The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

The United Arab Emirates (UAE):
August 17, 2022January 30, 2023
Issues for U.S. Policy
Kenneth KatzmanJeremy M. Sharp
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven principalities or “emirates.” Its The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven principalities or “emirates.” Its
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
population is nearly 10 million, of which population is nearly 10 million, of which nearly 90% are expatriates from within and outside the 90% are expatriates from within and outside the region
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
region who work in its open economy. The UAE is who work in its open economy. The UAE is a significantan important U.S. security partner that hosts U.S. security partner that hosts about

about 3,500 U.S. military personnel at UAE military facilities and buys sophisticated U.S. military 3,500 U.S. military personnel at UAE military facilities and buys sophisticated U.S. military
equipment, including missile defenses and combat aircraft. A January 20, 2021, deal equipment, including missile defenses and combat aircraft. A January 20, 2021, deal signed with

signed with the UAE to allow the country to procure up to 50 F-35s and 18 Reaper Drones was placed under the UAE to allow the country to procure up to 50 F-35s and 18 Reaper Drones was placed under
review by the Biden Administration, review by the Biden Administration, butand finalizing the sale has been delayed over several issues, including the UAE’s ability finalizing the sale has been delayed over several issues, including the UAE’s ability
to to keep secure the F-35 and its technology from other large powers, secure the F-35 and its technology from other large powers, including Chinasuch as the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China), with which the UAE has been expanding , with which the UAE has been expanding
relations. Furthermore, U.S.-UAE differences on the F-35 sale, as well as issues including energy production, Iran, Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine, and the conflict in Yemen, appear to have widened since late 2021. The UAE abstained on a February
24, 2022, U.N. Security Council resolution denouncing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
With ample financial resources and a U.S.-armed and advised military, the UAE has been asserting itself in the region, in
many cases seeking to keep authoritarian Arab leaders in power and work against Islamist organizations that UAE leaders
assert are regional and domestic threats. In June 2017, the UAE joined Saudi Arabia and several other countries in isolating
Qatar to pressure it to adopt policies closer to those of the UAE and Saudi Arabia on Iran, Turkey, the role of Islamists in
governance, the Qatar-based Al Jazeera network, and other issues. On January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their
partners agreed to lift the blockade, although differences on the issues that produced the rift remain and the UAE has not
reopened its embassy in Qatar, to date. In Libya, the UAE is supporting an anti-Islamist commander based in eastern Libya
who has sought to assert control of the whole country.
Iran also looms large as an issue for UAE leaders. UAE leaderrelations. Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has affected U.S.-UAE relations. From the outset of the conflict, the UAE has largely resisted “siding” with the United States and European countries while quietly benefitting from some of the war’s repercussions—most notably higher global oil prices and Russian capital transfer from the West to Dubai. As a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC—when combined with Russia, collectively known as OPEC+), the UAE has come under U.S. and European pressure to increase production quotas in order to stabilize oil prices. Iran looms large as an issue for the UAE government. UAE leaders reportedly are concerned that a U.S. and Iranian return to full reportedly are concerned that a U.S. and Iranian return to full
mutual implementation of the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal would not address the UAE’s key concerns about Iran’s mutual implementation of the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal would not address the UAE’s key concerns about Iran’s
regional influence. The UAE’s August 2020 agreement to normalize relations with Israel represented, in part, the UAE’s regional influence. The UAE’s August 2020 agreement to normalize relations with Israel represented, in part, the UAE’s
intent to work closely with Israel to counter Iran strategically. intent to work closely with Israel to counter Iran strategically. InSince the signing of the 2020 Israel-UAE diplomatic normalization agreement, commonly referred to as the Abraham Accords, Israeli-Emirati trade, military, and diplomatic ties have expanded significantly, and in May 2022, Israel and the UAE signed a free trade agreement. Likely in part to try to roll back Iran’s regional reach, in 2015, the part to try to roll back Iran’s regional reach, in 2015, the
UAE joined Saudi Arabia in a military effort to pressure the Iran-backed Zaidi Shia Houthi rebels in YemenUAE joined Saudi Arabia in a military effort to pressure the Iran-backed Zaidi Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen - —a campaign a campaign
that has produced significant numbers of civilian casualties and criticism of the UAE. That criticism contributed to the that has produced significant numbers of civilian casualties and criticism of the UAE. That criticism contributed to the
UAE’s decision in 2019 to remove most of the UAE’s ground forces from the Yemen conflict, although some UAE forces UAE’s decision in 2019 to remove most of the UAE’s ground forces from the Yemen conflict, although some UAE forces
continue to support pro-UAE militia factions there. UAE and Saudi officials continue to support pro-UAE militia factions there. UAE and Saudi officials have backed a Yemen ceasefire agreement backed a Yemen ceasefire agreement
between the warring parties that between the warring parties that began in early April. lasted from April to October 2022. Various aspects of the UAE involvement in Yemen, including U.S. Various aspects of the UAE involvement in Yemen, including U.S.
sales of weapons sales of weapons that the UAE has used there, have been the UAE has used there, have been the subject of congressional oversight hearings and some legislation. The UAE’s human rights record continues to be an issue of concern for Congress. The UAE government has increased restrictions on social media usage since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. In 2019, several Members of Congress, from both chambers, signed a letter to the UAE leadership urging the release of human rights activist Ahmad Mansoor. He remains imprisoned. In November 2023, the UAE is to host the United Nations (U.N.) Climate Change Conference, or COP28, which it may use as an opportunity to boost cooperation with the United States in mitigating the deleterious effects of climate change in the developing world. In November 2022, the UAE and the United States launched their Partnership for Accelerating Clean Energy (PACE) program, a joint commitment to raise $100 billion in climate change adaptation funds globally. The UAE has pledged to reach carbon neutrality by 2050, though given Russia’s continued invasion of Ukraine and its effect on oil and gas prices, the UAE also may continue increasing its exports of oil and natural gas. Congressional Research Service link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 20 link to page 21 link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page 22 link to page 4 link to page 17 link to page 23 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy Contents Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1 Historical Background ..................................................................................................................... 2 Domestic Politics ............................................................................................................................. 4 Human Rights, Women’s Rights, Foreign Labor, and Trafficking in Persons .................... 5 Opposition and Repression of Domestic and Foreign Activists.......................................... 6 Oil and Climate Change .................................................................................................................. 7 Foreign Policy and Defense Issues .................................................................................................. 9 Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and Global Oil Prices ................................................................. 9 UAE-China Relations ............................................................................................................... 11 Iran .......................................................................................................................................... 12 Israel and the Abraham Accords.............................................................................................. 13 Afghanistan ............................................................................................................................. 14 UAE Involvement in the Middle East and North Africa ......................................................... 15 The Emirati-Saudi “Alliance” ........................................................................................... 15 Yemen ............................................................................................................................... 15 Syria .................................................................................................................................. 16 Libya ................................................................................................................................. 17 U.S. Trade, Military Cooperation, and Arms Sales ....................................................................... 17 Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) .......................................................................... 18 The Possible Sale of the F-35 .................................................................................................. 18 Money Laundering and U.S. Concern ........................................................................................... 19 Outlook and Considerations for Congress ..................................................................................... 19 Figures Figure 1. UAE at a Glance .............................................................................................................. 1 Tables Table 1. Selected Israeli Defense Deals with the UAE ................................................................. 14 Contacts Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 20 Congressional Research Service The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy Overview The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates (principalities): Abu Dhabi, the oil-rich federation capital; Dubai, a large commercial hub; and the five smaller and less wealthy emirates of Sharjah, Ajman, Fujayrah, Umm al Qaywayn, and Ra’s al Khaymah. The five smaller emirates, often called the “northern emirates,” tend to be more politically and religiously conservative than Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which are urban amalgams populated by many expatriates (nearly 90% of the total UAE population). Figure 1. UAE at a Glance Population About 9.9 mil ion, of whom about 12% are Emirati citizens. Religions Of total population, 76% Muslim; 9% Christian; and 15% other (primarily Buddhist or Hindu). Ethnic Groups 11% Emirati (citizenry); South Asian 59% (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi); Egyptian 10%; Filipino 6%; other 13%. GDP and GDP-related GDP Growth Rate: 7.3% (2022) Metrics GDP: $571 bil ion (2022 est.) Per capita (PPP): $79,000 Oil Exports About 3.2 mil ion barrels per day Sovereign Wealth Assets About $1.700 tril ion under Management Sources: Map created by CRS. Facts from CIA, The World Factbook; Economist Intelligence Unit; and Global SWF. Congressional Research Service 1 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy The UAE holds 8.9% of the world’s proven oil reserves, and national wealth is closely tied to oil prices.1 With oil production at the current rate of 3.2 million barrels per day (mbd) and global oil prices elevated, the UAE remains one of the wealthiest countries in the world; the International Monetary Fund ranks it seventh globally in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (current prices).2 With 1 million Emirati citizens out of a total population of 10 million, the UAE’s national wealth not only enables it to provide generous income tax-free benefits and social services to its citizens, but also gives the small country outsized global influence (see below). The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) runs the world’s third-largest sovereign wealth fund, with an estimated $800 billion in assets under management (the UAE has funds that bring total assets under management to over $1 trillion). Historical Background From the mid-18th to the mid-19th century, the emirates were under the sway of the British and were known as the “Trucial States,” a term derived from a series of maritime truces among the several emirates negotiated under British auspices. For over a century and until independence in 1971, the Trucial States functioned as informal British protectorates, with Britain conducting foreign and defense relations on their behalf.3 During most of this period, the Trucial States were economic backwaters, consisting of a mostly semi-nomadic population focused on pearl diving, merchandise trade, and date cultivation. Oil exploration in the Trucial States began in the 1930s; the discovery and eventual export of oil in Abu Dhabi in the late 1950s and early 1960s completely transformed the emirates politically and economically from a relatively impoverished area dependent on British protection into an independent nation with the Arab world’s second largest economy. When the British government announced its intended withdrawal from bases “East of Suez” in 1968, the Trucial States and other Gulf sheikdoms (Bahrain and Qatar) began deliberations over possible federation. Internally and prior to independence, the various ruling families of the Trucial States had cooperated with the British in delineating borders amongst themselves and forming a Trucial Council to discuss political matters. Externally, Britain, along with the United States, worked to ensure that larger Gulf powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, would not impede federation, despite their respective claims on territories within the emirates.4 After three years of negotiations, Qatar and Bahrain decided to become independent nations. The emirates acquired full independence from Britain on December 1, 1971. Six of them—Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Fujayrah, Ajman, and Umm al Qaywayn—immediately banded together to form the UAE. A seventh, Ra’s al Khaymah, joined the federation early in 1972. In its half-century of independence, the UAE has had three presidents; their domestic and foreign policies have evolved from an early focus on state building, development, and close ties to the West to becoming a more emboldened, global actor that has retained close Western ties while 1 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Annual Statistical Bulletin 2022. 2 See International Monetary Fund, Data Mapper, GDP per capita, current prices, purchasing power parity; international dollars per capita, World Economic Outlook, October 2022. 3 Government of the United Kingdom, National Archives, Trucial States in 1914. 4 In 1971, the Shah-led government of Iran seized the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands from Ras al Khaymah emirate and compelled the emirate of Sharjah to share with Iran control of Abu Musa island. In April 1992, the Islamic Republic of Iran took complete control of Abu Musa and placed some military equipment there. When the UAE achieved its independence in 1971, Saudi Arabia continued its unresolved border dispute with Abu Dhabi over the Al Buraymi Oasis, which was ultimately resolved by the 1974 Treaty of Jeddah. Congressional Research Service 2 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy expanding relationships further East. Under the late Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan (president from 1971-2004), Abu Dhabi used its oil wealth to invest heavily in infrastructure development, as well as federal institutions that could bond a society traditionally divided along various tribal, familial, and geographic lines. Nevertheless, strengthening national Emirati identity took time; the federal army was only truly united in 1997 when Dubai disbanded its armed forces. During the reign of Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan (president from 2004 to 2022), the UAE focused on diversifying its economy. In Dubai, which had far less oil than Abu Dhabi, UAE Vice President5 Shaykh Mohammad bin Rashid al Maktoum transformed the city-state into a global commercial center that revolved around finance, real estate, shipping, and tourism. While Abu Dhabi and Dubai have long competed commercially and culturally, Abu Dhabi’s oil wealth has undergirded the UAE’s growth; during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, Dubai’s real estate market crashed, and Abu Dhabi lent it $20 billion in bailout funds, which Dubai is still repaying. UAE President Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayed (MBZ) The current leader of the UAE is 61-year-old President Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayed al Nahyan (commonly referred to as “MBZ”), who formally assumed the role of president after the 2022 death of his older half-brother Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan. Since the late Shaykh Khalifa’s stroke in 2014, MBZ had exercised de facto executive authority. President Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayed al Nahyan is the third son of Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan, the first President of the UAE. As a young man, MBZ served in a number of different Emirati military positions before being appointed deputy crown prince of Abu Dhabi in 2003 and crown prince in 2004. Even before becoming de facto ruler of the UAE, MBZ worked to reform the UAE’s military, hiring foreign officers to lead the armed forces, instituting a year of compulsory service for male UAE citizens (which has since been extended to 16 months), and acquiring advanced and customized fighter aircraft from the United States, such as the F-16 Desert Falcon. As the UAE has become one of the most influential states in the Middle East, MBZ and his predecessors have used Abu Dhabi’s vast oil wealth to diversify the UAE economy, invest globally, and modernize the military with mostly U.S. equipment and training. According to one report, the ruling Al Nahyan family may be the world’s richest, with a reported net worth estimated at $300 bil ion.6 Since 2014, under MBZ’s long de facto and now de jure leadership, the UAE has used a combination of soft and hard power to assert itself in several parts of the Middle East and Africa—with key goals of keeping secular authoritarian Arab leaders in power, working against Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations, countering terrorism, and deterring Iran. At times, the UAE’s more aggressive regional posture, its foreign military interventions, and its behind-the-scenes sponsorship of autocratic leaders have drawn criticism, with some international observers claiming MBZ’s unilateral moves have been destabilizing.7 Others have focused on MBZ’s role as a modernizer and a peacemaker, as the UAE’s historic 2020 normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel has brought him widespread praise. 8 As of January 2023, MBZ has yet to designate a successor. From a legal standpoint, the federal constitution does not address procedures for selecting a crown prince; instead, the head of each emirate decides. MBZ could choose one of his brothers, such as National Security Advisor Shaykh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Or, he could break familial tradition and appoint one of his own sons. According to The Economist, MBZ has been grooming his 5 The ruler of Dubai has traditionally served as vice president and prime minister. 6 Devon Pendleton, Ben Bartenstein, Farah Elbahrawy and Nicolas Parasie, “Secretive Gulf Family’s $300 Billion Fortune Is About More than Oil,” Bloomberg, December 6, 2022. 7 David Kirkpatrick, “The Most Powerful Arab Ruler Isn’t M.B.S. It’s M.B.Z.,” New York Times, June 2, 2019. 8 “Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed receives prestigious US award for the Abraham Accords,” The National, November 19, 2021. Congressional Research Service 3 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy eldest son Khaled, “but he need not rush. At 61, Muhammad can expect to rule for a while. Naming a brother would let his son grow into the role, perhaps as deputy; the line of succession can always be changed.”9 Domestic Politics The UAE’s political system is notably stable. The seven dynastic rulers of each emirate exercise power within their respective principality over “all authorities that are not assigned by the Constitution to the Federation.”10 Per the constitution, the Federal Supreme Council, which comprises the hereditary leaders of all the emirates, has the power to elect a new president upon death or resignation of the sitting ruler.11 The Council is the highest federal executive and legislative authority in the UAE. Since the founding of the state, the ruler of Abu Dhabi has served as the federation’s president, and the presidential transition in 2022 (like the previous one in 2004) followed constitutional procedures.12 The UAE president has the legal authority to sign laws and issue decrees (in areas assigned to the federation under the constitution), appoint/dismiss cabinet ministers, and conduct the nation’s foreign affairs. The UAE does not have an independent legislative body, though it has provided for some formal popular representation of citizens through a 40-seat advisory Federal National Council (FNC)—a body that can debate laws and review government policies, but not legislate independently. The FNC can summon ministers for questioning, but it is not empowered to remove them. Half of the FNC’s seats are appointed; the other half are directly elected by limited suffrage among selected UAE citizens.13 By law, Emirati women must hold 50% of the council’s seats. In the last FNC election in 2019, seven women were elected, and 13 more were appointed. The UAE has a dual judicial system with a mix of federal courts and state courts within some individual emirates. Sharia (Islamic law) is the principal source of legislation, though courts may apply civil or sharia law depending on circumstances. According to the constitution, federal law supersedes local law, though each emirate can enact laws not expressly reserved for the federal government, or in areas in which the federal government has not legislated. A Federal Supreme Court, appointed by the UAE leadership, adjudicates disputes between emirates or between an emirate and the UAE federal government. Abu Dhabi and Dubai also have special economic zones with respective separate court systems to settle commercial and civil disputes. According to the latest U.S. State Department report on human rights practices for the UAE, while the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, “court decisions remained subject to review by the political leadership.... The judiciary consisted largely of contracted foreign nationals subject to potential deportation, further compromising its independence from the government.”14 Each individual emirate maintains its own police forces, which enforce both local and federal law and are officially subsumed within the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The Emirati federal government and each individual emirate maintain generous social welfare systems for Emirati citizens. In the UAE, Emirati citizens pay no personal income tax. Education 9 “The UAE’s new sheikh may jolt both succession and federation,” The Economist, May 26, 2022. 10 United Arab Emirates, The Cabinet (Federal System), available at https://uaecabinet.ae/en/federal-system 11 An English language translation of the UAE’s 1996 constitution is available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/48eca8132.pdf. 12 George Sadek, “United Arab Emirates: Supreme Council Elects New President of the Union,” Global Legal Monitor, Law Library of Congress, June 9, 2022. 13 For information on the regulations pertaining to FNC elections, see https://www.mfnca.gov.ae/en/areas-of-focus/elections/2019/. 14 U.S. State Department, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United Arab Emirates. Congressional Research Service 4 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy is compulsory and free, even for Emirati students attending public universities. Emirati citizens are entitled to universal health care. The state also maintains a vast subsidy system, particularly for low-income citizens. In 2022, the UAE increased payments from its Social Welfare Program to provide its citizens with subsidies for housing, unemployment support, food, fuel, water, and electricity. Many citizens who have worked in both the public and private sectors are entitled to pensions upon reaching retirement eligibility. The UAE’s population consists mostly of expatriates. The federal government has sought to attract and retain skilled labor to help make the economy globally competitive, and has reformed and liberalized some laws in apparent efforts to do so. The UAE faces competition from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf neighbors that similarly seek to be a hub for global commerce. In 2021, the federal government decriminalized premarital sex and cohabitation (but not for same-sex couples). The Dubai government also removed the requirement for a license to purchase or consume alcohol. In Abu Dhabi, a new federal law on the personal status of non-Muslims allows for civil law to govern marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody for non-Muslims.15 In 2021, the UAE also amended its citizenship law, allowing a pathway to citizenship for certain categories of foreigners from select career fields.16 Human Rights, Women’s Rights, Foreign Labor, and Trafficking in Persons According to the U.S. State Department, significant human rights issues in the UAE include, among other things, arbitrary arrest and detention; serious restrictions on free expression and media; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully in free and fair elections; and serious government restrictions or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations.17 The nongovernmental organization Freedom House classifies UAE as “not free.”18 The UAE government has attempted to take some steps toward improving gender equality in the UAE. In the workplace, the UAE has worked to increase women’s labor force participation (57% as of 2020) by introducing paid parental leave for employees in the private sector.19 The UAE also reformed other legal provisions to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex and gender, while also enacting a domestic violence law permitting women to obtain restraining orders against abusers. Several cabinet shuffles have greatly increased the number of female ministers. One woman has been FNC speaker, and, as mentioned above, a 2018 presidential decree required half of all FNC seats to be allocated for women members. The UAE Air Force has several female fighter pilots, and, in 2021, Nora Al Matrooshi was named the UAE’s first female astronaut.20 Despite some progress on women’s rights, some human rights groups assert that many forms of discrimination against women remain legal. According to Human Rights Watch, “Laws still provide male guardian authority over women and loopholes allow reduced sentences for men for 15 “UAE issues Personal Status Federal Decree- Law for non-Muslims in the country,” Emirates News Agency (WAM) (UAE), December 9, 2022. 16 “UAE adopts amendments to grant citizenship to investors and other professionals,” Reuters, January 30, 2021. 17 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United Arab Emirates. 18 See https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-arab-emirates. 19 Iva Hamel and Gharam Alkastalani Dexter, “UAE: The sky is the limit for gender reform,” World Bank Blogs, March 10, 2021. 20 “The United Arab Emirates has announced its first female astronaut,” CNN, April 10, 2021. Congressional Research Service 5 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy killing a female relative.”21 In 2022, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) expressed concern about the unequal legal status of Emirati women in marriage, family relations, and divorce.22 A significant percentage (89%) of the UAE’s expatriate workforce comprises low-paid, unskilled and semi-skilled laborers and domestic workers, predominantly from South Asia. UAE law the subject of congressional oversight hearings and some legislation.
The UAE remains under the control of a small circle of leaders. Since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, the government has
become less tolerant of political criticism on social media. The country’s wealth—amplified by the small size of the
citizenship population receiving government largesse—has helped the government maintain popular support. Since 2006, the
government has held a limited voting process for half of the 40 seats in its quasi-legislative body, the Federal National
Council (FNC). The most recent vote was held in October 2019.
In part to cope with the fluctuations in the price of crude oil, the government has created new ministries tasked with
formulating economic and social strategies that, among other objectives, can attract the support of the country’s youth.
Economic conditions were adversely affected by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, but an increase in
world oil prices in 2021 and much of 2022 has eased the leadership’s financial and economic concerns. The country has
generally rebuffed U.S. efforts to encourage it to produce more oil to ease pressure on the global oil market caused by the
Russian invasion of Ukraine. U.S. foreign assistance to the UAE has been negligible, and what is provided is mostly to train
UAE authorities on counterterrorism, border security, and anti-proliferation operations.
Congressional Research Service

