Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Lauren Ploch
Specialist in African Affairs
July 18, 2012
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
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CRS Report for Congress
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Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Summary
The U.S. government considers its strategic relationship with Nigeria, Africa’s largest producer of
oil and its second largest economy, to be among the most important on continent. Nigeria is
Africa’s most populous country, with more than 170 million people, roughly divided between
Muslims and Christians. U.S. diplomatic relations with Nigeria, which is among the top five
suppliers of U.S. oil imports, have improved since the country made the transition from military
to civilian rule in 1999, and Nigeria is a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid. The country is an
influential actor in African politics, having mediated disputes in several African countries and
ranking among the top five troop contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions.
Nigeria is a country of significant promise, but it also faces serious social, economic, and security
challenges that have the potential to threaten the stability of both the state and the region, and to
affect global oil prices. The country has faced intermittent political turmoil and economic crises
since independence. Political life has been scarred by conflict along ethnic, geographic, and
religious lines, and corruption and misrule have undermined the authority and legitimacy of the
state. Despite its extensive oil and natural gas resources, Nigeria’s human development indicators
are among the world’s lowest, and a majority of the population suffers from extreme poverty.
Social unrest, criminality, and corruption in the oil-producing Niger Delta have hindered oil
production and impeded the southern region’s economic development. Perceived neglect and
economic marginalization have also fueled resentment in the north.
Inter-communal conflicts are common in parts of Nigeria. Thousands have been killed in periodic
ethno-religious clashes in the past decade. The attempted terrorist attack on an American airliner
by a Nigerian in December 2009 and the resurgence of a militant Islamist group, Boko Haram,
have also heightened concerns about extremist recruitment in Nigeria, which has one of the
world’s largest Muslim populations. Boko Haram has increasingly targeted churches, sometimes
triggering retaliatory violence and threatening to inflame religious tensions in the country. While
the group has remained primarily focused on a domestic agenda, some U.S. officials state that its
members are expanding ties with other violent Islamist groups on the continent.
Nigeria’s most recent elections, held in April 2011, were viewed by many as a critical test of the
government’s commitment to democracy. The State Department had deemed the previous
elections to be deeply flawed, and, by some accounts, Nigeria had not held a free and fair general
election since the return to civilian rule in 1999. Election observer groups characterized the 2011
elections as a significant improvement over previous polls, but not without problems. Post-
election protests and violence across the north highlighted lingering communal tensions,
grievances, and mistrust of the government in the northern states. President Goodluck Jonathan, a
southerner, was re-elected and faces multiple, sometimes competing pressures to implement
reforms deemed critical to addressing the country’s security and development challenges.
The Obama Administration has been supportive of Nigeria’s recent reform initiatives, including
anti-corruption efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector privatization, and programs
to promote peace and development in the Niger Delta. In 2010, the Administration established the
U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission, a strategic dialogue to address issues of mutual concern.
Congress regularly monitors Nigerian political developments and has expressed concerns with
corruption, human rights abuses, and environmental damage in the Delta, as well as with the
threat of violent extremism in Nigeria. Congress oversees more than $600 million in U.S. foreign
assistance programs in Nigeria—one of the largest U.S. bilateral assistance packages in Africa.
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Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Contents
Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1
Political Context .............................................................................................................................. 2
The 2011 Elections: Opportunities and Challenges................................................................... 2
Development Challenges and Reform Initiatives ............................................................................ 5
Efforts to Combat Corruption.................................................................................................... 6
Petroleum and Power Sector Reforms....................................................................................... 7
Financial Sector Reforms .......................................................................................................... 8
Social Issues and Security Concerns ............................................................................................... 9
Islamic Sharia Law.................................................................................................................... 9
Religious and Communal Tensions ........................................................................................... 9
Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria ............................................................................. 10
Conflict in the Niger Delta ...................................................................................................... 13
Abuses by Security Forces ...................................................................................................... 14
HIV/AIDS, Education, and Population Growth ...................................................................... 14
International Relations................................................................................................................... 15
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 15
Administration Policy on Nigeria............................................................................................ 15
U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Maritime Security Issues............................................................. 16
Nigeria’s Role in Regional Stability and Counterterrorism Efforts .................................. 17
U.S. Assistance to Nigeria................................................................................................. 17
Congressional Engagement ............................................................................................... 18
Figures
Figure 1. Results of the 2011 Presidential Election ......................................................................... 4
Figure 2. Map of Nigeria ............................................................................................................... 19
Tables
Table 1. State Department and USAID Assistance to Nigeria....................................................... 19
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 20
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Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Overview
Nigeria is considered a key power on the African continent, not only because of its size, but
because of its political and economic role in the region. One in five people in Sub-Saharan Africa
call Nigeria home. The country’s commercial center, Lagos, is among the world’s largest cities.
Nigeria’s economy is Sub-Saharan Africa’s second largest, and it is one of the world’s major
sources of high-quality crude oil. Nigerian leaders have mediated conflicts throughout Africa, and
Nigerian troops have played a critical role in peace and stability operations on the continent. The
country ranks among the top five troop contributors to United Nations peacekeeping missions.
Few countries in Africa have the capacity to make a more decisive impact on the region.
Despite its oil wealth, however, Nigeria remains highly underdeveloped. Poor governance and
corruption have limited
infrastructure development and
Nigeria at a Glance
social service delivery, hindering
Population; Pop. Growth Rate: 170 million; 2.553%
economic growth and keeping much
of the country mired in poverty.
Independence: October
1960
Nigeria is also home to the world’s
Capital: Abuja
second-largest HIV/AIDS-infected
Comparative Area:
More than twice the
population and has Africa’s highest
size of California
tuberculosis burden.
Religions:
50% Muslim, 40% Christian,
10% indigenous beliefs
The country hosts over 250 ethnic
groups, but the northern Hausa and
Languages:
English (official), 250 local languages
Fulani, the southwestern Yoruba,
Literacy: 68%
and the southeastern Ibo have
Infant Mortality:
74.36 deaths/1,000 live births
traditionally been the most
politically active and dominant.
Life Expectancy:
52 years
Roughly half the population,
Prevalence of HIV:
3.6%
primarily residing in the north, are
Real GDP Growth:
6.9%
Muslim. Southern Nigeria is
Nominal GDP Per Capita:
$1,545
predominantly Christian.
Unemployment: 21%
Ethnic and religious strife have been
External Debt:
$12 billion
common in Nigeria. Divisions
among ethnic groups, between north
Source: CIA World FactBook 2012; International Monetary Fund
and south, and between Christians and Muslims, often stem from issues relating to access to land,
jobs, and socioeconomic development, and are sometimes fueled by politicians. By some
estimates, 15,000 Nigerians have died in localized clashes driven by such tensions in the last
decade, including more than 800 people killed in 2011 in post-election clashes. That violence
highlighted growing dissatisfaction with the government in the northern states. An increasingly
active violent Islamist group, Boko Haram, has contributed to deteriorating security conditions in
the north and seeks to capitalize on local frustrations and discredit the government. U.S.
policymakers are concerned with Boko Haram’s reported ties with transnational terrorist groups
and with its attack on the U.N. compound in Abuja in 2011. Further, the group’s recent attacks
against churches have the potential to inflame sectarian tensions across Nigeria. In the southern
Niger Delta region, local grievances related to oil production in the area have fueled simmering
conflict and criminality for over a decade. The government’s efforts to negotiate with local
militants have quieted the restive region, but the peace is fragile and violent criminality continues.
