The United Arab Emirates (UAE):
Issues for U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
April 20, 2009January 22, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21852
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
Summary
The UAE’s open economy and society have won praise from advocates of expanded freedoms in
the Middle East, but lax export controls, particularly in the emirate of Dubai, are causing U.S.
concern over proliferation of advanced technology; terrorist transiting; and human trafficking.
. However, some of those same policies have produced financial excesses, social
ills such as prostitution and human trafficking, and relatively lax controls on sensitive
technologies acquired from the West. These concerns—as well as concerns about the UAE
oversight and management of a complex
and technically advanced initiative such as a nuclear
power program—underscore some
congressional and other opposition to a recently-signeddissatisfaction with a U.S.-UAE civilian nuclear
cooperation agreement. The agreement was signed on May 21, 2009 and submitted to Congress
that day. It entered into force on December 17, 2009. agreement.
Despite its social tolerance and economic freedom, the UAE government is authoritarian,
although with substantial informal citizen participation and consensus building. The UAE
federation President, Shaykh Khalifah-building. Assessments by a
wide range of observers say that members of the elite routinely obtain favored treatment in court
cases, business opportunities, and influence on national decisions. The UAE federation President,
Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan, technically serves a five -year term,
renewable by the
Federal Supreme Council (composed of the seven heads of the individual
emirates), although in practice changes usually only take place in the event of the death of a
leader. After
practice leadership changes have generally taken place only after the death of a leader. After
several years of resisting electoral processes similar to those instituted by other Gulf
states states, and
despite an absence of popular pressure for elections, the UAE undertook its first major electoral process in December 2006, although with a
small, hand-picked electorate and for a body with limited powers.
There remains little evidence of unrest, despite a severe economic downturn caused by the global
financial crisis and recession, which has hit Dubai emirate particularly hard. Many expatriate
workers are reportedly leaving UAE after widespread layoffs, particularly in the financial and real
estate sectors.
This report will be updated. See also: CRS Report R40344, The United Arab Emirates Nuclear
Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K.
process in December 2006. The process was criticized as far from instituting Western-style
democratic processes, because the electorate was relatively small and subject to governmental
selection, and it voted for only half the membership of a body with limited powers. The other half
of the body was selected by appointment.
Partly because of substantial UAE federal government financial intervention, the political and
social climate has remained calm through the ongoing global financial crisis and recession, which
has hit Dubai emirate particularly hard and called into question its strategy of ambitious,
investment-fueled development. Many expatriate workers left UAE after widespread layoffs,
particularly in the financial and real estate sectors. During the crisis, there have been somewhat
more criticism of and official crackdowns against expatriate social behavior that many UAE
citizens have always considered offensive.
For details and analysis of the U.S.-UAE nuclear agreement and legislation concerning that
agreement, see CRS Report R40344, The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed
U.S. Nuclear Cooperation, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
Contents
Governance, Human Rights, and Reform.....................................................................................1
Steps Toward Political Reform ..............................................................................................3
Human Rights/TraffickingHuman Rights Issues .............................................................................................................24
Women’s Rights..............................................................................................................5
Religious Freedom ..........................................................................................................5
Human Trafficking..........................................................................................................5
Cooperation Against Terrorism and Proliferation .........................................................................3
Nuclear Agreement5
Record on Proliferation Cooperation ...............................................................................6
Nuclear Agreement .................................5
Defense and ........................................................................7
Foreign Policy.........................................................................................................5....................7
Relations With Iran ...............................................................................................................5
U.S.-UAE Defense Cooperation8
Arab-Israeli Issues ................................................................................................................................6
U.S. 8
U.S.-UAE Defense Cooperation/Iraq and Afghanistan Wars ........................................................9
U.S. and Other Arms Sales .................................................................................................. 10
Other Specific Cooperation on Iraq ..................................................................................... 10
Cooperation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.....................................6
Cooperation in Afghanistan.......................................................... 10
Other UAE Foreign Aid Issues ...............................................................7............................. 11
Economic Issues .........................................................................................................................7 11
Figures
Figure 1. Map of United Arab Emirates .......................................................................................3
Tables
Table 1. Recent U.S. Aid to UAE ................................................................................................ 8 12
Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................8 12
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
Governance, Human Rights, and Reform1
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates (principalities): Abu Dhabi,
the oil-rich capital of the federation; Dubai, its free-trading commercial hub; and the five smaller
and less wealthy emirates of Sharjah; Ajman; Fujayrah; Umm al-QawaynQaywayn; and Ras al-Khaymah.
After Britain announced in 1968 that it would no longer ensure security in the Gulf, six “Trucial
States” decided to form the UAE federation in December 1971; Ras al-Khaymah, joined in 1972.
The UAE federation has completed a major leadership transition since the death of its key
founder, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan, long-time ruler of Abu Dhabi and UAE
President, on November 2, 2004.
His son, Crown Prince Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan, now about 62 years old, was
born in 1948, was named ruler of
Abu Dhabi and, keeping with tradition, was subsequently selected by all seven
emirates (Federal
Supreme Council) as UAE president. The third son of Zayid, Shaykh
Mohammad bin Zayid al-NuhayyanalNuhayyan, is Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and heir apparent. The ruler of
Dubai traditionally serves
concurrently as Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE; that
position has been held by
Mohammad bin Rashid Al Maktum, architect of Dubai’s modernization
drive, since the death of
his elder brother Maktum bin Rashid Al Maktum on January 5, 2006.
Shaykh Mohammad bin Rashid also continued as Defense Minister.
The federation President and Vice President technically serve five year terms, and the Federal
Supreme Council is to meet by November 2009 to decide whether Shaykh Khalifa and Shaykh
Mohammad will continue in those posts. In practice, posts at that level of leadership have
changed only in the event of death of an incumbent.
Basic Facts About UAE
Population
4.8 million, of which about 900,000 are citizens
Rashid also continued as Defense Minister. The Crown Prince of Dubai is his son Hamdan bin
Mohammad Al Maktum, who heads the “Dubai Executive Committee,” the equivalent of a
cabinet for Dubai emirate. Under a Dubai-level reorganization announced in January 2010, five
committees were set up to help the Executive Committee on various major issues.