---

link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 10 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page 22 link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page 24 link to page 9 link to page 5 link to page 24 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

Contents
Governance, Human Rights, and Reform ........................................................................................ 1
Other Governance Issues ........................................................................................................... 2
Federal National Council (FNC) and FNC Elections ......................................................... 3
Human Rights-Related Issues ................................................................................................... 3
Treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood and Other Domestic Opposition ............................ 4
Media and Research Institute Freedoms ............................................................................. 4
Justice/Rule of Law............................................................................................................. 4
Women’s Rights .................................................................................................................. 5
Religious Freedom .............................................................................................................. 6
Labor Rights and Trafficking in Persons ............................................................................ 7
Foreign Policy and Defense Issues .................................................................................................. 7
Rift with Qatar........................................................................................................................... 7
Iran ............................................................................................................................................ 8
UAE Regional Policy and Interventions in Regional Conflicts ................................................ 8
Egypt/North Africa.............................................................................................................. 9
Iraq and Syria ...................................................................................................................... 9
Yemen ............................................................................................................................... 10
Afghanistan ........................................................................................................................ 11
Israel, Normalization Agreement, and the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute ............................. 12
UAE Foreign Spending ........................................................................................................... 13
Defense Cooperation with the United States ........................................................................... 13
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and U.S. Forces in UAE .................................. 13
U.S. and Other Arms Sales ............................................................................................... 14
UAE Defense Cooperation with Other Powers ................................................................. 16
Cooperation against Terrorism, Proliferation, and Narcotics .................................................. 17
Port and Border Controls .................................................................................................. 18
U.S. Funding Issues................................................................................................................. 19
Nuclear Power and Space Program ............................................................................................... 19
Economic Issues ............................................................................................................................ 19
U.S.-UAE Economic Ties ....................................................................................................... 20
Commercial Aviation Issue ............................................................................................... 21

Figures
Figure 1. UAE at a Glance .............................................................................................................. 6

Tables
Table 1. UAE Leadership ................................................................................................................ 2

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 21


Congressional Research Service

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

Governance, Human Rights, and Reform
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates (principalities): Abu Dhabi,
the oil-rich federation capital; Dubai, a large commercial hub; and the five smaller and less
wealthy emirates of Sharjah, Ajman, Fujayrah, Umm al-Qaywayn, and Ras al-Khaymah. Sharjah
and Ras al-Khaymah have a common ruling family—leaders of the al-Qawasim tribe. After
Britain announced in 1968 that it would no longer ensure security in the Gulf, six “Trucial States”
formed the UAE federation in December 1971; Ras al-Khaymah joined in 1972.1 The five smaller
emirates, often called the “northern emirates,” tend to be more politically and religiously
conservative than Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which are urban amalgams populated by many
expatriates.
As is the case in the other Gulf states, the hereditary leaders of the UAE are the paramount
decision makers. In the UAE, visible opposition to the government has been largely confined to
exchanges on social media. The federation underwent a formal leadership transition in May 2022
upon the death of Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan, who succeeded the first UAE president
and ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan in 2004 but has been mostly
incapacitated since a stroke in 2014. Almost immediately after Khalifa’s death, and in keeping
with a long-standing agreement among the seven emirates, Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid Al
Nuhayyan (born in 1961), Khalifa’s younger brother, was selected as UAE president by the
leaders of all the emirates, who collectively comprise the “Federal Supreme Council.” Shaykh
Mohammad had already been de facto UAE leader since Khalifa’s 2014 stroke. The ruler of
Dubai traditionally serves as vice president and prime minister of the UAE; that position has been
held by Shaykh Mohammad bin Rashid Al Maktum, architect of Dubai’s modernization drive,
since the death of his elder brother Shaykh Rashid Al Maktum in 2006. Several senior UAE
officials are also brothers of Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid, including Foreign Minister Abdullah
bin Zayid, Deputy Prime Minister Mansur bin Zayid, Minister of Interior Sayf bin Zayid, and
National Security Advisor Shaykh Tahnoun bin Zayid.

1 For a brief history of the British role in the Persian Gulf, see Rabi, Uzi, “Britain’s ‘Special Position’ in the Gulf: Its
Origins, Dynamics and Legacy,” Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 42, No. 3 (May 2006), pp. 351-364.
Congressional Research Service

1

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

Table 1. UAE Leadership
Khalifa bin Zayid Al
Mohammad bin Zayid
Nuhayyan
Al Nuhayyhan
Was UAE president and
UAE President and Ruler
Ruler of Abu Dhabi
of Abu Dhabi. Named
Emirate from 2004 until
immediately upon the
his May 2022 death. Had
death of brother, Shaykh
been incapacitated and
Khalifa. Already was de
political y inactive since
facto UAE leader since
2014 stroke.
Khalifa’s incapacitation in
2014.
Mohammad bin Rashid
Sultan bin Mohammad
Al Maktum
Al Qassimi
UAE Vice President,
Ruler of Sharjah Emirate
Prime Minister, and
Defense Minister, and
ruler of Dubai Emirate


Saud bin Saqr Al
Humaid bin Rashid Al
Qassimi
Nuami
Ruler of Ras al-Khaymah
Ruler of Ajman Emirate


Saud bin Rashid Al
Hamad bin
Mu’alla
Mohammad Al Sharqi
Ruler of Umm al-
Ruler of Fujairah Emirate
Qaywayn Emirate


Abdullah bin Zayid Al
Yusuf al-Otaiba
Nuhayyan
Ambassador to the
Foreign Minister
United States
Son of former longtime
UAE Oil Minister Mani
Saeed al-Otaiba


Sources: Graphic by CRS, open source photos.
Other Governance Issues2
UAE leaders argue that the country’s social tolerance and distribution of national wealth have
rendered the bulk of the population satisfied with the political system. Emiratis are able to express

2 Much of this section taken from U.S. Department of State, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United
Arab Emirates, released April 11, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

2

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

their concerns directly to the country’s leaders through traditional consultative mechanisms, such
as the open majlis (assemblies) held by many UAE leaders. UAE law prohibits political parties,
and UAE officials maintain that parties would aggravate schisms among tribes and clans and
open UAE politics to regional influence.3
Federal National Council (FNC) and FNC Elections
The UAE has provided for some limited formal popular representation through a 40-seat Federal
National Council (FNC)—a body that can review and veto recommended laws. The FNC can call
ministers before it to question them, but it is not empowered to remove ministers. The seat
distribution of the FNC is weighted in favor of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which each hold eight
seats. Sharjah and Ras al-Khaymah have six each, and the other emirates each have four. Each
emirate also has its own appointed consultative council.
The government has expanded the electorate for the FNC in successive elections. In 2006, the
when UAE leadership instituted a limited election process for half of the FNC seats, a
government commission approved an “electorate” of about 6,600 persons, mostly members of the
elite. Out of the 452 candidates for the 20 elected seats, there were 65 female candidates. One
woman was elected (from Abu Dhabi), and another seven women received appointed seats. The
second FNC election, held on September 24, 2011, in the context of the “Arab spring” uprisings,
had an expanded electorate (129,000 electors), nearly half of them women. There were 468
candidates, including 85 women. Of the 20 winners, one was a woman, and six women received
appointed seats. The FNC selected the woman who was elected, Dr. Amal al-Qubaisi, as deputy
speaker—the first woman to hold such a high position in a GCC representative body. For the
October 3, 2015, FNC elections, the electorate was doubled to about 225,000 voters. There were
330 candidates, including 74 women. Dr. Amal al-Qubaisi, was again the only woman who won,
and she was promoted to FNC speaker. Of the 20 appointed seats, eight were women.
The most recent FNC elections were held over several days in October 2019. A December 2018
UAE leadership decree stipulated that half of the FNC members would be women - by appointing
enough women to constitute half of the body, after accounting for those elected.4 The electorate
was expanded further to 337,000 voters, and 478 candidates were approved to run, of which 180
were women. Seven women were elected, and thirteen more were appointed.5 The FNC was
inaugurated in November 2019, and Saqr bin Ghobash, a former minister, was named speaker.
Human Rights-Related Issues6
The State Department and groups such as Human Rights Watch identify the main human rights
problems in the UAE as: unverified reports of torture, government restrictions of freedoms of
speech and assembly, and lack of judicial independence. UAE human rights oversight
organizations include the Jurists’ Association’s Human Rights Committee, the Emirates Human
Rights Association (EHRA), and the Emirates Center for Human Rights (ECHR), but their degree
of independence is uncertain.