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Political Context
Nigeria, which gained its independence from Britain in 1960, is a federal republic with 36 states;
its political structure is similar to that of the United States. It has a bicameral legislature with a
109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives. Nigeria’s president, legislators,
and governors are directly elected on four-year terms. The country was ruled by the military for
much of the four decades after independence before making the transition to civilian rule in 1999.
Elections held in the decade after the transition were deemed by Nigerians and the international
community to be flawed, with each poll progressively worse than the last. The most recent
elections, in April 2011, showed serious improvements, but also highlighted outstanding issues.
The contest for power between north and south that has broadly defined much of Nigeria’s
modern political history can be traced, in part, to administrative divisions instituted during
Britain’s colonial administration.1 Northern military leaders dominated the political scene from
independence until the transition to democracy just over a decade ago. Since the election of
President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, there has been a de-facto power sharing arrangement,
often referred to as “zoning,” between the country’s geopolitical zones, through which the
presidency was expected to rotate among regions. As President Obasanjo, a previous military
ruler from the southwest, approached retirement in 2007, the ruling People’s Democratic Party
(PDP) chose a northern governor, Umaru Yar’Adua, as its presidential candidate. The other
leading presidential contenders in the April 2007 election were also from the north. Upon
President Yar’Adua’s death in office in 2010,2 his vice president, Goodluck Jonathan, a former
governor from the southern Niger Delta, took office for the remainder of Yar’Adua’s first term,
raising questions as to whether the ruling party would choose another northern candidate to run in
2011 or support a run for the office by the sitting president. President Jonathan ultimately secured
the party nomination. His electoral victory leaves the future of the zoning arrangement unclear.
The 2011 Elections: Opportunities and Challenges
Nigeria’s ability to weather the potential political crisis of President Yar’Adua’s hospitalization
and eventual death in office, and to manage the leadership transition without the military playing
an apparent role, was viewed by many as positive sign of its democratic progress. Under
President Yar’Adua, the government had commenced electoral reforms and increased the
autonomy of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), whose credibility had been
badly damaged by previous elections. President Jonathan continued these reform efforts, winning
praise for replacing the sitting INEC chairman with a respected academic and civil society
activist, Professor Attahiru Jega, a move that increased public confidence in the commission.3
1 Britain administered the north and south separately from the late 19th century until 1947, when it introduced a federal
system that divided the country into three regions: Northern, Eastern, and Western. Today, Nigeria is comprised of six
geopolitical zones: north-west, north-east, north-central, south-west, south-east, and south-south (the Niger Delta).
2 Many speculate that Yar’Adua suffered from a chronic kidney condition. His hospitalization abroad in late 2009 and
prolonged absence threatened to spark a political crisis in early 2010, amid rumors of his death, allegations that his wife
and close advisors were making decisions for him, and legal challenges related to his failure to transfer power during
his convalescence. After several months of uncertainty, the National Assembly recognized Jonathan as the acting head
of state in February 2010, allowing him to conduct critical government business. In May 2010, the government
announced President Yar’Adua’s death at age 58, and Jonathan was sworn in as the new president.
3 International Crisis Group, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Africa Briefing, February 24, 2011.
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With over 73 million registered voters, almost 120,000 polling stations, and more than 50
political parties, the challenges facing INEC in 2011 were daunting. Observers noted positive
developments prior to the elections, including efforts to compile a more credible voter register,
but also raised concerns about electoral preparedness and other areas deemed problematic in
previous polls, including ballot secrecy, intimidation, and transparency in the counting of ballots
and tabulation of results. Last minute court rulings on the parties’ candidate lists delayed the
delivery of voting materials, resulting in the election period being postponed by a week.
Given Nigeria’s unwritten “zoning” arrangement, there was considerable debate on whether
Jonathan’s decision to vie for the presidency would lead the ruling party to split prior to the 2011
elections. Many northerners argued that since Obasanjo had served two terms and Yar’Adua had
served only one, a candidate from their region should hold the office for another term. Jonathan,
who notably is from a minority ethnic group (the Ijaw), ultimately gained the support of key PDP
leaders, including a majority of the northern governors, for his candidacy, and he won the PDP
primary by a wide margin. The leading opposition parties chose northern presidential
candidates—former military leader Muhammadu Buhari, who had run in 2003 and 2007, for the
Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and Nuhu Ribadu, the former head of Nigeria’s anti-
corruption authority, for the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN).
The PDP remained the dominant party in the elections, retaining the presidency and a majority in
the House of Representatives and most state legislatures. Voters expressed their dissatisfaction,
however, by voting out two-thirds of the incumbents in the House and Senate. Opposition
candidates made significant gains in the southwest and the north.4 President Jonathan won 59.6%
of the vote, gaining a majority in 23 states and enough support nationwide to avoid a run-off.
Buhari followed with 32.3% of the votes, leading in one-third of the states (see Figure 1). Given
Buhari’s electoral success in the north, Jonathan’s victory was seen by some northern youth as
evidence that the results had been rigged, triggering protests that, in some areas, turned deadly.
U.S. government views on the elections were positive, despite the violence. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton declared, “This historic event marks a dramatic shift from decades of failed
elections,” but stated that “while this election was a success for the people of Nigeria, it was far
from perfect.”5 Another senior official noted “technical imperfections,” but argued that “this
reverses a downward democratic trajectory and provides the country a solid foundation for
strengthening its electoral procedures and democratic institutions.”6 President Obama remarked
that “the success of the elections was a testament to Nigerian voters who ... were determined that
these elections mark a new chapter in Nigerian history.”7
Election observers generally noted significant improvements in the legislative and presidential
polls, calling them a key step forward, but most stopped short of terming the elections “free and
fair.” Some raised concerns with presidential results from certain states in the Niger Delta
(President Jonathan’s home region) and the southeast, where turnout appeared to be near 100%
amid reports of intimidation, harassment, and violence.8 Nationally, under-age voting was a
4 The ACN dominated state elections in the southwest, where the PDP lost all governors’ races and kept a majority in
only one state assembly. Nationally, out of 36 states, opposition parties now have 13 governors and 10 state assemblies.
5 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Press Release: Election in Nigeria, April 19, 2011.
6 Special Briefing by Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, “The Recent Elections in Nigeria,” April 28, 2011.
7 The White House, Statement by President Obama on Elections in Nigeria, May 4, 2011.
8 Preliminary Statement of the European Union Election Observation Mission, April 18, 2011; Project 2011 Swift
(continued...)
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common concern of observers, and overcrowding at polling stations and complicated vote
collation procedures vulnerable to error or malfeasance remained a problem.9 Some of the state
elections were deemed to be less credible by observers.10 Various parties filed legal suits
challenging the results of the 2011 elections, with varying success. Nigeria’s Supreme Court
upheld a verdict rejecting the CPC’s challenge to President Jonathan’s win in December 2011.
Nigeria’s next elections are scheduled for 2015. Donors, including the United States, and
advocacy groups have stressed the need for the Jonathan Administration to continue to improve
electoral procedures and to prosecute those responsible for electoral fraud.11
Figure 1. Results of the 2011 Presidential Election
Source: BBC, adapted by CRS.
(...continued)
Count (http://www.pscnigeria.org) and the Transition Monitoring Group (http://www.tmgelection2011.org).
