U.S. International Food Assistance: An Overview

December 6, 2018 – February 23, 2021 R45422

U.S. International Food Assistance:
February 23, 2021
An Overview
Alyssa R. Casey
The United States is one of the foremost donors of food, or the means to purchase food,
Analyst in Agricultural
to people around the world at risk of hunger. The goal of U.S. international food
Policy
assistance programs is to provide emergency relief to populations impacted by crises,

such as conflicts or natural disasters, and nonemergency assistance to address chronic
Emily M. Morgenstern
food insecurity and help populations build resilience to potential threats to food supplies. Analyst in Foreign
The current suite of international food assistance programs began with the Food for
Assistance and Foreign
Peace Act (P.L. 83-480), commonly referred to as “P.L. 480,” which established the
Policy
Food for Peace programs. Congress has since authorized additional programs through

agriculture legislation and reauthorized these programs through periodic farm bil s.

Congress also has established international food assistance programs in foreign affairs
legislation and subsequent reauthorizations, such as the Global Food Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-195) and its
2018 reauthorization (P.L. 115-266).
Jurisdiction for international food assistance programs is split across the House and Senate Agriculture
Committees and the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. The U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) administer U.S.
international food assistance programs. Congress funds international food assistance programs through annual
Agriculture appropriations and State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations acts.
Annual outlays for U.S. international food assistance averaged $3.3 bil ion between FY2010 and FY2020.
Outlays during this period varied, declining to a low of $2.29 bil ion in FY2013 and increasing to a high of $5.06
bil ion in FY2020.
U.S. international food assistance programs provide support through two distinct methods: (1) in-kind aid, which
ships U.S. commodities to regions in need, and (2) market-based assistance, which provides recipients with
vouchers, direct cash transfers, or local y and regional y procured food. Historical y, the United States provided
international food assistance exclusively through in-kind aid. In 2010, the Obama Administration established, and
Congress later codified through legislation, the Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP), which provides
largely market-based assistance. Since the establishment of EFSP, U.S. provision of market-based food assistance
has increased. Market-based assistance now accounts for approximately 59% of total international food
assistance, while in-kind aid comprises roughly 41%.
Despite the growth in market-based assistance, U.S. international food assistance stil relies on in-kind aid. Many
other countries with international food assistance programs have converted to primarily market-based assistance.
U.S. reliance on in-kind aid is controversial due to its potential to disrupt international and local markets and
because it typical y costs more than market-based assistance. At the same time, lack of reliable suppliers and poor
infrastructure in recipient countries may limit the efficacy of market-based assistance. Cargo preference—the
requirement that 50% of al in-kind aid be shipped on U.S.-flag ships—also is controversial due to findings that it
can lead to higher transportation costs and longer delivery times. Higher costs may be partial y due to higher
wages and better working conditions on U.S.-flag vessels compared to foreign-flag vessels. Cargo preference also
may contribute to military readiness, though some studies suggest there is little evidence to support this assertion.
Prior Administrations and certain Members of Congress have proposed changes to the structure and intent of
international food assistance programs. The 2018 farm bil (P.L. 115-334) and the Global Food Security
Reauthorization Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-266) both wil expire at the end of FY2023. Congress may consider
changes to international food assistance programs in the next farm bil or Global Food Security Act
reauthorization, or in stand-alone legislation.
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Introduction
The United States is one of the foremost donors of food, or the means to purchase food, to people
around the world at risk of hunger. The goal of U.S. international food assistance programs is to
provide emergency relief to populations impacted by crises, such as conflicts or natural disasters,
and nonemergency assistance to address chronic food insecurity and help populations build
resilience to potential threats to food supplies.
Current food assistance programs originated in 1954 with the passage of what is now named the
Food for Peace Act (FFPA, P.L. 83-480).1 This legislation, commonly referred to as “P.L. 480,”
established Food for Peace programs. Original y, Food for Peace had multiple aims: (1) to
provide food to undernourished people abroad, (2) to reduce U.S. stocks of surplus grains that had
accumulated under U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) commodity support programs, and
(3) to expand potential markets for U.S. food commodities. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S.
food assistance goals have shifted away from the latter two aims and more toward emergency
response and supporting local agriculture markets in recipient countries.
For most of its existence, U.S. international
What Is Global Food Security?
food assistance provided exclusively in-kind
In the 1990 farm bil , Congress defined international food
aid—commodities sourced in the United
security as “access by any person at any time to food
States and shipped to recipient countries. U.S.
and nutrition that is sufficient for a healthy and
law requires some international food
productive life.”
assistance programs to provide primarily in-
In 1992, the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) issued a policy determination defining food
kind aid.2 However, in recent decades, U.S.
security as “when al people at al times have both
international food assistance has shifted from
physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet
exclusively in-kind to a combination of in-
their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life.”
kind and market-based assistance—such as
This definition took elements from the 1990 definition,
local y or regional y procured food, cash
as wel as from food security definitions put forward by
the World Bank and the U.N. Food and Agriculture
transfers, or vouchers.
Organization.
This report provides an overview of U.S.
international food assistance programs, including congressional jurisdiction, historical funding
trends, and issues for congressional consideration. This report focuses on international food
assistance programs that currently receive funding from Congress.3
Jurisdiction
Congressional jurisdiction over international food assistance programs is split between two
authorizing committees and two appropriations subcommittees. Jurisdiction general y aligns with
the major pieces of legislation that historical y provided statutory authority for international food
assistance programs: the FFPA and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, P.L. 87-195).
Administration of international food assistance programs also is split across two federal agencies:
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the U.S. Agency for International Development

1 T his law was originally titled the Agricultural T rade Development and Assistance Act when passed in 1954. In 2008,
Congress renamed it the Food for Peace Act.
2 For example, statute requires all aid provided through the Food for Peace T itle II program to be in-kind commodities,
with limited exceptions (7 U.S.C. §1732(2)). For further detail, see “ International Food Assistance Programs.”
3 For information on historical and inactive food assistance programs, see CRS Report R41072, U.S. International
Food Aid Program s: Background and Issues, by Randy Schnepf.
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U.S. International Food Assistance:
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(USAID). Figure 1 shows the congressional jurisdiction and implementing agency for each U.S.
international food assistance program discussed in this report.
Figure 1. U.S. International Food Assistance Jurisdiction

Source: CRS
Notes: Feed the Future Development refers to agricultural development assistance provided under the Feed the
Future initiative. The Feed the Future initiative is a government-wide initiative that includes al programs in this
matrix, as wel as other assistance provided outside USDA and USAID. Thus, this matrix does not include al
programs that comprise the Feed the Future initiative. The programs highlighted in this graphic are the programs
discussed in this report. SFOPS = Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs; USDA = U.S.
Department of Agriculture; USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development.
The House and Senate Agriculture Committees have jurisdiction over programs authorized in the
FFPA and other agriculture legislation. The House and Senate Agriculture Appropriations
subcommittees have jurisdiction over funding for these programs. The FFPA contains statutory
authority for four international food assistance programs, two of which are currently active—
Food for Peace (FFP) Title II and the Farmer-to-Farmer Program.4 Outside of the FFPA, Congress
has authorized additional international food assistance programs in subsequent agriculture
legislation, including the Bil Emerson Humanitarian Trust, the Food for Progress Program, and
the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program.5 Congress
has amended these programs in periodic farm bil s, most recently the 2018 farm bil (Agriculture
Improvement Act of 2018, P.L. 115-334). The programs under the Agriculture Committees’
jurisdiction are based primarily on in-kind aid.

