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U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

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U.S. Assistance tofor Sub-Saharan Africa: An August 30, 2022 Overview Tomas F. Husted, Overview. Congress authorizes, appropriates, and oversees U.S. foreign assistance for sub- Coordinator Saharan Africa (“Africa”), which typically receives about a quarter of all U.S. foreign assistance Analyst in African Affairs (including humanitarian assistance) annually. Annual State Department- and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-administered assistance to Africa increased more than five- Alexis Arieff fold in the 2000s, largely due to increases in global health spending to help combat HIV/AIDS. Specialist in African Affairs Over the past decade, funding levels have fluctuated between $6.5 and $7.5 billion annually. This does not include funding allocated from global accounts or programs, such as humanitarian assistance, or funds provided through multilateral bodies, such as the United Nations and the Lauren Ploch Blanchard World Bank. Other federal entities also administer programs in African countries, including the Specialist in African Affairs Millennium Challenge Corporation, Peace Corps, U.S. Development Finance Corporation, and the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture. Nicolas Cook Specialist in African Affairs Objectives and Delivery. Unless noted, this report focuses on State Department- and USAID- administered funds. Over the past decade, approximately 70% of U.S. assistance for Africa has sought to address health challenges, primarily HIV/AIDS. Other assistance has aimed to foster agricultural development and economic growth; strengthen peace and security; improve education access and social service delivery; and strengthen democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG). Much of this funding is provided under multi-country initiatives focused largely or wholly on Africa, including the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President’s Malaria Initiative, Feed the Future, Prosper Africa, and Power Africa. The Biden Administration. The Biden Administration has articulated priorities for U.S. engagement with Africa that are broadly consistent with those of its predecessors. Stated objectives include advancing global health; enhancing peace and security; promoting mutually beneficial economic growth, trade, and investment; strengthening democracy; and building resilience to address challenges related to health, climate change, food security, and other areas. In its FY2023 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) budget request, the Administration proposed $7.77 billion in assistance specifically for Africa, up from $7.65 billion in FY2021 actual nonemergency allocations. Health programs comprise roughly 75% of the FY2023 proposal, economic growth assistance 12%, peace and security assistance 6%, DRG programs 4%, and education and social service funding 4%. Top recipients would include Nigeria ($610 million), Tanzania ($565 million), Mozambique ($558 million), Uganda ($549 million), and Kenya ($525 million). Issues for Congress. The 117th Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2023 budget request for Africa as it debates FY2023 appropriations. Congress will evaluate the FY2023 request for Africa in the context of other demands on U.S. attention and resources—including for security, economic, and humanitarian aid for Ukraine and ongoing efforts to combat COVID-19. More broadly, policymakers, analysts, and advocates continue to debate the funding levels, focus, and effectiveness of U.S. assistance programs in Africa. Some Members have questioned whether current assistance for Africa is sufficient and appropriately balanced between sectors given the broad scope of U.S. interests in the region. Congressional debate also has focused on the appropriate approach to U.S. engagement with undemocratic governments in the region, and on the possible unintended consequences associated with U.S. foreign assistance, among other considerations. That comprehensive regional- or country-level breakouts of U.S. assistance are not routinely made available in public budget documents may complicate congressional oversight, inhibit efforts to assess impact, and obscure policy dilemmas. Congress may continue to assess whether executive branch departments and agencies provide sufficient programmatic, funding, and impact evaluation information to Congress to enable effective oversight and timely responses to identified challenges. Congress has shaped U.S. assistance for Africa through annual appropriations legislation directing allocations for certain activities and countries. Congress has also enacted appropriations provisions and other legislation prohibiting or imposing conditions on aid to specific countries in Africa, and on certain kinds of assistance, on various grounds (e.g., related to trafficking in persons, child soldiers, terrorism, military coups, and religious freedom). Security assistance has been a focus of congressional scrutiny: Congress has restricted certain kinds of support for foreign security forces implicated in human rights abuses, and the 117th Congress has acted to enhance congressional oversight of U.S. security assistance for Africa. Congressional Research Service link to page 4 link to page 4 link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 8 link to page 10 link to page 13 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 20 link to page 5 link to page 7 link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 18 link to page 24 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Historic Trends and Key Rationales ................................................................................................ 1 Recent Funding Trends, Objectives, and Delivery .......................................................................... 3 Health Assistance ...................................................................................................................... 3 Economic Growth Assistance.................................................................................................... 5 Peace and Security Assistance................................................................................................... 7 Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) ............................................................. 10 Education and Social Services ................................................................................................ 10 Selected Global Assistance for Africa ............................................................................................ 11 Humanitarian Assistance .......................................................................................................... 11 Health Assistance .................................................................................................................... 12 Peace and Security Assistance................................................................................................. 12 Other U.S. Department and Agency Assistance ............................................................................ 13 The Department of Defense (DOD) ........................................................................................ 13 Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) ............................................................................ 13 The Peace Corps ...................................................................................................................... 14 African Development Foundation (USADF) .......................................................................... 14 The Biden Administration and the FY2023 Request ..................................................................... 14 The FY2023 SFOPS Budget Request for Africa ..................................................................... 15 Outlook and Issues for Congress ................................................................................................... 17 Figures Figure 1. U.S. Assistance for Africa, Select State Department and USAID Accounts .................... 2 Figure 2. Health Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element ........................ 4 Figure 3. Economic Growth Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element......................................................................................................................................... 6 Figure 4. Peace and Security Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element......................................................................................................................................... 8 Figure 5. DRG Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element ........................ 10 Figure 6. Education and Social Services Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element ........................................................................................................................ 11 Figure 7. The FY2023 Request for Africa, by Account ................................................................. 15 Contacts Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 21 Congressional Research Service link to page 5 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Introduction This report is intended to serve as a primer on U.S. foreign assistance funding and programming for sub-Saharan Africa (“Africa”) to inform Congress as it authorizes, appropriates funds for, and oversees such engagement. This report focuses primarily on funds and programs administered by the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and includes more limited discussion of select assistance managed by other U.S. departments and agencies. A separate CRS report, CRS Report R45428, Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement, discusses U.S. policy toward and engagement in Africa. Scope and Definitions Unless otherwise indicated, this report discusses State Department- and USAID-administered assistance allocated specifically for African countries and regional programs. It does not comprehensively discuss funding allocated for African countries via global accounts and programs that are not allocated by country or region in annual State Department Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJs), which provide information on the planned allocation of appropriated assistance.1 Unless otherwise noted, figures refer to actual allocations of funding appropriated in given fiscal year (hereinafter, “allocations”).2 Historic Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

May 20, 2020 (R46368)
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Contents

Summary

Overview. Congress authorizes, appropriates, and oversees U.S. assistance to sub-Saharan Africa ("Africa"), which received over a quarter of U.S. aid obligated in FY2018. Annual State Department- and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-administered assistance to Africa increased more than five-fold over the past two decades, primarily due to sizable increases in global health spending and more incremental growth in economic and security assistance. State Department and USAID-administered assistance allocated to African countries from FY2019 appropriations totaled roughly $7.1 billion. This does not include considerable U.S. assistance provided to Africa via global accounts, such as emergency humanitarian aid and certain kinds of development, security, and health aid. The United States channels additional funds to Africa through multilateral bodies, such as the United Nations and World Bank.

Objectives and Delivery. Over the past decade, roughly 70-75% of annual U.S. aid to Africa has sought to address health challenges, notably relating to HIV/AIDS, malaria, maternal and child health, and nutrition. Much of this assistance has been delivered via disease-specific initiatives, including the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI). Other U.S. aid programs seek to foster agricultural development and economic growth; strengthen peace and security; improve education access and social service delivery; bolster democracy, human rights, and good governance; support sustainable natural resource management; and address humanitarian needs. What impacts the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic may have for the scale and orientation of U.S. assistance to Africa remains to be seen.

Aid to Africa during the Trump Administration. The Trump Administration has maintained many of its predecessors' aid initiatives that focus wholly or largely on Africa, and has launched its own Africa-focused trade and investment initiative, known as Prosper Africa. At the same time, the Administration has proposed sharp reductions in U.S. assistance to Africa, in line with proposed cuts to foreign aid globally. It also has proposed funding account eliminations and consolidations that, if enacted, could have implications for U.S. aid to Africa. Congressional consideration of the Administration's FY2021 budget request is underway; the Administration has requested $5.1 billion in aid for Africa, a 28% drop from FY2019 allocations. Congress has not enacted similar proposed cuts in past appropriations measures.

Selected Considerations for Congress. Policymakers, analysts, and advocates continue to debate the value and effectiveness of U.S. assistance programs in Africa. Some Members of Congress have questioned whether sectoral allocations are adequately balanced given the broad scope of Africa's needs and U.S. priorities in the region. Concern also exists as to whether funding levels are commensurate with U.S. interests. Comprehensive regional- or country-level breakouts of U.S. assistance are not routinely made publicly available in budget documents, complicating estimates of U.S. aid to the region and congressional oversight of assistance programs.

In addition to authorizing and appropriating U.S. foreign assistance, Congress has shaped U.S. aid to Africa through legislation denying or placing conditions on certain kinds of assistance to countries whose governments fail to meet standards in, for instance, human rights, debt repayment, or trafficking in persons. Congress also has restricted certain kinds of security assistance to foreign security forces implicated in human rights abuses. Some African countries periodically have been subject to other restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, including country-specific provisions in annual aid appropriations measures restricting certain kinds of assistance. Congress may continue to debate the merits and effectiveness of such restrictions while overseeing their implementation.


Introduction

This report is intended to serve as a primer on U.S. foreign assistance to sub-Saharan Africa ("Africa") to help inform Congress' authorization, appropriation, and oversight of U.S. foreign aid for the region. It focuses primarily on assistance administered by the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which administer the majority of U.S. aid to the region. It covers recent funding trends and major focus areas of such assistance, select programs managed by other U.S. agencies and federal entities, and the Trump Administration's FY2021 aid budget request for Africa. In addition to discussing aid appropriations, this report notes a range of legislative measures that have authorized specific assistance programs or placed conditions or restrictions on certain types of aid, or on aid to certain countries. Select challenges for congressional oversight are discussed throughout this report. For more on U.S. engagement in Africa, see also CRS Report R45428, Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement.

Definitions. Unless otherwise indicated, this report discusses State Department- and USAID-administered assistance allocated for African countries or for regional programs managed by the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs (AF), USAID's Bureau for Africa (AFR), and USAID regional missions and offices in sub-Saharan Africa. It does not comprehensively discuss funding allocated to African countries via global accounts or programs, which publicly available budget materials do not disaggregate by country or region.1 Except as noted, figures refer to actual allocations of funding appropriated in the referenced fiscal year (hereafter, "allocations"). 2

COVID-19 in Africa: Emergent Implications for U.S. Assistance3

This report does not specifically address the implications of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic for U.S. assistance to Africa, as the consequences of the pandemic for the scale and orientation of U.S. aid to the region remain to be seen. While the impacts of COVID-19 continue to unfold across the region, several factors may inhibit African countries' capacities to respond to the virus. Many countries have limited disease surveillance and response capabilities, owing in part to shortages of health equipment and personnel. Limited access to safe water may hinder handwashing and other hygienic measures. Physical distancing is a challenge in the high-density settlements where millions of Africans live, as well as in humanitarian settings such as displacement camps.

COVID-19's economic impacts also are likely to be substantial in Africa, where many countries rely on commodity exports or tourism—sectors expected to be hard-hit by the pandemic. Several initial analyses have projected that Africa will face an economic contraction in 2020, which would mark the first regional recession in over two decades.4 Africa's oil export-dependent countries, including regional powerhouse Nigeria, face a second threat: a concurrent global oil price collapse initially linked to an oil production competition between Saudi Arabia and Russia. That the pandemic is unfolding simultaneously in developed countries and in other developing regions may limit the availability of donor funds that could help African countries address health and economic challenges.

How the COVID-19 pandemic may affect U.S. assistance to Africa remains to be seen. 5 As of early May, the State Department and USAID had announced approximately $269 million in health, humanitarian, and economic and governance aid to support African responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.6 This assistance includes funding for public health information campaigns, laboratory capacity, disease surveillance, water and sanitation, and infection control in healthcare facilities in Africa, along with economic support and education programs. The Administration also has pledged to donate ventilators to several African countries; those deliveries are underway.

In addition to assistance provided on a bilateral basis, the United States provides substantial funding to multilateral organizations involved in regional responses to COVID-19, such as United Nations (U.N.) agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the African Development Bank (AfDB). Congressional authorization and appropriation measures will continue to shape U.S. foreign assistance as the pandemic unfolds.

Figure 1. Map of Africa

Source: General reference map created by CRS. Boundaries may not be authoritative. Mauritius is not shown.

Recent Assistance Trends and Key Rationales

Trends and Key Rationales Africa has received a growing share of annual U.S. foreign assistance funding over the past two decades: the region received 37, accounting for 36% of State Department- and USAID-administered aid obligations in FY2018, up from 28% of global obligations in 2008 and 16% in 1998.7 U.S. aid to Africafunding allocated for specific regions in FY2021 (latest available), up from 31% in 2011 and 10% in 2001.3 U.S. assistance for the region grew markedly during the 2000s (see Figure 1), as Congress appropriated substantial funds to support the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which the George W. Bush Administration launched in 2003. Development and security aid to Africa also increased during that period, albeit to a lesser extent (see Figure 2). Assistance for Africa plateaued during the Obama Administration, with bipartisan support in Congress. As discussed below, assistance to combat HIV/AIDS remains by far the largest category of U.S. assistance for Africa. Development and security aid for Africa also increased during the 2000s, albeit to a lesser extent. U.S. assistance for Africa was comparatively flat over the past decade, generally fluctuating between $7.06 billion and $8.0 billion in annual allocations, excluding emergency humanitarian assistance and other funding allocated from global accounts and programs. Africa received roughly $7.0 billion in annual U.S. aid allocations in the first three years of the Trump Administration, despite the Administration's repeated proposals to curtail aid to the region.8

Over the past decade, roughly 70% of U.S. assistance to African countries has supported health programs, notably focused on HIV/AIDS, malaria, nutrition, and maternal and child health. U.S. assistance also seeks to encourage economic growth and development, bolster food security, enhance governance, and improve security.

Figure 2. U.S. Aid to3 billion in annual inflation-adjusted dollars.4 1 See CRS In Focus IF11515, U.S. Foreign Assistance: Budget Development and Execution, by Nick M. Brown. 2 “Actual” allocations reflect a final plan for the use of appropriated funding, though agencies may continue to transfer or reprogram assistance, subject to availability and legislative authorities. 3 CRS calculations based on allocation data provided in Country/Account Summaries (“Spigots”) in State Department CBJs for FY2003, FY2013, and FY2023. Calculations do not include funding for the Peace Corps, humanitarian assistance, or funding categorized as “Other.” 4 CRS calculation based on allocations for FY2011-FY2021, drawn from State Department CBJs for FY2013-FY2023; constant FY2022 dollars based on deflators from Office of Management and Budget Historic Budget Tables, FY2022. Congressional Research Service 1 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Figure 1. U.S. Assistance for Africa, Select State Department and USAID Accounts Source: CRS graphic Africa, Select State Department and USAID Accounts

Source: CRS, based on State Department Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJs) for FY2003-FY2021.

