Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
May 17, 2011January 19, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33964
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Summary
Nigeria, Africa’s largest producer of oil and its largest democracy, is one of the U.S. government’s
key strategic partners on the continent. It is Africa’s most populous country, with over 150155 million
people, roughly half Muslim and half Christian, and its second-largest economy. Diplomatic
relations with Nigeria, which is regularly the fourth- or fifth-largest oil exporteramong the top five oil exporters to the United
States, are strong,
and the country is a major recipient of U.S. foreign assistance. After 16 years of
military rule,
Nigeria made the transition to civilian governance in 1999, and the country emerged
emerged as a powerful actor in
African politics. TheNigeria’s government has mediated disputes in several African
countries, and the
country ranks fourth among troop contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions.
Nigeria faces serious social and economic challenges, however, that some analysts contend
threaten both the stability of both the state and the region, and which have the potential to affect global
oil markets. The country today is relatively stable, but it has faced intermittent political turmoil
and economic crises since gaining independence in 1960
independence. Political life has been scarred by
conflict along ethnic, religious, and geographic
lines, and misrule has undermined the authority
and legitimacy of the state. Nigeria’s oil annual oil
and natural gas revenues are estimated at over $60
billion per year billion, but its human development indicators
are among the world’s lowest, and a
majority of the population suffers from extreme poverty. The Nigerian
government relies on the
oil sector for over 85% of revenues. By some estimates, Nigeria could
rank among the world’s
top five exporters of oil within a few years, but social unrest, criminality,
and corruption in the
country’s oil-producing Niger Delta region have cut output by one-fifth since 2006hindered production as
well as development.
Inter-communal conflicts in parts of the country are common. Resentment between the northern
and southern regions, and among communities in central Nigeria, has led periodically to
considerable unrest and displacement. Thousands have been killed and many more wounded in
in periodic ethno-religious clashes in the past decade. Perceived ethnic and religious differences
have been politicized by some political elites.
decade. The attempted terror attack on an American airliner
by a Nigerian in December 2009, and
the resurgence of a militant Islamist group, Boko Haram,
have also heightened concerns
regarding the possible radicalization of African Muslims. A series
of recent bombings led the government to adopt new anti-terrorism measures in early 2011.
Nigeria’s April 2011 elections have been viewed by many as a critical test of the government’s
commitment to democracy. The State Department referred to the previous elections, in 2007, as
deeply flawed, and some contended that Nigeria had not held a free and fair general election since
the return to civilian rule. The findings of election observer groups are still preliminary, but most
have Nigerian Muslims. While Boko Haram has remained
primarily focused on a domestic agenda, there are reports that some of its members may be
expanding ties with more developed violent Islamist groups on the continent.
Nigeria’s most recent elections, held in April 2011, were viewed by many as a critical test of the
government’s commitment to democracy. The State Department had deemed the previous
elections to be deeply flawed, and some observers contended that Nigeria had not held a free and
fair general election since the return to civilian rule in 1999. Election observer groups
characterized the 2011 elections as a significant improvement over previous polls, although
not not
without problems. Post-election violence across the north has highlighted lingering communal
tensions, grievances, and mistrust. President Goodluck Jonathan, who was re-elected, faces
mounting, and at times competing, internal and external pressure to implement reforms deemed
critical to addressing corruption and other development and security challenges.
The Obama Administration has been supportive of Nigeria’s recent reform initiatives, including
anti-corruption efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector privatization, and programs
to promote peace and development in the Niger Delta. In 2010, the Administration established athe
U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission, a strategic dialogue to address these and other issues of
mutual concern.
Congress regularly monitors Nigerian political developments in Nigeria and has expressed
concerns with
corruption and human rights abuses. Congress also provides oversight for over
$600 million in U.S.
foreign assistance programs in the countryNigeria—one of the largest U.S. assistance packages in Africa.
Congressional Research Service
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Contents
Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 1
Political Context .........................................................................................................................2
The 2003 Elections ...............................................................................................................2
2007..... 2
Previous Elections ......................................................................................................................3 2
The 2011 Elections: Opportunities and Challenges ................................................................5
Pre-Election Conditions ..................................................................................................5
The Results .....................................................................................................................7
Election Violence............................................... 3
Violence Surrounding and Following the 2011 Elections .................................................................................... 10 7
Development Challenges and Reform Initiatives ............................................................................ 8 13
Reforms to the Petroleum and Energy Sectors .......................................................................... 9 13
Financial Sector Reforms ........................................................................................................ 10 14
Efforts to Combat Corruption.................................................................................................. 11 15
Social Issues and Security Concerns ............................................................................................ 18. 13
Islamic Sharia Law .................................................................................................................. 1813
Sectarian Violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt ........................................................................... 13 18
Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria .......................................................................... 19... 14
Conflict in the Niger Delta ...................................................................................................... 16 21
Background of the Struggle............................................................................................... 16 21
Criminality and Violence................................................................................................... 16 21
Amnesty Offer for Delta Militants ................................................................................... 23. 18
Efforts to Address Environmental and Development Challenges ..................................... 18 24
Effects on the Oil Industry and the World Market ............................................................ 20 25
Abuses by Security Forces ...................................................................................................... 20 26
HIV/AIDS .........., Education, and Population Growth ......................................................................... 20
International Relations....................................... 26
International Relations .............................................................................................................. 27 21
Issues for Congress ................................................................................................................... 27..... 21
Administration Policy on Nigeria ............................................................................................ 2721
U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Maritime Security Issues ........................................................... 28.. 22
Nigeria’s Role in Regional Stability ..................................and Counterterrorism Efforts ............................................ 29 23
U.S. Assistance to Nigeria ................................................................................................. 2923
Recent Congressional Interest .Action ............................................................................................ 3125
Figures
Figure 1. Results of the 2011 Presidential Election ......................................................................... 68
Figure 2. Map of Nigeria .............................................................................................................. 32. 27
Tables
Table 1. State Department and USAID Assistance to Nigeria ....................................................... 24
Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................... 3328
Congressional Research Service
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Overview
Nigeria is considered a key power on the African continent, not only because of its size, but but also
because of its political and economic role in the region. One in five people in Sub-Saharan Africa
callscall Nigeria home. Nigeria’s economy is Sub-Saharan Africa’s second largest, and it is one of the
world’s major sources of high-quality sweet crude oil and natural gas. Nigerian leaders have
mediated conflicts throughout Africa, and Nigerian troops have played a critical role in peace and
stability operations inon the regioncontinent. The country ranks fourth among troop contributors to United
Nations peacekeeping missions around the world. Nigeria, which is roughly twice the size of
California, is also home to
world’s second-largest HIV/AIDS-infected population and has Africa’s
highest tuberculosis burden. According to one senior U.S. foreign policy analyst, “no country’s
fate is so decisive for the continent. No other country across a range of issues has the power so
thoroughly to shape outcomes
Nigeria at a Glance
elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.”1
Despite its oil wealth, Nigeria
remains highly underdeveloped.
Poor governance has severely
limited infrastructure development
and the provision of social services,
hindering economic growth and
leaving much of the country mired
in poverty. The government’s human
rights record has been poor.
burden. Few countries in Africa have the capacity to make a more decisive impact on the region.
Despite its oil wealth, Nigeria
remains highly underdeveloped.
Poor governance has limited
infrastructure development and
social service delivery, hindering
economic growth and leaving much
of the country mired in poverty.
The country is composed of over
250 ethnic groups, of which 10
account for nearly 80% of the total
population. The northern Hausa and
Fulani, the southwestern Yoruba,
and the southeastern Ibo have
traditionally been the most
politically active and dominant.
Almost half the population, some 75
million people who primarily reside
in the northern half of the country,
are Muslim. Southern Nigeria is
predominantly Christian.
Nigeria at a Glance
Population:
155 million
Pop. Growth Rate:
1.935%
Independence:
October 1960
Comparative Area:
Slightly larger than twice the
size of California
Religions:
50% Muslim, 40% Christian,
10% indigenous beliefs
Languages:
English (official), 250 local languages
Literacy:
68%
Ethnic and religious strife have been Infant Mortality:
91.54 deaths/1,000 live births
common in Nigeria, and perceived
Life Expectancy:
47.56 years
differences have been manipulated
3.1%
by some political elites. The country Prevalence of HIV:
is composed of over 250 ethnic
47.56 years
Prevalence of HIV:
3.1%
Real GDP Growth:
8.4% (2010 estimate)
groups, of which 10 account for
Nominal GDP Per Capita:
$1,191
nearly 80% of the total population.
$1,191
Unemployment:
4.9%
The northern Hausa and Fulani, the
southwestern Yoruba, and the
4.9%
Exports:
$45.4 billion
southeastern Ibo have traditionally
Ethnic and religious strife have been Imports:
$42.1 billion
been the most politically active and
External Debt:
$9.689 billion
dominant. Almost half of the
country’s population, some 75
Source: CIA World Fact Book, International Monetary Fund
million people primarily residing in
the northern half of the country, are Muslim. Divisions between ethnic groups, between north and
south, and between Christians and Muslims often stem from perceived differences in access to
land and social and economic development. More than 14,000 Nigerians are believed to have
been have been killed in local clashes sparked by these tensions in the last decade, and millions
periodically displaced. 2 In the southern Niger Delta region, simmering conflict and criminality
have been fueled by regional grievances related to oil production in the area.
1
2
Robert I. Rotberg, “Nigeria: Elections and Continuing Challenges,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 2007.
Human Rights Watch (HRW), A Human Rights Agenda for Candidates in Nigeria’s 2011 Elections, March 2011common in Nigeria. Divisions
External Debt:
$9.689 billion
among ethnic groups, between north
and south, and between Christians
Source: CIA World Fact Book, International Monetary Fund
and Muslims often stem from
perceived differences in access to land and socio-economic development, and are sometimes
fueled by political elites. More than 15,000 Nigerians are believed to have been have been killed
in local clashes sparked by these tensions in the last decade, and millions have been periodically
displaced. An increasingly active militant Islamist group, Boko Haram, has contributed to
deteriorating security conditions in the northeast. Recent attacks attributed to the group against
Christian targets have the potential to inflame sectarian tensions across the country. Its purported
ties with regional terrorist groups are also of concern. In the southern Niger Delta, simmering
conflict and criminality have been fueled by regional grievances related to oil production in the
area, although the government has had some recent success negotiating with local militant
groups.
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Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Political Context
Nigeria, which gained its independence from Britain in 1960, is a federal republic composed of
36 states; its political structure is similar to that of the United States. The country has a bicameral
legislature with a 109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives. Its president,
legislators, and governors are elected on four-year terms. The country was ruled by the military
for much of the three decades after independence before making the transition to civilian rule in
1999. Elections held in the decade after the transition were deemed to be flawed by Nigerians and
the international communityby Nigerians and the
international community to be flawed, with each poll progressively worse than the last, according
to many
domestic and international observers. In the wake of the 2007 elections, which were
marred by
fraud and political violence, the U.S. State Department expressed its view that the country
country remained in political transition.31 Human Rights Watch contended at that point that
“Nigeria has
not held a free and fair general election since the end of military rule.”4 Consequently,
2
Nevertheless, expectations were high for Nigeria’sthe most recent round of elections, held in April 2011.
The contest for power between north and south that has broadly defined much of Nigeria’s
modern political history can be traced, in part, to administrative divisions instituted during
Britain’s colonial administration. 53 Northern military leaders dominated Nigerian politics from
independence until the transition to democracy just over a decade ago. Since the election of
President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999,64 there has been a de-facto power sharing arrangement,
often referred to as “zoning,” between the country’s geopolitical zones, through which the
presidency was expected to rotate among the regions every two terms. President Obasanjo was
from the southwest, and with his retirement pending in 2007, the ruling People’s Democratic
Party (PDP), which has dominated Nigerian politics for more than a decade, chose Umaru
Yar’Adua, then a northern
governor, Umaru Yar’Adua, as its presidential candidate. The other main presidential
contenders contenders
in the April 2007 election were also northerners. Upon President Yar’Adua’s death in
office in
2010, his vice president, Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, took office for the remainder
of his of
Yar’Adua’s first term, raising questions as to whether the ruling party would chose another northern
northern candidate to run in the 2011 race 2011 or support a run for the office by the sitting president. In January
2011, President JonathanPresident
Jonathan ultimately secured the PDP nomination to stand as its candidate in the April
electionparty nomination. His subsequent electoral victory leaves the future of the zoning arrangement unclear.
The 2003 Elections
In April 2003, Nigerians went to the polls for the second time under a civilian government.
President Obasanjo, representing the ruling PDP, ran against another former military leader,
General Muhammadu Buhari; a former rebel leader, Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, who led the
secessionist region of Biafra in Nigeria’s civil war in the 1960s; and former foreign minister Ike
3
future of the zoning arrangement unclear.
Previous Elections
Nigeria’s third national elections since the return to civilian rule were held in April 2007, amid
widespread allegations of electoral mismanagement and fraud. The Nigerian Senate had rejected a
bid by Obasanjo supporters in 2006 to amend the constitution to allow him to run for a third term.
Facing retirement, President Obasanjo backed Umaru Yar’Adua, largely unknown to many
Nigerians, as the ruling party’s presidential candidate.5 Yar’Adua’s running mate, Goodluck
1
U.S. State Department, “Nigeria,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2008.
4
HRW
Human Rights Watch (HRW), Election or ‘Selection’? Human Rights Abuses and Threats to Free and Fair Elections
in Nigeria, April 2007,
and “Nigeria: Presidential Election Marred by Fraud, Violence,” April 24, 2007.
53
Britain administered the north and south separately from the late 19th century until 1947, when it introduced a federal
system that divided the country into three regions: Northern, Eastern, and Western.
64
Obasanjo, who had formerly served as aa former military head of state from 1976 to -1979, won 62.8% of the votes (18.7
million) in the February 1999 poll, while his challenger, Chief Olu Falae, received 37.2% of the votes (11.1 million).
Obasanjo’s party won over half the votes in both the House and Senate elections.
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Nwachukwu. Obasanjo won, and the PDP party also won in legislative elections. 7 The elections
were marred by serious irregularities and fraud, according to both domestic and international
election observers, with much emphasis placed on “inadequate election administration.”
Controversy surrounded the voter registration process, the certification of candidates, and poor
logistical preparations. One election official allegedly admitted that the voters’ register was “2530% fiction.”8 Reports of electoral malfeasance, or rigging, were also noted. Ballot box stuffing,
falsification of election result forms, and threats of violence were among the most serious
charges. In some states, observers noted “systematic attempts at all stages of the voting process to
alter the election results.”9 Although reports of rigging varied widely among states, the extent of
irregularities caused some to suggest that they “compromised the integrity of the elections where
they occurred.”10 The European Union delegation noted that in at least six states “the minimum
standards for democratic elections were not met.”11 Several election results were later overturned.
2007 Elections
Nigeria’s third national elections since the return to civilian rule were held in April 2007, amid
widespread allegations of electoral mismanagement and fraud. The Nigerian Senate had rejected a
bid by Obasanjo supporters in 2006 to amend the constitution to allow him to run for a third term.
Facing retirement, President Obasanjo backed Umaru Yar’Adua, a northern governor largely
unknown to many Nigerians, as the ruling party’s presidential candidate.12 Yar’Adua’s running
mate, Goodluck in 1999; his challenger received
37.2%. In 2003, Obasanjo won 62% of the votes, while his nearest rival, General Muhammadu Buhari, won 32%.
5
Yar’Adua, a former chemistry professor, was elected governor of Katsina in 1999. His better-known older brother, the
(continued...)
2
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Jonathan, had served as governor of Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta. Yar’Adua
was declared the winner with over 24.6 million votes, or 70%. Some critics suggest that Obasanjo
“hand-picked” Yar’Adua in order to retain political influence after he left office.13
The country’s
winner with over 70% of the votes cast. The two largest opposition parties, the All Nigeria
Peoples Party (ANPP) and the
Action Congress (AC), rejected the election results. The ANPP’s presidential candidate, General
Buhari, who had lost the election in 2003 to Obasanjo, received an estimated six million votes.
The AC’s candidate, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, was not among the 24 presidential
contenders approved by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), allegedly
because of pending corruption charges against him. 14 His exclusion exacerbated tensions during
the pre-election period, and his supporters contend he was unjustly excluded by INEC because he
had opposed Obasanjo’s third term. A last-minute ruling by the Supreme Court restored Abubakar
to the ballot, and he placed third with an estimated 2.6 million votes.
7
According to official results, Obasanjo won 62% of the votes, while his nearest rival, General Buhari, won 32%.
HRW, Election or ‘Selection’? Human Rights Abuses and Threats to Free and Fair Elections in Nigeria, April 2007.
9
The International Republican Institute (IRI), 2003 Election Observation Report.
10
The National Democratic Institute (NDI), “Statement of the NDI International Election Observer Delegation to
Nigeria’s April 19 Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections,” April 21, 2003.
11
The European Union, EU Election Observation Final Report: Nigeria.
8
12
Yar’Adua, a former chemistry professor, was elected governor of Katsina in 1999. His better-known older brother,
the late General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, served as Vice President under Obasanjo in the first military regime to transfer
power to civilian rule, and he was reported to be one of Nigeria’s wealthiest and most powerful men. Shehu died in
prison in 1997 after having been sentenced by a military tribunal for treason after calling for dictator Sani Abacha to
reestablish civilian rule. Yar’Adua’s father was a prominent minster in the first government after independence.
13
International Crisis Group, “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding A Political Crisis,” Africa Report 123, March 28, 2007.
14
The March 2007 decision by INEC to exclude Abubakar from the ballot was part of a complex series of legal battles
between the Obasanjo Administration and Abubakar, a founding member of the PDP, who was linked to a bribery case
involving the Petroleum Trust Fund and accused of stealing over $125 million in federal oil funds.
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poll results.
The ruling PDP won the majority of the state and federal elections, including 28 of the 36 state
governorships. Opposition gubernatorial
candidates won in seven states, including the two most
populous states, Lagos and Kano. The results of many electionsMany
election results were challenged in the courts,
based on allegations of fraud, threats of violence, or
the inability of voters to cast their ballots.
Ultimately, the results of almost a third of the
gubernatorial races were annulled and, in most of
those cases, elections were rerun, although many of the candidates who won in the first round
won again in the second. By the end of 2009, the PDP had held onto 25 governorships and picked
up three others, after winning opposition candidates changed parties and joined the PDP.
Opposition candidates were awarded governorships in two states after PDP wins were overturned
by election tribunals. The PDP’s gubernatorial win in Anambra state was nullified by the
Supreme Court, which allowed the incumbent governor, from an opposition party, to keep his
seat.15 The elections of several legislators, including Senate President David Mark, were also
annulled. An appeals court later overturned the ruling on Mark’s election and he kept his seat. A
, although many of the candidates who won in the first round
won again when elections were rerun. A tribunal hearing the challenges to President Yar’Adua’s
win reached its verdict in February 2008,
finding insufficient evidence to overturn the presidentialhis election.
Nigeria’s Supreme Court
upheld that verdict in a December 2008 rulinglate 2008.
Domestic and international observer groups were highly critical of the 2007 elections, and many
questioned the credibility of the election results. Violations and irregularities reported by election
observers included polling locations opening late, closing early, or not opening at all; errors on
the ballots; underage voting; vote buying; ballot box stuffing and theft; and falsified results
sheets. Media reports also documented widespread incidents of thuggery and coercion at polling
places.16 The largest domestic monitoring group suggested that elections were so flawed that they
should be held again.17 According .6 According
to the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute (NDI)
delegation, led by former Secretary of State Madeline Albright and several former world leaders,
delegation, “in many places, and in a
number of ways, the electoral process failed the Nigerian people. The
cumulative effect ...
substantially compromised the integrity of the electoral process.”18 The
European Union delegation declared that the elections “have not lived up to the hopes and
expectations of the Nigerian people and the process cannot be considered to have been credible.”
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) delegation was similarly critical,
suggesting that “irregularities and the sporadic violence characterized and challenged the validity
of the elections.”19 The U.S.-based7 The International Republican
Institute (IRI) called the elections
“below acceptable standards,” noting that the resolution of
election disputes would be “critical” to
restoring the credibility of the country’s democratic process.20
In the aftermath of the elections, democratic process.8
President Obasanjo reportedly acknowledged some electoral
irregularities, notably “logistical failures,”
violence, and ballot box theft, but indicated that
elections would not be re-held, sayingdeclared that “the magnitude does not make the results null and void.”21
15
The Supreme Court ruled that the incumbent, Peter Obi, who had lost to a PDP candidate in the 2003 gubernatorial
election but had been awarded the seat in 2006 after a court overturned the 2003 PDP win, could serve the rest of his
four-year. Obi won a second term when new elections were held in February 2010.
16
See, for example, “Nigerian: Forced to Vote Against My Wish,” BBC, April 23, 2007.
17
“Call for Nigeria Street Protests,” BBC, April 24, 2007.
18
NDI, “Statement of the National Democratic Institute International Election Observer Delegation to Nigeria’s April
21 Presidential and National Assembly Elections,” April 23, 2007.
19
“Nigeria: Elections Fraudulent; EU, Others,” Daily Trust (Abuja), April 24, 2007.
