.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Specialist in African Affairs
November 5, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33964
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Summary
The U.S. government considers its relationship with Nigeria, Africa’s largest producer of oil and
its largest economy, to be among the most important on the continent. Nigeria is Africa’s most
populous country, with almost 180 million people, roughly divided between Muslims and
Christians. U.S. diplomatic relations with Nigeria have improved since the country made the
transition from military to civilian rule in 1999, and Nigeria, which ranked until recently among
the top suppliers of U.S. oil imports, is a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid. The country is an
influential actor in African politics and a top troop contributor to U.N. peacekeeping missions.
Nigeria is a country of significant promise, but it also faces serious social, economic, and security
challenges that have the potential to threaten both state and regional stability, and to affect global
oil prices. The country has faced intermittent political turmoil and economic crises since
independence. Political life has been scarred by conflict along ethnic, geographic, and religious
lines, and corruption and misrule have undermined the state’s authority and legitimacy. Despite
extensive petroleum resources, Nigeria’s human development indicators are among the world’s
lowest, and a majority of the population faces extreme poverty. Thousands have been killed in
periodic ethno-religious clashes in the past decade. Years of social unrest, criminality, and
corruption in the oil-producing Niger Delta have hindered oil production, delayed the southern
region’s economic development, and contributed to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Perceived
neglect and economic marginalization also fuel resentment in the predominately Muslim north.
The attempted terrorist attack on an American airliner by a Nigerian in 2009 and the subsequent
rise of a militant Islamist group, Boko Haram, have heightened concerns about extremist
recruitment in Nigeria, which has one of the world’s largest Muslim populations. Boko Haram
has targeted churches, among other state and civilian targets, sometimes triggering retaliatory
violence and threatening to inflame religious tensions. While the group appears primarily focused
on a domestic agenda, its ties with other violent Islamist groups, notably Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), are of concern. The State Department designated Boko Haram and a splinter
faction, Ansaru, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) in November 2013.
Domestic criticism of the Nigerian government’s response to the Boko Haram threat, and in
particular to the April 2014 kidnapping of almost 300 schoolgirls, may have an impact on the
upcoming February 2015 elections. President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from southern
Nigeria, and his party appear set to face a strong challenge from an opposition alliance that draws
support, in part, from popular disaffection with Jonathan in northern Nigeria. In the aftermath of
Nigeria’s last presidential elections, in 2011, protests and violence across the north highlighted
strong dissatisfaction among some northerners with Jonathan’s victory. Recent divisions within
the ruling party, largely along geographic lines, suggest that discontent with his leadership has
since grown. The opposition cannot win the presidency, however, with northern support alone.
The Obama Administration has been supportive of reform initiatives in Nigeria, including anti-
corruption efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector privatization, and programs to
promote peace and development in the Niger Delta. In 2010, the Administration established the
U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission, a strategic dialogue to address issues of mutual concern.
Congress regularly monitors Nigerian political developments, and some Members have expressed
concern with corruption, human rights abuses, and the threat of violent extremism in Nigeria.
Congress oversees more than $700 million in U.S. foreign aid programs in Nigeria—one of the
largest U.S. bilateral assistance packages in Africa.
Congressional Research Service
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Congressional Research Service
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Contents
Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 1
Political Context .............................................................................................................................. 2
Elections: The 2011 Polls and a Look Ahead to February 2015 ................................................ 3
The 2015 Elections .............................................................................................................. 6
Development Challenges and Reform Initiatives ............................................................................ 6
Efforts to Combat Corruption .................................................................................................... 7
Petroleum and Power Sector Reforms ....................................................................................... 8
Financial Sector Reforms ........................................................................................................ 10
Social Issues and Security Concerns ............................................................................................. 10
Islamic Sharia Law .................................................................................................................. 10
Religious and Communal Tensions ......................................................................................... 11
Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria ............................................................................. 12
Conflict in the Niger Delta ...................................................................................................... 15
Abuses by Security Forces ...................................................................................................... 16
Ebola, Polio, and HIV/AIDS ................................................................................................... 17
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 18
Administration Policy on Nigeria ............................................................................................ 18
U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Maritime Security Issues ............................................................. 19
Nigeria’s Role in Regional Stability and Counterterrorism Efforts .................................. 20
U.S. Assistance to Nigeria ................................................................................................. 21
Congressional Engagement ............................................................................................... 22
Figures
Figure 1. Nigeria at a Glance ........................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Results of the 2011 Presidential Election ......................................................................... 4
Tables
Table 1. State Department and USAID Assistance to Nigeria ....................................................... 21
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 23
Congressional Research Service
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Overview
Nigeria is considered a key power on the African continent, not only because of its size, but
because of its political and economic role in the region. One in five people in Sub-Saharan Africa
call Nigeria home. The country’s commercial center, Lagos, is among the world’s largest cities.
Nigeria has overtaken South Africa as Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest economy, and it is one of the
world’s major sources of high-quality crude oil. Nigerian troops have played an important role in
peace and stability operations on the continent, and the country regularly ranks among the top
five troop contributors to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Few countries in Africa have
the capacity to make a more decisive impact on the region.
Despite its oil wealth, however, Nigeria remains highly underdeveloped. Poor governance and
corruption have limited infrastructure development and social service delivery, slowing economic
growth and keeping much of the country mired in poverty. Nigeria is also home to the world’s
second-largest HIV/AIDS-infected population and has Africa’s highest tuberculosis burden.
The country is home to more than 250 ethnic groups, but the northern Hausa and Fulani, the
southwestern Yoruba, and the southeastern Ibo have traditionally been the most politically active
and dominant. Roughly half the population, primarily those residing in the north, are Muslim.
Southern Nigeria is predominantly Christian.
Ethnic and religious strife have been common in Nigeria. By some estimates, 16,000 Nigerians
have died in localized clashes in the last decade. Nigeria now has the largest displaced population
in Africa—an estimated 3.3 million people—and the third largest in the world. Divisions among
ethnic groups, between north and south, and between Christians and Muslims often stem from
issues relating to access to land, jobs, and socioeconomic development, and are sometimes fueled
by politicians. More than 800 people were killed in 2011 in post-election clashes, which
highlighted growing dissatisfaction with the government in Nigeria’s northern states.
An increasingly active violent Islamist group, Boko Haram, has contributed to deteriorating
security conditions in the north and seeks to capitalize on local frustrations and discredit the
government. In November 2013, the U.S. State Department formally designated Boko Haram and
a splinter group, Ansaru, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). U.S. policy makers appear
particularly concerned with Boko Haram’s reported ties with transnational terrorist groups and
with the threat these groups may pose to U.S. and international targets, either in the region or
overseas. Further, Boko Haram’s attacks against churches have the potential to inflame sectarian
tensions across Nigeria and, potentially, beyond.
In the southern Niger Delta region, local grievances related to oil production in the area have
fueled simmering conflict and criminality for over a decade. The government’s efforts to
negotiate with local militants, including through an amnesty program, have quieted the restive
region, but the peace is fragile and violent criminality continues. Some militants continue to be
involved in various local and transnational criminal activities, including maritime piracy and drug
and weapons trafficking networks. These networks often overlap with oil theft networks, which
contribute to the rising trend of piracy off the coast of Nigeria and the wider Gulf of Guinea, now
one of the most dangerous bodies of water in the world.
Congressional Research Service
1
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Figure 1. Nigeria at a Glance
Political Context
Nigeria, which gained its independence from Britain in 1960, is a federal republic with 36 states;
its political structure is similar to that of the United States. It has a bicameral legislature with a
109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives. Nigeria’s president, legislators,
and governors are directly elected on four-year terms. The country was ruled by the military for
much of the four decades after independence before making the transition to civilian rule in 1999.
Congressional Research Service
2
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Elections held in the decade after the transition were deemed by Nigerians and the international
community to be flawed, with each poll progressively worse than the last. The most recent
elections, in 2011, showed improvement, but also highlighted outstanding issues.
The contest for power between north and south that has broadly defined much of Nigeria’s
modern political history can be traced, in part, to administrative divisions instituted during
Britain’s colonial administration.1 Northern military leaders dominated the political scene from
independence until the transition to democracy just over a decade ago. Since the election of
President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, there has been a de-facto power sharing arrangement,
often referred to as “zoning,” between the country’s geopolitical zones, through which the
presidency was expected to rotate among regions. The death of President Obasanjo’s successor,
President Umaru Yar’Adua, in office in 2010,2 and the subsequent ascension of his vice president,
Goodluck Jonathan, a former governor from the southern Niger Delta, to the presidency for the
remainder of Yar’Adua’s first term, raises questions about the future of the zoning arrangement,
which is discussed below. President Jonathan’s decision to vie for the presidency in 2011, his
victory, and his current reelection bid complicate the notional regional rotation formula.
