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Since 1946, the United States has provided an estimated total of $346 billion (obligations in current dollars) in foreign assistance to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)MENA region. For FY2021FY2022, overall bilateral aid requested for the MENA regionMENA countries amounts to $67.6 billion, or about 1513% of the State Department'’s International Affairs budget request. The State Department estimates that the Middle East stands to receive 4239% of the geographically specific assistance in the overall budget request, more than any other region. As in previous years, more than 90% would support assistance for Israel, Egypt, and Jordan constitute the majority of the Middle East funding request. The region also receives a sizable portion of annual emergency humanitarian assistance appropriations, which are not included in the region-specific aid figures.
The Biden Administration’s FY2022 request of $7.6 billion for the MENA region is $0.1 billion more than what Congress appropriated for FY2021 ($7.5 billion) and approximately $1.1 billion more than the previous Administration’s request for FY2021 ($6.5 billion). Congress regularly appropriated more in foreign assistance than the Trump Administration requested. Of the total FY2022 request, the Administration is seeking $1.9 billion (25%) in bilateral economic assistance.
Another point of departure between the two Administration requests concerns the Palestinians. In the spring of 2021, the Biden Administration resumed various forms of aid to the Palestinians that had been discontinued under the Trump Administration. For FY2022, the Biden Administration is requesting a total of $219 million in bilateral aid for the Palestinians, which its budget justification asserts will further “the Administration's goals for peace and stability in the region.”
In order to more accurately compare the Administration’s FY2022specific aid figures.
Policy changes during the Trump Administration, coupled with legislation passed by Congress, have halted various types of U.S. aid to the Palestinians. The Administration withheld FY2017 bilateral economic assistance, reprogramming it elsewhere, and ceased requesting bilateral economic assistance after Palestinian leadership broke off high-level political contacts to protest President Trump's December 2017 recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital. After Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 (ATCA, P.L. 115-253), the Palestinian Authority (PA) ceased accepting any U.S. aid in January 2019, including security assistance and legacy economic assistance from prior fiscal years. Amidst the COVID-19 outbreak, some Members of Congress are concerned that, due to the uncertainty surrounding the status of U.S. aid to the Palestinians, humanitarian aid to combat the disease may not reach the Palestinian population. In April, the Administration announced that it would provide $5 million in International Disaster Assistance (IDA) to the West Bank as part of its global COVID-19 response.
The foreign aid data in this report is based on a combination of resources, including the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (also known as the "Greenbook"), appropriations data collected by the Congressional Research Service from the State Department and USAID, data extrapolated from executive branch agencies' notifications to Congress, and information published annually in the State Department and USAID Congressional Budget Justifications. For foreign aid terminology and acronyms, see the glossary appended to the report.
In order to more accurately compare the Administration's FY2021 foreign assistance request to previous years' appropriations, aid figures in this report (except where otherwise indicated) refer only to funding that is administered by the State Department or USAID and requested for individual countries or regional programs. While this represents the majority of U.S. assistance to the Middle East, it is important to note that there are several other sources of U.S. aid to the region exist, such as Transition Initiatives (TI) and the aforementioned humanitarian aid provided through the Food for Peace Act, Title II (FFP), , such as International Disaster Assistance (IDA), and Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA), and Transition Initiatives (TI). Likewise, other accounts. Other U.S. federal entities—such as the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and the Treasury, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation—administer additional types of assistance. Funding for such activities is generally not requested for individual countries and regions, and it is largely excluded here.
The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has led to severe public health and economic consequences in the Middle East and North Africa region, in many cases exacerbating the region’s numerous pre-existing challenges. In April 2021, the Biden Administration stated that it had allocated over $225 million inexcluded here.
Much of the data presented in this report pre-dates the global spread of the Coronavirus Disease 2019, or COVID-19. All MENA countries, particularly poorer nations that receive foreign assistance, are expected to be affected by the outbreak; however, the extent and scale of the damage to public health and economies across the region is unknown, as is the pandemic's full impact on U.S. aid programs.
As of mid-April 2020, the Administration had allocated some emergency humanitarian assistance to the region as a first response to the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 16, the State Department announced that it would provide an estimated $79 million in health assistance to various MENA countries to help prepare laboratory systems, implement a public-health emergency plan for points of entry, and activate case-finding and event-based surveillance for influenza-like illnesses. To date, Congress has appropriated almost $1.8 billion in emergency foreign assistance funds through two supplemental appropriations bills to address the impact of COVID-19. See CRS In Focus IF11496, COVID-19 and Foreign Assistance: Issues for Congress, by Nick M. Brown, Marian L. Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern.
This report is an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).1 It includes a brief historical review of foreign aid levels, a description of specific country programs,2 and analysis of current foreign aid issues.3 It also provides analysis of the Administration's FY2021 budget request for State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Foreign Operations and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations in the MENA region.
Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance and conducts oversight of executive agencies' management of aid programs. As the largest regional recipient of U.S. economic and security assistance (see Figure 1 below), the Middle East is perennially a major focus of interest as Congress exercises these powers.
current U.S. dollars in billions |
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Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justification FY2021. |
The foreign aid data in this report is based on a combination of resources, including USAID's U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants Database (also known as the "Greenbook"), appropriations data collected by the Congressional Research Service from the State Department and USAID, data extrapolated from executive branch agencies' notifications to Congress, and information published annually in the State Department and USAID Congressional Budget Justifications.
The release of this report has coincided with the global spread of the Coronavirus Disease 2019, or COVID-19 (see text box below). The COVID-19 pandemic is expected to affect all MENA countries, and may significantly affect poorer nations that benefit from U.S. and other international assistance. Much of the data presented in this report predates the COVID-19 pandemic.
COVID-19 Pandemic in MENA Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, many MENA countries were already under political and economic strain. According to one USAID-funded 2018 study, MENA countries had some of the world's lowest levels of public expenditure on health, and access to health services varied greatly across and within countries, despite overall improvements in prior decades.4 In addition to these underlying vulnerabilities, the onset of the pandemic coincided with an oil production glut and a concomitant drop in energy prices, linked to disputes among producers and reduced global demand. As the COVID-19 pandemic spreads across the MENA region, every country is projected to face economic difficulties on par with or possibly even more severe than the 2008-2009 Great Recession, during which GDP in Middle East countries contracted by more than 11% in the years prior to the "Arab Spring" uprisings.5 Several countries appear particularly vulnerable. Iran was an early global epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic.6 Iraq and Lebanon saw major street protests in 2019 and, in Lebanon's case, the first government sovereign default in its nation's history, and both appear ill-equipped to deal with yet another major economic and social disruption. The COVID-19 pandemic also poses severe challenges for desperate populations in war-torn parts of the Middle East. After 10 years of civil war, some 6.2 million Syrians remain internally displaced, with many living in overcrowded internally displaced person (IDP) camps or informal settlements where they are likely unable to access clean water, sanitation facilities, or medical care. In Yemen, where conflict has contributed to what officials already have called the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, health care capacity is severely limited. Officials from international organizations have voiced concerns about a major COVID-19 outbreak in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, given the acute humanitarian challenges in Gaza and the blockade that restricts the movement of people and goods in and out of the territory. The densely populated territory of nearly 2 million Palestinians has a weak health infrastructure and many other challenges related to sanitation and hygiene.7 As of mid-April 2020, the Administration had allocated some emergency humanitarian assistance to the region as a first response to the COVID-19 pandemic. On May1, the State Department announced that it would provide an estimated $114.1 million in assistance to various MENA countries to help prepare laboratory systems, implement a public-health emergency plan for points of entry, activate case-finding and event-based surveillance for influenza-like illnesses, and assist vulnerable refugee populations. To date, Congress has appropriated almost $1.8 billion in emergency foreign assistance funds through two supplemental appropriations bills to address the impact of COVID-19. See CRS In Focus IF11496, COVID-19 and Foreign Assistance: Issues for Congress, by Nick M. Brown, Marian L. Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern. |
Foreign Aid to Support Key U.S. Policy Goals U.S. bilateral assistance to MENA countries is intended to support long-standing U.S. foreign policy goals for the region, such as containing Iranian influence, countering terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, preserving the free-flow of maritime commerce and energy resources, promoting Israeli-Arab peace, and preserving the territorial integrity and stability of the region'’s states. U.S. foreign assistance (from global accounts/non-bilateral) also is devoted to ameliorating major humanitarian crises stemming from ongoing conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere.
’s “Greenbook.” Note: Totals for Israel do not include funding for missile defense.
As in previous years, the United States provides the bulk of U.S. foreign aid toin the MENA region continues to be focused on assistance (mostly military(mostly in the form of military assistance) to three countries: Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. Almost all current U.S. aid to Israel is in the form of military assistance, and U.S. military aid for Israel has been designed to maintain Israel's "’s “qualitative military edge"” (QME) over neighboring militaries. U.S. military aid to Egypt and Jordan (which have been at peace with Israel since 1979 and 1994, respectively) is designed to encourage continued Israeli-Arab cooperation on security issues while also ensuringfacilitating interoperability between the United States and its Arab partners in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility.
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For the past two decades, successive Administrations and Congresses have drawn on sources of funding beyond State Department/USAID-administered bilateral aid appropriations to address challenges created by conflicts in the MENA region. The United States has devoted significant resources toward several major humanitarian crises stemming from ongoing conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere. For example, between FY2012 and
Separately, Congress has authorized and appropriated |
fol owing: 10 U.S.C. 333 (DOD’s global “authority to build capacity,” which was previously referred to as “global train and equip”),6 the Coalition Support Fund (CSF),7 the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF),8 and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program.9
4 USAID, “U.S. Announces Additional Humanitarian Assistance for the People of Syria,” press release, June 3, 2021. 5 See Millennium Challenge Corporation Congressional Notification July 7, 2021, available at www.mcc.gov. 6 Congress originally authorized DOD’s global train and equip activities under Section 1206 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 109-163), as amended. The authority was codified as 10 U.S.C. 2282 in the FY2015 NDAA (P.L. 113-291). These authorities were incorporated into and superseded by a new, broader global train and equip authority, 10 U.S.C. 333, under Section 1241(c) of the FY2017 NDAA. This provision also repealed other prior authorities, such as Section 1204 (FY2014 NDAA, P.L. 113-66): Authority to conduct activities to enhance the capabilities of foreign countries to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; Section 1207 (FY2014 NDAA, P.L. 113-66): Assistance to the Government of Jordan for border security operations; and Section 1033 (FY1998 NDAA, P.L. 105-85, as amended): Assistance for additional counternarcotics support for specified countries.
7 CSF authorizes the Secretary of Defense to reimburse key cooperating countries for logistical, military, and other support, including access, to or in connection with U.S. military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Syria and to assist such nations with U.S.-funded equipment, supplies, and training. CSF is authorized under Section 1233 (FY2008 NDAA, P.L. 110-181), as amended and extended.
8 The FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31) established the Counter-ISIL Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), since renamed the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund. The CTEF allows the Secretary of Defense, “in coordination with” the Secretary of State, to transfer funds, equipment, and related capabilities to partner countries in order to counter emergent ISIS threats. The CTEF is the primary account for funding the Syria and Iraq Train and Equip Programs, having replaced the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF). The underlying authorities for DOD’s Syria and Iraq train and equip programs are Sections 1209 and 1236 of P.L. 113-291, as amended. The Biden Administration has requested $522 million in CTEF funding for FY2022.
9 Chapter 48 of Title 10, U.S.C., authorizes DOD to build foreign countries’ capacity to prevent nuclear proliferation. Over the past five years, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency has provided training and equipment to border security forces in several Middle Eastern countries under this authority, including Jordan, Iraq, and Tunisia. See CRS Report R43143, The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress, by Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Amy F. Woolf.
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Questioning Long-standing U.S. Aid Policy to the MENA Region
A number of developments have led outside observers to question the level of U.S. involvement in the Middle East, including: the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, concern over Iran’s nuclear program, popular protests across the Arab world, continued transnational terrorism, failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process coupled with Israel’s improved ties to some Arab states (the Abraham Accords), and increased competition from Russia and China (and to a lesser extent Turkey). In light of these dynamics, experts have vigorously debated the importance of the MENA region to U.S. foreign policy and how to properly align U.S. military and economic investments in the MENA region based on changing geopolitical realities.10 As an instrument of U.S. policy, foreign assistance—and calls to reform or restructure it in the MENA region—has become part of a broader debate over the extent of the U.S. commitment to the Middle East. Trump Administration officials attempted to carry out President Trump’s vision of “ending the era of endless wars” and “putting America first,” sometimes putting U.S. budget officials at odds with lawmakers over the Administration’s proposals to cut foreign aid, particularly to key regional recipients such as Jordan.11 In recent years, several studies have asserted that the United States should rebalance its foreign assistance approach to the Middle East by prioritizing economic aid over military assistance.12 Other analysts have focused more on reforming U.S. military aid to the region with calls to monitor and evaluate security assistance to major partners.13 At the country level, some U.S. groups have become more vocal in challenging continued military aid to Israel and Egypt and arms sales to Saudi Arabia based on human rights concerns.14 Others have countered that continued threats from Iran, terrorist groups, and non-state actors make U.S. assistance essential for protecting long-standing partners in the region, such as Israel. 15 During an August 2021 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on security assistance in the Middle East, Senator Todd Young remarked that “this committee wil not be serving the national security interests of the American people if we act as a roadblock to security assistance and arms sales to the Middle East. Security assistance is a highly imperfect tool, and it carries its own degree of risk, but removing it from the table or conditioning it in a way that creates insurmountable barriers or creating false choices between defensive and offensive systems, undermines our ability to exert our influence in the region and provides excuses to those who wil seek new sources of security assistance.” 16 With debates ongoing, Congress may consider how and to what extent foreign aid to MENA states provides opportunities to engage or remain engaged with partner government officials and civil society actors.
The United States also has provided economic assistance to some MENA countries focusing on education, water, health, and economic growth initiatives. In part, U.S. bilateral economic assistance is premised on the idea that governments across the MENA region have had increasing
10 For example, see Elliott Abrams, United States Policy in the Middle East and North Africa, Council on Foreign Relations; Tamara Cofman Wittes, “What to Do – and What not to Do – in the Middle East,” Brookings Institution, January 25, 2021; Eric Edelman, “U.S. Middle East Policy In The Next Four Years,” Hoover Institution, December 8, 2020; and Jon Alterman, “The Yemen Model: The Future of U.S. Middle East Policy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 21, 2018.
