May 5, 2015
Somalia
Somalia has long been characterized as the classic “failed
state,” plagued for more than two decades by seemingly
chronic instability and humanitarian need. Since the
collapse of the authoritarian Siad Barre regime in 1991, the
country has lacked a viable central authority capable of
exerting territorial control, securing its borders, or meeting
the needs of its people. Terrorism, piracy, illicit trafficking,
chronic food insecurity, and mass refugee flows have been,
in part, symptoms of Somalia’s political disorder.
After numerous attempts to reunite Somalia’s regions,
clans, and sub-clans within a credible central government,
the international community has rallied behind a new
Somali federal government. The election of President
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in September 2012 by a new
federal parliament followed the approval of a provisional
constitution through an internationally facilitated political
process. U.S. and U.N. officials viewed that process as the
most credible, inclusive, and representative effort to date to
reestablish central governance. In January 2013, the United
States officially recognized the Somali government for the
first time in 22 years. Diplomatic recognition sought, in
part, to highlight fragile improvements in the country’s
stability, reflecting both political developments in the
capital, Mogadishu, and significant regional military
advances against the violent Islamist insurgency led by Al
Shabaab (an “affiliate” of Al Qaeda designated by the
United States as a foreign terrorist organization in 2008).
This progress has increasingly led donors to focus on
development assistance, including efforts to increase
stability; bolster access to government services, economic
growth, and political reconciliation; improve governance
and the rule of law; expand critical infrastructure; and build
resilience to drought and other humanitarian emergencies.
The United States, European donors, and the U.N. (with
member state funding) also provide substantial support for
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and for
the nascent Somali National Security Forces.
The year 2013 was a critical time in Somalia’s engagement
with international donors, and U.S. recognition was
important in building international support for Somali
efforts. The International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank adjusted their positions on Somalia, making the
country eligible for technical assistance and policy advice.
Donor governments, regional organizations, and
international financial institutions gathered in Brussels to
endorse a New Deal Compact with the Somali government;
donors pledged more than $2.4 billion, including $69
million from the United States, to support its
implementation (2014-2016). The Compact provides a
strategic framework for coordinating peace- and statebuilding activities and sets governance arrangements for
various multi-donor financing mechanisms.
Figure 1. Somalia Facts
Recent Security Developments
Challenges to stabilizing and rebuilding the Somali state are
substantial. Military offensives led by AMISOM and allied
Somali and regional forces facilitated critical gains against
Al Shabaab in 2011-2012, pushing the group out of
Mogadishu and other major southern cities and ports and
depriving it of key revenue sources. More recent offensives
have reclaimed additional towns, including the port city
Barawe, a key Al Shabaab base until October 2014. The
insurgents continue to control some rural areas, though, and
AMISOM and Somali forces struggle to provide security in
liberated areas and along main supply routes, impeding the
delivery of humanitarian and development aid. Al Shabaab
is not the government’s only rival; some local militias have
also resisted efforts to expand central authority.
Al Shabaab continues to attack government, civilian, and
international targets, primarily in Somalia, but also in
Kenya, and periodically elsewhere in East Africa. The
group released a video in February 2015 calling for attacks
in Kenya and abroad, and naming several shopping malls in
Europe and the United States as potential targets, including
Minnesota’s Mall of America. The threat was a reminder of
the 2013 Westgate mall attack in Nairobi, in which at least
67 people died. The English-language message reflects Al
Shabaab’s successful efforts to recruit and raise funds
abroad—several American foreign fighters, some but not all
of Somali descent, reportedly have been killed in Somalia.
The United States has provided substantial support for
AMISOM and Somali efforts against Al Shabaab. The
United States has also taken direct action in Somalia against
members of Al Qaeda, including those members of Al
Shabaab “who are engaged in efforts to carry out terrorist
attacks against the United States and our interests,” as
described in White House reports to Congress. U.S. strikes
have resulted in the deaths of several senior Al Shabaab
operatives, including its leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane in
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Somalia
September 2014, and at least three key figures reportedly
responsible for coordinating operations outside Somalia
(including the Westgate attack) in early 2015. Other
countries have also conducted strikes against Al Shabaab.
After Godane’s death, Al Shabaab announced Ahmad Dirie
Abdikadir Umar (aka Abu Ubaidah) as the group’s new
leader. Divisions under Godane, whose highly centralized
leadership style provoked dissent, led several commanders
to surrender to local authorities; some additional defections
have occurred since his death. The Somali government has
offered amnesty to those who surrender and renounce
violence. In March 2015, the United States removed a $3
million reward for Al Shabaab’s former intelligence chief
after he surrendered to Somali authorities.
