Somalia
Updated July 27, 2023
Somalia
Somalia has been plagued by instability and humanitarian
Figure 1. Somalia Facts
crises for decades. After the authoritarian Siad Barre regime
fell in 1991, the country was characterized for years as a
failed state. The formation of a federal government in 2012
was a turning point, and with international support, Somalia
has made progress including battlefield gains since 2022.
Among considerable challenges on its path toward stability,
however, is a long-running Islamist insurgency led by Al
Shabaab, which U.S. officials term Al Qaeda’s largest and
wealthiest affiliate. A catastrophic drought, Somalia’s
longest on record, has exacerbated the country’s problems,
fueling displacement and widespread acute food insecurity.
The United States plays a key role in Somalia, as a major
security partner and the largest humanitarian donor. The
Source: CRS map. Data from CIA and IMF reference databases.
United States has conducted episodic strikes against
terrorist targets there since 2003 and has provided support
Security Challenges
to Somali and African Union (AU) forces fighting Al
Somalis face substantial challenges in stabilizing and
Shabaab since 2007. Roughly 450 U.S. military personnel
securing the Somali state. Military offensives by AU and
are deployed in Somalia to advise and assist Somali and AU
allied Somali, Kenyan, and Ethiopian forces in 2011-2012
forces; U.S. officials say they are not directly engaged in
pushed Al Shabaab out of Mogadishu and other major
combat operations. Additional U.S. personnel support
southern cities and ports and reduced its access to revenue.
counterterrorism operations from neighboring countries.
Subsequent offensives reclaimed additional ground.
From Failed to Fragile State
Al Shabaab has proven resilient, however. It still controls
In 2013, the United States officially recognized the Somali
parts of the country and reportedly earns revenue of up to
government for the first time in 22 years. The decision
$150 million annually through illicit taxes and “mafia-
highlighted tenuous improvements, both in terms of
style” extortion, including in Mogadishu and other
political developments and advances against Al Shabaab.
government-held areas. UN monitors say the group’s ability
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) followed suit,
to carry out complex asymmetric attacks is “undiminished.”
making Somalia eligible for technical assistance and policy
advice. The United Kingdom (UK) was the first Western
Al Shabaab conducts frequent attacks in Mogadishu, likely
country to reopen its embassy there, followed by China,
seeking to undermine confidence in the government and its
Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and most East
security measures. In 2017, a truck bombing there killed
African countries. In 2016, the United States sent its first
over 500 people. A suicide bomber killed the city’s mayor
ambassador to Somalia in decades and reestablished a
in 2019. In late 2022, the group killed over 120 people in
permanent diplomatic presence in Mogadishu in late 2018.
car bombings outside the education ministry. Al Shabaab
periodically fires mortars at the heavily guarded Mogadishu
International donors have expanded their engagement in the
International Airport complex (where many diplomatic
past decade, seeking to help Somalia foster economic
facilities and residences are located, including the U.S.
growth; expand infrastructure and access to services;
embassy); gunmen briefly breached the perimeter in 2022.
improve governance and rule of law; and build resilience to
drought. With support from donors, an AU stabilization
The AU mission, which first deployed to Somalia in 2007,
force, and other security partners, Somalia is now described
has been described as “the deadliest peace operation in
by UN officials as a “fragile state,” rather than a failed one.
modern history.” Known as AMISOM until 2022, when it
was renamed ATMIS, the mission has served primarily as a
Political and clan rivalries, corruption, and contradictory
counterinsurgency force. Al Shabaab has killed hundreds of
visions for sharing power still complicate the way forward.
troops in complex assaults on its forward bases. The AU
Somalia, which has not held direct one-person one-vote
does not report casualty figures, but per a senior AU official
elections in decades, has held indirect elections since 2012.
over 3,500 AU troops have been killed since 2007.
Elections in 2017 resulted in a peaceful transfer of power,
but an electoral impasse in 2021 sparked fighting in the
Beyond Somalia, Al Shabaab has conducted terrorist
capital and fueled fears of civil war. When presidential
attacks in Kenya, Uganda, and Djibouti. In mid-2022, an
elections were ultimately held in May 2022, former
estimated 2,000 fighters launched an offensive deep into
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (2012-2017), defeated
Ethiopia, where hundreds reportedly remain. For more on
his successor, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, aka
the group, see CRS In Focus IF10170, Al Shabaab.
“Farmajo,” and returned to office.
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Somalia
President Hassan Sheikh has declared “total war” against Al
population remains acutely food insecure, and a famine risk
Shabaab. Building on a local uprising against the group in
persists. In 2023, historic flooding has destroyed farmland
the central Hiraan region, an offensive by Somali forces in
and livestock, and displaced over 460,000 people.
the latter half of 2022 made the most important territorial
Conflict, drought, and flooding displaced over a million
gains over the group in a decade. Whether that success can
Somalis in the first half of 2023, bringing total internal
be replicated in the offensive’s next phase (which would
displacement to over 3.8 million. (Another 685,000 Somalis
focus on southern regions, where political/clan dynamics
live as refugees in neighboring countries.) Of an estimated
are different), is debated. AU and Somali forces have long
7.6 million school-age children in Somalia, 4.8 million are
struggled to maintain security in territory taken from Al
out of school. As of July 2023, donors have funded 31% of
Shabaab, and attacks in recently reclaimed areas underscore
the $2.6 billion humanitarian appeal for 2023.
concerns about Somali forces’ ability to hold them or the
government’s ability to extend services and authority.