11 William Douglas, “S.C.’s Graham and Mulvaney Battle over Trump’s Proposed Foreign-Aid Cuts,” McClatchy, May 25, 2017.
12 For example, see Dalia Dassa Kaye, Linda Robinson, Jeffrey Martini, Nathan Vest, and Ashley L. Rhoades, Reimagining U.S. Strategy in the Middle East, Sustainable Partnerships, Strategic Investments, Rand Corporation, 2021; Ilan Goldenberg, Daphne McCurdy, Kaleigh Thomas and Sydney Scarlata, A People-First U.S. Assistance Strategy for the Middle East, Center for a New American Security, June 10, 2021; and Daniel Serwer, “Recalculating U.S. Policy in the Middle East: Less Military, More Civilian,” Middle East Institute, April 11, 2016. 13 Andrew Miller and Richard Sokolsky, “What Has $49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not Much,” American Conservative, February 27, 2018.
14 Alex Ward, “The Progressive Foreign Policy Moment Has Arrived,” Vox.com, May 26, 2021; William D. Hartung and Seth Binder, U.S. Security Assistance to Egypt: Examining the Return on Investment, Project on Middle East Democracy, May 5, 2020.
15 Representative Stephanie Murphy and Michael Makovsky, “Don't Cut or Condition US military Aid to Israel,” The Hill, March 19, 2021.
16 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism, Hearing on Middle East Security Assistance, August 10, 2021.
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assistance is premised on the idea that governments across the MENA region have had increasing difficulty meeting the expectations of their young citizenscitizens, particularly their youth. Public dissatisfaction over quality of life issues and lack of economic opportunities persist in many MENA countries. According to the Arab Youth Survey, the rising cost of living and unemployment are the two main obstacles facing Middle East youth today.14addressing government corruption is a top priority for Arab youth; nearly half of all Arabs surveyed have considered leaving their country for better economic opportunities elsewhere.17 Arab Barometer, a U.S.-funded, nonpartisan research network that provides insight into Arab public attitudes, also notes that widespread youth discontent about their economic prospects translates into broad frustration with government efforts to create employment opportunities. In recent years, as popular protests have proliferated across the MENA region, governments have continued to grapple with systemic socioeconomic challenges, such as corruption, over-reliance on oil, inefficient public sectors, low rates of spending on health and education, and soaring public debt.15
Since 1946, the MENA region has received the most U.S. foreign assistance worldwide, reflecting significant support for U.S. partners in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq (see Figure 2).16 For FY2021, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan combined would account for nearly 13.5% of the total international affairs request.
Reducing MENA Aid. For FY2021, the Administration proposes to spend an estimated $6.6 billion on bilateral assistance to the MENA region, a figure that would be nearly equal to the 2020 request but 12% less than what Congress appropriated for 2019 (see Figure 3). In order to achieve this 12% proposed reduction, the Administration's FY2021 request would reduce total military and economic assistance to Iraq, Lebanon, and Tunisia by a combined $544 million. It also seeks to reduce total aid to Jordan by $250 million and, as it did the previous year, does not request Economic Support Fund/Economic Support and Development Fund (ESF/ESDF)17 for stabilization programs in Syria.18 In its FY2021 request to Congress, the Administration reiterated from the previous year that it seeks to "share the burden" of economically aiding MENA countries with the international community while aiming to build countries' "capacities for self-reliance."
Stabilization Support for Iraq, Syria, and Beyond. For FY2021, the Administration is again requesting that Congress provide it flexibility in allowing up to $160 million in funding appropriated to various bilateral aid accounts to be used for the Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF). The RRF is designed to assist areas liberated or at risk from the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh) and other terrorist organizations (see "Potential Foreign Aid Issues for Congress" below). According to the Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ), "ESDF funding in the RRF will allow the State Department and USAID to support efforts in places like Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, where the situation on the ground changes rapidly, and flexibility is required." Among other things, funds designated for RRF purposes have supported Iraqi communities through contributions to the United Nations Development Program's Funding Facility for Stabilization (UNDP-FFS). The Trump Administration had ended U.S. contributions to stabilization efforts in Syria, but notified Congress of an intended obligation in 2020 and indicates that it may use FY2021 funds for programs in Syria.
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Source: State Department annual Congressional Budget Justifications FY2017 - FY2021. |
No Funds for the Palestinians. For the first time in over a decade, an Administration has not requested any U.S. bilateral economic or security assistance aid for the Palestinians (see "Potential Foreign Aid Issues for Congress" section below). The Trump Administration, having clashed repeatedly with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, has significantly reduced bilateral funding to the West Bank and Gaza, and has discontinued contributions to 18
In recent years, systemic socioeconomic challenges, such as corruption, inequality, poverty, and poor governance, have sparked popular protests across the MENA region.19 In lower and middle income states the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has exacerbated these preexisting challenges, further straining the social compact between state and citizen (see below). The International Monetary Fund and World Bank warn of the risks posed by continued deficit spending by already indebted governments (such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Oman, and Bahrain) and recommend structural reforms to improve the prospects for MENA citizens.20
COVID-19 in the MENA Region The COVID-19 pandemic has led to severe public health and economic consequences in the Middle East and North Africa region. Governments have instituted a range of public health and safety measures, which United Nations public health experts view as remaining necessary given ongoing limits to vaccine access in the region.21
Economic Impact Since early 2020, countries in the MENA region have experienced economic downturns as a result of the pandemic, including its impact on global trade and travel and the physical lockdown measures imposed to reduce the spread of COVID-19. Declines in global demand for some of the region’s key exports—including tourism services and oil (the price of which has fluctuated during the pandemic)—exacerbated local economic challenges.22 Prior to the pandemic, tourism spending by foreigners accounted for more than 5% of gross domestic product (GDP) on average in the region, and substantially more in several countries (such as Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia).23 In June 2021, the World Bank estimated the region’s GDP contracted by 3.9% in 2020, a 6.4% decline from its October 2019 forecast for the region’s 2020 economic growth.24 As a result of
17 The 12th Annual ASDA’A BCW Arab Youth Survey 2020 was conducted by international polling firm PSB to explore attitudes among Arab youth in 17 countries and territories in the Middle East and North Africa. See, http://arabyouthsurvey.com/findings.html.
18 See, Arab Barometer, Youth in Middle East and North Africa, August 2019. 19 International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, April 2021. 20 The World Bank, Living with Debt: How Institutions Can Chart a Path to Recovery in the Middle East and North Africa, April 2021.
21 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), COVID-19 Data Explorer: Global Humanitarian Operations, May 31, 2021.
22 World Bank Group, Global Economic Prospects, June 2021, p. 4. 23 Ibid, p. 81. 24 Ibid, p. 4.
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this economic contraction, regional unemployment increased significantly, particularly youth unemployment.25 In addition, the MENA region’s economic recovery appears to be on a slower trajectory relative to some other regions. For example, the World Bank projects global growth of 5.6% in 2021 (6.8% in the United States), with the MENA region forecast to grow at 2.4%.26
Within the region, there is considerable divergence in economic outlook among countries.27 Wealthier countries, which were able to implement stronger fiscal support during the pandemic and have higher vaccination rates, are expected to recover more quickly. Oil-exporting countries, which are benefitting from the return of oil prices to pre-pandemic levels and beyond, also have a more positive outlook. In contrast, the countries that entered the pandemic in states of conflict, political instability, or economic crises (e.g., Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Yemen) and those most dependent on tourism (e.g., Tunisia) face the prospect of long-term economic challenges.
Many countries in the region face difficult fiscal choices. The pandemic continues to place heightened demands on public health and anti-poverty spending, but growing debt levels increasingly create risk for debt sustainability. The region’s aggregate government revenue fell by 24% from 2019 to 2020, and due to the increased demands on public spending, the World Bank estimates that average fiscal deficits in 2020 as a share of GDP roughly doubled from their pre-pandemic forecasts from 4.6% to 9.4%.28 The World Bank estimates that the region’s public debt will grow from 46% of GDP in 2019 to 54% of GDP in 2021, which would be the largest increase in the past two decades.29
Selected U.S. Government Responses Since early 2020, Members of Congress have debated the scale and scope of U.S. foreign assistance to address COVID-19 abroad, including in the MENA region. Globally, Congress has provided more than $16 billion in emergency foreign assistance resources via four appropriations measures.30 USAID is using funds from these appropriations measures for a variety of public health activities in MENA countries, in conjunction with international assistance and technical cooperation activities of the State Department and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).31 For example, in Iraq, USAID reports that, among other activities, it has aided the government in updating some health centers with new equipment, improving access to personal protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare workers, launching educational outreach programs about COVID-19, and distributing hygiene kits, particularly within underserved communities.32
According to the State Department’s Office of Foreign Assistance, as of April 25, 2021, the State Department and USAID had allocated more than $225 million in the MENA region for the
25 International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, April 2021, p. 4. 26 World Bank Group, Global Economic Prospects, June 2021, p. 4. 27 International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, April 2021, pp. 6-7. 28 World Bank Group, Living with Debt: How Institutions Can Chart a Path to Recovery in the Middle East and North Africa, MENA Economic Update, April 2021, p. 15.
29 Ibid, p. 2. 30 Two emergency supplemental measures enacted in March 2020—P.L. 116-123 and P.L. 116-136—included nearly $1.5 billion in FY2020 foreign assistance resources. The FY2021 omnibus appropriations act, P.L. 116-260, included $4.0 billion in emergency foreign assistance funds and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, P.L. 117-2, provided nearly $10.6 billion in FY2021 in emergency foreign assistance resources.
31 See https://www.usaid.gov/coronavirus for more information. USAID, USAID: COVID-19 Global Response - Fact Sheet #8 FY20, August 21, 2020.
32 USAID, COVID-19 Response: Iraq, February 26, 2021, at https://www.usaid.gov/iraq/fact-sheets/covid-19-response.
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COVID-19 response.33 The countries in the region that have received the most funds include Iraq ($49.5 million), Lebanon ($41.6 million), Syria ($37.4 million), and Jordan ($36.5 million). Inspector-General reports indicate that USAID, in particular, has obligated and disbursed only a portion of the emergency funds provided by Congress for the global COVID-19 response.34
The Biden Administration’s FY2022 Aid Budget Request for the MENA Region Since 1946, the MENA region has received the most U.S. foreign assistance worldwide, reflecting significant support for U.S. partners in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq (see Figure 2).35 For FY2022, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan combined account for nearly 10% of the total international affairs request. For FY2022, the Biden Administration is requesting $7.6 billion for the MENA region (see Table 1), which is $0.1 billion more than what Congress appropriated for FY2021 ($7.5 billion) and $1.1 billion more than the previous Administration’s request for FY2021 ($6.5 billion). Of that total, the Administration is seeking $1.9 billion (25%) in bilateral economic assistance.
While the Biden Administration has requested bilateral funding for the top country recipients (Israel, Egypt, and Jordan) at levels consistent with past years and bilateral understandings, it is requesting increased spending for countries/populations either experiencing a current crisis or recovering from one.36 Compared to FY2021 enacted levels, the President is seeking $50 million more in military aid for Lebanon, which is undergoing one of the world’s worst economic collapses since the mid-19th century.37 In FY2021, Congress appropriated $40 million for nonlethal stabilization aid in Syria; the Biden Administration is now requesting $140 million for FY2022. (The Trump Administration did not request any Syria-specific nonlethal aid over the last two fiscal years, but Congress authorized assistance and allocated funds specifically for use in Syria.) The Biden Administration’s request would increase bilateral aid to Libya ($13 million above FY2021 enacted) and Yemen ($4 million above FY2021 enacted); in the case of Yemen, since 2015 the State Department and USAID generally have provided several hundred million dollars annually in additional humanitarian aid.
In the spring of 2021, the Biden Administration resumed various forms of aid (see “The Resumption of U.S. Aid to the Palestinians”) to the Palestinians that had been discontinued under the Trump Administration. For FY2022, the Administration is requesting a total of $219 million in bilateral aid for the Palestinians, which its budget justification asserts will further U.S. goals
33 Department of State, Office of Foreign Assistance, COVID-19 Virus Response, Regional and Operating Unit Topline as of April 25, 2021. Document provided to CRS upon request.
34 According to the USAID OIG, as of March 31, 2021, the agency had obligated $3.3 billion of the $11.2 billion in emergency funds it received. Of those obligations, $2.8 billion had been disbursed as of March 31, 2021. USAID OIG, COVID-19 Information Brief #3, June 9, 2021.
35 Israel, Egypt and Jordan combined have received $280.1 billion (in current dollars) from 1945-2018. USAID, U.S. Overseas Grants and Loans, July 1, 1945 through September 30, 2018.
36 According to the FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, “The request will enable the United States to work with coalition, international, and regional partners to resolve the ongoing conflicts destabilizing the region, including in Syria, through an increase in U.S.-funded stabilization assistance; support efforts to bring stability, security, and effective governance to areas emerging from conflict or enduring ongoing conflict such as in Libya and Yemen; and deliver vital assistance to the people of Lebanon as they weather economic and political crises.” 37 “Lebanon Crisis among World's Worst since 1850s: World Bank,” Agence France Presse, January 6, 2021.
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for peace and stability in the region. After the Trump Administration suspended voluntary contributions to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in August 2018, peacebuilding programs involving Palestinians in September 2018, and Economic Support Fund (ESF) and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) aid in January 2019,38 it did not request any funds for the Palestinians in FY2020 or FY2021. Congress, however, appropriated $150 million in bilateral aid for both years. The Biden Administration’s FY2022 request would increase annual bilateral aid amounts by nearly $70 million.
While the Biden Administration has sought to increase foreign aid overall, it has acknowledged in its budget justification documents that U.S. foreign assistance alone will be insufficient to resolve the MENA region’s numerous socio-economic challenges. Similarly, the Trump Administration’s FY2020 and FY2021 congressional budget justification documents noted that the United States sought to “share the burden” of economically aiding MENA countries with the international community while aiming to build countries’ “capacities for self-reliance.”39 In his FY2022 budget request, President Biden notes that the Administration plans to “invest in multilateral approaches to prioritize investments matched by commitments by both host countries and other international partners, to share the burden of economic and development assistance; and seek to improve resilience to shocks and stressors caused by climate change.”
Figure 3. Bilateral MENA Aid Budget Requests vs. Appropriations: FY2018-FY2022
current U.S. dollars in billions
Source: State Department annual Congressional Budget Justifications FY2017 - FY2022 and Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report.
38 CRS Report R46274, The Palestinians and Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction, by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.
