The United Arab Emirates (UAE):
August 17, 2022
Issues for U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven principalities or “emirates.” Its
Specialist in Middle
population is nearly 10 million, of which 90% are expatriates from within and outside the region
Eastern Affairs
who work in its open economy. The UAE is a significant U.S. security partner that hosts about

3,500 U.S. military personnel at UAE military facilities and buys sophisticated U.S. military
equipment, including missile defenses and combat aircraft. A January 20, 2021, deal signed with

the UAE to allow the country to procure up to 50 F-35s and 18 Reaper Drones was placed under
review by the Biden Administration, but finalizing the sale has been delayed over several issues, including the UAE’s ability
to secure the F-35 and its technology from other large powers, including China, with which the UAE has been expanding
relations. Furthermore, U.S.-UAE differences on the F-35 sale, as well as issues including energy production, Iran, Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine, and the conflict in Yemen, appear to have widened since late 2021. The UAE abstained on a February
24, 2022, U.N. Security Council resolution denouncing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
With ample financial resources and a U.S.-armed and advised military, the UAE has been asserting itself in the region, in
many cases seeking to keep authoritarian Arab leaders in power and work against Islamist organizations that UAE leaders
assert are regional and domestic threats. In June 2017, the UAE joined Saudi Arabia and several other countries in isolating
Qatar to pressure it to adopt policies closer to those of the UAE and Saudi Arabia on Iran, Turkey, the role of Islamists in
governance, the Qatar-based Al Jazeera network, and other issues. On January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their
partners agreed to lift the blockade, although differences on the issues that produced the rift remain and the UAE has not
reopened its embassy in Qatar, to date. In Libya, the UAE is supporting an anti-Islamist commander based in eastern Libya
who has sought to assert control of the whole country.
Iran also looms large as an issue for UAE leaders. UAE leader reportedly are concerned that a U.S. and Iranian return to full
mutual implementation of the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal would not address the UAE’s key concerns about Iran’s
regional influence. The UAE’s August 2020 agreement to normalize relations with Israel represented, in part, the UAE’s
intent to work closely with Israel to counter Iran strategically. In part to try to roll back Iran’s regional reach, in 2015, the
UAE joined Saudi Arabia in a military effort to pressure the Iran-backed Zaidi Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen - a campaign
that has produced significant numbers of civilian casualties and criticism of the UAE. That criticism contributed to the
UAE’s decision in 2019 to remove most of the UAE’s ground forces from the Yemen conflict, although some UAE forces
continue to support pro-UAE militia factions there. UAE and Saudi officials have backed a Yemen ceasefire agreement
between the warring parties that began in early April. Various aspects of the UAE involvement in Yemen, including U.S.
sales of weapons the UAE has used there, have been the subject of congressional oversight hearings and some legislation.
The UAE remains under the control of a small circle of leaders. Since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, the government has
become less tolerant of political criticism on social media. The country’s wealth—amplified by the small size of the
citizenship population receiving government largesse—has helped the government maintain popular support. Since 2006, the
government has held a limited voting process for half of the 40 seats in its quasi-legislative body, the Federal National
Council (FNC). The most recent vote was held in October 2019.
In part to cope with the fluctuations in the price of crude oil, the government has created new ministries tasked with
formulating economic and social strategies that, among other objectives, can attract the support of the country’s youth.
Economic conditions were adversely affected by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, but an increase in
world oil prices in 2021 and much of 2022 has eased the leadership’s financial and economic concerns. The country has
generally rebuffed U.S. efforts to encourage it to produce more oil to ease pressure on the global oil market caused by the
Russian invasion of Ukraine. U.S. foreign assistance to the UAE has been negligible, and what is provided is mostly to train
UAE authorities on counterterrorism, border security, and anti-proliferation operations.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy

Governance, Human Rights, and Reform
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates (principalities): Abu Dhabi,
the oil-rich federation capital; Dubai, a large commercial hub; and the five smaller and less
wealthy emirates of Sharjah, Ajman, Fujayrah, Umm al-Qaywayn, and Ras al-Khaymah. Sharjah
and Ras al-Khaymah have a common ruling family—leaders of the al-Qawasim tribe. After
Britain announced in 1968 that it would no longer ensure security in the Gulf, six “Trucial States”
formed the UAE federation in December 1971; Ras al-Khaymah joined in 1972.1 The five smaller
emirates, often called the “northern emirates,” tend to be more politically and religiously
conservative than Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which are urban amalgams populated by many
expatriates.
As is the case in the other Gulf states, the hereditary leaders of the UAE are the paramount
decision makers. In the UAE, visible opposition to the government has been largely confined to
exchanges on social media. The federation underwent a formal leadership transition in May 2022
upon the death of Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan, who succeeded the first UAE president
and ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan in 2004 but has been mostly
incapacitated since a stroke in 2014. Almost immediately after Khalifa’s death, and in keeping
with a long-standing agreement among the seven emirates, Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid Al
Nuhayyan (born in 1961), Khalifa’s younger brother, was selected as UAE president by the
leaders of all the emirates, who collectively comprise the “Federal Supreme Council.” Shaykh
Mohammad had already been de facto UAE leader since Khalifa’s 2014 stroke. The ruler of
Dubai traditionally serves as vice president and prime minister of the UAE; that position has been
held by Shaykh Mohammad bin Rashid Al Maktum, architect of Dubai’s modernization drive,
since the death of his elder brother Shaykh Rashid Al Maktum in 2006. Several senior UAE
officials are also brothers of Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid, including Foreign Minister Abdullah
bin Zayid, Deputy Prime Minister Mansur bin Zayid, Minister of Interior Sayf bin Zayid, and
National Security Advisor Shaykh Tahnoun bin Zayid.

1 For a brief history of the British role in the Persian Gulf, see Rabi, Uzi, “Britain’s ‘Special Position’ in the Gulf: Its
Origins, Dynamics and Legacy,” Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 42, No. 3 (May 2006), pp. 351-364.
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Table 1. UAE Leadership
Khalifa bin Zayid Al
Mohammad bin Zayid
Nuhayyan
Al Nuhayyhan
Was UAE president and
UAE President and Ruler
Ruler of Abu Dhabi
of Abu Dhabi. Named
Emirate from 2004 until
immediately upon the
his May 2022 death. Had
death of brother, Shaykh
been incapacitated and
Khalifa. Already was de
political y inactive since
facto UAE leader since
2014 stroke.
Khalifa’s incapacitation in
2014.
Mohammad bin Rashid
Sultan bin Mohammad
Al Maktum
Al Qassimi
UAE Vice President,
Ruler of Sharjah Emirate
Prime Minister, and
Defense Minister, and
ruler of Dubai Emirate

Saud bin Saqr Al
Humaid bin Rashid Al
Qassimi
Nuami
Ruler of Ras al-Khaymah
Ruler of Ajman Emirate

Saud bin Rashid Al
Hamad bin
Mu’alla
Mohammad Al Sharqi
Ruler of Umm al-
Ruler of Fujairah Emirate
Qaywayn Emirate

Abdullah bin Zayid Al
Yusuf al-Otaiba
Nuhayyan
Ambassador to the
Foreign Minister
United States
Son of former longtime
UAE Oil Minister Mani
Saeed al-Otaiba

Sources: Graphic by CRS, open source photos.
Other Governance Issues2
UAE leaders argue that the country’s social tolerance and distribution of national wealth have
rendered the bulk of the population satisfied with the political system. Emiratis are able to express

