Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress

March 26, 2019 – July 17, 2020 R45633

Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress
July 17, 2020
Iraq’s unicameral legislature, the Council of Representatives (COR), voted to approve Prime
Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi’s government program in May 2020 and finished confirmation of
Christopher M. Blanchard
his cabinet in June, ending a months-long political vacuum. Al Kadhimi has billed his
Specialist in Middle
government as transitional, pledging to move to early elections as soon as they can be held safely
Eastern Affairs
and fairly. He has acknowledged and begun acting to address the demands of protestors, whose

mass demonstrations paralyzed Iraq in late 2019 and early 2020, and led to former prime minister
Adel Abd al Mahdi’s resignation in November 2019. Kadhimi and his cabinet are contending

with difficult choices and risks stemming from ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, diminished oil
revenues, resulting fiscal pressures, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and remnants of the Islamic State
organization (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL).
U.S.-Iraqi cooperation has achieved several shared goals in recent years, but joint efforts also have faced significant
challenges. U.S. and coalition military assistance aided Iraqi efforts to end IS control of Iraqi territory from 2014 through
2018, and since have continued to support Iraqi counterterrorism operations and efforts to stabilize recovered areas and build
the capacity of Iraqi security forces. U.S. military personnel and coalition counterparts remain in Iraq at the government’s
invitation, subject to bilateral executive-to-executive agreements. Iraqi forces evicted IS forces from urban strongholds with
coalition assistance, but IS fighters continue to prosecute attacks from rural and remote areas, with the pace and scope of
attacks increasing since mid-2019.
During 2019 and early 2020, deepening U.S.-Iranian-Iraqi security strains amplified underlying political disputes among
Iraqis over the leadership of their government and the future of Iraq’s international orientation and partnerships. These
disputes were a significant factor in the delayed formation of the new Iraqi government. As confrontation between the United
States and Iran has intensified, some Iraqis have grown more insistent in demanding an end to the presence of U.S. and other
coalition military forces in Iraq.
Tensions increased during 2019 as Iran-backed Iraqi militia targeted U.S. and Iraqi military and civilian personnel in a series
of rocket attacks, and as unclaimed airstrikes in Iraq targeted Iranian officials and Iraqi militia facilities and fighters. After a
rocket attack killed and wounded U.S. contractors in December 2019, President Donald Trump cited U.S. concerns about the
imminent threat of new attacks in ordering the U.S. military to kill Iranian Major General Qas em Soleimani and Iraqi Popular
Mobilization Commission leader Abu Mahdi al Muhandis in Iraq on January 2, 2020. Days later, the Iraqi Council of
Representatives voted to direct the Iraqi government to end operations by international military forces in Iraq. When another
Iraqi militia attack killed and wounded U.S. and United Kingdom (U.K.) forces in March 2020, t he U.S. military conducted
retaliatory airstrikes. Intermittent rocket attacks have continued, with Iraqi officials taking some steps to disrupt hostile
operations by suspects, some of whom are Iran-aligned militia members.
In general, U.S. engagement in Iraq since 2011 has sought to support Iraq’s development as a secure, sovereign democracy.
Successive Administrations have trained and supported Iraqi security forces (including Kurdish peshmerga), while
expressing concern about Iranian influence. Mass protests in Iraq have highlighted underlying demands for systemic political
change amid intensifying economic and social pressures created by the COVID-19 pandemic. To address security issues and
a broader range of shared economic, stabilization, and cultural exchange concerns, U.S. and Iraqi officials began a high-level
strategic dialogue in June 2020 pursuant to the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. The dialogue is set to
address the future of the U.S. military presence in Iraq and develop shared understandings regarding U.S. foreign assistance
and Iraqi reform efforts. The Trump Administration repeatedly has extended a temporary waiver of U.S. sanctions to allow
Iraq to purchase electricity and natural gas from Iran, but the issue may remain a recurrent irritant until Iraq completes plans
to become more energy self-sufficient and diversify its energy partners. In July, Iraqi Finance Minister Ali Allawi announced
that Iraq seeks $5 billion in support from the International Monetary Fund.
In 2019, Congress appropriated additional military and civilian aid for Iraq without certainty about the future of Iraq’s
governing arrangements or about how change in Iraq and to the U.S. military and civilian presence there might affect U.S.
interests. Having appropriated hundreds of millions of dollars more for Iraq programs and authorized continued military
assistance efforts through December 2020, Congress may seek to clarify the Trump Administration’s intentions toward
partnership with Iraq and offer its own perspectives during consideration of the Administration’s FY2021 appropriations
requests and the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act. For background on Iraq, see CRS Report R45025, Iraq:
Back ground and U.S. Policy.

