Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
April 1, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33964
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Summary
Nigeria, Africa’s largest producer of oil and its largest democracy, is one of the U.S. government’s
key strategic partners on the continent. It is Africa’s most populous country, with over 150 million
people, roughly half Muslim and half Christian, and its second-largest economy. Diplomatic
relations with Nigeria, which is regularly the fourth- or fifth-largest oil exporter to the United
States, are strong, and the country is a major recipient of U.S. foreign assistance. After 16 years of
military rule, Nigeria made the transition to civilian governance in 1999, and the country
subsequently emerged as a powerful actor in African politics. The government has helped to
resolve political disputes in several African countries, and the country ranks fourth among troop
contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world.
Nigeria faces serious social and economic challenges, however, that some analysts contend
threaten both the stability of the state and the region, and which may affect global oil markets.
The country today is relatively stable, but it has faced intermittent political turmoil and economic
crises since gaining independence in 1960. Political life has been scarred by conflict along ethnic,
religious, and geographic lines, and misrule has undermined the authority and legitimacy of the
state. Nigeria’s oil and natural gas revenues are estimated at over $60 billion per year, but its
human development indicators are among the world’s lowest, and a majority of the population
suffers from extreme poverty. The Nigerian government relies on the oil sector for over 85% of
revenues. By some estimates, Nigeria could rank among the world’s top five exporters of oil
within a few years, but social unrest, criminality, and corruption in the country’s oil-producing
Niger Delta region have cut output by one-fifth since 2006.
Intercommunal conflicts in parts of the country are common. Resentment between the northern
and southern regions of the country, and among communities in the central region, has led
periodically to considerable unrest and population displacement. Thousands have been killed and
many more wounded in periodic ethno-religious clashes in the past decade. The attempted terror
attack on an American airliner by a Nigerian passenger on December 25, 2009, and the recent
resurgence of a militant Islamist group, Boko Haram, has heightened concerns regarding the
possible radicalization of African Muslims. A series of recent bombings led the government to
adopt new anti-terrorism measures in early 2011.
Nigeria’s April 2011 elections are seen by many as a critical test of the government’s commitment
to democracy. The State Department referred to the last elections, in 2007, as deeply flawed, and
some contend that Nigeria, which was ruled by the military until 1999, has not held a free and fair
general election since the return to civilian rule. Perceived ethnic and religious differences have
been politicized by political elites. The potential for political violence to mar the elections is
significant and could further compound other security challenges. Credible elections, on the other
hand, could confer the legitimacy the government needs to pass reforms deemed critical to
addressing corruption and other development challenges.
The Obama Administration has been supportive of the Nigerian government’s recent reform
initiatives, including anti-corruption efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector
privatization, and programs to promote peace and development in the Niger Delta. In 2010, the
Administration established a U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission, a strategic dialogue to address
these and other issues of mutual concern. Congress regularly monitors political developments in
Nigeria and has consistently expressed concerns with corruption and human rights abuses.
Congress also provides oversight for over $600 million in U.S. foreign assistance programs.
Congressional Research Service
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Contents
Overview .................................................................................................................................... 1
Political Context ......................................................................................................................... 2
The 2003 Elections ............................................................................................................... 3
2007 Elections ...................................................................................................................... 3
The 2011 Elections: Challenges and Opportunities ................................................................ 5
Development Challenges and Reform Initiatives ....................................................................... 10
Reforms to the Petroleum and Energy Sectors ..................................................................... 10
Financial Sector Reforms .................................................................................................... 11
Efforts to Combat Corruption.............................................................................................. 12
Social Issues and Security Concerns.......................................................................................... 15
Islamic Sharia Law ............................................................................................................. 15
Sectarian Violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt ........................................................................ 15
Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria .......................................................................... 16
Conflict in the Niger Delta .................................................................................................. 18
Background of the Struggle........................................................................................... 18
Criminality and Violence............................................................................................... 18
Amnesty Offer for Delta Militants ................................................................................. 20
Efforts to Address Environmental and Development Challenges .................................... 21
Effects on the Oil Industry and the World Market .......................................................... 22
Abuses by Security Forces .................................................................................................. 23
HIV/AIDS .......................................................................................................................... 23
International Relations .............................................................................................................. 24
Issues for Congress ................................................................................................................... 24
Administration Policy on Nigeria ........................................................................................ 24
U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Maritime Security Issues .......................................................... 25
Nigeria’s Role in Regional Stability .............................................................................. 26
U.S. Assistance to Nigeria ............................................................................................. 26
Recent Congressional Interest ............................................................................................. 28
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Nigeria ........................................................................................................... 29
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 30
Congressional Research Service
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Overview
Nigeria is considered a key power on the African continent, not only because of its size, but also
because of its political and economic role in the region. One in five people in Sub-Saharan Africa
calls Nigeria home. Nigeria’s economy is Sub-Saharan Africa’s second largest, and it is one of the
world’s major sources of high-quality sweet crude oil and natural gas. Nigerian leaders have
mediated conflicts throughout Africa, and Nigerian troops have played a critical role in peace and
stability operations in the region. The country ranks fourth among troop contributors to United
Nations peacekeeping missions around the world. Nigeria, which is roughly twice the size of
California, is also home to world’s second-largest HIV/AIDS-infected population and has Africa’s
highest tuberculosis burden. According to one senior U.S. foreign policy analyst, “no country’s
fate is so decisive for the continent. No other country across a range of issues has the power so
thoroughly to shape outcomes
elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.”1
Nigeria at a Glance
Population: 149
million
Despite its oil wealth, Nigeria
remains highly underdeveloped.
Pop. Growth Rate:
1.999%
Poor governance has severely
Independence: October
1960
limited infrastructure development
Comparative Area:
Slightly larger than twice the
and the provision of social services,
size of California
hindering economic growth and
Religions:
50% Muslim, 40% Christian,
leaving much of the country mired
10% indigenous beliefs
in poverty. The government’s human
Languages:
English (official), 250 local languages
rights record is poor.
Literacy: 68%
Ethnic and religious strife have been
Infant Mortality:
94.35 deaths/1,000 live births
common in Nigeria, and perceived
Life Expectancy:
46.9 years
differences have been manipulated
by some political elites. The country
Prevalence of HIV:
3.1%
is composed of over 250 ethnic
Real GDP Growth:
5.6% (2009 estimate), 6.7% (2010
groups, of which 10 account for
forecast)
nearly 80% of the total population.
Nominal GDP Per Capita:
$1,191
The northern Hausa and Fulani, the
Unemployment: 4.9%
southwestern Yoruba, and the
southeastern Ibo have traditionally
Exports: $45.4 billion
been the most politically active and
Imports: $42.1
billion
dominant. Almost half of the
External Debt:
$9.689 billion
country’s population, some 75
million people primarily residing in
Source: The CIA World Fact Book, Economist Intelligence Unit
the northern half of the country, are
(EIU), International Monetary Fund, World Bank.
Muslim. Divisions between ethnic
groups, between north and south, and between Christian and Muslim Nigerians often stem from
perceived differences in access to land and social and economic development. More than 14,000
Nigerians are believed to have been have been killed in local clashes sparked by these tensions in
the last decade, and millions periodically displaced.2 In the southern Niger Delta region,
1 Robert I. Rotberg, “Nigeria: Elections and Continuing Challenges,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 2007.
2 Human Rights Watch (HRW), A Human Rights Agenda for Candidates in Nigeria’s 2011 Elections, March 2011.
Congressional Research Service
1
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
simmering conflict and criminality have been fueled by regional grievances related to oil
production in the area.
Political Context
Nigeria, which gained its independence from Britain in 1960, is a federal republic composed of
36 states; its political structure is similar to that of the United States. The country has a bicameral
legislature with a 109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives. Its president,
legislators, and governors are elected on four-year terms. The country was ruled by the military
for almost three decades after independence before making the transition to civilian rule in 1999.
Elections since the transition have been deemed flawed by both Nigerians and the international
community, with each poll progressively worse than the last, according to many domestic and
international observers. In the wake of the most recent elections, which were held in April 2007
and marred by fraud and political violence, the U.S. State Department expressed its view that the
country remained in political transition.3 Human Rights Watch has contended that “Nigeria has
not held a free and fair general election since the end of military rule.”4 Consequently,
expectations are high for the next elections, scheduled for April 2011.
The contest for power between north and south that has broadly defined Nigeria’s modern
political history can be traced, in part, to administrative divisions instituted during Britain’s
colonial administration.5 Northern military leaders dominated Nigerian politics from
independence until the transition to democracy just over a decade ago. Today, the predominantly
Muslim Hausa remain dominant in the military and the federal government, but have lost power
in many state governments. Since the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999,6 there has
been a de-facto power sharing arrangement referred to as “zoning” between the country’s
geopolitical zones, through which the presidency is expected to rotate among the regions every
two terms. President Obasanjo was from the southwest, and with his retirement pending in 2007
the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP), which has dominated Nigerian politics in the past
decade, chose Umaru Yar’Adua, then a northern governor, as its presidential candidate. The other
main presidential contenders in the April 2007 election were also northerners. Upon President
Yar’Adua’s untimely death in 2010, his vice president, Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, took
office for the remainder of his first term, raising questions as to whether the ruling party would
chose another northern candidate to run in the 2011 race or support a run for the office by the
sitting president. In January, President Jonathan secured the PDP nomination to stand as its
candidate in the April election, leaving the future of the zoning arrangement unclear.
3 U.S. State Department, “Nigeria,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2008.
4 HRW, Election or ‘Selection’? Human Rights Abuses and Threats to Free and Fair Elections in Nigeria, April 2007,
and “Nigeria: Presidential Election Marred by Fraud, Violence,” April 24, 2007.
5 Britain administered the north and south separately from the late 19th century until 1947, when it introduced a federal
system that divided the country into three regions: Northern, Eastern, and Western.
6 Obasanjo, who had formerly served as a military head of state from 1976 to 1979, won 62.8% of the votes (18.7
million) in the February 1999 poll, while his challenger, Chief Olu Falae, received 37.2% of the votes (11.1 million).
Obasanjo’s party won over half the votes in both the House and Senate elections.
Congressional Research Service
2
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
The 2003 Elections
In April 2003, Nigerians went to the polls for the second time under a civilian government.
President Obasanjo, representing the ruling PDP, ran against another former military leader,
General Muhammadu Buhari; a former rebel leader, Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, who led the
secessionist region of Biafra in Nigeria’s civil war in the 1960s; and former foreign minister Ike
Nwachukwu. Obasanjo won, and the PDP party also won in legislative elections.7 The elections
were marred by serious irregularities and fraud, according to both domestic and international
election observers, with much emphasis placed on “inadequate election administration.”
Controversy surrounded the voter registration process, the certification of candidates, and poor
logistical preparations. One election official allegedly admitted that the voters’ register was “25-
30% fiction.”8 Reports of electoral malfeasance, or rigging, were also noted. Ballot box stuffing,
falsification of election result forms, and threats of violence were among the most serious
charges. In some states, observers noted “systematic attempts at all stages of the voting process to
alter the election results.”9 Although reports of rigging varied widely among states, the extent of
irregularities caused some to suggest that they “compromised the integrity of the elections where
they occurred.”10 The European Union delegation noted that in at least six states “the minimum
standards for democratic elections were not met.”11 Several election results were later overturned.
2007 Elections
Nigeria’s third national elections since the return to civilian rule were held in April 2007, amid
widespread allegations of electoral mismanagement and fraud. The Nigerian Senate had rejected a
bid by Obasanjo supporters in 2006 to amend the constitution to allow him to run for a third term.