State-Building Challenges
from the Central Bank were made for private purposes,
rather than for running the government, representing “a
patronage system and set of social relations that defy the
institutionalization of the state.” The most recent U.N.
report suggests that the systematic diversion of funds
continues, undermining efforts to build an effective public
financial management system. The report also suggests that
in some cases funds are used “for partisan agendas that
constitute threats to peace and security.” The Group has
reported on violations by senior Somali officials of the U.N.
arms embargo, which was modified in 2013 to allow the
government to buy light weapons. The Group has raised
serious concern with the diversion of government arms and
ammunition, including to arms markets in Mogadishu and
to clan-based militias, and has implicated a former advisor
to the president in the leakage of weapons to Al Shabaab.
Humanitarian Situation
The government faces major challenges in extending its
authority beyond Mogadishu and overcoming contentious
clan dynamics. After more than 20 years without central
authority, the sharing of power, revenue and resources
remains subject to considerable national debate. Most clans
favor a decentralized system of governance as the best way
to achieve power-sharing among clans and sub-clans.
Untapped petroleum resources complicate revenue sharing
discussions. Gaps in the legal and regulatory framework
governing the hydrocarbons sector are a potential flashpoint
for conflict. The nation building process is also complicated
by pervasive corruption, insecurity, and spoiler networks
working against the consolidation of state authority.
Federalism is enshrined in the provisional constitution, but
the document is vague on how it will work in practice. The
state building process is proceeding—two interim federal
states, Jubaland and Southwest, have been formed since
2013 (semi-autonomous Puntland in the northeast is widely
considered the first federal state). These processes have
been controversial, however, and there is significant tension
around efforts to create a state for central Somalia. The
government’s relations with Puntland resumed in October
2014, after being suspended for over a year, although
underlying questions about power and revenue sharing
remain. Another major challenge for the government is the
incorporation of clan and regional militia into the army. The
government is still seeking to define its relationship with
the autonomous northwest region of Somaliland, which
declared itself independent from Somalia in 1991.
The government is behind schedule on benchmarks it must
meet before its mandate expires in 2016. Political infighting
between the president and former prime minister delayed
action on key tasks in 2014, notably the approval of laws
establishing institutions for state formation and elections.
President Mohamud named Somalia’s then-ambassador to
the United States, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, as the
new prime minister in December. A constitutional review is
underway; a draft is to be approved via national referendum
to pave the way for elections in 2016.
According to the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia,
corruption is a “system of governance” in Somalia. The
Group reported in 2013 that at least 80% of withdrawals
Humanitarian conditions remain extremely poor in much of
Somalia, with some 3 million people in need of aid and
more than 730,000 Somalis facing acute food insecurity.
One million people remain internally displaced. By U.N.
estimates, 1.7 million children are not in school; 1 in 12
women die in childbirth; 1 in 10 children die before their
first birthday; and only 1 in 3 Somalis has access to safe
water. Insecurity constrains humanitarian access—this is
one of the most dangerous operating environments in the
world for aid workers. Funding shortages also threaten
relief programs. Advocacy groups have criticized the
decision by U.S. and British banks to close the accounts of
Somali money transfer businesses: many Somalis rely
heavily on remittances from family abroad, which are
estimated to represent one third of Somalia’s total income.
U.S. Policy and Foreign Assistance
The Obama Administration’s Somalia strategy is based on
three key elements: security, governance, and development.
The United States has been a key supporter of AMISOM
and coordinated diplomatic and military responses to the
threat of Somali maritime piracy. In late 2013, the U.S.
military, which had maintained a small contingent of
personnel in Somalia for several years, deployed a team of
military advisors to liaise with the Somali security forces
(previously, engagement had been focused on advising and
sharing information with AMISOM). U.S. diplomats based
in Kenya travel frequently to Mogadishu, but the State
Department has yet to reestablish an embassy there. In
February 2015, President Obama nominated the first U.S.
ambassador to Somalia since 1991; in May 2015, John
Kerry became the first Secretary of State to visit
Mogadishu. Efforts to promote stability through governance
and economic aid are increasing. The FY2016 foreign aid
request for Somalia is $209 million, over half of which is
focused on security assistance for AMISOM and Somali
forces. Humanitarian aid in FY2014 and FY2015 has
totaled over $230 million. The United States has provided
more than $1 billion in training, equipment, logistics
support for AMISOM since 2007 and almost $200 million
for Somali forces.
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
www.crs.gov | 7-5700
IF10155Updated April 10, 2019
Somalia
Rebuilding the State
Figure 1. Somalia Facts
Somalia has been plagued by instability and humanitarian
crisis for decades. Since the collapse of the authoritarian
Siad Barre regime in 1991, there have been numerous
attempts to reunite Somalia’s regions, clans, and sub-clans
under a credible central authority capable of exerting
territorial control and providing services and security for
the Somali people. The formation of a federal government
in 2012 was a turning point, but Somalia still faces
considerable challenges on the path to stability.
