The United Arab Emirates (UAE):
October 28, 2021May 10, 2022
Issues for U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven principalities or “emirates.”
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven principalities or “emirates.”
Its
Specialist in Middle
Specialist in Middle
Its population is population is
assessed at nearly 10 million, nearly 10 million,
but about 90% of the population are
Eastern Affairs
of which 90% are expatriates from within and outside the region expatriates from within and outside the region
Eastern Affairs
who work in its open economy. The UAE who work in its open economy. The UAE
is a significant U.S. security partner that hosts about is a significant U.S. security partner that hosts about
3,500 U.S. military personnel at 3,500 U.S. military personnel at
UAE military facilitiesUAE military facilities
, and buys sophisticated U.S. military equipment, including missile buys sophisticated U.S. military equipment, including missile
defenses and combat aircraft, and supports U.S. policy toward Iran. defenses and combat aircraft. A January 20, 2021, deal signed with
the UAE to allow the country to procure up to 50 F-35s and 18 Reaper Drones was placed under review by the Biden Administration, but finalizing the sale has been delayed over several issues, including the UAE’s ability to secure the F-35 and its technology from other large powers, including China, with which the UAE has been expanding relations. Furthermore, U.S.-UAE differences on the F-35 sale, as well as issues including energy production, Iran, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the conflict in Yemen, appear to have widened since late 2021. The UAE abstained on a February 24, 2022, U.N. Security Council resolution denouncing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
With ample financial resources and a U.S.-armed and advised military, the UAE has been asserting itself in the
With ample financial resources and a U.S.-armed and advised military, the UAE has been asserting itself in the
region, in many cases seeking to keep authoritarian Arab leaders in power and work against region, in many cases seeking to keep authoritarian Arab leaders in power and work against
Muslim Brotherhood-linkedIslamist organizations that UAE leaders assert are regional and domestic threats. organizations that UAE leaders assert are regional and domestic threats.
The UAE’s stance on those groups has contributed to a major rift with Qatar, another member of the Gulf Cooperation Council alliance (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman). In June 2017, the UAE joined Saudi ArabiaIn June 2017, the UAE joined Saudi Arabia
and several other countries in isolating Qatar in isolating Qatar
to pressure it to adopt policies closer to to pressure it to adopt policies closer to
those of the UAE and Saudi Arabia on the UAE and Saudi Arabia on
the BrotherhoodIran, Turkey, the role of Islamists in governance, the Qatar-based Al Jazeera network, and other issues. On and other issues. On
January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
Bahrain, and Egyptand their partners agreed to lift the blockade, although agreed to lift the blockade, although
differences on the issues that issues that
produced the rift produced the rift
continue to simmerremain, and the UAE has not reopened its embassy in Qatar, to date. In Libya, the UAE is supporting an anti-Islamist commander based in . In Libya, the UAE is supporting an anti-Islamist commander based in
eastern Libyaeastern Libya
, Khalifa Hafter, who has sought to assert control of the whole country.
Iran also looms large as an issue for UAE leaders. UAE leader reportedly are concerned that a U.S. and Iranian return to full mutual implementation of the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal would not address the UAE’s key concerns about Iran’s regional influence. The UAE’s August 2020 agreement to normalize relations with Israel represented, in part, the UAE’s intent to work closely with Israel to counter Iran strategically. In part to try to roll back Iran’s regional reach, in who has sought to defeat a U.N.-backed government that derives some support from Muslim Brotherhood factions. Some political leaders in Tunisia, including parliament speaker Rached Ghannouchi, accuse the UAE of backing President Kaïs Saïed’s assertion of sweeping executive powers and his suspension of the constitution that was adopted in the wake of Tunisia’s 2011 popular uprising.
Iran also looms large in UAE policy. The UAE’s August 2020 agreement to normalize relations with Israel appeared intended, at least in part, to help both the United States and Israel counter Iran. In 2015, the UAE joined 2015, the UAE joined
Saudi Arabia in a military effort to pressure the Iran-backed Zaidi Shia Houthi rebels in YemenSaudi Arabia in a military effort to pressure the Iran-backed Zaidi Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen
, - a campaign that a campaign that
has produced significant numbers of civilian casualties and criticism of the UAE. That criticismhas produced significant numbers of civilian casualties and criticism of the UAE. That criticism
, coupled with UAE concerns that U.S.-Iran tensions could embroil the UAE in war with Iran, might account for an apparent UAE shift toward more engagement with Iran and a 2019 decision contributed to the UAE’s decision in 2019 to remove most of the UAE’s ground forces to remove most of the UAE’s ground forces
from the Yemen conflictfrom the Yemen conflict
., although some UAE forces UAE forces
continue to support pro-UAE militia factions there. UAE officials publicly opposed the U.S. revocation of the designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in early 2021. Various aspects of the UAE involvement in Yemen, includingcontinue to support pro-UAE factions in southern Yemen and, alongside U.S. special operations forces, continue to combat Al Qaeda’s affiliate there (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP). The UAE’s involvement in Yemen, and U.S. sales of weapons the UAE has used there, have been the U.S. sales of weapons the UAE has used there, have been the
subject of congressional oversight hearings and some legislation. A January 20, 2021, deal signed with the UAE to allow the country to procure up to 50 F-35s and 18 Reaper Drones was placed under review by the Biden Administration, although Administration officials said in April 2021 that they plan to proceed with the sale.
The UAE’s tradition of welcoming expatriates to live and work has won wide praise from observers, but the countrysubject of congressional oversight hearings and some legislation.
The UAE remains under the control of a small circle of leaders. Since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, the remains under the control of a small circle of leaders. Since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, the
government has become less tolerant of political criticism on social media. The country’s wealth—amplified by government has become less tolerant of political criticism on social media. The country’s wealth—amplified by
the small size of the citizenship population receiving government largesse—has helped the government maintain the small size of the citizenship population receiving government largesse—has helped the government maintain
popular support. Since 2006, the government has held a limited voting process for half of the 40 seats in its quasi-popular support. Since 2006, the government has held a limited voting process for half of the 40 seats in its quasi-
legislative body, the Federal National Council (FNC). The most recent vote was held in October 2019. legislative body, the Federal National Council (FNC). The most recent vote was held in October 2019.
In part to cope with the fluctuations in the price of crude oil, the government has created new ministries tasked
In part to cope with the fluctuations in the price of crude oil, the government has created new ministries tasked
with formulating economic and social strategies that, among other objectives, can attract the support of the with formulating economic and social strategies that, among other objectives, can attract the support of the
country’s youth. Economic conditions country’s youth. Economic conditions
have been made difficult in 2020 because ofwere adversely affected by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 the Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic, which has caused a global economic downturn and, in the UAE, caused over 2,100 deaths and nearly 750,000 infections as of late October 2021(COVID-19) pandemic, but a significant increase in world oil prices in early 2022 has eased the leadership’s financial and economic concerns. The country has rebuffed U.S. efforts to encourage it to produce more oil to ease the increase in oil prices caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. U.S. foreign assistance to the UAE has been negligible, . U.S. foreign assistance to the UAE has been negligible,
and what is provided is mostly to train UAE authorities on and what is provided is mostly to train UAE authorities on
counter-terrorismcounterterrorism, border security, and anti-, border security, and anti-
proliferation operations. proliferation operations.
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Contents
Governance, Human Rights, and Reform ........................................................................................ 1
Other Governance Issues ........................................................................................................... 2
Federal National Council (FNC) and FNC Elections ......................................................... 3
Human Rights-Related Issues ................................................................................................... 3
Treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood and Other Domestic Opposition ............................ 4
Media and Research Institute Freedoms ............................................................................. 4
Justice/Rule of Law............................................................................................................. 54
Women’s Rights .................................................................................................................. 5
Religious Freedom .............................................................................................................. 76
Labor Rights and Trafficking in Persons ............................................................................ 7
Foreign Policy and Defense Issues .................................................................................................. 7
Rift with Qatar........................................................................................................................... 87
Iran ............................................................................................................................................ 8
UAE Regional Policy and Interventions in Regional Conflicts ................................................ 98
Egypt/North Africa.............................................................................................................. 9
Syria .................................................................................................................................. 10
Iraq ............Iraq and Syria ........................................................................................................................ 10 9
Yemen ................................................................................................................................ 11 10
Afghanistan ....................................................................................................................... 12
Israel, Normalization Agreement, and the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute ............................. 12
UAE Foreign Aid .........Spending ........................................................................................................... 1413
Defense Cooperation with the United States ........................................................................... 1413
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and U.S. Forces in UAE .................................. 14
U.S. and Other Arms Sales ............................................................................................... 1514
UAE Defense Cooperation with Other Powers ................................................................. 1716
Cooperation against Terrorism, Proliferation, and Narcotics .................................................. 18
Counter-Terrorism Issues .................................................................................................. 18
17
Port and Border Controls .................................................................................................. 1918
U.S. Funding Issues................................................................................................................. 2019
Nuclear AgreementPower and Space Program ............................................................................................... 19 20
Economic Issues ............................................................................................................................ 21
Oil and Gas Issues ................................................................................................................... 22
20
U.S.-UAE Economic Ties ....................................................................................................... 2220
Commercial Aviation Issue ............................................................................................... 2221
Figures
Figure 1. UAE at a Glance .............................................................................................................. 6
Tables
Table 1. UAE Leadership ................................................................................................................ 2
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Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 23
21
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
Governance, Human Rights, and Reform
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates (principalities): Abu Dhabi, The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates (principalities): Abu Dhabi,
the oil-rich federation capital; Dubai, a large commercial hub; and the five smaller and less the oil-rich federation capital; Dubai, a large commercial hub; and the five smaller and less
wealthy emirates of Sharjah, Ajman, Fujayrah, Umm al-Qaywayn, and Ras al-Khaymah. Sharjah wealthy emirates of Sharjah, Ajman, Fujayrah, Umm al-Qaywayn, and Ras al-Khaymah. Sharjah
and Ras al-Khaymah have a common ruling family—leaders of the al-Qawasim tribe. After and Ras al-Khaymah have a common ruling family—leaders of the al-Qawasim tribe. After
Britain announced in 1968 that it would no longer ensure security in the Gulf, six “Trucial States” Britain announced in 1968 that it would no longer ensure security in the Gulf, six “Trucial States”
formed the UAE federation in December 1971; Ras al-Khaymah joined in 1972.1 The five smaller formed the UAE federation in December 1971; Ras al-Khaymah joined in 1972.1 The five smaller
emirates, often called the “northern emirates,” tend to be more politically and religiously emirates, often called the “northern emirates,” tend to be more politically and religiously
conservative thanconservative than
are Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which are urban amalgams populated by many Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which are urban amalgams populated by many
expatriates. expatriates.
As is the case in the other Gulf states, the hereditary leaders of the UAE are the paramount
As is the case in the other Gulf states, the hereditary leaders of the UAE are the paramount
decisionmakers. And, indecision makers. In the UAE, the UAE,
visible opposition to the government has been opposition to the government has been
relatively minor and inactivelargely confined to exchanges on social media. The federation’s last major leadership transition occurred in November 2004, upon the . The federation’s last major leadership transition occurred in November 2004, upon the
death of the first UAE president and ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan. death of the first UAE president and ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan.
Shaykh Zayid’s eldest son, Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid Shaykh Zayid’s eldest son, Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid
al-Al Nuhayyan, born in 1948, was elevated Nuhayyan, born in 1948, was elevated
from Crown Prince to ruler of Abu Dhabi upon Zayid’s 2004 death. In keeping with a long-from Crown Prince to ruler of Abu Dhabi upon Zayid’s 2004 death. In keeping with a long-
standing agreement among the seven emirates, Khalifa was subsequently selected as UAE standing agreement among the seven emirates, Khalifa was subsequently selected as UAE
president by the leaders of all the emirates, who collectively comprise the “Federal Supreme president by the leaders of all the emirates, who collectively comprise the “Federal Supreme
Council.” The ruler of Dubai traditionally serves as vice president and prime minister of the Council.” The ruler of Dubai traditionally serves as vice president and prime minister of the
UAE; that position has been held by Shaykh Mohammad bin Rashid Al Maktum, architect of UAE; that position has been held by Shaykh Mohammad bin Rashid Al Maktum, architect of
Dubai’s modernization drive, since the death of his elder brother Shaykh Dubai’s modernization drive, since the death of his elder brother Shaykh
Maktum bin Rashid Al Rashid Al
Maktum in 2006. Maktum in 2006.
UAE leadership posts generally change only in the event of death of an incumbent. Shaykh
UAE leadership posts generally change only in the event of death of an incumbent. Shaykh
Khalifa’s stroke in January 2014 has sidelined him from an active role in decisionmaking, but Khalifa’s stroke in January 2014 has sidelined him from an active role in decisionmaking, but
there is unlikely to be a formal succession as long as he remains alive. His younger half-brother there is unlikely to be a formal succession as long as he remains alive. His younger half-brother
(third son of Shaykh Zayid), Crown Prince Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid (third son of Shaykh Zayid), Crown Prince Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid
al-Al Nuhayyan (born in Nuhayyan (born in
1961), who wielded substantial authority even before his elder brother’s incapacitation and has 1961), who wielded substantial authority even before his elder brother’s incapacitation and has
been de facto UAE leader since, is almost certain to succeed him in all posts. Several senior UAE been de facto UAE leader since, is almost certain to succeed him in all posts. Several senior UAE
officials are also brothers of Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid, including Foreign Minister Abdullah officials are also brothers of Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid, including Foreign Minister Abdullah
bin Zayid, Deputy Prime Minister Mansur bin Zayid, Minister of Interior Sayf bin Zayid, and bin Zayid, Deputy Prime Minister Mansur bin Zayid, Minister of Interior Sayf bin Zayid, and
National Security Advisor Shaykh Tahnoun bin Zayid. National Security Advisor Shaykh Tahnoun bin Zayid.
1 For a brief history of the British role in the Persian Gulf, see Rabi, Uzi1 For a brief history of the British role in the Persian Gulf, see Rabi, Uzi
. , “Britain’s ‘Special Position’ in the Gulf: Its Britain’s ‘Special Position’ in the Gulf: Its
Origins, Dynamics and LegacyOrigins, Dynamics and Legacy
.,” Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 42, No. 3 (May 2006), pp. 351-364. Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 42, No. 3 (May 2006), pp. 351-364.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
Table 1. UAE Leadership
Khalifa bin Zayid al-Al
Mohammad bin Zayid
Nuhayyan
al-Al Nuhayyhan
UAE president and Ruler
UAE president and Ruler
Crown Prince/heir
Crown Prince/heir
of Abu Dhabi Emirate
of Abu Dhabi Emirate
apparent of Abu Dhabi
apparent of Abu Dhabi
since 2004; incapacitated
since 2004; incapacitated
De facto President of
De facto President of
since 2014 stroke
since 2014 stroke
UAE due to brother’s
UAE due to brother’s
incapacitationincapacitation
Mohammad bin Rashid
Sultan bin Mohammad
Al Maktum
Al Qassimi
UAE Vice President,
UAE Vice President,
Ruler of Sharjah Emirate
Ruler of Sharjah Emirate
Prime Minister, and
Prime Minister, and
Defense Minister, and Defense Minister, and
ruler of Dubai Emirate ruler of Dubai Emirate
Saud bin Saqr Al
Humaid bin Rashid Al
Qassimi
Nuami
Ruler of Ras al-Khaymah
Ruler of Ras al-Khaymah
Ruler of Ajman Emirate
Ruler of Ajman Emirate
Saud bin Rashid Al
Hamad bin
Mu’alla
Mohammad Al Sharqi
Ruler of Umm al-
Ruler of Umm al-
Ruler of Fujairah Emirate
Ruler of Fujairah Emirate
Qaywayn Emirate
Qaywayn Emirate
Abdullah bin Zayid al-Al
Yusuf al-Otaiba
Nuhayyan
Ambassador to the
Ambassador to the
Foreign Minister
Foreign Minister
United States
United States
Son of former longtime Son of former longtime
UAE Oil Minister Mani UAE Oil Minister Mani
Saeed al-OtaibaSaeed al-Otaiba
Sources: Graphic by CRS, open source photos. Graphic by CRS, open source photos.