4 Food for Peace (FFP) program names refer to the titles in the Food for Peace Act (FFPA, P.L. 83-480) that originally
authorized the programs. FFP T itle II and FFP T itle V (commonly known as the Farmer -to-Farmer program) remain
active today. T itles I and III of the FFPA authorize curren tly inactive programs. T itle IV includes general authorities
and program requirements.
5 For more information on the authorizing statut e for each program, see Appendix.
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The House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees have jurisdiction over
programs with statutory authority in the FAA. Congress enacted the FAA in 1961 and has
amended it through periodic legislation. The Global Food Security Act of 2016 (GFSA, P.L. 114-
195) amended Section 491 of the FAA to create the Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP).
The program is authorized to provide emergency food assistance “including in the form of funds,
transfers, vouchers, and agricultural commodities” to address emergency food needs as a result of
natural, human-induced, and complex emergencies. The Global Food Security Reauthorization
Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-266) reauthorized EFSP through FY2023. The Community Development
Fund (CDF) also derives its authority from the FAA, though the act does not specifical y
authorize CDF. Rather, CDF is designated as a portion of the Development Assistance (DA)
account within the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS)
appropriation. As such, it is subject to DA’s FAA authorities.6
International Food Assistance Programs
USDA and USAID administer seven different international food assistance programs. The
programs are implemented through partner organizations with oversight and program funding
from USAID or USDA. These partner organizations typical y are nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) or international organizations, though foreign country governments and private-sector
companies are eligible to participate in some programs.7 USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC) procures commodities for al food assistance programs, regardless of which agency
implements the program.8 Typical y, funding for an international food assistance program
supports multiple projects in a given fiscal year. For example, in FY2019, FFP Title II funding
supported over 100 projects in more than 30 countries.9
International food assistance programs may differ from one another in a number of ways,
including in their delivery method, sometimes referred to as a modality. Programs provide
assistance through two distinct methods:
1. In-kind contributions are commodities produced in the United States and
shipped to the target region. In addition to standard in-kind contributions, in-kind
assistance also may be provided through the following methods:
a. Prepositioning is a form of in-kind aid where shelf-stable (i.e., not easily
spoiled) U.S. commodities are prepositioned in storage facilities in the
United States and abroad to enable quicker response to emergencies.

6 T hese include Sections 103, 104, 106, 214, 251-255 and Chapter 10 of Part I of P.L. 87-195.
7 A nongovernmental organization (NGO) typically is a voluntary group or institution with a social mission, which
operates independently from government. Partner NGOs may be based in the United States or in another country. An
international organization may include an intergovernmental organization or a multilat eral institution such as the
United Nations World Food Program.
8 T he Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) is a government-owned financial institution, overseen by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), which procures commodities, processes financial transactions, and finances
domestic and international programs to support U.S. agriculture. T he CCC procures U.S.-produced commodities for
international food assistance programs on the open market. For more information on the CCC, see CRS Report
R44606, The Com m odity Credit Corporation (CCC), by Megan Stubbs.
9 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), USAID International Food Assistance Report to Congress for
Fiscal Year 2019.
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b. Monetization is a form of in-kind aid in which the partner organization sel s
U.S. commodities on local markets in developing countries and uses the
proceeds to fund development projects.10
2. Market-based assistance provides direct cash transfers, food vouchers, or
locally and regional y procured food to populations in need (also cal ed
beneficiaries). Under local and regional procurement (LRP), partner
organizations purchase food in the country or region where it is to be distributed
rather than in the United States.11
International food assistance programs may provide emergency assistance, nonemergency
assistance, or both. Emergency projects seek to distribute immediate, life-saving food and
nutrition assistance to populations in crisis due to conflict or natural disaster. Nonemergency
projects address the root causes of food insecurity and seek to build resilience among vulnerable
populations. Nonemergency projects often provide a combination of food distribution and
nonfood assistance including education programs, technical assistance, and broader community
development initiatives.
International Food Assistance and the Feed the Future Initiative
Feed the Future is a government-wide initiative that aims to improve U.S. international food security efforts by
strengthening coordination and uniting al food-security-related programs under common goals and evaluation
criteria. Feed the Future coordinates nonemergency food assistance programs with other food security efforts,
such as global health and agricultural development programs. Because Feed the Future focuses on long-term food
security, it does not include emergency food assistance activities. However, nonemergency food assistance—
including the McGovern-Dole, Food for Progress, and Farmer-to-Farmer programs; nonemergency assistance
provided under Food for Peace Title II; and Community Development Fund programming—are part of Feed the
Future. USDA and USAID submit data on nonemergency food assistance programs to col aborative Feed the
Future evaluations.12
Food for Peace Title II
Under FFP Title II, the federal government donates U.S.-sourced commodities to a qualifying
international organization or NGO to be distributed directly to food-insecure populations.13

10 Monetization is a process by which implementing partners sell in-kind commodities in local markets to fund
nonemergency projects. Monetization used to be required for some FFP T itle II assistance by the farm bill; the most
recent farm bill (P.L. 115-334) eliminated the monetization requirement, instead replacing it with a permissive
authority. Analysts have found that in practice, monetization loses 20 -25 cents on the dollar (see, for example, Erin C.
Lentz, Stephanie Mercier, and Christopher B. Barrett, “ International Food Aid and Food Assistance Programs and the
Next Farm Bill,” American Enterprise Institute, October 2017, p. 8, at http://www.aei.org/publication/international-
food-aid-and-food-assistance-programs-and-the-next-farm-bill/).
11 Historically, this modality has been referred to as local and regional procurement (LRP). More recently, USAID has
recognized that in rare cases food must be procured outside the country or region of need for reasons of cost,
timeliness, or appropriateness. T hus, USAID began referring to this modality as local, regional, and international
procurem ent (LRIP). See Office of Food for Peace, Inform ation Bulletin 19-03, August 8, 2019, at
https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00T VW5.pdf. T his report uses local and regional procurem ent to maintain
consistency when discussing past studies and data on LRP.
12 For more information on Feed the Future, see CRS Report R44216, The Obama Administration’s Feed the Future
Initiative, by Marian L. Lawson, Randy Schnepf, and Nicolas Cook . For more information on collaborative monitoring
of international food assistance programs and Feed the Future, see USAID and USDA, “ U.S. International Food
Assistance Report to Congress,” various years beginning in FY2012.
13 Partner organizations also may monetize commodities. However, since the 2018 farm bill eliminated the
monetization requirement, use of monetization in FFP T itle II has decreased significantly. According to 7 U.S.C.
§1723(c), monetization proceeds may “be used to implement income-generating, community development, health,
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USAID administers FFP Title II. The program funds both emergency and nonemergency projects.
USAID determines how much program funding to al ocate to emergency and nonemergency
projects each year, within statutory requirements. The majority of FFP Title II funds support
emergency assistance. In FY2019, 84% of FFP Title II funds supported emergency assistance and
the remaining 16% supported nonemergency assistance.14
FFP Title II has statutory authority in the FFPA, and Congress provides funding for the program
in annual Agriculture appropriations bil s. The FFPA contains a number of requirements that
dictate how USAID must implement FFP Title II. These requirements include the following:
 Al commodities must be U.S.-sourced commodities, with limited exceptions.15
 At least 75% of nonemergency commodities must be in the form of processed,
fortified, or bagged commodities (value-added commodities), and at least 50% of
bagged, whole-grain commodities must be bagged in the United States.16
 FFP Title II must distribute a minimum of 2.5 mil ion metric tons of commodities
per year, of which 1.875 mil ion metric tons must be distributed as nonemergency
assistance.17
 USAID must al ocate a minimum of $365 mil ion and a maximum of 30% of
total FFP Title II funding to nonemergency assistance each year.18
Farmer-to-Farmer (Food for Peace Title V)
The John Ogonowski and Doug Bereuter Farmer-to-Farmer program finances short-term
(typical y two- to four-week) volunteer placements in developing countries to provide technical
assistance to farmers.19 Volunteers are U.S. citizens drawn from farming, agribusiness,
universities, and nonprofit organizations. USAID, which administers the program, selects eligible
NGOs to coordinate volunteer placements. Potential volunteers apply directly to the coordinating
NGOs and are selected based on the needs of the individual or organization in the developing
country. The Farmer-to-Farmer program does not finance food distribution. It is included in this
discussion because it is part of the suite of programs the FFPA authorizes and it receives funding
through annual appropriations for Food for Peace programs.

