May 5, 2015
Somalia
Somalia has long been characterized as the classic “failed
Figure 1. Somalia Facts
state,” plagued for more than two decades by seemingly
chronic instability and humanitarian need. Since the
collapse of the authoritarian Siad Barre regime in 1991, the
country has lacked a viable central authority capable of
exerting territorial control, securing its borders, or meeting
the needs of its people. Terrorism, piracy, illicit trafficking,
chronic food insecurity, and mass refugee flows have been,
in part, symptoms of Somalia’s political disorder.
After numerous attempts to reunite Somalia’s regions,
clans, and sub-clans within a credible central government,
the international community has rallied behind a new
Somali federal government. The election of President
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in September 2012 by a new
federal parliament followed the approval of a provisional

constitution through an internationally facilitated political
Recent Security Developments
process. U.S. and U.N. officials viewed that process as the
most credible, inclusive, and representative effort to date to
Challenges to stabilizing and rebuilding the Somali state are
reestablish central governance. In January 2013, the United
substantial. Military offensives led by AMISOM and allied
States officially recognized the Somali government for the
Somali and regional forces facilitated critical gains against
first time in 22 years. Diplomatic recognition sought, in
Al Shabaab in 2011-2012, pushing the group out of
part, to highlight fragile improvements in the country’s
Mogadishu and other major southern cities and ports and
stability, reflecting both political developments in the
depriving it of key revenue sources. More recent offensives
capital, Mogadishu, and significant regional military
have reclaimed additional towns, including the port city
advances against the violent Islamist insurgency led by Al
Barawe, a key Al Shabaab base until October 2014. The
Shabaab (an “affiliate” of Al Qaeda designated by the
insurgents continue to control some rural areas, though, and
United States as a foreign terrorist organization in 2008).
AMISOM and Somali forces struggle to provide security in
liberated areas and along main supply routes, impeding the
This progress has increasingly led donors to focus on
delivery of humanitarian and development aid. Al Shabaab
development assistance, including efforts to increase
is not the government’s only rival; some local militias have
stability; bolster access to government services, economic
also resisted efforts to expand central authority.
growth, and political reconciliation; improve governance
and the rule of law; expand critical infrastructure; and build
Al Shabaab continues to attack government, civilian, and
resilience to drought and other humanitarian emergencies.
international targets, primarily in Somalia, but also in
The United States, European donors, and the U.N. (with
Kenya, and periodically elsewhere in East Africa. The
member state funding) also provide substantial support for
group released a video in February 2015 calling for attacks
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and for
in Kenya and abroad, and naming several shopping malls in
the nascent Somali National Security Forces.
Europe and the United States as potential targets, including
Minnesota’s Mall of America. The threat was a reminder of
The year 2013 was a critical time in Somalia’s engagement
the 2013 Westgate mall attack in Nairobi, in which at least
with international donors, and U.S. recognition was
67 people died. The English-language message reflects Al
important in building international support for Somali
Shabaab’s successful efforts to recruit and raise funds
efforts. The International Monetary Fund and the World
abroad—several American foreign fighters, some but not all
Bank adjusted their positions on Somalia, making the
of Somali descent, reportedly have been killed in Somalia.
country eligible for technical assistance and policy advice.
Donor governments, regional organizations, and
The United States has provided substantial support for
international financial institutions gathered in Brussels to
AMISOM and Somali efforts against Al Shabaab. The
endorse a New Deal Compact with the Somali government;
United States has also taken direct action in Somalia against
donors pledged more than $2.4 billion, including $69
members of Al Qaeda, including those members of Al
million from the United States, to support its
Shabaab “who are engaged in efforts to carry out terrorist
implementation (2014-2016). The Compact provides a
attacks against the United States and our interests,” as
strategic framework for coordinating peace- and state-
described in White House reports to Congress. U.S. strikes
building activities and sets governance arrangements for
have resulted in the deaths of several senior Al Shabaab
various multi-donor financing mechanisms.
operatives, including its leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane in
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Somalia
September 2014, and at least three key figures reportedly
from the Central Bank were made for private purposes,
responsible for coordinating operations outside Somalia
rather than for running the government, representing “a
(including the Westgate attack) in early 2015. Other
patronage system and set of social relations that defy the
countries have also conducted strikes against Al Shabaab.
institutionalization of the state.” The most recent U.N.
