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Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

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Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Updated February 1, 2019 (RL33964)
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Summary

Successive Administrations have described the U.S. relationship with Nigeria, Africa's largest producer of oil and its largest economy, to be among the most important on the continent. The country is Africa's most populous, with more than 200 million people, roughly evenly divided between Muslims and Christians. Nigeria, which transitioned from military to civilian rule in 1999, ranked for years among the top suppliers of U.S. oil imports, and it is a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid. The country is the United States' second-largest trading partner in Africa and the third-largest beneficiary of U.S. foreign direct investment on the continent. Nigerians comprise the largest African diaspora group in the United States.

Nigeria is a country of significant promise, but it also faces serious social, economic, and security challenges, some of which pose threats to state and regional stability. The country has faced intermittent political turmoil and economic crises since gaining independence in 1960 from the United Kingdom. Political life has been scarred by conflict along ethnic, geographic, and religious lines, and corruption and misrule have undermined the state's authority and legitimacy. Despite extensive petroleum resources, its human development indicators are among the world's lowest, and a majority of the population faces extreme poverty. In the south, social unrest, criminality, and corruption in the oil-producing Niger Delta have hindered oil production and contributed to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Perceived government neglect and economic marginalization have also fueled resentment in the predominately Muslim north, while communal grievances and competition over land and other resources—sometimes subject to political manipulation—drive conflict in the Middle Belt.

The rise of Boko Haram has heightened concerns about extremist recruitment in Nigeria, which has one of the world's largest Muslim populations. Boko Haram has focused on a range of targets, but civilians in the impoverished, predominately Muslim northeast have borne the brunt of the violence. The group became notorious for its 2014 kidnapping of over 270 schoolgirls and its use of women and children as suicide bombers. It has staged attacks in neighboring countries and poses a threat to international targets in the region. Boko Haram appears primarily focused on the Lake Chad Basin region. Its 2015 pledge to the Islamic State and the emergence of a splinter faction, Islamic State-West Africa (IS-WA), have raised concerns from U.S. policymakers, though the extent of intergroup linkages is unclear. IS-WA is credited with a number of devastating attacks in 2018 against Nigerian military bases; the army has struggled to defend them.

Domestic criticism of the government's response to corruption, economic pressures, and Boko Haram contributed to the election in 2015 of former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari. In what was widely hailed as a historic transition, the ruling People's Democratic Party and President Goodluck Jonathan lost power to Buhari and his All Progressives Congress, marking Nigeria's first democratic transfer of power. Buhari has since struggled to enact promised reforms amid persistent security challenges and a struggling economy. He faces a challenge from former vice president Atiku Abubakar in elections scheduled for February 2019; it is forecast to be a close race. As in previous elections, there are concerns about violence around the polls, and intense, high-stakes contests over a number of legislative and gubernatorial posts increase the risk of conflicts. U.S. officials and Members of Congress have called for credible, transparent, and peaceful elections.

U.S.-Nigeria relations under the Trump Administration appear generally consistent with U.S. policy under the Obama Administration. Both Administrations have supported reform initiatives in Nigeria, including anticorruption efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector privatization, and programs to promote peace and development. Congress oversees more than $500 million in U.S. foreign aid programs in Nigeria and regularly monitors political developments; some Members have expressed concern with corruption, human rights abuses, and violent extremism in Nigeria.

Overview

Nigeria is considered a key power in Africa, not only because of its size, but also because of its political and economic role on the continent. Nigeria has overtaken South Africa as Africa's largest economy, and it is one of the world's major sources of high-quality crude oil. The country's commercial center, Lagos, is among the world's largest cities. Nigeria has the fastest-growing population globally, which is forecast to reach 410 million by 2050 and overtake the United States to become the world's third-most populous country.1 It also has one of Africa's largest militaries, and has played an important role in peace and stability operations on the continent. Few states in Africa have the capacity to make a more decisive impact on the region.

Despite its oil wealth, Nigeria remains highly underdeveloped. Poor governance and corruption have limited infrastructure development and social service delivery, slowing economic growth and keeping much of the country mired in poverty. Nigeria has the world's second-largest HIV/AIDS-infected population and Africa's highest tuberculosis burden.

The country is home to more than 250 ethnic groups, but the northern Hausa and Fulani, the southwestern Yoruba, and the southeastern Igbo have traditionally been the most politically active and dominant. Roughly half the population, primarily residing in the north, is Muslim. Southern Nigeria is predominantly Christian, and Nigeria's Middle Belt (which spans the country's central zone) is a diverse mix. Ethnic and religious strife have been common in Nigeria. Tens of thousands of Nigerians have been killed in sectarian and intercommunal clashes in the past two decades.2 Ethnic, regional, and sectarian divisions often stem from issues related to access to land, jobs, and socioeconomic development, and are sometimes fueled by politicians.

The violent Islamist group Boko Haram has contributed to a major deterioration of security conditions in the northeast since 2009. It espouses a Salafist interpretation of Islam and seeks to capitalize on local frustrations, discredit the government, and establish an Islamic state in the region. The insurgency has claimed thousands of lives and exacerbated an already-dire humanitarian emergency in the impoverished Lake Chad basin region, comprising Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Nigeria now has one of the largest displaced populations in the world—an estimated 2 million people—most of whom have fled Boko Haram-related violence. In late 2013, the State Department designated Boko Haram and a splinter group, Ansaru, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).3 Boko Haram's 2015 pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State raised its profile, though the extent of operational ties between the two groups remains unclear. A Boko Haram leadership dispute led, in 2016, to the emergence of a splinter group, the Islamic State-West Africa (IS-WA). The State Department designated IS-WA as an FTO in early 2018.4

Figure 1. Nigeria at a Glance

Size: More than twice the size of California

Capital: Abuja

Population: 203.5 million; 2.5% growth rate

Languages: English (official), Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo (Igbo), Fulani, over 500 other local languages

Religions: Muslim 52%, Christian 47%, traditionalist/unspecified 1% (2013)

Literacy: 59.6% (2015)

Infant Mortality Rate: 63 deaths/1,000 live births

Median Age: 18.3 years

Life Expectancy: 59.3 years

Prevalence of HIV: 2.8% (2017)

GDP: $397.5 billion; $2,050 (per capita); 1.9% (growth)

Key exports: petroleum and petroleum products 95%, cocoa, rubber (2012)

External Debt: $40.2 billion (2017)

Source: Map created with data from State Department and Esri. Fact information from the World Bank, CIA World Factbook, and the International Monetary Fund. Data for 2018 unless otherwise indicated.

In the southern Niger Delta region, local grievances related to oil production in the area have fueled conflict and criminality for decades. Intermittent government negotiations with local militants and an ongoing amnesty program have quieted the region, but attacks on oil installations surged briefly in 2016 and remain a threat to stability and oil production. Some militants continue to be involved in various local and transnational criminal activities, including maritime piracy and drug and weapons trafficking. These networks often overlap with oil theft networks, which contribute to maritime piracy off the coast of Nigeria and the wider Gulf of Guinea (see map). Already among the most dangerous bodies of water in the world, the Gulf of Guinea has seen a dramatic increase in piracy and attacks against ships in recent years.

Presidential and legislative elections slated for mid-February 2019 and gubernatorial and state-level polls due two weeks later increase pressure on some of Nigeria's sociopolitical fault lines. Protests in the Igbo-dominated southeast over perceived marginalization by the government have led to clashes with security forces; separatist sentiment among some Igbo has arisen against the backdrop of a deadly civil war waged from 1967 to 1970, during which secessionists fought unsuccessfully to establish an independent Republic of Biafra. Economic frustration is reportedly widespread in the region, but by many accounts the majority of Igbo would not support insurrection. Meanwhile, an emerging conflict in border regions of neighboring Cameroon has led over 30,000 Cameroonians to seek refuge in Nigeria.5 In the Middle Belt, violent competition for resources between nomadic herders, largely Muslim, and settled farming communities, many of them Christian, has been on the rise in recent years and is spreading into Nigeria's southern states. Herder-farmer tensions in Nigeria are not new, but they overlap with ethnic and religious divisions and have been exacerbated by desertification, increasing access to sophisticated weapons, land-grabbing by politicians, and banditry.

Politics

Nigeria, which gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1960, is a federal republic with 36 states. Its political structure is similar to that of the United States: it has a bicameral legislature with a 109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives. Nigeria's president, legislators, and governors are directly elected for four-year terms. The country was ruled by the military for much of the four decades after independence before making the transition to civilian rule in 1999. Subsequent elections were widely viewed as flawed, with each poll progressively worse than the last. Elections in 2011 were seen as more credible, although they were followed by violent protests in parts of the north that left more than 800 people dead and illustrated northern mistrust and dissatisfaction with the government.

The contest for power between north and south that has broadly defined much of Nigeria's modern political history can be traced, in part, to administrative divisions under Britain's colonial administration.6 Northern military leaders dominated the political scene from independence until the country's democratic transition in 1999. Since the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, there has been a de facto power-sharing arrangement, often referred to as "zoning," between the country's geopolitical zones, through which the presidency is expected to rotate among regions. The death of President Obasanjo's successor, northern-born President Umaru Yar'Adua, during his first term in office in 2010, and the subsequent ascension of his southern-born vice president, Goodluck Jonathan, brought the zoning arrangement into question.7 Jonathan's decision to run in the 2011 elections was seen by many northerners as a violation of the arrangement, which contributed to the violence that followed the polls.

The 2015 Elections

Nigeria's 2015 elections were its most competitive contest to date and were viewed as a critical test for its leaders, security forces, and people. They were widely hailed as historic, with President Jonathan and the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) losing to a new opposition coalition led by former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari.8 Jonathan was Nigeria's first incumbent president to lose an election.9 Buhari's All Progressives Congress (APC) capitalized on popular frustration with rising insecurity, mounting economic pressures, and allegations of large-scale state corruption to win a majority in the legislature and a majority of state elections. Decreased turnout for the PDP appeared to be partly linked to broad discontent with the government's response to the Boko Haram threat, in particular the April 2014 kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls from the northeast town of Chibok and the group's subsequent territorial advances.

U.S. government views on the 2015 elections were broadly positive. A White House statement described the event as demonstrating "the strength of Nigeria's commitment to democratic principles."10 There had been significant concern about the potential for large-scale political violence around the polls, and then-Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Nigeria months prior to the elections to stress U.S. views about the importance of the event.

President Buhari's popularity in the 2015 elections was notable, given his history. A Muslim from Katsina state in northern Nigeria, Buhari had formerly drawn support from across the predominately Muslim north, but had struggled to gain votes in the south. In 2014, his party joined with the other main opposition parties to form the diverse APC coalition. His vice president, Yemi Osinbajo, is an ethnic Yoruba (Nigeria's second-largest ethnic group) Pentecostal pastor and former state attorney general from the populous southwest. Osinbajo is reported to be widely respected, and he served as Acting President during Buhari's months-long stay in London in 2017, when the latter was receiving medical treatment for an undisclosed condition. Buhari's silence on the nature of his illness fueled speculation about his fitness for office.

The 2019 Elections

With presidential and legislative elections scheduled for February 16, 2019, and gubernatorial and state assembly polls on March 2, prospects for the ruling APC are uncertain. In October 2018, the party affirmed Buhari as its presidential candidate, but his political standing has arguably weakened since 2015. In advance of the APC primary, several prominent former military and government officials, including former President Obasanjo, publicly urged him to not run again.11

Buhari is set to run against Atiku Abubakar, a former vice president under Obasanjo and erstwhile Buhari ally who defected from the APC to rejoin the PDP in late 2017. Viewed as a successful businessman prior to his foray into politics, Abubakar has pledged to revive Nigeria's struggling economy. This will be his fourth attempt at the presidency; analysts expect the 2019 election to be closely fought. Abubakar, who like Buhari hails from the North and is Muslim, may be able to split the northern vote and thereby weaken what was previously an APC stronghold.

Abubakar is one of several recent high-profile defectors from the APC. In mid-2018, an anti-Buhari faction known as the Reformed APC (R-APC) emerged within the ruling party. Shortly thereafter, Senate President Bukola Saraki, several governors, and dozens of representatives defected to the PDP. In turn, a number of high-ranking PDP officials have joined the ruling party. While not unusual in advance of Nigerian elections, such rearrangements threaten to further paralyze an unproductive legislature and widen rifts between the presidency and parliament, hindering the government's ability to respond to pressing humanitarian and security challenges.

In July 2018, a joint preelection assessment by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI) met with senior officials of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) as well as representatives from the government, political parties, civil society organizations, and media.12 In follow-up statements, the delegation praised INEC's efforts to reinforce the integrity of the electoral process, but noted a lack of public confidence in the neutrality of Nigeria's security services as well as popular concerns about "vote buying, illegal voting, and efforts to compromise the secrecy of the vote on election day."13 INEC has taken steps to enable voting by marginalized voters, notably those displaced by Nigeria's multiple conflicts. Whether displaced voters are ultimately able to cast their ballots remains to be seen.

In December 2018 testimony before Congress, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy noted other factors that could threaten the credibility of the 2019 polls, including politically motivated attacks on the legitimacy of INEC, intimidation by state security forces, electoral violence, and the possible exclusion of displaced persons and individuals with disabilities from voting.14 President Buhari's suspension, just weeks before the election, of the country's chief justice, who is head of the judiciary and was accused of failing to declare assets, prompted widespread criticism. The United States and other donors questioned the constitutionality of the decision, which Buhari made without the support of the legislature, and noted concerns that it could affect the perceived credibility of the elections, given the judiciary's role in resolving election disputes.15

Observers have expressed concern over the potential for the elections to spark violence in parts of the country.16 In some areas, subnational contests for gubernatorial and state legislative seats may present greater risks for violence than the presidential election, though the latter has received more attention from donors and Nigerian officials.17 The International Crisis Group (ICG) has identified six states as especially vulnerable to violence owing to their political importance and/or the presence of prevailing social fissures or conflicts: Rivers and Akwa Ibom (in the Niger Delta), Plateau and Adamawa (in the Middle Belt), and Kaduna and Kano (in the northwest).18 With Nigeria's security forces reportedly overstretched in responding to a range of security threats across the country (discussed below), allegations of politicians stoking divisions for political ends, and concerns about partisanship among some security officials, ICG has described the conditions around the 2019 elections as "particularly combustible."19

Social Issues and Security Concerns

Islamic Sharia Law

Nigeria is home to one of the world's largest Muslim populations. The north is predominately Sunni Muslim, and 12 northern states use sharia (Islamic law) to adjudicate criminal and civil matters for Muslims.20 Under the Nigerian constitution, sharia does not apply to non-Muslims in civil and criminal proceedings, but Islamic mores are reportedly often enforced in public without regard to citizens' religion.21 In some areas, citizen groups known as hisbah provide social services and enforce sharia-based rulings—some with financial and legal backing from state governments.

Communal Violence

Divisions among ethnic groups, between regions, and between Christians and Muslims often stem from issues related to access to land and jobs and are sometimes fueled by politicians. In Nigeria's Middle Belt, violence between nomadic herdsmen, many of them belonging to the largely Muslim Fulani ethnic group, and settled farming communities, many—but not all—of them Christian, has increased in recent years. An estimate by the International Crisis Group suggests that over 2011-2016, roughly 2,000 Nigerians died annually in herder-farmer clashes, which surged in 2016 to claim some 2,500 lives—more than the total killed in Boko Haram-related violence that year.22 Amnesty International asserts that herder-farmer violence killed more than 2,000 Nigerians from January through October 2018 and contends that a failure by the Nigerian government to respond to the violence and hold perpetrators to account had fostered a climate of impunity and a cycle of violence characterized by retaliatory attacks.23

Reports suggest that weapons used by all sides have grown more sophisticated, and that the recent surge in violence has involved the rise of ethnic militias and community vigilante groups backed by local leaders.24 The nongovernmental organization (NGO) Search for Common Ground describes the violence as "neither an ethnic nor religious conflict, but rather a competition for resources playing out on ethno-religious lines in a fragile country characterized by impunity and corruption."25 Analysis by Reuters indicates that a decades-long expansion of farming activity into traditional grazing zones had resulted in a 38% decrease in land available for open grazing in the Middle Belt between 1975 and 2013.26 The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) suggests, however, that the violence often takes on religious undertones and is perceived by some involved to be a religion-based conflict.27 Attackers have burned villages and destroyed a number of churches and mosques, even as the conflict has spread beyond the Middle Belt into southern states. The violence also affects northern states like Zamfara, where cattle rustling and banditry have fueled vigilantism; notably, in Zamfara the clashes are often occurring between settled Hausa communities and pastoralist Fulani, both Muslim.28 Illustrative of Nigeria's charged political climate, Buhari, himself an ethnic Fulani, has been accused of complicity in herder attacks due to what some call an insufficient state reaction to the violence.