The federation President and Vice President serve five-year terms, but they technically owe their
positions to the UAE’s highest body, the Federal Supreme Council, which is composed of the
leaders of each of the seven emirates of the UAE. Two emirates, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaymah,
have a common ruling family: the Al Qawasim tribe. The Federal Supreme Council meets four
times per year to establish general policy guidelines, although the leaders of the seven emirates
consult frequently with each other. It met in November 2009 to decide whether Shaykh Khalifa
and Shaykh Mohammad would continue in those posts. As expected, no major changes were
made at this “election” meeting. In practice, posts at that level of leadership have changed only in
the event of death of an incumbent.
A UAE cabinet reshuffle in May 2009 resulted in a change in two new deputy Prime Ministers,
one of which serves concurrently as Interior Minister (the lead agency on internal security). The
shift was viewed by observers as strengthening the hand of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayid
because the new deputy prime ministers are close to him, although there are no evident rifts
between him and his brother, the UAE President.
1
Information in this section is from the following State Department reports: Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices-2008 (February 25, 2009); Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2006 (April 5, 2007);
Trafficking in Persons Report for 2009 (June 16, 2009); and International Religious Freedom report: 2009 (October 26,
2009).
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Some Basic Facts About UAE
Population
4.8 million, of which about 900,000 are citizens.
Expatriates are 85% of the work force,
Religions
96% Muslim, of which 16% are Shiite. 4% Christian and
Hindu
Ethnic Groups
19% Emirati (citizenry); 23% other Arab and Iranian; 50%
South Asian; 8% western and other Asian expatriate
Gross Domestic Product (purchasing power parity)
$186 billion; GDP per capita is $40,000 per year
Each emirate has its own leadership (Sharjah and Ras al-Khaymah have a common ruling family,
the Al Qawasim tribe); all seven leaders sit on the Federal Supreme Council, the UAE’s highest
decision-making body. It meets four times per year to establish general policy guidelines,
although the leaders of the seven emirates consult frequently with each other. The other leaders
are Dr. Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qassimi (Sharjah); Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qassimi (Ras al1
Information in this section is from the following State Department reports: Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices-2008 (February 25, 2009); Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2006 (April 5, 2007);
Trafficking in Persons Report for 2008 (June 4, 2008); and International Religious Freedom report - 2007 (September
19, 2008).
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Khaymah); Humaid bin Rashid Al Nuaimi (Ajman); Hamad bin Muhammad Al Sharqi
(Fujayrah); and Saud bin Rashid Al-Mu’alla (Umm al-Qawayn). Shaykh Saud of Umm alQawayn, who is about 57 years old, was named leader of that emirate in January 2009 upon the
death of his father, Shaykh Rashid Al-Mu’alla. In Ras al-Khaymah, Shaykh Khalid bin Saqr Al
Qassimi claims to remain as Crown Prince even though Shaykh Saqr replaced him in that position
with Shaykh Khalid’s younger brother in 2003Inflation Rate
About 14.5%
Budget
Revenues: $83 billion. Expenditures: $48 billion
Oil Exports
About 2.7 million barrels per day
Foreign Exchange and Gold Reserves
About $67 billion
Exports to the UAE
$14.4 billion, making UAE the largest U.S. export market
in the Arab world (2008). Goods sold to UAE are mostly
machinery, aircraft, industrial materials, and other high
value items. The United States imported $1.3 billion in
goods from UAE,
Imports from UAE by the United States
$826 million (2008). Goods imported include mostly
clothing and oil, as well as diamonds.
U.S. citizens resident in UAE
About 30,000
Major Projects
Dubai inaugurated 2,000+ foot “Burj Khalifa,” world’s
tallest building, on January 4, 2010. Dubai metro has
begun operations and is expanding service. Burj al Arab
hotel in Dubai bills itself as “world’s only 7-star hotel.”
UAE participating in Gulf country-wide railroad network
to become operational by 2017.
Sources: CIA World Factbook.
The leaders of the other individual emirates are: Dr. Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qassimi (Sharjah);
Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qassimi (Ras al-Khaymah); Humaid bin Rashid Al Nuaimi (Ajman);
Hamad bin Muhammad Al Sharqi (Fujayrah); and Saud bin Rashid Al-Mu’alla (Umm alQaywayn). Shaykh Saud of Umm al-Qaywayn, who is about 57 years old, was named leader of
that emirate in January 2009 upon the death of his father, Shaykh Rashid Al-Mu’alla. In Ras alKhaymah, Shaykh Khalid bin Saqr Al Qassimi claims to remain as Crown Prince even though
Shaykh Saqr replaced him in that position with Shaykh Khalid’s younger brother in 2003. On
October 5, 2009, the UAE’s Ambassador to the United States, Yousef Al Otaiba, issued a letter
stating that Shaykh Khalid was indeed removed in 2003 and holds no official position in the
UAE.
In part because of its small size, the UAE is one of the wealthiest of the Gulf states, as shown in
the table above, and there is little unrest. Islamist movements in UAE, including those linked to
the Muslim Brotherhood, are generally non-violent and perform social and relief work. UAE
residents of Iranian origin tend to oppose governmental criticism of Iran, but this community does
not constitute an organized opposition to the UAE government.
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Figure 1. Map of United Arab Emirates
Source: CRS graphics
Steps Toward Political Reform
Despite or perhaps because of the lack of significant opposition, the UAE has long lagged on
political political
reform. UAE leaders long resisted instituting any electoral processes, even as such
elections elections
began to expand in the other Gulf states, arguing that elections would inevitably
aggravate long
dormant schisms among tribes and clans, and potentially cause Islamist parties to
become more
radical. Political parties are not permitted. UAE leaders said that UAE citizens are
able to express
their concerns directly to the leadership through traditional consultative
mechanisms, such as the
open majlis (council) held by many UAE leaders, including Shaykh Khalifa.