FY2023. Notes: CSD=Child Survival and Disease Programs; CSH=Child Survival and Health Programs; DA=Development Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; GHP=Global Health Programs; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; PKO=Peacekeeping Operations. Calculations do not include funding allocated from global accounts or programs.

As discussed below, African countries also receive assistance administered by other federal agencies. The United States channels additional funding to Africa through multilateral bodies, such as U.N. agencies and international financial institutions like the World Bank.

Policymakers, analysts, and advocates continue to debate the value and design of assistance programs in Africa. Proponents of such assistance often contend that foreign aid advances U.S. national interests in the region, or that U.S. assistance (e.g., to respond to humanitarian need) reflects U.S. values of charity and global leadership.9 Critics often allege that aid has done little to improve socioeconomic outcomes in Africa overall, that aid flows may have negative unintended consequences (such as empowering undemocratic regimes), or that other countries should bear more responsibility for providing aid to the region.10 Assessing the effectiveness of foreign aid is complex—particularly in areas afflicted by conflict or humanitarian crisis—further complicating such debates.11 Selected considerations concerning U.S. aid to Africa and issues for Congress are discussed in further detail below (see "Select Issues for Congress").

U.S. Assistance to Africa: Objectives and Delivery

U.S. assistance seeks to address a range of development, governance, and security challenges in Africa, reflecting the continent's size and diversity as well as the broad scope of U.S. policy interests in the region. State Department- and USAID-administered assistance for Africa totaled roughly $7.1 billion in FY2019, not including funding allocated to Africa via global accounts and programs (see "Select Assistance Provided through Global Accounts and Programs," below).

Figure 3. U.S. Assistance to Africa in FY2019, by Program Area

Source: CRS calculation based on FY2019 sectoral data provided by USAID, February 2020.

Notes: Funding allocated from global or functional programs, including emergency humanitarian assistance, is not included. International food assistance provided under Title II of the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480) is also excluded, whether provided for humanitarian or development purposes.

Health. At $5.3 billion, health assistance comprised 75% of U.S. aid to Africa in FY2019.12 The majority of this funding supported HIV/AIDS programs (see Figure 4), with substantial assistance provided through the global President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—a State Department-led, interagency effort that Congress first authorized during the George W. Bush Administration and reauthorized through 2023 under P.L. 115-305.13 Programs to prevent and treat malaria, a leading cause of death in Africa, constituted the second-largest category of health assistance; such funding is largely provided through the USAID-led President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), which targeted 24 countries in Africa (out of 27 globally) as of 2019.14

Figure 4. Health Assistance to Africa in FY2019 by Program Area

Source: CRS calculation based on FY2019 sectoral data provided by USAID, February 2020.

Beyond disease-specific initiatives, U.S. assistance has supported health system strengthening, nutrition, family planning and reproductive health, and maternal and child health programs. The United States also has supported global health security efforts, including pandemic preparedness and response activities, notably through the U.S.-supported Global Health Security Agenda.15 In recent years, USAID and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) led robust U.S. responses to two Ebola outbreaks on the continent, in West Africa (2014-2016) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, 2018-present).16

Agriculture and Economic Growth. U.S. support for economic growth in Africa centers on agricultural development assistance. USAID agriculture programs seek to improve productivity by strengthening agricultural value chains, enhancing land tenure systems and market access road infrastructure, promoting climate-resilient farming practices, and funding agricultural research. Nearly 60% of U.S. agricultural assistance to Africa in FY2019 benefitted the eight African focus countries17 under Feed the Future (FTF)—a USAID-led, interagency initiative launched by the Obama Administration that supports agricultural development to reduce food insecurity and enhance market-based economic growth.18 (There are 12 FTF focus countries worldwide; the initiative supports additional countries under "aligned" and regional programs.) The Global Food Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-195, reauthorized through 2023 in P.L. 115-266) endorsed an approach to U.S. agricultural and food assistance similar to FTF.

Other U.S. economic assistance programs support trade capacity-building efforts, economic policy reforms and analysis, microenterprise and other private sector strengthening, and infrastructure development. Since the early 2000s, USAID has maintained three sub-regional trade and investment hubs focused on expanding intra-regional and U.S.-Africa trade, including by supporting African exports to the United States under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, Title I, P.L. 106-200, as amended) trade preference program.19 USAID also coordinates Prosper Africa, an emerging Trump Administration trade and investment initiative (see Text Box).

The Administration's Prosper Africa Initiative20

Prosper Africa seeks to double U.S.-Africa trade, spur U.S. and African economic growth, and encourage U.S. commercial interest and investment in African markets. As of early 2020, a "deal team" within each U.S. embassy in Africa had been established to help link U.S. firms to trade and investment opportunities in Africa, enable African firms to access similar opportunities in the United States, and facilitate private sector access to U.S. trade assistance, financing, and insurance services. USAID's sub-regional trade and investment hubs are expected to support the initiative through trade capacity-building and related activities. Prosper Africa seeks to marshal the resources and capabilities of various U.S. trade promotion agencies, such as the Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank, the Trade and Development Agency (TDA), the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC, established in the BUILD Act, Division F of P.L. 115-254).21

Prosper Africa is at an early stage of implementation, and its impact on U.S.-Africa trade remains to be seen. In addition, the extent to which Prosper Africa differs from past U.S. trade assistance efforts focused on Africa may be debated. Trade capacity-building has been an enduring focus of USAID's trade and investment hubs, which have long supported efforts to expand African exports. The Obama Administration's Trade Africa initiative, which the Trump Administration discontinued, was a trade hub-led effort to bolster intra-regional trade and integration, with an initial focus on East Africa. The Obama Administration also launched Doing Business in Africa (DBIA), an effort to increase U.S. business exposure to African markets and U.S. trade promotion programs. DBIA is now defunct apart from the DBIA President's Advisory Council, a board of private sector actors that offers advice on strengthening U.S.-Africa commercial ties. The Administration has portrayed Prosper Africa as a "one-stop shop" to connect U.S. and African entrepreneurs with the broad range of U.S. trade and investment support programs.22

Electrification is another focus of U.S. economic assistance in Africa. Power Africa, a USAID-led initiative that the Obama Administration launched in 2013, seeks to enhance electricity access through technical assistance, grants, financial risk mitigation tools, loans, and other resources—accompanied by trade promotion and diplomatic and advisory efforts. Facilitating private sector contracts is a key focus of the initiative, which aims to build power generation facilities capable of producing 30,000 megawatts of new power and establish 60 million new power connections by 2030.23 A sub-initiative, Beyond the Grid, supports off-grid electricity access. Power Africa involves a range of U.S. federal entities in addition to USAID, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), DFC, Ex-Im Bank, TDA, and Departments of State, Energy, Commerce, and Agriculture. The Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-121) made it U.S. policy to aid electrification in Africa through an approach similar to that of Power Africa.

Peace and Security. The State Department administers a range of programs to build the capacity of African militaries and law enforcement agencies to counter security threats, participate in international peacekeeping and stabilization operations, and combat transnational crime (e.g., human and drug trafficking). State Department security assistance authorities are codified in Title 22 of the U.S. Code. Congress appropriates funds for Title 22 programs in annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations, though the Department of Defense (DOD) implements several of these programs. (For information on DOD security cooperation, see "Assistance Administered by Other U.S. Federal Departments and Agencies.")

The Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account is the primary vehicle for State Department-administered security assistance to African countries (Figure 5). Despite its name, PKO supports not only peacekeeping capacity-building, but also counterterrorism, maritime security, and security sector reform. (A separate State Department-administered account, Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities [CIPA], funds U.S. assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping budgets.) In recent years, the largest PKO allocation for Africa has been for the U.N. Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which supports an African Union stabilization operation in that country.24 PKO funding also supports two interagency counterterrorism programs in Africa: the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP, in North-West Africa), and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT, in East Africa).

Figure 5. Title 22 Security Assistance to Africa FY2015-FY2019, Selected Accounts

Source: State Department, CBJs for FY2017-2021.

Notes: FMF=Foreign Military Financing; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE= International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; PKO=Peacekeeping Operations. Funding allocated from global programs not included.

The Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account funds counterterrorism training and other capacity-building programs for internal security forces, as well as other activities such as landmine removal. International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds support efforts to combat transnational crime and strengthen the rule of law, including through judicial reform and law enforcement capacity-building. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program offers training for foreign military personnel at facilities in the United States and abroad, and seeks to build military-to-military relationships, introduce participants to the U.S. judicial system, promote respect for human rights, and strengthen civilian control of the military. The United States provides grants to help countries purchase defense articles and services through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account.

USAID also implements programs focused on conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution. Such assistance seeks to prevent mass atrocities, support post-conflict transitions and peace building, and counter violent extremism, among other objectives. Congress appropriates funding for such programs as economic assistance, as opposed to security assistance.

Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG). State Department- and USAID-administered DRG programs seek to enhance democratic institutions, improve government accountability and responsiveness, and strengthen the rule of law. Activities include supporting African electoral institutions and political processes; training political parties, civil society organizations, parliaments, and journalists; promoting effective and accountable governance; bolstering anti-corruption efforts; and strengthening justice sectors. U.S. assistance also provides legal aid to human rights defenders abroad and funds programs to address particular human rights issues and enable human rights monitoring and reporting.

Education and Social Services. U.S. basic, secondary, and higher education programs seek to boost access to quality education, improve learning outcomes, and support youth transitions into the workforce. Some programs specifically target marginalized students, such as girls and students in rural areas or communities affected by conflict or displacement. Youth development activities also include the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), which supports young African business, science, and civic leaders through training and mentorship, networking, and exchange-based fellowships.25 USAID supports four YALI Regional Leadership Centers on the continent—in Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and South Africa—which offer training and professional development programs. Additional U.S. assistance programs enhance access to, and delivery of, other social services, such as improved water and sanitation facilities.