nutrition, cooperative development, agricultural, and other developmental activities.” It also states that proceeds may be
used for transportation, storage, distribution, or enhancing the use of FFP T itle II commodities, or they may be
invested, with any earned interest used for the purposes of the food assistance project under which the monetization
occurs.
14 USAID, International Food Assistance Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2019, April 2020.
15 7 U.S.C. §1723(2).
16 7 U.S.C. §1724(b). T he USAID administrator may waive this requirement if he or she determines the program goals
would not be best met by enforcing it. In FY2019, 18% of non emergency commodities were value-added and 23% of
whole-grain, bagged commodities were bagged in the United States.
17 7 U.S.C. §1724(a). T he USAID administrator has discretion to waive the minimum tonnage requirement to meet
emergency needs or if such quantities cannot be used effectively as nonemergency assistance. T he administrator has
waived this requirement every year in recent decades. In FY2017, T itle II assistance totaled 1.5 million metric tons of
commodities, 243,180 metric tons of which were nonemergency assistance.
18 7 U.S.C. §1736f(e). Statute also states that funds appropriated for the Farmer-to-Farmer Program and for Community
Development Funds that are used for implementing income-generating, community development, health, nutrition,
cooperative development, agricultural, and other developmental activities may be counted toward the minimum FFP
T itle II nonemergency requirement.
19 Congress established the program as the Farmer-to-Farmer Program and later renamed it after John Ogonowski, one
of the pilots killed in the September 11, 2001, attacks and Representative Doug Bereuter, who was an initial sponsor of
and advocate for the program.
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Congress established the Farmer-to-Farmer program in the 1966 FFPA reauthorization (P.L. 89-
808). Congress did not fund the program until the 1985 farm bil (P.L. 99-198) established
minimum required funding of 0.1% of the annual funds appropriated for Food for Peace
programs. Congress has periodical y updated minimum required funding levels in the farm bil .
The 2018 farm bil (P.L. 115-334) reauthorized minimum funding of the greater of $15 mil ion or
0.6% of the funds appropriated annual y for Food for Peace programs.
McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition
The McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program aims to
advance food security, nutrition, and education for children—especial y girls—by providing in-
kind aid to be distributed in school meals in priority countries. The program, administered by
USDA, also focuses on improving children’s health before they enter school by providing food to
pregnant and nursing mothers, infants, and children under school age. In addition to providing
food, the program encourages governments in recipient countries to establish national school
feeding programs and provides technical assistance to help them do so. USDA chooses priority
countries for McGovern-Dole projects each year based on criteria including per capita income,
literacy, and malnutrition rates
Congress established McGovern-Dole in the 2002 farm bil (P.L. 107-171). The 2018 farm bil
(P.L. 115-334) reauthorized the program, including discretionary funding of “such sums as
necessary.” P.L. 115-334 also amended the program to authorize USDA to use up to 10% of
annual McGovern-Dole funding for LRP.20 (This is separate from funding set aside for USDA’s
LRP Program in annual appropriations for McGovern-Dole; see next section.) The 2018 farm bil
conference report directed USDA to incorporate LRP assistance, particularly in the final years of
McGovern-Dole projects “to support the transition to full local ownership and implementation.”
Congress funds the McGovern-Dole program through annual Agriculture appropriations bil s.
Local and Regional Food Aid Procurement Program
The LRP Program finances the provision of local y and regional y procured foods to
beneficiaries, usual y in nonemergency situations. USDA provides funding to partner
organizations, which then procure eligible commodities in the country or region in which the
commodities wil be distributed. Al procured commodities must meet certain nutritional, quality,
and labeling standards determined by USDA. USDA typical y has used the LRP Program to
supplement in-kind assistance in McGovern-Dole projects.21 In FY2019, USDA financed three
LRP Program projects in Burkina Faso, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. Al three projects provided
commodities to schools to supplement McGovern-Dole projects.22
Congress established the LRP Program as a pilot program in the 2008 farm bil (P.L. 110-246).
The provision authorized pilot projects to provide local y and regional y procured food to
beneficiaries, and directed USDA to have an independent third party conduct an evaluation of al
pilot projects. The provision provided $60 mil ion in mandatory funding over four years to
finance the pilot projects and evaluation. The 2014 farm bil (P.L. 113-79) permanently authorized
the program and authorized discretionary funding of $80 mil ion annual y for FY2014-FY2018.

20 P.L. 115-334, §3309.
21 Statute authorizes USDA to give preference for LRP Program awards to eligible entities “that have, or are working
toward, projects under” the McGovern-Dole program (7 U.S.C. §1726c(e)(2)).
22 For further detail, see USDA, Local and Regional Food Aid Procurement Program FY2019 Report to Congress, June
2020, at https://www.fas.usda.gov/newsroom/local-and-regional-food-aid-procurement -program-fy-2019-report -
congress.
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The 2018 farm bil (P.L. 115-334) reauthorized this level of funding through FY2023. Since
FY2016, Congress has appropriated funding for the program as a set-aside within funding for the
McGovern-Dole Program. In FY2021, Congress set aside $23 mil ion of McGovern-Dole funding
for the LRP Program.
Food for Progress
Under the Food for Progress program, USDA donates U.S. agricultural commodities to
international organizations, NGOs, foreign governments, or private entities, which can then
distribute the commodities to beneficiaries or monetize the commodities by sel ing them local y
to raise funds for development projects.23 Food for Progress projects focus on improving
agricultural productivity and expanding agricultural trade. Statute directs USDA, when awarding
projects, to consider a country’s commitments to promote economic freedom and expand efficient
domestic commodity markets.24 In FY2020, USDA funded five Food for Progress projects in
seven countries.25
Congress first authorized the Food for Progress program in the 1985 farm bil (P.L. 99-198). It
may receive funding through either Food for Peace Title I appropriations or CCC financing.
Congress has not appropriated funding for new Title I programs since FY2006. Food for Progress
now relies on CCC financing. Statute requires the program provide a minimum of 400,000 metric
tons of commodities each fiscal year.26 However, this minimum has not been met in recent years,
with actual totals averaging 253,269 metric tons per year between FY2010 and FY2019.27 Statute
authorizes the program to pay no more than $40 mil ion annual y for freight costs,28 which limits
the amount of shipped commodities, particularly in years with high shipping costs. The 2018 farm
bil authorized a new pilot program to finance Food for Progress projects directly rather than
through monetization.29 The act authorized appropriations of $10 mil ion per year for FY2019-
FY2023 for pilot agreements. Congress has not provided funding for these pilot agreements to
date.
Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust
The Bil Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT) is a reserve authorized to hold funds or
commodities for use in rapidly responding to emergency food needs in humanitarian contexts.
USDA and USAID jointly administer the BEHT, and the CCC holds al BEHT funds. These
commodities or funds can supplement FFP Title II when international food assistance programs
cannot meet emergency food needs in a given fiscal year. The BEHT al ows USDA and USAID
the option to provide additional food assistance quickly, without having to rely on supplemental
appropriations from Congress. BEHT funds or commodities are subject to many of the same
requirements as FFP Title II, including the requirement to provide in-kind aid.