Other Governance Issues2
UAE leaders argue that the country’s social tolerance and distribution of national wealth have UAE leaders argue that the country’s social tolerance and distribution of national wealth have
rendered the bulk of the population satisfied with the political system. Emiratis are able to express rendered the bulk of the population satisfied with the political system. Emiratis are able to express
their concerns directly to the country’s leaders through traditional consultative mechanisms, such their concerns directly to the country’s leaders through traditional consultative mechanisms, such
2 Much of this section taken from U.S. Department of State, 2 Much of this section taken from U.S. Department of State,
20202021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United
Arab Emirates, ,
March 30, 2021released April 11, 2022. .
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
as the open
as the open
majlis (assemblies) held by many UAE leaders. UAE law prohibits political parties, (assemblies) held by many UAE leaders. UAE law prohibits political parties,
and UAE officials maintain that parties would aggravate schisms among tribes and clans and and UAE officials maintain that parties would aggravate schisms among tribes and clans and
open UAE politics to regional influence.3 open UAE politics to regional influence.3
Federal National Council (FNC) and FNC Elections
The UAE has provided for some limited formal popular representation through a 40-seat Federal
The UAE has provided for some limited formal popular representation through a 40-seat Federal
National Council (FNC)—a body that can review and veto recommended laws. The FNC can call National Council (FNC)—a body that can review and veto recommended laws. The FNC can call
ministers before it to question them, but it ministers before it to question them, but it
cannot remove ministers. Its sessions are open to the publicis not empowered to remove ministers. The seat distribution of the FNC is weighted in favor of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which . The seat distribution of the FNC is weighted in favor of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which
each hold eight seats. Sharjah and Ras al-Khaymah have six each, and the other emirates each each hold eight seats. Sharjah and Ras al-Khaymah have six each, and the other emirates each
have four. Each emirate also has its own appointed consultative council. have four. Each emirate also has its own appointed consultative council.
The government has expanded the electorate for the FNC in successive elections. In 2006, the whenIn 2006, the UAE leadership instituted a limited election process for half of the FNC seats, UAE leadership instituted a limited election process for half of the FNC seats,
with the other 20 FNC seats remaining appointed. A a government commission approved an “electorate” government commission approved an “electorate”
of about 6,600 persons, mostly members of the elite. Out of the 452 candidates for the 20 elected of about 6,600 persons, mostly members of the elite. Out of the 452 candidates for the 20 elected
seats, there were 65 female candidates. One woman was elected (from Abu Dhabi), and another seats, there were 65 female candidates. One woman was elected (from Abu Dhabi), and another
seven women received appointed seats.seven women received appointed seats.
The second FNC election, held on September 24, 2011, in the context of the “Arab spring” The second FNC election, held on September 24, 2011, in the context of the “Arab spring”
uprisings, had an expanded electorate (129,000uprisings, had an expanded electorate (129,000
electors), nearly half of them women. There were 468 ), nearly half of them women. There were 468
candidates, including 85 women. Of the 20 winners, one was a woman, and six women received candidates, including 85 women. Of the 20 winners, one was a woman, and six women received
appointed seats. The FNC selected the woman who was elected, Dr. Amal al-Qubaisi, as deputy appointed seats. The FNC selected the woman who was elected, Dr. Amal al-Qubaisi, as deputy
speaker—the first woman to hold such a high position in a GCC representative body. For the speaker—the first woman to hold such a high position in a GCC representative body. For the
October 3, 2015, FNC elections, the electorate was doubled to about 225,000 voters. There were October 3, 2015, FNC elections, the electorate was doubled to about 225,000 voters. There were
330 candidates, including 74 women. Dr. Amal al-Qubaisi, was again the only woman who won, 330 candidates, including 74 women. Dr. Amal al-Qubaisi, was again the only woman who won,
and she was promoted to FNC speaker. Of the 20 appointed seats, eight were women. and she was promoted to FNC speaker. Of the 20 appointed seats, eight were women.
The most recent FNC elections were held over several days in October 2019
The most recent FNC elections were held over several days in October 2019
, an under a . A December 2018 UAE leadership decree December 2018 UAE leadership decree
stipulated that half of the FNC members would be womenthat half of the FNC members would be women
. The quota would be achieved - by appointing enough women to constitute half of the body, after by appointing enough women to constitute half of the body, after
accounting for those elected.4 The electorate was expanded further to 337,000 voters, and 478 accounting for those elected.4 The electorate was expanded further to 337,000 voters, and 478
candidates were approved to run, of which candidates were approved to run, of which
about 180 180
were women. Seven women were elected, and thirteen more were appointedwere women. Winners included seven women, of which two were from Abu Dhabi, two from Dubai, and one each from Umm al-Qawayn and Fujairah. Thirteen women were among the 20 total appointees—meeting the requirement that half the FNC be women.5 The FNC was inaugurated .5 The FNC was inaugurated
onin November November
14, 2019, and 2019, and
Mr. Saqr bin Ghobash, a former minister, was named Mr. Saqr bin Ghobash, a former minister, was named
Speakerspeaker. .
Human Rights-Related Issues6
Reports by theThe State Department and groups such as Human Rights Watch State Department and groups such as Human Rights Watch
assert that there are a variety ofidentify the main human rights problems in the UAE human rights problems in the UAE
, including as: unverified reports of torture, government unverified reports of torture, government
restrictions of freedoms of speech and assembly, and lack of judicial independence. UAE human restrictions of freedoms of speech and assembly, and lack of judicial independence. UAE human
rights oversight organizations include the Jurists’ Association’s Human Rights Committee, the rights oversight organizations include the Jurists’ Association’s Human Rights Committee, the
Emirates Human Rights Association (EHRA), and the Emirates Center for Human Rights Emirates Human Rights Association (EHRA), and the Emirates Center for Human Rights
(ECHR), but their degree of independence is uncertain.
3 Anwar Gargash, “Amid Challenges, UAE Policies Engage Gradual Reforms3 Anwar Gargash, “Amid Challenges, UAE Policies Engage Gradual Reforms
.,” ”
The National, August 26, 2012. , August 26, 2012.
4 Communication from UAE Embassy Washington, DC, representatives4 Communication from UAE Embassy Washington, DC, representatives
., December 11, 2018. December 11, 2018.
5 Emirates News Agency (WAM) releases and press articles5 Emirates News Agency (WAM) releases and press articles
., October 2019. October 2019.
6 Much of this section is from U.S. Department of State, 6 Much of this section is from U.S. Department of State,
20202021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United
Arab Emirates, Arab Emirates,
March 30, 2021April 11, 2022. .
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
(ECHR), but their degree of independence is uncertain. In a January 2018 U.N. Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review, UAE officials highlighted their formation of a human rights commission under international standards (“Paris Principles”).7
Some observers claim that U.S. officials downplay criticism of the UAE’s human rights record because of the U.S.-UAE strategic partnership. Readouts of meetings between U.S. and UAE leaders over the past decade have emphasized regional issues, strategic cooperation, and economic ties, with relatively little mention of discussion of UAE domestic human rights issues.
Treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood and Other Domestic Opposition
Since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, the government has increased its arrests and monitoring of domestic activists who agitate, on social media or through other mechanisms, for more political space and government accountability. The government has been particularly focused on the Muslim Brotherhood, asserting that groups inspired byTreatment of the Muslim Brotherhood and Other Domestic Opposition
Since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, the government has asserted that the Muslim Brotherhood and groups affiliated with it are a threat to the stability of the it are a threat to the stability of the
region and the UAE itself.region and the UAE itself.
87 In 2014 the UAE named the Muslim Brotherhood as one of 85 In 2014 the UAE named the Muslim Brotherhood as one of 85
“terrorist organizations” (a list that included Al Qaeda and the Islamic State).“terrorist organizations” (a list that included Al Qaeda and the Islamic State).
9 Yet, there is an 8 A domestic affiliate of the Brotherhood in the country—the Islah (Reform) organization—affiliate of the Brotherhood in the country—the Islah (Reform) organization—
that has operated has operated
openly in the UAE since 1974openly in the UAE since 1974
and has no history of attacks or violence. It attracts, attracting followers followers
mostly from the less wealthy and more religiously conservative northern mostly from the less wealthy and more religiously conservative northern
emirates. Despite that record of non-violence, the government cracked down on Islah in 2012. The UAE leadership apparently feared that the Brotherhood and its affiliates were becoming ascendant in the region, in light of the election of a Muslim Brotherhood figure Mohammad Morsi as president of Egypt.10 In emirates; it has no history of attacks or violence. Despite that record of nonviolence, in 2013, the UAE State Security Court convicted and sentenced 69 2013, the UAE State Security Court convicted and sentenced 69
out of 94 UAE nationals (“UAE-94”)—Islamists arrested during 2011-2013 for Islamists arrested during 2011-2013 for
trying to overthrow the government.
Since 2011, the government has increased its arrests of domestic activists who use social media to agitate for more political space and government accountability. The government has also sought to head off active opposition by enacting reforms and economic incentivestrying to overthrow the government.
The government has also sought to head off active opposition by enacting reforms and economic incentives. In 2011, the government increased funding for infrastructure of the poorer emirates; raised military pensions; and began subsidizing some foods. In several cabinet reshuffles since . In several cabinet reshuffles since
2013, the government 2013, the government
has added several younger ministers, many of them female, and established added several younger ministers, many of them female, and established
minister of state positions for “tolerance,” “happiness,” artificial intelligence, and food security. minister of state positions for “tolerance,” “happiness,” artificial intelligence, and food security.
Media and Research Institute Freedoms
The UAE government has increased restrictions on social media usage since the 2011 Arab
The UAE government has increased restrictions on social media usage since the 2011 Arab
Spring uprisings. The government has jailed several activists for violating a 2015 law that criminalizeduprisings. A 2012 “cybercrimes decree” (Federal Legal Decree No. 5/2012) established a legal basis to prosecute those accused of using information technology to promote dissent. In 2015, an Anti-Discrimination Law was enacted, criminalizing the publication of “provocative” political or the publication of “provocative” political or
religious material.religious material.
Several activists have been jailed for violating the decree.” In 2019, several In 2019, several
Members of Congress, from both chambers, signed a letter to the UAE leadership urging the Members of Congress, from both chambers, signed a letter to the UAE leadership urging the
release of one such activist, Ahmad Mansoor.release of one such activist, Ahmad Mansoor.
119 He remains imprisoned. He remains imprisoned.
A “National Media Council” (NMC) directly oversees all media content, and the The government has government has
banned some journalists from entering the country, and prohibited distribution of books and banned some journalists from entering the country, and prohibited distribution of books and
7 “UAE Officials under Investigation for Torture,” Al Jazeera, January 22, 2018. 8 “UAE and the Muslim Brotherhood: A Story of Rivalry and Hatred.” Middle East Monitor, June 15, 2017. 9 “UAE Lists Scores of Groups as ‘Terrorists.” Al Jazeera, November 16, 2014. 10 “UAE Targets Muslim Brotherhood in Crackdown on Dissent,” BBC, September 26, 2012. 11 “US Congress members call on UAE to release rights activist Ahmed Mansoor,” Middle East Eye, December 13, 2019.
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articles that highlight human rights abuses. The country has applied increasingly strict criteria to articles that highlight human rights abuses. The country has applied increasingly strict criteria to
renewing the licenses of research institutes and some, such as the Gulf Research Center, have renewing the licenses of research institutes and some, such as the Gulf Research Center, have
relocated outside the country.relocated outside the country.
12 On the other hand, some On the other hand, some
new UAE-run think tanks have opened UAE-run think tanks have opened
in recent years, including the Emirates Policy Center and the TRENDS Institute. in recent years, including the Emirates Policy Center and the TRENDS Institute.
Justice/Rule of Law
The UAE constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but court decisions are subject to
The UAE constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but court decisions are subject to
being overruled by political leaders. A 2012 amendment to the UAE constitution set up a “Federal being overruled by political leaders. A 2012 amendment to the UAE constitution set up a “Federal
Judicial Council” chaired by the UAE president. Sharia (Islamic law) courts adjudicate criminal Judicial Council” chaired by the UAE president. Sharia (Islamic law) courts adjudicate criminal
and family law matters, and civil courts, based on French and Egyptian legal systems, adjudicate and family law matters, and civil courts, based on French and Egyptian legal systems, adjudicate
civil matters. Sharia courts civil matters. Sharia courts
mayare empowered to impose flogging as punishment for adultery, prostitution, impose flogging as punishment for adultery, prostitution,
consensual premarital sex, pregnancy outside marriage, defamation of character, and drug or consensual premarital sex, pregnancy outside marriage, defamation of character, and drug or
alcohol charges, but reports of flogging were rare and tended to be confined to a few jurisdictions. alcohol charges. A Federal Supreme Court, appointed by the UAE leadership, adjudicates disputes between A Federal Supreme Court, appointed by the UAE leadership, adjudicates disputes between
emirates or between an emirate and the UAE federal government and questions officials accused emirates or between an emirate and the UAE federal government and questions officials accused
of misconduct. Foreign nationals serve in the judiciary, making them subject to threats of of misconduct. Foreign nationals serve in the judiciary, making them subject to threats of
deportation. The UAE justice system has often come under criticism in cases involving deportation. The UAE justice system has often come under criticism in cases involving
expatriates, particularly involving public displays of affection.
Women’s Rights13
7 “UAE and the Muslim Brotherhood: A Story of Rivalry and Hatred,” Middle East Monitor, June 15, 2017. 8 “UAE Lists Scores of Groups as ‘Terrorists,” Al Jazeera, November 16, 2014. 9 “US Congress members call on UAE to release rights activist Ahmed Mansoor,” Middle East Eye, December 13, 2019.
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expatriates, particularly involving public displays of affection, although in 2020 some laws were altered to allow, for example, unmarried couples to cohabitate.10
Women’s Rights11
Women’s political rights have expanded steadily over the past few decades, but some forms of
Women’s political rights have expanded steadily over the past few decades, but some forms of
discrimination remain legal. Beginning in 2012, UAE women have been allowed to pass on their discrimination remain legal. Beginning in 2012, UAE women have been allowed to pass on their
citizenship to their children—a first in the GCC. However, UAE women are still at a legal citizenship to their children—a first in the GCC. However, UAE women are still at a legal
disadvantage in divorce cases and other family law issues. The penal code allows men to disadvantage in divorce cases and other family law issues. The penal code allows men to
physically punish female family members. Many domestic service jobs are performed by migrant physically punish female family members. Many domestic service jobs are performed by migrant
women, and they are denied basic legal protections such as limits to work hours.women, and they are denied basic legal protections such as limits to work hours.
The 2021 Global Gender Gap Report notes that the UAE is one of the “most improved” countries, due to the country’s increase in female political representation. The Women, Peace and Security index also ranks the UAE highly within the MENA region, and 44th globally.14
Recent cabinet Recent cabinet
shuffles have greatly increased the number of female ministers. As noted, one woman has been shuffles have greatly increased the number of female ministers. As noted, one woman has been
FNC SpeakerFNC speaker, and the FNC selected in 2019 has half women membership. About 10% of the , and the FNC selected in 2019 has half women membership. About 10% of the
UAE diplomatic corps is female, whereas there were no female diplomats prior to 2001. The UAE diplomatic corps is female, whereas there were no female diplomats prior to 2001. The
UAE Air Force has several female fighter pilots. UAE Air Force has several female fighter pilots.
