Contents

• Overview
• The UAE and the Conflict in the Gulf
• Damage to Critical Infrastructure, U.S. Assets, and AI
• The Economy and the UAE's "Zero Hormuz Strategy"
• UAE Policy Toward Iran and Sanctions
• The UAE and Israel
• UAE Involvement in the Middle East and North Africa and its Rivalry with Saudi Arabia
• The UAE and Sudan
• U.S.-Emirati Relations
• Historical Background
• Domestic Politics and Society
• Human Rights, Women's Rights, Foreign Labor, and Trafficking in Persons
• Analysis: UAE Foreign Relations and U.S. Ties

Summary

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven principalities or "emirates." Its population is 10 million, of which nearly 90% are expatriates from within and outside the region who work in its economy. The UAE is a U.S.-designated "major defense partner" that hosts U.S. military personnel at UAE military facilities and buys sophisticated U.S. military equipment, including missile defenses and combat aircraft. From 1950 to 2023, the United States implemented more than $33.5 billion in Foreign Military Sales for the UAE, making it the 14^th largest U.S. defense customer by foreign military sales value worldwide.

The conflict in the Gulf that began in February 2026 has dramatically affected the UAE's security and economy. Since the conflict started, Iran has targeted the UAE more than any other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state. During the initial months of the conflict, Iranian projectiles or debris from intercepted projectiles struck several critical sites inside the UAE. In response to restrictions on traffic transiting the Strait of Hormuz, the UAE has accelerated efforts to construct infrastructure designed to bypass the Strait, including ports and pipelines. Overall, while the UAE remains in a far better economic position than some of its GCC neighbors, the conflict in the Gulf has disrupted foreign investment and tourism.

While the UAE has been vulnerable to Iranian attacks, it has aligned itself with the United States' Operation Economic Outcast to pressure Iran financially. To date, Emirati authorities have halted commercial air traffic to/from Iran and sanctioned Iranian banks operating in Dubai. Although the current situation remains fluid, regardless of the Iran conflict's outcome, the UAE appears unlikely to retreat from its ambitions to become a global commercial center, even if the current war has increased the cost of pursuing those ambitions.

Beyond Iran, the UAE has continued to maintain close ties to Israel. Emirati-Israeli relations, which have been defined by the post-October 7, 2023, conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, have witnessed unprecedented levels of military cooperation following normalization in 2020, but also strained diplomatic ties over Israeli military action across the Middle East. As civil war in Sudan continues between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), press reports and UN sanctions monitors have implicated the UAE in backing the RSF. Several Members of Congress have formally expressed concerns over the UAE's reported role in the Sudan conflict. In the 119^th Congress, Representative Sara Jacobs and Senator Chris Van Hollen reintroduced legislation (H.R. 2059 and S. 935) to restrict arms exports licenses to the UAE until the Trump Administration can certify that the UAE is not supplying arms to the RSF. Other Members, such as Senator Joni Ernst, have spoken in favor of the continued U.S.-UAE defense partnership.

Over the past two decades, the UAE has become one of the United States' closest partners in the Middle East region. Those ties have been strengthened during the Trump Administration. Gulf countries like the UAE have increasingly emerged as arenas for competition with the People's Republic of China, particularly in the race for artificial intelligence (AI) dominance. In January 2026, the UAE joined Pax Silica, the U.S. State Department's multilateral AI and supply chain security initiative. In July 2026, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the U.S. Department of Commerce issued the rule, "Enhanced Favorable Treatment for the United Arab Emirates under the Export Administration Regulations ("Rule")", which upgrades the export control status of the UAE, thereby facilitating the export of certain sensitive U.S. technologies. Under the new rule, UAE AI companies may no longer need individual export licenses for the purchase of U.S. AI chips and servers.

In 2025, the UAE was the largest U.S. trading partner by value ($39 billion) in the Middle East and North Africa region. The UAE has remained the top U.S. export destination for the entire MENA region for the 17^th year in a row, and the United States has a trade surplus of $23 billion with the UAE.