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Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress

Iraq: Map and Country Data

Area: 438,317 sq. km (slightly more than three times the size of New York State)
Population: 38,872,655 (July 2020 estimate), ~59% are 24 years of age or under
Internally Displaced Persons: 1.3 mil ion (April 2020)
Religions: Muslim 95-98% (64-69% Shia, 29-34% Sunni), Christian 1%, Yazidi 1-4% (2015 est.)
Ethnic Groups: Arab 75-80%; Kurdish 15-20%; Turkmen, Assyrian, Shabak, Yazidi, other ~5%. (1987 est.)
Gross Domestic Product [GDP; growth rate]: $227.2 bil ion (2019); 3.9% (2019 est.)
Budget (revenues; expenditure; balance): $89 bil ion, $112 bil ion, -$23 bil ion (2019 est.)
Percentage of Revenue from Oil Exports: 92% (2018)
Current Account Balance (% of GDP): -4.6% (2019 projected)
Foreign Reserves: $68 bil ion (August 2019)
Oil and natural gas reserves: 142.5 bil ion barrels (2017 est., fifth largest); 3.158 tril ion meters3 (2017 est.)
External Debt: $73.43 bil ion (2017 est.)
Sources: Graphic created by CRS using data from U.S. State Department and Esri. Country data from CIA, The World Factbook,
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Iraq Ministry of Finance, and International Organization for Migration.
Note: Select cities in bold.

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link to page 41 link to page 31 Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress

Overview
After more than 17 years of conflict and zero-sum political competition, Iraqis are struggling to
redefine their country’s future and are reconsidering their relationships with the United States,
Iran, and other third parties. Since seeking international military assistance in 2014 to regain
territory seized by the Islamic State organization (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL), Iraqi leaders have implored
international actors to avoid using Iraq as a battleground for their own rivalries and have
attempted to build positive, nonexclusive ties to their neighbors and to global powers.
Nevertheless, Iraq has become a venue for competition and conflict between the United States
and Iran, with resulting violence now raising basic questions about the future of the U.S.-Iraqi
partnership and regional security. When a new government took office in Baghdad in June 2020
after a months-long delay, U.S. and Iraqi officials opened talks on a new foundation for bilateral
ties through a high-level strategic dialogue. In the meantime, Iraqi leaders are grappling with
chal enges posed by lower oil revenues, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic,
and the latent demands of protestors whose demonstrations toppled last Iraqi government.
Iraq: Select History and Background
Iraqis have persevered through intermittent wars, internal conflicts, sanctions, displacements, unrest, and
terrorism for decades. A 2003 U.S.-led invasion ousted the dictatorial government of Saddam Hussein and ended
the decades-long rule of the Baath Party. This created an opportunity for Iraq to establish new democratic, federal
political institutions and reconstitute its security forces. It also ushered in a period of chaos, violence, and political
transition from which the country is stil emerging. Latent tensions among Iraqis that were suppressed and
manipulated under the Baath regime were amplified in the wake of its col apse. Political parties, ethnic groups, an d
religious communities competed with rivals and among themselves for influence in the post-2003 order, amid
sectarian violence, insurgency, and terrorism. Misrule, foreign interference, and corruption also took a heavy tol
on Iraqi society during this period, and continue to undermine public trust and social cohesion.
In 2011, when the United States completed an agreed military withdrawal, Iraq’s gains proved fragile. Security
conditions deteriorated from 2012 through 2014, as the insurgent terrorists of the Islamic State organization (IS,
also cal ed ISIS/ISIL)—the successor to Al Qaeda-linked groups active during the post-2003 transition—drew
strength from conflict in neighboring Syria and seized large areas of northern and western Iraq. From 2014
through 2017, war against the Islamic State dominated events in Iraq, and many pressing social, economic, and
governance chal enges remain to be addressed (See Table 1 for a statistical profile of Iraq). Iraqi security forces
and their foreign partners wrested control of northern and western Iraq back from the Islamic State, but the
group’s remnants remain dangerous and Iraqi politics have grown increasingly fraught.
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) maintains considerable administrative autonomy under Iraq's 2005
constitution. From mid-2014 through October 2017, Kurdish forces took control of many areas that had been
subject to territorial disputes with national authorities prior to the Islamic State’s 2014 advance, including much of
the oil-rich governorate of Kirkuk. However, after the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held a
controversial advisory referendum on independence from Iraq on September 25, 2017 , Iraqi government forces
reasserted security control in many of these areas, leading to some armed confrontations and casualties on both
sides and setting back some Kurds’ aspirations for independence (Figure 7). A reduced security presence in some
disputed territories since then has al owed some IS fighters to regroup and operate.
Across Iraq, including in the KRI, long-standing popular demands for improved service delivery, security, and
effective, honest governance remain widespread. Opposition to uninvited foreign political and security
interference also is shared broadly. Stabilization and reconstruction needs in areas liberated from the Islamic State
are extensive. Paramilitary forces mobilized to fight IS terrorists have grown stronger and more numerous since
the Islamic State's rapid advance in 2014, but have yet to be ful y integrated into national security institutions.
Iraqis are grappling with these political and security issues in an environment shaped by ethnic, religious, regional,
and tribal identities, partisan and ideological differences, personal rivalries, economic disparities, and natural
resource imbalances. Iraq’s neighbors and other international powers are actively pursuing their diplomatic,
economic, and security interests in the country. Iraq’s strategic location, its economic potential, and its diverse
population with ties to neighboring countries underlie its importance to U.S. officials, U.S. partners, and U.S. rivals.
For background and additional sources, see CRS Report R45025, Iraq: Background and U.S. Policy.
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Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress

Figure 1. Iraq: Areas of Influence and Operation
As of July 8, 2020

Source: Congressional Research Service using ArcGIS, IHS Markit Conflict Monitor, U.S. government, and
United Nations data.
Notes: Areas of influence are approximate and subject to change.

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Political Dynamics
Since the U.S.-led ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq’s Shia Arab majority has exercised
greater national power both in concert and in competition with the country’s Sunni Arab and
Kurdish minorities. Sunni Arabs led Hussein’s regime, which repressed opposition movements
drawn from al elements of Iraq’s population. Governance in Iraq since 2003 has reflected an
informal quota-based distribution of leadership and administrative positions based on ethno-
sectarian identity and political affiliation. Extensive negotiations following national elections in
2005, 2010, 2014, and 2018 resulted in prime ministers drawn from Iraq’s Shia Arab majority. By
agreement, Iraq’s presidency has been held by a member of the Kurdish minority, and the speaker
of the unicameral legislature, the Council of Representatives (COR), has been a Sunni. Groups in
turn have sought ministry and agency positions with ethnic and sectarian considerations in mind.
Voters have elected legislative representatives based on a party list system, but government
formation has been determined by deal-making that has often included unelected elites and been
influenced by foreign powers, including Iran and the United States. In principle, this
apportionment system, referred to in Iraq as muhassasa, has deferred most conflict between
identity groups and political rivals by dividing influence and access to state resources along
negotiated lines that do not completely exclude any major group.1 In practice, the system has
enabled patronage networks to treat administrative functions as a source of private benefit and
political sustenance. Government service delivery and economic opportunity have suffered.
Corruption has spread, resulting in abuse of power and enabling foreign exploitation.2
Communal identities and rivalries remain
Iraq’s 2018 National Legislative Election
political y relevant, but over time,
Seats won by Coalition/Party
competition among Shia movements and
coalition building across communal groups
Coalition/Party
Seats Won
also have become stronger factors in Iraqi
politics. Notwithstanding their ethnic and
Sa’irun
54
religious diversity and political differences,
Fatah
48
many Iraqis advance similar demands for
Nasr
42
improved security, honest and effective
Kurdistan Democratic Party
25
government, and greater economic
opportunity. Some Iraqi politicians have
State of Law
25
broadened their outreach to appeal across
Wataniya
21
communal lines, but others continue to
Hikma
19
pursue power to benefit discrete groups.
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
18
Iraq’s national election in May 2018 held
Qarar
14
out the promise of a fresh start for the
country after the war with the Islamic State
Others
63
group, but low turnout and an inconclusive
Source: Iraq Independent High Electoral Commission.
result instead produced paralysis. The
Sa’irun (On the March) coalition led by populist Shia cleric and longtime U.S. antagonist
Muqtada al Sadr’s Istiqama (Integrity) list placed first in the election (54 seats), followed by the
predominantly Shia Fatah (Conquest) coalition led by Hadi al Ameri of the Badr Organization
(48 seats). Fatah includes several individuals formerly associated with the Popular Mobilization

