Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
May 17, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33964
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Summary
Nigeria, Africa’s largest producer of oil and its largest democracy, is one of the U.S. government’s
key strategic partners on the continent. It is Africa’s most populous country, with over 150 million
people, roughly half Muslim and half Christian, and its second-largest economy. Diplomatic
relations with Nigeria, which is regularly the fourth- or fifth-largest oil exporter to the United
States, are strong, and the country is a major recipient of U.S. foreign assistance. After 16 years of
military rule, Nigeria made the transition to civilian governance in 1999, and the country emerged
as a powerful actor in African politics. The government has mediated disputes in several African
countries, and the country ranks fourth among troop contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions.
Nigeria faces serious social and economic challenges, however, that some analysts contend
threaten both the stability of the state and the region, and which have the potential to affect global
oil markets. The country today is relatively stable, but it has faced intermittent political turmoil
and economic crises since gaining independence in 1960. Political life has been scarred by
conflict along ethnic, religious, and geographic lines, and misrule has undermined the authority
and legitimacy of the state. Nigeria’s oil and natural gas revenues are estimated at over $60
billion per year, but its human development indicators are among the world’s lowest, and a
majority of the population suffers from extreme poverty. The Nigerian government relies on the
oil sector for over 85% of revenues. By some estimates, Nigeria could rank among the world’s
top five exporters of oil within a few years, but social unrest, criminality, and corruption in the
country’s oil-producing Niger Delta region have cut output by one-fifth since 2006.
Inter-communal conflicts in parts of the country are common. Resentment between the northern
and southern regions, and among communities in central Nigeria, has led periodically to
considerable unrest and displacement. Thousands have been killed and many more wounded in
periodic ethno-religious clashes in the past decade. Perceived ethnic and religious differences
have been politicized by some political elites. The attempted terror attack on an American airliner
by a Nigerian in December 2009, and the resurgence of a militant Islamist group, Boko Haram,
have also heightened concerns regarding the possible radicalization of African Muslims. A series
of recent bombings led the government to adopt new anti-terrorism measures in early 2011.
Nigeria’s April 2011 elections have been viewed by many as a critical test of the government’s
commitment to democracy. The State Department referred to the previous elections, in 2007, as
deeply flawed, and some contended that Nigeria had not held a free and fair general election since
the return to civilian rule. The findings of election observer groups are still preliminary, but most
have characterized the 2011 elections as a significant improvement over previous polls, although
not without problems. Post-election violence across the north has highlighted lingering communal
tensions, grievances, and mistrust. President Goodluck Jonathan, who was re-elected, faces
mounting, and at times competing, internal and external pressure to implement reforms deemed
critical to addressing corruption and other development and security challenges.
The Obama Administration has been supportive of Nigeria’s recent reform initiatives, including
anti-corruption efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector privatization, and programs
to promote peace and development in the Niger Delta. In 2010, the Administration established a
U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission, a strategic dialogue to address these and other issues of
mutual concern. Congress regularly monitors political developments in Nigeria and has expressed
concerns with corruption and human rights abuses. Congress also provides oversight for over
$600 million in U.S. foreign assistance programs in the country.
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Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Contents
Overview .................................................................................................................................... 1
Political Context ......................................................................................................................... 2
The 2003 Elections ............................................................................................................... 2
2007 Elections ...................................................................................................................... 3
The 2011 Elections: Opportunities and Challenges ................................................................ 5
Pre-Election Conditions .................................................................................................. 5
The Results ..................................................................................................................... 7
Election Violence .......................................................................................................... 10
Development Challenges and Reform Initiatives ....................................................................... 13
Reforms to the Petroleum and Energy Sectors ..................................................................... 13
Financial Sector Reforms .................................................................................................... 14
Efforts to Combat Corruption.............................................................................................. 15
Social Issues and Security Concerns.......................................................................................... 18
Islamic Sharia Law ............................................................................................................. 18
Sectarian Violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt ........................................................................ 18
Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria .......................................................................... 19
Conflict in the Niger Delta .................................................................................................. 21
Background of the Struggle........................................................................................... 21
Criminality and Violence............................................................................................... 21
Amnesty Offer for Delta Militants ................................................................................. 23
Efforts to Address Environmental and Development Challenges .................................... 24
Effects on the Oil Industry and the World Market .......................................................... 25
Abuses by Security Forces .................................................................................................. 26
HIV/AIDS .......................................................................................................................... 26
International Relations .............................................................................................................. 27
Issues for Congress ................................................................................................................... 27
Administration Policy on Nigeria ........................................................................................ 27
U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Maritime Security Issues .......................................................... 28
Nigeria’s Role in Regional Stability .............................................................................. 29
U.S. Assistance to Nigeria ............................................................................................. 29
Recent Congressional Interest ............................................................................................. 31
Figures
Figure 1. Results of the 2011 Presidential Election ...................................................................... 8
Figure 2. Map of Nigeria ........................................................................................................... 32
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 33
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Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Overview
Nigeria is considered a key power on the African continent, not only because of its size, but
because of its political and economic role in the region. One in five people in Sub-Saharan Africa
calls Nigeria home. Nigeria’s economy is Sub-Saharan Africa’s second largest, and it is one of the
world’s major sources of high-quality sweet crude oil and natural gas. Nigerian leaders have
mediated conflicts throughout Africa, and Nigerian troops have played a critical role in peace and
stability operations in the region. The country ranks fourth among troop contributors to United
Nations peacekeeping missions around the world. Nigeria, which is roughly twice the size of
California, is also home to world’s second-largest HIV/AIDS-infected population and has Africa’s
highest tuberculosis burden. According to one senior U.S. foreign policy analyst, “no country’s
fate is so decisive for the continent. No other country across a range of issues has the power so
thoroughly to shape outcomes
elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.”1
Nigeria at a Glance
Population: 155
million
Despite its oil wealth, Nigeria
remains highly underdeveloped.
Pop. Growth Rate:
1.935%
Poor governance has severely
Independence: October
1960
limited infrastructure development
Comparative Area:
Slightly larger than twice the
and the provision of social services,
size of California
hindering economic growth and
Religions:
50% Muslim, 40% Christian,
leaving much of the country mired
10% indigenous beliefs
in poverty. The government’s human
Languages:
English (official), 250 local languages
rights record has been poor.
Literacy: 68%
Ethnic and religious strife have been
Infant Mortality:
91.54 deaths/1,000 live births
common in Nigeria, and perceived
Life Expectancy:
47.56 years
differences have been manipulated
by some political elites. The country
Prevalence of HIV:
3.1%
is composed of over 250 ethnic
Real GDP Growth:
8.4% (2010 estimate)
groups, of which 10 account for
Nominal GDP Per Capita:
$1,191
nearly 80% of the total population.
The northern Hausa and Fulani, the
Unemployment: 4.9%
southwestern Yoruba, and the
Exports: $45.4 billion
southeastern Ibo have traditionally
Imports: $42.1
billion
been the most politically active and
dominant. Almost half of the
External Debt:
$9.689 billion
country’s population, some 75
Source: CIA World Fact Book, International Monetary Fund
million people primarily residing in
the northern half of the country, are Muslim. Divisions between ethnic groups, between north and
south, and between Christians and Muslims often stem from perceived differences in access to
land and social and economic development. More than 14,000 Nigerians are believed to have
been have been killed in local clashes sparked by these tensions in the last decade, and millions
periodically displaced.2 In the southern Niger Delta region, simmering conflict and criminality
have been fueled by regional grievances related to oil production in the area.
1 Robert I. Rotberg, “Nigeria: Elections and Continuing Challenges,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 2007.
2 Human Rights Watch (HRW), A Human Rights Agenda for Candidates in Nigeria’s 2011 Elections, March 2011.
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Political Context
Nigeria, which gained its independence from Britain in 1960, is a federal republic composed of
36 states; its political structure is similar to that of the United States. The country has a bicameral
legislature with a 109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives. Its president,
legislators, and governors are elected on four-year terms. The country was ruled by the military
for much of the three decades after independence before making the transition to civilian rule in
1999. Elections held in the decade after the transition were deemed to be flawed by Nigerians and
the international community, with each poll progressively worse than the last, according to many
domestic and international observers. In the wake of the 2007 elections, which were marred by
fraud and political violence, the U.S. State Department expressed its view that the country
remained in political transition.3 Human Rights Watch contended at that point that “Nigeria has
not held a free and fair general election since the end of military rule.”4 Consequently,
expectations were high for Nigeria’s most recent round of elections, held in April 2011.
The contest for power between north and south that has broadly defined much of Nigeria’s
modern political history can be traced, in part, to administrative divisions instituted during
Britain’s colonial administration.5 Northern military leaders dominated Nigerian politics from
independence until the transition to democracy just over a decade ago. Since the election of
President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999,6 there has been a de-facto power sharing arrangement,
often referred to as “zoning,” between the country’s geopolitical zones, through which the
presidency was expected to rotate among the regions every two terms. President Obasanjo was
from the southwest, and with his retirement pending in 2007, the ruling People’s Democratic
Party (PDP), which has dominated Nigerian politics for more than a decade, chose Umaru
Yar’Adua, then a northern governor, as its presidential candidate. The other main presidential
contenders in the April 2007 election were also northerners. Upon President Yar’Adua’s death in
office in 2010, his vice president, Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, took office for the remainder
of his first term, raising questions as to whether the ruling party would chose another northern
candidate to run in the 2011 race or support a run for the office by the sitting president. In January
2011, President Jonathan secured the PDP nomination to stand as its candidate in the April
election. His subsequent electoral victory leaves the future of the zoning arrangement unclear.
The 2003 Elections
In April 2003, Nigerians went to the polls for the second time under a civilian government.
President Obasanjo, representing the ruling PDP, ran against another former military leader,
General Muhammadu Buhari; a former rebel leader, Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, who led the
secessionist region of Biafra in Nigeria’s civil war in the 1960s; and former foreign minister Ike
3 U.S. State Department, “Nigeria,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2008.
4 HRW, Election or ‘Selection’? Human Rights Abuses and Threats to Free and Fair Elections in Nigeria, April 2007,
and “Nigeria: Presidential Election Marred by Fraud, Violence,” April 24, 2007.
5 Britain administered the north and south separately from the late 19th century until 1947, when it introduced a federal
system that divided the country into three regions: Northern, Eastern, and Western.
6 Obasanjo, who had formerly served as a military head of state from 1976 to 1979, won 62.8% of the votes (18.7
million) in the February 1999 poll, while his challenger, Chief Olu Falae, received 37.2% of the votes (11.1 million).
Obasanjo’s party won over half the votes in both the House and Senate elections.
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Nwachukwu. Obasanjo won, and the PDP party also won in legislative elections.7 The elections
were marred by serious irregularities and fraud, according to both domestic and international
election observers, with much emphasis placed on “inadequate election administration.”
Controversy surrounded the voter registration process, the certification of candidates, and poor
logistical preparations. One election official allegedly admitted that the voters’ register was “25-
30% fiction.”8 Reports of electoral malfeasance, or rigging, were also noted. Ballot box stuffing,
falsification of election result forms, and threats of violence were among the most serious
charges. In some states, observers noted “systematic attempts at all stages of the voting process to
alter the election results.”9 Although reports of rigging varied widely among states, the extent of
irregularities caused some to suggest that they “compromised the integrity of the elections where
they occurred.”10 The European Union delegation noted that in at least six states “the minimum
standards for democratic elections were not met.”11 Several election results were later overturned.
2007 Elections
Nigeria’s third national elections since the return to civilian rule were held in April 2007, amid
widespread allegations of electoral mismanagement and fraud. The Nigerian Senate had rejected a
bid by Obasanjo supporters in 2006 to amend the constitution to allow him to run for a third term.
Facing retirement, President Obasanjo backed Umaru Yar’Adua, a northern governor largely
unknown to many Nigerians, as the ruling party’s presidential candidate.12 Yar’Adua’s running
mate, Goodluck Jonathan, had served as governor of Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta. Yar’Adua
was declared the winner with over 24.6 million votes, or 70%. Some critics suggest that Obasanjo
“hand-picked” Yar’Adua in order to retain political influence after he left office.13
The country’s two largest opposition parties, the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) and the
Action Congress (AC), rejected the election results. The ANPP’s presidential candidate, General
Buhari, who had lost the election in 2003 to Obasanjo, received an estimated six million votes.