23 Statute authorizes USDA to provide commodities to partner entities for distribution or monetization. In practice, the
majority of Food for Progress projects have monetized all commodities.
24 7 U.S.C. §1736o(c)-(d).
25 USDA, “Food for Progress Funding—FY2020,” at https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/food-progress/food-progress-
funding-fy-2020.
26 7 U.S.C. §1736o(g).
27 USDA and USAID, U.S. International Food Assistance Report, for years FY2010 through FY2019.
28 7 U.S.C. §1736o(f)(3).
29 P.L. 115-334, §3302.
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Congress authorized the BEHT in its current form in the Africa: Seeds of Hope Act of 1998 (P.L.
105-385).30 Congress authorized the BEHT to hold funds or certain commodities (wheat, rice,
corn, and sorghum), but, since 2008, the BEHT has held only funds.31 Congress may appropriate
funds to reimburse the CCC for any commodities or funds released from the BEHT. The CCC
may either hold these funds in the BEHT or use the funds to replenish commodities to the BEHT.
BEHT funds were last used in FY2014 to purchase 189,970 metric tons of U.S. agricultural
commodities to supply FFP Title II projects in South Sudan.32 Currently, the BEHT holds
approximately $280 mil ion in funds.33
Emergency Food Security Program
EFSP is considered a market-based assistance program, providing assistance in the form of food
vouchers, cash transfers, or the local or regional procurement of commodities (LRP).34 USAID
has asserted that it uses EFSP assistance when significant barriers exist to providing in-kind aid—
for example, when in-kind food would not arrive soon enough or could disrupt local markets or
when it is unsafe to operate in conflict zones. Once the agency has determined an EFSP
intervention is needed, it uses four criteria to decide which market-based intervention is best
suited to the recipient country context: market appropriateness, feasibility, project objectives, and
cost.35 In FY2019, the most recent year for which comprehensive data are available, USAID
administered EFSP assistance in 50 countries. LRP was used most often, accounting for 45% of
EFSP assistance, with food vouchers and cash transfers following at 27% and 23%, respectively.36
USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance administers EFSP. USAID first employed EFSP in
FY2010 based on authority in the FAA to provide disaster assistance. In 2016, Congress
permanently authorized EFSP in the GFSA. Congress funds EFSP through the International
Disaster Assistance (IDA) account within the SFOPS appropriations bil .
Community Development Fund
CDF is used to fund—either solely or in conjunction with FFP Title II nonemergency funds—
USAID’s Resilience Food Security Activities (RFSAs) in countries targeted by the Feed the
Future food security initiative.37 RFSAs typical y are five-year programs aimed at addressing the

30 T he Bill Emerson Humanitarian T rust (BEHT ) replaced the Food Security Commodity Reserve established in 1996
and its predecessor, the Food Security Wheat Reserve, originally authorized in 1980.
31 In 2008, USDA sold the BEHT ’s remaining commodities—about 915,000 metric tons of wheat—and currently the
BEHT holds only funds.
32 USAID, U.S. International Food Assistance Report: Fiscal Year 2014 , May 2016.
33 Author communication with USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, January 11, 2021.
34 For definitions of each market -based modality, see Appendix A in USAID, Emergency Food Security Program
Fiscal Year 2019 Report to Congress, April 13, 2020, at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1867/
USAID_FY2019_EmergencyFoodSecurityProgramReport.pdf .
35 USAID, Emergency Food Security Program Fiscal Year 2019 Report to Congress, April 13, 2020.
36 USAID, Emergency Food Security Program Fiscal Year 2019 Report to Congress, April 13, 2020. USAID reports
that the remaining 5% was used for “ complementary investments and other related activities.”
37 Resilience Food Security Activities formerly were referred to as Development Food Security Activities. Food for
Peace Act T itle II nonemergency funds are authorized by the Food for Peace Act and provided for in the Agriculture
appropriation. As such, they are subject to specific requirements that are different from the Community Development
Fund. For more on nonemergency programs, see CRS Report R45879, International Food Assistance: Food for Peace
Nonem ergency Program s, by Emily M. Morgenstern.
T he Feed the Future initiative was launched by the Obama Administration and continues today. Current Feed the
Future initiat ive target countries include Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Mali, Nepal,
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root causes of food insecurity. Although the composition of each project depends on the local
context, RFSAs may include in-kind food distributions, seed and livestock distribution, water
supply and sanitation activities, trainings for smal holder farmers, and the organization of
microenterprise groups. USAID considers the RFSAs as a means to support the transition from
short-term emergency food assistance programs to longer-term food security assistance, such as
agricultural development and nutrition assistance programs. As such, they share a close
relationship with USAID’s emergency food security activities and broader Feed the Future
initiative programming.
USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance administers CDF with input from USAID’s
Bureau for Resilience and Food Security. USAID first employed CDF to reduce the agency’s
reliance on monetization in its FFP Title II nonemergency projects and increase the funds
available for a broader range of activities. Even as Congress has loosened the monetization
requirement and made FFP Title II nonemergency funds more flexible, CDF remains in use today.
Congress designates a level of funding each year for CDF within the DA account of the SFOPS
appropriation. The designation typical y is included in report language or in the joint explanatory
statement accompanying the final appropriation.
Food Assistance Funding
U.S. international food assistance outlays have fluctuated over the past 11 years (Figure 2). Total
outlays declined from FY2010 to FY2013. Outlays have increased since FY2013, partly in
response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa between 2014 and 2016 and ongoing conflicts in
South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. For example, in FY2019, the U.S. al ocated over $1 bil ion of its
emergency food assistance to needs arising from just the three conflicts in South Sudan, Syria,
and Yemen.38 Extreme weather shocks also have increased international food assistance needs.
For example, the United States provided emergency food assistance in response to multiple
severe droughts in the Horn of Africa between 2014 and 2020 and Tropical Cyclones Kenneth
and Idai in southern Africa in 2019.
FFP Title II comprised the bulk of international food assistance outlays between the mid-1980s
and the mid-2010s. However, since FY2010 (the first year of EFSP), EFSP assistance has grown
from approximately 10% of total international food assistance outlays to 57% in FY2020. During
that same period, Title II outlays decreased as a share of total international food assistance from
75% to 33%, even as Title II funding levels remained relatively constant, on average. These
trends reflect a shift over the past decade from predominantly in-kind assistance to predominantly
market-based assistance (see “In-Kind and Market-Based Food Assistance”).

Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda. For more on the history of Feed the Future, see CRS Report R44216, The Obam a
Administration’s Feed the Future Initiative, by Marian L. Lawson, Randy Schnepf, and Nicolas Cook .
38 USAID, Office of Food for Peace Fiscal Year 2019 Annual Report, December 2019, at https://www.usaid.gov/
documents/1866/food-peace-fiscal-year-2019-annual-report.
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Figure 2. U.S. International Food Assistance Outlays, FY2010-FY2020
$ in bil ions (current year)

Source: Figure created by CRS using data from USAID, U.S. International Food Assistance Report, various years.
Notes: FFP = Food for Peace; EFSP = Emergency Food Security Program; The “Other” category includes the
Farmer-to-Farmer Program, Local and Regional Food Aid Procurement Program, Bil Emerson Humanitarian
Trust, and Community Development Fund.
Recent Administration Proposals
The Obama and Trump Administrations both pursued changes to the structure and intent of U.S.
international food assistance programs. Although the proposed changes were different, the
underlying arguments for both were similar: that U.S. international food assistance programs
should be streamlined and better coordinated to increase both programmatic and cost efficiency.
Responses to both Administration efforts were mixed, and Congress ultimately did not enact the
major restructuring that either Administration proposed. These administrative proposals are
detailed below.
Proposed Food Aid Reform Under the Obama Administration
In its FY2014 budget request, the Obama Administration proposed changes to U.S. international
food assistance programs that it asserted would al ow the United States to reach an additional 2-4
mil ion more people each year.39 The proposal included shifting funds from FFP Title II to SFOPS
appropriations accounts—mainly IDA and DA. For emergency food assistance, funds would be
shifted from FFP Title II to IDA to al ow for the increased use of market-based approaches in
emergency contexts. Further, the Administration advocated for a new Emergency Food Assistance
Contingency Fund. For nonemergency contexts, the Administration proposed a Community
Development and Resilience Fund within DA. The Administration asserted that these changes

39 Department of State, FY2014 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Op erations Volume 2, May 17, 2013,
p. 57.
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would “make food aid more timely and cost-effective” and “al ow the use of the right tool at the
right time for responding to emergencies and chronic food insecurity.”40 The Administration
claimed it did not seek to eliminate the use of U.S. in-kind food aid but rather to al ow USAID to
choose the contexts in which U.S. in-kind food aid was most appropriate. In an effort to address
concerns from the Maritime Administration and its stakeholders about shipping contracts
decreasing with in-kind aid levels, the Administration included $25 mil ion for the Maritime
Administration “for additional targeted operating subsidies for militarily-useful vessels and
incentives to facilitate the retention of mariners.”41 Final y, the Administration estimated these
reforms would be cost-effective for the U.S. taxpayer, reducing the deficit by an estimated $500
mil ion over 10 years.
The Obama Administration’s reform proposal met with polarized reactions. Within the
implementing partner community, proponents of the plan agreed with the Administration’s
criticism of in-kind food, saying the approach was “outdated” and that with FFP Title II, “for
every dol ar that is spent on feeding the hungry, only 47 cents reaches a person in need.”42 The
reform proposal was celebrated for its “right tool right time” approach and overal increased
flexibility. However, other implementing partners expressed concern that removing U.S. food
from U.S. international food assistance would undermine the program’s congressional support
and ultimately result in a decrease in funding for al U.S. international food assistance in the long
run.43
In the U.S. agricultural community, the reactions to the reform proposal also were mixed. Some
larger agribusinesses, including Cargil , and organizations such as the National Farmers Union
voiced their support for the proposed changes.44 However, commodity groups such as USA Rice
joined with other organizations to write a letter to the President urging the continuation of U.S.
food aid programs in the current form.45
Perhaps the most vocal constituency against the Administration’s reform proposal was the
shipping industry, with one union organization noting the proposal was “bad for the American
farmer, bad for the American ports, bad for the taxpayer, and bad for our workers.”46 Others
suggested the reform would harm the U.S.-flag fleet and ultimately would reduce U.S. military
readiness.47 However, in a letter to House Foreign Affairs Committee leadership, the Department

40 Department of State, FY2014 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations Volume 2, May 17, 2013,
p. 57.
41 Department of State, FY2014 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations Volume 2, May 17, 2013,
p. 57.
42 CARE, CARE Supports President Obama’s Food Aid Reforms, April 10, 2013, at https://www.care.org/news-and-
stories/press-releases/care-supports-president -obamas-food-aid-reforms/.
43 Ron Nixon, “Obama Administration Seeks to Overhaul International Food Aid,” New York Times, April 4, 2013, at
nytimes.com/2013/04/05/us/politics/white-house-seeks-to-change-international-food-aid.html.
44 “Cargill Lends Support to Food Aid Reform,” AgriPulse, May 23, 2013, at https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/
2878-cargill-lends-support -to-food-aid-reform; Roger Johnson, “ Op-Ed: NFU Calls for More Flexibility on Food Aid,”
AgriPulse, May 21, 2013, at https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/2868-op-ed-nfu-calls-for-more-flexibility-on-food-
aid.
45 Letter to the President from advocacy groups in support of current food aid programs, February 21, 2013.
46 Letter from Robert McEllrath, President of the International Longshore & Warehouse Union, June 12, 2013, at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/814081-international-longshoreand-warehouse-union-letter.html.
47 Letter from Edward Wytkind, President of the T ransportation Trades Department, June 18, 2013, at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/814076-afl-transportation-trades-department-letter.html.
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of Defense noted the reform proposal would not affect U.S. maritime readiness, national security,
or the “Department’s ability to crew the surge fleet and deploy forces and sustainment cargo.”48
Although some Members of Congress introduced legislation that would have enacted the
Administration’s proposal, ultimately the reform in its entirety was not enacted. The 2014 farm
bil and GFSA reflected some of the proposed changes, but the broader U.S. international food
assistance structure remained intact during the Obama Administration.
Proposed Funding Cuts and Account Consolidation Under the
Trump Administration
Citing a desire to cut costs and find programmatic efficiencies, in its first two budget requests, the
Trump Administration proposed eliminating funding for the McGovern-Dole and FFP Title II
programs and funding al international food assistance through IDA within the SFOPS
appropriation. However, in both instances, the requests also included significant cuts to IDA from
the prior fiscal year: a 39% cut for FY2018 and a 17% cut for FY2019.
In its FY2020 and FY2021 budget requests, the Trump Administration again proposed
eliminating the McGovern-Dole program, but instead of eliminating FFP Title II in favor of IDA,
the Administration proposed a consolidated International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA)
appropriations account that would combine funding from four humanitarian accounts: FFP Title
II, IDA, Migration and Refugee Assistance, and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance.49
According to budget documents, if enacted, IHA would have been managed by USAID under the
policy authority of the Department of State. Notably, the proposed levels for IHA would have
represented 37% and 38% decreases, respectively, from the prior year’s appropriations for the
component accounts.
The Trump Administration’s proposals to reduce and consolidate U.S. funding for international
food assistance largely were unsupported by stakeholders, including food assistance
implementing partners, commodity groups, and the shipping industry.50 The proposals were
similarly received in Congress, with existing programs continuing to receive bipartisan support in
both chambers. As such, in the Administration’s later years, U.S. international food assistance
program stakeholders saw the budget requests as a routine exercise that had little effect on
congressional action. For example, in a statement following the release of the President’s FY2021
budget request, USA Rice’s vice president of government affairs stated, “While it is discouraging
to hear that the Administration is proposing to balance the budget on the backs of American
farmers and those in need, we know that this budget wil not be wel received by Congress and is
essential y dead on arrival.”51