1 Safwan Al Amin, “What “Inclusivity” Means in Iraq,” Atlantic Council – MENASource, March 28, 2016.
2 See Ahmed T abaqchali and Renad Mansour, “Webinar: Will COVID-19 Mark the Endgame for Iraq’s Muhasasa
T a'ifia?” Chatham House (UK), April 30, 2020.
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Commission (PMC) and the mostly Shia Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The Fatah list, as
wel as former prime minister Nouri al Maliki’s separate State of Law list, included figures with
ties to Iran. Fatah’s rivals secured representation, but did not present unified leadership or a
shared alternative agenda. Former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi’s Nasr (Victory) coalition
placed third (42 seats), while Ammar al Hakim’s Hikma (Wisdom) list and former interim prime
minister and Vice President Iyad Al awi’s Wataniya (National) list also won large blocs of seats.
Among Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) won the most seats, and smal er Kurdish opposition lists protested al eged
irregularities. As negotiations continued, Nasr and Sa’irun members joined with others to form
the Islah (Reform) bloc in the COR, while Fatah and State of Law formed the core of a rival
Bin’a (Reconstruction) bloc. Months of negotiation in 2018 produced a compromise government
under the leadership of Prime Minister Adel Abd al Mahdi, but his lack of an individual political
mandate and his reliance on the consensus of fractious political blocs diluted his reform efforts.
Meanwhile, tensions between the United States and Iran increased steadily during this period (see
textbox below), as U.S. officials implemented more intense sanctions on Iran and Iranian leaders
used proxies to undermine regional security in defiance of the Trump Administration’s
“maximum pressure” campaign.3 In 2018 and 2019, U.S. officials attributed a series of indirect
fire attacks on some U.S. and Iraqi instal ations to Iranian proxy forces, including a December
2019 rocket attack on an Iraqi military base that kil ed a U.S. citizen contractor and wounded
others. Tensions crested as U.S. retaliatory strikes targeted pro-Iranian militia forces operating as
PMF units and armed Iraqi demonstrations surrounded the U.S. Embassy.
After a January 2020, U.S. military strike in Baghdad kil ed Iranian Major General and Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) commander Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi
PMF leader Jamal Ja’far al Ibrahimi (commonly referred to as Abu Mahdi al Muhandis), the
future of U.S. and other foreign forces in Iraq reemerged as a pivotal political issue. Iraqi leaders
condemned the U.S. strike and Iranian counterstrikes as violations of Iraqi sovereignty, and the
COR voted to direct then-acting Prime Minister Adel Abd Al Mahdi to ask al foreign military
forces to leave the country.4 Abd Al Mahdi deferred the question of the presence of foreign forces
until the seating of the new government, even after a deadly militia attack and U.S. counterstrike
in March. Meanwhile, U.S. forces consolidated their presence on fewer bases with enhanced
force protection, and the counter-IS coalition has shifted to a more streamlined advising posture.
In June 2020, U.S. and Iraqi officials engaged in talks on security, economic cooperation, public
health, and other matters under the rubric of a high-level strategic dialogue. Iran-aligned factions
continue to insist that the United States withdraw al military forces. Years of conflict, poor
service delivery, corruption, sacrifice, and foreign interference have strained the Iraqi
population’s patience with the status quo, adding to the pressures that their leaders face from the
country’s uncertain domestic and regional security environment. Some U.S. officials perceive a
“growing revulsion for Iraq’s political elite by the rest of the population,”5 but it is with these
divided elites that U.S. officials are now engaged to develop a new vision for bilateral relations.

3 See also, CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy.
4 T hose COR members present adopted by voice vote a parliamentary decision directing the Iraqi government inter alia
to withdraw its request to the international anti-IS coalition for military support and to remove all foreign forces from
Iraq and end the use of Iraq’s territory, waters, and airspace by foreign militaries. Under Iraq’s constitution, binding
legislation originates with the executive and is reviewed and amended by the legislature. Iraqi courts have not
consistently considered COR decisions (akin to concurrent resolutions under the U.S. system) to be binding.
5 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Joey Hood, Statement for the Record, Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism (SFRC-ME), December 4, 2019.
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Figure 2. Iraq: Select Political and Religious Figures