2 Much of this section taken from U.S. Department of State, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United
Arab Emirates, released April 11, 2022.
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their concerns directly to the country’s leaders through traditional consultative mechanisms, such
as the open majlis (assemblies) held by many UAE leaders. UAE law prohibits political parties,
and UAE officials maintain that parties would aggravate schisms among tribes and clans and
open UAE politics to regional influence.3
Federal National Council (FNC) and FNC Elections
The UAE has provided for some limited formal popular representation through a 40-seat Federal
National Council (FNC)—a body that can review and veto recommended laws. The FNC can call
ministers before it to question them, but it is not empowered to remove ministers. The seat
distribution of the FNC is weighted in favor of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which each hold eight
seats. Sharjah and Ras al-Khaymah have six each, and the other emirates each have four. Each
emirate also has its own appointed consultative council.
The government has expanded the electorate for the FNC in successive elections. In 2006, the
when UAE leadership instituted a limited election process for half of the FNC seats, a
government commission approved an “electorate” of about 6,600 persons, mostly members of the
elite. Out of the 452 candidates for the 20 elected seats, there were 65 female candidates. One
woman was elected (from Abu Dhabi), and another seven women received appointed seats. The
second FNC election, held on September 24, 2011, in the context of the “Arab spring” uprisings,
had an expanded electorate (129,000 electors), nearly half of them women. There were 468
candidates, including 85 women. Of the 20 winners, one was a woman, and six women received
appointed seats. The FNC selected the woman who was elected, Dr. Amal al-Qubaisi, as deputy
speaker—the first woman to hold such a high position in a GCC representative body. For the
October 3, 2015, FNC elections, the electorate was doubled to about 225,000 voters. There were
330 candidates, including 74 women. Dr. Amal al-Qubaisi, was again the only woman who won,
and she was promoted to FNC speaker. Of the 20 appointed seats, eight were women.
The most recent FNC elections were held over several days in October 2019. A December 2018
UAE leadership decree stipulated that half of the FNC members would be women - by appointing
enough women to constitute half of the body, after accounting for those elected.4 The electorate
was expanded further to 337,000 voters, and 478 candidates were approved to run, of which 180
were women. Seven women were elected, and thirteen more were appointed.5 The FNC was
inaugurated in November 2019, and Saqr bin Ghobash, a former minister, was named speaker.
Human Rights-Related Issues6
The State Department and groups such as Human Rights Watch identify the main human rights
problems in the UAE as: unverified reports of torture, government restrictions of freedoms of
speech and assembly, and lack of judicial independence. UAE human rights oversight
organizations include the Jurists’ Association’s Human Rights Committee, the Emirates Human
Rights Association (EHRA), and the Emirates Center for Human Rights (ECHR), but their degree
of independence is uncertain.

3 Anwar Gargash, “Amid Challenges, UAE Policies Engage Gradual Reforms,” The National, August 26, 2012.
4 Communication from UAE Embassy Washington, DC, representatives, December 11, 2018.
5 Emirates News Agency (WAM) releases and press articles, October 2019.
6 Much of this section is from U.S. Department of State, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United
Arab Emirates, April 11, 2022.
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Treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood and Other Domestic Opposition
Since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, the government has asserted that the Muslim
Brotherhood and groups affiliated with it are a threat to the stability of the region and the UAE
itself.7 In 2014 the UAE named the Muslim Brotherhood as one of 85 “terrorist organizations” (a
list that included Al Qaeda and the Islamic State).8 A domestic affiliate of the Brotherhood in the
country—the Islah (Reform) organization—has operated openly in the UAE since 1974,
attracting followers mostly from the less wealthy and more religiously conservative northern
emirates; it has no history of attacks or violence. Despite that record of nonviolence, in 2013, the
UAE State Security Court convicted and sentenced 69 Islamists arrested during 2011-2013 for
trying to overthrow the government.
Since 2011, the government has increased its arrests of domestic activists who use social media to
agitate for more political space and government accountability. The government has also sought
to head off active opposition by enacting reforms and economic incentives. In several cabinet
reshuffles since 2013, the government has added several younger ministers, many of them female,
and established minister of state positions for “tolerance,” “happiness,” artificial intelligence, and
food security.
Media and Research Institute Freedoms
The UAE government has increased restrictions on social media usage since the 2011 Arab
Spring uprisings. The government has jailed several activists for violating a 2015 law that
criminalized the publication of “provocative” political or religious material.” In 2019, several
Members of Congress, from both chambers, signed a letter to the UAE leadership urging the
release of one such activist, Ahmad Mansoor.9 He remains imprisoned. The government has
banned some journalists from entering the country, and prohibited distribution of books and
articles that highlight human rights abuses. The country has applied increasingly strict criteria to
renewing the licenses of research institutes and some, such as the Gulf Research Center, have
relocated outside the country. On the other hand, some UAE-run think tanks have opened in
recent years, including the Emirates Policy Center and the TRENDS Institute.
Justice/Rule of Law
The UAE constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but court decisions are subject to
being overruled by political leaders. A 2012 amendment to the UAE constitution set up a “Federal
Judicial Council” chaired by the UAE president. Sharia (Islamic law) courts adjudicate criminal
and family law matters, and civil courts, based on French and Egyptian legal systems, adjudicate
civil matters. Sharia courts are empowered to impose flogging as punishment for adultery,
prostitution, consensual premarital sex, pregnancy outside marriage, defamation of character, and
drug or alcohol charges. A Federal Supreme Court, appointed by the UAE leadership, adjudicates
disputes between emirates or between an emirate and the UAE federal government and questions
officials accused of misconduct. Foreign nationals serve in the judiciary, making them subject to
threats of deportation. The UAE justice system has often come under criticism in cases involving

7 “UAE and the Muslim Brotherhood: A Story of Rivalry and Hatred,” Middle East Monitor, June 15, 2017.
8 “UAE Lists Scores of Groups as ‘Terrorists,” Al Jazeera, November 16, 2014.
9 “US Congress members call on UAE to release rights activist Ahmed Mansoor,” Middle East Eye, December 13,
2019.
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expatriates, particularly involving public displays of affection, although in 2020 some laws were
altered to allow, for example, unmarried couples to cohabitate.10
Women’s Rights11
Women’s political rights have expanded steadily over the past few decades, but some forms of
discrimination remain legal. Beginning in 2012, UAE women have been allowed to pass on their
citizenship to their children—a first in the GCC. However, UAE women are still at a legal
disadvantage in divorce cases and other family law issues. The penal code allows men to
physically punish female family members. Many domestic service jobs are performed by migrant
women, and they are denied basic legal protections such as limits to work hours.
Recent cabinet shuffles have greatly increased the number of female ministers. As noted, one
woman has been FNC speaker, and the FNC selected in 2019 has half women membership. About
10% of the UAE diplomatic corps is female, whereas there were no female diplomats prior to
2001. The UAE Air Force has several female fighter pilots.

10 “UAE announces relaxing of Islamic laws for personal freedoms,” PBS Weekend News, November 20, 2020.
11 See U.S. Department of State, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United Arab Emirates, March 30,
2021.
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Figure 1. UAE at a Glance

Population
About 9.8 mil ion, of whom about 11% are citizens.
Religions
Of total population, 76% Muslim; 10% is Christian; and 15% other (primarily Buddhist or
Hindu). The citizenry is almost all Muslim, of which 85% are Sunni and 15% are Shia.
Ethnic Groups
11% Emirati (citizenry); 29% other Arab and Iranian; 50% South Asian; 10% Western and
East and South Asian expatriate
Inflation Rate
About 4%
GDP and GDP-related
GDP Growth Rate: 5.3% forecast for 2022.
Metrics
GDP: $520 bil ion (2022 est)
Per capita (PPP): $76,000
Oil Exports
About 2.9 mil ion barrels per day
Sovereign Wealth Reserves About $700 bil ion
Sources: Map created by CRS. Facts from CIA, The World Factbook; U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics; Economist
Intelligence Unit; various press.
Religious Freedom12
The UAE constitution provides for freedom of religion but also declares Islam as the official
religion. The death penalty for conversion from Islam remains in law, but is not enforced. The
Shia Muslim minority, which is about 15% of the citizen population and is concentrated largely in
Dubai, is free to worship and maintain its own mosques, but Shia mosques receive no government
funds.