48 Letter from Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense, to Chairman Edward Royce and Ranking Member Eliot
Engel, House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 18, 2013, at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/814075-
pentagon-letter-on-food-aid-reform.html.
49 T he Migration and Refugee Assistance and Emergency Migration an d Refugee Assistance accounts both are in the
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriation and are managed by the Department of State’s Bureau
of Population, Refugees, and Migration.
50 See, for example, American Maritime Officers, “ Administration Seeks to Eliminate Food for Peace T itle II, Roll
Back MSP Funding in FY2018 Budget,” Am erican Maritim e Officer, June 2017 at https://www.amo-union.org/news/
2017/201706/201706.pdf; U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, “ Analysis of the Administration’s FY19 International
Affairs Budget Request,” February 12, 2018, at https://www.usglc.org/the-budget/analysis-administrations-fy19-
international-affairs-budget-request.
51 USA Rice, “ President’s FY2021 Budget Proposal,” February 10, 2020, at https://www.usarice.com/news-and-events/
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Issues for Congress
In-Kind and Market-Based Food Assistance
Historical y, the United States provided international food aid exclusively via in-kind
commodities. The United States remains one of the few major donor countries that continues the
provision of large quantities of in-kind aid. Many other donors—such as Canada, the European
Union, and the United Kingdom—have switched to primarily market-based assistance.52 U.S. use
of market-based assistance has increased significantly in recent years under EFSP, CDF, and the
LRP Program—to the point where EFSP is now the largest among al U.S. international food
assistance programs in terms of total annual outlays. In FY2010, in-kind aid comprised roughly
89% of U.S. international food assistance, with market-based assistance making up the remaining
11%. In FY2020, in-kind aid accounted for roughly 41% of assistance and market-based
assistance comprised approximately 59% (Figure 3). During this same period, total international
food assistance outlays grew over 97%, from approximately $2.6 bil ion to $5.1 bil ion.
Figure 3. U.S. In-Kind and Market-Based Food Assistance Outlays, FY2010 and
FY2020

Source: CRS, using data from U.S. International Food Assistance Report to Congress, FY2010, and USDA and USAID
preliminary food assistance outlays for FY2020.

publications/usa-rice-daily/article/usa-rice-daily/2020/02/10/president -s-fy-2021-budget-proposal.
52 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Local and Regional Procurement Can Enhance the Efficiency of
U.S. Food Aid, But Challenges May Constrain Its Im plem entation, GAO-09-570, May 2009.
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Notes: In-kind and market-based breakdowns are CRS approximations, based on available data from USDA and
USAID. FY2020 outlays are preliminary data. BEHT, which is used in years where USAID determines other
international food assistance programs cannot meet emergency needs, was not used in FY202 0. Data does not
include the Farmer-to-Farmer Program, because the program does not provide food assistance. FFP = Food for
Peace; MGD = McGovern-Dole; FFPR = Food for Progress; BEHT = Bil Emerson Humanitarian Trust; EFSP =
Emergency Food Security Program; LRP = Local and Regional Food Aid Procurement Program; CDF =
Community Development Fund.
Proponents of in-kind aid contend it supports American jobs. Providing U.S.-grown commodities
supports the agricultural sector, and shipping those commodities on U.S.-flag ships supports the
transportation sector. In-kind aid also supports American companies that produce ready-to-use
therapeutic and supplementary foods, foods that are special y formulated to address malnutrition.
Proponents also maintain the visibility of in-kind food with U.S labels fosters goodwil between
the United States and recipient countries.53
U.S. in-kind aid may be appropriate when local food availability is scarce. For example, in 2012,
during a severe drought in the Sahel region of Africa, USAID provided in-kind aid to recipients
during the “lean season,” when markets were not wel stocked. According to USAID, in-kind aid
al owed local farmers to plant and tend to crops instead of having to migrate in search of food.54
However, in these instances, LRP also may be appropriate and may support regional markets.
Prepositioning food at warehouses in the United States and abroad al ows aid to reach recipients
sooner than traditional in-kind aid in emergency situations. In 2014, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) found that prepositioning shortened delivery time frames for in-
kind aid by one to two months compared with standard delivery methods.55
Critics of in-kind aid emphasize that it takes longer to reach recipients than market-based
assistance and can be more costly, as transporting food aid requires food-safety measures such as
regular fumigation to prevent contamination from pests, mold, or other forms of rot. Although
prepositioning in-kind aid shortens delivery times, GAO found it can involve additional costs due
to increased storage and shipping expenses. Prepositioned commodities also can cost more than
traditional in-kind commodities, due to a limited supply of commodities available for domestic
prepositioning.56
In 2011, GAO found that in-kind aid may not provide adequate nutrition to recipients during
long-term emergencies. In some instances, lack of adequate nutrition led to micronutrient
deficiencies. USAID and USDA can use specialized, nutrient-dense food products to supplement
traditional commodities, but these products are costly and may be difficult to direct to intended
recipients. GAO’s analysis also found vulnerabilities in quality control of the food aid supply
chain. In some instances, these vulnerabilities led to contamination of food aid commodities.57
Critics also contend that in-kind aid can be difficult to deliver in situations with geographic and
security chal enges. For example, in multiple instances, food aid has reportedly been stolen from
warehouses near conflict zones in South Sudan.58 In 2015, Dina Esposito, former director of

53 See, for example, testimony of John Didion, Chief Executive Officer, Didion Milling, in U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Agriculture, U.S. International Food Aid Program s: Stakeholder Perspectives, hearings, 114th Cong., 1st
sess., September 30, 2015, S.Hrg. 114-28.
54 USAID, U.S. International Food Assistance Report FY2012, April 2014.
55 GAO, Prepositioning Speeds Delivery of Emergency Aid, But Additional Monitoring of Time Frames and Costs Is
Needed, GAO-14-277, March 2014.
56 GAO, Prepositioning Speeds Delivery of Emergency Aid.
57 GAO, Better Nutrition and Quality Control Can Further Improve U.S. Food Aid , GAO-11-491, May 2011.
58 United Nations News, “South Sudan: U.N. Supply Warehouse Looted; Non-Critical Staff Ordered to Relocate,” July
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USAID’s Office of Food for Peace, testified that many Syrian refugees who had fled to
neighboring countries to escape conflict were widely dispersed rather than congregated in refugee
camps (as has become more common in humanitarian contexts). According to Esposito, without
the use of market-based assistance, USAID “would not be able to feed people inside Syria and
would have great difficulty feeding those displaced within the region, particularly where refugees
are dispersed within host communities.”59 Critics of in-kind aid also assert that in-kind
commodities can disrupt local markets and cause price distortions.60
Market-based assistance can take the form of direct cash transfers, food vouchers, or LRP.
Proponents of market-based assistance emphasize that it al ows for quicker response times than
shipping in-kind aid via ocean freight. This response time may be especial y relevant to
emergencies, when food needs are immediate. Research shows that LRP can arrive 14-16 weeks
sooner than in-kind aid.61 Proponents also contend that market-based assistance is less costly than
in-kind aid, al owing donors to reach more people in need with less funding. The cost savings of
market-based assistance can vary widely based on target destination and current commodity
prices. GAO concluded that LRP costs 25% less, on average, than in-kind aid.62
Some research also found that market-based assistance can better meet local dietary preferences
and can support local agricultural markets and producers, both of which may be fragile in the
wake of conflict or disaster.63 According to USAID, market-based assistance is especial y
appropriate in situations in which people are physical y spread out or highly mobile or when there
are security concerns about transporting in-kind aid.64
Market-based assistance may have policy or implementation chal enges. Cost differences
between LRP and in-kind aid can vary based on the specific commodity involved. For example,
one study found that while LRP was less costly than in-kind aid when purchasing bulk cereals
and beans, it was more expensive for processed foods such as vegetable oils or corn-soy blends.65
In addition, using LRP in food-deficit regions or underdeveloped markets could cause local or
regional price spikes or provide insufficient access to food due to local unavailability. Lack of
reliable suppliers and poor infrastructure can also limit the efficiency of LRP.66
Critics of market-based assistance contend that in poorly controlled settings, cash transfers or
food vouchers could be stolen or used to purchase nonfood items. In 2015, GAO found instances
of fraud and theft in EFSP projects. GAO also determined that USAID risk assessments for EFSP