Facing retirement, President Obasanjo backed Umaru Yar’Adua, a northern governor largely
unknown to many Nigerians, as the ruling party’s presidential candidate.12 Yar’Adua’s running
mate, Goodluck Jonathan, had served as governor of Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta. Yar’Adua
was declared the winner with over 24.6 million votes, or 70%. Some critics suggest that Obasanjo
“hand-picked” Yar’Adua in order to retain political influence after he left office.13
The country’s two largest opposition parties, the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) and the
Action Congress (AC), rejected the election results. The ANPP’s presidential candidate, General
Buhari, who had lost the election in 2003 to Obasanjo, received an estimated 6 million votes. The
AC’s candidate, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, was not among the 24 presidential
contenders approved by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), allegedly
7 According to official results, Obasanjo won 62% of the votes, while his nearest rival, General Buhari, won 32%.
8 HRW, Election or ‘Selection’? Human Rights Abuses and Threats to Free and Fair Elections in Nigeria, April 2007.
9 The International Republican Institute (IRI), 2003 Election Observation Report.
10 The National Democratic Institute (NDI), “Statement of the NDI International Election Observer Delegation to
Nigeria’s April 19 Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections,” April 21, 2003.
11 The European Union, EU Election Observation Final Report: Nigeria.
12 Yar’Adua, a former chemistry professor, was elected governor of Katsina in 1999. His better-known older brother,
the late General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, served as Vice President under Obasanjo in the first military regime to transfer
power to civilian rule, and he was reported to be one of Nigeria’s wealthiest and most powerful men. Shehu died in
prison in 1997 after having been sentenced by a military tribunal for treason after calling for dictator Sani Abacha to
reestablish civilian rule. Yar’Adua’s father was a prominent minster in the first government after independence.
13 International Crisis Group, “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding A Political Crisis,” Africa Report 123, March 28, 2007.
Congressional Research Service
3
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
because of pending corruption charges against him.14 His exclusion exacerbated tensions during
the pre-election period, and his supporters contend he was unjustly excluded by INEC because he
had opposed Obasanjo’s third term. A last-minute ruling by the Supreme Court restored Abubakar
to the ballot, and he placed third with an estimated 2.6 million votes.
The ruling PDP won the majority of the state and federal elections, including 28 of the 36 state
governorships. Opposition gubernatorial candidates won in seven states, including the two most
populous states, Lagos and Kano. The results of many elections were challenged in the courts,
based on allegations of fraud, threats of violence, or the inability of voters to cast their ballots.
Ultimately, the results of almost a third of the gubernatorial races were annulled and, in most of
those cases, elections were rerun, although many of the candidates who won in the first round
won again in the second. By the end of 2009, the PDP had held onto 25 governorships and picked
up three others, after winning opposition candidates changed parties and joined the PDP.
Opposition candidates were awarded governorships in two states after PDP wins were overturned
by election tribunals. The PDP’s gubernatorial win in Anambra state was nullified by the
Supreme Court, which allowed the incumbent governor, from an opposition party, to keep his
seat.15 The elections of several legislators, including Senate President David Mark, were also
annulled. An appeals court later overturned the ruling on Mark’s election and he kept his seat. A
tribunal hearing the challenges to President Yar’Adua’s win reached its verdict in February 2008,
finding insufficient evidence to overturn the presidential election. Nigeria’s Supreme Court
upheld that verdict in a December 2008 ruling.
Domestic and international observer groups were highly critical of the 2007 elections, and many
questioned the credibility of the election results. Violations and irregularities reported by election
observers included polling locations opening late, closing early, or not opening at all; errors on
the ballots; underage voting; vote buying; ballot box stuffing and theft; and falsified results
sheets. Media reports also documented widespread incidents of thuggery and coercion at polling
places.16 The largest domestic monitoring group suggested that elections were so flawed that they
should be held again.17 According to the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute (NDI)
delegation, led by former Secretary of State Madeline Albright and several former world leaders,
“in many places, and in a number of ways, the electoral process failed the Nigerian people. The
cumulative effect ... substantially compromised the integrity of the electoral process.”18 The
European Union delegation declared that the elections “have not lived up to the hopes and
expectations of the Nigerian people and the process cannot be considered to have been credible.”
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) delegation was similarly critical,
suggesting that “irregularities and the sporadic violence characterized and challenged the validity
of the elections.”19 The U.S.-based International Republican Institute (IRI) called the elections
14 The March 2007 decision by INEC to exclude Abubakar from the ballot was part of a complex series of legal battles
between the Obasanjo Administration and Abubakar, a founding member of the PDP, who was linked to a bribery case
involving the Petroleum Trust Fund and accused of stealing over $125 million in federal oil funds.
15 The Supreme Court ruled that the incumbent, Peter Obi, who had lost to a PDP candidate in the 2003 gubernatorial
election but had been awarded the seat in 2006 after a court overturned the 2003 PDP win, could serve the rest of his
four-year. Obi won a second term when new elections were held in February 2010.
16 See, for example, “Nigerian: Forced to Vote Against My Wish,” BBC, April 23, 2007.
17 “Call for Nigeria Street Protests,” BBC, April 24, 2007.
18 NDI, “Statement of the National Democratic Institute International Election Observer Delegation to Nigeria’s April
21 Presidential and National Assembly Elections,” April 23, 2007.
19 “Nigeria: Elections Fraudulent; EU, Others,” Daily Trust (Abuja), April 24, 2007.
Congressional Research Service
4
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
“below acceptable standards,” noting that the resolution of election disputes would be “critical” to
restoring the credibility of the country’s democratic process.20
In the aftermath of the elections, President Obasanjo reportedly acknowledged some electoral
irregularities, notably “logistical failures,” violence, and ballot box theft, but indicated that
elections would not be re-held, saying “the magnitude does not make the results null and void.”21
Opposition calls for mass protests went largely unheeded, although thousands reportedly gathered
in the streets of Kano, northern Nigeria’s largest city, before being dispersed by police with tear
gas. World oil prices rose to $68 a barrel in the week after the election, based in part on concerns
surrounding the disputed polls.22 Despite speculation that questions surrounding the credibility of
the election results might trigger a military coup, Yar’Adua’s inauguration was unimpeded.
The 2011 Elections: Challenges and Opportunities
President Yar’Adua conceded in his inaugural speech that the 2007 elections were flawed and
subsequently appointed a panel of government officials, former judges, and civil society
representatives to recommend changes to the country’s electoral institutions. The Electoral
Reform Committee (ERC) issued its findings in December 2008, but the government was slow to
commence reforms. In mid-2010, the parliament approved the first of several amendments to the
country’s electoral laws to incorporate some of the ERC’s recommendations and increase
transparency in the electoral process.
Among the most significant of the reforms were those to increase INEC’s independence and fiscal
autonomy. INEC’s credibility had been badly damaged by the 2003 and 2007 elections,23 and
President Jonathan won praise from both Nigerians and the international community for removing
the sitting INEC chairman from office in April 2010 and replacing him with a respected academic
and civil society activist, Professor Attahiru Jega, in June. Concerns remain regarding the
independence of some state-level electoral election commissioners,24 but, according to a recent
survey, over 60% of Nigerians have confidence in the current electoral commission, and 74% of
Nigerians think the 2011 polls will be more credible than the last.25 The Jonathan Administration
has generally been seen as supportive of Jega’s efforts to improve the electoral process, backing
his budget request and his proposal to delay elections from January to April to allow more time to
prepare the 2011 polls.
A January 2011 rerun of the flawed 2007 gubernatorial elections in Delta state has been viewed
by some as a test for INEC’s new management. Observer reports suggest that, while rigging and
20 IRI “Nigeria’s Elections Below Acceptable Standards: Preliminary Findings of IRI’s International Election
Observation Mission,” April 22, 2007.
21 “Obasanjo Appeals to Nigerians Over Election Results,” Radio Nigeria-Abuja, April 23, 2007, and “Nigerian
President Olusegun Obasanjo Says Elections Flawed, But Not Fatally,” Associated Press, April 25, 2007.
22 “Landslide Win for Yar’Adua is ‘Flawed,’” Financial Times, April 23, 2007.
23 ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding A Political Crisis,” Africa Report No. 123, March 28, 2007, p. 14.
24 ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Africa Briefing No.79, February 24, 2011; Ebere
Onwudiwe and Chloe Berwind-Dart, Breaking the Cycle of Electoral Violence in Nigeria, U.S. Institute for Peace,
December 2010.
25 IRI, Nigerian National Survey, released February 1, 2011. The poll was conducted between November 29 and
December 7, 2010. Neither the Yar’Adua or Jonathan Administrations adopted the ERC recommendation that the
INEC chair should be chosen independently, rather than by the president.
Congressional Research Service
5
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
voter intimidation still occurred, the poll was an improvement over previous elections in a state
heavily controlled by the ruling party. According to one report, “the Delta rerun demonstrated
both the potential for INEC to administer improved elections with the support of communities
and the risk that political actors can still overwhelm reforms with systematic fraud.”26 Many
analysts contend that INEC, under Chairman Jega, has demonstrated the will, if not necessarily
the capacity, to overcome problems in the 2011 polls.
As mentioned above, there has been an unwritten agreement that the presidency should rotate
among the country’s regions. President Yar’Adua’s early demise and Jonathan’s assumption of the
post led many observers to debate whether Jonathan’s decision to vie for the presidency in 2011
would lead the ruling party to split. Prior to the PDP party primaries in January, many northerners
argued that since Yar’Adua was from the north and had only served one term, a candidate from
their region should hold the office for another term, given that former President Obasanjo, who
was from the south, had two terms in office. Some reports suggest a lack of consensus among the
ruling party elite on the zoning issue and presidential succession contributed to the apparent
reluctance by Yar’Adua’s cabinet to formally transfer power to Jonathan in early 2010 (see
below). Jonathan ultimately won the support of several key northern PDP leaders, including a
majority of the northern governors, for his candidacy, and in January 2011, he won the party
primary overwhelmingly, with over 2,700 votes against roughly 800 for his rival, Atiku
Abubakar.27 Jonathan has declared that he will not seek a second term in 2016 if elected.
Some Nigeria watchers argue that the de-facto suspension of the zoning arrangement may
increase the potential for regional and ethnic conflict, making the presidential contest “more
dangerous and destabilizing” as voters face the choice of a southern, Christian candidate running
against a field of primarily northern, Muslim presidential contenders.28 Others argue that
Nigeria’s political parties are geographically, as well as religiously, diverse, and that, in order to
win, any presidential candidate must be able to draw support not just from one region or voting
bloc, but from across the country.29 They also note that a southern candidate, Obasanjo, ran
against a northern candidate, Buhari, in the 2003 election without major upheaval.
President Jonathan, along with his running mate, Vice President Namadi Sambo (a former
northern governor), is among almost 20 candidates contesting the presidency, including
Muhammadu Buhari, representing the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC); former head of
Nigeria’s anti-corruption authority Nuhu Ribadu, representing the Action Congress of Nigeria
(ACN); and Kano State Governor Ibrahim Shekaru, representing the ANPP. These three leading
contenders all hail from the north and have chosen running mates from the south.
26 Stakeholder Democracy Network, The Delta Governorship Rerun: Signposts and Storm Warnings for the 2011
Elections, February 24, 2011. Observers credit, in part, a new alternative “accreditation voting” system that INEC has
adopted, under which all voters must check in at their polling station before voting can begin. Some suggest this system
could affect turnout and disenfranchise certain segments of the population because of the additional time commitment,
but INEC argues that it increases transparency. See also ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid.