12 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom, May 2021.
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UAE officials boast of the country’s religious tolerance by citing the 40 churches present there, of
a variety of denominations, serving the 1 million Christians in the country, almost all of whom are
expatriates.13 In November 2017, the Abu Dhabi Department of Justice signed an agreement with
Christian leadership to allow churches to handle non-Islamic marriages and divorces. In 2016,
Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid met with Pope Francis in the Vatican, and the Pope visited the
country in February 2019, the first papal visit to the Gulf region. A Jewish synagogue has been
open in Dubai since 2008, serving mostly expatriates.
Labor Rights and Trafficking in Persons14
UAE law prohibits all forms of compulsory labor, but enforcement is inconsistent. Foreign
laborers have sometimes conducted strikes to protest poor working conditions, nonpayment of
wages, and cramped housing conditions. Workers still sometimes have their passports held, are
denied wages or paid late, and are deported for lodging complaints. The government has put in
place an electronic salary payment system that applies to companies with more than 100 workers,
facilitating timely payment of agreed wages. Since 2011, the UAE reformed its kafala (worker
sponsorship) system to allow expatriate workers to more easily switch employers.
The UAE is a “destination country” for women trafficked from Asia and the countries of the
former Soviet Union and forced into prostitution. The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons
report for 2022, for the 11th year in a row, rated the UAE as “Tier 2,” based on the assessment that
the UAE is making significant efforts to meet the minimum standards for eliminating human
trafficking. The report credited the UAE for convicting more traffickers overall, reporting a
forced labor prosecution for the first time since 2018, and identifying a victim of forced labor for
the first time in five years. The report criticized the government for not convicting any traffickers
for the forced labor of a migrant worker during the year and not ever doing so, and for not
reporting the number of trafficking cases authorities investigated for the 10th consecutive year.
Foreign Policy and Defense Issues
The UAE has sought to influence regional affairs using its significant financial resources as well
as the expertise and equipment gained in its security partnership with the United States. Within
the GCC, the UAE is closely aligned with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and, in 2011, it deployed 500
police officers to the Saudi-led GCC military intervention in Bahrain to suppress a Shia-led
uprising. At least some UAE law enforcement personnel remained there. Regional affairs and
global energy issues constituted the focus of President Biden’s multilateral and separate bilateral
meetings with Mohammad bin Zayid during his July 2022 trip to Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Rift with Qatar
In June 2017, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain sought to isolate Qatar by denying it land, sea,
and air access to their territories, and issuing 13 demands as a condition for ending the boycott,
including reducing its ties to Iran and ceasing support for Muslim Brotherhood-related
movements. Qatar refused to accede, asserting that doing so would forfeit Qatar’s sovereignty.
The same issues had prompted a shorter rift in 2014.
At the 41st GCC summit in Al Ula on January 5, 2021, after a series of meetings between Qatar
and Saudi Arabia to try to end the dispute, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt announced

13 “Pope Makes Historic Gulf Visit, Amid Yemen Crisis and Siege of Christians,” New York Times, February 4, 2019.
14 This section is derived from the U.S. Department of State, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report.
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a restoration of diplomatic relations with Qatar and an end to the territorial blockades. Since mid-
2021, the UAE has improved ties to Qatar through a visit to Doha by UAE National Security
Advisor Tahnoun Al Nuhayyan and in a meeting between the de facto leaders of the UAE and
Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s ruler on the Red Sea in September 2021. However, the UAE has not, to
date, returned an ambassadors to Qatar.
Iran
U.S. policy toward Iran has been a consistent focus of UAE leaders in relations with their U.S.
counterparts. Asserting that Iran is a major threat to regional stability, UAE leaders supported the
Trump Administration’s May 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the July 2015 Iran nuclear agreement
(Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) and application of a policy of “maximum
pressure” on Iran. Diplomatic ties with Iran, on the other hand, have fluctuated: in January 2016,
the UAE withdrew its ambassador from Iran in solidarity with Saudi Arabia’s breaking relations
with Iran over issues related to the Saudi execution of a dissident Shia cleric. In mid-2019, amid
U.S.-Iran tensions in the Gulf, the UAE leadership began to engage Iran, perhaps in part because
UAE infrastructure could be at risk in the event of war with Iran. In August 2019, UAE maritime
officials visited Iran for the first bilateral security talks since 2013.15 UAE officials have publicly
questioned Biden Administration policy to negotiate a mutual U.S. and Iranian return to full
compliance with the JCPOA without demanding additional concessions from Iran on its support
for regional armed factions.
The emirate of Dubai has often advocated that the federation emphasize engagement with Iran - a
stance that might reflect the presence of the large Iranian-origin community (estimated at 400,000
persons) and the extensive Iranian commercial presence in that emirate. The business ties have
included some illicit purchases by UAE firms of Iranian oil and jet fuel, exports of proliferation-
related technology to Iran (see below), and the use of some UAE financial institutions by Iranian
entities. Numerous UAE-based entities have been sanctioned by the United States for these
activities.16
Another factor in UAE-Iran relations is a dispute over several Persian Gulf islands. In 1971, the
Shah-led government of Iran seized the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands from Ras al-Khaymah
emirate and compelled the emirate of Sharjah to share with Iran control of Abu Musa island. In
April 1992, Iran took complete control of Abu Musa and placed some military equipment there.
The UAE has called for direct negotiations or referral to the International Court of Justice to try
to resolve the issue. A UAE-Iran joint commission held periodic talks, without a breakthrough,
during 2008-2012. In 2014, the two countries reportedly discussed a possible solution under
which Iran might cede control of the disputed islands in exchange for rights to the seabed around
them.17Iran reduced its presence on Abu Musa to build confidence, but no further progress has
been reported. The United States takes no position on the sovereignty of the islands.
UAE Regional Policy and Interventions in Regional Conflicts
Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, the UAE has become more active in the region, including through
the direct use of its own military forces, the capabilities of which have benefitted from many
years of defense cooperation with the United States. The UAE’s opposition to the Muslim

15 “Rivals Iran and UAE to hold maritime security talks,” Reuters, July 30, 2019.
16 See CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
17 Awad Mustafa, “Iran, UAE Close to Deal on Hormuz Islands,” Defense News, December 9, 2013.
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Brotherhood has been a key factor driving UAE policies toward countries where Brotherhood-
linked groups are prominent.
Egypt/North Africa18
The UAE has been an active supporter of like-minded leaders in Egypt and elsewhere in North
Africa:
 The UAE leadership applauded the Egyptian military’s 2013 toppling of Muslim
Brotherhood figure Mohammad Morsi, who was elected president in 2012. It has
since supported Egypt with more than $15 billion in assistance, loans, and
investments.19
 In Libya, the UAE joined several Gulf states in conducting air strikes to help
armed Libyan rebels overthrow Muammar Qadhafi in 2011.20 Since then, the
UAE, in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions that ban arms transfers to
Libya, reportedly has sent weapons to and conducted air operations in support of
eastern Libya-based Khalifa Hafter’s Libyan National Army (LNA).21 Hafter, a
former commander in the Libyan armed forces, has sought to undermine the
U.N.-backed government based in Tripoli.
 Some political leaders in Tunisia, including parliament speaker Rached
Ghannouchi, accuse the UAE of backing President Kaïs Saïed’s July 2021
assertion of sweeping executive powers and his suspension of the constitution
that was adopted in the wake of Tunisia’s 2011 popular uprising.22 Ghannouchi is
the longtime leader of the Islamist movement Ennadha, which is considered by
many to be an affiliate or offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.23
Iraq and Syria24
The GCC states supported Iraq against Iran in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, and they fought in the
U.S.-led coalition that ended Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1990-1991. No Arab state
participated in the U.S.-led invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003. To help stabilize
post-Saddam Iraq, the UAE wrote off $7 billion in Iraqi debt in 2008, hosted a German mission to
train Iraqi police, and provided funds for Iraq reconstruction.25 In 2012, it opened a consulate in
the Kurdish-controlled autonomous region of Iraq. After several years of political tensions with
Iraq’s Shia-dominated governments that sought to marginalize Iraqi Sunni leaders, UAE and
Saudi officials have in recent years sought to engage moderate Iraqi Shia leaders. During