14, 2016; Save t he Children, “ Save the Children Strongly Condemn the Looting of Its Compound and Warehouse in
Northern Jonglei,” ReliefWeb, February 28, 2017.
59 Dina Esposito, Director of the Office of Food for Peace, USAID, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Am erican Food Aid: Why Reform Matters, hearings, 114th Cong., 1st sess., April 15, 2015, S.Hrg. 114-74.
60 Alexander Gaus and Julia Steets, “T he Challenging Path to a Global Food Assistance Architecture,” in Uniting on
Food Assistance: The Case for Transatlantic Cooperation, ed. Christopher B. Barrett et al. (Abingdon, Oxon:
Routledge, 2012), pp. 11-29.
61 E. C. Lentz et al., “T he T imeliness and Cost -Effectiveness of the Local and Regional Procurement of Food Aid,”
World Developm ent, vol. 49 (Sept ember 2013), pp. 9-18; GAO, Local and Regional Procurem ent, GAO-09-570, May
2009.
62 GAO, Local and Regional Procurement, GAO-09-570, May 2009.
63 Overseas Development Institute, Doing Cash Differently: How Cash Transfers Can Transform Humanitarian Aid ,
Sept ember 2015.
64 USAID, “T ypes of Emergency Food Assistance,” updated June 4, 2018, at https://www.usaid.gov/food-assistance/
what -we-do/emergency-activities/types-emergency.
65 Lentz et al., “T imeliness and Cost -Effectiveness,” pp. 9-18.
66 GAO, Local and Regional Procurement.
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projects did not fully address risks specific to market-based food assistance.67 Additional y, in
cases of particularly acute malnutrition, local foods may not offer adequate nutritional quality for
therapeutic treatment and rehabilitation, especial y for highly vulnerable populations such as
children and pregnant or lactating women.68 Under these circumstances, providing fortified or
specialized in-kind foods may be preferable. Critics of market-based assistance also argue that it
could undermine the coalition of commodity groups, NGOs, and shippers that advocate for
international food assistance programs, potential y resulting in reductions in total U.S. food
assistance funding.
Cargo Preference
The Cargo Preference Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-164), as amended, mandates that at least 50% of the
gross tonnage of U.S. food aid commodities must ship on U.S.-flag vessels. This requirement,
known as cargo preference, is part of broader cargo preference requirements that apply to other
government cargo, such as Department of Defense cargo.69 The Department of Transportation’s
Maritime Administration (MARAD) monitors and enforces cargo preference. Under cargo
preference, qualifying U.S.-flag ships must be privately owned and must employ a crew
consisting of at least 75% U.S. citizens. Cargo preference applies to al in-kind aid provided
under international food assistance programs. It does not apply to LRP or other market-based
assistance. Congress increased the share of food aid commodities required to ship on U.S.-flag
vessels from 50% to 75% in the 1985 farm bil (P.L. 99-198) and subsequently lowered it to 50%
in a 2012 surface transportation reauthorization act (P.L. 112-141).
According to MARAD, the main purpose of cargo preference laws is to sustain a privately
owned, U.S.-flag merchant marine to provide sealift capability in wartime and national
emergencies and to protect U.S. ocean commerce from foreign control.70 USA Maritime—an
organization representing shipper and maritime unions—asserts that maintaining a U.S.-flag fleet
and supply of U.S. mariners through cargo preference is a cost-effective alternative to the U.S.
government building ships and hiring employees to maintain sealift capacity.71
MARAD contends that cargo preference is critical to the financial viability of U.S.-flag vessels
and maintaining the supply of qualified U.S. mariners.72 According to a 2017 report by
MARAD’s Maritime Workforce Working Group, the current supply of qualified U.S. mariners is
sufficient to crew the fleet of government and privately owned U.S.-flag ships necessary during
an initial activation (for example, during wartime or a national emergency). However, there are

67 GAO, USAID Has Developed Processes for Initial Project Approval But Should Strengthen Financial Oversight,
GAO-15-328, March 2015. Since this report, USAID has fully implemented all GAO recommendations to strengthen
implementation of market-based assistance.
68 David Ryckembusch et al., “Enhancing Nutrition: A New T ool for Ex Ante Comparison of Commodity -Based
Vouchers and Food T ransfers,” World Developm ent, vol. 49 (September 2013), pp. 58-67.
69 46 U.S.C. §55305; For more information on cargo preference, see CRS Report R44254, Cargo Preferences for U.S.-
Flag Shipping, by John Frittelli.
70 MARAD, “Cargo Preference,” accessed 3 February 2021, at https://www.maritime.dot.gov/ports/cargo-preference/
cargo-preference.
71 USA Maritime, “Statement of USA Maritime on House Foreign Affairs Committee February 14, 2018, Hearing
Regarding Food Aid Programs,” February 15, 2018, at http://usamaritime.org/2018/02/statement-of-usa-maritime-on-
house-foreign-affairs-committee-february-14-2018-hearing-regarding-food-aid-programs/.
72 GAO, DOT Needs to Expeditiously Finalize the Required National Maritime Strategy for Sustaining U.S.-Flag Fleet,
GAO-18-478, August 2018.
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not enough U.S. mariners to support a sustained activation of this fleet for a period longer than
180 days.73
Shipping on U.S.-flag vessels typical y costs more than shipping on foreign-flag vessels. A 2011
study by MARAD found that average daily operating costs for U.S.-flag vessels were 2.7 times
higher than for foreign-flag vessels.74 USA Maritime maintains that a primary reason for the
higher cost is that U.S.-flag ships have better working conditions and pay higher wages than
foreign-flag ships.75 Ship owners surveyed by MARAD noted that “the standard of living in the
U.S. and the social benefits provided to mariners contribute to U.S.-flag wages being significantly
higher than foreign-flag wages.”76
When shipping costs on U.S.-flag ships are higher than foreign-flag ships, cargo preference
increases food aid costs. This reduces the volume of food aid provided and, therefore, the number
of people aided. USAID officials have stated that for each $40 mil ion increase in shipping costs,
its food aid reaches one mil ion fewer recipients each year.77 USAID officials also noted that in
some instances the agency has had to ship food aid on types of vessels that are not meant to carry
bulk food cargo and are not compatible with equipment typical y used to load and unload bulk
grains. They asserted that this has resulted in increased costs and delays.78 In a 2019 hearing, the
Administrator of USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service stated that competition for U.S. vessels is
limited and that shipping food aid on U.S.-flag ships costs roughly 200% more than on foreign-
flag ships, reducing the amount of food aid commodities USDA is able to supply.79
Some opponents of cargo preference question its contributions to U.S. sealift capacity. They
assert that few U.S.-flag ships depend on food aid shipments, and only some of those ships are
capable of carrying military cargo. They also argue that cargo preference often benefits U.S.
subsidiaries of foreign shipping companies rather than U.S. shipping companies.80 A 2010 study
asserted that cargo preference increased food aid costs and contributed little to national security
because 70% of cargo preference vessels did not meet the criteria that would deem them militarily
useful.81
In 2015, GAO found that from April 2011 through July 2014, cargo preference increased the
overal cost of shipping food aid by an average of 23%, or $107 mil ion in total. GAO also
concluded that cargo preference contributions to Department of Defense sealift capacity were