Overview

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven principalities, or "emirates" (see Figure 1). Its population is 10 million, of whom nearly 90% are expatriates from within and outside the Middle East region. The UAE accounts for 4% of the world's annual oil production and was the world's 8^th largest oil producer in 2025.¹ Having benefitted from decades of oil revenue and having pursued a host of economic diversification and global investment initiatives, the UAE is a high-income nation; the International Monetary Fund ranks it 14^th globally in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita.² The UAE's national wealth gives the small country outsized global influence; its various sovereign wealth funds alone manage assets totaling over $3.1 trillion, allowing the UAE to make investments globally, including in the United States.³

The UAE and the Conflict in the Gulf

The conflict in the Gulf that began in February has dramatically affected the UAE's security and economy, accelerating the Emirates' longstanding pursuit of policies independent of other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), even as it remains dependent on U.S. defense ties. The UAE may be the most financially resilient GCC member state, though its economy's dependence on international commerce, global air and maritime transit, and foreign labor creates vulnerabilities to sustained disruption from the Iran conflict. In light of both the UAE's setbacks and resilience, it is an open question as to how viable the "UAE model" (i.e., an innovative Gulf state attempting to forge a non-oil economy while still remaining tethered to the United States' security umbrella) is in the face of Iranian threats. The conflict has complicated the UAE's traditional attempts at retaining residual diplomatic and commercial links to Iran (see below).

Figure 1. UAE at a Glance

Since the conflict began in February 2026, Iran has targeted the UAE more than any other GCC state.⁴ The UAE has reportedly retaliated with airstrikes of its own against Iranian energy sites.⁵ While missile defense systems, including Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) installations and at least one Iron Dome battery operated by Israeli soldiers, have intercepted the vast majority of Iranian projectiles targeting the UAE, damage from those that penetrated Emirati defenses has been substantial enough to accelerate longstanding defense and economic plans aimed at greater self-sufficiency.⁶

Damage to Critical Infrastructure, U.S. Assets, and AI

During the initial months of the conflict, Iranian projectiles or debris from intercepted projectiles struck several critical sites, including an electrical generator in the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant. The Habshan gas processing plant, which was twice damaged by debris from intercepted drones, is not expected to be fully operational again until 2027, assuming it sustains no further damage.⁷ Iranian attacks also have damaged UAE aluminum smelters. Emirates Global Aluminum's main smelter is undergoing an estimated $400 million in repairs and is expected to return to full operation in 2027.⁸ Almost 90% of high-purity aluminum used in the United States to make certain types of defense equipment, including fighter aircraft, comes from the UAE.⁹

Iran also struck Al Dhafra Air Base, which is used by both U.S. and French military forces. Several hangars sustained fire and roof damage according to commercial satellite imagery.¹⁰ Iran also damaged the U.S. Consulate General in Dubai.¹¹

In order to adjust to Iranian attacks using one-way attack drones, the UAE has adopted tactics from the war in Ukraine and built "cope cages," or metal caging constructed around critical infrastructure such as fuel tanks.¹² In March 2026, the UAE signed a ten-year military-technical cooperation agreement with Ukraine, and several Ukrainian military experts have been stationed in the UAE to advise defense officials on counter-drone techniques.¹³ The UAE's main defense conglomerate, Edge Group, is partnering with South Korea to create an integrated air defense system against higher-tier threats, such as ballistic missiles.¹⁴

As the UAE has attempted to position itself as a regional leader in artificial intelligence (AI), and the Trump Administration has facilitated the approval of export licenses for sensitive AI technologies to the UAE,¹⁵ Iran also has proven it can damage the UAE's nascent AI industry, exposing its vulnerabilities. Earlier in 2026, Iran damaged an Amazon Web Services facility in Abu Dhabi, forcing the company to temporarily move its data centers elsewhere until repairs can be completed; that same facility (Stargate UAE) also was to house OpenAI servers, but OpenAI has yet to sign a lease there, perhaps due to the continuation of conflict.¹⁶ Reports now indicate that the UAE may be planning on dispersing AI infrastructure and moving some data facilities underground.¹⁷ Others suggest that while the Iran conflict may have temporarily set back U.S.-UAE AI partnerships, competition with China and the demand for data centers and capital means that "Both sides are too dependent on each other, and neither side can step back."¹⁸ Microsoft is continuing to invest in the UAE, where it has a minority stake in the AI company, G42.¹⁹

The Economy and the UAE's "Zero Hormuz Strategy"