9 The author served as an election observer in Lagos for the parliamentary elections and Sokoto for the presidential.
10 EU Election Observation Mission, “Press Release: EU EOM on the Elections of 26 and 28 April,” April 29, 2011.
11 See, e.g., ICG, Lessons From Nigeria’s 2011 Elections, Africa Briefing No. 81, September 15, 2011.
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Election-Related Violence in 2011
Despite generally positive reviews of the April 2011 elections, the level of election-related violence was higher than in
previous years. Deadly clashes that followed the presidential vote highlighted lingering communal tensions,
disaffection, and mistrust of the state in the under-developed north—issues that may have been considered a
secondary priority for the national government in the past decade as it grappled with militant activity in the oil-
producing Niger Delta.
Violence prior to the 2011 elections included clashes between party supporters and several assassinations, and some
politicians deployed “thugs” to intimidate opponents and voters. Security concerns were further heightened by a
spate of bombings during political rallies, primarily in the Delta, that were linked to local politics. There were at least
six bombings in the northeast state of Borno, where Boko Haram has been most active. Boko Haram was linked to
the assassination of that state’s leading gubernatorial candidate, as well as to the bombing of a state election
commission headquarters not far from the national capital, Abuja. The government increased security during the pol s,
and election observer comments were general y positive regarding security forces’ behavior during the elections.
The worst violence in 2011 came almost immediately after the presidential pol , with supporters of Muhammadu
Buhari leading protests in the northern states, alleging that the PDP had rigged the vote. The protests devolved into
violent riots and, in some areas, killings, largely along religious and ethnic lines. In some parts of the north, the clashes
lasted for several days until soldiers were deployed to enforce stability. At least 800 people were killed in a three-day
period, according Human Rights Watch, and as many as 65,000 displaced. An independent panel, tasked with
conducting an official government inquiry into the violence and led by a prominent Islamic scholar, faulted successive
administrations for failing to act on the recommendations of previous inquiries into communal and political violence.
The panel viewed the zoning arrangement as having politicized ethno-religious tensions and also suggested that
statements made by politicians such as Buhari for supporters to “guard their votes” may have fueled popular
frustrations and (possibly inadvertently) sparked acts of violence. Some observers caution that the 2015 elections
could again spark protests in the north if President Jonathan decides to run for another term.
Development Challenges and Reform Initiatives
Despite its oil wealth and large economy, Nigeria’s population is among Africa’s poorest, and the
distribution of wealth is highly unequal. As many as 70% of Nigerians live below the poverty
line, and the average life expectancy is 52 years. Nigeria has the world’s second-largest
HIV/AIDS population, after South Africa. Access to clean water remains a major problem—
almost half the population has no access to improved sources of water and less than one-fifth of
households have piped water. Thirty percent of people lack access to adequate sanitation.
Diarrhea is the second-leading cause of death among children, and Nigeria ranks second only to
India in the number of diarrhea-related child deaths globally.
Decades of economic mismanagement, instability, and corruption have hindered investment in
Nigeria’s education and social services systems and stymied industrial growth. The economy
depends heavily on the oil and gas sector, which according to the World Bank accounts for almost
80% of government revenues and 95% of export earnings, making the country particularly
vulnerable to swings in global oil prices, as well as to conflict and criminality in the Niger Delta.
Nigeria has averaged real annual GDP growth of almost 7% in the past six years, but economists
suggest that the economy continues to underperform, held back by poor infrastructure and
electricity shortages. The manufacturing and telecommunications sectors are growing, however,
and the banking sector has been a strong performer. Agricultural production contributes over one-
third of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs more than two-thirds of the workforce.
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Nigeria is the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa,12 and it aims to be
among the world’s top 20 economies by 2020, although rising insecurity in the north, persistent
corruption, and a challenging business environment threaten long-term growth.
When Goodluck Jonathan assumed power in February 2010 from the ailing President Yar’Adua,
he vowed to continue his predecessor’s various reform initiatives and made public commitments
to “restoring Nigeria’s image” abroad, both by continuing to act as a key partner in regional peace
and counterterrorism efforts, and by ending the “culture of impunity” in Nigeria in terms of
corruption and human rights concerns. Those initiatives are discussed briefly below.
Efforts to Combat Corruption
Corruption in Nigeria is “massive, widespread, and pervasive,” according to the U.S. State
Department, and by many accounts, the country’s development will be hampered until it can
address the perception of impunity for corruption and fraud.13 Human Rights Watch suggests that
Nigeria’s political system rewards rather than punishes corruption, which has been fueled by oil
revenues for decades.14 Nigeria’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index has consistently worsened in the past three years, after transiently improving in 2008
following President Yar’Adua’s election.15
According to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), a Nigerian law
enforcement agency created in 2003 to combat corruption and fraud, billions of dollars have been
expropriated by political and military leaders since oil sales began in the 1970s.16 The country’s
central bank governor recently estimated that Nigeria may lose more than 10% of its annual GDP
through fraud.17 Several international firms have been implicated in Nigerian bribery scandals,
including German telecom giant Siemens and the U.S. firm Halliburton and its subsidiary
Kellogg, Brown, and Root, Inc. (KBR).18 Nigeria is known globally for cyber crimes, including
“419 scams,” so-named for the article in the country’s penal code that outlaws fraudulent e-mails.
Successive presidents have taken a public stance against corruption, but some observers suggest
that they have also used corruption charges to sideline critics and political opponents. President
Yar’Adua campaigned on an anti-corruption agenda; in 1999 he was the first governor to publicly
declare his assets. Upon assuming the presidency, he distanced himself from his predecessor,
dismissing many of Obasanjo’s political appointees and security chiefs and overturning several of
the privatization agreements approved by the former president, amid charges of corruption
associated with the sales. Yar’Adua also proposed, unsuccessfully, that the constitution be
12 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2012, May 7, 2012.
13 State Department, “Nigeria,” Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2011, May 2012.
14 HRW, Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, August 2011.
15 The Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceptions of business people and country analysts regarding the
degree of corruption among public officials and politicians. A high score indicates greater levels of corruption.
16 Former dictator Sani Abacha reportedly stole more than $3.5 billion during his five years as head of state (1993-
1998). Some stolen funds have been repatriated, but other Abacha assets remain frozen abroad.
17 “Nigeria: Dazzling Statistics,” Africa Confidential, Vol. 53 No. 14, July 6, 2012.
18 Halliburton and KBR have paid several hundred million dollars in U.S. and Nigerian fines, and in 2012 the former
head of KBR was sentenced to prison in the United States, for bribing Nigerian officials in exchange for contracts
worth over $6 billion. The EFCC brought charges against former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney in 2010 based on
his tenure as Halliburton’s chief executive; the charges were dropped after the company agreed to a $250 million fine.
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amended to remove an immunity clause that prevents the president, vice president, governors, and
deputy governors from being prosecuted for corruption while in office.
Nevertheless, critics contend that executive interference with the EFCC continued during
Yar’Adua’s tenure, undermining the entity’s investigations and derailing prosecutions. Donors
were highly critical of the transfer and eventual dismissal of the EFCC’s first chairman, Nuhu
Ribadu, in late 2007.19 President Jonathan fired Ribadu’s successor, who was implicated in
corrupt practices, in late 2011, replacing her with Ribadu’s former deputy, Ibrahim Lamorde.
