The United Arab Emirates (UAE):
Issues for U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
August 20, 2013
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
RS21852
CRS Report for Congress
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epared for Members and Committees of Congress
The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
Summary
The UAE’s relatively open borders and economy have won praise from advocates of expanded
freedoms in the Middle East while producing financial excesses, social ills such as human
trafficking, and opportunity for UAE-based Iranian businesses to try to circumvent international
sanctions. The social and economic freedoms have not translated into significant political change;
the UAE government remains under the control of a small circle of leaders who allow citizen
participation primarily through traditional methods of consensus-building. To date, these
mechanisms, economic wealth, and reverence for established leaders have enabled the UAE to
avoid wide-scale popular unrest. Since 2006, the government has increased formal popular
participation in governance through a public selection process for half the membership of its
consultative body, the Federal National Council (FNC). But, particularly since the Arab uprisings
that began in 2011, there has been an increase in domestic criticism of the unchallenged power
and privileges of the UAE ruling elite as well as the spending of large amounts of funds on
elaborate projects that cater to tourists. The leadership has resisted any dramatic or rapid further
opening of the political process, and it is becoming increasingly aggressive in preventing the rise
of Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamist, as well as secular opposition movements. The crackdown
is drawing increased criticism from human rights groups.
On foreign policy issues, the UAE—as has Qatar—has become increasingly assertive in recent
years, using its the UAE’s ample financial resources and its drive to promote regional stability.
The UAE has ordered the most sophisticated missile defense system sold by the United States,
making the UAE pivotal to U.S. efforts to assemble a regional missile defense network directed
primarily to counter Iran’s expanding missile force. It also has joined the United States and U.S.
allies in implementing significant financial and economic sanctions against Iran. The UAE has
deployed about 250 troops to Afghanistan since 2003 and pledges to keep some forces there after
the existing international security mission there ends in 2014. In 2011, it sent 500 police to help
the beleaguered government of fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state Bahrain; UAE
pilots flew combat missions against Muammar Qadhafi of Libya; and it joined the GCC
diplomatic effort that brokered a political solution to the unrest in Yemen. The UAE is financially
backing armed rebels in Syria. It gives large amounts of international aid, for example for relief
efforts in Somalia, and the UAE is giving substantial aid to the transitional government of Egypt
that followed the military ousting of President Mohammad Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood leader.
For the Obama Administration and many in Congress, there were initial concerns about the UAE
oversight and management of a complex and technically advanced initiative such as a nuclear
power program, particularly for the potential leakage for U.S. and other advanced technologies to
leak illicitly to Iran. These concerns were underscored by dissatisfaction among some Members
of Congress with a U.S.-UAE civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement was signed
on May 21, 2009, submitted to Congress that day, and entered into force on December 17, 2009.
The concerns have since been largely alleviated by the UAE’s development of strict controls,
capable management, and cooperation with international oversight of its nuclear program.
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Contents
Governance, Human Rights, and Reform ........................................................................................ 1
Political Reform and Responses to Opposition ......................................................................... 3
A Top-Driven Modest Reform Process ............................................................................... 4
Arab Uprisings Increase Focus on September 24, 2011, FNC Election .............................. 4
Government Puts Limits on Political Reform But Offers Largesse .................................... 5
International Criticism of UAE Record............................................................................... 7
U.S. Democracy Promotion Efforts and UAE Restrictions ................................................ 7
General Human Rights-Related Issues ...................................................................................... 8
Press and Research Institute Freedoms ............................................................................... 8
Justice/Rule of Law ............................................................................................................. 8
Women’s Rights .................................................................................................................. 9
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 10
Labor Rights ...................................................................................................................... 10
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 10
Foreign Policy and Defense ........................................................................................................... 11
Security Cooperation with the United States/Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) ......... 11
U.S. and Other Arms Sales ................................................................................................ 12
Defense Relations with Other Nations and Alliances ....................................................... 14
Cooperation Against Iran ......................................................................................................... 15
Cooperation Against Terrorism and Proliferation .................................................................... 16
Terrorism Issues ................................................................................................................ 16
Port and Border Controls ................................................................................................... 17
Export Controls ................................................................................................................. 17
Cooperation on Iraq ................................................................................................................. 19
Cooperation on Afghanistan and Pakistan ............................................................................... 19
Other Regional Issues: Response to 2011 Unrest in the Middle East ...................................... 20
Other Regional Issues: Arab-Israeli Dispute ..................................................................... 21
Border Issues ..................................................................................................................... 22
UAE Provision of Foreign Aid .......................................................................................... 22
Nuclear Agreement ........................................................................................................................ 23
Economic Issues ............................................................................................................................ 24
Oil and Gas Sector/Dedication to Future Clean Energy .......................................................... 25
U.S.-UAE Trade and Trade Promotion Discussions ................................................................ 25
Figures
Figure 1. Map of United Arab Emirates........................................................................................... 3
Tables
Table 1. Some Basic Facts About the UAE ..................................................................................... 2
Table 2. Recent U.S. Aid to UAE .................................................................................................. 26
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Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 26
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Governance, Human Rights, and Reform1
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates (principalities): Abu Dhabi,
the oil-rich capital of the federation; Dubai, its free-trading commercial hub; and the five smaller
and less wealthy emirates of Sharjah, Ajman, Fujayrah, Umm al-Qaywayn, and Ras al-Khaymah.
Sharjah and Ras al-Khaymah have a common ruling family—leaders of the Al Qawasim tribe.
After Britain announced in 1968 that it would no longer ensure security in the Gulf, six “Trucial
States” decided to form the UAE federation in December 1971; Ras al-Khaymah joined in 1972.
The UAE federation has completed a major leadership transition since the death of its key
founder, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan, long-time ruler of Abu Dhabi and UAE
president, on November 2, 2004.
Shaykh Zayid’s first son, Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan, born in 1948, was at that time
Crown Prince and was named ruler of Abu Dhabi upon Zayid’s death. In keeping with tradition,
although not formal law, Khalifa was subsequently selected as UAE president by the leaders of all
seven emirates who comprise the “Federal Supreme Council.” The ruler of Dubai traditionally
serves concurrently as Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE; that position has been held
by Shaykh Mohammad bin Rashid Al Maktum, architect of Dubai’s modernization drive, since
the death of his elder brother Shaykh Maktum bin Rashid Al Maktum in January 2006. Shaykh
Mohammad bin Rashid also continued as federation Defense Minister. At its review of senior
leadership posts on November 3, 2009, the Federal Supreme Council decided that Shaykh Khalifa
and Shaykh Mohammad would serve another five-year term. The review was mostly a formality;
in practice, the leadership posts change only in the event of death of an incumbent. The Federal
Supreme Council meets four times per year to establish general policy guidelines, although the
leaders of the seven emirates consult frequently with each other.
Among the heirs apparent, the third son of Zayid, Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan,
born in 1961, is Abu Dhabi crown prince. UAE President Shaykh Khalifa, his elder half-brother,
has delegated significant day-to-day governing responsibilities to him, and several members of
the UAE cabinet are Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid’s allies. Shaykh Mohammad is also close to
one of his full brothers, Shaykh Hazza bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan, who is national security adviser of
the UAE federation. Another full brother, Abdullah bin Zayid, is Foreign Minister. The crown
prince of Dubai is Shaykh Mohammad bin Rashid’s son, Hamdan bin Mohammad Al Maktum,
who heads the “Dubai Executive Committee,” the equivalent of a cabinet for Dubai emirate.
Under a Dubai-level reorganization announced in January 2010, five committees were set up to
advise the Executive Committee on major issues.
1 Much of this section is from the State Department’s country report on human rights practices for 2012 (released April
19, 2013), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204370#wrapper; the
International Religious Freedom Report for 2012 (May 20, 2013),
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=208398#wrapper; and the Trafficking in
Persons Report for 2013 (June 19, 2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210740.pdf.
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Table 1. Some Basic Facts About the UAE
Population
5.47 million, of whom about 1 million (about 20%) are
citizens.
Religions
96% Muslim, of whom 16% are Shiite; 4% Christian and
Hindu
Ethnic Groups
19% Emirati (citizenry); 23% other Arab and Iranian; 50%
South Asian; 8% Western and other Asian expatriate
Size of Armed Forces
About 50,000
Inflation Rate (2012)
About 1.1%
GDP Growth Rate for 2012
3.9%
GDP (purchasing power parity, ppp, 2012)
$275 billion. Per capita is $49,800 ppp
Oil Exports
About 2.7 million barrels per day
Foreign Exchange and Gold Reserves
About $67 billion, but some estimates of the value of its
sovereign wealth fund investments run into the several
hundreds of billions of dollars.
U.S. Exports to the UAE (2012)
$22.5 billion, making UAE the largest U.S. export market
in the Arab world and a 50% increase over 2011. Goods
sold to UAE are mostly machinery, aircraft, industrial
materials, and other high value items.
Imports from UAE by the United States (2012)
$2.25 billion. Less than 10% of that amount was crude
oil.
U.S. citizens resident in UAE
About 60,000
Major Projects
Dubai inaugurated 2,000+ foot “Burj Khalifa,” world’s
tal est building, on January 4, 2010. Dubai has established
a metro rail system. Burj al Arab hotel in Dubai bills itself
as “world’s only 7-star hotel.” Abu Dhabi has built local
branches of Guggenheim and Louvre museums. UAE
participating in Gulf country-wide railroad network to
become operational by 2017.
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics.
The leaders of the other individual emirates are Dr. Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qassimi (Sharjah);
Saud bin Saqr Al Qassimi, (Ras al-Khaymah, see below); Humaid bin Rashid Al Nuaimi
(Ajman); Hamad bin Muhammad Al Sharqi (Fujayrah); and Saud bin Rashid Al-Mu’alla (Umm
al-Qaywayn). Shaykh Saud of Umm al-Qaywayn, who is about 64 years old, was named leader of
that emirate in January 2009 upon the death of his father, Shaykh Rashid Al-Mu’alla. These five
emirates, often called the “northern emirates,” tend to be more politically and religiously
conservative and homogenous than are Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which are urban amalgams
populated by many Arab, South Asian, and European expatriates.