Beyond the physical damage suffered by the UAE, Iran's attempts to assert control of the Strait of Hormuz have challenged the UAE's existing approach to energy exports and positioning as a global hub for commerce. In response, the UAE, which exited the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in May 2026, has accelerated efforts to construct infrastructure designed to bypass the Strait, including ports and pipelines. DP World plans to build two new deep-water terminals within two years on the UAE's eastern coast, outside the Strait, in the emirate of Fujairah.²⁰ The UAE has increased overland trucking, maximized crude oil exports through existing pipelines, purchased additional oil tankers, and reportedly directed shippers to "go dark" by turning off their transponders in hopes of evading Iranian attacks.²¹ The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) reportedly moved more oil through the Strait of Hormuz than any other producer during June and July 2026.²² Recent reports indicate that Iran's attempts to limit tanker traffic transiting the Strait may be diminishing, as overall crude exports from Gulf producers rebounded in September 2026 to their highest levels since the conflict started in February.²³

As of September 30, the International Maritime Organization has tracked at least 17 Iranian attacks against tankers near or within the UAE's territorial waters.²⁴ Although Gulf exporters have sought to reduce Iran's ability to disrupt their economies, these workarounds, according to one UAE-based academic, have "not been enough to render Iran's veto irrelevant" given the proven capability of Iran and its allies to strike targets throughout the Gulf region.²⁵ The additional port capacity now under construction is reportedly insufficient to compensate for the tonnage stranded at major existing facilities, such as Jebel Ali in Dubai and Khalifa Port in Abu Dhabi.²⁶

As UAE officials have characterized the current situation in the Gulf as "neither war nor peace,"²⁷ 2026 gross domestic product projections for the UAE vary widely depending on the source. The UAE Central Bank anticipates 2026 GDP growth of 1.7% this year, while other projections estimate a slight contraction for the UAE economy.²⁸ Overall, while the UAE remains in a far better economic position than some of its GCC neighbors, the conflict in the Gulf has disrupted foreign investment and tourism. In response, the UAE government has offered business subsidies, waived fees and taxes, and provided other forms of incentives to attract foreign capital, visitors, and entertainers.²⁹

UAE Policy Toward Iran and Sanctions

Like U.S. policy, UAE policy toward Iran has shifted repeatedly since the conflict began. The UAE moved from pre-war wariness of confrontation to a more hawkish posture after hostilities began, then toward cautious engagement as the conflict continued.³⁰ In August 2026, however, the UAE again adopted a tougher position toward Iran, as the UAE Foreign Ministry announced the suspension of all trade activity, commercial exchanges, and financial transactions with Iran until further notice.³¹ The shift is particularly significant given the UAE's longstanding role as a major trading partner of Iran; as of 2024, the UAE accounted for approximately one-third of Iranian imports. Reportedly, the policy change came at the behest of the United States, which had sought Emirati cooperation in tightening sanctions and trade restrictions against Iran.³² Dubai's special economic zones have long been used by Iranian-linked entities to evade U.S. and international sanctions; dozens of Emirati entities have been designated for U.S. sanctions for their role in various Iran-related transactions, particularly related to Iran's oil exports.³³ Though Emirati sanctions enforcement is notoriously uneven, for both capacity and policy reasons, the UAE is expected to "move step by step, beginning with new restrictions on cargo and potentially expanding to a broader crackdown on Iranian-linked entities if the Revolutionary Guard continues its strikes."³⁴ According to one analysis, "The majority of Iran's transshipment, smuggling, and shadow banking activity takes place in Dubai, so Washington must do what it can to help the UAE's national leaders in Abu Dhabi convince and cajole Dubai's leaders to play ball."³⁵

However, as of early September 2026, the UAE rhetoric vis-à-vis Iran has again shifted or even softened, as officials have acknowledged the reality of Iran's proximity and the need "to find some new channels of understanding."³⁶ At the recent BRICS Summit in New Delhi, India, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed Al Nahyan (the UAE President's son and designated successor) met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian for bilateral talks. At the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York, UAE diplomatic advisor Anwar Gargash said "Iran remains our neighbour, and at some point we will have to find a way to restore what can be restored…. Geography leaves us no alternative to engagement."³⁷

While the UAE may be acknowledging its vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Iran, it has aligned itself with the United States' Operation Economic Outcast to pressure Iran financially.³⁸ One report indicated that while the UAE (and Saudi Arabia) do not seek a return to full scale hostilities, both Gulf countries have been advocating for continued U.S. economic pressure on Iran.³⁹

On August 28, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) proposed a rule that would revoke the UAE branch of Egypt's Banque Misr from access to U.S. financial institutions.⁴⁰ Perhaps in response to the sanctions, the National Bank of Egypt may acquire Banque Misr's UAE branch.⁴¹ The UAE's central bank has imposed sanctions on the Emirati branches of Iran's Bank Melli. As of late September 2026, Iranian commercial flights to the UAE had been cancelled.

