The United Arab Emirates (UAE):
Issues for U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 23December 7, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21852
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
Summary
The UAE’s relatively open borders, economy, and society have won praise from advocates of
expanded freedoms in the Middle East while producing financial excesses, social ills such as
prostitution and human trafficking, and relatively lax controls on sensitive technologies acquired
from the West. These concerns—as well as concerns about the UAE oversight and management
of a complex and technically advanced initiative such as a nuclear power program—underscored
dissatisfaction among some Membersmembers of Congress with a U.S.-UAE civilian nuclear cooperation
agreement. The agreement was signed on May 21, 2009, and submitted to Congress that day. It
entered into force on December 17, 2009. However, U.S. concerns about potential leakage of U.S.
and other advanced technologies through the UAE to Iran, in particular, are far from alleviated.
Despite its social tolerance and economic freedom, the UAE government is authoritarian,
although with substantial informal citizen participation and consensus-building. Assessments by a
wide range of observers say that members of the elite (the ruling families of the seven emirates
and clans allied with them) routinely obtain favored treatment in court
cases, cases, obtain access to
lucrative business opportunities, and exert preponderant influence on national decisions. The
UAE federation president,
Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan, technically serves a five-year
term, renewable by the
Federal Supreme Council (composed of the seven heads of the individual
emirates), although in
practice leadership changes have generally taken place only after the death
of a leader. After
several years of resisting electoral processes similar to those instituted by other
Gulf states, and
despite an absence of popular pressure for elections, the UAE undertook its first
electoral process
in December 2006. The process was criticized as far from instituting Western-styleWesternstyle democratic
processes, because the electorate was limited and selected by the government,
and it voted for
only half of the membership of a body with limited powers. The other half of the
body continues
to be appointed.
Partly because of substantial UAE federal government financial intervention and ample financial
reserves, the political and
social climate has remained calm through the ongoing2008-2009 global financial
crisis and recession, which
has. The downturn hit Dubai emirate particularly hard and called into question its
strategy of ambitious,
rapid, investment-fueled development, especially of luxury projects. Many expatriate
workers left UAE after widespread layoffs,
particularly in the financial and real estate sectors. During the crisis, there have been somewhat
more criticism of and official crackdowns against expatriate social behavior that many UAE
citizens have always considered offensive,
and the decline affected property investors and the economies of several neighboring countries,
including Afghanistan.
For details and analysis of the U.S.-UAE nuclear agreement and legislation concerning that
agreement, see CRS Report R40344, The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed
U.S. Nuclear Cooperation, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
Contents
Governance, Human Rights, and Reform.....................................................................................1
Status of Political Reform .....................................................................................................3
Human Rights-Related Issues................................................................................................4
Women’s RightsPress Freedoms ..............................................................................................................5
Religious Freedom ..4
Justice/Rule of Law.........................................................................................................5
Human TraffickingWomen’s Rights..............................................................................................................5
Cooperation Against Terrorism and Proliferation Religious Freedom ..........................................................................................................6
Record on Proliferation Cooperation 5
Labor Rights ..................................................................................6
Nuclear Agreement .................................5
Human Trafficking..........................................................................................................7
Foreign Policy and Defense Cooperation With the United States 6
Cooperation Against Terrorism and Proliferation .........................................................................6
Record on Proliferation Cooperation ..............................................................8
Regional Issues .................7
Nuclear Agreement .........................................................................................................8
Foreign Policy and Defense Cooperation With the United States .................................................8
Security Cooperation With the United States .........................................................................9
Relations With Iran .........................................................................................................9
Cooperation on Iraq ...................................................................................................... 10
Cooperation on Afghanistan and Pakistan...................................................................... 1011
U.S. and Other Arms Sales ............................................................................................ 11
UAE Provision of Foreign Aid ...................................................................................... 12
Other Regional Issues ......................................................................................................... 12
Economic Issues ....................................................................................................................... 1213
Figures
Figure 1. Map of United Arab Emirates .......................................................................................3
Tables
Table 1. Recent U.S. Aid to UAE .............................................................................................. 1314
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 1314
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
Governance, Human Rights, and Reform1
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates (principalities): Abu Dhabi,
the oil-rich capital of the federation; Dubai, its free-trading commercial hub; and the five smaller
and less wealthy emirates of Sharjah, Ajman, Fujayrah, Umm al-Qaywayn, and Ras al-Khaymah.
After Britain announced in 1968 that it would no longer ensure security in the Gulf, six “Trucial
States” decided to form the UAE federation in December 1971; Ras al-Khaymah joined in 1972.
The UAE federation has completed a major leadership transition since the death of its key
founder, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan, long-time ruler of Abu Dhabi and UAE
president, on November 2, 2004.
His son, Crown Prince Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan, born in 1948, was named ruler of
Abu Dhabi and, keeping with tradition, was subsequently selected by all seven emirates (Federal
Supreme Council) as UAE president. The third son of Zayid, Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid alNuhayyan, is Abu Dhabi crown prince and heir apparent. The ruler of Dubai traditionally serves
concurrently as vice president and prime minister of the UAE; that position has been held by
Mohammad bin Rashid Al Maktum, architect of Dubai’s modernization drive, since the death of
his elder brother Maktum bin Rashid Al Maktum on January 5, 2006. Shaykh Mohammad bin
Rashid also continued as defense minister. The crown prince of Dubai is his son, Hamdan bin
Mohammad Al Maktum, who heads the “Dubai Executive Committee,” the equivalent of a
cabinet for Dubai emirate. Under a Dubai-level reorganization announced in January 2010, five
committees were set up to help the Executive Committee on various major issues.
The federation president and vice president serve five-year terms, but they technically owe their
positions to the UAE’s highest body, the Federal Supreme Council, which is composed of the
leaders of each of the seven emirates of the UAE. Two emirates, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaymah,
have a common ruling family: the Al Qawasim tribe. The Federal Supreme Council meets four
times per year to establish general policy guidelines, although the leaders of the seven emirates
consult frequently with each other. It met on November 3, 2009, to decide whether Shaykh
Khalifa and Shaykh Mohammad would continue in their posts and, as expected, no major changes
were made. In practice, posts at that level of UAE leadership change only in the event of death of
an incumbent.