20
IRI “Nigeria’s Elections Below Acceptable Standards: Preliminary Findings of IRI’s International Election
Observation Mission,” April 22, 2007.
21
“Obasanjo Appeals to Nigerians Over Election Results,” Radio Nigeria-Abuja, April 23, 2007, and “Nigerian
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Opposition calls for mass protests went largely unheeded, although thousands reportedly gathered
in the streets of Kano, northern Nigeria’s largest city, before being dispersed by police with tear
gas. World oil prices rose to $68 a barrel in the week after the election, based in part on concerns
surrounding the disputed polls. 22 Despite speculation that questions surrounding the credibility of
the election results might trigger a military coup, Yar’Adua’s inauguration was unimpeded.
The 2011 Elections: Opportunities and Challenges
Pre-Election Conditions
President Yar’Adua conceded in his inaugural speech that the 2007 elections were flawed and
subsequently appointed a panel of
void.”9 World oil prices rose the week after the election amid concerns surrounding the disputed
polls,10 but opposition calls for mass protests went largely unheeded.
The 2011 Elections: Opportunities and Challenges
Conceding that the 2007 elections were flawed, President Yar’Adua appointed a panel of
government officials, former judges, and civil society
representatives to recommend changes to
the country’s electoral institutions. The Electoral
Reform Committee (ERC)panel issued its findings in December 2008, but the
government was slow to
commence reforms. In until mid-2010, when the parliament approved the
first of several amendments to the
country’s electoral laws to incorporate some of the ERC’s recommendations and increase
transparency in the electoral process.
electoral laws. Among the most significant of the reforms were those
those designed to increase INEC’s independence and fiscal
autonomy. INEC’s autonomy of the Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC), whose credibility had been badly damaged by the 2003 and 2007 elections,23 and
President Jonathan won praise from both Nigerians and the international community for removing
the sitting INEC chairman from office in April 2010 and replacing him with a respected academic
and civil society activist, Professor Attahiru Jega, in June. Concerns remain regarding the
independence of some state-level electoral election commissioners,24 but, according to a survey
conducted in late 2010, over 60% of Nigerians had confidence in the current electoral
commission, and 74% of Nigerians thought the 2011 polls would be more credible than the last.25
The Jonathan Administration was generally seen as supportive of Jega’s efforts to improve the
electoral process, backing his budget request and his proposal to delay elections from January to
April to allow more time to prepare the 2011 polls.
Turnout was high for the most recent voter registration exercise, launched in January 2011 in an
effort by Chairman Jega to compile a credible register. The registration period was extended by
over a week due to technical and logistical problems that led to registration centers opening late,
or, in some cases, not at all. According to the final voters list, 73.5 million voters registered.
INEC reported over 870,000 cases of multiple registration, contributing to concerns about
“widespread but not yet systemic fraud.”26 INEC has charged several of its own staff with
offences associated with the registration process. Observers suggest that the exercise appeared to
(...continued)
President Olusegun Obasanjo Says Elections Flawed, But Not Fatally,” Associated Press, April 25, 2007.
22
“Landslide Win for Yar’Adua is ‘Flawed,’” Financial Times, April 23, 2007.
23
ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding A Political Crisis,” Africa Report No. 123, March 28, 2007, p. 14.
24
ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Africa Briefing No.79, February 24, 2011; Ebere
Onwudiwe and Chloe Berwind-Dart, Breaking the Cycle of Electoral Violence in Nigeria, U.S. Institute for Peace,
December 2010.
25
IRI, Nigerian National Survey, released February 1, 2011. The poll was conducted between November 29 and
December 7, 2010.
26
ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid.
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increase voter confidence and generally deemed the register an improvement over previous
efforts, but not without problems, including instances of underage participation.
A January 2011 rerun of the flawed 2007 gubernatorial elections in Delta state was viewed by
some as a test for INEC’s new management. Observer reports suggest that, while rigging and
voter intimidation occurred, the poll was an improvement over previous elections in a state
heavily controlled by the ruling party. According to one report, “the Delta rerun demonstrated
both the potential for INEC to administer improved elections with the support of communities
and the risk that political actors can still overwhelm reforms with systematic fraud.”27 As April
approached, analysts contended that INEC, under Chairman Jega, had demonstrated the will, if
not necessarily the capacity, to overcome problems in the 2011 polls.
Observers noted some positive developments in the pre-election period, but continued to raise
concerns about electoral preparedness and other areas deemed problematic in previous polls,
including ballot secrecy, intimidation, and transparency in the counting of ballots and tabulation
of results.28 Previous elections in Nigeria have been marred by various types of fraud, including
the falsification of voter information, bribery, theft, incitement, and the harassment of domestic
observers, opposition candidates, and supporters. Pre-election reports suggested that the 2011
elections would likely feature many of these practices, but that there might be a shift “from
blatant fraud with state acquiescence to a pattern of suppressing opposition voting areas while
inflating strongholds.”29 Despite ERC recommendations to increase the transparency and fairness
of the political parties’ primaries, the International Crisis Group declared that the recent round of
primaries were “as manipulated as ever,” resulting in numerous court challenges to the parties’
candidate lists.30 Last minute court rulings related to the candidate lists required the reprinting of
ballots and caused delays in the delivery of voting materials.
As mentioned above, there has been an unwritten agreement that the presidency should rotate
among the country’s regions. President Yar’Adua’s early demise and Jonathan’s assumption of the
post led many observers to debate whether Jonathan’s decision to vie for the presidency in 2011
would lead the ruling party to split. Prior to the PDP party primaries in January, many northerners
argued that since Yar’Adua was from the north and had only served one term, a candidate from
their region should hold the office for another term, given that Obasanjo, who was from the south,
had two terms in office. Some reports suggest that a lack of consensus among the ruling party
elite on the zoning issue and presidential succession contributed to the apparent reluctance by
Yar’Adua’s cabinet to formally transfer power to Jonathan in early 2010 (see below). Jonathan
ultimately won the support of key northern PDP leaders, including a majority of the northern
governors, for his candidacy, and in January 2011, he won the party primary overwhelmingly,
27
Stakeholder Democracy Network, The Delta Governorship Rerun: Signposts and Storm Warnings for the 2011
Elections, February 24, 2011. Observers credit, in part, a new alternative “accreditation voting” system that INEC has
adopted, under which all voters must check in at their polling station before voting can begin. Some observers n the
April elections found that this system required voters to stand in long lines midday and may have affected turnout in
some areas and disenfranchise certain segments of the population because of the additional time commitment. INEC
has acknowledged these concerns but has argued that the system increases transparency. See also ICG, “Nigeria’s
Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid.
28
See, e.g., IRI, “Statement of IRI’s Pre-Election Assessment Mission,” March 3, 2011; NDI, “Nigeria Election
Watch,” Issue 3, March 15, 2011.
29
Stakeholder Democracy Network, The Delta Governorship Rerun, Ibid.
30
ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid; NDI, “Nigeria Election Watch,” Issue 3, Ibid.
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with over 2,700 votes against roughly 800 for his northern rival, Atiku Abubakar.31 Jonathan
declared prior to the elections that he would not seek a second term in 2016.
President Jonathan, along with his running mate, Vice President Namadi Sambo (a northerner),
was among almost 20 candidates contesting the presidency, including Muhammadu Buhari,
representing the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC); former head of Nigeria’s anticorruption authority Nuhu Ribadu, representing the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN); and Kano
State Governor Ibrahim Shekaru, representing the ANPP. These three leading opposition
contenders all hail from the north and chose running mates from the south.
With over 73 million registered voters, almost 120,000 polling stations, and more than 50
political parties, the challenges in administering elections in Nigeria were daunting. The 2011
elections were scheduled to be held on three successive Saturdays, beginning April 2; however,
logistical delays in the delivery of materials to polling stations across the country resulted in the
delay of the April 2 legislative elections by a week, to April 9. This pushed the timing of the
presidential elections to April 16 and the gubernatorial and state assembly elections to April 26.
For some, the delay reinforced concerns regarding the credibility of the polls, but others argued
that the “trial run” allowed INEC the opportunity to identify and address some deficiencies,
particularly related to the voters’ register. Gubernatorial elections were not held in 10 states where
post-2007 election court cases led to the overturning of election results or the rerun of elections. 32
The Results
The ruling PDP maintained its dominant position in Nigerian politics in the 2011 elections,
retaining the presidency, a majority of the seats declared, to date, in the National Assembly, and a
majority of the gubernatorial posts and state assemblies.33 The two main opposition parties, the
CPC and the ACN, made some significant regional gains, however. The ACN dominated the state
elections in the southwest, where the PDP retained a majority in only one of the state assemblies
and no longer holds any gubernatorial positions. 34 Notably, the PDP lost former President
Obasanjo’s home state of Ogun. Nationally, opposition parties now control 13 of the powerful
governors’ posts and hold a majority in 10 of the state assemblies. 35
31
Some reports suggest that Jonathan may have had an arrangement with the PDP governors to ensure his election by
their states’ delegates in return for his support for their own re-election campaigns. See ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections:
Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid. INEC dismissed a petition filed by Abubakar challenging Jonathan’s primary win.
32
Gubernatorial elections were not held in Adamawa, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Kogi, or Sokoto states, where rerun
elections were held after the 2007 elections; nor in Ondo, Osum, Edo, or Ekiti, where the current governors won
appeals overturning the 2007 results, nor in Anambra, which had its gubernatorial election in February 2010.
33
As of May 17, 2011, 72 Senate seats had been declared. The ruling PDP won 45, the ACN 13, and other parties 16.
Of the 234 seats declared for the House of Representatives, the PDP won 123 (52%), ACN 47 (20%), and other parties
64 seats.
34
Six states now have ACN governors: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Osun, and Oyo in the southwest, and Edo in the “southsouth” Niger Delta region. The Labor Party party holds the gubernatorial post in Ondo state. The 10 state assemblies
now controlled by opposition parties are: Anambra (APGA); Borno, Yobe, and Zamfara (ANPP); Edo, Ogun, Osun,
Lagos, and Ekiti (ACN); and Ondo (LP).
35
Opposition gubernatorial candidates took the following states in the April 2011 elections- Ogun, Oyo, and Lagos in
the southwest (ACN), Yobe in the north (ANPP), and Imo in the southeast (APGA). ANPP retained its control of the
gubernatorial posts in Borno and Zamfara. The CPC picked up Nasarawa from the ANPP. Osun, Ekiti, Ondo, Edo, and
Anambra were already held by opposition governors.
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Incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan won 59.6% of the presidential vote, taking a majority of
the votes cast in 23 states and gaining enough support nationwide to avoid a run-off. 36 His closest
competitor, General Buhari, followed with 32.3% of the votes, taking the lead in one-third of the
states, notably, those in the north. The ACN’s Nuhu Ribadu came in third with 5.5% of the votes.
Figure 1. Results of the 2011 Presidential Election
Source: BBC, adapted by CRS.
U.S. government comments on the conduct of the 2011 elections have been largely positive.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that “This historic event marks a dramatic shift from
decades of failed elections and a substantial improvement” over the 2007 election, but noted that
“while this election was a success for the people of Nigeria, it was far from perfect.”37 Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson has called the polls “the most successful
36
Under Nigeria’s constitution, a presidential candidate must win at least 25% of votes cast in at least two-thirds of the
country’s states and the Federal Capital Territory. If they fail to do so, a run-off will be held. Jonathan gained at least
25% of the votes in 31 states. Buhari gained a quarter of the votes cast in only 18 states.
37
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Press Release: Election in Nigeria, April 19, 2011.
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elections since [Nigeria’s] return to multiparty democracy, ... despite some technical
imperfections,” and has argued that “this reverses a downward democratic trajectory and provides
the country a solid foundation for strengthening its electoral procedures and democratic
institutions.”38 President Obama called to congratulate President Jonathan in early May, stating
that “the success of the elections was a testament to Nigerian voters who...were determined that
these elections mark a new chapter in Nigerian history.”39
International observers have also generally noted significant improvements in the electoral
process in the National Assembly and presidential polls, but most have stopped short of calling
the elections “free and fair.” Observed irregularities, as reported by international observer groups,
do not appear to call into question the overall results of the legislative and presidential polls (most
international groups were not present for the state elections), although several legal challenges
have been filed. The IRI and NDI delegations both termed these elections a key step forward,
while documenting areas for improvement.40 The African Union delegation called the legislative
and presidential elections “credible and creditable and reflect(ing) the will of the Nigerian
people.”41 Commonwealth observers declared that “previously held notions that Nigeria can only
hold flawed elections are now being discarded and this country can now shake off that stigma and
redeem its image.”42 The European Union (EU) delegation was also generally positive, but raised
concerns with presidential results from some states in the Niger Delta and the southeast, where
turnout appeared to be near 100%.43 This echoes the findings of some of the domestic groups,
who reported the largest number of electoral incidents in the “south-south” (i.e., the Niger Delta)
and southeast states, including intimidation, harassment , and in some cases, violence, in Awka
Ibom, Delta, and Imo states.44 Under-age voting was cited as a common concern by observer
groups, and most suggested that over-crowding at polling stations and complicated vote collation
procedures vulnerable to error or malfeasance remained a problem during the polls. The EU
delegation, which remained for the state elections, found that those elections “did not resemble
the quality of the process and environment of the elections for President and National Assembly,”
noting the inconsistent implementation of procedures, numerous instances of underage voting,
and increased attempts to influence voters.45 Reports of domestic observer harassment and
intimidation increased in the state elections.
General Buhari's party has challenged the presidential results of states in the south-south and
southeast, where it claims the totals are inflated. The CPC is also challenging the gubernatorial
results in two northern states, Katsina and Niger. The ACN party is challenging the gubernatorial
results in the southern state of Akwa Ibom, where several major acts of violence occurred before
38
39
Special Briefing by Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, “The Recent Elections in Nigeria,” April 28, 2011.
The White House, Statement by President Obama on Elections in Nigeria, May 4, 2011.
40
IRI, “Nigerian Election Major Step Forward,” April 18, 2011; NDI, “Statement of the National Democratic
Institute’s International Election Observer Mission to Nigeria’s April 16 Presidential Election,” April 18, 2011.
41
African Union, “Preliminary Statement of the African Union Observer Mission on the 2011 Presidential Election in
Nigeria,” April 16, 2011.
42
The Commonwealth, Interim Statement by H.E. Festus Mogae, Chairman, Commonwealth Observer Group, April
18, 2011.
43
European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission, “Preliminary Statement: Important Steps Toward Strengthening
Democratic Elections, but Challenges Remain,” April 18, 2011.
44
See, e.g., the reports of Project 2011 Swift Count at http://www.pscnigeria.org and the Transition Monitoring Group
at http://www.tmgelection2011.org.
45
EU Election Observation Mission, Press Release: EU EOM on the Elections of 26 and 28 April, April 29, 2011.
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the election. Several challenges related to National Assembly races have also been filed, and
INEC is reportedly pursing prosecutions for a range of election-related crimes. When the
Electoral Reform Committee issued its findings in 2008, it noted that the Nigerian government
had not convicted and punished a single individual for election-related offenses since
independence.46 Human Rights Watch reported that under Jega’s leadership, INEC had initiated
criminal proceedings against several dozen individuals in the six months prior to the 2011
elections, but that “these cases have barely scratched the surface.”47 Civil society has called on
the courts to resolve election petitions and appeals in a timely manner, but some suggest that the
mounting elections-related caseload threatens to overwhelm the judiciary.
Election Violence
Despite generally positive preliminary statements on the conduct and orderly nature of the April
2011 legislative and presidential elections, election-related violence surrounding the polls was
higher than in previous years and highlights lingering communal tensions. Rioting that broke out
in the north in protest of President Jonathan’s win emphasizes grievances that many in that region
feel have been left unaddressed by the ruling party. The international community has condemned
the violence and stressed that the government must conduct an impartial inquiry into the postelection violence and hold perpetrators accountable.
Previous elections have been accompanied by an increase in political violence. Over 150 people
were estimated to have been killed in violence related to the 2003 elections, and by some
estimates, as many as 350 people may have been killed in violence related to the 2007 polls.48
Violence prior to the 2011 elections included clashes between party supporters and several
assassinations. Poll-related security concerns were further heightened by a spate of bombings
during political rallies, predominantly in Bayelsa state in the Delta. There were at least six
bombings in April in Borno state in the north (most in the capital, Maidiguri), where Boko
Haram, a local militant Islamist group, has been most active. Boko Haram claimed responsibility
in January for the assassination of the state’s leading gubernatorial candidate and several of his
supporters. On the eve of the legislative elections, a bombing at the state election commission
headquarters in Niger state killed at least 10 people. President Jonathan and Chairman Jega had
both pledged to increase security during the elections, and observers generally commented
positively on the presence and behavior of security forces during the polls.
Prior to the 2011 elections, some Nigeria watchers argued that the de-facto suspension of the
zoning arrangement could increase the potential for regional and ethnic conflict, making the
presidential contest “more dangerous and destabilizing” as voters faced the choice of a southern,
Christian candidate running against a field of primarily northern, Muslim presidential
contenders.49 Others argued that Nigeria’s political parties are geographically, as well as
religiously, diverse, and that, in order to win, any presidential candidate must be able to draw
support not just from one region or voting bloc, but from across the country.50 They also noted
46
Report of the Electoral Reform Committee, “Volume 1, Main Report,” December 2008.
HRW, A Human Rights Agenda for Candidates in Nigeria’s 2011 Elections, Ibid.
48
HRW, “Nigeria: Pass Bill to Prosecute Electoral Abuses,” March 13, 2011.
47
49
John Campbell, “Nigeria: Closer to the Brink?” Rowman & Littlefield, November 12, 2010, and “Nigeria’s
Goodluck Jonathan Gets the PDP Nomination,” Huffington Post, January 21, 2011.
50
Howard F. Jeter and Gwendolyn Mikell, “ Nigeria on the Brink: a Rejoinder,” September 27, 2010.
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that a southern candidate, Obasanjo, ran against a northern candidate, Buhari, in the 2003 election
without major upheaval.
Protests erupted in Nigeria's northern states on April 17, 2011, the day after the presidential
election, with supporters of General Buhari, a northern Muslim, alleging that the ruling party had
rigged the election to favor President Jonathan, a southern Christian. The protests devolved into
violent riots and, in some areas, killings, largely along religious and ethnic lines. In some parts of
the north, the violence lasted for three days until soldiers were deployed to enforce stability. At
least 800 people were killed during those three days, according Human Rights Watch, and as
many as 65,000 temporarily displaced.51 The highest level of violence recorded was in Kaduna
state, with as many as 500 killed in sectarian clashes in the southern part of the state, and more
than 180 killed in northern Kaduna. There was also significant property destruction, including the
burning of villages, in some areas of Kaduna, a state with a roughly equal population of Muslims
and Christians that had not seen a major outbreak of violence in almost a decade. 52 Dozens were
reportedly killed in riots in several other northern states, including Bauchi. Among the dead in
Bauchi state were ten members of the National Youth Service Corps (university graduates who
are required to perform a year of national service), who were reportedly targeted because they had
served as poll workers. Human Rights Watch has documented reports in three states (Kaduna,
Bauchi, and Gombe) of police and soldiers beating people who had been detained during the
riots. State elections (gubernatorial and state assembly) in Kaduna and Bauchi were postponed
from April 26 to April 28 to allow for a lowering of tensions and improved security. Turnout in
those elections was low, and in both cases, the ruling PDP retained control of both the
governorship and the state assembly.
Domestic and international human rights groups have launched investigations into the causes and
perpetrators of the post-election violence, and President Jonathan has named an independent
panel led by a prominent Islamic scholar to conduct an official government inquiry. Additional
assessments may be conducted by the office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
and the UN Special Advisor of the Prevention of Genocide.
51
Human Rights Watch, “Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed 800,” May 16, 2011.
52
In 2000, an estimated 2,000 people were killed in Kaduna in clashes sparked by the introduction of Islamic law in the
state. In 2002, some 250 people were reportedly killed in religious violence during protests against the Miss World
pageant, which Nigeria was to have hosted (the event was moved to London).
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The Death of President Yar’Adua and the Transition of Power
Questions about President Yar’Adua’s health plagued his administration throughout his tenure. Many speculate that
he suffered from a chronic kidney condition, and when he was hospitalized in Saudi Arabia in November 2009,
reportedly with acute pericarditis (inflammation of the lining around the heart), his absence threatened to spark a
political crisis. His prolonged absence from public view spurred rumors of his death before he ostensibly held an
interview from Saudi Arabia, via BBC radio, on January 12, 2010. Government officials reported that he was
responding to treatment and recuperating, but questions as to his fitness to govern grew. The Nigerian Bar
Association and a prominent human rights lawyer launched legal suits suggesting that Yar’Adua had violated the
constitution by not officially transferring power to his Vice President during his absence.53 Further constitutional
questions were raised about several judicial appointments, including that of a new chief justice of the Supreme
Court.54 Some observers contend that the president was incapacitated, and that a group of close advisors including
his wife, who strictly controlled access to the president, were making decisions on his behalf.55
President Yar’Adua’s continued absence also raised concerns regarding a tenuous ceasefire with Niger Delta militants.