The UAE and Israel

In 2020, the UAE and Israel normalized relations in the first of the Abraham Accords. In support of this normalization, the first Trump Administration pledged to sell to the UAE the advanced F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft and armed drones.⁴² In the last hours of the first Trump Administration, the UAE signed Letters of Acceptance to purchase up to 50 F-35s and 18 MQ-9 Reaper drones from the United States (reportedly as an incentive for signing the Abraham Accords).⁴³ The Biden Administration temporarily paused the sale for review upon taking office in 2021, partially due to concerns over UAE-People's Republic of China ties.⁴⁴ The UAE Air Force subsequently sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Defense in 2021 withdrawing its Letters of Acceptance for the F-35 and MQ-9. Since 2021, the U.S. and UAE governments have engaged in periodic negotiations over the sales, though a final agreement has remained elusive. The Trump Administration's September 2026 proposal to sell 48 F-35s and related systems and training to Saudi Arabia may revive Emirati interest in the platform.

For the first three years (2020-2023) of normalization, Emirati-Israeli relations flourished, as trade, tourism, military, and diplomatic ties expanded significantly. In May 2022, Israel and the UAE signed a free trade agreement. In 2023, bilateral trade reached $2.95 billion, up from just a few hundred million before the Accords.⁴⁵ In February 2023, the UAE inaugurated a multi-faith complex known as the "Abrahamic Family House," which contains a Jewish synagogue. The UAE also has purchased arms from Israel, including various air and missile defense systems.⁴⁶

The next three years (2023-2026) of Emirati-Israeli normalization, which have been defined by the post-October 7, 2023 conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, have witnessed unprecedented levels of military cooperation, but also strained diplomatic ties over Israeli military action across the Middle East. In Gaza, the UAE has been one of the largest country donors of humanitarian aid, and the coordination of aid delivery necessitates close cooperation between the Israeli and Emirati governments and militaries. However, in 2025, when some ultranationalist members of Israel's governing coalition suggested that Israel annex part of the West Bank, the UAE said that such a step would trigger downgraded ties with Israel.⁴⁷ Israel's September 2025 strike against Hamas negotiators in Qatar elicited a particularly sharp response from Emirati officials.⁴⁸

Despite tensions, Emirati-Israeli trade, investment, and defense ties are ongoing. In January 2025, the UAE's main defense company, EDGE, bought a minority stake in Israel's Thirdeye Systems, a developer of drone-detection systems. Reportedly, the UAE may also have entered into a significant defense export agreement with the Israeli defense firm Elbit Systems, worth $2.3 billion over eight years; this deal could be for Israel's Hermes 900 unmanned aerial vehicles.⁴⁹

In 2026, U.S.-Israel strikes on Iran and resulting Iranian strikes on the UAE illustrate the perils and promise of closer Emirati-Israeli ties. On the one hand, the UAE accepted an Israeli military presence on its soil to operate Iron Dome batteries.⁵⁰ UAE officials also attended a recent roundtable with representatives from various Abraham Accords signatories, including Israel.⁵¹ On the other hand, there appears to have been a general erosion of trust between Emirati and Israeli leaders, perhaps exacerbated by the apparent leak of a secret visit by Prime Minister Netanyahu to the UAE to the press in May 2026.⁵²

In September 2026, Israeli media reported that UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ) warned Netanyahu a week prior to the October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks that Hamas was planning a major operation against Israel.⁵³ The UAE Foreign Ministry declined to comment on the specific media reporting. Netanyahu then made another visit to the UAE in late September 2026 reportedly to ask MBZ to deny reports of any UAE 2023 Hamas warning.⁵⁴ Also, in September,

On balance, the fact that the UAE cannot fully defend itself against Iranian aggression without external assistance may motivate continued Emirati-Israeli defense cooperation, even if Emirati policy quietly returns to a policy of general rapprochement with Iran.⁵⁵