3 Anwar Gargash, “Amid Challenges, UAE Policies Engage Gradual Reforms,” The National, August 26, 2012.
4 Communication from UAE Embassy Washington, DC, representatives, December 11, 2018.
5 Emirates News Agency (WAM) releases and press articles, October 2019.
6 Much of this section is from U.S. Department of State, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United
Arab Emirates, April 11, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

3

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

Treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood and Other Domestic Opposition
Since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, the government has asserted that the Muslim
Brotherhood and groups affiliated with it are a threat to the stability of the region and the UAE
itself.7 In 2014 the UAE named the Muslim Brotherhood as one of 85 “terrorist organizations” (a
list that included Al Qaeda and the Islamic State).8 A domestic affiliate of the Brotherhood in the
country—the Islah (Reform) organization—has operated openly in the UAE since 1974,
attracting followers mostly from the less wealthy and more religiously conservative northern
emirates; it has no history of attacks or violence. Despite that record of nonviolence, in 2013, the
UAE State Security Court convicted and sentenced 69 Islamists arrested during 2011-2013 for
trying to overthrow the government.
Since 2011, the government has increased its arrests of domestic activists who use social media to
agitate for more political space and government accountability. The government has also sought
to head off active opposition by enacting reforms and economic incentives. In several cabinet
reshuffles since 2013, the government has added several younger ministers, many of them female,
and established minister of state positions for “tolerance,” “happiness,” artificial intelligence, and
food security.
Media and Research Institute Freedoms
The UAE government has increased restrictions on social media usage since the 2011 Arab
Spring uprisings. The government has jailed several activists for violating a 2015 law that
criminalized the publication of “provocative” political or religious material.” In 2019, several
Members of Congress, from both chambers, signed a letter to the UAE leadership urging the
release of one such activist, Ahmad Mansoor.9 He remains imprisoned. The government has
banned some journalists from entering the country, and prohibited distribution of books and
articles that highlight human rights abuses. The country has applied increasingly strict criteria to
renewing the licenses of research institutes and some, such as the Gulf Research Center, have
relocated outside the country. On the other hand, some UAE-run think tanks have opened in
recent years, including the Emirates Policy Center and the TRENDS Institute.
Justice/Rule of Law
The UAE constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but court decisions are subject to
being overruled by political leaders. A 2012 amendment to the UAE constitution set up a “Federal
Judicial Council” chaired by the UAE president. Sharia (Islamic law) courts adjudicate criminal
and family law matters, and civil courts, based on French and Egyptian legal systems, adjudicate
civil matters. Sharia courts are empowered to impose flogging as punishment for adultery,
prostitution, consensual premarital sex, pregnancy outside marriage, defamation of character, and
drug or alcohol charges. A Federal Supreme Court, appointed by the UAE leadership, adjudicates
disputes between emirates or between an emirate and the UAE federal government and questions
officials accused of misconduct. Foreign nationals serve in the judiciary, making them subject to
threats of deportation. The UAE justice system has often come under criticism in cases involving

7 “UAE and the Muslim Brotherhood: A Story of Rivalry and Hatred,” Middle East Monitor, June 15, 2017.
8 “UAE Lists Scores of Groups as ‘Terrorists,” Al Jazeera, November 16, 2014.
9 “US Congress members call on UAE to release rights activist Ahmed Mansoor,” Middle East Eye, December 13,
2019.
Congressional Research Service

4

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

expatriates, particularly involving public displays of affection, although in 2020 some laws were
altered to allow, for example, unmarried couples to cohabitate.10
Women’s Rights11
Women’s political rights have expanded steadily over the past few decades, but some forms of
discrimination remain legal. Beginning in 2012, UAE women have been allowed to pass on their
citizenship to their children—a first in the GCC. However, UAE women are still at a legal
disadvantage in divorce cases and other family law issues. The penal code allows men to
physically punish female family members. Many domestic service jobs are performed by migrant
women, and they are denied basic legal protections such as limits to work hours.
Recent cabinet shuffles have greatly increased the number of female ministers. As noted, one
woman has been FNC speaker, and the FNC selected in 2019 has half women membership. About
10% of the UAE diplomatic corps is female, whereas there were no female diplomats prior to
2001. The UAE Air Force has several female fighter pilots.







10 “UAE announces relaxing of Islamic laws for personal freedoms,” PBS Weekend News, November 20, 2020.
11 See U.S. Department of State, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United Arab Emirates, March 30,
2021.
Congressional Research Service

5

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

Figure 1. UAE at a Glance

Population
About 9.8 mil ion, of whom about 11% are citizens.
Religions
Of total population, 76% Muslim; 10% is Christian; and 15% other (primarily Buddhist or
Hindu). The citizenry is almost all Muslim, of which 85% are Sunni and 15% are Shia.
Ethnic Groups
11% Emirati (citizenry); 29% other Arab and Iranian; 50% South Asian; 10% Western and
East and South Asian expatriate
Inflation Rate
About 4%
GDP and GDP-related
GDP Growth Rate: 5.3% forecast for 2022.
Metrics
GDP: $520 bil ion (2022 est)
Per capita (PPP): $76,000
Oil Exports
About 2.9 mil ion barrels per day
Sovereign Wealth Reserves About $700 bil ion
Sources: Map created by CRS. Facts from CIA, The World Factbook; U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics; Economist
Intelligence Unit; various press.
Religious Freedom12
The UAE constitution provides for freedom of religion but also declares Islam as the official
religion. The death penalty for conversion from Islam remains in law, but is not enforced. The
Shia Muslim minority, which is about 15% of the citizen population and is concentrated largely in
Dubai, is free to worship and maintain its own mosques, but Shia mosques receive no government
funds.

12 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom, May 2021.
Congressional Research Service