Environment. Environmental assistance programs in Africa focus on biodiversity conservation, climate change mitigation and adaptation, countering wildlife crime, and natural resource management. In recent years, the largest allocation of regional environmental assistance has been for the Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE) These figures do not include funds administered through global accounts or programs, such as humanitarian assistance. They also exclude funds administered by other U.S. federal entities, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and Department of Defense (DOD), and U.S. contributions to international financial institutions and other multilateral bodies, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and United Nations (U.N.) agencies. Policymakers, analysts, and advocates continue to debate the value and appropriate balance of U.S. assistance programs in Africa. Proponents contend that foreign assistance helps African countries address pressing challenges (e.g., development and humanitarian needs) while advancing U.S. national interests, such as by bolstering U.S. economic relations abroad and promoting U.S. influence vis-à-vis that of global competitors such as China and Russia.5 Some also contend that U.S. assistance reflects U.S. values of charity and global leadership.6 Critics have alleged that foreign aid may create market distortions or dependencies, or have other unintended consequences, such as prolonging conflicts or strengthening undemocratic regimes.7 Some African commentators have criticized the nature of donor-recipient relationships, describing them as shaped primarily by donor prerogatives rather than by the needs and demands of recipient countries, or as benefitting international implementers over local authorities and organizations.8 5 Stephen A. O’Connell, “What the U.S. Gains From its Development Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa,” EconoFact, January 31, 2017. 6 For more on the rationales and objectives of U.S. foreign assistance, see CRS Report R40213, Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, by Emily M. Morgenstern and Nick M. Brown. 7 For a critical assessment of foreign assistance in Africa, see, for example, Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, A Plan to Reform U.S. Security Assistance, Center for American Progress, 2021; and Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009). 8 See, e.g., testimony by Degan Ali and Ali Mohamed in House Foreign Affairs Committee, “Shifting the Power: Advancing Locally-Led Development and Partner Diversification in U.S. Development Programs,” hearing, 117th Congressional Research Service 2 link to page 20 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview More broadly, some Members and others have called for a reorientation of U.S. engagement in Africa to deemphasize U.S. assistance relative to U.S. commercial engagement, calling for “trade, not aid” to promote development in the region.9 Other considerations related to U.S. assistance for Africa and issues for Congress are discussed below (see “Outlook and Issues for Congress”). Recent Funding Trends, Objectives, and Delivery Since FY2017, health assistance has constituted approximately three-quarters of annual U.S. assistance for Africa; HIV/AIDS-related funding alone typically accounts for around half of all State Department- and USAID-administered assistance for the region in a given fiscal year.10 Agriculture and other economic programs generally have comprised the second-largest focus area of U.S. assistance for Africa, accounting for around 9% of average annual allocations since FY2017, followed by peace and security programs (7%), education and social services funding (4%) and democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) assistance (4%).11 U.S. assistance for Africa totaled $7.65 billion in FY2021 allocations, including supplemental global health security funds provided in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA, P.L. 117-2) but excluding emergency assistance appropriated for Sudan under Title IX of P.L. 116-260 as well as humanitarian assistance.12 Broadly consistent with past years, health programs comprised roughly 78% of FY2021 assistance, followed by funds to promote economic growth, advance peace and security, enhance education and other social service delivery, and strengthen democracy, human rights, and governance. Health Assistance Congress funds U.S. health assistance for Africa primarily through appropriations to the Global Health Programs account, which is administered partly by the State Department (GHP-State) and partly by USAID (GHP-USAID). Health assistance to improve access to water and sanitation, however, is generally funded under the Development Assistance (DA) account. Cong., 1st Sess., September 23, 2021; U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Mark Lowcock, “What’s Wrong with the Humanitarian Aid System and How to Fix It,” remarks at Center for Global Development, April 2021. 9 See, e.g., remarks by Representative Karen Bass in House Foreign Affairs Committee roundtable, “Roundtable: Celebrating African Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Leadership,” May 25, 2021; Adva Saldinger, “Q&A: US Representative Ted Yoho on his foreign aid philosophy,” Devex, February 24, 2017. 10 CRS calculations based on FY2017-FY2021 data provided by USAID, May 2022. In FY2017, the State Department revised the Standardized Program Structure and Definitions (SPSD) framework under which U.S. foreign assistance is categorized by program area and activity, complicating assessments of longer-term sectoral funding trends. 11 CRS calculations based on data provided by USAID, May 2022. Figures reflect averages from FY2017-FY2021. 12 State Department, CBJ for FY2023. Specifically, this includes $367 million in global health security in development (GHSD) assistance provided in ARPA to enable comparison with the Biden Administration’s FY2023 request, which—in a departure from past budget requests—disaggregates most GHSD funding by country. It excludes $700 million in emergency funding for Sudan appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Title IX of P.L. 116-260). Congressional Research Service 3 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Figure 2. Health Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element Source: CRS graphic. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023. HIV/AIDS. Most U.S. health assistance for Africa supports HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment efforts under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—a State Department-led, interagency effort that Congress first authorized during the George W. Bush Administration and reauthorized through 2023 in P.L. 115-305.13 GHP-State is the primary vehicle for HIV/AIDS assistance for Africa, though USAID partly manages such funding, and USAID administers some additional HIV/AIDS assistance via GHP-USAID. Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia were the top recipients of HIV/AIDS assistance allocations in FY2021. Malaria. Programs to prevent and treat malaria typically constitute the second-largest category of U.S. health assistance for the region.14 Such funding is largely provided through the USAID-led President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), which focused on 24 African “focus countries” (out of 27 worldwide) as of July 2022. Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which together account for roughly 40% of annual malaria cases globally, regularly rank as the leading recipients of U.S. counter-malaria assistance in Africa.15 Maternal and Child Health, Family Planning, and Reproductive Health. African countries have made strides in maternal and child health in recent decades, yet stark challenges persist; as a region, Africa accounts for an estimated two-thirds of global maternal deaths and has the world’s highest neonatal and under-five mortality rates.16 U.S. maternal and child health programs aim to improve maternal, newborn, and early childhood care. Family planning and reproductive health 13 See CRS In Focus IF11018, Global Trends in HIV/AIDS, by Sara M. Tharakan, and CRS In Focus IF10797, PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act: Expiring Authorities, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther. 14 See CRS In Focus IF11146, Global Trends: Malaria, by Sara M. Tharakan. 15 Malaria burden figures from World Health Organization (WHO), World Malaria Report 2021, 2021. 16 WHO, U.N. Children’s Fund, U.N. Population Fund, World Bank, and U.N. Population Division, Trends in Maternal Mortality, 2000 to 2017, 2019; U.N. Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation, Levels & Trends in Child Mortality: Report 2021, 2021. Congressional Research Service 4 link to page 14 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview programs, meanwhile, support access to contraception, along with efforts to end child marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, gender-based violence, and other reproductive health issues.17 Global Health Security. U.S. health assistance for Africa includes some funding for pandemic preparedness and response activities, though most such assistance is channeled through global accounts and programs or administered by other U.S. agencies, such as the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, it also has included aid to help African countries counter the disease and its effects (see Text Box). COVID-19-Related Assistance for Africa As of March 31, 2022 (latest data available), USAID-administered support for COVID-19 responses in Africa totaled over $1.8 bil ion, most of which was special y appropriated by Congress and represents an addition to regular annual foreign aid appropriations.18 USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) administered a majority ($1.3 bil ion) of such funding, with smaller amounts managed by the Bureau for Africa ($353 mil ion) and Bureau for Global Health ($231 mil ion). Ethiopia has been the largest recipient of U.S. COVID-19-related assistance in Africa by, with at least $366 mil ion in U.S. obligations as of March 2022, fol owed by South Sudan ($182 mil ion), Sudan ($163 mil ion), and Nigeria ($104 mil ion). Other Assistance. Other U.S. health assistance for Africa, most administered by USAID, seeks to enhance access to improved water and sanitation facilities, improve nutrition, and combat tuberculosis. As discussed below (see “Selected Global Assistance for Africa”), the United States provides additional health funding for Africa through global programs as well as through contributions to multilateral health initiatives such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund). Economic Growth Assistance As noted above, economic growth programs typically comprise the second-largest focus area of U.S. assistance for Africa. Congress funds such assistance primarily through the DA account, though some programs are funded via the Economic Support Fund (ESF).19 17 See CRS Report R46215, U.S. Bilateral International Family Planning and Reproductive Health Programs: Background and Selected Issues. On differences between maternal and child health programs and family planning and reproductive health programs, see State Department, “Updated Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions,” April 19, 2016. 18 Figures in this text box refer to obligated funds provided in the 2020 Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-123), the 2020 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act (P.L. 116-136), the 2021 American Rescue Plan Act (P.L. 117-2), and prior year funding. Figures do not include USAID support for GAVI COVAX, the multilateral vaccine initiative. USAID, “COVID-19 – Sub-Saharan Africa (Fact Sheet #4, FY2022),” March 31, 2022. 19 The State Department and USAID jointly administer ESF funding; USAID manages DA. Congressional Research Service 5 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Figure 3. Economic Growth Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element Source: CRS graphic. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023. Agricultural Development. Support for agricultural development typically constitutes the largest category of U.S. economic growth assistance for Africa. Such programs seek to improve agricultural productivity by strengthening value chains, enhancing land tenure systems and access to markets, promoting climate-resilient farming practices, and funding agricultural research. Feed the Future (FTF), a USAID-led, interagency initiative launched by the Obama Administration to reduce food insecurity and enhance market-based economic growth, is the main channel for U.S. agricultural assistance for Africa; as of July 2022, there were eight African FTF focus countries, out of 12 globally.20 The Global Food Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-195, reauthorized through 2023 in P.L. 115-266) endorsed an approach to U.S. food security assistance similar to FTF. Trade and Investment. Prosper Africa, a USAID-led, multiagency initiative launched by the Trump Administration in 2019, is the primary vehicle for U.S. trade and investment assistance for Africa. It aims to spur U.S. and African market-led economic growth by substantially increasing two-way U.S.-African trade and investment ties, foster business environment reforms in Africa, and counter the economic influence of China and other U.S. global competitors.21 A range of U.S. assistance programs support trade capacity-building (TCB) efforts that aim to boost African countries’ ability to trade with other countries and with the United States—the latter notably under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 106-200, as amended), 20 African FTF focus countries are Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda. FTF supports other countries under “aligned” and regional programs 21 Prosper Africa primarily seeks to harmonize and provide a single point of access to the services and programs of 17 U.S. agencies and departments with trade and investment promotion and economic development mandates. See CRS In Focus IF11384, The Trump Administration’s Prosper Africa Initiative, by Nicolas Cook and Brock R. Williams. Congressional Research Service 6 link to page 17 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview which provides duty-free treatment for U.S. imports from eligible African countries.22 Over the last two decades, much of this activity has been channeled through two (formerly three) USAID-administered sub-regional trade and investment hubs, located in West and Southern Africa. Climate Change and Environment. The State Department classifies a range of U.S. assistance to mitigate and address the impacts of climate change under the umbrella of economic growth assistance, though not all of this assistance is directly related to economic growth.23 Under the Obama Administration, the United States sharply increased such funding, including for Africa; the Trump Administration took steps to largely end such assistance globally. The Biden Administration has placed a high priority on responding to climate change globally and, as discussed below, has sought to increase climate change-related assistance for Africa (see “The Biden Administration and the FY2023 Request”). During the Biden Administration, the largest allocation of climate change-related assistance has been for Power Africa, a USAID-led electrification effort launched by the Obama Administration that provides technical assistance and advice, grants, loans, financial risk mitigation, and other assistance to support increased access to power, including renewable energy.24 Facilitating individual power projects is a core focus of the initiative, which aims to create 30,000 megawatts of new power generation capacity and establish 60 million new connections in Africa by 2030.25 Expanding energy access in the region is a standing U.S. policy goal under the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-121). U.S. economic growth assistance also funds “environment” programs, activities related to natural resources that are not directly focused on climate change (e.g., conservation and countering wildlife crime). Funding for the Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE) is typically the largest allocation of annual environment assistance. Implemented by USAID and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (per congressional directives), CARPE, CAPRE promotes conservation, and sustainable resource use, and climate change mitigation in Central Africa's Congo Basin rainforest, with a present focus on landscapes in DRC, the Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic (CAR).26 Congress has shown enduring interest in international conservation initiatives and efforts to curb wildlife trafficking and other environmental crime, including in Africa.27

Select Assistance Provided through Global Accounts and Programs

As noted, the discussion above does not account for U.S. development, security, or health assistance allocated to African countries via global accounts and programs—funds that are not broken out by region or country in public budget documents. This includes situation-responsive assistance, such as emergency humanitarian aid and certain kinds of governance support, which is appropriated on a global basis and allocated in response to emerging needs or opportunities. Notably, it also includes certain security assistance programs through which some African countries have received considerable funding in recent years. Gaps in region- and country-level aid data may raise challenges for congressional oversight (see "Select Issues for Congress").

Emergency Assistance. As of early 2020, there were U.S.- or U.N.-designated humanitarian crises in Burkina Faso, CAR, DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and the Lake Chad Basin (including parts of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria). The United States administers humanitarian aid to Africa under various authorities. Key accounts and programs include:

  • USAID-administered Food for Peace (FFP) assistance authorized under Title II of the Food for Peace Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-480, commonly known as "P.L. 480"), which primarily provides for the purchase and distribution of U.S. in-kind food commodities.28 African countries consistently have received a majority of annual FFP Title II emergency assistance in recent years.

USAID-administered International Disaster Assistance (IDA), which funds food and nonfood humanitarian assistance—including the Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP), which funds market-based food assistance, including cash transfers, food vouchers, and food procured locally and regionally.29

State Department-administered Migration and Refugees Assistance (MRA) assistance for refugees and vulnerable migrants.

Figure 6. Emergency Food Assistance to Africa, Select Programs

Source: USAID, Emergency Food Security Program Report and International Food Assistance Report, FY2014-FY2018.

Assistance Administered by Other U.S. Federal Departments and Agencies

While the State Department and USAID administer the majority of U.S. foreign assistance to Africa, other federal departments and agencies also manage or support aid programs in the region. For example, the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, and the Treasury conduct technical assistance programs and other activities in Africa, and may help implement some State Department- and USAID-administered programs on the continent.

Other U.S. federal entities involved in administering assistance to Africa notably include:

The Department of Defense (DOD). In addition to implementing some State Department-administered security assistance programs, DOD is authorized to engage in security cooperation with foreign partner militaries and internal security entities for a range of purposes.30 The majority of this assistance has been provided under DOD's "global train and equip" authority, first established by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of FY2006 (P.L. 109-163). In the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328), Congress codified and expanded the "global train and equip" authority under 10 U.S.C. 333 ("Section 333"), consolidating various capacity-building authorities that it had granted DOD on a temporary or otherwise limited basis. Section 333 authorizes DOD to provide training and equipment to foreign military and internal security forces to build their capacity to counter terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, and transnational crime, and to bolster maritime and border security and military intelligence.

Comprehensive regional- or country-level funding data for DOD security cooperation programs are not publicly available, complicating approximations of funding for African countries. A CRS calculation based on available congressional notification data suggests that Kenya, Uganda, Niger, Chad, Somalia, and Cameroon have been the top African recipients of cumulative DOD global train and equip assistance over the past decade.31 Congress has authorized additional DOD security cooperation programs in Africa under global or Africa-specific authorities (e.g., to help combat the Lord's Resistance Army rebel group in Central Africa between FY2012 and FY2017).

Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).32 Authorized by Congress in 2004, the MCC supports five-year development "compacts" in developing countries that meet various governance and development benchmarks. MCC recipient governments lead the development and implementation of their programs, which are tailored to address key "constraints to growth" identified during the compact design phase. The MCC also funds smaller, shorter-term "threshold programs" that assist promising candidate countries to become compact-eligible.

As shown in Appendix B, the MCC has supported 32 compacts or threshold programs in 22 African countries since its inception, valued at roughly $8.0 billion in committed funding. There are seven ongoing compacts and threshold programs in the region. The MCC has suspended or terminated compacts with some African governments for failing to maintain performance against selection benchmarks: it terminated engagement in Madagascar and Mali due to military coups, and suspended development of a second compact for Tanzania in 2016 due to a government crackdown on the political opposition.33 In late 2019, the MCC cancelled a $190 million tranche of funding under Ghana's second compact over concerns with the Ghanaian government's termination of a contract with a private energy utility.34

The Peace Corps.35 The Peace Corps supports American volunteers to live in local communities abroad and conduct grassroots-level assistance programs focused on agriculture, economic development, youth engagement, health, and education. As of September 2019, 45% of Peace Corps Volunteers were serving in sub-Saharan Africa—by far the largest share by region.36 Conflict and other crises in Africa have episodically led the Peace Corps to suspend programming over concern for volunteer safety, with recent conflict-related suspensions in Mali (in 2015) and Burkina Faso (2017) and temporary suspensions in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone during the 2014-2016 West Africa Ebola outbreak. In 2019, the Peace Corps announced that it would resume operations in Kenya after suspending activities in 2014 due to security concerns. The Peace Corps ceased all activities and recalled all volunteers worldwide in March 2020 due to COVID-19.

African Development Foundation (USADF). A federally funded, independent nonprofit corporation created by Congress in the African Development Foundation Act of 1980 (Title V of P.L. 96-533), the USADF seeks to reduce poverty by providing targeted grants worth up to $250,000 that typically serve as seed capital for small-scale economic growth projects. The USADF maintains a core focus on agriculture, micro-enterprise development, and community resilience. It prioritizes support for marginalized, poor, and often remote communities as well as selected social groups, such as women and youth—often in fragile or post-conflict countries. USADF also plays a role in selected multi-agency initiatives, such as Power Africa and YALI.

U.S. Aid to Africa During the Trump Administration

In 2018, the Trump Administration identified three core goals of its policy approach toward Africa: expanding U.S. trade and commercial ties, countering armed Islamist violence and other forms of conflict, and imposing more stringent conditions on U.S. assistance and U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region.37 The Administration also has emphasized efforts to counter "great power competitors" in Africa, namely China and Russia, which it has accused of challenging U.S. influence in the region through "predatory" economic practices and other means.38 Other stated policy objectives include promoting youth development and strengthening investment climates on the continent.39 Budget requests and other official documents, such as USAID country strategies, have asserted other priorities broadly similar to those pursued by past Administrations, such as boosting economic growth, investment, and trade, enhancing democracy and good governance, promoting socioeconomic development, and improving health outcomes.40

The Administration has expressed skepticism of U.S. foreign aid globally, and to certain African countries in particular. For instance, then-National Security Advisor John Bolton pledged in 2018 to curtail aid to African countries whose governments are corrupt and to direct assistance toward states that govern democratically, pursue transparent business practices, and "act as responsible regional stakeholders [...and] where state failure or weakness would pose a direct threat to the United States and our citizens."41 These objectives do not appear to have been revoked since Bolton's departure from the White House in September 2019. Whether the Administration's budget proposals for aid to Africa have reflected such pledges is debatable, however, as discussed below ("The FY2021 Assistance Request for Africa: Overview and Analysis").