UAE Involvement in the Middle East and North Africa and its Rivalry with Saudi Arabia

For over a decade, the UAE has exerted its influence and pursued national interests in war-torn, politically unstable countries, such as Yemen, Libya, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan (see below). The reasons for Emirati foreign intervention are complex. Beyond the basic goal of growing state power, MBZ may seek to counter political Islamist movements (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood which he may view as radical and destabilizing) in parts of the Middle East and Africa.⁵⁶ Sometimes, this anti-Islamist agenda also coincides with a deliberate Emirati strategy to acquire strategic land and mineral resources.⁵⁷ The UAE also seeks foreign markets for its government-backed companies, particularly in the logistics sector (e.g., Dubai-based port operator DP World).⁵⁸ Overall, the UAE most likely sees itself as an opportunistic and key player in a global competition for political, economic, and military influence in parts of the world where more powerful nations are less engaged.⁵⁹

UAE involvement in some of these arenas has at times put it into direct conflict with Saudi Arabia, as the two countries differ in their positions on political Islam and Israel and race to be best positioned for a global energy future that is possibly less reliant on hydrocarbon extraction and production.⁶⁰ In recent years, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have backed different or competing factions in Yemen and Sudan (see below). In Yemen, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have backed different elements of forces opposed to the Iran-backed Houthis. The UAE has backed the southern separatist Southern Transition Council (STC) while Saudi Arabia has backed Al Islah party, a coalition of tribal and Islamist leaders.

The UAE and Sudan

As civil war in Sudan continues between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the insurgent paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), press reports and UN monitors have implicated the UAE in backing the RSF; the UAE continues to reject the allegations.⁶¹

U.S. officials have avoided publicly accusing the UAE of arming the RSF—which per the State Department has committed genocide in Sudan's Darfur region—but stated that such support—from any source should stop.⁶² According to press reports and some Members of Congress, Biden Administration officials in a briefing confirmed the UAE's role in weapons transfers.⁶³ Under the Biden Administration, the Department of the Treasury has designated multiple UAE-based companies linked to the RSF for sanctions, including one that has provided Colombian mercenaries to the RSF.⁶⁴

UAE officials have cited "the re-emergence of Muslim Brotherhood influence" in Sudan as a major concern,⁶⁵ and Emirati media has highlighted the role of other foreign actors in providing drones to the SAF for use in civilian areas and the SAF's alleged use of chemical weapons.⁶⁶

UAE interest in Sudan may be part of a broader regional UAE strategy in the Red Sea/Horn of Africa to invest financially and engage various governments and non-state actors militarily.⁶⁷ Among East African countries, the largest Emirati engagements have been in Sudan, where the UAE has been the single largest investor among regional actors, with a reported $22 billion in non-security initiatives.⁶⁸

While the UAE has drawn international criticism for its clandestine support of the RSF, the United States has continued to include the UAE government in the "Quad," a U.S.-led diplomatic initiative to end the conflict, that also includes Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which are seen as aligned with the SAF. The UAE has expressed its commitment to the Quad and has emphasized that "an immediate ceasefire would strengthen ongoing efforts to support a sustainable, civilian political solution that places the interests of the Sudanese people above all else."⁶⁹

U.S.-Emirati Relations

Over the past two decades, the UAE has become one of the United States' closest partners in the Middle East region.⁷⁰ Those ties have been strengthened during the Trump Administration. Gulf countries like the UAE have increasingly emerged as arenas for competition with China, particularly in the race for AI dominance. In January 2026, the UAE joined Pax Silica, the U.S. State Department's multilateral AI and supply chain security initiative. In June 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio traveled to the UAE where he "reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the security of the Emirates."⁷¹

Though U.S.-Emirati ties remain strong, the UAE's ongoing rivalry with Saudi Arabia in both the commercial and diplomatic spheres have complicated U.S. efforts to forge a common regional response to various challenges in war-torn countries, such as Yemen and Sudan.⁷² As the conflict in the Gulf continues, U.S. policymakers may seek greater Emirati-Saudi cooperation against common threats.⁷³ In Yemen, where the UAE and Saudi Arabia backed different factions aligned against the Iran-backed Houthis and where Saudi Arabia is now embroiled in renewed conflict, U.S. officials have been privately urging Emirati-Saudi reconciliation.⁷⁴ In late September 2026, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman held talks with UAE Vire President Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al Nahyan.