The UAE leadership relented in December 2006, and instituted a limited and controlled electoral
process for half of the 40-seat Federal National Council (FNC); the other 20 seats continue to be
appointed. Previously, all 40 members of the FNC were appointed by all seven emirates. The seat
distribution of the FNC remains weighted in favor of Abu Dhabi and Dubai (eight seats each).
Sharjah and Ras al-Khaymah have six each; and the others have four seats each. According to the
State Department, in 2008 the government accepted 80% of the FNC’s recommendations on
legislation.
In the voting, a 6,690-person “electorate” (100 electors per FNC seat; each elector appointed by
emirate leaderships) chose among 456 candidates for the 20 FNC elected seats. 1,200 of the
electors were female, as were 65 candidates were femaleThere were 1,200
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female electors and 65 female candidates, but only one woman won (from Abu
Dhabi). Another
eight women were appointed to the remaining 20 seats. UAE plans are to
gradually expand the
size of the FNC and to broaden its powers, according to the Minister of
State for FNC Affairs (and now
(also Minister of State for Foreign Affairs) Anwar Gargash. The
FNC can review, but not enact or
veto, federal legislation, and it can question, but not impeach,
federal cabinet ministers. It has
questioned government ministers mostly on economic and social
issues. Its sessions are open to the public. Each emirate also has its own consultative council.
Human Rights Issues
Freedom of assembly is forbidden by law, but in practice small demonstrations on working
conditions and some other issues have been tolerated. On several occasions, foreign laborers
working on the large, ambitious construction projects in Dubai have conducted strikes to protest
poor working conditions and non-payment of wages. Some of these concerns have been or are
being addressed by the Labor Ministry’s recent penalizing of employers, and a new process,
formulated in June 2008, to have workers’ salaries deposited directly in banks.
Progress on women’s political rights has been steady. There are now four women in the cabinet:
Shayha Lubna al-Qassimi, Minister of Economy and Planning; Mariam al-Roumi, Minister of
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Social Affairs; and two ministers without portfolio – Reem al-Hashimi and Maitha al-Shamsi.
Nine women are in the Federal National Council, and seven women serve on the 40 seat
consultative council in Sharjah emirate. About 10% of the UAE diplomatic corps is now female;
none served prior to 2001. In November 2008, Dubai emirate appointed ten female public
prosecutors
the public. Each emirate also has its own consultative council.
On the other hand, many observers note that justice in UAE is selective. For example, on January
10, 2010, a UAE court acquitted the UAE President’s brother, Shaykh Issa bin Zayid Al
Nuhayyan, on charges of torturing an Afghan merchant. He was acquitting even though there was
a video available of him beating the Afghan and driving over his legs with a sport vehicle, and
even though three others involved in the incident, all non-royals, were convicted. The UAE court
ruled that Shaykh Issa was not liable because he was taking prescription drugs that may have
prompted his actions. Others say that arrests of expatriates and non-citizens have increased along
with the unfolding of the financial crisis, possibly out of citizen frustration that globalization and
dramatic economic expansion have led to bursting of the economic “bubble” in UAE. In 2007,
human rights groups criticized the conservative-dominated justice system for threatening to
prosecute a 15-year-old French expatriate for homosexuality, a crime in UAE, when he was raped
by two UAE men; the UAE men were later sentenced for sexual assault and kidnapping.
Human Rights/Trafficking Issues
The human rights record of the UAE is relatively positive on some issues, but relatively poor on
others. Some human rights problems in UAE, such as human trafficking, are caused because the
government is relatively lax in some cases, not because it is too strict. Freedom of assembly is
forbidden by law, but in practice small demonstrations on working conditions and some other
issues have been tolerated. On several occasions, foreign laborers working on the large, ambitious
construction projects in Dubai have conducted strikes to protest poor working conditions and
non-payment of wages. Some of these concerns have been addressed by the Labor Ministry’s
penalizing of employers, and a process, formulated in June 2008, to have workers’ salaries
deposited directly in banks.
Some cabinet choices signal commitment to reform, including Shaykh Abdullah bin Zayid alNuhayyan as Foreign Minister and Anwar Gargash, mentioned above. Shaykh Abdullah’s former
post of Information Minister was abolished in 2006 to allow media independence. On the other
hand, as ofin April 2009, a draftnew media law is drawingdrew opposition from some human rights groups
who say it would continue to provide who said
it allows for penalties against journalists who personally criticize
UAE leaders. Provisions
governing media licensing todo not clearly articulate the standards the
government will apply in
approving or denying licenses for media organs to operate. The UAE
government says the draft law willlaw
does not apply to the several media “Free Zones” in UAE in which
major foreign media organizations operate.
On other areas, the UAE record is less positive. The referenced State Department reports point
out numerous restrictions such as on free
assembly, freedom of speech, and workers’ rights, and
flogging penalties imposed by some courts. On religious freedom, non-Muslims in UAE are free
to practice their religion; there are 24 Christian churches built on land donated by the ruling
families of the various emirates, but there are no Jewish synagogues or Buddhist temples. The
Shiite Muslim minority is free to worship and maintain its own mosques, but Shiite mosques
receive no government funds and there are no Shiites in top federal posts. In 2007, human rights
groups criticized the conservative-dominated justice system for threatening to prosecute a 15 year
old French expatriate for homosexuality, a crime in UAE, when he was raped by two UAE men;
the UAE men were later sentenced for sexual assault and kidnapping.
courts. Some Members of Congress criticized the UAE for a videotaped beating by a member of
the royal family of an Afghan merchant living in UAE. Some reports say that the financial crisis
has caused UAE security forces to become more vigilant in enforcing penalties against
expatriates who violate UAE law on social behavior in public.
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The United States has sought to promote democracy, rule of law, and civil society in the Persian
Gulf region, including in UAE. Some State Department programs to promote student and
women’s political
participation, entrepreneurship, legal reform, civil society, independent media,
and international
trade law compliance, are funded by the State Department’s Middle East
Partnership Initiative
(MEPI), and the. The U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi contains a Gulf-wide MEPI/democracy promotion
office.