During his hospitalization abroad, Yar’Adua reportedly signed the government’s 2009 supplemental budget, which
contained several projects earmarked for the troubled region. Some opposition leaders questioned whether the
president actually signed the document himself.56 In early January 2010, one of the Delta’s militant factions claimed
responsibility for the bombing of an oil pipeline in Rivers State, calling the attack a “warning strike,” noting the
president’s absence, and suggesting that a “meaningful dialogue” on the region’s problems had yet to occur.57 The
militants threatened to continue attacks until Goodluck Jonathan was named acting president or until Yar’Adua
returned to office.
Pressure for President Yar’Adua to transfer presidential authority until he recovered increased in early February
2010. Vice President Jonathan had presided over cabinet meetings after Yar’Adua’s departure, and he used executive
powers in January to deploy troops to quell sectarian violence in Jos, but he had not moved to assume full authority.
At the behest of the Senate, the cabinet declared Yar’Adua fit for office in late January, and a Nigerian court ruled that
there was no need for a formal transfer of power during the president’s “medical vacation.” Nevertheless, the
country’s influential state governors met in early February, issuing a call for the vice president to become acting
president. Under pressure from the governors, the National Assembly subsequently passed resolutions recognizing
Jonathan as the acting head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The cabinet accepted the National
Assembly’s decision. Although the resolutions were not legally binding and could ultimately be questioned in court,
the move allowed Jonathan to conduct critical government business. In one of his first acts as acting head of state,
Jonathan replaced the influential justice minister, who was reportedly among the most vocally opposed to the formal
transfer of power. In June 2010, in response to the ambiguity surrounding Jonathan’s assumption of duties as acting
president, the parliament approved a constitutional amendment addressing procedures for the temporary transfer of
presidential powers to the vice president in the event of the president’s absence or inability to discharge his duties.
The U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria welcomed Goodluck Jonathan’s assumption of the title of acting president, calling
Nigeria’s commitment to constitutional process and the rule of law “commendable.”58 The Obama Administration
warned against efforts by others to “upset Nigeria’s stability and create renewed uncertainty in the democratic
process.”59 On May 5, 2010, the Nigerian government announced the death of ailing President Umaru Yar’Adua at age
58. Goodluck Jonathan was sworn in as Nigeria’s new president the following day, choosing as his vice president
Namadi Sambo, a former architect who was elected governor of the northern state of Kaduna in 2007.
53
Nigeria’s constitution requires the President to submit a written declaration to the Senate and the House of
Representatives delegating powers to the Vice President as Acting President in the event that he travels on vacation or
is unable to discharge the functions of his office, but there is no timeline identified for doing so. The National
Assembly passed an amendment to the constitution in June 2010 to provide more clarity to the procedure.
54
See, e.g., “How We Averted Chaos, by VP,” This Day (Abuja), January 4, 2010.
55
See, for example, John Campbell, “Nigeria Fragmented and Unstable,” Huffington Post, March 5, 2010, and “On Her
Majesty’s Secret Service,” Africa Confidential, March 5. 2010.
56
“Buhari, Atiku Doubt Signing of Budget by Yar’Adua,” This Day, January 4, 2010.
57
“MEND’s Fresh Resurgence As Yar’Adua’s Absence Enters 2nd Month,” AllAfrica, January 4, 2010.
58
Press Statement by the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, February 12, 2010.
59
State Department Daily Press Briefing, February 26, 2010; State Department Spokesman, “Political Situation in
Nigeria, March , 2010; and Briefing by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs on February 24, 2010.
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Development Challenges and Reform Initiatives
Nigeria has the second-largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa and generates over $60 billion a
year in oil and gas revenue, and yet many of its people are among the continent’s poorest. As
many as 70% of Nigerians live beneath the poverty line, and the average life expectancy is less
than 47 years. Nigeria has the world’s second-largest HIV/AIDS population (after South Africa).
Access to clean water remains a major challenge—almost half the population has no access to
improved sources of water and only 17% of households are served by piped water. Sanitation is
also a problem, with 30% of people lacking access to adequate sanitation. Diarrhea remains the
second-leading cause of death among Nigerian children, and the country ranks second only to
India in the number of diarrhea-related child deaths globally. The country ranks 142 of 169
countries on U.N. Development Program’s (UNDP) 2010 Human Development Index.60 Due to
decades of economic mismanagement, political instability, and widespread corruption, Nigeria’s
education and social services systems have suffered from lack of funding, industry has idled, and
Africa’s largest oil producer suffers periodically from severe fuel and electricity shortages.
When Goodluck Jonathan assumed power in February 2010 from the ailing President Yar’Adua,
he made public commitments to “restoring Nigeria’s image” abroad, both by continuing to act as
a key partner in regional peace and counterterrorism efforts, and by ending the “culture of
impunity” in Nigeria by addressing corruption and human rights concerns.61 He vowed to
continue President Yar’Adua’s various reform initiatives. Those efforts are discussed below.
Reforms to the Petroleum and Energy Sectors
Nigeria’s economy depends heavily on its oil sector, and for decades, as the country’s extractive
industries grew, many of its other industries stagnated or declined. According to the World Bank,
oil and gas production accounts for 85% of government revenues and 95% of export earnings, but
the sector’s share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has fallen because of decreased output,
which does not meet the country’s estimated oil production capacity of three million barrels per
day (bdp). Despite increased deepwater oil production, persistent conflict and criminality in the
oil-producing Niger Delta region and swings in world oil prices have threatened Nigeria’s fiscal
outlook. According to the IMF, annual GDP growth fell from 7% in 2007 to an estimated 6% in
2008, but rose to an estimated 8.4% in 2010. Economists suggest that the economy continues to
underperform because of poor infrastructure and electricity shortages, although the manufacturing
and telecommunications sectors have performed better in recent years. Agricultural production
contributes over one-third of GDP, but less than 5% of exports.
President Jonathan has stressed his commitment to reforming the oil and gas industry. In 2007,
the government announced plans to restructure the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC), which oversees regulation of the industry and has been criticized for its lack of
transparency. President Yar’Adua appointed a committee to review Nigeria’s contracts with
foreign oil companies, a process through which the committee chair suggested, “we may have to
reconsider some of our generous terms.”62 President Jonathan appointed Nigeria’s first female oil
60
The UNDP index is a composite measure of life expectancy, adult literacy and school enrollment, and income.
61
President Jonathan has referred to Nigeria’s “culture of impunity” in several speeches, including one quoted in
“Again, We’ve Succeeded in Moving Nigeria Forward - Jonathan,” Daily Champion (Lagos), February 10, 2010.
62
Matthew Green, “Nigeria Considers Oil Contracts Review,” Financial Times, October 23, 2007.
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minister, Diezani Allison-Madueke, a former executive with Royal Dutch Shell, in 2010. She is
leading the administration’s efforts to press parliament to pass the ambitious Petroleum Industry
Bill (PIB), which would restructure the NNPC and reportedly increase transparency within the
industry. Nigeria was designated compliant with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI), a global standard for transparency in the oil, gas, and mining sectors, in March 2011.
Despite its position as one of the world’s largest exporters of oil, Nigeria imports an estimated
$10 billion in refined fuel annually, and it continues to face a nationwide power crisis.63 In an
effort to increase its refining capacity, the government has granted permits for the construction of
several independently owned refineries. The government aims to halt oil imports by 2020. The
Jonathan Administration has also pledged to increase Nigeria’s electricity generation tenfold over
the next decade, and President Jonathan emphasized this as a key priority in his 2011 presidential
campaign. Efforts to privatize power stations and distribution companies are underway, despite
objections from the country’s trade unions. The Obama Administration recently praised the
Nigerian government for its progress in rehabilitating the power sector.64 In 2010, with two of
Nigeria’s existing four oil refineries running at only 60% capacity, the NNPC signed an
agreement worth an estimated $23 billion with China for the construction of three new
refineries.65 Nigeria is also in the process of increasing its liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports,
which are expected to surpass revenues derived from oil exports in the next decade. Nigeria now
exports natural gas to Benin, Togo, and Ghana through the new West Africa Gas Pipeline. The
initiative, led by Chevron, had been delayed due to supply shortages resulting from sabotage to
production facilities in the Niger Delta. Reports suggest that gas supplies have increased as
pipelines have been repaired since 2009.
Financial Sector Reforms
Successive Nigerian administrations have made commitments to economic reform, but their track
record is mixed. According to the IMF, reforms initiated under the Obasanjo Administration and
continued by his successors, most importantly the policies of maintaining low external debt and
budgeting based on a conservative oil price benchmark to create a buffer of foreign reserves,
lessened the impact of the recent global economic crisis on Nigeria’s economy. 66 Oil revenues
above the benchmark price have been saved since 2003 in an Excess Crude Account (ECA),
although the government drew substantially from the account in 2009-2010 in an effort to
stimulate economic recovery. The ECA’s balance fell from $20 billion in early 2009 to less than
$500 million in September 2010, but Nigerian officials report that the rise in the price of oil
brought the ECA back above $2 billion at the end of 2010.67 The country has made significant
gains in paying down its external debt, which declined from 36% of GDP in 2004 to 2.2% in
2010. By paying down its external debt, the Nigerian government has freed over $750 million for
63
Jon Gambrell, “Nigeria, China sign $23B Deal to Build Refineries in Oil Rich, but Gasoline-Starved Nation,”
Associated Press, May 14, 2010.
64
U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Commends Nigerian Authorities on Power Sector Reforms,” January 14, 2011.
65
“Two Nigerian Refineries Running at 60 Pct Capacity,” Reuters, March 30, 2010.
66
International Monetary Fund, “Staff Report for the Article IV Consultation with Nigeria,” January 27, 2011. The
price benchmarks set by the Nigerian government are $58/barrel for 2011, $60 for 2012, and $62 for 2013.
67
EIU, “Nigeria,” Country Reports, March 2011.
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programs aimed at poverty reduction and reaching the country’s Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), according to the World Bank.68
Like his predecessors, President Jonathan has committed his Administration to reforms that aim
to fuel development. He named a former Goldman Sachs official, Olusegun Aganga, as finance
minister to lead the reforms, which include an audit of the NNPC and the proposed creation of a
sovereign wealth fund. Jonathan retained Lamido Sanusi, appointed under President Yar’Adua as
governor of Central Bank of Nigeria, who has led efforts to modernize the country’s banking
system. He has pushed reforms to tighten banking supervision and in late 2009 instituted new
regulations that require banks to report large cash transactions between accounts if one of the
account holders is considered to be “politically exposed.” Bank audits ordered by Sanusi in 2009
found 10 banks near collapse due to reckless lending; most of the banks’ top executives were
fired. The government provided $4 billion in 2009 to rescue the banks, and in December 2010,
under pressure from Sanusi, the parliament approved the establishment of the Asset Management
Company of Nigeria (AMCON) to buy bad bank loans in exchange for government bonds, in an
effort to get the banks lending again. AMCON is jointly funded by the central bank and the
finance ministry. Some analysts expect it to take up to a decade for AMCON to divest itself of all
its toxic assets, which total over $14 billion.69 The government is pursuing debtors and
prosecuting several bank executives.
Efforts to Combat Corruption
According to the U.S. State Department, corruption in Nigeria is “massive, widespread, and
pervasive.”70 In 2008, Nigeria’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index improved from 147 to 121 out of 180 countries, but it fell in 2009, and again in 2010, to a
ranking of 134.71 Nigeria also has one of the world’s highest incidences of cyber crime, including
“419 scams,” so-named for the country’s penal code that outlaws fraudulent e-mails. For years
observers have suggested that the country’s development will be hindered until it can reverse its
perceived “culture of impunity for political and economic crimes.”72
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), a Nigerian law enforcement agency
created in 2003 to combat corruption and fraud, has estimated that over $380 billion has been
expropriated by political and military leaders since oil sales began in the 1970s.73 Former dictator
Sani Abacha reportedly stole more than $3.5 billion during the course of his five years in power.
Switzerland was the first country to repatriate stolen funds to Nigeria and has returned over $700
million since 2005. According to a study by the World Bank, a significant percentage of those
funds have been used by the Nigerian government toward meeting the country’s Millennium
Development Goals. The government has also recovered funds stolen by Abacha and his family
from the autonomous British island of Jersey and from Luxembourg. Other Abacha funds remain
68
World Bank, “Nigeria: Country Brief,” April 2010, available at http://www.worldbank.org.
69
AMCON bought non-performing loans from 9 rescued banks and margin loans from 12 other domestic banks. EIU,
“Nigeria, Ibid.
70
U.S. State Department, “Nigeria,” Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2009, March 2010.
71
The Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceptions of business people and country analysts regarding the
degree of corruption among public officials and politicians. A high score indicates greater levels of corruption.
72
International Crisis Group, “Want in the Midst of Plenty,” Africa Report No. 113, July 19, 2006.
73
“Strong Convictions: Nigeria’s First Anticorruption Czar,” Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 2007.
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frozen in accounts in Europe. In late 2009, a Swiss court convicted Abacha’s son of participating
in a criminal organization and seized $350 million in assets stolen from Nigeria.
The Nigerian government won praise under President Obasanjo for some of its efforts to combat
the rampant corruption that has plagued Nigeria, but some charge that the former head of state
used corruption charges to sideline critics and political opponents. Investigations by the EFCC
resulted in the arrest of over 2,000 responsible for illegal email scams and in over 130 convictions
for fraud during Obasanjo’s tenure.74 However, the International Crisis Group (ICG) suggested
that the EFCC was “used as a political weapon to whip political foes, especially state governors
likely to stand for the presidency and their supporters, into line.”75 Five state governors, some of
whom were considered contenders for the PDP presidential nomination, were impeached in 20052006 for corruption.76 ICG charged that the impeachments, three of which were reversed in
appeals courts, were conducted under heightened military presence in those states and lacked due
process.77 Under President Obasanjo the EFCC conducted investigations into the alleged financial
crimes of 31 of the country’s 36 state governors; several were prosecuted. In February 2007, the
EFCC released a list of 135 candidates in the April elections who were “unfit to hold public office
because of corruption,” of which 53 were PDP and 82 opposition candidates.78 The legality of
INEC’s decision to bar candidates on the EFCC’s list from the elections was questioned.
President Yar’Adua, reportedly a devout Muslim, campaigned on a platform of fighting
corruption; in 1999 he became the first governor to publicly declare his assets before he was
sworn in. Upon taking office, he ordered the review of all privatization agreements approved by
former President Obasanjo, amid charges of corruption associated with the sales, and
subsequently reversed several contracts. President Yar’Adua moved to distance himself from the
former president, dismissing many of Obasanjo’s political appointees and military leaders in late
2008 and overturning several key government contracts made by the former administration. In
December 2008, he proposed that the National Assembly amend the constitution to remove the
immunity clause which prevents the president, vice president, governors, and deputy governors
from being prosecuted for corruption while in office. The proposal has not been adopted.
In late 2007, Nigeria’s Inspector General of Police announced that EFCC head Nuhu Ribadu was
being transferred from his post. Some questioned whether Ribadu’s transfer was linked to his
order two weeks earlier for the arrest of former Delta State Governor James Ibori, one of the
primary financial contributors to Yar’Adua’s presidential campaign. The Executive Director of
the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime wrote a letter to President Yar’Adua suggesting Ribadu’s
removal could be detrimental to ongoing investigations and might damage the reputation of the
EFCC in the view of international donors.79 Ribadu was later dismissed from the police service.
The EFCC continued to prosecute high profile cases after Ribadu’s departure, and several EFCC
operatives were reportedly murdered in retaliation in early 2010. In early 2008, the commission
ordered the arrest of Lucky Igbinedion, former governor of Edo State, who is alleged to have
stolen $25 million in state funds. He later submitted a plea bargain and was released with a fine.
74
“Strong Convictions: Nigeria’s First Anti-Corruption Czar,” Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 2007.
ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding A Political Crisis,” Ibid.
76
The impeached governors represented Bayelsa, Oyo, Ekiti, Anambra, and Plateau States.
77
ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding A Political Crisis,” Ibid.
78
“Strong Convictions: Nigeria’s First Anticorruption Czar,” Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 2007.
79
Matthew Green, “Nigerian Anti-Graft Police Arrest Governor,” Reuters, January 22, 2008.
75
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In June 2008, the Nigerian Senate unanimously approved the appointment of a former highranking police officer, Farida Waziri, to replace Ribadu as EFCC Chair. Some in Nigerian civil
society alleged that Waziri was appointed to derail the prosecution of Ibori and others.80 Ibori’s
case was dropped by a federal judge in December 2009, but the EFCC obtained a new warrant for
his arrest in April 2010, alleging that Ibori embezzled over $250 million. Ibori eluded capture
after his armed supporters reportedly exchanged fire with Nigerian security forces. He fled
Nigeria and was arrested by Interpol in Dubai in May 2010. He was extradited in April 2011 to
the United Kingdom, where he has been charged with money laundering.
Several senior leaders of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) have faced charges of
corruption, including Vincent Ogbulafor, who resigned as national party chairman in 2010 to
stand trial for fraud during his tenure as a government minister in 2001.81 Ogbulafor’s former
deputy and now acting PDP chairman, Dr. Bello Mohammed, a former communications minister,
was reportedly questioned in 2010 in relation to bribes paid to government officials by the
German telecommunications firm Siemens. In 2009, a Nigerian court sentenced former PDP
Chairman Olabode George, a close ally of Obasanjo, to 2.5 years in prison for misuse of $500
million in public funds during his tenure as head of the Nigerian Ports Authority. Former
President Obasanjo himself has not escaped charges of corruption. In 2007, a Nigerian Senate
committee report recommended that both Obasanjo and Atiku Abubakar be prosecuted for illegal
use of government funds. Obasanjo rejected the charges. Other parliamentary panels have
investigated allegations of corruption during his tenure as president. His daughter, who chaired
Nigeria’s Senate Health Committee, was charged by the EFCC in 2008 with fraud; she lost her
Senate seat in the 2011 elections.
Several multinational corporations have been investigated for paying bribes in Nigeria. In
December 2007, Nigeria suspended its contracts with Siemens after a German court found the
company guilty of paying an estimated 10 million euro in bribes to Nigerian officials between
2001 and 2004.82 An alleged bribery case involving a Nigerian gas plant is being investigated in
several countries, including France, Nigeria, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The companies
involved in the natural gas project and the alleged bribery include Halliburton; Total of France;
and Italy’s Eni. The U.S. Justice Department led the probe into Halliburton’s role, and officials
have reported evidence of bribes paid. 83 Halliburton and Kellogg, Brown, and Root, Inc. (KBR)
reached a $177 million settlement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in
February 2009 related to the case, and KBR paid a $402 million fine to settle the Justice
Department charges.84 The EFCC brought charges against former U.S. Vice President Dick
Cheney in early December 2010 related to his tenure as chief executive of Halliburton, but later
dropped them after the company agreed to pay $250 million in fines.
80
See, for example, “Nigerian Group Criticizes Choice of a New Corruption Chief,” VOA News, May 27, 2008.
Ogbulafor maintains that the charges were politically motivated as part of an internal PDP power struggle.
82
“Nigeria to Blacklist Siemens After Bribery Scandal,” Reuters, December 5, 2007.
83
“The Gas Ghost Keeps Haunting,” Africa Confidential, May 9, 2008.
84
“Halliburton, KBR Paying $547 Million in Bribery Settlement,” Market Watch, February 11, 2009.
81
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Social Issues and Security Concerns
Islamic Sharia Law
Nigeria is home to Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest Muslim population. Twelve of Nigeria’s states in
the Sunni Muslim-dominated north of the country have adopted Islamic sharia law since 1999 to
adjudicate criminal and civil matters for Muslims. 85 Non-sharia based common law and
customary law courts adjudicate cases involving non-Muslims in these states, and sharia-based
criminal law courts are elective for non-Muslims. In some states, the introduction of sharia
proved to be a flashpoint between Muslims and Christians. The introduction of sharia has also
resulted in much-publicized rulings, several of which have been criticized by human rights groups
as well as by Nigerians in the southern and mostly Christian part of the country. The State
Department reports that sharia “technically does not apply to non-Muslims in civil and criminal
proceedings,” although observers acknowledge that Islamic mores are often enforced in public
without regard for citizens’ religion. In some areas, state-funded vigilante groups known as
hisbah patrol public areas and attempt to enforce sharia rulings.
While some sharia courts have issued controversial stoning and amputation sentences, the U.S.
State Department reports that none of the stoning sentences have been implemented. 86 In 2002,
Amina Lawal was sentenced to death by stoning after a court in Katsina State found her guilty of
adultery. In 2003, Ms. Lawal appealed her sentence to the state Appeals Court and won after the
court ruled her conviction invalid. In another highly publicized case, a sharia court in Sokoto
sentenced Safiya Hussaini to death for adultery in 2001. Ms. Hussaini appealed her sentence and
was exonerated on the grounds that she was impregnated by her former husband and that the
affair took place before sharia law was enacted. Despite such cases, many observers see the
interpretation and implementation of Nigerian sharia as moderate in comparison to that of some
other Islamic countries.
Sectarian Violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt
In May 2009, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom recommended that
Nigeria be classified as a “Country of Particular Concern” for religious freedom violations. It is
not currently designated as such by the Secretary of State. According to the commission, as many
as 12,000 Nigerians have been killed since 1999 in sectarian violence, and the commissioners
based the CPC recommendation on their belief that the country is tolerating this violence.