6

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

UAE officials boast of the country’s religious tolerance by citing the 40 churches present there, of
a variety of denominations, serving the 1 million Christians in the country, almost all of whom are
expatriates.13 In November 2017, the Abu Dhabi Department of Justice signed an agreement with
Christian leadership to allow churches to handle non-Islamic marriages and divorces. In 2016,
Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid met with Pope Francis in the Vatican, and the Pope visited the
country in February 2019, the first papal visit to the Gulf region. A Jewish synagogue has been
open in Dubai since 2008, serving mostly expatriates.
Labor Rights and Trafficking in Persons14
UAE law prohibits all forms of compulsory labor, but enforcement is inconsistent. Foreign prohibits all forms of compulsory labor, but enforcement is inconsistent. Foreign
laborers have sometimes conducted strikes to protest poor working conditions, nonpayment of laborers have sometimes conducted strikes to protest poor working conditions, nonpayment of
wages, and cramped housing conditions. Workers still wages, and cramped housing conditions. Workers still reportedly sometimes have their passports held, are sometimes have their passports held, are
denied wages or paid late, and are deported for lodging complaints. The denied wages or paid late, and are deported for lodging complaints. The federal government has put in government has put in
place an electronic salary payment system that applies to companies with more than 100 workers, place an electronic salary payment system that applies to companies with more than 100 workers,
facilitating timely payment of agreed wages. facilitating timely payment of agreed wages. Since 2011In 2022, the UAE government issued a federal decree aimed at creating better work conditions for domestic workers.23 , the UAE reformed its kafala (worker
sponsorship) system to allow expatriate workers to more easily switch employers.
The UAE is a “destination country” for women trafficked from Asia and the countries of the The UAE is a “destination country” for women trafficked from Asia and the countries of the
former Soviet Union and forced into prostitution. The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons former Soviet Union and forced into prostitution. The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons
report for 2022, for the 11th year in a row, rated the UAE as “Tier 2,” based on the assessment that report for 2022, for the 11th year in a row, rated the UAE as “Tier 2,” based on the assessment that
the UAE is making significant efforts to meet the minimum standards for eliminating human the UAE is making significant efforts to meet the minimum standards for eliminating human
trafficking.trafficking.24 The report credited the UAE for convicting more traffickers overall, reporting a The report credited the UAE for convicting more traffickers overall, reporting a
forced labor prosecution for the first time since 2018, and identifying a victim of forced labor for forced labor prosecution for the first time since 2018, and identifying a victim of forced labor for
the first time in five years. The report criticized the government for not convicting any traffickers the first time in five years. The report criticized the government for not convicting any traffickers
for the forced labor of a migrant workerfor the forced labor of a migrant worker during the year and not ever doing so, and for not , and for not
reporting the number of trafficking cases reporting the number of trafficking cases authorities investigated for the 10th consecutive year. Opposition and Repression of Domestic and Foreign Activists UAE law prohibits political parties, and there has been no indication of organized public political opposition since the 2011-2013 period of widespread social unrest in the Arab world. The UAE government has asserted that the Muslim Brotherhood and groups affiliated with it are a threat to the stability of the region and the UAE itself.25 In 2014, the UAE named the Muslim Brotherhood as one of 85 “terrorist organizations” (a list that included Al Qaeda and the Islamic State).26 A domestic affiliate of the Brotherhood in the country—the Islah (the Association for Reform and Guidance) organization—has operated openly in the UAE since 1974, attracting followers mostly from the less wealthy and more religiously conservative northern emirates; it has no history of attacks or violence. Despite that record of nonviolence, in 2013, the UAE State Security Court convicted and sentenced dozens of Islamists—many from the Islah—who were arrested during the 2011-2013 period for trying to overthrow the government.27 The UAE government has increased restrictions on social media usage since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. The government has jailed several activists for violating a 2015 law that 21 Human Rights Watch, UAE: Greater Progress Needed on Women’s Rights, March 4, 2021. 22 United Nations, UN women’s rights committee publishes findings on Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Portugal, Türkiye and United Arab Emirates, July 4, 2022. 23 “United Arab Emirates: New Law Regulating Work of Foreign Domestic Workers Adopted,” Global Legal Monitor, The Law Library, Library of Congress, January 5, 2023. 24 U.S. Department of State, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report, at https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-trafficking-in-persons-report/united-arab-emirates/. 25 “UAE and the Muslim Brotherhood: A Story of Rivalry and Hatred,” Middle East Monitor, June 15, 2017. 26 “UAE Lists Scores of Groups as ‘Terrorists,’” Al Jazeera, November 16, 2014. 27 “UAE jails 61 Islamists in coup plot trial, rights groups protest,” Reuters, July 12, 2013. Congressional Research Service 6 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy criminalized the spread of religious hatred whether through speech, written media, or online. In 2019, several Members of Congress, from both chambers, signed a letter to the UAE leadership urging the release of one such activist, Ahmad Mansoor.28 He remains imprisoned as of January 2023. The government has banned some journalists from entering the country and has prohibited distribution of books and articles that highlight human rights abuses. Since the 2018 murder of Saudi journalist and U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi, there has been renewed international interest in the treatment of foreign journalists and political activists by Gulf countries, including U.S. citizens.29 In 2022, UAE authorities arrested, convicted, fined, and deported a U.S. citizen and associate of Khashoggi, Asim Ghafoor, for money laundering and tax evasion.30 While Ghafoor’s prison sentence was ultimately overturned, some Members of Congress protested against his detention and treatment by Emirati authorities.31 In November 2022, authorities temporarily detained Sherif Osman, an Egyptian-American dual citizen after the Egyptian government requested his extradition to Egypt. Egyptian authorities accused Osman of “speaking negatively against government institutions” for posting a YouTube video criticizing Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi.32 The UAE released him after several weeks, and Osman returned to the United States.33 Oil and Climate Change In recognition of its half-century of independence, in 2022 the UAE issued “The Principles of the 50,” in which it envisions a dynamic economic future revolving around the continued development of “human capital.”34 Nevertheless, though the UAE has made strides to reduce its dependence on hydrocarbon exports via economic diversification, the UAE economy and financial picture still fluctuates along with the world energy outlook. Abu Dhabi has 80% of the federation’s proven oil reserves of about 111 billion barrels. According to The Economist, the UAE’s state-run oil company, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), has enough oil reserves to continue producing at current rates (which are about 3.2 mbd) for over four decades.35 Major UAE crude oil export destination markets include Japan, India, China, and South Korea. Expecting continued global oil consumption and seeking additional market share, the UAE has plans to increase crude oil production capacity to 5 mbd by 2030.36 According to ADNOC Chief 28 “US Congress members call on UAE to release rights activist Ahmed Mansoor,” Middle East Eye, December 13, 2019. 29 In 2021, as part of a broad investigation on foreign governments’ use of “Pegasus” spyware, the Washington Post alleged that, in 2018, the UAE government installed Pegasus on the phone of one of Khashoggi’s fiancées, Hanan Elatr. See Dana Priest, “A UAE agency put Pegasus spyware on phone of Jamal Khashoggi’s wife months before his murder, new forensics show,” Washington Post, December 21, 2021. 30 “UAE overturns prison sentence for former Khashoggi attorney,” Associated Press, August 10, 2022. 31 Vivian Yee, “Pressure Grows in the U.S. for the U.A.E. to Free an American Lawyer,” New York Times, July 29, 2022. 32 “Fiancé of U.S. citizen detained in UAE fears he will be extradited to Egypt,” Reuters, December 4, 2022. 33 Stephen Kalin, “American Avoids Extradition to Egypt After Release From Dubai Detention,” Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2022. 34 See https://u.ae/en/about-the-uae/initiatives-of-the-next-50/the-principles-of-the-50. 35 “Enormous oil; State-run oil giants will make or break the energy transition,” The Economist, July 25, 2022. 36 U.S. Department of Commerce, Country Commercial Guide, UAE, July 26, 2022. Congressional Research Service 7 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy Executive Sultan al Jaber, “We cannot simply unplug from the energy system of today. We cannot just flip a switch.”37 Though the UAE economy remains largely dependent on hydrocarbon exports, it has started diversifying into clean energy initiatives. Partly due to global climate change concerns, the UAE has worked to develop ventures, such as the clean energy and autonomous vehicle showcase project “Masdar City,” that provide jobs and attract tourism and publicity. Over the past few decades, the government claims to have spent $40 billion domestically to develop clean sources of energy, including nuclear power.38 Just weeks prior to the November 2021 United Nations (U.N.) Climate Change Conference, more commonly referred to as COP26, held in Glasgow, Scotland, the UAE announced plans to work toward net-zero emissions by 2050. However, that pledge includes emissions only from domestic sources and energy production and excludes emissions generated by the foreign consumption of UAE hydrocarbon exports.39 The UAE is scheduled to host COP28 from November 6-17, 2023. In January 2023, the UAE government appointed Sultan al Jaber as COP president. The host of the annual COP conference chooses the conference’s president, who has significant influence in setting agendas. Sultan al Jaber, as previously noted, is CEO of ADNOC. He also is the Minister of Industry and Technology and the UAE’s Climate Envoy. While climate activists have criticized the involvement of major oil-producing nations and companies in the conference proceedings, others note that Sultan al Jaber is the founding CEO of the UAE’s renewable energy firm Masdar, in which ADNOC has a 24% stake.40 The UAE donates globally to mitigate the effects of climate change in developing countries. As of May 2022, the UAE government claims that the country “has invested in renewable energy ventures with a total value of $17 billion across the globe, from the UK to India to Uzbekistan. The UAE provides $1 billion of aid for renewables to more than 40 countries, with a special focus on island and least-developed nations.”41 On November 1, 2022, the United States and the UAE signed the U.S.-UAE Partnership for Accelerating Clean Energy (PACE), an agreement intended to spur “$100 billion in financing, investment, and other support and to deploy globally 100 gigawatts of clean energy by 2035.”42 37 Yousef Saba and Alex Lawler, Hadeel Al Sayegh, “Oil Industry Calls for Inclusivity Under Climate Efforts,” Reuters, November 15, 2021. 38 In 2009, the United States and the UAE concluded a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement—pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA; 42 U.S.C. 2153(b))—committing the UAE to refrain from producing enriched uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear reactor fuel; both processes could produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. This provision is typically not included in peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements. The Korea Electric Power Corporation of South Korea is the prime contractor operating the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant, which contains four nuclear power reactors and began operating in mid-2020. 39 Climate Action Tracker, an independent organization that tracks government climate measures, rates the UAE’s net zero target as “incomplete” as of November 2022. It notes that the “UAE is planning to significantly increase oil and fossil gas production by 2030, as part of its goal to reach gas self-sufficiency and increase exports.” See https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/uae/. 40 Maha El Dahan and Gloria Dickie, “UAE names oil boss to lead climate summit, worrying activists,” Reuters, January 12, 2023. 41 Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Washington DC, “The UAE: A Leader and Partner for Climate Action.” 42 White House, Fact Sheet: U.S.-UAE Partnership to Accelerate Transition to Clean Energy (PACE), November 1, 2022. Congressional Research Service 8 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy Foreign Policy and Defense Issues The United States is arguably the UAE’s most important security partner (see below). U.S. troops are stationed on Emirati soil (at the invitation of the UAE government); the UAE military procures sophisticated U.S. military equipment; and the security partnership has been, since 1994, delineated by a “Defense Cooperation Agreement” that promotes U.S.-UAE interoperability (see below). For the past decade, the UAE government has asserted greater independence from U.S. foreign policy amid the growing influence of other foreign actors (Russia, China, Turkey/(Türkiye, and France) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and as the UAE officials have bemoaned what they describe as U.S. disengagement from the MENA region.43 Though the Biden Administration, like its predecessors, has denied that the United States has reduced its security commitment to the region,44 one observer has asserted, “The perception of U.S. disengagement with the region has led countries to reconsider alliances and rivalries.”45 The UAE, like other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, has appeared to pursue a foreign policy strategy of hedging against its close U.S. relationship by expanding ties to Russia, China, and other countries.46 According to statements by Anwar Gargash, a senior advisor to the UAE’s president, “The UAE has no interest in choosing sides between great powers.... Trade relations increasingly look to the East while our primary security and investment relations (are) in the West.”47 President Biden’s summer 2022 visit to the Middle East may have come, in part, to disprove notions about a reduced U.S. commitment to Gulf security. President Biden said at the GCC + 3 Summit Meeting: Let me state clearly that the United States is going to remain an active, engaged partner in the Middle East. As the world grows more competitive and the challenges we face more complex, it is only becoming clearer to me that—how closely interwoven America’s interests are with the successes of the Middle East. We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran. And we’ll seek to build on this moment with active, principled American leadership.48 Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and Global Oil Prices Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has affected U.S.-UAE relations. From the outset of the conflict, the UAE has largely resisted “siding” with the United States and European countries while quietly benefitting from some of the war’s repercussions—most notably, higher global oil prices and Russian capital transfer from the West to Dubai. Shortly after the invasion, the UAE (which was a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council at the time) abstained from a February 25, 2022, draft U.N. Security Council resolution denouncing Russia’s actions. Two days later, it again abstained from a vote to convene the emergency special session of the General Assembly. According to some observers, the UAE’s abstentions were an expression of its displeasure over the U.S. response to drone and missile attacks against it 43 Phil Steward, “In Middle East, U.S. General Hears Concerns about American Commitment,” Reuters, May 13, 2022. 44 “State Dept: Narrative that US Leaving MENA ‘wholly incorrect,’” Al Mayadeen, June 7, 2022. 45 David Siddhartha Patel, “A Changing Middle East: The View from Israel: A Conversation with Chuck Freilich,” Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, February 9, 2022. See also, David Ignatius, “The unintended consequences of U.S. disengagement in the Middle East,” Washington Post, August 14, 2018. 46 Danielle Pletka, “The Qatarization of the Middle East,” Foreign Policy, May 4, 2022. 47 “UAE won't take sides in ‘great power’ standoff: senior official,” Agence France Presse, November 14, 2022. 48 White House, Remarks by President Biden at the GCC + 3 Summit Meeting, July 16, 2022. Congressional Research Service 9 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy emanating from Iranian-backed groups.49 In March 2022, the UAE voted yes on two U.N. General Assembly resolutions condemning aggression against Ukraine; in October 2022, it voted in favor of a U.N. General Assembly resolution that condemned Russia’s “illegal so-called referendums” in regions within Ukraine.50 As a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC—when combined with Russia, and some other oil producing countries, collectively known as OPEC+51), the UAE has come under U.S. and European pressure to increase production quotas in order to stabilize oil prices. Spare crude production capacity in the MENA region and globally is generally concentrated in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. After the October 5, 2022, OPEC+ decision to cut oil production quotas by 2.0 mbd starting in November, the Biden Administration and some lawmakers have called for a reassessment of U.S.-Saudi relations.52 For its part, the UAE appears to be balancing its ongoing commitment to OPEC+ while trying to maintain cordial relations with the United States. As a result, several reports suggest that, before OPEC+ made its final production cut decisions, UAE officials advocated privately for “a one-month delay in line with U.S. requests.”53 Reportedly, MBZ’s brother, National Security Advisor Shaykh Tahnoun bin Zayed al Nahyan, visited Saudi Arabia in a September 2022 attempt to dissuade Saudi officials “from pushing an oil-production cut.”54 Although the UAE is balancing its commitment to OPEC+ alongside sensitivity to U.S. policy, the UAE has not enacted economic sanctions against the Russian government or Russian officials; on the contrary, reports suggest that the UAE has benefitted significantly from the flight of Russian capital to Dubai. According to one London consultancy’s June 2022 estimate, in 2022, the UAE had the potential to attract a net inflow of 4,000 millionaires, many of whom hail from Russia.55 As a result, U.S. Treasury officials have called on the UAE to maintain its commitment to combating money laundering while maintaining “vigilance and proactive action” in countering Russian sanctions evasion.56 Though Emirati-Russian relations have received much media attention since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Emirati government is attempting to improve bilateral ties with Ukraine. The UAE has shipped medical supplies and food to Ukraine and provided relief to Ukrainian refugees in Poland and Moldova. Reportedly, trade talks between both countries have resumed, as the UAE imports the second-most amount of its annual wheat imports from Ukraine.57 At times, the UAE has acted as an interlocutor between the United States and its rivals. In the case of Russia, the UAE (and Saudi Arabia) claimed to have played a successful role in mediating 49 Barak Ravid, “UAE abstained from UN Security Council vote due to U.S. response to Houthi attacks,” Axios, March 2, 2022. 50 See https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3990400?ln=en. 51 The formation of OPEC+ dates back to the “Declaration of Cooperation” in 2016 between OPEC and 11 other oil exporters, including Russia. 52 “Biden vows consequences for Saudi Arabia after OPEC+ decision,” Reuters, October 12, 2022. 53 Summer Said, Benoit Faucon, Dion Nissenbaum, and Stephen Kalin, “Saudis Spurned Biden On Call to Delay Oil Cuts,” Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2022. 54 Summer Said and Dion Nissenbaum, “U.A.E. Envoy Secretly Urged Saudis Not to Cut Oil Output,” Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2022. 55 Ben Bartenstein, “World’s Wealthy Flock to UAE as War Spurs Russian Capital Flight,” Bloomberg, June 14, 2022. 56 Simeon Kerr and Laura Pitel, “US reminds UAE of vigilance to combat Russian sanctions evasion,” Financial Times, June 23, 2022. 57 Simeon Kerr, “UAE and Ukraine open trade talks,” Financial Times, December 5, 2022. Congressional Research Service 10 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy the release of American citizen and professional basketball player Brittney Griner.58 Upon her release from Russian authorities in a prisoner swap, a private Emirati plane flew Griner from Moscow to Bateen Airport (an executive airport) in Abu Dhabi, where she was taken safely into U.S. protection. Afterward, President Biden thanked “the UAE for helping us facilitate Brittney’s return, because that’s where she landed.”59 UAE-China Relations As the UAE invests heavily in various technologies to gradually diversify its economy away from hydrocarbon production, the UAE has expanded commercial ties to the People’s Republic of China, a worrisome development for U.S. officials seeking to maintain and expand longstanding U.S.-Emirati defense ties. In August 2022 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf stated that the Biden Administration has “concerns with Chinese inroads in the UAE’s tech sector.”60 According to the UAE government, the UAE is China’s largest non-oil trading partner in the Middle East and North Africa, with a bilateral trade volume over $50 billion.61 The PRC telecom company Huawei provides domestic network services in the UAE. In October 2022, Omar Sultan al Olama, the UAE’s minister of state for artificial intelligence, digital economy and remote work applications, said in an interview that the UAE is open to using PRC-origin technology, noting, “As long as it makes economic sense, we will use it.”62 A month later, National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk stated at a security conference in Bahrain that “there are certain partnerships with China that would create a ceiling to what we can do.”63 In November 2021, the Biden Administration reportedly warned the UAE government that Chinese construction of a possible military facility at Khalifa port, where PRC-based company Cosco operates a commercial container terminal, could damage U.S.-UAE ties; construction was subsequently halted.64 Nevertheless, U.S. concerns about PRC-owned firms’ operations at the port appear to have contributed to the 2021 suspension of U.S.-UAE talks on a proposed sale of F-35 aircraft.65 PRC-owned firms’ role in operating 5G communications technology in the UAE could 58 WAM News Agency (UAE), “Success of joint Emirati-Saudi mediation regarding release and exchange of prisoners between United States and Russian Federation,” December 8, 2022. 59 White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Release of Brittney Griner, December 8, 2022. 60 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, August 4, 2022 61 Ali Obaid Al Dhaheri, Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the People’s Republic of China, “Op-Ed: UAE-China Ties a Model of Global Cooperation,” Emirates News Agency, February 4, 2021. 62 Nesreen Bakheit, “UAE open to China AI despite U.S. concerns: minister,” Nikkei Asia, October 15, 2022. 63 Zainab Fattah, “U.S. Tells Gulf Allies Certain China Ties Would Cap Cooperation,” Bloomberg, November 20, 2022. At the same conference, U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Colin Kahl, said, “In the Middle East, the PRC has no interest in mutually beneficial coalitions, and Beijing has neither the intent nor the capability to integrate the region’s security architecture.... The PRC pursues ties based on its narrow transactional, commercial, and geopolitical interests. Period.” See Aaron Mehta, “Kahl to Gulf states: Why work with Russia when it is funding Iran?” Breaking Defense, November 18, 2022. 64 Gordon Lubold and Warren P. Strobel, “China Move in U.A.E. Thwarted—U.S. Rang Alarm about Building of Suspected Military Facility at Port on Mideast Ally’s Turf,” Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2021. 65 Mohammed Soliman, “The Gulf has a 5G conundrum and Open RAN is the key to its tech sovereignty,” Middle East Institute, January 12, 2022. Congressional Research Service 11 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy allow China to discern sensitive operating information about the F-35 and other U.S.-origin platforms. Following the suspension of the F-35 talks, UAE officials announced plans to proceed with cooperation with Huawei on telecommunications and other technology projects. The UAE also announced plans to purchase 12 light-attack training aircraft from a PRC-owned defense company, with the option for 36 additional aircraft.66 Additionally, the UAE has reportedly bought armed UAVs from China and has used them for strikes in Libya.67 Congress also has expressed concern regarding UAE-PRC relations and possible implications for U.S. security. Section 704 of P.L. 117-103, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2022, required the Director of National Intelligence to report to Congress within 60 days of enactment on, among other things, the cooperation between China and the UAE regarding “defense, security, technology, and other strategically sensitive matters that implicate the national security interests of the United States.” Iran U.S. policy toward Iran has been a consistent focus of UAE leaders in relations with their U.S. counterparts. The UAE has pursued a policy of limited engagement with Iran while maintaining its strategic defense cooperation with the United States. The UAE cautiously supported the Biden Administration’s efforts to reengage Iran on nuclear talks.68 At the July 2022 GCC + 3 Summit, the UAE signed on to a joint statement that “affirmed their support for ensuring that the Arab Gulf region is free from all weapons of mass destruction, underscoring the centrality of diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.”69 During President Biden’s visit, UAE officials publicly stated that while the Emirates have “serious issues” with Iran, they did not support constructing regional collective security alliances targeting Iran; additionally, the UAE officials announced that they were in the process of appointing and sending an ambassador to Iran.70 The emirate of Dubai has often advocated that the federation emphasize engagement with Iran—a stance that might stem partly from Dubai’s significant Iranian-origin community and the extensive Iranian commercial presence there. According to the Financial Times, in 2021, the UAE was the top source for Iran’s imports and the fourth largest destination for Iran’s non-oil exports.71 The business ties have included some illicit purchases by UAE firms of Iranian oil and jet fuel, exports of proliferation-related technology to Iran, and the use of some UAE financial institutions by Iranian entities. Numerous UAE-based entities have been sanctioned by the United States for these activities.72 66 Emirates News Agency, “Ministry of Defence intends to buy 12 L15 Chinese aircraft,” February 23, 2022. 67 “UAE Allegedly Using Chinese Drones for Deadly Airstrikes in Libya,” Defense News, May 2, 2019. 68 U.S. Department of State, U.S. GCC Iran Working Group Statement, Office of the Spokesperson, November 17, 2021. 69 White House, Joint Statement Following the Summit of the Leaders of the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), July 16, 2022. 70 “UAE Working to Send Envoy to Iran, against anti-Iran Axis – Official,” Reuters, July 15, 2022. 71 Najmeh Bozorgmehr and Simeon Kerr, “UAE spy chief in Iran to improve ties,” Financial Times, December 6, 2021. 