39 Then-USAID Administrator Mark Green was a proponent of moving certain countries away from a dependency on foreign assistance. See, e.g., USAID, “Statement by Administrator Mark Green on the Launch of USAID’s Self-Reliance Roadmaps,” October 4, 2018.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Aid to MENA Countries: FY2017 - FY2022
current U.S. dollars in millions
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
actual
actual
actual
actual
allocated
request
Algeria
1.82
2.12
1.48
1.78
1.30
3.30
Bahrain
1.04
0.29
0.57
0.08
3.70
4.95
Egypt
1,353.54
1,413.67
1,419.30
1,430.50
1,430.15
1,430.30
Iraq
861.33
403.28
451.51
454.11
454.11
448.50
Israel
3,175.00
3,100.00
3,300.00
3,300.00
3,300.00
3,300.00
Jordan
1,319.83
1,525.01
1,524.99
1,525.00
1,650.00
1,275.00
Lebanon
208.41
245.94
242.29
216.00
258.32
295.96
Libya
139.20
33.00
33.00
28.67
22.60
43.00
Morocco
38.58
38.65
38.49
45.00
41.00
35.90
Oman
3.94
3.75
3.12
2.50
2.80
3.00
Saudi Arabia
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Syria
422.65
0.00
40.00
45.00
40.00
145.00
Tunisia
205.23
165.31
191.32
191.40
191.40
197.10
West Bank & Gaza
291.14
61.00
0.60
75.00
76.28
219.00
Yemen
370.60
315.52
37.30
17.30
14.60
45.10
Total
8,392.32
7,307.55
7,283.96
7,332.33
7,486.26
7,446.11
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs (SFOPS) (UNRWA) for Palestinian refugees. Moreover, as a result of provisions in the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 (ATCA, P.L. 115-253), no bilateral assistance has been delivered to the Palestinians since January 2019.19 The Administration did suggest that funds from its re-proposed "Diplomatic Progress Fund" ($225 million) could be used to "resume security assistance in the West Bank" or support critical diplomatic efforts, such as "a plan for Middle East peace." In FY2020, the Administration requested $175 million in ESDF for the Diplomatic Progress Fund, though Congress did not fund it in the FY2020 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 116-94 (referred to herein as P.L. 116-94).
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Aid to MENA Countries: FY2016 - FY2021
current U.S. dollars in millions, actual or requested bilateral assistance funds
|
FY2016 Actual |
|
|
|
|
|
Algeria |
2.59 |
1.82 |
2.12 |
1.48 |
N/A |
3.30 |
Bahrain |
5.82 |
1.04 |
0.29 |
0.57 |
N/A |
0.65 |
Egypt |
1,448.95 |
1,353.54 |
1,413.67 |
1,419.30 |
1,431.80 |
1,381.85 |
Iraq |
405.35 |
861.33 |
403.28 |
451.51 |
451.60 |
124.50 |
Israel |
3,100.00 |
3,175.00 |
3,100.00 |
3,300.00 |
3,300.00 |
3,300.00 |
Jordan |
1,274.93 |
1,319.83 |
1,525.01 |
1,524.99 |
1,525.00 |
1,275.00 |
Lebanon |
213.46 |
208.41 |
245.94 |
242.29 |
242.29 |
133.16 |
Libya |
18.50 |
139.20 |
33.00 |
33.00 |
40.00 |
21.44 |
Morocco |
31.74 |
38.58 |
38.65 |
38.49 |
41.00 |
13.50 |
Oman |
5.42 |
3.94 |
3.75 |
3.12 |
N/A |
2.70 |
Saudi Arabia |
0.01 |
0.01 |
0.01 |
- |
- |
- |
Syria |
177.14 |
422.65 |
- |
40.00 |
40.00 |
- |
Tunisia |
141.85 |
205.23 |
165.31 |
191.32 |
191.40 |
83.85 |
West Bank & Gaza |
261.34 |
291.14 |
61.00 |
0.60 |
150.00 |
- |
Yemen |
203.40 |
370.60 |
315.52 |
37.30 |
40.00 |
36.45 |
Total |
7,290.49 |
8,392.32 |
7,307.55 |
7,283.96 |
7,453.09 |
6,376.40 |
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS calculations. FY2020 actuals includes supplemental COVID-19 funding for Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Yemen from P.L. 116-123 and P.L. 116-136 as reported in the FY2022 SFOPS Congressional Budget JustificationJustifications (FY2017-FY2021), P.L. 116-94, Division G of the Joint Explanatory Statement (JES) accompanying P.L. 116-94, and CRS calculations. Figures may reflect rounding.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East
Selected Country Summaries
Israel40 may reflect rounding. N/A means no dollar amount specified in enacted bill or JES.
Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. To date, the United States has provided Israel $142.3146 billion (current, or noninflationnon-inflation-adjusted, dollars) in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding. Almost all U.S. bilateral aid to Israel is in the form of military assistance.
In 2016, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed a 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on military aid, covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of the MOU, the United States pledges (pending congressional appropriation) to provide Israel $38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in Foreign Military Financing or FMF grants plus $5 billion in missile defense appropriations). This MOU replaced a previous $30 billion 10-year agreement, which ran through FY2018.
Top Ten FMF Recipients: FY2021 Request Israel: $3,3 billion Egypt: $1.3 billion Jordan: $500 million Ukraine: $115 million Lebanon: $50 million Tunisia: $40 million Philippines: $40 million Georgia: $20 million Colombia: $20 million Vietnam: $10.9 million |
FY2018. Israel is the largest recipient of FMF (see textbox). For FY2022. For FY2021, the President'’s request for Israel would encompass approximately 5953% of total requested FMF funding worldwide.
Israel uses most FMF to finance the procurement of advanced U.S. weapons systems. In March 2020, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of a planned sale to Israel of eight KC-46A Boeing "Pegasus" aircraft for an estimated $2.4 billion. According to Boeing, the KC-46A Pegasus is a multirole tanker (can carry passengers, fuel, and equipment) that can refuel all U.S. and allied military aircraft. The Israeli Air Force's current fleet of tankers was originally procured in the 1970s, and it is anticipated that Israel will be able to use the KC-46A to refuel its F-35 fighters. Israel is the first international operator of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Department of Defense's fifth-generation stealth aircraft considered to be the most technologically advanced fighter jet ever made. After Japan, Israel will become the second foreign user of the KC-46A.
|
|
FY2018 actual |
|
FY2020 request |
FY2020 enacted |
| |
FMF |
3,100.00 |
3,175.00 |
3,100.00 |
3,300.00 |
3,300.00 |
3,300.00 |
3,300.00 |
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2017-FY2021), P.L. 116-94, and CRS calculations and rounding.
Notes: Funding totals do not include monies allocated through Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA).
In May 2021, Israel and several Palestinian armed groups based
Top Ten FMF Recipients:
in the Gaza Strip fought their fourth major armed conflict since
FY2022 Request
2007. To replenish its munitions stocks, Israel has requested
1. Israel: $3.3 bil ion
additional U.S. military aid. Under the terms of the 2016 MOU,
2. Egypt: $1.3 bil ion
the agreement stipulates that under exceptional circumstances
3. Jordan: $350 mil ion
(major armed conflict involving Israel), both sides may agree on
4. Iraq: $250 mil ion
additional U.S. support for missile defense.41
5. Lebanon: $160 mil ion
In the report accompanying its annual FY2022 bill, the House
6. Ukraine: $115 mil ion
Appropriations Subcommittee for State, Foreign Operations,
7. Tunisia: $85 mil ion
and Related Programs reaffirmed its support for the MOU, while
8. Colombia: $40 mil ion
also urging the Secretary of State to ensure that “MOU-
9. Philippines: $40 mil ion
supported equipment is not used in any way that undermines the
10. Georgia: $25 mil ion
prospects of a negotiated two-state solution.”42
Table 2. Bilateral Aid to Israel
current U.S. dollars in millions
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
actual
actual
actual
actual
allocated
request
FMF
3,175.00
3,100.00
3,300.00
3,300.00
3,300.00
3,300.00
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS calculations.
Notes: Funding totals do not include monies allocated through Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA).
40 For additional background, please see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 41 In 2014, Congress passed P.L. 113-145, the FY2014 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Resolution, which provided $225 million in Iron Dome funding requested by Israel on an expedited basis during the summer 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict. It also exempted those funds from co-production requirements.
42 See H.Rept. 117-84 accompanying H.R. 4373, the State, Foreign Operations, And Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2022.
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link to page 27 U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East
Egypt43 Since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the United States has provided Egypt with large amounts of foreign assistance. U.S. policymakers have routinely justified this aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and the perceived need to sustain the treaty. Egypt has used FMF to purchase major U.S. defense systems, such as the F-16 fighter aircraft, the M1A1 Abrams battle tank, and the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter.
U.S. economic aid to Egypt (funded through ESF) is divided into two components: (1) USAID-managed programs (public health, education, economic development, democracy and governance); and (2) the U.S.-EgyptianEgyptian-American Enterprise Fund (EAEF).2244 Since its inception in FY2012, Congress has appropriated $300 million in ESF for the EAEF.
Egypt', which has, in turn, invested over $220 million in Egyptian businesses and attracted $447 million in foreign capital to Egypt.45
Egypt’s governance and human rights record has sparked regular criticism from U.S. officials and some Members of Congress (see "Potential Foreign Aid Issues for Congress"“Human Rights and Foreign Aid to MENA” section below). Since FY2012, Congress has passed appropriations legislation that withholds the obligation of FMF to Egypt until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking various steps toward supporting democracy and human rights. With the exception of FY2014, lawmakers have included a national security waiver to allow the Administration to waive these congressionally mandated certification requirements under certain conditions. For FY2019, the Trump Administration has obligated $1 billion in FMF for Egypt, of which $300 million in FY2019 FMF remains withheldThe Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2021 (P.L. 116-260) withholds $225 million in FMF from obligation until the Secretary of State makes democracy-related certifications and provides waiver authority on national security grounds. P.L. 116-260 also includes a condition that withholds $75Secretary issues a determination pursuant to Section 7041(a)(3)(B) of P.L. 116-6, the FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act. The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94) also withholds $300 million in FMF until the Secretary of State determines that the Government of Egypt is making clear and consistent progress in releasing political prisoners and providing detainees with due process of law. This condition is new in the FY2021 act, and affords no national security waiver.
FMF until a certification or waiver is issued.
For the past three fiscal years (see Table 3), Congress has appropriated over $1.4 billion in total bilateral aid for Egypt and has added $30 million to $50 million in ESF above the president's request for USAID programs in Egypt.
Table 3. Bilateral Aid to Egypt
Table 3. Bilateral Aid to Egypt
current U.S. dollars in millions
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
actual
actual
actual
actual
allocated
request
ESF
112.50
106.87
112.50
125.00
125.00
125.00
FMF
1,234.30
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
IMET
1.74
1.80
1.80
0.00
1.80
1.80
INCLE
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
0.35
0.00
NADR
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.50
3.00
3.50
Total
1,353.54
1,413.67
1,419.30
1,430.50
1,430.15
1,430.30
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS calculations.
43 For additional background, see CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 44 “Here’s One U.S. - Egypt Success Story,” Washington Post, April 5, 2019. 45 Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, 2020 Impact Report. https://www.eaefund.org/
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East
Jordan46 current U.S. dollars in millions
|
|
FY2018 actual |
|
FY2020 enacted |
| ||||||||||||||
|
142.65 |
112.50 |
106.87 |
112.50 |
125.00 |
142.65 |
|||||||||||||
|
1,300.00 |
1,234.30 |
1,300.00 |
1,300.00 |
1,300.00 |
1,300.00 |
|||||||||||||
|
1.80 |
1.74 |
1.80 |
1.80 |
1.80 |
1.80 |
|||||||||||||
|
2.00 |
2.00 |
2.00 |
2.00 |
2.00 |
2.00 |
|||||||||||||
|
2.50 |
3.00 |
3.00 |
3.00 |
3.00 |
2.50 |
|||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2017-FY2021), P.L. 116-94, and CRS calculations and rounding.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is also one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid globally. Like Israel, the United States and Jordan have signed an MOU on foreign assistance, most recently in 2018. The MOU, the third such agreement between the United States and Jordan, commits the United States (pending congressional appropriation) to provide $1.275 billion per year in bilateral foreign assistance over a five-year period for a total of $6.375 billion (FY2018-FY2022).24
47 U.S. military assistance primarily enables the Jordanian military to procure and maintain U.S.-origin conventional weapons systems. FMF overseen by the State Department supports the Jordanian Armed Forces'’ multi-year (usually five-year) procurement plans, while DOD-administered security assistance supports ad hoc defense systems to respond to emerging threats.
The United States provides economic aid to Jordan for (1) budgetary support (cash
Figure 4. U.S. Cash Transfers to Jordan
transfer), (2) USAID programs in Jordan, and (3) loan , and (3) loan
Obligated funds in millions of U.S. dollars
guarantees. The cash transfer portion of U.S. economic assistance to Jordan is the largest amount of budget support given to any U.S. foreign aid recipient worldwide.25.48 U.S. cash assistance is provided to help the kingdom with foreign debt payments, Syrian refugee support, and fuel import costs (Jordan is almost entirely reliant on imports for its domestic energy needs). Separately, theneeds). ESF cash transfer funds are deposited in a single tranche into a U.S.-domiciled interest-bearing account and are not commingled with other funds. The U.S. State Department State Department
estimates that, since large-scale U.S. aid to Syrian refugees began in FY2012, it has allocated more than $1.38 billion in humanitarian
Source: USAID Foreign Aid Explorer.
assistance from global accounts for programsSyrian refugees in Jordan.
in Jordan.26
Table 4. Bilateral Aid to Jordan
current U.S. dollars in millions
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
actual
actual
actual
actual
allocated
request
DA
-
-
-
-
85.00
-
ESF
832.35
1,082.40
1,082.40
1,082.40
1,122.40
910.80
FMF
470.00
425.00
425.00
425.00
425.00
350.00
IMET
3.88
4.01
3.99
4.00
4.00
3.80
NADR
13.60
13.60
13.60
13.60
13.60
10.40
Total
1,319.83
1,525.01
1,524.99
1,525.00
1,650.00
1,275.00
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS calculations. Notes: Prior-year funds not included in this table: $125 mil ion in ESF in FY2020 (P.L. 116-93); $50 mil ion in Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF) aid in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6).
46 For additional background, see CRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 47 U.S. State Department, New U.S.-Jordan Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Jordan, Fact Sheet, February 14, 2018.