27 Some reports suggest that Jonathan may have had an arrangement with the PDP governors to ensure his election by
their states’ delegates in return for his support for their own re-election campaigns. See ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections:
Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid. INEC dismissed a petition filed by Abubakar challenging Jonathan’s primary win.
28 John Campbell, “Nigeria: Closer to the Brink?” Rowman & Littlefield, November 12, 2010, and “Nigeria’s
Goodluck Jonathan Gets the PDP Nomination,” Huffington Post, January 21, 2011.
29 Howard F. Jeter and Gwendolyn Mikell, “ Nigeria on the Brink: a Rejoinder,” September 27, 2010. Under Nigeria’s
constitution, a presidential candidate must win at least 25% of votes cast in at least two-thirds of the country’s states
and the Federal Capital Territory. If they fail to do so, a run-off will be held.
Congressional Research Service
6
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
With over 73 million registered voters, almost 120,000 polling stations, and more than 50 parties
competing in the upcoming polls, the challenges in administering elections in Nigeria are
daunting. The 2011 elections were scheduled to be held on three successive Saturdays, beginning
April 2; however, logistical delays in the delivery of materials to polling stations across the
country resulted in the delay of the April 2 parliamentary elections by a week, to April 9. This has
pushed the timing of the presidential elections to April 16 and the gubernatorial and state
assembly elections to April 23. The delay may reinforce concerns regarding the credibility of the
polls. Gubernatorial elections are not expected to be held in 11 states where post-2007 election
court cases led to the overturning of election results or the rerun of elections.30 Observers have
noted some positive developments in the pre-election period, but continue to raise concerns about
electoral preparedness, ballot secrecy, and transparency in the counting of ballots and tabulation
of results.31 They also warn that potential for voter intimidation, disenfranchisement, and fraud, as
well as political violence, remains high. A summary of issues raised by official observer groups
and advocacy organizations prior to the elections follows:
• Party Primaries. Despite ERC recommendations to increase the transparency
and fairness of the political parties’ primaries, the International Crisis Group has
declared that the recent round of primaries were “as manipulated as ever,”
resulting in numerous court challenges to the parties’ candidate lists.32 Observers
have expressed concern that last minute court rulings related to the candidate lists
could require the reprinting of ballots and cause delays on election day.
• Voter Registration. Turnout was high for the most recent voter registration
exercise, launched in January 2011. The registration period was extended by over
a week due to technical and logistical problems that led to registration centers
opening late, or, in some cases, not at all. According to the final voters list, 73.5
million voters registered.33 INEC has reported over 870,000 cases of multiple
registration, contributing to concerns about “widespread but not yet systemic
fraud.”34 INEC has charged several of its own staff with offences associated with
the registration process. The validity of the new voters list is, to date, unknown,
but observers generally deem it an improvement over previous efforts.
• Electoral Malfeasance. Previous elections have been marred by various types of
fraud, including the falsification of voter information, bribery, theft, incitement,
and the harassment of domestic observers, opposition candidates, and supporters.
Early reports suggest that the 2011 elections are likely to feature many of these
practices, although some speculate that there may be a shift “from blatant fraud
with state acquiescence to a pattern of suppressing opposition voting areas while
30 Pending another court ruling, gubernatorial elections are not expected to be held in Adamawa, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers,
Delta, Kogi, and Sokoto states, where rerun elections were held after the 2007 elections. Gubernatorial elections are
also not expected in Ondo, Osum, Edo, and Ekiti, where the current governors won appeals overturning the 2007
results, or in Anambra, which had its gubernatorial election in February 2010.
31 See, e.g., IRI, “Statement of IRI’s Pre-Election Assessment Mission,” March 3, 2011; NDI, “Nigeria Election
Watch,” Issue 3, March 15, 2011.
32 ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid; NDI, “Nigeria Election Watch,” Issue 3, Ibid.
33 INEC has attributed a discrepancy between the final registration figure and the provisional total released on February
21, 67.8 million, to the lack of an efficient communications between its headquarters and the local election officials
conducting the registration exercise.
34 ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
7
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
inflating strongolds.”35 Many observers suggest that the potential for rigging is
particularly high in the gubernatorial races.
When the Electoral Reform Committee issued its findings in 2008, it noted that
the Nigerian government had not convicted and punished a single individual for
election-related offenses since independence.36 Human Rights Watch reports that
under Jega’s leadership, INEC has initiated criminal proceedings against several
dozen individuals in the six months prior to the 2011 elections, but that “these
cases have barely scratched the surface.”37 Civil society has called on the courts
to resolve election petitions and appeals in a timely manner, but some suggest
that the mounting elections-related caseload threatens to overwhelm the judiciary.
• Political Violence. By some estimates, as many as 300 people may have been
killed in violence related to the 2007 elections, and, since November 2010, more
than 70 people have been killed in violence linked to the 2011 polls.38 Violence
tied to the 2011 elections has included clashes between party supporters and
several assassinations. Poll-related security concerns have been further
heightened by a spate of bombings during political rallies.
The threat of violence is reportedly high in certain “hot spots”, including Bauchi,
Borno, and Yobi states in the north; Plateau state in central Nigeria; and Abia,
Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers states in the south; among others. In the southern Niger
Delta region, a spokesman for the militant group MEND has threatened attacks,
and several bombings at political rallies have been attributed to the group.
Political killings in Borno state have included the assassination of a gubernatorial
candidate and six of his supporters. The militant Islamist group Boko Haram
claimed responsibility, raising concerns that the group seeks to influence the
polls; many suggest the killings were politically motivated. Observers have
expressed particular concern with the potential for further sectarian violence in
central Nigeria, particularly in Plateau state, where elections have previously
been a flashpoint for violence. Over 1,000 people have been killed in local
clashes in the state in the past year.
President Jonathan and Chairman Jega have pledged to increase security during
the upcoming elections. Jonathan met with the country’s traditional Muslim
leaders in northern Nigeria, including the Sultan of Sokoto, in late March to seek
their support in efforts to reduce communal tensions surrounding the polls. The
government showed a significant commitment to increasing the presence of
security forces during recent elections in Anambra and Delta states, deploying
over 20,000 police for each poll. The INEC chairman has pledged to have at least
two policemen at each polling station in April, but observers suggest the Nigerian
police lack the capacity to deploy nationally in the numbers needed.
35 Stakeholder Democracy Network, The Delta Governorship Rerun, Ibid.
36 Report of the Electoral Reform Committee, “Volume 1, Main Report,” December 2008,
37 HRW, A Human Rights Agenda for Candidates in Nigeria’s 2011 Elections, Ibid.
38 HRW, “Nigeria: Pass Bill to Prosecute Electoral Abuses,” March 13, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
8
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
The Death of President Yar’Adua and the Transition of Power
Questions about President Yar’Adua’s health plagued his administration throughout his tenure. Many speculate that
he suffered from a chronic kidney condition, and when he was hospitalized in Saudi Arabia in November 2009,
reportedly with acute pericarditis (inflammation of the lining around the heart), his absence threatened to spark a
political crisis. His prolonged absence from public view spurred rumors of his death before he ostensibly held an
interview from Saudi Arabia, via BBC radio, on January 12, 2010. Government officials reported that he was
responding to treatment and recuperating, but questions as to his fitness to govern grew. The Nigerian Bar
Association and a prominent human rights lawyer launched legal suits suggesting that Yar’Adua had violated the
constitution by not official y transferring power to his Vice President during his absence.39 Further constitutional
questions were raised about several judicial appointments, including that of a new chief justice of the Supreme
Court.40 Some observers contend that the president was incapacitated, and that a group of close advisors including
his wife, who strictly controlled access to the president, were making decisions on his behalf.41
President Yar’Adua’s continued absence also raised concerns regarding a tenuous ceasefire with Niger Delta militants.
During his hospitalization abroad, Yar’Adua reportedly signed the government’s 2009 supplemental budget, which
contained several projects earmarked for the troubled region. Some opposition leaders questioned whether the
president actually signed the document himself.42 In early January 2010, one of the Delta’s militant factions claimed
responsibility for the bombing of an oil pipeline in Rivers State, calling the attack a “warning strike,” noting the
president’s absence, and suggesting that a “meaningful dialogue” on the region’s problems had yet to occur.43 The
militants threatened to continue attacks until Goodluck Jonathan was named acting president or until Yar’Adua
returned to office.
Pressure for President Yar’Adua to transfer presidential authority until he recovered increased in early February
2010. Vice President Jonathan had presided over cabinet meetings after Yar’Adua’s departure, and he used executive
powers in January to deploy troops to quel sectarian violence in Jos, but he had not moved to assume ful authority.
At the behest of the Senate, the cabinet declared Yar’Adua fit for office in late January, and a Nigerian court ruled that
there was no need for a formal transfer of power during the president’s “medical vacation.” Nevertheless, the
country’s influential state governors met in early February, issuing a call for the vice president to become acting
president. Under pressure from the governors, the Senate and National Assembly subsequently passed resolutions
recognizing Jonathan as the acting head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The cabinet accepted
parliament’s decision. Although the resolutions were not legally binding and could ultimately be questioned in court,
the move al owed Jonathan to conduct critical government business. In one of his first acts as acting head of state,
Jonathan replaced the influential justice minister, who was reportedly among the most vocally opposed to the formal
transfer of power. In June 2010, in response to the ambiguity surrounding Jonathan’s assumption of duties as acting
president, the parliament approved a constitutional amendment addressing procedures for the temporary transfer of
presidential powers to the vice president in the event of the president’s absence or inability to discharge his duties.
The U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria welcomed Goodluck Jonathan’s assumption of the title of acting president, calling
Nigeria’s commitment to constitutional process and the rule of law “commendable.”44 The Obama Administration
warned against efforts by others to “upset Nigeria’s stability and create renewed uncertainty in the democratic
process.”45 On May 5, 2010, the Nigerian government announced the death of ailing President Umaru Yar’Adua at age
58. Goodluck Jonathan was sworn in as Nigeria’s new president the following day, choosing as his vice president
Namadi Sambo, a former architect who was elected governor of the northern state of Kaduna in 2007.
39 Nigeria’s constitution requires the President to submit a written declaration to the Senate and the House of
Representatives delegating powers to the Vice President as Acting President in the event that he travels on vacation or
is unable to discharge the functions of his office, but there is no timeline identified for doing so. Parliament passed an
amendment to the constitution in June 2010 to provide more clarity to the procedure.
40 See, e.g., “How We Averted Chaos, by VP,” This Day (Abuja), January 4, 2010.
41 See, for example, John Campbell, “Nigeria Fragmented and Unstable,” Huffington Post, March 5, 2010, and “On Her
Majesty’s Secret Service,” Africa Confidential, March 5. 2010.
42 “Buhari, Atiku Doubt Signing of Budget by Yar’Adua,” This Day, January 4, 2010.
43 “MEND’s Fresh Resurgence As Yar’Adua’s Absence Enters 2nd Month,” AllAfrica, January 4, 2010.
44 Press Statement by the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, February 12, 2010.
45 State Department Daily Press Briefing, February 26, 2010; State Department Spokesman, “Political Situation in
Nigeria, March , 2010; and Briefing by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs on February 24, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
9
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Development Challenges and Reform Initiatives
Nigeria has the second-largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa and generates over $60 billion a
year in oil and gas revenue, and yet many of its people are among the continent’s poorest. As
many as 70% of Nigerians live beneath the poverty line, and the average life expectancy is less
than 47 years. Nigeria has the world’s second-largest HIV/AIDS population (after South Africa).