72 See CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, updated February 2, 2022. Congressional Research Service 12 link to page 17 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy Israel and the Abraham Accords In 2020, the UAE and Israel normalized relations, the first of the “Abraham Accords,” negotiated by the UAE, Israel, and the United States. The three countries jointly negotiated the Israel-UAE diplomatic normalization agreement during summer 2020 in the wake of statements by then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that publicly floated the idea of formally annexing parts of the West Bank. According to the UAE Ambassador to the United States, the Accords were “about preventing annexation” and “saving the two-state solution.”73 In support of the first bilateral normalization agreement, the Trump Administration pledged to sell to the UAE the advanced F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft and armed drones.74 By early 2021, Israel had reached Abraham Accords agreements to normalize or improve its relations with three other members of the Arab League: Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan.75 The Trump Administration facilitated each of these agreements and, as with the UAE deal, provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives for most of the countries in question.76 Since the signing of the 2020 Israel-UAE diplomatic normalization agreement, Israeli-Emirati trade, military, and diplomatic ties have expanded significantly. In May 2022, Israel and the UAE signed a free trade agreement. The deal, once ratified, would loosen restrictions on bilateral trade and could reportedly boost annual Israel-UAE trade volume from around $1 billion to $10 billion within five years.77 The UAE is now purchasing arms from and engaging in joint arms development projects with Israel, including various air and missile defense systems (see Table 1 for selected examples). With the formation of Israel’s more right-wing government in December 2022, there is a possibility for greater tension in the Israeli-Emirati diplomatic relationship. After the early January 2023 visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif in Jerusalem by Minister of National Security Itamar Ben Gvir, the UAE government issued a press statement that “strongly condemned the storming of Al-Aqsa Mosque courtyard by an Israeli minister under the protection of Israeli forces.”78 73 Jacob Magid, “UAE ambassador: ‘Abraham Accords were about preventing annexation,’” Times of Israel, February 2, 2021. 74 See CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, October 26, 2020. 75 Steps toward Israel-Sudan normalization appear to be on hold following the Sudanese military’s seizure of power in October 2021. See testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S. Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022. 76 These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and Morocco, possible U.S. and international economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports suggest that the Trump Administration linked Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its agreement to recognize Israel. See Max Bearak and Naba Mohieddin, “U.S. Takes Sudan off Terrorism List, Reintegrating it into the Global Economy,” Washington Post, December 15, 2020. 77 Patrick Kingsley, “Trade Accord with U.A.E. Would Be Israel’s Broadest Yet with an Arab Country,” New York Times, June 1, 2022. 78 UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, “UAE condemns storming of Al-Aqsa Mosque courtyard by Israeli Minister,” January 3, 2023. Congressional Research Service 13 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy Table 1. Selected Israeli Defense Deals with the UAE Date Description October 2022 Though unconfirmed, multiple reports suggest that Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) is in the process of selling the UAE a variant of its Barak-family surface-to-air missile defense system. Satellite imagery detected Barak launchers in the UAE. September 2022 Rafael Advanced Defense Systems agreed to sell the SPYDER (Surface-to-air PYthon and DERby) to the UAE to protect its airspace against attack aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. May 2022 A subsidiary of Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems agreed to sell an Emirates marine services company (Al Fattan group) advanced underwater sonar systems to detect underwater threats to naval bases, ports, and offshore energy platforms. November 2021 IAI agreed to jointly develop with UAE defense conglomerate EDGE modular un-crewed surface vessels (m-USV) for military and commercial applications. March 2021 IAI agreed to jointly develop with EDGE an advanced C-UAS (Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System). Source: Jane’s Defence. Afghanistan79 The UAE was one of three countries (Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were the others) that recognized the Taliban during 1996-2001 as the government of Afghanistan. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the UAE allowed the United States to use its military facilities for U.S. operations against targets in Afghanistan, and it deployed a 250-person contingent, supported by six UAE F-16s, in Afghanistan’s restive south until 2014.80 The risks of this involvement were evident in January 2017 when five UAE diplomats were killed in an attack on the governor’s compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The UAE also donated significant aid to post-Taliban Afghanistan. Following the August 2021 Taliban takeover, the UAE permitted former Afghan president Ashraf Ghani to live in exile in the Emirates. The UAE also took in Afghan air force pilots who had flown their aircraft to Uzbekistan as the Taliban advanced on Kabul. More broadly, after the Taliban takeover, thousands of Afghan refugees fled to the UAE, where they have been housed in temporary facilities known as the Emirates Humanitarian City. As many of these refugees have waited months for determinations on their future status, some have protested against their indefinite detention and uncertain resettlement prospects. According to one report, “The United States is prioritizing those who had visas or applications to go the United States but ... the facility includes people who have no clear pathway to be resettled in the United States or a third country.”81 As of December 2022 according to one report, around 2,000 Afghans remain at Emirates Humanitarian City.82 79 CRS Report R45818, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton Thomas. 80 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potent ally nicknamed ‘Little Sparta,’” The Washington Post, November 9, 2014. 81 “Afghan Refugees in UAE Protest Months-Long Wait for Resettlement,” Reuters, February 10, 2022. 82 Hayatullah Amanat, “‘Kept in a golden cage’: Afghan families share their experience of life in refugee camps,” CTV News, December 28, 2022. Congressional Research Service 14 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy The UAE is providing humanitarian aid to Afghanistan; in April 2022, the UAE sent 30 metric tons of food and relief supplies. According to Issa Salem Al Dhaheri, the UAE Ambassador to Afghanistan, “During the period from September to December of 2021, the UAE established a relief airlift of 21 aircraft that carried about 500 tonnes of food and medical supplies to meet the essential needs of more than half a million people, most of whom are women and children.”83 The UAE is seeking to maintain influence in Afghanistan, while keeping rival GCC states like Qatar from enhancing their own role there.84 In 2022, the Taliban chose an Emirati company, GAAC Holding, to operate Afghanistan’s airports, reportedly over several other bids from Qatari and Turkish competitors. In December 2022, Mullah Yaqoob, the Taliban’s acting defense minister, met with MBZ in Abu Dhabi. UAE Involvement in the Middle East and North Africa The Emirati-Saudi “Alliance” The UAE has sought to influence regional affairs using its significant financial resources, as well as the expertise and equipment gained in its security partnership with the United States. Within the GCC, the UAE has been most closely aligned with Saudi Arabia. Many observers attribute close Saudi-Emirati relations to personal ties between MBZ and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS, who is nearly 24 years younger than his Emirati counterpart.85 Both leaders have cooperated on various regional endeavors, such as the blockade of Qatar (2017-2021), the ongoing war in Yemen (2015-present), and support to counter Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist-affiliated movements, popular Shia uprisings, and democratic reform efforts in the Middle East and Africa (e.g., in Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, and Sudan). Though the UAE and Saudi Arabia are not always closely aligned on either regional or oil-policy matters, and often appear to compete globally for status on the world’s stage, they are similarly threatened by Iran’s own regional ambitions and rely heavily on the United States as their primary security partner. Yemen In 2014, the northern Yemeni-based Houthi movement launched a military offensive that seized large swaths of northern Yemen, culminating in their capture of the capital Sana’a in September 2014. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of Arab partners, including the UAE, and launched a military offensive aimed at dislodging Houthis from the capital and major cities. In 2022, the Houthis conducted ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks against UAE territory. After almost eight years of conflict in Yemen, an April 2022 truce appeared to offer the first hope for an end to the fighting. The truce resulted in six months of reduced conflict and the formation of a new Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). However, by late 2022, the truce had expired, the PLC was beset by infighting, Iran had continued its activities in the region, and the Houthis had resumed longer-range strikes against domestic energy facilities in government-held areas. Though the UAE formally withdrew its main military contingent from Yemen in 2019, it has retained a small military presence while working with allied non-state groups in southern Yemen, 83 Emirates News Agency (WAM), “UAE Provides 30 Tonnes of Food, Relief Supplies to Afghanistan,” April 19, 2022. 84 “Taliban acting defence minister holds talks with UAE president,” Reuters, December 5, 2022. 85 Arwa Ibrahim, “MBS-MBZ: A special bond between two Gulf princes,” Al Jazeera, March 17, 2020. Congressional Research Service 15 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The STC advocates for an independent southern Yemen and controls the government’s interim capital city of Aden. According to the United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen, the UAE “retains an outsized political role ... mostly through providing political, financial and military support to the Joint Forces on the West Coast, as well as political support” to the STC.86 In 2021, the panel concluded that the UAE “support to the Southern Transitional Council undermines the Government of Yemen.”87 UAE support to the STC appears to stem at least partly from a UAE interest in countering ties between the former internationally recognized government and the Yemeni Islah party. The UAE views Islah as linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, which UAE leaders consider to be a significant domestic and transnational threat.88 At times, some U.S. lawmakers have called on the UAE to contribute additional funds to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.89 According to the Emirati government, from 2015 to 2021, the UAE has provided over $6 billion for various government support and relief efforts.90 The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), in 2022, described the UAE as the eighth largest donor to the U.N. humanitarian appeal for Yemen with a commitment of $40 million (as of December 2022).91 In spring 2022, the U.S. State Department praised the UAE government for a $1 billion pledge to the Central Bank of Yemen based in Aden.92 Syria In Syria, the GCC states initially supported the 2011 uprising against President Bashar Al Asad, in part to oust a strong ally of Iran. Over the past few years, there has been a concerted Emirati attempt to reconcile with Asad. The UAE reopened its embassy in Damascus in December 2018, claiming that doing so would help counter Iran’s influence in Syria.93 In March 2022, the UAE hosted a visit by Asad, his first to an Arab country since the uprising, signaling UAE intent to help reintegrate Asad into the regional fold. U.S. officials and some Members of Congress criticized the UAE decision to host Asad.94 During 2014-2015, as a member of the U.S.-led coalition combatting the Islamic State organization, the UAE sent pilots to conduct and even command some coalition air strikes against Islamic State positions in Syria. The UAE also hosted other forces participating in the anti- 86 United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen, “Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014),” U.N. Document S/2022/50, January 26, 2022. 87 See United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen, “Letter dated 22 January 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council,” U.N. Document, S/2021/79, January 25, 2021. 88 “A Moment of Truth for Yemen’s Truce,” International Crisis Group, September 30, 2022. 89 House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism, Hearing on Yemen’s Humanitarian and Political Crises, December 6, 2022. 90 Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in the United States, Foreign Aid, at https://www.uae-embassy.org/discover-uae/foreign-policy/foreign-aid. 91 UNOCHA, Financial Tracking Service, Yemen, accessed December 8, 2022. 92 U.S. State Department, Welcoming Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s Economic and Humanitarian Support for Yemen, April 7, 2022. 93 “UAE reopens Syria embassy in boost for Assad,” Reuters, December 27, 2018. 94 U.S. Department of State, Press Briefing, March 21, 2022. See also Sarakshi Rai, “Top Democrat knocks UAE’s welcome for ‘brutal murderer Assad,’” The Hill, March 21, 2022. Congressional Research Service 16 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy Islamic State effort, including French jets stationed at Al Dhafra Air Base and 600 forces from Australia.95 None of the GCC states conducted anti-Islamic State air operations in Iraq. Libya In Libya, the UAE joined several Gulf states in conducting air strikes to help armed Libyan rebels overthrow Muammar Qadhafi in 2011.96 Since then, the UAE, in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions that ban arms transfers to Libya, reportedly has sent weapons to and conducted air operations in support of eastern Libya-based Khalifa Hafter’s Libyan National Army (LNA).97 Hafter, a former commander in the Libyan armed forces, has sought to undermine the U.N.-backed government based in Tripoli. According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the UAE also may have financially supported the operations of Russian mercenaries, such as those employed by the Wagner Group, in Libya.98 Since the end of the last round of major hostilities in Libya (2019-2020), which witnessed a significant Turkish intervention against the LNA, the UAE has been more conciliatory due to its rapprochement with Turkey.99 In December 2022, the UAE government stated that it will “continue to demand the gradual, balanced, and parallel withdrawal of foreign forces, foreign fighters, and mercenaries” from Libya and called for support to the U.N. Special Representative’s efforts “to enable Libya to hold parliamentary and presidential elections, thus ending the transitional period.”100 U.S. Trade, Military Cooperation, and Arms Sales The UAE is one of the top 30 trading partners of the United States globally and the third-largest by value in the MENA region (after Israel and Saudi Arabia).101 According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the UAE has been the top U.S. export market in the MENA region for the past 12 years and is a “global hub for over 1,500 American companies.”102 As of 2021, the United States deployed about 3,500 U.S. military personnel at several UAE facilities including Jebel Ali port (between Dubai and Abu Dhabi), Al Dhafra Air Base (near Abu Dhabi), and naval facilities at Fujairah.103 Jebel Ali, which is capable of handling aircraft carriers, and other UAE ports collectively host more U.S. Navy ships for visits than any other port outside the United States.104 U.S. forces in the UAE support U.S. operations in the region, including 95 “Islamic State Crisis: Australia to Send 600 Troops to UAE,” BBC News, September 14, 2014. 96 “Militant Forces Got Arms Meant for Libya Rebels,” New York Times, December 6, 2012. 97 United Nations, “Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya Established pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2021/229, March 21, 2021. 98 U.S. Department of Defense, Lead Inspector General, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operation, July 1, 2020‒September 30, 2020. 99 Emadeddin Badi, “The UAE is making a precarious shift in its Libya policy. Here’s why,” MENASource, Atlantic Council, October 27, 2022. 100 Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations, UAE Statement at the UN Security Council on the Situation in Libya, December 16, 2022. 101 U.S. Census Bureau, Trade in Goods with United Arab Emirates, 2021. 102 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Country Commercial Guide, United Arab Emirates. 103 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates,” Fact Sheet, June 25, 2021. 104 Factbox: U.S. forces in Gulf region and Iraq, Reuters, January 8, 2020. Congressional Research Service 17 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy deterring Iran, countering terrorist groups, and intercepting illicit shipments of weaponry or technology. According to the U.S. State Department, in 2021, the United States had $29.3 billion in active government-to-government sales cases with the UAE under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. Since 2016, the United States had also authorized the permanent export of over $11.3 billion in defense articles to the UAE via the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process, primarily launch vehicles, aircraft, munitions, and military electronics.105 Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) The United States and the UAE have established a “Defense Cooperation Framework” to develop joint approaches to regional conflicts and to promote U.S.-UAE interoperability. A “Joint Military Dialogue” (JMD) meets periodically. On May 15, 2017, the United States and the UAE confirmed that they had concluded negotiations on a new Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with a 15-year duration, which came into force as of May 30, 2019.106 The DCA is not a mutual defense treaty. Throughout 2022, particularly after Houthi rocket attacks targeted UAE soil in January, multiple reports suggested that the UAE has advocated for a legally binding mutual defense treaty with the United States.107 On November 14, 2022, Anwar Gargash, senior advisor to the UAE’s president, called for a security relationship with the United States that is defined by “clear, codified and unambivalent commitments.”108 The Possible Sale of the F-35109 On November 10, 2020, the Trump Administration notified Congress of a $23 billion arms sale to the UAE, to include F-35s, drones, and various munitions. As mentioned above, the sale was proposed to support UAE-Israel diplomatic normalization. An effort to block the proposed sale in the Senate failed to garner the required votes (S.J.Res. 77 and S.J.Res. 78). In the last hours of the Trump presidency, the UAE signed a Letter of Acceptance (not a contract) to purchase up to 50 F-35s and 18 MQ-9 Reaper drones from the United States.110 The Biden Administration temporarily paused the sale for review upon taking office. Later, a State Department spokesperson told journalists in April 2021 that the Administration plans to proceed with the sale.111 The UAE would become the first Arab country to purchase the F-35 system. As of December 2022, a contract between the UAE and Lockheed Martin for the F-35 has yet to be reached or approved by the Biden Administration. As previously mentioned, UAE-China ties have stalled progress on completing the sale. On December 3, 2021, during French President 105 Op.cit., Fact Sheet. 106 Department of Defense, “SecDef Meets with UAE’s Crown Prince,” May 15, 2017; “UAE-US defence agreement kicks in as John Bolton visits Abu Dhabi,” The National, May 30, 2019. 107 See Sylvia Westall and Ben Bartenstein, “Gulf Oil Powers Seek U.S. Security Treaty After Yemen Strikes, Bloomberg, March 30, 2022. 108 See “UAE official calls for ‘unambivalent’ US security commitment,” Reuters, November 14, 2022. 109 For more detail on the F-35 sale to the UAE, see CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti. 110 Mike Stone, “UAE Signs Deal with U.S. to Buy 50 F-35 Jets and up to 18 Drones: Sources,” Reuters, January 20, 2021. 111 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Remarks to the Press, January 27, 2021; “Joe Biden Is Proceeding with Donald Trump’s Biggest Arms Deal,” Huffington Post, April 13, 2021. Congressional Research Service 18 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy Emmanuel Macron’s visit to the UAE, the UAE agreed to purchase the F4 version of French aircraft manufacturer Dassault’s Rafale fighter class, in one of France’s largest ever fighter aircraft export deals ($19 billion). For over a decade, the UAE and France have been negotiating replacements for the UAE’s fleet of French Mirage fighters. Money Laundering and U.S. Concern How the UAE addresses money laundering and terrorism financing attracts U.S. attention. The UAE Central Bank’s Financial Intelligence Unit is credited in State Department terrorism reports with providing training programs to UAE financial institutions on money laundering and terrorism financing, and making mandatory the registration of informal financial transmittal networks (hawalas). During 2018 and 2019, the Emirati government enacted and issued implementing regulations for updated anti-money laundering laws.112 However, in April 2020, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) found that the United Arab Emirates was not doing enough to prevent money laundering, despite recent progress, and risked being including in the body’s watch list of countries found to have “strategic deficiencies” in Antiterrorism Financing and Money Laundering (AMF/CFT)—the so-called “gray list.”113 In March 2022, the FATF formally placed the UAE on the gray list, subjecting the country to increased monitoring of its efforts to correct the deficiencies the FATF identified.114 Since 2012, there has been an FBI Legal Attaché office at the U.S. consulate in Dubai to assist with joint efforts against terrorism and terrorism financing. Some financial networks based in the UAE have been sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury for facilitating transactions for Iran and pro-Iranian regional factions in furtherance of Iran’s “malign activities” in the region. Outlook and Considerations for Congress If global economic activity remains robust and contributes to elevated global oil prices during 2023, the UAE may continue to experience strong economic growth, which would enable it to keep investing both in non-oil sectors at home and in accumulating assets abroad. The degree to which the UAE may leverage its “soft power” in ways that are beneficial to U.S. interests remains to be seen. The UAE is to host COP28 in November 2023 and may use its status as host nation to promote the expansion of climate adaptation aid to the developing world. The UAE and the United States are to implement their Partnership for Accelerating Clean Energy (PACE) program. The UAE may also accelerate investment in domestic renewables to meet its 2050 target of carbon neutrality. At the same time, with Russia’s continued invasion of Ukraine straining global natural gas supplies, the UAE also may increase investment to expand its liquefied natural gas export capacity. Furthermore, some speculate that the UAE may leave OPEC in order to increase daily production capacity immediately, which would help improve U.S. ties.115 Geopolitically, the UAE appears likely to continue to pursue an independent and assertive foreign policy and seeks to strengthen its diplomatic, economic, security, and cultural ties to a diverse set of partner countries. In 2022, public and private Emirati entities invested globally, with particular 112 Fact sheet provided by UAE embassy representatives, October 31, 2018; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, June 24, 2020. 113 “UAE at risk of landing on watchlist over money laundering,” Al Jazeera, April 30, 2020. 114 “UAE is placed on money laundering watchdog’s ‘gray list,’” CNBC, March 5, 2022. 115 “UAE will look to a world beyond OPEC,” Reuters, December 19, 2022. Congressional Research Service 19 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy focus on Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Mediterranean, and East Africa. Trade with China, the Emirates’ largest trading partner, is expected to grow, posing a continued challenge for U.S. policymakers seeking to expand U.S.-UAE defense ties. Nevertheless, many analysts anticipate the fundamentals of the U.S.-UAE relationship to remain unchanged. According to one account, “The United States continues to consider the UAE a strong and capable—though perhaps somewhat less reliable—partner in an unstable region. For its part, the UAE continues to need its U.S. partner and the security umbrella it provides, even as the UAE seeks to diversify its relationships.”116 For Congress, Members may continue to balance U.S. strategic support to a partner vulnerable to Iranian regional meddling against some concern for UAE ties to China, UAE-based illicit financial transactions, and the UAE’s human rights record. As the war in Yemen continues, some lawmakers continue to press for more accountability regarding the UAE’s use of U.S. supplied-military equipment in Yemen. A 2022 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report noted that “despite several reports that airstrikes and other attacks by Saudi Arabia and UAE have caused extensive civilian harm in Yemen, DOD [Department of Defense] has not reported and State [Department of State] could not provide evidence that it investigated any incidents of potential unauthorized use of equipment transferred to Saudi Arabia or UAE.”117 UAE participation in the 2020-2021 Abraham Accords has received broad bipartisan support, and Members may seek ways of further advancing trilateral U.S.-Israeli-Emirati partnerships. For example, Section 1658 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for FY2023 mandates U.S. cooperation with allies and partners in the Middle East with respect to developing a strategy for implementing an integrated air and missile defense architecture to protect against attacks from Iran and groups linked to Iran. Author Information Jeremy M. Sharp Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs 116 Dina Esfandiary, “The Ukraine Strain in the U.S.-UAE Partnership,” Lawfare Blog, June 5, 2022. 117 Government Accountability Office, Yemen: State and DOD Need Better Information on Civilian Impacts of U.S. Military Support to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, GAO-22-105988, June 15, 2022. Congressional Research Service 20 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. Congressional Research Service RS21852 · VERSION 144authorities investigated for the 10th consecutive year.
Foreign Policy and Defense Issues
The UAE has sought to influence regional affairs using its significant financial resources as well
as the expertise and equipment gained in its security partnership with the United States. Within
the GCC, the UAE is closely aligned with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and, in 2011, it deployed 500
police officers to the Saudi-led GCC military intervention in Bahrain to suppress a Shia-led
uprising. At least some UAE law enforcement personnel remained there. Regional affairs and
global energy issues constituted the focus of President Biden’s multilateral and separate bilateral
meetings with Mohammad bin Zayid during his July 2022 trip to Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Rift with Qatar
In June 2017, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain sought to isolate Qatar by denying it land, sea,
and air access to their territories, and issuing 13 demands as a condition for ending the boycott,
including reducing its ties to Iran and ceasing support for Muslim Brotherhood-related
movements. Qatar refused to accede, asserting that doing so would forfeit Qatar’s sovereignty.
The same issues had prompted a shorter rift in 2014.
At the 41st GCC summit in Al Ula on January 5, 2021, after a series of meetings between Qatar
and Saudi Arabia to try to end the dispute, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt announced