From 1950 to 2024, the United States implemented more than $33.5 billion in Foreign Military Sales for the UAE, making it the 14^th largest U.S. defense customer by value worldwide.⁷⁵ From 2016 to 2025, the United States also authorized the export of over $11.3 billion in defense articles to the UAE via the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process, primarily launch vehicles, aircraft, munitions, and military electronics.⁷⁶ Since the conflict with Iran began in February 2026, the Administration has notified Congress of an estimated $8.6 billion in possible U.S. Foreign Military Sales to the UAE (see Table 1). On March 26, 2026, Senator Chris Van Hollen proposed a Joint Resolution of Disapproval (S.J.Res. 158) to the proposed sale of F-16 munitions notified to Congress on March 19. For several years, Senator Van Hollen and others have proposed legislation (S. 935, H.R. 2509) to prohibit U.S. arms sales to the UAE until the President certifies that the UAE is not providing materiel support to the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.

The United States and the UAE have established a "Defense Cooperation Framework" to develop joint approaches to regional conflicts and to promote U.S.-UAE interoperability. On May 15, 2017, the United States and the UAE confirmed that they had concluded negotiations on a new Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with a 15-year duration, which came into force as of May 30, 2019.⁷⁷ The DCA is not a mutual defense treaty.

Figure 2. U.S.-UAE Bilateral Trade: 2020-2025 Nominal U.S. dollars in millions

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5200.html#2025.

In 2025, the UAE was the largest U.S. trading partner by value ($39 billion) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.⁷⁸ The UAE has remained the top U.S. export destination for the entire MENA region for the 17^th year in a row, and the United States has a trade surplus of $23 billion with the UAE (see Figure 2). According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the UAE is a "global hub for over 1,500 American companies."⁷⁹ The current baseline U.S. tariff rate on most goods imported from the UAE is 10%; tariffs on aluminum imported from the UAE are 50%.

Historical Background

From the mid-18^th to the mid-19^th century, the emirates were under the sway of the United Kingdom and were known as the "Trucial States," a term derived from a series of maritime truces among the several emirates negotiated under British auspices. For over a century and until independence in 1971, the Trucial States functioned as informal British protectorates, with Britain conducting foreign and defense relations on their behalf.⁸⁰

During most of this period, the Trucial States' mostly semi-nomadic population focused on pearl diving, merchandise trade, and date cultivation. Oil exploration in the Trucial States began in the 1930s; the discovery and eventual export of oil in Abu Dhabi in the late 1950s and early 1960s helped transform the emirates politically and economically from a relatively impoverished area dependent on British protection into an independent nation with the Arab world's second largest GDP.

When the British government announced its intent to withdraw from bases "East of Suez" in 1968, the Trucial States and other Gulf sheikhdoms (Bahrain and Qatar) began deliberations over possible federation. Internally and prior to independence, the various ruling families of the Trucial States had cooperated with the British in delineating borders among themselves and forming a Trucial Council to discuss political matters. Externally, Britain, along with the United States, worked to ensure that larger Gulf powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, would not impede federation, despite their respective claims on territories within the emirates.⁸¹ After three years of negotiations, Qatar and Bahrain decided to become independent nations. The emirates acquired full independence from Britain on December 1, 1971. Six of them—Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Fujayrah, Ajman, and Umm al Qaywayn—immediately banded together to form the UAE. A seventh, Ra's al Khaymah, joined the federation early in 1972.

In its half-century of independence, the UAE has had three presidents; their domestic and foreign policies have evolved from an early focus on state building, development, and close ties to the West to becoming a more emboldened, global actor that has retained close Western ties while expanding relationships further East. Under the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan (president from 1971-2004), Abu Dhabi used its oil wealth to invest heavily in infrastructure development, as well as federal institutions that could bond a society traditionally divided along various tribal, familial, and geographic lines. Nevertheless, strengthening Emirati national identity took time; the federal army was only truly united in 1997 when Dubai disbanded its armed forces.