In Ras al-Khaymah, there was a brief leadership struggle upon the October 27, 2010, death of the
ailing longtime ruler, Shaykh Saqr bin Mohammad Al Qassim. He was succeeded by Shaykh
Saud bin Saqr, who had been crown prince/heir apparent since 2003, when the ruler removed
Saud’s elder brother, Shaykh Khalid bin Saqr, from that position. During 2003-2010, using public
relations campaigns in the United States and elsewhere, Shaykh Khalid claimed to remain as heir
apparent even though the UAE federal government had repeatedly stated that his removal from
that position was legitimate and that he held no official position in the UAE. Shaykh Khalid’s
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home in Ras al-Khaymah was surrounded by security forces the night Shaykh Saqr died,
enforcing the succession of Shaykh Saud.
Figure 1. Map of United Arab Emirates
Source: CRS Graphics.
Political Reform and Responses to Opposition
The UAE is not considered by any U.S. or outside organization to be a democracy, but its
perceived social openness and tolerance, coupled with ample wealth have long rendered the
overwhelming bulk of the population apparently satisfied with the political system. Prior to an
increase in youth and intellectual-led activism in the UAE inspired by the Arab uprisings of 2011,
there were few, if any, signs of clamor for more rapid political reform. A combination of modest
reforms, repressive measures, distribution of largesse, and the highlighting of UAE development
and economic achievements over 40 years has enabled the UAE government to avoid significant
public unrest such as those that occurred in several Middle Eastern countries since 2011. Still, the
government is wary of and is increasingly moving against underground activism using the
Internet and other communication means.
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A Top-Driven Modest Reform Process
UAE leaders long argued that Western-style democracy, including elections for the country’s
leadership, is not needed in UAE because Emiratis are able to express their concerns directly to
the leadership through traditional consultative mechanisms. Most prominent among these
channels are the open majlis (councils) held by many UAE leaders. UAE leaders maintain that
Western-style political parties and elections for a legislature or other representative body would
inevitably aggravate long dormant schisms among tribes and clans and potentially cause Islamist
factions to become more radical.
The UAE leadership had long provided a modest measure of popular representation through an
all-appointed 40-seat Federal National Council (FNC). The seat distribution of the FNC remains
weighted in favor of Abu Dhabi and Dubai (eight seats each). Sharjah and Ras al-Khaymah have
six each, and the others have four seats each. The FNC can review, but not enact or veto, federal
legislation, and the government frequently accepts the FNC’s legislative recommendations. The
FNC can question, but not impeach, federal ministers and it has done so, mostly on economic and
social issues. In April 2009, the government prohibited the FNC from discussing the economic
ramifications for the UAE of the global financial downturn. Its sessions are open to the public.
Each emirate also has its own all-appointed consultative council.
The leadership resistance to elections to the FNC prevailed until 2006 as electoral processes
began to expand in the other Gulf states. The UAE leadership apparently decided it had fallen too
far behind its Gulf neighbors and, in December 2006, it instituted a limited and controlled
electoral process for half of the FNC seats, with the other 20 FNC seats still appointive. The 2006
electorate was to be limited to about 100 persons for each FNC, seat appointed or elected, or
about 4,000 total electors. The Election Commission approved a slightly larger 6,595-person
electorate, or about 160 persons per FNC seat. Of this total, 1,162 electors were women (less than
20%). Out of the total of 452 candidates for the 20 FNC elected seats, there were 65 female
candidates. Only one woman was elected (from Abu Dhabi), but another seven women were
appointed to the remaining 20 seats. The “election” process was spread over three days—
December 16, 18, and 20, 2006.
Arab Uprisings Increase Focus on September 24, 2011, FNC Election
Perhaps inspired by the 2011 Arab uprisings and dissatisfied with the slow pace of reform, some
UAE intellectuals, businessmen, students, and other groups began agitating peacefully—primarily
through written editorials and Internet postings—for more political space. Some UAE youth, on
social networking outlets such as Facebook and Twitter, called for a protest on March 25, 2011. It
did not produce a significant demonstration in part because the UAE government blocked some
social media sites, although most experts attributed the low turnout to insufficient public support
for an open challenge to the regime.
Still, the government decided it needed to take more significant steps to address growing reform
demands. On March 8, 2011, the government expanded the size of the electorate to more than 300
times the total number of FNC seats—a total of 129,000 electors, or “voters”—for the FNC
election process held on September 24, 2011. A total of 468 candidates filed to run for the 20
seats up for election on September 24, 2011, including 85 women—little more than the number of
candidates who filed to run in the 2006 process. However, the 2011 electorate was nearly half
female, in contrast to the fewer than 20% electors in the 2006 process. There was a restriction that
no candidate spend more than about $545,000 on their campaigns.
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There was widespread press reporting of citizen apathy about the election, with little information
about the election or campaigns in the media, little evidence of any campaigning, and reportedly
little enthusiasm. Turnout averaged about 25%, which UAE officials called disappointing, and
which was apparently pulled down by the 21% turnout in the largest emirate, Abu Dhabi.
Of the 20 winners, only one was female (Sheika Isa Ghanem); she is from Umm Al Quwain, one
of the more conservative emirates. It was believed that female candidates would have the best
chance of winning in Dubai, considered the most liberal of the emirates. Other winners were
elected along tribal lines; in Abu Dhabi, three of the four who were elected are from the Al Amiri
tribe. The FNC as a whole—the election winners and the other twenty to be appointed—began
their sessions in mid-November. Of those appointed, six were women, bringing the total number
of women in the FNC to seven. Upon the FNC’s convening, the government selected one of the
appointed members, well-known writer Mohammad al-Murr, as Speaker. A woman and another
appointed member (of the eight appointed women), Amal al-Qubaisi, was selected deputy
speaker, making her the first women to hold so high a position in any GCC legislative body.
Government Puts Limits on Political Reform But Offers Largesse
Aside from expanding the FNC electorate, the UAE leadership has put clear limits on further
reform. After the 2006 selection process, the UAE planned to gradually expand the size of the
FNC and to broaden its powers, according to the Minister of State for FNC Affairs (also Minister
of State for Foreign Affairs) Anwar Gargash and the FNC speaker Abdul Aziz al-Ghurair.
However, insisting on implementing those plans at a gradual pace, the government did not agree
to meet the demands of a March 2011 petition, signed by 160 UAE intellectuals, for a fully
elected body that would have powers similar to those of a Western-style parliament.2 No specific
expansion of powers or time frames for such expansion has been announced, and Minister
Gargash wrote an editorial in a UAE paper (The National) on August 26, 2012, saying that “The
UAE’s end goal is not a liberal multiparty system. This model does not correspond with our
cultural or historical development.”3 His comments came following an August 1, 2012,
announcement by several Islamists of the formation of a political party called “Al Umma”—an
alleged violation of UAE laws that do not grant citizen rights to form political parties.
As an alternative to expanding the FNC’s powers, the government has attempted to address
growing youth activism and other popular demands. In March 2011, the government announced
investment of about $1.5 billion in utilities infrastructure of the poorer, northern emirates. It also
raised military pensions by 70% and introduced subsidies for some foodstuffs. To prevent Internet
and underground agitation from turning to large public demonstrations, authorities generally
disperse protests and public gatherings that are political in nature, unless such gatherings align
with government policies. On March 12, 2013, the government announced a minor cabinet
reshuffle—advertised as a “new look” to bring in youthful figures and ideas. The relatively young
and dynamic Suhail al-Mazroui was appointed Energy Minister. An Abu Dhabi royal family
member, Shaykh Abdullah bin Mubarak al-Nuhayyan, was moved to head a newly formulated
Ministry of Culture, Youth and Social Development, with expanded powers to reach out to UAE
youth. The government’s most prominent female minister, Minister of Foreign Trade Shaykha
Lubna Al Qassimi, was moved to more prominent role as head of a new Ministry of Development
2 Al Jazeera News Network, March 9, 2011.
3 Anwar Gargash. “Amid Challenges, UAE Policies Engage Gradual Reforms.” The National, August 26, 2012.
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and International Cooperation, which will be in charge of all UAE foreign aid and cooperation
with international bodies.
Efforts Against Liberal, Pro-Democracy Activists
The government has also made use of measures to suppress underground political activism by
Islamists as well as by pro-democracy liberals. On April 8, 2011, a prominent Dubai blogger and
activist, Ahmad Mansour Al Shehi, was arrested; his detention came two months after another
activist made a speech in Sharjah emirate in support of Egyptian protesters. Four other critics and
online activists were arrested later in April 2011, charged with violating the penal code that
prevents publicly humiliating senior officials. The so-called “UAE-5” appeared in court on June
15 and October 2, 2011. Human rights organizations said their trials violated the most basic rights
of the accused, and called on UAE leaders to release the five. Those calls were heeded on
November 28, 2011, when President Khalifa commuted the “UAE-5” jail sentences that had been
announced the previous day.
During April and May 2011, the government dissolved the elected board of directors of the Jurist
Association and the Teachers Association, leading civil society groups, after members of their
boards signed petitions for political reforms. The boards were reconstituted with government
appointees. The Jurists’ Association’s Human Rights Committee and the Emirates Human Rights
Association (EHRA) are the only two recognized local human rights organizations in the country.