13 “Pope Makes Historic Gulf Visit, Amid Yemen Crisis and Siege of Christians,” New York Times, February 4, 2019.
14 This section is derived from the U.S. Department of State, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report.
Congressional Research Service

7

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

a restoration of diplomatic relations with Qatar and an end to the territorial blockades. Since mid-
2021, the UAE has improved ties to Qatar through a visit to Doha by UAE National Security
Advisor Tahnoun Al Nuhayyan and in a meeting between the de facto leaders of the UAE and
Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s ruler on the Red Sea in September 2021. However, the UAE has not, to
date, returned an ambassadors to Qatar.
Iran
U.S. policy toward Iran has been a consistent focus of UAE leaders in relations with their U.S.
counterparts. Asserting that Iran is a major threat to regional stability, UAE leaders supported the
Trump Administration’s May 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the July 2015 Iran nuclear agreement
(Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) and application of a policy of “maximum
pressure” on Iran. Diplomatic ties with Iran, on the other hand, have fluctuated: in January 2016,
the UAE withdrew its ambassador from Iran in solidarity with Saudi Arabia’s breaking relations
with Iran over issues related to the Saudi execution of a dissident Shia cleric. In mid-2019, amid
U.S.-Iran tensions in the Gulf, the UAE leadership began to engage Iran, perhaps in part because
UAE infrastructure could be at risk in the event of war with Iran. In August 2019, UAE maritime
officials visited Iran for the first bilateral security talks since 2013.15 UAE officials have publicly
questioned Biden Administration policy to negotiate a mutual U.S. and Iranian return to full
compliance with the JCPOA without demanding additional concessions from Iran on its support
for regional armed factions.
The emirate of Dubai has often advocated that the federation emphasize engagement with Iran - a
stance that might reflect the presence of the large Iranian-origin community (estimated at 400,000
persons) and the extensive Iranian commercial presence in that emirate. The business ties have
included some illicit purchases by UAE firms of Iranian oil and jet fuel, exports of proliferation-
related technology to Iran (see below), and the use of some UAE financial institutions by Iranian
entities. Numerous UAE-based entities have been sanctioned by the United States for these
activities.16
Another factor in UAE-Iran relations is a dispute over several Persian Gulf islands. In 1971, the
Shah-led government of Iran seized the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands from Ras al-Khaymah
emirate and compelled the emirate of Sharjah to share with Iran control of Abu Musa island. In
April 1992, Iran took complete control of Abu Musa and placed some military equipment there.
The UAE has called for direct negotiations or referral to the International Court of Justice to try
to resolve the issue. A UAE-Iran joint commission held periodic talks, without a breakthrough,
during 2008-2012. In 2014, the two countries reportedly discussed a possible solution under
which Iran might cede control of the disputed islands in exchange for rights to the seabed around
them.17Iran reduced its presence on Abu Musa to build confidence, but no further progress has
been reported. The United States takes no position on the sovereignty of the islands.
UAE Regional Policy and Interventions in Regional Conflicts
Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, the UAE has become more active in the region, including through
the direct use of its own military forces, the capabilities of which have benefitted from many
years of defense cooperation with the United States. The UAE’s opposition to the Muslim

15 “Rivals Iran and UAE to hold maritime security talks,” Reuters, July 30, 2019.
16 See CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
17 Awad Mustafa, “Iran, UAE Close to Deal on Hormuz Islands,” Defense News, December 9, 2013.
Congressional Research Service

8

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

Brotherhood has been a key factor driving UAE policies toward countries where Brotherhood-
linked groups are prominent.
Egypt/North Africa18
The UAE has been an active supporter of like-minded leaders in Egypt and elsewhere in North
Africa:
 The UAE leadership applauded the Egyptian military’s 2013 toppling of Muslim
Brotherhood figure Mohammad Morsi, who was elected president in 2012. It has
since supported Egypt with more than $15 billion in assistance, loans, and
investments.19
 In Libya, the UAE joined several Gulf states in conducting air strikes to help
armed Libyan rebels overthrow Muammar Qadhafi in 2011.20 Since then, the
UAE, in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions that ban arms transfers to
Libya, reportedly has sent weapons to and conducted air operations in support of
eastern Libya-based Khalifa Hafter’s Libyan National Army (LNA).21 Hafter, a
former commander in the Libyan armed forces, has sought to undermine the
U.N.-backed government based in Tripoli.
 Some political leaders in Tunisia, including parliament speaker Rached
Ghannouchi, accuse the UAE of backing President Kaïs Saïed’s July 2021
assertion of sweeping executive powers and his suspension of the constitution
that was adopted in the wake of Tunisia’s 2011 popular uprising.22 Ghannouchi is
the longtime leader of the Islamist movement Ennadha, which is considered by
many to be an affiliate or offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.23
Iraq and Syria24
The GCC states supported Iraq against Iran in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, and they fought in the
U.S.-led coalition that ended Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1990-1991. No Arab state
participated in the U.S.-led invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003. To help stabilize
post-Saddam Iraq, the UAE wrote off $7 billion in Iraqi debt in 2008, hosted a German mission to
train Iraqi police, and provided funds for Iraq reconstruction.25 In 2012, it opened a consulate in
the Kurdish-controlled autonomous region of Iraq. After several years of political tensions with
Iraq’s Shia-dominated governments that sought to marginalize Iraqi Sunni leaders, UAE and
Saudi officials have in recent years sought to engage moderate Iraqi Shia leaders. During

18 For information on U.S. policy toward Egypt and Libya, see CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp, and CRS In Focus IF11556, Libya and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
19 “Gulf countries supported Egypt with $92bn since 2011,” Middle East Monitor, March 19, 2019.
20 “Militant Forces Got Arms Meant for Libya Rebels.” New York Times, December 6, 2012.
21 United Nations, “Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya Established pursuant to Resolution
1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2021/229, March 21, 2021.
22 “Tunisia coup: Ennahda leader blames UAE for power grab,” Middle East Eye, July 31, 2021.
23 Monica Marks and Sayida Ounissi, “Ennahda from within: Islamists or “Muslim Democrats”? A conversation,”
Brookings Institution, March 23, 2016.
24 For more information on the Syria conflict, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S.
Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud. For analysis on Iraq, see CRS In Focus IF10404, Iraq and U.S. Policy, by
Christopher M. Blanchard.
25 “UAE cancels nearly $7 billion in Iraq debt.” Reuters, July 6, 2008.
Congressional Research Service

9

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

President Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia in July 2022, the GCC states announced they would link
Iraq’s electricity grid to theirs, as part of an effort to wean Iraq from dependence on Iranian
supplies. In 2020, the UAE delivered planeloads of equipment to help Iraq cope with the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
In Syria, the GCC states initially supported the 2011 uprising against President Bashar Al Asad, in
part to oust a strong ally of Iran. The UAE contributed to a multilateral pool of funds to buy arms
for approved rebel groups in Syria,26 but Russian military intervention in 2015 enabled Asad to
largely prevail over his opponents. The UAE reopened its embassy in Damascus in December
2018, claiming that doing so would help counter to Iran’s influence in Syria.27 In 2021, the UAE
provided food, vaccines, and other medical supplies to help Syria cope with the COVID-19
outbreak.28 In March 2022, the UAE hosted a visit by Asad, his first to an Arab country since the
uprising, signaling UAE intent to help reintegrate Asad into the regional fold. U.S. officials
criticized the UAE decision to host Asad. The UAE has also sought to alleviate suffering from the
Syria crisis through donations to Syrian refugees and grants to Jordan to help it cope with the
Syrian refugees that have fled there. (In 2018, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait provided a
total of $2.5 billion to help stabilize Jordan’s finances.)29
During 2014-2015, as a member of the U.S.-led coalition combatting the Islamic State
organization, the UAE sent pilots to conduct and even command some coalition air strikes against
Islamic State positions in Syria. The UAE also hosted other forces participating in the anti-
Islamic State effort, including French jets stationed at Al Dhafra Air Base and 600 forces from
Australia.30 None of the GCC states conducted anti-Islamic State air operations in Iraq.
Yemen31
The UAE, in close partnership with Saudi Arabia, intervened militarily in Yemen in March 2015
with military personnel, armor, and air strikes against the Zaydi Shia “Houthi” faction that had
ousted the government in Sanaa. The Saudi-led coalition asserted that the intervention was
required to roll back the regional influence of Iran. Iran has, since the Saudi/UAE-led
intervention, supplied the Houthis with arms, including short-range ballistic and cruise missiles
that the Houthis have fired on UAE and Saudi territory and ships in the Bab el Mandeb Strait.
Despite highlighting its provision of humanitarian aid to the people of Yemen, international
criticism that the Saudi-led coalition effort was causing civilian casualties and humanitarian
problems contributed to a UAE decision in July 2019 to withdraw most of its ground forces from
Yemen. Since early 2022, gains by UAE-supported militia fighters in central Yemen contributed
to an agreement by all sides to an April-May 2022 ceasefire that U.N. and other mediators have
since extended and will now last until at least October 2, 2022.
UAE policy in Yemen has been a source of friction in U.S.-UAE relations. The humanitarian
consequences of the UAE war effort in Yemen produced congressional opposition to the U.S.
logistical support provided to the effort and to some U.S. arms sales to the UAE.32 UAE leaders

26 Author conversations with experts in Washington, D.C., 2013-2014.
27 “UAE reopens Syria embassy in boost for Assad.” Reuters, December 27, 2018.
28 “Syria’s Assad, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince spoke on phone: State media.” Straits Times, March 28, 2020; Bassem
Mroue, “UAE sends Syria aid to help it fight spread of coronavirus,” The Washington Post, April 8, 2021.
29 “UAE Extends AED 3 Billion Economic Aid Package to Jordan,” Forbes Middle East, October 9, 2018.
30 “Islamic State Crisis: Australia to Send 600 Troops to UAE,” BBC News, September 14, 2014.
31 See CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
32 For information on congressional action on U.S. support for the Arab coalition, and CRS Report R45046, Congress
Congressional Research Service