The Trump Administration has maintained several assistance initiatives focused substantially or exclusively on Africa—including PEPFAR, the PMI, Feed the Future, Power Africa, and YALI, among others—and, as noted above, has launched Prosper Africa, a new Africa-focused trade and investment initiative. At the same time, the Administration has proposed to sharply reduce U.S. assistance to Africa (and globally), even as Congress has provided assistance for Africa at roughly constant levels in recent fiscal years (see Figure 7). The Trump Administration also has proposed changes to the manner in which the United States delivers assistance which, if enacted, could have implications for U.S. aid to Africa. These include:

Changes to humanitarian assistance. As part of a consolidation of humanitarian aid accounts, the Administration has repeatedly proposed to eliminate FFP Title II aid, through which African countries received $1.2 billion in emergency food assistance in FY2019.42 The FY2021 budget request would merge the four humanitarian accounts—FFP Title II, International Disaster Assistance (IDA), Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA), and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA)—into a single International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account. Budget documents assert that the consolidation would enhance the flexibility and efficiency of humanitarian assistance.43

Changes to bilateral economic assistance. The Administration has repeatedly proposed to merge a number of bilateral economic assistance accounts—including Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid, through which African countries received a cumulative $1.5 billion in FY2019—into a new Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) account. The Administration has consistently requested far less in ESDF than prior-year combined allocations for the subsumed accounts. Budget documents contend the consolidation would improve efficiency.44

Cutting Foreign Military Financing for Africa. Unlike previous Administrations, the Trump Administration has not requested FMF for African countries, with the exception of Djibouti, which hosts the only enduring U.S. military installation in Africa.45

Eliminating the USADF. The Administration annually has proposed to eliminate the USADF and create a grants office within USAID that would assume responsibility for the agency's work. In successive budget requests, the Administration has included one-time closeout funding for the agency (e.g., $4.7 million for FY2021).

To date, Congress has maintained the existing account structures for the delivery of humanitarian aid and economic assistance and continued to appropriate operating funds to the USADF—most recently under P.L. 116-94 at a level of $33 million for FY2020. Consideration of the President's FY2021 budget request, released in February 2020, is underway.

Figure 7. Allocated and Requested Aid to Africa in FY2016-FY2021, Select Accounts

Source: State Department, CBJs for FY2017-FY2021; FY2019 data provided to CRS by USAID, February 2020.

Notes: Security assistance calculations include proposed funding for UNSOS. Calculations do not include funding allocated from global programs or functional accounts.

The FY2021 Assistance Request for Africa

Overview. The Administration's FY2021 budget request includes $5.2 billion in aid for Africa, an increase from its FY2020 request ($5.0 billion) but 28% below FY2019 allocations ($7.1 billion).46 These totals do not include emergency humanitarian aid or funding allocated to African countries from global accounts and programs. Funding for Africa would fall sharply from FY2019 levels across most major funding accounts, including Global Health Programs (which would see a 22% drop), PKO (23%), INCLE (46%), and IMET (16%).47 Non-health development assistance would see the largest decline from FY2019 levels: the request would provide $797 million in ESDF for Africa, down 48% from $1.5 billion in allocated ESF and DA in FY2019. The request includes $75 million in ESDF for Prosper Africa, up from $50 million requested in FY2020. Separate proposed decreases in U.S. funding for U.N. peacekeeping missions, most of which are in Africa, could have implications for stability and humanitarian operations.48

Analysis. Overwhelmingly weighted toward health assistance, with the balance largely dedicated to traditional development and security activities, the FY2021 request aligns with long-standing U.S. priorities in the region—while at the same time proposing significant cuts to U.S. assistance across all major sectors. Congress has not enacted similar proposed reductions in previous appropriations measures; several Members specifically have raised concerns over the potential ramifications of such cuts for U.S. influence and partnerships abroad.49 In this regard, it may be debated whether the FY2021 budget, if enacted, would be likely to advance the Administration's stated priority of countering the influence of geostrategic competitors in Africa. For instance, officials have described Prosper Africa as partly intended to counter China's growing influence in the region, yet $75 million in proposed funding for the initiative is arguably incommensurate with the Administration's goal of "vastly accelerat[ing]" two way U.S-Africa trade and investment.50

Despite the Administration's pledge to curtail aid to countries that fail to govern democratically and transparently, top proposed recipients in FY2021 include several countries with poor or deteriorating governance records (e.g., Uganda, Rwanda, Nigeria, and Tanzania). Sharp proposed cuts to bilateral economic assistance, through which the United States funds most DRG activities, could have implications for U.S. democracy and governance programming in the region.

Figure 8. U.S. Aid to Africa, Top Recipients, Recent Allocations vs. FY2021 Request

Source: State Department, CBJs for FY2019-FY2021.

Notes: Calculations reflect assistance provided through the DA, ESF, GHP-State, GHP-USAID, IMET, INCLE, NADR, and PKO accounts. Humanitarian aid and funding allocated from global accounts/programs not included.

Select Issues for Congress

Below is a selected list of issues that Congress may consider as it weights budgetary proposals and authorizes, appropriates funding for, and oversees U.S. foreign aid programs in Africa. References to specific countries are provided solely as illustrative examples.

Scale and balance. Members may debate whether U.S. assistance to Africa is adequately balanced between sectors given the broad scope of Africa's needs and U.S. priorities on the continent, and whether overall funding levels are commensurate with U.S. interests in the region. Successive Administrations have articulated a diverse range of development, governance, and security objectives in Africa—yet U.S. assistance to the region has remained dominated by funding for health programs since the mid-2000s. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern over the relatively small share of U.S. aid dedicated to other stated U.S. priorities, such as promoting good governance, expanding U.S.-Africa commercial ties, and mitigating conflict.51

Meanwhile, the Trump Administration's repeated proposals to sharply reduce U.S. assistance to Africa have spurred pushback from some Members. Congressional objections have centered on the risks that aid cuts could potentially pose for U.S. national security, foreign policy goals, and U.S. influence and partnerships in Africa.52 Notably, the proposed cuts in U.S. assistance come at a time when China and other countries, including Russia, India, Turkey, and several Arab Gulf states, are seeking to expand their roles in the region.53

Transparency and oversight. While this report provides approximate funding figures based largely on publicly available allocation data, comprehensive estimates of U.S. aid to Africa and amounts dedicated to specific focus areas are difficult to determine. Executive branch budget documents and congressional appropriations measures do not fully disaggregate aid allocations by country or region; meanwhile, databases such as USAID's Foreign Aid Explorer and the State Department's ForeignAssistance.gov provide data on obligations and disbursements but do not track committed funding against enacted levels, raising challenges for congressional oversight.

As noted above, gaps in region- and country-level assistance data may partly reflect efforts to maintain flexibility in U.S. assistance programs—for instance, by appropriating humanitarian aid to global accounts and allocating it according to need. At the same time, Congress has not imposed rigorous reporting requirements evenly across U.S. foreign aid programs. For instance, while DOD "global train and equip" assistance is subject to congressional notification and reporting requirements that require detailed information about country and security force unit recipients and assistance to be provided, there is no analogous reporting requirement governing State Department security assistance.54 Public budget documents may thus include country- and program-level breakouts of some security assistance, while other funds—such as for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a PKO-funded peacekeeping capacity-building program through which some African militaries have received substantial U.S. training and equipment—are not reflected in bilateral aid budgets. A lack of data on what U.S. assistance has been provided to African countries may obscure policy dilemmas or inhibit efforts to evaluate impact.55

Country Ownership. Policymakers may debate the extent to which U.S. assistance supports partner African governments in taking the lead in addressing challenges related to socioeconomic development, security, and governance. The majority of U.S. aid to Africa is provided through nongovernment actors—such as U.N. agencies, humanitarian organizations, development practitioners, and civil society entities—rather than directly to governments. (Exceptions include U.S. security assistance for African security forces and some healthcare capacity-building programs.) Channeling aid through nongovernment actors may be preferable in countries where the state is unable or unwilling to meet the needs of its population, and may additionally grant the United States greater control and oversight over the use of aid funds. At the same time, experts debate whether this method of assistance adequately equips recipient governments to take primary responsibility for service delivery and other state duties—as well as whether this mode of delivery may limit donor influence and leverage with the recipient country government.56

Conditions on U.S. assistance. Congress has enacted legislation denying or placing conditions on assistance to countries that fail to meet certain standards in, for instance, human rights, counterterrorism, debt repayment, religious freedom, child soldier use, or trafficking in persons. In general, statutes establishing such conditions accord the executive branch the discretion to designate countries for sanction or waive such restrictions. Congress may continue to debate the merits and effectiveness of such restrictions. In FY2020, several African governments are subject to aid restrictions due to failure to meet standards related to:

  • Religious freedom, under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292), with Eritrea currently listed as a "Country of Particular Concern."57
  • The use of child soldiers, under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA, P.L. 110-457, as amended) and related legislation, with DRC, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan subject to potential security assistance restrictions in FY2020.58 In October 2019, President Trump exercised his authority under CSPA to waive certain restrictions for DRC, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan.59
  • Trafficking in persons (TIP), under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, P.L. 106-386, as amended) and related legislation, with Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, The Gambia, Mauritania, and South Sudan subject to potential aid restrictions in FY2020. In October 2019, President Trump partially waived such restrictions with regard to DRC and South Sudan, and fully waived them for Comoros.60

Some African countries periodically have been subject to other restrictions on U.S. foreign aid, such as those imposed on governments that rose to power through a coup d'état, support international terrorism, or are in external debt arrears. (In contrast to most legislative aid restrictions, a provision in annual appropriations legislation prohibiting most aid to governments that accede to power through a military coup does not grant the executive branch authority to waive the restrictions.61) Congress has also included provisions in annual aid appropriations measures restricting certain aid to specific African countries, notably Sudan and Zimbabwe.

In addition, the so-called "Leahy Laws" restrict most kinds of State Department- and DOD-administered security assistance to individual units or members of foreign security forces credibly implicated in a "gross violation of human rights," subject to certain exceptions.62 The executive branch does not publish information on which units or individual personnel have been prohibited from receiving U.S. assistance pursuant to these laws. Congress also has restricted certain kinds of security assistance deemed likely to be used for unintended purposes; for instance, language in annual foreign aid appropriations measures prohibits the use of funds for providing tear gas and other crowd control items to security forces that curtail freedoms of expression and assembly.

Unintended consequences. Some observers have raised concerns that the provision of U.S. foreign assistance may have unintended consequences, including in Africa. For instance, some analysts have questioned whether U.S. food assistance may inadvertently prolong civil conflict by enabling warring parties to sustain operations, though others have challenged that assertion.63 Whether providing certain forms of U.S. aid, notably security assistance, may at times jeopardize U.S. policy goals in other areas is another potential consideration. For instance, some analysts have questioned whether security assistance to African governments with poor human rights records (e.g., Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Uganda) may strengthen abusive security forces or inhibit U.S. leverage on issues related to democracy and governance.64 Proponents of U.S. security assistance programs in Africa may contend that aspects of such engagements—such as military professionalization and human rights training—enhance security sector governance and civil-military relations, and may thus improve human rights practices by partner militaries.

Outlook

Congress commenced consideration of the President's FY2021 budget request in February 2020. To date, the 116th Congress has not adopted many of the Administration's proposed changes regarding assistance to Africa, notably its repeated attempts to significantly reduce aid to the region. Allocated funding has instead hovered around $7 billion per year, excluding emergency humanitarian aid. As Congress debates the FY2021 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measure, Members may consider issues such as:

  • The economic, humanitarian, and health-related shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is expected to have a severe impact on Africa's development trajectory;

Unfolding political transitions in Sudan and Ethiopia, which may have significant implications for governance and conflict trends in the region;65

Conflicts and humanitarian crises in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and South Sudan;66

Repressive governance in several countries that rank as top recipients of U.S. assistance in Africa, including Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia;67

The effectiveness of existing conditions on U.S. foreign assistance to Africa, whether additional conditions and restrictions may be necessary, and the appropriate balance between ensuring congressional influence and providing executive branch flexibility;

U.S.-Africa trade and investment issues, including as they relate to funding and overseeing the Administration's Prosper Africa initiative; and

The involvement in Africa of foreign powers such as China and Russia, and the implications of such engagement for U.S. national security and policy interests.

Appendix A. U.S. Assistance to Africa, by Country

Allocations by year of appropriation, selected accounts, in thousands of current U.S. dollars

Country / Account

FY2017

FY2018

FY2019

FY2020 req.

FY2021 req.

Angola

43,942

42,023

33,619

24,400

36,400

GHP-State

11,058

9,028

4,932

0

10,000

GHP-USAID

28,390

28,390

24,000

22,000

22,000

IMET

494

605

587

400

400

NADR

4,000

4,000

4,100

2,000

4,000

Benin

23,590

24,512

25,550

19,300

19,300

GHP-USAID

23,000

24,000

25,000

19,000

19,000

IMET

590

512

550

300

300

Botswana

36,810

65,323

39,290

68,580

45,600

GHP-State

36,061

64,764

38,667

67,880

45,000

IMET

749

559

623

700

600

Burkina Faso

36,675

45,790

49,666

25,350

29,850

DA

0

0

2,300

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

2,300

4,300

GHP-State

0

0

2,068

0

0

GHP-USAID

25,000

29,000

33,500

22,000

23,500

IMET

545

549

432

550

550

NADR

0

0

0

500

1,500

Burundi

53,400

54,802

44,277

19,260

19,100

DA

3,000

3,000

3,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

1,000

1,000

GHP-State

7,599

11,340

7,810

8,260

8,000

GHP-USAID

18,500

20,000

25,500

10,000

10,000

IMET

0

0

0

0

100

Cabo Verde

299

234

356

125

125

IMET

299

234

356

125

125

Cameroon

83,395

80,087

194,380

52,065

114,200

DA

0

1,000

3,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

1,000

3,000

ESF

0

0

1,000

-

-

GHP-State

37,565

39,674

139,728

32,365

90,000

GHP-USAID

21,500

24,000

22,500

18,000

20,500

IMET

607

1,036

740

700

700

Central African Republic

26,333

33,908

46,557

6,600

6,100

DA

3,000

3,000

3,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

1,000

1,000

GHP-USAID

0

0

1,000

0

0

IMET

121

90

142

150

150

INCLE

4,450

4,500

4,500

2,000

1,500

PKO

8,000

8,000

8,000

3,450

3,450

Chad

28,069

32,083

48,263

2,900

2,900

DA

0

1,000

3,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

1,100

1,100

IMET

871

800

1,161

800

800

NADR

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

Comoros

113

324

0

100

100

IMET

113

324

0

100

100

Côte d'Ivoire

143,016

142,438

87,046

138,614

117,350

DA

4,232

6,000

6,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

2,000

5,000

GHP-State

113,012

106,876

48,629

116,264

90,000

GHP-USAID

25,000

29,000

32,000

20,000

22,000

IMET

772

562

417

350

350

Dem. Rep. of Congo

362,185

375,330

411,720

200,667

257,350

DA

0

0

37,594

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

42,000

45,000

ESF

75,188

75,188

37,594

-

-

GHP-State

55,470

43,258

68,245

43,567

90,000

GHP-USAID

136,550

138,200

129,000

107,000

114,600

IMET

0

0

0

0

150

INCLE

2,000

3,000

4,000

2,000

1,500

NADR

2,000

4,000

3,000

4,000

4,000

PKO

10,000

5,000

5,000

2,100

2,100

Djibouti

16,216

18,420

19,778

8,395

8,395

ESF

9,000

9,000

9,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

2,500

2,500

FMF

500

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

GHP-State

300

300

0

0

0

GHP-USAID

1,500

0

0

0

0

IMET

652

1,038

788

895

895

Eswatini

58,679

65,961

69,271

63,334

55,100

GHP-State

51,655

58,868

69,028

63,234

55,000

GHP-USAID

6,900

6,900

0

0

0

IMET

124

193

243

100

100

Ethiopia

749,072

601,293

634,361

203,869

278,000

DA

97,857

99,551

84,615

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

51,000

92,000

ESF

0

0

38,285

-

-

GHP-State

141,812

68,813

59,594

59,169

90,000

GHP-USAID

135,550

135,550

135,550

92,850

92,000

IMET

648

945

1,543

850

1,000

INCLE

0

0

4,000

0

3,000

Gabon

641

520

0

400

400

IMET

641

520

0

400

400

Gambia

26

197

2,179

200

200

DA

0

0

2,000

0

-

IMET

26

197

179

200

200

Ghana

135,674

143,217

143,986

62,750

63,250

DA

67,157

74,157

43,418

0

-

ESDF

-

-

-

20,000

20,000

ESF

0

0

34,782

0

-

GHP-State

2,681

5,934

6,076

0

0

GHP-USAID

64,999

62,299

58,500

42,000

42,500

IMET

837

827

1,210

750

750

Guinea

26,120

26,568

26,477

19,300

19,300

DA

4,000

3,000

3,000

-

-

GHP-USAID

21,500

23,000

23,000

19,000

19,000

IMET

620

568

477

300

300

Guinea-Bissau

149

70

0

150

100

IMET

149

70

0

150

100

Kenya

743,275

701,603

488,177

383,845

330,400

DA

88,079

101,579

100,670

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

43,500

39,000

FMF

1,000

0

0

 