Elections: The 2011 Polls and a Look Ahead to February 2015
Nigeria’s ability to weather the potential political crisis of President Yar’Adua’s hospitalization
and death in office, and to manage the transition without the military playing an apparent role,
was viewed by many as positive sign of its democratic progress. After assuming office, President
Jonathan continued electoral reforms begun under his predecessor, including efforts to increase
the autonomy of the election commission, whose credibility had been badly damaged by previous
polls. Jonathan won praise for replacing the commission’s chairman with a respected academic
and civil society activist, Attahiru Jega, enhancing public confidence prior to the 2011 elections.
With over 73 million registered voters, almost 120,000 polling stations, and more than 50
political parties, the challenges facing the election commission in 2011 were daunting. Observers
noted positive developments prior to the elections, including efforts to compile a more credible
voter register, but also raised concerns about electoral preparedness and areas deemed
problematic in previous polls, including ballot secrecy, intimidation, and transparency in the
counting of ballots and tabulation of results. Last-minute court rulings on the parties’ candidate
lists slowed the delivery of voting materials, which in turn delayed the election period by a week.
Given Nigeria’s unwritten “zoning” arrangement, there was considerable debate on whether
Jonathan’s decision to stand for the presidency would lead the ruling party to split prior to the
2011 elections. Many northerners argued that since Obasanjo, who is from the southwest, had
served two terms and Yar’Adua, who was from the north, had served only one term, a northern
candidate should hold the office for another term. Jonathan, who notably is from a minority
1 Britain administered the north and south separately from the late 19th century until 1947, when it introduced a federal
system that divided the country into three regions: Northern, Eastern, and Western. Today, Nigeria is comprised of six
geopolitical zones: north-west, north-east, north-central, south-west, south-east, and south-south (the Niger Delta).
2 Many speculate that Yar’Adua suffered from a chronic kidney condition. His hospitalization abroad in late 2009 and
prolonged absence threatened to spark a political crisis in early 2010, amid rumors of his death, allegations that his wife
and close advisors were making decisions for him, and legal challenges related to his failure to transfer power during
his convalescence. After several months of uncertainty, the National Assembly recognized Jonathan as the acting head
of state in February 2010, allowing him to conduct critical government business. In May 2010, the government
announced President Yar’Adua’s death at age 58, and Jonathan was sworn in as the new president.
Congressional Research Service
3
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
southeastern ethnic group (the Ijaw), ultimately gained the support of key People’s Democratic
Party (PDP) leaders, including a majority of the northern governors, for his candidacy, and he
won the PDP primary by a wide margin. The leading opposition parties, presumably following the
zoning deal, chose northern presidential candidates—former military leader Muhammadu Buhari,
who had run twice before, for the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and Nuhu Ribadu, the
former head of Nigeria’s anti-corruption authority, for the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN).
Figure 2. Results of the 2011 Presidential Election
Source: BBC, adapted by CRS.
The PDP remained dominant in the elections, retaining the presidency and a majority in the
House of Representatives and most state legislatures. Voters expressed their dissatisfaction,
however, by voting out two-thirds of the incumbents in the House and Senate. Opposition
candidates made significant gains in the southwest and the north.3 President Jonathan won 59.6%
of the vote, gaining a majority in 23 states and enough support nationwide to avoid a run-off.
Buhari followed with 32.3% of the votes, leading in one-third of the states (see Figure 2). Given
3 The ACN dominated state elections in the south west, where the PDP lost all governors’ races and kept a majority in
only one state assembly.
Congressional Research Service
4
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Buhari’s electoral success in the north, Jonathan’s victory was seen by some northern youth as
evidence that the results had been rigged, triggering protests that, in some areas, turned deadly.
Election-Related Violence in 2011
Despite generally positive reviews of the 2011 elections, the level of election-related violence was higher than in
previous years. Deadly clashes that followed the presidential vote highlighted communal tensions, disaffection, and
mistrust of the state in the under-developed north—issues that the federal government may have considered a
secondary priority as it grappled with militant activity in the oil-producing Niger Delta.
Violence prior to the 2011 elections included clashes between party supporters and several assassinations, and some
politicians deployed “thugs” to intimidate opponents and voters. Security concerns were further heightened by a
spate of bombings during political rallies, primarily in the Delta, that were linked to local politics. There were at least
six bombings in the northeast state of Borno, where Boko Haram has been most active. Boko Haram was linked to
the assassination of that state’s leading gubernatorial candidate, as well as to the bombing of a state election
commission headquarters not far from the national capital, Abuja. The government increased security during the pol s,
and election observer comments were general y positive regarding security forces’ behavior during the elections.
The worst violence in 2011 came almost immediately after the presidential pol , with supporters of Muhammadu
Buhari leading protests in the northern states, alleging that the PDP had rigged the vote. The protests devolved into
violent riots and, in some areas, killings, largely along religious and ethnic lines. In some parts of the north, the clashes
lasted for several days until soldiers were deployed to enforce stability. At least 800 people were killed in a three-day
period, according to Human Rights Watch, and as many as 65,000 displaced. An independent panel, tasked with
conducting an official government inquiry into the violence and led by a prominent Islamic scholar, faulted successive
administrations for failing to act on the recommendations of previous inquiries into communal and political violence.
The panel viewed the zoning arrangement as having politicized ethno-religious tensions and also suggested that
statements made by politicians such as Buhari for supporters to “guard their votes” may have fueled popular
frustrations and, possibly inadvertently, sparked acts of violence.
U.S. government views on the 2011 elections were broadly positive, despite the violence. Then-
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared, “This historic event marks a dramatic shift from
decades of failed elections,” but stated that “while this election was a success for the people of
Nigeria, it was far from perfect.”4 Another senior official noted “technical imperfections,” but
argued that “this reverses a downward democratic trajectory and provides the country a solid
foundation for strengthening its electoral procedures and democratic institutions.” President
Obama remarked that “the success of the elections was a testament to Nigerian voters who ...
were determined that these elections mark a new chapter in Nigerian history.”
Election observers generally noted significant improvements in the legislative and presidential
polls, calling them a key step forward, but most stopped short of terming the elections “free and
fair.”5 Some raised concerns with presidential results from certain states in the Niger Delta
(President Jonathan’s home region) and the southeast, where turnout appeared to be near 100%
amid reports of intimidation, harassment, and violence. Nationally, under-age voting was a
common concern of observers, and overcrowding at polling stations and complicated vote
collation procedures vulnerable to error or malfeasance remained a problem. Some of the state
elections were deemed to be less credible by observers. Various parties filed legal suits
4 Official comments cited herein include Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Press Release: Election in Nigeria, April
19, 2011; Special Briefing by Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, “The Recent Elections in Nigeria,” April 28, 2011;
and the White House, Statement by President Obama on Elections in Nigeria, May 4, 2011.
5 The author served as an election observer in Lagos for the parliamentary elections and Sokoto for the presidential
poll. See the official observer reports of the National Democratic Institute (http://www.ndi.org); the European Union
(http://eeas.europea.eu/eueom/missions/2011/nigeria); Project 2011 Swift Count (http://www.pscnigeria.org); and the
Transition Monitoring Group (http://www.tmgelection2011.org).
Congressional Research Service
5
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
challenging the results of the 2011 elections, with varying success. Nigeria’s Supreme Court
upheld a verdict rejecting the CPC’s challenge to President Jonathan’s win in December 2011.
The 2015 Elections
Nigeria’s next elections are scheduled for February 2015, and President Jonathan will seek
reelection for a second full term in office.6 The ruling party may face its strongest challenge to
date from a new opposition coalition, the All Progressive Congress (APC), formed in 2013 by
three main opposition parties. The APC is widely expected to select a northerner, possibly Buhari,
as its presidential candidate, potentially with a prominent southwestern politician as his running
mate.
The ruling PDP has struggled with increasing internal divisions that may impact the party’s
ability to mobilize resources and votes behind Jonathan’s campaign. A splinter faction composed
of seven state governors (all but one from the north) and a sizeable number of members of both
the House and the Senate emerged in 2013. Five of the governors, along with almost 40
legislators, subsequently defected to the opposition. More recent shifts have occurred, notably the
defection of Aminu Tambuwal, Speaker of the House of Representatives, to the APC in late
October. The PDP split represents opposition, largely but not exclusively from northern party
members, to Jonathan’s reelection bid. It also reflects internal power struggles, as politicians vie
for position prior to the elections. State-level elections are expected to be extremely competitive
in 2015, with vacant seats in two-thirds of the governorships. Some analysts contend that with
fewer incumbent governors seeking reelection, party mobilization for Jonathan at the state level
may be affected, potentially leading to a presidential run-off election.7 In order to win, Jonathan,
or his competitor, must obtain an overall majority and at least 25% of the votes cast in two-thirds
of the states.