Over the past decade, international donors have expanded
their engagement and increased their focus on development
aid, seeking to build resilience to drought; bolster economic
growth, access to government services, and political
reconciliation; expand critical infrastructure; and improve
governance and the rule of law.
With the support of donors and an African Union (AU)
stabilization force (known as AMISOM), the country has
made progress: some now consider Somalia a fragile state,
rather than a failed one. Political infighting, clan
competition, corruption, and contradictory visions for
Somalia’s system of government all complicate the way
forward, however, as does an enduring Islamist insurgency.
Somalia has not held direct one-person one-vote elections
in decades. Foreign officials viewed the 2012 presidential
election, in which parliamentarians elected the president
after an internationally supported selection process and the
adoption of a provisional constitution, as a credible effort to
reestablish central governance.
In 2013, the United States officially recognized the Somali
government for the first time in 22 years, highlighting
fragile improvements, both in terms of political
developments and advances against Al Shabaab, an affiliate
of Al Qaeda. The World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) also adjusted their positions on Somalia,
making the country eligible for policy advice and technical
assistance. The UK was the first Western country to reopen
its embassy in Somalia, followed by China, Turkey, the
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and most East African
countries. The United States reestablished a permanent
diplomatic presence in the capital, Mogadishu, in late 2018.
Somalia experienced a peaceful political transition in 2017,
when the parliament elected former prime minister and dual
U.S.-Somali national Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, aka
“Farmajo,” to the presidency over the incumbent. Farmajo’s
government has been hamstrung by infighting, corruption,
and tensions with Somalia’s federal states. Competition
among Arab Gulf states, which are among Somalia’s largest
investors and trade partners, has exacerbated frictions
between the federal and state governments. These tensions
may undermine U.S. policy interests in Somalia as the
country moves toward elections expected in 2020/2021.
Source: CRS graphic. Map data from Department of State and Esri,
Fact information from CIA World Factbook and IMF, 2018.
Recent Security Developments
Challenges to stabilizing and securing the Somali state are
substantial. Military offensives by AMISOM and allied
Somali, Kenyan, and Ethiopian forces facilitated critical
gains against Al Shabaab in 2011-2012, pushing the group
out of Mogadishu and other major southern cities and ports
and depriving it of valuable revenue sources. Subsequent
offensives reclaimed additional towns and key bases.
Al Shabaab has proven resilient, however. It still controls
parts of southern and central Somalia, earning revenue by
taxing agricultural production, livestock, and illicit trades in
charcoal and sugar. It has launched complex assaults on
AMISOM bases that have killed hundreds of troops and
prompted the mission to realign forces, pulling back from
some areas that insurgents have since reoccupied.
Al Shabaab also continues to conduct attacks in Mogadishu,
likely seeking to undermine confidence in the government
and its security measures. In 2016, an Al Shabaab suicide
bomber on a Somali airliner detonated a bomb concealed in
a laptop computer; it detonated before the plane reached
cruising altitude and did not destroy the aircraft. In October
2017, a truck bombing in Mogadishu (attributed to Al
Shabaab, though it did not claim responsibility) killed over
500. In January 2019, Al Shabaab showed its ability to hit
targets inside the heavily-guarded Mogadishu International
Airport complex with mortars, striking the U.N. compound.
Many diplomatic facilities and residences are located in the
complex, including those of the United States.
Over a decade since AMISOM’s deployment to Somalia,
the timeline for its exit is uncertain. Per U.N. Security
Council resolutions and a 2017 agreement between Somalia
and major donors, AMISOM and Somalia’s international
security partners are expected to help build the Somali
security sector so that the AU mission can gradually hand
over responsibilities and withdraw. Various factors have
stymied those efforts, including funding shortfalls, limited
donor coordination, insufficient institutional development,
government dysfunction, and corruption.
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Somalia
The Somali government has taken some notable recent
steps to address corruption in the army: authorities have
replaced several senior officers, launched a program to
biometrically register troops to eliminate “ghost soldiers”
from the payroll, and made plans to directly deposit salaries
in soldiers’ accounts to ensure consistent payment and
reduce theft. Reports of salary delays persist, however: in
March 2019, several units outside the capital abandoned
their posts, reportedly in protest, and Al Shabaab briefly
claimed the areas before being repelled. In early April, elite
infantry units trained, equipped, and mentored by the
United States launched a new offensive to retake territory
from Al Shabaab south of Mogadishu. Whether regular
army units can hold the territory will be a key test.
Nation-Building Challenges
The Somali federal government has struggled to overcome
contentious clan and regional dynamics and extend its
authority beyond Mogadishu. After more than 20 years
without central authority, the sharing of power, revenue,
and resources is subject to considerable national debate.