0

GHP-State

496,210

441,512

205,472

276,145

225,000

GHP-USAID

86,000

81,600

115,500

54,000

56,500

IMET

924

855

985

1,000

1,000

INCLE

1,000

5,000

7,000

4,700

3,400

NADR

5,000

5,000

5,000

4,500

5,500

Lesotho

61,708

79,644

84,654

78,453

65,100

GHP-State

55,308

73,174

84,617

78,353

65,000

GHP-USAID

6,400

6,400

0

0

0

IMET

0

70

37

100

100

Liberia

111,827

112,289

96,503

39,510

32,560

DA

65,429

65,439

45,350

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

9,200

6,200

ESF

0

0

10,000

-

-

FMF

2,500

0

0

0

0

GHP-State

350

350

3,500

0

0

GHP-USAID

33,150

34,150

30,000

23,000

23,000

IMET

398

350

653

360

360

INCLE

9,000

11,000

6,000

6,000

3,000

PKO

1,000

1,000

1,000

950

0

Madagascar

95,007

90,602

108,390

44,000

44,000

DA

16,705

16,605

19,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

3,000

3,000

GHP-USAID

52,000

52,000

54,200

40,800

40,800

IMET

247

475

1,043

200

200

Malawi

198,300

258,953

263,361

202,262

206,800

DA

56,000

56,000

56,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

15,000

25,000

GHP-State

57,770

120,518

142,347

138,462

130,000

GHP-USAID

73,700

74,375

62,500

48,500

51,500

IMET

357

579

417

300

300

Mali

145,554

139,892

134,963

78,925

85,100

DA

55,541

58,541

60,801

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

28,200

33,400

GHP-State

1,500

1,500

4,500

0

0

GHP-USAID

61,500

64,800

62,800

48,850

49,850

IMET

842

986

948

875

850

NADR

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

Mauritania

6,457

7,091

3,000

2,080

47,900

DA

1,584

2,000

2,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

1,000

1,000

IMET

744

751

0

580

400

NADR

1,000

1,000

1,000

500

500

Mauritius

286

204

219

100

100

IMET

286

204

219

100

100

Mozambique

446,675

471,672

418,244

403,535

456,450

DA

41,206

39,656

62,016

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

5,600

47,000

GHP-State

327,330

353,685

279,154

343,185

350,000

GHP-USAID

70,500

74,000

76,250

54,300

59,000

IMET

533

696

282

450

450

Namibia

65,323

66,926

69,284

64,877

60,100

GHP-State

65,064

66,879

69,135

64,777

60,000

IMET

259

47

149

100

100

Niger

78,791

92,744

100,688

34,300

47,300

DA

5,000

21,085

11,000

-

 

ESDF

-

-

-

15,500

26,000

ESF

0

0

15,000

-

 

GHP-USAID

18,000

22,000

27,000

17,000

19,500

IMET

811

834

1,379

800

800

NADR

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

Nigeria

584,886

519,906

699,349

431,750

472,100

DA

80,500

92,000

74,500

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

49,000

34,000

ESF

45,500

0

0

-

-

FMF

500

0

0

0

0

GHP-State

224,782

199,561

353,417

235,800

300,000

GHP-USAID

203,500

199,000

222,500

141,900

134,100

IMET

1,041

1,092

1,034

1,050

1,000

INCLE

5,000

6,000

7,000

4,000

3,000

Republic of Congo

1,379

1,446

3,756

150

150

IMET

503

538

0

150

150

Rwanda

142,809

161,251

148,903

116,562

105,750

DA

46,000

46,000

46,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

12,200

12,200

GHP-State

53,010

74,416

61,861

75,812

65,000

GHP-USAID

43,175

40,175

40,500

28,000

28,000

IMET

624

660

542

550

550

Sao Tome & Principe

338

290

155

100

100

IMET

338

290

155

100

100

Senegal

116,172

121,301

124,811

58,100

67,600

DA

54,000

61,185

63,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

15,500

26,000

GHP-State

600

600

4,785

0

0

GHP-USAID

60,435

58,435

56,100

41,800

40,800

IMET

1,137

1,081

926

800

800

Seychelles

275

241

14

100

100

IMET

275

241

14

100

100

Sierra Leone

18,913

21,952

22,020

15,600

17,600

DA

3,000

2,000

2,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

1,200

1,200

GHP-State

500

500

0

0

0

GHP-USAID

15,000

19,000

19,000

14,000

16,000

IMET

413

452

1,020

400

400

Somalia

456,412

428,908

409,748

140,000

137,265

DA

53,344

58,000

56,500

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

43,200

43,200

ESF

9,500

0

0

-

-

IMET

180

264

225

300

265

INCLE

7,600

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,800

NADR

18,750

4,500

4,500

4,500

8,000

PKO

256,132

253,500

222,500

90,000

84,000

South Africa

470,975

586,603

734,992

172,096

241,650

DA

6,540

5,000

3,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

0

2,000

GHP-State

450,132

560,120

668,285

161,846

225,000

GHP-USAID

13,000

20,785

63,000

9,600

14,000

IMET

853

698

707

650

650

INCLE

150

0

0

-

-

NADR

300

0

0

-

-

South Sudan

436,430

453,154

256,630

64,711

102,300

DA

72,327

51,201

38,909

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

22,200

22,200

ESF

0

0

17,091

-

-

GHP-State

10,817

15,535

27,279

11,411

50,000

GHP-USAID

17,010

21,010

32,257

10,100

10,100

INCLE

2,000

180

0

0

0

NADR

2,000

2,000

2,000

1,000

2,000

PKO

27,491

25,000

25,000

20,000

18,000

Sudan

77,799

154,606

127,395

1,500

12,000

DA

5,000

5,000

6,500

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

1,500

12,000

ESF

0

0

1,000

-

-

Tanzania

554,247

557,121

429,136

348,406

328,700

DA

65,829

65,229

45,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

12,600

5,000

GHP-State

380,692

380,339

254,338

266,606

250,000

GHP-USAID

99,400

100,500

126,000

68,500

73,000

IMET

716

1,009

751

700

700

NADR

200

0

0

0

0

Togo

514

539

1,841

300

300

GHP-State

0

0

1,632

300

0

IMET

514

539

209

0

300

Uganda

415,689

560,168

494,599

415,488

305,700

DA

53,940

65,190

48,257

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

17,000

9,500

ESF

0

0

10,000

-

-

GHP-State

246,425

364,613

308,820

332,288

225,000

GHP-USAID

90,500

98,783

119,500

65,500

70,500

IMET

818

707

826

700

700

NADR

200

0

0

0

0

Zambia

397,062

451,903

442,911

364,869

307,225

DA

35,500

35,500

35,500

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

5,000

5,000

GHP-State

273,932

334,086

323,146

312,494

250,000

GHP-USAID

87,175

81,875

83,800

47,025

51,875

IMET

455

442

465

350

350

Zimbabwe

197,126

230,838

242,451

174,512

139,500

DA

17,793

21,500

22,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

9,000

5,000

GHP-State

109,223

127,607

142,094

144,312

110,000

GHP-USAID

42,500

42,500

26,000

20,200

23,000

NADR

1,500

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,500

African Union

389

378

350

350

350

ESDF

-

-

-

350

350

ESF

389

378

350

-

-

State Africa Regional

280,564

120,959

137,720

138,785

154,635

ESDF

-

-

-

18,200

18,200

ESF

28,964

25,964

31,000

-

-

FMF

20,000

0

0

0

0

GHP-State

0

0

0

25,000

40,000

INCLE

46,000

35,820

42,350

29,200

24,985

NADR

24,350

24,850

24,850

23,450

24,950

PKO

161,250

34,325

39,520

42,935

46,500

USAID Africa Regional

150,938

119,505

146,635

177,400

198,000

DA

137,338

106,305

133,435

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

169,400

190,000

GHP-USAID

13,600

13,200

13,200

8,000

8,000

USAID Central Africa

56,900

56,900

57,500

3,900

3,900

DA

46,900

46,900

47,500

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

3,900

3,900

ESF

10,000

10,000

10,000

-

-

USAID East Africa

41,350

35,000

35,800

9,700

15,000

DA

31,250

30,500

30,300

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

8,200

14,000

GHP-USAID

10,100

4,500

5,500

1,500

1,000

USAID Sahel

40,000

39,750

40,371

19,000

18,500

DA

27,000

22,000

22,371

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

6,500

6,000

GHP-USAID

13,000

17,750

18,000

12,500

12,500

USAID Southern Africa

31,600

29,000

33,950

5,800

12,500

DA

28,000

29,000

33,950

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

5,800

12,500

GHP-USAID

3,600

0

0

0

0

USAID West Africa

100,830

72,691

64,780

29,000

29,000

DA

57,775

55,191

49,000

-

-

ESDF

-

-

-

19,000

19,000

ESF

25,555

0

0

0

-

GHP-State

0

0

280

0

0

GHP-USAID

17,500

17,500

15,500

10,000

10,000

Source: State Department CBJs for FY2019-FY2021.

Appendix B. MCC Programs in Africa: A Snapshot

Country

Program

Date Range

Amount

Focus

Benin

Compact

2006 – 2011

$307.3 million

Land/property, financial services, judicial system, port expansion

 

Power Compact

2017 – ongoing

$375.0 million

Electric power

Burkina Faso

Threshold Program

2005 – 2008

$12.9 million

Girls' education

 

Compact

2009 – 2014

$480.9 million

Rural land governance, agriculture, roads, girls' education

Cabo Verde

Compact I

2005 – 2010

$110.1 million

Infrastructure, private sector development, watershed management, agriculture

 

Compact II

2012 – 2017

$66.2 million

Water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), land management

Côte d'Ivoire

Compact

2019 – ongoing

$524.7 million

Education, transport

Ghana

Compact

2007 – 2012

$547.0 million

Agriculture, transport, rural development

 

Power Compact

2016 – ongoing

$308 million [reduced from

$498.2 million]

Electric power

Kenya

Threshold Program

2007 – 2010

$12.7 million

Anti-corruption, governance

Lesotho

Compact

2008 – 2013

$362.6 million

Water sector, health sector, private sector development.

Liberia

Threshold Program

2010 – 2013

$15.1 million

Land rights and access, girls' education, trade policy

 

Compact

2015 – ongoing

$256.7 million

Electric power, roads

Madagascar

Compact

2005 – 2009

[Terminated due to undemocratic transfer of power]

$109.8 million

Land titling, agriculture, financial sector development

Malawi

Threshold Program

2005 – 2008

$20.9 million

Anti-corruption, governance

 

Compact

2013 – 2018

$350.7 million

Electric power

Mali

Compact

2007 – 2012

[Terminated due to undemocratic transfer of power]

$460.8 million

Irrigation, transport, airport and industrial park development

Mozambique

Compact

2008 – 2013

$506.9 million

WASH, transport, land tenure, agriculture

Namibia

Compact

2009 – 2014

$304.5 million

Education, tourism, agriculture

Niger

Threshold Program

2008 – 2013

$16.9 million

Girls' education, anti-corruption, governance

 

Compact

2018 – ongoing

$437.0 million

Irrigation, roads, agriculture

Rwanda

Threshold Program

2008 - 2013

$24.7 million

Civic participation, justice sector

São Tomé and Principe

Threshold Program

2007 – 2011

$7.4 million

Tax enforcement, business environment

Senegal

Compact

2010 – 2015

$540 million

Roads, irrigation

 

Power Compact

Signed 2018

$550 million

Electric power

Sierra Leone

Threshold Program

2016 – ongoing

$44.4 million

Water sector, electric power, governance

Tanzania

Threshold Program

2006 – 2008

$11.2 million

Anti-corruption, governance, civic participation

 

Compact

2008 – 2013

$694.5 million

Airport development, transport, water, and energy sectors

Togo

Threshold Program

2019 – ongoing

$35.0 million

internet and communications technology access, land rights

Uganda

Threshold Program

2007 – 2009

$10.4 million

Anti-corruption, governance

Zambia

Threshold Program

2006 – 2009

$22.7 million

Anti-corruption, business environment, trade management

 

Compact

2013 – 2018

$354.8 million

WASH

Source: MCC.

Notes: Committed funds may not be fully disbursed due to programmatic adjustments. Date range from entry into force.

Author Contact Information

Tomas F. Husted, Coordinator, Analyst in African Affairs ([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed])
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs ([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed])
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs ([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed])
Nicolas Cook, Specialist in African Affairs ([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed])

Footnotes

1.

In this report, "global" funds refer to those not allocated by country or region in State Department Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJs), which provide information on the planned allocation of appropriated foreign assistance. See also CRS In Focus IF11515, U.S. Foreign Assistance: Budget Development and Execution, by Nick M. Brown.

2.

"Actual" allocations represent a final plan for the use of appropriated funding, though agencies may continue to transfer or reprogram assistance, subject to availability and legislative authorities.

3.

See CRS In Focus IF11532, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Impact in Africa, coordinated by Alexis Arieff.

4.

World Bank, Africa's Pulse Vol. 21, April 2020; McKinsey & Company, Tackling COVID-19 in Africa, April 2020.

5.

See also CRS Report R46319, Novel Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19): Q&A on Global Implications and Responses, coordinated by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther and CRS In Focus IF11496, COVID-19 and Foreign Assistance: Issues for Congress, by Nick M. Brown, Marian L. Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern.

6.

State Department, "Update: The United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to COVID-19," May 19, 2020.

7.