A UAE cabinet reshuffle in May 2009 resulted in a change in two new deputy prime ministers,
one of whom serves concurrently as interior minister (the lead agency on internal security). The
shift was viewed by observers as strengthening the hand of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayid
because the new deputy prime ministers are close to him, although there are no evident rifts
between him and his brother, the UAE president.
1
Information in this section is from the following State Department reports: Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices-2009 (March 11, 2010); Trafficking in Persons Report for 2010 (June 14, 2010); and International Religious
Freedom report: 2009 (October 26, 2009).
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Some Basic Facts About UAE
Population
4.8 million, of which about 900,000 are citizens.
Expatriates are 85% of the work force.
Religions
96% Muslim, of which 16% are Shiite; 4% Christian and
Hindu
Ethnic Groups
19% Emirati (citizenry); 23% other Arab and Iranian; 50%
South Asian; 8% western and other Asian expatriate
Size of Armed Forces
About 50,000
Gross Domestic Product (purchasing power parity)
$201 billion; per capita is $42,000 per year
Inflation Rate
About 14.5%
Oil Exports
About 2.7 million barrels per day
Foreign Exchange and Gold Reserves
About $67 billion
U.S. Exports to the UAE (2009)
$12.2 billion, making UAE the largest U.S. export market
in the Arab world (2008). Goods sold to UAE are mostly
machinery, aircraft, industrial materials, and other high
value items.
Imports from UAE by the United States (2009)
$1.5 billion. About half of the total was crude oil. Other
major categories include clothing and diamonds.
U.S. citizens resident in UAE
About 30,000
Major Projects
Dubai inaugurated 2,000+ foot “Burj Khalifa,” world’s
tallest building, on January 4, 2010. Dubai metro has
begun operations and is expanding service. Burj al Arab
hotel in Dubai bills itself as “world’s only 7-star hotel.”
UAE participating in Gulf country-wide railroad network
to become operational by 2017. Abu Dhabi building local
branches of Guggenheim and Louvre museums.
Sources: CIA World Factbook.
The leaders of the other individual emirates are Dr. Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qassimi (Sharjah);
Saqr bin MuhammadSaud bin Saqr Al Qassimi, (Ras al-Khaymah, see below); Humaid bin Rashid Al Nuaimi
(Ajman);
Hamad bin Muhammad Al Sharqi (Fujayrah); and Saud bin Rashid Al-Mu’alla (Umm alQaywayn
al-Qaywayn). Shaykh Saud of Umm al-Qaywayn, who is about 57 years old, was named leader of
that emirate in January 2009 upon the death of his father, Shaykh Rashid Al-Mu’alla. In Ras alKhaymah, Shaykh Khalid bin Saqr Al Qassimi claims to remain as crown prince even though
Shaykh Saqr replaced him in that position with Shaykh Khalid’s younger brother in 2003. On
October 5, 2009, the UAE’s ambassador to the United States, Yousef Al Otaiba, issued a letter
stating that Shaykh Khalid was removed in 2003 and holds no official position in the UAEthere was a brief leadership struggle upon the October 27, 2010, death of the ailing
longtime ruler, Shaykh Saqr bin Mohammad Al Qassim. He was succeeded by Shaykh Saud bin
Saqr, who was the crown prince since 2003 when the ruler replaced Saud’s elder brother, Shaykh
Khalid bin Saqr, as crown prince. During 2003-2010, often using public relations campaigns in
the United States and elsewhere, Shaykh Khalid had claimed to remain as crown prince even
though the UAE federal government had repeatedly stated that his removal was legitimate and
that he held no official position in the UAE. Shaykh Khalid’s home in Ras al-Khaymah was
surrounded by security forces the night his father died, enforcing the rulership rights of Shaykh
Saud.
In part because of its small size, the UAE is one of the wealthiest of the Gulf states, as shown in
the table above, and there is little unrest. Islamist movements in UAE, including those linked to
the Muslim Brotherhood, are generally non-violent and perform social and relief work. UAE
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residents of Iranian origin tend to oppose governmental criticism of Iran, but this community does
not constitute an organized opposition to the UAE government.
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Figure 1. Map of United Arab Emirates
Source: CRS graphics
Status of Political Reform
Despite or perhaps because of the lack of significant opposition, the UAE has lagged on political
reform. UAE leaders long delayed instituting any electoral processes, even as such elections
began to expand in the other Gulf states, arguing that elections would inevitably aggravate long
dormant schisms among tribes and clans, and potentially cause Islamist factions to become more
radical. (Formal political parties are not permitted.) UAE leaders say that UAE citizens are able
to express their concerns directly to the leadership through traditional consultative mechanisms,
such as the open majlis (councils) held by many UAE leaders, including Shaykh Khalifa.
The UAE leadership decided it had fallen too far behind its Gulf neighbors, and, in December
2006, it instituted a limited and controlled electoral process for half of the 40-seat Federal
National Council (FNC). The other 20 seats would continue to be appointed. Previously, all 40
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members of the FNC were appointed by all seven emirates. The seat distribution of the FNC
remains weighted in favor of Abu Dhabi and Dubai (eight seats each). Sharjah and Ras alKhaymah have six each, and the others have four seats each.
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The electorate was to be limited to a “local council,” convened by the rulers of each emirate,
numbering 100 persons per FNC seat. So, for example, the Abu Dhabi electoral council would be
100 x 8 = 800 electors, and the total UAE-wide electorate would be 4,000 persons. However, the
Election Commission approved a slightly larger 6,595-person electorate, or about 160 persons per
FNC seat. Of this total, 1,162 electors were women. Out of the total of 452 candidates for the 20
FNC elected seats, there were 65 female candidates. Only one woman was elected (from Abu
Dhabi), but another seven women were appointed to the remaining 20 seats. The “election”
process was spread over three different days—December 16, 18, and 20, 2006.
UAE plans are to gradually expand the size of the FNC and to broaden its powers, according to
the Minister of State for FNC Affairs (also Minister of State for Foreign Affairs) Anwar Gargash.