Farmer-Pastoralist Violence: Problems of Attribution

The classification by the Australia-based Institute for Economics and Peace's Global Terrorism Index of "Fulani militants" as the world's fourth-deadliest terrorist group in 2015 sparked controversy and has drawn criticism from regional experts. Many contend that broadly attributing the violence to the Fulani—a disparate ethnic group that spans much of Central and West Africa—inaccurately suggests that pastoralist militia in Nigeria are a single group with a coherent ideology and agenda.29 By contrast, most analysts credit the violence to intercommunal competition over resources—notably land and water—as well as tensions related to crop damage and livestock theft amid a gradual southward shift of pastoralist herding routes and expansion of farming activity into lands previously used for grazing.30 State Department monitors describe the violence as a form of "indigene-settler conflict," pitting settled communities against herders they consider to be nonindigenous.31

Generalizations about Fulani complicity in farmer-pastoralist violence have contributed to a documented rise in ethno-religious tensions. A July 2018 report by the International Crisis Group noted an increase in anti-Fulani sentiment and allegations of a Fulani plot to "Islamize" the Middle Belt that have led to ethnically motivated murders of actual or perceived Fulani—emblematic of a broader escalation in which occasional attacks have given way to "premeditated scorched-earth campaigns."32 The conflation of ethnic, religious, and regional identities has long hindered attempts at resolution, as such categories constitute political and social fault lines.

Anti-Shia Muslim sentiment in northern Nigeria has gained increased attention amid reports that the Nigerian army killed hundreds of members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), a Shia group led by Iranian-trained cleric Ibrahim Zakzaky, in December 2015. According to USCIRF reports, the army killed and buried 347 IMN members, injured hundreds more, and arrested almost 200 others over a two-day span in Zaria, Kaduna State.33 A Kaduna state commission of inquiry found the army responsible for the mass killing, but no soldiers have faced prosecution; instead, state prosecutors brought murder charges against 177 IMN members—dozens of whom, including Zakzaky, remained on trial as of December 2018.34 Zakzaky's supporters have called for his release and staged repeated demonstrations that have led to clashes with security forces and mass arrests. In October 2018, soldiers reportedly used live fire to disperse an IMN religious gathering and a separate peaceful protest, both in Abuja, killing dozens of IMN members over three days.35 Nigeria's Shia population has been estimated at between 4 million and 10 million people.

Separately, protests in the ethnic Igbo-dominated southeast have raised concern about resurgent separatism in a region that fought a secessionist war (the Biafra War) from 1967 to 1970 in which up to 2 million people died. Igbo political grievances appear to have risen under Buhari.36 In October 2015, protests led to clashes with security forces, and in 2016, soldiers killed at least 150 pro-Biafra demonstrators, according to Amnesty International.37 Economic frustration is reportedly widespread in the region, and some experts suggest that the government's forceful response to separatist sentiments could fuel support for taking up arms.38

Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria

Boko Haram has evolved since 2009 to become one of the world's deadliest terrorist groups, drawing in part on a narrative of vengeance for state abuses to elicit recruits and sympathizers. Key factors contributing to its rise in Nigeria include a legacy of overlapping intercommunal and Muslim-Christian tensions in the country; perceived disparities in access to development, jobs, state services, and investment in the north; and popular frustration with elite corruption and other state abuses.39 Some research suggests that the reportedly heavy-handed response of Nigerian security forces since 2009 has fueled extremist recruitment in some areas.40 The reported erosion of traditional leaders' perceived legitimacy among local populations in northeast Nigeria and northern Cameroon may also have contributed to the group's ascendance. Resource struggles related to the shrinking of Lake Chad, once one of Africa's largest lakes, have further exacerbated tensions among communities that Boko Haram has reportedly sought to exploit.41

The nickname Boko Haram was given by Hausa-speaking communities to describe the group's narrative that Western education and culture are corrupting influences and haram ("forbidden"). Boko Haram's ideology combines an exclusivist interpretation of Sunni Islam—one that rejects not only Western influence but also democracy, pluralism, and more moderate forms of Islam—with a "politics of victimhood" that resonates in parts of Nigeria's underdeveloped north.42 Some of its fighters have reportedly been recruited by financial incentives or under threat.43

Some 16,000 people are estimated to have been killed in Boko Haram violence since 2011, and more than 2 million Nigerians are internally displaced.44 The group has also abducted a large number of civilians, including schoolgirls from Chibok (in 2014) and Dapchi (in 2018); some have escaped or been rescued or released, but dozens from Chibok remain missing as of late 2018, in addition to hundreds of other abductees. Boko Haram has routinely used women and children as suicide bombers since 2014.

The Nigerian Response

Boko Haram commenced a territorial offensive in mid-2014 that Nigerian forces struggled to reverse until early 2015, when regional forces, primarily from Chad, launched a counteroffensive. Regional efforts to counter Boko Haram and its Islamic State-affiliated splinter group (see below) are coordinated within the African Union-authorized Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF has received U.S. and other donor support. The regional force has found success reclaiming some Boko Haram-held territory, but many areas remain insecure and militants continue to stage attacks in northeastern Nigeria and border areas of Cameroon and Niger.

Multiple factors have undermined the Nigerian response to Boko Haram, notably security sector corruption and mismanagement. A July 2018 report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace concluded that "decades of unchecked corruption have hollowed out the Nigerian military and security services and rendered them unable to effectively combat Boko Haram or address ethno-religious and communal conflict."45 The State Department has also identified other dynamics limiting the response, including a lack of coordination and cooperation between Nigerian security agencies, limited database use, the slow pace of the judicial system with regard to charging and trying suspected militants, and a lack of sufficient training for prosecutors and judges to implement antiterrorism laws.46 The International Crisis Group, among others, has called for comprehensive defense sector reform, including "a drastic improvement in leadership, oversight, administration and accountability across the sector."47

Boko Haram's Fracture and the Emergence of Islamic State-West Africa

Boko Haram currently appears to pose a threat primarily in northern Nigeria and surrounding areas in neighboring countries. The group also poses a threat to international targets, including Western citizens, in the region. Boko Haram's self-described leader, Abubakar Shekau, has issued threats against the United States, but to date no U.S. citizens are known to have been kidnapped or killed by the group. Boko Haram's 2015 pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State raised its profile and may have provided recruitment and fundraising opportunities, though the extent to which affiliation has facilitated operational ties remains unclear (see text box).

In August 2016, the Islamic State recognized the leader of a breakaway faction, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, as the new leader of the Islamic State-West Africa (IS-WA). Barnawi is reported to be the son of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf and had previously served as Boko Haram's spokesman.48 His group has reportedly focused its attacks primarily on security force and government targets on both sides of the Nigeria-Niger border, mainly operating in Nigeria's Borno state, where both groups appear most active. The name "Boko Haram" is still often used to refer to both groups, reflecting their common history and underscoring debate over the extent to which they are perceived as distinct. Shekau apparently continues to head the other faction. The U.S. Department of Defense has estimated IS-WA to have approximately 3,500 fighters and Boko Haram to have roughly 1,500.49

The Barnawi-led faction, IS-WA, was reportedly responsible for the February 2018 kidnapping of over 100 schoolgirls from the northeast town of Dapchi. It has also been credited with a series of devastating attacks against Nigerian military bases in 2018, including a spate of raids in late 2018 that reportedly killed more than 100 soldiers. The military has struggled to defend these bases, and the attacks and resulting death toll have reportedly damaged morale.50

Islamic State-West Africa (IS-WA)

In March 2015, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau released a statement pledging loyalty to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, leader of the Syria/Iraq-based Islamic State. An IS spokesman welcomed the pledge, urging followers to travel to West Africa and support Boko Haram. The Islamic State's English-language magazine, Dabiq, heralded the alliance, declaring that "the mujahidin of West Africa now guard yet another frontier of the [caliphate]."

Branding itself as part of the Islamic State may have provided recruitment and fundraising opportunities, but the extent to which affiliation has facilitated operational ties between either Boko Haram faction and Islamic State "Central" remains unclear. Reported links between Boko Haram and Islamist militants in North Africa, including other IS "affiliates" in Libya, may be of more immediate concern. IS-WA is reported to be the largest Islamic State cell on the continent (significantly larger in size, for example, than cells in Egypt and Libya).51