CRS-5

link to page 18 Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress

U.S.-Iran Confrontation Intensifies in Iraq
Iran’s government supported insurgent attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq during the U.S. military presence from 2003
to 2011. From 2012 through 2017, U.S.-Iranian competition in Iraq remained largely contained and relatively
nonviolent. However, in 2018 and 2019, U.S. officials attributed a series of indirect fire attacks on some U.S. and
Iraqi instal ations to Iranian proxy forces.
During unrest in southern Iraq during summer 2018, the State Department directed the temporary evacuation of
U.S. personnel and the temporary closure of the U.S. Consulate in Basra after indirect fire attacks on the
consulate and the U.S. Embassy compound in Baghdad. U.S. officials attributed the attacks to Iran -backed forces
and said that the United States would hold Iran accountable and respond directly to future attacks on U.S. facilities
or personnel by Iran-backed entities.6 In May 2019, the State Department ordered the departure of
nonemergency U.S. government personnel from Iraq, citing an “increased threat stream.”7 The Administration
extended the ordered departure through November 2019, and, in December 2019, notified Congress of its plan
to reduce personnel levels in Iraq on a permanent basis. In December 2019 and March 2020, U.S. officials
reiterated warnings that the United States would respond forceful y to any attacks on U.S. persons or interests in
Iraq and the wider region.
After a rocket attack on an Iraqi military base kil ed a U.S. citizen contractor and wounded others near Kirkuk,
Iraq on December 27, 2019, U.S. military forces launched airstrikes against facilities and personnel affiliated with
Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Syria. In western Iraq, the U.S. strikes kil ed and wounded dozens of personnel
associated with the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Kata’ib Hezbol ah (KH, Figure 3), who are
formal y part of Iraq’s state-affiliated Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
Iraqi officials protested the December 29 U.S. attacks on Kata’ib Hezbol ah as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty, and,
days later, KH members and other figures associated with Iran-linked militias and PMF units marched to the U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad and damaged property, setting outer buildings on fire. Iraqi officials and security forces
reestablished order outside the embassy, but tensions remained high, with KH supporters and other pro-Iran
figures threatening further action and vowing to expel the United States from Iraq by force if necessary.
In the early morning hours of January 3, 2020 (Iraq local time), a U.S. airstrike near Baghdad International Airport
hit a convoy carrying Iranian Major General and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)
commander Qasem Soleimani, kil ing him and KH founder and Iraqi PMC leader Jamal Ja’far al Ibrahimi (commonly
referred to as Abu Mahdi al Muhandis). U.S. officials hold Soleimani responsible for a lethal campaign of insurgent
attacks on U.S. forces during the U.S. military presence in Iraq from 2003 to 2011 that resulted in the deaths of
603 U.S. soldiers and injuries to many more.8 Soleimani and Muhandis have played central roles in Iran’s efforts to
develop and maintain ties to armed groups in Iraq over the last 20 years, and Soleimani served as a leading Iranian
emissary to Iraqi political and security figures. Muhandis had served as PMF Deputy Commander.
The U.S. operation was met with shock in Iraq, and then-Prime Minister Abd al Mahdi and President Barham Salih
issued statements condemning the strike as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. The prime minister cal ed for and then
addressed a special session of the Council of Representatives (COR) on January 5, recommending that the
quorum of legislators present vote to direct his government to ask al foreign military forces to leave the country.9
A subsequent voice vote confirmed the proposed COR decision, which some factions insist is binding.

6 Statement by the White House Press Secretary, September 11, 2018; and, Ben Kesling and Micha el Gordon, “U.S. to
Close Consulate in Iraq, Citing T hreats From Iran,” Wall Street Journal, September 28, 2018.
7 Security Alert – U. S. Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, May 15, 2019; and, Chad Garland, “ State Department orders
evacuation of nonemergency US government employees from Iraq,” Stars and Stripes, May 15, 2019.
8 “Iran killed more US troops in Iraq than previously known, Pentagon says,” Military Times, April 4, 2019
9 Prime Minister Abd al Mahdi’s status as a caretaker raised some questions about his mandate. In past instances where
the political mandate of key institutions has been in question, executive authorities have at times deferred to legislative
directives contained in COR-adopted decisions. For example, amid a dispute over May 2018 national election results
the COR passed a decision mandating a recount on certain terms. T hen-Prime Minister Hayder al Abadi was not
obliged to implement the decision, but did so out of deference to the COR’s representative legitimacy. Under normal
political circumstances, an Iraqi prime minister would not require any COR action to amend or end Iraq’s bilateral
security arrangements with the United States or any other international coalition members since the agreements are not
based on legislative decisions but are governed by executive-to-executive decisions. In this case, the COR had
recognized Prime Minister Abd al Mahdi’s resignation in early December 2019. In light of the gravity of the questions
involving foreign forces and the fraught security circumstances prevailing in Iraq in January, it appears that he chose to
solicit a decision from the COR to bolster the legitimacy of his caretaker government’s response.
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Protests, Violence, and U.S. Responses
Iraqi citizens’ have long expressed frustration with endemic corruption, economic stagnation,
poor service delivery, and foreign interference, including through periodic protests. By October
2019, however, broad dissatisfaction ignited a mass protest movement led by young activists
demanding fundamental political change. Mass protests paralyzed several urban areas across
central and southern Iraq for months in late 2019 and early 2020, including central Baghdad. The
movement channeled nationalist, nonsectarian sentiment and a range of frustrations into potent
rejections of the post-2003 political order, the creation of which many Iraqis attribute to U.S.
intervention in Iraq.10 Protestors reiterated past demonstrators’ concerns and frustrations with the
prevailing system’s failures while voicing louder, more direct critiques of Iranian political
interference than in the past.
Some Iraqi security forces and Iran-backed militias acted to violently suppress protests, kil ing
more than 550 people, wounding thousands, and fueling growing domestic and international
anxiety over Iraq’s future. Members of some state security bodies that had garnered public trust
through the war with the Islamic State perpetrated violence against protestors.
Iraqi political rivals and competing foreign powers appear to have responded to the protest
movement based on calculations about how the movement’s demands might affect their
respective interests. Arguably, Iran-aligned groups have worked to forestal political outcomes
that could threaten their power to shape security in Iraq and to entrench pro-Iran figures and
militia groups inside Iraq’s national security apparatus. U.S. officials embraced some protestors’
cal s for reform while expressing concern about the empowerment of Iranian proxies and
wariness about Iraq’s future alignment.11 In response to protestors’ demands, Prime Minister Adel
Abd al Mahdi resigned in November 2019 after one year in office. He then served in a caretaker
role for nearly 6 months while other Iraqi political leaders remained deadlocked over a
replacement candidate.
Protestor cal s for improved governance, reliable local services, more trustworthy and capable
security forces, and greater economic opportunity broadly correspond to stated U.S. goals for
Iraq. However, U.S. officials did not endorse demands for an immediate political transition during
the height of the protest movement, and stated in December 2019 that they were taking care not to
portray protestors “as pro-American.”12 Instead, U.S. officials advocated for protestors’ rights to
demonstrate and express themselves freely without coercive force or undue restrictions on media
and communications.13 U.S. officials urged Iraqi leaders to respond seriously to protestors’
demands and to avoid attacks against unarmed protestors, while expressing broad U.S. goals for
continued partnership with “a free and independent and sovereign Iraq.”14