Access to clean water remains a major challenge—almost half the population has no access to
improved sources of water and only 17% are served by piped water. Sanitation is also a problem,
with 30% of people lacking access to adequate sanitation. Diarrhea remains the second-leading
cause of death among Nigerian children, and the country ranks second only to India in the
number of diarrhea-related child deaths globally. The country ranks 142 of 169 countries on U.N.
Development Program’s (UNDP) 2010 Human Development Index.46 Due to decades of
economic mismanagement, political instability, and widespread corruption, Nigeria’s education
and social services systems have suffered from lack of funding, industry has idled, and Africa’s
largest oil-producing country suffers periodically from severe fuel shortages.
When Goodluck Jonathan assumed power in February 2010 from the ailing President Yar’Adua,
he made public commitments to “restoring Nigeria’s image” abroad, both by continuing to act as
a key partner in regional peace and counterterrorism efforts, and by ending the “culture of
impunity” in Nigeria by addressing corruption and human rights concerns.47 He vowed to
continue President Yar’Adua’s reform initiatives. Those efforts are discussed below.
Reforms to the Petroleum and Energy Sectors
Nigeria’s economy depends heavily on its oil sector, and for decades, as the country’s extractive
industries grew, many of its other industries stagnated or declined. According to the World Bank,
oil and gas production accounts for 85% of government revenues and 95% of export earnings, but
the sector’s share of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has fallen because of decreased
output, which does not meet the country’s estimated oil production capacity of 3 million barrels
per day (bdp). Despite increased deepwater oil production, persistent conflict and criminality in
the oil-producing Niger Delta region and swings in world oil prices have threatened Nigeria’s
fiscal outlook. According to the IMF, annual GDP growth fell from 7% in 2007 to an estimated
6% in 2008, but rose to an estimated 8.4% in 2010. Economists suggest that the economy
continues to underperform because of poor infrastructure and electricity shortages, although the
manufacturing and telecommunications sectors have performed better in recent years.
Agricultural production contributes over one-third of GDP, but less than 5% of exports.
President Jonathan has stressed his commitment to reforming the oil and gas industry. In 2007,
the government announced plans to restructure the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC), which oversees regulation of the industry and has been criticized for its lack of
transparency. President Yar’Adua appointed a committee to Nigeria’s contracts with foreign oil
companies, a process through which the committee chair suggested, “we may have to reconsider
some of our generous terms.”48 President Jonathan appointed Nigeria’s first female oil minister,
46 The UNDP index is a composite measure of life expectancy, adult literacy and school enrollment, and income.
47 President Jonathan has referred to Nigeria’s “culture of impunity” in several speeches, including one quoted in
“Again, We’ve Succeeded in Moving Nigeria Forward - Jonathan,” Daily Champion (Lagos), February 10, 2010.
48 Matthew Green, “Nigeria Considers Oil Contracts Review,” Financial Times, October 23, 2007.
Congressional Research Service
10
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Diezani Allison-Madueke, a former executive with Royal Dutch Shell, in 2010. She is leading the
administration’s efforts to press parliament to pass the ambitious Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB),
which would restructure the NNPC and reportedly increase transparency within the industry.
Nigeria was designated compliant with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a
global standard for transparency in the oil, gas, and mining sectors, in March 2011.
Despite its position as one of the world’s largest exporters of oil, Nigeria imports an estimated
$10 billion in refined fuel annually, and it continues to face a nationwide power crisis.49 In an
effort to increase its refining capacity, the government has granted permits for the construction of
several independently owned refineries. The government aims to halt oil imports by 2020. The
Jonathan Administration has also pledged to increase Nigeria’s electricity generation by 10 times
over the next decade, and President Jonathan has emphasized this as a key priority in his 2011
presidential campaign. Efforts to privatize power stations and distribution companies are
underway, despite objections from the country’s trade unions. The Obama Administration recently
praised the Nigerian government for its progress in rehabilitating the power sector.50 In 2010,
with two of Nigeria’s existing four oil refineries running at only 60% capacity, the NNPC signed
an agreement worth an estimated $23 billion with China for the construction of three new
refineries.51 Nigeria is also in the process of increasing its liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports,
which are expected to surpass revenues derived from oil exports in the next decade. Nigeria now
transmits natural gas to Benin, Togo, and Ghana through the new West Africa Gas Pipeline. The
initiative, led by Chevron, had been delayed due to supply shortages resulting from sabotage to
production facilities in the Niger Delta. Reports suggest that gas supplies have increased as
pipelines have been repaired since 2009.
Financial Sector Reforms
Successive Nigerian administrations have made commitments to economic reform, but their track
record is mixed. According to the IMF, reforms initiated under the Obasanjo Administration and
continued by his successors, most importantly the policies of maintaining low external debt and
budgeting based on a conservative oil price benchmark to create a buffer of international reserves,
lessened the impact of the recent global financial crisis on Nigeria’s economy.52 Oil revenues
above the benchmark price have been saved since 2003 in an Excess Crude Account (ECA),
although the government drew substantially from the account in 2009-2010 in an effort to
stimulate economic recovery. The ECA’s balance fell from $20 billion in early 2009 to less than
$500 million in September 2010, but Nigerian officials report that the rise in the price of oil
brought the ECA back above $2 billion at the end of 2010.53 The country has made significant
gains in paying down its external debt, which declined from 36% of GDP in 2004 to 2.2% in
2010. By paying down its external debt, the Nigerian government has freed over $750 million for
49 Jon Gambrell, “Nigeria, China sign $23B Deal to Build Refineries in Oil Rich, but Gasoline-Starved Nation,”
Associated Press, May 14, 2010.
50 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Commends Nigerian Authorities on Power Sector Reforms,” January 14, 2011.
51 “Two Nigerian Refineries Running at 60 Pct Capacity,” Reuters, March 30, 2010.
52 International Monetary Fund, “Staff Report for the Article IV Consultation with Nigeria,” January 27, 2011. The
price benchmarks set by the Nigerian government are $58/barrel for 2011, $60 for 2012, and $62 for 2013.
53 EIU, “Nigeria,” Country Reports, March 2011.
Congressional Research Service
11
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
programs aimed at poverty reduction and reaching the country’s Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), according to the World Bank.54
Like his predecessors, President Jonathan has committed his Administration to reforms that aim
to fuel development. He named a former Goldman Sachs official, Olusegun Aganga, as finance
minister to lead the reforms, which include an audit of the NNPC and the proposed creation of a
sovereign wealth fund. Jonathan retained Lamido Sanusi, appointed under President Yar’Adua as
governor of Central Bank of Nigeria, who has led efforts to modernize the country’s banking
system. He has pushed reforms to tighten banking supervision and in late 2009 instituted new
regulations that require banks to report large cash transactions between accounts if one of the
account holders is considered to be “politically exposed.” Bank audits ordered by Sanusi in 2009
found 10 banks near collapse due to reckless lending; most of the banks’ top executives were
fired. The government provided $4 billion in 2009 to rescue the banks, and in December 2010,
under pressure from Sanusi, the parliament approved the establishment of the Asset Management
Company of Nigeria (AMCON) to buy bad bank loans in exchange for government bonds, in an
effort to get the banks lending again. AMCON is jointly funded by the central bank and the
finance ministry. Some analysts expect it to take up to a decade for AMCON to divest itself of all
its toxic assets, which total over $14 billion.55 The government is pursuing debtors and
prosecuting several bank executives.
Efforts to Combat Corruption
According to the U.S. State Department, corruption in Nigeria is “massive, widespread, and
pervasive.”56 In 2008, Nigeria’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index improved from 147 to 121 out of 180 countries, but it fell in 2009, and again in 2010, to a
ranking of 134.57 Nigeria also has one of the world’s highest incidences of cyber crime, including
“419 scams,” so-named for the country’s penal code that outlaws fraudulent e-mails. For years
observers have suggested that the country’s development will be hindered until it can reverse its
perceived “culture of impunity for political and economic crimes.”58
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), a Nigerian law enforcement agency
created in 2003 to combat corruption and fraud, has estimated that over $380 billion has been
expropriated by political and military leaders since oil sales began in the 1970s.59 Former dictator
Sani Abacha reportedly stole more than $3.5 billion during the course of his five years in power.
Switzerland was the first country to repatriate stolen funds to Nigeria and has returned over $700
million since 2005. According to a study by the World Bank, a significant percentage of those
funds have been used by the Nigerian government toward meeting the country’s Millennium
Development Goals. The government has also recovered funds stolen by Abacha and his family
from the autonomous British island of Jersey and from Luxembourg. Other Abacha funds remain
54 World Bank, “Nigeria: Country Brief,” April 2010, available at http://www.worldbank.org.
55 AMCON bought non-performing loans from 9 rescued banks and margin loans from 12 other domestic banks. EIU,
“Nigeria, Ibid.
56 U.S. State Department, “Nigeria,” Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2009, March 2010.
57 The Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceptions of business people and country analysts regarding the
degree of corruption among public officials and politicians. A high score indicates greater levels of corruption.
58 International Crisis Group, “Want in the Midst of Plenty,” Africa Report No. 113, July 19, 2006.
59 “Strong Convictions: Nigeria’s First Anticorruption Czar,” Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 2007.
Congressional Research Service
12
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
frozen in accounts in Europe. In late 2009, a Swiss court convicted Abacha’s son of participating
in a criminal organization and seized $350 million in assets stolen from Nigeria.
The Nigerian government won praise under President Obasanjo for some of its efforts to combat
the rampant corruption that has plagued Nigeria, but some charge that the former head of state
used corruption charges to sideline critics and political opponents. Investigations by the EFCC
resulted in the arrest of over 2,000 responsible for illegal email scams and in over 130 convictions
for fraud during Obasanjo’s tenure.60 However, the International Crisis Group (ICG) suggested
that the EFCC was “used as a political weapon to whip political foes, especially state governors
likely to stand for the presidency and their supporters, into line.”61 Five state governors, some of
whom were considered contenders for the PDP presidential nomination, were impeached in 2005-
2006 for corruption.62 ICG charged that the impeachments, three of which were reversed in
appeals courts, were conducted under heightened military presence in those states and lacked due
process.63 Under President Obasanjo the EFCC conducted investigations into the alleged financial
crimes of 31 of the country’s 36 state governors; several were prosecuted. In February 2007, the
EFCC released a list of 135 candidates in the April elections who were “unfit to hold public office
because of corruption,” of which 53 were PDP and 82 opposition candidates.64 The legality of
INEC’s decision to bar candidates on the EFCC’s list from the elections was questioned.
President Yar’Adua, reportedly a devout Muslim, campaigned on a platform of fighting
corruption; in 1999 he became the first governor to publicly declare his assets before he was
sworn in. Upon taking office, he ordered the review of all privatization agreements approved by
former President Obasanjo, amid charges of corruption associated with the sales, and
subsequently reversed several contracts. President Yar’Adua moved to distance himself from the
former president, dismissing many of Obasanjo’s political appointees and military leaders in late
2008 and overturning several key government contracts made by the former administration. In
December 2008, he proposed that the National Assembly amend the constitution to remove the
immunity clause which prevents the president, vice president, governors, and deputy governors
from being prosecuted for corruption while in office. The proposal has not been adopted.
In late 2007, Nigeria’s Inspector General of Police announced that EFCC head Nuhu Ribadu was
being transferred from his post. Some questioned whether Ribadu’s transfer was linked to his
order two weeks earlier for the arrest of former Delta State Governor James Ibori, one of the
primary financial contributors to Yar’Adua’s presidential campaign. The Executive Director of
the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime wrote a letter to President Yar’Adua suggesting Ribadu’s
removal could be detrimental to ongoing investigations and might damage the reputation of the
EFCC in the view of international donors.65 Ribadu was later dismissed from the police service.