“Cybercrimes” Decree. On November 13, 2012, the government established a legal base to
prosecute and jail people who use information technology to agitate against the regime or demand
more political rights. UAE President Shaykh Khalifa issued Federal Legal Decree No. 5/2012 on
combating cybercrimes. According to Human Rights Watch, which criticized the decree, Article
28 of the ruling provides for imprisonment and large fines for anyone who uses information
technology to incite actions that endanger state security or infringe on the public order. Article 30
provides for life imprisonment for anyone using such technology to advocate the overthrow or
change of the system of governance.
Efforts Against Islamists
A long-term potential source of domestic opposition are Islamist movements linked to the Muslim
Brotherhood. These movements have been generally nonviolent and limited their activities to
social and relief work. However, possibly perceiving that Islamist movements have gained
strength regionally since Muslim Brotherhood member Mohammad Morsi came to power in
Egypt in 2012, the government has been arresting members of a Brotherhood-affiliated Islamist
group, Islah (Reform). The government might also fear that Islamist groups in UAE could add
strength to youth and intellectual-led activism. Islah is one of the oldest and best organized
groups in the UAE, first appearing in UAE in 1974, and has its base of support in the poorer and
more religiously conservative northern emirates. UAE officials have accused Islah and other
Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in UAE of obtaining support from the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt and of having ties to Yusuf Qaradawi, a pro-Brotherhood Egyptian cleric resident in
neighboring Gulf state Qatar.4
4 UAE Targets Muslim Brotherhood in Crackdown on Dissent. BBC, September 26, 2012.
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The UAE crackdown on the Brotherhood began in December 2011, when it revoked the
citizenship of a Muslim Brotherhood figure who headed an institution called the “Innovative
Thinking Center” in Dubai emirate. On April 20, 2012, an Islah member who belongs to the royal
family of Ras al-Khaymah, Dr. Sultan al-Qasimi, was arrested. Another, arrested on July 16,
2012, was human rights lawyer Mohammad al-Roken, who has provided legal services not only
to Islah but also to the “UAE-5” mentioned above. On November 12, 2012, a UAE court rejected
an appeal by seven Islamists against the Interior Ministry’s revocation of their citizenship on the
grounds of links to terrorist groups.
The government continued to arrest suspected Brotherhood activists throughout 2012. According
to the State Department human rights report for 2012, released April 19, 2013, the government
arrested a total of 80 persons for suspected Brotherhood activity, of which 12 were Egyptian
nationals. On March 4, 2013, a trial began for 94 UAE nationals (those arrested in 2012 and
others arrested in 2011 and early 2013) accused of forming a secret Muslim Brotherhood-
affiliated network that was plotting a coup against the UAE government. Human rights groups
say some of the suspects have been tortured and deprived of proper legal representation. On July
2, 2013, the UAE State Security Court sentenced 68 of the 94 to prison terms of between seven
and 15 years for “plotting to overthrow the state.” The other 26 were acquitted. While that trial
was underway, on June 19, 2013 UAE authorities referred another 30 persons, including several
Egyptian nationals, to that court for alleged connections to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
International Criticism of UAE Record
On October 26, 2012, the European parliament adopted a resolution criticizing the deteriorating
human rights situation; the UAE government claimed the resolution was based on erroneous
information brought to the European parliament by UAE bloggers and other activists. Despite that
European step, several European governments with close financial or security ties to the UAE,
including Italy and France, made statements indicating disagreement with the European
parliament resolution. The resolution did not prevent the UAE from assuming a seat on the U.N.
Human Rights Council on November 12, 2012.
U.S. Democracy Promotion Efforts and UAE Restrictions
The United States has sought to promote democracy, rule of law, and civil society in the Persian
Gulf region, including in UAE. Some State Department programs to promote student and
women’s political participation, entrepreneurship, legal reform, civil society, independent media,
and international trade law compliance are funded by the State Department’s Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI). The U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi houses a MEPI office/staff that
runs the MEPI programs throughout the Gulf region.
In April 2012, U.S. and other country support for civil society and democratization in the UAE
drew an adverse response from the government, which suggests perhaps increasing government
nervousness about a potential increase in opposition activities. On April 5, 2012, the government
closed the National Democratic Institute (NDI) office in Dubai, and briefly barred both its
American director and Serbian deputy director from leaving the country. NDI had been working
for four years, with license from the UAE government, to promote women’s rights and to advise
on municipal governance. The government also shut down the office of the German democracy-
promotion organization, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which was performing work similar to
that of NDI. UAE government representatives continue to insist that NDI and the Adenauer
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Foundation were meddling in its internal affairs and that such activity was unacceptable. UAE
officials say they have denied entry to some academics and human rights organizations officials
who are highly critical of the UAE crackdown on Islah and other domestic reform activists.5
General Human Rights-Related Issues
Although the government’s reaction to the few acts of opposition discussed above may color
future assessments, the State Department human rights report for 2012, released April 19, 2013,
was similar to that of previous reports, asserting that there are unverified reports of torture,
government restrictions of freedoms of speech and assembly, and lack of judicial independence.6
Press and Research Institute Freedoms
Prior to its efforts to ferret out unrest, the UAE had drawn praise for its free-wheeling media. The
post of Information Minister was abolished in 2006 to allow for full media independence.
However, in April 2009, a media law drew opposition from some human rights groups who said it
allows for penalties against journalists who personally criticize UAE leaders. Provisions
governing media licensing do not clearly articulate the standards the government will apply in
approving or denying licenses for media organs to operate. The UAE government said the law
does not apply to the “Free Zones” in UAE in which major foreign media organizations operate.
Since 2010, there have been increasing restrictions on the ability of research institutes to operate.
Several such institutes had opened in UAE since the 1990s because of the perceived openness to
free expression and ideas. During 2010-2012, the government applied increasingly strict criteria
to licensing research institutes and some, such as the Dubai-based Gulf Research Center (GRC),
left the UAE entirely. In August 2012, a U.S. academic, Matthew Duffy, had his contract with a
UAE university terminated for lectures advocating media and journalistic freedom. In November
2012, the UAE ordered the Rand Corporation to close its office in Abu Dhabi, which was focused
on research in education, public safety, and environmental health. Some academics who have
been critical of the UAE crackdown on pro-democracy and Islamist activists have been refused
entry to UAE either before or upon arrival at UAE airports.
Justice/Rule of Law
The UAE has a dual court system. Sharia (Islamic law) courts adjudicate criminal and family law
matters. Civil courts, based on French and Egyptian legal systems, adjudicate civil law matters.
The federal judiciary in the UAE began in 1973 with the establishment of the Federal Supreme
Court. The federal judiciary now comprises the Federal Supreme Court, Federal First Instance
Courts, and Federal Appeal Courts. The Federal Supreme Court consists of a president and a
maximum number of five judges appointed by a decree issued by the President of the UAE after
approval by the Federal Supreme Council. The Federal Supreme Court looks into matters such
as various disputes erupting between the member emirates or between one or more emirate and
the UAE federal government, the constitutionality of federal and other laws and legislations,
conflicts of jurisdiction between the federal and local judicial authorities in the country, conflict
5 CRS conversations with UAE officials. 2012-2013.
6 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper
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of jurisdiction between the judicial authority in one Emirate and another, and crimes directly
affecting the interests of the UAE federation. It also interprets the provisions of the constitution
and questioning ministers and senior federal officials for official misconduct. Under the
constitution, each emirate has the right to join the federal judiciary system or maintain its own
judicial system, and Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Ras al-Khaymah have opted for the latter
arrangement. According to the State Department, foreign nationals hold many positions in the
judiciary, making them subject to political influence because they can be deported easily.
Furthermore, local rulers review criminal and civil cases before referral to prosecutors, and these
political leaders review sentences as well—and the rulers’ decisions supersede those of any court.
Some human rights groups express concern about a draft law that, if adopted by the FNC, would
set up a “Federal Judicial Council” chaired by UAE President Khalifa. His deputy on that body
would be the chair of the Federal Supreme Court. Under the proposal, the council would not be
under the authority of the ministry of justice, and could undermine judicial independence.
Many observers note that justice in UAE is selective. For example, on January 10, 2010, a UAE
court acquitted the UAE president’s brother, Shaykh Issa bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan, on charges of
torturing an Afghan merchant. He was acquitted even though there was a video available of
Shaykh Issa beating the Afghan and driving over his legs with a sport vehicle, and even though
three nonroyals involved in the incident were convicted. The UAE court ruled that Shaykh Issa
was not liable because he was taking prescription drugs that affected his actions.
The UAE justice system has often come under criticism when expatriates are involved. Even
though the UAE promotes itself as a popular tourist destination, Western expatriates have
sometimes been arrested for sexual activity on UAE beaches. Arrests of noncitizens increased
during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, possibly out of citizen frustration that globalization and
dramatic economic expansion have led to bursting of the economic “bubble” in UAE. In 2007,
human rights groups criticized the conservative-dominated justice system for threatening to
prosecute a 15-year-old French expatriate for homosexuality, a crime in UAE, when he was raped
by two UAE men; the UAE men were later sentenced for sexual assault and kidnapping. In 2012,
a 78-year-old pediatrician from South Africa, Cyril Karabus, was imprisoned for alleged issues of
malpractice related to his six-week service as a doctor in Abu Dhabi in 2002.7 In July 2013, a
Norwegian woman was sentenced to 16 months in jail by a Dubai court for having sex outside
marriage after she reported being raped. On July 22, 2013, several days after the sentenced was
publicized and drew an outcry from human rights organizations, the women reported that her case
had been dismissed and she was free to leave the UAE.
Women’s Rights
Progress on women’s political rights has been steady—as exemplified by the November 2011
appointment of a woman as deputy FNC Speaker. Observers say the UAE is perhaps the only
country in the Middle East where women are fully accepted working in high-paying professions
such as finance and banking. Still, women in the UAE are at a disadvantage in divorce cases and
other family law issues.