The State Department designated both Boko Haram and IS-WA as FTOsNigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy September 18, 2020 Overview. Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, largest economy, and leading oil producer. Successive U.S. Administrations have described the U.S.-Nigeria relationship Tomas F. Husted as among the most important in sub-Saharan Africa: the country is the United States’ Analyst in African Affairs second-largest trading partner and third-largest destination for U.S. foreign direct investment in the region, and it routinely ranks among the top annual recipients of U.S. Lauren Ploch Blanchard foreign aid globally. Nigeria plays a major political and economic role in Africa and Specialist in African Affairs wields influence regionally. Nigerians make up the largest African-born population in the United States, generating billions of dollars in annual remittance outflows. Governance. Nigeria has been a multiparty democracy since 1999, after decades of military rule. Governance conditions have broadly improved over the past two decades, yet corruption, ethno-religious tensions, security force abuses, discrimination against women and sexual minorities, and government harassment of political opponents and journalists remain key challenges. In 2015, Nigeria underwent its first democratic transfer of power between political parties when former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari won office on a groundswell of discontent over corruption, economic malaise, and rising insecurity. Buhari won reelection in 2019, in elections that featured historically low turnout, pervasive vote buying, and widespread violence and heightened concerns over Nigeria’s democratic trajectory. Security. Nigeria faces security challenges on several fronts. In the northeast, conflict between the military and two U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)—Boko Haram and an Islamic State-affiliated splinter faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)—has killed tens of thousands over the past decade, displaced millions, and caused a protracted humanitarian crisis. The conflict also has destabilized adjacent areas of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon in the wider Lake Chad Basin region. In Nigeria’s northwest, conflict between pastoralists and farmers recently has escalated amid a broader deterioration in security conditions involving cattle rustling, kidnapping, ethnic massacres, and emergent Islamist extremist activity. Farmer-herder violence also has surged in the central Middle Belt, where disputes over resource access coincide with ethno-religious cleavages between Christian and Muslim communities. In the south, criminality and militancy in the oil-rich Niger Delta have impeded development and contributed to insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea for decades. Economy. With massive oil reserves, extensive potential in the agriculture and service sectors, and a youthful, rapidly growing population, Nigeria is equipped to emerge as a global economic powerhouse. Yet corruption, infrastructure gaps, insecurity, and a failure to diversify the economy away from petroleum production have constrained economic growth and development. The economy is poised to enter a deep recession in 2020—its second contraction in five years—amid a global oil price collapse and disruptions linked to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The International Monetary Fund projects Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP) to decline by 5.4% in 2020, with severe implications for economic livelihoods and government finances. Nigeria already ranks among the world’s least developed countries across a range of indicators: according to some estimates, Nigeria is home to the world’s largest population living in extreme poverty. U.S. Engagement. U.S.-Nigeria relations are extensive by regional standards, encompassing a U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission and other bilateral engagements, significant commercial linkages, and considerable people-to-people ties. President Trump’s phone call to President Buhari in 2017 was his first to any sub-Saharan African leader, and in 2018, Buhari became the first sub-Saharan African leader to meet with President Trump at the White House. U.S. concerns over human rights conditions in Nigeria periodically have strained ties and impeded security cooperation; in recent years, some Members of Congress have expressed particular concern with military abuses against civilians, along with deteriorating press and religious freedoms. The State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated over $450 million in FY2020 bilateral foreign assistance for Nigeria, supporting programs focused on health, good governance, agricultural development, and law enforcement and justice sector strengthening. This does not include substantial emergency assistance provided in response to the humanitarian crisis in the northeast, or funds administered by other U.S. federal departments, such as the Departments of Defense, Justice, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security. Congressional Research Service link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 20 link to page 20 link to page 21 link to page 6 link to page 11 link to page 20 link to page 22 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Contents Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1 Politics ............................................................................................................................................. 2 The Buhari Administration (2015-Present) ............................................................................... 4 Security Conditions and Human Rights Concerns .......................................................................... 5 Boko Haram and the Islamic State-West Africa ........................................................................ 5 Intercommunal Violence and Nigeria’s “Farmer-Herder” Conflicts ......................................... 8 Religious Freedom Issues, Sharia Law, and the Shia Minority ................................................. 9 Niger Delta Insecurity: Militancy, Criminality, and Oil Theft ................................................ 10 Security Sector Challenges and Accountability Concerns ....................................................... 11 The Economy ................................................................................................................................ 12 Development Challenges and Humanitarian Conditions ........................................................ 13 U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Investment ......................................................................................... 14 U.S. Relations and Assistance ....................................................................................................... 15 U.S. Assistance to Nigeria ....................................................................................................... 17 U.S. Security Assistance and Military Sales ..................................................................... 17 Outlook and Issues for Congress ................................................................................................... 18 Figures Figure 1. Nigeria at a Glance ........................................................................................................... 3 Figure 2. Nigeria’s Geopolitical Zones ........................................................................................... 8 Tables Table 1. State Department- and USAID-Administered Assistance to Nigeria .............................. 17 Contacts Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 19 Congressional Research Service Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Overview Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, largest economy, and leading oil producer. It plays a major political and economic role in Africa and wields significant influence in regional bodies such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The country’s commercial center, Lagos, is among the world’s largest cities, with an annual economic output surpassing that of many African countries. By 2050, Nigeria is poised to overtake the United States as the world’s third most populous country, with a population projected to exceed 400 million.1 (At 216 million inhabitants as of mid-2020, Nigeria is currently the world’s sixth most populous.) Few countries in Africa have the potential to make a larger global impact. At the same time, Nigeria faces considerable economic, security, and social challenges. In 2020, the twin shocks of a collapse in the global price of oil, Nigeria’s top export, and Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) are expected to push its economy into a deep recession, the country’s second contraction in five years. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected in June 2020 that Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP) would decline by 5.4% in 2020, with implications for livelihoods, social programs, and state finances—and for a governance system that relies, to a large extent, on the distribution of centrally collected oil revenues.2 The downturn is likely to heighten development challenges in a country where roughly half the population lives in extreme poverty. It also may draw attention and resources away from a number of pressing security threats, notably including a decade-long insurgency by Islamist extremists in the northeast. Recent congressional attention on Nigeria has centered on terrorist threats, elections and other governance issues, human rights challenges, and humanitarian conditions. Nigeria routinely ranks among the top global recipients of U.S. development aid, although U.S. concern over Nigerian security force abuses periodically have strained bilateral ties and limited security cooperation. State Department- and USAID-administered assistance totaled over $450 million in FY2020 allocations, excluding emergency humanitarian aid and other globally administered funds.3 A particular emphasis of U.S. health aid has been efforts to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS; Nigeria is home to the world’s second-largest population living with HIV/AIDS.4 Other U.S. federal departments and agencies also administer assistance to Nigeria. COVID-19 in Nigeria: Health Impacts and Nigerian and U.S. Responses As of September 17, Nigeria had confirmed approximately 57,000 cases of COVID-19 (about 26.5 per 100,000 people), with roughly 1,100 deaths (1.9%).5 After the country recorded its first known case in late February 2020, the Buhari administration imposed a lockdown in three zones—the Federal Capital Territory encompassing the capital, Abuja, as well as Lagos and Ogun States—prohibiting public gatherings and closing schools, places of worship, and most businesses. Authorities in other states introduced ful or partial lockdowns, and in mid-March, the central government imposed a nationwide curfew and restrictions on non-essential travel into the country and between states. Since early May, national and state authorities have gradually eased such measures, which imposed a heavy economic burden in an economy already facing a contraction, despite a mounting COVID-19 caseload. (The number of total confirmed cases doubled over a six-week period in mid-2020, from roughly 25,000 in late June to over 50,000 in mid-August). 1 United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects 2019 Revision, 2019. 2 IMF, World Economic Outlook database, June 2020 update. 3 State Department, 653(a) report for FY2020. 4 Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), UNAIDS Data 2019, 2019. 5 CRS calculation of incidence and death rates based on data from Johns Hopkins University COVID-19 map, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html, accessed September 10, 2020, and population data from CIA World Factbook. Congressional Research Service 1 link to page 15 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Nigeria has lagged behind some other African countries in testing for the virus. As of September 17, Nigerian authorities had tested roughly 480,000 samples, as compared to nearly 4.0 mil ion tests conducted in fellow economic powerhouse South Africa, which has a population one-quarter the size of Nigeria’s.6 Low testing rates have raised fears that Nigeria’s official caseload may considerably understate the extent of the pandemic. Notably, in April, the northern city of Kano experienced a spike in deaths due to unknown causes; a government inquiry based on interviews with those in contact with the deceased estimated that some 60% of those deaths may have been due to COVID-19. Other cities also reportedly have seen spikes in unexplained deaths due to respiratory il ness.7 Meanwhile, the enforcement of lockdown orders in Nigeria has raised concerns in light of reported abuses by security forces. According to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), an independent government agency, security forces kil ed nearly 30 people and unlawful y detained, extorted, or tortured dozens more over the first five weeks of lockdown.8 Several journalists also have faced arrest while reporting on COVID-19.9 Nigerian authorities have requested roughly $7 bil ion from the IMF, World Bank, and other multilateral lenders to help counter the virus and cushion its economic impacts. As of August 2020, the IMF had provided $3.4 bil ion in emergency financing for Nigeria (see “The Economy,” below). As of August 21, the State Department had announced roughly $42 mil ion in U.S. health and humanitarian assistance for Nigeria, separate from U.S. support provided through multilateral institutions.10 In August, the Administration also donated 200 ventilators to Nigeria, fulfil ing a pledge made by President Trump after an April 2020 call with President Buhari.11 Politics Nigeria is a federal republic with 36 states. Its political structure is similar to that of the United States, with a bicameral legislature comprising a 109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives. It became a multiparty democracy in 1999, after four decades of military rule punctuated by repeated coups and intermittent attempts to establish civilian government. Nigeria’s politics have been shaped by efforts to distribute power and state resources equitably in a country that is home to over 250 ethnic groups and has witnessed recurrent conflict along ethno-regional and religious lines. The “federal character” principle, enshrined in the 1999 constitution, requires that appointments to government posts reflect the country’s diversity.12 By a de facto system known as “zoning,” political parties rotate candidates for elected office on an ethno-regional basis. Perceived violations of these arrangements have led to conflict: in 2011, for instance, frustrated expectations that a northerner would retain the presidency contributed to post- 6 Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, COVID-19 Nigeria dashboard; South Africa National Department of Health, COVID-19 dashboard, both accessed September 18, 2020. 7 Ruth Maclean, “Covid-19 Outbreak in Nigeria Is Just One of Africa’s Alarming Hot Spots,” New York Times, May 17, 2020. 8 NHRC, National Human Rights Commission Press Release on COVID-19 Enforcement So Far Report on Incidents of Violation of Human Rights, April 15, 2020; NHRC, Report of Alleged Human Rights Violations Recorded Between 13th April to 4th May, 2020 Following the Extension of the Lockdown Period by Government, May 15, 2020. 9 See, e.g., Committee to Project Journalists (CPJ), "Nigerian journalist held under cybercrime act for COVID-19 coverage," June 10, 2020. 10 State Department, “Update: The United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to COVID-19,” August 21, 2020. 11 White House, “Remarks by President Trump in Meeting with Governor DeSantis of Florida,” April 28, 2020. 12 Implementation of the “federal character” remains uneven. See Leila Demarest, Arnim Langer, and Ukoha Ukiwo, “Nigeria’s Federal Character Commission (FFC): a critical appraisal,” Oxford Development Studies (2020). Congressional Research Service 2 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy election riots in which hundreds died.13 Elections often serve as flashpoints for violence as political office at all tiers of government yields access to oil earnings and other state resources.14 Figure 1. Nigeria at a Glance Size: More than twice the size of California Literacy: 62% (71% male, 53% female) (2015) Capital: Abuja Infant Mortality Rate: 60 deaths/1,000 live births Population: 214 mil ion; 2.5% growth rate Median Age / Life Expectancy: 18.6 years / 60 years Languages: English (official), Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo Prevalence of HIV: 1.5% (2018) (Igbo), Fulani, over 500 other local languages GDP Per Capita / Growth Rate: $1,168 / 2.2% (2019) Religions: Muslim 54%, Roman Catholic 11%, other Key exports: petroleum and petroleum products 95%, Christian 35%, other 1% (2018) cocoa, rubber (2012) Source: CRS map with data from State Department and Esri. Fact information from CIA World Factbook and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); 2020 data unless otherwise indicated. GDP per capita is adjusted to international dol ars based on purchasing power parity. 13 The 2011 zoning controversy resulted from the 2010 death of incumbent President Umaru Yar’Adua, a northerner. He was succeeded by southern-born Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, who won reelection in 2011. Many northerners, including some prominent figures within Jonathan’s party, opposed Jonathan’s candidacy on the grounds that a northerner should have held the presidency for two consecutive terms. For an account of this controversy and the post-election violence, see Human Rights Watch (HRW), Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed 800, May 16, 2011. 14 For a study of corruption and oversight challenges related to government expenditures in Nigeria, see Matthew Page, Camouflaged Cash: How ‘Security Votes’ Fuel Corruption in Nigeria, Transparency International, May 2018. Congressional Research Service 3 link to page 8 link to page 14 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy The Buhari Administration (2015-Present) President Muhammadu Buhari, a retired army major general, first won office in 2015 and was reelected in 2019. He had previously served as military head of state after leading a coup d’état in 1983, before being overthrown in another coup in 1985. An ethnic Fulani Muslim from the northwest, Buhari swept the north in both electoral cycles. His vice president, Yemi Osinbajo, is an ethnic Yoruba Pentecostal pastor and former state attorney general from the southwest. Approaching the 2015 polls, Buhari leveraged his military background and stoic reputation to campaign on a platform of addressing mounting security challenges and rooting out graft. Upon taking office, he earned praise for launching an anti-corruption campaign that resulted in charges against several high-ranking former officials, and for intensifying the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram, which had rapidly expanded its territorial control in 2014-2015.15 In contrast to his predecessor, Buhari strengthened counterterrorism coordination with neighboring countries and recorded a series of military victories against Boko Haram soon after taking office. Boko Haram has nevertheless proven resilient, as the military has struggled to curb the group’s attacks and reestablish state control in contested areas, notably in rural zones. The emergence and growth of an Islamic State-affiliated splinter faction since 2016, alongside rising insecurity in other parts of the country, have placed further strain on Nigeria’s overstretched security forces (see “Security Conditions and Human Rights Concerns”). Meanwhile, several high profile corruption cases have stalled in Nigeria’s slow-moving court system, and the country’s top anti-corruption official has himself come under investigation for alleged graft.16 Critics accuse the Buhari administration of targeting anti-corruption inquiries to sideline political opponents, even as Buhari’s cabinet includes several ministers previously implicated in corrupt practices.17 Observers also have expressed concerns over human rights and democracy trends. According to Amnesty International, attacks on the press have “continued unabated” since 2015, as authorities have raided media offices and detained journalists on security and criminal defamation charges.18 Several Members of Congress have expressed alarm over the prosecution of U.S.-based journalist and 2019 presidential candidate Omoyele Sowore, who faces treason charges for calling for anti-Buhari protests after the election.19 Despite Buhari’s pledge to curb security force misconduct, human rights groups have accused the police and military of torture, extrajudicial killings, and other abuses (see “Security Sector Challenges and Accountability Concerns”). The 2019 elections featured extensive violence and fraud, raising further questions about Nigeria’s democratic trajectory as the country enters its third decade of continuous civilian rule (see Text Box). The 2019 Elections and U.S. Engagement Many observers described the 2019 general elections as a step backward in Nigeria’s democratic trajectory and a missed opportunity to build on the successes of the 2015 pol s—widely considered the most credible in the 15 Zainab Usman, “Buhari's first 100 days: Does Nigerian president mean business?” CNN, September 4, 2015. 16 According to the State Department, Nigeria’s anticorruption agencies attribute the delays to “a lack of judges and the widespread practice of filing for and granting multiple adjournments.” State Department, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nigeria, 2019. 17 Ibid. For more on Nigeria’s leading anti-corruption agency, see Onyema et. al, The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the politics of (in)effective implementation of Nigeria’s anti-corruption policy, SOAS University of London: Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Research Consortium Working Paper 007. 18 Amnesty International (AI), Endangered Voices: Attack on Freedom of Expression in Nigeria, October 2019. 19 In December 2019, Senators Booker, Coons, Menendez, and Schumer and Representatives Gottheimer and Pascrell sent a joint letter to Nigeria’s Attorney General urging respect for Sowore’s due process rights. Congressional Research Service 4 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy country’s history.20 The presidential contest pitted President Buhari against Atiku Abubakar, a former vice president who defected from the ruling party in 2017. Buhari ultimately won with 56% of the vote. Voter turnout for the presidential election was 36%, the lowest rate recorded since Nigeria’s democratic transition in 1999.21 The 2019 elections featured significant shortcomings. Disinformation, inflammatory rhetoric, and widespread violence marred the pre-election period.22 Weeks before the election, Buhari replaced Nigeria’s chief justice without support from the Senate, prompting the U.S. embassy to express concern that the decision could harm the credibility of the pol s, given the judiciary’s role in resolving electoral disputes.23 A weeklong voting delay announced hours before first-round pol s were to open created confusion among voters and may have dampened eventual turnout. Election day concerns included “increasingly brazen” vote buying, ballot secrecy violations, and irregularities in ballot col ation, according to U.S.-funded international election observers.24 According to the State Department, state security forces intimidated voters and officials at some pol ing centers, dimming turnout and reinforcing perceptions (particularly in the south) that “the army is a tool of the ruling party.”25 Nigeria’s elections have been a focus of congressional interest and U.S. foreign assistance. The House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing ahead of the 2019 elections, and concurrent resolutions calling for credible elections were introduced in the House and Senate.26 Secretary of State Michael Pompeo spoke with Buhari and Atiku to underscore the importance of a credible election process. U.S. assistance included technical support for Nigeria’s electoral commission, capacity-building programs to enhance civil society oversight of electoral processes, and party strengthening activities.27 After the pol s, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on unnamed individuals “believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining democracy in Nigeria.”28 Security Conditions and Human Rights Concerns Boko Haram and the Islamic State-West Africa Over the past decade, violence between government forces and Islamist insurgents based in the northeast has killed an estimated 38,000 people in Nigeria and displaced over three million throughout the Lake Chad Basin region comprising parts of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.29 Founded in the early 2000s as a Salafist Muslim reform movement, Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal Jihad (JAS), known as Boko Haram (“Western education is forbidden” in the Hausa language), has evolved and expanded since 2009 to become one of the world’s deadliest terrorist groups. It espouses an “exclusivist” interpretation of Islam that rejects as sacrilegious the more moderate Islam practiced in much of northern Nigeria, and has attracted some supporters by 20 See, for instance, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI), Nigeria International Election Observation Mission Final Report, June 2019. 21 Ibid. 22 According to SB Morgen Intelligence, a Nigeria-based research group, over 600 people were killed during the 2019 election cycle. SBM Intel, Nigeria: 2019 Election Survey Report, 2019. 23 U.S. Embassy in Nigeria, “Statement on the Suspension and Replacement of the Chief Justice,” January 26, 2019. 24 NDI/IRI, Nigeria International Election Observation Mission Final Report, op. cit. 25 State Department, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nigeria, March 2020. 26 The concurrent resolutions (S.Con.Res. 1/H.Con.Res. 4) were agreed to in the Senate but not in the House. 27 USAID, “Nigeria: Elections,” accessed May 19, 2020, available at https://www.usaid.gov/elections-0. 28 State Department, “Imposing Visa Restrictions on Nigerians Responsible for Undermining the Democratic Process,” July 23, 2019. 29 Fatality figure from Council on Foreign Relations, “Nigeria Security Tracker,” at https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/ nigeria-security-tracker/p29483, accessed September 9, 2020. Displacement figure from International Organization for Migration (IOM) and U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). See UNHCR, “Operational Portal: Nigeria Situation,” at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/nigeriasituation, accessed September 9, 2020. Congressional Research Service 5 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy stoking a sense of state persecution and victimhood.30 Security force abuses appear to have fueled recruitment by playing into such narratives, while economic motivations also may play a role.31 In 2015, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau pledged loyalty to the Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS), and Boko Haram subsequently rebranded as the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (IS-WA, aka ISWAP or ISIS-WA). An ensuing leadership dispute fractured the group; the Islamic State ultimately recognized a different leader of IS-WA, while Shekau’s faction reassumed the group’s original name. (Observers generally refer to Shekau’s faction as Boko Haram.) In contrast to Shekau’s Boko Haram, which gained notoriety for its indiscriminate assaults on civilian centers and use of female and child suicide bombers, IS-WA has focused attacks primarily on security forces and other state targets. IS-WA also reportedly has sought to provide basic services and law enforcement in its areas of operation, building ties with local communities that could further complicate counterinsurgency efforts.32 As of late 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) estimated IS-WA to have roughly 3,500 members, and Boko Haram to have 1,500.33 In August 2020, the U.N. Secretary-General’s report on global Islamic State operations noted that IS-WA “remains a major focus of ISIL global propaganda” and described it as “one of the largest and most conspicuous of [ISIL’s] remote ‘provinces.’”34 Boko Haram and IS-WA are based in northeast Nigeria, though each remains capable of mounting cross-border attacks in the wider Lake Chad Basin region. Regional counterinsurgency efforts are coordinated under the African Union-authorized Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which comprises troops from Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The MNJTF has received U.S. and other donor support. MNJTF forces have mounted some successful operations, notably in border zones and areas around Lake Chad, yet they continue to face capacity gaps and coordination challenges, and security gains often have been short-lived.35 Boko Haram and IS-WA pose a threat to international targets and Western citizens in the region, though no U.S. citizens are publicly reported to have been killed or kidnapped by either group. The State Department has designated Boko Haram, IS-WA, and a separate splinter faction known as Ansaru as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, (as amended,) and as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) subject to 30 Alex Thurston, “The Disease is Unbelief’: Boko Haram’s Religious and Political Worldview,” Brookings Institution, January 2016. For more on Boko Haram, see Jacob Zenn et. al, Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa’s Enduring Insurgency, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 9, 2018; Alex Thurston, Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017); and Brandon Kendhammer and Carmen McCain, Boko Haram (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2018). 31 On economic drivers of extremist recruitment, see Mercy Corps, Motivations and Empty Promises: Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth, February 2015. On the role of state abuses in driving enlistment into extremist groups in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, see United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment, 2017. 32 According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), IS-WA “has cultivated a level of support among local civilians that Boko Haram never enjoyed and has turned neglected communities in the area and islands in Lake Chad into a source of economic support.” ICG, Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province, May 16, 2019. 33 Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, East Africa and North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations: October 1, 2019-December 31, 2019, February 2020. 34 U.N. Security Council, Eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, U.N. doc. S/2020/774, August 4, 2020. 35 ICG, What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?, July 26, 2020; Omar S Mahmood and Ndubuisi Christian Ani, Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region: Policies, Cooperation and Livelihoods, Institute for Security Studies, July 2018. Congressional Research Service 6 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy U.S. financial sanctions under Executive Order 13224. The State Department also has designated several individuals linked to Boko Haram and IS-WA as SGDTs. As Nigeria’s Islamist insurgencies have persisted, non-state vigilante groups have emerged to provide security in some zones. Known collectively as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), they have, in some cases, received state support or participated in military operations; some also have received U.N. training.36 The CJTF reportedly has helped stabilize some areas, including by channeling information between community members and the military.37 At the same time, some CJTF members reportedly have committed violence against civilians and other abuses.38 The Chibok and Dapchi Kidnappings and U.S. Responses Boko Haram and IS-WA have abducted thousands of civilians, including several thousand children.39 Two mass kidnappings—Boko Haram’s abduction of 276 girls from Chibok (Borno State) in 2014, and IS-WA’s abduction of 110 girls from Dapchi (Yobe State) in 2018—have drawn significant U.S. attention. Muslim communities in northeast Nigeria have borne the brunt of kidnappings and other attacks by the two groups, yet the Chibok and Dapchi abductions were notable, in part, for their targeting of Christians: many Chibok victims reportedly were Christian, and of the students abducted from Dapchi, all but one, a Christian named Leah Sharibu, have been kil ed or released. IS-WA reportedly has refused to free Sharibu as punishment for her refusal to convert to Islam.40 In response to the 2014 Chibok abduction, which gave rise to the international “#BringBackOurGirls” advocacy movement, the Obama Administration sent an interagency team to Nigeria to support search efforts. President Obama also deployed an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and approximately 80 U.S. military personnel to neighboring Chad to support recovery operations through surveillance activities.41 Though over half of the Chibok students have escaped over the years, more than 100 remain missing. (The U.S. UAV mission reportedly ended in late 2014; in early 2015, a Pentagon spokesperson stated that the number of surveillance missions requested by Nigerian authorities "had dropped to the point that we were able to cover it through other means."42) U.S. policymakers have shown an enduring interest in the victims of the Chibok and Dapchi kidnappings. Several Members of Congress have met with or hosted Chibok survivors; in 2016, one testified before the House of Representatives.43 President Trump hosted two Chibok survivors at the White House in 2017. Some Members have considered Leah Sharibu’s ongoing captivity in the context of broader concerns over religious freedom in Nigeria (see below). In the 116th Congress, S.Res. 170 and H.Res. 375 would recognize the fifth anniversary of the Chibok abduction and call for the release of the remaining Chibok girls and of Sharibu. 36 U.N. Development Program (UNDP), “UNDP trains vigilantes and Civilian Joint Task Force members in human rights and leadership,” July 9, 2019. 37 Center for Civilians in Conflict, Civilian Perceptions of the Yan Gora (CJTF) in Borno State, Nigeria¸ 2018. 38 Idayat Hassan and Zacharias Piero, “The Rise and Risks of Nigeria’s Civilian Joint Task Force: Implications for Post-Conflict Recovery in Northeast Nigeria,” Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa’s Enduring Insurgency, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 9, 2018. 39 ICG, Preventing Boko Haram Abductions of Schoolchildren in Nigeria, April 12, 2018; Drew Hinshaw and Joe Parkinson, “The 10,000 Kidnapped Boys of Boko Haram,” Wall Street Journal, August 12, 2016. 40 Bukola Adebayo, “Lone Dapchi schoolgirl in Boko Haram captivity begs for her freedom,” CNN, August 28, 2018. 41 White House, Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, June 12, 2014. 42 Armin Rosen, "Almost a year after #BringBackOurGirls, they're still missing but the US pulled its 80 troops looking for Boko Haram," Business Insider, March 11, 2015. 