However, no specific expansion of powers or time frames for such expansions have been
announced. The FNC can review, but not enact or veto, federal legislation, and it can question,
but not impeach, federal cabinet ministers. It has questioned government ministers mostly on
economic and social issues. Its sessions are open to the public. According to the State
Department, in 2008 the government accepted 80% of the FNC’s recommendations on legislation.
Each emirate also has its own consultative council. On the other hand, the State Department
human rights report on UAE for 2009 says that in April 2009, the government prohibited the FNC
from discussing the economic ramifications for the UAE of the global financial downturn.
Human Rights-Related Issues
The human rights record of the UAE is relatively positive on some issues, but relatively poor on
others. Some human rights problems in UAE, such as human trafficking, are caused because the
government is relatively lax in some cases, not because it is too strict, according to U.S. and outside assessments. The State Department
human rights report for
2009 was somewhat more critical of the UAE than previous years’
reports, asserting that there are
unverified reports of torture, government restrictions of freedoms
of speech, and lack of judicial
independence. Freedom of assembly is forbidden by law, but in
Some human rights problems in UAE, such as human trafficking, are caused in
part because the government is relatively lax in some cases, not because it is too strict. Political
rights and democratization are discussed above; among other specific measures, freedom of
assembly is forbidden by law, but in practice small demonstrations on working conditions and some other issues have been tolerated.
On several occasions, foreign laborers working on the large, ambitious construction projects in
Dubai have conducted strikes to protest poor working conditions and non-payment of wages.
Some of these concerns have been addressed by the Labor Ministry’s penalizing of employers,
and a process, formulated in June 2008, to have workers’ salaries deposited directly in banks.
Some cabinet choices signal commitment to reform, including Shaykh Abdullah bin Zayid alNuhayyan as foreign minister and Anwar Gargash, mentioned above. Shaykh Abdullah’s former
post of information minister was abolished in 2006 to allow media independence. On the other
hand, in April 2009, a new media law drew opposition from some human rights groups who said
it allows for penalties against journalists who personally criticize UAE leaders. Provisions
governing media licensing do not clearly articulate the standards the government will apply in
approving or denying licenses for media organs to operate. The UAE government says the law
does not apply to the “Free Zones” in UAE in which major foreign media organizations operate.
some other issues have been tolerated.
The United States has sought to promote democracy, rule of law, and civil society in the Persian
Gulf region, including in UAE. Some State Department programs to promote student and
women’s political participation, entrepreneurship, legal reform, civil society, independent media,
and international trade law compliance are funded by the State Department’s Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI). The U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi houses a MEPI office/staff that
runs the MEPI programs throughout the Gulf region.
Press Freedoms
Some ministerial rank officials are committed to reform, including Foreign Minister Shaykh
Abdullah bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan and Minister of State Anwar Gargash, mentioned above. Shaykh
Abdullah’s former post of information minister was abolished in 2006 to allow media
independence. On the other hand, in April 2009, a new media law drew opposition from some
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human rights groups who said it allows for penalties against journalists who personally criticize
UAE leaders. Provisions governing media licensing do not clearly articulate the standards the
government will apply in approving or denying licenses for media organs to operate. The UAE
government says the law does not apply to the “Free Zones” in UAE in which major foreign
media organizations operate.
Justice/Rule of Law
Many observers note that justice in UAE is selective. For example, on January 10, 2010, a UAE
court acquitted the UAE president’s brother, Shaykh Issa bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan, on charges of
torturing an Afghan merchant. He was acquitted even though there was a video available of
Shaykh Issa beating the Afghan and driving over his legs with a sport vehicle, and even though
three others involved in the incident, all non-royals, were convicted. The UAE court ruled that
Shaykh Issa was not liable because he was taking prescription drugs that may have prompted his
actions. Others say that arrests of expatriates and non-citizens have increased along with the
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continuing economic downturn, possibly out of citizen frustration that globalization and dramatic
economic expansion have led to bursting of the economic “bubble” in UAE. In 2007, human
rights groups criticized the conservative-dominated justice system for threatening to prosecute a
15-year-old French expatriate for homosexuality, a crime in UAE, when he was raped by two
UAE men; the UAE men were later sentenced for sexual assault and kidnapping.
The United States has sought to promote democracy, rule of law, and civil society in the Persian
Gulf region, including in UAE. Some State Department programs to promote student and
women’s political participation, entrepreneurship, legal reform, civil society, independent media,
and international trade law compliance are funded by the State Department’s Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI). The U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi houses a MEPI office/staff that
runs the MEPI programs throughout the Gulf region.
Women’s Rights
Progress on women’s political rights has been steady and observers say the UAE is perhaps the
only country in the Middle East where expatriate women are fully accepted working in highpaying professions such as finance and banking. There are now four women in the cabinet:
Shayha Lubna al-Qassimi, minister of foreign trade and planning; Mariam al-Roumi, minister of
social affairs; and two ministers without portfolio—Reem al-Hashimi and Maitha al-Shamsi.
Nine women are in the Federal National Council, and seven women serve on the 40-seat
consultative council in Sharjah emirate. About 10% of the UAE diplomatic corps is now female;
none served prior to 2001. In November 2008, Dubai emirate appointed 10 female public
prosecutors. The UAE Air Force has four women fighter pilots.
Religious Freedom
The October 2009November 17, 2010, State Department report on international religious freedom said there was “no
changerepeated the
previous year’s assessment that there was “no change” in the status of respect for religious
freedom by the Governmentgovernment during the reporting
period.” Non-Muslims The constitution provides for freedom
of religion but also declares Islam as the official religion of the country. In practice, non-Muslims
in UAE are free to practice their religion; there are 2434 Christian churches
built on land donated by
the ruling families of the various emirates, but there are no Jewish
synagogues or Buddhist
temples. The Shiite Muslim minority is free to worship and maintain its
own mosques, but Shiite
mosques receive no government funds and there are no Shiites in top
federal posts.
federal posts.
Labor Rights
On several occasions, foreign laborers working on the large, ambitious construction projects in
Dubai have conducted strikes to protest poor working conditions and non-payment of wages.
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Some of these concerns have been addressed by the Labor Ministry’s penalizing of employers,
and a process, formulated in June 2008, to have workers’ salaries deposited directly in banks.