CRS calculation based on obligations data from USAID's Foreign Aid Explorer. Elsewhere in this report, figures refer to allocations of funding appropriated in the referenced fiscal year unless otherwise noted.

8.

CRS calculations based on State Department Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJs) for FY2019-2021.

9.

For more on the rationales and objectives of U.S. foreign assistance, see CRS Report R40213, Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, by Marian L. Lawson and Emily M. Morgenstern.

10.

For a critical assessment of foreign assistance in Africa, see, for example, Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009).

11.

CRS Report R42827, Does Foreign Aid Work? Efforts to Evaluate U.S. Foreign Assistance, by Marian L. Lawson.

12.

CRS calculation based on FY2019 sectoral data provided by USAID, February 2020.

13.

See CRS In Focus IF11018, Global Trends in HIV/AIDS, by Sara M. Tharakan and CRS In Focus IF10797, PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act: Expiring Authorities, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.

14.

Implementing a proposal made by the Obama Administration, the Trump Administration has launched new PMI programs in Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, and Sierra Leone, and expanded an existing program in Burkina Faso. PMI, "Where we work," at https://www.pmi.gov/where-we-work.

15.

See CRS In Focus IF10022, The Global Health Security Agenda (2014-2019) and International Health Regulations (2005), by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.

16.

See CRS Report R45933, Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak: Democratic Republic of Congo, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther and Alexis Arieff; CRS Report R44507, Status of the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther, Susan B. Epstein, and Bolko J. Skorupski.

17.

Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda.

18.

See CRS Report R44216, The Obama Administration's Feed the Future Initiative, by Marian L. Lawson, Randy Schnepf, and Nicolas Cook.

19.

See CRS In Focus IF10149, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), by Brock R. Williams.

20.

See CRS In Focus IF11384, The Trump Administration's Prosper Africa Initiative, by Nicolas Cook and Brock R. Williams.

21.

See CRS In Focus IF11436, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Nick M. Brown; CRS In Focus IF10017, Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank), by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar; and CRS In Focus IF10673, U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA), by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.

22.

See, e.g., Department of Commerce, "Prosper Africa," available at https://www.trade.gov/prosper-africa.

23.

For more on Power Africa, see USAID, "Power Africa," available at https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica.

24.

Successive Administrations have requested assistance for UNSOS through the CIPA account, but Congress has appropriated such funds via PKO.

25.

For more information, see YALI, "About YALI," at https://yali.state.gov/.

26.

For more information, see CARPE, "About," at https://carpe.umd.edu/content/development-objectives.

27.

For more, see CRS Insight IN11227, Foreign Assistance for International Conservation, by Pervaze A. Sheikh and Lucas F. Bermejo; CRS In Focus IF10601, Transnational Crime Issues: Global Trends Overview, by Liana W. Rosen.

28.

Congress appropriates funds for FFP Title II programs via agriculture appropriations. USAID also administers nonemergency food assistance authorized under FFP Title II, which supports countries to transition from emergency food assistance to agricultural development. In FY2019, FFP nonemergency programs operated in eight African countries. See CRS Report R45422, U.S. International Food Assistance: An Overview, by Alyssa R. Casey and CRS Report R45879, International Food Assistance: Food for Peace Nonemergency Programs, by Emily M. Morgenstern.

29.

Congress authorized EFSP in the Global Food Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-195) and reauthorized it in the Global Food Security Reauthorization Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-266).

30.

For more on U.S. security assistance to Africa prior to the FY2017 consolidation of security cooperation authorities, see Testimony of Lauren Ploch Blanchard, CRS Specialist in African Affairs, before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, U.S. Security Assistance in Africa, 114th Cong., 1st sess., June 4, 2015.

31.

CRS calculation based on DOD notifications to Congress of planned security cooperation activities. Top African recipients of recent DOD global train and equip assistance play key roles in U.S.-backed counterterrorism efforts.

32.

See CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues, by Nick M. Brown.

33.

MCC, "MCC Statement on Decision of Board of Directors to Suspend Partnership with Tanzania," March 28, 2016.

34.

MCC, "MCC Statement Regarding Termination of the Private Sector Concession by the Government of Ghana," October 23, 2019.

35.

See also CRS Report RS21168, The Peace Corps: Overview and Issues, by Nick M. Brown.

36.

Peace Corps, Agency Financial Report: FY2019, November 2019.

37.

White House, "Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Trump Administration's New Africa Strategy," December 13, 2018.

38.

Ibid.

39.

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy, "The Trump Administration and U.S. Africa Policy: What has been accomplished and what lies ahead?" Remarks at the Wilson Center, March 3, 2020.

40.

See, for example, State Department, CBJ for FY2020; and USAID, Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS), available at https://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/planning/country-strategies-cdcs.

41.

White House, "Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton..." op. cit.

42.

USAID response to CRS query, February 2020.

43.

State Department, CBJ for FY2021.

44.

Ibid.

45.

Djibouti also hosts China's only overseas military base. The State Department CBJ for FY2021 describes the $5 million FMF request for Djibouti as aiming to bolster bilateral ties and "counter malign influences in the region."

46.

State Department, CBJ for FY2021. FY2020 and FY2021 figures include funds requested for the U.N. Support office in Somalia (UNSOS), which successive Administrations have requested under the CIPA account, but Congress generally has appropriated to Somalia's bilateral aid budget via the PKO account.

47.

PKO calculation includes proposed funding for UNSOS requested through CIPA.

48.

See CRS In Focus IF10597, United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping, by Luisa Blanchfield.

49.

See, e.g., Remarks by Senator Menendez in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Review of the FY2020 Budget Request for USAID, 116th Cong., 1st sess., May 8, 2019; remarks by Representative Rogers in House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Department of State Budget Request for FY2020, 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 2019.

50.

State Department, CBJ for FY2021. On Prosper Africa's role in countering Chinese influence, see White House, "Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton..." op. cit.

51.

See, for example, remarks by Representatives Bass and Wild in House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations, FY2020 Budget and U.S. – Africa Relations, 116th Cong., 1st sess., November 19, 2019.

52.

See, for example, remarks by Senators Graham and Leahy in Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations, Review of the FY2020 Budget Request for USAID, 1st sess., April 30, 2019.

53.

See, for example, Judd Devermont, "The World is Coming to Sub-Saharan Africa. Where is the United States?" Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Brief, August 24, 2018.

54.

On U.S. counterterrorism activities in Africa and associated oversight challenges, see Testimony of Alexis Arieff, CRS Specialist in African Affairs, before the House Oversight Subcommittee on National Security, U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Challenges in Africa, 116th Cong., 1st sess., December 16, 2019.

55.

Past Administrations and Congresses have attempted to address foreign assistance reporting gaps, including by establishing public databases that track foreign aid data. Such resources include https://www.foreignassistance.gov (a State Department tool); https://explorer.usaid.gov (administered by USAID); and https://www.usaspending.gov (a Treasury Department resource). Foreign aid data challenges are discussed in the State Department's Foreign Assistance Data Review (FADR) Findings Report, 2015, and FADR Phase Two–Data Element Index, 2016, and in various Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports (e.g., Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Quality of Data on ForeignAssistance.gov, GAO-16-768, August 24, 2016) as well as various reports by agency inspectors general.

56.

For an overview of the potential benefits and risks associated with direct budget support, see Koeberle et. al., Budget Support as More Effective Aid? Recent Experiences and Emerging Lessons (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2006).

57.

In December 2019, the State Department removed Sudan from its longstanding listing as a CPC "due to significant steps taken by the civilian-led transitional government" to address religious freedom concerns. In re-designating Eritrea as a CPC, the Administration referred to existing restrictions rather than instituting new sanctions pursuant to the law. See CRS In Focus IF10803, Global Human Rights: International Religious Freedom Policy, by Michael A. Weber.

58.

CSPA designations are published annually in the State Department's Trafficking in Persons report.

59.

White House, "Presidential Memorandum on Determination and Certification with Respect to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008," October 18, 2019. See also CRS In Focus IF10901, Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008: Security Assistance Restrictions, by Michael A. Weber.

60.

White House, "Presidential Memorandum on Determination with Respect to the Efforts of Foreign Governments Regarding Trafficking in Persons," October 18, 2019. See also CRS In Focus IF10587, Human Trafficking and Foreign Policy: An Introduction, by Liana W. Rosen and Michael A. Weber.

61.

See CRS In Focus IF11267, Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations, by Alexis Arieff, Marian L. Lawson, and Susan G. Chesser.

62.

See CRS In Focus IF10575, Human Rights Issues: Security Forces Vetting ("Leahy Laws"), by Liana W. Rosen.

63.

For this critique, see Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian, "US Food Aid and Civil Conflict," American Economic Review, vol. 106 no. 6 (2014), p. 1630-1666; for a response, see USAID's Office of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), (Re)assessing the Relationship Between Food Aid and Armed Conflict, October 2014.

64.

For more on the debates surrounding U.S. security assistance to Africa, see Stephen Watts et. al, Building Security in Africa: An Evaluation of U.S. Security Sector Assistance in Africa from the Cold War to the Present, 2018.

65.

See CRS In Focus IF10182, Sudan and CRS In Focus IF10185, Ethiopia.

66.

See CRS In Focus IF10434, Burkina Faso, CRS In Focus IF10279, Cameroon, CRS In Focus IF11171, Crisis in the Central African Republic, CRS Report R43166, Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS In Focus IF10116, Conflict in Mali, CRS Report RL33964, Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, CRS In Focus IF10155, Somalia, and CRS In Focus IF10218, South Sudan.

67.

See CRS Report R44402, Rwanda: In Brief, CRS Report R44271, Tanzania: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, CRS In Focus IF10325, Uganda, and CRS In Focus IF11271, Zambia.