According to their 2010 report, “Not a single criminal, Muslim or Christian, has been convicted
and sentenced in Nigeria’s ten years of religious violence. Therein lies the problem. The Nigerian
government and judicial system have so far been unwilling or unable to protect either side.”87
The report cites hundreds of recent deaths in sectarian violence in Jos, the capital of Plateau State
in central Nigeria, which sits between the predominately Muslim north and Christian south.
85
These states are Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara. Nigerian
law protects freedom of religion and permits states to establish courts based on common law or customary law systems.
86
As of December 2009, only one amputation sentence had been carried out, involving a victim who refused to appeal
his conviction, according to the U.S. State Department, “Nigeria,” 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
87
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2010, May 2010.
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Violence between communities in this “Middle Belt” in the past decade reflects tensions that are
not only religious, but also ethnic, and which are exacerbated by some local politicians. These
tensions stem from a competition over resources—land, education, government jobs—between
ethnic groups classified as settlers or “indigene” (original inhabitants of the state), a designation
that conveys political and economic benefits. In Jos, the mostly Christian Berom are considered
indigene, and the predominately Muslim Hausa-Fulani, who were traditionally nomadic and
pastoralist, are not. According to Human Rights Watch, over 1,000 were killed in inter-communal
fighting and targeted killings in Plateau State in 2010.88
The State Department, in its November 2010 Religious Freedom report, found that “the
government generally respected religious freedom in practice, although local political actors
stoked sectarian violence with impunity, occasionally using religion as a catalyst, especially in the
Middle Belt region.” The report states that the hostility between Christians and Muslims
“increased and involved the targeting of religious symbols and spaces” in 2010, and that the
sectarian violence in parts of the country “heightened tensions between religious groups, even in
parts of the country without violence.”
The death toll from sectarian clashes in Nigeria in the last decade has been high, although exact
figures are unavailable. By some estimates, over 8,000 were killed in clashes between 1999 and
2002.89 In Plateau State alone, as many as 3,800 have been killed in the past decade. 90 Among the
more recent outbreaks of violence, disputed local elections spurred unrest in November 2008 that
may have resulted in as many as 700 deaths. Violence in Jos and surrounding villages broke out
again in early 2010, displacing an estimated 18,000 and resulting in 300-500 deaths in January
and several hundred in March. In response, the Nigerian government established a special task
force composed of both military and police in May 2010 to restore stability in the state. 91 The
latest round of clashes were sparked by bombings in Christian areas of Jos on December 24 that
killed 80. Revenge attacks by both sides have followed, and the Muslim community has called for
the ouster of the current governor, whom they view as ignoring the violence.
Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria
In July 2009, religious clashes erupted in the northern states of Bauchi, Borno, and Yobe,
reportedly resulting in at least 700 deaths and the displacement of several thousand. The clashes
originated in Bauchi state between police and a Muslim sect, Boko Haram (“Western education is
forbidden”), also known as the “Nigerian Taliban,” which aims to overthrow the government and
impose sharia throughout the country. Alleged attempts by militants to storm police stations and
other government buildings led to rioting and street battles with security forces. The group’s
leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed by police in the northern city of Maiduguri. Some contend
that his death was an extrajudicial killing, a charge that the police deny (see “Abuses by Security
Forces” below). 92 Following the clashes, local religious and traditional leaders announced plans
to establish a preaching board composed of Islamic leaders and scholars to vet clerics. Violence
88
HRW, “Nigeria: New Wave of Violence Leaves 200 Dead,” January 27, 2011. The report stated than in addition to
the more than 1,000 deaths in 2010, over 200 were killed between December 24 and late January 2011.
89
ICG, “Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty,” Africa Report No. 113, July 19, 2006.
90
HRW, Nigeria: New Wave of Violence Leaves 200 Dead,” Ibid.
91
The task force has a website: http://www.specialtaskforceonplateaustate.gov.ng.
92
“Islamic Death ‘Good for Nigeria’,” BBC, July 31, 2009.
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between security forces and members of another Islamic sect reported to hold beliefs similar to
those of Boko Haram in Bauchi state in late December 2009 resulted in over 40 deaths.93
Boko Haram appears to have reemerged, claiming responsibility in September 2010 for a major
prison raid in Bauchi that resulted in 700 prisoners being freed, including a number of Boko
Haram members. The group has also claimed responsibility for the January 2011 assassination of
a gubernatorial candidate in the state, and has staged attacks on public buildings and police
stations and bombings during the April 2011 elections. Its current size and strength are unknown.
Boko Haram currently appears to pose more of a threat to local stability than to the country as a
whole. Nevertheless, there are concerns that the group may seek to align itself with more
developed violent Islamist groups. One of its purported leaders has expressed respect for Al
Qaeda (AQ) and Osama Bin Laden, and in February 2010 the leader of the regional AQ affiliate
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) publicly offered the group assistance.94
The international media focused on concerns regarding the possible radicalization of Nigerian
Muslims following the attempted terrorist attack on an American airliner by a Nigerian passenger,
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, on December 25, 2009. According to reports, Abdulmutallab, son
of a respected Nigerian banker and former government minister, became “radicalized” while
living abroad, most recently in Yemen, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claims to
have sponsored his attempt to detonate an explosive device while onboard a flight bound from
Amsterdam to Detroit. Abdulmutallab’s father reported concerns about his son’s radicalization to
the U.S. embassy and others in November 2009. The attempted attack, allegedly scheduled to
coincide with Christmas Day, raised questions regarding airport security in both the Netherlands
and Nigeria, where Abdulmutallab’s journey began. Both countries began using full body
scanners in their international airports in 2010. The attempt also led to increased screening
measures at airports around the world. In January 2010, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) announced that passengers flying to the United States who are citizens of 14 countries
deemed to be either “state sponsors of terrorism” or “countries of interest” would be subject to
additional screening, including compulsory “pat-downs.” Nigeria was among five African
countries, including Algeria, Libya, Sudan, and Somalia, included in the new regulation, and the
Nigerian government protested the rule as discriminatory.95 In April 2010, DHS announced new
security measures for screening all passengers on international flights to the United States,
superseding the regulations that specifically targeted Nigerians for further screening.96
Abdulmutallab’s actions are considered by most to be an isolated incident, and many observers
stress that, by all accounts, Abdulmutallab’s radicalization and training took place outside
Nigeria. Nevertheless, the expansion of conservative Sunni Islamist movements and clashes
between security forces and Islamist sects in northern Nigeria have raised concerns among some
observers and officials that other Nigerians may be susceptible to recruitment by Al Qaeda or
other groups hoping to use violence against government or civilian targets in Nigeria or abroad.
93
“Death Toll From Nigeria Clashes Rises to 40 – Red Cross,” Reuters, December 30, 2009.
“Fertile Ground: The Potential for Jihad in Nigeria,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 2010.
95
“Nigeria Criticizes ‘Unfair’ US Air Passenger Screening,” BBC, January 4, 2010.
96
DHS, “Secretary Napolitano Announces New Measures to Strengthen Aviation Security,” April 2, 2010.
94
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Conflict in the Niger Delta
Background of the Struggle
Oil from the southern Niger Delta region has accounted for over 75% of the country’s oil
production since the 1970s, and yet the area’s political history remains one of conflict and
marginalization. The Delta is home to an estimated 31 million people. Among them are the
Ogoni, an ethnic minority whose members have received international attention for their efforts to
highlight the extensive environmental damage done by oil extraction in the region. In 1994,
author and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, president of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni
People (MOSOP), and 14 others were accused of involvement in the murder of four prominent
Ogoni politicians. They pled not guilty, but nine, including Saro-Wiwa, were convicted and
sentenced to death in 1995 by the Ogoni Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal. The executions
sparked international outrage against the regime of dictator Sani Abacha, who was accused of
extensive human rights abuses. The United States recalled its ambassador and pushed for the U.N.
General Assembly to condemn Nigeria’s action. In 2009, Shell established a trust fund to benefit
the Ogoni people, part of a $15.5 million settlement in a New York court case related to the 1995
executions. The company maintains that it played no role in the executions or other abuses.
Criminality and Violence
Nigeria’s oil wealth has been a source of continuing political tension, protest, and criminality in
the Delta, where most of the country’s oil presently originates. The conflict has been linked to the
vandalism of oil infrastructures; massive, systemic production theft known as “oil bunkering,”
often abetted by state officials; protests over widespread environmental damage caused by oil
operations; hostage taking; and public insecurity and communal violence. Several thousand
people have been killed in pipeline explosions in southeast Nigeria since the late 1990s; the
largest single toll from an explosion was approximately 1,000 in October of 1998. These
explosions are triggered when people siphon off oil from holes punched in the above-ground
pipeline for personal use, resulting in a reported loss of some 100,000 barrels of oil per day.
In 1998, militants from the Delta’s largest ethnic group, the Ijaw, initiated “Operation Climate
Change,” triggering violent conflict between the Ijaw and the Nigerian military and disrupting oil
production in the region. Threats of an “all out war” against the government and the oil
companies by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, one of the leaders of that group, reportedly played a role in
the then-unprecedented rise in the world price of oil above $50 a barrel in 2004.97 The threat was
later called off after negotiations with the government. A new rebel movement, the Niger Delta
People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Dokubo-Asari, emerged in 2004, launching a series of
attacks against government forces and threatening to attack foreign oil workers. The NDPVF
demanded autonomy for the region and a share of oil revenues. An estimated 500 people were
reportedly killed in the ensuing violence, according to Amnesty International, though the Nigerian
government disputes this figure. Dokubo-Asari was arrested in September 2005 and charged with
plotting to overthrow the government. He was released on bail in June 2007, allegedly because of
his failing health, and upon his release he reportedly denounced the practice of hostage-taking in
the region and subsequently assisted in the government’s negotiations with militants.98
97
98
“Pumping Up the Oil Price; the Price of Oil,” The Economist, October 1, 2004.
“Freed Militant Opposes Kidnappings,” This Day, June 17, 2007.
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In November 2005, the Nigerian army deployed additional troops to the oil-rich Bayelsa State
after lawmakers began impeachment proceedings against State Governor Diepreye
Alamieyeseigha. British authorities had charged Alamieyeseigha, while visiting in London
months prior, with money laundering. The former governor, who returned to Nigeria, was found
guilty of money laundering and embezzlement in 2007. He was later released by President
Yar’Adua on a plea bargain to help advance peace talks. The British government has returned
over $2 million in assets allegedly stolen by Alamieyeseigha to Nigerian authorities.
Conflict between the Delta’s militants and the Nigerian military escalated after early 2006, and
the kidnapping of foreign oil workers increased exponentially. A new rebel group, the Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), emerged in late 2005, using kidnappings to
bring international attention to its cause and to demand that the government release various
regional figures, including Dokubu-Asari and Alamieyeseigha. Media reports suggest over 300
foreigners were kidnapped between 2006 and 2009, including several American citizens.
Attacks on oil facilities by militant groups like the MEND have periodically cut Nigeria’s oil
production by as much as 25%, and analysts partially credit supply disruptions in Nigeria with
periodically raising the world price of oil. 99 According to the State Department’s Coordinator for
International Energy Affairs, “If Nigeria was to produce oil at capacity, it would play a major role
in helping to lower and stabilize world oil prices.”100 Nigeria’s deep-water production has proven
vulnerable to militant attacks as well, as evidenced by attacks on Shell’s offshore Bongo platform,
and the threat of sea piracy is high. According to some estimates, up to 10% of Nigeria’s oil is
stolen every year, and some experts suggest that the heightened violence and criminality in the
Delta has been used to fund local political campaigns.101
From 2007 through mid-2009, militant activity in the Delta was punctuated with periodic
ceasefires and negotiations with the government. In June 2007, MEND declared a one-month
truce, declaring it would cease kidnappings and attacks on oil facilities during that period in
exchange for dialogue with the Yar’Adua government. As part of the truce, the group released
several hostages taken from a Chevron facility, including at least one American. 102 The NDPVF
extended a similar 90-day truce offer a week later, and groups represented under the so-called
Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC) also declared a temporary ceasefire. Other smaller militant
groups remained active. In July 2007 the truce unraveled, and in August MEND announced that it
would resume attacks on oil installations. Gang violence in Port Harcourt, the region’s main city,
escalated into running street battles until government troops imposed a curfew on the city. Selfdescribed MEND spokesman Henry Okah was arrested in Angola in September 2007 on
suspicion of arms-trafficking. In December 2007, the Bayelsa state government announced the
signing of a peace agreement with the state’s militant groups, although MEND rejected the truce,
declaring it would increase its attacks until Okah, who was extradited to Nigeria in February
2008, was released. Street clashes erupted again in Port Harcourt in February (random violence in
99
See, for example, “Oil Steady Over 70 USD as Concerns about US Gasoline Supply, Nigeria Continue,” AFX News
Limited, May 22, 2007, and “Assault at Gas Pumps Related to Attacks on Nigerian Pipelines,” CNN, May 23, 2008.
100
David L. Goldwyn, testimony before the Senate Committee on ForeignRelations’ Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Washington, D.C., September 24, 2008.
101
Human Rights Watch, Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria, Vol. 19, No. 16(A),
October 2007.
102
“Nigerian Militants Free Six Hostages, Suspend Attacks for a Month,” Agence France Presse, June 2, 2007.
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the city has continued sporadically). MEND declared another cessation of hostilities in mid-2008,
but it suspended the ceasefire in January 2009.
Nigeria’s Joint Task Force (JTF), a special combined military and police unit established in 2004
to restore order in the Delta, launched a new offensive against militants in May 2009. Fighting
between security forces and militants, combined with JTF air and land strikes against militant
camps, displaced thousands, according to Amnesty International.103 Acts of sabotage by the
MEND and other militant groups increased in early 2009, cutting oil production by approximately
273,000 barrels per day.
Amnesty Offer for Delta Militants
In June 2009, President Yar’Adua extended an offer of amnesty to Delta militants; those who
surrendered their weapons, renounced violence, and accepted rehabilitation by October of that
year would be granted a presidential pardon, along with cash and job training. Within days, five
militant groups had announced their intention to accept amnesty. MEND initially rejected the
president’s gesture, but days after jailed MEND leader Henry Okah was pardoned and freed, in
July, the group announced a 60-day ceasefire. MEND has not collectively accepted the amnesty
offer, but several of its purported leaders have. According to Nigerian government estimates,
15,260 “militants” accepted the amnesty and turned in weapons by the October 2009 deadline;
the government ultimately aims to disarm 20,000.104 As acting president, Goodluck Jonathan
approved an initiative to spend $180 million on job training centers in the Delta, a key pledge in
the second phase of Yar’Adua’s amnesty and reconciliation plan, which focuses on the
rehabilitation of militants. The federal government’s ability to deliver on promised infrastructure
improvements and job creation will be critical to addressing regional grievances.
Oil output has increased in the wake of the amnesty offer, but observers warn that unless the root
causes of the conflict are addressed, further violence will follow. 105 MEND attacks appear to be
on the rise again. MEND spokesman Jomo Gbomo, declaring that President Jonathan has
demonstrated that he is unwilling to address the issues of the Delta, has claimed responsibility for
several attacks on oil facilities and recent bombings, including explosions in Abuja on October 1,
2010, during celebrations marking Nigeria’s Independence Day, that left 12 dead. Gbomo claims
that MEND has issued warnings to Nigerian officials prior to the bombings to avoid loss of life.
MEND’s identity and composition has changed since it first emerged. Various militant groups in
the Niger Delta have claimed actions under the name of MEND, and analysts suggest that it is
now an umbrella group with a decentralized structure. Several high-profile militant commanders,
including Soboma George, Ateke Tom, and Government Ektemupolo (alias Tompolo), who were
rumored to be among MEND’s senior leadership, accepted the amnesty, raising questions about
the group’s current cohesiveness.106
103
Amnesty International, “Hundreds Feared Dead and Thousands Trapped in Niger Delta Fighting,” May 22, 2009.
“On the MEND: The Politics of Surrender in Nigeria,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 2009.
105
“In Niger Delta, Uneasy Peace as Rebel Disarmament Dates Nears,” Washington Post, July 27, 2009.
106
Soboma George was killed in August 2010, reportedly by men he had hired to kill two politicians in the region.
104
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Efforts to Address Environmental and Development Challenges
Oil production in the Delta has caused major damage to the area’s fragile riverine ecosystem, and
ultimately to the livelihoods of its inhabitants.107 Reports on the amount of crude leaked into the
Delta’s fragile ecosystem vary significantly and there is no accurate measure, but millions of
barrels of oil are believed to have been spilled since oil production began in Nigeria.108 Gas
flares, which burn unwanted natural gas when drilling for oil, have plagued the Delta with acid
rain and air pollution. This pollution has severely limited locals’ access to clean water, and has
largely destroyed the fishing stocks the majority of Delta inhabitants depended on to make a
living.109 In 2006, Shell Oil, which has the largest production capacity of the oil companies in
Nigeria, was ordered by a Nigerian federal court to pay $1.5 billion to compensate local
communities for environmental damage. President Yar’Adua announced in 2008 that Shell would
be replaced by another company in the oil fields of Ogoniland.110 In 2010, a Dutch court began
hearing a case against Shell related to a massive spill that occurred in the Delta in 2005. The
Dutch parliament held a hearing on Shell’s role in Delta oil spills in January 2011.
Under President Yar’Adua, the government took several important initial steps to engage the
Delta’s disaffected communities, efforts that activists hope the Jonathan Administration will
expand. An unprecedented 20% of Yar’Adua’s first federal budget proposal, for 2008, was
allocated for security and development projects in the Delta, although activists expressed concern
that the amount allocated for security far outweighed funds for development.111 A supplemental
2009 budget passed in November 2009 included more than $750 million for “post-amnesty
intervention.” The 2010 budget included some $1.2 billion for “post-amnesty development”
projects in the region, targeting transport, education, and health infrastructure. Concerns remain
regarding the government’s ability to spend the funds effectively.
Most observers agree that the crisis in the Delta must ultimately be solved politically, rather than
militarily, but there is considerable disagreement on the details of such a solution. The current
federal system provides states with a 13% share of local revenues (predominately from oil sales).
Groups like MEND argue that the states should receive a 50% share, as was stipulated in the 1960
constitution. A technical committee nominated by President Yar’Adua to identify policies to
stimulate development and improve security in the Delta region issued a report in December
2008. In the report, the committee advocated raising the share of oil revenues allocated to the oilproducing states to 25%. Some analysts suggest that corruption within the state governments is so
high that the local populations would see little improvement even if the state share were raised.
Some of the oil-producing states have reported revenues of $1 billion per year but have dismal
records of development or service delivery. 112 Other analysts question what effect a change in
revenue allocation might have on the northern states, several of which have lower development
107
Amnesty International, Petroleum, Pollution, and Poverty in the Niger Delta, June 2009.
Amnesty International, Petroleum, Pollution, and Poverty in the Niger Delta, Ibid.; UNDP, Niger Delta Human
Development Report, 2006; Jonathan Brown, “Niger Delta Bears Brunt After 50 Years of Oil Spills,” The Independent
(London), October 26, 2006; Popken, Ben, “BP Gulf-Sized Spilling Occurs in Nigeria Annually, but Nobody Cares,”
The Consumerist.com, June 15, 2010.
109
ICG, “Fueling the Niger Delta Crisis,” Africa Report No. 118, September 28, 2006.
110
“Nigeria’s Removal of Shell Hailed,” BBC News, June 5, 2008.
111
“Nigeria’s Pledge to Increase Niger Delta Spending Elicits Skeptical Response,” VOA News, November 11, 2007.
112
“Blood and Oil,” The Economist, March 15, 2007.
108
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indicators than those in the Delta. In late 2009, President Yar’Adua proposed transferring 10% of
the revenues from the government’s oil and gas joint ventures to local Delta communities.
In September 2008, President Yar’Adua created a new cabinet-level Ministry for Niger Delta
Affairs. The position was intended to build on development plans started under the Obasanjo
Administration in 2007 under the auspices of the Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC),
established in 2000 to improve social and environmental conditions in the Delta. Improvements in
infrastructure and education were identified as areas of major focus for Obasanjo’s 15-year, $50
billion plan.113 In his first year in office, President Yar’Adua doubled the budget for the NNDC, to
$566 million. Some observers have raised concerns that the ministry’s programs and those of the
NDDC, which is intended to be a part of the ministry, may be duplicative. Some analysts suggest
that given the level of corruption endemic in the Delta, the international community should work
with the Nigerian government to establish a new development fund that would have independent
oversight. New opportunities for foreign investment in the Delta could also contribute to
improvements in the region, although unrest may deter investors.