During the reign of Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan (president from 2004 to 2022), the UAE focused on diversifying its economy. In Dubai, which has far less oil than Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Mohammad bin Rashid al Maktoum transformed the city-state into a global commercial center centered on finance, real estate, shipping, and tourism.⁸² While Abu Dhabi and Dubai have long competed commercially and culturally, Abu Dhabi's oil wealth has undergirded the UAE's growth; during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, Dubai's real estate market crashed, and Abu Dhabi lent it $20 billion in bailout funds.

Domestic Politics and Society

The UAE's political system is notably stable. The dynastic rulers of each of the seven emirates exercise power within their respective principalities over "all authorities that are not assigned by the Constitution to the Federation."⁸³ Per the constitution, the Federal Supreme Council, which comprises the hereditary leaders of all the emirates, has the power to elect a new president upon death or resignation of the sitting ruler.⁸⁴ The Council is the highest federal executive and legislative authority in the UAE. Since the founding of the state, the ruler of Abu Dhabi has served as the federation's president, and the presidential transition in 2022 (like the previous one in 2004) followed constitutional procedures.⁸⁵ The UAE president has the legal authority to sign laws and issue decrees (in areas assigned to the federation under the constitution), appoint/dismiss cabinet ministers, and conduct the nation's foreign affairs.

The UAE does not have an independent legislative body, though it has provided for some formal popular representation of citizens through a 40-seat advisory Federal National Council (FNC)—a body that can debate laws and review government policies, but not legislate independently. The FNC can summon ministers for questioning, but it is not empowered to remove them. Half of the FNC's seats are appointed; the other half are directly elected by limited suffrage among selected UAE citizens.⁸⁶ According to a 2018 presidential decree, Emirati women must hold 50% of the council's seats.

The UAE has a dual judicial system with a mix of federal courts and state courts within some individual emirates. Sharia (Islamic law) is the principal source of legislation, though courts may apply civil or sharia law depending on circumstances. According to the constitution, federal law supersedes local law, though each emirate can enact laws not expressly reserved for the federal government, or in areas in which the federal government has not legislated. A Federal Supreme Court, appointed by the UAE leadership, adjudicates disputes between emirates or between an emirate and the UAE federal government. Additionally, the Federal Supreme Court adjudicates over state security cases, wherein its verdicts are final and cannot be appealed. Abu Dhabi and Dubai also have special economic zones with respective separate court systems to settle commercial and civil disputes. Each individual emirate maintains its own police forces, which enforce both local and federal law and are officially subsumed within the Federal Ministry of the Interior.

The Emirati federal government and each individual emirate maintain generous social welfare systems for Emirati citizens. In the UAE, Emirati citizens pay no personal income tax. Education is compulsory and free. Emirati citizens are entitled to universal health care. The state also maintains a vast subsidy system, particularly for low-income citizens. The UAE's Social Welfare Program provides its citizens with subsidies for housing, unemployment support, food, fuel, water, and electricity. Many citizens who have worked in both the public and private sectors are entitled to pensions upon reaching retirement eligibility.

The UAE's population consists mostly of expatriates, who make up a higher share of the UAE's population than any other GCC state (see Figure 2). The federal government has sought to attract and retain skilled foreign labor to help make the economy globally competitive, and has reformed and liberalized some laws in apparent efforts to do so. The UAE faces competition from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf neighbors that similarly seek to be a hub for global commerce. In 2021, the federal government decriminalized premarital sex and cohabitation; ("homosexual activities are illegal," per the State Department). The Abu Dhabi Dubai governments also removed the requirement for a license to purchase or consume alcohol. A federal law on the personal status of non-Muslims allows for civil law to govern marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody for non-Muslims.⁸⁷ In 2021, the UAE amended its citizenship law, allowing a pathway to citizenship for certain categories of foreigners from select career fields.⁸⁸ In the emirate of Ras al Khaimah, the Wynn Casino company is building a resort and gaming complex, in what would become the first casino to operate in any of the GCC states; to date, the UAE has yet to legalize gambling, which is prohibited in Islam.⁸⁹ The UAE also runs a Golden Residency program, which offers foreigners long-term residency (five to ten years with possible renewal) based on income and investment qualifications.

Figure 3. Migrant Population by Percentage in the GCC

Sources: The Economist and United Nations. Notes: m = millions. Each bubble depicts the number of migrants in each country, while each bar shows what percentage of the country's total population that number represents.