’s Congo Basin.26 Congress has supported efforts to curb wildlife trafficking and other environmental crime in Africa.27 Other Economic Growth Efforts. Other U.S. trade and investment assistance programs in Africa seek to aid economic policy reform and analysis, microenterprise lending and support, other private sector strengthening activity, and infrastructure development. Peace and Security Assistance U.S. peace and security assistance for Africa principally refers to State Department-administered security assistance programs, which are authorized under Title 22 of the U.S. Code. Some such programs are implemented by the Department of Defense (DOD), some by other federal entities 22 Among other activities, TCB assistance aims to help improve countries’ ability to negotiate and implement trade agreements, as well as customs procedures and processes, legal and regulatory structures for trade-related issues (e.g. intellectual property rights and labor and environmental protections), overall commercial environments, and infrastructure. See CRS In Focus IF10149, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), by Brock R. Williams, and CRS Report R47197, African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress in Brief, by Nicolas Cook, Brock R. Williams, and Rileigh K. Greutert. 23 State Department, “Updated Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions.” 24 The Trump Administration categorized Power Africa funding under a separate program classification, “Modern Energy Services,” which does not specifically refer to climate change. 25 For more on Power Africa, see USAID, “Power Africa,” available at https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica. 26 For more information, see CARPE, “About,” at https://carpe.umd.edu/content/development-objectives. 27 See CRS Insight IN11227, Foreign Assistance for International Conservation, by Pervaze A. Sheikh and CRS In Focus IF11923, Wildlife Poaching and Trafficking in Africa: An Overview, coordinated by Katarina C. O'Regan. Congressional Research Service 7 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview (such as the Department of Justice), and others by private contractors.28 Congress appropriates such assistance primarily via five accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). U.S. peace and security assistance also includes more limited funding for programs that aim to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflicts, typically funded through DA and ESF. As discussed below, many countries receive additional U.S. peace and security assistance through global programs, and DOD administers security cooperation programs from DOD funds, complicating efforts to assess the extent of U.S. security assistance for any particular country. Figure 4. Peace and Security Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element Source: CRS graphic. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023. Strengthening Military Partnerships and Capabilities. Security force capacity-building and military professionalization constitute the largest category of annual peace and security assistance for Africa. As a region, Africa receives a tiny share of global FMF funding, which supports grant-based transfers of U.S.-origin military equipment and related training. Instead, most military assistance for Africa is provided through the PKO account, regularly the largest channel for Title 22 security assistance for the region—including for programs unrelated to peacekeeping per se (see Text Box). For over a decade, more than half of annual PKO funding for Africa has typically been allocated for Somalia, in support of an African Union (AU) stabilization and peace support operation in the country and a U.N. presence that aids the AU mission.29 Most other PKO funding for Africa is generally requested and allocated for regional programs under the State 28 See CRS Report R45091, U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding Trends, coordinated by Susan B. Epstein. 29 Prior to the Biden Administration, successive Administrations had requested funding for the U.N. Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS, formerly known as the U.N. Support Office for AMISOM) via the State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities account, but Congress had appropriated such funds through PKO. In its budget requests to date, the Biden Administration has requested funding to support UNSOS under PKO, instead of CIPA. Congressional Research Service 8 link to page 14 link to page 14 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Department’s Africa Regional allocation. In the past five years, the State Department also has allocated PKO funding specifically for the Central African Republic, DRC, Liberia, and South Sudan in support of military professionalization and security sector reform. U.S. assistance to strengthen military partnerships and capabilities also encompasses the IMET program, which supports professionalization, military exchanges, and English language instruction, generally in the United States. A majority of African countries participate in IMET.30 The Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Account PKO is the primary vehicle for State Department-administered security assistance to African countries, accounting for between half and three-quarters of annual Title 22 assistance al ocated specifically for Africa over the past decade.31 Despite its name, PKO supports not only peacekeeping capacity-building, but also counterterrorism, maritime security, and security sector reform activities. A separate account, Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA), funds U.S. assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping budgets.32 In addition to funding for Somalia, PKO funding whol y or partly funds a range of regional security programs, including the Africa Conflict Stabilization and Border Security (ACSBS) program, Africa Military Education Program (AMEP), Africa Maritime Security Initiative (AMSI), Africa Regional Counterterrorism (ARCT) program, and a nascent Countering Strategic Competitors (CSC) program, focused on addressing malign foreign influence. PKO funding also supports two interagency counterterrorism programs in Africa: the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT, in East Africa) and Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP, focused on North and West Africa). Public budget documents do not disaggregate allocations for such programs by country. PKO funding for TSCTP is managed centrally, rather than regionally, and is discussed in greater detail below (see “Selected Global Assistance for Africa”). Counterterrorism. PKO also is the main funding vehicle for State Department-administered assistance to build the capacity of African security forces to disrupt and respond to terrorist threats. Other security assistance accounts, including NADR and FMF, also fund counterterrorism activities, while assistance focused on countering violent extremist ideology and recruitment among vulnerable populations is funded through ESF and DA. Somalia and Kenya have been top country recipients of Title 22 counterterrorism assistance, though most such funding is allocated to regional programs. Additional counterterrorism assistance for Africa is provided via global accounts and programs (see “Selected Global Assistance for Africa”). Other Peace and Security Assistance. The State Department also administers programs to build the capacity of law enforcement bodies and other justice sector institutions and personnel, funded primarily under INCLE. USAID, for its part, administers programs aimed at increasing citizens’ access to justice, primarily funded through the DA account. U.S. assistance also funds efforts to destroy excess or obsolete small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and unexploded ordnance, and improve management of weapons stockpiles. The State Department administers such programs, which are funded principally under NADR, in countries previously affected by violence that face challenges related to stockpile management and landmine removal (e.g., Angola), and those currently afflicted by conflict (e.g., Somalia).33 30 Forty African countries received IMET allocations in FY2021. 31 CRS calculation based on State Department CBJs for FY2012-FY2023. Calculation does not account for centrally managed assistance. 32 See CRS In Focus IF10597, United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping, by Luisa Blanchfield. 33 State Department, “U.S. Conventional Weapons Destruction in Africa: Stabilizing Conflict-Affected Areas and Setting the Stage for Development,” April 4, 2022. Congressional Research Service 9 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Conflict mitigation and stabilization programs, most funded under the DA and ESF accounts, aim to help prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflicts through support for early warning systems, peace and reconciliation initiatives, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts. Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) U.S. DRG programs in Africa seek to enhance democratic institutions, improve government accountability and responsiveness, and strengthen respect for human rights and the rule of law. Activities include efforts to strengthen civil society and independent media, enhance the capacity and effectiveness of state institutions, combat corruption, promote legal reform and justice sector operations and independence, and foster participatory political systems characterized by credible elections and other democratic processes. The DA and, to a lesser extent, ESF accounts are the main vehicles for such assistance, though some funding to help strengthen law enforcement and justice sector authorities is provided via INCLE. Figure 5. DRG Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element Source: CRS graphic. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023. Somalia, Nigeria, DRC, Liberia, South Sudan, and Kenya rank among the top recipients of U.S. DRG assistance in Africa over the past five years. Regional DRG assistance for Africa supports the Africa Regional Democracy Fund, a regional program primarily funded via ESF that supports programs across DRG focus areas to strengthen democratic institutions in the region. Education and Social Services DA is the primary funding vehicle for U.S. education and social service assistance for Africa. U.S. basic, secondary, and higher education programs constitute the majority of U.S. education and social service support for Africa. Most such funding is allocated toward basic education programs, of which DRC has been the leading recipient since FY2017; Malawi has been the leading bilateral recipient of U.S. higher education assistance in Africa over the same period, as Congressional Research Service 10 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Congress has directed allocations of higher education funding for Malawi in successive SFOPS appropriations (most recently, Section 7042(f) of P.L. 117-103). Figure 6. Education and Social Services Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element Source: CRS graphic. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023. U.S. higher education programs also include funding for the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), which provides training and mentorship, networking, and exchange-based fellowships to emerging African business, science, and civic leaders. Regional funding for YALI supports four Africa Regional Leadership Centers, based in Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and South Africa, which provide training and professional development for participants. (The Mandela Washington Fellowship program, which brings YALI fellows to the United States to study at U.S. colleges and universities, is administered by the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and is not accounted for in regional budget allocations.) Selected Global Assistance for Africa As noted above, topline regional assistance data do not account for U.S. assistance allocated for African countries via global accounts and programs—funds that are not disaggregated by region or country in public budget documents. This notably includes humanitarian assistance, which is appropriated on a global basis and allocated in response to needs and U.S. policy priorities, as well as a range of health and peace and security programs through which African countries receive considerable funding in addition to regional and country-specific allocations. Humanitarian Assistance As a region, Africa generally receives a large share of annual U.S. humanitarian assistance funds, which are administered under various authorities and accounts, including USAID-administered International Disaster Assistance (IDA), State Department-administered Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA), and USAID-administered Food for Peace (FFP) assistance authorized under Title II of the Food for Peace Act Congressional Research Service 11 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview (P.L. 83-480, known as “P.L. 480”) and appropriated in the Agriculture appropriations bill.34 IDA, MRA, ERMA, and FFP assistance for Africa totaled $4.0 billion in FY2021 obligations, accounting for nearly 60% of the global total.35 Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, and Nigeria were the top African recipient countries of such assistance in FY2021 obligations.36 Health Assistance The United States channels additional health assistance for Africa through global programs. This includes considerable funding (most via GHP-State) to support the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, which oversees PEPFAR, and replenishments of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund), both of which target a majority of their health assistance toward Africa.37 Other global health assistance benefitting Africa includes GHP-USAID International Partnerships funding supporting contributions to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, and a range of U.S. special-focus health programs that operate, in large part, in Africa (e.g., aimed at eradicating neglected tropical diseases and addressing multi-drug resistant tuberculosis). As noted above, U.S. assistance to support African countries’ responses to COVID-19 has been channeled partly through country-specific programs and partly through U.S. contributions to multilateral initiatives, such as COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX).38 Peace and Security Assistance Many African countries receive U.S. peace and security assistance through global programs. This includes PKO funding provided under the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI), a program that builds the capacity of partner security forces to participate in international peacekeeping deployments. It also includes PKO funding for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).39 The State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) manages PKO funding for GPOI and TSCTP. The State Department Bureau for Counterterrorism, meanwhile, manages the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), a NADR-funded program to strengthen civilian counterterrorism capacities. CTPF programming in Africa has focused on the Sahel, East Africa, and the Lake Chad Basin region. Other assistance helps African countries prevent, mitigate, and transition out of conflict. This includes most funding provided pursuant to the Global Fragility Act (GFA, Title V of Division J, P.L. 116-94), which authorized aid for preventing conflict and promoting stability through two funds: the State Department-administered Prevention and Stabilization Fund and the USAID-managed Complex Crises Fund. The Biden Administration has selected part of coastal West Africa (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo) and Mozambique as two of five global GFA focus areas. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) provides short-term aid focused 34 USAID also administers nonemergency food assistance authorized under FFP Title II, which supports countries to transition from emergency food assistance to agricultural development. See CRS Report R45422, U.S. International Food Assistance: An Overview, by Alyssa R. Casey and Emily M. Morgenstern and CRS Report R45879, International Food Assistance: Food for Peace Nonemergency Programs, by Emily M. Morgenstern. 35 CRS calculation based on FY2021 obligations data from ForeignAssistance.gov, accessed June 14, 2022. 36 Ibid. 37 Global Fund, “Global Fund Overview.” 38 See CRS Report R46633, COVID-19 Vaccines: Global Health Issues, coordinated by Sara M. Tharakan. 39 Successive Administrations have requested non-PKO funding for TSCTP—including DA, ESF, INCLE, and NADR funding—on a regional or bilateral basis, while requesting PKO funds under the State Department’s Bureau of Military Affairs allocation. See Supplementary Tables in annual State Department Congressional Budget Justifications. Congressional Research Service 12 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview on averting conflict, fostering reconciliation, and supporting recoveries, funded via the TI account; as of July 2022, OTI had programs in coastal West Africa, Ethiopia, Niger, and Sudan. Other U.S. Department and Agency Assistance While the State Department and USAID administer the majority of U.S. foreign assistance to Africa, other federal departments and agencies also manage or support aid programs in the region. For example, the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, and the Treasury conduct technical assistance programs and other activities in Africa, and in some cases help implement State Department- and USAID-administered programs in the region. Other U.S. federal departments and agencies that administer assistance for Africa include: The Department of Defense (DOD) As noted above, DOD implements some State Department-administered security assistance in Africa. DOD also is authorized, under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, to use DOD appropriations to fund and conduct security cooperation activities with foreign partner militaries and internal security entities.40 Most Title 10 assistance for Africa has been provided under DOD’s “global train and equip” authority, first established by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of FY2006 (P.L. 109-163). In the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328), Congress codified and expanded this authority under 10 U.S.C. §333 (“Section 333”), consolidating various capacity-building authorities that it had granted DOD on a temporary or otherwise limited basis. Section 333 authorizes DOD to provide training and equipment to foreign military and internal security forces to build their capacity to counter terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, and transnational crime, and to bolster maritime and border security and military intelligence. Congress has authorized additional DOD security cooperation programs in Africa under global or Africa-specific authorities (e.g., to help combat the Lord’s Resistance Army rebel group in Central Africa between FY2012 and FY2017).41 Comprehensive regional- or country-level funding data for DOD security cooperation programs are not publicly available. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) The MCC, which Congress authorized in 2004 (Title VI of Division D, P.L. 108-199), supports economic growth programs in developing countries that meet a range of governance and development benchmarks.42 The MCC funds two types programs: five-year, large-scale investments known as “compacts” that are designed to address key “constraints to growth” identified during the project design phase, and smaller, shorter-term “threshold programs,” that aim to help countries address reforms necessary for them to become compact-eligible. As of July 2022, the MCC was implementing six programs in Africa—compacts in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, and Senegal, and threshold programs in Gambia and Togo—jointly valued at 40 DOD uses the term “security assistance” to denote Title 22 (State Department-administered) programs, including those implemented by DOD, and the term “security cooperation” to denote activities authorized under Title 10. See CRS In Focus IF11677, Defense Primer: DOD “Title 10” Security Cooperation, by Christina L. Arabia. 41 CRS Report R42094, The Lord’s Resistance Army: The U.S. Response, by Alexis Arieff, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, and Tomás F. Husted. 42 See CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues, by Nick M. Brown. Congressional Research Service 13 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview $1.97 billion.43 A $316 million compact in Ghana closed in June 2022, while a $300 million compact for Lesotho was signed in May 2022; in March 2022, Kenya won approval to implement a threshold program.44 Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Zambia also were developing compact proposals as of July 2022.The MCC has suspended or terminated compacts with some African governments for failing to meet MCC eligibility criteria. In late 2021, the MCC discontinued the development of a proposed threshold program for Ethiopia amid that country’s civil conflict, and announced that it would “significantly reduce” funding for Benin under a planned joint compact with Niger due to concerns over democratic backsliding under Benin’s current government.45 In 2022, the MCC suspended the development of a proposed compact with Burkina Faso due to a military coup.46 The Peace Corps Peace Corps volunteers lead locally oriented programs focused on agriculture, economic development, youth engagement, health, and education.47 As of FY2020, 45% of Peace Corps volunteers were serving in sub-Saharan Africa—by far the largest share of any region.48 The Peace Corps is gradually returning volunteers to pre-pandemic levels. Conflicts and other crises in Africa have in some cases led the Peace Corps to suspend programming over concern for volunteer safety, with recent conflict-related suspensions in Mali (in 2015) and Burkina Faso (2017) and suspensions in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone during a 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak. African Development Foundation (USADF) The USADF is a federally funded, independent nonprofit corporation, established by Congress under the African Development Foundation Act of 1980 (Title V of P.L. 96-533), that provides targeted grants worth up to $250,000 that typically serve as seed capital for small-scale economic growth projects. The Foundation focuses on women- and youth-led entrepreneurship, agriculture and food security, and off-grid electricity projects, and also plays a role in selected multi-agency initiatives (e.g., Power Africa and YALI). The Biden Administration and the FY2023 Request The Department of State-USAID Joint Regional Strategy for Africa, released in February 2022, identifies four priorities for U.S. engagement in Africa: advancing peace and security; increasing “mutually beneficial” economic growth, trade, and investment; strengthening democratic governance and respect for human rights; and building resilience to address challenges in health, climate change, food security, and other areas.49 These goals are consistent with those articulated 43 See MCC, “Where We Work,” at https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work. 44 In 2019, the MCC cancelled a $190 million worth of funds under Ghana’s compact over concern with the Ghanaian government’s termination of a private energy utility contract, reducing the compact’s total value from $498 million. On the recent approvals, see MCC, “MCC Board Approves Grants for Lesotho, Kenya to Drive Sustainable, Inclusive Economic Growth,” April 1, 2022. 45 MCC, “MCC’s Board Selects Belize, Zambia for Grant Assistance,” December 15, 2021. 