Development Challenges and Reform Initiatives
Despite its oil wealth and large economy, Nigeria’s population is among Africa’s poorest, and the
distribution of wealth is highly unequal. The average life expectancy for Nigerians is less than 53
years, and the percentage of the population living in absolute poverty (less than $1.25 a day) has
grown in the past decade. Nigeria has the world’s second-largest HIV/AIDS population. Access to
clean water remains a major problem—almost half the population has no access to improved
sources of water, less than one-fifth of households have piped water, and some 30% lack access to
adequate sanitation. Diarrhea is the second-leading cause of death among children, and Nigeria
ranks second only to India in the number of diarrhea-related child deaths globally.
Decades of economic mismanagement, instability, and corruption have hindered investment in
education and social services and stymied industrial growth. U.S. officials suggest that “good
governance, healthy political competition, and equitable economic growth would go a long way”
to addressing the country’s development challenges.8 The country’s oil and gas sector accounts
6 A Nigerian court ruled in March 2013 that Jonathan is serving his first term and is thus eligible to run in 2015.
7 Zainab Usman and Oliver Owen, “Incumbency and Opportunity: Forecasting Nigeria’s 2015 Elections,” October 29,
2014, available at http://www.africanarguments.org.
8 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Linda Thomas-Greenfield, House Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, Countering the Threat Posed by Boko Haram, November 13, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
6
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
for the majority of government revenues and export earnings. This makes the country particularly
vulnerable to swings in global oil prices, and to conflict and criminality in the Niger Delta.
In April 2014, the Nigerian government announced the rebasing of its economy, which is now
internationally recognized as the largest in Africa and the 26th largest in the world.9 The rebased
GDP, now substantially larger than South Africa’s, is almost double what it was previously
thought to have been, and is less reliant on the petroleum sector than expected. The service sector
is now seen to contribute just over 50% of GDP, and the telecommunications and homegrown
film industries are growing rapidly. Economists suggest that the economy nevertheless continues
to underperform, held back by poor infrastructure and electricity shortages.
Efforts to Combat Corruption
Corruption in Nigeria is “massive, widespread, and pervasive,” according to the Department of
State, and by many accounts, development will be hampered until Nigeria can address the
perception of impunity for corruption and fraud.10 Human Rights Watch suggests that the political
system rewards corruption, which has been fueled by oil revenues for decades.11 Several
international firms have been implicated in Nigerian bribery scandals. Nigeria is also known
globally for cyber crimes, including “419 scams,” so-named for the article in the country’s penal
code that outlaws fraudulent e-mails.
According to Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), a law enforcement
agency created in 2003 to combat corruption and fraud, billions of dollars have been expropriated
by political and military leaders since oil sales began in the 1970s. Former dictator Sani Abacha
reportedly stole more than $3.5 billion during his five years as head of state (1993-1998). Some
stolen funds have been repatriated, but other Abacha assets remain frozen abroad. In March 2014,
the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it had forfeited more than $480 million in Abacha
corruption proceeds held in foreign bank accounts—the largest kleptocracy forfeiture action in
the department’s history. Expropriation of Nigeria’s resources did not stop with Abacha—
Nigeria’s former central bank governor estimated that Nigeria may lose more than 10% of its
annual GDP through fraud, and a task force appointed by President Jonathan found in 2012 than
billions of dollars have been lost since 2002 through oil theft and the mispricing of gas exports.12
Successive presidents have taken a public stance against corruption, but some observers suggest
that they have also used corruption charges to sideline critics and political opponents. President
Yar’Adua campaigned on an anti-corruption agenda; in 1999 he was the first governor to publicly
declare his assets. Upon assuming the presidency, he dismissed many of Obasanjo’s political
appointees and security chiefs and overturned several of the privatization agreements approved by
his predecessor, amid charges of corruption associated with the sales. Yar’Adua also proposed,
unsuccessfully, that the constitution be amended to remove an immunity clause that prevents the
president, vice president, governors, and deputy governors from being prosecuted for corruption
9 The rebasing of the economy was triggered by the country’s National Bureau of Statistics, which recalculated the
value of GDP based on production patterns in 2010, increasing the number of industries it measured and giving greater
weighting to sectors such as telecommunications and financial services.
10 State Department, “Nigeria,” Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2013, April 2014.
11 HRW, Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, August 2011.
12 “Nigeria: Dazzling Statistics,” Africa Confidential, Vol. 53 No. 14, July 6, 2012; and “The $100 Billion Bash,”
Africa Confidential, November2, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
7
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
while in office. Nevertheless, critics contend that executive interference with the EFCC continued
during his tenure, undermining investigations and derailing prosecutions.13 Advocacy groups have
called on President Jonathan to increase the EFCC’s independence, suggesting that its chairman
“remains deeply vulnerable to the whims of the president and lacks security of tenure.”14
The Jonathan Administration launched several new anti-corruption initiatives during its first term,
including the passage of a Freedom of Information law in 2011, a parliamentary inquiry into
fraud associated with the country’s fuel subsidy program, and an independent audit of the oil and
gas sector. That audit report, however, which suggested large-scale corruption and waste, appears
to have been largely ignored by the government. Despite pledges by the Jonathan Administration
to expand budget transparency by requiring legislators and other senior officials to publicly
declare their assets, the extent of the president’s own assets remains unknown. In January 2014,
President Jonathan forced the country’s central bank governor, Lamido Sanusi, to resign after a
leaked memorandum from Sanusi regarding the state oil firm’s failure to account for between $10
billion and $20 billion in revenue. To date, the issue of the missing billions remains unresolved.
Crude Oil Theft in Nigeria and Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Corruption and fraud have long been associated with Nigeria’s oil industry. Alleged state-level fraud has been linked
to the al ocation of state oil revenues, concession licensing, and exploration and extraction permits, but the outright
theft of crude, known locally as bunkering, is also a major challenge. Small-scale pilfering and illegal local refining has
been, and continues to be, a problem, but large-scale illegal bunkering by sophisticated theft networks is a significant
threat with international dimensions. By some estimates, between $3 billion and $8 billion in Nigerian oil is stolen
annual y.15 In its 2013 report Nigeria’s Criminal Crude, the London-based Chatham House estimated that an average of
100,000 barrels per day were stolen in the first quarter of 2013. Niger Delta militants, Nigerian politicians, security
officers, and oil industry personnel have been implicated in the theft and illegal trade of Nigerian crude. Challenges in
addressing oil theft are compounded by a lack of transparency in the Nigerian oil industry.
Export oil theft networks, to which some of the Niger Delta militant groups are tied, have also been implicated in
moving drugs and other illicit materials. Experts suggest that the trade in stolen oil supports the spread of other
transnational organized crimes in the Gulf of Guinea, including maritime piracy. Attacks in Nigerian territorial waters
account for the overwhelming majority of piracy incidents in the Gulf, and the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime
reports that most of these incidents can be traced back to the Niger Delta and linked to the illegal oil trade.16
Petroleum and Power Sector Reforms
President Jonathan has pledged to reform the oil and gas industry, which has been plagued by
corruption for decades. Nigeria’s first female oil minister, Diezani Allison-Madueke, a former
Royal Dutch Shell executive, continues to be the lead on the government’s efforts to pass and
implement the ambitious Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which is aimed at increasing
13 Donors criticized the dismissal of the first EFCC chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, in 2007. There was speculation that his
removal was linked to his effort to prosecute former Delta State Governor James Ibori, one of Yar’Adua’s key financial
contributors, who may have embezzled over $200 million. First arrested in 2007, acquitted, and then indicted again in
2010, Ibori eluded capture and fled to Dubai, where he was arrested and extradited in 2011 to the United Kingdom. He
was convicted there on money laundering and fraud charges. In 2011, Jonathan fired Ribadu’s successor, who was
implicated in corruption, replacing her with Ribadu’s former deputy, Ibrahim Lamorde.
14 HRW, Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, August 2011.
15 Christina Katsouris and Aaron Sayne, Nigeria’s Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of
Stolen Oil, Chatham House, September 2013.
16 The hijacking of oil tankers and opportunistic robberies are the predominant types of maritime crime in these waters.
Kidnapping for ransom is less common, particularly in comparison to acts of piracy off the Horn of Africa. For more
information, see UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment, February 2013.
Congressional Research Service
8
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
transparency in the industry, attracting investors, and creating jobs. Progress on the legislation,
however, has been halting, and the regulatory uncertainty surrounding its passage has deterred
investment. The PIB would restructure the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the
parastatal that oversees regulation of the industry and has been criticized for its lack of
transparency. It would also alter the fiscal terms for oil-producing firms.