18 For information on U.S. policy toward Egypt and Libya, see CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp, and CRS In Focus IF11556, Libya and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
19 “Gulf countries supported Egypt with $92bn since 2011,” Middle East Monitor, March 19, 2019.
20 “Militant Forces Got Arms Meant for Libya Rebels.” New York Times, December 6, 2012.
21 United Nations, “Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya Established pursuant to Resolution
1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2021/229, March 21, 2021.
22 “Tunisia coup: Ennahda leader blames UAE for power grab,” Middle East Eye, July 31, 2021.
23 Monica Marks and Sayida Ounissi, “Ennahda from within: Islamists or “Muslim Democrats”? A conversation,”
Brookings Institution, March 23, 2016.
24 For more information on the Syria conflict, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S.
Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud. For analysis on Iraq, see CRS In Focus IF10404, Iraq and U.S. Policy, by
Christopher M. Blanchard.
25 “UAE cancels nearly $7 billion in Iraq debt.” Reuters, July 6, 2008.
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President Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia in July 2022, the GCC states announced they would link
Iraq’s electricity grid to theirs, as part of an effort to wean Iraq from dependence on Iranian
supplies. In 2020, the UAE delivered planeloads of equipment to help Iraq cope with the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
In Syria, the GCC states initially supported the 2011 uprising against President Bashar Al Asad, in
part to oust a strong ally of Iran. The UAE contributed to a multilateral pool of funds to buy arms
for approved rebel groups in Syria,26 but Russian military intervention in 2015 enabled Asad to
largely prevail over his opponents. The UAE reopened its embassy in Damascus in December
2018, claiming that doing so would help counter to Iran’s influence in Syria.27 In 2021, the UAE
provided food, vaccines, and other medical supplies to help Syria cope with the COVID-19
outbreak.28 In March 2022, the UAE hosted a visit by Asad, his first to an Arab country since the
uprising, signaling UAE intent to help reintegrate Asad into the regional fold. U.S. officials
criticized the UAE decision to host Asad. The UAE has also sought to alleviate suffering from the
Syria crisis through donations to Syrian refugees and grants to Jordan to help it cope with the
Syrian refugees that have fled there. (In 2018, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait provided a
total of $2.5 billion to help stabilize Jordan’s finances.)29
During 2014-2015, as a member of the U.S.-led coalition combatting the Islamic State
organization, the UAE sent pilots to conduct and even command some coalition air strikes against
Islamic State positions in Syria. The UAE also hosted other forces participating in the anti-
Islamic State effort, including French jets stationed at Al Dhafra Air Base and 600 forces from
Australia.30 None of the GCC states conducted anti-Islamic State air operations in Iraq.
Yemen31
The UAE, in close partnership with Saudi Arabia, intervened militarily in Yemen in March 2015
with military personnel, armor, and air strikes against the Zaydi Shia “Houthi” faction that had
ousted the government in Sanaa. The Saudi-led coalition asserted that the intervention was
required to roll back the regional influence of Iran. Iran has, since the Saudi/UAE-led
intervention, supplied the Houthis with arms, including short-range ballistic and cruise missiles
that the Houthis have fired on UAE and Saudi territory and ships in the Bab el Mandeb Strait.
Despite highlighting its provision of humanitarian aid to the people of Yemen, international
criticism that the Saudi-led coalition effort was causing civilian casualties and humanitarian
problems contributed to a UAE decision in July 2019 to withdraw most of its ground forces from
Yemen. Since early 2022, gains by UAE-supported militia fighters in central Yemen contributed
to an agreement by all sides to an April-May 2022 ceasefire that U.N. and other mediators have
since extended and will now last until at least October 2, 2022.
UAE policy in Yemen has been a source of friction in U.S.-UAE relations. The humanitarian
consequences of the UAE war effort in Yemen produced congressional opposition to the U.S.
logistical support provided to the effort and to some U.S. arms sales to the UAE.32 UAE leaders

26 Author conversations with experts in Washington, D.C., 2013-2014.
27 “UAE reopens Syria embassy in boost for Assad.” Reuters, December 27, 2018.
28 “Syria’s Assad, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince spoke on phone: State media.” Straits Times, March 28, 2020; Bassem
Mroue, “UAE sends Syria aid to help it fight spread of coronavirus,” The Washington Post, April 8, 2021.
29 “UAE Extends AED 3 Billion Economic Aid Package to Jordan,” Forbes Middle East, October 9, 2018.
30 “Islamic State Crisis: Australia to Send 600 Troops to UAE,” BBC News, September 14, 2014.
31 See CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
32 For information on congressional action on U.S. support for the Arab coalition, and CRS Report R45046, Congress
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also publicly questioned the Biden Administration’s decision in February 2021 to remove the
Houthis from the list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) - a designation made in the final
weeks of the Trump Administration. In January 2022, the Houthis sought to put additional
pressure on the UAE to exit the conflict by firing Iran-supplied missiles on targets near Abu
Dhabi International Airport. Some of those launches were at least partly intercepted by U.S.-
operated missile defense systems in the country (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense,
THAAD),33 and the United States subsequently deployed U.S. ships and additional forces to the
UAE to deter additional attacks. However, UAE leaders have complained that the United States
did not respond strongly enough to the launches.34
Related UAE Power Projection Capabilities/East Africa
In part to support its intervention in Yemen, the UAE established military bases and supported
various leaders in several East African countries.35 In 2016, the UAE and Saudi Arabia persuaded
Sudan’s leaders to forgo a two-decade alliance with Iran and to deploy Sudanese troops as part of
the Saudi/UAE-led intervention in Yemen. In April 2019, Sudan’s then-leader, Omar Hassan al-
Bashir, was ousted by military colleagues in response to a popular uprising. Perhaps to keep the
new regime aligned with the two Gulf states, the UAE and Saudi Arabia pledged $3 billion in aid
to Sudan.36 In late 2020, Sudan joined the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco in signing the Abraham
Accords normalizing relations with Israel.
During 2015, UAE forces deployed to Djibouti to support the intervention in Yemen, but a UAE-
Djibouti dispute over funding arrangements caused UAE (and Saudi) forces to begin using
facilities in neighboring Eritrea. Perhaps to solidify its relations with Eritrea, the UAE helped
broker a 2018 rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, possibly facilitated by a UAE pledge
of $3 billion in investments in Ethiopia.37 Similarly, the UAE sought to enlist support from
Somalia in the Saudi/UAE-led campaign in Yemen. In 2014, the UAE conducted training for
Somali troops, but the arrangement unraveled following Mogadishu’s refusal to boycott Qatar.38
Afghanistan39
Before the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, the UAE apparently did not perceive
the Taliban movement as a major threat. The UAE was one of three countries (Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia were the others) that recognized the Taliban during 1996-2001 as the government of
Afghanistan, even though the Taliban harbored Al Qaeda leaders. Following the September 11
attacks, the UAE allowed the United States to use its military facilities for U.S. operations in