Human Trafficking
Other social problems might be a result of the relatively open economy of the UAE, particularly
in Dubai. The UAE is still considered a “destination country” for women trafficked from Asia and
the former Soviet Union. The Trafficking in Persons report for 2010 placed the UAE in “Tier
2”—an upgrade from the “Tier 2: Watch List” placement in 2009. The 2010 upgrade was made
on on
the grounds that the UAE is taking steps to eliminate trafficking in persons, particularly
against against
sex trafficking offenders. The UAE has made progress in curbing trafficking of young
boys as
camel jockeys; it has repatriated at least 1,050 children out of a suspected 5,000 trafficked
for for
camel racing, provided $3 million for their care and repatriation, and it now uses robot
jockeys at camel races.
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camel races.
Cooperation Against Terrorism and Proliferation
These issues are of particular concern to the United States because of a pattern of lax enforcement
of existingUAE
enforcement of export and border controls, with respect particularly to the leakage of U.S. or
other technology to Iran. The relatively small sums of U.S. aid to UAE are generally
for programs
to improve UAE performance on enforcing export control laws.
The UAE was one
of only three countries (Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were the others) to have
recognized the
Taliban during 1996-2001 as the government of Afghanistan, even though the
Taliban was harboring Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders during that time. During
. During Taliban rule, the UAE
allowed Ariana Afghan airlines to operate direct service, and Al Qaeda
activists reportedly spent
time there. 2 Two of the September 11 hijackers were UAE nationals,
and they reportedly used
UAE-based financial networks in the plot.
Since then, the UAE has been credited in State
Department “Country Reports on Terrorism” with
assisting in the arrests of senior Al Qaeda
operatives;3 denouncing terror attacks; improving
border security; prescribing guidance for Friday
prayer leaders; investigating suspect financial transactions;
transactions; criminalizing use of the Internet by terrorist groups, and strengthening its
bureaucracy and
legal framework to combat terrorism. The UAE Central Bank is credited in the
State Department
terrorism report for 2008 (published April 30,and 2009) with providing training programs to UAE
financial institutions on money laundering and terrorism financing, although actions against
informal financial transmittals (hawala) require “further vigilance.” It was reported in September
2009 that earlier in 2009, UAE security officials had broken up an Al Qaeda plot to blow up
targets in Dubai emirate.4
In November 2010, the UAE’s National Committee to Combat
Terrorism announced that the UAE was reviewing a 2004 counterterrorism law to better fight
evolving threats and money laundering.
2
Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Country Reports on Terrorism 2009. August 5,
2010. CRS conversations with executive branch officials, 1997-2000.
3
“U.S. Embassy to Reopen on Saturday After UAE Threat.” Reuters, March 26, 2004.
4
Lake, Eli and Sarah Carter. “UAE Kept Tight Lid on Disrupted Terror Plot.” Washington Times, September 17, 2009.
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The UAE has signed on to several U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation and terrorism. These
include the Container Security Initiative Statement of Principles, aimed at screening U.S.-bound
containerized cargo transiting Dubai ports. Under it, three U.S. Customs and Border Protection
officers are co-located with the Dubai Customs Intelligence Unit at Port Rashid in Dubai. The
program results in about 20 ship inspections per week of U.S.-bound containers, many of them
apparently originating in Iran, according to the State Department terrorism report for 2008
(published April 30, 2009). The UAE is a signator to the proliferation Security Initiative, the
Megaports Initiative designed to prevent terrorist from using major ports to ship illicit material,
and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism.
Record on Proliferation Cooperation
The UAE record on preventing the re-export of advanced technology, particularly to Iran, is less
positive
mixed, although said to be improving as of mid-2010. Taking advantage of geographic proximity
and the high volume of Iran-Dubai trade ($10
billion per year), numerous Iranian entities
involved in Iran’s energy sector and its WMD
programs have offices in the UAE that are used to
try to procure needed technology and
equipment. However, the UAE has enhanced its
cooperation at times when U.S. officials or
outside experts have questioned its performance. In
connection with revelations of illicit sales of
nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea
by Pakistan’s nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan,
Dubai was named as a key transfer point for Khan’s
shipments of nuclear components. Two
Dubai-based companies were apparently involved in
transshipping components: SMB Computers
and Gulf Technical Industries.5 On April 7, 2004, the Administration sanctioned a UAE firm,
2
CRS conversations with executive branch officials, 1997-2000.
“U.S. Embassy to Reopen on Saturday After UAE Threat.” Reuters, March 26, 2004.
4
Lake, Eli and Sarah Carter. “UAE Kept Tight Lid on Disrupted Terror Plot.” Washington Times, September 17, 2009.
5
Milhollin, Gary and Kelly Motz. “Nukes ‘R’ US.” New York Times op.ed. March 4, 2004.
3
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Administration sanctioned a UAE firm, Elmstone Service and Trading FZE, for allegedly selling
weapons of mass destruction-related
technology to Iran, under the Iran-Syria Non-Proliferation
Act (P.L. 106-178). In June 2006, the
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released a general
order imposing a license requirement on
Mayrow General Trading Company and related
enterprises in the UAE. This was done after
Mayrow was implicated in the transhipment of
electronic components and devices capable of
being used to construct improvised explosive
devices (IED) used in Iraq and Afghanistan. 6 In
February 2007 the Administration threatened to
form a new category of control called
“Destinations of Diversion Control” with UAE as the
intended designee country. In connection
with the FNC approval of a law strengthening export controls (April 2007), the Administration
did not create that category, and P.L. 111-195 sets up a provision for a category of countries similar
to that, which would be sanctioned (restrictions on dual use U.S. exports) for a determination of
non-cooperation. Earlier, in September 2007, the FNC headed off U.S. penalties by adopting a
law strengthening export controls (April 2007). In September 2007, the UAE used the new law to
shut down 40
foreign and UAE firms allegedly involved in dual use exports to Iran and other
countries.
However, UAE officials publicly acknowledged in June 2009 that the UAE’s application of this
law law
is still evolving.