Nigeria was designated compliant with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a
global standard for transparency in the oil, gas, and mining sectors, in 2011, indicating that
Nigeria had fulfilled the minimum criterion of annually declaring its extractive sector revenues.
This does not necessarily suggest that Nigeria has taken aggressive steps to curb corruption in the
sector. The task force led by former EFCC Chairman Nuhu Ribadu to audit oil revenues reported
in late 2012 that billions of dollars could not be accounted for, findings that, despite criticism
from some in the government, were similar to those of Nigeria’s own EITI (NEITI) audits.17
Despite its status as one of the world’s largest crude oil exporters, Nigeria imports roughly $10
billion in refined fuel annually for domestic consumption, and it suffers periodically from severe
fuel and electricity shortages.18 In an effort to increase its refining capacity and halt oil imports by
2020, the government has granted permits for several new independently owned refineries.19
Nigeria’s domestic subsidy on gasoline (roughly 70% of which is imported, despite domestic
petroleum production) may have limited the attractiveness of refining capacity expansion plans to
foreign investors. For years, the government has subsidized the price its citizens pay for fuel, and
economists have long deemed the subsidy benefit unsustainable. The subsidy’s cost—roughly $8
billion, or 4% of GDP, in 2011—has been steep, comprising almost one-quarter of the annual
government budget. At the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund and others, in
late 2011 President Jonathan cut the subsidy, causing the price of gasoline for consumers to
double in early 2012 and sparking strong domestic opposition. In the face of mass protests and a
nationwide strike, the government backtracked and reinstated a partial subsidy, estimated at 2%
of GDP.20 Public scrutiny of the program has since increased—a legislative inquiry revealed that
an estimated $7 billion allocated for the subsidy may have been misappropriated, prompting
Jonathan to replace several senior executives at the national petroleum company.21 Government
efforts to reduce the subsidy by limiting import licenses led to fuel scarcities in 2014, adding
further popular frustration given Nigerians’ reliance on gasoline for personal generators because
of the unreliable power supply.
The government plans to refocus funds saved by decreasing the fuel subsidy on improving health,
education, and the nation’s power supply. Jonathan has pledged to increase electricity generation
tenfold over the next decade, and efforts to privatize power stations and distribution companies
are underway, albeit behind schedule, despite objections from the country’s trade unions.
17 NEITI’s audits are available at http://www.neiti.org.ng.
18 Nigerians Face Fuel Shortages in the Shadow of Plenty,” National Geographic, April 11, 2014.
19 In 2010, Nigeria signed an agreement with China worth a reported $23 billion for new refineries, and in 2012 the
government signed a memorandum of understanding with U.S.-based Vulcan Petroleum Resources for a $4.5 billion
project to build six refineries. In 2013, Nigerian businessman Aliko Dangote, Africa’s wealthiest man, signed a multi-
billion deal with banks to finance the construction of an oil refinery in the southwest.
20 See, e.g., “Removal of Fuel Subsidies in Nigeria: An Economic Necessity and a Political Dilemma,” The Brookings
Institution, January 10, 2012.
21 The lawmaker who led the probe, Farouk Lawan, was accused of taking a bribe from one of the companies involved
and was replaced in early 2013. Lawan maintained that he took the bribe as evidence.
Congressional Research Service
9
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Nigeria’s Natural Gas Resources
In addition to its oil reserves, Nigeria has the ninth-largest natural gas reserves in the world and the largest in Africa,
but they have provided comparatively little benefit to the country’s economy. Many of Nigeria’s oil fields lack the
infrastructure to capture and transport natural gas. The government has repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, set deadlines
for oil companies to stop “flaring” gas at oil wells (burning unwanted gas during oil drilling), a practice estimated to
destroy more than one-fifth of annual production.22 In 2011, President Jonathan announced a series of new
agreements to develop gas processing facilities as part of a “gas revolution” designed to create new jobs and
revenues, and to end flaring. Nigeria is in the process of increasing its liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, which
could surpass revenues derived from oil exports in the next decade. Uncertainty surrounding the Petroleum Industry
Bill, however, has hindered development of the sector.
Financial Sector Reforms
Successive Nigerian administrations have made commitments to economic reform, but their track
record is mixed. According to the IMF, reforms initiated under the Obasanjo Administration and
continued by his successors, most importantly the policies of maintaining low external debt and
budgeting based on a conservative oil price benchmark to create a buffer of foreign reserves,
lessened the impact of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis on Nigeria’s economy.23 Since 2004,
oil revenues above the benchmark price were saved in an Excess Crude Account (ECA), although
the government drew substantially from the account in 2009-2010 in an effort to stimulate
economic recovery. The Jonathan Administration replaced the ECA with a sovereign wealth fund
in 2011. The country has made significant gains in the past decade in paying down its external
debt, which constituted more than one-third of GDP a decade ago, freeing funding for programs
aimed at poverty reduction and reaching the country’s Millennium Development Goals.
Like his predecessors, President Jonathan has committed to reforms that aim to attract foreign
investment, create jobs, and fuel development. In 2011, he appointed then-World Bank managing
director Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who had led efforts to reduce Nigeria’s debt as Obasanjo’s finance
minister, to resume her former post. Investors and analysts have expressed concern about possible
government interference in monetary system in the wake of the resignation of former central bank
governor Lamido Sanusi, who had led efforts to modernize the country’s banking system and
tighten banking supervision. Sanusi was selected in June 2014 to become Nigeria’s second most
important traditional Muslim leader, the Emir of Kano.
Social Issues and Security Concerns
Islamic Sharia Law
Nigeria is home to one of the world’s largest Muslim populations, vying with, and likely
overtaking, Egypt as the largest on the continent. The north is predominately Sunni Muslim, and
12 northern states use Islamic sharia law to adjudicate criminal and civil matters for Muslims.24
22 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief: Nigeria, December 30, 2013.
23 International Monetary Fund, “Staff Report for the Article IV Consultation with Nigeria,” July 2012.
24 Nigerian law protects freedom of religion and permits states to establish courts based on common law or customary
law systems. Non-sharia based common law and customary law courts adjudicate cases involving non-Muslims in these
states, and sharia-based criminal law courts are elective for non-Muslims.
Congressional Research Service
10
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Under the Nigerian constitution, sharia does not apply to non-Muslims in civil and criminal
proceedings, but Islamic mores are often enforced in public without regard for citizens’ religion.
In some areas, state-funded vigilante groups known as hisbah patrol public areas to enforce
sharia-based rulings. Many analysts nonetheless see the interpretation and implementation of
Nigerian sharia as moderate in comparison to some other Muslim-majority countries.
Religious and Communal Tensions
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has recommended since
2009 that Nigeria be classified as a “Country of Particular Concern” for “systematic, ongoing,
and egregious violations of religious freedom that lead to particularly severe violations affecting
all Nigerians, both Christian and Muslim.”25 It is not designated as such by the Secretary of State.
According to USCIRF, as many as 16,000 Nigerians have been killed since 1999 in sectarian
violence, and the commissioners argue that the government has tolerated the violence, creating a
culture of impunity that has emboldened Boko Haram and its sympathizers and been used to
exploit Muslim-Christian tensions to destabilize the country. USCIRF has noted ongoing reprisal
attacks between Muslim and Christian communities in central Nigeria, the religious nature of the
2011 post-election violence, Boko Haram’s attacks against Christians, and rising religiously
charged rhetoric as areas of significant concern. Other experts also point to increasingly well-
armed militias, loosely organized along religious lines, in central and northern Nigeria.26 The
State Department, in its most recent Religious Freedom report, criticized the government’s lack of
effective efforts to stem communal violence or to investigate and prosecute those responsible.27
Sectarian violence has been a particular problem in and around the central Nigerian city of Jos,
the capital of Plateau State, which sits between the predominately Muslim north and Christian
south. Tensions among communities in this culturally diverse “Middle Belt” are both religious
and ethnic, and they stem from competition over resources—land, education, government jobs—
between ethnic groups classified as settlers or as “indigenes” (original inhabitants of the state),
with the latter designation conveying certain political and economic benefits. In Jos, the mostly
Christian Berom are considered indigenes, and the predominately Muslim Hausa-Fulani, who
were traditionally nomadic and pastoralist, are viewed as the settlers. In 2010, the Nigerian
government established a special task force composed of both military and police to restore
stability in the state; periodic outbreaks of violence have nonetheless continued, and have been
exacerbated by attacks on churches attributed to Boko Haram.28
25 The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom issued its latest report in April 2014.
26 Testimony of Darren Kew, House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, The Crisis in
Christian-Muslim Relations in Nigeria, July 10, 2012.