43 House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, The U.S. Role in Helping Nigeria Confront Boko Haram and Other Threats in Northern Nigeria, 114th Cong., May 11, 2016. Congressional Research Service 7 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Intercommunal Violence and Nigeria’s “Farmer-Herder” Conflicts In the Middle Belt—a loosely defined region spanning Nigeria’s North Central geopolitical zone and adjacent parts of the North East and North West (see map)—violence between sedentary farmers and mobile livestock herders has surged in recent years. Precise statistics are unavailable and fatality counts are contested, but one expert analysis estimated that farmer-herder conflicts in the Middle Belt killed 2,000 Nigerians annually between 2011 and 2016.44 In the northwest, such clashes have mounted in a context of escalating insecurity marked by armed banditry, kidnapping for ransom, ethnic vigilantism, and intercommunal conflict that killed approximately 8,000 people and displaced 200,000 between 2011 and early 2020.45 More recently, Islamist extremist groups reportedly have sought to establish themselves in the northwest, building ties with local communities, criminal gangs, and herder-affiliated militia.46 In August 2020, the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command-Africa stated that “we’re seeing al-Qaida starting to make some inroads” in the northwest, but provided no further information about the assertion.47 Figure 2. Nigeria’s Geopolitical Zones Source: Nigerian National Population Commission and ICF, Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2018, 2019. 44 ICG, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, July 26, 2018. 45 ICG, Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem, May 18, 2020. 46 Ibid. 47 State Department, “Digital Briefing on U.S. Efforts to Combat Terrorism in Africa during COVID,” August 4, 2020. Congressional Research Service 8 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Conflict between farmers and herders over access to resources, crop damage, and livestock theft is not a new phenomenon, but mounting demographic, ecological, and socioeconomic pressures have placed growing strains on intercommunal relations. A 2018 Reuters analysis found that a decades-long expansion of farming activity in the Middle Belt had sharply reduced the amount of land available for livestock grazing.48 Rising livestock prices have spurred organized cattle rustling and other forms of criminality, prompting herders to heavily arm themselves for self-defense and herd protection.49 Weapons used by all parties have grown more sophisticated, with arms sourced from national defense stockpiles or trafficked into the country from abroad.50 Farmer-herder tensions in Nigeria often overlap with ethnic and religious cleavages, heightening the risk of escalation and complicating attempts at conflict resolution. In the Middle Belt, much of the violence has pitted largely Christian farmers of various ethnicities against predominately Muslim, ethnic Fulani herders. (The Fulani are an expansive, diverse group that spans much of Central and West Africa.) The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF, a congressionally mandated independent body) finds that herder-farmer clashes in Nigeria “can sometimes be framed as being between religious groups or can lead to reprisals that target individuals based on their religion.”51 (In the northwest, however, much of the violence has pitted Fulani herders against ethnic Hausa farmers, both predominately Muslim.) Efforts to resolve farmer-herder violence and address resource access challenges have proven ineffective to date. In 2018, the Buhari administration unveiled a ten-year National Livestock Transformation Plan (NLTP) entailing the establishment of ranches for sedentary grazing and other agriculture sector investments. The NLTP, which some critics portray as overly favorable to herder communities, is being piloted in several states, yet its implementation has been slow.52 Meanwhile, political leaders have inflamed tensions through hate speech and prohibitions on open grazing, which herders view as a threat to their livelihoods.53 Religious Freedom Issues, Sharia Law, and the Shia Minority Islamist extremism in the north and farmer-herder clashes in the Middle Belt have heightened U.S. concerns over religious freedom in Nigeria, whose population is roughly half Christian, half Muslim. In 2019, the Trump Administration placed Nigeria on the “Special Watch List” pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA, P.L. 105-292, as amended), finding that the government had tolerated or engaged in “severe violations of religious freedom.”54 A downgrade to Country of Particular Concern (CPC) status—a designation USCIRF has recommended for Nigeria each year since 2009—could carry restrictions on certain kinds of U.S. foreign assistance. 48 Ryan McNeill and Alexis Akwagyiram, “The Fight for Nigeria’s heartland,” Reuters, December 19, 2018. 49 Matt Luizza, “Urban Elites’ Livestock Exacerbate Herder-Farmer Tensions in Africa’s Sudano-Sahel,” Wilson Center New Security Beat, June 10, 2019; Chom Bagu and Katie Smith, Past is Prologue: Criminality & Reprisal Attacks in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, Search for Common Ground (SFCG), 2017. 50 Conflict Armament Research, Nigeria’s Herder-Farmer Conflict: Domestic, Regional, and Transcontinental Weapon Sources, January 2020. 51 USCIRF, Annual Report 2020, April 2020. 52 See, e.g., Adelani Adepegba, “NLTP is RUGA in disguise –SMBLF,” The Punch, September 27, 2019. 53 Chris M.A. Kwaja and Bukola I. Ademola-Adelehin, The Implications of the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law on Farmer-Herder Relations in the Middle Belt of Nigeria, SFCG, December 2017; USCIRF, Central Nigeria: Overcoming Dangerous Speech and Ending Religious Divides, February 2019. 54 For more on country designations pursuant to the IFRA, see CRS In Focus IF10803, Global Human Rights: International Religious Freedom Policy, by Michael A. Weber. Congressional Research Service 9 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy U.S. religious freedom concerns partly center on the application of Sharia (Islamic) law in Nigeria’s north. Sharia courts have operated in northern Nigeria since independence in 1960, yet their jurisdiction was limited to civil law until 1999, when northern states began to extend Sharia to criminal cases. Sharia criminal courts now operate in 12 northern states and the Federal Capital Territory encompassing the capital. (The courts may not compel participation by non-Muslims, though non-Muslims may elect to have cases tried in Sharia courts.55) The advent of Sharia criminal law in Nigeria sparked alarm due in part to the potentially harsh sentences prescribed under Sharia, which include amputation and death by stoning. Such concerns waned as Sharia judges generally refrained from imposing these more severe sentences, but in 2020, a Kano State Sharia court sentenced a Muslim singer to death for blasphemy, sparking outrage from human rights groups.56 Also in 2020, Kaduna State authorities arrested a prominent atheist, reportedly for blasphemy, and transferred him to Kano for prosecution, spurring further alarm over religious freedom trends and raising questions about statutory protections for non-Muslims under Sharia.57 State repression of minority Shia Muslims in northern Nigeria, which is predominately Sunni, has garnered growing attention in recent years. In 2015, the military killed nearly 350 members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), a Shia movement led by Iranian-trained cleric Ibrahim Zakzaky, and arrested Zakzaky and hundreds of his adherents.58 A state inquiry found the army culpable for the massacre, but no soldiers have faced prosecution. Zakzaky remains in detention on charges of unlawful assembly and homicide in connection with the death of a soldier during the incident. Security forces have since violently suppressed a series of protests calling for his release, killing dozens of IMN members with the use of live fire and arresting hundreds more.59 Niger Delta Insecurity: Militancy, Criminality, and Oil Theft Political unrest, criminality, and intermittent bouts of armed militancy linked to grievances over perceived exploitation and environmental degradation have afflicted the southern, oil-rich Niger Delta region for decades.60 Despite massive petroleum reserves, the Niger Delta faces high rates of poverty and unemployment. Decades of oil spills, which oil companies attribute to vandalism and oil theft, but which human rights groups ascribe to negligent practices on the part of oil operators, have devastated local livelihoods and contributed to stark ecological and health challenges.61 A 2011 assessment by the U.N. Environment Program (UNEP) called for the 55 Some non-Muslims report a preference for Sharia courts, considering them more to be more efficient and less corrupt than common law courts. USCIRF, Shari’ah Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria: Implementation of Expanded Shari’ah Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes in Kano, Sokoto, and Zamfara States, 2017-2019, December 2019. 56 AI, “Nigeria: Authorities must quash the conviction and death sentence imposed on Kano-based singer,” August 13, 2020. 57 USCIRF, “USCIRF Condemns Death Sentence for Yahaya Sharif-Aminu on Blasphemy Charges,” August 11, 2020 and “USCIRF Condemns Arrest of Prominent Nigerian Atheist, Mubarak Bala,” May 8, 2020. 58 USCIRF, Annual Report 2017, April 2017. 59 Human Rights Watch, “Nigeria: End Impunity for Killings of Shia,” December 12, 2018; Dionne Searcey and Emmanuel Akinwotu, “Nigeria Says Soldiers Who Killed Marchers Were Provoked. Video Shows Otherwise,” The New York Times, December 17, 2018. 60 In the early 1990s, activists from the Ogoni ethnic group drew international attention to the extensive environmental damage done by oil extraction in the Niger Delta. Activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, president of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), and 14 others were accused in 1994 of involvement in the murder of several Ogoni politicians. They pled not guilty, but Saro-Wiwa and eight others were convicted and executed. The executions sparked outrage against the regime of military ruler Sani Abacha, and the United States recalled its ambassador in response. 61 Anna Bruederle and Roland Hodler, “Effect of oil spills on infant mortality in Nigeria,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 116, no. 12 (March 2019), pp. 5467-5471. Congressional Research Service 10 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy rehabilitation of vast swathes of the Niger Delta, but such efforts have stalled as state agencies mandated to coordinate the clean-up have faced allegations of corruption and mismanagement. Human rights advocates claim the vast majority of UNEP-identified zones remain polluted.62 In 2009, in response to a wave of attacks on oil infrastructure that sharply reduced output, the government launched an amnesty and monthly stipend for militants. The program has curbed large attacks on oil facilities, but root causes of insecurity remain unaddressed and ex-militants routinely threaten to resume violence. In 2016, renewed attacks on oil infrastructure pushed production to a 30-year low, helping trigger an economic recession. Oil theft for black-market sale is another key challenge, one implicating criminal networks, politicians, security personnel, and oil workers.63 The Niger Delta also is the epicenter of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea: for several years, waters off Nigeria have ranked among the world’s most dangerous for attacks at sea.64 The region has become a hotspot for kidnappings targeting shipping personnel, as attackers exploit vast river networks to hide abducted crew while negotiating ransoms. Security Sector Challenges and Accountability Concerns Several factors have undermined the government’s response to security challenges. A 2018 analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace found that “decades of unchecked corruption have hollowed out the Nigerian military and security services and rendered them unable to effectively combat Boko Haram or address ethno-religious and communal conflict.”65 Equipment shortages reportedly have hindered counterterrorism operations, as IS-WA and Boko Haram have looted weaponry and other materiel in repeated raids on military facilities.66 Reports suggest that personnel have deployed for extended periods without rotation, with implications for troop morale and discipline.67 The Wall Street Journal and others have accused the military of concealing evidence of mounting losses by burying soldiers without notifying their families.68 The State Department’s 2019 human rights report documented accounts of extrajudicial and arbitrary killings by security forces, enforced disappearances, violence against journalists and protesters, and arbitrary detention and torture of detainees.69 Attention has centered on abuses committed during counterterrorism operations, in which Nigerian security forces allegedly have executed hundreds of civilians, arbitrarily detained thousands more, and committed widespread torture.70 Those captured in military sweeps or arrested after fleeing extremist-held territory may be detained without charge for extended periods while undergoing interrogation: Amnesty International estimates that “likely more than 10,000” people, including many children, have died in custody due to overcrowding, heat, inadequate health and sanitation facilities, and insufficient 62 AI, No Clean-Up, No Justice: An Evaluation of the Implementation of UNEP’s Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, Nine Years On, June 2020. 63 Transparency International, Military Involvement in Oil Theft in the Niger Delta: A Discussion Paper, June 2019. 64 CRS In Focus IF11117, Gulf of Guinea: Recent Trends in Piracy and Armed Robbery, by Tomas F. Husted. 65 Matthew Page, A New Taxonomy for Corruption in Nigeria, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2018. 66 Neil Munshi, “Under fire: why Nigeria is struggling to defeat Boko Haram,” Financial Times, December 6, 2018. 67 See, e.g., Obi Anyadike, “‘Year of the Debacle’: How Nigeria Lost Its Way in the War Against Boko Haram,” World Politics Review, October 30, 2018. 68 Joe Parkinson, “Nigeria Buries Soldiers at Night in Secret Cemetery,” The Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2019. 69 State Department, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nigeria, op. cit. 70 AI, Stars on Their Shoulders. Blood on their Hands. War Crimes Committed by the Nigerian Military, 2015. Congressional Research Service 11 link to page 18 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy food and water.71 Security personnel reportedly have raped and sexually exploited women and girls, including detainees and displaced people.72 Impunity for such abuses remains widespread. Security force abuses have hindered U.S. counterterrorism cooperation with the Nigerian military (see “U.S. Relations and Assistance”), and may help drive extremist recruitment and discourage demobilization.73 According to Amnesty International, the detention and abuse of individuals who defect or escape from Boko Haram have led former detainees to report that they would not encourage others to flee from Boko Haram, lest they undergo a similar experience.74 The Economy Nigeria’s economy is the largest in Africa.75 The petroleum sector accounts for roughly half of state revenues and a large share of foreign exchange earnings, though services, agriculture, and manufacturing together employ a much larger segment of the labor force and contribute most of GDP.76 Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial center, is among the world’s largest cities and has emerged as a leading technology hub in Africa. With a youthful, rapidly growing population and abundant natural resource reserves, Nigeria has the potential to become a global economic powerhouse. According to various analyses, Nigeria’s economy continues to underperform. Infrastructure gaps, policy uncertainty, chronic power shortages, and years of underinvestment in education have impeded productivity.77 Pervasive corruption drains state resources and discourages private investment.78 Longstanding government intervention measures such as fuel subsidies, foreign exchange controls, import restrictions, and tax exemptions have created market distortions, eroded state finances, and enabled graft.79 Due to poor non-oil tax administration and high non-compliance, Nigeria has one of the world’s lowest ratios of tax revenues to GDP.80 Already in a period of low growth in the wake of a brief 2016 recession, Nigeria’s economy is expected to face its sharpest contraction in decades amid a collapse in global oil prices and economic disruptions brought on by COVID-19. As of June 2020, the IMF projected Nigeria’s GDP to contract by 5.4% in 2020; according to Nigeria’s statistical agency, the economy shrank by an annualized rate of 6.1% between April and June.81 Nigeria’s poorest households are likely to endure the brunt of COVID-19’s economic shocks. According to the World Bank, the downturn could push five million more Nigerians into poverty as compared to pre-pandemic 71 AI, “We Dried Our Tears”: Addressing the Toll on Children of Northeast Nigeria’s Conflict, May 2020. 72 Human Rights Watch, They Didn’t Know if I was Alive or Dead, September 10, 2019; and AI, “They betrayed us”: Women who survived Boko Haram raped, starved and detained in Nigeria, May 24, 2018. 73 UNDP, Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment, December 2017. 74 AI, “We Dried Our Tears”: Addressing the Toll on Children... op. cit. 75 Economy size ranking as of 2019. World Bank DataBank, “GDP (current US$),” accessed September 10, 2020. 76 Sarah Burns and Olly Owen, Nigeria: No Longer an Oil State?, Oxford Martin School Working Paper, August 2019. 77 World Bank, Jumpstarting Inclusive Growth: Unlocking the Productive Potential of Nigeria’s People and Resource Endowments, Fall 2019. 78 State Department, 2020 Investment Climate Statements; Nigeria, September 2020. 79 Matthew Page, A New Taxonomy for Corruption in Nigeria, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, op. cit. 80 IMF, Nigeria: Staff Report for the 2019 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Nigeria, April 2019; Brahima S. Coulibaly and Dhruv Gandhi, “Mobilization of tax revenues in Africa: State of play and policy options,” Brookings, October 2018. 81 IMF, “Nigeria,” accessed August 14, 2020, available at https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/NGA; Oladeinde Olawoyin, “Nigeria’s economy sees biggest decline in 10 years,” Premium Times, August 24, 2020. Congressional Research Service 12 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy projections.82 Roughly half of Nigerians work in the informal labor force with sparse social safety nets, leaving them especially vulnerable. Remittance inflows from Nigerian workers abroad, valued at over 5% of GDP in 2019, have fallen sharply; half of Nigerians live in remittance-receiving households.83 Plunging oil receipts are likely to have severe consequences for state finances. Allocations to federal, state, and local governments from the Federation Account—a centrally administered fund of oil earnings and other state revenues—dipped in mid-2020 and may decline further as Nigeria seeks to come into compliance with production cuts mandated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The government has announced a stimulus package to cushion the impacts of the downturn, and in April 2020, the IMF approved an emergency loan of $3.4 billion through its Rapid Financing Instrument.84 Approval of requested support from the World Bank reportedly has faced delays over demands for economic policy reforms on the part of the Nigerian government.85 The Buhari administration has adjusted its official exchange rate downward, a key request on the part of international lenders, and has eliminated a longstanding fuel subsidy and raised electricity tariffs. The government’s future commitment to such cost-cutting measures, which are highly unpopular among consumers, remains to be seen; Buhari’s predecessor also sought to remove gasoline subsidies, but reversed the decision after nationwide protests. Development Challenges and Humanitarian Conditions According to the World Data Lab, a nongovernmental data analysis organization, roughly 102 million Nigerians live in extreme poverty—the largest extremely poor population in the world.86 The World Bank estimated in early 2020 that roughly half of Nigerians were living on less than $1.90 per day.87 Needs are most acute in the conflict-affected northeast: according to U.N. agencies, nearly 2.1 million Nigerians were displaced internally as of June 2020, largely due to the Boko Haram/IS-WA conflict, with an additional 300,000 living as refugees in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger.88 In early 2020, the U.N. estimated that nearly ten million people in the Lake Chad Basin region required aid, including eight million Nigerians.89 Much of the northeast faces crisis- or emergency-level food insecurity, with a risk of famine in some areas.90 Nigeria has made notable progress in combating fatal diseases in recent years, significantly reducing HIV/AIDS prevalence and declaring itself polio-free in 2020 following a prolonged immunization campaign. Still, as of 2015 (latest data), 30% of Nigerians lacked access to improved water, while 70% lacked access to basic sanitation facilities.91 Roughly 37% of children under five are “stunted,” or too short for their age (a risk indicator of impaired development), 82 World Bank, Nigeria in Times of COVID-19: Laying Foundations for a Strong Recovery, June 2020. 83 Ibid. 84 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Approves US$ 3.4 Billion in Emergency Support to Nigeria to address the COVID-19 Pandemic,” April 28, 2020. 85 Chijioke Ohuocha and Libby George, “Exclusive: Nigeria's $1.5 billion World Bank loan delayed over reforms, say sources,” Reuters, August 17, 2020. 86 See, e.g., World Data Lab, World Poverty Clock, at https://worldpoverty.io/map, accessed September 8, 2020. 87 World Bank, Macro Poverty Outlook: Spring Meetings 2020, April 2020. 88 Data from the IOM and UNHCR. See UNHCR, “Operational Portal: Nigeria Situation,” available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/nigeriasituation, accessed August 27, 2020. 89 USAID, “Lake Chad Basin – Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #2 (FY2020), March 31, 2020. 90 FEWS NET, “Increase in conflict and continued COVID-19,” op. cit. 91 World Bank, Nigeria Biannual Economic Update: Water supply, sanitation & hygiene—a wake-up call, April 2019. Congressional Research Service 13 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy with higher proportions in the north.92 Among Nigerians aged 15-49, some 35% of women and 22% of men have no formal education; literacy is lowest in the northeast and northwest.93 Relative to GDP, Nigeria’s public spending on health and education ranks among the lowest globally.94 Nigeria places among the worst performing countries on the World Bank’s Human Capital Index, a survey of health and education indicators.95 Endemic corruption diverts resources away from social services, heightening barriers to poverty reduction and development promotion. U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Investment As of 2019, Nigeria was the United States’ second-largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa (after South Africa) and third-largest beneficiary of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region (after Mauritius and South Africa).96 Nigerian exports to the United States are dominated by crude oil, which at $4.4 billion accounted for 88% of U.S. imports from Nigeria in 2019.97 According to U.S. International Trade Commission data, Nigeria consistently ranks as the top source of exports to the United States under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 106-200, as amended) trade preference program; crude oil accounts for nearly all such exports. U.S. imports of Nigerian crude have fallen sharply since 2011 as U.S. domestic energy production has increased. Nigeria is a major regional destination for U.S. exports of motor vehicles and refined petroleum products (e.g., gasoline), which are among the fastest-growing U.S. exports to Africa. Agricultural products and machinery are other top U.S. exports to the country. Nigerian demand also has driven growing U.S. petroleum exports to nearby Togo, a regional transshipment hub.98 U.S. FDI is concentrated in the oil and gas sectors.99 Investors in Nigeria cite foreign exchange risk and policy uncertainty as key concerns.100 Import restrictions and local content requirements intended to foster domestic industry may deter U.S. investment, though the State Department reports that “corruption and lack of transparency in tender processes has been a far greater concern to U.S. companies than discriminatory policies based on foreign status.”101 Inadequate power supply, infrastructure gaps, and poor intellectual property protections also may constrain U.S. and other investor interest.102 92 Nigeria National Population Commission and ICF. 2019. Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2018, 2019. 93 Ibid. 94 IMF, Staff Report for the 2019 Article IV Consultation, March 13, 2019. 95 World Bank Human Capital Index, available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/human-capital. 96 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “International Trade and Investment Country Factsheets,” accessed September 10, 2020. 97 CRS estimate based on data from the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) Dataweb, accessed September 10, 2020. 98 Togo recently has ranked among the top destinations for U.S. petroleum product exports in Africa. Per the USITC, “Nigeria is actually the main source of petroleum product demand in West Africa, but high rates of piracy in Nigerian waters and congestion at Lagos, Nigeria’s largest port, have encouraged traders to operate out of Togo instead.” USITC, U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and New Developments, March 2020. 99 State Department, 2020 Investment Climate Statements; Nigeria, op. cit. 100 KPMG, Top 10 Business Risks in 2020/21, April 2020. 101 State Department, 2020 Investment Climate Statements; Nigeria, op. cit. 102 USITC, U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa, op. cit.; State Department, 2019 Investment Climate Statements; Nigeria, op. cit. Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 5 link to page 12 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy U.S. Relations and Assistance U.S.-Nigeria ties improved after Nigeria’s transition to civilian rule in 1999, and they remain robust. President Trump’s phone call to President Buhari in 2017 was his first to any sub-Saharan African leader; in April 2018, Buhari became the first sub-Saharan African leader to meet with President Trump at the White House. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy visited Nigeria during his first official trip to the region, in 2018. He expressed interest in seeing Nigeria play a larger role in peacekeeping and democracy promotion in Africa, and described Nigeria as a focus country for efforts to increase U.S. commercial activity in the region.103 Bilateral engagements include the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission (BNC), a mechanism for convening high-level officials for strategic dialogue that was launched in 2010. The most recent BNC, held in January 2020 in Washington, D.C., centered on bolstering U.S.-Nigeria commercial ties.104 A separate U.S.-Nigeria Commercial and Investment Dialogue (CID) aims to enhance bilateral trade and investment, with an initial focus on “infrastructure, agriculture, digital economy, investment, and regulatory reform.”105 The United States maintains an embassy in Abuja and a consulate in Lagos, and the State Department supports “American Corners” in libraries throughout Nigeria to share information on U.S. culture. Nigerians comprise the largest African-born population in the United States, according to U.S. Census data, and remittances from the United States are a source of income support for many Nigerian households.106 U.S. human rights and governance concerns periodically have raised challenges for bilateral ties. As noted above (see “Politics”), the State Department imposed visa restrictions on individuals found responsible for undermining the conduct of the 2019 general elections. In September 2020, the State Department imposed additional sanctions on unnamed Nigerians for “undermining the democratic process,” citing gubernatorial elections in Kogi and Bayelsa States in late 2019 that featured reports of violence and fraud as well as forthcoming gubernatorial polls in Edo and Ondo States, which have seen rising tensions ahead of elections scheduled for late 2020.107 In 2019, as noted above (see “Religious Freedom Issues, Sharia Law, and the Shia Minority”), the State Department placed Nigeria on the Special Watch List pursuant to the IFRA for governments that tolerate or engage in severe violations of religious freedom. In its 2020 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, the State Department additionally designated Nigeria pursuant to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA, Title IV of P.L. 110-457) as having government or state-supported armed forces that use child soldiers, a designation that could carry restrictions on U.S. aid in FY2021, subject to a presidential waiver and exceptions.108 The State Department also downgraded Nigeria to the Tier 2 Watch List (from Tier 2) in the 2020 TIP report, meaning the country does not meet minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. A further downgrade to Tier 3 status could carry restrictions on certain types of U.S. assistance.109 103 Assistant Secretary Nagy, “The Enduring Partnership between the United States and Nigeria,” November 9, 2018. 104 State Department, “U.S. Department of State to Host the 2020 U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission Meeting,” January 31, 2020. 105 State Department, 2019 Investment Climate Statements; Nigeria, op. cit. 106 U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2018 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. 107 State Department, “Imposing Visa Restrictions on Nigerians Responsible for Undermining the Democratic Process,” September 14, 2020. 108 State Department, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2020. 109 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 15 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy In January 2020, President Trump issued Proclamation 9983, which added Nigeria to the list of countries whose nationals are subject to restrictions on entry to the United States introduced under Executive Order (EO) 13780 (the “Travel Ban”). Proclamation 9983 stated that Nigeria “does not adequately share public-safety and terrorism-related information” required for U.S. immigration screening.110 The action suspends the entry of Nigerian immigrants except as Special Immigrants, subject to waivers and exceptions, and does not apply to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. In August 2020, President Buhari stated that his administration had made progress toward addressing U.S. concerns, but that it would require “enormous resources” to fully implement the recommendations of a Nigerian commission established to resolve the matter.111 U.S. Justice Sector Engagement: Cybercrime and “Abacha Loot” Repatriation Nigeria is globally notorious for cybercrimes, including advance-fee “419 scams,” named for the article in Nigeria’s penal code that outlaws fraudulent e-mails. Recent attention has focused on the role of Nigerian nationals in “romance scams,” whereby conspirators defraud victims through fake social media profiles, including by posing as U.S. military personnel. The U.S. government has supported Nigerian authorities in cracking down on such crimes, and joint U.S.-Nigerian law enforcement operations have led to hundreds of arrests in the United States and Nigeria for fraud and cybercrimes.112 In June 2020, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on six Nigerian nationals for email and romance scams under EO 13694 (as amended), pertaining to malicious cyber activities.113 The United States also has supported efforts to repatriate the proceeds of corruption by former dictator Sani Abacha, who embezzled bil ions of dol ars in public funds during his time in office (1993-1998). In 2014, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that a federal court in the District of Columbia had ordered forfeited to the United States roughly $500 mil ion in ill-gotten Abacha assets laundered through U.S. banks and held in foreign bank accounts.114 DOJ has authority to pay restitution to the victims of the corruption out of the forfeited funds.115 The Bailiwick of Jersey, a British Crown dependency, subsequently enforced the ruling against roughly $310 mil ion held in its jurisdiction; the DOJ transferred those funds to the Nigerian government in May 2020.116 DOJ efforts to enforce the ruling against funds held in other jurisdictions remain ongoing. Some Members of Congress have raised concerns over the restitution of corruption proceeds directly to the Nigerian government. Ahead of the May 2020 transfer of assets from Jersey, several lawmakers issued letters to the DOJ expressing concern over the potential misuse of repatriated funds, demanding clarification regarding the oversight of returned assets, and raising alarm over broader governance trends under President Buhari.117 Past analyses have identified challenges with tracking the use of restituted Abacha funds.118 Some foreign governments have sought to ensure that recovered funds be used to support development objectives; for instance, Switzerland recently repatriated $321 mil ion in Abacha funds through a cash assistance project managed by the World Bank. 110 White House, “Proclamation on Improving Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry,” January 31, 2020. 111 State House Abuja, “Nigeria Making Progress to Reverse U.S Visa Restriction- President Buhari,” August 13, 2020. 112 See, e.g., U.S. Attorney’s Office, Central District of California, “Massive International Fraud and Money Laundering Conspiracy Detailed in Federal Grand Jury Indictment that Charges 80 Defendants,” August 22, 2019; DOJ, “281 Arrested Worldwide in Coordinated International Enforcement Operation Targeting Hundreds of Individuals in Business Email Compromise Schemes,” September 10, 2019. 113 Treasury Department, “Treasury Sanctions Nigerian Cyber Actors for Targeting U.S. Businesses and Individuals,” June 16, 2020. 114 DOJ, “ and as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under Executive Order 13224.52 The FTO designations aim to assist U.S. and other law enforcement agencies in efforts to investigate and prosecute suspects associated with the group. The State Department had already designated three individuals53 linked to Boko Haram as SGDTs in June 2012, including Shekau, and in 2013 issued a $7 million reward for information on the location of Shekau through its Rewards for Justice program. The Nigerian government also formally designated Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist groups in 2013. The British government had named Ansaru as a "Proscribed Terrorist Organization" broadly aligned with Al Qaeda in 2012, and designated Boko Haram as such in July 2013. Boko Haram was added to the U.N. Al Qaeda sanctions list in May 2014. The State Department designated two more senior Boko Haram leaders as SDGTs in December 2015 and added IS-WA leader Barnawi in February 2018.