Effects on the Oil Industry and the World Market
Nigeria has an estimated oil production capacity of 3 million barrels per day (bpd), but output has
not met capacity.114 Instability, criminality, and oil leaks in the Delta have cut output by one-fifth
since 2006. Nigeria’s production averaged 2.5 million bpd in 2010. By comparison, Saudi Arabia
produces an estimated 10.1 million bpd, Iran 4.3 million bpd, and Venezuela 2.4 million bpd.115 In
2005, a group of former senior U.S. national security officials convened a working group to
develop a possible U.S. response to a simulated world oil crisis.116 Under the scenario given to the
participants, civil unrest in northern Nigeria required the Nigerian government to move troops
from the unstable Niger Delta region to quell violence in the north. Unprotected, oil companies in
the Delta ceased production, and the country’s contribution to the world oil market was reduced
by 800,000 bpd for an extended period. Combined with an unseasonably cold winter and
hypothetical terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, oil prices rose to $120 per barrel and U.S. gasoline
prices at the pump rose to $4.74 per gallon, triggering a recession and potential job losses of up to
2 million. In reality, even the threat of coordinated militant attacks against oil targets in the Delta
can affect the price of oil on the world market. A longer and more sustained disruption of
Nigeria’s oil supply, particularly if combined with the disruption of another major supplier’s
product, could have a significant impact on the world economy.
In addition to its oil reserves, Nigeria has the eighth-largest natural gas reserves in the world, but
to date they have provided little benefit to the Nigerian economy. The gas reserves, also
predominantly located in the Delta region, are estimated at over 185 trillion cubic feet. The
government had pledged to increase gas exports to 50% of oil revenues by 2010, but many of
Nigeria’s fields currently lack the infrastructure to produce natural gas and would require
significant investment to meet that goal. The government has repeatedly set deadlines for oil
113
“Nigeria Launches New Development Plan for Niger Delta,” Voice of America, March 27, 2007, and “New Hope
for Old ‘Master Plan’ on Niger Delta,” IRIN, November 19, 2007.
114
Oil production dropped from 2.13 million bpd in 2007 to 1.95 million bpd in 2008, but increased from an estimated
1.6 million bpd in July 2009, before the ceasefire, to 2 million bpd by late 2009. EIU, “Nigeria,” Country Reports.
115
Production figures for 2010 acquired from the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration.
116
For more information on the exercise, known as “Oil Shockwave,” see http://www.secureenergy.org/reports/
oil_shock_report_master.pdf.
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companies to stop flaring gas at oil wells, estimated at up to 40% of annual production, but
significant flaring continues. 117 In March 2011, President Jonathan announced a series of new
agreements to develop gas processing facilities as part of a “gas revolution” designed to create
new jobs and revenues and to end flaring. 118
Abuses by Security Forces
Nigerian security forces, particularly the police, have been accused of serious human rights
abuses, and activists suggest that the government has done little to address issues of impunity and
corruption within the Nigerian Police Force. In 2007, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture
reported that “torture is an intrinsic part of how law enforcement services operate within the
country,” and called on the Nigerian government to criminalize the practice.119 The State
Department’s annual human rights reports on Nigeria document numerous instances of
“politically motivated and extrajudicial killings by security forces, including summary executions
… torture, rape and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of prisoners, detainees, and
criminal suspects,” and a variety of other offenses. Its 2009 report noted serious abuses by both
police and soldiers related to the July 2009 Boko Haram uprising and referenced “credible media
reports” claiming that police executed the group’s leader. Other recent reports on abuses include
Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces, produced by Human Rights Watch; Killing at Will:
Extrajudicial Executions and Other Unlawful Killings by the Police in Nigeria, by Amnesty
International; and Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigerian
Police Force, by the Open Society Justice Initiative and the Network of Police Reform in Nigeria.
Nigerian officials have acknowledged some abuses, and in early 2010 the country’s police
minister called the situation “condemnable and unacceptable.”120 Nigeria’s prison system has also
drawn criticism; a 2008 Amnesty International report alleged that at least 65% of the inmates had
never been convicted of a crime, and that some awaited trial for up to 10 years.121
HIV/AIDS
Nigeria’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 3.6% is relatively small in comparison to some Southern
African nations with adult seropositivity rates of over 20%. However, the West African nation
comprises nearly one-tenth of the world’s HIV/AIDS infected persons with 3.3 million infected
people, the largest HIV-positive population in the world after South Africa. Nigeria’s population
is expected to double by the year 2025, which is likely to multiply the spread of HIV. In addition
to the devastation HIV/AIDS continues to cause among Nigeria’s adult population, over 40% of
the current population is under the age of 15. With almost a third of primary-school-aged children
not enrolled in school and the large number of HIV/AIDS-infected adults, Nigeria faces serious
challenges and significant obstacles in the education and health care sectors.
117
“Nigeria Gas Profits ‘Up in Smoke’,” BBC, January 13, 2009.
“Jonathan Sets Agenda for Ending Gas Flaring,” BusinessDay, March 25, 2011.
119
United Nations Press Release, “Special Rapporteur on Torture Concludes Visit to Nigeria,” March 12, 2007.
120
“Nigeria Condemns Police ‘Killing’,” BBC, March 5, 2010.
121
Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Criminal Justice System Utterly Failing Nigerian People; Majority of Inmates Not
Convicted of Any Crime,” February 26, 2008.
118
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International Relations
Since the 1990s, Nigeria has emerged as an important player in regional and international affairs.
Nigeria is one of 12 members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
and is a key member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The
government has helped to resolve political disputes in Togo, Mauritania, and Liberia. Nigeria has
also played a leading role in efforts to resolve the political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, where it has
previously acted as a mediator. The government was critical of the international community for
“contradictions” in its reaction to the recent crises in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya.122 Nigeria has also
mediated between the government of Sudan and the Darfur rebels. Nigerian troops have played a
vital role in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and are currently deployed to
missions in Liberia and Sudan. Nigerian police, military observers, and experts are also deployed
in U.N. missions in Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Sudan,
Timor-Leste, and Western Sahara. The United States is the top destination for Nigerian exports,
followed by India, Brazil, Spain and France. China is the lead source for Nigerian imports,
followed by the United States, the Netherlands, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. 123
Issues for Congress
Administration Policy on Nigeria
After a period of strained relations in the 1990s, when Nigeria was under a military dictatorship,
U.S.-Nigeria relations steadily improved under the administration of former President Obasanjo,
and they have remained strong under Presidents Yar’Adua and Jonathan. The Bush
Administration praised the Nigerian government’s improved budget practices, banking sector
reform, and efforts to eliminate the country’s foreign debt, although it remained critical of the
country’s human rights record and questioned its commitment to ensuring free and fair elections.
President George W. Bush visited the country in 2003, and First Lady Laura Bush visited Nigeria
in 2006. Following the 2007 elections, though, the Bush Administration expressed concern with
what the State Department called “a flawed election, and in some instances, deeply flawed.”124
Nevertheless, the State Department stressed the need to “engage” rather than isolate the country
in order to “nurture Nigeria’s fragile democracy,” and President Bush met Yar’Adua at the White
House later that year.125
President Barack Obama’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, has
referred to Nigeria as “probably the most important country in Sub-Saharan Africa.”126 President
Obama has reiterated the importance of the U.S.-Nigeria relationship. He formally acknowledged
the country’s role as a regional leader during a meeting with then-Acting President Goodluck
Jonathan at the White House in April 2010. Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Nigeria in August
122
“Nigeria Lashes at World’s Focus on Libya While I. Coast Burns,” AFP, March 22, 2011.
CIA, “Nigeria”, The World Factbook, March 8, 2011.
124
“Governing Party Wins in Nigeria, but Many Claim Fraud,” New York Times, April 23, 2007.
123
125
Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer before the House Subcommittee on Africa and Global
Health, June 7, 2007.
126
U.S. Department of State, “Remarks by Ambassador Carson on Secretary Clinton’s Africa Trip,” July 30, 2009.
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2009 on her first visit to the continent as Secretary of State, which included six other countries.
Clinton’s discussions in Nigeria focused on regional security, democracy, corruption, and
economic development. In her remarks during the visit, she stressed the need for electoral reform
and expressed support for the government’s political approach toward resolving the conflict in the
Niger Delta.127 The United States and Nigeria agreed in January 2010 to establish a binational
commission on areas of mutual concern, as called for by Members of the House of
Representatives in H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and
2011. The first meetings of the commission, formally established in April following then-Acting
President Jonathan’s participation in the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, were held
in late May 2010. The commission is composed of four working groups that meet regularly: Good
Governance, Transparency, and Integrity; Energy and Investment; Food Security and Agriculture;
and Niger Delta and Regional Security Cooperation.
U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Maritime Security Issues
Nigeria is an important trading partner for the United States and is the largest beneficiary of U.S.
investment on the continent. The country is eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth
and Opportunity Act (AGOA); AGOA-eligible exports account for over 90% of its exports to the
United States, which totaled over $30 billion in 2010. Nearly all of these exports were petroleum.
Nigeria vies with Venezuela to be the United States’ fourth-largest source of imported oil (behind
Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia), depending on how much of its oil production is shut-in in
any given month. U.S. imports account for over 40% of Nigeria’s total crude oil exports, making
the United States Nigeria’s largest trading partner. U.S. energy companies may face increasing
competition for rights to the country’s energy resources; China, for example, has offered Nigeria
favorable loans for infrastructure projects in exchange for oil exploration rights. The NNPC
signed an agreement with Russia’s Gazprom in 2009 to create a joint venture for oil and gas
exploration. Nigeria has also signed an agreement with Algeria and Niger to build a 2,500-mile
pipeline across their territories to deliver gas to Europe, though its prospects are uncertain.
Nigeria exports natural gas to neighboring countries through the new West Africa Gas Pipeline.
Gulf of Guinea crude is prized on the world market for its low sulphur content, and Nigeria’s
proximity to the United States relative to that of Middle East oil-producing countries makes its oil
particularly attractive to U.S. interests. In 2005, the United States, Nigeria, and other interested
partners initiated the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy, a forum through which
participants would work to address challenges to oil production. Other regional and international
initiatives focused on maritime security in the Gulf have followed. 128 Nigeria’s waters have been
named among the most dangerous in the world; the country ranked first in global pirate attacks
until it was overtaken by Somalia in 2008, according to the International Maritime Bureau.
Nigeria is also considered a growing transshipment hub for narcotics trafficking, and several
Nigerian criminal organizations have been implicated in the trade. 129 The U.S. Navy has increased
its operations in the Gulf of Guinea in recent years to enhance security in the region and in 2007
launched a new initiative, the African Partnership Station (APS).130 APS deployments have
127
U.S. Department of State, “Remarks With Nigerian Foreign Minister Ojo Maduekwe,” August 12, 2009.
For further information on maritime and port security issues in the region, see, e.g., the Atlantic Council, Advancing
U.S., African, and Global Interests: Security and Stability in the West African Maritime Domain, November 30, 2010.
129
CRS Report R40838, Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook.
130
Under APS, U.S. and partner naval ships deploy to the region for several months to serve as a continuing sea base of
operations and a “floating schoolhouse” to provide assistance and training to the Gulf nations. Training focuses on
(continued...)
128
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included port visits to Nigeria and joint exercises between U.S., Nigerian, European, and other
regional navies. Nigerian military personnel have also embarked onboard as trainees, and a
Nigerian naval captain has served as the APS Deputy Commander. The Department of Defense’s
newest regional combatant command, Africa Command (AFRICOM), has maintained this
increased focus on maritime security in the region. 131
Nigeria’s Role in Regional Stability
Nigeria plays a significant role in peace and stability operations across Africa. Former President
Obasanjo reportedly played a critical role in building consensus on the continent for cooperation
with U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. The Nigerian parliament adopted new anti-terrorism
legislation in February 2011 after a series of bombings in the country. The United States provides
the country with military training with an emphasis on professionalization and respect for human
rights and civilian authority through a range of security assistance programs, including those
focused on enhancing its peacekeeping capabilities. Nigeria is also a participant in the State
Department’s Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a U.S. interagency effort that
aims to increase border protection and regional counter-terrorism capabilities. The State
Department has established 10 “American Corners” to share information on American culture and
values with Nigerians.
U.S. Assistance to Nigeria
The United States is the largest bilateral donor in Nigeria, having provided over $614 million in
foreign aid to the country in FY2010. Democratic governance, agriculture and economic reform,
improved education and health services, professionalization and reform of the security services,
and HIV/AIDS have been the main focus for U.S. assistance programs in recent years. Nigeria is
a focus country under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President’s
Malaria Initiative (PMI), and the Obama Administration’s new Feed the Future (FTF) Initiative.
The State Department’s FY2012 budget request, which totals $660.5 million, includes
approximately $588 million (89% of the total) in funding for HIV/AIDS and related health
programs. In 2008, the State Department’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found that:
Exceptionally high funding levels for HIV/AIDS create a clear imbalance in the embassy
program mix and present a skewed picture of U.S. policy priorities. In addition, this level of
HIV/AIDS funding has unintended consequences for Nigeria’s broader health infrastructure,
monopolizing the country’s supplies of medical goods and services, including the qualified
health professionals needed to meet Nigeria’s other health needs.132
Although AIDS-related interventions have composed the majority of health funding for Nigeria,
the funds also target other health concerns, including maternal and child health, malaria, and
(...continued)
maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, port facilities management and security, seamanship/navigation,
search and rescue, leadership, logistics, civil engineering, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
131
For more information on AFRICOM and Nigeria’s response to the command’s creation, see CRS Report RL34003,
Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
132
U.S. Department of State Office of the Inspector General, Report on Inspection: Embassy Abuja and Consulate
General Lagos, Nigeria, Report Number ISP-I-08-25A, July 2008.
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tuberculosis. U.S. health assistance focused on tuberculosis aims to double the case detection rate
and halve Nigeria’s incidence in the next decade.
In addition to health programs, the State Department’s FY2012 foreign assistance request for
Nigeria includes funding for an array of programs focused on economic growth, education, and
good governance. U.S. economic and agriculture assistance supports programs that will increase
productivity and build trade and investment capacity. Such assistance also aims to address climate
change, including through efforts to increase the production of clean energy and reduce gas
flaring. As the request points out, one-third of Nigeria’s 30 million school-aged children are not
enrolled in school, and the request includes over $15 million in basic education funding. The
FY2012 request would further increase assistance for programs aimed at strengthening
democratic governance in Nigeria, up from $9.5 million in FY2008, $16 million in FY2009, and
$21 million in FY2010, to over $27 million for the upcoming fiscal year. USAID provided over
$14 million to support the 2011 elections, which included funding for technical assistance
provided by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to increase INEC capacity.
The Administration has requested funding in FY2012 for new conflict mitigation programs to
address extremism in the north and conflict in the Niger Delta. USAID has paired with Chevron
on a four-year, $50 million program (of which USAID is contributing half) to improve
agricultural development as well as civil society and governance capacity in the Delta.
USAID is implementing several “flagship” programs designed to concentrate resources and
achieve maximum impact. They are focused on two northern Nigerian states: Bauchi and Sokoto
(within Nigeria, human development indicators are lowest in the north). USAID’s flagship
education project, the Northern Education Initiative (NEI), is being implemented in the two focus
states to strengthen state and local government systems for the delivery of education services.
USAID’s flagship peace and democratic governance project in the two focus states is known as
Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy and Development (LEAD). The project is designed to
build partnerships between state and local governments, civil society, and the private sector to
improve governance, accountability, and service delivery. A third flagship program, the five-year,
$85 million Targeted States High Impact Project (TSHIP) is being implemented in the focus states
to reduce maternal and child deaths. The project aims to build the states’ health systems to
effectively deliver primary health care, and to support overall improvement of the primary health
care delivery system through capacity building and institutional strengthening.
U.S. security assistance to Nigeria was suspended from FY2003 until 2006, when the State
Department restarted a modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.133
Security cooperation has increased since then, and the State Department’s FY2012 security
assistance request, which focuses on military professionalization, peacekeeping support and
training, and land and maritime border security, includes $1 million in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) and almost $1 million for IMET. Nigeria has also received maritime security assistance
through the U.S. Navy’s Africa Partnership Station and the State Department’s African Coastal
and Border Security (ACBS) program. 134 As an important troop contributor to peacekeeping
missions, Nigeria continues to receive U.S. support through the African Contingency Operations
133
P.L. 109-102 restricted FY2006 FMF and IMET funding for Nigeria due to issues related to former Liberian
President Charles Taylor. Those restrictions were lifted after Nigeria surrendered Taylor to the Special Court for Sierra
Leone.
134
For more information on APS, see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of
the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
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Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. The country also participates in security cooperation
activities with the California National Guard through the National Guard State Partnership
Program. U.S. counterterrorism assistance to Nigeria includes programs coordinated through
TSCTP. Nigeria has also received security assistance through DOD funds, including $2.2 million
in “Section 1206” funding for the development of a counterterrorism infantry company and $6.2
million aimed at building the capacity of the country’s counterterrorism unit and its tactical
communications interoperability.135 Nigeria also received coastal radar and communications
training and equipment through regional Section 1206 programs.
Recent Congressional Interest
The United States Congress continues to monitor political developments in Nigeria. During the
111th Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing “Examining the U.S.Nigeria Relationship in a Time of Transition.” The 110th Congress closely followed Nigeria’s
2007 elections. Days prior to those elections, Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
publicly expressed “serious concern about the prospects for free, fair, and peaceful conduct” of
the elections. Following the elections, Senator Russ Feingold issued a statement condemning
electoral irregularities, saying “President Obasanjo’s leadership over the last eight years has been
called into question by the failure of efforts to reform Nigeria’s electoral system and combat
political corruption. The Administration should not legitimize this election as doing so would
undermine our commitment to good governance and transparency, and to building strong
democracies.”136 The House Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health subsequently held a
hearing entitled “Nigeria at a Crossroads: Elections, Legitimacy, and a Way Forward.” Nigeria’s
flawed elections also featured prominently in a July 2007 hearing on democracy in Africa by the
Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs.
Congress also continues to monitor Nigeria’s energy sector and its role in world oil supplies, as
well as humanitarian and human rights issues in the country. Congressional hearings have
examined the attempted terrorist attack by a Nigerian citizen on a U.S. airliner in December 2009,
raising concerns with the State Department’s visa process and with “systematic failures across the
Intelligence Community (IC), which contributed to the failure to identify the threat.”137 The
Director of National Intelligence, during February 2011 hearings by the House and Senate
intelligence communities on worldwide threats, highlighted a range of security concerns in
Nigeria in his testimony, including political and sectarian violence and militancy in the Niger
Delta and the northeast, and suggesting that although the group Boko Haram appears focused on
local issues, “it may be pursuing interests it shares with” a regional Al Qaeda affiliate, AQIM.
Congressional attention to these and other issues is expected to continue in the 112th Congress.
135
For more information on DOD’s global train and equip or “Section 1206” authority, see CRS Report RS22855,
Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
136
See “Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold on the Marred Nigerian Election,” April 23, 2007, at
http://feingold.senate.gov.
137
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Unclassified Executive Summary of the Committee Report on the
Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253,” May 18, 2010.
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Figure 2. Map of Nigeria
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Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
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elections.11 President Jonathan won praise for replacing the sitting INEC chairman with a
(...continued)
late General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, served as Vice President under Obasanjo in the first military regime to transfer
power to civilian rule, and he was reported to be one of Nigeria’s wealthiest and most powerful men. Shehu died in
prison in 1997 after having been sentenced by a military tribunal for treason after calling for dictator Sani Abacha to
reestablish civilian rule. Yar’Adua’s father was a prominent minster in the first government after independence.
6
“Nigeria: Elections Fraudulent; EU, Others,” Daily Trust (Abuja), April 24, 2007.
7
The National Democratic Institute (NDI), “Statement of the National Democratic Institute International Election
Observer Delegation to Nigeria’s April 21 Presidential and National Assembly Elections,” April 23, 2007.
8
The International Republican Institute (IRI), “Nigeria’s Elections Below Acceptable Standards: Preliminary Findings
of IRI’s International Election Observation Mission,” April 22, 2007.
9
“Obasanjo Appeals to Nigerians Over Election Results,” Radio Nigeria-Abuja, April 23, 2007, and “Nigerian
President Olusegun Obasanjo Says Elections Flawed, But Not Fatally,” Associated Press, April 25, 2007.
10
“Landslide Win for Yar’Adua is ‘Flawed,’” Financial Times, April 23, 2007.
11
International Crisis Group (ICG), “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis,” Africa Report No. 123, March
(continued...)
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respected academic and civil society activist, Professor Attahiru Jega. Despite lingering concerns
about the independence of some state-level electoral officials,12 Nigerians were optimistic that the
2011 polls would be more credible than the last, according to a survey conducted in late 2010.13
Turnout was high for the voter registration exercise, launched in January 2011 to compile a more
credible register. INEC reported over 870,000 cases of multiple registration, raising concerns
about “widespread but not yet systemic fraud.”14 The exercise nevertheless appeared to increase
voter confidence and many observers generally deemed the register an improvement over
previous efforts, although not without problems.
A delayed rerun in January 2011 of one of the flawed 2007 gubernatorial elections was viewed as
another test for INEC’s new management. Observer reports suggest that, while rigging and voter
intimidation occurred, the poll was an improvement in a state heavily controlled by the PDP. By
one account, the rerun “demonstrated both the potential for INEC to administer improved
elections with the support of communities and the risk that political actors can still overwhelm
reforms with systematic fraud.”15 As April approached, analysts argued that Jega’s INEC had
demonstrated the will, if not necessarily the capacity, to overcome problems in the 2011 polls.