and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2021, by Jeremy M. Sharp, Christopher M. Blanchard, and
Sarah R. Collins.
33 “THAAD, in first operational use, destroys midrange ballistic missile in Houthi attack,” Defense News, January 21
2022. See also: CRS Insight IN11891, Attacks Against the United Arab Emirates: Issues for Congress, by Jeremy M.
Sharp and Carla E. Humud.
34 Bilal Saab and Karen Young, “How Biden Can Rebuild U.S. Ties with the Gulf States,” Foreign Policy, April 4,
2022.
35 Material in this section is taken from Alex Mello and Michael Knights, “West of Suez for the United Arab Emirates.”
Warontherocks.com. September 2, 2016.
36 “Sudan has received half the $3 billion promised by Saudi Arabia and UAE,” Reuters, October 8, 2019.
37 “UAE to give Ethiopia $3 billion in aid and investments,” Reuters, June 16, 2018.
38 “Why the UAE Wants Somalia in the Yemen Conflict,” Fair Observer, August 17, 2020.
39 CRS Report R45818, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton Thomas.
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Afghanistan and it deployed a 250-person contingent, supported by six UAE F-16s, in
Afghanistan’s restive south until 2014.40 The risks of this involvement were evident in January
2017 when five UAE diplomats were killed by a bomb during their visit to the governor’s
compound in Qandahar. The UAE also was a significant donor of aid to post-Taliban Afghanistan.
The UAE closed its embassy in Kabul following the August 2021 Taliban takeover and
subsequently allowed ousted president Ashraf Ghani to live in exile there. It also took in Afghan
air force pilots who had flown their aircraft to Uzbekistan as the Taliban advanced on Kabul. It
has since reopened its embassy in Kabul. Several thousand Afghans who evacuated from Kabul in
August 2021 are present in Abu Dhabi and seek repatriation to the United States. In July 2022,
the UAE signed an agreement with the Taliban-run government to manage Afghanistan’s major
civilian airports, including the international airport at Kabul.
Israel, Normalization Agreement, and the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute41
From its founding in 1971 until 2020, the UAE had no formal diplomatic relations with Israel, but
the two had been quietly building ties for the past decade in an effort to counter Iran. In
November 2015, the UAE gave Israel permission to establish a diplomatic office in Abu Dhabi to
facilitate Israel’s participation in the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).42 In June
2019, Israeli Foreign Minister Yisrael Katz attended a U.N. meeting on climate change in Abu
Dhabi.43 Bilateral trade had been increasing, even though the UAE formally enforced the Arab
League primary boycott of Israel.44
On August 13, 2020, President Trump, then-Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and
Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayid announced that Israel and the UAE agreed to fully normalize their
relations, and that Israel would suspend plans to annex parts of the West Bank. By committing to
the “Abraham Accords,” the UAE leadership arguably hoped not only to strengthen a regional
coalition against Iran but also to extract benefits from the United States, including the U.S. sale to
the UAE of F-35 aircraft and armed drones to the UAE (see below). In August 2020, the UAE
government formally repealed a law enforcing the primary Arab League boycott of Israel, paving
the way for regular relations, including openly conducted commercial passenger flights, between
the two nations. In June 2021, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid met the UAE’s foreign minister in
Abu Dhabi and inaugurated Israel’s first embassy in the Gulf. In December 2021, Israel’s then-
Prime Minister Naftali Bennett became the first Israeli leader to visit the UAE.45
UAE leaders emphasized that they had extracted Israeli concession on West Bank annexation,
noting that the normalization announcement followed an editorial by the UAE’s Ambassador to
the United States warning that unilateral annexation of West Bank territory would endanger
Israel’s warming ties with Arab countries.46 As did other Arab states, the UAE publicly opposed
the Trump Administration’s 2017 decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and its 2019

40 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potent ally nicknamed ‘Little Sparta’,” The
Washington Post, November 9, 2014.
41 See CRS Insight IN11485, Israel-UAE Normalization and Suspension of West Bank Annexation, by Jim Zanotti and
Kenneth Katzman.
42 Simon Henderson, “Israel’s Gulf Breakthrough,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 30, 2015.
43 “Minister Katz visits Abu Dhabi: A ‘significant step’ in Israel-Arab relations,” Jerusalem Post, July 1, 2019.
44 In 1994, the UAE and the other GCC states ended enforcement of the Arab League’s secondary and tertiary boycotts
(boycotts of companies doing business with Israel and on companies that do business with those companies).
45 “Israeli PM Naftali Bennett begins first official visit to UAE,” Al Jazeera, December 12, 2021.
46 Yusuf al-Otaiba, “Annexation will be a serious setback for better relations with the Arab world,” Ynet News, June 12,
2020.
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recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the Golan Heights. In line with UAE animosity toward
Muslim Brotherhood-related movements, the UAE does not support the Palestinian Islamist
group Hamas, which exercises de facto control of the Gaza Strip.
UAE Foreign Spending47
The UAE has provided billions of dollars in international aid through its government and through
funds controlled by royal family members and other elites. The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development
(ADFD), established in 1971, has distributed over $4 billion for more than 200 projects spanning
102 countries. Some other examples include the following. For example, the UAE provided $100
million for victims of the December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, and it provided about $2
million for victims of conflict in Somalia (2011-2012). To help the victims of natural disasters in
the United States, it donated $100 million to assist recovery from Hurricane Katrina; $5 million
for a pediatric wing at St. John’s Mercy Hospital in Joplin, Missouri, after the 2011 tornado there;
and $10 million for reconstruction after Hurricane Sandy in 2013. The UAE, as do other GCC
states, provides significant amounts of funds to U.S. research organizations, public relations
firms, law firms, and other representatives to support UAE policies and try to influence U.S.
policymakers.48
Defense Cooperation with the United States49
The UAE’s ability to project power in the region is in part a result of many years of U.S.-UAE
defense cooperation that includes U.S. arms sales and training, strategic planning, and joint
exercises and operations. The UAE’s armed forces are small—approximately 50,000 personnel—
but they have become experienced from participating in several U.S.-led military ground
operations, including Somalia (1992), the Balkans (late 1990s), and Afghanistan (2003-2014), as
well as air operations in Libya (2011) and against the Islamic State organization in Syria (2014-
2015). The UAE reportedly has augmented its manpower by recruiting foreign nationals and
tasking U.S. and other security experts to build militias and mercenary forces.50 In September
2019, the UAE formally joined the U.S.-led maritime security mission in the Gulf (International
Maritime Security Construct, IMSC), an effort to deter Iranian attacks on Gulf shipping in mid-
2019. Unlike fellow GCC countries Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, the UAE has not been
designated by the United States as a “Major Non-NATO Ally” (MNNA) - a designation that
opens participants to enhanced defense research cooperation with the United States.
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and U.S. Forces in UAE
The United States and the UAE have established a “Defense Cooperation Framework” to develop
joint approaches to regional conflicts and to promote U.S.-UAE interoperability. A “Joint Military
Dialogue” (JMD) meets periodically. The security cooperation processes build on the July 25,
1994, bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), the text of which is classified.51 On May