report suggests that the systematic diversion of funds
After Godane’s death, Al Shabaab announced Ahmad Dirie
continues, undermining efforts to build an effective public
Abdikadir Umar (aka Abu Ubaidah) as the group’s new
financial management system. The report also suggests that
leader. Divisions under Godane, whose highly centralized
in some cases funds are used “for partisan agendas that
leadership style provoked dissent, led several commanders
constitute threats to peace and security.” The Group has
to surrender to local authorities; some additional defections
reported on violations by senior Somali officials of the U.N.
have occurred since his death. The Somali government has
arms embargo, which was modified in 2013 to allow the
offered amnesty to those who surrender and renounce
government to buy light weapons. The Group has raised
violence. In March 2015, the United States removed a $3
serious concern with the diversion of government arms and
million reward for Al Shabaab’s former intelligence chief
ammunition, including to arms markets in Mogadishu and
after he surrendered to Somali authorities.
to clan-based militias, and has implicated a former advisor
State-Building Challenges
to the president in the leakage of weapons to Al Shabaab.
Humanitarian Situation
The government faces major challenges in extending its
Humanitarian conditions remain extremely poor in much of
authority beyond Mogadishu and overcoming contentious
Somalia, with some 3 million people in need of aid and
clan dynamics. After more than 20 years without central
more than 730,000 Somalis facing acute food insecurity.
authority, the sharing of power, revenue and resources
One million people remain internally displaced. By U.N.
remains subject to considerable national debate. Most clans
estimates, 1.7 million children are not in school; 1 in 12
favor a decentralized system of governance as the best way
women die in childbirth; 1 in 10 children die before their
to achieve power-sharing among clans and sub-clans.
first birthday; and only 1 in 3 Somalis has access to safe
Untapped petroleum resources complicate revenue sharing
water. Insecurity constrains humanitarian access—this is
discussions. Gaps in the legal and regulatory framework
one of the most dangerous operating environments in the
governing the hydrocarbons sector are a potential flashpoint
world for aid workers. Funding shortages also threaten
for conflict. The nation building process is also complicated
relief programs. Advocacy groups have criticized the
by pervasive corruption, insecurity, and spoiler networks
decision by U.S. and British banks to close the accounts of
working against the consolidation of state authority.
Somali money transfer businesses: many Somalis rely
heavily on remittances from family abroad, which are
Federalism is enshrined in the provisional constitution, but
estimated to represent one third of Somalia’s total income.
the document is vague on how it will work in practice. The
state building process is proceeding—two interim federal
U.S. Policy and Foreign Assistance
states, Jubaland and Southwest, have been formed since
The Obama Administration’s Somalia strategy is based on
2013 (semi-autonomous Puntland in the northeast is widely
three key elements: security, governance, and development.
considered the first federal state). These processes have
The United States has been a key supporter of AMISOM
been controversial, however, and there is significant tension
and coordinated diplomatic and military responses to the
around efforts to create a state for central Somalia. The
threat of Somali maritime piracy. In late 2013, the U.S.
government’s relations with Puntland resumed in October
military, which had maintained a small contingent of
2014, after being suspended for over a year, although
personnel in Somalia for several years, deployed a team of
underlying questions about power and revenue sharing
military advisors to liaise with the Somali security forces
remain. Another major challenge for the government is the
(previously, engagement had been focused on advising and
incorporation of clan and regional militia into the army. The
sharing information with AMISOM). U.S. diplomats based
government is still seeking to define its relationship with
in Kenya travel frequently to Mogadishu, but the State
the autonomous northwest region of Somaliland, which
Department has yet to reestablish an embassy there. In
declared itself independent from Somalia in 1991.
February 2015, President Obama nominated the first U.S.
ambassador to Somalia since 1991; in May 2015, John
The government is behind schedule on benchmarks it must
Kerry became the first Secretary of State to visit
meet before its mandate expires in 2016. Political infighting
Mogadishu. Efforts to promote stability through governance
between the president and former prime minister delayed
and economic aid are increasing. The FY2016 foreign aid
action on key tasks in 2014, notably the approval of laws
request for Somalia is $209 million, over half of which is
establishing institutions for state formation and elections.
focused on security assistance for AMISOM and Somali
President Mohamud named Somalia’s then-ambassador to
forces. Humanitarian aid in FY2014 and FY2015 has
the United States, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, as the
totaled over $230 million. The United States has provided
new prime minister in December. A constitutional review is
more than $1 billion in training, equipment, logistics
underway; a draft is to be approved via national referendum
support for AMISOM since 2007 and almost $200 million
to pave the way for elections in 2016.
for Somali forces.
According to the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia,
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
corruption is a “system of governance” in Somalia. The

Group reported in 2013 that at least 80% of withdrawals
IF10155
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