Observers noted positive developments prior to the elections, but also raised concerns about
electoral preparedness and other areas deemed problematic in previous polls, including ballot
secrecy, intimidation, and transparency in the counting of ballots and tabulation of results.16
Previous instances of electoral fraud included the falsification of voter information, bribery, theft,
incitement, and intimidation. Some civil society groups suggested that these practices were likely
to occur in the 2011 elections, but that there might be a shift “from blatant fraud with state
acquiescence to a pattern of suppressing opposition voting areas while inflating strongholds.”17
The International Crisis Group declared the party primaries to be “as manipulated as ever,”
resulting in court challenges to the parties’ candidate lists.18 Last minute court rulings related to
the lists required ballots to be reprinted and caused delays in the delivery of voting materials.
As mentioned above, there has been an unwritten agreement that the presidency should rotate
among the country’s regions, and there was considerable debate on whether Jonathan’s decision
to vie for the presidency would lead the ruling party to split. Prior to the party primaries, many
northerners argued that since Yar’Adua, a northerner, had only served one term, a candidate from
their region should hold the office for another term, given that Obasanjo, a southerner, had two
terms in office. Some reports suggest that a lack of consensus among the PDP elite on the zoning
(...continued)
28, 2007, p. 14.
12
ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Africa Briefing No.79, February 24, 2011; Breaking the
Cycle of Electoral Violence in Nigeria, U.S. Institute for Peace, December 2010.
13
A poll conducted by IRI in late 2010 indicated that over 60% of Nigerians had confidence in the new electoral
commission, and that 74% of Nigerians thought the 2011 polls would be more credible that the last.
14
ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid.
15
Stakeholder Democracy Network, The Delta Governorship Rerun: Signposts and Storm Warnings for the 2011
Elections, February 24, 2011.
16
See, e.g., IRI, “Statement of IRI’s Pre-Election Assessment Mission,” March 3, 2011; NDI, “Nigeria Election
Watch,” Issue 3, March 15, 2011.
17
Stakeholder Democracy Network, The Delta Governorship Rerun, Ibid.
18
ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid; NDI, “Nigeria Election Watch,” Issue 3, Ibid.
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issue contributed to the apparent reluctance by Yar’Adua’s cabinet to formally transfer power to
Jonathan in early 2010 (see below). Jonathan ultimately won the support of key PDP leaders,
including a majority of the northern governors, for his candidacy, winning the primary
overwhelmingly with over 2,700 votes against roughly 800 for his northern rival, Atiku Abubakar.
President Jonathan, along with his running mate, Vice President Namadi Sambo (a northerner),
was among almost 20 candidates contesting the presidency, including former military leader
Muhammadu Buhari,19 representing the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC); former head of
Nigeria’s anti-corruption authority Nuhu Ribadu, representing the Action Congress of Nigeria
(ACN); and a northern state governor, Ibrahim Shekaru, representing the ANPP. These three
leading opposition contenders all hailed from the north and chose running mates from the south.
With over 73 million registered voters, almost 120,000 polling stations, and more than 50
political parties, the challenges facing INEC were daunting. The 2011 elections were scheduled to
be held on three successive Saturdays in April; however, logistical delays in the delivery of
materials to polling stations across the country resulted in all three elections being delayed by a
week. 20 For some, the delay reinforced concerns regarding the polls’ credibility. Others argued
that the “trial run” allowed INEC the opportunity to identify and address some deficiencies.
The ruling PDP maintained its dominant position in Nigerian politics in the 2011 elections,
retaining the presidency, a majority of the seats in the National Assembly, the gubernatorial posts
and state assemblies. The CPC and ACN made some significant regional gains, however. The
ACN dominated state elections in the southwest, where the PDP retained a majority in only one
of the state assemblies and lost all gubernatorial positions. Nationally, opposition parties now
control 13 governors’ posts and hold a majority in 10 state assemblies.21 Incumbent President
Goodluck Jonathan won 59.6% of the vote, taking a majority in 23 states and gaining enough
support nationwide to avoid a run-off.22 Buhari, who followed with 32.3% of the votes, led in
one-third of the states, notably in the north. Ribadu came in third with 5.5% of the votes.
19
General Buhari also ran for the presidency in 2003 and 2007.
Gubernatorial elections were not held in 10 states 2007 election results were overturned or rerun.
21
Opposition candidates took Ogun, Oyo, and Lagos in the southwest (ACN), Yobe in the north (ANPP), and Imo in
the southeast (APGA). ANPP retained control in Borno and Zamfara. The CPC won Nasarawa from the ANPP. Osun,
Ekiti, Ondo, Edo, and Anambra were already held by the opposition.
22
A candidate must win at least 25% in at least two-thirds of the states and the Federal Capital Territory to avoid a
runoff. Jonathan gained at least 25% in 31 states. Buhari gained 25% in 18 states.
20
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Figure 1. Results of the 2011 Presidential Election
Source: BBC, adapted by CRS.
U.S. government comments on the conduct of the 2011 elections were largely positive. Secretary
of State Clinton declared, “This historic event marks a dramatic shift from decades of failed
elections and a substantial improvement” over the 2007 election, but noted that “while this
election was a success for the people of Nigeria, it was far from perfect.”23 Another senior State
Department official called the polls “the most successful elections since [Nigeria’s] return to
multiparty democracy, ... despite some technical imperfections,” and argued that “this reverses a
downward democratic trajectory and provides the country a solid foundation for strengthening its
electoral procedures and democratic institutions.”24 When President Obama called to congratulate
President Jonathan, he stated that “the success of the elections was a testament to Nigerian voters
who...were determined that these elections mark a new chapter in Nigerian history.”25
23
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Press Release: Election in Nigeria, April 19, 2011.
Special Briefing by Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, “The Recent Elections in Nigeria,” April 28, 2011.
25
The White House, Statement by President Obama on Elections in Nigeria, May 4, 2011.
24
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International observers also generally noted significant improvements in the electoral process in
the National Assembly and presidential polls, but most stopped short of calling the elections “free
and fair.” The IRI and NDI delegations both termed the 2011 elections a key step forward.26 The
African Union called the legislative and presidential elections “credible and creditable and
reflect(ing) the will of the Nigerian people.”27 The Commonwealth declared that “previously held
notions that Nigeria can only hold flawed elections are now being discarded and this country can
now shake off that stigma and redeem its image.”28 The European Union (EU) was also generally
positive, but raised concerns with presidential results from some states in the Niger Delta and the
southeast, where turnout appeared to be near 100%.29 This echoes the findings of some domestic
groups, who reported the largest number of electoral incidents in the “south-south” (i.e., the Niger
Delta) and southeast, including intimidation, harassment, and in some cases, violence.30 Underage voting was cited as a common concern by observers, and most suggested that over-crowding
at polling stations and complicated vote collation procedures vulnerable to error or malfeasance
remained a problem during the polls. The EU delegation, one of the few groups to observe the
state elections, found that they “did not resemble the quality of the process and environment of
the elections for President and National Assembly,” and noted increased attempts to influence
voters.31 Domestic observer reports suggest harassment increased in the state elections.
Various parties filed legal suits challenging the results of the 2011 elections. Nigeria’s Supreme
Court upheld a verdict rejecting the CPC’s challenge to President Jonathan’s win in December
2011. Nigeria’s next elections are scheduled for 2015.
Violence Surrounding and Following the 2011 Elections
Despite generally positive preliminary statements on the conduct of the April 2011 legislative and
presidential elections, election-related violence surrounding the polls was higher than in previous
years, highlighting lingering communal tensions. Rioting that broke out in the north in protest of
President Jonathan’s win reflected grievances that many in that region feel had been left
unaddressed by the ruling party.
Violence had accompanied previous elections in Nigeria. Over 150 people were estimated to have
been killed in violence related to the 2003 elections, and by some estimates, as many as 350
people were killed in violence related to the 2007 polls.32 Violence prior to the 2011 elections
included clashes between party supporters and several assassinations. Poll-related security
concerns were further heightened by a spate of bombings during political rallies, predominantly
in Bayelsa state in the Delta. There were at least six bombings in April in the northeast state of
Borno, where Boko Haram, a local militant Islamist group, has been most active. Boko Haram
claimed responsibility in January 2011 for the assassination of the state’s leading gubernatorial
candidate and several of his supporters. On the eve of the legislative elections, a bombing at the
26
IRI, “Nigerian Election Major Step Forward,” April 18, 2011; NDI, “Statement of the National Democratic
Institute’s International Election Observer Mission to Nigeria’s April 16 Presidential Election,” April 18, 2011.
27
Preliminary Statement of the AU Observer Mission on the 2011 Presidential Election in Nigeria, April 16, 2011.
28
Interim Statement by the Chairman of the Commonwealth Observer Group, April 18, 2011.
29
Preliminary Statement of the European Union Election Observation Mission, April 18, 2011.
30
Project 2011 Swift Count (www.pscnigeria.org) and the Transition Monitoring Group (www.tmgelection2011.org).
31
EU Election Observation Mission, Press Release: EU EOM on the Elections of 26 and 28 April, April 29, 2011.
32
HRW, “Nigeria: Pass Bill to Prosecute Electoral Abuses,” March 13, 2011.
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state election commission headquarters in Niger state killed at least 10 people. President Jonathan
and Chairman Jega pledged to increase security during the elections, and observers generally
commented positively on the presence and behavior of security forces during the polls.
Protests erupted in the northern states the day after the presidential election, with Buhari
supporters alleging that the ruling party had rigged the election. The protests devolved into
violent riots and, in some areas, killings, largely along religious and ethnic lines. In some parts of
the north, the violence lasted for several days until soldiers were deployed to enforce stability. At
least 800 people were killed in a three-day period, according Human Rights Watch, and as many
as 65,000 displaced. An independent panel led by a prominent Islamic scholar who was appointed
to conduct an official government inquiry into the post-election violence submitted a final report
in October 2011, faulting the failure of successive administrations to act on the recommendations
of previous commissions on communal and political violence. The panel also suggested that
statements made by politicians such as Buhari for voters to “guard their votes” may have fueled
popular frustrations and inadvertently sparked acts of violence.33
The Death of President Yar’Adua and the Transition of Power
Questions about President Yar’Adua’s health plagued his administration throughout his tenure (2007-2010). Many
speculate that he suffered from a chronic kidney condition, and his hospitalization in Saudi Arabia in November 2009,
reportedly with acute pericarditis, threatened to spark a political crisis. His prolonged absence spurred rumors of his
death, and several groups launched legal suits suggesting that Yar’Adua had violated the constitution by not
transferring power during his absence. Some observers contend that the president was completely incapacitated, and
that close advisors, including his wife, were making decisions for him.34 President Yar’Adua’s absence also raised
concerns regarding a tenuous ceasefire with Niger Delta militants.35
Pressure for presidential authority to be transferred to Vice President Jonathan increased in early 2010, despite the
cabinet declaring Yar’Adua fit for office in late January and a court ruling that there was no need for a formal transfer
of power during a “medical vacation.” Under pressure from influential state governors, the National Assembly passed
resolutions recognizing Jonathan as the acting head of state. The cabinet accepted the National Assembly’s decision.
Although the resolutions were not legally binding, the move allowed Jonathan to conduct critical government
business. In June 2010, in response to the ambiguity surrounding Jonathan’s role as acting president, the National
Assembly amended the constitution to address procedures for the temporary transfer of presidential powers in the
event of the president’s absence or inability to discharge his duties.
On May 5, 2010, the Nigerian government announced the death of President Yar’Adua at age 58. Goodluck Jonathan
was sworn in as Nigeria’s new president the following day, choosing as his vice president Namadi Sambo, a former
architect and governor of the northern state of Kaduna.
Development Challenges and Reform Initiatives
Nigeria generates over $60 billion a year in oil and gas revenue, but despite its large economy its
population is among Africa’s poorest. As many as 70% of Nigerians live beneath the poverty line,
and the average life expectancy is less than 48 years. Nigeria also has the world’s second-largest
HIV/AIDS population (after South Africa). Access to clean water remains a major challenge—
33
“Post-Election Violence – FG Panel Report Indicts Buhari,” Vanguard, October 11, 2011.
John Campbell, “Nigeria Fragmented and Unstable,” Huffington Post, March 5, 2010, and “On Her Majesty’s Secret
Service,” Africa Confidential, March 5. 2010.
35
“MEND’s Fresh Resurgence as Yar’Adua’s Absence Enters 2nd Month,” AllAfrica, January 4, 2010.
34
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almost half the population has no access to improved sources of water and less than one-fifth of
households are served by piped water. Sanitation is also a problem, with 30% of people lacking
access to adequate sanitation. Diarrhea remains the second-leading cause of death among
Nigerian children, and the country ranks second only to India in the number of diarrhea-related
child deaths globally. The country ranks 156th out of 187 countries on U.N. Development
Program’s (UNDP) 2011 Human Development Index.36 Due to decades of economic
mismanagement, political instability, and widespread corruption, Nigeria’s education and social
services systems have suffered from lack of funding, industry has idled, and Africa’s largest oil
producer suffers periodically from severe fuel and electricity shortages.
When Goodluck Jonathan assumed power in February 2010 from the ailing President Yar’Adua,
he made public commitments to “restoring Nigeria’s image” abroad, both by continuing to act as
a key partner in regional peace and counterterrorism efforts, and by ending the “culture of
impunity” in Nigeria in terms of corruption and human rights concerns.37 He vowed to continue
President Yar’Adua’s various reform initiatives. Those efforts are discussed below.
Reforms to the Petroleum and Energy Sectors
Nigeria’s economy depends heavily on its oil sector, and for decades, as the country’s extractive
industries grew, many of its other industries stagnated or declined. According to the World Bank,
oil and gas production accounts for almost 80% of government revenues and 95% of export
earnings. Despite increased deepwater oil production, persistent conflict and criminality in the
oil-producing Niger Delta region and swings in world oil prices have threatened Nigeria’s fiscal
outlook for much of the past decade. Economists suggest that the economy continues to
underperform because of poor infrastructure and electricity shortages, although the performance
of the manufacturing and telecommunications sectors is improving. Agricultural production
contributes over one-third of GDP, but less than 5% of exports.
President Jonathan has stressed his commitment to reforming the oil and gas industry. In 2007,
the government announced plans to restructure the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC), which oversees regulation of the industry and has been criticized for its lack of
transparency. Nigeria’s oil and gas sector has long been a focal point for corruption charges, and
numerous government officials have been accused of taking bribes in exchange for approving
deals with foreign firms. President Yar’Adua appointed a committee to review Nigeria’s contracts
with foreign oil companies, a process through which the committee chair suggested, “We may
have to reconsider some of our generous terms.”38 President Jonathan appointed Nigeria’s first
female oil minister, Diezani Allison-Madueke, a former executive with Royal Dutch Shell, in
2010. She is leading the administration’s efforts to press parliament to pass the ambitious
Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which would restructure the NNPC and reportedly increase
transparency within the industry. Nigeria was designated compliant with the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI), a global standard for transparency in the oil, gas, and mining
sectors, in March 2011.
36
The UNDP index is a composite measure of life expectancy, adult literacy and school enrollment, and income.
President Jonathan has referred to Nigeria’s “culture of impunity” in several speeches, including one quoted in
“Again, We’ve Succeeded in Moving Nigeria Forward - Jonathan,” Daily Champion (Lagos), February 10, 2010.
38
Matthew Green, “Nigeria Considers Oil Contracts Review,” Financial Times, October 23, 2007.
37
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Despite its position as one of the world’s largest exporters of oil, Nigeria imports an estimated
$10 billion in refined fuel annually, and it continues to face a nationwide power crisis. In an effort
to increase its refining capacity, the government has granted permits for the construction of
several independently owned refineries. The government aims to halt oil imports by 2020. In
2010, with two of Nigeria’s existing four oil refineries running at only 60% capacity, the NNPC
signed a $23 billion agreement with China for the construction of three new refineries.39
In addition to its oil reserves, Nigeria has the ninth-largest natural gas reserves in the world and
the largest in Africa, but to date they have provided little benefit to the Nigerian economy. Many
of Nigeria’s oil fields lack the infrastructure to produce natural gas. The government has
repeatedly set deadlines for oil companies to stop flaring gas at oil wells, estimated at roughly
one-third of annual production and $2.5 billion in lost revenue, but significant flaring has
continued.40 In March 2011, President Jonathan announced a series of new agreements to develop
gas processing facilities as part of a “gas revolution” designed to create new jobs and revenues
and to end flaring.41 Nigeria is in the process of increasing its liquefied natural gas (LNG)
exports, which could surpass revenues derived from oil exports in the next decade. Nigeria now
exports natural gas to Benin, Togo, and Ghana through the new West Africa Gas Pipeline. The
initiative, led by Chevron, had been delayed due to supply shortages resulting from sabotage to
production facilities in the Niger Delta. Reports suggest that gas supplies have increased as
pipelines have been repaired since 2009.
A decision by the Jonathan Administration in late 2011 to remove a fuel subsidy, which totaled
almost $8 billion annually (roughly one-quarter of the government’s 2012 budget), was
controversial domestically. In removing the subsidy, fuel prices doubled in early January 2012,
leading to mass protests. The subsidy benefit has long been deemed unsustainable by economists,
but in the face of a nationwide strike by unions, the government was forced to compromise and
reinstate a partial subsidy. The Jonathan Administration plans to refocus funds from the subsidy
cut on improving health, education, and the nation’s power supply.
The Jonathan Administration has pledged to increase Nigeria’s electricity generation tenfold over
the next decade; President Jonathan emphasized this as a key priority in his campaign. Efforts to
privatize power stations and distribution companies are underway, despite objections from the
country’s trade unions, but are behind schedule. The Obama Administration has praised the
government for its progress thus far in rehabilitating the power sector,42 but its ability to deliver
on its promises of improved supply will be a key test for President Jonathan.
Financial Sector Reforms
Successive Nigerian administrations have made commitments to economic reform, but their track
record is mixed. According to the IMF, reforms initiated under the Obasanjo Administration and
continued by his successors, most importantly the policies of maintaining low external debt and
budgeting based on a conservative oil price benchmark to create a buffer of foreign reserves,
39
“Two Nigerian Refineries Running at 60 Pct Capacity,” Reuters, March 30, 2010.
U.S. Energy Information Administration
41
“Jonathan Sets Agenda for Ending Gas Flaring,” BusinessDay, March 25, 2011.
42
U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Commends Nigerian Authorities on Power Sector Reforms,” January 14, 2011.
40
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lessened the impact of the recent global economic crisis on Nigeria’s economy.43 Oil revenues
above the benchmark price have been saved since 2003 in an Excess Crude Account (ECA),
although the government drew substantially from the account in 2009-2010 in an effort to
stimulate economic recovery. The ECA’s balance fell from $20 billion in early 2009 to less than
$500 million in September 2010, but Nigerian officials report that the rise in the price of oil
brought the ECA back above $2 billion at the end of 2010, and it has since risen to over $4
billion.44 The Jonathan Administration’s efforts to create a sovereign wealth fund, which would
draw seed money from the ECA, have met with some resistance from the state governors. The
country has made significant gains in the past decade in paying down its external debt, which
declined from 36% of GDP in 2004 to under 3%, freeing funding for programs aimed at poverty
reduction and reaching the country’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Like his predecessors, President Jonathan has committed his Administration to reforms that aim
to fuel development. In mid-2011 he appointed World Bank managing director Ngozi OkonjoIweala, who led efforts to reduce Nigeria’s debt while serving as finance minister under President
Obasanjo, to resume her former post at the finance ministry. Jonathan has retained Lamido Sanusi
as governor of Central Bank of Nigeria. He has led efforts to modernize the country’s banking
system, pushing reforms to tighten banking supervision. In late 2009 he instituted new regulations
that require banks to report large cash transactions between accounts if one of the account holders
is considered to be “politically exposed.” Bank audits ordered by Sanusi in 2009 found 10 banks
near collapse due to reckless lending; most of the banks’ top executives were fired. The
government provided $4 billion in 2009 to rescue the banks, and in late 2010, under pressure
from Sanusi, the legislature approved the establishment of the Asset Management Company of
Nigeria (AMCON) to buy bad bank loans in exchange for government bonds, in an effort to get
the banks lending again. AMCON is jointly funded by the central bank and the finance ministry.
Some Nigerian legislators believe the central bank overstepped its authority in rescuing the banks.
By some estimates it may take a decade for AMCON to divest its toxic assets.45
Efforts to Combat Corruption
According to the U.S. State Department, corruption in Nigeria is “massive, widespread, and
pervasive.”46 Nigeria’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index has
consistently worsened in the past three years, after momentarily improving in 2008 following
President Yar’Adua’s victory.47 Human Rights Watch suggests that the country’s political system
rewards rather than punishes corruption, which has been fueled by oil revenues for decades.48
Nigeria also has one of the world’s highest incidences of cyber crime, including “419 scams,” sonamed for the country’s penal code that outlaws fraudulent e-mails. Observers suggest that the
43
International Monetary Fund, “Staff Report for the Article IV Consultation with Nigeria,” January 27, 2011. The
price benchmarks set by the Nigerian government are $58/barrel for 2011, $60 for 2012, and $62 for 2013.
44
EIU, “Nigeria,” Country Reports, March 2011 and November 2011.
45
AMCON bought non-performing loans from 9 rescued banks and margin loans from 12 other domestic banks.
46
U.S. State Department, “Nigeria,” Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2009, March 2010.