10 According to former U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission in Iraq and Principal Deputy Secretary of State for Near East
Affairs (PDAS) Joey Hood, “ Although many protesters are too young to remember Saddam’s tyranny, most are
intimately familiar with the shortcomings of political elites that many believe the United States is responsible for
bringing to power.” PDAS Hood, Statement for the Record, SFRC-ME, op cit.
11 Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs David Schenker called on Iraqi leaders “to investigate and hold
accountable” individuals responsible for attacks on protestors and to reject “the distorting influence Iran has exerted on
the political process.” Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker, Special Briefing,
Washington, DC, December 2, 2019.
12 Hood, Statement for the Record, SFRC-ME, op cit.
13 Hood, T estimony before SFRC-ME, op cit.
14 After dozens of protestors were killed in late November 2019, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and other officials
said that the Administration “ will not hesitate” to use tools at its disposal, “ including designations under the Global
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In December, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced Global Magnitsky sanctions
against “three leaders of Iran-backed militias in Iraq that opened fire on peaceful protests” (see
“U.S. Policy and the Popular Mobilization Forces” textbox below) and an Iraqi mil ionaire
businessman “for bribing government officials and engaging in corruption at the expense of the
Iraqi people.”15 During the crackdowns, U.S. officials acknowledged that there had been “Iraqi
military leaders and units implicated” in some cases of violence, but they also noted that there
was uncertainty about responsibility in other cases.16 U.S. officials have reviewed reports of
violence against protestors and have said these reviews wil inform decisions about Iraqi military
and federal police participation in U.S. security assistance programs.17
Transitional Government Takes Office as Iraqis Demand Change
The protest movement subsided in early 2020 as public fatigue reportedly grew and in the face of
risks and restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. In May 2020, the Council of
Representatives approved Mustafa al Kadhimi, the director of the Iraqi National Intel igence
Service, as prime minister and endorsed his proposed program and 15 cabinet ministers. Al
Kadhimi’s confirmation followed withdrawal from consideration by two previous prime
ministers-designate who failed to garner sufficient support from competing blocs. The COR
approved the remainder of Al Kadhimi’s cabinet members in June 2020.
Upon taking office, Al Kadhimi declared his government would serve in a transitional capacity
until early elections (which are otherwise due in 2022) and would work to improve security and
fight corruption. Among the priorities identified in his government program are:
 mobilizing resources to fight the COVID-19 pandemic;
 “restricting weapons to state and military institutions”;
 “submitting a draft budget law to address the economic crisis”; and
 “protecting the sovereignty and security of Iraq, continuing to fight terrorism,
and providing a national vision on the future of foreign forces in Iraq.”
Since taking office, Prime Minister Al Kadhimi has pledged to investigate the disappearance of
several protest activists, ordered the release of detained demonstrators, and stated his
government’s commitment to protecting the interests of poorer Iraqis when considering policies
for spending reforms. Since May, pressing concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic, Iraq’s
fiscal crisis, and defiant militia groups have overshadowed discussions of finalizing the 2020
budget and preparing for early elections.
Public Health and COVID-19
Neighboring Iran was the early epicenter of COVID-19 pandemic in the Middle East region,
creating significant public health chal enges for Iraq’s then-acting government. Acting leaders
instituted travel restrictions and strict internal curfews to help contain the early spread of the
coronavirus and began mobilizing the limited capacity of Iraq’s public health system to meet