The Niger Delta and its Militants

Nigeria's oil wealth has long been a source of political tension, protest, and criminality in the Niger Delta region, where most of the country's oil is produced.54 Compared to national averages, the region's social indicators are low and unemployment is high. Millions of barrels of oil are believed to have been spilled in the region since production began, causing major damage to the fragile riverine ecosystem and to the livelihoods of many of the Delta's 30 million inhabitants. In 2011, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) estimated that it could take 25 to 30 years to clean up Ogoniland, a coastal region in Rivers State hard-hit by pollution.55 After several delays, the Nigerian government launched a $1 billion Ogoniland restoration program in 2017.

Local grievances related to oil production have fueled conflict and criminality for years. An amnesty program launched in 2009 that includes monthly stipends for former militants largely quieted the area, but attacks on oil installations by a militant group that emerged in 2016 pushed production to a 30-year low and sent Nigeria's economy into recession.56 The resurgence of militant activity may have been linked to President Buhari's intention to end the amnesty, which had originally been scheduled to expire in late 2015, or his decision to cancel pipeline security contracts awarded to prominent former militant leaders by the Jonathan government. In response to renewed violence, Buhari agreed to extend the amnesty and later nearly tripled its budget; a fractious peace returned to the region in mid-2017 and oil production has since rebounded. Nevertheless, ex-militants routinely threaten to resume attacks, and little has been done to develop long-term solutions to the violence.

Research suggests some former Delta militants have leveraged the resources and patronage opportunities presented by the amnesty to enter politics.57 Meanwhile, some reportedly remain involved in local and transnational criminal activities, including piracy and drug and arms trafficking. These networks overlap with oil theft and contribute to piracy off the Nigerian coast in the Gulf of Guinea, one of the world's most dangerous bodies of water (see below).

Security Sector Abuses

Nigerian military and police have been accused of serious human rights abuses, and activists contend that successive Nigerian administrations have done little to hold abusers accountable.58 The State Department's 2017 human rights report documents allegations by multiple sources of "extrajudicial and arbitrary killings" as well as "torture, periodically in detention facilities, including sexual exploitation and abuse; use of children by some security elements, looting, and destruction of property." While Nigerian officials have acknowledged some abuses by security forces, few security personnel have been prosecuted. The State Department's report suggests that authorities do not investigate the majority of cases of police abuse or punish perpetrators.

Abuses by the Nigerian army have taken a toll on civilians and reportedly driven some support for Boko Haram;59 they have also complicated U.S. efforts to pursue greater counterterrorism cooperation (see below). Major incidents include the army's alleged massacre of more than 640 people at a military detention facility in northeast Borno state in 2014 and a January 2017 air force bombing raid on an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Borno that killed as many as 200 people, many of them children. The military also has been accused of committing human rights violations outside of the terror-affected northeast; in late 2017, for instance, an air raid in response to herder-farmer violence in Adamawa state reportedly killed dozens of villagers.

The military also has cracked down on domestic and international civil society. In December 2018, citing national security concerns, Nigeria's military suspended activities by the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF)—a ban it promptly revoked under widespread pressure—and separately threatened to prohibit operations by Amnesty International. In January 2019, military personnel raided the offices of the Daily Trust, a respected Abuja-based newspaper, for "undermining national security" by reporting on a planned military operation in the northeast; soldiers reportedly confiscated computers and arrested several staff members.60

Human rights monitors have also documented serious abuses by the paramilitary Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a militia that emerged to combat the Boko Haram insurgency.61 Some observers warn that the government may struggle to demobilize the CJTF, which reportedly numbers over 23,000; some of its members may be integrated into the military or police.62

Reform Initiatives

Efforts to Combat Corruption

Corruption in Nigeria has been characterized as "massive, widespread, and pervasive," by the State Department, and by many accounts, Nigeria's development will be hampered until it can address the perception of impunity for corruption and fraud.63 Several analyses have been done seeking to quantify the costs of corruption in Nigeria, which pervades a range of sectors and all levels of government.64 A 2017 study estimated that Nigeria had lost some $65 billion to power sector corruption from 1999 to 2015,65 for instance, while a nationwide survey estimated that Nigerian officials took some $4.6 billion in bribes in the year to May 2016.66 Several international firms have been implicated in Nigerian bribery scandals. Nigeria is also known globally for cybercrimes, including "419 scams," advance-fee fraud so-named for the article in the country's penal code that outlaws fraudulent e-mails. More recently, analysts have drawn particular attention to "security votes"—opaque discretionary funds widely used throughout the Nigerian government that are particularly vulnerable to embezzlement. Security votes are estimated to total over $670 million annually.67 According to Transparency International, the Buhari Administration has expanded the number and scale of such discretionary accounts in advance of the 2019 polls. In 2017, Nigeria ranked 148th out of 180 countries on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, a measure of domestic perceptions of corruption.