48 Other budget support aid recipients include: the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East
Iraq49 The State Department and USAID fundcurrent U.S. dollars in millions
|
|
FY2018 actual |
|
FY2020 enacted |
| ||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2017-FY2021), P.L. 116-94, and CRS calculations and rounding.
Notes: Funding levels for FY2020 enacted include $125 million in ESF from prior acts. Under P.L. 116-6 (FY2019 omnibus), Congress provided an additional $50 million in prior-year Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF) aid for Jordan.
The United States funds military, economic, stabilization, and security programs in Iraq, with mostadditional security assistance funding provided through the Defense Department Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF).50 From FY2015 through FY2020, Congress authorized and appropriated more than $6.5 billion in Defense Department funding for train and equip assistance in Iraq.
Iraq began purchasing U.S.-origin weapons systems using its own national funds through the Foreign Military Sales program in 2005,2851 and the United States began providing FMF to Iraq in 2012 in order to help Iraq sustain U.S.-origin systems. systems. Between 2014 and 2015, as Iraq and the United States battled the Islamic State throughout northern and western Iraq, FMF funds were "redirected to urgent counterterrorism requirements" including ammunition and equipment."29 A $250 million FY2016 FMF allocation subsidized the costs of a $2.7 billion FMF loan to support acquisition, training, and continued sustainment of U.S.-origin defense systems.
U.S. economic assistance to Iraq has supported public financial management reform, United Nations-coordinated stabilization programs, and loan guarantees. The Obama Administration and Congress provided a U.S. loan guarantee in 2017 to encourage other lenders to purchase bonds issued by Iraq to cover budget shortfalls. The Trump Administration has directed U.S. stabilization support since 2017 to prioritize programs benefitting persecuted Iraqi religious minority groups. P.L. 116-94 directs stabilization assistance to Anbar province and appropriates bilateral economic assistance, international security assistance, and humanitarian assistance for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The act also directs funds to support transitional justice and accountability programs for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in Iraq.
Table 5. Bilateral Aid to Iraq
Recent Iraqi acquisitions include: Armed Bell 407GX Helicopters, pilot training for C-172, C-208, and T-6 aircraft, and equipment for two Peshmerga infantry brigades and two artillery battalions.52
The United States provides foreign aid to Iraq in support of de-mining programs, public sector financial management reform, civil society, economic development, U.N.-coordinated stabilization, and other goals.53 In FY2021, U.S. assistance is supporting Iraqi preparations for national elections planned for October 2021. The U.S. government has obligated more than $405 million for stabilization of liberated areas of Iraq since 2016, including funds for religious and ethnic minority communities. USAID contributes to the Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund, which aids the victims of conflict in Iraq.54 The United States is the top humanitarian funding donor for Iraq and provided more than $348 million in humanitarian aid for Iraq in FY2020 and FY2021, including more than $47 million for COVID-19 programs.
Table 5. Bilateral Aid to Iraq
current U.S. dollars in millions
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
actual
actual
actual
actual
allocated
request
ESF
553.50
100.00
150.00
150.00
150.00
150.00
FMF
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
IMET
0.70
0.82
0.91
1.00
1.00
1.00
INCLE
0.20
5.60
5.60
5.60
5.60
-
NADR
56.92
46.86
45.00
47.51
47.51
47.50
Total
861.33
403.28
451.51
451.60
454.11
448.50
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS calculations.
49 For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10404, Iraq and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard, and CRS Report R45633, Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
50 U.S. State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Iraq,” factsheet, January 20, 2021. From FY2015 through FY2021, Congress authorized and appropriated nearly $7 billion in Defense Department funding for train and equip assistance in Iraq. The Biden Administration's FY2022 defense appropriations request seeks $345 million for train and equip efforts under Iraq-specific authorities, including $240 million for Kurdistan Regional Government Peshmerga stipends.
51 Solomon Moore, “Secret Iraqi Deal Shows Problems in Arms Orders,” New York Times, April 13, 2008; and U.S. State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Iraq,” factsheet, March 22, 2017. 52 op.cit., State Department, January 20, 2021. 53 USAID, Congressional Notification #19, Country Narrative, Iraq, October 30, 2020. 54 Available online at https://www.usaid.gov/iraq/marla-ruzicka-iraqi-war-victims-fund.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East
Tunisia55 After its 2011 popular uprising, Tunisia adopted a democratic political system and constitution enshrining various civil liberties. Political crises and worsening economic conditions have stymied structural reforms and undermined public faith in government. President Kaïs Saïed’s decision in July 2021 to suspend parliament and assert sweeping extraconstitutional executive powers introduced new political uncertainty, even as many Tunisians welcomed his moves.
current U.S. dollars in millions
|
|
FY2018 actual |
|
FY2020 enacted |
| ||
|
122.50 |
553.50 |
100.00 |
150.00 |
150.00 |
75.00 |
|
|
250.00 |
250.00 |
250.00 |
250.00 |
250.00 |
- |
|
|
0.99 |
0.70 |
0.82 |
0.91 |
1.00 |
1.00 |
|
|
11.00 |
0.20 |
5.60 |
5.60 |
5.60 |
1.00 |
|
|
20.86 |
56.92 |
46.86 |
45.00 |
45.00 |
47.50 |
|
|
405.35 |
861.33 |
403.28 |
451.51 |
451.60 |
124.50 |
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2017-FY2021), P.L. 116-94 and accompanying explanatory statement, and CRS calculations and rounding.
As of early 2020, Tunisia remained the sole MENA country to have made a durable transition to democracy since the 2011 wave of Arab uprisings. U.S. bilateral aid has increased significantly since then, supporting economic growth initiatives, good governance, and security assistance.
U.S.-Tunisia security cooperation has expanded since 2011, as Tunisia has sought to maintain its U.S.-origin defense materiel, reform its security institutions, and respond to evolving terrorist threats. The United States has supported Tunisia's security sector reform efforts with $12 million toterrorist threats. Congress has appropriated $85 million per year in FMF for Tunisia since FY2019, the highest level for any country within U.S. Africa Command’s area of responsibility. Congress has also provided $13 million per year in State Department-administered fundingbilateral aid for law enforcement strengthening and reform; Tunisia has received additional internal security force aid under State’s global Counterterrorism Partnerships Fundstrengthening and reform. Over the last five years, Congress has appropriated $65 million to $95 million per year in bilateral FMF for Tunisia (see Table 6). DOD has provided substantial additional counterterrorism and border security assistance for Tunisia under its "global train and equip" authorityglobal “authority to build capacity” (currently, 10 U.S.C. 333) and separate nonproliferation authorities.
Since the Trump Administration issued its first aid budget request (for FY2018), Congress has appropriated, on average, $104 million more in bilateral aid to Tunisia each year than the President requested. As part of its justification for requesting global FMF loan authority in FY2021, the Administration cited a "request from the Government of Tunisia for a $500 million FMF loan to procure U.S.-manufactured light attack aircraft for the Tunisian Armed Forces." 31 Congress did not enact FMF loan authority in prior years in response to previous Trump Administration requests.
and Libya-related authorities.
President Biden’s FY2022 request seeks to channel bilateral economic aid to Tunisia through the ESF account only, instead of providing half as Development Assistance (DA) as in FY2020 and FY2021. U.S. economic aid has recently focused on promoting private sector growth, strengthening democratic governance, bolstering civil society, and countering the drivers of violent extremist recruitment. Reflecting the rise in U.S. economic aid since 2011, USAID elevated its presence in Tunisia to a full bilateral Mission in 2019. In early July 2021, the MCC announced plans to sign a $499 million development compact with Tunisia.56
Table 6. Bilateral Aid to Tunisia
Table 6. Bilateral Aid to Tunisia
current U.S. dollars in millions
|
|
FY2018 actual |
|
FY2020 enacted |
| ||
DA |
- |
- |
- |
- |
40.00 |
- |
|
|
60.00 |
89.00 |
79.00 |
85.00 |
45.00 |
31.50 |
|
|
65.00 |
95.00 |
65.00 |
85.00 |
85.00 |
40.00 |
|
|
2.25 |
2.13 |
2.21 |
2.22 |
2.30 |
2.30 |
|
|
12.00 |
13.00 |
13.00 |
13.00 |
13.00 |
8.05 |
|
|
2.60 |
6.10 |
6.10 |
6.10 |
6.10 |
2.00 |
|
|
141.85 |
205.23 |
165.31 |
191.32 |
191.40 |
83.85 |
current U.S. dollars in millions
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
actual
actual
actual
actual
allocated
request
DA
-
-
-
40.00
45.00
-
ESF
89.00
79.00
85.00
45.00
40.00
85.00
FMF
95.00
65.00
85.00
85.00
85.00
85.00
IMET
2.13
2.21
2.22
2.30
2.30
2.30
INCLE
13.00
13.00
13.00
13.00
13.00
22.80
NADR
6.10
6.10
6.10
6.10
6.10
2.00
Total
205.23
165.31
191.32
191.40
191.40
197.10
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2017-FY2021), P.L. 116-94 and accompanying conference report, and CRS calculations and rounding.
Notes: Under P.L. 116-94 (FY2020 omnibus), Congress provided an additional $50 million in prior-year ESF funds for Tunisia. Under P.L. 116-6 (FY2019 omnibus), Congress provided an additional $50 million in prior-year(FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS calculations. Notes: Prior-year funds not included in this table: an additional $50 mil ion in ESF funds in FY2021 (P.L. 116-260); an additional $50 mil ion in ESF funds in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94); and an additional $50 mil ion in Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF) aid in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6).
55 For more background, see CRS Report RS21666, Tunisia: In Brief, by Alexis Arieff. 56 MCC Congressional Notification, “Tunisia Intent to Sign,” July 7, 2021; available at www.mcc.gov.
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Lebanon57 U.S. military and economic assistance programs in Lebanon seek to bolster forces that could help counter Syrian and Iranian influence. U.S. security assistance priorities reflectRecovery Fund (RRF) aid for Tunisia.
The United States has sought to bolster forces that could help counter Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon through a variety of military and economic assistance programs. U.S. security assistance priorities reflect increased concern about the potential for Sunni jihadist groups such as the Islamic State to target Lebanon, as well as long-standing U.S. concerns about the role of Hezbollah, while U.S. economic aid to Lebanon seeks to stabilize the economy, boost employment, strengthen the delivery of public services, and address the needs of vulnerable communities. Some in Congress have expressed concern about the potential for U.S. assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to be divertedconcerns about Hezbollah and preserving Israel's qualitative military edge (QME). U.S. economic aid to Lebanon seeks to promote democracy, stability, and economic growth, particularly in light of the challenges posed by the ongoing conflict in neighboring Syria. Congress places several certification requirements on U.S. assistance funds for Lebanon annually in an effort to prevent their misuse or the transfer of U.S. equipment to Hezbollah or other designated terrorists. Others assert that U.S. aid to the LAF is key to containing Hezbollah’s influence. Congress places several certification requirements on U.S. assistance funds for Lebanon annually in an effort to prevent their misuse or the retransfer of U.S. equipment.
terrorists. Hezbollah's participation in the Syria conflict on behalf of the Asad government is presumed to have strengthened the group's military capabilities and has increased concern among some in Congress over the continuation of U.S. assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).
FMF has been one of the primary sources of U.S. funding for the LAF, along with the Counter-ISIL Train and Equip Fund (CTEF). According to the State Department, between FY2015 and FY2019, security assistance has averaged $224 million annually in FY2020, the United States provided $216 million in combined State Department and Department of Defense military grant assistance.33DOD military aid.58 These funds have been used to procure, among other things, light attack helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, transport helicopters, and night vision devices.
The United States has long provided relatively modest amounts of ESF to Lebanon for scholarships and USAID programs. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, U.S. programs have been aimed at increasing the capacity of the public sector to provide basic services to both refugees and Lebanese host communities, including reliable access to potable water, sanitation, and health services. U.S. programs have also aimed to increase the capacity of the public education system to cope with the refugee influx.
For FY2021
To assist with Lebanon’s worsening economic crisis, for FY2022, the President is requesting $133$296 million in total bilateral aid to Lebanon, which is 46% less22% more than what Congress provided for Lebanon in FY2021.
for Lebanon in FY2020. For the past three fiscal years, Congress has appropriated, on average, $113.5 million per year above the President's request.
Table 7. Bilateral Aid to Lebanon
current U.S. dollars in millions
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
actual
actual
actual
actual
allocated
request
DA
-
-
-
7.55
-
-
ESF
110.00
117.00
112.50
78.95
112.5
112.50
FMF
80.00
105.00
105.00
105.00
120.00
160.00
IMET
2.65
3.12
2.97
2.68
3.00
3.50
INCLE
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
8.20
NADR
5.76
10.82
11.82
11.82
12.82
11.76
Total
208.41
245.94
242.29
216.00
258.32
295.96
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2019-FY2022), of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS calculations.
57 For additional background, please see CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud. 58 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Lebanon,” factsheet, May 21, 2021.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East
current U.S. dollars in millions
|
|
FY2018 actual |
|
FY2020 enacted |
| ||
|
110.00 |
110.00 |
117.00 |
112.50 |
112.50 |
62.20 |
|
|
85.90 |
80.00 |
105.00 |
105.00 |
105.00 |
50.00 |
|
|
2.80 |
2.65 |
3.12 |
2.97 |
2.97 |
3.00 |
|
|
10.00 |
10.00 |
10.00 |
10.00 |
10.00 |
6.20 |
|
|
4.76 |
5.76 |
10.82 |
11.82 |
11.82 |
11.76 |
|
|
213.46 |
208.41 |
245.94 |
242.29 |
242.29 |
133.16 |
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2017-FY2021), P.L. 116-94, and CRS calculations and rounding.
Regional Program Aid In addition to assistance provided directly to certain countries, the United States provides aid to Middle Eastern countries through regional programs, including the following.
For nearly a decade, the United States has continued to devote significant amounts of foreign assistance resources toward several major humanitarian crises stemming from ongoing conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere (see Figure 4)5). Since 2010, the United States has provided about $16.420 billion in humanitarian response funding to the Middle East.
.
The State Department and USAID provide this humanitarian assistance through implementing partners, including international aid organizations and nongovernmental organizations . Humanitarian assistance is primarily managed by USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), USAID's Office of Food for Peace (FFP),’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/BHA) and the U.S. Department of State'’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM) using "“global accounts"” (rather than bilateral assistance), such as IDA, FFP, and MRA.
Figure 5. SelectFFP, and MRA.