The AC’s candidate, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, was not among the 24 presidential
contenders approved by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), allegedly
because of pending corruption charges against him.14 His exclusion exacerbated tensions during
the pre-election period, and his supporters contend he was unjustly excluded by INEC because he
had opposed Obasanjo’s third term. A last-minute ruling by the Supreme Court restored Abubakar
to the ballot, and he placed third with an estimated 2.6 million votes.
7 According to official results, Obasanjo won 62% of the votes, while his nearest rival, General Buhari, won 32%.
8 HRW, Election or ‘Selection’? Human Rights Abuses and Threats to Free and Fair Elections in Nigeria, April 2007.
9 The International Republican Institute (IRI), 2003 Election Observation Report.
10 The National Democratic Institute (NDI), “Statement of the NDI International Election Observer Delegation to
Nigeria’s April 19 Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections,” April 21, 2003.
11 The European Union, EU Election Observation Final Report: Nigeria.
12 Yar’Adua, a former chemistry professor, was elected governor of Katsina in 1999. His better-known older brother,
the late General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, served as Vice President under Obasanjo in the first military regime to transfer
power to civilian rule, and he was reported to be one of Nigeria’s wealthiest and most powerful men. Shehu died in
prison in 1997 after having been sentenced by a military tribunal for treason after calling for dictator Sani Abacha to
reestablish civilian rule. Yar’Adua’s father was a prominent minster in the first government after independence.
13 International Crisis Group, “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding A Political Crisis,” Africa Report 123, March 28, 2007.
14 The March 2007 decision by INEC to exclude Abubakar from the ballot was part of a complex series of legal battles
between the Obasanjo Administration and Abubakar, a founding member of the PDP, who was linked to a bribery case
involving the Petroleum Trust Fund and accused of stealing over $125 million in federal oil funds.
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The ruling PDP won the majority of the state and federal elections, including 28 of the 36 state
governorships. Opposition gubernatorial candidates won in seven states, including the two most
populous states, Lagos and Kano. The results of many elections were challenged in the courts,
based on allegations of fraud, threats of violence, or the inability of voters to cast their ballots.
Ultimately, the results of almost a third of the gubernatorial races were annulled and, in most of
those cases, elections were rerun, although many of the candidates who won in the first round
won again in the second. By the end of 2009, the PDP had held onto 25 governorships and picked
up three others, after winning opposition candidates changed parties and joined the PDP.
Opposition candidates were awarded governorships in two states after PDP wins were overturned
by election tribunals. The PDP’s gubernatorial win in Anambra state was nullified by the
Supreme Court, which allowed the incumbent governor, from an opposition party, to keep his
seat.15 The elections of several legislators, including Senate President David Mark, were also
annulled. An appeals court later overturned the ruling on Mark’s election and he kept his seat. A
tribunal hearing the challenges to President Yar’Adua’s win reached its verdict in February 2008,
finding insufficient evidence to overturn the presidential election. Nigeria’s Supreme Court
upheld that verdict in a December 2008 ruling.
Domestic and international observer groups were highly critical of the 2007 elections, and many
questioned the credibility of the election results. Violations and irregularities reported by election
observers included polling locations opening late, closing early, or not opening at all; errors on
the ballots; underage voting; vote buying; ballot box stuffing and theft; and falsified results
sheets. Media reports also documented widespread incidents of thuggery and coercion at polling
places.16 The largest domestic monitoring group suggested that elections were so flawed that they
should be held again.17 According to the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute (NDI)
delegation, led by former Secretary of State Madeline Albright and several former world leaders,
“in many places, and in a number of ways, the electoral process failed the Nigerian people. The
cumulative effect ... substantially compromised the integrity of the electoral process.”18 The
European Union delegation declared that the elections “have not lived up to the hopes and
expectations of the Nigerian people and the process cannot be considered to have been credible.”
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) delegation was similarly critical,
suggesting that “irregularities and the sporadic violence characterized and challenged the validity
of the elections.”19 The U.S.-based International Republican Institute (IRI) called the elections
“below acceptable standards,” noting that the resolution of election disputes would be “critical” to
restoring the credibility of the country’s democratic process.20
In the aftermath of the elections, President Obasanjo reportedly acknowledged some electoral
irregularities, notably “logistical failures,” violence, and ballot box theft, but indicated that
elections would not be re-held, saying “the magnitude does not make the results null and void.”21
15 The Supreme Court ruled that the incumbent, Peter Obi, who had lost to a PDP candidate in the 2003 gubernatorial
election but had been awarded the seat in 2006 after a court overturned the 2003 PDP win, could serve the rest of his
four-year. Obi won a second term when new elections were held in February 2010.
16 See, for example, “Nigerian: Forced to Vote Against My Wish,” BBC, April 23, 2007.
17 “Call for Nigeria Street Protests,” BBC, April 24, 2007.
18 NDI, “Statement of the National Democratic Institute International Election Observer Delegation to Nigeria’s April
21 Presidential and National Assembly Elections,” April 23, 2007.
19 “Nigeria: Elections Fraudulent; EU, Others,” Daily Trust (Abuja), April 24, 2007.
20 IRI “Nigeria’s Elections Below Acceptable Standards: Preliminary Findings of IRI’s International Election
Observation Mission,” April 22, 2007.
21 “Obasanjo Appeals to Nigerians Over Election Results,” Radio Nigeria-Abuja, April 23, 2007, and “Nigerian
(continued...)
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Opposition calls for mass protests went largely unheeded, although thousands reportedly gathered
in the streets of Kano, northern Nigeria’s largest city, before being dispersed by police with tear
gas. World oil prices rose to $68 a barrel in the week after the election, based in part on concerns
surrounding the disputed polls.22 Despite speculation that questions surrounding the credibility of
the election results might trigger a military coup, Yar’Adua’s inauguration was unimpeded.
The 2011 Elections: Opportunities and Challenges
Pre-Election Conditions
President Yar’Adua conceded in his inaugural speech that the 2007 elections were flawed and
subsequently appointed a panel of government officials, former judges, and civil society
representatives to recommend changes to the country’s electoral institutions. The Electoral
Reform Committee (ERC) issued its findings in December 2008, but the government was slow to
commence reforms. In mid-2010, the parliament approved the first of several amendments to the
country’s electoral laws to incorporate some of the ERC’s recommendations and increase
transparency in the electoral process.
Among the most significant of the reforms were those to increase INEC’s independence and fiscal
autonomy. INEC’s credibility had been badly damaged by the 2003 and 2007 elections,23 and
President Jonathan won praise from both Nigerians and the international community for removing
the sitting INEC chairman from office in April 2010 and replacing him with a respected academic
and civil society activist, Professor Attahiru Jega, in June. Concerns remain regarding the
independence of some state-level electoral election commissioners,24 but, according to a survey
conducted in late 2010, over 60% of Nigerians had confidence in the current electoral
commission, and 74% of Nigerians thought the 2011 polls would be more credible than the last.25
The Jonathan Administration was generally seen as supportive of Jega’s efforts to improve the
electoral process, backing his budget request and his proposal to delay elections from January to
April to allow more time to prepare the 2011 polls.
Turnout was high for the most recent voter registration exercise, launched in January 2011 in an
effort by Chairman Jega to compile a credible register. The registration period was extended by
over a week due to technical and logistical problems that led to registration centers opening late,
or, in some cases, not at all. According to the final voters list, 73.5 million voters registered.
INEC reported over 870,000 cases of multiple registration, contributing to concerns about
“widespread but not yet systemic fraud.”26 INEC has charged several of its own staff with
offences associated with the registration process. Observers suggest that the exercise appeared to
(...continued)
President Olusegun Obasanjo Says Elections Flawed, But Not Fatally,” Associated Press, April 25, 2007.
22 “Landslide Win for Yar’Adua is ‘Flawed,’” Financial Times, April 23, 2007.
23 ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding A Political Crisis,” Africa Report No. 123, March 28, 2007, p. 14.
24 ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Africa Briefing No.79, February 24, 2011; Ebere
Onwudiwe and Chloe Berwind-Dart, Breaking the Cycle of Electoral Violence in Nigeria, U.S. Institute for Peace,
December 2010.
25 IRI, Nigerian National Survey, released February 1, 2011. The poll was conducted between November 29 and
December 7, 2010.
26 ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid.
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increase voter confidence and generally deemed the register an improvement over previous
efforts, but not without problems, including instances of underage participation.
A January 2011 rerun of the flawed 2007 gubernatorial elections in Delta state was viewed by
some as a test for INEC’s new management. Observer reports suggest that, while rigging and
voter intimidation occurred, the poll was an improvement over previous elections in a state
heavily controlled by the ruling party. According to one report, “the Delta rerun demonstrated
both the potential for INEC to administer improved elections with the support of communities
and the risk that political actors can still overwhelm reforms with systematic fraud.”27 As April
approached, analysts contended that INEC, under Chairman Jega, had demonstrated the will, if
not necessarily the capacity, to overcome problems in the 2011 polls.
Observers noted some positive developments in the pre-election period, but continued to raise
concerns about electoral preparedness and other areas deemed problematic in previous polls,
including ballot secrecy, intimidation, and transparency in the counting of ballots and tabulation
of results.28 Previous elections in Nigeria have been marred by various types of fraud, including
the falsification of voter information, bribery, theft, incitement, and the harassment of domestic
observers, opposition candidates, and supporters. Pre-election reports suggested that the 2011
elections would likely feature many of these practices, but that there might be a shift “from
blatant fraud with state acquiescence to a pattern of suppressing opposition voting areas while
inflating strongholds.”29 Despite ERC recommendations to increase the transparency and fairness
of the political parties’ primaries, the International Crisis Group declared that the recent round of
primaries were “as manipulated as ever,” resulting in numerous court challenges to the parties’
candidate lists.30 Last minute court rulings related to the candidate lists required the reprinting of
ballots and caused delays in the delivery of voting materials.
As mentioned above, there has been an unwritten agreement that the presidency should rotate
among the country’s regions. President Yar’Adua’s early demise and Jonathan’s assumption of the
post led many observers to debate whether Jonathan’s decision to vie for the presidency in 2011
would lead the ruling party to split. Prior to the PDP party primaries in January, many northerners
argued that since Yar’Adua was from the north and had only served one term, a candidate from
their region should hold the office for another term, given that Obasanjo, who was from the south,
had two terms in office. Some reports suggest that a lack of consensus among the ruling party
elite on the zoning issue and presidential succession contributed to the apparent reluctance by
Yar’Adua’s cabinet to formally transfer power to Jonathan in early 2010 (see below). Jonathan
ultimately won the support of key northern PDP leaders, including a majority of the northern
governors, for his candidacy, and in January 2011, he won the party primary overwhelmingly,
27 Stakeholder Democracy Network, The Delta Governorship Rerun: Signposts and Storm Warnings for the 2011
Elections, February 24, 2011. Observers credit, in part, a new alternative “accreditation voting” system that INEC has
adopted, under which all voters must check in at their polling station before voting can begin. Some observers n the
April elections found that this system required voters to stand in long lines midday and may have affected turnout in
some areas and disenfranchise certain segments of the population because of the additional time commitment. INEC
has acknowledged these concerns but has argued that the system increases transparency. See also ICG, “Nigeria’s
Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid.
28 See, e.g., IRI, “Statement of IRI’s Pre-Election Assessment Mission,” March 3, 2011; NDI, “Nigeria Election
Watch,” Issue 3, March 15, 2011.
29 Stakeholder Democracy Network, The Delta Governorship Rerun, Ibid.
30 ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid; NDI, “Nigeria Election Watch,” Issue 3, Ibid.
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with over 2,700 votes against roughly 800 for his northern rival, Atiku Abubakar.31 Jonathan
declared prior to the elections that he would not seek a second term in 2016.
President Jonathan, along with his running mate, Vice President Namadi Sambo (a northerner),
was among almost 20 candidates contesting the presidency, including Muhammadu Buhari,
representing the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC); former head of Nigeria’s anti-
corruption authority Nuhu Ribadu, representing the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN); and Kano
State Governor Ibrahim Shekaru, representing the ANPP. These three leading opposition
contenders all hail from the north and chose running mates from the south.
With over 73 million registered voters, almost 120,000 polling stations, and more than 50
political parties, the challenges in administering elections in Nigeria were daunting. The 2011
elections were scheduled to be held on three successive Saturdays, beginning April 2; however,
logistical delays in the delivery of materials to polling stations across the country resulted in the
delay of the April 2 legislative elections by a week, to April 9. This pushed the timing of the
presidential elections to April 16 and the gubernatorial and state assembly elections to April 26.