27 State Department, International Religious Freedom Report for 2013, February 2014.
28 See, e.g., ICG, Curbing Violence in Nigeria: The Jos Crisis, Africa Report No. 196, December 17, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
11
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria29
Boko Haram, a violent Islamist movement in the north, has grown increasingly active and deadly
in its attacks against state and civilian targets in Nigeria since 2010, drawing on a narrative of
vengeance for state abuses to elicit recruits and sympathizers. By many estimates, more than
11,000 civilians, security forces, and militants have been killed in related violence. The group has
focused on a wide range of targets, both government and civilian. While attacks attributed to the
group have not exclusively, or even primarily, targeted Christians, attacks on churches in several
northern and central states may further fuel existing religious tensions. These bombings, which
often occur on Sundays or religious holidays, have sparked deadly reprisal attacks by Christians
against Muslim civilians. The group’s kidnapping in April 2014 of almost 300 schoolgirls from a
secondary school in Chibok, Nigeria, brought renewed international attention to Boko Haram and
increased domestic pressure on the Jonathan Administration to do more to address the threat and
protect civilians. Such high-profile attacks may be part of a deliberate effort to foment instability,
with the aim of discrediting and delegitimizing the government in these regions by exposing the
weakness of its security apparatus and justice mechanisms.
Boko Haram emerged in the early 2000s as a small, radical Sunni Islamic sect that advocated a
strict interpretation and implementation of Islamic law for Nigeria. Calling itself Jama’a Ahl as-
Sunna Li-da’wa wa-al Jihad (JASLWJ; roughly translated from Arabic as “People Committed to
the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”), the group is more popularly known as
Boko Haram (“Western education is forbidden”), a nickname given by local Hausa-speaking
communities to describe its view that Western education and culture have been corrupting
influences. It engaged in periodic skirmishes with police during its formative years, but the
group’s activities were limited in scope and contained within several highly impoverished states
in the predominately Muslim northeast.
In July 2009, the government’s attempts to stop Boko Haram’s attacks on police stations and
other government buildings resulted in the death of at least 700 people, a figure that likely
includes not only militants, but also security personnel and bystanders. In the course of that
violence, the group’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic young cleric who had studied in
Saudi Arabia, was killed while in police custody.30 A sizeable number of Yusuf’s followers were
also killed or arrested. The group appeared to dissipate after the heavy-handed security
crackdown, but reemerged a year later, orchestrating a large-scale prison break in September 2010
that freed hundreds, including its own members. Some reports suggest that a small number of
Boko Haram militants may have fled to insurgent training camps in the Sahel during this period.
Boko Haram’s attacks have since increased substantially in frequency, reach, and lethality, now
occurring almost daily in northeast Nigeria (primarily in Borno and Yobe States), and periodically
beyond.31 Attacks attributed to the group periodically feature improvised explosive devices
(IEDs), car bombs, and suicide attacks, in addition to small arms. Boko Haram has primarily
29 For more information, see CRS Report R43558, Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions, by Lauren
Ploch Blanchard. See also Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the
Boko Haram Crisis, Chatham House, September 2014, and ICG, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram
Insurgency, April 3, 2014.
30 “Islamic Death ‘Good for Nigeria’,” BBC, July 31, 2009.
31For more information on the location and estimated death toll, by week, of Boko Haram attacks, see, e.g., the Council
on Foreign Relations’ Nigeria Security Tracker at http://www.cfr.org.
Congressional Research Service
12
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
focused on state and federal targets, such as police stations, but also targets civilians in schools,
churches, markets, and bars. Cell phone towers and media houses have also been attacked. The
group has assassinated local political leaders and moderate Muslim clerics. Bank robberies and
extortion attributed to the group may contribute to its financing, although authorities warn that
criminal groups may also be opportunistically posing as Boko Haram militants.
The bombing of the U.N. building in Abuja on August 24, 2011, marked a major departure from a
previously exclusive focus on domestic targets. It was also Boko Haram’s first clearly intentional
suicide bombing. Boko Haram spokesmen claimed the attack was retribution for the state’s
heavy-handed security response against its members, referencing U.S. and international
“collaboration” with the Nigerian security apparatus. The bombing may have indicated an
aspiration by some in Boko Haram to move beyond local politics toward an international jihadist
agenda, or it may have been an effort to elicit foreign backing for the group’s domestic agenda.
Boko Haram has been linked to the kidnapping of foreigners—the abduction of a French family
in northern Cameroon in early 2013 was believed to be its first major operation outside Nigeria.
By many accounts, Boko Haram is not a monolithic organization. Some reports estimate its
fighting force at 6,000 to 8,000 militants. According to U.S. officials, the group appears to draw
support primarily from young Muslim men in the northeast, some of whom have expressed
frustration with perceived disparities in the application of laws (including sharia); the lack of
development, jobs, and investment in the north; and the heavy-handed response of security
forces.32 Some of its fighters may be motivated by the prospect of financial gain or may have
been forcibly conscripted.33 Some analysts suggest that Boko Haram is susceptible to fracturing,
with a segment of the leadership working to build ties with the international Al Qaeda franchise,
while others remain focused exclusively on a domestic agenda. The emergence of a purported
splinter faction known as Ansaru in early 2012 led to speculation about divisions among Boko
Haram hardliners.34 Ansaru was critical of Boko Haram’s killing of Nigerian Muslims in its
public statements and primarily focused its attacks on foreigners, chiefly through kidnappings.35
By some accounts, the Boko Haram leadership targeted its critics in Ansaru through a series of
attacks in 2013—the splinter faction has been quiet in 2014, leading to speculation that its
remaining followers reconciled with the broader movement or focused their efforts elsewhere.
Efforts by various interlocutors to facilitate government negotiations with Boko Haram have
been, to date, unsuccessful. The state of emergency initially declared by the Nigerian government
in May 2013 for the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa has been repeatedly extended, and
significant questions surround the government’s ability to hold elections in the most affected
areas in 2015. Boko Haram attacks against soft targets, and associated fighting between militants
and security forces, have had a heavy toll on these states. The insurgents appear to have changed
tactics in 2014—rather than merely attacking and withdrawing from villages, they have
increasingly sought to seize territory. The significant increase in insurgent attacks in 2014 has led
to the displacement of more than 1.5 million people, who have fled both Boko Haram attacks and
32 Testimony of Assistant Secretary Linda Thomas-Greenfield, November 13, 2013, op. cit.
33 Navanti Group, Boko Haram Recruitment, Native Prospector West Bridge, September 30, 2014.
34 Ansaru’s full name is Jama’at Ansar al Muslimin fi Bilad is Sudan (“Supporters of the Muslims in the Land of the
Blacks”). For more information, see, e.g., articles by Jacob Zenn in the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point’s
CTC Sentinel: “Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria,” February 24, 2014, “Boko Haram’s
Evolving Tactics and Alliances in Nigeria,” June 25, 2013, and “Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru
After the Mali Intervention, March 27, 2013.
35 See, e.g., “Boko Haram: Splinter Group, Ansaru Emerges,” Vanguard, February 1, 2012
Congressional Research Service
13
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
the government’s counterinsurgency operations in the northeast.36 Another 75,000 Nigerians have
fled as refugees into neighboring countries. There have been increasing calls for the Nigerian
security forces to improve efforts to protect civilians as they conduct their offensive against the
militants, and increasing public criticism of reported abuses by local vigilante groups (who
collectively call themselves the “Civilian Joint Task Force” or Civilian-JTF) who work with
security forces in parts of the northeast to rout Boko Haram cells.37
Boko Haram and Ansaru: An Increasingly Transnational Threat?
While Boko Haram currently appears primarily to pose a threat to local stability, its rise has
amplified concerns that Nigerians may be susceptible to recruitment by Muslim extremist groups
aiming to use violence against government or civilian targets elsewhere in the region or abroad.
The increasing lethality and sophistication of Boko Haram’s attacks has further raised the group’s
profile among U.S. national security officials. The kidnappings of Western citizens in northern
Nigeria, several of whom have been killed in captivity, are another source of concern as policy
makers seek to determine the extent to which Boko Haram, Ansaru, or other violent extremist
groups in the region may pose an increasingly transnational threat.38
Potential ties with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a regional criminal and terrorist
network that is designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), appear
to be of particular concern. The FBI assessed in November 2013 that while “Boko Haram does
not currently pose a threat to the Homeland,” it does “aspire to attack U.S. or Western interests in
the region,” and demonstrated its capability to do so with the 2011 U.N. attack.39 The FBI
expressly noted concern with communications, training, and weapons links between the group
and AQIM, Al Shabaab, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The Obama
Administration does not currently consider Boko Haram to be an Al Qaeda affiliate.