Advocacy groups welcomed Lamorde’s appointment, but have called on Jonathan to increase the
EFCC’s independence, suggesting that the EFCC chairman “remains deeply vulnerable to the
whims of the president and lacks security of tenure.”20 The U.S. government has also signaled its
support for Lamorde, and has welcomed other recent anti-corruption initiatives by the
government, including the passage of a Freedom of Information law in 2011, a recent
parliamentary inquiry into fraud associated with the country’s fuel subsidy program (see below),
and the appointment of Ribadu to lead an independent audit of the oil and gas sector. The
Jonathan Administration has also pledged to expand budget transparency by requiring legislators
and other senior officials to publicly declare their assets.21
Petroleum and Power Sector Reforms
President Jonathan has pledged to reform the oil and gas industry, which has long been plagued
by corruption. Nigeria’s first female oil minister, Diezani Allison-Madueke, a former Royal Dutch
Shell executive, is leading the government’s efforts to pass and implement the ambitious
Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which is aimed at increasing transparency in the industry,
attracting investors, and creating jobs. Progress on the legislation has been halting. The PIB
would restructure the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the parastatal that
oversees regulation of the industry and has been criticized for its lack of transparency. Nigeria
was designated compliant with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a global
standard for transparency in the oil, gas, and mining sectors, in 2011, indicating that Nigeria had
fulfilled the minimum criterion of annually declaring its extractive sector revenues. This does not
necessarily suggest that Nigeria has taken aggressive steps to curb corruption in the sector. The
United States and other donors have welcomed Jonathan’s appointment in 2012 of former EFCC
Chairman Nuhu Ribadu to lead a new task force to audit oil revenues.
Despite its status as one of the world’s largest crude oil exporters, Nigeria imports an estimated
$10 billion in refined fuel annually for domestic consumption, and it suffers periodically from
severe fuel and electricity shortages. In an effort to increase its refining capacity and halt oil
imports by 2020, the government has granted permits for several new independently owned
refineries. In 2010, Nigeria signed an agreement with China worth a reported $23 billion for new
refineries, and in July 2012 the government signed a memorandum of understanding with U.S.-
based Vulcan Petroleum Resources for a $4.5 billion project to build six refineries.
19 There was speculation that Ribadu’s removal from office was linked to his effort to prosecute former Delta State
Governor James Ibori, one of Yar’Adua’s primary financial contributors, who may have embezzled over $200 million
while in office. First arrested in 2007 and later acquitted, Ibori was indicted again in 2010 but eluded capture and fled
to Dubai, where he was arrested by Interpol. He was extradited in April 2011 to the United Kingdom, where he owned
property and kept some of his assets; he was convicted in April 2012 on money laundering and fraud charges.
20 HRW, Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, August 2011.
21 U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission, Joint Communique, June 2012.
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For years, the Nigerian government has subsidized the price its citizens pay for gasoline (roughly
70% of which is imported), and economists have long deemed the subsidy benefit unsustainable.
The subsidy’s cost—roughly $8 billion in 2011—was steep, comprising almost one-quarter of the
government’s annual budget. At the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund and
others, in late 2011 President Jonathan cut the subsidy, causing the price of fuel for consumers to
double in early January 2012 and sparking strong domestic opposition. In the face of mass
protests and a nationwide strike, the government backtracked and reinstated a partial subsidy.22
Public scrutiny of the program has since increased, and in May a legislative inquiry revealed that
an estimated $7 billion allocated for the subsidy may have been misappropriated. The scandal
prompted President Jonathan to replace several senior executives at the national petroleum
company, which was implicated in the scandal. The lawmaker who led the probe, Farouk Lawan,
was subsequently accused of taking a bribe from one of the companies involved in the fraud;
Lawan claims he took the bribe as evidence.
The government plans to refocus funds saved by decreasing the fuel subsidy on improving health,
education, and the nation’s power supply. Jonathan has pledged to increase electricity generation
tenfold over the next decade, and efforts to privatize power stations and distribution companies
are underway, albeit behind schedule, despite objections from the country’s trade unions.
In addition to its oil reserves, Nigeria has the ninth-largest natural gas reserves in the world and
the largest in Africa, but they have provided comparatively little benefit to the country’s economy.
Many of Nigeria’s oil fields lack the infrastructure to capture and transport natural gas. The
government has repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, set deadlines for oil companies to stop “flaring”
gas at oil wells (burning unwanted gas during oil drilling), a practice estimated to destroy roughly
one-third of annual production and to constitute more than $2 billion in lost revenue annually.23 In
2011, President Jonathan announced a series of new agreements to develop gas processing
facilities as part of a “gas revolution” designed to create new jobs and revenues, and to end
flaring. Nigeria is in the process of increasing its liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, which
could surpass revenues derived from oil exports in the next decade.
Financial Sector Reforms
Successive Nigerian administrations have made commitments to economic reform, but their track
record is mixed. According to the IMF, reforms initiated under the Obasanjo Administration and
continued by his successors, most importantly the policies of maintaining low external debt and
budgeting based on a conservative oil price benchmark to create a buffer of foreign reserves,
lessened the impact of the recent global economic crisis on Nigeria’s economy.24 Oil revenues
above the benchmark price have been saved since 2003 in an Excess Crude Account (ECA),
although the government drew substantially from the account in 2009-2010 in an effort to
stimulate economic recovery. The Jonathan Administration’s efforts to create a sovereign wealth
fund, which would draw seed money from the ECA, have met with some resistance from state
governors, who benefit from the distribution of national oil revenues to state governments. The
22 See, e.g., “Removal of Fuel Subsidies in Nigeria: An Economic Necessity and a Political Dilemma,” The Brookings
Institute, January 10, 2012.
23 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief: Nigeria, August 2011.
24 International Monetary Fund, “Staff Report for the Article IV Consultation with Nigeria,” January 27, 2011. The
price benchmarks set by the Nigerian government are $58/barrel for 2011, $60 for 2012, and $62 for 2013, far lower
than current and projected global prices..
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country has made significant gains in the past decade in paying down its external debt, which
constituted more than one-third of GDP a decade ago, freeing funding for programs aimed at
poverty reduction and reaching the country’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Like his predecessors, President Jonathan has committed to reforms that aim to attract foreign
investment, create jobs, and fuel development, and the U.S. government has been publicly
supportive of his economic team.25 In mid-2011, he appointed World Bank managing director
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who led efforts to reduce Nigeria’s debt as finance minister under
President Obasanjo, to resume her former post. Jonathan has retained Lamido Sanusi as governor
of the central bank. Sanusi has led efforts to modernize the country’s banking system, pushing
reforms to tighten banking supervision.26
Social Issues and Security Concerns
Islamic Sharia Law
Nigeria is home to one of the world’s largest Muslim populations, vying with, and likely
outpacing, Egypt as the largest on the continent. The north is predominately Sunni Muslim, and
12 northern states have formally adopted Islamic sharia law since 1999 to adjudicate criminal and
civil matters for Muslims.27 In some states, the introduction of sharia was a flashpoint between
Muslims and Christians. The State Department reports that sharia “technically does not apply to
non-Muslims in civil and criminal proceedings,” although observers note that Islamic mores are
often enforced in public without regard for citizens’ religion. In some areas, state-funded vigilante
groups known as hisbah patrol public areas and attempt to enforce sharia-based rulings. Many
analysts nonetheless see the interpretation and implementation of Nigerian sharia as moderate in
comparison to that of some other Muslim-majority countries.
Religious and Communal Tensions
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has recommended since 2009 that
Nigeria be classified as a “Country of Particular Concern” for “severe, ongoing, and egregious
religious freedom violations.”28 It is not currently designated as such by the Secretary of State.
According to the Commission, as many as 14,000 Nigerians have been killed since 1999 in
sectarian violence, and the commissioners argue that the Nigerian government has tolerated the
25 Remarks by Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, “Nigeria, One Year After Elections,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, April 9, 2012.