There are four women in the cabinet: Shayha Lubna al-Qassimi (discussed above); Mariam al-
Roumi, minister of social affairs; and two ministers without portfolio—Reem al-Hashimi and
7 Lydia Polgreen. “Emirates’ Laws Trap a Doctor Just Passing Through.” New York Times, April 12, 2013.
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Maitha al-Shamsi. Seven women are in the Federal National Council, as discussed above, and six
women serve on the 40-seat consultative council in Sharjah emirate. About 10% of the UAE
diplomatic corps is now female; none served prior to 2001. In November 2008, Dubai emirate
appointed 10 female public prosecutors. The UAE Air Force has four female fighter pilots. The
percentage of female voters in the September 2011 FNC election process was expanded to nearly
50%, as discussed above. As of December 2011, UAE women are allowed to pass on their
citizenship to their children—the first GCC state to allow this.
Religious Freedom
The State Department report on international religious freedom for 2012, issued May 20, 2013,
repeated the previous year’s assessment that there was no significant change in the government’s
respect for religious freedom during 2012.8 The constitution provides for freedom of religion but
also declares Islam as the official religion of the country. The death penalty for conversion from
Islam remains on the books but is not known to be enforced.
In practice, non-Muslims in UAE are free to practice their religion; there are 35 Christian
churches built on land donated by the ruling families of the various emirates, but there are no
Jewish synagogues or Buddhist temples. There is a Sikh temple that shares a building with one of
two existing Hindu temples. Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, and Jews conduct religious ceremonies in
private homes, generally without interference.
The Shiite Muslim minority is free to worship and maintain its own mosques, but Shiite mosques
receive no government funds and there are no Shiites in top federal posts. At times, the
government has acted against non-UAE Shiite Muslims because of their perceived support for
Iran, Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the mostly Shiite opposition in
Bahrain. In 2012, the government closed a Shiite madrassa (school) and, in May 2012, it denied
permission to UAE Shiites to host a meeting of worldwide Shiites. In March 2013, the
government deported 30 Shiite Muslims, including those from Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
The UAE and other GCC states are taking steps, including expulsions of Lebanese Shiites, to
pressure Lebanese Hezbollah for its direct military support of the beleaguered Assad regime.
Labor Rights
The law prohibits all forms of compulsory labor, but it is not enforced effectively. On several
occasions, foreign laborers working on the large, ambitious construction projects in Dubai have
conducted strikes to protest poor working conditions and nonpayment of wages. Some of these
concerns have been addressed by the Labor Ministry’s penalizing of employers, and a process,
formulated in June 2008, to have workers’ salaries deposited directly in banks.
Human Trafficking
Other social problems might be a result of the relatively open economy of the UAE, particularly
in Dubai. The UAE is still considered a “destination country” for women trafficked from Asia and
the former Soviet Union. The Trafficking in Persons report for 2013 released June 19, 2013, again
placed the UAE in “Tier 2”—the same level as in the 2010, 2011, and 2012 reports and an
8 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=208416#wrapper
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improvement from the “Tier 2: Watch List” placement in 2009. The Tier 2 placement for 2012
was determined, as it was in the prior years, on the grounds that the UAE does not meet the
minimum standards for eliminating human trafficking, but is taking significant efforts to do so.
The 2013 report notes that UAE authorities have prosecuted and punished sex trafficking
offenders. However, the UAE efforts against forced labor - including unlawful withholding of
passports, restrictions on movement, nonpayment of wages, and physical or sexual abuse of
workers – have been less clear. The 2013 report states that, for the first time ever, the Ministry of
Labor reported statistics on the number of cases of labor complaints it had referred for
prosecution, although not every case involved forced labor. An issue in previous years had been
trafficking of young boys as camel jockeys, but that issue was largely alleviated with repatriation
of many of those trafficked, and the use of robot jockeys at camel races.
Foreign Policy and Defense
Following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the UAE determined that it needed a closer security
relationship with the United States. The UAE did not necessarily fear a direct threat from Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq, which is at the north end of the Persian Gulf, but the UAE saw the United States
as the key actor in any successful effort to balance out Iranian power—a primary UAE concern.
That cooperation has taken on numerous dimensions, including purchase of advanced missile
defense capabilities designed to counter Iranian ballistic missiles, as well as U.S. military
deployments intended to demonstrate resolve to Iran. Beyond the Gulf, UAE actions and
responses to the 2011-2013 unrest in the Middle East suggest that the UAE is increasingly
assertive on foreign policy in an effort to create and preserve regional stability.
Security Cooperation with the United States/Defense Cooperation
Agreement (DCA)
The framework for U.S.-UAE defense cooperation is a July 25, 1994, bilateral Defense
Cooperation Agreement (DCA), the text of which is classified.9 The DCA initially was
accompanied by a separate “Status of Forces Agreement” (SOFA) giving U.S. military personnel
in UAE certain legal immunities, but several incidents caused the UAE to void the SOFA and
legal incidents are now handled on a “case-by-case basis.” Under the DCA, the UAE has allowed
U.S. equipment pre-positioning and U.S. warship visits at its large Jebel Ali port, which is
capable of handling aircraft carriers, and it permitted the upgrading of airfields in the UAE that
were used for U.S. combat support flights during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and continued to
be used for flights in support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan.10
According to UAE officials, there are about 5,000 U.S. forces—an increase from 2010-2012
levels of about 3,000, and up substantially from 800 before OIF. The U.S. forces in UAE are
mostly Air Force, deployed primarily at Al Dhafra air base handling KC-10 refueling and several
types of surveillance aircraft such as the Global Hawk and the AWACS (Airborne Warning and
Control System). Some U.S. personnel reportedly are stationed at naval facilities at Fujairah. In
9 Some provisions are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S.
Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March 2002, p. 27.
10 Jaffe, Greg. “U.S. Rushes to Upgrade Base for Attack Aircraft.” Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2003.
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April 2012—possibly to signal additional resolve over Iran’s nuclear program—the United States
reportedly deployed several “Stealth” F-22 Raptor combat aircraft to Al Dhafra—a deployment
that could explain why U.S. forces in UAE have increased since early 2012.11
The U.S.-UAE defense pact has also reportedly included U.S. training of UAE armed forces,
UAE forces are relatively small—about 51,000—but have benefitted from U.S. and other
training. At the Air Warfare Center near Al Dhafra Air Base, UAE and U.S. forces conduct
extensive exercises on early warning, air and missile defense, and logistics. The UAE also hosts
the Integrated Air Missile Defense Center, a major training facility for Gulf and U.S.-GCC
cooperation on missile defense. Since 2009, UAE Air Force personnel have participated in the
yearly Desert Falcon exercises at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, according to UAE
representatives. About 350 UAE military personnel study and train in the United States each year,
mostly through the Foreign Military Sales program, through which the UAE buys most of its
U.S.-made arms. U.S. military officers say that UAE operators of HAWK surface-to-air missile
batteries are on par with U.S. operators of that system and that UAE fighter pilots are “combat
ready,” as demonstrated in operations in Libya in 2011.
U.S. and Other Arms Sales
The UAE views arms purchases from the United States as enhancing the U.S. commitment to
UAE security, and the United States views the sales as enhancing the U.S.-led Gulf security
architecture by building up indigenous GCC capabilities and promoting inter-operability. From
2007 to 2010, the UAE agreed to acquire more U.S. defense articles and services through the
Foreign Military Sales program—$10.4 billion worth—than any other country in the world
except Saudi Arabia.12 Until 2008, the most significant buy was the March 2000 purchase of 80
U.S. F-16 aircraft, equipped with the Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM)
and the HARM (High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile), a deal exceeding $8 billion. Congress did
not try to block the aircraft sale, although some Members questioned the AMRAAM as an
introduction of the weapon into the Gulf. Defense industry sources say that the equipment and
capabilities on the F-16s sold to the UAE were highly sophisticated. In September 2006, the
United States sold UAE High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Army Tactical
Missile Systems (ATACMs), valued at about $750 million.
Among more recent sales, in March 2009, the UAE signed agreements with Boeing Co. and
Lockheed Martin Corp. to buy $3 billion worth of military transport aircraft (C-17 and C-130,
respectively). On November 4, 2010, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress
of two potential sales: $140 million worth of ATACMs (see above) and associated support; and a
possible $5 billion worth of AH-64 Apache helicopters (30 helicopters, remanufactured to Block
III configuration).13 In 2011, a notification was made for $300 million worth of support for
UAE’s F-16 fleet and AIM-9X missiles. On September 22, 2011, there was notification to
Congress of a possible sale of 500 “Hellfire” missiles and related equipment and services, a total
estimated cost of $65 million. There was a December 14, 2011, notification of a potential sale to
the UAE of 260 JAVELIM anti-tank guided missiles and associated equipment and support at a
total value of $60 million.
11 Washington Post, April 28, 2012.
12 CRS Report: U.S. Arms Sales: Agreement with and Deliveries to Major Clients, 2003-2010.
13 DSCA transmittal number 10-52. http://www.dsca.mil.
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Congress was notified by DSCA on November 30, 2011, of a potential sale that caused significant
discussion (transmittal number 10-56). The sale was for 4,900 Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAM) kits with an estimated value of $304 million. The widespread perception was that the
munitions could potentially be used to strike hard targets, such as nuclear facilities in Iran,
although there are no indications the UAE would contemplate such a strike on its own, no matter
its concerns about Iran. The United States had previously sold the UAE JDAM kits worth $326
million value, announced January 3, 2008. During a visit to the UAE on April 25, 2013, Secretary
of Defense Chuck Hagel reportedly finalized a sale to UAE of an additional 25 F-16 aircraft and
associated “standoff” air-to-ground munitions, with an estimated value of about $5 billion. The
sale was in conjunction with similar weapons sales to Israel and Saudi Arabia, and which
Secretary Hagel and other officials clearly indicated were intended to signal U.S. and partner
resolve to Iran.14 A formal notification to Congress has not been transmitted to date. The sale
agreement came about one week after President Obama met visiting Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid at the White House on April 16, 2013; the meeting focused on
regional security issues and U.S.-UAE economic relations, according to a U.S.-UAE joint
statement released after the meeting.