Most observers agree that the oil and gas industries form the core of illicit self-enrichment networks in Nigeria, where petroleum provides the majority of government revenues and export earnings. One expert considers petroleum revenues to be "the lifeblood of official corruption in Nigeria," whose "epicenter" is the state oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).68 According to Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), a law enforcement agency created in 2003 to combat corruption and fraud, billions of dollars have been expropriated by political and military leaders since oil sales began. Former dictator Sani Abacha reportedly stole more than $3.5 billion, much of it originating in the country's oil sector, during his five years as head of state (1993-1998). Some stolen funds have been repatriated, but other Abacha assets remain frozen abroad. In 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that a federal court in the District of Columbia had ordered forfeited to the United States more than $480 million in Abacha corruption proceeds laundered through U.S. banks and held in foreign bank accounts.69 DOJ has authority to pay restitution to the victims of the corruption out of the forfeited funds.70 In 2017, the Swiss government agreed to restitute $321 million through a project overseen by the World Bank, resulting in a total return of $1.2 billion by Switzerland in Abacha assets. In 2017, a Nigerian NGO requested that the Trump Administration return $500 million in Abacha assets "separate from the $480 million" forfeited by the DOJ in 2014.71 In a mid-2018 visit to the White House, President Buhari announced that Nigeria and the United States were collaborating to secure "the return to Nigeria of over 500 million United States dollars of looted funds siphoned away in banks around the world."72 Other governments are reportedly assisting in that repatriation effort.73

Illicit expropriation of Nigeria's resources did not stop with Abacha. In a 2013 letter to President Jonathan later made public, central bank governor Lamido Sanusi asserted that up to $20 billion in NNPC revenue could not be accounted for and had likely been diverted in the course of opaque no-bid oil contracts and "swap deals" in which crude oil is exported in exchange for refined fuel, among other "leakages."74 The NNPC denied the allegations, yet then-Minister of Petroleum Resources Diezani Alison-Madueke has since come under investigation for corrupt practices during her tenure as NNPC chairwoman. In December 2018, the EFCC issued an arrest warrant for Alison-Madueke, who also faces charges in an ongoing UK global corruption inquiry. Separately, in 2017, the U.S. DOJ filed a civil complaint seeking the forfeiture of $144 million in ill-gotten assets resulting from corrupt oil dealings between Alison-Madueke and her associates.75

Observers have identified major structural challenges that render Nigeria's petroleum industry particularly vulnerable to corruption.76 One key shortcoming is the NNPC's reliance on direct sale-direct purchase (DSDP) contracts, whereby crude oil is exported in exchange for refined petroleum products—transactions associated with high corruption risks, in part due to the abundance of intermediaries involved.77 Other factors include a general lack of oversight of the NNPC's operations and financial management, amid repeated concerns that the NNPC has failed to remit sufficient revenues to the federal government.78 Underscoring the extent of corruption in Nigeria's oil industry, investigations continue into bribes attending the 2011 purchase, by Eni and Royal Dutch Shell, of a license for OPL 245, a massive offshore block. The scandal has spurred a series of lawsuits, including an ongoing trial in which top Shell and Eni executives, including Eni's CEO, are defendants; in late 2018, an Italian court sentenced two accused intermediaries in the deal to four-year prison sentences.79 Global Witness, an international resource governance NGO, asserts that OPL 245's sale at an artificially deflated price may have cost the Nigerian government an estimated $6 billion in expected revenue.80

The Buhari Administration has introduced legislation to increase transparency in the oil industry (see below), and the EFCC is pursuing investigations into alleged large-scale graft during the Jonathan government. Notable targets of such inquiries include Alison-Madueke as well as former National Security Advisor Colonel Sambo Dasuki, accused of embezzling more than $2 billion through fraudulent security sector procurements. Acting EFCC Chairman Ibrahim Magu has also probed allegations against members of the ruling party, including former APC governors. Yet observers warn that the political influence of beneficiaries of grand corruption in Nigeria may thwart attempts at comprehensive reform. Magu's efforts have reportedly stirred discontent across the country's political class, and key targets of his campaign have thus far escaped prosecution.81

Crude Oil Theft in Nigeria and Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

Beyond graft related to the allocation of state oil revenues, concession licensing, and exploration and extraction permits, the outright theft of crude, known as bunkering, is also a major challenge. Small-scale pilfering and illegal local refining has been, and continues to be, a problem, but large-scale illegal bunkering by sophisticated theft networks is a significant threat with international dimensions. The United Nations reports that, in 2017, "oil-related crimes resulted in the loss of nearly $2.8 billion in revenues."82 According to previous estimates, between $3 billion and $8 billion in Nigerian oil may be stolen annually.83 Niger Delta militants, Nigerian politicians, security officers, and oil industry personnel have been implicated in the theft of Nigerian crude. A lack of transparency compounds challenges in addressing oil theft in the Nigerian oil industry.

Oil theft networks, to which some Niger Delta militant groups are tied, have also been implicated in moving drugs and other illicit materials. Experts suggest trade in stolen oil supports the spread of other transnational organized crimes in the Gulf of Guinea, including maritime piracy. The U.K.-based International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports that attacks against ships off the Nigerian coast "continue to rise substantially," with 48 such incidents in 2018 alone—driving a broader piracy increase in the Gulf of Guinea, which saw 79 attacks in 2018, more than double the total in 2017.84

Petroleum and Power Sector Reforms

Despite its status as one of the world's largest crude oil exporters, Nigeria reportedly imported as much as 90% of the country's gasoline for domestic consumption in 2017 and suffers periodically from severe fuel and electricity shortages.85 In an effort to increase its refining capacity and halt oil imports by 2020, the government has granted permits in recent years for the construction of new independently owned refineries.86

Nigeria's domestic subsidy on gasoline may have limited the attractiveness of refining capacity expansion plans to foreign investors. For years, the government has subsidized the price its citizens pay for fuel, and economists have long deemed the subsidy benefit unsustainable. At the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and others, President Jonathan cut the subsidy in 2011, sparking strong domestic opposition, including riots. In the face of mass protests and a nationwide strike, the government backtracked and reinstated a partial subsidy, then estimated at 2% of GDP.87 Public scrutiny of the program has increased amid revelations that billions of dollars allocated for the subsidy may have been misappropriated under Jonathan. The subsidy remains in place despite calls for its elimination from international financial institutions; in March 2018, the NNPC estimated that the subsidy costs more than $2 million per day, while warning that much of the oil sold in Nigeria is smuggled for sale at higher prices in neighboring countries.88 Analysts contend that the subsidy hampers growth, as gains in revenue associated with global oil price increases are at least partly offset by rising subsidy costs.89

President Buhari has pledged to reform the oil and gas industry and to recover the "mind-boggling" amounts of money stolen from the sector over the years.90 His government overhauled and reintroduced the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), an ambitious piece of legislation aimed at increasing transparency in the industry, attracting investors, and creating jobs. First introduced during the Jonathan Administration, the PIB had stalled in parliament for years, and the regulatory uncertainty surrounding its passage has deterred investment. Lawmakers subsequently split the PIB into four different bills to enable more rapid passage; the first bill, the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill (PIGB), would restructure the NNPC to create four new entities to oversee and regulate bidding and exploration. The NNPC has long been criticized for its lack of transparency and observers have welcomed efforts to improve it, though substantive reform will likely face significant pushback from elites benefitting from the current system.

Nigeria's Natural Gas Resources

In addition to its oil reserves, Nigeria has the ninth-largest natural gas reserves in the world and the largest in Africa, but they have provided comparatively little benefit to the country's economy. Many of Nigeria's oil fields lack the infrastructure to capture and transport natural gas. The government has repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, set deadlines for oil companies to stop "flaring" gas at oil wells (burning unwanted gas during oil drilling), a practice estimated to destroy 15% of its gross natural gas production.91 Nigeria is in the process of increasing its liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, which could surpass revenues derived from oil exports in the next decade. Uncertainty surrounding the PIB/PIGB, however, has arguably hindered development of the sector.

Financial Sector Reforms

Successive Nigerian administrations have made commitments to economic reform, but their track record has been mixed. According to the IMF, reforms initiated under Obasanjo—most importantly the policies of maintaining low external debt and budgeting based on a conservative oil price benchmark to create a buffer of foreign reserves—lessened the impact of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis on Nigeria's economy.92 Beginning in 2004, oil revenues above the benchmark price were saved in an Excess Crude Account (ECA), although the government drew substantially from the account in 2009-2010 in an effort to stimulate economic recovery. President Jonathan replaced the ECA with a sovereign wealth fund in 2011.

In response to revenue shortfalls due to the slump in oil prices, Nigeria has increasingly sought loans from the international community. In 2015, then-Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala announced that Nigeria had borrowed nearly $2.38 billion to pay government salaries and fund the 2015 budget.93 Engagement with international financial institutions has expanded under Buhari: in June 2018, the World Bank announced that it had approved a total of $2.1 billion in concessionary loans to Nigeria through its International Development Association (IDA) entity to support access to electricity, promote nutrition, and enhance governance. The government's Eurobond sales garnered $4.8 billion in 2017, with an additional $2.5 million sold in February 2018.94 The IMF notes that reforms under the Buhari Administration have resulted in "significant strides in strengthening the business environment and steps to improve governance," but stresses the need for non-oil sector activity and revenue mobilization and further structural reforms.95

The Buhari Administration has sought to shift spending toward capital investment and expanding the social safety net, seeking to stimulate the ailing economy through increased public expenditure.96 The IMF has lauded Buhari's Economic Growth and Recovery Plan (ERGP), which is intended to drive diversification, create jobs, and secure macroeconomic stability. The Fund has also welcomed the decline of Nigeria's external debt to GDP ratio, though public debt remains highly sensitive to fluctuations in oil sales and the currency exchange rate.

Economy

Despite its oil wealth and large economy, Nigeria's population is among the world's poorest, and the distribution of wealth is highly unequal. The average life expectancy for Nigerians (estimated at 59 years in 2018) is rising, but the percentage of the population living on less than $1.90 per day has grown in the past decade to a projected 87 million, making Nigeria the country with the largest population living in extreme poverty.97 Over 30% of the population has no access to improved sources of water, less than one-fifth of households have piped water, and some 70% lack access to adequate sanitation, according to the World Bank. Nigeria ranked 157 out of 189 in the United Nations' 2018 Human Development Index (HDI).98 Decades of economic mismanagement, instability, and corruption have hindered investment in education and social services and stymied industrial growth.

These challenges notwithstanding, Nigeria has attained notable success in public health provision. A small Ebola outbreak in mid-2014 was swiftly contained, enabling World Health Organization (WHO) authorities to declare the country Ebola-free in October 2014. The country has taken great strides to eradicate polio, though sporadic cases have precluded its designation as polio-free. Other successes include decreasing malaria and tuberculosis prevalence and reducing HIV prevalence among pregnant women. Nigeria's HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate of 2.9% is relatively low in comparison to Southern African nations, but Nigeria comprises the largest HIV-positive population in the world after South Africa, with more than 3 million infected persons. Malaria remains the leading cause of death in Nigeria.

In 2014, the Nigerian government announced the rebasing of its economy, which is now recognized as the largest in Africa.99 The rebased GDP, substantially larger than South Africa's, was almost double what it was previously thought to have been and less reliant on the petroleum sector than expected. Nigeria's GDP now ranks 30th in the world, according to the World Bank, with notable nonoil contributions from the country's mining, services, manufacturing, and agriculture sectors.100 Economists suggest that the economy nevertheless continues to underperform, held back by poor infrastructure and electricity shortages.

Low global oil prices, compounded by Niger Delta militant attacks on oil installations, led to a recession and sharp decline in real GDP growth in 2016. A subsequent rebound saw growth reach 1.9% in 2018; the IMF forecasts real GDP growth of 2.0% in 2019.101 The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries estimated Nigeria's crude oil production to be 1.72 million barrels per day (BPD) in 2018, up from 1.66 BPD in 2017 yet below levels recorded in 2010-2015.102 Insecurity poses a perennial threat to this output: in June 2018, vandalism by oil thieves prompted Shell's Nigerian subsidiary to briefly declare force majeure on exports from one of its streams.103

China has played a growing role in Nigeria's economy, notably through investment in transport infrastructure, manufacturing, and agriculture and energy projects. According to the American Enterprise Institute, Chinese investments and contracts in Nigeria totaled $8 billion in 2018, when Nigeria ranked as the largest recipient of Chinese investment in sub-Saharan Africa.104 Notable projects include the 700MW Zungeru hydropower plant, projected to be completed in 2020; CNEEC-Sinohydro Consortium, a Chinese firm, is developing the $1.3 billion project, which is jointly funded by the Nigerian and Chinese governments.105 China is also involved in the development of the massive Mambilla hydropower project, which is slated to produce more than 3,000MW of energy once operational. The four-dam, $5.8 billion Mambilla project is being constructed by Chinese firms and is largely funded by China's Exim Bank and other Chinese lenders; it is reportedly expected to be completed in 2023.106

U.S.-Nigeria Trade

Nigeria is the United States' second-largest trading partner in Africa and the third-largest beneficiary of U.S. foreign direct investment on the continent. Two-way trade was over $9 billion in 2017, when U.S. investment stood at $5.8 billion.107 Given Nigeria's ranking as one of Africa's largest consumer markets and its affinity for U.S. products and American culture, opportunities for increasing U.S. exports to the country, and the broader West Africa region, are considerable.

Nigeria is eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). AGOA-eligible exports, nearly all of which are petroleum products, have accounted for over 90% of exports to the United States. Gulf of Guinea crude is prized on the world market for its low sulphur content, and Nigeria's proximity to the United States relative to that of Middle East countries had long made its oil particularly attractive to U.S. interests. The country regularly ranked among the United States' largest sources of imported oil, although U.S. purchases of Nigerian sweet crude have fallen substantially since 2012 as domestic U.S. crude supply increased. U.S. imports, which accounted for over 40% of Nigeria's total crude oil exports until 2012, made the United States Nigeria's largest trading partner. India has recently been the largest importer of Nigerian crude. U.S. energy companies may face increasing competition for rights to the country's energy resources; China, for example, has offered Nigeria favorable loans for infrastructure projects in exchange for oil exploration rights. The U.S. Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank signed an agreement in 2011 with the Nigerian government that aimed to secure up to $1.5 billion in U.S. exports of goods and services to support power generation reforms. Nigeria is a partner country under USAID's Power Africa initiative, which aims to facilitate 60 million new connections to electricity and 30,000 megawatts of new power generation in Africa by 2030.108

Issues for Congress

U.S. Policy Toward Nigeria

After a period of strained relations in the 1990s, when a military dictatorship ruled Nigeria, U.S.-Nigeria relations steadily improved under President Obasanjo (1999-2007) and remain robust. Diplomatic engagement is sometimes tempered by U.S. concerns with human rights, governance, and corruption issues, which Nigerian officials sometimes reject as U.S. interference in their domestic affairs. In 2010, the Obama and Jonathan Administrations established the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission (BNC) as a strategic dialogue to address issues of mutual concern. Buhari's election in 2015 ushered in an improvement in bilateral relations, which became strained due to U.S. criticisms of the Jonathan Administration's corruption and poor handling of the Boko Haram crisis. President Obama hosted President Buhari at the White House in 2015.