The EFCC continued to prosecute high profile cases after Ribadu’s departure, and several EFCC
operatives were reportedly murdered in retaliation in early 2010. In early 2008, the commission
ordered the arrest of Lucky Igbinedion, former governor of Edo State, who is alleged to have
stolen $25 million in state funds. He later submitted a plea bargain and was released with a fine.
60 “Strong Convictions: Nigeria’s First Anti-Corruption Czar,” Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 2007.
61 ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding A Political Crisis,” Ibid.
62 The impeached governors represented Bayelsa, Oyo, Ekiti, Anambra, and Plateau States.
63 ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding A Political Crisis,” Ibid.
64 “Strong Convictions: Nigeria’s First Anticorruption Czar,” Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 2007.
65 Matthew Green, “Nigerian Anti-Graft Police Arrest Governor,” Reuters, January 22, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
13
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
In June 2008, the Nigerian Senate unanimously approved the appointment of a former high-
ranking police officer, Farida Waziri, to replace Ribadu as EFCC Chair. Some in Nigerian civil
society alleged that Waziri was appointed to derail the prosecution of Ibori and others.66 Ibori’s
case was dropped by a federal judge in December 2009, but the EFCC obtained a new warrant for
his arrest in April 2010, alleging that Ibori embezzled over $250 million. Ibori eluded capture
after his armed supporters reportedly exchanged fire with Nigerian security forces. He fled
Nigeria and was arrested by Interpol in Dubai in May 2010. He faces extradition to the United
Kingdom, where he has been charged with money laundering.
The ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) has faced several charges of corruption against
senior leaders, including Vincent Ogbulafor, who resigned as national chairman of the party in
2010 to stand trial for fraud during his tenure as a government minister in 2001.67 Ogbulafor’s
former deputy and now acting PDP chairman, Dr. Bello Mohammed, a former communications
minister, was reportedly questioned in 2010 in relation to bribes paid to government officials by
the German telecommunications firm Siemens. In 2009, a Nigerian court sentenced former PDP
Chairman Olabode George, a close ally of Obasanjo, to 2.5 years in prison for misuse of $500
million in public funds during his tenure as head of the Nigerian Ports Authority. Former
President Obasanjo himself has not escaped charges of corruption. In 2007, a Nigerian Senate
committee report recommended that both Obasanjo and Atiku Abubakar be prosecuted for illegal
use of government funds. Obasanjo rejected the charges. Other parliamentary panels have
investigated allegations of corruption during his tenure as president. His daughter, who chairs
Nigeria’s Senate Health Committee, was charged by the EFCC in 2008 with fraud.
Several multinational corporations have been investigated for paying bribes in Nigeria. In
December 2007, Nigeria suspended its contracts with Siemens after a German court found the
company guilty of paying an estimated 10 million euro in bribes to Nigerian officials between
2001 and 2004.68 An alleged bribery case involving a Nigerian gas plant is being investigated in
several countries, including France, Nigeria, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The companies
involved in the natural gas project and the alleged bribery include Halliburton; Total of France;
and Italy’s Eni. The U.S. Justice Department led the probe into Halliburton’s role, and officials
have reported evidence of bribes paid.69 Halliburton and Kellogg, Brown, and Root, Inc. (KBR)
reached a $177 million settlement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in
February 2009 related to the case, and KBR paid a $402 million fine to settle the Justice
Department charges.70 The EFCC brought charges against former U.S. Vice President Dick
Cheney in early December 2010 related to his tenure as chief executive of Halliburton, but later
dropped them after the company agreed to pay $250 million in fines.
66 See, for example, “Nigerian Group Criticizes Choice of a New Corruption Chief,” VOA News, May 27, 2008.
67 Ogbulafor maintains that the charges were politically motivated as part of an internal PDP power struggle.
68 “Nigeria to Blacklist Siemens After Bribery Scandal,” Reuters, December 5, 2007.
69 “The Gas Ghost Keeps Haunting,” Africa Confidential, May 9, 2008.
70 “Halliburton, KBR Paying $547 Million in Bribery Settlement,” Market Watch, February 11, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
14
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Social Issues and Security Concerns
Islamic Sharia Law
Nigeria is home to Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest Muslim population. Twelve of Nigeria’s states in
the Sunni Muslim-dominated north of the country have adopted Islamic sharia law since 1999 to
adjudicate criminal and civil matters for Muslims.71 Non-sharia based common law and
customary law courts adjudicate cases involving non-Muslims in these states, and sharia-based
criminal law courts are elective for non-Muslims. In some states, the introduction of sharia
proved to be a flashpoint between Muslims and Christians. The introduction of sharia has also
resulted in much-publicized rulings, several of which have been criticized by human rights groups
as well as by Nigerians in the southern and mostly Christian part of the country. The State
Department reports that sharia “technically does not apply to non-Muslims in civil and criminal
proceedings,” although observers acknowledge that Islamic mores are often enforced in public
without regard for citizens’ religion. In some areas, state-funded vigilante groups known as
hisbah patrol public areas and attempt to enforce sharia rulings.
While some sharia courts have issued controversial stoning and amputation sentences, the U.S.
State Department reports that none of the stoning sentences have been implemented.72 In 2002,
Amina Lawal was sentenced to death by stoning after a court in Katsina State found her guilty of
adultery. In 2003, Ms. Lawal appealed her sentence to the state Appeals Court and won after the
court ruled her conviction invalid. In another highly publicized case, a sharia court in Sokoto
sentenced Safiya Hussaini to death for adultery in 2001. Ms. Hussaini appealed her sentence and
was exonerated on the grounds that she was impregnated by her former husband and that the
affair took place before sharia law was enacted. Despite such cases, many observers see the
interpretation and implementation of Nigerian sharia as moderate in comparison to that of some
other Islamic countries.
Sectarian Violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt
In May 2009, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom recommended that
Nigeria be classified as a “Country of Particular Concern” for religious freedom violations. It is
not currently designated as such by the Secretary of State. According to the commission, as many
as 12,000 Nigerians have been killed since 1999 in sectarian violence, and the commissioners
based the CPC recommendation on their belief that the country is tolerating this violence.
According to their 2010 report, “Not a single criminal, Muslim or Christian, has been convicted
and sentenced in Nigeria’s ten years of religious violence. Therein lies the problem. The Nigerian
government and judicial system have so far been unwilling or unable to protect either side.”73
The report cites hundreds of recent deaths in sectarian violence in Jos, the capital of Plateau State
in central Nigeria, which sits between the predominately Muslim north and Christian south.
71 These states are Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara. Nigerian
law protects freedom of religion and permits states to establish courts based on common law or customary law systems.
72 As of December 2009, only one amputation sentence had been carried out, involving a victim who refused to appeal
his conviction, according to the U.S. State Department, “Nigeria,” 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
73 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2010, May 2010.
Congressional Research Service
15
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Violence between communities in this “Middle Belt” in the past decade reflects tensions that are
not only religious, but also ethnic, and which are exacerbated by some local politicians. These
tensions stem from a competition over resources—land, education, government jobs—between
ethnic groups classified as settlers or “indigene” (original inhabitants of the state), a designation
that conveys political and economic benefits. In Jos, the mostly Christian Berom are considered
indigene, and the predominately Muslim Hausa-Fulani, who were traditionally nomadic and
pastoralist, are not. According to Human Rights Watch, over 1,000 were killed in inter-communal
fighting and targeted killings in Plateau State in 2010.74
The State Department, in its November 2010 Religious Freedom report, found that “the
government generally respected religious freedom in practice, although local political actors
stoked sectarian violence with impunity, occasionally using religion as a catalyst, especially in the
Middle Belt region.” The report states that the hostility between Christians and Muslims
“increased and involved the targeting of religious symbols and spaces” in 2010, and that the
sectarian violence in parts of the country “heightened tensions between religious groups, even in
parts of the country without violence.”
The death toll from sectarian clashes in Nigeria in the last decade has been high, although exact
figures are unavailable. By some estimates, over 8,000 were killed in clashes between 1999 and
2002.75 In Plateau State alone, as many as 3,800 have been killed in the past decade.76 Among the
more recent outbreaks of violence, disputed local elections spurred unrest in November 2008 that
may have resulted in as many as 700 deaths. Violence in Jos and surrounding villages broke out
again in early 2010, displacing an estimated 18,000 and resulting in 300-500 deaths in January
and several hundred in March. In response, the Nigerian government established a special task
force composed of both military and police in May 2010 to restore stability in the state.77 The
latest round of clashes were sparked by bombings in Christian areas of Jos on December 24 that
killed 80. Revenge attacks by both sides have followed, and the Muslim community has called for
the ouster of the current governor, whom they view as ignoring the violence.
Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria
In July 2009, religious clashes erupted in the northern states of Bauchi, Borno, and Yobe,
reportedly resulting in at least 700 deaths and the displacement of several thousand. The clashes
originated in Bauchi state between police and a Muslim sect, Boko Haram (“Western education is
forbidden”), also known as the “Nigerian Taliban,” which aims to overthrow the government and
impose sharia throughout the country. Alleged attempts by militants to storm police stations and
other government buildings led to rioting and street battles with security forces. The group’s
leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed by police in the northern city of Maiduguri. Some contend
that his death was an extrajudicial killing, a charge that the police deny (see “Abuses by Security
Forces” below).78 Following the clashes, local religious and traditional leaders announced plans
to establish a preaching board composed of Islamic leaders and scholars to vet clerics. Violence
74 HRW, “Nigeria: New Wave of Violence Leaves 200 Dead,” January 27, 2011. The report stated than in addition to
the more than 1,000 deaths in 2010, over 200 were killed between December 24 and late January 2011.
75 ICG, “Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty,” Africa Report No. 113, July 19, 2006.
76 HRW, Nigeria: New Wave of Violence Leaves 200 Dead,” Ibid.
77 The task force has a website: http://www.specialtaskforceonplateaustate.gov.ng.
78 “Islamic Death ‘Good for Nigeria’,” BBC, July 31, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
16
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
between security forces and members of another Islamic sect reported to hold beliefs similar to
those of Boko Haram in Bauchi state in late December 2009 resulted in over 40 deaths.79
Boko Haram appears to have reemerged, claiming responsibility in September 2010 for a major
prison raid in Bauchi that resulted in 700 prisoners being freed, including a number of Boko
Haram members. The group has also claimed responsibility for the January 2011 assassination of
a gubernatorial candidate in the state, and has staged attacks on public buildings and police
stations. Its current size and strength are unknown. Boko Haram currently appears to pose more
of a threat to local stability than to the country as a whole. Nevertheless, there are concerns that
the group may seek to align itself with more developed violent Islamist groups. One of its
purported leaders has expressed respect for Al Qaeda (AQ) and Osama Bin Laden, and in
February 2010 the leader of the regional AQ affiliate Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
publicly offered the group assistance.80
The international media focused on concerns regarding the possible radicalization of Nigerian
Muslims following the attempted terrorist attack on an American airliner by a Nigerian passenger,
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, on December 25, 2009. According to reports, Abdulmutallab, son
of a respected Nigerian banker and former government minister, became “radicalized” while
living abroad, most recently in Yemen, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claims to
have sponsored his attempt to detonate an explosive device while onboard a flight bound from
Amsterdam to Detroit. Abdulmutallab’s father reported concerns about his son’s radicalization to
the U.S. embassy and others in November 2009. The attempted attack, allegedly scheduled to
coincide with Christmas Day, raised questions regarding airport security in both the Netherlands
and Nigeria, where Abdulmutallab’s journey began. Both countries began using full body
scanners in their international airports in 2010. The attempt also led to increased screening
measures at airports around the world. In January 2010, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) announced that passengers flying to the United States who are citizens of 14 countries
deemed to be either “state sponsors of terrorism” or “countries of interest” would be subject to
additional screening, including compulsory “pat-downs.” Nigeria was among five African
countries, including Algeria, Libya, Sudan, and Somalia, included in the new regulation, and the
Nigerian government protested the rule as discriminatory.81 In April 2010, DHS announced new
security measures for screening all passengers on international flights to the United States,
superseding the regulations that specifically targeted Nigerians for further screening.82
Abdulmutallab’s actions are considered by most to be an isolated incident, and many observers
stress that, by all accounts, Abdulmutallab’s radicalization and training took place outside
Nigeria. Nevertheless, the expansion of conservative Sunni Islamist movements and clashes
between security forces and Islamist sects in northern Nigeria have raised concerns among some
observers and officials that other Nigerians may be susceptible to recruitment by Al Qaeda or
other groups hoping to use violence against government or civilian targets in Nigeria or abroad.