12 CRS conversations with UAE and GRC officials, 2012-2020. 13 See U.S. Department of State, 2020
10 “UAE announces relaxing of Islamic laws for personal freedoms,” PBS Weekend News, November 20, 2020. 11 See U.S. Department of State, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United Arab Emirates, March 30, , March 30,
2021. 2021.
14 For a more in depth discussion of these metrics, see CRS Report R46423, Women in the Middle East and North
Africa: Issues for Congress, by Zoe Danon and Sarah R. Collins.
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Figure 1. UAE at a Glance
Population
About
About
109.8 mil ion, of whom about mil ion, of whom about
1211% are citizens. % are citizens.
Religions
Of total population, 76% Muslim; 10% is Christian; and 15% other (primarily Buddhist or
Of total population, 76% Muslim; 10% is Christian; and 15% other (primarily Buddhist or
Hindu). The citizenry is almost all Muslim, of which 85% are Sunni and 15% are Shia. Hindu). The citizenry is almost all Muslim, of which 85% are Sunni and 15% are Shia.
Ethnic Groups
11% Emirati (citizenry); 29% other Arab and Iranian; 50% South Asian; 10% Western and
11% Emirati (citizenry); 29% other Arab and Iranian; 50% South Asian; 10% Western and
otherEast and South Asian expatriate Asian expatriate
Size of Armed Forces
About 50,000
Inflation Rate
About
About
24% %
GDP and GDP-related
GDP Growth Rate:
GDP Growth Rate:
about 2% in 2019, -5.5% in 2020, 3.65.3% forecast for % forecast for
20212022. .
Metrics
GDP
GDP
on Purchasing Power Parity basis (PPP): $696: $520 bil ion bil ion
(2022 est) Per capita (PPP): $Per capita (PPP): $
71,83476,000
Oil Exports
About 2.9 mil ion barrels per day
About 2.9 mil ion barrels per day
Sovereign Wealth Reserves About $About $
1 tril ion
U.S. citizens in UAE
About 60,000
Major Sites
Dubai’s “Burj Khalifa,” world's tallest building; Burj al-Arab hotel in Dubai; local branches of Guggenheim and Louvre museums in Abu Dhabi. 700 billion
Sources: Map created by CRS. Facts from CIA, Map created by CRS. Facts from CIA,
The World Factbook; U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics; Economist ; U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics; Economist
Intelligence Unit; various press. Intelligence Unit; various press.
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Religious Freedom15Religious Freedom12
The UAE constitution provides for freedom of religion but also declares Islam as the official
The UAE constitution provides for freedom of religion but also declares Islam as the official
religion. The death penalty for conversion from Islam remains in law, but is not religion. The death penalty for conversion from Islam remains in law, but is not
generally enforced. The Shia Muslim minority, which is about 15% of the citizen population and is enforced. The Shia Muslim minority, which is about 15% of the citizen population and is
concentrated largely in Dubai, is free to worship and maintain its own mosques, but Shia mosques concentrated largely in Dubai, is free to worship and maintain its own mosques, but Shia mosques
receive no government receive no government
funds.
12 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom, May 2021.
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funds. There are no Shias in top federal posts.
UAE officials boast of the country’s religious tolerance by citing the 40 churches present there, of
UAE officials boast of the country’s religious tolerance by citing the 40 churches present there, of
a variety of denominations, serving the 1 million Christians in the country, almost all of whom are a variety of denominations, serving the 1 million Christians in the country, almost all of whom are
expatriates.expatriates.
16 In January 2017, the Ministry hosted 30 Christian leaders at the site of an early Christian monastery on Sir Bani Yas Island in Abu Dhabi.13 In November 2017, the Abu Dhabi In November 2017, the Abu Dhabi
Department of Justice signed an agreement with Christian leadership to allow churches to handle Department of Justice signed an agreement with Christian leadership to allow churches to handle
non-Islamic marriages and divorces. In 2016, Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid met with Pope non-Islamic marriages and divorces. In 2016, Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid met with Pope
Francis in the Vatican, and the Pope visited the country in February 2019, Francis in the Vatican, and the Pope visited the country in February 2019,
enabling the UAE to showcase its commitment to religious tolerance. The trip was the first papal visit to the Gulf the first papal visit to the Gulf
region. A Jewish synagogue has been open in Dubai since 2008, serving mostly expatriates. region. A Jewish synagogue has been open in Dubai since 2008, serving mostly expatriates.
Labor Rights and Trafficking in Persons17Persons14
UAE law prohibits all forms of compulsory labor, but enforcement is inconsistent. Foreign
UAE law prohibits all forms of compulsory labor, but enforcement is inconsistent. Foreign
laborers have sometimes conducted strikes to protest poor working conditions, nonpayment of laborers have sometimes conducted strikes to protest poor working conditions, nonpayment of
wages, and cramped housing conditions. Workers still sometimes have their passports held, are wages, and cramped housing conditions. Workers still sometimes have their passports held, are
denied wages or paid late, and are deported for lodging complaints. The government has put in denied wages or paid late, and are deported for lodging complaints. The government has put in
place an electronic salary payment system that applies to companies with more than 100 workers, place an electronic salary payment system that applies to companies with more than 100 workers,
facilitating timely payment of agreed wages. facilitating timely payment of agreed wages.
InSince 2011, the UAE reformed its 2011, the UAE reformed its
kafala (worker (worker
sponsorship) system to allow expatriate workers to more easily switch employers. sponsorship) system to allow expatriate workers to more easily switch employers.
The UAE is a “destination country” for women trafficked from Asia and the countries of the
The UAE is a “destination country” for women trafficked from Asia and the countries of the
former Soviet Union and forced into prostitution. The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons former Soviet Union and forced into prostitution. The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons
report for report for
20202021, for the tenth year in a row, rated the UAE as “Tier 2,” based on the assessment , for the tenth year in a row, rated the UAE as “Tier 2,” based on the assessment
that the UAE is that the UAE is
takingmaking significant efforts to meet the minimum standards for eliminating human significant efforts to meet the minimum standards for eliminating human
trafficking. The trafficking. The
2020 report credits the UAE with report credits the UAE with
increasing its efforts to combat trafficking in persons as compared to the previous year, for example by increasing the number of sex trafficking prosecutions, doubling the number of sex trafficking convictions, and launching awareness campaigns. Since 2013, the UAE government, through its “National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking,” has assisted human trafficking victims, including through sheltersexpanding law enforcement training on trafficking, increasing oversight of domestic worker recruitment by expanding the number of public-private partnership recruitment centers and closing all non-government-regulated recruitment agencies to prevent contract switching and conversion of tourist visas to work visas by unregulated agencies. .
Foreign Policy and Defense Issues
The UAE has sought to influence regional affairs using its significant financial resources as well The UAE has sought to influence regional affairs using its significant financial resources as well
as the expertise and equipment gained in as the expertise and equipment gained in
a decades-longits security partnership with the United security partnership with the United
States. States.
TheWithin the GCC, the UAE is closely aligned with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain UAE is closely aligned with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
on strategy in the region, including on the issues of Iran, Yemen, Syria, and related issues. In 2011, the UAE contributed and, in 2011, it deployed 500 police officers to 500 police officers to
athe Saudi-led GCC military intervention in Bahrain to Saudi-led GCC military intervention in Bahrain to
support the Sunni minority Al Khalifa regime againstsuppress a Shia-led uprising. At least some UAE law enforcement a Shia-led uprising. At least some UAE law enforcement
personnel have remained since.
15 U.S. Department of State, 2019 Report on Religious Freedom, June 10, 2020. 16 “Pope Makes Historic Gulf Visit, Amid Yemen Crisis and Siege of Christians.” New York Times, February 4, 2019. 17 This section is derived from the U.S. Department of State, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report, June 24, 2020.
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personnel remained there.
Rift with Qatar
In June 2017, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain sought to isolate Qatar by denying it land, sea, In June 2017, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain sought to isolate Qatar by denying it land, sea,
and air access to their territories, and issuing 13 demands and air access to their territories, and issuing 13 demands
that Qatar accede to, as a condition for ending the boycott, including reducing its ties toincluding distancing itself from Iran and ceasing support for Muslim Brotherhood-related movements. Iran and ceasing support for Muslim Brotherhood-related movements.
Qatar refused Qatar refused
those demandsto accede, asserting that doing so would forfeit Qatar’s sovereignty. The same issues had prompted a shorter rift in 2014.
At the 41st GCC summit in Al Ula on January 5, 2021, after a series of meetings between Qatar and Saudi Arabia to try to end the dispute, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt announced a restoration of diplomatic relations with Qatar and an end to the territorial blockades., asserting that accepting them would amount to a loss of its sovereignty. High-level talks between Qatar and Saudi Arabia in 2019 to resolve the rift broke off in January 2020, in part because the UAE leadership argued that Qatar was not willing to alter its regional policies.18 Despite the rift, the UAE and Saudi Arabia allowed Qatari commanders to participate in joint GCC security meetings. The issues dividing Qatar and some of its neighbors prompted a similar, but shorter, rift in 2014.
At the 41st GCC summit in Al Ula on January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt announced that they would be restoring diplomatic relations with Qatar. The Al-Ula Declaration refers to a restoration of “collaboration among all Member States” and strengthening “the bonds of brotherhood among them.”19 Direct flights between the UAE and Qatar resumed on January 18.20 Since mid-2021, the UAE has improved ties to Qatar through a visit to Doha by Since mid-2021, the UAE has improved ties to Qatar through a visit to Doha by
UAE National Security Advisor Tahnoun Al Nuhayyan and in a meeting between the de facto UAE National Security Advisor Tahnoun Al Nuhayyan and in a meeting between the de facto
leaders of the UAE and leaders of the UAE and
13 “Pope Makes Historic Gulf Visit, Amid Yemen Crisis and Siege of Christians,” New York Times, February 4, 2019. 14 This section is derived from the U.S. Department of State, 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report.
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Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s ruler on the Red Sea in September 2021. Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s ruler on the Red Sea in September 2021.
However, the UAE and Bahrain have not, to date, returned their ambassadors to Qatar. However, the UAE and Bahrain have not, to date, returned their ambassadors to Qatar.
Iran
U.S. policy toward Iran has been a consistent focus of UAE leaders in relations with their U.S. counterparts. Asserting that Iran is a major threat to regional stability, UAE leaders supported the Trump Asserting that Iran is a major threat to regional stability, UAE leaders supported the Trump
Administration’s May 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the July 2015 Iran nuclear agreement (Joint Administration’s May 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the July 2015 Iran nuclear agreement (Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) and application of a policy of “maximum pressure” on Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) and application of a policy of “maximum pressure” on
IranIran. Diplomatic ties with Iran, on the other hand, have fluctuated: in January 2016, the UAE withdrew its ambassador from Iran in solidarity with Saudi Arabia’s breaking relations with Iran over issues related to the Saudi execution of a dissident Shia cleric. Yet, in mid-2019, amid U.S.-Iran tensions in the Gulf, the UAE leadership began to engage . Yet, in mid-2019, amid U.S.-Iran tensions in the Gulf, the UAE leadership began to engage
Iran, perhaps in part because UAE infrastructure could be at risk in the event of war with Iran. In Iran, perhaps in part because UAE infrastructure could be at risk in the event of war with Iran. In
August 2019, UAE maritime officials visited Iran for the first bilateral security talks since 2013.August 2019, UAE maritime officials visited Iran for the first bilateral security talks since 2013.
21
15 Since 2021, UAE officials have UAE officials have
at timespublicly expressed concerns about Biden Administration policy to negotiate a mutual U.S. and Iranian return to full compliance with the JCPOA without demanding additional concessions from Iran on its support for regional armed factions.
The emirate of Dubai has often advocated that the federation emphasize engagement with Iran - a stance that might reflect the presence of the large Iranian-origin community (estimated at 400,000 persons) and expressed concerns that the large Iranian-origin community in Dubai emirate (estimated at 400,000 persons) could pose an internal threat to UAE stability. This large Iranian community is a product of the extensive Iranian commercial presence in the extensive Iranian commercial presence in
the UAEthat emirate. The . The
business ties have business ties have
led toincluded some illicit purchases by UAE firms of Iranian oil and jet fuel, exports of some illicit purchases by UAE firms of Iranian oil and jet fuel, exports of
proliferation-related technology to Iran (see below), and the use of some UAE financial proliferation-related technology to Iran (see below), and the use of some UAE financial
institutions by Iranian institutions by Iranian
entities. Numerousentities; numerous UAE-based entities have been sanctioned by the United UAE-based entities have been sanctioned by the United
States for these activities.22 Diplomatic ties with Iran, on the other hand, have fluctuated: in January 2016, the UAE withdrew its ambassador from Iran in solidarity with Saudi Arabia’s breaking relations with Iran over issues related to the Saudi execution of a dissident Shia cleric.
Another factor in UAE-Iran relations is a dispute over several Persian Gulf islands. In 1971, the Shah-led government of Iran seized the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands from Ras al-Khaymah
18 “UAE said to be holding up Gulf deal that could end Qatar blockade and protect US interests in Middle East,” Fox
News, July 9, 2020.
19 Tuqa Khalid, “Full transcript of AlUla GCC Summit Declaration: Bolstering Gulf unity,” Al Arabiya, January 6, 2021; Sultan Barakat, “Qatar-GCC agreement: A victory for measured diplomacy,” opinion, Al Jazeera, January 8, 2021.
20 Egypt, UAE resume first Qatar flights after blockade,” Al Jazeera, January 18, 2021. 21 “Rivals Iran and UAE to hold maritime security talks,” Reuters, July 30, 2019. 22 See CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
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States for these activities.16
Another factor in UAE-Iran relations is a dispute over several Persian Gulf islands. In 1971, the Shah-led government of Iran seized the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands from Ras al-Khaymah emirate and compelled the emirate of Sharjah to share with Iran control of Abu Musa island. In emirate and compelled the emirate of Sharjah to share with Iran control of Abu Musa island. In
April 1992, Iran took complete control of Abu Musa and subsequently placed some military April 1992, Iran took complete control of Abu Musa and subsequently placed some military
equipment and administrative offices there. The UAE equipment and administrative offices there. The UAE
has called for called for peaceful resolution of the issue through direct negotiations or referral direct negotiations or referral
to the International Court of Justice to try to resolve the issue. A UAE-Iran joint commission held periodic talks, without a breakthrough, during 2008-to the International Court of Justice. The United States takes no position on the sovereignty of the islands but supports the UAE call for a negotiated settlement. In October 2008, the UAE and Iran established a joint commission to resolve the dispute but talks broke off in 2012. In 2014, the two countries reportedly discussed a possible 2012. In 2014, the two countries reportedly discussed a possible
solution under which Iran might cede control of the disputed islands in exchange for rights to the solution under which Iran might cede control of the disputed islands in exchange for rights to the
seabed around them.seabed around them.
23 Iran17Iran reduced its presence on Abu Musa to build confidence, but no further reduced its presence on Abu Musa to build confidence, but no further
progress has been reported.progress has been reported.
24 The United States takes no position on the sovereignty of the islands.
UAE Regional Policy and Interventions in Regional Conflicts
Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, the UAE has become more active in the region, including through Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, the UAE has become more active in the region, including through
the direct use of its own military forcesthe direct use of its own military forces
and its development of regional military facilities from which to project power. Some assert that the UAE seeks in its regional interventions to restore to power deposed authoritarian Arab leaders and suppress popular uprisings that might threaten them. The UAE’s capabilities have been enhanced by the many years of defense cooperation with the United States. The UAE’s opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood generally drives UAE , the capabilities of which have benefitted from many years of defense cooperation with the United States. The UAE’s opposition to the Muslim
15 “Rivals Iran and UAE to hold maritime security talks,” Reuters, July 30, 2019. 16 See CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman. 17 Awad Mustafa, “Iran, UAE Close to Deal on Hormuz Islands,” Defense News, December 9, 2013.