Magnitsky Act, to sanction corrupt individuals who are stealing the public wealth of the Iraqi people and those killing
and wounding peaceful protesters.” Remarks by Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, November 18, 2019; Secretary of
State Michael Pompeo, Remarks to the Press, November 26, 2019.
15 T reasury Sanctions Iran-Backed Militia Leaders Who Killed Innocent Demonstrators in Iraq, December 6, 2019.
16 Hood, T estimony before SFRC-ME, op cit.
17 Ibid.
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expected needs. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) officials also instituted local mitigation
measures in areas under their jurisdiction. Prime Minister Al Kadhimi’s government has amended
and extended curfew measures, maintained closures at some points of entry, and institute internal
movement restrictions, varying by governorate. KRG officials similarly have limited nonessential
movement inside the Kurdistan region on varying terms and amended and extended lockdown
measures in some areas for specific periods.18
Iraq’s public and private health systems have significant shortcomings and limited capacity,
amplifying risks.19 Iraq has approximately 0.8 physicians and 1.3 hospital beds per 1,000 people
(below the global average of 1.5 and 2.7, respectively), according to World Bank statistics. From
April 21 to June 23, Iraqi authorities confirmed an increase in COVID-19 cases from 1,574 to
34,500 and fatalities from 82 to 1,252.20 Limited testing and public health surveil ance capacity
may be underrepresenting the full incidence of the disease. Upticks in case detection and the
number of governorates reporting cases have occurred as testing volume has grown.
The United States has provided $10 mil ion through the United Nations Development Program’s
Funding Facility for Stabilization to support emergency health infrastructure improvements
related to COVID-19. Additional U.S. financing seeks to assist International Organization for
Migration (IOM) programs to address COVID-19 risks among vulnerable populations in Iraq.
Economic and Fiscal Challenges
Among the most pressing effects of the pandemic on Iraq are economic and fiscal consequences:
curfews and movement restrictions have suppressed private sector economic activity and lower
global demand for oil has contributed to plummeting oil prices, jeopardizing Iraq’s public
finances. In June, Prime Minister Al Kadhimi said, “We are witnessing the worst economic
situation since the formation of the Iraqi state.”21 Oil exports provide more than 90% of public-
sector revenue in Iraq, and insecurity, weak service delivery, and corruption have hindered growth
in non-oil sectors over time. In June 2020, Iraq’s Finance Minister Ali Al awi raised alarm about
the country’s resulting fiscal chal enges and reform needs, saying, “We are in an existential
economic situation. ...If oil prices stay at this level for a year and our expenses stay the same,
[then] without a doubt we’re going to hit a wal .”22
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, strained public finances already were complicating national
government and KRG leaders’ efforts to address the country’s many chal enges. The combined
effects of periods of lower global oil prices, expansion of public-sector liabilities,23 and the costs
of the military campaign against the Islamic State exacerbated national budget deficits in 2016