26 In 2009 Sanusi instituted regulations that require banks to report large cash transactions between accounts if one of
the account holders is considered to be “politically exposed.” Bank audits ordered by Sanusi that year found 10 banks
near collapse due to reckless lending. The government provided $4 billion to rescue the banks, and in late 2010, under
pressure from Sanusi, the legislature approved the establishment of the Asset Management Company of Nigeria
(AMCON) to buy bad bank loans in exchange for government bonds, in an effort to get the banks lending again. By
some estimates it may take a decade for AMCON to divest its toxic assets. AMCON bought non-performing loans from
9 rescued banks and margin loans from 12 other domestic banks.
27 Nigerian law protects freedom of religion and permits states to establish courts based on common law or customary
law systems. Non-sharia based common law and customary law courts adjudicate cases involving non-Muslims in these
states, and sharia-based criminal law courts are elective for non-Muslims.
28 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2012, May 2012.
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violence, creating a culture of impunity that has emboldened Boko Haram and its sympathizers.
The Commission’s 2012 report notes the religious nature of the 2011 post-election violence, Boko
Haram’s attacks against Christians, and rising religiously-charged rhetoric as areas of significant
concern. Other experts point to increasingly well armed militias, loosely organized along
religious lines, in central and northern Nigeria.29 The State Department, in its annual Religious
Freedom report, states that “the government generally respected religious freedom in practice,
although some local political actors stoked communal and sectarian violence with impunity.”30
Sectarian violence continues to be a particular problem in the central Nigerian city of Jos, the
capital of Plateau State, which sits between the predominately Muslim north and Christian south.
Tensions among communities in this culturally diverse “Middle Belt” are both religious and
ethnic, and they stem from competition over resources—land, education, government jobs—
between ethnic groups classified as settlers or as “indigenes” (original inhabitants of the state),
with the latter designation conveying certain political and economic benefits. In Jos, the mostly
Christian Berom are considered indigenes, and the predominately Muslim Hausa-Fulani, who
were traditionally nomadic and pastoralist, are viewed as the settlers. In 2010, the Nigerian
government established a special task force composed of both military and police to restore
stability in the state; periodic outbreaks of violence have nonetheless continued, and have been
exacerbated by attacks on churches attributed to Boko Haram.
Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria31
Boko Haram, a violent Salafist movement in the north, has grown increasingly active and deadly
in its attacks against state and civilian targets in Nigeria, drawing on a narrative of vengeance for
state abuses to elicit recruits and sympathizers. While its attacks have not exclusively, or even
primarily, targeted Christians, attacks attributed to the group on churches in several north and
central states are fueling existing religious tensions. The church bombings, which usually occur
on Sundays or religious holidays to achieve maximum effect, have sparked deadly reprisal attacks
by Christians against Muslim civilians. Such attacks may be part of a deliberate effort to foment
instability, with the aim of discrediting and delegitimizing the government in these regions by
exposing the weakness of its security apparatus and justice mechanisms.
Boko Haram emerged in the early 2000s as a small, radical Sunni Islamic sect that advocated a
strict interpretation and implementation of Islamic law for Nigeria. Calling itself Jama’a Ahl as-
Sunna Li-da’wa wa-al Jihad (JASLWJ; roughly translated from Arabic as “People Committed to
the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”), the group is more popularly known as
Boko Haram (“Western education is forbidden”), a nickname given by local Hausa-speaking
communities to describe its view that Western education and culture have been corrupting
influences. It engaged in periodic skirmishes with police during its formative years, but the
group’s activities were limited in scope and contained within several highly impoverished states
in the predominately Muslim northeast.
29 Testimony of Darren Kew, in U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, The
Crisis in Christian-Muslim Relations in Nigeria, 112th Cong., July 10, 2012.
30 State Department, July-December 2010 International Religious Freedom Report, September 13, 2011.
31 For more information on Boko Haram, see, e.g., Andrew Walker, What is Boko Haram? USIP, May 2012; Peter J.
Pham, “Boko Haram’s Evolving Threat,” Africa Security Brief No. 20, April 2012; and Testimony of CRS Specialist
Lauren Ploch, in U.S. Congress, House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Boko
Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland?, 112th Cong., November 30, 2011.
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In July 2009, the government’s attempts to stop Boko Haram’s attacks on police stations and
other government buildings resulted in the death of at least 700 people, a figure that likely
includes not only militants, but also security personnel and bystanders. In the course of that
violence, the group’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic young cleric who had studied in
Saudi Arabia, was killed while in police custody.32 A sizeable number of Yusuf’s followers were
also killed or arrested. The group appeared to dissipate after the heavy-handed security
crackdown, but reemerged a year later, orchestrating a large-scale prison break in September 2010
that freed hundreds, including its own members. Some reports suggest that a small number of
Boko Haram militants may have fled to insurgent training camps in the Sahel during this period.
Boko Haram’s attacks have since increased substantially in frequency, reach, and lethality, now
occurring almost daily in northeast Nigeria, and periodically beyond. Attacks attributed to the
group since 2010 have increasingly featured improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs,
and suicide attacks. Boko Haram has primarily focused on state and federal targets, such as police
stations, but has also targeted civilians in schools, churches, markets, and beer halls. The group
has also conducted assassinations of local political leaders and moderate Muslim clerics. Bank
robberies attributed to the group may contribute to its financing, although authorities warn that
criminal groups may also be opportunistically posing as Boko Haram militants.
The bombing of the U.N. building in Abuja on August 24, 2011 marked a major departure from a
previously exclusive focus on domestic targets. It was also Boko Haram’s first clearly intentional
suicide bombing. Boko Haram spokesmen claimed the attack was retribution for the state’s
heavy-handed security response against its members, referencing U.S. and international
“collaboration” with the Nigerian security apparatus. The bombing may indicate an aspiration by
some in Boko Haram to move beyond local politics toward an international jihadist agenda, or it
may have been an effort to elicit foreign backing for the group’s domestic agenda. The Nigerian
government has also linked Boko Haram to the May 2011 kidnapping of two Europeans in
northwest Nigeria; the two men were killed in a rescue attempt in early 2012.
By most accounts, Boko Haram is not a monolithic organization. According to U.S. officials, core
Boko Haram militants may number in the hundreds, but the group also appears to draw support
from a broader following of several thousand Nigerians, primarily young men from the northeast,
who have expressed frustration with the lack of development, jobs, and investment in the north,
and with the heavy-handed response of security forces to Boko Haram. Some analysts suggest
that Boko Haram may be susceptible to fracturing, with a segment of the leadership working to
build ties with the international Al Qaeda franchise, while others remain focused exclusively on a
domestic agenda. The public emergence of a purported splinter faction in early 2012 has led some
to contend that there are divisions among the hardliners. Efforts by various interlocutors to
facilitate government negotiations with Boko Haram have, to date, been unsuccessful.
While Boko Haram currently appears to pose more of a threat to local stability, its expansion has
amplified concerns among some observers and officials that Nigerians may be susceptible to
recruitment by Al Qaeda or other groups aiming to use violence against government or civilian
targets in Nigeria or abroad.33 Potential ties with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are of
32 “Islamic Death ‘Good for Nigeria’,” BBC, July 31, 2009.
33 Prior to Boko Haram’s reemergence, a Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, attempted to detonate an explosive
device onboard an American airliner bound from Amsterdam to Detroit on December 25, 2009. Abdulmutallab, son of
a respected banker and former government minister, reportedly became radicalized while living abroad. Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claims to have sponsored the effort.