For some, the delay reinforced concerns regarding the credibility of the polls, but others argued
that the “trial run” allowed INEC the opportunity to identify and address some deficiencies,
particularly related to the voters’ register. Gubernatorial elections were not held in 10 states where
post-2007 election court cases led to the overturning of election results or the rerun of elections.32
The Results
The ruling PDP maintained its dominant position in Nigerian politics in the 2011 elections,
retaining the presidency, a majority of the seats declared, to date, in the National Assembly, and a
majority of the gubernatorial posts and state assemblies.33 The two main opposition parties, the
CPC and the ACN, made some significant regional gains, however. The ACN dominated the state
elections in the southwest, where the PDP retained a majority in only one of the state assemblies
and no longer holds any gubernatorial positions.34 Notably, the PDP lost former President
Obasanjo’s home state of Ogun. Nationally, opposition parties now control 13 of the powerful
governors’ posts and hold a majority in 10 of the state assemblies.35
31 Some reports suggest that Jonathan may have had an arrangement with the PDP governors to ensure his election by
their states’ delegates in return for his support for their own re-election campaigns. See ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections:
Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid. INEC dismissed a petition filed by Abubakar challenging Jonathan’s primary win.
32 Gubernatorial elections were not held in Adamawa, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Kogi, or Sokoto states, where rerun
elections were held after the 2007 elections; nor in Ondo, Osum, Edo, or Ekiti, where the current governors won
appeals overturning the 2007 results, nor in Anambra, which had its gubernatorial election in February 2010.
33 As of May 17, 2011, 72 Senate seats had been declared. The ruling PDP won 45, the ACN 13, and other parties 16.
Of the 234 seats declared for the House of Representatives, the PDP won 123 (52%), ACN 47 (20%), and other parties
64 seats.
34 Six states now have ACN governors: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Osun, and Oyo in the southwest, and Edo in the “south-
south” Niger Delta region. The Labor Party party holds the gubernatorial post in Ondo state. The 10 state assemblies
now controlled by opposition parties are: Anambra (APGA); Borno, Yobe, and Zamfara (ANPP); Edo, Ogun, Osun,
Lagos, and Ekiti (ACN); and Ondo (LP).
35 Opposition gubernatorial candidates took the following states in the April 2011 elections- Ogun, Oyo, and Lagos in
the southwest (ACN), Yobe in the north (ANPP), and Imo in the southeast (APGA). ANPP retained its control of the
gubernatorial posts in Borno and Zamfara. The CPC picked up Nasarawa from the ANPP. Osun, Ekiti, Ondo, Edo, and
Anambra were already held by opposition governors.
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Incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan won 59.6% of the presidential vote, taking a majority of
the votes cast in 23 states and gaining enough support nationwide to avoid a run-off.36 His closest
competitor, General Buhari, followed with 32.3% of the votes, taking the lead in one-third of the
states, notably, those in the north. The ACN’s Nuhu Ribadu came in third with 5.5% of the votes.
Figure 1. Results of the 2011 Presidential Election
Source: BBC, adapted by CRS.
U.S. government comments on the conduct of the 2011 elections have been largely positive.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that “This historic event marks a dramatic shift from
decades of failed elections and a substantial improvement” over the 2007 election, but noted that
“while this election was a success for the people of Nigeria, it was far from perfect.”37 Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson has called the polls “the most successful
36 Under Nigeria’s constitution, a presidential candidate must win at least 25% of votes cast in at least two-thirds of the
country’s states and the Federal Capital Territory. If they fail to do so, a run-off will be held. Jonathan gained at least
25% of the votes in 31 states. Buhari gained a quarter of the votes cast in only 18 states.
37 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Press Release: Election in Nigeria, April 19, 2011.
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elections since [Nigeria’s] return to multiparty democracy, ... despite some technical
imperfections,” and has argued that “this reverses a downward democratic trajectory and provides
the country a solid foundation for strengthening its electoral procedures and democratic
institutions.”38 President Obama called to congratulate President Jonathan in early May, stating
that “the success of the elections was a testament to Nigerian voters who...were determined that
these elections mark a new chapter in Nigerian history.”39
International observers have also generally noted significant improvements in the electoral
process in the National Assembly and presidential polls, but most have stopped short of calling
the elections “free and fair.” Observed irregularities, as reported by international observer groups,
do not appear to call into question the overall results of the legislative and presidential polls (most
international groups were not present for the state elections), although several legal challenges
have been filed. The IRI and NDI delegations both termed these elections a key step forward,
while documenting areas for improvement.40 The African Union delegation called the legislative
and presidential elections “credible and creditable and reflect(ing) the will of the Nigerian
people.”41 Commonwealth observers declared that “previously held notions that Nigeria can only
hold flawed elections are now being discarded and this country can now shake off that stigma and
redeem its image.”42 The European Union (EU) delegation was also generally positive, but raised
concerns with presidential results from some states in the Niger Delta and the southeast, where
turnout appeared to be near 100%.43 This echoes the findings of some of the domestic groups,
who reported the largest number of electoral incidents in the “south-south” (i.e., the Niger Delta)
and southeast states, including intimidation, harassment , and in some cases, violence, in Awka
Ibom, Delta, and Imo states.44 Under-age voting was cited as a common concern by observer
groups, and most suggested that over-crowding at polling stations and complicated vote collation
procedures vulnerable to error or malfeasance remained a problem during the polls. The EU
delegation, which remained for the state elections, found that those elections “did not resemble
the quality of the process and environment of the elections for President and National Assembly,”
noting the inconsistent implementation of procedures, numerous instances of underage voting,
and increased attempts to influence voters.45 Reports of domestic observer harassment and
intimidation increased in the state elections.
General Buhari's party has challenged the presidential results of states in the south-south and
southeast, where it claims the totals are inflated. The CPC is also challenging the gubernatorial
results in two northern states, Katsina and Niger. The ACN party is challenging the gubernatorial
results in the southern state of Akwa Ibom, where several major acts of violence occurred before
38 Special Briefing by Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, “The Recent Elections in Nigeria,” April 28, 2011.
39 The White House, Statement by President Obama on Elections in Nigeria, May 4, 2011.
40 IRI, “Nigerian Election Major Step Forward,” April 18, 2011; NDI, “Statement of the National Democratic
Institute’s International Election Observer Mission to Nigeria’s April 16 Presidential Election,” April 18, 2011.
41 African Union, “Preliminary Statement of the African Union Observer Mission on the 2011 Presidential Election in
Nigeria,” April 16, 2011.
42 The Commonwealth, Interim Statement by H.E. Festus Mogae, Chairman, Commonwealth Observer Group, April
18, 2011.
43 European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission, “Preliminary Statement: Important Steps Toward Strengthening
Democratic Elections, but Challenges Remain,” April 18, 2011.
44 See, e.g., the reports of Project 2011 Swift Count at http://www.pscnigeria.org and the Transition Monitoring Group
at http://www.tmgelection2011.org.
45 EU Election Observation Mission, Press Release: EU EOM on the Elections of 26 and 28 April, April 29, 2011.
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the election. Several challenges related to National Assembly races have also been filed, and
INEC is reportedly pursing prosecutions for a range of election-related crimes. When the
Electoral Reform Committee issued its findings in 2008, it noted that the Nigerian government
had not convicted and punished a single individual for election-related offenses since
independence.46 Human Rights Watch reported that under Jega’s leadership, INEC had initiated
criminal proceedings against several dozen individuals in the six months prior to the 2011
elections, but that “these cases have barely scratched the surface.”47 Civil society has called on
the courts to resolve election petitions and appeals in a timely manner, but some suggest that the
mounting elections-related caseload threatens to overwhelm the judiciary.
Election Violence
Despite generally positive preliminary statements on the conduct and orderly nature of the April
2011 legislative and presidential elections, election-related violence surrounding the polls was
higher than in previous years and highlights lingering communal tensions. Rioting that broke out
in the north in protest of President Jonathan’s win emphasizes grievances that many in that region
feel have been left unaddressed by the ruling party. The international community has condemned
the violence and stressed that the government must conduct an impartial inquiry into the post-
election violence and hold perpetrators accountable.
Previous elections have been accompanied by an increase in political violence. Over 150 people
were estimated to have been killed in violence related to the 2003 elections, and by some
estimates, as many as 350 people may have been killed in violence related to the 2007 polls.48
Violence prior to the 2011 elections included clashes between party supporters and several
assassinations. Poll-related security concerns were further heightened by a spate of bombings
during political rallies, predominantly in Bayelsa state in the Delta. There were at least six
bombings in April in Borno state in the north (most in the capital, Maidiguri), where Boko
Haram, a local militant Islamist group, has been most active. Boko Haram claimed responsibility
in January for the assassination of the state’s leading gubernatorial candidate and several of his
supporters. On the eve of the legislative elections, a bombing at the state election commission
headquarters in Niger state killed at least 10 people. President Jonathan and Chairman Jega had
both pledged to increase security during the elections, and observers generally commented
positively on the presence and behavior of security forces during the polls.
Prior to the 2011 elections, some Nigeria watchers argued that the de-facto suspension of the
zoning arrangement could increase the potential for regional and ethnic conflict, making the
presidential contest “more dangerous and destabilizing” as voters faced the choice of a southern,
Christian candidate running against a field of primarily northern, Muslim presidential
contenders.49 Others argued that Nigeria’s political parties are geographically, as well as
religiously, diverse, and that, in order to win, any presidential candidate must be able to draw
support not just from one region or voting bloc, but from across the country.50 They also noted
46 Report of the Electoral Reform Committee, “Volume 1, Main Report,” December 2008.
47 HRW, A Human Rights Agenda for Candidates in Nigeria’s 2011 Elections, Ibid.
48 HRW, “Nigeria: Pass Bill to Prosecute Electoral Abuses,” March 13, 2011.
49 John Campbell, “Nigeria: Closer to the Brink?” Rowman & Littlefield, November 12, 2010, and “Nigeria’s
Goodluck Jonathan Gets the PDP Nomination,” Huffington Post, January 21, 2011.
50 Howard F. Jeter and Gwendolyn Mikell, “ Nigeria on the Brink: a Rejoinder,” September 27, 2010.
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that a southern candidate, Obasanjo, ran against a northern candidate, Buhari, in the 2003 election
without major upheaval.
Protests erupted in Nigeria's northern states on April 17, 2011, the day after the presidential
election, with supporters of General Buhari, a northern Muslim, alleging that the ruling party had
rigged the election to favor President Jonathan, a southern Christian. The protests devolved into
violent riots and, in some areas, killings, largely along religious and ethnic lines. In some parts of
the north, the violence lasted for three days until soldiers were deployed to enforce stability. At
least 800 people were killed during those three days, according Human Rights Watch, and as
many as 65,000 temporarily displaced.51 The highest level of violence recorded was in Kaduna
state, with as many as 500 killed in sectarian clashes in the southern part of the state, and more
than 180 killed in northern Kaduna. There was also significant property destruction, including the
burning of villages, in some areas of Kaduna, a state with a roughly equal population of Muslims
and Christians that had not seen a major outbreak of violence in almost a decade.52 Dozens were
reportedly killed in riots in several other northern states, including Bauchi. Among the dead in
Bauchi state were ten members of the National Youth Service Corps (university graduates who
are required to perform a year of national service), who were reportedly targeted because they had
served as poll workers. Human Rights Watch has documented reports in three states (Kaduna,
Bauchi, and Gombe) of police and soldiers beating people who had been detained during the
riots. State elections (gubernatorial and state assembly) in Kaduna and Bauchi were postponed
from April 26 to April 28 to allow for a lowering of tensions and improved security. Turnout in
those elections was low, and in both cases, the ruling PDP retained control of both the
governorship and the state assembly.
Domestic and international human rights groups have launched investigations into the causes and
perpetrators of the post-election violence, and President Jonathan has named an independent
panel led by a prominent Islamic scholar to conduct an official government inquiry. Additional
assessments may be conducted by the office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
and the UN Special Advisor of the Prevention of Genocide.
51 Human Rights Watch, “Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed 800,” May 16, 2011.
52 In 2000, an estimated 2,000 people were killed in Kaduna in clashes sparked by the introduction of Islamic law in the
state. In 2002, some 250 people were reportedly killed in religious violence during protests against the Miss World
pageant, which Nigeria was to have hosted (the event was moved to London).