10

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

also publicly questioned the Biden Administration’s decision in February 2021 to remove the
Houthis from the list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) - a designation made in the final
weeks of the Trump Administration. In January 2022, the Houthis sought to put additional
pressure on the UAE to exit the conflict by firing Iran-supplied missiles on targets near Abu
Dhabi International Airport. Some of those launches were at least partly intercepted by U.S.-
operated missile defense systems in the country (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense,
THAAD),33 and the United States subsequently deployed U.S. ships and additional forces to the
UAE to deter additional attacks. However, UAE leaders have complained that the United States
did not respond strongly enough to the launches.34
Related UAE Power Projection Capabilities/East Africa
In part to support its intervention in Yemen, the UAE established military bases and supported
various leaders in several East African countries.35 In 2016, the UAE and Saudi Arabia persuaded
Sudan’s leaders to forgo a two-decade alliance with Iran and to deploy Sudanese troops as part of
the Saudi/UAE-led intervention in Yemen. In April 2019, Sudan’s then-leader, Omar Hassan al-
Bashir, was ousted by military colleagues in response to a popular uprising. Perhaps to keep the
new regime aligned with the two Gulf states, the UAE and Saudi Arabia pledged $3 billion in aid
to Sudan.36 In late 2020, Sudan joined the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco in signing the Abraham
Accords normalizing relations with Israel.
During 2015, UAE forces deployed to Djibouti to support the intervention in Yemen, but a UAE-
Djibouti dispute over funding arrangements caused UAE (and Saudi) forces to begin using
facilities in neighboring Eritrea. Perhaps to solidify its relations with Eritrea, the UAE helped
broker a 2018 rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, possibly facilitated by a UAE pledge
of $3 billion in investments in Ethiopia.37 Similarly, the UAE sought to enlist support from
Somalia in the Saudi/UAE-led campaign in Yemen. In 2014, the UAE conducted training for
Somali troops, but the arrangement unraveled following Mogadishu’s refusal to boycott Qatar.38
Afghanistan39
Before the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, the UAE apparently did not perceive
the Taliban movement as a major threat. The UAE was one of three countries (Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia were the others) that recognized the Taliban during 1996-2001 as the government of
Afghanistan, even though the Taliban harbored Al Qaeda leaders. Following the September 11
attacks, the UAE allowed the United States to use its military facilities for U.S. operations in

and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2021, by Jeremy M. Sharp, Christopher M. Blanchard, and
Sarah R. Collins.
33 “THAAD, in first operational use, destroys midrange ballistic missile in Houthi attack,” Defense News, January 21
2022. See also: CRS Insight IN11891, Attacks Against the United Arab Emirates: Issues for Congress, by Jeremy M.
Sharp and Carla E. Humud.
34 Bilal Saab and Karen Young, “How Biden Can Rebuild U.S. Ties with the Gulf States,” Foreign Policy, April 4,
2022.
35 Material in this section is taken from Alex Mello and Michael Knights, “West of Suez for the United Arab Emirates.”
Warontherocks.com. September 2, 2016.
36 “Sudan has received half the $3 billion promised by Saudi Arabia and UAE,” Reuters, October 8, 2019.
37 “UAE to give Ethiopia $3 billion in aid and investments,” Reuters, June 16, 2018.
38 “Why the UAE Wants Somalia in the Yemen Conflict,” Fair Observer, August 17, 2020.
39 CRS Report R45818, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton Thomas.
Congressional Research Service

11

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

Afghanistan and it deployed a 250-person contingent, supported by six UAE F-16s, in
Afghanistan’s restive south until 2014.40 The risks of this involvement were evident in January
2017 when five UAE diplomats were killed by a bomb during their visit to the governor’s
compound in Qandahar. The UAE also was a significant donor of aid to post-Taliban Afghanistan.
The UAE closed its embassy in Kabul following the August 2021 Taliban takeover and
subsequently allowed ousted president Ashraf Ghani to live in exile there. It also took in Afghan
air force pilots who had flown their aircraft to Uzbekistan as the Taliban advanced on Kabul. It
has since reopened its embassy in Kabul. Several thousand Afghans who evacuated from Kabul in
August 2021 are present in Abu Dhabi and seek repatriation to the United States. In July 2022,
the UAE signed an agreement with the Taliban-run government to manage Afghanistan’s major
civilian airports, including the international airport at Kabul.
Israel, Normalization Agreement, and the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute41
From its founding in 1971 until 2020, the UAE had no formal diplomatic relations with Israel, but
the two had been quietly building ties for the past decade in an effort to counter Iran. In
November 2015, the UAE gave Israel permission to establish a diplomatic office in Abu Dhabi to
facilitate Israel’s participation in the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).42 In June
2019, Israeli Foreign Minister Yisrael Katz attended a U.N. meeting on climate change in Abu
Dhabi.43 Bilateral trade had been increasing, even though the UAE formally enforced the Arab
League primary boycott of Israel.44
On August 13, 2020, President Trump, then-Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and
Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayid announced that Israel and the UAE agreed to fully normalize their
relations, and that Israel would suspend plans to annex parts of the West Bank. By committing to
the “Abraham Accords,” the UAE leadership arguably hoped not only to strengthen a regional
coalition against Iran but also to extract benefits from the United States, including the U.S. sale to
the UAE of F-35 aircraft and armed drones to the UAE (see below). In August 2020, the UAE
government formally repealed a law enforcing the primary Arab League boycott of Israel, paving
the way for regular relations, including openly conducted commercial passenger flights, between
the two nations. In June 2021, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid met the UAE’s foreign minister in
Abu Dhabi and inaugurated Israel’s first embassy in the Gulf. In December 2021, Israel’s then-
Prime Minister Naftali Bennett became the first Israeli leader to visit the UAE.45
UAE leaders emphasized that they had extracted Israeli concession on West Bank annexation,
noting that the normalization announcement followed an editorial by the UAE’s Ambassador to
the United States warning that unilateral annexation of West Bank territory would endanger
Israel’s warming ties with Arab countries.46 As did other Arab states, the UAE publicly opposed
the Trump Administration’s 2017 decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and its 2019

40 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potent ally nicknamed ‘Little Sparta’,” The
Washington Post, November 9, 2014.
41 See CRS Insight IN11485, Israel-UAE Normalization and Suspension of West Bank Annexation, by Jim Zanotti and
Kenneth Katzman.
42 Simon Henderson, “Israel’s Gulf Breakthrough,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 30, 2015.
43 “Minister Katz visits Abu Dhabi: A ‘significant step’ in Israel-Arab relations,” Jerusalem Post, July 1, 2019.
44 In 1994, the UAE and the other GCC states ended enforcement of the Arab League’s secondary and tertiary boycotts
(boycotts of companies doing business with Israel and on companies that do business with those companies).
45 “Israeli PM Naftali Bennett begins first official visit to UAE,” Al Jazeera, December 12, 2021.
46 Yusuf al-Otaiba, “Annexation will be a serious setback for better relations with the Arab world,” Ynet News, June 12,
2020.
Congressional Research Service

12

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the Golan Heights. In line with UAE animosity toward
Muslim Brotherhood-related movements, the UAE does not support the Palestinian Islamist
group Hamas, which exercises de facto control of the Gaza Strip.
UAE Foreign Spending47
The UAE has provided billions of dollars in international aid through its government and through
funds controlled by royal family members and other elites. The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development
(ADFD), established in 1971, has distributed over $4 billion for more than 200 projects spanning
102 countries. Some other examples include the following. For example, the UAE provided $100
million for victims of the December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, and it provided about $2
million for victims of conflict in Somalia (2011-2012). To help the victims of natural disasters in
the United States, it donated $100 million to assist recovery from Hurricane Katrina; $5 million
for a pediatric wing at St. John’s Mercy Hospital in Joplin, Missouri, after the 2011 tornado there;
and $10 million for reconstruction after Hurricane Sandy in 2013. The UAE, as do other GCC
states, provides significant amounts of funds to U.S. research organizations, public relations
firms, law firms, and other representatives to support UAE policies and try to influence U.S.
policymakers.48
Defense Cooperation with the United States49
The UAE’s ability to project power in the region is in part a result of many years of U.S.-UAE
defense cooperation that includes U.S. arms sales and training, strategic planning, and joint
exercises and operations. The UAE’s armed forces are small—approximately 50,000 personnel—
but they have become experienced from participating in several U.S.-led military ground
operations, including Somalia (1992), the Balkans (late 1990s), and Afghanistan (2003-2014), as
well as air operations in Libya (2011) and against the Islamic State organization in Syria (2014-
2015). The UAE reportedly has augmented its manpower by recruiting foreign nationals and
tasking U.S. and other security experts to build militias and mercenary forces.50 In September
2019, the UAE formally joined the U.S.-led maritime security mission in the Gulf (International
Maritime Security Construct, IMSC), an effort to deter Iranian attacks on Gulf shipping in mid-
2019. Unlike fellow GCC countries Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, the UAE has not been
designated by the United States as a “Major Non-NATO Ally” (MNNA) - a designation that
opens participants to enhanced defense research cooperation with the United States.
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and U.S. Forces in UAE
The United States and the UAE have established a “Defense Cooperation Framework” to develop
joint approaches to regional conflicts and to promote U.S.-UAE interoperability. A “Joint Military
Dialogue” (JMD) meets periodically. The security cooperation processes build on the July 25,
1994, bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), the text of which is classified.51 On May

47 Factsheets provided by UAE Embassy in Washington, DC, 2011-2020.
48 Ben Freeman. “The Emirati Lobby: How the UAE Wins in Washington.” Center for International Policy, October 15,
2019.
49 Some of this section is from U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates,”
Fact Sheet, June 25, 2021.
50 “Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater’s Founder,” New York Times, May 14, 2011.
51 For key provisions, see: Sami Hajjar, U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War
College: Strategic Studies Institute), March 2002, p. 27. According to UAE diplomats, no “Status of Forces
Congressional Research Service

13

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

15, 2017, the United States and the UAE confirmed that they had concluded negotiations on a
new DCA with a 15-year duration, which came into force as of May 30, 2019.52 In accordance
with the DCA:
 The United States deploys about 3,500 U.S. military personnel at several UAE
facilities including Jebel Ali port (between Dubai and Abu Dhabi), Al Dhafra Air
Base (near Abu Dhabi), and naval facilities at Fujairah.53 Al Dhafra air base hosts
a variety of U.S. military aircraft including surveillance, refueling, and combat
aircraft. In April 2019, in the context of escalating tensions with Iran, the United
States deployed the F-35 combat aircraft to Al Dhafra, the first such U.S.
deployment of that aircraft in the region.54 Jebel Ali, capable of handling aircraft
carriers, and other UAE ports collectively host more Navy ships than any other
port outside the United States. The U.S. forces in UAE support U.S. operations in
the region, including deterring Iran, countering terrorist groups, and intercepting
illicit shipments of weaponry or technology.
 UAE military personnel study and train in the United States each year, through
the Foreign Military Sales program, through which the UAE buys U.S.-made
arms, and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.
U.S. officials say that UAE pilots and special operations forces demonstrated
their effectiveness, including against AQAP in Yemen.
 The UAE hosts a “Joint Air Warfare Center” where UAE and U.S. forces conduct
joint exercises on early warning, air and missile defense, and logistics.55
U.S. and Other Arms Sales
According to the State Department factsheet cited above, “The UAE is a significant purchaser of
U.S. military equipment, including our most sophisticated missile defense systems. This
partnership has enhanced the UAE’s military capabilities to the point that they have become a net
security provider for the region.” The United States has over $29 billion in active government-to-
government sales cases with the UAE under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, and the
UAE does not receive U.S. aid to purchase U.S. weaponry.56 Since 2016, the United States has
also authorized the permanent export of over $11 billion in defense articles to the UAE via the
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process, primarily launch vehicles, ground vehicles, and military
electronics. During this time, the Department closed 65 end-use monitoring checks in the UAE.
 F-16 Program. In 2000, the UAE purchased 80 U.S. F-16 aircraft, equipped with
the Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the High
Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), at a value of about $8 billion. Congress
did not block the sale. In April 2013, the United States sold the UAE an

Agreement” (SOFA) is in effect - legal issues involving U.S. military personnel are handled on a “case-by-case basis.”
52 Department of Defense, “SecDef Meets with UAE’s Crown Prince,” May 15, 2017; “UAE-US defence agreement
kicks in as John Bolton visits Abu Dhabi,” The National, May 30, 2019.
53 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates,” Fact Sheet, June 25, 2021.
54 “US Air Force sends next generation fighter jets to UAE,” The National, April 17, 2019.
55 Chandresekaran, “A Quiet, Potent Ally to U.S.,” op. cit.
56 In FY2018, the United States provided about $32 million worth of excess defense articles (EDA) to the UAE—
equipment to make the UAE’s armored vehicles more mine-resistant. USAID Foreign Aid Explorer database.
Congressional Research Service

14

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

additional 30 F-16s and associated “standoff” air-to-ground munitions. The UAE
also has about 60 French-made Mirage 2000 warplanes.
 F-35.57 UAE officials say the country has sought since 2014 to buy the advanced
F-35 “Joint Strike Fighter.” In 2016, Israel began taking deliveries of the jet—a
significant development in light of the U.S. law requiring the United States to
preserve Israel’s “Qualitative Military Edge” (QME) in the region.58 On
November 10, 2020, the Trump Administration notified Congress of a $23 billion
arms sale to the UAE, to include F-35 “Joint Strike Fighters,” drones, and various
munitions. An effort to block the proposed sale in the Senate failed (S.J.Res. 77
and S.J.Res. 78). In the last days of the Trump presidency, the UAE signed an
agreement to purchase up to 50 F-35 joint strike fighter aircraft and 18 MQ-9
Reaper drones from the United States.59 The Biden Administration paused the
sale for review upon taking office, and a variety of issues, including a U.S.
request for additional UAE measures to ensure the security of the aircraft at UAE
bases, have delayed finalizing the sale, to date.60 The UAE would be the first
Arab country to purchase the F-35 system.
 JDAMs and other Precision-Guided Munitions. The United States has sold the
UAE advanced precision-guided missiles (PGMs), including the ATM-84
SLAM-ER Telemetry missile, GBU-39/B “bunker buster” bombs, and Joint
Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) kits (which convert gravity bombs to precision-
guided bombs). The UAE has used many of these weapons in the conflict in
Yemen. In May 2019, invoking emergency authority codified in the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA) and citing “the need to deter further Iranian adventurism in
the Gulf and throughout the Middle East,”61the Trump Administration formally
notified Congress of immediate sales to the UAE of additional PGMs, with an
estimated value of $1 billion (Transmittal Number 17-73 and Transmittal
Number 17-70). Congress did not override the President’s veto of measures to
block the sales (S.J.Res. 37, 116th Congress).62
 Apache attack helicopter. In 2010, the United States sold the UAE 30 AH-64
Apache helicopters, at an estimated cost of about $5 billion.63
 Ballistic Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The United States has
not historically supplied or assisted the UAE with ballistic missile technology or
armed UAVs, in part because the UAE is not an adherent of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). However, the Trump Administration’s
2020 change of U.S. MTCR policy allows for the export of U.S.-made armed

57 For more detail on the F-35 sale to the UAE, see CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and
Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.
58 See CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
59 Mike Stone, “UAE signs deal with U.S. to buy 50 F-35 jets and up to 18 drones: sources,” Reuters, January 20, 2021.
60 Grant Rumley. “Unpacking the UAE F-35 Negotiations,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 15,
2022.
61 Letter from Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman James E. Risch,
May 24, 2019.
62 For more information on the congressional response to the emergency sale, see CRS Report R45046, Congress and
the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2021, by Christopher M. Blanchard, Jeremy M. Sharp, and Carla E.
Humud.
63 DSCA transmittal number 10-52.
Congressional Research Service