Allegations continued in January 2009 with the publication by the Institute for Science and
International Security of a report entitled “Iranian Entities’ Illicit Military Procurement
Networks,” published January 12, 2009. The report asserts that Iran has used UAE companies to
obtain technology from U.S. suppliers, and that the components obtained have been used to
construct improvised explosive devices (IEDs) shipped by Iran to militants in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Other UAE companies the report alleges were involved in this network included not
only Mayrow but also Majidco Micro Electronics, Micatic General Trading, and Talinx
Electronics.
Despite the UAE efforts to enhance its export controls, in December 2008 some Members of
Congress called for a review by the inter-agency “Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States” (CFIUS) of a proposed joint venture between Advanced Micro Devices and
Advanced Technology Investment Co. of Abu Dhabi for the potential for technology transfers. In
February 2006, CFIUS approved the takeover by the Dubai-owned “Dubai Ports World” company
of a British firm that manages six U.S. port facilities. Members, concerned that the takeover
might weaken U.S. port security, opposed it in P.L. 109-234, causing the company to divest assets
involved in U.S. port operations (divestment completed in late 2006 to AIG Global Investments).
Little opposition was expressed to a September 2007 Borse Dubai plan to take a 20% stake in the
NASDAQ stock market, or to a November 2007 investment of $7.5 billion in Citigroup by the
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), which manages excess oil revenues estimated at over
On July 22, 2010, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security
and Nonproliferation Vann Van Diepen testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
(Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade) that the UAE is augmenting the staff
of the office that implements the 2007 law. He added that the UAE’s enforcement bodies—
customs, law enforcement, and intelligence services—are functioning to that end. 7
Still, allegations recur periodically. In January 2009, the Institute for Science and International
Security issued a report entitled “Iranian Entities’ Illicit Military Procurement Networks,”
5
Milhollin, Gary and Kelly Motz. “Nukes ‘R’ US.” New York Times op.ed. March 4, 2004.
6
BIS, “General Order Concerning Mayrow General Trading and Related Enterprises,” 71 Federal Register 107, June 5,
2006.
7
Testimony of Mr. Vann Van Diepen before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. July 22, 2010.
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published January 12, 2009. The report asserts that Iran has used UAE companies to obtain
technology from U.S. suppliers, and that the components obtained have been used to construct
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) shipped by Iran to militants in Iraq and Afghanistan. Other
UAE companies the report alleges were involved in this network included not only Mayrow but
also Majidco Micro Electronics, Micatic General Trading, and Talinx Electronics.
The issue of leakage of technology has sometimes caused U.S. criticism or questioning of UAE
investment deals. In December 2008 some members of Congress called for a review by the interagency “Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States” (CFIUS) of a proposed joint
venture between Advanced Micro Devices and Advanced Technology Investment Co. of Abu
Dhabi for the potential for technology transfers. In February 2006, CFIUS approved the takeover
by the Dubai-owned “Dubai Ports World” company of a British firm that manages six U.S. port
facilities. Members, concerned that the takeover might weaken U.S. port security, opposed it in
P.L. 109-234, causing the company to divest assets involved in U.S. port operations (divestment
completed in late 2006 to AIG Global Investments). Little opposition was expressed to a
September 2007 Borse Dubai plan to take a 20% stake in the NASDAQ stock market, or to a
November 2007 investment of $7.5 billion in Citigroup by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
(ADIA), which manages excess oil revenues estimated at over $500 billion.
Nuclear Agreement
It is the concern about the leakage of technology to Iran, via the UAE, that underpins much of the
concern about a U.S.-UAE agreement, signed January 15, 2009, to help the UAE develop a
nuclear power program. The agreement, which was revised slightly and signed again by the
Obama Administration on May 21, 2009 (and submitted to Congress that day), would be subject
to conditions specified in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2153(b)], and
was subject to congressional approval (in the form of passage of a joint resolution of approval or
non-passage of a joint resolution of disapproval within 90 days of continuous legislative session
following the May 21 submission). In the 111th Congress, concerns were encapsulated in H.R.
6
BIS, “General Order Concerning Mayrow General Trading and Related Enterprises,” 71 Federal Register 107, June 5,
2006.
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364, which would require the President to certify that the UAE has taken a number of steps to
stop illicit trade with Iran before any agreement would take effect. However, several
congressional resolutions of approval of the agreement (S.J.Res. 18 and H.J.Res. 60) have been
introduced, whereas one resolution of disapproval (H.J.Res. 55) was introduced. No measure
blocking the agreement was enacted, and the “1-2-3 Agreement” entered into force on December
17, 2009. See CRS Report R40344, The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed
U.S. Nuclear Cooperation, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr
Foreign Policy and Defense Cooperation With the
United States
Following the 1991 Gulf War to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the UAE determined that it
wantedneeded a closer security relationship with the United States. The UAE did not fear a direct threat
from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which is at the
north end of the Persian Gulf, but it primarily seeks to deter and balance out Iranian power.
Regional Issues
On most regional issues, including the Arab-Israeli dispute, the UAE does not follow U.S. policy
strictly or uncritically, but it does generally agree with most U.S. assessments of regional threats,
and it supports U.S. diplomatic efforts to resolve regional issues. On the Arab-Israeli issue, the
UAE wants to ensure that any settlement between Israel and the Palestinians is “just,” and it
sometimes criticizes the United States as excessively supportive of Israel. However, the UAE has
not advanced its own far-reaching proposals to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, as has King
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. It also tends to defer to Saudi Arabia rather than try to emerge as a
major direct mediator between Palestinian factions, as have Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt.
The UAE’s steps to support U.S. policy have tended to be incremental and taken in concert with
other Gulf states. In 1994 the UAE joined with the other Gulf monarchies in ending enforcement
of the Arab League’s boycott of companies doing business with Israel and on companies that deal
with companies that do business with Israel. The UAE formally bans direct trade with Israel,
although UAE companies reportedly do business with Israeli firms and some Israeli diplomats
have attended multilateral meetings in the UAE. Unlike Qatar and Oman, the UAE did not host
multi-lateral Arab-Israeli working groups on regional issues when those talks took place during
1994-1998. In 2007, the UAE joined a “quartet” of Arab states (the others are Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, and Jordan) to assist U.S. diplomacy on Israeli-Palestinian issues. In December 2008 and
January 2009, the UAE government permitted street demonstrations in support of Hamas during
its war with Israel. In February 2009, the UAE denied a visa to an Israeli tennis player who was
to participate in a Dubai tennis tournament, earning the UAE some international criticism.