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The Death of President Yar’Adua and the Transition of Power
Questions about President Yar’Adua’s health plagued his administration throughout his tenure. Many speculate that
he suffered from a chronic kidney condition, and when he was hospitalized in Saudi Arabia in November 2009,
reportedly with acute pericarditis (inflammation of the lining around the heart), his absence threatened to spark a
political crisis. His prolonged absence from public view spurred rumors of his death before he ostensibly held an
interview from Saudi Arabia, via BBC radio, on January 12, 2010. Government officials reported that he was
responding to treatment and recuperating, but questions as to his fitness to govern grew. The Nigerian Bar
Association and a prominent human rights lawyer launched legal suits suggesting that Yar’Adua had violated the
constitution by not official y transferring power to his Vice President during his absence.53 Further constitutional
questions were raised about several judicial appointments, including that of a new chief justice of the Supreme
Court.54 Some observers contend that the president was incapacitated, and that a group of close advisors including
his wife, who strictly controlled access to the president, were making decisions on his behalf.55
President Yar’Adua’s continued absence also raised concerns regarding a tenuous ceasefire with Niger Delta militants.
During his hospitalization abroad, Yar’Adua reportedly signed the government’s 2009 supplemental budget, which
contained several projects earmarked for the troubled region. Some opposition leaders questioned whether the
president actually signed the document himself.56 In early January 2010, one of the Delta’s militant factions claimed
responsibility for the bombing of an oil pipeline in Rivers State, calling the attack a “warning strike,” noting the
president’s absence, and suggesting that a “meaningful dialogue” on the region’s problems had yet to occur.57 The
militants threatened to continue attacks until Goodluck Jonathan was named acting president or until Yar’Adua
returned to office.
Pressure for President Yar’Adua to transfer presidential authority until he recovered increased in early February
2010. Vice President Jonathan had presided over cabinet meetings after Yar’Adua’s departure, and he used executive
powers in January to deploy troops to quel sectarian violence in Jos, but he had not moved to assume ful authority.
At the behest of the Senate, the cabinet declared Yar’Adua fit for office in late January, and a Nigerian court ruled that
there was no need for a formal transfer of power during the president’s “medical vacation.” Nevertheless, the
country’s influential state governors met in early February, issuing a call for the vice president to become acting
president. Under pressure from the governors, the National Assembly subsequently passed resolutions recognizing
Jonathan as the acting head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The cabinet accepted the National
Assembly’s decision. Although the resolutions were not legally binding and could ultimately be questioned in court,
the move al owed Jonathan to conduct critical government business. In one of his first acts as acting head of state,
Jonathan replaced the influential justice minister, who was reportedly among the most vocally opposed to the formal
transfer of power. In June 2010, in response to the ambiguity surrounding Jonathan’s assumption of duties as acting
president, the parliament approved a constitutional amendment addressing procedures for the temporary transfer of
presidential powers to the vice president in the event of the president’s absence or inability to discharge his duties.
The U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria welcomed Goodluck Jonathan’s assumption of the title of acting president, calling
Nigeria’s commitment to constitutional process and the rule of law “commendable.”58 The Obama Administration
warned against efforts by others to “upset Nigeria’s stability and create renewed uncertainty in the democratic
process.”59 On May 5, 2010, the Nigerian government announced the death of ailing President Umaru Yar’Adua at age
58. Goodluck Jonathan was sworn in as Nigeria’s new president the following day, choosing as his vice president
Namadi Sambo, a former architect who was elected governor of the northern state of Kaduna in 2007.
53 Nigeria’s constitution requires the President to submit a written declaration to the Senate and the House of
Representatives delegating powers to the Vice President as Acting President in the event that he travels on vacation or
is unable to discharge the functions of his office, but there is no timeline identified for doing so. The National
Assembly passed an amendment to the constitution in June 2010 to provide more clarity to the procedure.
54 See, e.g., “How We Averted Chaos, by VP,” This Day (Abuja), January 4, 2010.
55 See, for example, John Campbell, “Nigeria Fragmented and Unstable,” Huffington Post, March 5, 2010, and “On Her
Majesty’s Secret Service,” Africa Confidential, March 5. 2010.
56 “Buhari, Atiku Doubt Signing of Budget by Yar’Adua,” This Day, January 4, 2010.
57 “MEND’s Fresh Resurgence As Yar’Adua’s Absence Enters 2nd Month,” AllAfrica, January 4, 2010.
58 Press Statement by the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, February 12, 2010.
59 State Department Daily Press Briefing, February 26, 2010; State Department Spokesman, “Political Situation in
Nigeria, March , 2010; and Briefing by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs on February 24, 2010.
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Development Challenges and Reform Initiatives
Nigeria has the second-largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa and generates over $60 billion a
year in oil and gas revenue, and yet many of its people are among the continent’s poorest. As
many as 70% of Nigerians live beneath the poverty line, and the average life expectancy is less
than 47 years. Nigeria has the world’s second-largest HIV/AIDS population (after South Africa).
Access to clean water remains a major challenge—almost half the population has no access to
improved sources of water and only 17% of households are served by piped water. Sanitation is
also a problem, with 30% of people lacking access to adequate sanitation. Diarrhea remains the
second-leading cause of death among Nigerian children, and the country ranks second only to
India in the number of diarrhea-related child deaths globally. The country ranks 142 of 169
countries on U.N. Development Program’s (UNDP) 2010 Human Development Index.60 Due to
decades of economic mismanagement, political instability, and widespread corruption, Nigeria’s
education and social services systems have suffered from lack of funding, industry has idled, and
Africa’s largest oil producer suffers periodically from severe fuel and electricity shortages.
When Goodluck Jonathan assumed power in February 2010 from the ailing President Yar’Adua,
he made public commitments to “restoring Nigeria’s image” abroad, both by continuing to act as
a key partner in regional peace and counterterrorism efforts, and by ending the “culture of
impunity” in Nigeria by addressing corruption and human rights concerns.61 He vowed to
continue President Yar’Adua’s various reform initiatives. Those efforts are discussed below.
Reforms to the Petroleum and Energy Sectors
Nigeria’s economy depends heavily on its oil sector, and for decades, as the country’s extractive
industries grew, many of its other industries stagnated or declined. According to the World Bank,
oil and gas production accounts for 85% of government revenues and 95% of export earnings, but
the sector’s share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has fallen because of decreased output,
which does not meet the country’s estimated oil production capacity of three million barrels per
day (bdp). Despite increased deepwater oil production, persistent conflict and criminality in the
oil-producing Niger Delta region and swings in world oil prices have threatened Nigeria’s fiscal
outlook. According to the IMF, annual GDP growth fell from 7% in 2007 to an estimated 6% in
2008, but rose to an estimated 8.4% in 2010. Economists suggest that the economy continues to
underperform because of poor infrastructure and electricity shortages, although the manufacturing
and telecommunications sectors have performed better in recent years. Agricultural production
contributes over one-third of GDP, but less than 5% of exports.
President Jonathan has stressed his commitment to reforming the oil and gas industry. In 2007,
the government announced plans to restructure the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC), which oversees regulation of the industry and has been criticized for its lack of
transparency. President Yar’Adua appointed a committee to review Nigeria’s contracts with
foreign oil companies, a process through which the committee chair suggested, “we may have to
reconsider some of our generous terms.”62 President Jonathan appointed Nigeria’s first female oil
60 The UNDP index is a composite measure of life expectancy, adult literacy and school enrollment, and income.
61 President Jonathan has referred to Nigeria’s “culture of impunity” in several speeches, including one quoted in
“Again, We’ve Succeeded in Moving Nigeria Forward - Jonathan,” Daily Champion (Lagos), February 10, 2010.
62 Matthew Green, “Nigeria Considers Oil Contracts Review,” Financial Times, October 23, 2007.
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minister, Diezani Allison-Madueke, a former executive with Royal Dutch Shell, in 2010. She is
leading the administration’s efforts to press parliament to pass the ambitious Petroleum Industry
Bill (PIB), which would restructure the NNPC and reportedly increase transparency within the
industry. Nigeria was designated compliant with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI), a global standard for transparency in the oil, gas, and mining sectors, in March 2011.
Despite its position as one of the world’s largest exporters of oil, Nigeria imports an estimated
$10 billion in refined fuel annually, and it continues to face a nationwide power crisis.63 In an
effort to increase its refining capacity, the government has granted permits for the construction of
several independently owned refineries. The government aims to halt oil imports by 2020. The
Jonathan Administration has also pledged to increase Nigeria’s electricity generation tenfold over
the next decade, and President Jonathan emphasized this as a key priority in his 2011 presidential
campaign. Efforts to privatize power stations and distribution companies are underway, despite
objections from the country’s trade unions. The Obama Administration recently praised the
Nigerian government for its progress in rehabilitating the power sector.64 In 2010, with two of
Nigeria’s existing four oil refineries running at only 60% capacity, the NNPC signed an
agreement worth an estimated $23 billion with China for the construction of three new
refineries.65 Nigeria is also in the process of increasing its liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports,
which are expected to surpass revenues derived from oil exports in the next decade. Nigeria now
exports natural gas to Benin, Togo, and Ghana through the new West Africa Gas Pipeline. The
initiative, led by Chevron, had been delayed due to supply shortages resulting from sabotage to
production facilities in the Niger Delta. Reports suggest that gas supplies have increased as
pipelines have been repaired since 2009.
Financial Sector Reforms
Successive Nigerian administrations have made commitments to economic reform, but their track
record is mixed. According to the IMF, reforms initiated under the Obasanjo Administration and
continued by his successors, most importantly the policies of maintaining low external debt and
budgeting based on a conservative oil price benchmark to create a buffer of foreign reserves,
lessened the impact of the recent global economic crisis on Nigeria’s economy.66 Oil revenues
above the benchmark price have been saved since 2003 in an Excess Crude Account (ECA),
although the government drew substantially from the account in 2009-2010 in an effort to
stimulate economic recovery. The ECA’s balance fell from $20 billion in early 2009 to less than
$500 million in September 2010, but Nigerian officials report that the rise in the price of oil
brought the ECA back above $2 billion at the end of 2010.67 The country has made significant
gains in paying down its external debt, which declined from 36% of GDP in 2004 to 2.2% in
2010. By paying down its external debt, the Nigerian government has freed over $750 million for
63 Jon Gambrell, “Nigeria, China sign $23B Deal to Build Refineries in Oil Rich, but Gasoline-Starved Nation,”
Associated Press, May 14, 2010.
64 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Commends Nigerian Authorities on Power Sector Reforms,” January 14, 2011.
65 “Two Nigerian Refineries Running at 60 Pct Capacity,” Reuters, March 30, 2010.
66 International Monetary Fund, “Staff Report for the Article IV Consultation with Nigeria,” January 27, 2011. The
price benchmarks set by the Nigerian government are $58/barrel for 2011, $60 for 2012, and $62 for 2013.
67 EIU, “Nigeria,” Country Reports, March 2011.
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programs aimed at poverty reduction and reaching the country’s Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), according to the World Bank.68
Like his predecessors, President Jonathan has committed his Administration to reforms that aim
to fuel development. He named a former Goldman Sachs official, Olusegun Aganga, as finance
minister to lead the reforms, which include an audit of the NNPC and the proposed creation of a
sovereign wealth fund. Jonathan retained Lamido Sanusi, appointed under President Yar’Adua as
governor of Central Bank of Nigeria, who has led efforts to modernize the country’s banking
system. He has pushed reforms to tighten banking supervision and in late 2009 instituted new
regulations that require banks to report large cash transactions between accounts if one of the
account holders is considered to be “politically exposed.” Bank audits ordered by Sanusi in 2009
found 10 banks near collapse due to reckless lending; most of the banks’ top executives were
fired. The government provided $4 billion in 2009 to rescue the banks, and in December 2010,
under pressure from Sanusi, the parliament approved the establishment of the Asset Management
Company of Nigeria (AMCON) to buy bad bank loans in exchange for government bonds, in an
effort to get the banks lending again. AMCON is jointly funded by the central bank and the
finance ministry. Some analysts expect it to take up to a decade for AMCON to divest itself of all
its toxic assets, which total over $14 billion.69 The government is pursuing debtors and
prosecuting several bank executives.
Efforts to Combat Corruption
According to the U.S. State Department, corruption in Nigeria is “massive, widespread, and
pervasive.”70 In 2008, Nigeria’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index improved from 147 to 121 out of 180 countries, but it fell in 2009, and again in 2010, to a
ranking of 134.71 Nigeria also has one of the world’s highest incidences of cyber crime, including
“419 scams,” so-named for the country’s penal code that outlaws fraudulent e-mails. For years
observers have suggested that the country’s development will be hindered until it can reverse its
perceived “culture of impunity for political and economic crimes.”72
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), a Nigerian law enforcement agency
created in 2003 to combat corruption and fraud, has estimated that over $380 billion has been
expropriated by political and military leaders since oil sales began in the 1970s.73 Former dictator
Sani Abacha reportedly stole more than $3.5 billion during the course of his five years in power.