Possible Drone Sale? At the IDEX defense show in February 2013, the UAE reportedly agreed to
a commercial sale, worth about $200 million, for Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
although the system apparently would be unarmed and for surveillance only. Still, Defense
Department officials say they have not completed formulating a policy for the sale of such
equipment to the Gulf states and it is possible that the deal might not be permitted by DOD.
THAAD and Other Major Missile and Air Defense Systems
Several major sales to the UAE have been in concert with the U.S.-led “Gulf Security Dialogue,”
intended to help the Gulf states contain Iran. The UAE is a key participant in U.S. efforts to build
a missile defense shield for the Gulf, primarily intended to defend against Iran’s growing missile
force. The joint missile defense effort has been discussed extensively with the Gulf states, and
was the focus of Secretary of State Clinton’s March 31, 2012, attendance at the first ministerial
meeting of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Subsequently,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose spoke in Abu Dhabi on April 12, 2012,15 on the
missile defense issue, saying, “As our partners acquire greater missile defense capabilities, the
United States will work to promote interoperability and information sharing among the GCC
states. This will allow for more efficient missile defenses and could lead to greater security
cooperation in the region.” Then Secretary of State Clinton continued to press for greater GCC
cooperation in establishing a Gulf-wide missile defense at a meeting on September 28, 2012, with
GCC leaders attending the U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York.
The UAE is pivotal to the U.S. effort to forge a Gulf-wide missile defense network because the
UAE has ordered the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense System (THAAD), the first sale ever of
that sophisticated missile defense system. A sale of THAAD equipment was first announced
September 9, 2008, valued at about $7 billion. The main manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, said in
June 2010 that a firm agreement for three THAAD fire units with 147 THAAD missiles and four
radar sets might be signed in the next few months, although the firm said in August 2011 that the
14 Thom Shanker. “Arms Deal with Israel and 2 Arab Nations Is Near.” New York Times, April 19, 2013.
15 U.S. Department of State Daily Digest Bulletin, April 12, 2012.
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UAE might reduce the buy somewhat.16 On December 31, 2011, the Defense Department
announced the two countries had reached a final deal to sell the UAE 96 of the THAAD missiles,
along with two firing units, with a total estimated value of the sale at $3.48 billion, about half of
what was first envisioned. The delivery schedule has not been announced. On November 2, 2012,
DSCA notified Congress of a potential sale to the UAE of additional THAAD equipment: 9
launchers, 48 missiles, and associated equipment with total estimated value of $1.135 billion.17
Also on November 5, 2012, DSCA announced the first sale of the THAAD to neighboring Qatar.
Among significant other recent missile defense sales to the UAE are the advanced Patriot anti-
missile systems (PAC-3, up to $9 billion value, announced December 4, 2007). Also announced
on September 9, 2008, were sales to UAE of vehicle mounted “Stinger” anti-aircraft systems
($737 million value).
Defense Relations with Other Nations and Alliances
In recent years, the UAE has sought to broaden its defense relationships. In 2004, the UAE joined
NATO’s “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,” which was launched that year by NATO as an effort to
bolster bilateral security with Middle Eastern countries. The UAE has “observer” status in NATO
and, in May 2011, the UAE requested to send an Ambassador to NATO under a new alliance
policy approved by the organization in April 2011. The UAE appointed an Ambassador, but UAE
cooperation with NATO has waned since mid-2011 as NATO and the United States wind down
involvement in Afghanistan and the European Union financial crisis has placed significant
burdens on NATO country budgets.
France has become a major defense partner for the UAE. In January 2008 the UAE signed an
agreement with then French President Nicolas Sarkozy to allow a French military presence. The
facilities—collectively termed Camp De La Paix (“Peace Camp”) were inaugurated during a visit
by Sarkozy to UAE on May 27, 2009, and include (1) a 900-foot section of the Zayid Port for use
by the French navy; (2) an installation at Dhafra Air Base to be used by France’s air force; and (3)
a barracks at an Abu Dhabi military camp that houses about 400 French military personnel. On
the other hand, in October 2010, the UAE asked Canada to evacuate a UAE base, Camp Mirage,
used by Canada as a staging point for its forces to deploy to Afghanistan, when Canada refused
additional landing slots in Canada for Emirates Air.18 The two countries subsequently negotiated a
resolution. The UAE has already bought 380 French-made Leclerc tanks and 60 Mirage 2000
warplanes.
The UAE has also looked to the private sector to augment its security. The UAE confirmed on
May 15, 2011, that it had retained the U.S. private firm Reflex Responses, to provide
“operational, planning, and training support,” to the UAE military. The statement followed a New
York Times report that the UAE had hired the firm, which is run by Eric Prince, who founded the
Blackwater security contractor, to a $529 million contract to build a foreign mercenary battalion
to help defend the UAE from internal revolt or related threats.19 The State Department
16 Jim Wolf. “UAE Said to Trim Planned US Missile-Defense Purchase.” Reuters, August 24, 2011.
17 Defense Security Cooperation Agency transmittal No. 12-40. November 5, 2012.
18 Chase, Steven and Brent Jang. “UAE Threatens to Kick Canada Out of Covert Military Base Camp Mirage.” Toronto
Globe and Mail, October 8, 2010.
19 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/middleeast/15prince.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss.
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investigated the reports to determine whether the contract violated any U.S. laws controlling the
export of U.S. defense technology and expertise. No findings have been announced.
Cooperation Against Iran
To address the potential threat from Iran—a high priority foreign policy issue for the UAE—the
UAE has cooperated with virtually all U.S. efforts to counter Iranian power and capabilities. The
December 6-7, 2010, GCC summit, held in Abu Dhabi, called for a peaceful resolution of the Iran
nuclear issue, although expressing “utmost concern” about Iran’s program. Similar language was
repeated as succeeding GCC summits. These comments add to UAE statements that reflect GCC
backing for more aggressive U.S. action to set back Iran’s program if diplomacy fails.
At the same time, the UAE has a large population of Iranian expatriates and historic commercial
ties to Iran, and the UAE seeks to deny Iran any justification for aggression or adverse action.
Many Iranian firms and individuals—primarily in the import-export business— operate from the
UAE, taking advantage of the UAE’s integration into the global trading and financial system. The
extensive Iranian presence in the UAE also gives the United States ample opportunity to enlist the
UAE in a multilateral effort to stiffen international sanctions on Iran. In October 2010, the UAE
government directed its banks to fully comply with the restrictions on dealing with Iranian banks
outlined in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 (adopted June 9, 2010); the directive caused a
15% drop in the value of Iran’s currency, the rial. The UAE took a major step in February 2012,
when a Dubai bank, the Noor Islamic Bank, announced it would no longer handle transactions
with Iranian banks; Iran had used that bank to process much of its receipts of hard currency for its
oil sales internationally.20 UAE representatives say that Iranian-owned banks that continue to
operate in UAE, including Bank Saderat and Bank Melli, do so only in cash and are relatively
inactive. Closing them outright would, according to UAE officials, unduly antagonize Iran.
The United States also has enlisted the cooperation of the UAE and other Gulf oil producers to
sell additional oil to European Union countries, which adopted a voluntary ban on buying Iranian
oil that took full effect on July 1, 2012. Still, reflecting the UAE’s free and open trading regimen
and unwillingness to antagonize Iran outright, there are reports that some small firms in the UAE
continue to supply gasoline to Iran even though such activity is potentially sanctionable under the
Iran Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172, as amended), and even though some UAE firms have been
sanctioned under the Act for those sales.
Iranian actions in the Gulf may account for the UAE’s strategic closeness to the United States and
other Western powers. In April 1992, Iran asserted complete control of the largely uninhabited
Persian Gulf island of Abu Musa, which it and the UAE shared under a 1971 bilateral agreement.
(In 1971, Iran, then ruled by the U.S.-backed Shah, seized two other islands, Greater and Lesser
Tunb, from the emirate of Ras al-Khaymah, as well as part of Abu Musa from the emirate of
Sharjah.) The UAE has called for peaceful resolution of the issue through direct negotiations, the
International Court of Justice, or another agreed forum. In October 2008 - two months after the
UAE protested Iran’s opening in August 2008 of administrative and maritime security offices on
Abu Musa - the UAE and Iran signed an agreement to establish a joint commission to resolve the
dispute. Iran later allowed Sharjah to open power and water desalination facilities on the island.
20 Alan Cowell. “Dubai Bank Reduces Ties With Iran, It Reports.” New York Times, March 1, 2012.
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The 2010 GCC summit in Abu Dhabi, referenced above, nodded to UAE concerns by demanding
Iran return the UAE islands.
The issue was inflamed significantly on April 11, 2012, when then Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad visited Abu Musa and spoke to the inhabitants there, mostly Iranian fishermen. The
UAE withdrew its ambassador from Tehran, and UAE officials said the action undermined many
months of quiet UAE-Iran diplomacy on the issue, including the naming of negotiators on both
sides. Consistent with its past positions, on April 17, 2012, the State Department said the United
States supports the UAE’s call to negotiate the dispute. The U.S. statement, as have past U.S
statements on this issue, took no position on the legal sovereignty of the islands, but it criticized
the Ahmadinejad visit as a step that complicates efforts to settle the issue. Iran further
antagonized the UAE on the issue with a May 2, 2012, visit to the island by Revolutionary Guard
Corps Commander-in-Chief Mohammad Ali Jafari, accompanied by several Iranian
parliamentarians, to discuss making the island a tourist hub. There has been no evident movement
on a bilateral settlement since.