The UAE has expressed concerns about the plight of the Palestinians, and has put its considerable
financial resources to work on their behalf. One major UAE action has been to fund a housing
project in Rafah, in the Gaza Strip, called “Shaykh Khalifa City.”
The UAE cooperates with virtually all GCC-wide development and economic initiatives,
although some past border disputes and other disagreements with Saudi Arabia occasionally flare.
A 1974 “Treaty of Jeddah” with Saudi Arabia formalized Saudi access to the Persian Gulf via a
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
corridor running through UAE, in return for UAE gaining formal control of villages in the
Buraymi oasis area.sought
to deter and balance out Iranian power, which remains the primary UAE concern.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
Security Cooperation With the United States
The UAE may be emerging as a lynchpin of U.S. strategy to defend the Gulf, despite the small
size of the UAE armed forces (about 50,000). The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990
prompted the UAE to enter into substantial defense cooperation with the United States. The
framework for U.S.-UAE defense cooperation is a July 25, 1994, bilateral defense pact, the text
of which is classified, including a “status of forces agreement” (SOFA). Under the pact, during
the years of U.S. “containment” of Iraq (1991-2003), the UAE allowed U.S. equipment prepositioning and U.S. warship visits at its large Jebel Ali port, capable of handling aircraft carriers,
and it permitted the upgrading of airfields in the UAE that were used for U.S. combat support
flights during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).78
About 1,800 U.S. forces, mostly Air Force, are in UAE, up from 800 before OIF; they use Al
Dhafra air base (mostly KC-10 refueling) and naval facilities at Fujairah to support U.S.
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, even though UAE officials say that OIF benefitted Iran
strategically.
Suggesting it wants to broaden its defense relations, in January 2008 the UAE signed an
agreement with French President Nicolas Sarkozy to allow a French military presence. The
facilities were inaugurated during a visit by Sarkozy to UAE on May 27, 2009, and include (1) a
900-foot section of the Zayid Port for use by the French navy; (2) an installation at Dhafra Air
Base to be used by France’s air force; and (3) a barracks at an Abu Dhabi military camp that will
house about 400 French military personnel. On the other hand, in October 2010, the UAE
reportedly threatened to ask Canada to evacuate a UAE base, Camp Mirage, used by Canada as a
staging point for its forces to deploy to Afghanistan, when Canada refused additional landing
slots in Canada for Emirates Air.9 The two countries reportedly agreed to try to negotiate a
solution to the mutual concerns.
Relations With Iran
The UAE remains highly wary of Iran’s ambitions and powers, but it has sought to reach out to
Iran’s government and deny Iran any justification for aggression or adverse action against the
UAE. Commercial ties between the two are extensive and relatively free of complaints by either
side and, as discussed above, these Iran-UAE ties have caused U.S. concerns about leakage of
key dual-use technology to Iran and to U.S.-UAE measures to limit such leakage.
Aside from trying to limit technology leakage to Iran via UAE, the United States has enlisted the
UAE in a multilateral effort to stiffen international sanctions on Iran, in part by alleviating the
concerns of China (a permanent U.N. Security Council member) about its oil supplies. The
Obama Administration has encouraged the UAE and other oil exporters to offer to boost oil
supplies to China to compensate for any loss of imports from Iran that may result from China’s
cooperation against Iran.8 The UAE is also a key participant in U.S. efforts to build a missile
defense shield for the Gulf, in order to deter or contain Iran, as noted below. In October 2009,
Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayid was uncharacteristically public in expressing support for
“political and diplomatic pressure on Iran to stop it from acquiring nuclear technology.” The
statements were made at a joint news conference with visiting NATO Secretary General Anders
Fogh Rasmussen.
7
8
Jaffe, Greg. “U.S. Rushes to Upgrade Base for Attack Aircraft.” Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2003.
Solomon, Jay. “U.S. Enlists Oil to Sway Beijing’s Stance on Tehran.” Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2009.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
10 In early October 2010, the UAE government directed its banks to fully
comply with the restrictions on dealing with Iranian banks outlined in U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1929, adopted June 9, 2010. The move caused a 15% drop in the value of Iran’s
8
Jaffe, Greg. “U.S. Rushes to Upgrade Base for Attack Aircraft.” Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2003.
9
Chase, Steven and Brent Jang. “UAE Threatens to Kick Canada Out of Covert Military Base Camp Mirage.” Toronto
Globe and Mail, October 8, 2010.
10
Solomon, Jay. “U.S. Enlists Oil to Sway Beijing’s Stance on Tehran.” Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2009.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
currency, the rial. The UAE is also a key participant in U.S. efforts to build a missile defense
shield for the Gulf, in order to deter or contain Iran, as noted below. In October 2009, Foreign
Minister Abdullah bin Zayid was uncharacteristically public in expressing support for “political
and diplomatic pressure on Iran to stop it from acquiring nuclear technology.” The statements
were made at a joint news conference with visiting NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen. The 2010 GCC summit, held in Abu Dhabi and concluded December 7, 2010, called
for a peaceful resolution of the Iran nuclear issue, although expressing “utmost concern” about
Iran’s program. This latter comment appears to support press reports and UAE statements in 2010
that reflect GCC backing for more aggressive U.S. action to set back Iran’s program.
Some Iranian actions may account for the UAE’s strategic closeness to the United States and
other Western powers. UAE fears of Iran have been elevated since April 1992, when Iran
asserted asserted
complete control of the largely uninhabited Persian Gulf island of Abu Musa, which it
and the
UAE shared under a 1971 bilateral agreement. (In 1971, Iran, then ruled by the U.S.backed -backed
Shah, seized two other islands, Greater and Lesser Tunb, from the emirate of Ras alKhaymah, as al-Khaymah, as
well as part of Abu Musa from the emirate of Sharjah.) In October 2008, the UAE
and Iran signed
an agreement to establish a joint commission to resolve the dispute; that
agreement came two
months after the UAE protested Iran’s opening in August 2008 of
administrative and maritime
security offices on Abu Musa. Iran has allowed Sharjah to open
power and water desalination
facilities on the island. The 2010 GCC summit in Abu Dhabi, referenced above, nodded to UAE
concerns by demanding Iran return the UAE islands. The United States is concerned about Iran’s
physical control over the islands, but takes no position on the legal sovereignty of the islands. The
The UAE, particularly Abu Dhabi, has long feared that the large Iranian-origin community in Dubai
Dubai emirate (estimated at 400,000 persons) could pose a “fifth column” threat to UAE stability.