Switzerland was the first country to repatriate stolen funds to Nigeria and has returned over $700
million since 2005. According to a study by the World Bank, a significant percentage of those
funds have been used by the Nigerian government toward meeting the country’s Millennium
Development Goals. The government has also recovered funds stolen by Abacha and his family
from the autonomous British island of Jersey and from Luxembourg. Other Abacha funds remain
68 World Bank, “Nigeria: Country Brief,” April 2010, available at http://www.worldbank.org.
69 AMCON bought non-performing loans from 9 rescued banks and margin loans from 12 other domestic banks. EIU,
“Nigeria, Ibid.
70 U.S. State Department, “Nigeria,” Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2009, March 2010.
71 The Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceptions of business people and country analysts regarding the
degree of corruption among public officials and politicians. A high score indicates greater levels of corruption.
72 International Crisis Group, “Want in the Midst of Plenty,” Africa Report No. 113, July 19, 2006.
73 “Strong Convictions: Nigeria’s First Anticorruption Czar,” Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 2007.
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frozen in accounts in Europe. In late 2009, a Swiss court convicted Abacha’s son of participating
in a criminal organization and seized $350 million in assets stolen from Nigeria.
The Nigerian government won praise under President Obasanjo for some of its efforts to combat
the rampant corruption that has plagued Nigeria, but some charge that the former head of state
used corruption charges to sideline critics and political opponents. Investigations by the EFCC
resulted in the arrest of over 2,000 responsible for illegal email scams and in over 130 convictions
for fraud during Obasanjo’s tenure.74 However, the International Crisis Group (ICG) suggested
that the EFCC was “used as a political weapon to whip political foes, especially state governors
likely to stand for the presidency and their supporters, into line.”75 Five state governors, some of
whom were considered contenders for the PDP presidential nomination, were impeached in 2005-
2006 for corruption.76 ICG charged that the impeachments, three of which were reversed in
appeals courts, were conducted under heightened military presence in those states and lacked due
process.77 Under President Obasanjo the EFCC conducted investigations into the alleged financial
crimes of 31 of the country’s 36 state governors; several were prosecuted. In February 2007, the
EFCC released a list of 135 candidates in the April elections who were “unfit to hold public office
because of corruption,” of which 53 were PDP and 82 opposition candidates.78 The legality of
INEC’s decision to bar candidates on the EFCC’s list from the elections was questioned.
President Yar’Adua, reportedly a devout Muslim, campaigned on a platform of fighting
corruption; in 1999 he became the first governor to publicly declare his assets before he was
sworn in. Upon taking office, he ordered the review of all privatization agreements approved by
former President Obasanjo, amid charges of corruption associated with the sales, and
subsequently reversed several contracts. President Yar’Adua moved to distance himself from the
former president, dismissing many of Obasanjo’s political appointees and military leaders in late
2008 and overturning several key government contracts made by the former administration. In
December 2008, he proposed that the National Assembly amend the constitution to remove the
immunity clause which prevents the president, vice president, governors, and deputy governors
from being prosecuted for corruption while in office. The proposal has not been adopted.
In late 2007, Nigeria’s Inspector General of Police announced that EFCC head Nuhu Ribadu was
being transferred from his post. Some questioned whether Ribadu’s transfer was linked to his
order two weeks earlier for the arrest of former Delta State Governor James Ibori, one of the
primary financial contributors to Yar’Adua’s presidential campaign. The Executive Director of
the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime wrote a letter to President Yar’Adua suggesting Ribadu’s
removal could be detrimental to ongoing investigations and might damage the reputation of the
EFCC in the view of international donors.79 Ribadu was later dismissed from the police service.
The EFCC continued to prosecute high profile cases after Ribadu’s departure, and several EFCC
operatives were reportedly murdered in retaliation in early 2010. In early 2008, the commission
ordered the arrest of Lucky Igbinedion, former governor of Edo State, who is alleged to have
stolen $25 million in state funds. He later submitted a plea bargain and was released with a fine.
74 “Strong Convictions: Nigeria’s First Anti-Corruption Czar,” Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 2007.
75 ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding A Political Crisis,” Ibid.
76 The impeached governors represented Bayelsa, Oyo, Ekiti, Anambra, and Plateau States.
77 ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding A Political Crisis,” Ibid.
78 “Strong Convictions: Nigeria’s First Anticorruption Czar,” Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 2007.
79 Matthew Green, “Nigerian Anti-Graft Police Arrest Governor,” Reuters, January 22, 2008.
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In June 2008, the Nigerian Senate unanimously approved the appointment of a former high-
ranking police officer, Farida Waziri, to replace Ribadu as EFCC Chair. Some in Nigerian civil
society alleged that Waziri was appointed to derail the prosecution of Ibori and others.80 Ibori’s
case was dropped by a federal judge in December 2009, but the EFCC obtained a new warrant for
his arrest in April 2010, alleging that Ibori embezzled over $250 million. Ibori eluded capture
after his armed supporters reportedly exchanged fire with Nigerian security forces. He fled
Nigeria and was arrested by Interpol in Dubai in May 2010. He was extradited in April 2011 to
the United Kingdom, where he has been charged with money laundering.
Several senior leaders of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) have faced charges of
corruption, including Vincent Ogbulafor, who resigned as national party chairman in 2010 to
stand trial for fraud during his tenure as a government minister in 2001.81 Ogbulafor’s former
deputy and now acting PDP chairman, Dr. Bello Mohammed, a former communications minister,
was reportedly questioned in 2010 in relation to bribes paid to government officials by the
German telecommunications firm Siemens. In 2009, a Nigerian court sentenced former PDP
Chairman Olabode George, a close ally of Obasanjo, to 2.5 years in prison for misuse of $500
million in public funds during his tenure as head of the Nigerian Ports Authority. Former
President Obasanjo himself has not escaped charges of corruption. In 2007, a Nigerian Senate
committee report recommended that both Obasanjo and Atiku Abubakar be prosecuted for illegal
use of government funds. Obasanjo rejected the charges. Other parliamentary panels have
investigated allegations of corruption during his tenure as president. His daughter, who chaired
Nigeria’s Senate Health Committee, was charged by the EFCC in 2008 with fraud; she lost her
Senate seat in the 2011 elections.
Several multinational corporations have been investigated for paying bribes in Nigeria. In
December 2007, Nigeria suspended its contracts with Siemens after a German court found the
company guilty of paying an estimated 10 million euro in bribes to Nigerian officials between
2001 and 2004.82 An alleged bribery case involving a Nigerian gas plant is being investigated in
several countries, including France, Nigeria, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The companies
involved in the natural gas project and the alleged bribery include Halliburton; Total of France;
and Italy’s Eni. The U.S. Justice Department led the probe into Halliburton’s role, and officials
have reported evidence of bribes paid.83 Halliburton and Kellogg, Brown, and Root, Inc. (KBR)
reached a $177 million settlement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in
February 2009 related to the case, and KBR paid a $402 million fine to settle the Justice
Department charges.84 The EFCC brought charges against former U.S. Vice President Dick
Cheney in early December 2010 related to his tenure as chief executive of Halliburton, but later
dropped them after the company agreed to pay $250 million in fines.
80 See, for example, “Nigerian Group Criticizes Choice of a New Corruption Chief,” VOA News, May 27, 2008.
81 Ogbulafor maintains that the charges were politically motivated as part of an internal PDP power struggle.
82 “Nigeria to Blacklist Siemens After Bribery Scandal,” Reuters, December 5, 2007.
83 “The Gas Ghost Keeps Haunting,” Africa Confidential, May 9, 2008.
84 “Halliburton, KBR Paying $547 Million in Bribery Settlement,” Market Watch, February 11, 2009.
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Social Issues and Security Concerns
Islamic Sharia Law
Nigeria is home to Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest Muslim population. Twelve of Nigeria’s states in
the Sunni Muslim-dominated north of the country have adopted Islamic sharia law since 1999 to
adjudicate criminal and civil matters for Muslims.85 Non-sharia based common law and
customary law courts adjudicate cases involving non-Muslims in these states, and sharia-based
criminal law courts are elective for non-Muslims. In some states, the introduction of sharia
proved to be a flashpoint between Muslims and Christians. The introduction of sharia has also
resulted in much-publicized rulings, several of which have been criticized by human rights groups
as well as by Nigerians in the southern and mostly Christian part of the country. The State
Department reports that sharia “technically does not apply to non-Muslims in civil and criminal
proceedings,” although observers acknowledge that Islamic mores are often enforced in public
without regard for citizens’ religion. In some areas, state-funded vigilante groups known as
hisbah patrol public areas and attempt to enforce sharia rulings.
While some sharia courts have issued controversial stoning and amputation sentences, the U.S.
State Department reports that none of the stoning sentences have been implemented.86 In 2002,
Amina Lawal was sentenced to death by stoning after a court in Katsina State found her guilty of
adultery. In 2003, Ms. Lawal appealed her sentence to the state Appeals Court and won after the
court ruled her conviction invalid. In another highly publicized case, a sharia court in Sokoto
sentenced Safiya Hussaini to death for adultery in 2001. Ms. Hussaini appealed her sentence and
was exonerated on the grounds that she was impregnated by her former husband and that the
affair took place before sharia law was enacted. Despite such cases, many observers see the
interpretation and implementation of Nigerian sharia as moderate in comparison to that of some
other Islamic countries.
Sectarian Violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt
In May 2009, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom recommended that
Nigeria be classified as a “Country of Particular Concern” for religious freedom violations. It is
not currently designated as such by the Secretary of State. According to the commission, as many
as 12,000 Nigerians have been killed since 1999 in sectarian violence, and the commissioners
based the CPC recommendation on their belief that the country is tolerating this violence.
According to their 2010 report, “Not a single criminal, Muslim or Christian, has been convicted
and sentenced in Nigeria’s ten years of religious violence. Therein lies the problem. The Nigerian
government and judicial system have so far been unwilling or unable to protect either side.”87
The report cites hundreds of recent deaths in sectarian violence in Jos, the capital of Plateau State
in central Nigeria, which sits between the predominately Muslim north and Christian south.
85 These states are Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara. Nigerian
law protects freedom of religion and permits states to establish courts based on common law or customary law systems.
86 As of December 2009, only one amputation sentence had been carried out, involving a victim who refused to appeal
his conviction, according to the U.S. State Department, “Nigeria,” 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
87 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2010, May 2010.
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Violence between communities in this “Middle Belt” in the past decade reflects tensions that are
not only religious, but also ethnic, and which are exacerbated by some local politicians. These
tensions stem from a competition over resources—land, education, government jobs—between
ethnic groups classified as settlers or “indigene” (original inhabitants of the state), a designation
that conveys political and economic benefits. In Jos, the mostly Christian Berom are considered
indigene, and the predominately Muslim Hausa-Fulani, who were traditionally nomadic and
pastoralist, are not. According to Human Rights Watch, over 1,000 were killed in inter-communal
fighting and targeted killings in Plateau State in 2010.88
The State Department, in its November 2010 Religious Freedom report, found that “the
government generally respected religious freedom in practice, although local political actors
stoked sectarian violence with impunity, occasionally using religion as a catalyst, especially in the
Middle Belt region.” The report states that the hostility between Christians and Muslims
“increased and involved the targeting of religious symbols and spaces” in 2010, and that the
sectarian violence in parts of the country “heightened tensions between religious groups, even in
parts of the country without violence.”
The death toll from sectarian clashes in Nigeria in the last decade has been high, although exact
figures are unavailable. By some estimates, over 8,000 were killed in clashes between 1999 and
2002.89 In Plateau State alone, as many as 3,800 have been killed in the past decade.90 Among the
more recent outbreaks of violence, disputed local elections spurred unrest in November 2008 that
may have resulted in as many as 700 deaths. Violence in Jos and surrounding villages broke out
again in early 2010, displacing an estimated 18,000 and resulting in 300-500 deaths in January
and several hundred in March. In response, the Nigerian government established a special task
force composed of both military and police in May 2010 to restore stability in the state.91 The
latest round of clashes were sparked by bombings in Christian areas of Jos on December 24 that
killed 80. Revenge attacks by both sides have followed, and the Muslim community has called for
the ouster of the current governor, whom they view as ignoring the violence.
Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria
In July 2009, religious clashes erupted in the northern states of Bauchi, Borno, and Yobe,
reportedly resulting in at least 700 deaths and the displacement of several thousand. The clashes
originated in Bauchi state between police and a Muslim sect, Boko Haram (“Western education is
forbidden”), also known as the “Nigerian Taliban,” which aims to overthrow the government and
impose sharia throughout the country. Alleged attempts by militants to storm police stations and
other government buildings led to rioting and street battles with security forces. The group’s
leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed by police in the northern city of Maiduguri. Some contend
that his death was an extrajudicial killing, a charge that the police deny (see “Abuses by Security
Forces” below).92 Following the clashes, local religious and traditional leaders announced plans
to establish a preaching board composed of Islamic leaders and scholars to vet clerics. Violence
88 HRW, “Nigeria: New Wave of Violence Leaves 200 Dead,” January 27, 2011. The report stated than in addition to
the more than 1,000 deaths in 2010, over 200 were killed between December 24 and late January 2011.
89 ICG, “Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty,” Africa Report No. 113, July 19, 2006.
90 HRW, Nigeria: New Wave of Violence Leaves 200 Dead,” Ibid.
91 The task force has a website: http://www.specialtaskforceonplateaustate.gov.ng.
92 “Islamic Death ‘Good for Nigeria’,” BBC, July 31, 2009.
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between security forces and members of another Islamic sect reported to hold beliefs similar to
those of Boko Haram in Bauchi state in late December 2009 resulted in over 40 deaths.93
Boko Haram appears to have reemerged, claiming responsibility in September 2010 for a major
prison raid in Bauchi that resulted in 700 prisoners being freed, including a number of Boko
Haram members. The group has also claimed responsibility for the January 2011 assassination of
a gubernatorial candidate in the state, and has staged attacks on public buildings and police
stations and bombings during the April 2011 elections. Its current size and strength are unknown.
Boko Haram currently appears to pose more of a threat to local stability than to the country as a
whole. Nevertheless, there are concerns that the group may seek to align itself with more
developed violent Islamist groups. One of its purported leaders has expressed respect for Al
Qaeda (AQ) and Osama Bin Laden, and in February 2010 the leader of the regional AQ affiliate
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) publicly offered the group assistance.94
The international media focused on concerns regarding the possible radicalization of Nigerian
Muslims following the attempted terrorist attack on an American airliner by a Nigerian passenger,
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, on December 25, 2009. According to reports, Abdulmutallab, son
of a respected Nigerian banker and former government minister, became “radicalized” while
living abroad, most recently in Yemen, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claims to
have sponsored his attempt to detonate an explosive device while onboard a flight bound from
Amsterdam to Detroit. Abdulmutallab’s father reported concerns about his son’s radicalization to
the U.S. embassy and others in November 2009. The attempted attack, allegedly scheduled to
coincide with Christmas Day, raised questions regarding airport security in both the Netherlands
and Nigeria, where Abdulmutallab’s journey began. Both countries began using full body
scanners in their international airports in 2010. The attempt also led to increased screening
measures at airports around the world. In January 2010, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) announced that passengers flying to the United States who are citizens of 14 countries
deemed to be either “state sponsors of terrorism” or “countries of interest” would be subject to
additional screening, including compulsory “pat-downs.” Nigeria was among five African
countries, including Algeria, Libya, Sudan, and Somalia, included in the new regulation, and the
Nigerian government protested the rule as discriminatory.95 In April 2010, DHS announced new
security measures for screening all passengers on international flights to the United States,
superseding the regulations that specifically targeted Nigerians for further screening.96
Abdulmutallab’s actions are considered by most to be an isolated incident, and many observers
stress that, by all accounts, Abdulmutallab’s radicalization and training took place outside
Nigeria. Nevertheless, the expansion of conservative Sunni Islamist movements and clashes
between security forces and Islamist sects in northern Nigeria have raised concerns among some
observers and officials that other Nigerians may be susceptible to recruitment by Al Qaeda or
other groups hoping to use violence against government or civilian targets in Nigeria or abroad.
93 “Death Toll From Nigeria Clashes Rises to 40 – Red Cross,” Reuters, December 30, 2009.
94 “Fertile Ground: The Potential for Jihad in Nigeria,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 2010.
95 “Nigeria Criticizes ‘Unfair’ US Air Passenger Screening,” BBC, January 4, 2010.
96 DHS, “Secretary Napolitano Announces New Measures to Strengthen Aviation Security,” April 2, 2010.
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Conflict in the Niger Delta
Background of the Struggle
Oil from the southern Niger Delta region has accounted for over 75% of the country’s oil
production since the 1970s, and yet the area’s political history remains one of conflict and
marginalization. The Delta is home to an estimated 31 million people. Among them are the
Ogoni, an ethnic minority whose members have received international attention for their efforts to
highlight the extensive environmental damage done by oil extraction in the region. In 1994,
author and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, president of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni
People (MOSOP), and 14 others were accused of involvement in the murder of four prominent
Ogoni politicians. They pled not guilty, but nine, including Saro-Wiwa, were convicted and
sentenced to death in 1995 by the Ogoni Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal. The executions
sparked international outrage against the regime of dictator Sani Abacha, who was accused of
extensive human rights abuses. The United States recalled its ambassador and pushed for the U.N.
General Assembly to condemn Nigeria’s action. In 2009, Shell established a trust fund to benefit
the Ogoni people, part of a $15.5 million settlement in a New York court case related to the 1995
executions. The company maintains that it played no role in the executions or other abuses.
Criminality and Violence
Nigeria’s oil wealth has been a source of continuing political tension, protest, and criminality in
the Delta, where most of the country’s oil presently originates. The conflict has been linked to the
vandalism of oil infrastructures; massive, systemic production theft known as “oil bunkering,”
often abetted by state officials; protests over widespread environmental damage caused by oil
operations; hostage taking; and public insecurity and communal violence. Several thousand
people have been killed in pipeline explosions in southeast Nigeria since the late 1990s; the
largest single toll from an explosion was approximately 1,000 in October of 1998. These
explosions are triggered when people siphon off oil from holes punched in the above-ground
pipeline for personal use, resulting in a reported loss of some 100,000 barrels of oil per day.
In 1998, militants from the Delta’s largest ethnic group, the Ijaw, initiated “Operation Climate
Change,” triggering violent conflict between the Ijaw and the Nigerian military and disrupting oil
production in the region. Threats of an “all out war” against the government and the oil
companies by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, one of the leaders of that group, reportedly played a role in
the then-unprecedented rise in the world price of oil above $50 a barrel in 2004.97 The threat was
later called off after negotiations with the government. A new rebel movement, the Niger Delta
People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Dokubo-Asari, emerged in 2004, launching a series of
attacks against government forces and threatening to attack foreign oil workers. The NDPVF
demanded autonomy for the region and a share of oil revenues. An estimated 500 people were
reportedly killed in the ensuing violence, according to Amnesty International, though the Nigerian
government disputes this figure. Dokubo-Asari was arrested in September 2005 and charged with
plotting to overthrow the government. He was released on bail in June 2007, allegedly because of
his failing health, and upon his release he reportedly denounced the practice of hostage-taking in
the region and subsequently assisted in the government’s negotiations with militants.98
97 “Pumping Up the Oil Price; the Price of Oil,” The Economist, October 1, 2004.
98 “Freed Militant Opposes Kidnappings,” This Day, June 17, 2007.
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In November 2005, the Nigerian army deployed additional troops to the oil-rich Bayelsa State
after lawmakers began impeachment proceedings against State Governor Diepreye
Alamieyeseigha. British authorities had charged Alamieyeseigha, while visiting in London
months prior, with money laundering. The former governor, who returned to Nigeria, was found
guilty of money laundering and embezzlement in 2007. He was later released by President
Yar’Adua on a plea bargain to help advance peace talks. The British government has returned
over $2 million in assets allegedly stolen by Alamieyeseigha to Nigerian authorities.
Conflict between the Delta’s militants and the Nigerian military escalated after early 2006, and
the kidnapping of foreign oil workers increased exponentially. A new rebel group, the Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), emerged in late 2005, using kidnappings to
bring international attention to its cause and to demand that the government release various
regional figures, including Dokubu-Asari and Alamieyeseigha. Media reports suggest over 300
foreigners were kidnapped between 2006 and 2009, including several American citizens.
Attacks on oil facilities by militant groups like the MEND have periodically cut Nigeria’s oil
production by as much as 25%, and analysts partially credit supply disruptions in Nigeria with
periodically raising the world price of oil.99 According to the State Department’s Coordinator for
International Energy Affairs, “If Nigeria was to produce oil at capacity, it would play a major role
in helping to lower and stabilize world oil prices.”100 Nigeria’s deep-water production has proven
vulnerable to militant attacks as well, as evidenced by attacks on Shell’s offshore Bongo platform,
and the threat of sea piracy is high. According to some estimates, up to 10% of Nigeria’s oil is
stolen every year, and some experts suggest that the heightened violence and criminality in the
Delta has been used to fund local political campaigns.101
From 2007 through mid-2009, militant activity in the Delta was punctuated with periodic
ceasefires and negotiations with the government. In June 2007, MEND declared a one-month
truce, declaring it would cease kidnappings and attacks on oil facilities during that period in
exchange for dialogue with the Yar’Adua government. As part of the truce, the group released
several hostages taken from a Chevron facility, including at least one American.102 The NDPVF
extended a similar 90-day truce offer a week later, and groups represented under the so-called
Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC) also declared a temporary ceasefire. Other smaller militant
groups remained active. In July 2007 the truce unraveled, and in August MEND announced that it
would resume attacks on oil installations. Gang violence in Port Harcourt, the region’s main city,
escalated into running street battles until government troops imposed a curfew on the city. Self-
described MEND spokesman Henry Okah was arrested in Angola in September 2007 on
suspicion of arms-trafficking. In December 2007, the Bayelsa state government announced the
signing of a peace agreement with the state’s militant groups, although MEND rejected the truce,
declaring it would increase its attacks until Okah, who was extradited to Nigeria in February
2008, was released. Street clashes erupted again in Port Harcourt in February (random violence in
99 See, for example, “Oil Steady Over 70 USD as Concerns about US Gasoline Supply, Nigeria Continue,” AFX News
Limited, May 22, 2007, and “Assault at Gas Pumps Related to Attacks on Nigerian Pipelines,” CNN, May 23, 2008.
100 David L. Goldwyn, testimony before the Senate Committee on ForeignRelations’ Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Washington, D.C., September 24, 2008.
101 Human Rights Watch, Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria, Vol. 19, No. 16(A),
October 2007.
102 “Nigerian Militants Free Six Hostages, Suspend Attacks for a Month,” Agence France Presse, June 2, 2007.
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the city has continued sporadically). MEND declared another cessation of hostilities in mid-2008,
but it suspended the ceasefire in January 2009.
Nigeria’s Joint Task Force (JTF), a special combined military and police unit established in 2004
to restore order in the Delta, launched a new offensive against militants in May 2009. Fighting
between security forces and militants, combined with JTF air and land strikes against militant
camps, displaced thousands, according to Amnesty International.103 Acts of sabotage by the
MEND and other militant groups increased in early 2009, cutting oil production by approximately
273,000 barrels per day.
Amnesty Offer for Delta Militants
In June 2009, President Yar’Adua extended an offer of amnesty to Delta militants; those who
surrendered their weapons, renounced violence, and accepted rehabilitation by October of that
year would be granted a presidential pardon, along with cash and job training. Within days, five
militant groups had announced their intention to accept amnesty. MEND initially rejected the
president’s gesture, but days after jailed MEND leader Henry Okah was pardoned and freed, in
July, the group announced a 60-day ceasefire. MEND has not collectively accepted the amnesty
offer, but several of its purported leaders have. According to Nigerian government estimates,
15,260 “militants” accepted the amnesty and turned in weapons by the October 2009 deadline;
the government ultimately aims to disarm 20,000.104 As acting president, Goodluck Jonathan
approved an initiative to spend $180 million on job training centers in the Delta, a key pledge in
the second phase of Yar’Adua’s amnesty and reconciliation plan, which focuses on the
rehabilitation of militants. The federal government’s ability to deliver on promised infrastructure
improvements and job creation will be critical to addressing regional grievances.