The UAE, like other GCC countries, has attempted to encourage more of its own citizens to be active participants in the private sector labor force. According to the country's "Emiratisation" laws, private sector companies with over 50 employees must have at least 3% of their payroll consist of Emirati citizens; noncompliance results in steep fines, though the government has offered to subsidize a portion of its citizens' salaries from private employers.⁹⁰ Despite these efforts, studies indicate that Emirati students lag internationally on key educational performance benchmarks; some contend that "the promise of a public-sector job, regardless of ability, offered little motivation to work hard in school."⁹¹ In 2024, the ruler of Dubai claimed that, for the first time, the number of Emirati citizens working in the private sector had exceeded 100,000, due, in part, to government programs designed to incentivize local hiring.⁹²

Human Rights, Women's Rights, Foreign Labor, and Trafficking in Persons

According to the U.S. Department of State, significant human rights issues in the UAE include, among other things, credible reports of: "disappearances; arbitrary arrest or detention; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including censorship; and prohibiting independent trade unions or significant or systematic restrictions on workers' freedom of association."⁹³ The nongovernmental organization Freedom House classifies the UAE as "not free."⁹⁴

According to the World Economic Forum's 2026 Global Gender Gap report, the UAE ranks 91^st overall in the report's global gender gap index and second overall in the Middle East and North Africa, behind Israel.⁹⁵ This score may reflect the high educational attainment of Emirati women and government attempts to encourage their political participation. The UAE has reformed legal provisions to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex and gender, while enacting a domestic violence law permitting women to obtain restraining orders against abusers. The UAE Air Force has several female fighter pilots, and, in 2021, Nora al Matrooshi was named the UAE's first female astronaut.⁹⁶

Overall, UAE law governing certain personal matters differs for Muslim Emirati citizens and non-Muslim expatriates. For the former, the Personal Status Law, which is based on sharia law, governs policies on marriage, divorce, and child custody.

The UAE is a "destination country" for women trafficked from Asia, Africa, and the countries of the former Soviet Union and forced into prostitution. The Department of State's Trafficking in Persons report for 2025, for the 14^th year in a row, rated the UAE as "Tier 2," based on the assessment that the UAE "does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so."⁹⁷ In a 2023 investigative exposé published by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and Reuters, journalists concluded that "the UAE is a major destination for sex trafficking, where African women are forced into prostitution by illicit networks operating within the country…. Emirati authorities do little to protect these women, according to anti-trafficking activists, Nigerian authorities and interviews with trafficked women."⁹⁸ Dubai has a police unit tasked solely with assisting victims of trafficking.⁹⁹

A significant percentage of the UAE's expatriate workforce comprises low-paid, unskilled and semi-skilled laborers and domestic workers, predominantly from South Asia. UAE law prohibits all forms of compulsory labor, but enforcement is inconsistent. Foreign laborers have sometimes conducted strikes to protest poor working conditions, nonpayment of wages, and cramped housing conditions. Workers still reportedly sometimes have their passports withheld, are denied wages or paid late, and are deported for lodging complaints. The federal government has put in place an electronic salary payment system that applies to companies with more than 100 workers, facilitating timely payment of agreed wages. In 2022, the UAE government issued a federal decree aimed at creating better work conditions for domestic workers.¹⁰⁰

Analysis: UAE Foreign Relations and U.S. Ties

Amid the events of 2026 and their impact on the region, the UAE is adjusting to a new security and economic environment, while other Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia, continue to confront Iranian-backed groups such as the Houthis. Against this backdrop, the UAE's relationship with the United States faces uncertainty. On the one hand, no other single external power can provide military assistance to the UAE to the same extent as the United States. U.S. arms sales to the Emirates have increased notably over the past nine months, and cooperation in other areas, such as artificial intelligence, remains robust. On the other hand, if the conflicts in the Gulf result in a more assertive Iran, with much of its proxy network intact, and a perception of diminished U.S. deterrence, the UAE may face difficult choices over whether and how to reduce its dependence on the United States without alienating its most important security partner by embracing U.S. competitors. Alternatively, increased U.S.-UAE economic pressure on Iran could contribute to diminished Iranian influence and an outcome that reinforces bilateral cooperation. Although the situation remains fluid, regardless of the Iran conflict's outcome, the UAE appears unlikely to retreat from its ambitions to become a global commercial center, even if the current conflict has increased the cost of pursuing those ambitions.

Footnotes