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particular concern—the Commander of U.S. Africa Command, who has identified Boko Haram
as a “threat to Western interests,” referenced indications in mid-2012 that the two groups “are
likely sharing funds, training, and explosive materials.”34 The increasing lethality and
sophistication of Boko Haram’s attacks, as demonstrated in the killing of an estimated 200 people
in coordinated bomb and gun attacks in the northern city of Kano on January 20th, has further
raised the group’s profile among U.S. national security officials.
Some in Congress have pressed the State Department to designate Boko Haram as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO), arguing that greater intelligence and security resources should be
focused on the group.35 Many Nigeria experts caution that the Nigerian government’s own
response to Boko Haram has been, to date, heavy-handed and may actually fuel radical
recruitment. Some argue that an FTO designation might be seen, by both the Nigerian
government and the northern population, as an endorsement by the United States of “excessive
use of force at a time when the rule of law in Nigeria hangs in the balance.”36 Others suggest that
Boko Haram’s shift toward Christian targets may be tactical, and caution that U.S. policymakers
avoid taking positions that fuel perceptions that the United States has “taken sides” among
Christians and Muslims.37 State Department officials have acknowledged these concerns and
called on the Nigerian government to “change their strategy with regard to Boko Haram from a
primarily military response to one that also addresses the grievances felt by many in northern
Nigeria.”38 President Jonathan replaced his National Security Advisor and Minister of Defense in
June 2012, citing the need for new tactics against the group. His appointment of a northerner as
the new National Security Advisor may bring a different perspective to the government’s
counterterrorism strategy and tactics in the north, although changes may meet with resistance
from senior military officials.39 Additional arguments against an FTO designation focus on
concerns that the label would enhance Boko Haram’s status among international extremist groups
and internationalize its standing, potentially serving as a fundraising and recruitment tool. In June
2012 the State Department designated three individuals linked to Boko Haram as Specially
Designated Global Terrorists. It has yet to make a determination on a possible designation for the
organization as a whole, but in doing so will weigh the potential benefits of an FTO designation
against possible consequences for U.S. policy goals in the country and the wider region.
34 Testimony of General Carter Ham, in U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Proposed FY2013 Defense
Authorization as it Relates to the U.S. European and Africa Commands, March 1, 2012; and Remarks by General
Carter Ham at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies Senior Leaders Seminar, June 25, 2012.
35 The FTO designation derives from authorities granted to the Secretary of State in the Immigration and Nationality
Act, as amended. The designation triggers the freezing of any assets in U.S. financial institutions, bans FTO members’
travel to the United States, and criminalizes transactions (including material support) with the organization or its
members. It is unclear, given the current lack of public information available on Boko Haram’s possible ties abroad, if
these measures would have any impact on the group. FTO status might serve to prioritize greater U.S. security and
intelligence resources toward the group, although this is not a legal requirement of the designation. Legislation in the
112th Congress, including S. 3249, H.R. 5822 and H.R. 4310, the National Defense Authorization for FY2013, would
each require the Secretary of State to report on whether Boko Haram meets the criteria to be designated as an FTO.
36 Letter to Secretary Clinton by 21 American academics with Nigeria expertise on May 2012.
37 D. Kew, op. cit.
38 Testimony of State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism Daniel Benjamin, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign
Affairs Committee, LRA, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa, April 25, 2012.
39 Jonathan’s former National Security Advisor, who, like Jonathan, was from the Niger Delta, was seen by some as out
of touch with northern perceptions of the Boko Haram crisis. The new appointee, retired Col. Sambo Dasuki, is a
cousin of an influential Muslim leader in Nigeria, the Sultan of Sokoto, and has close ties to senior northern politicians.
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Conflict in the Niger Delta
Nigeria’s oil wealth has long been a source of political tension, protest, and criminality in the
Niger Delta region, where most of the country’s oil is produced.40 Compared to Nigeria’s national
average, the region’s social indicators are low, and unemployment is high. Millions of barrels of
oil are believed to have been spilled in the region since oil production began, causing major
damage to the fragile riverine ecosystem, and ultimately to the livelihoods of many of the Delta’s
30 million inhabitants.41 Gas flares have further plagued the Delta with acid rain and air pollution,
limiting locals’ access to clean water and destroying fishing stocks that the majority of Delta
inhabitants depended on to make a living.
Conflict in the Niger Delta has been marked by the vandalism of oil infrastructures; massive,
systemic production theft locally known as “oil bunkering,” often abetted by state officials;
protests over widespread environmental damage caused by oil operations; kidnapping for ransom;
and public insecurity and communal violence. The demands of the region’s various militant
groups have varied, but often include calls for greater autonomy for the region and a larger share
of oil revenues. Militant groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND) have used the kidnapping of oil workers and attacks on oil facilities to bring
international attention to the Delta’s plight. These attacks have periodically cut Nigeria’s oil
production by as much as 25%, and have been blamed for spikes in the world price of oil.
Nigeria’s deep-water production has also proven vulnerable to militant attacks, and the threat of
sea piracy is high. By some estimates, up to 10% of Nigeria’s oil has been stolen annually, and
local politicians have reportedly financed their campaigns through such criminal activities.42
Successive Nigerian governments have pledged to engage the Delta’s disaffected communities,
but few of their efforts met with success until 2009, when President Yar’Adua extended an offer
of amnesty to Delta militants. Under the offer, those who surrendered their weapons, renounced
violence, and accepted rehabilitation were granted a presidential pardon, along with cash and job
training. According to Nigerian government estimates, more than 20,000 have benefitted from the
program, which is costing the government roughly $400 million a year, though it is unclear
whether all were directly involved in militancy. The activities of criminal gangs have continued.
President Jonathan has continued to allocate significant financing for “post-amnesty”
interventions and development projects in the Delta, targeting transport, education, and health
infrastructure. Concerns remain regarding the government’s ability to spend the funds effectively
in a region where corruption is, at all levels, endemic, and some Nigerian politicians from other
regions have criticized the cost of the program.43 Some of the oil-producing states have reported
40 In the early 1990s, activists from the Ogoni ethnic group drew international attention to the extensive environmental
damage done by oil extraction in the Niger Delta. Author and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, president of the Movement for
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), and 14 others were accused in 1994 of involvement in the murder of
several prominent Ogoni politicians. They pled not guilty, but Saro-Wiwa and eight others were convicted and
sentenced to death. Their executions sparked international outrage against the regime of dictator Sani Abacha, and the
United States recalled its ambassador in response.
41 For more information, see UNEP, Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, 2011; UNDP, Niger Delta Human
Development Report, 2006; Amnesty International, Petroleum, Pollution, and Poverty in the Niger Delta, June 2009;
and Paul Francis, Deirdre Lapin, and Paula Rossiasco, Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta, Woodrow
Wilson Center for Scholars, 2011.
42 HRW, Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria, Vol. 19, No. 16(A), October 2007.
43 Xan Rice, “Nigerian Rebels Swap Weapons for Welding,” Washington Post, July 5, 2012.
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revenues of over $2 billion per year but have dismal records of development or service delivery.44
The federal government’s commitment and ability to deliver on promised infrastructure
improvements and job creation will be critical to addressing regional grievances. Observers
caution that unless the root causes of conflict are addressed, the Delta will remain volatile.