Illustrating the UAE’s attempts to avoid antagonizing Iran, in May 2007, Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was permitted to hold a rally for Iranian expatriates in Dubai when he
made the first high-level visit to UAE since UAE independence in 1971. Still, reflecting the
underlying tensions and volatility of UAE-Iran relations, the two countries issued mutual
recriminations in January 2009 over the UAE decision in late 2008 to begin fingerprinting Iranian
visitors to UAE.
Cooperation on Iraq
Aside from allowing U.S. use of UAE military facilities, the UAE has undertaken several
initiatives to support U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein. The UAE has
provided facilities for Germany to train Iraqi police. It pledged $215 million for Iraq
reconstruction but has provided the funds not in cash but in the form of humanitarian
contributions ($71 million as of December 2007). Some of the funds were used to rebuild
hospitals in Iraq and to provide medical
treatment to Iraqi children in the UAE. Agreeing with the
U.S. view that Sunni Arab states need
to engage the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad, in
June 2008, the UAE appointed an
Ambassador to Iraq, the first Arab country to do so. The
following month it wrote off $7 billion
(including interest) in Iraqi debt. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid visited Iraq in October 2008.
Iraq in October 2008. The UAE has tended to defer to Saudi Arabia in its efforts to encourage
inclusion of high profile Sunni Arabs in new Iraqi government being formed in late 2010.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
Cooperation on Afghanistan and Pakistan
In addition to placing some of its military facilities at U.S. and allied disposal for use in
Afghanistan (and
Iraq), the UAE is assisting the U.S. and international mission to stabilize
Afghanistan. Despite the
small size of its military force, a 250-person contingent of UAE troops
has been serving in
Afghanistan since 2004. The UAE forces, the only Arab combat forces in
Afghanistan, are
operating in the restive southern part of Afghanistan, particularly Uruzgan
Province, where they
appear to be welcomed by the Muslim population there.
The UAE has pledged a total of $323 million in economic aid for Afghanistan since the fall of the
Taliban. Among the projects funded with UAE aid include “Zayed University,” a college serving
over 6,000 Afghan students per year; six medical clinics; a major hospital with a capacity of
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
7,000 patients; the building of “Zayed City” that houses 200 Afghan families displaced by
violence; 160 drinking wells; and 38 mosques.911
In related aid for U.S. regional policy, Abu Dhabi hosted the November 2008 meeting of the
“Friends of Pakistan” donors group that is attempting to help Pakistan through its financial
difficulties. The UAE provided about $100 million to aid victims of a major earthquake in
Pakistan in October 2005. The UAE also has appointed a direct counterpart to the Obama
Administration’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke.
U.S. and Other Arms Sales
The UAE views arms purchases from the United States as enhancing the U.S. commitment to
UAE security. The United States views these sales as a means to enhance the U.S.-led security
architecture for the Gulf in which the Gulf partners take on increased responsibilities. In 2009, the
UAE bought about $18 billion worth of U.S. military equipment, according to June 16, 2010,
testimony by CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus. Until 2008, the most significant
buy was the March 2000 purchase of 80 U.S. F-16 aircraft, equipped with the Advanced Medium
Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the HARM (High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile), a
deal exceeding $8 billion. Congress did not try to block the aircraft sale, but some Membersmembers
questioned the AMRAAM as an introduction of the weapon into the Gulf. Among other sales with
the potential to enhance the UAE’s offensive capability, a sale of High Mobility Artillery Rocket
Systems (HIMARS) and Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs), valued at about $750
million, notified on September 21, 2006.
More recent sales to UAE, some with offensive potential, have been in concert with the U.S.-led
“Gulf Security Dialogue,” intended to help the Gulf states contain Iran. The most significant is
the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense System (THAAD), the first sale ever of that sophisticated
missile defense system (notified September 9, 2008, valued at about $7 billion). The main
manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, said in June 2010 that a firm agreement might be signed in the
next few months. Among the most significant other recent sales are the advanced Patriot anti-missile
antimissile systems (PAC-3, up to $9 billion value, notified December 4, 2007) and kits for the Joint Direct
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits ($326 million value, notified January 3, 2008). Also notified on
on September 9, 2008, were sales to UAE of a surface launched AMRAAM ($445 million value) and
and vehicle mounted “Stinger” anti-aircraft systems ($737 million value). In conjunction with the
11
Information provided to CRS by the UAE Embassy in Washington, D.C. December 2009.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
international defense exhibit in Abu Dhabi in March 2009, the UAE signed agreements with
Boeing Co. and Lockheed Martin Corp. to buy $3 billion worth of military transport aircraft (C17 and C-130, respectively). On November 4, 2010, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
notified Congress of two potential sales: $140 million worth of ATACMs (see above) and
associated support; and a possible $5 billion worth of AH-64 Apache helicopters (30 helicopters,
remanufactured to Block III configuration). 12
The United States is in competition with France for further aircraft sales. France is hoping that, as
part of the facilities basing agreement discussed above, the UAE will buy about 60 Rafale combat
aircraft, which could be valued at about $8 billion. The UAE has already bought 380 Frenchmade Leclerc tanks and 60 Mirage 2000 warplanes. However, the United States is hoping to sell
the UAE additional F-16’s, according to press reports.
9
Information provided to CRS by the UAE Embassy in Washington, D.C. December 2009.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
UAE Provision of Foreign Aid
The UAE asserts that it has provided billions of dollars in international aid through its
government and through funds controlled by royal family members and other elites. Among the
foreign aid activities reported are $100 million to aid victims of the December 2004 tsunami in
the Indian Ocean and $100 million to help victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United States.