Deliberations within the U.S. government over whether to designate Boko Haram as an FTO
concluded in November 2013, when the State Department designated both Boko Haram and
Ansaru as FTOs under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, and as
Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under Executive Order 13224.40 The FTO
designations aim to assist U.S. and other law enforcement agencies in efforts to investigate and
prosecute suspects associated with the group. The State Department had designated three
individuals linked to Boko Haram as SGDTs in June 2012, including its leader Abubakar Shekau,
and in 2013 issued a $7 million reward for information on the location of Shekau through its
Rewards for Justice program.41 The Nigerian government also formally designated Boko Haram
36 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Bulletin Nigeria” Issue 7, September 2014.
37 See, e.g., John Campbell, “Barbarism Begets Barbarism in Nigeria,” Council on Foreign Relations, Africa in
Transition (blog), November 5, 2014, http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/.
38 Testimony of National Counterterrorism Center Director Matthew Olsen, Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee, Threats to the Homeland, November 14, 2013.
39 Testimony of FBI Director James Comey, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Threats
to the Homeland, November 14, 2013.
40 The FTO designation triggers the freezing of any assets a group might have in U.S. financial institutions, bans FTO
members’ travel to the United States, and criminalizes transactions (including material support) with the organization
or its members. It is unclear, given the current lack of public information available on Boko Haram’s possible ties
abroad, if these measures would have any impact on the group. While FTO status might serve to prioritize greater U.S.
security and intelligence resources toward the group, this is not a legal requirement of the designation.
41 Shekau, along with Khalid al-Barnawi and Abubakar Adam Kambar, both of whom have ties to Boko Haram and
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
14
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
and Ansaru as terrorist groups in 2013. The British government had named Ansaru as a
“Proscribed Terrorist Organization” in 2012, describing it as broadly aligned with Al Qaeda, and
designated Boko Haram as such in July 2013. Boko Haram was added to the U.N. Al Qaeda
sanctions list in May 2014.
Conflict in the Niger Delta
Nigeria’s oil wealth has long been a source of political tension, protest, and criminality in the
Niger Delta region, where most of the country’s oil is produced.42 Compared to Nigeria’s national
average, the region’s social indicators are low, and unemployment is high. Millions of barrels of
oil are believed to have been spilled in the region since oil production began, causing major
damage to the fragile riverine ecosystem, and ultimately to the livelihoods of many of the Delta’s
30 million inhabitants.43 Gas flares have further plagued the Delta with acid rain and air pollution,
limiting locals’ access to clean water and destroying fishing stocks that the majority of Delta
inhabitants depended on to make a living.
Conflict in the Niger Delta has been marked by the vandalism of oil infrastructures; massive,
systemic production theft locally known as “oil bunkering,” often abetted by state officials;
protests over widespread environmental damage caused by oil operations; kidnapping for ransom;
and public insecurity and communal violence. The demands of the region’s various militant
groups have varied, but often include calls for greater autonomy for the region and a larger share
of oil revenues. Militant groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND) have used the kidnapping of oil workers and attacks on oil facilities to bring
international attention to the Delta’s plight. These attacks have periodically cut Nigeria’s oil
production by as much as 25%, and have been blamed for spikes in the world price of oil.
Nigeria’s deep-water production has also proven vulnerable to militant attacks, and the threat of
sea piracy is high. By some estimates, up to 10% of Nigeria’s oil has been stolen annually, and
local politicians have reportedly financed their campaigns through such criminal activities.44
Successive Nigerian governments have pledged to engage the Delta’s disaffected communities,
but few of their efforts met with success until 2009, when President Yar’Adua extended an offer
of amnesty to Delta militants. Under the offer, those who surrendered their weapons, renounced
violence, and accepted rehabilitation were granted a presidential pardon, along with cash and job
training. According to Nigerian government estimates, more than 26,000 have benefitted from the
program, which has cost the government roughly $400 million a year, though it is unclear
whether all were directly involved in militancy. While the activities of criminal gangs have
(...continued)
close links to AQIM, according to the State Department, have been designated as SDGTs.
42 In the early 1990s, activists from the Ogoni ethnic group drew international attention to the extensive environmental
damage done by oil extraction in the Niger Delta. Author and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, president of the Movement for
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), and 14 others were accused in 1994 of involvement in the murder of
several prominent Ogoni politicians. They pled not guilty, but Saro-Wiwa and eight others were convicted and
sentenced to death. Their executions sparked international outrage against the regime of dictator Sani Abacha, and the
United States recalled its ambassador in response.
43 UNEP, Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, 2011; UNDP, Niger Delta Human Development Report, 2006;
Amnesty International, Petroleum, Pollution, and Poverty in the Niger Delta, June 2009; and Paul Francis, Deirdre
Lapin, and Paula Rossiasco, Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta, Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011.
44 HRW, Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria, Vol. 19, No. 16(A), October 2007.
Congressional Research Service
15
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
continued, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime suggested in its 2013 report on transnational
criminal organizations in West Africa that the number of recorded attacks on the oil industry—
including bombings, kidnappings, hijackings, and acts of piracy—has declined “remarkably”
since the amnesty effort began, and contends that “the link between political activism and oil theft
has grown increasingly tenuous since 2011.”45
President Jonathan has continued to allocate significant financing for “post-amnesty”
interventions and development projects in the Delta, targeting transport, education, and health
infrastructure. Concerns remain regarding the government’s ability to spend the funds effectively
in a region where corruption is, at all levels, endemic, and some Nigerian politicians from other
regions have criticized the cost of the program.46 Some of the oil-producing states have reported
revenues of over $2 billion per year but have dismal records of development or service delivery.47
The federal government’s commitment and ability to deliver on promised infrastructure
improvements and job creation will be critical to addressing regional grievances. Observers
caution that unless the root causes of conflict are addressed, the Delta will remain volatile.
Abuses by Security Forces
Nigerian security forces, particularly the police, but also the military, have been accused of
serious human rights abuses, and both activists and U.S. officials suggest that the government has
done little to address issues of impunity and corruption within the police force.48 The State
Department’s 2013 human rights report documents allegations by multiple sources of “arbitrary
or unlawful killings” by security forces, including “summary executions … torture, rape and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of prisoners, detainees, and criminal suspects,” and
a variety of other offenses, such as the use of “excessive force to stem civil unrest and interethnic
violence.” The prison system has also drawn criticism; human rights groups report that many of
the country’s inmates are incarcerated for years without being convicted of a crime. The security
crackdown on Boko Haram in the northeast has recently drawn particular attention—Amnesty
International reported that an estimated 3000 people were arrested and detained in 2013 in three
specific sites, in Borno, Yobe, and Abuja, and that many died in those facilities. The group
suggests that the government restricted human rights investigators from accessing these
facilities.49 A reported effort by Boko Haram gunmen to free prisoners held at Giwa military
barracks in the Borno capital, Maiduguri, in March 2014 brought renewed international attention
to the large number of detainees held in relation to Boko Haram activity. During that incident,
45 MEND, for example, had previously admitted to being involved in such activities, which it justified as a
reappropriation of wealth and form of protest. UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa, op.cit.
46 Xan Rice, “Nigerian Rebels Swap Weapons for Welding,” Washington Post, July 5, 2012.
47 Francis, Lapin, and Rossiasco, Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta, op. cit.
48 Recent reports on abuses include HRW, Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces and Spiraling Violence; Amnesty
International, Killing at Will: Extrajudicial Executions and Other Unlawful Killings by the Police in Nigeria and
Nigeria: Trapped in the Cycle of Violence and “Welcome to Hellfire”: Torture and Other Ill-Treatment in Nigeria; and
Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigerian Police Force, by the Open Society Justice
Initiative and the Network of Police Reform in Nigeria.
49 Amnesty International “Nigeria: Authorities Must Allow Human Rights Commission to Audit Military Detention
Centres,” November 12, 2013; “Nigeria: Authorities Must Investigate Deaths of Boko Haram Suspects in Military
Custody,” October 15, 2013; and Stop Torture—Country Profile: Nigeria, May 13, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
16
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Amnesty International estimates that more than 620 people, including attackers and unarmed
detainees, were killed by the military.50
In the past decade, the government has deployed Joint Task Forces (JTFs), special combined
military and police units, to respond to specific conflicts that the government classifies as national
emergencies. The first JTF was established in the Niger Delta. In 2009, it launched an offensive
against Delta militants during which thousands of civilians were reportedly displaced.51 Armed
conflict between security forces and Delta militia has decreased with the amnesty program,
although periodic attacks and skirmishes continue. JTFs have also been deployed to stem the
communal violence in Jos and to address the Boko Haram threat in the northeast.