Other social problems might be a result of the relatively open economy of the UAE, particularly
in Dubai. The Trafficking in Persons report for 2008 placed the UAE in “Tier 2” (up from Tier
2/Watch List in 2007 and from Tier 3 in 2005) because it does not comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. The UAE is
considered a “destination country” for women trafficked from Asia and the former Soviet Union.
The improved 2008 rating appeared to be a recognition of some implementation of a December
2006 law prohibiting trafficking in persons. The UAE has made progress in curbing trafficking of
young boys as camel jockeys: it has repatriated at least 1,050 children out of a suspected 5,000
trafficked for camel racing, provided $3 million for their care and repatriation, and it now uses
robot jockeys at camel races.
Cooperation Against Terrorism and Proliferation
These issues are of particular concern to the United States because of absent or lax enforcement
of existing export and border controls. The relatively small sums of U.S. aid to UAE are generally
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houses a MEPI office/staff that
runs the MEPI programs throughout the Gulf region.
Women’s Rights
Progress on women’s political rights has been steady. There are now four women in the cabinet:
Shayha Lubna al-Qassimi, Minister of Foreign Trade and Planning; Mariam al-Roumi, Minister
of Social Affairs; and two ministers without portfolio—Reem al-Hashimi and Maitha al-Shamsi.
Nine women are in the Federal National Council, and seven women serve on the 40-seat
consultative council in Sharjah emirate. About 10% of the UAE diplomatic corps is now female;
none served prior to 2001. In November 2008, Dubai emirate appointed 10 female public
prosecutors. The UAE Air Force has four women fighter pilots.
Religious Freedom
The October 2009 State Department report on international religious freedom said there was “no
change in the status of respect for religious freedom by the Government during the reporting
period.” Non-Muslims in UAE are free to practice their religion; there are 24 Christian churches
built on land donated by the ruling families of the various emirates, but there are no Jewish
synagogues or Buddhist temples. The Shiite Muslim minority is free to worship and maintain its
own mosques, but Shiite mosques receive no government funds and there are no Shiites in top
federal posts.
Human Trafficking
Other social problems might be a result of the relatively open economy of the UAE, particularly
in Dubai. The UAE is still considered a “destination country” for women trafficked from Asia and
the former Soviet Union. The Trafficking in Persons report for 2009 placed the UAE in “Tier 2:
Watch List”—a downgrade from the Tier 2 placement in 2008 and back to the status of the 2007
placement. The 2009 downgrade (from 2008) is on the grounds that the UAE is not taking steps
against people being trafficked for the purpose of forcing them into labor. The UAE’s positive
efforts are directed primarily against sexual trafficking, not labor-related trafficking. UAE has
made progress in curbing trafficking of young boys as camel jockeys; it has repatriated at least
1,050 children out of a suspected 5,000 trafficked for camel racing, provided $3 million for their
care and repatriation, and it now uses robot jockeys at camel races.
Cooperation Against Terrorism and Proliferation
These issues are of particular concern to the United States because of a pattern of lax enforcement
of existing export and border controls. The relatively small sums of U.S. aid to UAE are generally
for programs to improve UAE performance on enforcing export control laws. The UAE was one
of only three countries (Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were the others) to have recognized the
Taliban during 1996-2001 as the government of Afghanistan. During Taliban rule, the UAE
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allowed Ariana Afghan airlines to operate direct service, and Al Qaeda activists reportedly spent
time there. 2 Two of the September 11 hijackers were UAE nationals, and they reportedly used
UAE-based financial networks in the plot. Since then, the UAE has been credited in U.S. reports
(State Department “Country Reports on Terrorism: 2007, released April 30, 2008”)State
Department “Country Reports on Terrorism” with assisting
in the arrests of senior Al Qaeda
operatives;3 denouncing terror attacks; improving border
security; prescribing guidance for Friday
prayer leaders; investigating suspect financial
transactions; and strengthening its bureaucracy and
legal framework to combat terrorism. In
December 2004, the United States and Dubai signed a Container Security Initiative Statement of
Principles, aimed at screening U.S.-bound containerized cargo transiting Dubai ports. Under it,
U.S. Customs officers are co-located with the Dubai Customs Intelligence Unit at Port Rashid in
Dubai.
In connection with revelations of illicit sales of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North
Korea by Pakistan’s nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, Dubai was named as a key transfer point for
Khan’s shipments of nuclear components. Two Dubai-based companies were apparently involved
in trans-shipping components: SMB Computers and Gulf Technical Industries.4 On April 7, 2004,
the Administration sanctioned a UAE firm, Elmstone Service and Trading FZE, for allegedly
selling weapons of mass destruction-related technology to Iran, under the Iran-Syria NonProliferation Act (P.L. 106-178). In June 2006, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released
a general order imposing a license requirement on Mayrow General Trading Company and related
enterprises in the UAE. This was done after Mayrow was implicated in the transhipment of
electronic components and devices capable of being used to construct improvised explosive
devices (IED) used in Iraq and Afghanistan. 5 In February 2007 the Administration threatened to
form a new category of control called “Destinations of Diversion Control” with UAE as the
intended designee country. In connection with the FNC approval of a law strengthening export
controls (April 2007), the Administration did not create that category. In September 2007, the
UAE used the new law to shut down 40 foreign and UAE firms allegedly involved in dual use
exports to Iran and other countriesThe UAE Central Bank is credited in the State Department
terrorism report for 2008 (published April 30, 2009) with providing training programs to UAE
financial institutions on money laundering and terrorism financing, although actions against
informal financial transmittals (hawala) requires “further vigilance.” It was reported in September
2009 that earlier in 2009, UAE security officials had broken up an Al Qaeda plot to blow up
targets in Dubai emirate.4
The UAE has signed on to several U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation and terrorism. These
include the Container Security Initiative Statement of Principles, aimed at screening U.S.-bound
containerized cargo transiting Dubai ports. Under it, three U.S. Customs and Border Protection
officers are co-located with the Dubai Customs Intelligence Unit at Port Rashid in Dubai. The
program results in about 20 ship inspections per week of U.S.-bound containers, many of them
apparently originating in Iran, according to the State Department terrorism report for 2008
(published April 30, 2009). The UAE is a signator to the proliferation Security Initiative, the
Megaports Initiative designed to prevent terrorist from using major ports to ship illicit material,
and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism.