47
The Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceptions of business people and country analysts regarding the
degree of corruption among public officials and politicians. A high score indicates greater levels of corruption.
48
HRW, Corruption on Trial?, August 25, 2011.
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country’s development will continue to be hampered until it can reverse its perceived “culture of
impunity for political and economic crimes.”49
According to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), a Nigerian law
enforcement agency created in 2003 to combat corruption and fraud, more than $380 billion has
been expropriated by the country’s political and military leaders since oil sales began in the
1970s.50 Former dictator Sani Abacha reportedly stole more than $3.5 billion during his five years
in power. Switzerland was the first country to repatriate stolen funds to Nigeria, some of which
have been used by the government toward meeting the country’s Millennium Development Goals.
The Nigerian government has recovered other funds stolen by Abacha and his family from several
European countries, but some Abacha funds remain frozen in other European accounts.
The Obasanjo Administration won praise for its efforts to combat corruption, but some observers
suggest that the former head of state also used corruption charges to sideline critics and political
opponents. EFCC investigations resulted in the arrest of more than 2,000 Nigerians for illegal
email scams and in over 130 convictions for fraud during Obasanjo’s tenure.51 The International
Crisis Group suggests that the EFCC was “used as a political weapon to whip political foes,
especially state governors likely to stand for the presidency and their supporters, into line.”52
President Yar’Adua, reportedly a devout Muslim, campaigned on an anti-corruption platform; in
1999 he became the first governor to publicly declare his assets. Upon taking the presidency, he
ordered the review of all privatization agreements approved by former President Obasanjo, amid
charges of corruption associated with the sales, and subsequently reversed several contracts.
President Yar’Adua moved to distance himself from the former president, dismissing many of
Obasanjo’s political appointees and military leaders in late 2008 and overturning several key
government contracts made by the former administration. In December 2008, he proposed that
the National Assembly amend the constitution to remove the immunity clause that prevents the
president, vice president, governors, and deputy governors from being prosecuted for corruption
while in office. His proposal was not adopted.
Human Rights Watch has called on the Jonathan Administration to reform the EFCC to increase
its independence. According to the group, the anti-corruption body has suffered from executive
interference that has undermined its investigations and derailed prosecutions, and the EFCC
chairman “remains deeply vulnerable to the whims of the president and lacks security of
tenure.”53 The transfer and eventual dismissal of the EFCC’s first chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, in late
2007, drew widespread criticism from the international donors. 54 Ribadu’s successor, a former
high-ranking police officer, Farida Waziri, was dismissed by President Jonathan in late 2011.
49
International Crisis Group, “Want in the Midst of Plenty,” Africa Report No. 113, July 19, 2006.
“Strong Convictions: Nigeria’s First Anticorruption Czar,” Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 2007.
51
“Strong Convictions: Nigeria’s First Anti-Corruption Czar,” Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 2007.
52
ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding A Political Crisis,” Ibid.
53
HRW, Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, August 2011.
54
Matthew Green, “Nigerian Anti-Graft Police Arrest Governor,” Reuters, January 22, 2008. Some questioned whether
Ribadu’s removal from office was linked to effort to prosecute former Delta State Governor James Ibori, one of
Yar’Adua’s primary financial contributors. Ibori’s case was dropped by a federal judge in late 2009.The EFCC
obtained a new warrant for his arrest in April 2010, charging that he had embezzled over $250 million. Ibori eluded
capture and fled Nigeria for Dubai, where he was arrested by Interpol in May 2010. He was extradited in April 2011 to
the United Kingdom, where he has been charged with money laundering.
50
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Several multinational corporations have been investigated for paying bribes in Nigeria. In 2007,
the German telecom giant Siemens was found guilty in a German court of paying an estimated 10
million euro in bribes to Nigerian officials. Bribes allegedly paid in relation to a Nigerian natural
gas project by the U.S. firm Halliburton, France’s Total, and Italy’s Eni are being investigated in
several countries, including France, Nigeria, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Halliburton and its
subsidiary Kellogg, Brown, and Root, Inc. (KBR) reached a $177 million settlement with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission in 2009 related to the case; KBR paid a $402 million fine
to settle Justice Department charges.55 Nigeria’s EFCC brought charges against former U.S. Vice
President Dick Cheney in early December 2010 based on his tenure as chief executive of
Halliburton, but later dropped them after the company agreed to pay $250 million in fines.
Social Issues and Security Concerns
Islamic Sharia Law
Nigeria is home to Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest Muslim population. The north is predominately
Sunni Muslim, and 12 northern states have adopted Islamic sharia law since 1999 to adjudicate
criminal and civil matters for Muslims.56 Non-sharia based common law and customary law
courts adjudicate cases involving non-Muslims in these states, and sharia-based criminal law
courts are elective for non-Muslims. In some states, the introduction of sharia was a flashpoint
between Muslims and Christians. The State Department reports that sharia “technically does not
apply to non-Muslims in civil and criminal proceedings,” although observers note that Islamic
mores are often enforced in public without regard for citizens’ religion. In some areas, statefunded vigilante groups known as hisbah patrol public areas and attempt to enforce sharia-based
rulings. Many analysts nonetheless see the interpretation and implementation of Nigerian sharia
as moderate in comparison to that of some other Muslim-majority countries.
Sectarian Violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has recommended since 2009 that
Nigeria be classified as a “Country of Particular Concern” for religious freedom violations. It is
not currently designated as such by the Secretary of State. According to the Commission, as many
as 13,000 Nigerians have been killed since 1999 in sectarian violence, and the commissioners
have based their recommendation on their belief that the Nigerian government is tolerating the
violence. The Commission’s 2011 report notes some progress by the government, however, citing
the first prosecutions, in late 2010, against perpetrators of religious violence in more than a
decade.57 The State Department, in its annual Religious Freedom report, states that “the
government generally respected religious freedom in practice, although some local political actors
stoked communal and sectarian violence with impunity.”58
55
“Halliburton, KBR Paying $547 Million in Bribery Settlement,” Market Watch, February 11, 2009.
Nigerian law protects freedom of religion and permits states to establish courts based on common law or customary
law systems. Non-sharia based common law and customary law courts adjudicate cases involving non-Muslims in these
states, and sharia-based criminal law courts are elective for non-Muslims.
57
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2011, May 2011.
58
U.S. Department of State, July-December 2010 International Religious Freedom Report, September 13, 2011.
56
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Sectarian violence continues to be a particular problem in Jos, the capital of Plateau State in
central Nigeria, which sits between the predominately Muslim north and Christian south. Clashes
among communities in this culturally diverse “Middle Belt” in the past decade reflect tensions
that are both religious and ethnic, and which have been exacerbated by some local politicians.
These tensions stem from a competition over resources—land, education, government jobs—
between ethnic groups classified as settlers or “indigene” (original inhabitants of the state), a
designation that conveys political and economic benefits. In Jos, the mostly Christian Berom are
considered indigene, and the predominately Muslim Hausa-Fulani, who were traditionally
nomadic and pastoralist, are not. In 2010, the Nigerian government established a special task
force composed of both military and police to restore stability in the state; periodic outbreaks of
violence have nonetheless continued.
Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria59
Boko Haram, a violent Islamist group in northern Nigeria, has grown increasingly active. While
its attacks have not exclusively focused on Christian targets, actions attributed to the group are
fueling religious tensions in Nigeria, and may more broadly have the effect of delegitimizing the
state. Some observers have also raised concerns that Boko Haram members may be expanding
ties with more developed violent Islamist groups on the continent. The group emerged in the early
2000s as a small, radical Sunni Islamic sect that advocated a strict interpretation and
implementation of Islamic law for Nigeria. Calling itself Jama’a Ahl as-Sunna Li-da’wa wa-al
Jihad (JASLWJ; roughly translated from Arabic as “People Committed to the Propagation of the
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”), the group is more popularly known as Boko Haram (“Western
education is forbidden”), a nickname given by local Hausa-speaking communities to describe its
view that western education and culture have been corrupting influences. It engaged in periodic
skirmishes with police during its formative years, but the group’s activities were limited in scope
and contained within several highly impoverished states in the predominately Muslim northeast.
In July 2009, the Nigerian government’s attempts to stop Boko Haram’s attacks on police stations
and other government buildings resulted in at least 700 deaths. In the course of that violence, the
group’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic young cleric who had studied in Saudi Arabia,
60
was killed while in police custody. A sizeable number of Yusuf’s followers were also killed or
arrested. The group appeared to dissipate after the heavy-handed security crackdown, but
reemerged a year later, orchestrating a large-scale prison break in September 2010 that freed 700
prisoners, including more than 100 of its own members. The group’s attacks have since increased
substantially in frequency, reach, and lethality, now occurring almost daily in northeast Nigeria,
and periodically beyond. It has primarily focused its attacks on state and federal targets, but has
also targeted civilians in churches, mosques, and beer halls. Bank robberies have also been
attributed to the group and may contribute to its financing, although Nigerian authorities warn
that criminal groups may also be opportunistically posing as Boko Haram militants.
By most accounts, Boko Haram is not a monolithic organization. According to U.S. government
sources, the core group of Boko Haram militants may number in the hundreds, but the group also
draws support from a broader following of several thousand Nigerians, primarily from the
59
For more information on Boko Haram, see Congressional Research Service testimony before a hearing of the House
Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, “Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S.
Homeland?” November 30, 2011.
60
“Islamic Death ‘Good for Nigeria’,” BBC, July 31, 2009.
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northeast. Some observers suggest that attacks attributed to Boko Haram may actually be the
work of several different groups, noting variations in the tactics and bomb-making styles
employed in recent attacks. Others suggest Boko Haram may be susceptible to fracturing, with a
segment of the leadership working to build ties with the international Al Qaeda franchise while
most other elements of the group remain focused exclusively on a local agenda.
Since its reemergence, Boko Haram has appeared increasingly committed to acts that aim to
discredit and delegitimize the Nigerian state by exposing the weakness of its security apparatus
and creating generalized insecurity. Attacks attributed to the group since 2010 have increasingly
featured improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, and, more recently, suicide attacks.
According to Human Rights Watch, more than 425 people, including politicians, community and
religious leaders, members of the security forces, and civilians have been killed in attacks
61
attributed to Boko Haram.
The bombing of the U.N. building in Abuja on August 24, 2011 has put Boko Haram under
increased international scrutiny. The targeting of the United Nations marks a major departure
from the group’s previous focus on domestic targets. It was also Boko Haram’s first clearly
intentional suicide bombing. Spokesmen for the group claimed the attack was retribution for the
state’s heavy-handed security response against its members, referencing U.S. and international
“collaboration” with the Nigerian security apparatus as rationale for targeting the U.N. The
bombing may indicate an aspiration by some in Boko Haram to move beyond local politics
toward an international jihadist agenda, or it may be part of an effort to elicit backing from
international jihadists for the group’s domestic agenda. Boko Haram currently appears to pose
more of a threat to local stability than to the country as a whole. Nevertheless, there are concerns
that it may seek to align itself with more developed violent Islamist groups. The regional AQ
affiliate Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has publicly offered the group assistance.62
The attempted terrorist attack on an American airliner by a Nigerian passenger, Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, on December 25, 2009 has also contributed to concerns regarding the possible
radicalization of Nigerian Muslims. According to reports, Abdulmutallab, son of a respected
Nigerian banker and former government minister, became “radicalized” while living abroad, most
recently in Yemen, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claims to have sponsored his
attempt to detonate an explosive device while onboard a flight bound from Amsterdam to Detroit.
The attempted bombing, allegedly scheduled to coincide with Christmas Day, raised questions
regarding airport security in both the Netherlands and Nigeria, where Abdulmutallab’s journey
began. Both countries began using full body scanners in their international airports in 2010. The
attempt also led to increased screening measures at airports around the world. In January 2010,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced that passengers flying to the United
States who are citizens of 14 countries deemed to be either “state sponsors of terrorism” or
“countries of interest” would be subject to additional screening, including compulsory “patdowns.” Nigeria was among five African countries, including Algeria, Libya, Sudan, and
Somalia, included in the new regulation, and the Nigerian government protested the rule as
discriminatory.63 In April 2010, DHS announced new security measures for screening all
61
Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Nigeria: Boko Haram Attacks Indefensible,” November 8, 2011.
“Fertile Ground: The Potential for Jihad in Nigeria,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 2010.
63
“Nigeria Criticizes ‘Unfair’ US Air Passenger Screening,” BBC, January 4, 2010.
62
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passengers on international flights to the United States, superseding the regulations that
specifically targeted Nigerians for further screening.64
Abdulmutallab’s actions are considered by most to be an isolated incident. Many observers stress
that, by all accounts, his radicalization and training took place outside Nigeria. Nevertheless, the
expansion of conservative Sunni Islamist movements and clashes between security forces and
Islamist sects in northern Nigeria have raised concerns among some observers and officials that
other Nigerians may be susceptible to recruitment by Al Qaeda or other groups hoping to use
violence against government or civilian targets in Nigeria or abroad. Many Nigerian experts
caution, however, that a heavy-handed security response to the Boko Haram threat in the
northeast may further alienate local communities and possibly facilitate extremist recruitment.
Conflict in the Niger Delta
Background of the Struggle
Oil from the southern Niger Delta region has accounted for over 75% of the country’s oil
production since the 1970s, and the area’s political history has been one of conflict and
marginalization. The Delta is home to more than 30 million people. Among them are the Ogoni,
an ethnic minority whose members have received international attention for their efforts to
highlight the extensive environmental damage done by oil extraction in the region. In 1994,
author and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, president of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni
People (MOSOP), and 14 others were accused of involvement in the murder of several prominent
Ogoni politicians. They pled not guilty, but Saro-Wiwa and eight others were convicted and
sentenced to death in 1995. Their executions sparked international outrage against the regime of
dictator Sani Abacha, who was accused of extensive human rights abuses. The United States
recalled its ambassador in response. In 2009, Shell established a trust fund to benefit the Ogoni
people, part of a $15.5 million settlement in a New York court case related to the 1995
executions. The company maintains that it played no role in the executions or other abuses.
Criminality and Violence
Nigeria’s oil wealth has been a source of continuing political tension, protest, and criminality in
the Delta, where most of the country’s oil presently originates. The conflict has been linked to the
vandalism of oil infrastructures; massive, systemic production theft known as “oil bunkering,”
often abetted by state officials; protests over widespread environmental damage caused by oil
operations; hostage taking; and public insecurity and communal violence. Several thousand
people have been killed in pipeline explosions in southeast Nigeria since the late 1990s. These
explosions are triggered when people siphon off oil from holes punched in the above-ground
pipeline for personal use, resulting in a reported loss of some 100,000 barrels of oil per day.
In 1998, militants from the Delta’s largest ethnic group, the Ijaw, initiated “Operation Climate
Change,” triggering violent conflict between the Ijaw and the Nigerian military and disrupting oil
production in the region. Threats of an “all out war” against the government and the oil
companies by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, one of the leaders of that group, reportedly played a role in
64
DHS, “Secretary Napolitano Announces New Measures to Strengthen Aviation Security,” April 2, 2010.
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an unprecedented rise in the world price of oil in 2004.65 The group later called off the threat after
negotiations with the government. Dokubo-Asari then led a new rebel movement, the Niger Delta
People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), in a series of attacks against government forces and threats
against foreign oil workers. The NDPVF demanded autonomy for the region and a share of oil
revenues. An estimated 500 people were reportedly killed in the ensuing violence, according to
Amnesty International. Dokubo-Asari was arrested in 2005 and charged with plotting to
overthrow the government. He was released on bail in 2007, allegedly because of failing health,
and upon his release he reportedly denounced the practice of hostage-taking and subsequently
assisted in the government’s negotiations with militants. Militants in the Delta also rallied around
former Bayelsa State Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, who was impeached in late 2005.
British authorities had charged Alamieyeseigha with money laundering when he visited London
earlier that year. The former governor, who returned to Nigeria, was found guilty of money
laundering and embezzlement in 2007, but was later released by President Yar’Adua on a plea
bargain to help advance peace talks. The British government has returned over $2 million in
assets allegedly stolen by Alamieyeseigha to Nigerian authorities.
A new rebel group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), emerged in
late 2005, using kidnappings to bring international attention to its cause and to demand that the
government release various regional figures, including Dokubu-Asari and Alamieyeseigha.
Conflict between the Delta’s militants and the Nigerian military subsequently escalated, and the
kidnapping of foreign oil workers increased exponentially. Media reports suggest over 300
foreigners, including several American citizens, were kidnapped between 2006 and 2009.
Attacks on oil facilities by militant groups like the MEND have periodically cut Nigeria’s oil
production by as much as 25%, and analysts partially blame supply disruptions in Nigeria for
periodically raising the world price of oil.66 According to the State Department’s Coordinator for
International Energy Affairs, “If Nigeria was to produce oil at capacity, it would play a major role
in helping to lower and stabilize world oil prices.”67 Nigeria’s deep-water production has proven
vulnerable to militant attacks as well, and the threat of sea piracy is high. According to some
estimates, up to 10% of Nigeria’s oil is stolen every year, and criminal activities in the region
have reportedly been used to fund local political campaigns.68
From 2007 through mid-2009, militant activity in the Delta was punctuated with periodic
ceasefires and negotiations with the government. Acts of sabotage by the MEND and other
militant groups increased in early 2009, cutting oil production by approximately 273,000 barrels
per day. In May 2009, Nigeria’s Joint Task Force (JTF), a special combined military and police
unit established in 2004 to restore order in the Delta, launched a new offensive against the
militants. The ensuing fight, combined with JTF air and land strikes against militant camps,
displaced thousands, according to Amnesty International.69 Armed conflict between security
forces and militia has decreased in the aftermath of an amnesty program, although periodic
skirmishes continue.
65
“Pumping Up the Oil Price; the Price of Oil,” The Economist, October 1, 2004.
See, for example, “Oil Steady Over 70 USD as Concerns about US Gasoline Supply, Nigeria Continue,” AFX News
Limited, May 22, 2007, and “Assault at Gas Pumps Related to Attacks on Nigerian Pipelines,” CNN, May 23, 2008.
67
David L. Goldwyn, testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Washington, D.C., September 24, 2008.
68
HRW, Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria, Vol. 19, No. 16(A), October 2007.
69
Amnesty International, “Hundreds Feared Dead and Thousands Trapped in Niger Delta Fighting,” May 22, 2009.
66
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Amnesty Offer for Delta Militants
In June 2009, President Yar’Adua extended an offer of amnesty to Delta militants; those who
surrendered their weapons, renounced violence, and accepted rehabilitation by October 2009
would be granted a presidential pardon, along with cash and job training. Within days, five
militant groups had announced their intention to accept amnesty. MEND initially rejected the
president’s gesture, but in July, after jailed MEND leader Henry Okah, who had been arrested in
2007 in Angola and extradited to Nigeria, was pardoned, the group announced a ceasefire. While
MEND has not collectively accepted the amnesty offer, several of its purported leaders have.
According to Nigerian government estimates, 15,260 “militants” accepted the amnesty and turned
in weapons by the October 2009 deadline; almost 20,200 self-declared militants had been
demobilized by late 2011. President Jonathan has pursued efforts to establish job training centers
in the Delta, a key pledge in the second phase of the amnesty and reconciliation plan, which
focuses on the rehabilitation of militia members. The government’s ability to deliver on promised
infrastructure improvements and job creation will be critical to addressing regional grievances.
Security in the Delta has improved in the wake
of the amnesty offer, and oil output has
increased to over 2.4 million barrels per day,
but observers warn that unless the root causes
of the conflict are addressed, the region will
remain volatile.71 MEND, citing outstanding
grievances, has continued to periodically
claim responsibility for attacks, including
explosions in Abuja in October 2010 that
killed 10 people. A MEND spokesman
claimed that the group had warned officials
prior to the bombings to avoid loss of life.
Who are the MEND?
The identity and composition of MEND has changed
since it first emerged in 2005. Various militant groups in
the Niger Delta have claimed actions under the name of
MEND, and analysts suggest that it is now an umbrella
group with a decentralized structure. Several high-profile
militant commanders, including Soboma George, Ateke
Tom, and Government Ektemupolo (alias Tompolo),
who were rumored to be among MEND’s senior
leadership, accepted the President Yar’Adua’s amnesty
offer in 2009, raising questions about the group’s current
cohesiveness.70
Efforts to Address Environmental and Development Challenges
Oil production in the Delta has caused major damage to the area’s fragile riverine ecosystem, and
ultimately to the livelihoods of its inhabitants.72 Reports on the amount of crude leaked into the
Delta’s fragile ecosystem vary significantly and there is no accurate measure, but millions of
barrels of oil are believed to have been spilled since oil production began in Nigeria.73 Gas flares,
which burn unwanted natural gas during oil drilling, have plagued the Delta with acid rain and air
pollution. This pollution has severely limited locals’ access to clean water, and has largely
destroyed the fishing stocks the majority of Delta inhabitants depended on to make a living.74 In
2006, Shell Oil, which has the largest production capacity of the oil companies in Nigeria, was
ordered by a Nigerian federal court to pay $1.5 billion to compensate local communities for
70
Soboma George was killed in August 2010, reportedly by men he had hired to kill two politicians in the region.
“In Niger Delta, Uneasy Peace as Rebel Disarmament Dates Nears,” Washington Post, July 27, 2009.