Forces deployed under the JTF to counter Islamist militants in the northeast—JTF-Operation
Restore Order— have been implicated in extrajudicial killings of suspected militants and in
civilian deaths. In April 2013, for example, more than 180 people were killed in fighting between
security forces and suspected Boko Haram militants in the village of Baga, according to the Red
Cross and local officials; among the dead were reportedly innocent bystanders, including
children.52 Nigerian security forces disputed the number of casualties. Satellite imagery suggests
that more than 2,000 homes may have been burned.53 The Nigerian government ostensibly
disbanded JTF-Restore Order in August 2013, replacing it with the army’s Seventh Division as
the umbrella command for joint security operations. The State Department reports that many of
the commanders and units remain, and the forces continued to be publicly referred to as the JTF.
Nigerian officials have acknowledged some abuses by security forces, but few security personnel
have been prosecuted. In its 2013 human rights report, the State Department suggests that
authorities do not investigate the majority of cases of police abuse or punish perpetrators.
Ebola, Polio, and HIV/AIDS
The announcement in October 2014 by the World Health Organization (WHO) that Nigeria was
free of Ebola virus transmission has brought positive international attention to the country’s
coordinated effort to stop the spread of the virus, which has ravaged Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone.54 Nigeria’s response has also highlighted lessons learned in a country that until recently
was considered a global epicenter of polio transmission. In July 2014, a Liberian American who
was acutely ill landed at the Lagos airport—he was transferred to a private hospital where he was
diagnosed with Ebola and later died. The virus then spread, via health care workers, to 19 other
people in Lagos and the Niger Delta city of Port Harcourt. Concern regarding the potential for
transmission in large, dense, urban environments like these has been significant.
Nigeria’s response to the outbreak was swift, with the government immediately declaring a
national public health emergency and creating an operations center from which experts directed
50 Amnesty International, Nigeria: More than 1,500 Killed in Armed Conflict in North-Eastern Nigeria in Early 2014,
op. cit.; Adam Nossiter, “Nigerian Army Facing Questions as Death Toll Soars After Prison Attack,” New York Times,
March 20, 2014; Adam Nossiter, “Bodies Pour in as Nigeria Hunts for Islamists, New York Times, May 7, 2013.
51 Amnesty International, “Hundreds Feared Dead and Thousands Trapped in Niger Delta Fighting,” May 22, 2009.
52 See, e.g., “Scores Killed in Nigeria Violence,” Al Jazeera, April 23, 2013.
53 Human Rights Watch, “Nigeria: Massive Destruction, Deaths from Military Raid,” May 1, 2013.
54 For more on Ebola, see CRS Report IF00044, Ebola: 2014 Outbreak in West Africa (In Focus), by Nicolas Cook and
Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.
Congressional Research Service
17
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
contact tracing, case management, health care worker protocols, and public education. The
response also benefited from applied epidemiology experience from Nigeria’s polio eradication
efforts; experts from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the WHO were on
hand to support the Nigerian effort. Nigeria has not closed its borders to travelers from the
affected countries, contending that travel across the region’s porous borders would be difficult to
stop and potentially complicate contact tracing.55 Another outbreak in Nigeria is possible, and
health officials remain concerned about the virus spreading in Africa’s most populous country.
Nigeria has had other public health successes in recent years, almost eradicating polio, decreasing
malaria and tuberculosis prevalence, and reducing HIV prevalence among pregnant women. The
U.N. Development Program (UNDP) indicates that Nigeria may reach its Millennium
Development Goal targets for reducing child mortality and improving maternal health by 2015.
Nigeria’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 3.6% is relatively low in comparison to Southern African
nations with adult seropositivity rates of 10% to 25%. However, Nigeria comprises nearly one-
tenth of the world’s HIV/AIDS infected persons with more than 3 million people infected, the
largest HIV-positive population in the world after South Africa. Nigeria’s population is expected
to double by the year 2025, which is likely to multiply the spread of HIV. In addition to the
devastation HIV/AIDS continues to cause among Nigeria’s adult population, over 40% of the
current population is under the age of 15. With almost a third of primary-school-aged children not
enrolled in school and a large number of HIV/AIDS-infected adults, Nigeria continues to face
serious challenges and significant obstacles in the education and health care sectors. Malaria
remains the leading cause of death in Nigeria.
Issues for Congress
Administration Policy on Nigeria
After a period of strained relations in the 1990s, when Nigeria had a military dictatorship, U.S.-
Nigeria relations steadily improved under President Obasanjo, and they have remained robust
under Presidents Yar’Adua and Jonathan. Diplomatic engagement is sometimes tempered,
however, by Nigerian perceptions of U.S. intrusion in regional or domestic affairs, and by U.S.
concern with human rights, governance, and corruption issues. President Obama’s former
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson often referred to Nigeria as
“probably the most strategically important country in Sub-Saharan Africa,” and his successor,
Linda Thomas-Greenfield, has described the country as “one of our most important partners in
Africa.”56 That partnership took on additional importance when Nigeria joined the U.N. Security
Council as one of its non-permanent members in January 2014, for a two-year term. In addition to
the strategic role their country plays in the region and in global forums, Nigerians compose the
largest African diaspora group in the United States.
55 After departing Liberia, the initial patient transited two other countries (Ghana and Togo) before arriving in Lagos.
For more on the Nigerian response, see, e.g., Centers For Disease Control, “Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak—Nigeria,
July-September 2014,” October 3, 2014, and Alexandra Sifferlin, “Nigeria Is Ebola-Free: Here’s What They Did
Right,” Time, October 19, 2014.
56 State Department, “Remarks by Ambassador Carson on Secretary Clinton’s Africa Trip,” July 30, 2009; Remarks by
Assistant Secretary Carson, “Promise and Peril in Nigeria: Implications for U.S. Engagement,” at CSIS, April 9, 2012;
Testimony of Linda Thomas-Greenfield, November 13, 2013, op. cit.
Congressional Research Service
18
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
The United States has been supportive of Nigerian reform initiatives, including anti-corruption
efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector privatization, and programs to promote
peace and development in the Niger Delta. In 2010, the Obama and Jonathan Administrations
established the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission (BNC), a strategic dialogue to address issues
of mutual concern; its working groups meet regularly. The State Department maintains
“American Corners,” located in libraries throughout the country, to share information on the
culture and values of the United States with Nigerians, and it has proposed to eventually expand
its presence in the north, when security conditions allow. The State Department maintains a travel
warning for U.S. citizens regarding travel to Nigeria, noting the risks of armed attacks in the
Niger Delta and the northeast, and the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, and currently
restricts U.S. officials from all but essential travel to all northern states.57
U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Maritime Security Issues
Nigeria is an important trading partner for the United States and is the second-largest beneficiary
of U.S. investment on the continent. Given Nigeria’s ranking as one of Africa’s largest consumer
markets and its affinity for U.S. products and American culture, opportunities for increasing U.S.
exports to the country, and the broader West Africa region, are considerable.58 The country is
eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). AGOA-
eligible exports, nearly all of which are petroleum products, have accounted for over 90% of
exports to the United States.
Gulf of Guinea crude is prized on the world market for its low sulphur content, and Nigeria’s
proximity to the United States relative to that of Middle East countries had long made its oil
particularly attractive to U.S. interests. The country regularly ranked among the United States’
largest sources of imported oil. U.S. imports, which accounted for over 40% of Nigeria’s total
crude oil exports until 2012, made the United States Nigeria’s largest trading partner, although
U.S. purchases of Nigerian sweet crude have fallen substantially since 2012 as domestic U.S.
crude supply increased. U.S. energy companies may face increasing competition for rights to the
country’s energy resources; China, for example, has offered Nigeria favorable loans for
infrastructure projects in exchange for oil exploration rights. The U.S. Export-Import (Ex-Im)
Bank signed an agreement in 2011 with the Nigerian government that aims to secure up to $1.5
billion in U.S. exports of goods and services to support power generation reforms. The
Administration has identified Nigeria as one of six initial partner countries for its Power Africa
initiative, which aims to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa.59
Given Nigeria’s strategic position along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, the United States has
coordinated with Nigeria through various regional forums and maritime security initiatives.60
Nigeria’s waters have been named the most dangerous in the world for maritime piracy and
armed robbery at sea. Nigeria is also considered a growing transshipment hub for narcotics
trafficking, and several Nigerian criminal organizations have been implicated in the trade. The
57 See http://travel.state.gov for the latest warning.
58 U.S. Commercial Service, Doing Business in Nigeria: 2013 Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies.
59 See The White House, Fact Sheet: Power Africa, August 5, 2014.
60 For further information on maritime and port security issues in the region, see, e.g., the Atlantic Council, Advancing
U.S., African, and Global Interests: Security and Stability in the West African Maritime Domain, November 30, 2010;
and CDR Michael Baker, “Toward an African Maritime Economy,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 64, Spring 2011;
and Chatham House, Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, March 2013.