Many clans see a decentralized system of governance as the
best way to share power among clans and sub-clans, but
competition over power in Mogadishu remains a flashpoint.
Federalism is enshrined in the 2012 provisional
constitution, but the document is vague on how it should
work. Untapped petroleum resources, among other issues,
complicate revenue-sharing discussions, and the sector’s
legal and regulatory gaps are a potential source of conflict.
Strains between the federal and state governments
worsened in 2018, and concerns about possible interference
by Mogadishu in upcoming state elections may stoke
tensions ahead of the anticipated 2020 polls. The federal
government still seeks to define its relationship with the
autonomous region of Somaliland, which declared itself
independent in 1991. Clashes between Somaliland and
neighboring Puntland in mid-2018 fueled fears of a more
protracted conflict, which could be exploited by either Al
Shabaab or a small Islamic State faction based in Puntland.
Efforts to rebuild Somalia are also complicated by
pervasive corruption and spoiler networks working against
the consolidation of state authority. Transparency
International ranks Somalia as the most corrupt country in
the world. The IMF has commended Somalia for
implementing some key reforms and for taking steps to
broaden its tax base, but allegations of misappropriation
persist. Somalia is not eligible for significant financial
support until it clears $5 billion in debt arrears. As Somalia
works towards the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
initiative decision point, it seeks donor commitments of
support for debt relief.
Humanitarian Situation
Humanitarian conditions, exacerbated by erratic weather
patterns, are poor in much of Somalia. Of the 4.2 million
Somalis in need of aid in 2019, 1.5 million face crisis or
emergency levels of food insecurity. Roughly 2.6 million
are internally displaced. Some 320,000 people were
displaced by conflict in 2018—the highest level of conflictrelated displacement in four years. By U.N. estimates, three
million children are not in school, one in seven children die
before their fifth birthday, and a majority of women have
undergone female genital mutilation. Funding shortfalls and
attacks against aid workers threaten relief programs, and Al
Shabaab restricts humanitarian aid activities in areas it
controls. Many Somalis rely on remittances from family
abroad, which are estimated at over $1 billion annually.
U.S. Policy and Foreign Assistance
The United States seeks to promote political and economic
stability, prevent Somalia from serving as a terrorist safe
haven, and alleviate the country’s protracted humanitarian
crisis, according to the State Department. Support for the
Somali government’s state-building agenda is part of this
effort. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) identifies
developing security in Somalia as a key line of effort.
After recognizing the Somali government in 2013, the State
Department redesignated the Somalia-focused diplomatic
unit at the U.S. embassy in Kenya as the U.S. Mission to
Somalia in 2015. In 2016, the United States named its first
ambassador to Somalia in 25 years. Bilateral relations have
been complicated by the Trump Administration’s 2017
decision to list Somalia as one of seven countries whose
citizens would be barred from receiving certain types of
visas to enter the United States.
The United States has provided over $487 million in
humanitarian assistance to Somalia in FY2018 - FY2019.
Non-emergency U.S. foreign aid, including funding for
AMISOM, totaled almost $430 million in FY2018. The
FY2020 budget request proposes cuts to governance,
health, education, social service, and agriculture programs.
The United States also has provided substantial support for
AMISOM and Somali efforts to counter Al Shabaab, and
U.S. military personnel advise, assist, and accompany
regional forces during counterterrorism operations. U.S.
support for AMISOM has totaled roughly $2 billion in the
past decade, and the United States has provided over half a
billion dollars in security assistance for Somali forces. In
late 2017, the United States suspended support for most of
Somalia’s forces over corruption concerns. Assistance for
the U.S.-mentored elite Danab units has continued.
The United States has conducted air strikes in Somalia
against members of Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab for over a
decade. U.S. strikes have killed key senior Al Shabaab
operatives, including leader Ahmed Abdi Godane in 2014.
The United States has also conducted airstrikes against a
small Islamic State faction, led by a former Al Shabaab
cleric in northern Somalia. The number of air strikes has
been on the rise since 2015, when the Obama
Administration broadened its justification for military
action in Somalia; President Trump authorized expanded
authority for strikes in the country in March 2017. DOD
officials reported 36 strikes in 2017 (more than twice the
number conducted in 2016) and 47 in 2018; almost 30 were
conducted in the first quarter of 2019 alone. Amnesty
International, among others, has challenged AFRICOM’s
longstanding assertion that no civilian casualties have
resulted from U.S. strikes in Somalia. In response,
AFRICOM commenced a review and, in April 2019,
acknowledged two civilian deaths in a 2018 strike.
Lauren Ploch Blanchard,
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IF10155
Somalia
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