The UAE, particularly Abu Dhabi, has long feared that the large Iranian-origin community in
Dubai emirate (estimated at 400,000 persons) could pose a “fifth column” threat to UAE stability.
Illustrating the UAE’s attempts to avoid antagonizing Iran, in May 2007, Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was permitted to hold a rally for Iranian expatriates in Dubai when he
made the first high-level visit to UAE since UAE independence in 1971. Reflecting the
underlying tensions of UAE-Iran relations, the two countries issued mutual recriminations in
January 2009 over the UAE decision in late 2008 to begin fingerprinting Iranian visitors to UAE.
Cooperation Against Terrorism and Proliferation
Related to the issue of joint U.S.-UAE efforts to contain and deter Iran is cooperation against
terrorism and proliferation in the region. These issues are of particular concern to the United
States because of a past pattern of lax UAE enforcement of export and border controls, with
respect particularly to the leakage of U.S. or other technology to Iran as well as terrorists’ use of
the UAE financial system and the presence of terrorists in the UAE. The relatively small sums of
U.S. aid to UAE that have been provided in recent years were generally for programs to improve
UAE performance on enforcing export control laws and on anti-terrorism. This U.S. assistance—
coupled with renewed UAE focus on enacting and enforcing additional export and border control
laws—appears to have alleviated at least some of the U.S. concerns on this issue. No U.S. aid to
UAE is requested for FY2014.
Terrorism Issues
During the mid-1990s, some Al Qaeda activists reportedly were able to move through and spend
time in the UAE.21 Two of the September 11 hijackers were UAE nationals, and they reportedly
used UAE-based financial networks in the plot. Since then, the UAE has been credited in State
Department “Country Reports on Terrorism,” including the one for 2012 released May 30, 2013,22
with assisting in the arrests of senior Al Qaeda operatives; denouncing terror attacks; improving
21 Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Country Reports on Terrorism 2012. May 30,
2013. Author conversations with executive branch officials, 1997-2013.
22 “U.S. Embassy to Reopen on Saturday After UAE Threat.” Reuters, March 26, 2004.
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border security; prescribing guidance for Friday prayer leaders to criticize extremist ideology;
investigating suspect financial transactions; criminalizing use of the Internet by terrorist groups;
and strengthening its bureaucracy and legal framework to combat terrorism. It was reported in
September 2009 that earlier in 2009, UAE security officials had broken up an Al Qaeda plot to
blow up targets in Dubai emirate.23 UAE authorities assisted in foiling an October 29, 2010, Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula plot to send bombs to the United States. On December 26, 2012,
the UAE stated that it had arrested members of an alleged terrorist cell plotting attacks in the
United States, in an operation conducted in cooperation with Saudi Arabia. The UAE statement
indicated the alleged terrorists might be part of Al Qaeda. In April 2013, UAE authorities arrested
seven non-UAE Arab nationals allegedly affiliated with Al Qaeda, although some activists said
the arrests were a cover for acts of repression against Islamists (discussed above).
The UAE Central Bank is credited in the recent State Department terrorism reports with
providing training programs to UAE financial institutions on money laundering and terrorism
financing, although actions against informal financial transmittals (hawala) require “further
vigilance.” In September 2012, the FBI Legal Attache established a sub-office at the U.S.
consulate in Dubai to assist with joint efforts against terrorism and terrorism financing.
On December 13-14, during a meeting of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), the UAE-
based “International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism,” known as
Hedayah, was inaugurated. The UAE is a founding member of the GCTF, which was formed in
September 2011. The efforts to counter violent extremism constitute part of the government effort
to shift public attitudes away from support for Islamic extremist movements.
Port and Border Controls
The UAE has signed on to several U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation and terrorism. These
include the Container Security Initiative Statement of Principles, aimed at screening U.S.-bound
containerized cargo transiting Dubai ports. Under it, three U.S. Customs and Border Protection
officers are co-located with the Dubai Customs Intelligence Unit at Port Rashid in Dubai. The
program results in about 20 ship inspections per week of U.S.-bound containers, many of them
apparently originating in Iran. The UAE is a party to the Proliferation Security Initiative, the
Megaports Initiative designed to prevent terrorist from using major ports to ship illicit material,
and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. The United States and UAE are
negotiating to establish a “pre-clearance facility” at the Abu Dhabi International Airport.
Export Controls
The UAE record on preventing the re-export of advanced technology, particularly to Iran, has
been mixed in past years, but has improved considerably since mid-2010. Taking advantage of
geographic proximity and the high volume of Iran-Dubai trade ($10 billion per year), numerous
Iranian entities involved in Iran’s energy sector and its WMD programs have offices in the UAE
that are used to try to procure needed technology and equipment. In connection with revelations
of illicit sales of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea by Pakistan’s nuclear
scientist A.Q. Khan, Dubai was named as a key transfer point for Khan’s shipments of nuclear
23 Lake, Eli and Sarah Carter. “UAE Kept Tight Lid on Disrupted Terror Plot.” Washington Times, September 17,
2009.
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components. Two Dubai-based companies were apparently involved in transshipping
components: SMB Computers and Gulf Technical Industries.24 On April 7, 2004, the
Administration sanctioned a UAE firm, Elmstone Service and Trading FZE, for allegedly selling
weapons of mass destruction-related technology to Iran, under the Iran-Syria Non-Proliferation
Act (P.L. 106-178). In June 2006, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released a general
order imposing a license requirement on Mayrow General Trading Company and related
enterprises in the UAE. This was done after Mayrow was implicated in the transhipment of
electronic components and devices capable of being used to construct improvised explosive
devices (IED) used in Iraq and Afghanistan.25
In January 2009, the Institute for Science and International Security issued a report entitled
“Iranian Entities’ Illicit Military Procurement Networks,” published January 12, 2009. The report
asserted that Iran has used UAE companies to obtain technology from U.S. suppliers, and that the
components obtained have been used to construct improvised explosive devices (IEDs) shipped
by Iran to militants in Iraq and Afghanistan. Other UAE companies the report alleges were
involved in this network included not only Mayrow but also Majidco Micro Electronics, Micatic
General Trading, and Talinx Electronics.
The UAE has enhanced its cooperation at times when U.S. officials or outside experts have
questioned its performance. In February 2007 the Administration threatened to form a new
category of control called “Destinations of Diversion Control” with UAE as the intended
designee country. In September 2007, the FNC adopted a law strengthening export controls (April
2007). That month, the UAE government used the new law to shut down 40 foreign and UAE
firms allegedly involved in dual use exports to Iran and other countries. On July 22, 2010, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Vann Van Diepen
testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation and Trade) that the UAE had augmented the staff of the office that implements
the 2007 law. He added that the UAE’s enforcement bodies—customs, law enforcement, and
intelligence services—are functioning to that end.26 A 2010 Iran sanctions law, the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA, P.L. 111-195)
created a category of countries that would be sanctioned (restrictions on dual use U.S. exports)
for a determination of non-cooperation, but the improved performance of the UAE on this issue
has caused this provision not to be invoked with respect to the UAE. As a possible reflection of
increased UAE vigilance on this issue, in September 2012 the UAE, as well as Bahrain,
impounded shipments to Iran of items that Iran purportedly sought for use in its nuclear program.
The issue of leakage of technology has sometimes caused U.S. criticism or questioning of UAE
investment deals. In December 2008, some Members of Congress called for a review by the inter-
agency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) of a proposed joint
venture between Advanced Micro Devices and Advanced Technology Investment Co. of Abu
Dhabi for the potential for technology transfers. In February 2006, CFIUS approved the takeover
by the Dubai-owned “Dubai Ports World” company of a British firm that manages six U.S. port
facilities. Members, concerned that the takeover might weaken U.S. port security, opposed it in
P.L. 109-234, causing the company to divest assets involved in U.S. port operations (divestment
24 Milhollin, Gary and Kelly Motz. “Nukes ‘R’ US.” New York Times op.ed. March 4, 2004.
25 BIS, “General Order Concerning Mayrow General Trading and Related Enterprises,” 71 Federal Register 107, June
5, 2006.
26 Testimony of Mr. Vann Van Diepen before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. July 22, 2010.
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completed in late 2006 to AIG Global Investments). Little opposition was expressed to a
September 2007 Borse Dubai plan to take a 20% stake in the NASDAQ stock market, or to a
November 2007 investment of $7.5 billion in Citigroup by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
(ADIA).
Cooperation on Iraq
Aside from allowing U.S. use of UAE military facilities, the UAE has undertaken several
initiatives to support U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein. The UAE has
provided facilities for Germany to train Iraqi police. Agreeing with the U.S. view that Sunni Arab
states need to engage the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad, in June 2008, the UAE
appointed an Ambassador to Iraq, Abdullah Ibrahim al-Shehi, the first Arab country to do so. The
following month it wrote off $7 billion (including interest) in Iraqi debt. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid visited Iraq in October 2008. The UAE tended to defer to Saudi
Arabia in its efforts to encourage inclusion of high profile Sunni Arabs in the new Iraqi
government formed in late 2010. In October 2011, the UAE announced it intends to open a
consulate in the Kurdish region of Iraq which comprises three northern provinces and is
administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), a legally constituted region within
Iraq. The consulate has not opened, to date.
In humanitarian efforts, the UAE provided about $215 million for Iraq reconstruction but has
provided the funds not in cash but in the form of humanitarian contributions. Some of the funds
have been used to rebuild hospitals in Iraq and to provide medical treatment to Iraqi children in
the UAE. Bilateral trade is estimated at about $5 billion, and UAE companies reportedly are
investing in housing and other projects in Iraq.