79 “Death Toll From Nigeria Clashes Rises to 40 – Red Cross,” Reuters, December 30, 2009.
80 “Fertile Ground: The Potential for Jihad in Nigeria,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 2010.
81 “Nigeria Criticizes ‘Unfair’ US Air Passenger Screening,” BBC, January 4, 2010.
82 DHS, “Secretary Napolitano Announces New Measures to Strengthen Aviation Security,” April 2, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
17
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Conflict in the Niger Delta
Background of the Struggle
Oil from the southern Niger Delta region has accounted for over 75% of the country’s oil
production since the 1970s, and yet the area’s political history remains one of conflict and
marginalization. The Delta is home to an estimated 31 million people. Among them are the
Ogoni, an ethnic minority whose members have received international attention for their efforts to
highlight the extensive environmental damage done by oil extraction in the region. In 1994,
author and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, president of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni
People (MOSOP), and 14 others were accused of involvement in the murder of four prominent
Ogoni politicians. They pled not guilty, but nine, including Saro-Wiwa, were convicted and
sentenced to death in 1995 by the Ogoni Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal. The executions
sparked international outrage against the regime of dictator Sani Abacha, who was accused of
extensive human rights abuses. The United States recalled its ambassador and pushed for the U.N.
General Assembly to condemn Nigeria’s action. In 2009, Shell established a trust fund to benefit
the Ogoni people, part of a $15.5 million settlement in a New York court case related to the 1995
executions. The company maintains that it played no role in the executions or other abuses.
Criminality and Violence
Nigeria’s oil wealth has been a source of continuing political tension, protest, and criminality in
the Delta, where most of the country’s oil presently originates. The conflict has been linked to the
vandalism of oil infrastructures; massive, systemic production theft known as “oil bunkering,”
often abetted by state officials; protests over widespread environmental damage caused by oil
operations; hostage taking; and public insecurity and communal violence. Several thousand
people have been killed in pipeline explosions in southeast Nigeria since the late 1990s; the
largest single toll from an explosion was approximately 1,000 in October of 1998. These
explosions are triggered when people siphon off oil from holes punched in the above-ground
pipeline for personal use, resulting in a reported loss of some 100,000 barrels of oil per day.
In 1998, militants from the Delta’s largest ethnic group, the Ijaw, initiated “Operation Climate
Change,” triggering violent conflict between the Ijaw and the Nigerian military and disrupting oil
production in the region. Threats of an “all out war” against the government and the oil
companies by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, one of the leaders of that group, reportedly played a role in
the then-unprecedented rise in the world price of oil above $50 a barrel in 2004.83 The threat was
later called off after negotiations with the government. A new rebel movement, the Niger Delta
People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Dokubo-Asari, emerged in 2004, launching a series of
attacks against government forces and threatening to attack foreign oil workers. The NDPVF
demanded autonomy for the region and a share of oil revenues. An estimated 500 people were
reportedly killed in the ensuing violence, according to Amnesty International, though the Nigerian
government disputes this figure. Dokubo-Asari was arrested in September 2005 and charged with
plotting to overthrow the government. He was released on bail in June 2007, allegedly because of
his failing health, and upon his release he reportedly denounced the practice of hostage-taking in
the region and subsequently assisted in the government’s negotiations with militants.84
83 “Pumping Up the Oil Price; the Price of Oil,” The Economist, October 1, 2004.
84 “Freed Militant Opposes Kidnappings,” This Day, June 17, 2007.
Congressional Research Service
18
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
In November 2005, the Nigerian army deployed additional troops to the oil-rich Bayelsa State
after lawmakers began impeachment proceedings against State Governor Diepreye
Alamieyeseigha. British authorities had charged Alamieyeseigha, while visiting in London
months prior, with money laundering. The former governor, who returned to Nigeria, was found
guilty of money laundering and embezzlement in 2007. He was later released by President
Yar’Adua on a plea bargain to help advance peace talks. The British government has returned
over $2 million in assets allegedly stolen by Alamieyeseigha to Nigerian authorities.
Conflict between the Delta’s militants and the Nigerian military escalated after early 2006, and
the kidnapping of foreign oil workers increased exponentially. A new rebel group, the Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), emerged in late 2005, using kidnappings to
bring international attention to its cause and to demand that the government release various
regional figures, including Dokubu-Asari and Alamieyeseigha. Media reports suggest over 300
foreigners were kidnapped between 2006 and 2009, including several American citizens.
Attacks on oil facilities by militant groups like the MEND have periodically cut Nigeria’s oil
production by as much as 25%, and analysts partially credit supply disruptions in Nigeria with
periodically raising the world price of oil.85 According to the State Department’s Coordinator for
International Energy Affairs, “If Nigeria was to produce oil at capacity, it would play a major role
in helping to lower and stabilize world oil prices.”86 Nigeria’s deep-water production has proven
vulnerable to militant attacks as well, as evidenced by attacks on Shell’s offshore Bongo platform,
and the threat of sea piracy is high. According to some estimates, up to 10% of Nigeria’s oil is
stolen every year, and some experts suggest that the heightened violence and criminality in the
Delta has been used to fund local political campaigns.87
From 2007 through mid-2009, militant activity in the Delta was punctuated with periodic
ceasefires and negotiations with the government. In June 2007, MEND declared a one-month
truce, declaring it would cease kidnappings and attacks on oil facilities during that period in
exchange for dialogue with the Yar’Adua government. As part of the truce, the group released
several hostages taken from a Chevron facility, including at least one American.88 The NDPVF
extended a similar 90-day truce offer a week later, and groups represented under the so-called
Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC) also declared a temporary ceasefire. Other smaller militant
groups remained active. In July 2007 the truce unraveled, and in August MEND announced that it
would resume attacks on oil installations. Gang violence in Port Harcourt, the region’s main city,
escalated into running street battles until government troops imposed a curfew on the city. Self-
described MEND spokesman Henry Okah was arrested in Angola in September 2007 on
suspicion of arms-trafficking. In December 2007, the Bayelsa state government announced the
signing of a peace agreement with the state’s militant groups, although MEND rejected the truce,
declaring it would increase its attacks until Okah, who was extradited to Nigeria in February
2008, was released. Street clashes erupted again in Port Harcourt in February (random violence in
85 See, for example, “Oil Steady Over 70 USD as Concerns about US Gasoline Supply, Nigeria Continue,” AFX News
Limited, May 22, 2007, and “Assault at Gas Pumps Related to Attacks on Nigerian Pipelines,” CNN, May 23, 2008.
86 David L. Goldwyn, testimony before the Senate Committee on ForeignRelations’ Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Washington, D.C., September 24, 2008.
87 Human Rights Watch, Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria, Vol. 19, No. 16(A),
October 2007.
88 “Nigerian Militants Free Six Hostages, Suspend Attacks for a Month,” Agence France Presse, June 2, 2007.
Congressional Research Service
19
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
the city has continued sporadically). MEND declared another cessation of hostilities in mid-2008,
but it suspended the ceasefire in January 2009.
Nigeria’s Joint Task Force (JTF), a special combined military and police unit established in 2004
to restore order in the Delta, launched a new offensive against militants in May 2009. Fighting
between security forces and militants, combined with JTF air and land strikes against militant
camps, displaced thousands, according to Amnesty International.89 Acts of sabotage by the
MEND and other militant groups increased in early 2009, cutting oil production by approximately
273,000 barrels per day.
Amnesty Offer for Delta Militants
In June 2009, President Yar’Adua extended an offer of amnesty to Delta militants; those who
surrendered their weapons, renounced violence, and accepted rehabilitation by October of that
year would be granted a presidential pardon, along with cash and job training. Within days, five
militant groups had announced their intention to accept amnesty. MEND initially rejected the
president’s gesture, but days after jailed MEND leader Henry Okah was pardoned and freed, in
July, the group announced a 60-day ceasefire. MEND has not collectively accepted the amnesty
offer, but several of its purported leaders have. According to Nigerian government estimates,
15,260 “militants” accepted the amnesty and turned in weapons by the October 2009 deadline;
the government ultimately aims to disarm 20,000.90 As acting president, Goodluck Jonathan
approved an initiative to spend $180 million on skills centers in the Delta, a key pledge in the
second phase of Yar’Adua’s amnesty and reconciliation plan, which focuses on the rehabilitation
of militants. The federal government’s ability to deliver on promised infrastructure improvements
and job creation will be critical to addressing regional grievances.
Oil output has increased in the wake of the amnesty offer, but observers warn that unless the root
causes of the conflict are addressed, further violence will follow.91 MEND attacks appear to be on
the rise again. MEND spokesman Jomo Gbomo, declaring that President Jonathan has
demonstrated that he is unwilling to address the issues of the Delta, has claimed responsibility for
several attacks on oil facilities and recent bombings, including explosions in Abuja on October 1,
2010, during celebrations marking Nigeria’s Independence Day, that left 12 dead. Gbomo claims
that MEND has issued warnings to Nigerian officials prior to the bombings to avoid loss of life.
MEND’s identity and composition has changed since it first emerged. Various militant groups in
the Niger Delta have claimed actions under the name of MEND, and analysts suggest that it is
now an umbrella group with a decentralized structure. Several high-profile militant commanders,
including Soboma George, Ateke Tom, and Government Ektemupolo (alias Tompolo), who were
rumored to be among MEND’s senior leadership, accepted the amnesty, raising questions about
the group’s current cohesiveness.92
89 Amnesty International, “Hundreds Feared Dead and Thousands Trapped in Niger Delta Fighting,” May 22, 2009.
90 “On the MEND: The Politics of Surrender in Nigeria,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 2009.
91 “In Niger Delta, Uneasy Peace as Rebel Disarmament Dates Nears,” Washington Post, July 27, 2009.
92 Soboma George was shot and killed in August 2010, reportedly by men he had hired to kill two politicians in the
region.
Congressional Research Service
20
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Efforts to Address Environmental and Development Challenges
Oil production in the Delta has caused major damage to the area’s fragile riverine ecosystem, and
ultimately to the livelihoods of its inhabitants.93 Reports on the amount of crude leaked into the
Delta’s fragile ecosystem vary significantly and there is no accurate measure, but millions of
barrels of oil are believed to have been spilled since oil production began in Nigeria.94 Gas flares,
which burn unwanted natural gas when drilling for oil, have plagued the Delta with acid rain and
air pollution. This pollution has severely limited locals’ access to clean water, and has largely
destroyed the fishing stocks the majority of Delta inhabitants depended on to make a living.95 In
2006, Shell Oil, which has the largest production capacity of the oil companies in Nigeria, was
ordered by a Nigerian federal court to pay $1.5 billion to compensate local communities for
environmental damage. President Yar’Adua announced in 2008 that Shell would be replaced by
another company in the oil fields of Ogoniland.96 In 2010, a Dutch court began hearing a case
against Shell related to a massive spill that occurred in the Delta in 2005. The Dutch parliament
held a hearing on Shell’s role in Delta oil spills in January 2011.