46 The MCC previously suspended a compact with Tanzania in 2016 due to a government crackdown on the political opposition, and curtailed implementation of a compact in Mali in 2012 due to a military coup. 47 See CRS Report RS21168, The Peace Corps: Overview and Issues, by Nick M. Brown. 48 Peace Corps, Agency Financial Report: FY2020, 2020. 49 State Department and USAID, Joint Regional Strategy for Africa, 2022. During his first visit to Africa as Secretary Congressional Research Service 14 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview by previous Administrations. At the same time, the Biden Administration has proposed higher levels of annual foreign assistance for Africa than did the Trump Administration, and the Biden Administration’s proposed assistance to help African countries respond to the impacts of climate change (discussed below) represents a departure from the approach of its predecessor. The FY2023 SFOPS Budget Request for Africa The Biden Administration requested $7.77 billion for Africa for FY2023, a 1.5% increase from FY2021 actual allocations. Noteworthy changes from FY2021 allocations include proposed decreases for HIV/AIDS, global health security, water and sanitation, and environment programs; increases for agriculture, trade and investment, and DRG programs; and a surge in funding for activities related to climate change. Figure 7. The FY2023 Request for Africa, by Account $ thousands Source: State Department, CBJ for FY2023. Health. At $5.80 billion, health assistance comprises 75% of the FY2023 budget request for Africa. This would represent a decrease of $262 million (4%) from FY2021 allocations, largely driven by proposed declines in funding for global health security, water and sanitation, and HIV/AIDS programming. Several other health activities would see funding increases (see Text Box below). Support for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment would constitute two-thirds of FY2023 health assistance for Africa, and nearly half of all U.S. assistance for the region. Broadly consistent with past years, Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, and Zambia would be the leading recipients of U.S. health assistance in Africa.50 The largest proportional increase in funding would be for USAID’s West Africa Regional Mission, which would see a surge in of State, in 2021, Secretary Blinken emphasized shared efforts to advance global health (including by combating COVID-19), respond to climate change, and foster inclusive economic growth, strengthen democracy, and advance security. Secretary Blinken, “The United States and Africa: Building a 21st Century Partnership,” November 19, 2021. 50 The request proposes $550 million in health assistance for Nigeria, $537 million for Tanzania, $498 million for Mozambique, $492 million for Uganda, and $466 million for Zambia. Congressional Research Service 15 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview HIV/AIDS-related funding. Health Assistance for Africa: FY2023 Economic Growth (including Climate Request vs. FY2021 Actual Change). Economic growth assistance HIV/AIDS: $3.83 bil ion (-$63 mil ion from FY2021 actual) would see a 50% upswing from FY2021 Malaria: $692 mil ion (+$10 mil ion) Maternal/Child Health: $371 mil ion (+$14 mil ion) allocations, with $936 million requested Family Planning/Reproductive Health: $368 mil ion for FY2023.51 Aid for agriculture, the (+$25 mil ion) largest focus area of U.S. economic growth Global Health Security: $193 mil ion (-$174 mil ion) funding for Africa, would see a $65 million Water Supply/Sanitation: $132 mil ion (-$87 mil ion) increase from FY2021 (see Text Box). Tuberculosis: $115 mil ion (+$13 mil ion) Nutrition: $102 mil ion (level with FY2021 actual) Trade and investment assistance would Source: State Department, CBJ for FY2023 also increase, to $134 million, including $100 million for Prosper Africa and $27 million requested separately for USAID’s East Africa, Southern Africa, and West Africa regional operating units. The request proposes $20 million for USAID’s Africa Regional Bureau (AFR) for “Digital Africa,” intended to “foster the growth of an inclusive and resilient African digital ecosystem led by African communities and built on an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet.”52 The FY2023 request also proposes Economic Growth Assistance for Africa: FY2023 a $174 million increase for climate Request vs. FY2021 Actual change programs focused on Selected Program Areas adaptation, clean energy, and Agriculture: $440 mil ion (+$65 mil ion) “sustainable landscapes” activities, Trade/Investment (incl. Prosper Africa): $134 mil ion (+$98 which support ecosystem mil ion) preservation and climate change- Environment: $92 mil ion (-$40 mil ion) related carbon storage. Most Climate Change-Related Assistance climate change-related aid would Adaptation: $84 mil ion (+$76 mil ion) be channeled through USAID’s Clean Energy (incl. Power Africa): $114 mil ion (+$57 mil ion) Sustainable Landscapes: $51 mil ion (+41 mil ion) AFR Bureau, including a proposed $100 million for Power Africa— Source: State Department, CBJ for FY2023. continuing the Biden Administration’s trend of classifying Power Africa funding as “Clean Energy” assistance, as opposed to the Trump Administration’s classification of such assistance under “Modern Energy Services,” for which no funding is requested. Funding for environment-related activities not directly focused on climate change (e.g., conservation and countering wildlife crime) would see a $46 million decrease, to $92 million. Security Assistance. The FY2023 request proposes $461 million for peace and security programs in Africa, a $19 million (4%) increase relative to FY2021 allocations. Changes from FY2021 would include increases for strengthening military partnerships and capabilities (+$23 million) and counterterrorism (+$11 million), and decreases for citizen security and law enforcement (-$9 million) and transnational threats (-$5 million). The PKO account would continue to be the primary vehicle for U.S. security assistance for Africa, with $303 million requested. Around 70% ($233 million) of the PKO request for Africa would be allocated for Somalia. The PKO request 51 FY2021 allocation figures in this paragraph do not include Food for Peace (FFP) Title II assistance. 52 State Department, CBJ for FY2023, p. 226. Congressional Research Service 16 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview also includes $3 million to support a “modest” Countering Strategic Competitors program “targeted against influence by strategic competitors in Sub-Saharan Africa.”53 DRG. DRG funding for Africa would increase by $59 million (26%) relative to FY2021, to $285 million. Good governance programming, which aims to enhance the effectiveness of government institutions and combat corruption, among other objectives, would see the largest absolute increase in funding. The request also proposes increases for activities to strengthen civil society, promote human rights, and support independent media. DRC, Kenya, Somalia, Liberia, and Sudan would be the top recipients of U.S. DRG funding in Africa. Education and Social Services. Total education and social services funding for Africa would see a $16 million (5%) decrease in FY2023, to $282 million. DRC, Liberia, Malawi, and Senegal would be the largest recipients of basic education assistance in Africa, the largest category of U.S. education assistance for the region. The higher education request includes $20 million in USAID Africa Regional funding for YALI, a $10 million increase from FY2021 allocations.54 Outlook and Issues for Congress The 117th Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2023 budget request for Africa as it debates FY2023 appropriations. Heavily weighted toward health programs, with the balance dedicated to longstanding economic development and security priorities, the FY2023 request for Africa closely resembles, in level and scope, recent-year allocations for the region—though it would expand regional climate change-related assistance considerably and provide funding for an emergent “Digital Africa” program, among other proposals. In June 2022, the House Appropriations Committee released its FY2023 SFOPS appropriations bill (H.R. 8282) and accompanying report (H.Rept. 117-401). As reported to the House, among other provisions, that bill would allocate $100 million for Power Africa (equal to the request) and $80 million for Prosper Africa ($100 million proposed). Somalia would receive $233.2 million in PKO funding (level with the request), while $59 million in PKO would be allocated for regional programs (roughly $7 million above the proposal). As in past years, the bill would also impose directives, conditions, and reporting requirements on assistance to several African countries. Globally, report language recommends $6.7 billion for HIV/AIDS programming, including $2.0 billion to support the Seventh Replenishment of the Global Fund.55 Global developments may shape Congress’s assessment of needs, priorities, and budgetary decision-making related to U.S. assistance for Africa. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for instance, has generated new demands on U.S. engagement and resources in Europe, even as an accompanying surge in global food and fuel prices has worsened food insecurity across Africa.56 As Congress sets its priorities for FY2023 assistance for Africa and continues to oversee U.S. programming in the region, Members may consider various issues, such as: Scale and Balance. Members may debate whether U.S. assistance to Africa is suitably balanced among programmatic sectors given the scope of U.S. priorities in the region and commensurate 53 State Department, CBJ for FY2023, p. 410. 54 The request includes an additional $20 million for YALI via the State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. 55 See Global Fund, “Seventh Replenishment,” at https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/seventh-replenishment/. 56 CRS Insight IN11919, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Implications for Global Food Prices and Food Security, by Rhoda Margesson et al. Congressional Research Service 17 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview with U.S. interests. Successive Administrations have articulated a diverse range of development, governance, and security objectives in Africa, yet U.S. assistance for the region remains largely weighted toward health programs. Some Members have called for a greater allocation of U.S. assistance to be dedicated to other stated U.S. priorities, such as fostering economic growth, expanding U.S.-Africa commercial ties, and mitigating conflict.57 Others have defended the relative allocation of funding for health programs vis-à-vis other U.S. assistance for Africa.58 Transparency and Oversight. While this report provides approximate funding figures based largely on publicly available allocation data, comprehensive estimates of U.S. assistance for Africa and amounts dedicated to specific focus areas are difficult to determine. Because annual executive branch budget documents and congressional appropriations measures do not fully disaggregate funding by region or country, topline bilateral assistance figures for specific countries may understate (in some cases, substantially) the amount of assistance allocated for a given country once global and regional funding is considered. Gaps in region- and country-level assistance data may partly reflect efforts to maintain flexibility in U.S. assistance programs, as in the case of humanitarian aid, which is appropriated to global accounts for subsequent allocation according to need and U.S. policy priorities. At the same time, Congress has not imposed rigorous country allocation reporting requirements evenly across U.S. foreign assistance programs. For instance, while DOD “global train and equip” assistance is subject to congressional notification and reporting requirements that capture information on country and security force unit recipient and assistance to be provided, there is no analogous reporting requirement governing State Department-administered security assistance.59 The 117th Congress has acted to enhance oversight of U.S. foreign assistance for Africa, notably security assistance. Section 6502 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) expanded the notification and reporting requirements associated with PKO assistance, for example. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program Act of 2022 (Division AA, P.L. 117-103), in addition to providing statutory authority for TSCTP, established congressional notification requirements on funding allocations and mandated regular reporting on progress in meeting TSCTP objectives and resolving past management deficiencies. Restrictions on U.S. Assistance. Several African countries are (or previously have been) subject to restrictions on U.S. assistance pursuant to provisions in annual appropriations measures or other laws that Congress has enacted prohibiting or placing conditions on such aid on human rights and other grounds. Statutes establishing such conditions often accord the executive branch the discretion to designate countries for sanction or waive such restrictions. Congress may continue to debate the effectiveness of such restrictions as it oversees and assesses executive branch implementation. Related laws and considerations include:  Section 7008 in SFOPS appropriations legislation (most recently, P.L. 117-103), which restricts certain U.S. assistance following a coup d’état.60 As of June 2022, 57 See, e.g., remarks by Representative Bass in House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights, FY2022 Budget and U.S.-Africa Relations, hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., December 1, 2021. 58 See, e.g., remarks by Senator Rounds in Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, FY2023 Budget Request for Africa, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., July 27, 2022. 59 On U.S. counterterrorism activities in Africa and associated oversight challenges, see Testimony of Alexis Arieff, CRS Specialist in African Affairs, before the House Oversight Subcommittee on National Security, U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Challenges in Africa, 116th Cong., 1st sess., December 16, 2019. 60 CRS In Focus IF11267, Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations, by Alexis Arieff, Marian L. Lawson, and Susan G. Chesser; CRS Insight IN11854, “An Epidemic of Coups” in Africa? Issues for Congress, by Congressional Research Service 18 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Section 7008 was in effect with regard to Burkina Faso (due to a coup in 2022), Guinea (2021), Mali (2020), and Sudan (1989). In contrast to most legislative restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, Section 7008 does not grant the executive branch the authority to waive such restrictions, which go into effect once the executive branch determines that a coup has taken place.  The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292), which provides a list of escalating punitive actions (potentially including restrictions on U.S. assistance) for “Countries of Particular Concern” (CPCs), whose governments engage in or tolerate “particularly severe” religious freedom violations.61 In the most recent CPC determinations, issued in late 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken re-designated Eritrea as a CPC and upheld existing sanctions on the country, while de-listing Nigeria. Some Members of Congress criticized Nigeria’s removal from the CPC list.62  The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, P.L. 106-386, as amended) and related legislation, which restrict “nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related assistance” for governments that the State Department determines do not meet minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons and are not making significant efforts to do so.63 In its 2021 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, the State Department designated Comoros, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and South Sudan for potential sanction pursuant to the TVPA; in late 2021, citing the U.S. national interest, President Biden partially waived associated restrictions on U.S. assistance in FY2022 for all four countries, with varying justifications.64  The Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (CSPA, Title IV of P.L. 110-457, as amended) and related legislation, which restrict certain U.S. security assistance for countries in which governmental security forces or government-backed armed groups have recruited or used child soldiers.65 In its 2021 TIP report, the Secretary of State designated DRC, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan pursuant to the CSPA. In October 2021, President Biden fully waived associated restrictions on U.S. security assistance in FY2022 for Nigeria, and partly waived them for DRC, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan.66 Some countries have been subject to other legal restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, such as those imposed on governments that support international terrorism or are in external debt arrears. Congress has also included provisions in annual SFOPS appropriations measures restricting or placing conditions on certain assistance to specific African countries. In FY2022, these include conditions on IMET assistance for the countries of Africa’s Great Lakes region (Burundi, DRC, Alexis Arieff and Lauren Ploch Blanchard. 61 CRS In Focus IF10803, Global Human Rights: International Religious Freedom Policy, by Michael A. Weber. 62 See letter from Senators Marco Rubio, Josh Hawley, James Lankford, Kevin Cramer, Mike Braun, Jim Inhofe, and Tom Cotton to Secretary Blinken, December 13, 2021; see also Representative Chris Smith, “Biden’s retreat from the noble and necessary fight to protect victims of religious persecution in Nigeria,” November 23, 2021. 63 CRS Report R44953, The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report: Scope, Aid Restrictions, and Methodology, by Michael A. Weber, Katarina C. O'Regan, and Liana W. Rosen. 64 White House, “Memorandum on the Presidential Determination with Respect to the Efforts of Foreign Governments Regarding Trafficking in Persons,” December 21, 2021. 65 CRS In Focus IF10901, Child Soldiers Prevention Act: Security Assistance Restrictions, by Michael A. Weber. 66 White House, “Presidential Determination and Certification With Respect to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008,” 86 Federal Register 57525, October 18, 2021. Congressional Research Service 19 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Rwanda, Republic of Congo, and Uganda) and restrictions on certain kinds of assistance for the central governments of South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.67 The so-called “Leahy Laws” restrict most kinds of State Department- and DOD-administered security assistance to individual units or members of foreign security forces credibly implicated in a “gross violation of human rights,” subject to certain exceptions.68 The executive branch does not regularly publicize information on which units have been prohibited from receiving U.S. assistance pursuant to these laws. Country Ownership. Most U.S. assistance for Africa is provided through multilateral or nongovernment actors—such as U.N. agencies, U.S. and international humanitarian organizations, and civil society groups—rather than through African governments. (Exceptions include U.S. security assistance for African security forces and some healthcare capacity-building programs.) Congress may thus debate the extent to which U.S. assistance enables partner African governments to take the lead in addressing their country’s socioeconomic development, security, and governance challenges. In some cases, providing assistance through nongovernment actors may enable the provision of assistance in contexts where a government is unable or unwilling to meet the needs of its population, and may help the United States better control and oversee the use of funds. Congress may debate, however, whether this mode of delivery adequately equips recipient country authorities to take responsibility for service provision, as well as whether it may limit U.S. influence with recipient country governments as opposed to budget support. Members also may consider the merits and status of the Biden Administration’s stated emphasis on increasing the share of U.S. assistance that is implemented by local partners (e.g., partner governments and local civil society organizations) as opposed to international actors.69 Possible Unintended Consequences. Some Members have raised concerns over potential unintended consequences of U.S. foreign assistance for African countries. For instance, some lawmakers have questioned whether providing security assistance to African governments with poor human rights records (e.g., Cameroon and Uganda) may strengthen abusive militaries and contribute to poor governance.70 Amid a wave of military coups in Africa since 2020, some led by personnel who previously took part in U.S. training programs, some Members have questioned to what extent U.S. security assistance may have empowered coup leaders, or how U.S. security assistance could be adjusted in light of such events.71 Proponents of U.S. security assistance may contend that aspects of such engagements—such as military professionalization and related training—work to enhance security sector governance and civil-military relations, and may thus 67 Most recently, Section 7042(a) and Section 7042(i)-(j) of P.L. 117-103, Division K, Title VII. 68 See CRS In Focus IF10575, Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”), by Michael A. Weber. 69 Remarks by USAID Administrator Samantha Power at Georgetown University, November 4, 2021, available at https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/speeches/nov-4-2021-administrator-samantha-power-new-vision-global-development. 70 See, e.g. letter from Representatives Ilhan Omar, Karen Bass, and Sara Jacobs to Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin pertaining to Cameroon, March 9, 2022; letter from Senators Cory Booker and James Risch to Secretary of State Blinken pertaining to Uganda, March 4, 2021. 71 See, e.g., remarks by Representative Sara Jacobs in House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International Organizations, and Global Corporate Social Impact, “Improving the United States’ Ability to Prevent and Stabilize Conflict: Global Fragility Act Implementation,” 117th Cong., 2nd sess., May 11, 2022, remarks by Senator Chris Van Hollen in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” 117th Cont., 2nd sess., March 10, 2022; and remarks by Senator Mike Rounds in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Instability and the State of Democracy in the Sahel and the U.S. Policy Response,” hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 12, 2022. Congressional Research Service 20 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview improve human rights practices by partner militaries.72 Members continue to debate the appropriate approach to U.S. engagement with military regimes in Africa.73 Author Information Tomas F. Husted, Coordinator Lauren Ploch Blanchard Analyst in African Affairs Specialist in African Affairs Alexis Arieff Nicolas Cook Specialist in African Affairs Specialist in African Affairs Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 72 For one evaluation of U.S. security assistance in Africa, see Stephen Watts et al. Building Security in Africa: An Evaluation of U.S. security Sector Assistance in Africa from the Cold War to the Present, 2018. 73 See Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Instability and the State of Democracy in the Sahel." Congressional Research Service R46368 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED 21