Cooperation on Afghanistan and Pakistan
The UAE was one of only three countries (Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were the others) to have
recognized the Taliban during 1996-2001 as the government of Afghanistan, even though the
Taliban was harboring Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders during that time. During
Taliban rule, the UAE allowed Ariana Afghan airlines to operate direct service. After the
September 11, 2011 attacks, the UAE helped the United States oust the Taliban regime from
Afghanistan by making available its military facilities for U.S. and allied use, as discussed above.
The UAE continues to assist the U.S. and international mission to stabilize Afghanistan with a
250-person contingent of UAE troops serving in Afghanistan since 2003. The UAE forces, the
only Arab combat forces in Afghanistan, are operating in the restive southern part of Afghanistan,
particularly Uruzgan Province, where they appear to be welcomed by the population. UAE
representatives say that UAE forces will remain in Afghanistan alongside the U.S. forces after the
end of the current international security mission in 2014. The UAE has appointed a counterpart to
the Obama Administration’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP).
The UAE has pledged a total of nearly $350 million in economic aid for Afghanistan since the
fall of the Taliban. Among the projects funded with UAE aid include “Zayed University,” a
college serving over 6,000 Afghan students per year; six medical clinics; a major hospital with a
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capacity of 7,000 patients; the building of “Zayed City” that houses 200 Afghan families
displaced by violence; 160 drinking wells; and 38 mosques.27
In related aid for U.S. regional policy, Abu Dhabi hosted the November 2008 meeting of the
“Friends of Pakistan” donors group that is attempting to help Pakistan through its financial
difficulties. The UAE provided about $100 million to aid victims of a major earthquake in
Pakistan in October 2005, and substantial amounts in 2010 to help victims of flooding there.
Other Regional Issues: Response to 2011 Unrest in the Middle East
The UAE has joined its GCC allies in attempting to keep uprisings elsewhere in the Arab world
from affecting the GCC countries themselves and to support the accession of friendly regimes in
Arab states that have undergone major political change.
In the immediate neighborhood, the UAE joined other GCC states in supporting the Al Khalifa
regime in Bahrain against the 2011 uprising. The UAE sent 500 UAE police to join a 1,000 troop
Saudi force that deployed to Bahrain during March—June 2011. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
and Qatar also have provided financial help to Bahrain and Oman; Oman faced significant
protests in 2011.
To promote political change that the UAE supports, it has assisted rebel movements in Libya and
Syria, although to different extents in the two cases. In Libya, UAE supported helped the
opposition to Muammar Qadhafi succeed in ending his regime in late August 2011. During that
conflict, the UAE sent six (a squadron) of its U.S-made F-16s and six Mirage fighters (a
squadron) to participate in the NATO-led no-fly zone enforcement and ground target strike
operations in Libya. It reportedly sent some weapons to the Libyan rebels, although U.S. officials
denied a UAE request to send the rebels U.S.-supplied weaponry.28 On May 10, 2011, Abu Dhabi
hosted a major meeting of Libyan dissidents, including representatives of cities and towns still
under Qadhafi regime control. In June 2011, the UAE formally recognized the Benghazi-based
Transitional National Council (TNC) as the sole representative of the Libyan people and pledged
financial support to it. In March 2012, the UAE transferred 58 aging Mirage 2000 combat aircraft
to the fledgling post-Qadhafi government. Other aid has been provided to post-Qadhafi Libya by
the UAE government and UAE charity organizations.
In Syria, the UAE did not initially articulate strong opposition to President Bashar Al Assad of
Syria’s crackdown against the uprising that began in March 2011, probably in order to avoid
antagonizing Assad’s ally, Iran. As the unrest in Syria worsened, the UAE and the other GCC
states leaders shifted decisively against Assad, at least in part to strategically weaken Iran in the
Middle East. In November 2011, after the Arab League suspended Syria’s membership, the UAE
embassy in Damascus, among others, was attacked. It closed that embassy, as the other GCC
states did theirs, in February 2012. The UAE joined its GCC allies in early April 2012, during a
multinational conference on Syria in Istanbul, in offering about $100 million in funds to Syrian
rebels, to be used as salaries and also presumably to buy weapons and services useful to their
cause. However, in contrast to Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the UAE is not reported to be supplying
weapons to the Syrian rebels. The UAE and its GCC allies also have had differences over which
27 Information provided to CRS by the UAE Embassy in Washington, DC, December 2009.
28 James Risen, Mark Mazzetti, and Michael Schmidt. “Militant Forces Got Arms Meant for Libya Rebels.” New York
Times, December 6, 2012.
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rebel groups to assist; the UAE tends to oppose aid to Syrian rebels linked to the Muslim
Brotherhood. The UAE also has sought greater U.S. involvement in the Syria crisis; in June 2013
the UAE declined to host a meeting of allied defense officials on Syria, maintaining that the
meeting would be unproductive unless there is strong U.S. leadership on Syria.29 In concert with
its GCC partners, the UAE is taking steps to punish Lebanese Hezbollah politically and
economically for providing direct military support to Assad.
In providing humanitarian aid to alleviate suffering from the Syria crisis, the UAE Embassy in
Washington, DC, said that, as of March 2013, the UAE government and various UAE charity
organizations (Red Crescent Authority, Khalifa bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan Foundation, and Sharjah
Chairty Association) had donated at least $330 million to help Syrian refugees. The UAE
separately has given $1.25 billion to Jordan to help it cope with the Syrian refugees that have fled
there because of the violence. And, UAE forces are participating in the June 2013 “Eager Lion”
military exercises in Jordan intended to insulate Jordan from any Syria conflict spillover.
In Yemen, the UAE joined a high-profile GCC mediation effort that reached an agreement for
President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down in favor of a political transition. President Saleh was
injured in an assassination attempt in June 2011 and recuperated in Saudi Arabia, but he returned
to the country in November 2011. He later signed the transition agreement and left office on
January 22, 2012.
The UAE has also aligned with some of the other Gulf states in attempting to build a post-
Mubarak political structure in Egypt that is friendly to the UAE. The UAE, as noted above, has
arrested domestic supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the UAE was displeased by the
2012 election of a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammad Morsi, as President. The UAE
was therefore supportive of the Egyptian military’s ouster of Morsi in early July 2013. Within a
week of Morsi’s ouster, the UAE backed a Saudi effort to financially stabilize the military-led
government in Cairo. The UAE pledged $3 billion in assistance as part of the broader Saudi-led
package totaling $12 billion ($5 billion from Saudi Arabia and $4 billion from Kuwait, in addition
to the UAE funds).
Other Regional Issues: Arab-Israeli Dispute
On most regional issues, including the Arab-Israeli dispute, the UAE does not follow U.S. policy
strictly or uncritically, but it does generally agree with most U.S. assessments of regional threats,
and it supports U.S. diplomatic efforts to resolve regional issues. On the Arab-Israeli issue, the
UAE wants to ensure that any settlement between Israel and the Palestinians is “just,” meaning
sufficiently beneficial to the Palestinians. It has sometimes criticized the United States as
excessively supportive of Israel, although it generally expresses that criticism in private meetings
with U.S officials. UAE leaders publicly backed the Palestinian Authority’s bid for statehood
recognition at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2011—a proposal the United
States opposed as premature and preemptive of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
The UAE has not advanced its own far-reaching proposals to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian
dispute, as has King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Nor has UAE tried to directly mediate between
Palestinian factions, as have Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or Egypt. In 1994 the UAE joined with the
29 Mark Mazzetti, Michael Gordon, and Mark Landler. “U.S. Is Said to Plan to Send Weapons to Syrian Rebels.” New
York Times, June 14, 2013.
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other Gulf monarchies in ending enforcement of the Arab League’s boycott of companies doing
business with Israel and on companies that deal with companies that do business with Israel. The
UAE formally bans direct trade with Israel, although UAE companies reportedly do business with
Israeli firms and some Israeli diplomats have attended multilateral meetings in the UAE. Unlike
Qatar and Oman, the UAE did not host multilateral Arab-Israeli working groups on regional
issues when those talks took place during 1994-1998. In 2007, the UAE joined a “quartet” of
Arab states (the others are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan) to assist U.S. diplomacy on Israeli-
Palestinian issues, and it attended the Annapolis summit on the issue that year.
The UAE has sometimes put its considerable financial resources to work on behalf of the
Palestinians. One major UAE action has been to fund a housing project in Rafah, in the Gaza
Strip, called “Shaykh Khalifa City.” It also has given economic aid to Lebanon, perhaps in part to
counter Iranian and Syrian influence there—an objective that UAE shares with Saudi Arabia and
the other GCC states. In December 2008 and January 2009, the UAE government permitted street
demonstrations in support of Hamas during its war with Israel. In February 2009, the UAE denied
a visa to an Israeli tennis player who was to participate in a Dubai tennis tournament, earning the
UAE some international criticism. It also aggressively investigated and, based on evidence
developed, formally accused Israel in the killing of a Hamas leader in Dubai in January 2010.
Border Issues
The UAE cooperates with virtually all GCC-wide development and economic initiatives,
although some past border disputes and other disagreements with Saudi Arabia occasionally flare.
A 1974 “Treaty of Jeddah” with Saudi Arabia formalized Saudi access to the Persian Gulf via a
corridor running through UAE, in return for UAE gaining formal control of villages in the
Buraymi oasis area.
UAE Provision of Foreign Aid30
The UAE asserts that it has provided billions of dollars in international aid through its
government and through funds controlled by royal family members and other elites, aside from
funds provided for the specific crises discussed above. Among the foreign aid activities reported
are $100 million to aid victims of the December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean and $100
million to help victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005. Among other initiatives:
• The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD), established in 1971, has
distributed about $3.5 billion to 207 projects in 53 countries. Of this amount,
about $240 million was distributed in 2010. In August 2011, the fund was used to
donate $250 million for reconstruction projects in Afghanistan.