Oil output has increased in the wake of the amnesty offer, but observers warn that unless the root
causes of the conflict are addressed, further violence will follow.105 MEND attacks appear to be
on the rise again. MEND spokesman Jomo Gbomo, declaring that President Jonathan has
demonstrated that he is unwilling to address the issues of the Delta, has claimed responsibility for
several attacks on oil facilities and recent bombings, including explosions in Abuja on October 1,
2010, during celebrations marking Nigeria’s Independence Day, that left 12 dead. Gbomo claims
that MEND has issued warnings to Nigerian officials prior to the bombings to avoid loss of life.
MEND’s identity and composition has changed since it first emerged. Various militant groups in
the Niger Delta have claimed actions under the name of MEND, and analysts suggest that it is
now an umbrella group with a decentralized structure. Several high-profile militant commanders,
including Soboma George, Ateke Tom, and Government Ektemupolo (alias Tompolo), who were
rumored to be among MEND’s senior leadership, accepted the amnesty, raising questions about
the group’s current cohesiveness.106
103 Amnesty International, “Hundreds Feared Dead and Thousands Trapped in Niger Delta Fighting,” May 22, 2009.
104 “On the MEND: The Politics of Surrender in Nigeria,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 2009.
105 “In Niger Delta, Uneasy Peace as Rebel Disarmament Dates Nears,” Washington Post, July 27, 2009.
106 Soboma George was killed in August 2010, reportedly by men he had hired to kill two politicians in the region.
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Efforts to Address Environmental and Development Challenges
Oil production in the Delta has caused major damage to the area’s fragile riverine ecosystem, and
ultimately to the livelihoods of its inhabitants.107 Reports on the amount of crude leaked into the
Delta’s fragile ecosystem vary significantly and there is no accurate measure, but millions of
barrels of oil are believed to have been spilled since oil production began in Nigeria.108 Gas
flares, which burn unwanted natural gas when drilling for oil, have plagued the Delta with acid
rain and air pollution. This pollution has severely limited locals’ access to clean water, and has
largely destroyed the fishing stocks the majority of Delta inhabitants depended on to make a
living.109 In 2006, Shell Oil, which has the largest production capacity of the oil companies in
Nigeria, was ordered by a Nigerian federal court to pay $1.5 billion to compensate local
communities for environmental damage. President Yar’Adua announced in 2008 that Shell would
be replaced by another company in the oil fields of Ogoniland.110 In 2010, a Dutch court began
hearing a case against Shell related to a massive spill that occurred in the Delta in 2005. The
Dutch parliament held a hearing on Shell’s role in Delta oil spills in January 2011.
Under President Yar’Adua, the government took several important initial steps to engage the
Delta’s disaffected communities, efforts that activists hope the Jonathan Administration will
expand. An unprecedented 20% of Yar’Adua’s first federal budget proposal, for 2008, was
allocated for security and development projects in the Delta, although activists expressed concern
that the amount allocated for security far outweighed funds for development.111 A supplemental
2009 budget passed in November 2009 included more than $750 million for “post-amnesty
intervention.” The 2010 budget included some $1.2 billion for “post-amnesty development”
projects in the region, targeting transport, education, and health infrastructure. Concerns remain
regarding the government’s ability to spend the funds effectively.
Most observers agree that the crisis in the Delta must ultimately be solved politically, rather than
militarily, but there is considerable disagreement on the details of such a solution. The current
federal system provides states with a 13% share of local revenues (predominately from oil sales).
Groups like MEND argue that the states should receive a 50% share, as was stipulated in the 1960
constitution. A technical committee nominated by President Yar’Adua to identify policies to
stimulate development and improve security in the Delta region issued a report in December
2008. In the report, the committee advocated raising the share of oil revenues allocated to the oil-
producing states to 25%. Some analysts suggest that corruption within the state governments is so
high that the local populations would see little improvement even if the state share were raised.
Some of the oil-producing states have reported revenues of $1 billion per year but have dismal
records of development or service delivery.112 Other analysts question what effect a change in
revenue allocation might have on the northern states, several of which have lower development
107 Amnesty International, Petroleum, Pollution, and Poverty in the Niger Delta, June 2009.
108 Amnesty International, Petroleum, Pollution, and Poverty in the Niger Delta, Ibid.; UNDP, Niger Delta Human
Development Report, 2006; Jonathan Brown, “Niger Delta Bears Brunt After 50 Years of Oil Spills,” The Independent
(London), October 26, 2006; Popken, Ben, “BP Gulf-Sized Spilling Occurs in Nigeria Annually, but Nobody Cares,”
The Consumerist.com, June 15, 2010.
109 ICG, “Fueling the Niger Delta Crisis,” Africa Report No. 118, September 28, 2006.
110 “Nigeria’s Removal of Shell Hailed,” BBC News, June 5, 2008.
111 “Nigeria’s Pledge to Increase Niger Delta Spending Elicits Skeptical Response,” VOA News, November 11, 2007.
112 “Blood and Oil,” The Economist, March 15, 2007.
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indicators than those in the Delta. In late 2009, President Yar’Adua proposed transferring 10% of
the revenues from the government’s oil and gas joint ventures to local Delta communities.
In September 2008, President Yar’Adua created a new cabinet-level Ministry for Niger Delta
Affairs. The position was intended to build on development plans started under the Obasanjo
Administration in 2007 under the auspices of the Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC),
established in 2000 to improve social and environmental conditions in the Delta. Improvements in
infrastructure and education were identified as areas of major focus for Obasanjo’s 15-year, $50
billion plan.113 In his first year in office, President Yar’Adua doubled the budget for the NNDC, to
$566 million. Some observers have raised concerns that the ministry’s programs and those of the
NDDC, which is intended to be a part of the ministry, may be duplicative. Some analysts suggest
that given the level of corruption endemic in the Delta, the international community should work
with the Nigerian government to establish a new development fund that would have independent
oversight. New opportunities for foreign investment in the Delta could also contribute to
improvements in the region, although unrest may deter investors.
Effects on the Oil Industry and the World Market
Nigeria has an estimated oil production capacity of 3 million barrels per day (bpd), but output has
not met capacity.114 Instability, criminality, and oil leaks in the Delta have cut output by one-fifth
since 2006. Nigeria’s production averaged 2.5 million bpd in 2010. By comparison, Saudi Arabia
produces an estimated 10.1 million bpd, Iran 4.3 million bpd, and Venezuela 2.4 million bpd.115 In
2005, a group of former senior U.S. national security officials convened a working group to
develop a possible U.S. response to a simulated world oil crisis.116 Under the scenario given to the
participants, civil unrest in northern Nigeria required the Nigerian government to move troops
from the unstable Niger Delta region to quell violence in the north. Unprotected, oil companies in
the Delta ceased production, and the country’s contribution to the world oil market was reduced
by 800,000 bpd for an extended period. Combined with an unseasonably cold winter and
hypothetical terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, oil prices rose to $120 per barrel and U.S. gasoline
prices at the pump rose to $4.74 per gallon, triggering a recession and potential job losses of up to
2 million. In reality, even the threat of coordinated militant attacks against oil targets in the Delta
can affect the price of oil on the world market. A longer and more sustained disruption of
Nigeria’s oil supply, particularly if combined with the disruption of another major supplier’s
product, could have a significant impact on the world economy.
In addition to its oil reserves, Nigeria has the eighth-largest natural gas reserves in the world, but
to date they have provided little benefit to the Nigerian economy. The gas reserves, also
predominantly located in the Delta region, are estimated at over 185 trillion cubic feet. The
government had pledged to increase gas exports to 50% of oil revenues by 2010, but many of
Nigeria’s fields currently lack the infrastructure to produce natural gas and would require
significant investment to meet that goal. The government has repeatedly set deadlines for oil
113 “Nigeria Launches New Development Plan for Niger Delta,” Voice of America, March 27, 2007, and “New Hope
for Old ‘Master Plan’ on Niger Delta,” IRIN, November 19, 2007.
114 Oil production dropped from 2.13 million bpd in 2007 to 1.95 million bpd in 2008, but increased from an estimated
1.6 million bpd in July 2009, before the ceasefire, to 2 million bpd by late 2009. EIU, “Nigeria,” Country Reports.
115 Production figures for 2010 acquired from the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration.
116 For more information on the exercise, known as “Oil Shockwave,” see http://www.secureenergy.org/reports/
oil_shock_report_master.pdf.
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companies to stop flaring gas at oil wells, estimated at up to 40% of annual production, but
significant flaring continues.117 In March 2011, President Jonathan announced a series of new
agreements to develop gas processing facilities as part of a “gas revolution” designed to create
new jobs and revenues and to end flaring.118
Abuses by Security Forces
Nigerian security forces, particularly the police, have been accused of serious human rights
abuses, and activists suggest that the government has done little to address issues of impunity and
corruption within the Nigerian Police Force. In 2007, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture
reported that “torture is an intrinsic part of how law enforcement services operate within the
country,” and called on the Nigerian government to criminalize the practice.119 The State
Department’s annual human rights reports on Nigeria document numerous instances of
“politically motivated and extrajudicial killings by security forces, including summary executions
… torture, rape and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of prisoners, detainees, and
criminal suspects,” and a variety of other offenses. Its 2009 report noted serious abuses by both
police and soldiers related to the July 2009 Boko Haram uprising and referenced “credible media
reports” claiming that police executed the group’s leader. Other recent reports on abuses include
Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces, produced by Human Rights Watch; Killing at Will:
Extrajudicial Executions and Other Unlawful Killings by the Police in Nigeria, by Amnesty
International; and Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigerian
Police Force, by the Open Society Justice Initiative and the Network of Police Reform in Nigeria.
Nigerian officials have acknowledged some abuses, and in early 2010 the country’s police
minister called the situation “condemnable and unacceptable.”120 Nigeria’s prison system has also
drawn criticism; a 2008 Amnesty International report alleged that at least 65% of the inmates had
never been convicted of a crime, and that some awaited trial for up to 10 years.121
HIV/AIDS
Nigeria’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 3.6% is relatively small in comparison to some Southern
African nations with adult seropositivity rates of over 20%. However, the West African nation
comprises nearly one-tenth of the world’s HIV/AIDS infected persons with 3.3 million infected
people, the largest HIV-positive population in the world after South Africa. Nigeria’s population
is expected to double by the year 2025, which is likely to multiply the spread of HIV. In addition
to the devastation HIV/AIDS continues to cause among Nigeria’s adult population, over 40% of
the current population is under the age of 15. With almost a third of primary-school-aged children
not enrolled in school and the large number of HIV/AIDS-infected adults, Nigeria faces serious
challenges and significant obstacles in the education and health care sectors.
117 “Nigeria Gas Profits ‘Up in Smoke’,” BBC, January 13, 2009.
118 “Jonathan Sets Agenda for Ending Gas Flaring,” BusinessDay, March 25, 2011.
119 United Nations Press Release, “Special Rapporteur on Torture Concludes Visit to Nigeria,” March 12, 2007.
120 “Nigeria Condemns Police ‘Killing’,” BBC, March 5, 2010.
121 Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Criminal Justice System Utterly Failing Nigerian People; Majority of Inmates Not
Convicted of Any Crime,” February 26, 2008.
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International Relations
Since the 1990s, Nigeria has emerged as an important player in regional and international affairs.
Nigeria is one of 12 members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
and is a key member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The
government has helped to resolve political disputes in Togo, Mauritania, and Liberia. Nigeria has
also played a leading role in efforts to resolve the political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, where it has
previously acted as a mediator. The government was critical of the international community for
“contradictions” in its reaction to the recent crises in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya.122 Nigeria has also
mediated between the government of Sudan and the Darfur rebels. Nigerian troops have played a
vital role in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and are currently deployed to
missions in Liberia and Sudan. Nigerian police, military observers, and experts are also deployed
in U.N. missions in Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Sudan,
Timor-Leste, and Western Sahara. The United States is the top destination for Nigerian exports,
followed by India, Brazil, Spain and France. China is the lead source for Nigerian imports,
followed by the United States, the Netherlands, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.123
Issues for Congress
Administration Policy on Nigeria
After a period of strained relations in the 1990s, when Nigeria was under a military dictatorship,
U.S.-Nigeria relations steadily improved under the administration of former President Obasanjo,
and they have remained strong under Presidents Yar’Adua and Jonathan. The Bush
Administration praised the Nigerian government’s improved budget practices, banking sector
reform, and efforts to eliminate the country’s foreign debt, although it remained critical of the
country’s human rights record and questioned its commitment to ensuring free and fair elections.