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Brotherhood has been a key factor driving UAE policies toward countries where Brotherhood-linked groups are prominent. policies toward countries where Brotherhood-linked groups are prominent.
Egypt/North Africa25
The UAE Africa18
The UAE has been an active supporter of like-minded leaders in Egypt and elsewhere in North Africa:
The UAE leadership applauded the Egyptian military’s 2013 toppling of Muslim leadership applauded the Egyptian military’s 2013 toppling of Muslim
Brotherhood Brotherhood
figure Mohammad Morsi, who was elected president in 2012. It has since supported Egypt with figure Mohammad Morsi, who was elected president in 2012. It has since supported Egypt with
approximatelymore than $15 billion in assistance $15 billion in assistance
(including loans, grants, and investments); most of the funds were loans for the country to buy oil and related products.26
In Libya, the UAE is aligned with Egypt and several other outside actors in Libya’s ongoing conflict. In 2011, several GCC states, including the UAE, conducted air strikes and , loans, and investments.19
In Libya, the UAE joined several Gulf states in conducting air strikes to help
armed Libyan armed Libyan
rebels to overthrow then-Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi.27rebels overthrow Muammar Qadhafi in 2011.20 Since then, the UAE, in violation of Since then, the UAE, in violation of
U.N. Security Council resolutions that ban arms transfers to Libya, reportedly has sent weapons U.N. Security Council resolutions that ban arms transfers to Libya, reportedly has sent weapons
to and conducted air operations in support of to and conducted air operations in support of
eastern Libya-based Khalifa Hafter’s Libyan National Army (LNA)Khalifa Hafter’s Libyan National Army (LNA)
movement.28.21 Hafter, a former commander in the Libyan armed forces, has Hafter, a former commander in the Libyan armed forces, has
refused to recognize the authority of the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and leads a coalition of military personnel and militias that has fought Islamist groups and some GNA-aligned forces. In August 2014, the UAE and Egypt carried out an air strike in Libya against a Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamist militia.29 The State Department cited reports from human rights
23 Awad Mustafa, “Iran, UAE Close to Deal on Hormuz Islands,” Defense News, December 9, 2013. 24 Author conversations with UAE representatives, May 2016. 25sought to undermine the U.N.-backed government based in Tripoli. The State Department cited reports from human rights organizations alleging that UAE military drone and air strikes in support of Hafter’s forces resulted in more than 130 civilian casualties in 2020.22
Some political leaders in Tunisia, including parliament speaker Rached
Ghannouchi, accuse the UAE of backing President Kaïs Saïed’s July 2021 assertion of sweeping executive powers and his suspension of the constitution that was adopted in the wake of Tunisia’s 2011 popular uprising.23 Ghannouchi is the longtime leader of the Islamist movement Ennadha, which is considered by many to be an affiliate or offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.24
Iraq and Syria25
The GCC states supported Iraq against Iran in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, and they fought in the U.S.-led coalition that ended Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1990-1991. No Arab state participated in the U.S.-led invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003. To help stabilize post-Saddam Iraq, the UAE wrote off $7 billion in Iraqi debt in 2008, UAE hosted a German
18 For information on U.S. policy toward Egypt and Libya, see CRS Report RL33003, For information on U.S. policy toward Egypt and Libya, see CRS Report RL33003,
Egypt: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp, and CRS In Focus IF11556, , by Jeremy M. Sharp, and CRS In Focus IF11556,
Libya and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard. , by Christopher M. Blanchard.
2619 “Gulf countries supported Egypt with $92bn since 2011,” “Gulf countries supported Egypt with $92bn since 2011,”
Middle East Monitor, March 19, 2019. , March 19, 2019.
2720 “Militant Forces Got Arms Meant for Libya Rebels.” “Militant Forces Got Arms Meant for Libya Rebels.”
New York Times, December 6, 2012. , December 6, 2012.
2821 United Nations, “Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya Established pursuant to Resolution United Nations, “Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya Established pursuant to Resolution
1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2021/229, March 21, 2021. 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2021/229, March 21, 2021.
29 “U.S. Officials: Egypt, UAE behind Airstrikes in Libya.” Associated Press, August 26, 2014. 22 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights: United Arab Emirates, March 31, 2021. 23 “Tunisia coup: Ennahda leader blames UAE for power grab,” Middle East Eye, July 31, 2021. 24 Monica Marks and Sayida Ounissi, “Ennahda from within: Islamists or “Muslim Democrats”? A conversation,” Brookings Institution, March 23, 2016.
25 For more information on the Syria conflict, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud. For analysis on Iraq, see CRS In Focus IF10404, Iraq and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
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organizations alleging that UAE military drone and air strikes in support of Hafter’s forces resulted in more than 130 civilian casualties in 2020.30
Some political leaders in Tunisia, including parliament speaker Rached Ghannouchi, accuse the UAE of backing President Kaïs Saïed’s July 2021 assertion of sweeping executive powers and his suspension of the constitution that was adopted in the wake of Tunisia’s 2011 popular uprising.31 Ghannouchi is the longtime leader of the Islamist movement Ennadha, which is considered by many to be an affiliate or offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.32
Syria33
In Syria, the GCC states sought the ousting President Bashar Al Asad when an uprising against his rule began in 2011. The UAE did not provide weaponry to particular groups, but instead mission to train Iraqi police, and provided funds for Iraq reconstruction.26 In 2012, it opened a consulate in the Kurdish-controlled autonomous region of Iraq. After several years of political tensions with Iraq’s Shia-dominated governments that sought to marginalize Iraqi Sunni leaders, UAE and Saudi officials have in recent years sought to engage moderate Iraqi Shia leaders. The UAE and other GCC states have advanced proposals to provide Iraq with electricity and help wean it from dependence on Iranian supplies. In 2020, the UAE delivered planeloads of equipment to help Iraq cope with the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
In Syria, the GCC states initially supported the 2011 uprising against President Bashar Al Asad, in part to oust a strong ally of Iran. The UAE contributed to a multilateral pool of funds to buy arms for approved rebel groups in Syriacontributed to a multilateral pool of funds to buy arms for approved rebel groups in Syria
.34 Asad has largely prevailed in the conflict after Russia’s military intervention on his behalf in 2015, and the,27 but Russian military intervention in 2015 has enabled Asad to largely prevail over his opponents. The UAE reopened its embassy in Damascus in December 2018, claiming that doing so would UAE reopened its embassy in Damascus in December 2018, claiming that doing so would
help counter to Iran’s influence in Syria.help counter to Iran’s influence in Syria.
3528 In March 2020, Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid offered In March 2020, Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid offered
Asad assistance to help Syria cope with the COVID-19 outbreak; a delivery of food and medical Asad assistance to help Syria cope with the COVID-19 outbreak; a delivery of food and medical
supplies, including COVID-19 vaccines, was delivered to Syria in early April 2021.supplies, including COVID-19 vaccines, was delivered to Syria in early April 2021.
36 The UAE 29 In March 2022, the UAE hosted a visit by Asad, his first to an Arab country since the uprising, signaling UAE intent to help reintegrate Asad into the regional fold. U.S. officials criticized the UAE decision to host Asad.
The UAE has also sought to alleviate suffering from the Syria crisis through donations to Syrian refugees has also sought to alleviate suffering from the Syria crisis through donations to Syrian refugees
and grants to Jordan to help it cope with the Syrian refugees that have fled there. In 2018, the and grants to Jordan to help it cope with the Syrian refugees that have fled there. In 2018, the
UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait provided a total of $2.5 billion to help stabilize Jordan’s UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait provided a total of $2.5 billion to help stabilize Jordan’s
finances.finances.
3730
During 2014-2015, as a member of the U.S.-led coalition combatting the Islamic State
During 2014-2015, as a member of the U.S.-led coalition combatting the Islamic State
organization, the UAE sent pilots to conduct and even command some coalition air strikes against organization, the UAE sent pilots to conduct and even command some coalition air strikes against
Islamic State positions in Syria. The UAE also hosted other forces participating in the anti-Islamic State positions in Syria. The UAE also hosted other forces participating in the anti-
Islamic State effort, including French jets stationed at Al Dhafra Air Base and 600 forces from Islamic State effort, including French jets stationed at Al Dhafra Air Base and 600 forces from
Australia.Australia.
3831 None of the GCC states conducted anti-Islamic State air operations in Iraq. None of the GCC states conducted anti-Islamic State air operations in Iraq.
Iraq39
The GCC states supported Iraq against Iran in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, and they fought in the U.S.-led coalition that ended Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1990-1991. No Arab state participated in the U.S.-led invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003. To help stabilize post-Saddam Iraq, the UAE wrote off $7 billion in Iraqi debt in 2008, and the UAE hosted a
30 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights: United Arab Emirates, March 31, 2021. 31 “Tunisia coup: Ennahda leader blames UAE for power grab,” Middle East Eye, July 31, 2021. 32 Monica Marks and Sayida Ounissi, “Ennahda from within: Islamists or “Muslim Democrats”? A conversation.” Brookings Institution, March 23, 2016.
33 For more information on the Syria conflict, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S.
Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud.
34 Author conversations with experts in Washington, DC, 2013-2014. 35 “UAE reopens Syria embassy in boost for Assad.” Reuters, December 27, 2018. 36Yemen32
The UAE, in close partnership with Saudi Arabia, intervened militarily in Yemen in March 2015 with military personnel, armor, and air strikes against the Zaydi Shia “Houthi” faction that had ousted the government in Sanaa. The Saudi-led coalition asserted that the intervention was required to roll back the regional influence of Iran. Iran has, since the Saudi/UAE-led intervention, supplied the Houthis with arms, including short-range ballistic and cruise missiles that the Houthis have fired on UAE and Saudi territory and ships in the Bab el Mandeb Strait. Despite highlighting its provision of humanitarian aid to the people of Yemen, international criticism that the Saudi-led coalition effort was causing civilian casualties and humanitarian problems contributed to a UAE decision in July 2019 to withdraw most of its ground forces from Yemen. Nearly 150 UAE soldiers died in the Yemen conflict. Since early 2022, gains by UAE- 26 “UAE cancels nearly $7 billion in Iraq debt.” Reuters, July 6, 2008. 27 Author conversations with experts in Washington, D.C., 2013-2014. 28 “UAE reopens Syria embassy in boost for Assad.” Reuters, December 27, 2018. 29 “Syria’s Assad, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince spoke on phone: State media.” “Syria’s Assad, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince spoke on phone: State media.”
Straits Times, March 28, 2020; Bassem , March 28, 2020; Bassem
Mroue, “UAE sends Syria aid to help it fight spread of coronavirus,” Mroue, “UAE sends Syria aid to help it fight spread of coronavirus,”
The Washington Post, April 8, 2021. April 8, 2021.
3730 “UAE Extends AED 3 Billion Economic Aid Package “UAE Extends AED 3 Billion Economic Aid Package
Toto Jordan,” Jordan,”
Forbes Middle East, October 9, 2018. , October 9, 2018.
3831 “Islamic State Crisis: Australia to Send 600 Troops to UAE,” “Islamic State Crisis: Australia to Send 600 Troops to UAE,”
BBC News, September 14, 2014. , September 14, 2014.
39 For analysis on Iraq, see CRS In Focus IF10404, Iraq and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard32 See CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
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supported militia fighters in central Yemen contributed to an agreement by all sides to an April-May 2022 ceasefire that U.N. and other mediators are seeking to convert into a longer term end to the hostilities in Yemen.
UAE policy in Yemen has been a source of friction in U.S.-UAE relations. The humanitarian consequences of the UAE war effort in Yemen produced congressional opposition to the U.S. logistical support provided to the effort and to some U.S. arms sales to the UAE.33 UAE leaders also publicly questioned the Biden Administration’s decision in February 2021 to remove the Houthis from the list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) - a designation made in the final weeks of the Trump Administration. In January 2022, the Houthis sought to put additional pressure on the UAE to exit the conflict by firing Iran-supplied missiles on targets near Abu Dhabi International Airport. Some of those launches were at least partly intercepted by U.S.-operated missile defense systems in the country (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD),34 and the United States subsequently deployed U.S. ships and additional forces to the UAE to deter additional attacks. However, UAE leaders have complained that the United States did not respond strongly enough to the launches.35
Related UAE Power Projection Capabilities/East Africa In part to support its intervention in Yemen, the UAE has established military bases and supported various leaders in several East African countries.36 In 2016, the UAE and Saudi Arabia persuaded Sudan’s leaders to forgo a two-decade alliance with Iran and to deploy Sudanese troops as part of the Saudi/UAE-led intervention in Yemen. In April 2019, Sudan’s then-leader, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, was ousted by military colleagues in response to a popular uprising. Perhaps to keep the new regime aligned with the two Gulf states, the UAE and Saudi Arabia pledged $3 billion in aid to Sudan.37 In late 2020, Sudan joined the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco in signing the Abraham Accords normalizing relations with Israel.
.
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German mission to train Iraqi police and the UAE provided funds for Iraq reconstruction.40 In 2012, it opened a consulate in the Kurdish-controlled autonomous region of Iraq. After several years of political tensions over efforts by Iraq’s Shia-dominated government to marginalize Iraqi Sunni leaders, UAE officials hosted Iraq’s then-Prime Minster Haydar Al Abadi in 2014. But, those tensions contributed to the UAE’s decision not to conduct air operations in Iraq against the Islamic State. In 2020, the UAE delivered planeloads of equipment to help Iraq cope with the COVID-19 pandemic.
Yemen41
The UAE, in close partnership with Saudi Arabia, intervened militarily in Yemen in March 2015 with military personnel, armor, and air strikes against the Zaydi Shia “Houthi” faction that had ousted the government in Sanaa. The Saudi-led coalition asserted that the intervention was required to roll back the regional influence of Iran, which has supplied the Houthis with arms, including short-range ballistic and cruise missiles that the Houthis have fired on UAE and Saudi territory and ships in the Bab el Mandeb Strait. Despite highlighting its provision of humanitarian aid to the people of Yemen, international criticism that the Saudi-led coalition effort was causing civilian casualties and humanitarian problems contributed to a UAE decision in July 2019 to withdraw most of its ground forces from Yemen. UAE forces continues to back a faction in southern Yemen opposed to the Republic of Yemen government.42 The coalition war effort has produced increasing congressional opposition to the U.S. logistical support provided to the effort and to some U.S. arms sales to the UAE.43 Nearly 150 UAE soldiers died in the Yemen conflict.
The UAE continues to work closely with U.S. forces and with local Yemeni communities to counter the local faction of Al Qaeda—Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).44 In August 2017, UAE and U.S. forces reportedly advised Yemen government forces in an operation against AQAP sanctuaries in Shabwa Province.45 In March 2019, a UAE-U.S. operation rescued an American hostage in Yemen who was held by a group tied to Al Qaeda.46
Related UAE Power Projection Capabilities/East Africa
In part to support its intervention in Yemen, the UAE has established military bases and supported various leaders in several East African countries.47 During 2015, UAE forces deployed to Djibouti During 2015, UAE forces deployed to Djibouti
to support the intervention in Yemen, but a UAE-Djibouti dispute over funding arrangements to support the intervention in Yemen, but a UAE-Djibouti dispute over funding arrangements
caused UAE (and Saudi) forces to begin using facilities in neighboring Eritrea. Perhaps to caused UAE (and Saudi) forces to begin using facilities in neighboring Eritrea. Perhaps to
solidify its relations with Eritrea, the UAE helped broker a 2018 rapprochement between Eritrea solidify its relations with Eritrea, the UAE helped broker a 2018 rapprochement between Eritrea
40 “UAE cancels nearly $7 billion in Iraq debt.” Reuters, July 6, 2008. 41 See CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 42 Ibrahim Jalal, “The UAE may have withdrawn from Yemen, but its influence remains strong,” Middle East Institute, February 25, 2020.