Under President Yar’Adua, the government took several important initial steps to engage the
Delta’s disaffected communities, efforts that activists hope the Nigerian government will expand.
An unprecedented 20% of Yar’Adua’s first federal budget proposal, for 2008, was allocated for
security and development projects in the Delta, although activists expressed concern that the
amount allocated for security far outweighed funds for development.97 A supplemental 2009
budget passed in November 2009 included more than $750 million for “post-amnesty
intervention.” The 2010 budget included some $1.2 billion for “post-amnesty development”
projects in the region, targeting transport, education, and health infrastructure. Concerns remain
regarding the government’s ability to spend the funds effectively.
Most observers agree that the crisis in the Delta must ultimately be solved politically, rather than
militarily, but there is considerable disagreement on the details of such a solution. The current
federal system provides states with a 13% share of local revenues (predominately from oil sales).
Groups like MEND argue that the states should receive a 50% share, as was stipulated in the 1960
constitution. A technical committee nominated by President Yar’Adua to identify policies to
stimulate development and improve security in the Delta region issued a report in December
2008. In the report, the committee advocated raising the share of oil revenues allocated to the oil-
producing states to 25%. Some analysts suggest that corruption within the state governments is so
high that the local populations would see little improvement even if the state share were raised.
Some of the oil-producing states have reported revenues of $1 billion per year but have dismal
records of development or service delivery.98 Other analysts question what effect a change in
revenue allocation might have on the northern states, several of which have lower development
93 Amnesty International, Petroleum, Pollution, and Poverty in the Niger Delta, June 2009.
94 Amnesty International, Petroleum, Pollution, and Poverty in the Niger Delta, Ibid.; UNDP, Niger Delta Human
Development Report, 2006; Jonathan Brown, “Niger Delta Bears Brunt After 50 Years of Oil Spills,” The Independent
(London), October 26, 2006; Popken, Ben, “BP Gulf-Sized Spilling Occurs in Nigeria Annually, but Nobody Cares,”
The Consumerist.com, June 15, 2010.
95 ICG, “Fueling the Niger Delta Crisis,” Africa Report No. 118, September 28, 2006.
96 “Nigeria’s Removal of Shell Hailed,” BBC News, June 5, 2008.
97 “Nigeria’s Pledge to Increase Niger Delta Spending Elicits Skeptical Response,” VOA News, November 11, 2007.
98 “Blood and Oil,” The Economist, March 15, 2007.
Congressional Research Service
21
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
indicators than those in the Delta. In late 2009, President Yar’Adua proposed transferring 10% of
the revenues from the government’s oil and gas joint ventures to local Delta communities.
In September 2008, President Yar’Adua created a new cabinet-level Ministry for Niger Delta
Affairs. The position was intended to build on development plans started under the Obasanjo
Administration in 2007 under the auspices of the Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC),
established in 2000 to improve social and environmental conditions in the Delta. Improvements in
infrastructure and education were identified as areas of major focus for Obasanjo’s 15-year, $50
billion plan.99 In his first year in office, President Yar’Adua doubled the budget for the NNDC, to
$566 million. Some observers have raised concerns that the ministry’s programs and those of the
NDDC, which is intended to be a part of the ministry, may be duplicative. Some analysts suggest
that given the level of corruption endemic in the Delta, the international community should work
with the Nigerian government to establish a new development fund that would have independent
oversight. New opportunities for foreign investment in the Delta could also contribute to
improvements in the region, although unrest may deter investors.
Effects on the Oil Industry and the World Market
Nigeria has an estimated oil production capacity of 3 million barrels per day (bpd), but output has
not met capacity.100 Instability, criminality, and oil leaks in the Delta have cut output by one-fifth
since 2006. Nigeria’s production averaged 2.5 million bpd in 2010. By comparison, Saudi Arabia
produces an estimated 10.1 million bpd, Iran 4.3 million bpd, and Venezuela 2.4 million bpd.101 In
2005, a group of former senior U.S. national security officials convened a working group to
develop a possible U.S. response to a simulated world oil crisis.102 Under the scenario given to the
participants, civil unrest in northern Nigeria required the Nigerian government to move troops
from the unstable Niger Delta region to quell violence in the north. Unprotected, oil companies in
the Delta ceased production, and the country’s contribution to the world oil market was reduced
by 800,000 bpd for an extended period. Combined with an unseasonably cold winter and
hypothetical terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, oil prices rose to $120 per barrel and U.S. gasoline
prices at the pump rose to $4.74 per gallon, triggering a recession and potential job losses of up to
2 million. In reality, even the threat of coordinated militant attacks against oil targets in the Delta
can affect the price of oil on the world market. A longer and more sustained disruption of
Nigeria’s oil supply, particularly if combined with the disruption of another major supplier’s
product, could have a significant impact on the world economy.
In addition to its oil reserves, Nigeria has the eighth-largest natural gas reserves in the world, but
to date they have provided little benefit to the Nigerian economy. The gas reserves, also
predominantly located in the Delta region, are estimated at over 185 trillion cubic feet. The
government had pledged to increase gas exports to 50% of oil revenues by 2010, but many of
Nigeria’s fields currently lack the infrastructure to produce natural gas and would require
significant investment to meet that goal. The government has repeatedly set deadlines for oil
99 “Nigeria Launches New Development Plan for Niger Delta,” Voice of America, March 27, 2007, and “New Hope for
Old ‘Master Plan’ on Niger Delta,” IRIN, November 19, 2007.
100 Oil production dropped from 2.13 million bpd in 2007 to 1.95 million bpd in 2008, but increased from an estimated
1.6 million bpd in July 2009, before the ceasefire, to 2 million bpd by late 2009. EIU, “Nigeria,” Country Reports.
101 Production figures for 2010 acquired from the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration.
102 For more information on the exercise, known as “Oil Shockwave,” see http://www.secureenergy.org/reports/
oil_shock_report_master.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
22
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
companies to stop flaring gas at oil wells, estimated at up to 40% of annual production, but
significant flaring continues.103 In March 2011, President Jonathan announced a series of new
agreements to develop gas processing facilities as part of a “gas revolution” designed to create
new jobs and revenues and to end flaring.104
Abuses by Security Forces
Nigerian security forces, particularly the police, have been accused of serious human rights
abuses, and activists suggest that the government has done little to address issues of impunity and
corruption within the Nigerian Police Force. In 2007, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture
reported that “torture is an intrinsic part of how law enforcement services operate within the
country,” and called on the Nigerian government to criminalize the practice.105 The State
Department’s annual human rights reports on Nigeria document numerous instances of
“politically motivated and extrajudicial killings by security forces, including summary executions
… torture, rape and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of prisoners, detainees, and
criminal suspects,” and a variety of other offenses. Its 2009 report noted serious abuses by both
police and soldiers related to the July 2009 Boko Haram uprising and referenced “credible media
reports” claiming that police executed the group’s leader. Other recent reports on abuses include
Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces, produced by Human Rights Watch; Killing at Will:
Extrajudicial Executions and Other Unlawful Killings by the Police in Nigeria, by Amnesty
International; and Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigerian
Police Force, by the Open Society Justice Initiative and the Network of Police Reform in Nigeria.
Nigerian officials have acknowledged some abuses, and in early 2010 the country’s police
minister called the situation “condemnable and unacceptable.”106 Nigeria’s prison system has also
drawn criticism; a 2008 Amnesty International report alleged that at least 65% of the inmates had
never been convicted of a crime, and that some awaited trial for up to 10 years.107
HIV/AIDS
Nigeria’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 3.6% is relatively small in comparison to some Southern
African nations with adult seropositivity rates of over 20%. However, the West African nation
comprises nearly one-tenth of the world’s HIV/AIDS infected persons with 3.3 million infected
people, the largest HIV-positive population in the world after South Africa. Nigeria’s population
is expected to double by the year 2025, which is likely to multiply the spread of HIV. In addition
to the devastation HIV/AIDS continues to cause among Nigeria’s adult population, over 40% of
the current population is under the age of 15. With almost a third of primary-school-aged children
not enrolled in school and the large number of HIV/AIDS-infected adults, Nigeria faces serious
challenges and significant obstacles in the education and health care sectors.
103 “Nigeria Gas Profits ‘Up in Smoke’,” BBC, January 13, 2009.
104 “Jonathan Sets Agenda for Ending Gas Flaring,” BusinessDay, March 25, 2011.
105 United Nations Press Release, “Special Rapporteur on Torture Concludes Visit to Nigeria,” March 12, 2007.
106 “Nigeria Condemns Police ‘Killing’,” BBC, March 5, 2010.
107 Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Criminal Justice System Utterly Failing Nigerian People; Majority of Inmates Not
Convicted of Any Crime,” February 26, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
23
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
International Relations
Since the 1990s, Nigeria has emerged as an important player in regional and international affairs.
Nigeria is one of 12 members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
and is a key member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The
government has helped to resolve political disputes in Togo, Mauritania, and Liberia. Nigeria has
also played a leading role in efforts to resolve the political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, where it has
previously acted as a mediator. The government has been critical of the international community
for “contradictions” in its reaction to the current crises in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya.108 Nigeria has
also mediated between the government of Sudan and the Darfur rebels. Nigerian troops have
played a vital role in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and are currently
deployed to missions in Liberia and Sudan. Nigerian police, military observers, and experts are
also deployed in U.N. missions in Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti,
Liberia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Western Sahara. The United States is the top destination for
Nigerian exports, followed by India, Brazil, Spain and France. China is the lead source for
Nigerian imports, followed by the United States, the Netherlands, South Korea, and the United
Kingdom.109
Issues for Congress
Administration Policy on Nigeria
After a period of strained relations in the 1990s, U.S.-Nigeria relations steadily improved under
the administration of former President Obasanjo, and they have remained strong under Presidents
Yar’Adua and Jonathan. The Bush Administration praised the Nigerian government’s improved
budget practices, banking sector reform, and efforts to eliminate the country’s foreign debt,
although it remained critical of the country’s human rights record and questioned its commitment
to ensuring free and fair elections. President George W. Bush visited the country in 2003, and
First Lady Laura Bush visited Nigeria in 2006. Following the 2007 elections, though, the Bush
Administration expressed concern with what the State Department called “a flawed election, and
in some instances, deeply flawed.”110 Nevertheless, the State Department stressed the need to
“engage” rather than isolate the country in order to “nurture Nigeria’s fragile democracy,” and
President Bush met Yar’Adua at the White House later that year.111
President Barack Obama’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, has
referred to Nigeria as “probably the most important country in Sub-Saharan Africa.”112 President
Obama has reiterated the importance of the U.S.-Nigeria relationship. He formally acknowledged
the country’s role as a regional leader during a meeting with then-Acting President Goodluck
Jonathan at the White House in April 2010. Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Nigeria in August
108 “Nigeria Lashes at World’s Focus on Libya While I. Coast Burns,” AFP, March 22, 2011.
109 CIA, “Nigeria”, The World Factbook, March 8, 2011.
110 “Governing Party Wins in Nigeria, but Many Claim Fraud,” New York Times, April 23, 2007.
111 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer before the House Subcommittee on Africa and Global
Health, June 7, 2007.