U.S. Policy, Operations, and Foreign Aid
ATMIS and international partners are working to help build
Stated U.S. foreign policy objectives in Somalia are to
Somali forces’ capacity so the AU mission can transfer
promote political and economic stability, prevent the
responsibilities and exit at the end of 2024, in line with AU
country from serving as a terrorist safe haven, and alleviate
and UN Security Council decisions. A range of factors
the humanitarian crisis. Some observers see the U.S.
constrain the effort, including political disputes, funding
approach on Somalia as largely centered on containing
shortfalls, institutional underdevelopment, and corruption.
terrorist threats and suggest greater focus on stabilization,
ATMIS began to draw down in June 2023, reducing its size
conflict resolution, and reconciliation is needed.
from over 19,000 troops to 16,586. Some analysts say the
The United States has conducted military strikes against Al
withdrawal timeline is too ambitious and heightens the risk
Qaeda and Al Shabaab targets in Somalia for over 15 years.
of Al Shabaab reversing recent gains.
Ground operations have been rare. U.S. strikes have killed
Other Nation-Building Challenges
top Al Shabaab operatives, including leader Ahmed Abdi
Godane in 2014. The United States has also conducted
The Somali federal government has struggled to overcome
strikes against a small Islamic State (IS) faction in northern
contentious clan and regional dynamics and extend its
Somalia; in 2023, U.S. forces targeted an alleged IS global
authority beyond Mogadishu. After over 20 years without
network facilitator. Successive Administrations have
central authority, Somalis continue to debate how to share
characterized Al Shabaab as an “associated force” of Al
power, revenue, and resources. While many see a
Qaeda in the context of the 2001 Authorization for Use of
decentralized system of governance as the best way to share
Military Force (AUMF; P.L. 107-40), which U.S. officials
power among clans and sub-clans, competition over power
say also covers the IS faction in Somalia. U.S. strikes in
in Mogadishu and state capitals remains a flashpoint.
Somalia peaked at 63 in 2019. AFRICOM reported 15
Federalism is enshrined in a 2012 provisional constitution,
strikes in 2022 and nine in the first six months of 2023.
but the charter is vague on how it should work. Progress on
The United States provides training, equipment, logistics,
a permanent constitution has been halting. Strains between
medical, intelligence, and advisory support to AU and
federal and state authorities have flared repeatedly: under
Somali troops. U.S. forces have mentored Somalia’s elite
Farmajo, who favored centralization, allegations of federal
special operations unit, the Danab Advanced Infantry
interference in state elections stoked tensions. President
Brigade. President Trump ordered the withdrawal of U.S.
Hassan Sheikh has taken steps to repair relations with
forces from Somalia at the end of his term. President Biden
Federal Member State (FMS) leaders, but frictions remain,
ordered their redeployment to Somalia in May 2022.
notably with semi-autonomous Puntland. Meanwhile,
Congress considered legislation in 2023, H.Con.Res. 30,
Somaliland, which declared itself independent in 1991,
that would have directed the removal of U.S. forces from
maintains its autonomy from Somalia.
Somalia. Three U.S. service members have been killed by
Pervasive corruption hinders Somalia’s efforts to rebuild (it
Al Shabaab—two in Somalia, in 2017 and 2018, and one in
ranks last on Transparency International’s corruption
Kenya. Two U.S. contractors were also killed in the 2020
perceptions index). The government’s public financial
Kenya attack, on an airfield near the Somali border. Al
management reforms have won praise from the IMF,
Shabaab unsuccessfully attacked an airfield used by the
however, paving the way for Somalia to reach the decision
U.S. military in central Somalia in 2019. The ATMIS
point for multilateral debt relief under the Heavily Indebted
drawdown may raise concerns for U.S. embassy security.
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 2020. Somalia owes
The United States has provided over $818 million in
almost $5 billion in external debt (most of it accrued under
humanitarian aid in FY2022 and $792 million to date in
Siad Barre); the United States is its largest bilateral creditor.
FY2023. The State Department and USAID provided over
In 2019, Congress approved $35 million for the first phase
$275 million in other assistance in FY2022, a majority of it
in canceling Somalia’s $1.1 billion bilateral debt.
military aid for Somali and AU forces and assessed U.S.
Humanitarian Situation
contributions for the UN Support Office in Somalia, which
A devastating regional drought that began in 2020 has
supports ATMIS. The Biden Administration’s FY2024
affected over 8 million Somalis, resulting in a massive loss
budget request includes over $285 million for Somalia,
of livestock and widespread food insecurity. An estimated
reflecting a planned increase in governance funding.
43,000 people—at least half children under 5—reportedly
died due to the drought in 2022. Increased relief efforts
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs
helped to avert a worse outcome, but over half the
IF10155
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Somalia
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10155 · VERSION 15 · UPDATED