Congressional Research Service
19
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
U.S. Navy has increased its operations in the Gulf of Guinea in recent years and in 2007 launched
the African Partnership Station (APS).61 APS deployments have included port visits to Nigeria
and joint exercises between U.S., Nigerian, European, and other regional navies.
Nigeria’s Role in Regional Stability and Counterterrorism Efforts
Nigeria has played a significant role in peace and stability operations across Africa, and the
United States continues to provide the country with security assistance focused on enhancing its
peacekeeping capabilities. Bilateral counterterrorism cooperation has reportedly improved in the
aftermath of the December 2009 airliner bombing attempt and the rise in the Boko Haram threat,
although there are still limits to that cooperation.62 The Nigerian government has coordinated
with the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the
International Civil Aviation Organization to strengthen its security systems, and the country now
uses full body scanners in its international airports. Nigeria is a participant in the State
Department’s Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a U.S. interagency effort that
aims to increase regional counter-terrorism capabilities and coordination. Its role in that program
has been, to date, minor in comparison to Sahel countries. In view of the reported expansion of
Boko Haram operations, including into Cameroon, U.S. officials may explore additional
programs to improve counterterrorism coordination between Nigeria and its neighbors, although
tensions in some of those relationships may hamper greater cooperation.
Many U.S. officials, while stressing the importance of the U.S.-Nigeria relationship and the
gravity of security threats in, and potentially emanating from, the country, remain concerned
about reported abuses by Nigerian security services, and about the government’s limited efforts to
address perceived impunity for such abuses. When Secretary of State John Kerry visited the
region in in mid-2013, he raised the issue with Nigerian officials, stating, “one person’s atrocity
does not excuse another’s.”63 Conversely, some Nigerian officials reportedly remain sensitive to
perceived U.S. interference in internal affairs and dismissive of certain training offers. These
factors appear to have constrained U.S.-Nigerian security cooperation, despite shared concerns
over terrorism and other regional security threats.64
The Obama Administration has nevertheless committed, through the BNC dialogue, to support
Nigerian efforts to increase public confidence in the military and police to respond more
effectively to the threat posed by extremists. In addition to USAID programs to counter
radicalization in Nigeria, the State Department and DOD continue to deliberate on how best to
support a shift by Nigeria to “an integrated civilian-security-focused strategy to counter Boko
Haram and Ansaru in a manner that adheres to the rule of law and ensures accountability.”65 The
State Department’s senior Africa official has urged the Nigerian government to take a more
61 Under APS, U.S. and partner naval ships deploy to the region for several months to serve as a continuing sea base of
operations and a “floating schoolhouse” to provide assistance and training to the Gulf nations. Training focuses on
maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, port facilities management and security, seamanship/navigation,
search and rescue, leadership, logistics, civil engineering, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
62 On December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the son of a respected Nigerian banker and former government
minister, attempted to detonate an explosive device on an American airliner bound from Amsterdam to Detroit. He was
reportedly radicalized while living abroad. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claims to have sponsored the effort.
63 “Kerry Criticizes Nigeria on Human Rights,” CNN, May 25, 2013.
64 See, e.g., On Terror’s New Front Line, Mistrust Blunts U.S. Strategy,” The Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2013.
65 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Linda Thomas-Greenfield, November 13, 2013, op. cit.
Congressional Research Service
20
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
“holistic” approach, suggesting that regional and socioeconomic disparities have contributed to
Boko Haram recruitment, and that the government’s response should incorporate not only efforts
to degrade the group’s capacity, but also to provide justice and ensure accountability “in instances
where government officials and security forces violate those [human] rights,” in part to “diminish
Boko Haram’s appeal and legitimacy” among would-be recruits.66
U.S. Assistance to Nigeria
Nigeria routinely ranks among the top recipients of U.S. bilateral foreign assistance in Africa. The
United States is Nigeria’s largest bilateral donor, providing almost $700 million annually in recent
years (see Table 1).67 The State Department’s FY2015 foreign aid request includes more than
$720 million for Nigeria. Strengthening democratic governance, improving agricultural
productivity and access to education and health services, promoting new jobs and increased
supplies of clean energy, and professionalizing and reforming the security services have been the
priorities for assistance. Nigeria is a focus country under the President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), and Nigerian farmers
benefit from agriculture programs under the Feed the Future (FTF) initiative that focus on
building partnerships with the private sector to expand exports and generate employment.
Interventions to encourage private sector participation in trade and energy are also key
components of the Obama Administration’s economic growth initiatives in Nigeria.
Table 1. State Department and USAID Assistance to Nigeria
($ in thousands)
FY2013
FY2014
FY2015
Actual
Estimate
Request
Development Assistance
76,920
71,000
89,440
Foreign Military Financing
949
1,000
600
Global Health Programs – State
455,746
456,652
456,652
Global Health Programs – USAID
165,451
173,500
173,500
International Military Education and Training
712
730
700
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
0 100 0
Programs
TOTAL 699,778
702,982
720,892
Source: State Department FY2015 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations and updated
Totals do not include emergency humanitarian assistance or certain types of security and development assistance
provided through regional programs, including for counterterrorism and peacekeeping purposes.
The State Department has focused security assistance requests in recent years on specialized law
enforcement training, military professionalization, peacekeeping support and training, and border
and maritime security. In addition to peacekeeping support provided through the State
Department’s African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program,
Nigeria also benefits from security cooperation activities with the California National Guard
66 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Linda Thomas-Greenfield, November 13, 2013, op. cit.
67 For further information on current U.S. assistance programs, see, e.g., Testimony of USAID Assistant Administrator
for Africa Earl Gast, in U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, U.S. Policy
Toward Nigeria: West Africa’s Troubled Titan, July 10, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
21
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
through the National Guard State Partnership Program. Nigeria also receives counterterrorism,
anticorruption, and maritime security assistance through the State Department’s West Africa
Regional Security Initiative (WARSI). Counterterrorism assistance to Nigeria includes programs
coordinated through TSCTP and other State Department initiatives, including Anti-Terrorism
Assistance (ATA), as well as through Department of Defense funds. Nigeria, along with
neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, will also benefit from counterterrorism and border
security assistance under the new $40 million, 3-year Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)
program focused on countering Boko Haram, to be jointly funded by the Departments of State
and Defense. Some U.S. assistance for Nigerian military and police units has been restricted
based on human rights concerns. In this context, U.S. counterterrorism-related training and
assistance for Nigerian troops has been constrained by the Nigerian military’s practice of rotating
its forces for short-term missions in the northeast, where some individuals and units have been
implicated in serious abuses against civilians and detainees.
Congressional Engagement
Terrorism-related concerns dominated congressional action on Nigeria in the 113th Congress,
although some Members also continued to monitor human rights and humanitarian issues,
developments in the Niger Delta, and Nigeria’s energy sector in the context of world oil supplies.
Both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held
hearings on Boko Haram in 2014. Some Members of Congress have expressed support for efforts
to find and rescue the young women abducted from Chibok in various public statements and
correspondence to both President Obama and President Jonathan, including a letter signed by all
20 female Senators that urged further sanctions on the group. Related legislation includes S.Res.
433, H.Res. 573, H.Res. 617, and the House version of the FY2015 National Defense
Authorization Act, H.R. 4435. The Africa subcommittees in both the House and the Senate also
held hearings during the 113th Congress on Nigeria to consider U.S. policy on governance,
security, and trade issues in Nigeria. The House Homeland Security Committee, whose
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence held Congress’s first hearing to examine
Boko Haram in late 2011, has raised concerns about the dearth of information available on the
group and the potential to underestimate Boko Haram’s potential threat to U.S. interests.68 Prior to
the State Department’s decision to designate the group as an FTO, several Members of Congress
introduced legislation, including H.R. 3209 and S. 198, to press the Obama Administration on the
FTO issue. The FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 112-239) directed the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to provide an assessment of the Boko Haram threat to
Congress. Congressional attention to these and other issues is expected to continue in 2015.
68 See House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Boko Haram: Emerging Threat
to the U.S. Homeland, committee print, 112th Cong., November 30, 2011 and House Homeland Security Committee,
Boko Haram: Growing Threat to the U.S. Homeland, committee print, 113th Cong., September 13, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
22
c11173008
.
Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Specialist in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
Congressional Research Service
23
c11173008