• In May 2011, the UAE donated $20 million for post-flood relief efforts in
Pakistan. Also that month, it donated $30 million to the Australian state of
Queensland to fund cyclone shelters.
• In June 2011, the UAE pledged $3 billion in aid for post-Mubarak Egypt.
However, the 2012 election of a president who is a Muslim Brotherhood
30 Factsheet provided by UAE Embassy in Washington, DC, June 2011.
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activist—an organization the UAE accuses of anti-regime activities in UAE—has
halted subsequent aid to Egypt.
• In July 2011, UAE foundations responded to a U.N. appeal for aid to the victims
of a drought in East Africa.
• In February 2012, the UAE announced an additional $2 million donation to the
Local Stability Fund that provides relief to victims of conflict in Somalia.
• The UAE has donated substantial sums for causes in the United States, including
$150 million for a cancer center at the University of Texas; $100 million to assist
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in 2005; $150 million to a children’s
medical center in Washington, DC, in 2009; and $1 million worth of Apple laptop
computers to the Joplin, Missouri, public schools systems in the wake of the May
2011 tornado there.
Nuclear Agreement31
The government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced in 2008 an ambitious plan to
acquire its first nuclear power reactors to satisfy projected increases in domestic electricity
demand.32 The United States and the UAE signed an agreement on January 15, 2009, to help the
UAE develop a nuclear power program. However, some in Congress expressed concerns about
this agreement because of fears of potential leakage of technology to Iran as well as the potential
for additional regional proliferation of nuclear technology.
Policymakers and advisers in the government of Abu Dhabi, in consultation with representatives
from the other six emirates, are guiding the program’s implementation. A number of U.S. and
European firms have secured administrative and financial advisory contracts with the program.
The agreement for the United States to assist the program, subject to conditions specified in
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2153(b)], was signed by the Obama
Administration on May 21, 2009 (and submitted to Congress that day). It became effective when
Congress declined to block the arrangement within 90 days of continuous legislative session
following the May 21 submission. Several congressional resolutions of approval of the agreement
(S.J.Res. 18 and H.J.Res. 60) were introduced, compared to only one disapproving (H.J.Res. 55).
No measure blocking the agreement was enacted, and the “1-2-3 Agreement” entered into force
on December 17, 2009. Nor was an earlier bill in the 111th Congress, H.R. 364, requiring the
President to certify that the UAE has taken a number of steps to stop illicit trade with Iran before
any agreement would take effect, enacted into law.
In January 2010, the UAE announced that it had chosen the Korea Electric Power Corporation
(KEPCO of South Korea) to construct the first of four APR1400 nuclear reactors that would sell
electricity to the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority. The first plant is expected to start
operating in 2017 and the other three are scheduled to be completed and operational by 2020,
31 This section was prepared by Paul Kerr, Analyst in Weapons of Mass Destruction Nonproliferation,
CRS. See CRS Report R40344, The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear
Cooperation, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr.
32 UAE officials estimate that their country must expand its power generation and transmission capacity
from the current level of 16 gigawatts to 40 gigawatts by 2020 in order to meet projected demand increases
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according to the UAE.33 The plant construction is to take place at Baraka, near Abu Dhabi’s
western border with Saudi Arabia, pending final approval by the UAE Federal Authority for
Nuclear Regulation.34
The Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) announced in July 2011 that it has begun a
“procurement competition” to obtain fuel supplies for the four proposed reactors.35 “The final
contracts are expected to be signed in the first quarter of 2012,” according to the ENEC. No
specific decisions have been made regarding the disposition of spent reactor fuel. The UAE has
committed to refrain from domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing spent nuclear reactor
fuel. Enrichment and reprocessing are considered to the most sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel
cycle because they can both produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.
The International Atomic Energy Agency announced December 14, 2011, that a group of experts
had completed a review of the UAE’s “regulatory framework for nuclear safety and radiation
protection.” Providing further reassurances to U.S. officials, the review both “noted good
practices” and provided suggestions to the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation, the UAE’s
nuclear regulatory authority.36
Economic Issues
The UAE, a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), has developed a free market
economy, but one that is widely considered weakly regulated. Partly as a result, the UAE,
particularly Dubai emirate, pursued economic strategies built on attracting investment to
construct large numbers of opulent and futuristic projects designed to attract expatriates and
international tourists. The UAE economy was affected significantly by the 2007-2009 global
financial crisis, which caused widespread layoffs in UAE and the departure of thousands of
foreign workers, and left UAE banks with vast amounts of nonperforming loans.37 The downturn
in real estate prices also affected regional investors, such as those in Afghanistan, who bought
into high-end housing such as on the Palm Islands. The fall in value nearly caused a collapse of a
major Afghan bank, Kabul Bank, in September 2010; the bank had made large loans to prominent
Afghan power brokers and officials to buy property in the UAE.
To address the crisis, the federal government took on some public debt and drew upon used some
of the country’s purported $700 billion invested in “sovereign wealth funds” to inject into Dubai
banks to help them ride out the downturn. The largest such fund, called Mubadala, is owned and
run by Abu Dhabi. However, by the end of 2011, the UAE’s worst economic problems were
behind it and its growth improved substantially to about 3.3% for all of 2011. Growth was about
2.5% growth for 2012, in part because of the European debt crisis.38
33 http://enec.gov.ae/our-nuclear-energy-program/prime-contractor/.
34 http://enec.gov.ae/our-nuclear-energy-program/preferred-site/.
35 http://www.enec.gov.ae/media-centre/news/content/emirates-nuclear-energy-corporation-begins-nuclear-fuel-
procurement-co.
36 http://www.iaea.org/press/?p=2572.
37 Worth, Robert. “Laid Off Foreigners Flee as Dubai Spirals Down.” New York Times, February 12, 2008.
38 Economist Intelligence Unit. “Country Report: United Arab Emirates,” December 2011.
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Oil and Gas Sector/Dedication to Future Clean Energy
The source of the UAE’s sovereign wealth has been oil sales. Abu Dhabi has 80% of the
federation’s proven oil reserves of about 100 billion barrels, enough for over 100 years of exports
at the current production rate of about 2.5 million–2.7 million barrels per day (mbd). Of that, over
2 mbd are exported, and the UAE may have as much as 500,000 bpd of spare capacity.39 Small
amounts of its oil exports go to the United States, while the largest share of UAE oil goes to
Japan. The UAE has vast quantities of natural gas but consumes more than it produces. It has
entered into a deal (Dolphin project) with neighboring countries under which a recently-
constructed pipeline carries natural gas from the large gas exporter, Qatar, to the UAE and on to
Oman as well.
In addition, the UAE is trying to secure its oil export routes against any threat by Iran to close the
strategic Strait of Hormuz, through with the UAE and other major oil exporters transport their oil
exports. In mid-July 2012, the UAE loaded its first tanker of oil following completion of the Abu
Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) which terminates in the emirate of Fujairah, on the Gulf of
Oman. The line, which cost $3 billion, has a capacity to transport 1.5 million barrels per day of
crude oil—about half of the UAE’s peak production. The UAE is also planning a large refinery
near that terminal, and possibly a second oil pipeline exiting there, to further secure its oil exports
and value-added petroleum products.40
Seeking to reinvest its oil wealth, Abu Dhabi has sought in recent years to outdo Dubai by
building local branches of famous U.S. and European museums. However, it has also tried to use
its oil wealth to plan for a time when the developed world is no longer reliant on oil imports. It
has funded “Masdar City”—a project, the first phase of which is to be completed in 2015, to build
a planned city which will rely only on renewable energy sources. Automobiles that run on fossil
fuels are banned from Masdar City. One feature of the city is a system of driverless taxis that use
automation to take passengers to their destinations. The civilian nuclear energy project discussed
above is also part of the effort to plan for a post-oil world economy.
U.S.-UAE Trade and Trade Promotion Discussions
U.S. trade with the UAE is a significant issue because the UAE is the largest market for U.S.
exports to the Middle East. In 2012, U.S. firms exported nearly $22 billion worth of goods to the
UAE. Over 1,000 U.S. companies have offices there and there are 60,000 Americans working in
UAE.
On November 15, 2004, the Administration notified Congress it had begun negotiating a free
trade agreement (FTA) with the UAE. Several rounds of talks were held prior to the June 2007
expiration of Administration “trade promotion authority,” but progress was halting. The FTA talks
have been replaced by an U.S.-UAE “Economic Policy Dialogue, involving the major U.S.
economic departments and their UAE counterparts. The dialogue, consisting of two meetings per
year, began in late 2011 and also included discussion of reform of UAE export controls, an issue
discussed above. In addition, as part of the GCC, the UAE is negotiating with the United States a
“GCC-U.S. Framework Agreement on Trade, Economic, Investment, and Technical
39 http://www.thenational.ae/events/areas/abu-dhabi/adnoc-preserves-spare-supplies.
40 “Abu Dhabi: In the Pipeline.” The Middle East, January 26, 2012.
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Cooperation,” an umbrella instrument for promoting ties between the two sides in the economic
area—essentially a GCC-wide trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA). The
negotiations were led by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and an agreement was signed on
September 25, 2012.
The UAE, which is considered wealthy, has received small amounts of U.S. assistance. The
primary purpose of the aid is to make the UAE eligible for advice and programming to improve
its border security and export controls, as shown below. None is requested for FY2014.
Table 2. Recent U.S. Aid to UAE
(amounts in $ thousands)
FY’13
FY’14
FY’07 FY’08 FY’09 FY’10
FY’11
FY’12
(req)
(req)
NADR
(Nonproliferation,
Anti-Terrorism,
Demining, and
1,409
725
Related)—
Counterterrorism
Programs (ATA)
NADR-
172 300 200
230
230
Combating WMD
International
Military Education
10
and Training
(IMET)
Totals 1,581
300
925
240
230
0
0
0
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
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