43and Ethiopia, possibly facilitated by a UAE pledge of $3 billion in investments in Ethiopia.38 Similarly, the UAE sought to enlist support from Somalia in the Saudi/UAE-led campaign in Yemen. In 2014, the UAE conducted training for Somali troops, but the arrangement unraveled following Mogadishu’s refusal to take sides in the ongoing blockade of Qatar.39
33 For information on congressional action on U.S. support for the Arab coalition, and CRS Report R45046, For information on congressional action on U.S. support for the Arab coalition, and CRS Report R45046,
Congress
and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-20202021, by Jeremy M. Sharp, Christopher M. Blanchard, and , by Jeremy M. Sharp, Christopher M. Blanchard, and
Sarah R. Collins. Sarah R. Collins.
44 “U.S. Forces to Stay Longer in Yemen to Fight al Qaeda.” Washington Post, June 18, 2016. 45 “Yemeni Forces Target Qaeda Stronghold.” New York Times, August 7, 2017. 46 “Operation Led by U.A.E. Freed American Hostage in Yemen.” New York Times, March 7, 2019. 4734 “THAAD, in first operational use, destroys midrange ballistic missile in Houthi attack,” Defense News, January 21 2022. See also: CRS Insight IN11891, Attacks Against the United Arab Emirates: Issues for Congress, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Carla E. Humud.
35 Bilal Saab and Karen Young, “How Biden Can Rebuild U.S. Ties with the Gulf States,” Foreign Policy, April 4, 2022.
36 Material in this section is taken from Alex Mello and Michael Knights Material in this section is taken from Alex Mello and Michael Knights
., “West of Suez for the United Arab Emirates.” Warontherocks.com. September 2, 2016.
37 “Sudan has received half the $3 billion promised by Saudi Arabia and UAE,” Reuters, October 8, 2019. 38 “UAE to give Ethiopia $3 billion in aid and investments,” Reuters, June 16, 2018. 39 “Why the UAE Wants Somalia in the Yemen Conflict,” Fair Observer, August 17, 2020.
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Afghanistan40 “West of Suez for the United Arab Emirates.” Warontherocks.com. September 2, 2016.
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link to page 17 The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
and Ethiopia, possibly facilitated by a UAE pledge of $3 billion in investments in Ethiopia.48 Reporting in February 2021 suggested that the UAE dismantled its military base in Eritrea.49 The UAE had also planned to establish a base in the breakaway region of Somaliland, and train Somaliland security forces, but those plans were abandoned in September 2019.50 The Emirati company, DP World, however, plans to expand its commercial operations at Berbera port.51
The UAE and Saudi Arabia succeeded in persuading Sudan’s leaders to forgo a two-decade alliance with Iran that began in 1993. In 2016, Sudanese troops joined the Saudi-led coalition effort in Yemen, and Sudan’s then-leader, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, visited the UAE. In April 2019, Bashir was ousted by military colleagues in response to a popular uprising and the UAE and Saudi Arabia pledged $3 billion in aid to Sudan, even though Sudan was not under civilian rule.52 Sudan joined the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco in signing the Abraham Accords normalizing relations with Israel in late 2020 (see “Normalization Agreement”).
Afghanistan53
Before the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, the UAE apparently did not perceive
Before the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, the UAE apparently did not perceive
the Taliban movement as a major threat. The UAE was one of three countries (Pakistan and Saudi the Taliban movement as a major threat. The UAE was one of three countries (Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia were the others) that recognized the Taliban during 1996-2001 as the government of Arabia were the others) that recognized the Taliban during 1996-2001 as the government of
Afghanistan, even though the Taliban harbored Al Qaeda leaders. Afghanistan, even though the Taliban harbored Al Qaeda leaders.
The UAE has assisted the U.S.-led mission to stabilize Afghanistan by allowing the use of its Following the September 11 attacks, the UAE allowed the United States to use its military facilities for U.S. operations in Afghanistan and it deployed a 250-person contingent, supported by six UAE F-16s, in Afghanistan’s restive south until 2014.41military facilities for U.S. operations there and by deploying a 250-person contingent since 2003, in Afghanistan’s restive south. During 2012-2014, the UAE deployed six F-16s for missions there.54 The UAE also was a significant donor of aid to post-Taliban Afghanistan. The risks of this The risks of this
involvement were evident in January 2017 when five UAE diplomats were killed by a bomb involvement were evident in January 2017 when five UAE diplomats were killed by a bomb
during their visit to the governor’s during their visit to the governor’s
compound in Qandahar. The UAE also was a significant donor of aid to post-Taliban Afghanistan. The compound in Qandahar. In December 2018, the UAE hosted meetings between Taliban representatives, U.S. officials, and officials from several regional countries to discuss a possible political settlement in Afghanistan, but the bulk of the meetings that produced a February 2020 U.S.-Taliban peace agreement were hosted in Doha, Qatar. The UAE closed its embassy in Kabul following the August 2021 Taliban takeover and subsequently UAE closed its embassy in Kabul following the August 2021 Taliban takeover and subsequently
allowed ousted president Ashraf Ghani to live in exile there. It also took in Afghan air force pilots allowed ousted president Ashraf Ghani to live in exile there. It also took in Afghan air force pilots
who had flown their aircraft to Uzbekistan as the Taliban advanced on Kabul.
Israel, Normalization Agreement, and the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute
Since its founding in 1971, the UAE has had no formal diplomatic relations with Israel. However, the two had been increasing their cooperation for the past decade, in large part to counter Iran. Israeli diplomats have long attended multilateral meetings in the UAE, Israelis have attended professional conferences there, and, in November 2015, the UAE gave Israel permission to 48 “UAE to give Ethiopia $3 billion in aid and investments.” Reuters, June 16, 2018. 49 “UAE Dismantles Eritrea Base as it Pulls Back After Yemen War,” Associated Press, February 18, 2021. 50 “UAE to Train Somaliland Forces under Military Base Deal,” Reuters, March 16, 2018; “Somaliland UAE military base to be turned into civilian airport,” Reuters, September 15, 2019.
51 Samuel Ramani, “What UAE’s growing presence in Somaliland means for its Horn of Africa strategy,” Al Monitor, March 29, 2021.
52 “Sudan has received half the $3 billion promised by Saudi Arabia and UAE,” Reuters, October 8, 2019. 53 CRS Report R45818, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton Thomas. 54 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potent ally nicknamed ‘Little Sparta’,” The
Washington Post, November 9, 2014.
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who had flown their aircraft to Uzbekistan as the Taliban advanced on Kabul. It has since reopened its embassy in Kabul. Several thousand Afghans who evacuated from Kabul in August 2021 are present in Abu Dhabi and seek repatriation to the United States.
Israel, Normalization Agreement, and the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute42
From its founding in 1971 until 2020, the UAE had no formal diplomatic relations with Israel, but the two had been quietly building ties for the past decade in an effort to counter Iran. In November 2015, the UAE gave Israel permission to establish a diplomatic office in Abu Dhabi to facilitate Israel’s participation in the International establish a diplomatic office in Abu Dhabi to facilitate Israel’s participation in the International
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).
5543 In June 2019, Israeli Foreign Minister Yisrael Katz In June 2019, Israeli Foreign Minister Yisrael Katz
visited Abu Dhabi to attendattended a U.N. meeting on climate change a U.N. meeting on climate change
.56 Along with the diplomatic and other contacts, there has been some Israel-UAE bilateral trade in Abu Dhabi.44 Bilateral trade had been increasing, even though the UAE formally enforced , even though the UAE formally enforced
the Arab the Arab
League primary boycott of Israel.45
On August 13, 2020, President Trump, then-League primary boycott of Israel. In 1994, the UAE and the other GCC states ended enforcement of the Arab League’s secondary and tertiary boycotts (boycotts of companies doing business with Israel and on companies that do business with those companies).
Normalization Agreement57
On August 13, 2020, President Trump issued a joint statement with Israeli Prime Minister Israeli Prime Minister
Binyamin Netanyahu and Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayid Binyamin Netanyahu and Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayid
announcingannounced that Israel and the UAE that Israel and the UAE
have agreed to fully normalize their relations, and that Israel agreed to fully normalize their relations, and that Israel
is suspendingwould suspend plans to annex parts of plans to annex parts of
the West Bank. Under the “Abraham Accords,” The UAE decision to normalize relations with Israel likely reflected a UAE calculation that the move would help it, in partnership with Israel and the United States, counter the Iranian threat. By committing to normalizing relations with Israel, the UAE leadership arguably hopedthe West Bank. By committing to the “Abraham Accords,” the UAE leadership arguably hoped not only to strengthen a regional coalition against Iran but also to extract benefits from the United States, including to extract benefits from the United States, including
the U.S. sale to the UAE of F-35 aircraft and armed drones to the UAE (see below). On August the U.S. sale to the UAE of F-35 aircraft and armed drones to the UAE (see below). On August
29, 2020, the UAE government formally repealed a law enforcing the primary Arab League 29, 2020, the UAE government formally repealed a law enforcing the primary Arab League
boycott of Israel, paving the way for boycott of Israel, paving the way for
regular relations, including openly conducted commercial passenger flightsopenly conducted commercial passenger flights
, between the between the
two nations.two nations.
58 In June 2021, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid met the UAE’s foreign minister in Abu In June 2021, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid met the UAE’s foreign minister in Abu
Dhabi and inaugurated Israel’s first embassy in the Gulf. In mid-October, Secretary Blinken met with the foreign ministers of Israel and the UAE at the State Department to discuss the progress of the Abraham Accords one year after their signing.
UAE leaders emphasized that they had extracted Israeli concession on West Bank annexation, noting that the normalization announcement came two months after the UAE’s Ambassador to the United States, Yusuf al-Otaiba, warned in an editorial in an Israeli newspaper that unilateral annexation of West Bank territory would endanger Israel’s warming ties with Arab countries.59 Over the past several years, the UAE had become more involved in Israeli-Palestinian issues, having joined Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan in 2007 in a “quartet” of Arab states to assist with diplomacy. UAE officials attended the June 2018 workshop in Bahrain that presented an economic framework for the Trump Administration’s Israel-Palestinian peace plan, as well as the unveiling of the plan’s political proposals in Washington, DC on January 28, 2020. The UAE opposed the Trump Administration’s 2017 decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and its 2019 recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the Golan Heights, as did other Arab states.
In line with UAE animosity toward Muslim Brotherhood-related movements, the UAE does not support Hamas60 but rather its rival, Fatah, whose leader, Mahmoud Abbas, is President of the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA). The UAE also hosts and financially backs former senior PA official Muhammad Dahlan, who is estranged from Abbas, but who is mentioned as one
55 Simon Henderson. “Israel’s Gulf Breakthrough.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 30, 2015. 56 “Minister Katz visits Abu Dhabi: A ‘significant step’ in Israel-Arab relations.” Jerusalem Post, July 1, 2019. 57 See CRS Insight IN11485, Israel-UAE Normalization and Suspension of West Bank Annexation, by Jim Zanotti and Kenneth Katzman.
58 “UAE Cancels Israel Boycott, Allows Economic Agreements.” 59 Yusuf al-Otaiba, “Annexation will be a serious setback for better relations with the Arab world,” Ynet News, June 12, 2020.
60 Hamas formed in the late 1980s out of Brotherhood groups in the Palestinian territories.
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who might take a leading role in the PA after Abbas leaves power.61 Still, the apparent outpouring of Arab support for Hamas during a June 2021 conflict with Israel seemed to set back the UAE policy of engaging with Israel and downplaying the plight of the Palestinians.
UAE Foreign Aid62Dhabi and inaugurated Israel’s first embassy in the Gulf. In December 2021, Israel’s Prime Minister Naftali Bennett became the first Israeli leader to visit the UAE.46
40 CRS Report R45818, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton Thomas. 41 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potent ally nicknamed ‘Little Sparta’,” The Washington Post, November 9, 2014.
42 See CRS Insight IN11485, Israel-UAE Normalization and Suspension of West Bank Annexation, by Jim Zanotti and Kenneth Katzman.
43 Simon Henderson, “Israel’s Gulf Breakthrough,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 30, 2015. 44 “Minister Katz visits Abu Dhabi: A ‘significant step’ in Israel-Arab relations,” Jerusalem Post, July 1, 2019. 45 In 1994, the UAE and the other GCC states ended enforcement of the Arab League’s secondary and tertiary boycotts (boycotts of companies doing business with Israel and on companies that do business with those companies).
46 “Israeli PM Naftali Bennett begins first official visit to UAE,” Al Jazeera, December 12, 2021.
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UAE leaders emphasized that they had extracted Israeli concession on West Bank annexation, noting that the normalization announcement followed an editorial by the UAE’s Ambassador to the United States warning that unilateral annexation of West Bank territory would endanger Israel’s warming ties with Arab countries.47 As did other Arab states, the UAE publicly opposed the Trump Administration’s 2017 decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and its 2019 recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the Golan Heights. In line with UAE animosity toward Muslim Brotherhood-related movements, the UAE does not support the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, which exercises de-facto control of the Gaza Strip and which is a Brotherhood affiliate.
UAE Foreign Spending48
The UAE has provided billions of dollars in international aid through its government and through The UAE has provided billions of dollars in international aid through its government and through
funds controlled by royal family members and other elites. The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development funds controlled by royal family members and other elites. The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development
(ADFD), established in 1971, has distributed over $4 billion for more than 200 projects spanning (ADFD), established in 1971, has distributed over $4 billion for more than 200 projects spanning
102 countries. Some other examples include the following: 102 countries. Some other examples include the following:
The UAE provided $100 million for victims of the December 2004 tsunami in
The UAE provided $100 million for victims of the December 2004 tsunami in
the Indian Ocean, and it provided about $2 million for victims of conflict in
the Indian Ocean, and it provided about $2 million for victims of conflict in
Somalia (2011-2012). Somalia (2011-2012).
The UAE donated $100 million to assist recovery from Hurricane Katrina; $5
The UAE donated $100 million to assist recovery from Hurricane Katrina; $5
million for a pediatric wing at St. John’s Mercy Hospital in Joplin,
million for a pediatric wing at St. John’s Mercy Hospital in Joplin,
MO Missouri, after the after the
2011 tornado2011 tornado
there; and $10 million for reconstruction after Hurricane Sandy in 2013. ; and $10 million for reconstruction after Hurricane Sandy in 2013.
The UAE, as do other GCC states, provides significant amounts of funds to U.S.
The UAE, as do other GCC states, provides significant amounts of funds to U.S.
research organizations, public relations firms, law firms, and other
research organizations, public relations firms, law firms, and other
representatives to support UAE policies and try to influence U.S. policymakers.representatives to support UAE policies and try to influence U.S. policymakers.