Record on Proliferation Cooperation
The UAE record on preventing the re-export of advanced technology is less positive, although the
UAE has enhanced its cooperation at times when U.S. officials or outside experts have questioned
its performance. In connection with revelations of illicit sales of nuclear technology to Iran,
Libya, and North Korea by Pakistan’s nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, Dubai was named as a key
transfer point for Khan’s shipments of nuclear components. Two Dubai-based companies were
apparently involved in transshipping components: SMB Computers and Gulf Technical
Industries.5 On April 7, 2004, the Administration sanctioned a UAE firm, Elmstone Service and
Trading FZE, for allegedly selling weapons of mass destruction-related technology to Iran, under
the Iran-Syria Non-Proliferation Act (P.L. 106-178). In June 2006, the Bureau of Industry and
Security (BIS) released a general order imposing a license requirement on Mayrow General
Trading Company and related enterprises in the UAE. This was done after Mayrow was
implicated in the transhipment of electronic components and devices capable of being used to
construct improvised explosive devices (IED) used in Iraq and Afghanistan. 6 In February 2007
the Administration threatened to form a new category of control called “Destinations of Diversion
Control” with UAE as the intended designee country. In connection with the FNC approval of a
law strengthening export controls (April 2007), the Administration did not create that category. In
2
CRS conversations with executive branch officials, 1997-2000.
“U.S. Embassy to Reopen on Saturday After UAE Threat.” Reuters, March 26, 2004.
4
Lake, Eli and Sarah Carter. “UAE Kept Tight Lid on Disrupted Terror Plot.” Washington Times, September 17, 2009.
5
Milhollin, Gary and Kelly Motz. “Nukes ‘R’ US.” New York Times op.ed. March 4, 2004.
6
BIS, “General Order Concerning Mayrow General Trading and Related Enterprises,” 71 Federal Register 107, June 5,
2006.
3
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September 2007, the UAE used the new law to shut down 40 foreign and UAE firms allegedly
involved in dual use exports to Iran and other countries. However, UAE officials publicly
acknowledged in June 2009 that the UAE’s application of this law is still evolving.
Allegations continued in January 2009 with the publication by the Institute for Science and
International Security of a report entitled “Iranian Entities’ Illicit Military Procurement
Networks,” published January 12, 2009. The report asserts that Iran has used UAE companies to
obtain technology from U.S. suppliers, and that the components obtained have been used to
construct improvised explosive devices (IED’s) shipped by Iran to militants in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Other UAE companies the report alleges were involved in this network included not
only Mayrow but also Majidco Micro Electronics, Micatic General Trading, and Talinx
Electronics.
Despite the UAE efforts to enhance its export controls, in December 2008 some Members of
Congress called for a review by the inter-agency “Committee on Foreign Investment in the
2
CRS conversations with executive branch officials, 1997-2000.
“U.S. Embassy to Reopen on Saturday After UAE Threat.” Reuters, March 26, 2004.
4
Milhollin, Gary and Kelly Motz. “Nukes ‘R’ US.” New York Times op.ed. March 4, 2004.
5
BIS, “General Order Concerning Mayrow General Trading and Related Enterprises,” 71 Federal Register 107, June 5,
2006.
3
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United States” (CFIUS) of a proposed joint venture between Advanced Micro Devices and
Advanced Technology Investment Co. of Abu Dhabi for the potential for technology transfers. In
February 2006, CFIUS approved the takeover by the Dubai-owned “Dubai Ports World” company
of a British firm that manages six U.S. port facilities. Members, concerned that the takeover
might weaken U.S. port security, opposed it in P.L. 109-234, causing the company to divest assets
involved in U.S. port operations (divestment completed in late 2006 to AIG Global Investments).
Little opposition was expressed to a September 2007 Borse Dubai plan to take a 20% stake in the
NASDAQ stock market, or to a November 2007 investment of $7.5 billion in Citigroup by the
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), which manages excess oil revenues estimated at over
$500 billion.
Nuclear Agreement
It is the concern about the leakage of technology to Iran, via the UAE, that underpins much of the
concern about a U.S.-UAE agreement, signed January 15, 2009, to help the UAE develop a
nuclear power program. The agreement, which was revised slightly and signed again by the
Obama Administration on May 21, 2009 (and submitted to Congress that day), would be subject
would be subject to conditions specified in Section 123 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2153(b)], and is
was subject to congressional approval. On
November 14, 2008, President Bush issued a determination (No. 2009-7) approving of bilateral
nuclear cooperation under Section 123. In the 111th Congress, the concerns are encapsulated in
H.R. (in the form of passage of a joint resolution of approval or
non-passage of a joint resolution of disapproval within 90 days of continuous legislative session
following the May 21 submission). In the 111th Congress, concerns were encapsulated in H.R.
364, which would require the President to certify that the UAE has taken a number of steps
to to
stop illicit trade with Iran before any agreement would take effect. However, several
congressional resolutions of approval of the agreement (S.J.Res. 18 and H.J.Res. 60) have been
introduced, whereas one resolution of disapproval (H.J.Res. 55) was introduced. No measure
blocking the agreement was enacted and the “1-2-3 Agreement” entered into force on December
17, 2009. SeeSee: CRS Report R40344,
The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed
U.S. Nuclear Cooperation, by
Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr
Defense and Foreign Policy
Following the 1991 Gulf war to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the UAE, whose armed forces
number about 60,000, determined that it wanted a closer relationship with the United States. The
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
UAE did not necessarily fear Iraq, which is at the north end of the Persian Gulf, but rather the
UAE sought primarilyit primarily
sought to deter and balance out Iranian power. UAE fears escalated in April 1992,
when Iran asserted complete control of the largely uninhabited Persian Gulf island of Abu Musa,
which it and the UAE shared under a 1971 bilateral agreement. (In 1971, Iran, then ruled by the
U.S.-backed Shah, seized two other islands, Greater and Lesser Tunb, from the emirate of Ras alKhaymah, as well as part of Abu Musa from the emirate of Sharjah.)