15

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

UAV that fly at speeds below 800 kph, including the Reaper Drones that
comprise part of the arms deal signed in January 2021. The UAE reportedly
possesses a small number (six) of Scud-B ballistic missiles obtained from non-
U.S. suppliers.64 In 2017, the UAE took delivery of a commercial sale, worth
about $200 million, of U.S.-made Predator X-P unarmed UAV. On May 24, 2019,
the State Department approved the sale to UAE of the Blackjack UAV, with an
estimated value of $80 million, under the emergency notification discussed above
(Transmittal Number 17-39). The country reportedly has bought armed UAVs
from China and has used them for strikes in Libya (see above).65
 Tanks and Ground Forces Missiles. UAE forces still use primarily 380 French-
made Leclerc tanks, and the UAE has not bought any main battle tanks from the
United States. In September 2006, the United States sold the UAE High Mobility
Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Army Tactical Missile Systems
(ATACMs), valued at about $750 million.
Missile and Air Defense
The UAE has purchased the most advanced missile defense systems sold by the United States,
and supports a long-standing U.S. objective to organize a coordinated Gulf-wide ballistic missile
defense (BMD) network that can defend against Iran’s advancing missile capabilities. It hosts an
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Center—a training facility to enhance intra-GCC and
U.S.-GCC missile defense cooperation.
The UAE was the first GCC state to order the THAAD, at an estimated cost of about $7 billion.
Delivery and training for the UAE’s THAAD system took place in 2015.66 On August 2, 2022,
the Administration notified Congress of a sale of additional THAAD systems at an estimated cost
of $2.245 billion.67 Earlier, in 2007, the UAE purchased the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-
3) missile defense system. In 2017, the Obama Administration approved the sale of 60 PAC-3 and
100 Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical (GEM-T) missiles, with a total estimated value
of about $2 billion. On May 3, 2019, the State Department approved a sale of up to 452 PAC-3
missiles and related equipment, with an estimated value of $2.728 billion.68
UAE Defense Cooperation with Other Powers
The UAE has sought to build defense partnerships beyond that with the United States. In 2004,
the UAE joined NATO’s “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.” In 2011, the UAE sent an Ambassador
to NATO under that organization’s revised alliance policy and NATO established a liaison office
in Abu Dhabi, under the auspices of the embassy of Denmark, in 2017. In 2009, the UAE allowed
France to inaugurate military facilities collectively termed Camp De La Paix (“Peace Camp”). It
includes a 900-foot section of the Zayid Port; a part of Al Dhafra Air Base; and a barracks at an
Abu Dhabi military camp that houses about several hundred French military personnel. India’s
Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited the UAE in August 2015, the first by an Indian leader
since 1981, and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayid made a reciprocal visit to India in January
2017, during which the two countries signed a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

64 International Institute of Strategic Studies “Military Balance.”
65 “UAE allegedly using Chinese drones for deadly airstrikes in Libya,” Defense News, May 2, 2019.
66 Adriane Elliot, “Antiballistic System Shared with International Partner,” U.S. Army, January 13, 2016.
67 DSCA Transmittal No. 22-32.
68 DSCA Transmittal No. 19-37.
Congressional Research Service

16

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

Agreement.” The UAE also hosts the Khawla bint Al Azwar Military School, the region’s first
military school for women, which has trained female peacekeepers for deployment in Africa and
Asia.
Russia/Ukraine. The UAE relationship with Russia has attracted significant attention, particularly
for the potential to violate a provision of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions
Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) that provides for sanctions on entities that conduct significant
defense-related transactions with Russia. In February 2017, press reports appeared that the UAE
and Russia might jointly develop a combat aircraft.69 In February 2019, the UAE ordered EM150
“Kornet” anti-tank weapons from Russia.70
UAE-U.S. relations have been strained somewhat by the UAE’s refusal to strongly condemn the
Russian invasion of Ukraine. The UAE abstained on the February 24, 2022, U.N. Security
Council resolution denouncing the invasion, although it subsequently voted in favor of a U.N.
General Assembly resolution with similar provisions. There have also been press reports that the
UAE government has turned a blind eye to the movement of assets to the UAE by sanctioned
Russian persons.71
Cooperation against Terrorism, Proliferation, and Narcotics72
During the mid-1990s, some Al Qaeda activists were able to move through the UAE, and two of
the September 11, 2001 hijackers were UAE nationals. Recent State Department reports on
terrorism credit the UAE with strengthening the country’s bureaucracy and legal framework to
combat terrorism. The UAE is part of a Saudi-initiated GCC “Security Pact” that entails increased
GCC information-sharing on internal security threats.
Still, the United States and the UAE differ on designations of some organizations as terrorist. The
85 groups that the UAE government designates as terrorist includes the Muslim Brotherhood,
which is not named by the United States or any European country as a terrorist organization.73
Antiterrorism Financing and Money Laundering (AML/CFT). The country is a member of the
Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a regional body
modeled on the broader Financial Action Task Force (FATF); the Counter-Islamic State Finance
Group chaired by Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the United States; and the Egmont Group of Financial
Intelligence Units. In May 2017, the UAE joined the U.S.-GCC Terrorist Financing Targeting
Center based in Riyadh, which has designated several AQAP and Islamic State-Yemen entities.
The UAE Central Bank’s Financial Intelligence Unit is credited in State Department terrorism
reports with providing training programs to UAE financial institutions on money laundering and
terrorism financing, and making mandatory the registration of informal financial transmittal
networks (hawalas). During 2018 and 2019, the government enacted and issued implementing
regulations for updated anti-money laundering laws.74 However, in April 2020, the FATF found
that the United Arab Emirates was not doing enough to prevent money laundering despite recent

69 “Russia, UAE to collaborate on 5th-generation fighter,” United Press International, February 20, 2017.
70 “United Arab Emirates Announces $1.3 Billion in Defense Deals at IDEX,” Defense News, February 18, 2019.
71 “Analysis: Can the UAE be a safe haven for Russian oligarchs?,” Al Jazeera, March 14 2022.
72 Much of this section is taken from U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020.
73 “UAE Lists Scores of Groups as ‘Terrorists,’” Al Jazeera, November 16, 2014.
74 Fact sheet provided by UAE embassy representatives, October 31, 2018; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports
on Terrorism 2019, June 24, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

17

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

progress, and risked being including in the body’s watch list of countries found to have “strategic
deficiencies” in AMF/CFT—the so-called “gray list.”75 In March 2022, the FATF formally placed
the UAE on the gray list, subjecting the country to increased monitoring of its efforts to correct
the deficiencies the FATF identified.76
Since 2012, there has been an FBI Legal Attaché office at the U.S. consulate in Dubai to assist
with joint efforts against terrorism and terrorism financing. However, some financial networks
based in the UAE have been sanctioned by the Department of the Treasury for facilitating
transactions for Iran and pro-Iranian regional factions in furtherance of Iran’s “malign activities”
in the region.
Countering Violent Extremism. The UAE works with partners and has empowered local
organizations to counter violent extremism. In 2012, the country established the “International
Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism,” known as Hedayah (“guidance”). The
Ministry of Tolerance has been active in promoting messages of tolerance and coexistence. The
United States and the UAE jointly operate the Sawab Center, an online hub to promote
information sharing with international police organizations when family members report on
relatives who have become radicalized.77 Several UAE-based think tanks conduct seminars on
confronting terrorism and violent extremism.
Port and Border Controls
The UAE has participated in a number of projects with the United States which are related to
nonproliferation and nuclear security. For example, the government has received assistance from
the State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security Program, which aims to build
“national strategic trade control systems in countries that possess, produce, or supply strategic
items, as well as in countries through which such items are most likely to transit.”78 The UAE has
also participated in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)-run Container Security
Initiative, under which CBP personnel work with foreign governments to screen U.S.-bound
containers.”79 The UAE participates in the U.S.-GCC Counter-proliferation Workshop.
The UAE participates in U.S. programs to improve UAE export control enforcement. During
2004-2006, several Dubai-based companies were cited by U.S. officials for illicit sales of nuclear
technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea and for transshipping devices used to make
improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq and Afghanistan.80 In 2007 the George W. Bush
Administration threatened to restrict U.S. exports of certain technologies to the UAE for the illicit
exports. The UAE government enacted a new law later that year that empowered authorities to
shut down 40 foreign and UAE firms allegedly involved in illicit exports, and no U.S. sanctions
were imposed on the country.
The UAE government supports the Department of Homeland Security’s programs to collect U.S.-
bound passenger information and operation of a “preclearance facility” at the Abu Dhabi
International Airport. In 2006, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States—a

75 “UAE at risk of landing on watchlist over money laundering,” Al Jazeera, April 30, 2020.
76 “UAE is placed on money laundering watchdog’s ‘gray list,’” CNBC, March 5, 2022.
77 David Ignatius, “A Small Organization Offers a Fresh Approach on Preventing Terrorism,” opinion, The Washington
Post, October 21, 2014.
78 “Export Control and Related Border Security Program,” Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation.
79 “CSI: Container Security Initiative,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
80 Milhollin, Gary and Kelly Motz, “Nukes ‘R’ US.” New York Times, op. ed. March 4, 2004; BIS, “General Order
Concerning Mayrow General Trading and Related Enterprises,” 71 Federal Register 107, June 5, 2006.
Congressional Research Service

18

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

body that reviews proposed foreign investments to ensure that the investment does not threaten
U.S. national security—approved the takeover by the Dubai-owned Dubai Ports World company
of a British firm that manages six U.S. port facilities. Congress expressed concern that the
takeover might weaken U.S. port security in P.L. 109-234, an emergency supplemental
appropriation.
U.S. Funding Issues
The United States has provided small amounts of counterterrorism assistance to help the UAE
build its capacity to enforce its border and financial controls. The Department of Defense
provided $300,000 to the UAE to assist its counter-narcotics capability in FY2016 and $531,000
in FY2017. In FY2019, about $1.35 million in State Department funds were provided to the UAE
to build its capacity to counter terrorism financing. In FY2020 and FY2021, the United States
spent about $130,000 and $110,000, respectively, to build the capacity of the UAE government to
enforce its export control laws.81
Nuclear Power and Space Program
The UAE announced in 2008 that it would acquire nuclear power reactors to meet projected
increases in domestic electricity demand. In 2009, the United States and the UAE concluded a
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement - pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (AEA; 42 U.S.C. 2153(b)) - committing the UAE to refrain from producing enriched
uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear reactor fuel; both processes could produce fissile material
for nuclear weapons. 82 This provision is typically not included in peaceful nuclear cooperation
agreements.
A number of U.S. and European firms have secured administrative and financial advisory
contracts with the UAE’s nuclear program. The Korea Electric Power Corporation of South
Korea received the prime contract “to design, build and help operate the Barakah Nuclear Energy
Plant,” which is to contain four nuclear power reactors.83 The nuclear plants began operating in
mid-2020.”84
In July 2014, the UAE formed a “UAE Space Agency.” In 2019, the country sent its first
astronaut to the International Space Station. In July 2020, the country launched an unmanned
spaceship that is to probe Mars. The probe entered Mars orbit in 2021.
Economic Issues
The UAE, a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), has developed a free market
economy, but its financial institutions are weakly regulated. Although the UAE has announced
plans and policies (“Vision 2021”) to try to further diversify its economy and reduce its
dependence on exports of hydrocarbons, the UAE economy and financial picture still fluctuates

81 USAID Foreign Aid Explorer database, accessed April 12, 2021.
82 For more information about nuclear cooperation agreements, see CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with
Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
83 “The Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) and the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant,” Emirates Nuclear
Energy Corporation factsheet.
84 “Safe Start-up of Unit 1 of Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant Successfully Achieved,” Emirates Nuclear Energy
Corporation press release, August 1, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

19

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

along with the world energy outlook. Abu Dhabi has 80% of the federation’s proven oil reserves
of about 100 billion barrels, enough for many decades of exports at the current rate of about 2.9
million barrels per day (mbd) of exports. Oil exports, of which over 60% go to Japan, account for
about 25% of the country’s GDP.85 The UAE has vast quantities of natural gas but consumes
more than it produces. Through its participation in the Dolphin Energy project, the UAE imports
natural gas from neighboring Qatar—an arrangement that was not disrupted by the GCC rift. A
UAE effort to become self-sufficient in gas by 2030 could benefit from the discovery in UAE
waters, announced in early 2020, of the large Jebel Ali non-associated gas field. Dubai emirate
has, to some extent, sought to plan for a post-hydrocarbons era through initiatives, such as the
clean energy and autonomous vehicle showcase project “Masdar City,” that provide jobs and
attract tourism and publicity.
To help it weather the effect of lower oil prices during 2014-2019, the government cut some
subsidies and sold government bonds, including $5 billion in bonds in 2016 and $10 billion in
2017. The government was able to avoid drawing down its $600 billion in various sovereign
wealth funds overseen by the Emirates Investment Authority (EIA). In 2022, world energy prices
increased significantly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which prompted U.S. and European
sanctions on Russian oil exports. In part because an oil price increase benefits the UAE budget,
the UAE and Saudi Arabia did not respond to U.S. requests to increase oil production to help
bring world oil prices back down.86 Adding to the U.S.-UAE tensions over oil prices, the UAE
and Saudi Arabia continue to engage with Russia in the “OPEC Plus” framework, giving the
impression that the two Gulf states are cooperating with, or at least refraining from opposing,
Russia. In the aftermath of President Biden’s meetings with the GCC leaders in Saudi Arabia in
July 2022, OPEC+ announced in August 2022 a slight increase in oil production, seemingly
responding positively, at least to some extent, to President Biden’s urgings for more Gulf state oil
production.
The country is also accepting investment from China under that country’s “Belt and Road
Initiative” (BRI), intended to better connect China economically to other parts of Asia, Central
Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. In April 2019, the UAE and China signed deals worth $3.4
billion to store and ship Chinese products from the UAE port of Jebel Ali.87
Aside from the public health consequences, the economic effects of the coronavirus outbreak
have been significant, resulting from travel and tourism restrictions and a decline in consumer
spending as bans on gatherings were imposed during 2020. China-based Sinopharm tested its
vaccine in the UAE, in part because nationals of many different countries live and work there.88
U.S.-UAE Economic Ties89
U.S. trade with the UAE is a significant issue because the UAE is the largest market for U.S.
exports to the Middle East. Over 1,000 U.S. companies have offices there, and there are over
60,000 Americans working in UAE. U.S. exports to the UAE in 2021 totaled over $17 billion,
and imports from the UAE nearly doubled from 2020 levels, totaling nearly $6 billion. U.S.

85 “The UAE and Global Oil Supply,” Embassy of the UAE in the United States, August 2020.
86 Bilal Saab and Karen Young, “How Biden Can Rebuild U.S. Ties With the Gulf States,” Foreign Policy, April 4,
2022.
87 “The UAE Signed a Massive, $3.4 Billion Deal with China—and That ‘Isn’t a Surprise,” NBC News, April 29, 2019.
88 “China’s Sinopharm begins late stage trial of COVID-19 vaccine in UAE,” Reuters, July 16, 2020.
89 Trade data taken from U.S. Census Bureau. Foreign Trade Statistics.
Congressional Research Service

20

---

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

products sold to UAE are mostly commercial aircraft, industrial machinery and materials, and
other high-value items. The United States imports small amounts of UAE crude oil.
In 2004, the George W. Bush Administration notified Congress it had begun negotiating a free
trade agreement (FTA) with the UAE. Several rounds of talks were held prior to the June 2007
expiration of Administration “trade promotion authority.” In 2011, the FTA talks were replaced
by a U.S.-UAE “Economic Policy Dialogue,” between major U.S. and UAE economic agencies.
The UAE is part of the “GCC-U.S. Framework Agreement on Trade, Economic, Investment, and
Technical Cooperation,” a trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA) created in 2012.
Commercial Aviation Issue90
One issue in U.S.-UAE economic relations has been a contention by several U.S. airlines that the
UAE government subsidizes two UAE airlines, Emirates Air (Dubai-based) and Etihad Air (Abu
Dhabi-based). In 2018, the two UAE airlines agreed to address the complaints by using globally
accepted accounting standards for annual reports and opening their books to outside
examination.91


Author Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs


Acknowledgments
This report was prepared with the assistance of Sarah Collins, Research Assistant, Middle East and Africa
Section.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.


90 For background on this issue, see CRS Report R44016, International Air Service Controversies: Frequently Asked
Questions, by Rachel Y. Tang.
91 “U.S. and United Arab Emirates Reach Deal to Solve Open Skies Spat,” Skift, May 11, 2018.
Congressional Research Service
RS21852 · VERSION 141 · UPDATED
21 21

---