6349
Defense Cooperation with the United States64States50
The UAE’s ability to project power in the region is The UAE’s ability to project power in the region is
in part a resulta product of many years of U.S.-UAE defense of many years of U.S.-UAE defense
cooperation that includes U.S. arms sales and training, strategic planning, and joint exercises and cooperation that includes U.S. arms sales and training, strategic planning, and joint exercises and
operations. The UAE’s armed forces are small—approximately 50,000 personnel—but they have operations. The UAE’s armed forces are small—approximately 50,000 personnel—but they have
become experienced from participating in several U.S.-led military become experienced from participating in several U.S.-led military
ground operations, including Somalia operations, including Somalia
(1992), the Balkans (late 1990s), (1992), the Balkans (late 1990s),
and Afghanistan (Afghanistan (
since 20032003-2014), as well as air operations in Libya ), as well as air operations in Libya
(2011)(2011)
, and against the Islamic State organization in Syria (2014-2015). The UAE reportedly has and against the Islamic State organization in Syria (2014-2015). The UAE reportedly has
augmented its manpower by recruiting foreign nationals and augmented its manpower by recruiting foreign nationals and
hiringtasking U.S. and other security U.S. and other security
experts to build militias and mercenary forcesexperts to build militias and mercenary forces
that supplement UAE national forces.65.51 In In
September 2019, the UAE formally joined the U.S.-led maritime security mission in the Gulf September 2019, the UAE formally joined the U.S.-led maritime security mission in the Gulf
(International Maritime Security Construct, IMSC), an effort to deter Iranian attacks on Gulf (International Maritime Security Construct, IMSC), an effort to deter Iranian attacks on Gulf
shipping in mid-2019. Unlike Kuwait and Bahrain, the UAE has not been designated by the United States as a “Major Non-NATO Ally” (MNNA).
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and U.S. Forces in UAE
The United States and UAE have established a “Defense Cooperation Framework” to develop joint approaches to regional conflicts and to promote U.S.-UAE interoperability. A “Joint Military
61 “Mohammed Dahlan: A Middle East Interloper Used in a Game of Nations.” Inside Arabia, April 17, 2019; Jonathan Ferziger, “The UAE’s Invisible Palestinian Hand,” Foreign Policy, October 30, 2020. 62shipping in mid-
47 Yusuf al-Otaiba, “Annexation will be a serious setback for better relations with the Arab world,” Ynet News, June 12, 2020.
48 Factsheets provided by UAE Embassy in Washington, DC, 2011-2020. Factsheets provided by UAE Embassy in Washington, DC, 2011-2020.
6349 Ben Freeman. “ Ben Freeman. “
The Emirati Lobby: How the UAE Wins in Washington.” Center for International Policy, October 15, .” Center for International Policy, October 15,
2019. 2019.
6450 Some of this section is from U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates,” Some of this section is from U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates,”
Fact Sheet, Fact Sheet,
January 20June 25, 2021. , 2021.
6551 “Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater’s Founder,” “Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater’s Founder,”
New York Times, May 14, 2011. , May 14, 2011.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
2019. Unlike fellow GCC countries Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, the UAE has not been designated by the United States as a “Major Non-NATO Ally” (MNNA) - a designation that opens participants to enhanced defense research cooperation with the United States.
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and U.S. Forces in UAE
The United States and UAE have established a “Defense Cooperation Framework” to develop joint approaches to regional conflicts and to promote U.S.-UAE interoperability. A “Joint Military Dialogue” (JMD) meets periodically. The security cooperation processes build on the July 25, Dialogue” (JMD) meets periodically. The security cooperation processes build on the July 25,
1994, bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), the text of which is classified.1994, bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), the text of which is classified.
6652 On May On May
15, 2017, the United States and the UAE confirmed that they had concluded negotiations on a 15, 2017, the United States and the UAE confirmed that they had concluded negotiations on a
new DCA with a 15-year duration, which came into force as of the visit to Abu Dhabi of then-new DCA with a 15-year duration, which came into force as of the visit to Abu Dhabi of then-
National Security Adviser John Bolton on May 30, 2019.National Security Adviser John Bolton on May 30, 2019.
6753 In accordance with the DCA: In accordance with the DCA:
As of late 2021, theThe United States deploys about 3,500 U.S. military personnel at United States deploys about 3,500 U.S. military personnel at
several UAE several UAE
facilities including Jebel Ali port (between Dubai and Abu Dhabi), facilities including Jebel Ali port (between Dubai and Abu Dhabi),
Al Dhafra Air Base (near Abu Dhabi), and naval facilities at Fujairah.Al Dhafra Air Base (near Abu Dhabi), and naval facilities at Fujairah.
68 Jebel Ali, capable of handling aircraft carriers, and other UAE ports collectively host more Navy ships than any other port outside the United States. The U.S. forces in UAE support U.S. operations in the region, including deterring Iran, countering terrorist groups, and intercepting illicit shipments of weaponry or technology.
54 Al Dhafra air base hosts a variety of U.S. military aircraft including surveillance, Al Dhafra air base hosts a variety of U.S. military aircraft including surveillance,
refueling, and combat aircraft. In April 2019, in the context of escalating tensions refueling, and combat aircraft. In April 2019, in the context of escalating tensions
with Iran, the United States deployed the F-35 combat aircraft to Al Dhafra, the with Iran, the United States deployed the F-35 combat aircraft to Al Dhafra, the
first such U.S. deployment of that aircraft in the region.first such U.S. deployment of that aircraft in the region.
6955 Jebel Ali, capable of handling aircraft carriers, and other UAE ports collectively host more Navy ships than any other port outside the United States. The U.S. forces in UAE support U.S. operations in the region, including deterring Iran, countering terrorist groups, and intercepting illicit shipments of weaponry or technology.
UAE military personnel study and train in the United States each year, through
UAE military personnel study and train in the United States each year, through
the Foreign Military Sales program, through which the UAE buys U.S.-made
the Foreign Military Sales program, through which the UAE buys U.S.-made
arms, and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. arms, and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.
U.S. officials say that UAE pilots and special operations forces demonstrated U.S. officials say that UAE pilots and special operations forces demonstrated
their effectiveness, including against AQAP in Yemen. their effectiveness, including against AQAP in Yemen.
The UAE hosts a “Joint Air Warfare Center” where UAE and U.S. forces conduct
The UAE hosts a “Joint Air Warfare Center” where UAE and U.S. forces conduct
joint exercises on early warning, air and missile defense, and logistics.
joint exercises on early warning, air and missile defense, and logistics.
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U.S. and Other Arms Sales
According to the State Department factsheet cited above, “The UAE is a significant purchaser of
According to the State Department factsheet cited above, “The UAE is a significant purchaser of
U.S. military equipment, including our most sophisticated missile defense systems. This U.S. military equipment, including our most sophisticated missile defense systems. This
partnership has enhanced the UAE’s military capabilities to the point that they have become a net partnership has enhanced the UAE’s military capabilities to the point that they have become a net
security provider for the region.” The security provider for the region.” The
UAE generally does not receive U.S. aid to purchase U.S. weaponry.71 According to the factsheet, the United States has $28.1United States has over $29 billion in active government- billion in active government-
to-government sales cases with the UAE under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) systemto-government sales cases with the UAE under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system
. Since 2014, the United States has also authorized the permanent export of over $7.2 billion in defense articles to the UAE via the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process, primarily launch vehicles,
66 Some provisions are discussed in, and the
52 For key provisions, see: Sami Hajjar, Sami Hajjar,
U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. (U.S.
Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March 2002, p. 27. According to UAE Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March 2002, p. 27. According to UAE
representatives, there is no diplomats, no “Status of Forces Agreement” (SOFA) “Status of Forces Agreement” (SOFA)
is in effect -in effect, but the United States and the UAE agreed to handle legal issues legal issues
involving U.S. military personnel involving U.S. military personnel
in the UAEare handled on a “case-by-case basis.” on a “case-by-case basis.”
Author conversations with UAE representatives, 2010-2016.
67 53 Department of Defense, “SecDef Meets with UAE’s Crown Prince,” May 15, 2017; “UAE-US defence agreement Department of Defense, “SecDef Meets with UAE’s Crown Prince,” May 15, 2017; “UAE-US defence agreement
kicks in as John Bolton visits Abu Dhabi,” kicks in as John Bolton visits Abu Dhabi,”
The National, May 30, 2019. , May 30, 2019.
6854 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates,” U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates,”
Fact Sheet, January 20June 25, 2021. , 2021.
6955 “US Air Force sends next generation fighter jets to UAE,” “US Air Force sends next generation fighter jets to UAE,”
The National, April 17, 2019. , April 17, 2019.
7056 Chandresekaran, “A Quiet, Potent Ally to U.S. Chandresekaran, “A Quiet, Potent Ally to U.S.
,” op. cit.
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UAE does not receive U.S. aid to purchase U.S. weaponry.57 Since 2016, the United States has also authorized the permanent export of over $11 billion in defense articles to the UAE via the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process, primarily launch vehicles, ground vehicles” op. cit. 71 In FY2018, the United States provided about $32 million worth of excess defense articles (EDA) to the UAE - equipment to make the UAE’s armored vehicles more mine-resistant. USAID Foreign Aid Explorer database.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
aircraft, munitions, and military electronics. During this time, the Department closed 65 end-use , and military electronics. During this time, the Department closed 65 end-use
monitoring checks in the UAE. monitoring checks in the UAE.
F-16 Program. In 2000, the UAE purchased 80 U.S. F-16 aircraft, equipped with . In 2000, the UAE purchased 80 U.S. F-16 aircraft, equipped with
the Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the High
the Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the High
Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), at a value of about $8 billion. Congress Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), at a value of about $8 billion. Congress
did not block the sale. In April 2013, the United States sold the UAE an did not block the sale. In April 2013, the United States sold the UAE an
additional 30 F-16s and associated “standoff” air-to-ground munitions. The UAE additional 30 F-16s and associated “standoff” air-to-ground munitions. The UAE
also has about 60 French-made Mirage 2000 warplanes. also has about 60 French-made Mirage 2000 warplanes.
F-35..
7258 UAE officials say the country has sought since 2014 to buy the advanced UAE officials say the country has sought since 2014 to buy the advanced
F-35 “Joint Strike Fighter.” In 2016, Israel began taking deliveries of the jet
F-35 “Joint Strike Fighter.” In 2016, Israel began taking deliveries of the jet
– —a a
significant development in light of the U.S. law requiring the United States to significant development in light of the U.S. law requiring the United States to
preserve Israel’s “Qualitative Military Edge” (QME) in the region.preserve Israel’s “Qualitative Military Edge” (QME) in the region.
7359 On On
November 10, 2020, the Trump Administration notified Congress of a $23 billion November 10, 2020, the Trump Administration notified Congress of a $23 billion
arms sale to the UAE, to include F-35 “Joint Strike Fighters,” drones, and various arms sale to the UAE, to include F-35 “Joint Strike Fighters,” drones, and various
munitions. An effort to block the proposed sale in the Senate failed munitions. An effort to block the proposed sale in the Senate failed
to garner the required votes (S.J.Res. 77 and S.J.Res. 78). In the last (S.J.Res. 77 and S.J.Res. 78). In the last
hoursdays of the Trump of the Trump
presidency, the UAE signed presidency, the UAE signed
a dealan agreement to purchase up to 50 F-35 joint strike fighter purchase up to 50 F-35 joint strike fighter
aircraft and 18 MQ-9 Reaper drones from the United States.aircraft and 18 MQ-9 Reaper drones from the United States.
7460 The Biden The Biden
Administration Administration
temporarily paused the sale for review upon taking office, paused the sale for review upon taking office,
but a State Department spokesperson told journalists in April that the Administration plans to proceed with the sale.75 The UAE would becomeand a variety of issues, including a U.S. request for additional UAE measures to ensure the security of the aircraft at UAE bases, have delayed finalizing the sale, to date.61 The UAE would be the first Arab country the first Arab country
to purchase the F-35 system. to purchase the F-35 system.
JDAMs and other Precision-Guided Munitions. The United States has sold the . The United States has sold the
UAE advanced UAE advanced
precision-guided missiles (PGMs), including the ATM-84 precision-guided missiles (PGMs), including the ATM-84
SLAM-ER Telemetry missile, GBU-39/B “bunker buster” bombs, andSLAM-ER Telemetry missile (the first sale of that weapon to a Gulf state) and GBU-39/B “bunker buster” bombs. During 2008-11, the United States sold the UAE an unspecified number of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) kits Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) kits
(which convert gravity bombs to precision-guided bombs)(which convert gravity bombs to precision-guided bombs)
worth an estimated $625 million. The . The
UAE has used many of these weapons in the conflict in Yemen. In May 2019, invoking UAE has used many of these weapons in the conflict in Yemen. In May 2019, invoking
emergency authority codified in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and citing “the need to emergency authority codified in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and citing “the need to
deter further Iranian adventurism in the Gulf and throughout the Middle East,”deter further Iranian adventurism in the Gulf and throughout the Middle East,”
76 the62the Trump Trump
Administration formally notified Congress of immediate sales to the UAE of additional PGMs, Administration formally notified Congress of immediate sales to the UAE of additional PGMs,
with an estimated value of $1 billion (Transmittal Number 17-73 and Transmittal Number 17-70). with an estimated value of $1 billion (Transmittal Number 17-73 and Transmittal Number 17-70).
Congress did not override the President’s veto of measures to block the sales (S.J.Res. 37, 116th Congress did not override the President’s veto of measures to block the sales (S.J.Res. 37, 116th
Congress).Congress).
77
Apache and other Helicopters. In 2010, the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of two potential sales, including a $5 billion
7263
57 In FY2018, the United States provided about $32 million worth of excess defense articles (EDA) to the UAE—equipment to make the UAE’s armored vehicles more mine-resistant. USAID Foreign Aid Explorer database. 58 For more detail on the F-35 sale to the UAE, see CRS Report R46580, For more detail on the F-35 sale to the UAE, see CRS Report R46580,
Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and
Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti
73.
59 See CRS Report RL33222, See CRS Report RL33222,
U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
7460 Mike Stone, “UAE signs deal with U.S. to buy 50 F-35 jets and up to 18 drones: sources,” Mike Stone, “UAE signs deal with U.S. to buy 50 F-35 jets and up to 18 drones: sources,”
Reuters, January 20, 2021. January 20, 2021.
75 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Remarks to the Press, January 27, 2021; “Joe Biden Is Proceeding with Donald Trump’s Biggest Arms Deal.” Huffington Post, April 13, 2021.
7661 Grant Rumley. “Unpacking the UAE F-35 Negotiations,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 15, 2022.
62 Letter from Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman James E. Risch, Letter from Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman James E. Risch,
May 24, 2019. May 24, 2019.
7763 For more information on the congressional response to the emergency sale, see CRS Report R45046, For more information on the congressional response to the emergency sale, see CRS Report R45046,
Congress and
the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020, by Jeremy M. Sharp, Christopher M. Blanchard, and Sarah R. Collins.
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sale of 30 AH-64 Apache helicopters.78 In November 2019, the State Department approved a possible sale of ten (10) CH-47F Chinook cargo helicopters and related equipment for an estimated cost of $830.3 million. Apache attack helicopter. In 2010, the United States sold the UAE 30 AH-64
Apache helicopters, at an estimated cost of about $5 billion.64
Ballistic Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The United States has The United States has
not historically supplied or assisted the UAE with ballistic missile technology or
not historically supplied or assisted the UAE with ballistic missile technology or
armed UAVs, in part because the UAE is not an adherent of the Missile armed UAVs, in part because the UAE is not an adherent of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). However, the Trump Administration’s Technology Control Regime (MTCR). However, the Trump Administration’s
2020 change of U.S. MTCR policy allows for the export of U.S.-made armed 2020 change of U.S. MTCR policy allows for the export of U.S.-made armed
UAV that fly at speeds below 800 kph, including the Reaper Drones that UAV that fly at speeds below 800 kph, including the Reaper Drones that
comprise part of the arms deal signed in January 2021. The UAE reportedly comprise part of the arms deal signed in January 2021. The UAE reportedly
possesses a small number (six) of Scud-B ballistic missiles obtained from non-possesses a small number (six) of Scud-B ballistic missiles obtained from non-
U.S. suppliers.U.S. suppliers.