U.S. Aid to the Palestinians Since 1950 Until the recent changes to U.S. law and policy, the United States provided aid to the Palestinians in several ways. Since 1950, the U.S. government had annually contributed to UNRWA to support Palestinian refugees. Since 1975, the United States also had provided bilateral economic aid for USAID programs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and these programs widely expanded in 1994 after the start of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Since Hamas forcibly took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the United States also consistently provided bilateral, nonlethal security assistance for West Bank-based PA security forces. At times, the executive branch and Congress took various measures to reduce, delay, or place conditions on this aid. Annual appropriations legislation has routinely contained (and still does) several conditions on direct and indirect aid to various Palestinian entities. |
Policy changes during the Trump Administration (see Chronology below), coupled with legislation passed by Congress, have halted various types of U.S. aid (see "U.S. Aid to the Palestinians Since 1950" Text Box) to the Palestinians. The Trump Administration withheld FY2017 bilateral economic assistance, reprogrammingreprogrammed it elsewhere, and ceased requesting bilateral economic assistanceit altogether after Palestinian leadership broke off high-level political contacts to protestin protest of President Trump'’s December 2017 recognition of Jerusalem as Israel'’s capital. In 2018, the United States suspended its contributions to UNRWA. In s capital. In January 2019, after Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 (ATCA, P.L. 115-253), the Palestinian Authority (PA) ceased accepting any U.S. aid, including security assistance and legacy economic assistance from prior fiscal years.65
In January 2021, the Biden Administration announced its intent to “restore credible U.S. engagement with Palestinians” by renewing U.S. relations with the Palestinian leadership, reopening diplomatic missions closed by the Trump Administration, and restarting U.S. assistance programs that “support economic development and humanitarian aid for the Palestinian people.”66 In March, the Biden Administration allocated $15 million in International Disaster Assistance (IDA) for COVID-19 response needs and emergency food assistance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In April, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that in conjunction with Congress, the Biden Administration would restart major aid programs to the Palestinians to include:
$75 million in bilateral economic aid (FY2020 ESF) for the West Bank and Gaza; $150 million in humanitarian assistance (MRA) for UNRWA; $10 million for peacebuilding programs through USAID (DA).67
Secretary Blinken also announced the “resumption of vital security assistance programs.”68
In May 2021, several days after a cease-fire was reached between Israel and Hamas ending their 11-day conflict, Secretary Blinken announced another round of Palestinian aid to include: $33 million for UNRWA, $75 million in bilateral aid (FY2021 ESF), and $5.5 million for Gaza from 64 For more information, see CRS InFocus CRS In Focus IF10644, The Palestinians: Overview, 2021 Aid, and U.S. Policy Issues, by Jim Zanotti; CRS Insight IN11649, U.S. Resumption of Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti and Rhoda Margesson; and CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti,
65 ATCA provided for a defendant’s consent to U.S. federal court jurisdiction over the defendant for lawsuits related to international terrorism if the defendant accepted U.S. foreign aid from any of the three accounts from which U.S. bilateral aid to the Palestinians has traditionally flowed (ESF, INCLE, and NADR). The PA made the decision not to accept bilateral aid, most likely to avoid being subjected to U.S. jurisdiction in lawsuits filed by U.S. victims of Palestinian terrorism.from prior fiscal years. ATCA provided for a defendant's consent to U.S. federal court jurisdiction over the defendant for lawsuits related to international terrorism if the defendant accepted U.S. foreign aid from any of the three accounts from which U.S. bilateral aid to the Palestinians has traditionally flowed (ESF, INCLE, and NADR). The PA made the decision not to accept bilateral aid, most likely to avoid being subjected to U.S. jurisdiction in lawsuits filed by U.S. victims of Palestinian terrorism.
Date |
Event |
December 2017 |
President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital and announced his intention to relocate the U.S. embassy there. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas announced at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) conference in Istanbul, Turkey, that the United States had "disqualified itself from playing the role of mediator in the peace process." He then broke off diplomatic contacts with the United States in response to its new policy on Jerusalem. |
January 2018 |
President Trump said that the hundreds of millions of dollars of aid that Palestinians receive "is not going to them unless they sit down and negotiate peace." |
March 2018 |
Congress and the President enact the Taylor Force Act (Title X of P.L. 115-141), which suspended all economic assistance for the West Bank and Gaza that "directly benefits" the PA for so long as Palestinian entities continue to make welfare payments that are identified in the Act as incentivizing terrorism. |
August 2018 |
The State Department announced that the United States would not make further contributions to UNRWA. |
September 2018 |
The Administration notified Congress that it would reprogram at least $231.5 million of FY2017 bilateral economic aid initially allocated for the West Bank and Gaza. |
October 2018 |
President Trump signed the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 (ATCA, P.L. 115-253) into law. |
December 2018 |
Then-PA Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah wrote to Secretary of State Michael Pompeo that the PA would not accept aid that subjected it to U.S. federal court jurisdiction |
January 2019 |
U.S. bilateral aid to the Palestinians ended. |
December 2019 |
The Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 is signed into law as part of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, P.L. 116-94. Congress appropriated $75 million in PA security assistance for the West Bank and $75 million in economic assistance for the West Bank and Gaza in P.L. 116-94. |
January 2020 |
The Trump Administration released its Middle East peace plan. |
Source: CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti and CRS Report R46274, The Palestinians and Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction, by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea.
Some sources suggested that the Administration and Congress belatedly realized ATCA's possible impact,37 and began considering how to resume security assistance to the PA—and perhaps other types of aid to the Palestinian people—after the PA stopped accepting bilateral aid in 2019.38 In December 2019, Congress passed the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019, or PSJVTA, as § 903 of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, P.L. 116-94. PSJVTA changes the legal framework applicable to terrorism-related offenses by replacing the provisions in ATCA that triggered Palestinianprovided for consent to personal jurisdiction for accepting U.S. aid. However, because PSJVTA did include other possible triggers of consent to personal jurisdiction. See, CRS Report R46274, The Palestinians and Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction, by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea.
66 United States Mission to the United Nations, "Remarks at a UN Security Council Open Debate on the Situation in the Middle East, Ambassador Richard Mills, Acting Representative, January 26, 2021.
67 U.S. Department of State, “The United States Restores Assistance for the Palestinians,” press statement, April 7, 2021.
68 Ibid.
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the IDA account. In July, the Administration contributed an additional $135.8 million for UNRWA.
Historically, Congress has enacted numerous restrictions on U.S. aid to the Palestinians both in standing law and annual appropriations acts.69 The Taylor Force Act or TFA (Div. S, Title X of P.L. 115-141) prohibits most ESF aid from directly benefitting the Palestinian Authority unless the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)/PA curtails domestically popular payments that arguably incentivize acts of terror. While the Biden Administration has claimed that all U.S. funds “will be administered in a way that benefit the Palestinian people — not Hamas” and will be “consistent with applicable U.S. law,”70 some lawmakers have attempted to halt the resumption of U.S. assistance. After the Biden Administration announced its intention to resume aid, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Jim Risch and House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Michael McCaul issued a joint statement arguing that U.S. funding should be linked to PA concessions and UNRWA reforms and reportedly placed an informal congressional hold on the FY2020 ESF assistance.71 Also, 18 Senators sent a letter to Secretary Blinken urging him to pause the ESF until the Administration takes some steps to justify it in light of the TFA’s general restriction on ESF directly benefitting the PA.72 The letter also calls on the Administration to implement recommendations from a March 2021 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report to ensure that aid disbursements to implementing partner organizations, including sub-grantees, fully comply with anti-terrorism vetting requirements. In early June 2021, 145 House Democrats sent a letter to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Risch asking him to “release your hold on tens of millions of dollars in appropriated humanitarian aid that is so desperately needed to meet the needs of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians rebuilding their lives in the wake of the fighting between Hamas and Israel earlier this month.”73 In a June 15, 2021, response to that letter, according to press reports, Ranking Member Risch wrote that the continuing hold on a portion of the FY2020 ESF did not affect the humanitarian aid provided for Palestinians to UNRWA (via the MRA account) or from IDA. He also explained that the hold on what he characterized as “longer-term development projects” continues because of potentially differing views between the Administration and some Members about whether the ESF funds in question would directly benefit the PA.74
Lebanon’s Economic Crisis75 According to the World Bank, Lebanon’s ongoing economic collapse, a result of overlapping governance, currency, debt, fiscal, and banking crises, “is likely to rank in the top 10, possibly top 3, most severe crises episodes globally since the mid-nineteenth century.”76 The Lebanese lira (also known as the pound), pegged to the dollar, has lost more than 90% of its value in black-market trading since October 2019. It dropped precipitously in March 2020, after the country 69 See Sections 7037-7040, 7041(k), and 7048(d) of P.L. 116-260. 70 op.cit., Department of State, May 26, 2021. 71 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Risch, McCaul: Biden Administration Should Have Secured Concessions Before Resuming Assistance to Palestinians,” April 7, 2021. 72 Available online at https://www.cotton.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/palestine_letter.pdf. 73 Available online at https://raskin.house.gov/_cache/files/4/6/46b7d344-a52a-4747-8cdd-49bcda9620ac/B649B27DDB83548BF673082A8A24EF97.final-raskin-letter-to-risch-re-gaza-aid.pdf.
74 Available online at https://freebeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/210615-TO-House-of-Representatives-Jamie-Raskin-Response-to-Israel-Gaza-Letter-1.pdf.
75 For more information, see CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud. 76 The World Bank, Lebanon Economic Monitor, Spring 2021: Lebanon Sinking (To the Top 3), May 31, 2021.
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defaulted on $31 billion in Eurobond debt; Lebanon had not previously defaulted on its foreign debt. Lebanon’s debt-to-GDP ratio (which economists project to reach 194% by the end of 2021) is among the highest in the world.77
Lebanon’s currency depreciation has led to hyperinflation that has crippled the purchasing power of average citizens; it is estimated that more than half the population now lives below the poverty line.78 The inflation rate rose tenfold in 2020 (from 10% in January 2020 to 120% in August 2020) and is projected to remain at 96.6% throughout 2021. Food price inflation has soared to more than 200% in 2021; in 2020, it briefly reached 400%.79
Without a fully formed government that can undertake economic reforms sought by international financial institutions, Lebanon remains in stasis. In May 2020, the Lebanese government formally requested a $10 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, IMF talks over a potential rescue package for Lebanon have stalled, as Lebanese officials, among other disputes, have not provided all the documents considered necessary to conduct a forensic audit of Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon’s central bank.80An external forensic audit would allow analysts to assess more accurately Lebanon’s economic and financial losses, and would investigate potential fraud, negligence, missing funds, and bank compliance with Lebanese law. Talks also stalled over questions regarding the exchange rate, government finances, and banking reforms. U.S. and European officials have conditioned their support for an IMF program for Lebanon on the implementation of structural reforms. Many of the reforms sought by outside donors would require the formation of a new government.
According to one forecast from the Economic Intelligence Unit:
We expect that once a new government has been appointed and gained parliamentary support for its reform agenda, a short-term [International Monetary] Fund agreement will follow, probably in the third quarter of 2021. The next government will seek between US$10bn and US$15bn in financial assistance from the IMF. The Fund will only provide US$3bn-5bn—with the remainder supplied by bilateral source— and disbursement will only commence once it sees a cohesive policy agenda with broad-based support. As a result, much will depend on the government's ability to draft a compelling blueprint that can achieve parliamentary support.81
possible triggers of consent to personal jurisdiction—based on actions that Palestinian entities might find difficult to stop for domestic political reasons—it is unclear whether the Palestinians will accept this "legislative fix" and resume accepting U.S. bilateral aid.39
Congress also appropriated $75 million in PA security assistance for the West Bank and $75 million in economic assistance in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94), with appropriators noting in the joint explanatory statement that "such funds shall be made available if the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 is amended to allow for their obligation." It is unclear whether the executive branch will implement the aid provisions. The Trump Administration had previously suggested that restarting U.S. aid for Palestinians could depend on a resumption of PA/PLO diplomatic contacts with the Administration.40 Such a resumption of diplomacy may be unlikely in the current U.S.-Israel-Palestinian political climate,41 particularly following the January 2020 release of a U.S. peace plan that the PA/PLO strongly opposes and possible discussion of Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank.
The Administration's omission of any bilateral assistance—security or economic—for the West Bank and Gaza in its FY2021 budget request, along with its proposal in the request for a $200 million "Diplomatic Progress Fund" ($25 million in security assistance and $175 million in economic) to support future diplomatic efforts, may potentially convey some intent by the Administration to condition aid to Palestinians on PA/PLO political engagement with the U.S. peace plan.42 The Administration also had requested funds for a Diplomatic Progress Fund in FY2020, but Congress instead provided the $150 million in bilateral aid in P.L. 116-94.
|
![]() |
Sources: U.S. State Department and USAID, adapted by CRS. Notes: All amounts are approximate. Amounts stated for FY2020 reflect pending appropriation amounts from the H.R. 1865 joint explanatory statement. NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, ESF = Economic Support Fund, OCO = Overseas Contingency Operations. |
Amidst the COVID-19 outbreak, some Members of Congress are concerned that the uncertainty surrounding the status of U.S. aid to the Palestinians may prevent humanitarian aid to combat the disease from reaching the Palestinian population. In late March 2020, several Senators sent a letter to Secretary of State Pompeo urging the Administration "to take every reasonable step to provide medicine, medical equipment and other necessary assistance to the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Palestinian territories) to prevent a humanitarian disaster."43 In April, the Administration announced that it would provide $5 million in International Disaster Assistance (IDA) to the West Bank as part of its global COVID-19 response. One media report stated that the $5 million in health assistance for hospitals in the West Bank does not "represent a change of policy regarding aid to the Palestinians, but is rather part of a larger decision to fight the spread of the pandemic across the Middle East, according to sources within the administration."44
Since the United States began providing military assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) following the 2006 summer war between Israel and Hezbollah, policymakers and foreign policy experts have debated the efficacy of such aid. U.S. military commanders have repeatedly testified before Congress that assistance to the LAF helps foster U.S.-Lebanese cooperation and strengthens the Lebanese government's capacity to counter terrorism.46 On the other hand, critics of such support have charged that U.S. aid to the LAF risks U.S. equipment falling into the hands of Hezbollah or other designated terrorists. They also contend that the LAF, even with U.S. aid, is unable or unwilling to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (passed after the 2006 war), which calls for the "disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon." More recently, as Hezbollah has played a key role in supporting the Asad regime in Syria, opponents of U.S. aid to Lebanon assert that Hezbollah and the LAF have more closely coordinated militarily and politically along the Lebanese-Syrian border.47
In 2019, the Trump Administration withheld $105 million in FMF to the LAF as part of a policy review over the efficacy of its military assistance program to Lebanon.48 In 2019, lawmakers in the House and Senate also introduced the "Countering Hezbollah in Lebanon's Military Act of 2019," (S. 1886 and H.R. 3331) which would withhold 20% of U.S. military assistance to the LAF unless the President can certify that the LAF is taking measurable steps to limit Hezbollah's influence over the force.