Bilateral relations under the Trump Administration appear broadly consistent with those pursued under the Obama Administration. President Trump's call to President Buhari in February 2017, his first to any sub-Saharan African leader, suggested continued emphasis on the importance of the bilateral relationship, and Nigeria was among the counties visited by then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in March 2018. President Buhari was the first sub-Saharan leader to visit the Trump White House, in April 2018. During the visit, President Trump lauded Nigeria's security efforts and U.S. cooperation while voicing the need to improve commercial and business ties. In November 2017, the Commerce Department launched the U.S.-Nigeria Commercial and Investment Dialogue (CID) with an initial focus on "infrastructure, agriculture, digital economy, investment, and regulatory reform."109 Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan outlined security cooperation, economic growth and development, and democracy and governance as defining goals of U.S.-Nigerian relations during the 2017 meeting of the BNC.110

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy visited Nigeria during his first official trip to the continent, in November 2018. He indicated a U.S. interest in seeing Nigeria play a larger role in the region, both in terms of peacekeeping and advancing democracy.111 The Assistant Secretary described Nigeria as at the center of his efforts to increase U.S. trade and investment in Africa.112 He and other U.S. officials have stressed the importance of free, fair, transparent, and peaceful elections in 2019. The United States and like-minded donors expressed concern with reported intimidation, interference, and vote-buying during gubernatorial elections in 2018.113

The United States maintains an embassy in Abuja and a consulate in Lagos. The State Department also maintains "American Corners" in libraries throughout the country to share information on the culture and values of the United States. The State Department's travel advisory for U.S. citizens regarding travel to Nigeria notes the risks of armed attacks in the Niger Delta and the northeast as well as the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, and it warns against travel to Borno, Yobe, and northern Adamawa states.114

Nigeria's Role in Regional Stability and Counterterrorism Efforts

Nigeria has played a significant role in peace and stability operations across Africa, and the United States has provided the country with security assistance focused on enhancing its peacekeeping capabilities. Given Nigeria's strategic position along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, the United States has also coordinated with Nigeria through various regional forums and maritime security initiatives.115 Nigeria's waters have been named the most dangerous in the world for maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea. Nigeria is also considered a transshipment hub for narcotics trafficking, and several Nigerian criminal organizations have been implicated in the trade. The U.S. Navy has increased its operations in the Gulf of Guinea and in 2007 launched the African Partnership Station (APS) there.116 APS deployments have included port visits to Nigeria and joint exercises between U.S., Nigerian, European, and other regional navies.

Bilateral counterterrorism cooperation increased in the aftermath of the 2009 bombing attempt of a U.S. airliner by a Nigerian national,117 but was constrained during the Jonathan Administration despite U.S. concern over the rising Boko Haram threat. The Nigerian government has coordinated with the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the International Civil Aviation Organization to strengthen its security systems. Cooperation with the Department of Defense has also expanded in recent years. Nigeria is a participant in the State Department's Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a U.S. interagency effort that aims to increase regional counterterrorism capabilities and coordination. Its role in that program, however, has been minor in comparison to Sahel countries.

U.S. military assistance for regional efforts to counter Boko Haram has been channeled primarily through engagement with Nigeria's neighbors: Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Support has also been focused on the region's Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The United States and several other foreign countries conduct periodic aerial surveillance operations in the region.

Many U.S. officials, while stressing the importance of the bilateral relationship and the gravity of security threats in and potentially emanating from the country, have been concerned about abuses by security services, and about the government's limited efforts to address perceived impunity within the forces. Obama Administration concerns culminated in the 2014 decision to block the sale of U.S.-manufactured Cobra helicopters by Israel to Nigeria.118 Security cooperation subsequently improved and the Obama Administration proceeded with plans for the sale of 12 Super Tucano A-29 aircraft and accompanying ammunition and weaponry, but when a Nigerian jet struck an IDP camp in early 2017, the United States suspended the process. The Trump Administration revisited and approved the sale, worth an estimated $345 million, in December 2017.119 In a joint press conference during Buhari's 2018 visit to the White House, President Trump downplayed the Obama Administration's concerns.120 Buhari has faced domestic pressure around the purchase, particularly over his withdrawal, reportedly without parliamentary approval, of nearly $900 million from Nigeria's Excess Crude Account to fund the Super Tucano acquisition and other security-related purchases.121 According to the contract award, work on the Super Tucanos is expected to be completed in May 2024.122

Nigerian officials are reportedly sensitive to perceived U.S. interference in internal affairs and have sometimes rejected other forms of assistance, in particular some U.S. military training offers. Upon taking office, President Buhari pledged to "insist on the rule of law, and deal with any proven cases of deviation from laws of armed conflict, including human rights abuses."123 Nonetheless, observers question whether the government has taken serious steps to hold senior commanders responsible for abuses, and raise concern that "scorched earth" tactics may persist.

U.S. Assistance to Nigeria

Nigeria routinely ranks among the top recipients of U.S. bilateral foreign assistance in Africa. The United States is Nigeria's largest bilateral donor, providing an average of over $450 million annually (see Table 1). According to the State Department's FY2019 Congressional Budget Justification, "assistance will address the drivers of conflict by seeking to strengthen democratic governance, broaden economic growth by introducing methods that increase agricultural sector productivity and efficiency, and expand the provision of basic services to Nigerians at the state and local levels."124 Nigeria is a focus country under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), and Nigerian farmers benefit from agriculture programs under the Feed the Future (FTF) initiative that focus on building partnerships with the private sector to expand exports and generate employment. Interventions to encourage private sector participation in trade and energy are also key components of economic growth initiatives in Nigeria.

Table 1. Recent U.S. Assistance and FY2019 Requests

(U.S. dollars, thousands)

 

DA

GHP-USAID

GHP-State

ESF/

ESDF

IMET

FMF

FFP

INCLE

Total

FY2015 Actual

57,800

173,500

403,236

4,600

817

600

2,200

-

642,753

FY2016 Actual

47,100

174,500

232,784

7,000

866

600

7,000

-

469,850

FY2017 Actual

80,500

203,500

224,782

45,500

1,041

500

24,063

5,000

584,886

FY2018 Request

-

96,300

250,000

67,000

800

-

-

5,000

419,100

FY2019 Request

-

146,300

143,512

56,000

800

-

-

5,000

351,612

Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations.

Acronyms: Development Assistance (DA), Global Health Programs-USAID (GHP-USAID), Global Health Programs-State Department (GHP-STATE), Economic Support Fund (ESF) / Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Food for Peace (FFP; P.L. 480 Title II), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).

ESDF is a merger of the DA and ESF accounts proposed in the FY2018-2019 Trump Administration requests.

Notes: Table does not reflect funds allocated to Nigeria programs from State Department administered regional accounts or humanitarian assistance provided through the Migration and Refugee Assistance or International Disaster Assistance accounts.

U.S. security assistance to Nigeria has focused on enhancing maritime security, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping capacity. Counterterrorism assistance to Nigeria, while increasing, has been constrained by various factors, including human rights concerns. The State Department has included Nigeria on its Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA) List since 2015 due to the CJTF's recruitment and use of children.125 Nigeria has received various equipment via the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, including naval vessels and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs). Nigeria was one of four country recipients of a $40 million Global Security Contingency Fund regional program launched in 2014 to counter Boko Haram. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has provided advanced infantry training for some of the troops deployed in the northeast and has deployed U.S. military advisors to the Nigerian military's operational headquarters in Maiduguri, in Borno. U.S. advisors have also supported the headquarters of the African Union-authorized, donor-supported MNJTF, which is commanded by a Nigerian general. U.S. military assistance has increased under the Trump Administration: the Department of Defense (DOD) has notified Congress of over $16 million in DOD Train-and-Equip support (10 U.S.C. 333) in FY2018 and FY2019.126

Congressional Engagement

Terrorism-related concerns have dominated congressional action on Nigeria in recent years, although some Members have also continued to monitor human rights, governance, and humanitarian issues; developments in the Niger Delta; Nigeria's energy sector; and violence in the country's Middle Belt. Nigeria's elections are often a focus of congressional interest: two resolutions introduced in the final weeks of the 115th Congress, H.Res. 1170 and S.Res. 716, would have called for Nigeria to hold credible, transparent, and peaceful elections in 2019; those resolutions have been reintroduced in the 116th Congress as H.Con.Res. 4 and S.Con.Res. 1.

Several congressional committees have held hearings on Boko Haram in recent years. The House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence held Congress's first hearing to examine the group in late 2011.127 Prior to the State Department's decision to designate the group as an FTO, several Members in the 113th Congress introduced legislation, including H.R. 3209 and S. 198, that would have advocated for the designation. Other recent Boko Haram-related legislation includes, but is not limited to, the following:

  • P.L. 114-92 (FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act, 114th Congress), with report language directing the Secretaries of Defense and State to provide an assessment of the Boko Haram threat and a description of U.S. counter-Boko Haram efforts.
  • P.L. 114-266 (Boko Haram Regional Threat Strategy, 114th Congress), requiring a regional strategy to address the threat posed by Boko Haram.
  • P.L. 115-31 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, 115th Congress), making funds available for assistance for Nigeria, including counterterrorism programs, activities to support women and girls targeted by Boko Haram, and efforts to protect freedoms of expression, association, and religion.

Author Contact Information

Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs ([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed])
Tomas F. Husted, Analyst in African Affairs ([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed])

Footnotes
1.

United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects 2017 Revision, 2017.
2.

In its annual report for 2016, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) estimated that more than 18,000 had been killed in sectarian clashes since 1999. In 2017, USCIRF noted that sectarian violence had "killed tens of thousands, displaced hundreds of thousands, and damaged or destroyed thousands of churches, mosques, businesses, homes, and other structures." See USCIRF, Annual Report 2016 and Annual Report 2017.
3.

State Department, Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru," November 13, 2013.

4.

State Department, "Terrorist Designations of ISIS Affiliates and Senior Leaders," February 27, 2018.
5.

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Operational Portal: Nigeria, updated November 8, 2018.
6.

Britain administered the north and south separately from the late 19th century until 1947, when it introduced a federal system that divided the country into three regions: Northern, Eastern, and Western. Today, Nigeria comprises six geopolitical zones: north-west, north-east, north-central, south-west, south-east, and south-south (the Niger Delta).
7.

Yar'Adua served one term; many northerners felt the region should hold the post for two consecutive terms.
8.

Buhari is a retired army Major General who attended the U.S. Army War College in 1980 and led a military coup in 1983 against Nigeria's first directly elected president. He served as head of state until 1985, when he was overthrown in another coup. After the 1999 transition to democracy, he ran unsuccessfully for president in 2003, 2007, and 2011.

9.

Buhari won with 15.4 million votes (53.9%), garnering enough support nationwide to avoid a run-off. Jonathan followed with 12.8 million votes (44.9%). The APC won the 2015 gubernatorial elections in a landslide, winning nearly every state in the north and southwest of the country and making inroads in central Nigeria.

10.

The White House, "Statement by the President on the Nigerian Elections," April 1, 2015.

11.

Africa Confidential, "Who Goes First," March 9, 2018 and "Rumblings in the Regions," February 9, 2018.

12.

NDI/IRI, Statement of the Joint NDI/IRI Pre-Election Assessment Mission to Nigeria, July 20, 2018
13.

NDI/IRI, Statement of the Third Joint NDI/IRI Pre-Election Assessment Mission to Nigeria, December 19, 2018. See also NDI/IRI, Statement of the Second Joint NDI/IRI Pre-Election Assessment Mission to Nigeria, September 28, 2018.
14.

Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy, House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, Nigeria at a Crossroads: The Upcoming Elections, December 13, 2018.
15.

U.S. Embassy in Nigeria, "Statement on the Suspension and Replacement of the Chief Justice," January 26, 2019.

16.

See, e.g., Oge Onubogu, "The Risk of Election Violence in Nigeria is Not Where You Think," United States Institute of Peace (USIP), December 5, 2018.
17.

See, e.g., Aly Verjee, Chris Kwaja, and Oge Onubogu, Nigeria's 2019 Elections: Change, Continuity, and the Risks to Peace, USIP, September 2018.
18.

ICG, Nigeria's 2019 Elections: Six States to Watch, December 21, 2018.
19.

For more on election-related security concerns, see, e.g., Idayat Hassan, "From Boko to Biafra: How Insecurity Will Affect Nigeria's Elections," African Arguments, December 18, 2018; Mark Amaza, "Nigeria is on Edge With Multiple Internal Security Conflicts as it Prepares for Tense Elections," Quartz, January 9, 2019; and ICG, "10 Conflicts to Watch in 2019," December 28, 2018.

20.

Nigerian law protects freedom of religion and permits states to establish courts based on common law or customary law systems. Non-sharia based common law and customary law courts adjudicate cases involving non-Muslims in these states, and sharia-based criminal law courts are elective for non-Muslims.
21.

For more on religious freedom issues in Nigeria, see, e.g., the State Department's International Religious Freedom Report and USCIRF's annual report.
22.

International Crisis Group (ICG), Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, July 26, 2018.
23.

Amnesty International, The Harvest of Death: Three Years of Bloody Clashes Between Farmers and Herders in Nigeria, December 17, 2018.
24.

ICG, Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, op. cit.
25.

Chom Bagu and Katie Smith, Past is Prologue: Criminality & Reprisal Attacks in Nigeria's Middle Belt, Search for Common Ground, 2017.

26.

Ryan McNeill and Alexis Akwagyiram, "The Fight for Nigeria's heartland," Reuters, December 19, 2018.

27.

USCIRF, Annual Report 2018.
28.

See, e.g., Obi Anyadike, "Zamfara: Nigeria's Wild Northwest," IRIN, September 13, 2018; Eromo Egbejule, "Deadly Cattle Raids in Zamfara: Nigeria's 'Ignored' Crisis," Al Jazeera, August 20, 2018.
29.

See, e.g., BBC, "Making Sense of Nigeria's Fulani-Farmer Conflict," May 5, 2016; Obi Anyadike, "The Deadly Conflict Tearing Nigeria Apart (and It's Not Boko Haram)," IRIN, June 13, 2017.
30.

See, e.g., Bagu and Smith, Past is Prologue: Criminality & Reprisal Attacks in Nigeria's Middle Belt, op. cit.
31.

State Department, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom: Nigeria, May 29, 2018.
32.

ICG, Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, op. cit.
33.

USCIRF, Nigeria Chapter, Annual Report 2017.
34.

Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Nigeria: End Impunity for Killings of Shia," December 12, 2018.
35.

Ibid. See also Amnesty International, "Nigeria: Security forces must be held accountable for killing of at least 45 peaceful Shi'a protesters," October 31, 2018, and Dionne Searcey and Emmanuel Akinwotu, "Nigeria Says Soldiers Who Killed Marchers Were Provoked. Video Shows Otherwise," The New York Times, December 17, 2018.
36.

Conor Gaffey, "Nigeria's Muhammadu Buhari Calls for End to Biafra Agitation," Newsweek, December 2, 2016.
37.

Amnesty International, "Nigeria: At Least 150 Peaceful Pro-Biafra Activists Killed in Chilling Crackdown," November 24, 2016.
38.

See, e.g., Nnamdi Obasi, "Nigeria's Biafran Separatist Upsurge," International Crisis Group Blog, December 4, 2015 and Nnamdi Obasi, "Nigeria: How to Solve a Problem Like Biafra," African Arguments Blog, May 29, 2017.

39.

See Jacob Zenn et. al, Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa's Enduring Insurgency, Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, May 9, 2018; Alex Thurston, Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017); and Brandon Kendhammer and Carmen McCain, Boko Haram (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2018).

40.

See, e.g., United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment," 2017.
41.

For more, see, e.g., U.N. Population Fund, Demographic Dynamics and the Crisis of Countries Around Lake Chad, June 26, 2017; Ben Taub, "Lake Chad: The World's Most Complex Humanitarian Disaster," The New Yorker, December 4, 2017; and Philip Obaji Jr., "Recharging Lake Chad Key to Ending the Conflict Between Farmers and Herders," IPI Global Observatory, September 5, 2018.
42.

Alex Thurston. "The Disease is Unbelief': Boko Haram's Religious and Political Worldview," Brookings Institution, January 2016.

43.

Mercy Corps, Motivations and Empty Promises: Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth, February 2015.

44.

Fatality figure compiled by the Council on Foreign Relations' Nigeria Security Tracker subject to periodic review; displacement figures from the International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix, October 2018.

45.

Matthew Page, A New Taxonomy for Corruption in Nigeria, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2018.
46.

See State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism: Nigeria, 2015-2017.
47.

International Crisis Group, Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform, June 6, 2016.
48.

State Department, "Terrorist Designations of ISIS Affiliates and Senior Leaders," February 27, 2018.
49.

Ryan Browne, "US warns of growing African terror threat," April 19, 2018.
50.

Obi Anyadike, "'Year of the Debacle': How Nigeria Lost Its Way in the War Against Boko Haram," World Politics Review, October 30, 2018.
51.

Jason Warner and Charlotte Hulme, "The Islamic State in Africa: Estimating Fighter Numbers in Cells Across the Continent," CTC Sentinel, Vol. 11, Issue 7, August 2018.
52.

The FTO designation triggers the freezing of any assets a group might have in U.S. financial institutions, bans FTO members' travel to the United States, and criminalizes transactions (including material support) with the organization or its members. It is unclear, given the current lack of public information available on Boko Haram's possible ties abroad, if these measures would have any impact on the group. While FTO status might serve to prioritize greater U.S. security and intelligence resources toward the group, this is not a legal requirement of the designation.
53.

Shekau, along with Khalid al-Barnawi (not Abu Musab al-Barnawi) and Abubakar Adam Kambar—both of whom had ties to Boko Haram and close links to AQIM, according to the State Department—were designated as SDGTs. Kambar was reportedly killed in 2012, and Nigerian officials confirmed the arrest of Khalid al-Barnawi in April 2016.

54.