President George W. Bush visited the country in 2003, and First Lady Laura Bush visited Nigeria
in 2006. Following the 2007 elections, though, the Bush Administration expressed concern with
what the State Department called “a flawed election, and in some instances, deeply flawed.”124
Nevertheless, the State Department stressed the need to “engage” rather than isolate the country
in order to “nurture Nigeria’s fragile democracy,” and President Bush met Yar’Adua at the White
House later that year.125
President Barack Obama’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, has
referred to Nigeria as “probably the most important country in Sub-Saharan Africa.”126 President
Obama has reiterated the importance of the U.S.-Nigeria relationship. He formally acknowledged
the country’s role as a regional leader during a meeting with then-Acting President Goodluck
Jonathan at the White House in April 2010. Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Nigeria in August
122 “Nigeria Lashes at World’s Focus on Libya While I. Coast Burns,” AFP, March 22, 2011.
123 CIA, “Nigeria”, The World Factbook, March 8, 2011.
124 “Governing Party Wins in Nigeria, but Many Claim Fraud,” New York Times, April 23, 2007.
125 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer before the House Subcommittee on Africa and Global
Health, June 7, 2007.
126 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks by Ambassador Carson on Secretary Clinton’s Africa Trip,” July 30, 2009.
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2009 on her first visit to the continent as Secretary of State, which included six other countries.
Clinton’s discussions in Nigeria focused on regional security, democracy, corruption, and
economic development. In her remarks during the visit, she stressed the need for electoral reform
and expressed support for the government’s political approach toward resolving the conflict in the
Niger Delta.127 The United States and Nigeria agreed in January 2010 to establish a binational
commission on areas of mutual concern, as called for by Members of the House of
Representatives in H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and
2011. The first meetings of the commission, formally established in April following then-Acting
President Jonathan’s participation in the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, were held
in late May 2010. The commission is composed of four working groups that meet regularly: Good
Governance, Transparency, and Integrity; Energy and Investment; Food Security and Agriculture;
and Niger Delta and Regional Security Cooperation.
U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Maritime Security Issues
Nigeria is an important trading partner for the United States and is the largest beneficiary of U.S.
investment on the continent. The country is eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth
and Opportunity Act (AGOA); AGOA-eligible exports account for over 90% of its exports to the
United States, which totaled over $30 billion in 2010. Nearly all of these exports were petroleum.
Nigeria vies with Venezuela to be the United States’ fourth-largest source of imported oil (behind
Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia), depending on how much of its oil production is shut-in in
any given month. U.S. imports account for over 40% of Nigeria’s total crude oil exports, making
the United States Nigeria’s largest trading partner. U.S. energy companies may face increasing
competition for rights to the country’s energy resources; China, for example, has offered Nigeria
favorable loans for infrastructure projects in exchange for oil exploration rights. The NNPC
signed an agreement with Russia’s Gazprom in 2009 to create a joint venture for oil and gas
exploration. Nigeria has also signed an agreement with Algeria and Niger to build a 2,500-mile
pipeline across their territories to deliver gas to Europe, though its prospects are uncertain.
Nigeria exports natural gas to neighboring countries through the new West Africa Gas Pipeline.
Gulf of Guinea crude is prized on the world market for its low sulphur content, and Nigeria’s
proximity to the United States relative to that of Middle East oil-producing countries makes its oil
particularly attractive to U.S. interests. In 2005, the United States, Nigeria, and other interested
partners initiated the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy, a forum through which
participants would work to address challenges to oil production. Other regional and international
initiatives focused on maritime security in the Gulf have followed.128 Nigeria’s waters have been
named among the most dangerous in the world; the country ranked first in global pirate attacks
until it was overtaken by Somalia in 2008, according to the International Maritime Bureau.
Nigeria is also considered a growing transshipment hub for narcotics trafficking, and several
Nigerian criminal organizations have been implicated in the trade.129 The U.S. Navy has increased
its operations in the Gulf of Guinea in recent years to enhance security in the region and in 2007
launched a new initiative, the African Partnership Station (APS).130 APS deployments have
127 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks With Nigerian Foreign Minister Ojo Maduekwe,” August 12, 2009.
128 For further information on maritime and port security issues in the region, see, e.g., the Atlantic Council, Advancing
U.S., African, and Global Interests: Security and Stability in the West African Maritime Domain, November 30, 2010.
129 CRS Report R40838, Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook.
130 Under APS, U.S. and partner naval ships deploy to the region for several months to serve as a continuing sea base of
operations and a “floating schoolhouse” to provide assistance and training to the Gulf nations. Training focuses on
(continued...)
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included port visits to Nigeria and joint exercises between U.S., Nigerian, European, and other
regional navies. Nigerian military personnel have also embarked onboard as trainees, and a
Nigerian naval captain has served as the APS Deputy Commander. The Department of Defense’s
newest regional combatant command, Africa Command (AFRICOM), has maintained this
increased focus on maritime security in the region.131
Nigeria’s Role in Regional Stability
Nigeria plays a significant role in peace and stability operations across Africa. Former President
Obasanjo reportedly played a critical role in building consensus on the continent for cooperation
with U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. The Nigerian parliament adopted new anti-terrorism
legislation in February 2011 after a series of bombings in the country. The United States provides
the country with military training with an emphasis on professionalization and respect for human
rights and civilian authority through a range of security assistance programs, including those
focused on enhancing its peacekeeping capabilities. Nigeria is also a participant in the State
Department’s Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a U.S. interagency effort that
aims to increase border protection and regional counter-terrorism capabilities. The State
Department has established 10 “American Corners” to share information on American culture and
values with Nigerians.
U.S. Assistance to Nigeria
The United States is the largest bilateral donor in Nigeria, having provided over $614 million in
foreign aid to the country in FY2010. Democratic governance, agriculture and economic reform,
improved education and health services, professionalization and reform of the security services,
and HIV/AIDS have been the main focus for U.S. assistance programs in recent years. Nigeria is
a focus country under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President’s
Malaria Initiative (PMI), and the Obama Administration’s new Feed the Future (FTF) Initiative.
The State Department’s FY2012 budget request, which totals $660.5 million, includes
approximately $588 million (89% of the total) in funding for HIV/AIDS and related health
programs. In 2008, the State Department’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found that:
Exceptionally high funding levels for HIV/AIDS create a clear imbalance in the embassy
program mix and present a skewed picture of U.S. policy priorities. In addition, this level of
HIV/AIDS funding has unintended consequences for Nigeria’s broader health infrastructure,
monopolizing the country’s supplies of medical goods and services, including the qualified
health professionals needed to meet Nigeria’s other health needs.132
Although AIDS-related interventions have composed the majority of health funding for Nigeria,
the funds also target other health concerns, including maternal and child health, malaria, and
(...continued)
maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, port facilities management and security, seamanship/navigation,
search and rescue, leadership, logistics, civil engineering, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
131 For more information on AFRICOM and Nigeria’s response to the command’s creation, see CRS Report RL34003,
Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
132 U.S. Department of State Office of the Inspector General, Report on Inspection: Embassy Abuja and Consulate
General Lagos, Nigeria, Report Number ISP-I-08-25A, July 2008.
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tuberculosis. U.S. health assistance focused on tuberculosis aims to double the case detection rate
and halve Nigeria’s incidence in the next decade.
In addition to health programs, the State Department’s FY2012 foreign assistance request for
Nigeria includes funding for an array of programs focused on economic growth, education, and
good governance. U.S. economic and agriculture assistance supports programs that will increase
productivity and build trade and investment capacity. Such assistance also aims to address climate
change, including through efforts to increase the production of clean energy and reduce gas
flaring. As the request points out, one-third of Nigeria’s 30 million school-aged children are not
enrolled in school, and the request includes over $15 million in basic education funding. The
FY2012 request would further increase assistance for programs aimed at strengthening
democratic governance in Nigeria, up from $9.5 million in FY2008, $16 million in FY2009, and
$21 million in FY2010, to over $27 million for the upcoming fiscal year. USAID provided over
$14 million to support the 2011 elections, which included funding for technical assistance
provided by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to increase INEC capacity.
The Administration has requested funding in FY2012 for new conflict mitigation programs to
address extremism in the north and conflict in the Niger Delta. USAID has paired with Chevron
on a four-year, $50 million program (of which USAID is contributing half) to improve
agricultural development as well as civil society and governance capacity in the Delta.
USAID is implementing several “flagship” programs designed to concentrate resources and
achieve maximum impact. They are focused on two northern Nigerian states: Bauchi and Sokoto
(within Nigeria, human development indicators are lowest in the north). USAID’s flagship
education project, the Northern Education Initiative (NEI), is being implemented in the two focus
states to strengthen state and local government systems for the delivery of education services.
USAID’s flagship peace and democratic governance project in the two focus states is known as
Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy and Development (LEAD). The project is designed to
build partnerships between state and local governments, civil society, and the private sector to
improve governance, accountability, and service delivery. A third flagship program, the five-year,
$85 million Targeted States High Impact Project (TSHIP) is being implemented in the focus states
to reduce maternal and child deaths. The project aims to build the states’ health systems to
effectively deliver primary health care, and to support overall improvement of the primary health
care delivery system through capacity building and institutional strengthening.
U.S. security assistance to Nigeria was suspended from FY2003 until 2006, when the State
Department restarted a modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.133
Security cooperation has increased since then, and the State Department’s FY2012 security
assistance request, which focuses on military professionalization, peacekeeping support and
training, and land and maritime border security, includes $1 million in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) and almost $1 million for IMET. Nigeria has also received maritime security assistance
through the U.S. Navy’s Africa Partnership Station and the State Department’s African Coastal
and Border Security (ACBS) program.134 As an important troop contributor to peacekeeping
missions, Nigeria continues to receive U.S. support through the African Contingency Operations
133 P.L. 109-102 restricted FY2006 FMF and IMET funding for Nigeria due to issues related to former Liberian
President Charles Taylor. Those restrictions were lifted after Nigeria surrendered Taylor to the Special Court for Sierra
Leone.
134 For more information on APS, see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of
the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
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Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. The country also participates in security cooperation
activities with the California National Guard through the National Guard State Partnership
Program. U.S. counterterrorism assistance to Nigeria includes programs coordinated through
TSCTP. Nigeria has also received security assistance through DOD funds, including $2.2 million
in “Section 1206” funding for the development of a counterterrorism infantry company and $6.2
million aimed at building the capacity of the country’s counterterrorism unit and its tactical
communications interoperability.135 Nigeria also received coastal radar and communications
training and equipment through regional Section 1206 programs.
Recent Congressional Interest
The United States Congress continues to monitor political developments in Nigeria. During the
111th Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing “Examining the U.S.-
Nigeria Relationship in a Time of Transition.” The 110th Congress closely followed Nigeria’s
2007 elections. Days prior to those elections, Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
publicly expressed “serious concern about the prospects for free, fair, and peaceful conduct” of
the elections. Following the elections, Senator Russ Feingold issued a statement condemning
electoral irregularities, saying “President Obasanjo’s leadership over the last eight years has been
called into question by the failure of efforts to reform Nigeria’s electoral system and combat
political corruption. The Administration should not legitimize this election as doing so would
undermine our commitment to good governance and transparency, and to building strong
democracies.”136 The House Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health subsequently held a
hearing entitled “Nigeria at a Crossroads: Elections, Legitimacy, and a Way Forward.” Nigeria’s
flawed elections also featured prominently in a July 2007 hearing on democracy in Africa by the
Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs.
Congress also continues to monitor Nigeria’s energy sector and its role in world oil supplies, as
well as humanitarian and human rights issues in the country. Congressional hearings have
examined the attempted terrorist attack by a Nigerian citizen on a U.S. airliner in December 2009,
raising concerns with the State Department’s visa process and with “systematic failures across the
Intelligence Community (IC), which contributed to the failure to identify the threat.”137 The
Director of National Intelligence, during February 2011 hearings by the House and Senate
intelligence communities on worldwide threats, highlighted a range of security concerns in
Nigeria in his testimony, including political and sectarian violence and militancy in the Niger
Delta and the northeast, and suggesting that although the group Boko Haram appears focused on
local issues, “it may be pursuing interests it shares with” a regional Al Qaeda affiliate, AQIM.
Congressional attention to these and other issues is expected to continue in the 112th Congress.
135 For more information on DOD’s global train and equip or “Section 1206” authority, see CRS Report RS22855,
Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
136 See “Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold on the Marred Nigerian Election,” April 23, 2007, at
http://feingold.senate.gov.
137 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Unclassified Executive Summary of the Committee Report on the
Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253,” May 18, 2010.
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Figure 2. Map of Nigeria
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Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
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