According to various reports, both the State and Defense Departments opposed the hold on FMF, calling the LAF a stabilizing institution in Lebanon that has served as a U.S. partner in countering Sunni Muslim extremist groups there.49 On November 8, 2019, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Eliot Engel and Chairman of its Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism Ted Deutch wrote a letter to the Office of Management and Budget agreeing with previous expert testimony by former U.S. officials who praised the LAF's capabilities.50
In December 2019, the Administration lifted its hold on FMF to Lebanon (DOD aid to Lebanon had not been withheld). The policy debate coincided with mass protests throughout Lebanon, which forced the LAF to deploy in the streets to maintain order. In December 2019, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued its review on U.S. security assistance to Lebanon concluding that "The Departments of State and Defense reported progress in meeting security objectives in Lebanon, but gaps in performance information limit their ability to fully assess the results of security-related activities."51
In January 2020, Lebanon formed a new government, which drew international scrutiny for being composed entirely of parties allied with the March 8 political bloc (headed by the Christian Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah, and the Amal Movement). Nevertheless, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper remarked in February 2020 that "In terms of security assistance, we've committed a lot to the Lebanese Armed Forces and we will continue that commitment."52
Years of war, corruption, and economic mismanagement have strained Iraq's economy and state finances, leading to widespread popular frustration toward the political system, and culminating in popular protests across central and southern Iraq. The 2019 national budget ran its largest ever one-year deficit, and in 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic and steep declines in world oil prices delivered two additional shocks to Iraq's already stretched fiscal position. Iraqi authorities have expressed confidence in their ability to withstand low oil prices for the short term. However, with approximately 30% of all Iraqi workers employed by the government, some observers express concern that sustained pressure on state finances and economic activity could lead to more intense street violence and unrest, and/or contribute to an Islamic State resurgence.54
Iraq's draft 2020 budget assumed an oil export price of $56 per barrel. According to one projection from mid-March 2020—when prices were less than half that level—Iraq would have been "likely to earn less than $3 billion per month, given its recent rate of exports—leaving a monthly deficit of more than $2 billion just to pay current expenditures."55 As of May 2020, it appears that without outside assistance, Iraq will need to draw on reserves (around $65 billion as of early 2020), cut salaries, and/or limit social spending to meet budget needs.
International financial institutions (IFIs), such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), could be one source of external financing for Iraq, but Iraq has not met reform targets set under its last round of agreements with the IMF. From 2016 to 2019, the IMF provided over $5 billion in loans to Iraq to help the country cope with lower oil prices and ensure debt sustainability. Iraq would likely face higher borrowing costs for new sovereign debt offerings, and obtaining commitments from Iraqi authorities as preconditions on further U.S. or IFI support may be complicated by Iraq's contested domestic politics and uncertainty over the future of U.S.-Iraq ties.
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced on April 7 that U.S. officials would engage Iraqi counterparts in a high-level strategic dialogue in June to address the future of the bilateral partnership, including U.S. assistance and the presence of U.S. forces. U.S. forces consolidated their presence to a reduced number of Iraqi facilities in March and April 2020, and the Administration has informed Congress of reductions in U.S. civilian personnel since 2019.
Stabilization in Areas Liberated from the Islamic State As Congress considers the President's FY2021’s FY2022 budget request for MENA, Members have continued to discuss what the appropriate level of U.S. assistance should be to stabilize and reconstruct areas recaptured from the Islamic State grouporganization (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL). Recent U.S. intelligence estimates warn that an IS-fueled insurgent campaign has begun in Syria and Iraq, foresee billions of dollars in reconstruction costs in liberated areas, and suggest that a host of complex, interconnected political, social, and economic challenges may rise from the Islamic State's ashes. According to the International Crisis Group,
In the two years since defeating ISIS, the Iraqi government has made only minimal progress rebuilding post-ISIS areas and reviving their local economies…. There is no reason to assume local resentment will lead residents directly back to ISIS, particularly given their bitter recent experience with the group's rule. Still, both Iraqis and Iraq's foreign partners worry about what might happen if these areas remain ruined and economically depressed.56
Since FY2017, Congress has appropriated over $1 billion in aid According to U.S. intelligence estimates, ISIS is “capable of waging a prolonged insurgency in Iraq and Syria and leading its global organization, despite compounding senior leadership losses.”82 From FY2017 to FY2020, the State Department and USAID obligated nearly $1 billion (see Table 8) from various accounts (ESF, INCLE, NADR, PKO, and FMF57) as part of a "Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF)" to help areas liberated or at risk from the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations.58 Among several conditions on RRF spending, lawmakers have repeatedly mandated in appropriations language that funds designated for the RRF "shall be made available to the maximum extent practicable on a cost-matching basis from sources other than the United States."
Over time, lawmakers have adjusted the RRF's authorities to ensure that assistance be made available for "vulnerable ethnic and religious minority communities affected by conflict." In addition, lawmakers have removed the geographic limitation (Iraq and Syria) on funds appropriated for RRF, and have specified either in bill text or accompanying explanatory statements that RRF funding be made available for Jordan, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, Lebanon, for countries in East and West Africa, the Sahel, and the Lake Chad Basin region. Congress also has appropriated funding specifically to address war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity in Iraq and Syria in recent years, including through the designation of RRF-eligible funds.
Table 9the “Relief and
77 The World Bank, Lebanon Economic Monitor, Fall 2020: The Deliberate Depression, December 1, 2020. 78 “ANALYSIS-Lebanon Frozen by Political Intransigence as It Hurtles Towards Collapse,” Reuters, March 26, 2021. 79 Emiko Terazono and Judith Evans, “Global Food Prices Post Biggest Jump in Decade,” Financial Times, June 3, 2021.
80 Nabil Makkari, “A tale of two audits,” Executive Magazine, April – May 2021. 81 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Lebanon, generated on June 16, 2021. 82 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, April 9, 2021.
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Recovery Fund (RRF)” 83 to help areas liberated or at risk from the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations.84
Table 8. Relief and Recovery Fund
. Relief and Recovery Fund
current U.S. dollars in millions
|
|
|
|
|
|
ESF/ESDF |
95.00 |
209.00 |
28.00 |
100.00 |
135.00 |
FMF |
100.00 |
75.00 |
25.00 |
- |
- |
INCLE |
15.00 |
25.00 |
25.00 |
- |
- |
NADR |
- |
50.00 |
23.00 |
45.00 |
25.00 |
PKO |
25.00 |
80.00 |
40.00 |
- |
- |
Total |
235.00 |
439.00 |
141.00 |
145.00 |
160.00 |
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2018-FY2021), and CRS calculations and rounding.
Notes: FY2020 enacted makes available not less than $200m from ESF, INCLE, NADR, PKO and FMF accounts, of which $10m from ESF and INCLE are to be used for transitional justice programs.
current U.S. dollars in millions
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
actual
actual
actual
actual
(PSF)
(PSF)
allocated
request
ESF
95.00
209.00
28.00
0.70
45.00
75.00
FMF
100.00
75.00
25.00
25.00
17.50
17.50
INCLE
15.00
25.00
25.00
19.44
5.00
10.00
NADR
-
50.00
23.00
23.50
10.00
0.00
PKO
25.00
80.00
40.00
40.00
12.50
12.50
Total
235.00
439.00
141.00
108.64
90.00
115.00
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS calculations. Notes: Pursuant to the Global Fragility Act (Title V, Division J, P.L. 116-94) the FY2021 Omnibus (Division K, P.L. 116-260) replaced the RRF with a new Prevention and Stabilization Fund (PSF).
In the 116th Congress, lawmakers replaced the RRF with a new “Prevention and Stabilization Fund” or PSF.85 The PSF, which received a $200 million per year authorization through FY2024, may provide assistance to “areas liberated or at risk from, or under the control of, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, other terrorist organizations, or violent extremist organizations, including for stabilization assistance for vulnerable ethnic and religious minority communities affected by conflict.”
For stabilization efforts in Iraq, USAID has used ESF and ESF-OCO (Overseas Contingency Operations) funds to contribute to the United Nations Development Program'’s Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS). To date, more than $396405 million in U.S. stabilization aid has flowed to liberated areas of Iraq, largely through the FFS—which remains the main international conduit for post-IS stabilization assistance in liberated areas of Iraq. USAID is the largest donor to the FFS, which has received $1.4 billion from 28 global donors since 2015.86
The United States has provided more than $1.3 billion in stabilization assistance for Syria since 2011.87 Stabilization assistance focuses on projects in non-regime held areas, particularly those 83 Funds designated for the Relief and Recovery Fund were subject to the authorities and availability of the specific accounts in which such funds were appropriated. For example, funds appropriated by acts for ESF, INCLE, and NADR are available for two fiscal years, while PKO and FMF funds are made available for one fiscal year, except for funds in those accounts that are designated as Overseas Contingency Operations funds, which are also available for two years.
84 Prior to the creation of the RRF, Congress had already appropriated more than $1 billion in Economic Support Fund-Overseas Contingency Operations (ESF-OCO) funding “for programs to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, other terrorist organizations, and violent extremism, and address the needs of populations impacted by such organizations.” See, P.L. 114-254, Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act. Congress has appropriated foreign assistance designated for the RRF in: P.L. 115-31 (FY2017 - $169 million), P.L. 115-141 (FY2018 - $500 million), P.L. 116-6 (FY2019 - $200 million), and P.L. 116-94 (FY2020 - $200 million).
85 Pursuant to the Global Fragility Act (Title V, Division J, P.L. 116-94) the FY2021 Omnibus (Division K, P.L. 116-260), replaced the RRF with the PSF.
86 See https://www.usaid.gov/iraq/stabilization. 87 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations With Syria,” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 10, 2021.
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liberated from Islamic State control. It aims to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State, and to enable the restoration of essential services—which would allow the safe return of displaced persons. The State Department also has described stabilization assistance as a “counterweight” to the destabilizing influence of Iran, Russia, and the Syrian government.88 In 2020, State Department and USAID stabilization programs in Syria included vocational training, seed and fertilizer distribution, and the rehabilitation of several bakeries and a desalination plant.
stabilization assistance in liberated areas of Iraq. The Trump Administration also has directed U.S. contributions to the FFS to address the needs of vulnerable religious and ethnic minority communities in Ninewa Plain, western Ninewa, and communities displaced from those areas to other parts of northern Iraq.
As U.S. officials continue to seek greater Iraqi and international contributions to stabilization efforts in Iraq, the scale of what is needed to rebuild Iraq has far exceeded international efforts to date. In 2018, experts from the World Bank and the Iraqi government concluded that the country would need $45 billion to repair civilian infrastructure that had been damaged or destroyed since 2014.59 At the 2018 Kuwait International Conference for Reconstruction of Iraq, the Iraqi government requested $88 billion from the international community for rebuilding efforts – it received pledges of $30 billion. According to one United Nations official, as of late 2019, just over $1 billion in reconstruction pledges have been delivered from donors.60
Stabilization needs in Syria also are extensive—the conflict has entered its tenth year and analysts have estimated that the cost of conflict damage and lost economic activity could exceed $388 billion.61 The Trump Administration generally has supported stabilization programming in areas of Syria controlled by U.S.-backed Kurdish forces and liberated from the Islamic State, while seeking to prevent such aid from flowing to areas of Syria controlled by the government of Syrian President Bashar al Asad. However, in 2018 and 2019, the Administration sought to shift responsibility for the funding of stabilization activities to other coalition partners. In contrast to prior years, the Administration's FY2020 and FY2021 foreign assistance budget requests have sought no Syria-specific funding, but as noted above, the FY2021 request states that "ESDF funding in the RRF will allow the State Department and USAID to support efforts in places like Syria" and other countries. In late 2019, USAID reported that donor funds for stabilization activities in Syria were nearly depleted.62 In October 2019, the Trump Administration announced that it was releasing $50 million in stabilization funding for Syria to support civil society groups, ethnic and religious minorities affected by the conflict, the removal of explosive remnants, and the documentation of human rights abuses. These funds were notified to Congress in early 2020, and consist primarily of FY2019 ESF-OCO funds, with $14 million in RRF-designated funds from various accounts.
The Trump Administration has stated its intent not to contribute to the reconstruction of Asad-controlled areas of Syria absent a political settlement to the country's civil conflict, and to use U.S. diplomatic influence to discourage other international assistance to Asad-controlled Syria. Congress also has acted to restrict the availability of U.S. funds for assistance projects in Asad-held areas.63 In the absence of U.S. engagement, other actors such as Russia or China could conceivably provide additional assistance for reconstruction purposes, but may be unlikely to mobilize sufficient resources or adequately coordinate investments with other members of the international community to meet Syria's considerable needs. Predatory conditional assistance could also further indebt the Syrian government to these or other international actors and might strengthen strategic ties between Syria and third parties in ways inimical to U.S. interests. A lack of reconstruction, particularly of critical infrastructure, could delay the country's recovery and exacerbate the legacy effects of the conflict on the Syrian population, with negative implications for the country's security and stability.
Human Rights and Foreign Aid to MENA In conducting diplomacy in the Middle East and providing foreign aid to friendly states, it has been an ongoing challenge for the United States to balance short-termthe United States has faced the challenge of balancing national security interests with the promotion of democratic principles. At times, executiveExecutive branch officials and some Members of Congress have judged that ensuringthat cooperation necessary to ensure stability and facilitatefacilitating counterterrorism cooperation requires partnerships at times requires partnering with governments that do not meet basic standards of democracy, good governance, or respect for human rights.
Nevertheless, successive
Successive Administrations and Congress also at times have used policy levers, such as conditional foreign aid, to demandtry to promote changes in behavior from partner governments accused of either suppressing their own populations or committing human rights abuses in military operations. In some instances, policymakers have taken action intended to reinforce democratic principles in U.S.-MENA diplomacy and to comply with U.S. and international law, while preserving basic security cooperation.