Other Regional Issues
On most regional issues, including the Arab-Israeli dispute, the UAE does not follow U.S. policy
strictly or uncritically, but it does generally agree with most U.S. assessments of regional threats,
and it supports U.S. diplomatic efforts to resolve regional issues. On the Arab-Israeli issue, the
UAE wants to ensure that any settlement between Israel and the Palestinians is “just,” and it
sometimes criticizes the United States as excessively supportive of Israel. However, the UAE has
not advanced its own far-reaching proposals to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, as has King
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. It also tends to defer to Saudi Arabia rather than try to emerge as a
major direct mediator between Palestinian factions, as have Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt.
The UAE’s steps to support U.S. policy on the Middle East peace process have tended to come in
concert with other Gulf states. In 1994 the UAE joined with the other Gulf monarchies in ending
enforcement of the Arab League’s boycott of companies doing business with Israel and on
companies that deal with companies that do business with Israel. The UAE formally bans direct
trade with Israel, although UAE companies reportedly do business with Israeli firms and some
Israeli diplomats have attended multilateral meetings in the UAE. Unlike Qatar and Oman, the
UAE did not host multilateral Arab-Israeli working groups on regional issues when those talks
took place during 1994-1998. In 2007, the UAE joined a “quartet” of Arab states (the others are
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan) to assist U.S. diplomacy on Israeli-Palestinian issues. In
December 2008 and January 2009, the UAE government permitted street demonstrations in
support of Hamas during its war with Israel. In February 2009, the UAE denied a visa to an
Israeli tennis player who was to participate in a Dubai tennis tournament, earning the UAE some
international criticism.
12
DSCA transmittal number 10-52. http://www.dsca.mil
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
The UAE has expressed concerns about the plight of the Palestinians, and has put its considerable
financial resources to work on their behalf. One major UAE action has been to fund a housing
project in Rafah, in the Gaza Strip, called “Shaykh Khalifa City.” It also has given economic aid
to Lebanon, perhaps in part to counter Iranian and Syrian influence there—an objective that UAE
shares with Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states.
The UAE cooperates with virtually all GCC-wide development and economic initiatives,
although some past border disputes and other disagreements with Saudi Arabia occasionally flare.
A 1974 “Treaty of Jeddah” with Saudi Arabia formalized Saudi access to the Persian Gulf via a
corridor running through UAE, in return for UAE gaining formal control of villages in the
Buraymi oasis area.
Economic Issues
The UAE, a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), has developed a free market
economy. Partly as a result, the UAE, particularly Dubai emirate, whose strategy was built on
attracting investment to construct large numbers of opulent and futuristic projects, built up a
“bubble” in real estate prices and other assets. The UAE, particularly Dubai, has therefore been
hurt significantly by the global economic downturn. Abu Dhabi has 80% of the federation’s
proven oil reserves of about 100 billion barrels, enough for over 100 years of exports at the
current export rate of about 2.7 million barrels per day (mbd). Small amounts go to the United
States. Abu Dhabi has been hurt by the fall in oil been hurt by the fall in oil
prices, but its reliance on oil has given it a
certain financial cushion, relative to Dubai, which
relies almost entirely on trade, financial
products, investment in big projects such as the “Atlantis
Hotel Dubai,” and tourism. Abu Dhabi has 80% of the federation’s proven oil reserves of about
100 billion barrels, enough for over 100 years of exports at the current export rate of about 2.7
million barrels per day (mbd). Small amounts go to the United States Hotel Dubai,” and tourism.
The federal government has used some of the country’s purported $700 billion “sovereign wealth
fund” to inject into Dubai banks to help them ride out the downturn. In December 2009, Abu
Dhabi pledged about $5 billion in additional funds (beyond $5 billion committed in November
2009) to help Dubai World (major real estate developer) avert outright default on about $26
billion in debt repayment. The severe recession has resulted in widespread layoffs in UAE and the
departure of thousands of foreign workers, who often have abandoned cars and properties that
were financed, leaving UAE banks with additional non-performing loans.1013 During 2008-2009,
real estate prices fell about 40%-50% from the 2007 levels. The downturn in real estate prices has
also affected regional investors, such as those in Afghanistan, who bought into high-end housing
such as on the Palm Islands. The fall in value nearly caused a collapse of a major Afghan bank,
Kabul Bank, in September 2010; the bank had made large loans to prominent Afghan power
brokers and officials to buy property there.
On November 15, 2004, the Administration notified Congress it had begun negotiating a free
trade agreement (FTA) with the UAE. Several rounds of talks were held prior to the June 2007
expiration of Administration “trade promotion authority,” but progress was been halting.
The UAE is seeking to diversify its energy production and consumption to plan for the day when
the developed world is no longer reliant on oil imports. While well endowed with oil, the UAE
lacks non-associated natural gas. It has entered into a deal with neighboring gas exporter Qatar to
13
Worth, Robert. “Laid Off Foreigners Flee as Once Booming Dubai Spirals Down.” New York Times, February 12,
2008.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
construct pipeline that will bring Qatari gas to UAE (Dolphin project). The nuclear power
program, discussed above, is also intended to address the country’s fast growing energy
consumption, although the global economic downturn has also served that purpose, at least
temporarily.
The UAE, which is considered wealthy, receives small amounts of U.S. assistance. The primary
purpose of the aid is to make the UAE eligible for advice and programming to improve its border
security and export controls, as shown below.
10
Worth, Robert. “Laid Off Foreigners Flee as Once Booming Dubai Spirals Down.” New York Times, February 12,
2008.
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Table 1. Recent U.S. Aid to UAE
FY2007
NADR (Non-ProliferationNonproliferation, AntiTerrorism, De-MiningDemining, and Related) Counter-TerrorismCounterterrorism Programs (ATA)
$1.409 million
NADR-Combating WMD
$172,000
FY2008
FY2009
$1.581 million
FY2011
(request)
$230,000
$230,000
$10,000
$10,000
$240,000
$240,000
$725,000
$300,000
$200,000
International Military Education and
Training (IMET)
Totals
FY2010
(est)
$300,000
$925,000
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
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