Abuses by Security Forces
Nigerian security forces, particularly the police, have been accused of serious human rights
abuses, and activists suggest that the government has done little to address issues of impunity and
corruption within the Nigerian Police Force.45 In 2007, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture
reported that “torture is an intrinsic part of how law enforcement services operate within the
country,” and called on the Nigerian government to criminalize the practice.46 The State
Department’s annual human rights reports document numerous instances of “politically motivated
and extrajudicial killings by security forces, including summary executions … torture, rape and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of prisoners, detainees, and criminal suspects,” and
a variety of other offenses. The 2011 report notes the use of excessive and sometimes deadly
force by security personnel, both military and police, to stem civil unrest and interethnic violence.
The prison system has also drawn criticism; Amnesty International alleges that more than half the
country’s inmates had never been convicted of a crime, some awaiting trial for up to 10 years.47
In May 2009, Nigeria’s Joint Task Force (JTF), a special combined military and police unit
established in 2004 to restore order in the Delta, launched a new offensive against the militants.
The ensuing fight, combined with JTF air and land strikes against militant camps, displaced
thousands, according to Amnesty International.48 Armed conflict between security forces and
militia has decreased with the amnesty program, although periodic skirmishes continue. The JTF
has also been deployed to the northeast to address the Boko Haram threat, and has been
implicated in the deaths of civilians and extrajudicial killings there. In its reporting, the State
Department notes serious abuses by both police and soldiers related to the 2009 Boko Haram
uprising and “credible media reports” that police executed the group’s leader. Nigerian officials
have acknowledged some abuses; in 2010 the country’s police minister called the situation
“condemnable and unacceptable,” but few security personnel have been prosecuted for abuses.49
HIV/AIDS, Education, and Population Growth
Nigeria’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 3.6% is relatively low in comparison to Southern African
nations with adult seropositivity rates of 10 to 25%. However, the West African nation comprises
nearly one-tenth of the world’s HIV/AIDS infected persons with more than three million people
44 Francis, Lapin, and Rossiasco, Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta, Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011.
45 Recent reports on abuses include Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces, by Human Rights Watch; Killing at Will:
Extrajudicial Executions and Other Unlawful Killings by the Police in Nigeria, by Amnesty International; and Criminal
Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigerian Police Force, by the Open Society Justice Initiative
and the Network of Police Reform in Nigeria.
46 United Nations Press Release, “Special Rapporteur on Torture Concludes Visit to Nigeria,” March 12, 2007.
47 Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Criminal Justice System Utterly Failing Nigerian People; Majority of Inmates Not
Convicted of Any Crime,” February 26, 2008.
48 Amnesty International, “Hundreds Feared Dead and Thousands Trapped in Niger Delta Fighting,” May 22, 2009.
49 “Nigeria Condemns Police ‘Killing’,” BBC, March 5, 2010.
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infected, the largest HIV-positive population in the world after South Africa. Nigeria’s population
is expected to double by the year 2025, which is likely to multiply the spread of HIV. In addition
to the devastation HIV/AIDS continues to cause among Nigeria’s adult population, over 40% of
the current population is under the age of 15. With almost a third of primary-school-aged children
not enrolled in school and a large number of HIV/AIDS-infected adults, Nigeria faces serious
challenges and significant obstacles in the education and health care sectors.
International Relations
Nigeria has been an important player in regional and international affairs since the 1990s,
although domestic challenges may distract the Jonathan Administration from playing a more
robust regional role in the near term. The government has mediated political disputes in Togo,
Mauritania, Liberia, Sudan, and Cote d’Ivoire, and has been engaged in regional efforts to resolve
the political crisis in Mali. Nigeria was critical of the international community for
“contradictions” in its reaction to the recent crises in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya, questioning the
comparatively robust Western response to protect civilians in Libya.50 Nigerian troops played a
vital role in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Nigerian police, military
observers, and experts are also deployed in U.N. missions in Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Haiti, Timor-Leste, Sudan, South Sudan, and Western Sahara.
The country is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The United States is the top
destination for Nigerian exports, followed by India, Brazil, Spain, and France. China is the lead
source for Nigerian imports, followed by the United States, the Netherlands, South Korea, and the
United Kingdom.51 Nigeria has become a top destination for Chinese investment on the continent.
Issues for Congress
Administration Policy on Nigeria
After a period of strained relations in the 1990s, when Nigeria was under a military dictatorship,
U.S.-Nigeria relations steadily improved under President Obasanjo, and they have remained
robust under Presidents Yar’Adua and Jonathan. Diplomatic engagement is sometimes tempered,
however, by Nigerian perceptions of U.S. intrusion in regional or domestic affairs, and by U.S.
concern with human rights, governance, and corruption issues. President Barack Obama’s
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs has often referred to Nigeria as “probably the most
strategically important country in Sub-Saharan Africa,” and the Administration considers Nigeria
to be a key ally.52 In addition the strategic role their country plays in the region and in global
forums, Nigerians comprise the largest African diaspora group in the United States.
50 “Nigeria Lashes at World’s Focus on Libya While I. Coast Burns,” AFP, March 22, 2011.
51 CIA, “Nigeria”, The World Factbook 2012.
52 State Department, “Remarks by Ambassador Carson on Secretary Clinton’s Africa Trip,” July 30, 2009; Remarks by
Assistant Secretary Carson, “Promise and Peril in Nigeria: Implications for U.S. Engagement,” at CSIS, April 9, 2012.
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The United States has been supportive of Nigerian reform initiatives, including anti-corruption
efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector privatization, and programs to promote
peace and development in the Niger Delta. In 2010, the Obama and Jonathan Administrations
established the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission (BNC), a strategic dialogue to address issues
of mutual concern; its working groups meet regularly. The State Department maintains 10
“American Corners,” located in libraries throughout the country, to share information on
American culture and values with Nigerians, and it plans to expand its presence in the country,
possibly through a new consulate in the northern city of Kano to increase outreach in the north,
although security concerns may slow the move.
U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Maritime Security Issues
Nigeria is an important trading partner for the United States and is the largest beneficiary of U.S.
investment on the continent. Given Nigeria ranking as one of Africa’s largest consumer markets
and its affinity for U.S. products and American culture, opportunities for increasing U.S. exports
to the country, and the broader West Africa region, are considerable, although U.S. imports from
Nigeria, totaling more than $33 billion in 2011, currently far outweigh exports, estimated at
almost $5 billion in 2011.53 The Obama Administration aims to double U.S. exports to Nigeria by
2015 through the President’s National Export Initiative. The country is eligible for trade benefits
under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). AGOA-eligible exports, nearly all of
which are petroleum products, account for over 90% of exports to the United States.
Nigeria vies with Venezuela to be the United States’ fourth-largest source of imported oil (behind
Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia). U.S. imports account for over 40% of Nigeria’s total crude
oil exports, making the United States Nigeria’s largest trading partner. U.S. energy companies
may face increasing competition for rights to the country’s energy resources; China, for example,
has offered Nigeria favorable loans for infrastructure projects in exchange for oil exploration
rights. The U.S. Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank signed an agreement in October 2011 with the
Nigerian government that aims to secure up to $1.5 billion in U.S. exports of goods and services
to support power generation reforms. A U.S. trade delegation composed of government officials,
Ex-Im Bank executives, and energy companies traveled to Nigeria in February 2012 to discuss
the participation of American companies in the development of Nigeria’s energy infrastructure.