Examples of provisions of U.S. law that limit the provision of U.S. foreign assistance in instances when a possible gross violation of human rights has occurred include, among others:
In addition to the U.S. Code, annual appropriations legislation contains several general and MENA-specific provisions that restrict aid to human rights violators.66 Recent annual appropriations legislation conditioning U.S. aid to Egypt is one of the more prominent examples of how policymakers have attempted to leverage foreign aid as a tool to promote U.S. values abroad.
Section 7041(a) of P.L. 116-94 contains the most recent legislative language conditioning aid to Egypt. The Act includes a provision that withholds $300 million of FMF funds67 until the Secretary of State certifies that the Government of Egypt is taking effective steps to advance, among other things, democracy and human rights in Egypt.68 The Secretary of State may waive this certification requirement, though any waiver must be accompanied by a justification to the appropriations committees.
Members of Congress and the broader foreign policy community continue to debate the efficacy of using foreign aid as leverage to promote greater respect for human rights in the Middle East and elsewhere. After the January 2020 death of an American citizen incarcerated in Egypt,69 one report suggests that the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs has raised the option of possibly cutting up to $300 million in foreign aid to Egypt.70 In 2017, the Trump Administration reduced FMF aid to Egypt by $65.7 million, citing "Egyptian inaction on a number of critical requests by the United States, including Egypt's ongoing relationship with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, lack of progress on the 2013 convictions of U.S. and Egyptian nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers, and the enactment of a restrictive NGO law that will likely complicate ongoing and future U.S. assistance to the country."71
Country |
House |
Senate |
Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying H.R. 1865 |
Egypt |
The bill would provide $1.402 billion for assistance for Egypt, including up to $102.5 million in ESF of which not less than $35 million should be made available for higher education programs including not less than $15 million for scholarships, and up to $1.3 billion in FMF, provided that 20% of such funds shall be withheld from obligation until the Secretary of State certifies "that the Government of Egypt is taking the steps enumerated under this section in the report accompanying this Act." The Secretary of State may waive the certification requirement with respect to 95% of the amount withheld from obligation. The remaining 5% may only be made available for obligation if the Secretary of State determines "that the Government of Egypt has completed action to provide fair and commensurate compensation to American citizen April Corley for injuries suffered by Egyptian armed forces on September 13, 2015." The bill also includes authority for loan guarantees for Egypt. |
The bill would provide $1.438 billion for assistance for Egypt, including not less than $125 million in ESF, of which not less than $40 million should be made available for higher education programs, including not less than $15 million for scholarships, and not less than $1.3 billion in FMF, provided that $300 million of FMF funds shall be withheld from obligation until the Secretary of State certifies that the Government of Egypt is taking sustained and effective steps to, among other things, advance democracy and human rights in Egypt. In making the certification, the Committee recommends the submission of reports on the cases of American citizens detained in Egypt, Egypt's compliance with end-user monitoring agreements for the use of U.S. military equipment in the Sinai, and efforts by the Government of Egypt to compensate April Corley. The bill also includes authority for loan guarantees for Egypt. |
The Act provides not less than $125 million in ESF, of which not less than $40 million should be made available for higher education programs, including not less than $15 million for scholarships, and not less than $1.3 billion in FMF, provided that $300 million of FMF funds shall be withheld from obligation until the Secretary of State certifies that the Government of Egypt is taking sustained and effective steps to, among other things, advance democracy and human rights in Egypt, release political prisoners. The Act requires reports from the Secretary of State to congressional committees on efforts by the Government of Egypt to compensate April Corley and on the implementation of Egyptian Law 149/2019 and its impact on Egyptian and foreign NGOs. The Act also includes authority for loan guarantees and financing for the procurement of defense articles to Egypt. |
Iran |
Same as enacted bill text. |
Would make funds available under ESF for democracy programs, and for the semi-annual report required of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. |
Funds appropriated under the Diplomatic Programs, ESF, and NADR accounts shall be made available 1) to support U.S. policy to prevent Iran from achieving the capability to produce or otherwise obtain a nuclear weapon; 2) support an expeditious response to any violation of UNSC resolutions; 3) to support the implementation, enforcement, and renewal of sanctions against Iran; and 4) for democracy programs in Iran. The Act also requires a semi-annual report required of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and a report on sanctions. |
Iraq |
The bill does not specify a precise amount of aid, but would make funds available "for assistance for Iraq for economic, stabilization, and humanitarian programs... None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used by the Government of the United States to enter into a permanent basing rights agreement between the United States and Iraq." Report language notes that funding may be used for the Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and for programs to protect and assist religious and ethnic minority populations in Iraq. "The Committee directs not less than $50,000,000 of the funds provided in this Act for stabilization and recovery assistance be made available for assistance to support the safe return of displaced religious and ethnic minorities to their communities in Iraq." |
The bill would provide $453.6 million, including not less than $150 million in ESF, not less than $47 million in NADR, and not less than $250 million in FMF, for assistance for Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The Committee recommends not less than $7.5 million for the Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund, not less than $10 million for scholarships for students in Iraq, and a report assessing the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary of Iraq. |
The Act makes funds available under titles III and IV for bilateral economic and international security assistance, including in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and for the Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund ($7.5 million); stabilization assistance, humanitarian assistance, programs to protect religious and ethnic minority populations, and for scholarships ($10 million). The JES states that the Secretary of State "shall work with the Government of Iraq to ensure security forces reflect the ethno-sectarian makeup of the areas in which they operate...." The Act states that any change in the status of operations at the U.S. Consulate General in Basrah shall be subject to prior consultation with the appropriate congressional committees. None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be used to enter into a permanent basing rights agreement between the U.S. and Iraq. The Act also provides $40 million in NADR funding for conventional weapons destruction, makes funds available from the Relief and Recovery Fund for humanitarian demining in Iraq, and makes funds available for the Counterterrorism Partnership Funds for programs in areas affected by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. |
Israel |
The bill would provide $3.3 billion in FMF and $5 million in MRA for refugee resettlement. |
The bill would provide $3.3 billion in FMF and $5 million in MRA for refugee resettlement. The bill would make not less than $30 million available under ESF and DA to support reconciliation programs, including between Israelis and Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. |
The Act provides $3.3 billion in FMF and $5 million in MRA for refugee resettlement. The Act also makes not less than $30 million available under DA to support reconciliation programs, including between Israelis and Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. |
Jordan |
The bill would provide not less than $1.525 billion for assistance to Jordan, including not less than $745.1 million in ESF for budget support for the Government of Jordan and not less than $425 million in FMF. The bill also includes authority for loan guarantees for Jordan. |
The bill would provide not less than $1.65 billion for assistance to Jordan, including not less than $745.1 million for budget support, not less than $425 million in FMF, and not less than $125 million from ESF balances in prior acts. The Committee recommends the establishment of an enterprise fund for Jordan. The bill also authorizes loan guarantees for Jordan. |
The Act provides not less than $1.525 billion for assistance to Jordan, including not less than $745.1 million in ESF for budget support for the Government of Jordan, not less than $425 million in FMF, not less than $13.6 million in NADR and not less than $4 million in IMET. The Act makes available not less than $125 million ESF funds appropriated in prior Acts for budget support to the Government of Jordan and to increase electricity transmission to neighboring countries. The Act also includes authority for loan guarantees for Jordan. |
Lebanon |
The Committee recommends $56.2 million in ESF and $56.3 million in DA, of which $12 million is for scholarships. Bill language specifies that INCLE and FMF funds may be made available for the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to address security and stability requirements in areas affected by the conflict in Syria. FMF funds may be used only to professionalize the LAF and to strengthen border security and combat terrorism. FMF funds may not be obligated for assistance for the LAF until the Secretary of State submits to the Committees on Appropriations a spend plan, including actions to be taken to ensure equipment provided to the LAF is only used for the intended purposes. Aid shall not be made available for the ISF or the LAF if these entities fall under control by a foreign terrorist organization. |
The bill would provide not less than $244 million in assistance to pursue the resolution of border disputes between Lebanon and Israel, including not less than $115 million in ESF, $10 million in INCLE, $11 million in NADR, $3 million in IMET, and not less than $105 million in FMF only for programs to professionalize the LAF, strengthen border security and combat terrorism, and implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. The Committee recommends not less than $5 million for not-for-profit educational institutions in Lebanon and $12 million for scholarships for students in Lebanon. The Committee expects that no funds made available by the act will benefit or legitimize Hizballah or any other FTOs operating in Lebanon. |
|
Libya |
|
The bill would provide not less than $40 million ($27 million ESF, $11 million NADR, $2 million INCLE) for stabilization assistance and continues limitations on assistance similar to the prior fiscal year. |
The Act makes funds available for stabilization assistance for Libya, including support for a United Nations-facilitated political process and border security, provided that the Secretary of State certifies that mechanisms are in place for monitoring, oversight, and control of such funds. The agreement includes not less than $40 million under the Relief and Recovery Fund for stabilization assistance for Libya. |
Morocco and Western Sahara |
|
The bill does not specify a precise amount of aid, but would make economic assistance funds available for Western Sahara, provided that "not later than 90 days after enactment of this Act and prior to the obligation of such funds, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the USAID Administrator, shall consult with the Committees on Appropriations on the proposed uses of such funds," and that "nothing in this Act shall be construed to change the policy of the United States to support the United Nations-led process to monitor the ceasefire and bring about a peaceful, sustainable, and mutually agreed upon solution for the Western Sahara." The Committee recommends not less than $41 million ($20 million ESF, $10 million FMF, $5 million INCLE, $4 million NADR, $2 million IMET), with NADR funds used to bolster counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria and Tunisia, and to address security threats emanating from Libya and in the Sahel. |
The Act makes funds available under title III for assistance for the Western Sahara, "provided that not later than 90 days after enactment of this Act and prior to the obligation of such funds, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the USAID Administrator, shall consult with the Committees on Appropriations on the proposed uses of such funds." The Act also states that FMF "may only be used for the purposes requested in the Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2017." The JES states that additional funds provided for Morocco under NADR shall be used to address security threats emanating from Libya and the Sahel. |
Saudi Arabia |
The bill specifies that none of the funds appropriated by this Act should be used to support the sale of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia. The Committee also recommends the submission of a report to the appropriate congressional committees regarding the murder of Jamal Khashoggi on October 2, 2018. |
Same as enacted bill text. |
|
Syria |
The bill does not specify a precise amount of aid, but would make funds under ESF, INCLE, and PKO available for nonlethal stabilization assistance for Syria, including for emergency medical and rescue response and chemical weapons use investigations. The bill would prohibit any funds from supporting or otherwise legitimizing the government of Iran, the Government of the Russian Federation, foreign terrorist organizations, or a proxy of Iran, and states that funds should not be used in areas controlled by the Asad government. The Committee recommends the submission of a report detailing the dangers Syrian refugees face and what the United States, the United Nations, other nations, and international partners can do to alleviate suffering and secure the safety of returning refugees, as well as a detailed assessment on the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Syria. |
The bill would provide not less than $130 million ($105 million in ESF) for nonlethal stabilization assistance for Syria. The Committee recommends $25 million for stabilization programs in a "safe zone" in Syria, and $10 million in Relief and Recovery Funds for Syria, The Committee "encourages the Secretary of State, in consultation with the USAID Administrator, to secure the commitment of the Government of Turkey to cooperate with international and local partners on all aspects of delivering assistance and access to all populations within the zone, including facilitation of registration, unfettered movement, and accessibility of key border crossings." |
|
Tunisia |
The bill would provide not less than $191.4 million for assistance for Tunisia (accompanying report specifies $40 million DA, $45 million ESF, $85 million FMF). The bill also includes authority for loan guarantees for Tunisia. |
Same as enacted bill text. |
The Act provides not less than $191.4 million for Tunisia, in addition to $50 million in prior-year ESF appropriations. The bill also includes authority for loan guarantees for Tunisia. |
West Bank/Gaza |
The bill contains several sections detailing U.S. policy in West Bank/Gaza: Sections 7038 (Palestinian Statehood), 7039 (Limitations on aid to the PA), 7040 (West Bank/Gaza limitations), and 7048 (UNRWA). The Committee recommends a total of $226.55 million in multilateral assistance to support humanitarian and development efforts "as part of a broader policy objective to keep the goal of a two-state solution viable by providing resources through international organizations to address human needs in the West Bank and Gaza." Such assistance "shall only be provided to international organizations that are currently operating in the West Bank and Gaza and that adhere to the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality, humanity, and neutrality." |
The bill would continue the terms and conditions of assistance to the West Bank and Gaza contained in P.L. 116-6. The Committee recommends "not less than $75 million for security assistance for the West Bank under title IV of this act and prior acts" and a reporting requirement on private sector partnership programs to support joint Palestinian and Israeli businesses and to encourage commerce between Israeli and Palestinian businesses in the West Bank. |
|
Yemen |
|
The bill would provide not less than $40 million for stabilization assistance, of which not less than $15 million is to be administered by the U.N. Development Program, and not less than $5 million is to be used to meet the needs of vulnerable populations including women and girls. |
The Act makes $40 million in title III funds from this Act and prior Acts available for stabilization assistance in Yemen, including for a contribution for United Nations stabilization and governance facilities, and to meet the needs of vulnerable populations, including women and girls. |
Source: S.Rept. 116-126 and H.Rept. 116-78 accompanying H.R. 2839 (which was rolled into H.R. 2740), and the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division G – Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020.
Notes: For brevity, authors have paraphrased bill text and accompanying committee reports.
Appendix A.