112 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks by Ambassador Carson on Secretary Clinton’s Africa Trip,” July 30, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
24
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
2009 on her first visit to the continent as Secretary of State; Nigeria was one of seven African
countries on her itinerary. Clinton’s discussions in Nigeria focused on regional security,
democracy, corruption, and economic development. In her remarks during the visit, she stressed
the need for electoral reform and expressed support for the government’s political approach
toward resolving the conflict in the Niger Delta.113 The United States and Nigeria agreed in
January 2010 to establish a binational commission on areas of mutual concern, as called for by
Members of the House of Representatives in H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011. The first meetings of the commission, formally established in April
following then-Acting President Jonathan’s participation in the Nuclear Security Summit in
Washington, DC, were held in late May 2010. The commission is composed of four working
groups that meet regularly: Good Governance, Transparency, and Integrity; Energy and
Investment; Food Security and Agriculture; and Niger Delta and Regional Security Cooperation.
U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Maritime Security Issues
Nigeria is an important trading partner for the United States and is the largest beneficiary of U.S.
investment on the continent. The country is eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth
and Opportunity Act (AGOA); AGOA-eligible exports account for over 90% of its exports to the
United States, which totaled over $30 billion in 2010. Nigeria vies with Venezuela to be the
United States’ fourth-largest source of imported oil (behind Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia),
depending on how much of its oil production is shut-in in any given month. U.S. imports of
Nigerian crude account for over 40% of the country’s total oil exports, making the United States
Nigeria’s largest trading partner. U.S. energy companies may face increasing competition for
rights to the country’s energy resources; China, for example, has offered Nigeria loans for
infrastructure projects in exchange for oil exploration rights. The NNPC signed an agreement
with Russia’s Gazprom in 2009 to create a joint venture for oil and gas exploration. Nigeria has
also signed an agreement with Algeria and Niger to build a 2,500-mile pipeline across their
territories to deliver gas to Europe. Nigeria exports natural gas to neighboring countries through
the new West Africa Gas Pipeline.
Gulf of Guinea crude is prized on the world market for its low sulphur content, and Nigeria’s
proximity to the United States relative to that of Middle East oil-producing countries makes its oil
particularly attractive to U.S. interests. In 2005, the United States, Nigeria, and other interested
partners initiated the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy, a forum through which
participants would work to address challenges to oil production. Other regional and international
initiatives focused on maritime security in the Gulf have followed.114 Nigeria’s waters have been
named among the most dangerous in the world; the country ranked first in global pirate attacks
until it was overtaken by Somalia in 2008, according to the International Maritime Bureau.
Nigeria is also considered a growing transshipment point for narcotics trafficking, and several
Nigerian criminal organizations have been implicated in the trade.115 The U.S. Navy has increased
its operations in the Gulf of Guinea in recent years to enhance security in the region and in 2007
launched a new initiative, the African Partnership Station (APS).116 Successive APS deployments
113 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks With Nigerian Foreign Minister Ojo Maduekwe,” August 12, 2009.
114 For further information on maritime and port security issues in the region, see, e.g., the Atlantic Council, Advancing
U.S., African, and Global Interests: Security and Stability in the West African Maritime Domain, November 30, 2010.
115 CRS Report R40838, Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook.
116 Under APS, U.S. and partner naval ships deploy to the region for several months to serve as a continuing sea base of
operations and a “floating schoolhouse” to provide assistance and training to the Gulf nations. Training focuses on
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
25
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
have included port visits to Nigeria and joint exercises between U.S., Nigerian, European, and
other regional navies. Nigerian military personnel have also served onboard as embarked trainees,
and a Nigerian naval captain has served as the APS Deputy Commander. The Department of
Defense’s newest regional combatant command, Africa Command (AFRICOM), has maintained
this increased focus on maritime security in the region.117
Nigeria’s Role in Regional Stability
Nigeria plays a significant role in peace and stability operations across Africa. Former President
Obasanjo reportedly played a critical role in building consensus on the continent for cooperation
with U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. The Nigerian parliament adopted new anti-terrorism
legislation in February 2011 after a series of bombings in the country. The United States provides
the country with military training with an emphasis on professionalization and respect for human
rights and civilian authority through a range of security assistance programs, including those
focused on enhancing its peacekeeping capabilities. Nigeria is also a participant in the State
Department’s Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a U.S. interagency effort that
aims to increase border protection and regional counter-terrorism capabilities. The State
Department has established 10 “American Corners” to share information on American culture and
values with Nigerians.
U.S. Assistance to Nigeria
The United States is the largest bilateral donor in Nigeria, providing over $614 million in foreign
aid to the country in FY2010. Democratic governance, agriculture and economic reform,
improved education and health services, professionalization and reform of the security services,
and HIV/AIDS have been the main focus for U.S. assistance programs in recent years. Nigeria is
a focus country under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President’s
Malaria Initiative (PMI), and the Obama Administration’s new Feed the Future (FTF) Initiative.
The State Department’s FY2012 budget request, which totals $660.5 million, includes
approximately $588 million (89% of the total) in funding for HIV/AIDS and related health
programs. In 2008, the State Department’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found that:
Exceptionally high funding levels for HIV/AIDS create a clear imbalance in the embassy
program mix and present a skewed picture of U.S. policy priorities. In addition, this level of
HIV/AIDS funding has unintended consequences for Nigeria’s broader health infrastructure,
monopolizing the country’s supplies of medical goods and services, including the qualified
health professionals needed to meet Nigeria’s other health needs.118
Although AIDS-related interventions have composed the majority of health funding for Nigeria,
the funds also target other health concerns, including maternal and child health, malaria, and
(...continued)
maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, port facilities management and security, seamanship/navigation,
search and rescue, leadership, logistics, civil engineering, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
117 For more information on AFRICOM and Nigeria’s response to the command’s creation, see CRS Report RL34003,
Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
118 U.S. Department of State Office of the Inspector General, Report on Inspection: Embassy Abuja and Consulate
General Lagos, Nigeria, Report Number ISP-I-08-25A, July 2008.
Congressional Research Service
26
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
tuberculosis. U.S. health assistance focused on tuberculosis aims to double the case detection rate
and halve Nigeria’s incidence in the next decade.
In addition to health programs, the State Department’s FY2012 foreign assistance request for
Nigeria includes funding for an array of programs focused on economic growth, education, and
good governance. U.S. economic and agriculture assistance supports programs that will increase
productivity and build trade and investment capacity. Such assistance also aims to address climate
change, including through efforts to increase the production of clean energy and reduce gas
flaring. As the request points out, one-third of Nigeria’s 30 million school-aged children are not
enrolled in school, and the request includes over $15 million in basic education funding. The
FY2012 request would further increase assistance for programs aimed at strengthening
democratic governance in Nigeria, up from $9.5 million in FY2008, $16 million in FY2009, and
$21 million in FY2010, to over $27 million for the upcoming fiscal year. USAID has provided
over $14 million to support the 2011 elections, which includes funding for technical assistance
provided by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to increase INEC capacity.
The Administration has requested funding in FY2012 for new conflict mitigation programs to
address extremism in the north and conflict in the Niger Delta. USAID has paired with Chevron
on a four-year, $50 million program (of which USAID is contributing half) to improve
agricultural development as well as civil society and governance capacity in the Delta.
USAID is implementing several “flagship” programs designed to concentrate resources and
achieve maximum impact. They are focused on two northern Nigerian states: Bauchi and Sokoto
(within Nigeria, human development indicators are lowest in the north). USAID’s flagship
education project, the Northern Education Initiative (NEI), is being implemented in the two focus
states to strengthen state and local government systems for the delivery of education services.
USAID’s flagship peace and democratic governance project in the two focus states is known as
Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy and Development (LEAD). The project is designed to
build partnerships between state and local governments, civil society, and the private sector to
improve governance, accountability, and service delivery. A third flagship program, the five-year,
$85 million Targeted States High Impact Project (TSHIP) is being implemented in the focus states
to reduce maternal and child deaths. The project aims to build the states’ health systems to
effectively deliver primary health care, and to support overall improvement of the primary health
care delivery system through capacity building and institutional strengthening.
U.S. security assistance to Nigeria was suspended from FY2003 until 2006, when the State
Department restarted a modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.119
Security cooperation has increased since then, and the State Department’s FY2012 security
assistance request, which focuses on military professionalization, peacekeeping support and
training, and land and maritime border security, includes $1 million in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) and almost $1 million for IMET. Nigeria has also received maritime security assistance
through the U.S. Navy’s Africa Partnership Station and the State Department’s African Coastal
and Border Security (ACBS) program.120 As an important troop contributor to peacekeeping
missions, Nigeria continues to receive U.S. support through the African Contingency Operations
119 P.L. 109-102 restricted FY2006 FMF and IMET funding for Nigeria due to issues related to former Liberian
President Charles Taylor. Those restrictions were lifted after Nigeria surrendered Taylor to the Special Court for Sierra
Leone.
120 For more information on APS, see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of
the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
Congressional Research Service
27
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. The country also participates in security cooperation
activities with the California National Guard through the National Guard State Partnership
Program. U.S. counterterrorism assistance to Nigeria includes programs coordinated through
TSCTP. Nigeria has also received security assistance through DOD funds, including $2.2 million
in “Section 1206” funding for the development of a counterterrorism infantry company and $6.2
million aimed at building the capacity of the country’s counterterrorism unit and its tactical
communications interoperability.121 Nigeria also received coastal radar and communications
training and equipment through regional Section 1206 programs.
Recent Congressional Interest
The United States Congress continues to monitor political developments in Nigeria. During the
111th Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing “Examining the U.S.-
Nigeria Relationship in a Time of Transition.” The 110th Congress closely followed Nigeria’s
2007 elections. Days prior to those elections, Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
publicly expressed “serious concern about the prospects for free, fair, and peaceful conduct” of
the elections. Following the elections, Senator Russ Feingold issued a statement condemning
electoral irregularities, saying “President Obasanjo’s leadership over the last eight years has been
called into question by the failure of efforts to reform Nigeria’s electoral system and combat
political corruption. The Administration should not legitimize this election as doing so would
undermine our commitment to good governance and transparency, and to building strong
democracies.”122 The House Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health subsequently held a
hearing entitled “Nigeria at a Crossroads: Elections, Legitimacy, and a Way Forward.” Nigeria’s
flawed elections also featured prominently in a July 2007 hearing on democracy in Africa by the
Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs.
Congress continues to monitor Nigeria’s energy sector and its role in world oil supplies, as well
as humanitarian and human rights issues in the country. Congressional hearings have examined
the attempted terrorist attack by a Nigerian citizen on a U.S. airliner in December 2009, raising
concerns with the State Department’s visa process and with “systematic failures across the
Intelligence Community (IC), which contributed to the failure to identify the threat.”123 The
Director of National Intelligence, during February 2011 hearings by the House and Senate
intelligence communities on worldwide threats, highlighted a range of security concerns in
Nigeria in his testimony, including political and sectarian violence and militancy in the Niger
Delta and the northeast, and suggesting that although the group Boko Haram appears focused on
local issues, “it may be pursuing interests it shares with” a regional Al Qaeda affiliate, AQIM.
Congressional attention to these and other issues is expected to continue in the 112th Congress.
121 For more information on DOD’s global train and equip or “Section 1206” authority, see CRS Report RS22855,
Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
122 See “Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold on the Marred Nigerian Election,” April 23, 2007, at
http://feingold.senate.gov.
123 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Unclassified Executive Summary of the Committee Report on the
Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253,” May 18, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
28
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Figure 1. Map of Nigeria
Congressional Research Service
29
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
Congressional Research Service
30