7965 In 2017, the UAE took delivery of a commercial sale, worth In 2017, the UAE took delivery of a commercial sale, worth
about $200 million, of U.S.-made Predator X-P unarmed UAV. On May 24, 2019, about $200 million, of U.S.-made Predator X-P unarmed UAV. On May 24, 2019,
the State Department approved the sale to UAE of the Blackjack UAV, with an the State Department approved the sale to UAE of the Blackjack UAV, with an
estimated value of $80 million, under the emergency notification discussed above estimated value of $80 million, under the emergency notification discussed above
(Transmittal Number 17-39). The country reportedly has bought armed UAVs (Transmittal Number 17-39). The country reportedly has bought armed UAVs
from China and has used them for strikes in Libya (see above).from China and has used them for strikes in Libya (see above).
8066
Tanks and Ground Forces Missiles. UAE forces still use primarily 380 French-. UAE forces still use primarily 380 French-
made Leclerc tanks, and the UAE has not bought any main battle tanks from the
made Leclerc tanks, and the UAE has not bought any main battle tanks from the
United States. In September 2006, the United States sold UAE High Mobility United States. In September 2006, the United States sold UAE High Mobility
Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Army Tactical Missile Systems Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Army Tactical Missile Systems
(ATACMs), valued at about $750 million. (ATACMs), valued at about $750 million.
Missile and Aircraft DefensesAir Defense
The UAE has purchased the most advanced missile defense systems sold by the United States, The UAE has purchased the most advanced missile defense systems sold by the United States,
andand
in so doing supports a long-standing U.S. objective to organize a coordinated Gulf-wide supports a long-standing U.S. objective to organize a coordinated Gulf-wide
ballistic missile defense (BMD) network that can defend against Iran’s advancing missile ballistic missile defense (BMD) network that can defend against Iran’s advancing missile
capabilities. capabilities.
The UAEIt hosts an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Center—a training hosts an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Center—a training
facility to enhance intra-GCC and U.S.-GCC missile defense cooperation.facility to enhance intra-GCC and U.S.-GCC missile defense cooperation.
The UAE began buying The UAE was the first GCC state to order the THAAD, at an estimated cost of about $7 billion. Delivery and training for the UAE’s THAAD system took place in 2015.67 Earlier, in 2007, the UAE purchased the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) missile defense system the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) missile defense system
in 2007. In 2017, the Obama Administration approved the sale of 60 PAC-3 and 100 Patriot . In 2017, the Obama Administration approved the sale of 60 PAC-3 and 100 Patriot
Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical (GEM-T) missiles, with a total estimated value of about $2 Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical (GEM-T) missiles, with a total estimated value of about $2
billion. On May 3, 2019, the State Department approved a sale of up to 452 PAC-3 missiles and billion. On May 3, 2019, the State Department approved a sale of up to 452 PAC-3 missiles and
related equipment, with an estimated value of $2.728 billion.related equipment, with an estimated value of $2.728 billion.
81
The UAE was the first GCC state to order the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD), the first sale ever of that sophisticated missile defense system, with an estimated value of about $7 billion. Delivery and training for the UAE’s THAAD system took place in 2015.82
UAE Defense Cooperation with Other Powers
The UAE has sought to build defense partnerships beyond that with the United States. In 2004, the UAE joined NATO’s “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.” In 2011, the UAE sent an Ambassador 78 DSCA transmittal number 10-52, at http://www.dsca.mil. 79 International Institute of Strategic Studies “Military Balance.” 8068
UAE Defense Cooperation with Other Powers
The UAE has sought to build defense partnerships beyond that with the United States. In 2004, the UAE joined NATO’s “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.” In 2011, the UAE sent an Ambassador to NATO under that organization’s revised alliance policy and NATO established a liaison office in Abu Dhabi, under the auspices of the embassy of Denmark, in 2017. In 2009, the UAE allowed the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2021, by Christopher M. Blanchard, Jeremy M. Sharp, and Carla E. Humud.
64 DSCA transmittal number 10-52. 65 International Institute of Strategic Studies “Military Balance.” 66 “UAE allegedly using Chinese drones for deadly airstrikes in Libya,” “UAE allegedly using Chinese drones for deadly airstrikes in Libya,”
Defense News, May 2, 2019. , May 2, 2019.
81 DSCA Transmittal No. 19-37, May 3, 2019. 8267 Adriane Elliot, “Antiballistic System Shared with International Partner,” U.S. Army, January 13, 2016. Adriane Elliot, “Antiballistic System Shared with International Partner,” U.S. Army, January 13, 2016.
68 DSCA Transmittal No. 19-37
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to NATO under that organization’s revised alliance policy and NATO established a liaison office in Abu Dhabi, under the auspices of the embassy of Denmark, in 2017. In 2009, the UAE allowed France to inaugurate military facilities collectively termed Camp De La Paix (“Peace Camp”). It France to inaugurate military facilities collectively termed Camp De La Paix (“Peace Camp”). It
includes a 900-foot section of the Zayid Port; a part of Al Dhafra Air Base; and a barracks at an includes a 900-foot section of the Zayid Port; a part of Al Dhafra Air Base; and a barracks at an
Abu Dhabi military camp that houses about several hundred French military personnel. India’s Abu Dhabi military camp that houses about several hundred French military personnel. India’s
Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited the UAE in August 2015, the first by an Indian leader Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited the UAE in August 2015, the first by an Indian leader
since 1981, and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayid made a reciprocal visit to India in January since 1981, and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayid made a reciprocal visit to India in January
2017, during which the two countries signed a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 2017, during which the two countries signed a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
Agreement.”Agreement.”
The UAE also hosts the Khawla bint Al Azwar Military School, the region’s first military school for women, which has trained female peacekeepers for deployment in Africa and Asia.
Russia/Ukraine. The UAE relationship with Russia has attracted significant attention, particularly for the potential The UAE relationship with Russia has attracted significant attention, particularly for the potential
to violate a provision of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, to violate a provision of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA,
P.L. 115-44) that provides for sanctions on entities that conduct significant defense-related P.L. 115-44) that provides for sanctions on entities that conduct significant defense-related
transactions with Russia. In February 2017, press reports appeared that the UAE and Russia transactions with Russia. In February 2017, press reports appeared that the UAE and Russia
might jointly develop a combat aircraft.might jointly develop a combat aircraft.
8369 In February 2019, the UAE ordered EM150 “Kornet” In February 2019, the UAE ordered EM150 “Kornet”
anti-tank weapons from Russia.anti-tank weapons from Russia.
8470
UAE-U.S. relations have been strained somewhat by the UAE’s refusal to strongly condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The UAE abstained on the February 24, 2022, U.N. Security Council resolution denouncing the invasion, although it subsequently voted in favor of a U.N. General Assembly resolution with similar provisions. There have also been press reports that the UAE government has turned a blind eye to the movement of assets to the UAE by sanctioned Russian persons.71
Cooperation against Terrorism, Proliferation, and Narcotics72 During the mid-1990s, some Al Qaeda activists were able to move through the UAE, and two of the September 11, 2001 hijackers were UAE nationals. Recent State Department reports on terrorism credit the UAE with
Cooperation against Terrorism, Proliferation, and Narcotics
The UAE cooperates with U.S. counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation policies in the region.
Counter-Terrorism Issues85
During the mid-1990s, some Al Qaeda activists were able to move through the UAE, and two of the September 11, 2001 hijackers were UAE nationals. The State Department reports on terrorism credit the UAE with thwarting planned terrorist attacks within the UAE as well as assisting with the foiling of some plots in the United States, including an AQAP plot in 2010. In December 2012, the UAE, working with Saudi Arabia, arrested members of an alleged terrorist cell plotting attacks in the United States. On the other hand, UAE authorities failed to prevent a December 1, 2014, killing of an American teacher by an extremist-inspired Emirati woman. In 2016, UAE courts convicted 30 out of 41 individuals (almost all were UAE citizens) belonging to a group called Shabab al Manara for plotting terrorist attacks in the UAE. The UAE has been strengthening the country’s bureaucracy and legal framework to combat terrorism. The UAE is strengthening the country’s bureaucracy and legal framework to combat terrorism. The UAE is
part of a Saudi-initiated GCC “Security Pact” that entails increased GCC information-sharing on part of a Saudi-initiated GCC “Security Pact” that entails increased GCC information-sharing on
internal security threats.internal security threats.
There were no reported terrorist attacks in the UAE in 2019 or in 2020.
The
Still, the United States and the UAE United States and the UAE
sometimes differ on designations of differ on designations of
terroristsome organizations organizations
as terrorist. The . The
85 groups that the UAE government designates as terrorist 85 groups that the UAE government designates as terrorist
include not only the Muslim Brotherhood but also U.S. and Europe-based groups that are not accusedincludes the Muslim Brotherhood, which is not named by the United States or by the United States or
any European country of terrorism,86 including the U.S.-based Muslim American Society and Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR).any European country as a terrorist organization.73
Antiterrorism Financing and Money Laundering (AML/CFT). The country is a member of the The country is a member of the
Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a regional body Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a regional body
modeled on the broader Financial Action Task Force (FATF); the Counter-Islamic State Finance modeled on the broader Financial Action Task Force (FATF); the Counter-Islamic State Finance
Group chaired by Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the United States; and the Egmont Group of Financial Group chaired by Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the United States; and the Egmont Group of Financial
Intelligence Units. In May 2017, the UAE joined the U.S.-GCC Terrorist Financing Targeting Center based in Riyadh, which has designated several AQAP and Islamic State-Yemen entities.
The UAE Central Bank’s Financial Intelligence Unit is credited in State Department terrorism reports with providing training programs to UAE financial institutions on money laundering and
69
83 “Russia, UAE to collaborate on 5th-generation fighter,” “Russia, UAE to collaborate on 5th-generation fighter,”
United Press International, February 20, 2017. , February 20, 2017.
8470 “United Arab Emirates Announces $1.3 Billion in Defense Deals at IDEX,” Defense News, February 18, 2019. “United Arab Emirates Announces $1.3 Billion in Defense Deals at IDEX,” Defense News, February 18, 2019.
8571 “Analysis: Can the UAE be a safe haven for Russian oligarchs?,” Al Jazeera, March 14 2022. 72 Much of this section is taken from U.S. Department of State, Much of this section is taken from U.S. Department of State,
Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, June 24, 20202020
. 73. 86 “UAE Lists Scores of Groups as ‘Terrorists,’” “UAE Lists Scores of Groups as ‘Terrorists,’”
Al Jazeera, November 16, 2014. , November 16, 2014.
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Intelligence Units. In May 2017, the UAE joined the U.S.-GCC Terrorist Financing Targeting Center based in Riyadh, which has designated several AQAP and Islamic State-Yemen entities.
The UAE Central Bank’s Financial Intelligence Unit is credited in State Department terrorism reports with providing training programs to UAE financial institutions on money laundering and terrorism financing, and making mandatory the registration of informal financial transmittal terrorism financing, and making mandatory the registration of informal financial transmittal
networks (networks (
hawalas). During 2018 and 2019, the government enacted and issued implementing ). During 2018 and 2019, the government enacted and issued implementing
regulations for updated anti-money laundering laws.regulations for updated anti-money laundering laws.
8774 However, in April 2020, the FATF found However, in April 2020, the FATF found
that the United Arab Emirates that the United Arab Emirates
iswas not doing enough to prevent money laundering despite recent not doing enough to prevent money laundering despite recent
progress, and progress, and
risksrisked being including in the body’s being including in the body’s
watchlistwatch list of countries found to have “strategic of countries found to have “strategic
deficiencies” in AMF/CFTdeficiencies” in AMF/CFT
– —the so-called “the so-called “
greygray list.” list.”
8875 In March 2022, the FATF formally placed the UAE on the gray list, subjecting the country to increased monitoring of its efforts to correct the deficiencies the FATF identified.76
Since 2012, there has been an FBI Legal Attaché office at the U.S. consulate in Dubai to assist
Since 2012, there has been an FBI Legal Attaché office at the U.S. consulate in Dubai to assist
with joint efforts against terrorism and terrorism financing. However, some financial networks with joint efforts against terrorism and terrorism financing. However, some financial networks
based in the UAE have been sanctioned by the Department of the Treasury for facilitating based in the UAE have been sanctioned by the Department of the Treasury for facilitating
transactions for Iran and pro-Iranian regional factions in furtherance of Iran’s “malign activities” transactions for Iran and pro-Iranian regional factions in furtherance of Iran’s “malign activities”
in the regionin the region
. These sanctions designations suggest that U.S. officials might consider the enforcement of UAE laws against money laundering to be insufficient. .
Countering Violent Extremism. The UAE works with partners and has empowered local . The UAE works with partners and has empowered local
organizations to counter violent extremism. organizations to counter violent extremism.
The Ministry of Tolerance has been active in promoting messages of tolerance and coexistence. The UAE-basedIn 2012, the country established the “International Center of “International Center of
Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism,” known as Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism,” known as
Hedayah (“guidance”) (“guidance”)
, was inaugurated in 2012. The Ministry of Tolerance has been active in promoting messages of tolerance and coexistence. The United States and the UAE jointly operate the . The United States and the UAE jointly operate the
Sawab Center, an online Center, an online
counter-Islamic State messaging hub.89 The center promotes hub to promote information sharing with information sharing with
international police organizations when family members report on relatives who have become international police organizations when family members report on relatives who have become
radicalized.radicalized.
9077 Several UAE-based think tanks Several UAE-based think tanks, including the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR), the Emirates Policy Center, the TRENDS Institute, the Tabah Foundation, and the Future Institute for Advanced Research and Statutes, also conduct seminars conduct seminars
on confronting terrorism and violent extremism. on confronting terrorism and violent extremism.
Transfers from Guantanamo. The UAE has cooperated with U.S. efforts to reduce the detainee population at the U.S. prison facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. During 2015-17, the Department of Defense transferred 23 detainees (mostly Yemeni nationals) from the facility to the UAE.
Port and Border Controls
The UAE has participated in a number of projects with the United States which are related to
The UAE has participated in a number of projects with the United States which are related to
nonproliferation and nuclear security. For example, the government has received assistance from nonproliferation and nuclear security. For example, the government has received assistance from
the State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security Program, which aims to build the State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security Program, which aims to build
“national strategic trade control systems in countries that possess, produce, or supply strategic “national strategic trade control systems in countries that possess, produce, or supply strategic
items, as well as in countries through which such items are most likely to transit.”items, as well as in countries through which such items are most likely to transit.”
9178 The UAE has The UAE has
also participated in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)-run Container Security also participated in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)-run Container Security
87Initiative, under which CBP personnel work with foreign governments to screen U.S.-bound containers.”79 The UAE participates in the U.S.-GCC Counter-proliferation Workshop.
The UAE participates in U.S. programs to improve UAE export control enforcement. During 2004-2006, several Dubai-based companies were cited by U.S. officials for illicit sales of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea and for transshipping devices used to make improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq and Afghanistan.80 In 2007 the George W. Bush Administration threatened to restrict U.S. exports of certain technologies to the UAE for the illicit exports. The UAE government enacted a new law later that year that empowered authorities to
74 Fact sheet provided by UAE embassy representatives, October 31, 2018; U.S. Department of State, Fact sheet provided by UAE embassy representatives, October 31, 2018; U.S. Department of State,
Country Reports
on Terrorism 2019, June 24, 2020. June 24, 2020.
8875 “UAE at risk of landing on watchlist over money laundering “UAE at risk of landing on watchlist over money laundering
.,” ”
Al Jazeera, April 30, 2020. , April 30, 2020.
89 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, July 19, 2017. 9076 “UAE is placed on money laundering watchdog’s ‘gray list,’” CNBC, March 5, 2022. 77 David Ignatius, “A Small Organization Offers a Fresh Approach on Preventing Terrorism,” opinion, David Ignatius, “A Small Organization Offers a Fresh Approach on Preventing Terrorism,” opinion,
The Washington
Post, October 21, 2014. , October 21, 2014.