Gulf of Guinea crude is prized on the world market for its low sulphur content, and Nigeria’s
proximity to the United States relative to that of Middle East countries makes its oil particularly
attractive to U.S. interests. The United States has coordinated with Nigeria through various
regional forums and maritime security initiatives.54 Nigeria’s waters have been named among the
most dangerous in the world; the country ranked first in global pirate attacks until it was
overtaken by Somalia in 2008, according to the International Maritime Bureau. Nigeria is also
considered a growing transshipment hub for narcotics trafficking, and several Nigerian criminal
organizations have been implicated in the trade. The U.S. Navy has increased its operations in the
Gulf of Guinea in recent years and in 2007 launched the African Partnership Station (APS).55 APS
53 U.S. Commercial Service, Doing Business in Nigeria: 2011 Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies.
54 For further information on maritime and port security issues in the region, see, e.g., the Atlantic Council, Advancing
U.S., African, and Global Interests: Security and Stability in the West African Maritime Domain, November 30, 2010;
and CDR Michael Baker, “Toward an African Maritime Economy,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 64, Spring 2011.
55 Under APS, U.S. and partner naval ships deploy to the region for several months to serve as a continuing sea base of
operations and a “floating schoolhouse” to provide assistance and training to the Gulf nations. Training focuses on
(continued...)
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deployments have included port visits to Nigeria and joint exercises between U.S., Nigerian,
European, and other regional navies.
Nigeria’s Role in Regional Stability and Counterterrorism Efforts
Nigeria plays a significant role in peace and stability operations across Africa, and the United
States provides the country with security assistance focused on enhancing its peacekeeping
capabilities. Bilateral counterterrorism cooperation has reportedly improved in the aftermath of
the December 2009 airliner bombing attempt, although some Nigerian officials remain sensitive
to perceived U.S. interference in internal affairs. The Nigerian government has coordinated with
the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the International
Civil Aviation Organization to strengthen its security systems, and the country now uses full body
scanners in its international airports. Nigeria is a participant in the State Department’s Trans
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a U.S. interagency effort that aims to increase
regional counter-terrorism capabilities and coordination. A recent anti-terrorism capabilities
assessment conducted by the State Department deemed Nigeria “at high or critical risk” of
terrorist threat in more than a dozen categories, including land and maritime border security,
critical infrastructure security, and explosive incident countermeasures. The Obama
Administration has committed through the BNC dialogue to support Nigerian efforts to increase
public confidence in the military and police to respond more effectively to the threat posed by
extremists. As noted above, the State Department has designated three individuals linked to Boko
Haram as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.56
U.S. Assistance to Nigeria
Nigeria is the second largest recipient of U.S. bilateral foreign assistance in Africa, following
another strategic partner, Kenya. In Nigeria, the United States is the largest bilateral donor,
providing roughly $600 million annually (see Table 1).57 Improved health and education services,
democratic governance, agriculture and economic reform, improved education and health
services, professionalization and reform of the security services, and HIV/AIDS have been the
main areas of focus for U.S. assistance programs in recent years. Governance aid focuses on the
justice and electoral systems, on advancing anti-corruption efforts, and on initiatives to make
governance structures more responsive and accountable. U.S. economic growth assistance
supports programs that aim to increase agricultural productivity and build trade and investment
capacity. This funding also aims to address climate change, including through efforts to increase
the production of clean energy and reduce gas flaring. Nigeria is a focus country under the
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President’s Malaria Initiative
(PMI), and Nigerian farmers benefit from agriculture programs under the Feed the Future (FtF)
initiative that focus on building partnerships with the private sector to expand exports and
generate employment. In the Niger Delta, USAID has paired with Chevron on a four-year, $50
(...continued)
maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, port facilities management and security, seamanship/navigation,
search and rescue, leadership, logistics, civil engineering, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
56 These individuals are Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s most visible leader, and Khalid al-Barnawi and Abubakar
Adam Kambar, both of whom have ties to Boko Haram and close links to AQIM, according to the State Department.
57 For further information on current U.S. assistance programs, see, e.g., Testimony of USAID Assistant Administrator
for Africa Earl Gast, in U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, U.S. Policy
Toward Nigeria: West Africa’s Troubled Titan, July 10, 2012.
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million program (of which USAID is contributing half) to improve agricultural development as
well as civil society and governance capacity. In the north, USAID is implementing “flagship”
education, health, peace, and governance programs designed to concentrate resources, build
partnerships, and achieve maximum impact in two states: Bauchi and Sokoto.
Security cooperation has increased since the mid-2000s,58 and the State Department’s FY2013
security assistance request, which focuses on military professionalization, peacekeeping support
and training, and land and maritime border security, includes $1 million in Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) and almost $1 million for military education and training. U.S. officials have
stressed the importance of civilian oversight of the military, and respect for human rights and the
rule of law, in their engagements with Nigerian military officials.59 In addition to peacekeeping
support provided through the State Department’s African Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance (ACOTA) program, Nigeria also benefits from security cooperation activities with the
California National Guard through the National Guard State Partnership Program. U.S.
counterterrorism assistance to Nigeria includes programs coordinated through TSCTP and other
regional State Department initiatives, as well as through Department of Defense funds. U.S.
support for Nigerian law enforcement has been limited due to human rights concerns.
Congressional Engagement
Terrorism-related concerns have dominated congressional action on Nigeria in the 112th Congress,
although Members also continue to monitor human rights and humanitarian issues, developments
in the Niger Delta, and Nigeria’s energy sector in the context of world oil supplies. As
international media attention on Boko Haram grew in the wake of the August 2011 U.N.
bombing, the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence held
a hearing to examine the group’s potential to commit acts of terrorism against U.S. interests or
against the United States. In a related report, the committee raised concerns about the dearth of
information available on the group and the potential to underestimate Boko Haram’s potential
threat to U.S. interest. The report suggested that the U.S. government expand military and
intelligence support, as well as diplomatic engagement with Nigeria, and examine whether Boko
Haram should be designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).60 Subsequent legislation
has been introduced to press the State Department on the FTO issue. In congressional testimony
on worldwide threats, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) declared Nigeria to be “critical
to U.S. interests,” highlighting three key challenges the country faces in 2012—“healing political
wounds” from the 2011 election, “managing the chronic unrest” in the Niger Delta, and
addressing the threat posed by Boko Haram, the last of which he identified as “most pressing.”
He expressed concern that Boko Haram may be interested in hitting additional Western targets in
Nigeria.61 The Africa subcommittees in both houses held hearings on Nigeria in 2012 to consider
U.S. policy on governance, security and trade issues in the country. Congressional attention to
these and other issues is expected to continue through the remainder of the 112th Congress.
58 U.S. security cooperation with Nigeria was restricted until the transition to civilian rule, and it was suspended in the
early 2000s when Nigeria hosted exiled Liberian President Charles Taylor.
59 Remarks by Ambassador Terence P. McCulley at the National Defense College in Abuja, April 26, 2012.
60 U.S. Congress, House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Boko Haram:
Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland, committee print, 112th Cong., November 30, 2011.
61 Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, in U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, January 31, 2012.
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Table 1. State Department and USAID Assistance to Nigeria
($ in thousands)
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
Actual
Estimate
Request
Development Assistance
55,791
50,291
50,200
Foreign Military Financing
1,212
1,000
1,000
Global Health and Child Survival - State
471,227
441,227
438,600
Global Health and Child Survival - USAID
101,971
132,000
108,900
International Military Education and Training
1,013
870 750
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
1,250
0
0
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
0 0 0
Programs
TOTAL 632,464
625,388
599,450
Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations.
Figure 2. Map of Nigeria
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Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch
Specialist in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
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