Relations With Iran
In October 2008, the UAE and Iran signed an agreement to establish a joint commission to
resolve the dispute; that agreement came two months after the UAE protested Iran’s opening in
August 2008 of administrative and maritime security offices on Abu Musa. Iran has allowed
Sharjah to open power and water desalination facilities on the island. The United States is
concerned about Iran’s control over the islands, but takes no position on sovereignty of the
islands. The UAE, particularly Abu Dhabi, has long feared that the large Iranian-origin
community in Dubai emirate (est. 400,000 persons) could pose a “fifth column” threat to UAE
stability. Illustrating the UAE’s attempts to avoid antagonizing Iran, in May 2007, Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was permitted to hold a rally for Iranian expatriates in Dubai
when he made the first high level visit to UAE since UAE independence in 1971. Still, reflecting
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
the underlying tensions and volatility of UAE-Iran relations, the two countries issued mutual
recriminations in January 2009 over the UAE decision in late 2008 to begin fingerprinting Iranian
visitors to UAE.
On the Arab-Israeli dispute, in 1994 the UAE joined with the other Gulf monarchies in ending
enforcement of the Arab League’s boycott of companies doing business with Israel and on
companies that deal with companies that do business with Israel. The UAE formally bans direct
trade with Israel, although UAE companies reportedly do business with Israeli firms and some
Israeli diplomats attend multilateral meetings in the UAE. Unlike Qatar and Oman, the UAE did
not host multi-lateral Arab-Israeli working groups on regional issues when those talks took place
during 1994-1998. In 2007, the UAE joined a “quartet” of Arab states (the others are Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan) to assist U.S. diplomacy on Israeli-Palestinian issues. In December
2008 and January 2009, the UAE government permitted street demonstrations in support of
Hamas during its war with Israel. In February 2009, the UAE denied a visa to an Israeli tennis
player who was to participate in a Dubai tennis tournament, earning UAE some international
criticism.
U.S.-UAE Defense Cooperation
The framework for U.S.-UAE defense cooperation is a July 25, 1994, bilateral defense pact, the
text of which is classified, including a “status of forces agreement” (SOFA). Under the pact,
during the years of U.S. “containment” of Iraq (1991-2003), the UAE allowed U.S. equipment
pre-positioning and U.S. warship visits at its large Jebel Ali port, capable of handling aircraft
carriers, and it permitted the upgrading of airfields in the UAE that were used for U.S. combat
support flights, during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).6 About 1,800 U.S. forces, mostly Air
Force, are in UAE, up from 800 before OIF; they use Al Dhafra air base (mostly KC-10
refueling) and naval facilities at Fujairah to support U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, even
though UAE officials say that the OIF benefitted Iran strategically. The UAE has provided
facilities for Germany to train Iraqi police. It pledged $215 million for Iraq reconstruction but has
provided funds not in cash but in the form of humanitarian contributions ($71 million as of
December 2007). Agreeing with the U.S. view that Sunni Arab states need to engage the Shiite
dominated government in Baghdad, in June 2008, the UAE appointed an Ambassador to Iraq, the
first Arab country to do so. The following month it wrote off $7 billion (including interest) in
Iraqi debt. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid visited Iraq in October 2008.
Suggesting it wants to broaden its defense relations, in January 2008 the UAE signed an
agreement with French President Nicolas Sarkozy to allow a French air and naval base near Abu
Dhabi, which will reportedly be used by about 400 French military personnel.
U.S. The UAE cooperates with virtually all GCC-wide
development and economic initiatives, although some past border disputes and other
disagreements with Saudi Arabia occasionally flare. A 1974 “Treaty of Jeddah” with Saudi Arabia
formalized Saudi access to the Persian Gulf via a corridor running through UAE, in return for
UAE gaining formal control of villages in the Buraymi oasis area.
Relations With Iran
The UAE remains highly wary of Iran’s ambitions and powers, but it has sought to reach out to
Iran’s government and deny Iran any justification for aggression or adverse action against the
UAE. At the same time, the United States has enlisted the UAE in a multilateral effort to stiffen
international sanctions on Iran, in part by alleviating the concerns of China (a permanent U.N.
Security Council member) about its oil supplies. The Obama Administration has encouraged the
UAE and other oil exporters to offer to boost oil supplies to China to compensate for any loss of
imports from Iran that may result from China’s cooperation against Iran.7 Still, as noted above,
UAE-Iran trade is substantial, and numerous Iranian banks and trading companies have offices in
UAE, particularly in Dubai. It is preventing the re-transfer to Iran of U.S. goods shipped to UAE
that is the main intent of U.S. programs to help the UAE enforce its export control laws and
regulations, as discussed above. In October 2009, Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayid was
uncharacteristically public in expressing support for “political and diplomatic pressure on Iran to
stop it from acquiring nuclear technology.” The statements were made at a joint news conference
with visiting NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.
UAE fears of Iran have been elevated since April 1992, when Iran asserted complete control of
the largely uninhabited Persian Gulf island of Abu Musa, which it and the UAE shared under a
1971 bilateral agreement. (In 1971, Iran, then ruled by the U.S.-backed Shah, seized two other
islands, Greater and Lesser Tunb, from the emirate of Ras al-Khaymah, as well as part of Abu
Musa from the emirate of Sharjah.) In October 2008, the UAE and Iran signed an agreement to
establish a joint commission to resolve the dispute; that agreement came two months after the
UAE protested Iran’s opening in August 2008 of administrative and maritime security offices on
Abu Musa. Iran has allowed Sharjah to open power and water desalination facilities on the island.