9178 “Export Control and Related Border Security Program,” Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. 79 “CSI: Container Security Initiative,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 80 Milhollin, Gary and Kelly Motz, “Nukes ‘R’ US.” New York Times, op. ed. March 4, 2004; BIS, “General Order Concerning Mayrow General Trading and Related Enterprises,” 71 Federal Register 107, June 5, 2006.
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“Export Control and Related Border Security Program,” Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, available at https://www.state.gov/export-control-and-related-border-security-program/.
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Initiative. Under this program, CBP personnel work with foreign governments to screen U.S.-bound containers posing a “potential risk for terrorism.”92 As a GCC member, the UAE participates in the U.S.-GCC Counter-proliferation Workshop.
UAE participation in U.S. programs to improve UAE export control enforcement suggests that the country wants to avoid the disputes with the United States that occurred in the past on the issue. In 2004, two Dubai-based companies, SMB Computers and Gulf Technical Industries, were identified as conducting illicit sales of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea by Pakistan’s nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, and the Mayrow General Trading Company was sanctioned in 2006, after the company transshipped devices used to make improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq and Afghanistan.93 In February 2007 the George W. Bush Administration threatened to restrict U.S. exports of certain technologies to the UAE for the illicit exports. UAE authorities cited a September 2007 UAE law to shut down 40 foreign and UAE firms allegedly shut down 40 foreign and UAE firms allegedly
involved in dual use exports to Iran and other countriesinvolved in illicit exports, and no U.S. sanctions were imposed on , and no U.S. sanctions were imposed on
the country. the country.
The UAE government supports the Department of Homeland Security’s programs to collect U.S.-
The UAE government supports the Department of Homeland Security’s programs to collect U.S.-
bound passenger information and bound passenger information and
operatingoperation of a “preclearance facility” at the Abu Dhabi a “preclearance facility” at the Abu Dhabi
International Airport. In International Airport. In
February 2006, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 2006, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States—a body that reviews proposed foreign investments to ensure that the investment does not States—a body that reviews proposed foreign investments to ensure that the investment does not
threaten U.S. national security—approved the takeover by the Dubai-owned Dubai Ports World threaten U.S. national security—approved the takeover by the Dubai-owned Dubai Ports World
company of a British firm that manages six U.S. port facilities. Congress expressed concern that company of a British firm that manages six U.S. port facilities. Congress expressed concern that
the takeover might weaken U.S. port security in P.L. 109-234the takeover might weaken U.S. port security in P.L. 109-234
, an emergency supplemental appropriation. .
U.S. Funding Issues
The United States has provided small amounts of counterterrorism assistance to help the UAE The United States has provided small amounts of counterterrorism assistance to help the UAE
build its capacity to enforce its border and financial controls. The Department of Defense build its capacity to enforce its border and financial controls. The Department of Defense
provided $300,000 to the UAE to assist its counter-narcotics capability in FY2016 and $531,000 provided $300,000 to the UAE to assist its counter-narcotics capability in FY2016 and $531,000
in FY2017. In FY2019, about $1.35 million in State Department funds were provided to the UAE in FY2017. In FY2019, about $1.35 million in State Department funds were provided to the UAE
to build its capacity to counter terrorism financing. In FY2020to build its capacity to counter terrorism financing. In FY2020
and FY2021, the United States spent about , the United States spent about
$130,000 $130,000
to train and build capacity forand $110,000, respectively, to build the capacity of the UAE government to enforce its export control laws. the UAE government to enforce its export control laws.
9481
Nuclear AgreementPower and Space Program95Program
The UAE announced in 2008 that it would acquireThe UAE announced in 2008 that it would acquire
its first nuclear power reactors to nuclear power reactors to
satisfy meet projected increases in domestic electricity demand. projected increases in domestic electricity demand.
TheIn 2009, the United States and the UAE concluded a United States and the UAE concluded a
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement
- pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (AEA; 42 U.S.C. 2153(b))1954 (AEA; 42 U.S.C. 2153(b))
.96 This agreement, which entered into force on December 17, 2009, included a UAE commitment - committing the UAE to refrain from producing enriched to refrain from producing enriched
uranium or reprocessing uranium or reprocessing
92 “CSI: Container Security Initiative,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, available at https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/csi/csi-brief.
93 Milhollin, Gary and Kelly Motz. “Nukes ‘R’ US.” New York Times, op. ed. March 4, 2004; BIS, “General Order Concerning Mayrow General Trading and Related Enterprises,” 71 Federal Register 107, June 5, 2006. 94 USAID Foreign Aid Explorer database, accessed April 12, 2021. 95 This section was prepared by Paul Kerr, Analyst in Weapons of Mass Destruction Nonproliferation. 96 For more information about nuclear cooperation agreements, see CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with
Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
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spent nuclear reactor fuel; both processes could produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. spent nuclear reactor fuel; both processes could produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.
82 This This
provision is typically not included in peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements. provision is typically not included in peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements.
A number of U.S. and European firms have secured administrative and financial advisory
A number of U.S. and European firms have secured administrative and financial advisory
contracts with the UAE’s nuclear program. The Korea Electric Power Corporation of South contracts with the UAE’s nuclear program. The Korea Electric Power Corporation of South
Korea received the prime contract “to design, build and help operate the Barakah Nuclear Energy Korea received the prime contract “to design, build and help operate the Barakah Nuclear Energy
Plant,” which is to contain four nuclear power reactors.Plant,” which is to contain four nuclear power reactors.
97 The Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), the institution administering the nuclear program, announced on August 1, 2020, that the first of the reactors had “successfully started up.”9883 The nuclear plants began operating in mid-2020.”84
In July 2014, the UAE formed a “UAE Space Agency.” In
In July 2014, the UAE formed a “UAE Space Agency.” In
September 2019, the country sent its 2019, the country sent its
first astronaut to the International Space Station. In July 2020, the country launched an unmanned first astronaut to the International Space Station. In July 2020, the country launched an unmanned
spaceship that is to probe Mars. spaceship that is to probe Mars.
The probe entered Mars orbit in 2021.
81 USAID Foreign Aid Explorer database, accessed April 12, 2021. 82 For more information about nuclear cooperation agreements, see CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
83 “The Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) and the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant,” Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation factsheet.
84 “Safe Start-up of Unit 1 of Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant Successfully Achieved,” Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation press release, August 1, 2020.
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Economic Issues
The UAE, a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), has developed a free market The UAE, a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), has developed a free market
economy, but its financial institutions are weakly regulated. economy, but its financial institutions are weakly regulated.
TheAlthough the UAE has announced plans and UAE has announced plans and
policies (“Vision 2021”) to try to further diversify its economy and reduce its dependence on policies (“Vision 2021”) to try to further diversify its economy and reduce its dependence on
exports of hydrocarbons, as have the other GCC states. Dubai emirate, in particular, has long sought to attract investors and develop initiatives, such as the clean energy and autonomous vehicle showcase project “Masdar City,” that provide jobs and attract tourism and publicity.
The country is also accepting investment from China under that country’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), intended to better connect China economically to other parts of Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. In April 2019, the UAE and China signed deals worth $3.4 billion to store and ship Chinese products from the UAE port of Jebel Ali.99
To help it weather the effect of lower oil prices since 2014, the government has exports of hydrocarbons, the UAE economy and financial picture still fluctuates along with the world energy outlook. Abu Dhabi has 80% of the federation’s proven oil reserves of about 100 billion barrels, enough for many decades of exports at the current rate of about 2.9 million barrels per day (mbd) of exports. Oil exports, of which over 60% go to Japan, account for about 25% of the country’s GDP.85 The UAE has vast quantities of natural gas but consumes more than it produces. Through its participation in the Dolphin Energy project, the UAE imports natural gas from neighboring Qatar—an arrangement that was not disrupted by the GCC rift. A UAE effort to become self-sufficient in gas by 2030 could benefit from the discovery in UAE waters, announced in early 2020, of the large Jebel Ali non-associated gas field. Dubai emirate has, to some extent, sought to plan for a post-hydrocarbons era through initiatives, such as the clean energy and autonomous vehicle showcase project “Masdar City,” that provide jobs and attract tourism and publicity.
To help it weather the effect of lower oil prices during 2014-2019, the government cut some cut some
subsidies and sold government bonds, including $5 billion in bonds in 2016 and $10 billion in subsidies and sold government bonds, including $5 billion in bonds in 2016 and $10 billion in
2017. The government 2017. The government
budget has beenwas able to avoid drawing down its $600 billion in various able to avoid drawing down its $600 billion in various
sovereign sovereign
wealth funds overseen by the Emirates Investment Authority (EIA). In 2022, world energy prices increased significantly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which prompted U.S. and European sanctions on Russian oil exports. In part because an oil price increase benefits the UAE budget, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have not responded to U.S. requests to increase oil production to help bring world oil prices back down.86 Adding to the U.S.-UAE tensions over oil prices, the UAE and Saudi Arabia continue to engage with Russia in the “OPEC Plus” framework, giving the impression that the two Gulf states are cooperating with, or at least refraining from opposing, Russia.
The country is also accepting investment from China under that country’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), intended to better connect China economically to other parts of Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. In April 2019, the UAE and China signed deals worth $3.4 billion to store and ship Chinese products from the UAE port of Jebel Ali.87
Aside from the public health consequences, the economic effects of the coronavirus outbreak have been significant, resulting from travel and tourism restrictions and a decline in consumer spending as bans on gatherings were imposed during 2020. China-based Sinopharm tested its vaccine in the UAE, in part because nationals of many different countries live and work there.88
U.S.-UAE Economic Ties89 U.S. trade with the UAE is a significant issue because the UAE is the largest market for U.S. exports to the Middle East. Over 1,000 U.S. companies have offices there, and there are over
85 “The UAE and Global Oil Supply,” Embassy of the UAE in the United States, August 2020. 86 Bilal Saab and Karen Young, “How Biden Can Rebuild U.S. Ties With the Gulf States,” Foreign Policy, April 4, 2022.
87 “The UAE Signed a Massive, $3.4 Billion Deal with China—and That ‘Isn’t a Surprise,” NBC News, April 29, 2019. 88 “China’s Sinopharm begins late stage trial of COVID-19 vaccine in UAE,” Reuters, July 16, 2020. 89 Trade data taken from U.S. Census Bureau. Foreign Trade Statistics.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
60,000 Americans working in UAE. U.S. exports to the UAE in 2021 totaled over $17 billion, and imports from the UAE nearly doubled from 2020 levels, totaling nearly $6 billion. U.S. products wealth funds overseen by the Emirates Investment Authority (EIA).100
Aside from the public health consequences, the economic effects of the coronavirus outbreak have been significant, resulting from travel and tourism restrictions and a decline in consumer spending as bans on gatherings have been imposed. The IMF predicts 3.1% economic growth in 2021, due to improvements in the oil sector, following a -5.9% contraction in 2020.101 As of late October 2021, the UAE has reported nearly 750,000 COVID-19 infections and over 2,100 deaths from the disease.102 China-based Sinopharm tested its vaccine in the UAE, in part because nationals of many different countries live and work there.103 As of late October, about 87% of the UAE population is full vaccinated with Sinopharm, Pfizer/BioNTech, and Sputnik V vaccines.
97 “The Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) and the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant,” available at https://www.enec.gov.ae/doc/factsheet-enec-and-barakah-plant-eng-5f195cca2b5c2.pdf.
98 “Safe Start-up of Unit 1 of Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant Successfully Achieved,” August 1, 2020. 99 “The UAE Signed a Massive, $3.4 Billion Deal with China—and That ‘Isn’t a Surprise,” NBC News, April 29, 2019. 100 The two largest of the UAE’s sovereign wealth funds are run by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) and Mubadala (“Exchange”).
101 IMF, “Transcript of April 2021 Middle East and Central Asia Department Press Briefing,” April 11, 2021. 102 Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center. 103 “China’s Sinopharm begins late stage trial of COVID-19 vaccine in UAE,” Reuters, July 16, 2020.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
Oil and Gas Issues
The UAE is wealthy because it exports large amounts of crude oil while having a small population that receives benefits and services. Abu Dhabi has 80% of the federation’s proven oil reserves of about 100 billion barrels, enough for many decades of exports at the current rate of about 2.9 million barrels per day (mbd) of exports. Oil exports, of which over 60% go to Japan, account for about 25% of the country’s GDP.104 The United States imports negligible amounts of UAE crude oil.
The UAE has vast quantities of natural gas but consumes more than it produces. Through its participation in the Dolphin Energy project, the UAE imports natural gas from neighboring Qatar – an arrangement that was not disrupted by the GCC rift discussed above. A UAE effort to become self-sufficient in gas by 2030 could benefit from the discovery, announced in early 2020, of a large field (“Jebel Ali field”) of non-associated gas in UAE waters.
U.S.-UAE Economic Ties105
U.S. trade with the UAE is a significant issue because the UAE is the largest market for U.S. exports to the Middle East. Over 1,000 U.S. companies have offices there, and there are over 60,000 Americans working in UAE. U.S. exports to the UAE in 2020 totaled nearly $15 billion, and imports from the UAE totaled about $3 billion, a decrease from 2019 figures. U.S. products sold to UAE are mostly commercial aircraft, industrial machinery and materials, and other high-sold to UAE are mostly commercial aircraft, industrial machinery and materials, and other high-
value items.value items.
The United States imports small amounts of UAE crude oil.
In 2004, the George W. Bush Administration notified Congress it had begun negotiating a free
In 2004, the George W. Bush Administration notified Congress it had begun negotiating a free
trade agreement (FTA) with the UAE. Several rounds of talks were held prior to the June 2007 trade agreement (FTA) with the UAE. Several rounds of talks were held prior to the June 2007
expiration of Administration “trade promotion authority.” In 2011, the FTA talks were replaced by expiration of Administration “trade promotion authority.” In 2011, the FTA talks were replaced by
a U.S.-UAE “Economic Policy Dialogue,” between major U.S. and UAE economic agencies. The a U.S.-UAE “Economic Policy Dialogue,” between major U.S. and UAE economic agencies. The
UAE is part of the “GCC-U.S. Framework Agreement on Trade, Economic, Investment, and UAE is part of the “GCC-U.S. Framework Agreement on Trade, Economic, Investment, and
Technical Cooperation,” a trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA) created in 2012. Technical Cooperation,” a trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA) created in 2012.
Commercial Aviation Issue106Issue90
One issue in U.S.-UAE economic relations has been a contention by several U.S. airlines that the
One issue in U.S.-UAE economic relations has been a contention by several U.S. airlines that the
UAE government subsidizes two UAE airlines, Emirates Air (Dubai-based) and Etihad Air (Abu UAE government subsidizes two UAE airlines, Emirates Air (Dubai-based) and Etihad Air (Abu
Dhabi-based). In 2018, the two UAE airlines agreed to address the complaints by using globally Dhabi-based). In 2018, the two UAE airlines agreed to address the complaints by using globally
accepted accounting standards for annual reports and opening their books to outside accepted accounting standards for annual reports and opening their books to outside
examination.examination.
10791
Author Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Acknowledgments
This report was prepared with the assistance of Sarah Collins, Research Assistant, Middle East and Africa Section.
90
104 “The UAE and Global Oil Supply,” Embassy of the UAE in the United States, August 2020. 105 Trade data taken from U.S. Census Bureau. Foreign Trade Statistics. 106 For background on this issue, see CRS Report R44016, For background on this issue, see CRS Report R44016,
International Air Service Controversies: Frequently Asked
Questions, by Rachel Y. Tang. , by Rachel Y. Tang.
10791 “U.S. and United Arab Emirates Reach Deal to Solve Open Skies Spat,” “U.S. and United Arab Emirates Reach Deal to Solve Open Skies Spat,”
Skift, May 11, 2018. May 11, 2018.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
Author Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Acknowledgments
This report was prepared with the assistance of Sarah Collins, Research Assistant, Middle East and Africa Section.
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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