Common Foreign Assistance Acronyms and Abbreviations
1206 |
Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military forces |
CCF |
Complex Crises Fund |
CTPF |
Counter-Terrorism Partnerships Fund |
DA |
Development Assistance |
DOD |
Department of Defense |
DOS |
Department of State |
ERMA |
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance |
ESF |
Economic Support Fund |
ESDF |
Economic Support and Development Fund (account requested to replace ESF and DA) |
FMF |
Foreign Military Financing |
GHCS |
Global Health Child Survival |
IDA |
International Disaster Assistance |
IMET |
International Military Education and Training |
IMF |
International Monetary Fund |
INCLE |
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement |
JES |
Joint Explanatory Statement |
MCC |
Millennium Challenge Corporation |
MOU |
Memorandum of Understanding |
MRA |
Migration and Refugees Assistance |
NADR |
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs |
NGO |
Non-Governmental Organization |
OCO |
Overseas Contingency Operations |
ODA |
Official Development Assistance |
PKO |
Peacekeeping Operations |
P.L. 480 |
Food for Peace/Food Aid |
T&E |
Train & Equip |
TI |
Transition Initiatives |
USAID |
U.S. Agency for International Development |
Author Contact Information
1. |
For the purposes of this report, the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), or what the State Department calls "Near East" Affairs (NEA), is defined as an area stretching from Morocco in the west to the Persian/Arabian Gulf in the east, excluding Turkey. It comprises: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank/Gaza, and Yemen. The governments of Iran (since 1984) and Syria (since 1979) are prohibited under law from receiving U.S. bilateral aid because they are U.S.-designated State Sponsors of Terrorism. See CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by Dianne E. Rennack. |
2. |
While foreign assistance can take many forms, in most cases, U.S. foreign assistance is channeled through a U.S. government-managed economic or military program rather than a direct cash transfer to a recipient nation. In the MENA region, most U.S. military aid to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors. For general information on how U.S. foreign assistance works, see CRS Report R40213, Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, by Marian L. Lawson and Emily M. Morgenstern. |
3. |
For assistance with foreign aid terminology and acronyms, please see the glossary appended to this report. |
4. |
Sustaining Health Outcomes through the Private Sector Project and Health Finance and Governance Project. 2018, Trends in Health Financing and the Private Health, Sector in the Middle East and North Africa, Rockville, MD: Abt Associates Inc. |
5. |
According to Jihad Azour, Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department at the International Monetary Fund, "We project the region to contract this year, with substantial economic impact. This downward revision of more than 4 percentage points of GDP in one year is equivalent to removing $425 billion from the region's total output. For nearly all countries, these revisions are higher than those seen during the global financial crisis in 2008." See, "Press Remarks by Jihad Azour on the Economic Outlook for the Middle East and Central Asia," International Monetary Fund, April 15, 2020. |
6. |
See CRS Insight IN11279, COVID-19 and U.S. Iran Policy, by Kenneth Katzman. |
7. |
Lewis Sanders IV, "Coronavirus: Gaza faces worst-case scenario," Deutsche Welle, March 18, 2020; Anna Ahronheim, "Concern of potential coronavirus outbreak in Gaza grows," Jerusalem Post, March 15, 2020. |
8. |
U.S. State Department, U.S. Humanitarian Assistance in Response to the Syria Crisis, March 14, 2019. |
9. |
Since MCC's inception, it has agreed to three aid compacts (five-year grant agreements) with MENA countries: Morocco (2007-2012, $697 million), Jordan (2011-2016, $275 million), and Morocco II (2017-2022, $450 million). The MCC's FY2019 budget proposal included $292 million for a Tunisia compact focusing on water scarcity and job creation, possibly to be signed in 2020. |
10. |
DOD's global train and equip activities were originally authorized by Section 1206 (FY2006 NDAA, P.L. 109-163), as amended. Section 1206 was the first major DOD authority to be used expressly for the purpose of training and equipping the national military forces of foreign countries worldwide. The authority was later codified as 10 U.S.C. 2282 in the FY2015 NDAA (P.L. 113-291). Activities permitted under 10 U.S.C. 2282 have been incorporated into a new, broader global train and equip authority established by Section 1241(c) of the FY2017 NDAA: 10 U.S.C. 333. This provision also repealed prior authorities, such as: 10 U.S.C. 2282: Building capacity of foreign forces; Section 1204 (FY2014 NDAA, P.L. 113-66): Authority to conduct activities to enhance the capabilities of foreign countries to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; Section 1207 (FY2014 NDAA, P.L. 113-66): Assistance to the Government of Jordan for border security operations; and Section 1033 (FY1998 NDAA, P.L. 105-85, as amended): Assistance for additional counternarcotics support for specified countries. |
11. |
CSF authorizes the Secretary of Defense to reimburse key cooperating countries for logistical, military, and other support, including access, to or in connection with U.S. military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Syria and to assist such nations with U.S.-funded equipment, supplies, and training. CSF is authorized by Section 1233 (FY2008 NDAA, P.L. 110-181), as amended and extended. |
12. |
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (P.L. 114-328) and The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31) created the Counter-ISIL Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), since renamed the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund. The CTEF is designed to allow the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to transfer funds, equipment, and related capabilities to partner countries in order to counter emergent ISIS threats. The CTEF is the primary account for the Syria and Iraq Train and Equip Programs. It replaced the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF). The underlying authorities for the Department of Defense Syria and Iraq train and equip programs are Sections 1209 and 1236 of P.L. 113-291, as amended. |
13. |
DOD is authorized, under Chapter 48 of Title 10, U.S.C., to build foreign countries' capacity to prevent nuclear proliferation. Over the past five years, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency has provided training and equipment to border security forces in several Middle Eastern countries under this authority, including Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Tunisia. CRS Report R43143, The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress, by Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Amy F. Woolf. |
14. |
The 11th Annual ASDA'A BCW Arab Youth Survey 2019 was conducted by international polling firm PSB to explore attitudes among Arab youth in 15 countries and territories in the Middle East and North Africa. See, http://arabyouthsurvey.com/findings.html. |
15. |
International Monetary Fund, MENA Region, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia Update, April 2019. |
16. |
Israel, Egypt and Jordan combined have received $280.1 billion from 1945-2018. USAID, U.S. Overseas Grants and Loans, July 1, 1945 through September 30, 2018. |
17. |
ESDF refers to a proposal by the Administration, which Congress has not enacted to date, to merge the ESF account with several other foreign aid accounts. |
18. |
Appropriators directed in the final FY2020 appropriations Act that $11 million in ESF be provided to strengthen Syrian civil society groups. Funds also were appropriated for Relief and Recovery Fund stabilization programs that could be used in Syria. |
19. |
Recent amendments to ATCA contained in the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA) as § 903 of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, P.L. 116-94 could facilitate the resumption of various types of aid to the Palestinians, though it is unclear whether the Palestinians would cooperate with a U.S. effort to provide aid given certain provisions in the PSJVTA. In the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying P.L. 116-94, appropriators also provided $75 million in ESF and $75 million in INCLE for humanitarian/development and security assistance programs respectively. |
20. |
For additional background, please see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. |
21. |
For additional background, see CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp. |
22. |
"Here's One U.S. - Egypt Success Story," Washington Post, April 5, 2019. |
23. |
For additional background, see CRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp. |
24. |
U.S. State Department, New U.S.-Jordan Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Jordan, Fact Sheet, February 14, 2018. |
25. |
Other budget support aid recipients include: the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau. |
26. |
U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheets: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance in Response to the Syria Crisis, March 14, 2019. |
27. |
For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10404, Iraq and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard, and CRS Report R45633, Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress, by Christopher M. Blanchard. |
28. |
Solomon Moore, "Secret Iraqi Deal Shows Problems in Arms Orders," New York Times, April 13, 2008; and, U.S. State Department, U.S. Security Cooperation With Iraq, March 22, 2017. |
29. |
U.S. State Department, U.S. Security Cooperation with Iraq, March 22, 2017. |
30. |
For more background, see CRS Report RS21666, Tunisia: In Brief, by Alexis Arieff. |
31. |
In February 2020, DSCA notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Tunisia of four AT-6C Wolverine Light Attack Aircraft for an estimated cost of $325.8 million. This notification followed an earlier one for 12 T-6C Texan trainer aircraft for an estimated cost of $234 million. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Transmittal No: 19-71, February 26, 2020; and DSCA news release, "Tunisia – T-6C Texan Trainer Aircraft," October 10, 2019. Without FMF loan authority, it is unclear whether Tunisia would use FMF grant aid, its own national funds, or some other source to finance these purchases. |
32. |
For additional background, please see CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud. |
33. |
U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Lebanon Military Assistance and Defense Cooperation, February 13, 2019. |
34. |
Other ongoing MEPI programs include the Tomorrow's Leaders Scholarship Program, which provides scholarships for students across the Arab world. MEPI also funds a mid-career training program called the Leaders for Democracy Fellowship program, which provides professionals with training in democracy studies and political mobilization. |
35. |
Using the appropriations process, Congress has acted to ensure that "democracy and governance activities shall not be subject to the prior approval by the government of any foreign country." Originally referred to as the Brownback amendment, this legislative language began in reference to Egypt, but was expanded in FY2009 to include "any foreign country." See Section 7032 (e) of P.L. 116-94. |
36. | For more background, please see CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report R46274, The Palestinians and Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction, by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea. |
37. |
Matthew Lee, "In a Twist, Trump Fights to Keep Some Palestinian Aid Alive," Associated Press, November 30, 2018; Scott R. Anderson, "Congress Has (Less Than) 60 Days to Save Israeli-Palestinian Security Cooperation," Lawfare Blog, December 7, 2018. |
38. |
Transcript of October 29, 2019, hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism. |
39. |
See, CRS Report R46274, The Palestinians and Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction, by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea. |
40. |
Barak Ravid, "Trump told officials that Netanyahu should pay security aid to Palestinians," Axios, November 6, 2019. |
41. |
CRS Report R44245, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti; CRS In Focus IF10644, The Palestinians: Overview and Key Issues for U.S. Policy, by Jim Zanotti. |
42. |
See Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer, "Trump Pressures Palestinians and Allies over Peace Plan," foreignpolicy.com, February 11, 2020; Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2021, stating (at p. 77), "The creation of this fund sends a clear signal that additional support from the United States can be made available for governments that choose to engage positively to advance peace and/or shared diplomatic goals." |
43. |
Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren, Letter to State Department re assistance to help combat coronavirus in Palestinian Territories, March 26, 2020. |
44. |
Amir Tibon, "Coronavirus Grant to Palestinians not a Policy Change on Aid Cuts," U.S. officials say, Haaretz, April 17, 2020. |
45. |
For additional background, please see CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud. |
46. |
For example, see House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Terrorism and Iran, testimony of General Joseph Votel, February 27, 2018. |
47. |
Richard Natonski and Thomas Trask, "US has Given Lebanese Armed Forces a Pass with Hezbollah — Conditioning Aid is Necessary," The Hill, July 5, 2019. |
48. |
Amir Tibon, "Pentagon, State Dep't, U.S. Evangelicals and Israel Battle Over Lebanese Army Aid," Ha'aretz, November 23, 2019. |
49. |
Edward Wong, Vivian Yee and Michael Crowley, "White House Freezes Military Aid to Lebanon, Against Wishes of Congress, State Dept. and Pentagon," New York Times, November 1, 2019. |
50. |
Some lawmakers also expressed surprise about the hold, particularly after having been notified in September 2019 that the FMF had already been obligated. See: https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/files/1/d/1d24fcaa-be96-4fba-aac4-ddbe7ff7628d/5F2FEC146CE4D8D6AEDB3F158E778C73.11-8-19---chairman-engel-deutch-letter-to-omb-nsc-re-lebanon-fmf.pdf. |
51. |
Government Accountability Office, Report # GAO-20-176, Security Assistance: Actions Needed to Assess U.S. Activities and Ensure Timely Inspections of Equipment Transferred to Lebanon, December 2019. |
52. |
"U.S. will continue support for Lebanese Army: Esper," Daily Star (Beirut), February 16, 2020. |
53. |
For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10404, Iraq and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard. |
54. |
Alissa J. Rubin, "Oil Prices Crash, Virus Hits, Commerce Stops: Iraq Is in Trouble," New York Times, March 29, 2020. |
55. |
Ben Van Heuvelen, Cathy Otten, and Ben Lando, Iraqi economic crisis looms as oil prices collapse, Iraq Oil Report, March 11, 2020. |
56. |
International Crisis Group, "Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria," Report 207, October 11, 2019. |
57. |
Funds designated for the Relief and Recovery Fund are subject to the authorities and availability of the specific accounts in which such funds are appropriated. For example, funds appropriated by acts for ESF, INCLE, and NADR are available for two fiscal years, while PKO and FMF funds are made available for one fiscal year, except for funds in those accounts that are designated as Overseas Contingency Operations funds, which are also available for two years. |
58. |
Prior to the creation of the RRF, Congress had already appropriated more than $1 billion in Economic Support Fund-Overseas Contingency Operations (ESF-OCO) funding "for programs to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, other terrorist organizations, and violent extremism, and address the needs of populations impacted by such organizations." See, P.L. 114-254, Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act. Congress has appropriated foreign assistance designated for the RRF in: P.L. 115-31 (FY2017 - $169 million), P.L. 115-141 (FY2018 - $500 million), P.L. 116-6 (FY2019 - $200 million), and P.L. 116-94 (FY2020 - $200 million). |
59. |
Michael R. Gordon and Isabel Coles, "Defeat of ISIS in Iraq Caused $45.7 Billion in Damage to Infrastructure, Study Finds," Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2018. |
60. |
"Billions Still Needed to Rebuild Iraq, Only 'a Drop in the Ocean' Received," United Nations News, November 27, 2019. |
61. |
U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, "Experts discuss post-conflict reconstruction policies after political agreement in Syria," August 7, 2018. |
62. |
Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve I Quarterly Report to the United States Congress I October 1, 2019 – December 31, 2019. |
63. |
Section 7041(i)(2)(C) of Division G of P.L. 116-94 states that FY2020 funds made available for authorized purposes in Syria "should not be used in areas of Syria controlled by a government led by Bashar al-Assad or associated forces." |
64. |
In the 116th Congress, Senator Murphy has sponsored S.Res. 243 that, among other things, would require the Secretary of State, pursuant to Section 502B(c) of the FAA, to provide Congress with an assessment of "whether extraordinary circumstances exist that necessitate a continuation of security assistance for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." |
65. |
See CRS In Focus IF11197, U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions, by Paul K. Kerr and Liana W. Rosen. |
66. |
For example, see Section 7008 of P.L. 116-94, the FY2020 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act. For background information on Section 7008, see CRS In Focus IF11267, Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations, by Alexis Arieff, Marian L. Lawson, and Susan G. Chesser. |
67. |
The $300 million FMF withholding pending certification is an increase from prior years. In the FY2017 Omnibus, appropriators withheld 15% of FMF ($195 million) pending certification. |
68. |
The FMF certification requirement for Egypt in P.L. 116-94 does not apply to funds appropriated for counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation programs. |
69. |
For background, see CRS Insight IN11216, Egypt: Death of American Citizen and Congressional Response, by Jeremy M. Sharp. |
70. |
Jack Detsch, Robbie Gramer, Colum Lynch, "After Death of U.S. Citizen, State Department Floats Slashing Egypt Aid," Foreignpolicy.com, March 31, 2020. |
71. |
Congressional Notification Transmittal Sheet, Mary K. Waters, Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs, January 23, 2018. |