47 Factsheets provided by UAE Embassy in Washington, DC, 2011-2020.
48 Ben Freeman. “The Emirati Lobby: How the UAE Wins in Washington.” Center for International Policy, October 15,
2019.
49 Some of this section is from U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates,”
Fact Sheet, June 25, 2021.
50 “Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater’s Founder,” New York Times, May 14, 2011.
51 For key provisions, see: Sami Hajjar, U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War
College: Strategic Studies Institute), March 2002, p. 27. According to UAE diplomats, no “Status of Forces
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15, 2017, the United States and the UAE confirmed that they had concluded negotiations on a
new DCA with a 15-year duration, which came into force as of May 30, 2019.52 In accordance
with the DCA:
 The United States deploys about 3,500 U.S. military personnel at several UAE
facilities including Jebel Ali port (between Dubai and Abu Dhabi), Al Dhafra Air
Base (near Abu Dhabi), and naval facilities at Fujairah.53 Al Dhafra air base hosts
a variety of U.S. military aircraft including surveillance, refueling, and combat
aircraft. In April 2019, in the context of escalating tensions with Iran, the United
States deployed the F-35 combat aircraft to Al Dhafra, the first such U.S.
deployment of that aircraft in the region.54 Jebel Ali, capable of handling aircraft
carriers, and other UAE ports collectively host more Navy ships than any other
port outside the United States. The U.S. forces in UAE support U.S. operations in
the region, including deterring Iran, countering terrorist groups, and intercepting
illicit shipments of weaponry or technology.
 UAE military personnel study and train in the United States each year, through
the Foreign Military Sales program, through which the UAE buys U.S.-made
arms, and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.
U.S. officials say that UAE pilots and special operations forces demonstrated
their effectiveness, including against AQAP in Yemen.
 The UAE hosts a “Joint Air Warfare Center” where UAE and U.S. forces conduct
joint exercises on early warning, air and missile defense, and logistics.55
U.S. and Other Arms Sales
According to the State Department factsheet cited above, “The UAE is a significant purchaser of
U.S. military equipment, including our most sophisticated missile defense systems. This
partnership has enhanced the UAE’s military capabilities to the point that they have become a net
security provider for the region.” The United States has over $29 billion in active government-to-
government sales cases with the UAE under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, and the
UAE does not receive U.S. aid to purchase U.S. weaponry.56 Since 2016, the United States has
also authorized the permanent export of over $11 billion in defense articles to the UAE via the
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process, primarily launch vehicles, ground vehicles, and military
electronics. During this time, the Department closed 65 end-use monitoring checks in the UAE.
 F-16 Program. In 2000, the UAE purchased 80 U.S. F-16 aircraft, equipped with
the Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the High
Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), at a value of about $8 billion. Congress
did not block the sale. In April 2013, the United States sold the UAE an

Agreement” (SOFA) is in effect - legal issues involving U.S. military personnel are handled on a “case-by-case basis.”
52 Department of Defense, “SecDef Meets with UAE’s Crown Prince,” May 15, 2017; “UAE-US defence agreement
kicks in as John Bolton visits Abu Dhabi,” The National, May 30, 2019.
53 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates,” Fact Sheet, June 25, 2021.
54 “US Air Force sends next generation fighter jets to UAE,” The National, April 17, 2019.
55 Chandresekaran, “A Quiet, Potent Ally to U.S.,” op. cit.
56 In FY2018, the United States provided about $32 million worth of excess defense articles (EDA) to the UAE—
equipment to make the UAE’s armored vehicles more mine-resistant. USAID Foreign Aid Explorer database.
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additional 30 F-16s and associated “standoff” air-to-ground munitions. The UAE
also has about 60 French-made Mirage 2000 warplanes.
 F-35.57 UAE officials say the country has sought since 2014 to buy the advanced
F-35 “Joint Strike Fighter.” In 2016, Israel began taking deliveries of the jet—a
significant development in light of the U.S. law requiring the United States to
preserve Israel’s “Qualitative Military Edge” (QME) in the region.58 On
November 10, 2020, the Trump Administration notified Congress of a $23 billion
arms sale to the UAE, to include F-35 “Joint Strike Fighters,” drones, and various
munitions. An effort to block the proposed sale in the Senate failed (S.J.Res. 77
and S.J.Res. 78). In the last days of the Trump presidency, the UAE signed an
agreement to purchase up to 50 F-35 joint strike fighter aircraft and 18 MQ-9
Reaper drones from the United States.59 The Biden Administration paused the
sale for review upon taking office, and a variety of issues, including a U.S.
request for additional UAE measures to ensure the security of the aircraft at UAE
bases, have delayed finalizing the sale, to date.60 The UAE would be the first
Arab country to purchase the F-35 system.
 JDAMs and other Precision-Guided Munitions. The United States has sold the
UAE advanced precision-guided missiles (PGMs), including the ATM-84
SLAM-ER Telemetry missile, GBU-39/B “bunker buster” bombs, and Joint
Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) kits (which convert gravity bombs to precision-
guided bombs). The UAE has used many of these weapons in the conflict in
Yemen. In May 2019, invoking emergency authority codified in the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA) and citing “the need to deter further Iranian adventurism in
the Gulf and throughout the Middle East,”61the Trump Administration formally
notified Congress of immediate sales to the UAE of additional PGMs, with an
estimated value of $1 billion (Transmittal Number 17-73 and Transmittal
Number 17-70). Congress did not override the President’s veto of measures to
block the sales (S.J.Res. 37, 116th Congress).62
 Apache attack helicopter. In 2010, the United States sold the UAE 30 AH-64
Apache helicopters, at an estimated cost of about $5 billion.63
 Ballistic Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The United States has
not historically supplied or assisted the UAE with ballistic missile technology or
armed UAVs, in part because the UAE is not an adherent of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). However, the Trump Administration’s
2020 change of U.S. MTCR policy allows for the export of U.S.-made armed

57 For more detail on the F-35 sale to the UAE, see CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and
Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.
58 See CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
59 Mike Stone, “UAE signs deal with U.S. to buy 50 F-35 jets and up to 18 drones: sources,” Reuters, January 20, 2021.
60 Grant Rumley. “Unpacking the UAE F-35 Negotiations,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 15,
2022.
61 Letter from Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman James E. Risch,
May 24, 2019.
62 For more information on the congressional response to the emergency sale, see CRS Report R45046, Congress and
the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2021, by Christopher M. Blanchard, Jeremy M. Sharp, and Carla E.
Humud.
63 DSCA transmittal number 10-52.
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UAV that fly at speeds below 800 kph, including the Reaper Drones that
comprise part of the arms deal signed in January 2021. The UAE reportedly
possesses a small number (six) of Scud-B ballistic missiles obtained from non-
U.S. suppliers.64 In 2017, the UAE took delivery of a commercial sale, worth
about $200 million, of U.S.-made Predator X-P unarmed UAV. On May 24, 2019,
the State Department approved the sale to UAE of the Blackjack UAV, with an
estimated value of $80 million, under the emergency notification discussed above
(Transmittal Number 17-39). The country reportedly has bought armed UAVs
from China and has used them for strikes in Libya (see above).65
 Tanks and Ground Forces Missiles. UAE forces still use primarily 380 French-
made Leclerc tanks, and the UAE has not bought any main battle tanks from the
United States. In September 2006, the United States sold the UAE High Mobility
Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Army Tactical Missile Systems
(ATACMs), valued at about $750 million.
Missile and Air Defense
The UAE has purchased the most advanced missile defense systems sold by the United States,
and supports a long-standing U.S. objective to organize a coordinated Gulf-wide ballistic missile
defense (BMD) network that can defend against Iran’s advancing missile capabilities. It hosts an
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Center—a training facility to enhance intra-GCC and
U.S.-GCC missile defense cooperation.
The UAE was the first GCC state to order the THAAD, at an estimated cost of about $7 billion.
Delivery and training for the UAE’s THAAD system took place in 2015.66 On August 2, 2022,
the Administration notified Congress of a sale of additional THAAD systems at an estimated cost
of $2.245 billion.67 Earlier, in 2007, the UAE purchased the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-
3) missile defense system. In 2017, the Obama Administration approved the sale of 60 PAC-3 and
100 Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical (GEM-T) missiles, with a total estimated value
of about $2 billion. On May 3, 2019, the State Department approved a sale of up to 452 PAC-3
missiles and related equipment, with an estimated value of $2.728 billion.68
UAE Defense Cooperation with Other Powers
The UAE has sought to build defense partnerships beyond that with the United States. In 2004,
the UAE joined NATO’s “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.” In 2011, the UAE sent an Ambassador
to NATO under that organization’s revised alliance policy and NATO established a liaison office
in Abu Dhabi, under the auspices of the embassy of Denmark, in 2017. In 2009, the UAE allowed
France to inaugurate military facilities collectively termed Camp De La Paix (“Peace Camp”). It
includes a 900-foot section of the Zayid Port; a part of Al Dhafra Air Base; and a barracks at an
Abu Dhabi military camp that houses about several hundred French military personnel. India’s
Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited the UAE in August 2015, the first by an Indian leader
since 1981, and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayid made a reciprocal visit to India in January
2017, during which the two countries signed a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