The United States is concerned about Iran’s control over the islands, but takes no position on the
sovereignty of the islands. The UAE, particularly Abu Dhabi, has long feared that the large
Iranian-origin community in Dubai emirate (est. 400,000 persons) could pose a “fifth column”
threat to UAE stability. Illustrating the UAE’s attempts to avoid antagonizing Iran, in May 2007,
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was permitted to hold a rally for Iranian expatriates in
Dubai when he made the first high-level visit to UAE since UAE independence in 1971. Still,
reflecting the underlying tensions and volatility of UAE-Iran relations, the two countries issued
mutual recriminations in January 2009 over the UAE decision in late 2008 to begin fingerprinting
Iranian visitors to UAE.
Arab-Israeli Issues
On the Arab-Israeli dispute, the UAE tends to defer to Saudi Arabia and has not sought to emerge
as a major mediator between Palestinian factions, as has Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or Egypt. Nor has
7
Solomon, Jay. “U.S. Enlists Oil to Sway Beijing’s Stance on Tehran.” Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2009.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
UAE advanced far reaching plans to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, as has King Abdullah
of Saudi Arabia.
The UAE’s steps have tended to be incremental and in concert with other Gulf states. In 1994 the
UAE joined with the other Gulf monarchies in ending enforcement of the Arab League’s boycott
of companies doing business with Israel and on companies that deal with companies that do
business with Israel. The UAE formally bans direct trade with Israel, although UAE companies
reportedly do business with Israeli firms and some Israeli diplomats have attended multilateral
meetings in the UAE. Unlike Qatar and Oman, the UAE did not host multi-lateral Arab-Israeli
working groups on regional issues when those talks took place during 1994-1998. In 2007, the
UAE joined a “quartet” of Arab states (the others are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan) to assist
U.S. diplomacy on Israeli-Palestinian issues. In December 2008 and January 2009, the UAE
government permitted street demonstrations in support of Hamas during its war with Israel. In
February 2009, the UAE denied a visa to an Israeli tennis player who was to participate in a
Dubai tennis tournament, earning the UAE some international criticism.
The UAE has expressed concerns about the plight of the Palestinians, and has put its considerable
financial resources to work on their behalf. One major UAE action has been to fund a housing
project in Rafah, in the Gaza Strip, called “Shaykh Khalifa City.”
U.S.-UAE Defense Cooperation/Iraq and
Afghanistan Wars
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 prompted the UAE to enter into substantial defense
cooperation with the United States. The framework for U.S.-UAE defense cooperation is a July
25, 1994, bilateral defense pact, the text of which is classified, including a “status of forces
agreement” (SOFA). Under the pact, during the years of U.S. “containment” of Iraq (1991-2003),
the UAE allowed U.S. equipment pre-positioning and U.S. warship visits at its large Jebel Ali
port, capable of handling aircraft carriers, and it permitted the upgrading of airfields in the UAE
that were used for U.S. combat support flights, during Operation Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).8 About 1,800 U.S. forces, mostly Air Force, are
in UAE, up from 800 before OIF; they use Al Dhafra air base (mostly KC-10 refueling) and naval
facilities at Fujairah to support U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, even though UAE
officials say that the OIF benefitted Iran strategically.
Suggesting it wants to broaden its defense relations, in January 2008 the UAE signed an
agreement with French President Nicolas Sarkozy to allow a French military presence. The
facilities were inaugurated during a visit by Sarkozy to UAE on May 27, 2009 and include (1) a
900-foot section of the Zayid Port for use by the French navy; (2) an installation at Dhafra Air
Base to be used by France’s air force; and (3) a barracks at an Abu Dhabi military camp that will
house about 400 French military personnel.
8
Jaffe, Greg. “U.S. Rushes to Upgrade Base for Attack Aircraft.” Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2003.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
U.S. and Other Arms Sales
The UAE views arms purchases from the United States as enhancing the U.S. commitment to
UAE security. Until 2008, the most significant buy was the March 2000 purchase of 80 U.S. F-16
aircraft, equipped with the Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the
HARM (High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile), a deal exceeding $8 billion. Congress did not try to
block the aircraft sale, but some Members questioned the AMRAAM as an introduction of the
6
Jaffe, Greg. “U.S. Rushes to Upgrade Base for Attack Aircraft.” Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2003.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
weapon into the Gulf. Among other sales with the potential to enhance the UAE’s offensive
capability, a sale of High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Army Tactical
Missile Systems (ATACMs), valued at about $750 million, notified on September 21, 2006. More
recent sales to UAE, some with offensive potential, have been in concert with the U.S.-led “Gulf
Security Dialogue,” intended to help the Gulf states contain Iran. Among the most significant are
the advanced Patriot anti-missile systems (PAC-3, up to $9 billion value, notified December 4,
2007); kits for the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits ($326 million value, notified
January 3, 2008); and the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense System (THAAD), the first sale
ever of that sophisticated missile defense system (notified September 9, 2008, valued at about $7
billion). Also notified on September 9, 2008, were sales to UAE of a surface launched AMRAAM
($445 million value) and vehicle mounted “Stinger” anti-aircraft systems ($737 million value). In
conjunction with the international defense exhibit in Abu Dhabi in March 2009, the UAE signed
agreements with Boeing Co. and Lockheed Martin Corp. to buy $3 billion worth of military
transport aircraft (C-17 and C-130, respectively).
Cooperation in Afghanistan
The UAE is assisting the U.S. and international mission to stabilize Afghanistan. Despite the
small size of its military force, a 250 person contingent of UAE troops have
The United States is in competition with France for further aircraft sales. France is hoping that, as
part of the facilities basing agreement discussed above, the UAE will buy about 60 Rafale combat
aircraft, which could be valued at about $8 billion. The UAE has already bought 380 Frenchmade Leclerc tanks and 60 Mirage 2000 warplanes. However, the United States is hoping to sell
the UAE additional F-16’s, according to press reports.