73 MARAD, Maritime Workforce Working Group Report, September 2017.
74 MARAD, Comparison of U.S. and Foreign-Flag Operating Costs, September 2011.
75 USA Maritime, A Critical Analysis of “International Food Aid and Food Assistance Programs and the Next Farm
Bill” in Defense of the United States Merchant Marine, May 2018.
76 MARAD, Comparison of U.S. and Foreign-Flag Operating Costs.
77 GAO, DOT Needs to Finalize Maritime Strategy, GAO-18-478, August 2018.
78 GAO, DOT Needs to Finalize Maritime Strategy.
79 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and
Drug Administration, and Related Agencies, International Food Assistance Program s at USDA and USAID, 116th
Cong., 1st sess., September 25, 2019 (Washington, DC, GPO: 2019).
80 For example, see testimony of Andrew Natsios, Executive Professor, the Bush School of Government and Public
Service, T exas A&M University, in U.S. Congress, House Co mmittee on Foreign Affairs, Modernizing Food Aid:
Im proving Effectiveness and Saving Lives, hearings, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., February 14, 2018; and Brett D. Schaefer,
“Reforming U.S. Food Aid Can Feed Millions More at the Same Cost,” Heritage Foundation, May 17, 2018, at
https://www.heritage.org/hunger-and-food-programs/commentary/reforming-us-food-aid-can-feed-millions-more-the-
same-cost.
81 Elizabeth R. Bageant et al., “Food Aid and Agricultural Cargo Preference,” Applied Economic Perspectives and
Policy, vol. 32, no. 4 (2010), pp. 624-641.
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uncertain, because in the preceding 13 years, including during conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the entire reserve sealift fleet was not activated. Additional y, MARAD had not fully assessed the
potential availability of U.S. mariners needed for a full and prolonged activation.82 In 2018, GAO
analyzed the assessment of U.S. mariner availability in the above-mentioned Maritime Workforce
Working Group report. GAO found that although “the working group concluded that there is a
shortage of mariners for sustained operations, its report also details data limitations that cause
some uncertainty regarding the actual number of existing qualified mariners and, thus, the extent
of this shortage.”83
Looking Ahead
As Congress considers options for amending or reauthorizing international food assistance
programs, Members may act through reauthorizing existing legislation or drafting new stand-
alone legislation. Historical y, Congress has made changes to international food assistance
programs through periodic farm bil s and, more recently, through the Global Food Security Act.84
The 2018 farm bil (P.L. 115-334) and the Global Food Security Reauthorization Act of 2017
(P.L. 115-266) both are set to expire at the end of FY2023. As Congress considers drafting the
next farm bil or potential y reauthorizing the Global Food Security Act, Members may consider
changes to international food assistance programs.
Congress also may consider future changes to international food assistance programs through
stand-alone legislation, such as the Food for Peace Modernization Act (S. 2551, H.R. 5276)
introduced in the 115th Congress, or through annual Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations acts.
In addition to funding levels, appropriations bil s and accompanying explanatory statements often
contain policy-related provisions that direct the executive branch how to spend certain funds.
Congress may make changes to program funding or direct USAID and USDA on how to spend
certain funds through annual appropriations acts.

82 GAO, Cargo Preference Increases Food Aid Shipping Costs, and Benefits Are Unclear, GAO-15-666, August 2015.
83 GAO, DOT Needs to Finalize Maritime Strategy, p. 32.
84 For further detail on changes to international food assistance programs in the 2018 farm bill, see CRS In Focus
IF11223, 2018 Farm Bill Prim er: Agricultural Trade and Food Assistance, by Anita Regmi and Alyssa R. Casey, and
the “T rade” section in CRS Report R45525, The 2018 Farm Bill (P.L. 115-334): Summary and Side-by-Side
Com parison, coordinated by Mark A. McMinimy.
Congressional Research Service

18

link to page 22 link to page 22 link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page 22 link to page 23
Appendix. U.S. International Food Assistance Programs
Table A-1. U.S. International Food Assistance
Primary
Year
Emergency or
Delivery
Implementing
Program
Began
Statutory Authoritya
Funding
Nonemergency
Method
Agency
Food for Peace Title II
1954
Food for Peace Act (P.L. 83-
Agriculture
E+NE
In-kind
USAID
480)
appropriations
Bil Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT)
1980b
Agricultural Act of 1980
Mandatory fundingc
E
In-kind
USDA
(P.L. 96-494)
Farmer-to-Farmer (Food for Peace Title V)
1985d
Food for Peace Act (P.L. 83-
Agriculture
NE
Technical
USAID
480)
appropriations
assistance
Food for Progress
1985
Food Security Act of 1985
Mandatory fundingc
NE
In-kind
USDA
(P.L. 99-198)
McGovern-Dole International Food for
2002
Farm Security and Rural
Agriculture
NE
In-kind
USDA
Education and Child Nutrition
Investment Act of 2002 (P.L.
appropriations
107-171)
Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP)
2010e
Foreign Assistance Act of
SFOPS
E
Market-
USAID
1961 (P.L. 87-195)
appropriations
based
Community Development Fund
2010
Foreign Assistance Act of
SFOPS
NE
Market-
USAID
1961 (P.L. 87-195)
appropriations
based
Local and Regional Food Aid Procurement
2014
Food, Conservation, and
Agriculture
NE
Market-
USDA
Program
Energy Act of 2008 (P.L.
appropriations
based
110-246)
Source: Compiled by CRS.
Notes: E = Emergency; NE = Nonemergency; SFOPS = State and Foreign Operations; USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; USDA = U.S. Department
of Agriculture.
a. The laws cited here provide statutory authority for the programs. Congress has reauthorized international food assistance programs by amending these acts, such as
through periodic farm bil s or the Global Food Security Reauthorization Act (P.L. 115-266).
b. Congress first authorized BEHT in its current form in the Africa: Seeds of Hope Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-385), but authorized its predecessor, the Food Security
Wheat Reserve, in the Agricultural Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-494).
c. Authorizing legislation establishes mandatory funding and the borrowing authority of USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation finances program activities.
CRS-19

d. Congress authorized Farmer-to-Farmer in the Food for Peace Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-808) but did not fund the program until 1985.
e. USAID first used EFSP in FY2010 based on authority in the FAA. Congress permanently authorized EFSP in the Global Food Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-195).
CRS-20

U.S. International Food Assistance:
An Overview

Author Information

Alyssa R. Casey
Emily M. Morgenstern
Analyst in Agricultural Policy
Analyst in Foreign Assistance and Foreign Policy

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