64 International Institute of Strategic Studies “Military Balance.”
65 “UAE allegedly using Chinese drones for deadly airstrikes in Libya,” Defense News, May 2, 2019.
66 Adriane Elliot, “Antiballistic System Shared with International Partner,” U.S. Army, January 13, 2016.
67 DSCA Transmittal No. 22-32.
68 DSCA Transmittal No. 19-37.
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Agreement.” The UAE also hosts the Khawla bint Al Azwar Military School, the region’s first
military school for women, which has trained female peacekeepers for deployment in Africa and
Asia.
Russia/Ukraine. The UAE relationship with Russia has attracted significant attention, particularly
for the potential to violate a provision of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions
Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) that provides for sanctions on entities that conduct significant
defense-related transactions with Russia. In February 2017, press reports appeared that the UAE
and Russia might jointly develop a combat aircraft.69 In February 2019, the UAE ordered EM150
“Kornet” anti-tank weapons from Russia.70
UAE-U.S. relations have been strained somewhat by the UAE’s refusal to strongly condemn the
Russian invasion of Ukraine. The UAE abstained on the February 24, 2022, U.N. Security
Council resolution denouncing the invasion, although it subsequently voted in favor of a U.N.
General Assembly resolution with similar provisions. There have also been press reports that the
UAE government has turned a blind eye to the movement of assets to the UAE by sanctioned
Russian persons.71
Cooperation against Terrorism, Proliferation, and Narcotics72
During the mid-1990s, some Al Qaeda activists were able to move through the UAE, and two of
the September 11, 2001 hijackers were UAE nationals. Recent State Department reports on
terrorism credit the UAE with strengthening the country’s bureaucracy and legal framework to
combat terrorism. The UAE is part of a Saudi-initiated GCC “Security Pact” that entails increased
GCC information-sharing on internal security threats.
Still, the United States and the UAE differ on designations of some organizations as terrorist. The
85 groups that the UAE government designates as terrorist includes the Muslim Brotherhood,
which is not named by the United States or any European country as a terrorist organization.73
Antiterrorism Financing and Money Laundering (AML/CFT). The country is a member of the
Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a regional body
modeled on the broader Financial Action Task Force (FATF); the Counter-Islamic State Finance
Group chaired by Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the United States; and the Egmont Group of Financial
Intelligence Units. In May 2017, the UAE joined the U.S.-GCC Terrorist Financing Targeting
Center based in Riyadh, which has designated several AQAP and Islamic State-Yemen entities.
The UAE Central Bank’s Financial Intelligence Unit is credited in State Department terrorism
reports with providing training programs to UAE financial institutions on money laundering and
terrorism financing, and making mandatory the registration of informal financial transmittal
networks (hawalas). During 2018 and 2019, the government enacted and issued implementing
regulations for updated anti-money laundering laws.74 However, in April 2020, the FATF found
that the United Arab Emirates was not doing enough to prevent money laundering despite recent

69 “Russia, UAE to collaborate on 5th-generation fighter,” United Press International, February 20, 2017.
70 “United Arab Emirates Announces $1.3 Billion in Defense Deals at IDEX,” Defense News, February 18, 2019.
71 “Analysis: Can the UAE be a safe haven for Russian oligarchs?,” Al Jazeera, March 14 2022.
72 Much of this section is taken from U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020.
73 “UAE Lists Scores of Groups as ‘Terrorists,’” Al Jazeera, November 16, 2014.
74 Fact sheet provided by UAE embassy representatives, October 31, 2018; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports
on Terrorism 2019, June 24, 2020.
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progress, and risked being including in the body’s watch list of countries found to have “strategic
deficiencies” in AMF/CFT—the so-called “gray list.”75 In March 2022, the FATF formally placed
the UAE on the gray list, subjecting the country to increased monitoring of its efforts to correct
the deficiencies the FATF identified.76
Since 2012, there has been an FBI Legal Attaché office at the U.S. consulate in Dubai to assist
with joint efforts against terrorism and terrorism financing. However, some financial networks
based in the UAE have been sanctioned by the Department of the Treasury for facilitating
transactions for Iran and pro-Iranian regional factions in furtherance of Iran’s “malign activities”
in the region.
Countering Violent Extremism. The UAE works with partners and has empowered local
organizations to counter violent extremism. In 2012, the country established the “International
Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism,” known as Hedayah (“guidance”). The
Ministry of Tolerance has been active in promoting messages of tolerance and coexistence. The
United States and the UAE jointly operate the Sawab Center, an online hub to promote
information sharing with international police organizations when family members report on
relatives who have become radicalized.77 Several UAE-based think tanks conduct seminars on
confronting terrorism and violent extremism.
Port and Border Controls
The UAE has participated in a number of projects with the United States which are related to
nonproliferation and nuclear security. For example, the government has received assistance from
the State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security Program, which aims to build
“national strategic trade control systems in countries that possess, produce, or supply strategic
items, as well as in countries through which such items are most likely to transit.”78 The UAE has
also participated in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)-run Container Security
Initiative, under which CBP personnel work with foreign governments to screen U.S.-bound
containers.”79 The UAE participates in the U.S.-GCC Counter-proliferation Workshop.
The UAE participates in U.S. programs to improve UAE export control enforcement. During
2004-2006, several Dubai-based companies were cited by U.S. officials for illicit sales of nuclear
technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea and for transshipping devices used to make
improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq and Afghanistan.80 In 2007 the George W. Bush
Administration threatened to restrict U.S. exports of certain technologies to the UAE for the illicit
exports. The UAE government enacted a new law later that year that empowered authorities to
shut down 40 foreign and UAE firms allegedly involved in illicit exports, and no U.S. sanctions
were imposed on the country.
The UAE government supports the Department of Homeland Security’s programs to collect U.S.-
bound passenger information and operation of a “preclearance facility” at the Abu Dhabi
International Airport. In 2006, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States—a