Other Specific Cooperation on Iraq
Aside from allowing U.S. use of UAE military facilities, the UAE has undertaken several
initiatives to support U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein. The UAE has
provided facilities for Germany to train Iraqi police. It pledged $215 million for Iraq
reconstruction but has provided the funds not in cash but in the form of humanitarian
contributions ($71 million as of December 2007). Some of the funds were used to rebuild
hospitals in Iraq and to provide medical treatment to Iraqi children in the UAE. Agreeing with the
U.S. view that Sunni Arab states need to engage the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad, in
June 2008, the UAE appointed an Ambassador to Iraq, the first Arab country to do so. The
following month it wrote off $7 billion (including interest) in Iraqi debt. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid visited Iraq in October 2008.
Cooperation in Afghanistan and Pakistan
In addition to placing some of its military facilities at U.S. disposal for use in Afghanistan (and
Iraq), the UAE is assisting the U.S. and international mission to stabilize Afghanistan. Despite the
small size of its military force, a 250-person contingent of UAE troops has been serving in
Afghanistan since 2004. The UAE forces, the only Arab combat forces in Afghanistan, are
operating in the restive southern part of Afghanistan, particularly Uruzgan Province, where they
appear to be welcomed by the Muslim population there. The UAE also
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
The UAE has pledged a total of
$323 million in economic aid for Afghanistan since the fall of the
Taliban. In addition, Abu Dhabi
hosted the November 2008 meeting of the “Friends of Pakistan” donors group that is attempting
to help Pakistan through its financial difficulties.Among the projects funded with UAE aid include “Zayed University,” a college serving
over 6,000 Afghan students per year; six medical clinics; a major hospital with a capacity of
7,000 patients; the building of “Zayed City” that houses 200 Afghan families displaced by
violence; 160 drinking wells; and 38 mosques.9
In related aid for U.S. regional policy, Abu Dhabi hosted the November 2008 meeting of the
“Friends of Pakistan” donors group that is attempting to help Pakistan through its financial
difficulties. The UAE provided about $100 million to aid victims of a major earthquake in
Pakistan in October 2005. The UAE also has appointed a direct counterpart to the Obama
Administration’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke.
Other UAE Foreign Aid Issues
The UAE asserts that it has provided billions of dollars in international aid through its
government and through funds controlled by royal family members and other elites. Among the
foreign aid activities reported are $100 million to aid victims of the December 2004 Tsunami in
the Indian Ocean and $100 million to help victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United States.
Economic Issues
The UAE, a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), has developed a free market
economy. Partly as result, the UAE, particularly experienced apparent “bubbles” in real estate
prices and other assets, and has been Dubai emirate, whose strategy was built on
attracting investment to construct large numbers of opulent and futuristic projects, built up a
“bubble” in real estate prices and other assets. The UAE, particularly Dubai, has therefore been
hurt significantly by the global economic downturn. Abu
Dhabi has been hurt by the fall in oil
prices, but its reliance on oil has given it a certain financial
cushion, relative to Dubai, which
relies almost entirely on trade, financial products, investment in
big projects, such as the “Atlantis
Hotel Dubai,” and tourism. Abu Dhabi has 80% of the
federation’s proven oil reserves of about
100 billion barrels, enough for over 100 years of exports
at the current production rate of 2.2
million barrels per day (mbd). About 2.1 mbd are exported,
but negligible amounts go to the
United States.
The federal government has used some of the
countries country’s purported $700 billion “sovereign wealth
fund” to inject into Dubai banks to help them
ride out the downturn. ride out the downturn. In December 2009, Abu
Dhabi pledged about $5 billion in additional funds (beyond $5 billion committed in November
2009) to help Dubai World (major real estate developer) avert outright default on about $26
billion in debt repayment. The severe recession has resulted in widespread layoffs in UAE and the
departure of thousands of foreign workers, who often have abandoned cars and properties that
were financed, leaving UAE banks with additional non-performing loans.7 Real10 During 2008-2009,
real estate prices fell
about 30% - 40% in late 2008 alone.
7
about 40%-50% from the 2007 levels.
9
Information provided to CRS by the UAE Embassy in Washington, D.C. December 2009.
Worth, Robert. “Laid Off Foreigners Flee as Once Booming Dubai Spirals Down.” New York Times, February 12,
2008.
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On November 15, 2004, the Administration notified Congress it had begun negotiating a free
trade agreement (FTA) with the UAE. Several rounds of talks were held prior to the June 2007
expiration of Administration “trade promotion authority,” but progress was been halting. In 2008,
the United States sold about $15.7 billion worth of goods to UAE, mostly machinery, aircraft,
industrial materials, and other high value items. The United States imported $1.3 billion in goods
from UAE, mostly clothing and oil, as well as diamonds that are widely sold there.
The UAE is seeking to diversify its energy production and consumption to plan for the day when
the developed world is no longer reliant on oil imports. While well endowed with oil, the UAE
lacks non-associated natural gas. It has entered into a deal with neighboring gas exporter Qatar to
construct pipeline that will bring Qatari gas to UAE (Dolphin project). The nuclear power
program, discussed above, is also intended to address the country’s fast growing energy
consumption, although the global economic downturn has also served that purpose, at least
temporarily.
The UAE, which is considered wealthy, receives on small amounts of U.S. assistance. The
primary purpose of the aid is to make the UAE eligible for advice and programming to improve
its border security and export controls, as shown below.
Table 1. Recent U.S. Aid to UAE
FY2007
NADR (Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism,
De-Mining, and Related) - Counter-Terrorism
Programs (ATA)
NADR-Combating WMD
$1.409 million
NADR-Combating WMD
$172,000
International Military Education and Training
(IMET)
FY2008
$1.409 million
$172,000
FY2009
(est.)
FY2009
FY2010
$725,000
$300,000
$200,000
$14230,000
$15,000
$15,000
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Congressional Research Service
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