In the early 1990s, activists from the Ogoni ethnic group drew international attention to the extensive environmental damage done by oil extraction in the Niger Delta. Activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, president of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), and 14 others were accused in 1994 of involvement in the murder of several Ogoni politicians. They pled not guilty, but Saro-Wiwa and eight others were convicted and executed. The executions sparked outrage against the regime of military ruler Sani Abacha, and the United States recalled its ambassador in response.

55.

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, 2011.
56.

"Nigeria's Buhari Sacks Head of Niger Delta Amnesty Programme," Reuters, March 13, 2018.
57.

SDN, Agitators to legislators: The migration of ex-militants into Niger Delta politics, December 2018.
58.

Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (AI), and other human rights groups have released numerous reports on Nigerian security force abuses. See, e.g., AI, Nigeria: Human Rights Violations by the Military Continue in the Absence of Accountability for Crimes under International Law: Written statement to the 32nd Session of the UN Human Rights Council, June 6, 2016.
59.

See UNDP, Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment," op cit.
60.

Committee to Protect Journalists, "Nigeria's military raids Daily Trust offices, arrests editor," January 7, 2019.
61.

See, e.g., Amnesty International, "They Betrayed Us": Women who survived Boko Haram raped, starved and detained in Nigeria, May 2018.
62.

Hilary Matfess, "Nigeria Wakes Up To Its Growing Vigilante Problem," IRIN, May 9, 2017; Idayat Hassan and Zacharias Piero, "The Rise and Risks of Nigeria's Civilian Joint Task Force: Implications for Post-Conflict Recovery in Northeast Nigeria," Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa's Enduring Insurgency, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 9, 2018.

63.

State Department, "Nigeria," Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017.
64.

For a study of official corruption in Nigeria, see Matthew Page, A New Taxonomy for Corruption, op cit.
65.

Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), "From Darkness to Darkness": How Nigerians are Paying the Price for Corruption in the Electricity Sector, August 2017.
66.

U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Corruption in Nigeria—Bribery: public experience and response, July 2017.
67.

Transparency International, Camouflaged Cash: How 'Security Votes' Fuel Corruption in Nigeria, May 2018.
68.

Ibid.
69.

DOJ, "U.S. Forfeits Over $480 Million Stolen by Former Nigerian Dictator in Largest Forfeiture Ever Obtained Through a Kleptocracy Action,"” August 7, 2014. 115 August 7, 2014.

70.

28 C.F.R. pt. 9 (2018).
71.

SERAP, "SERAP writes Trump, demands return of Nigeria's stolen assets," February 5, 2017.
72.

The White House, "Remarks by President Trump and President Buhari of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Joint Press Conference," April 30, 2018.
73.

Elisha Bala-Gbogbo, "Nigeria Gets Deal for Return of $500 Million of Stolen Funds," Bloomberg, June 13, 2018.
74.

Tim Cocks and Joe Brock, "Special Report: Anatomy of Nigeria's $20 Billion 'Leak,'" Reuters, February 6, 2015.

75.

DOJ, "Department of Justice Seeks to Recover Over $100 Million Obtained From Corruption in the Nigerian Oil Industry," July 14, 2017.
76.

See Aaron Sayne, Alexandra Gillies, and Christina Katsouris, Inside NNPC Oil Sales: A Case for Reform in Nigeria, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), August 2015.
77.

The NRGI considers DSDP contracts to be an improvement over many of Nigeria's traditional oil-for-product "swap deals," while noting the continued risk of corruption and mismanagement. See Aaron Sayne, Securing Fair Value from Nigeria's DSDP Contracts, NRGI Briefing, March 2017.

78.

Alexandra Gillies and Aaron Sayne, NNPC Still Holds 'Blank Check', NRGI Briefing, March 2016.
79.

Emilio Parodi, "Italian judge jails two in Nigerian oil graft case," Reuters, September 20, 2018.
80.

Global Witness, Take the Future: Shell's Scandalous Deal for Nigeria's Oil, November 26, 2018.
81.

See, e.g., Africa Confidential, "The Probity Contest," July 27, 2018.
82.

U.N. Security Council, Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, U.N. doc. S/2018/1175, December 28, 2018.
83.

Christina Katsouris and Aaron Sayne, Nigeria's Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of Stolen Oil, Chatham House, September 2013.

84.

International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period of 1 January – 31 December 2018, January 2019.
85.

Reuters, "Nigerian State Oil Firm Spent $5.8 Bln on Fuel Imports Since Late 2017," February 20, 2018.
86.

In 2010, Nigeria signed an agreement with China worth a reported $23 billion for new refineries, and in 2012 the government signed a memorandum of understanding with U.S.-based Vulcan Petroleum Resources for a $4.5 billion project to build six refineries. In 2013, Nigerian businessman Aliko Dangote, Africa's wealthiest man, signed a multi-billion deal with banks to finance the construction of an oil refinery in the southwest.
87.

See, e.g., "Removal of Fuel Subsidies in Nigeria: An Economic Necessity and a Political Dilemma," The Brookings Institution, January 10, 2012.
88.

Chineme Okafor, "Smugglers Force NNPC to Record N774m Deficit in Petrol Supply," This Day, March 5, 2018.
89.

Neil Munshi, "Nigeria's fuel subsidies bill set to soar on rising oil price," Financial Times, October 8, 2018.
90.

"Nigeria's Buhari Warns the Corrupt: 'No Longer Business as Usual,'" Agence France-Presse, October 6, 2015.
91.

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief: Nigeria, February 27, 2015.
92.

IMF, "Staff Report for the Article IV Consultation with Nigeria," July 2012.

93.

"Nigerian Govt Borrowing Billions to Pay Salaries – Okonjo-Iweala," Premium Times, May 6, 2015.
94.

Paul Wallace and David Malingha Doya, "Nigeria Sells $2.5 Billion Eurobonds to Replace Naira Debt," Bloomberg, February 16, 2018.

95.

IMF, "IMF Executive Board Concludes 2018 Article IV Consultation with Nigeria," March 7, 2018.
96.

IMF, "IMF Staff Completes 2016 Article IV Mission to Nigeria," February 24, 2016.
97.

According to the dataset, extreme poverty headcount grows by six people per minute in Nigeria. Data from German-funded World Poverty Clock, see e.g., Homi Kharas, Kristofer Hamel & Martin Hofer, "The Start of a New Poverty Narrative," Brookings Institution, June 19, 2018.

98.

U.N. Development Program HDI, 2018 Statistical Update, at http://hdr.undp.org/en/2018-update.
99.

The rebasing of the economy was triggered by the country's National Bureau of Statistics, which recalculated the value of GDP based on production patterns in 2010, increasing the number of industries it measured and giving greater weighting to sectors such as telecommunications and financial services. GDP ranking according to the World Bank.
100.

National Bureau of Statistics, Nigerian Gross Domestic Product Report Q3 2017, November 2017. GDP world ranking from the World Bank.
101.

For 2018 figure see IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2018 update. For 2019 projection, see IMF, "Nigeria and the IMF," at https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/NGA.
102.

OPEC, Monthly Oil Market Report, January 17, 2019.
103.

"Shell Says Force Majeure Still in Place on Nigerian Bonny Crude," Reuters, May 21, 2018.
104.

American Enterprise Institute, "China Global Investment Tracker," accessed January 22, 2019.
105.

Sahara Reporters, "Funds May Stall Zungeru Power Project, Says Ministry of Power," March 15, 2018.
106.

Simon Echewofun Sunday, "What to expect for 3050MW Mabilla hydropower in 2018," Daily Trust, January 8, 2018.
107.

Assistant Secretary of State Tibor Nagy, "The Enduring Partnership between the United States and Nigeria," November 9, 2018.
108.

See USAID, "Power Africa," at https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica.

109.

U.S. Mission in Nigeria, "U.S. & Nigeria Agree to Commercial and Investment Dialogue," November 21, 2017.
110.

Remarks of Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan, "U.S.-Nigeria Bi-National Commission," November 20, 2017.
111.

Nigeria ranked among the top ten troop contributors to UN peacekeeping missions until 2016; in late 2018 it ranked 41st. Nigeria was a key troop contributor to the UN mission in Liberia, which ended in early 2018—its declining troop contribution to UN missions partly reflects the drawdown of that mission and the one in Darfur, but it may also reflect competing domestic priorities, i.e., operations to counter Boko Haram.

112.

Assistant Secretary Nagy, "The Enduring Partnership between the United States and Nigeria," November 9, 2018.
113.

U.S. Embassy in Nigeria, Statement on the Occasion of the Beginning of the 2019 Election Campaign, November 18, 2018.
114.

See http://travel.state.gov for the latest warning.
115.

For further information on maritime and port security issues in the region, see, e.g., the Atlantic Council, Advancing U.S., African, and Global Interests: Security and Stability in the West African Maritime Domain, November 30, 2010; and CDR Michael Baker, "Toward an African Maritime Economy," Naval War College Review, Vol. 64, Spring 2011; and Chatham House, Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, March 2013.
116.

Under APS, U.S. and partner naval ships deploy to the region for several months to serve as a continuing sea base of operations and a "floating schoolhouse" to provide assistance and training to the Gulf nations. Training focuses on maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, port facilities management and security, seamanship/navigation, search and rescue, leadership, logistics, civil engineering, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
117.

On December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the son of a respected Nigerian banker and former government minister, attempted to detonate an explosive device on an American airliner bound from Amsterdam to Detroit. He was reportedly radicalized while living abroad. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claims to have sponsored the effort.
118.

Helene Cooper, "Rifts Between U.S. and Nigeria Impeding Fight Against Boko Haram," New York Times, January 24, 2015.
119.

DOD, "Contracts for Nov. 28, 2018," DOD Release No: CR-228-18.
120.

The White House, " 28 C.F.R. pt. 9 (2018). 116 DOJ, “U.S. Repatriates over $311.7 Million in Assets to the Nigerian People that were Stolen by Former Nigerian Dictator and His Associates,” May 4, 2020. 117 See letter from Senator Charles Grassley to Deborah Connor, Chief of the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section at DOJ, April 1, 2020; and letter from Representatives Steve Shabot and Chris Smith to Attorney General William Barr and Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, April 15, 2020. 118 World Bank, Utilization of Repatriated Abacha Loot: Results of the Field Monitoring Exercise, December 2006. Congressional Research Service 16 link to page 20 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy U.S. Assistance to Nigeria Nigeria routinely ranks among the top recipients of U.S. foreign assistance globally. The State Department and USAID allocated $451.4 million in bilateral aid for Nigeria in FY2020, nearly 90% of which supported health programs (see Table 1). The Administration requested $472.1 million for Nigeria for FY2021, a rare case in Africa in which the Trump Administration’s aid proposal exceeded the previous year’s allocation. These totals exclude emergency humanitarian assistance and other aid provided through global programs—those not allocated by country in annual State Department Congressional Budget Justifications—or funds managed by other U.S. agencies. The State Department and USAID allocated $468.6 million in humanitarian funding in response to the Lake Chad Basin crisis in FY2019, including $346.9 million for Nigeria.119 Table 1. State Department- and USAID-Administered Assistance to Nigeria selected non-humanitarian accounts, current $ in millions, allocations by year of appropriation Account FY2017 (act.) FY2018 (act.) FY2019 (act.) FY2020 (act.) FY2021 (req.) DA 80.5 92.0 74.5 50.0 - ESF/ESDF 45.5 0 0 0 34.0 FMF 0.5 0 0 0 0 GHP-State 224.8 199.6 353.4 181.2 300.0 GHP-USAID 203.5 199.0 222.5 212.0 134.1 IMET 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.0 INCLE 5.0 6.0 7.0 7.0 3.0 TOTAL 560.8 497.7 658.4 451.4 472.1 Source: State Department, Congressional Budget Justifications for FY2019-FY2021 and 653(a) report. Notes: DA=Development Assistance; ESDF=Economic Support and Development Fund; ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; GHP=Global Health Programs; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement. The ESDF account, which the Trump Administration has proposed in successive budget requests, would merge various economic assistance accounts, including DA and ESF. To date, Congress has maintained the existing economic assistance account structure. Nigeria is a focus country under the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) as well as Feed the Future, an agriculture development program. U.S. assistance under the Power Africa initiative has supported gas and solar power generation, off-grid energy projects, and regulatory reform.120 U.S. Security Assistance and Military Sales U.S. security assistance to Nigeria has sought to bolster peacekeeping capacity, enhance maritime and border security, combat transnational crime, support civilian law enforcement, and strengthen counterterrorism efforts. Nigeria participates in the State Department’s Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP, an interagency effort to build regional counterterrorism capabilities and coordination), but has not been a top recipient of funds under the program. Nigeria also has benefitted from the provision of U.S. training and equipment to the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) coalition in the Lake Chad Basin. In addition to funds 119 USAID, “Lake Chad Basin – Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #5, FY2019, September 30, 2019. 120 USAID, “Nigeria: Power Africa Fact Sheet,” accessed June 22, 2020. Congressional Research Service 17 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy administered by the State Department, DOD has notified Congress of roughly $50 million in planned security assistance for Nigeria under its “global train and equip” program, currently authorized under 10 U.S.C. 333—considerably less than amounts provided to other Lake Chad Basin countries.121 Nigeria has received additional DOD assistance through regional programs. U.S. concerns with human rights abuses by Nigerian security personnel have constrained U.S. security assistance, including counterterrorism aid.122 In 2014, the Obama Administration blocked a transfer of U.S.-manufactured military helicopters from Israel to Nigeria due to human rights concerns. U.S. security cooperation increased after the 2015 inauguration of President Buhari, who pledged to curtail and investigate abuses, and the following year, the Obama Administration sought congressional approval for the sale of 12 A-29 Super Tucano attack aircraft to Nigeria. The Obama Administration froze the sale in early 2017, however, after a Nigerian jet struck a camp for displaced people during a bombing raid. The Trump Administration revisited that decision, and in late 2017 approved the sale, over opposition from some Members of Congress.123 President Trump has appeared to downplay human rights concerns regarding the Nigerian military.124 The aircraft are now in development, and are due for delivery in 2021. Outlook and Issues for Congress Despite vast potential, Nigeria faces steep security, economic, and governance challenges. A protracted Islamist conflict in the northeast and mounting intercommunal violence in the Middle Belt have strained a security apparatus weakened by decades of unchecked corruption and spurred massive humanitarian needs. The collapse of global oil prices and disruptions linked to COVID-19 have dimmed Nigeria’s economic prospects. Constrained by a limited fiscal space, the government may struggle to cushion the impacts of these shocks, which observers expect to hit hardest among the most vulnerable households. It is unclear whether the twin crises may hasten or impede longstanding efforts to diversify the economy away from hydrocarbons. In the near term, rising unemployment and other economic hardships appear likely to aggravate social and political tensions, particularly among Nigeria’s youthful and rapidly growing labor force. How Nigerian authorities respond to mounting security challenges and political pressures may have consequences for U.S. policy and engagement. Notwithstanding the Trump Administration’s approval of a military aircraft sale in 2017, its designation of Nigeria pursuant to the IFRA and CSPA and imposition of sanctions surrounding flawed elections attest to growing U.S. concerns with human rights and governance conditions in Nigeria. Several Members of Congress also have expressed alarm over deteriorating press and religious freedoms in the country. At the same time, Nigeria remains a critical U.S. security, development, and economic partner in Africa and a top U.S. aid recipient globally. Some Members may assess whether U.S. engagement and assistance reflect an appropriate ranking and balance of priorities in Nigeria. Congress also may debate the relative effectiveness of various tools for advancing U.S. interests in Nigeria, including legislative action, diplomacy, foreign assistance (and restrictions thereof), and punitive measures. 121 CRS calculation based on DOD congressional notifications. 122 In 2014, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations held a hearing on abuses by Nigerian security forces and U.S. vetting pursuant to the "Leahy Laws," which prohibit U.S. security assistance to security forces credibly accused of gross human rights violations. House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, Human Rights Vetting: Nigeria and Beyond, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., July 10, 2014. 123 Letter from Senators Cory Booker and Rand Paul to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, June 8, 2017. 124 White House, “Remarks by President Trump and President Buhari of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Joint Press Conference,"” April 2030, 2018. Congressional Research Service 18 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Author Information Tomas F. Husted Lauren Ploch Blanchard Analyst in African Affairs Specialist in African Affairs Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. Congressional Research Service RL33964 · VERSION 46 · UPDATED 19 , 2018.

121.

Tope Alake, "Nigeria MPs Dispute Buhari's $496 Million Jets, ThisDay Reports," Bloomberg, April 24, 2018.
122.

See DOD, "Contracts for Nov. 28, 2018," op. cit.
123.

Premium Times, "Buhari Vows To Punish Officers, Soldiers Involved in Human Rights Violations," September 12, 2015.
124.

State Department Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2019.
125.

Inclusion in the CSPA List triggers certain restrictions on security assistance; President Trump has waived the application of those restrictions with respect to Nigeria.
126.

Total based on CRS calculations from DOD Congressional Notifications.

127.

See House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland, committee print, 112th Cong., November 30, 2011 and House Homeland Security Committee, Boko Haram: Growing Threat to the U.S. Homeland, committee print, 113th Cong., September 13, 2013.