75 “UAE at risk of landing on watchlist over money laundering,” Al Jazeera, April 30, 2020.
76 “UAE is placed on money laundering watchdog’s ‘gray list,’” CNBC, March 5, 2022.
77 David Ignatius, “A Small Organization Offers a Fresh Approach on Preventing Terrorism,” opinion, The Washington
Post, October 21, 2014.
78 “Export Control and Related Border Security Program,” Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation.
79 “CSI: Container Security Initiative,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
80 Milhollin, Gary and Kelly Motz, “Nukes ‘R’ US.” New York Times, op. ed. March 4, 2004; BIS, “General Order
Concerning Mayrow General Trading and Related Enterprises,” 71 Federal Register 107, June 5, 2006.
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body that reviews proposed foreign investments to ensure that the investment does not threaten
U.S. national security—approved the takeover by the Dubai-owned Dubai Ports World company
of a British firm that manages six U.S. port facilities. Congress expressed concern that the
takeover might weaken U.S. port security in P.L. 109-234, an emergency supplemental
appropriation.
U.S. Funding Issues
The United States has provided small amounts of counterterrorism assistance to help the UAE
build its capacity to enforce its border and financial controls. The Department of Defense
provided $300,000 to the UAE to assist its counter-narcotics capability in FY2016 and $531,000
in FY2017. In FY2019, about $1.35 million in State Department funds were provided to the UAE
to build its capacity to counter terrorism financing. In FY2020 and FY2021, the United States
spent about $130,000 and $110,000, respectively, to build the capacity of the UAE government to
enforce its export control laws.81
Nuclear Power and Space Program
The UAE announced in 2008 that it would acquire nuclear power reactors to meet projected
increases in domestic electricity demand. In 2009, the United States and the UAE concluded a
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement - pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (AEA; 42 U.S.C. 2153(b)) - committing the UAE to refrain from producing enriched
uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear reactor fuel; both processes could produce fissile material
for nuclear weapons. 82 This provision is typically not included in peaceful nuclear cooperation
agreements.
A number of U.S. and European firms have secured administrative and financial advisory
contracts with the UAE’s nuclear program. The Korea Electric Power Corporation of South
Korea received the prime contract “to design, build and help operate the Barakah Nuclear Energy
Plant,” which is to contain four nuclear power reactors.83 The nuclear plants began operating in
mid-2020.”84
In July 2014, the UAE formed a “UAE Space Agency.” In 2019, the country sent its first
astronaut to the International Space Station. In July 2020, the country launched an unmanned
spaceship that is to probe Mars. The probe entered Mars orbit in 2021.
Economic Issues
The UAE, a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), has developed a free market
economy, but its financial institutions are weakly regulated. Although the UAE has announced
plans and policies (“Vision 2021”) to try to further diversify its economy and reduce its
dependence on exports of hydrocarbons, the UAE economy and financial picture still fluctuates

81 USAID Foreign Aid Explorer database, accessed April 12, 2021.
82 For more information about nuclear cooperation agreements, see CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with
Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
83 “The Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) and the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant,” Emirates Nuclear
Energy Corporation factsheet.
84 “Safe Start-up of Unit 1 of Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant Successfully Achieved,” Emirates Nuclear Energy
Corporation press release, August 1, 2020.
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along with the world energy outlook. Abu Dhabi has 80% of the federation’s proven oil reserves
of about 100 billion barrels, enough for many decades of exports at the current rate of about 2.9
million barrels per day (mbd) of exports. Oil exports, of which over 60% go to Japan, account for
about 25% of the country’s GDP.85 The UAE has vast quantities of natural gas but consumes
more than it produces. Through its participation in the Dolphin Energy project, the UAE imports
natural gas from neighboring Qatar—an arrangement that was not disrupted by the GCC rift. A
UAE effort to become self-sufficient in gas by 2030 could benefit from the discovery in UAE
waters, announced in early 2020, of the large Jebel Ali non-associated gas field. Dubai emirate
has, to some extent, sought to plan for a post-hydrocarbons era through initiatives, such as the
clean energy and autonomous vehicle showcase project “Masdar City,” that provide jobs and
attract tourism and publicity.
To help it weather the effect of lower oil prices during 2014-2019, the government cut some
subsidies and sold government bonds, including $5 billion in bonds in 2016 and $10 billion in
2017. The government was able to avoid drawing down its $600 billion in various sovereign
wealth funds overseen by the Emirates Investment Authority (EIA). In 2022, world energy prices
increased significantly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which prompted U.S. and European
sanctions on Russian oil exports. In part because an oil price increase benefits the UAE budget,
the UAE and Saudi Arabia did not respond to U.S. requests to increase oil production to help
bring world oil prices back down.86 Adding to the U.S.-UAE tensions over oil prices, the UAE
and Saudi Arabia continue to engage with Russia in the “OPEC Plus” framework, giving the
impression that the two Gulf states are cooperating with, or at least refraining from opposing,
Russia. In the aftermath of President Biden’s meetings with the GCC leaders in Saudi Arabia in
July 2022, OPEC+ announced in August 2022 a slight increase in oil production, seemingly
responding positively, at least to some extent, to President Biden’s urgings for more Gulf state oil
production.
The country is also accepting investment from China under that country’s “Belt and Road
Initiative” (BRI), intended to better connect China economically to other parts of Asia, Central
Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. In April 2019, the UAE and China signed deals worth $3.4
billion to store and ship Chinese products from the UAE port of Jebel Ali.87
Aside from the public health consequences, the economic effects of the coronavirus outbreak
have been significant, resulting from travel and tourism restrictions and a decline in consumer
spending as bans on gatherings were imposed during 2020. China-based Sinopharm tested its
vaccine in the UAE, in part because nationals of many different countries live and work there.88
U.S.-UAE Economic Ties89
U.S. trade with the UAE is a significant issue because the UAE is the largest market for U.S.
exports to the Middle East. Over 1,000 U.S. companies have offices there, and there are over
60,000 Americans working in UAE. U.S. exports to the UAE in 2021 totaled over $17 billion,
and imports from the UAE nearly doubled from 2020 levels, totaling nearly $6 billion. U.S.

85 “The UAE and Global Oil Supply,” Embassy of the UAE in the United States, August 2020.
86 Bilal Saab and Karen Young, “How Biden Can Rebuild U.S. Ties With the Gulf States,” Foreign Policy, April 4,
2022.
87 “The UAE Signed a Massive, $3.4 Billion Deal with China—and That ‘Isn’t a Surprise,” NBC News, April 29, 2019.
88 “China’s Sinopharm begins late stage trial of COVID-19 vaccine in UAE,” Reuters, July 16, 2020.
89 Trade data taken from U.S. Census Bureau. Foreign Trade Statistics.
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products sold to UAE are mostly commercial aircraft, industrial machinery and materials, and
other high-value items. The United States imports small amounts of UAE crude oil.
In 2004, the George W. Bush Administration notified Congress it had begun negotiating a free
trade agreement (FTA) with the UAE. Several rounds of talks were held prior to the June 2007
expiration of Administration “trade promotion authority.” In 2011, the FTA talks were replaced
by a U.S.-UAE “Economic Policy Dialogue,” between major U.S. and UAE economic agencies.
The UAE is part of the “GCC-U.S. Framework Agreement on Trade, Economic, Investment, and
Technical Cooperation,” a trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA) created in 2012.
Commercial Aviation Issue90
One issue in U.S.-UAE economic relations has been a contention by several U.S. airlines that the
UAE government subsidizes two UAE airlines, Emirates Air (Dubai-based) and Etihad Air (Abu
Dhabi-based). In 2018, the two UAE airlines agreed to address the complaints by using globally
accepted accounting standards for annual reports and opening their books to outside
examination.91

Author Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Acknowledgments
This report was prepared with the assistance of Sarah Collins, Research Assistant, Middle East and Africa
Section.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

90 For background on this issue, see CRS Report R44016, International Air Service Controversies: Frequently Asked
Questions, by Rachel Y. Tang.
91 “U.S. and United Arab Emirates Reach Deal to Solve Open Skies Spat,” Skift, May 11, 2018.
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