72
Amnesty International, Petroleum, Pollution, and Poverty in the Niger Delta, June 2009.
73
Amnesty International, Petroleum, Pollution, and Poverty in the Niger Delta, Ibid.; UNDP, Niger Delta Human
Development Report, 2006; Jonathan Brown, “Niger Delta Bears Brunt After 50 Years of Oil Spills,” The Independent
(London), October 26, 2006; Popken, Ben, “BP Gulf-Sized Spilling Occurs in Nigeria Annually, but Nobody Cares,”
The Consumerist.com, June 15, 2010.
74
ICG, “Fueling the Niger Delta Crisis,” Africa Report No. 118, September 28, 2006.
71
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environmental damage. President Yar’Adua announced in 2008 that Shell would be replaced by
another company in the oil fields of Ogoniland.75 The U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to
consider a suit filed by Ogoni residents against Shell for complicity in torture and other crimes
against humanity in 2012; their case is based a 200-year-old law used in recent years to sue
corporations for alleged abuses abroad.
Under President Yar’Adua, the government took several important initial steps to engage the
Delta’s disaffected communities, efforts that activists hope the Jonathan Administration will
expand. An unprecedented 20% of Yar’Adua’s first federal budget proposal, for 2008, was
allocated for security and development projects in the Delta, although activists expressed concern
that the amount allocated for security far outweighed funds for development.76 The government
has continued to allocate significant financing for “post-amnesty” interventions and development
projects in the region, targeting transport, education, and health infrastructure. Concerns remain
regarding the government’s ability to spend the funds effectively.
Most observers agree that the crisis in the Delta must ultimately be solved politically, rather than
militarily, but there is considerable disagreement on the details of such a solution. The current
federal system provides states with a 13% share of local revenues (predominately from oil sales).
Groups like MEND argue that the states should receive a 50% share, as was stipulated in the 1960
constitution. A technical committee nominated by President Yar’Adua to identify policies to
stimulate development and improve security in the Delta region issued a report in December
2008. In the report, the committee advocated raising the share of oil revenues allocated to the oilproducing states to 25%. Some analysts suggest that corruption within the state governments is so
high that the local populations would see little improvement even if the state share were raised.
Some of the oil-producing states have reported revenues of $1 billion per year but have dismal
records of development or service delivery.77 Other analysts question what effect a change in
revenue allocation might have on the northern states, several of which have lower development
indicators than those in the Delta. In late 2009, President Yar’Adua proposed transferring 10% of
the revenues from the government’s oil and gas joint ventures to local Delta communities.
In September 2008, President Yar’Adua created a new cabinet-level Ministry for Niger Delta
Affairs. The position was intended to build on development plans started under the Obasanjo
Administration in 2007 under the auspices of the Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC),
established in 2000 to improve social and environmental conditions in the Delta. Improvements in
infrastructure and education were identified as areas of major focus for Obasanjo’s 15-year, $50
billion plan.78 In his first year in office, President Yar’Adua doubled the budget for the NNDC, to
$566 million. Some observers have raised concerns that the ministry’s programs and those of the
NDDC, which is intended to be a part of the ministry, may be duplicative. Some analysts suggest
that given the level of corruption endemic in the Delta, the international community should work
with the Nigerian government to establish a new development fund that would have independent
oversight. New opportunities for foreign investment in the Delta could also contribute to
improvements in the region, although unrest may deter investors.
75
“Nigeria’s Removal of Shell Hailed,” BBC News, June 5, 2008.
“Nigeria’s Pledge to Increase Niger Delta Spending Elicits Skeptical Response,” VOA News, November 11, 2007.
77
“Blood and Oil,” The Economist, March 15, 2007.
78
“Nigeria Launches New Development Plan for Niger Delta,” Voice of America, March 27, 2007, and “New Hope for
Old ‘Master Plan’ on Niger Delta,” IRIN, November 19, 2007.
76
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Effects on the Oil Industry and the World Market
Nigeria has an estimated oil production capacity of three million barrels per day (bpd), but output
has struggled to meet capacity. Instability, criminality, and oil leaks in the Delta have cut output
by one-fifth since 2006. Nigeria’s production now averages 2.4 million bpd, but prior to the 2009
amnesty offer output fell below two million bpd. The threat of a renewed militant campaign
against oil targets in the Delta could affect the price of oil on the world market. A longer and
more sustained disruption of Nigeria’s oil supply, particularly if combined with the disruption of
another major supplier’s product, could have a significant impact on the world economy.
Abuses by Security Forces
Nigerian security forces, particularly the police, have been accused of serious human rights
abuses, and activists suggest that the government has done little to address issues of impunity and
corruption within the Nigerian Police Force.79 In 2007, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture
reported that “torture is an intrinsic part of how law enforcement services operate within the
country,” and called on the Nigerian government to criminalize the practice.80 The State
Department’s annual human rights reports on Nigeria document numerous instances of
“politically motivated and extrajudicial killings by security forces, including summary executions
… torture, rape and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of prisoners, detainees, and
criminal suspects,” and a variety of other offenses. In its reporting, the State Department noted
serious abuses by both police and soldiers related to the July 2009 Boko Haram uprising and
referenced “credible media reports” claiming that police executed the group’s leader. Nigerian
officials have acknowledged some abuses; in 2010 the country’s police minister called the
situation “condemnable and unacceptable.”81 Nigeria’s prison system has also drawn criticism;
Amnesty International has alleged that more than half of the country’s inmates had never been
convicted of a crime, some awaiting trial for up to 10 years.82
HIV/AIDS, Education, and Population Growth
Nigeria’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 3.6% is relatively low in comparison to Southern African
nations with adult seropositivity rates of 10 to 25%. However, the West African nation comprises
nearly one-tenth of the world’s HIV/AIDS infected persons with an estimated 3.3 million infected
people, the largest HIV-positive population in the world after South Africa. Nigeria’s population
is expected to double by the year 2025, which is likely to multiply the spread of HIV. In addition
to the devastation HIV/AIDS continues to cause among Nigeria’s adult population, over 40% of
the current population is under the age of 15. With almost a third of primary-school-aged children
not enrolled in school and a large number of HIV/AIDS-infected adults, Nigeria faces serious
challenges and significant obstacles in the education and health care sectors.
79
Recent reports on abuses include Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces, by Human Rights Watch; Killing at Will:
Extrajudicial Executions and Other Unlawful Killings by the Police in Nigeria, by Amnesty International; and Criminal
Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigerian Police Force, by the Open Society Justice Initiative
and the Network of Police Reform in Nigeria.
80
United Nations Press Release, “Special Rapporteur on Torture Concludes Visit to Nigeria,” March 12, 2007.
81
“Nigeria Condemns Police ‘Killing’,” BBC, March 5, 2010.
82
Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Criminal Justice System Utterly Failing Nigerian People; Majority of Inmates Not
Convicted of Any Crime,” February 26, 2008.
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International Relations
Nigeria has been an important player in regional and international affairs since the 1990s,
although domestic challenges may distract the Jonathan Administration from playing a more
robust regional role in the near term. The government has mediated political disputes in Togo,
Mauritania, Liberia, Sudan and Cote d’Ivoire. Nigeria was critical of the international community
for “contradictions” in its reaction to the recent crises in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya, questioning the
comparatively robust Western response to protect civilians in Libya.83 Nigerian troops have
played a vital role in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Nigerian police,
military observers, and experts are also deployed in U.N. missions in Cote d’Ivoire, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Timor-Leste, Sudan, South Sudan, and Western Sahara.
The country is one of 12 members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), and Nigeria is a key member of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). The United States is the top destination for Nigerian exports, followed by India,
Brazil, Spain and France. China is the lead source for Nigerian imports, followed by the United
States, the Netherlands, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.84 Nigeria has become a top
destination for Chinese investment on the continent.
Issues for Congress
Administration Policy on Nigeria
After a period of strained relations in the 1990s, when Nigeria was under a military dictatorship,
U.S.-Nigeria relations steadily improved under President Obasanjo, and they have remained
strong under Presidents Yar’Adua and Jonathan. The Bush Administration praised the Nigerian
government’s improved budget practices, banking sector reforms, and efforts to eliminate the
country’s foreign debt, although it remained critical of the country’s human rights record and
questioned its commitment to ensuring free and fair elections. President George W. Bush visited
the country in 2003, and First Lady Laura Bush visited Nigeria in 2006. Following the 2007
elections, though, the Bush Administration expressed concern with what it termed “a flawed
election, and in some instances, deeply flawed.”85 Nevertheless, the State Department stressed the
need to “engage,” rather than isolate, Nigeria to “nurture Nigeria’s fragile democracy.”86
President Barack Obama’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, has
referred to Nigeria as “probably the most important country in Sub-Saharan Africa.”87 President
Obama has reiterated the importance of the U.S.-Nigeria relationship. He formally acknowledged
the country’s role as a regional leader during a meeting with then-Acting President Goodluck
Jonathan at the White House in April 2010. Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Nigeria in August
83
“Nigeria Lashes at World’s Focus on Libya While I. Coast Burns,” AFP, March 22, 2011.
CIA, “Nigeria”, The World Factbook, last updated November 10, 2011.
85
“Governing Party Wins in Nigeria, but Many Claim Fraud,” New York Times, April 23, 2007.
86
Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer before the House Subcommittee on Africa and Global
Health, June 7, 2007.
87
U.S. Department of State, “Remarks by Ambassador Carson on Secretary Clinton’s Africa Trip,” July 30, 2009.
84
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2009 on her first visit to the continent as Secretary of State. Clinton’s discussions in Nigeria
focused on regional security, democracy, corruption, and economic development. She stressed the
need for electoral reform and expressed support for the government’s political approach toward
resolving the conflict in the Niger Delta.88
The United States and Nigeria agreed in January 2010 to establish a binational commission on
areas of mutual concern, as called for by Members of the House of Representatives in H.R. 2410,
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011. The first meetings of the
commission, formally established in April following then-Acting President Jonathan’s
participation in the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, were held in late May 2010.
The commission is composed of four working groups that meet regularly: Good Governance,
Transparency, and Integrity; Energy and Investment; Food Security and Agriculture; and Niger
Delta and Regional Security Cooperation.
U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Maritime Security Issues
Nigeria is an important trading partner for the United States and is the largest beneficiary of U.S.
investment on the continent. The country is eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth
and Opportunity Act (AGOA). AGOA-eligible exports, nearly all of which are petroleum
products, account for over 90% of Nigeria’s exports to the United States. Nigeria vies with
Venezuela to be the United States’ fourth-largest source of imported oil (behind Canada, Mexico,
and Saudi Arabia), depending on how much of its oil production is shut-in in any given month.
U.S. imports account for over 40% of Nigeria’s total crude oil exports, making the United States
Nigeria’s largest trading partner. U.S. energy companies may face increasing competition for
rights to the country’s energy resources; China, for example, has offered Nigeria favorable loans
for infrastructure projects in exchange for oil exploration rights. The NNPC signed an agreement
with Russia’s Gazprom in 2009 to create a joint venture for oil and gas exploration. Nigeria has
also signed an agreement in 2009 with Algeria and Niger to build a 2,500-mile pipeline across
their territories to deliver gas to Europe, though its prospects are uncertain. Nigeria exports
natural gas to neighboring countries through the new West Africa Gas Pipeline.
Gulf of Guinea crude is prized on the world market for its low sulphur content, and Nigeria’s
proximity to the United States relative to that of Middle East oil-producing countries makes its oil
particularly attractive to U.S. interests. In 2005, the United States, Nigeria, and other interested
partners initiated the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy, a forum through which
participants would work to address challenges to oil production. Other regional and international
initiatives focused on maritime security in the Gulf have followed.89 Nigeria’s waters have been
named among the most dangerous in the world; the country ranked first in global pirate attacks
until it was overtaken by Somalia in 2008, according to the International Maritime Bureau.
Maritime piracy in Nigerian waters remains a major concern. Nigeria is also considered a
growing transshipment hub for narcotics trafficking, and several Nigerian criminal organizations
have been implicated in the trade. The U.S. Navy has increased its operations in the Gulf of
Guinea in recent years to enhance security in the region and in 2007 launched a new initiative, the
African Partnership Station (APS).90 APS deployments have included port visits to Nigeria and
88
U.S. Department of State, “Remarks With Nigerian Foreign Minister Ojo Maduekwe,” August 12, 2009.
For further information on maritime and port security issues in the region, see, e.g., the Atlantic Council, Advancing
U.S., African, and Global Interests: Security and Stability in the West African Maritime Domain, November 30, 2010.
90
Under APS, U.S. and partner naval ships deploy to the region for several months to serve as a continuing sea base of
(continued...)
89
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joint exercises between U.S., Nigerian, European, and other regional navies. Nigerian military
personnel have also embarked as trainees, and a Nigerian naval captain has served as the APS
Deputy Commander. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has maintained increased focus on
maritime security in the region.91
Nigeria’s Role in Regional Stability and Counterterrorism Efforts
Nigeria plays a significant role in peace and stability operations across Africa, as noted above,
and the United States provides it with military training with an emphasis on professionalization
and respect for human rights and civilian authority through a range of security assistance
programs, including those focused on enhancing its peacekeeping capabilities. Bilateral
cooperation on counterterrorism reportedly improved in the aftermath of the December 2009
airliner bombing attempt, although some government officials remain sensitive to perceived
intrusion in domestic affairs. The Nigerian government has coordinated with the Department of
Homeland Security, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the International Civil Aviation
Organization to strengthen its security systems. Nigeria is also a participant in the State
Department’s Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a U.S. interagency effort that
aims to increase border protection and regional counter-terrorism capabilities. The Nigerian
parliament adopted new anti-terrorism legislation in February 2011 after a series of bombings in
the country. The Obama Administration has urged the Nigerian government to balance its security
response to the emerging threat of Islamic extremism with efforts to address some of the
legitimate grievances voiced by northern communities.
U.S. Assistance to Nigeria
Nigeria is the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance in Africa, following another
strategic partner, Kenya, whose population is less than a third the size of Nigeria. The United
States is the largest bilateral donor in Nigeria, providing it with over $616 million in foreign aid
in FY2010 and $632 million in FY2011. Democratic governance, agriculture and economic
reform, improved education and health services, professionalization and reform of the security
services, and HIV/AIDS have been the main focus for U.S. assistance programs in recent years.
Nigeria is a focus country under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and
the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI). The State Department’s FY2012 foreign aid request for
Nigeria, which totals $660.5 million, includes approximately $588 million (89% of the total) in
funding for HIV/AIDS and related health programs.92 In 2008, the State Department’s Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) reported that:
Exceptionally high funding levels for HIV/AIDS create a clear imbalance in the embassy
program mix and present a skewed picture of U.S. policy priorities. In addition, this level of
HIV/AIDS funding has unintended consequences for Nigeria’s broader health infrastructure,
(...continued)
operations and a “floating schoolhouse” to provide assistance and training to the Gulf nations. Training focuses on
maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, port facilities management and security, seamanship/navigation,
search and rescue, leadership, logistics, civil engineering, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
91
For more information on AFRICOM and Nigeria’s response to the command’s creation, see CRS Report RL34003,
Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
92
Congress passed H.R. 2055, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74), in December 2011. The
legislation cuts $6.15 billion from the President’s request. Final country-specific allocations have yet to be announced.
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monopolizing the country’s supplies of medical goods and services, including the qualified
health professionals needed to meet Nigeria’s other health needs.93
Although AIDS-related interventions have composed the majority of health funding for Nigeria,
the funds also target other health concerns, including maternal and child health, malaria, and
tuberculosis. U.S. health assistance focused on tuberculosis aims to double the case detection rate
and halve Nigeria’s incidence in the next decade.
In addition to health programs, the State Department’s FY2012 foreign assistance request for
Nigeria includes funding for an array of programs focused on economic growth, education, and
good governance. U.S. economic and agriculture assistance supports programs that will increase
productivity and build trade and investment capacity. This funding also aims to address climate
change, including through efforts to increase the production of clean energy and reduce gas
flaring. As the FY2012 request points out, one-third of Nigeria’s 30 million school-aged children
are not enrolled in school, and the request includes over $15 million in basic education funding.
The FY2012 request would further increase assistance for programs aimed at strengthening
democratic governance in Nigeria, up from $9.5 million in FY2008, $16 million in FY2009, and
$21 million in FY2010, to over $27 million for the upcoming fiscal year. USAID provided over
$14 million to support the 2011 elections, which included funding for technical assistance to
increase INEC capacity. The Administration has requested funding in FY2012 for new conflict
mitigation programs to address extremism in the north and conflict in the Niger Delta. USAID
has paired with Chevron on a four-year, $50 million program (of which USAID is contributing
half) to improve agricultural development as well as civil society and governance capacity in the
Delta. The State Department maintains 10 “American Corners,” located in libraries throughout
the country, to share information on American culture and values with Nigerians.
Table 1. State Department and USAID Assistance to Nigeria
($ in thousands)
FY2010
Actual
FY2011
Actual
FY2012
Request
Development Assistance
70,967
55,791
70,276
Foreign Military Financing
1,850
1,212
1,000
Global Health and Child Survival - State
471,227
471,227
471,227
Global Health and Child Survival - USAID
69,100
101,971
117,000
International Military Education and Training
1,016
940
950
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
500
1,250
0
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
Programs
1,520
0
0
TOTAL
616,180
632,391
660,453
Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations.
USAID is implementing several “flagship” programs designed to concentrate resources and
achieve maximum impact. They are focused on two northern Nigerian states: Bauchi and Sokoto
(within Nigeria, human development indicators are lowest in the north). USAID’s flagship
93
U.S. Department of State Office of the Inspector General, Report on Inspection: Embassy Abuja and Consulate
General Lagos, Nigeria, Report Number ISP-I-08-25A, July 2008.
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education project, the Northern Education Initiative (NEI), is being implemented in the two focus
states to strengthen state and local government systems for the delivery of education services.
USAID’s flagship peace and democratic governance project in these two states is known as
Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy and Development (LEAD). The project is designed to
build partnerships between state and local governments, civil society, and the private sector to
improve governance, accountability, and service delivery. A third flagship program, the five-year,
$85 million Targeted States High Impact Project (TSHIP) is being implemented in the same two
states to reduce maternal and child deaths. The project aims to build the states’ health systems to
effectively deliver primary health care, and to support overall improvement of the primary health
care delivery system through capacity building and institutional strengthening.
U.S. security assistance to Nigeria was suspended from FY2003 until 2006, when the State
Department restarted a modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.94
Security cooperation has increased since then, and the State Department’s FY2012 security
assistance request, which focuses on military professionalization, peacekeeping support and
training, and land and maritime border security, includes $1 million in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) and almost $1 million for IMET. Nigeria has also received maritime security assistance
through the U.S. Navy’s Africa Partnership Station and the State Department’s African Coastal
and Border Security (ACBS) program.95 As an important troop contributor to peacekeeping
missions, Nigeria continues to receive U.S. support through the African Contingency Operations
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. The country also participates in security cooperation
activities with the California National Guard through the National Guard State Partnership
Program. U.S. counterterrorism assistance to Nigeria includes programs coordinated through
TSCTP. Nigeria has also received security assistance through Department of Defense funds,
including $2.2 million in “Section 1206” funding for the development of a counterterrorism
infantry company and $6.2 million aimed at building the capacity of a counterterrorism unit and
its tactical communications interoperability. Nigeria also received coastal radar and
communications training and equipment through regional Section 1206 programs. U.S. support
for Nigerian law enforcement has been limited due to human rights concerns.
Recent Congressional Action
The United States Congress continues to monitor political developments in Nigeria. Congress
also continues to monitor Nigeria’s energy sector and its role in world oil supplies, as well as
humanitarian and human rights issues in the country. Congressional hearings have examined the
attempted terrorist attack by a Nigerian citizen on a U.S. airliner in December 2009, raising
concerns with the State Department’s visa process and with “systematic failures across the
Intelligence Community (IC), which contributed to the failure to identify the threat.”96
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), during February 2011 hearings by the House and
Senate intelligence communities on worldwide threats, highlighted a range of security concerns in
Nigeria in his testimony, including political and sectarian violence and militancy in the Niger
94
U.S. security cooperation with Nigeria was suspended in the early 2000s when Nigeria hosted exiled Liberian
President Charles Taylor.
95
For more information on APS, see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of
the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
96
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Unclassified Executive Summary of the Committee Report on the
Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253,” May 18, 2010.
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Delta and the northeast. The DNI suggested that although the group Boko Haram appeared to be
focused on local issues, “it may be pursuing interests it shares with” regional Al Qaeda affiliate
AQIM. As international media attention on Boko Haram grew in the wake of the August 2011
U.N. bombing, the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence held a hearing to examine the group’s potential to commit acts of terrorism against
U.S. interests or against the United States. In a related report, the committee raised concerns
about the dearth of information available on the group and the potential to underestimate Boko
Haram’s potential threat to U.S. interest. The report suggested that the U.S. government expand
military and intelligence support, as well as diplomatic engagement with Nigeria, and examine
whether Boko Haram should be designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).97
Congressional attention to these and other issues is expected to continue during the second
session of the 112th Congress.
97
Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland, Report of the House of Representatives Committee on
Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, November 30, 2011.
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Figure 2. Map of Nigeria
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Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
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