18 T he International Organization for Migration (IOM) monitors and reports on evolving movement limits put in place
by national and KRG authorities during the COVID-19 emergency. See IOM, “ Iraq Mobility Restrictions Due to
COVID-19, 16–29 June 2020,” June 29, 2020. T he United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
regularly reports on COVID-19 pandemic conditions and related health measures.
19 Ahmed Aboulenein and Reade Levinson, “T he medical crisis that’s aggravating Iraq’s unrest ,” Reuters, March 2,
2020.
20 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), COVID-19 Update V, April 19, 2020, and COVID-19
Update XI, June 23, 2020.
21 Alissa Rubin, “In Iraq, a New Prime Minister T akes Stock of His Bloodied Land,” New York Times, June 16, 2020.
22 Maya Gebeily, “Without urgent reform, Iraq economy will face irreparable shocks,” AFP, June 22, 2020.
23 In October 2019, the World Bank summarized this trend as follows: “Repeating past patterns of ‘windfall’ spending,
higher oil revenues have resulted in a rising wage bill and public consumption. ... T he fiscal policy stance is
expansionary based on a higher wage bill and subsidies to lessen social pressures amidst weak private sector job
creation.” World Bank Group, Macro Poverty Outlook – Iraq, October 2019.
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and 2017.24 The Iraqi government borrowed domestical y and international y to meet its financing
needs, including through a U.S.-guaranteed bond offering and through a U.S.-promoted Stand-by
Arrangement with the International Monetary Fund. Stronger economic performance improved
conditions in 2018 and 2019, but leaders made several concessions during the 2019 protests that
increased budget costs.
Iraq’s overal debt-to-GDP ratio remains relatively low, but lower oil output and revenues in 2020
are expected to drastical y reduce annual GDP and increase borrowing needs. Iraq’s government
needs COR authorization to enter into foreign and domestic borrowing agreements, and the COR
approved authorization for new borrowing on June 24, with stipulations requiring the government
to pay new employees brought on in response to protests and to submit a reform plan.
Iraq manages its overal oil production in line with mutual y agreed output limits set in
consultation the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC
countries (OPEC+), including Russia. Iraqi output and exports exceeded the OPEC+ agreed
levels through May 2020, and in June, Iraqi oil officials announced specific plans to reduce
output from major fields and said they “wil keep lowering production gradual y to comply with
OPEC quota.”25 A draft 2020 budget considered before the pandemic assumed a $56 benchmark
price, but sales in May brought an average of $21 per barrel and sales in June brought $33 per
barrel.26 A July report from the World Food Program and World Bank estimated that Iraq would
need oil sales at $76 per barrel to meet its current budget commitments.27
In recent months, government officials have reported significant shortfal s in revenue and
announced that the government has initiated a credit arrangement with state banks to provide
salaries for state employees. A restructuring committee also has been studying public financial
commitments and recommending changes to the Prime Minister. Monthly revenue deficits
already have created short-term bottlenecks in debt-service, salary, and benefit payments, with
Iraqi leaders discussing deferral of debt payments with the IMF and drawing some citizens’
criticism for delays in some benefits to retirees and civil servant salaries.28 Iraq also reportedly
has sought concessions from Kuwait on the payment of reparations for the 1990 Iraqi invasion,
and is expected to turn to foreign lenders for budget support for the remainder of 2020.29
Until recently, fiscal pressures have been most acute in the federal y recognized Kurdistan region,
where the fal out from the national government’s response to the Kurdistan Regional
Government’s KRG September 2017 referendum had further strained the KRG’s already
weakened ability to pay salaries to its public-sector employees and security forces. The KRG’s
post-referendum loss of control over significant oil resources in Kirkuk governorate, coupled with
changes implemented by national government authorities over shipments of oil from those fields
via the KRG-controlled export pipeline to Turkey, contributed to a sharp decline in revenue for
the KRG during 2018. KRG leaders borrowed funds domestical y and international y to cover
costs, delaying and deferring salaries and benefits.
Related issues have shaped consideration of recent national budgets in the COR, with Kurdish
representatives criticizing the government’s proposals to al ocate the KRG a smal er percentage

24 IMF Country Report No. 17/251, Iraq: Second Review of the T hree-Year Stand-By Arrangement, August 2017.
25 Reuters, “Iraq agrees with oil companies on deeper output cuts in June- sources,” June 14, 2020.
26 AFP, “Iraq oil exports sink to comply with OPEC cuts,” July 2, 2020.
27 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), World Food
Programme (WFP) and the World Bank, Food Security in Iraq: Im pact of COVID-19, April-June 2020, July 2020
28 Shaima Rashid, “Iraq is discussing a pause in payments on its debt with the [International] Monetary Fund,” Al
Sabah (Iraq), April 16, 2020; and, AFP, “ In Iraq, public outrage over austerity stymies reform plan,” June 16, 2020.
29 Stephen Kalin, “ Iraq T urns to Neighbors to Ease Economic Strains,” Wall Street Journal, May 24, 2020.
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of funds to the KRI than the 17% benchmark reflected in past budgets. National government
objectives reportedly include revision of KRG al ocations based on new population estimates and
enhanced transparency for the collection of national and regional taxes in the KRI, the payment of
administrative charges to oil companies operating in the KRI, KRG public employee verification,
and the al ocation of KRG oil revenues.
Agreements reached for the national government to pay KRG civil service and peshmerga
salaries in the 2019 budget were linked to the KRG placing 250,000 barrels per day of oil exports
under federal control in exchange for financial al ocations for verified expenses. The transfer of
national funds to the KRG in 2019 eased some fiscal pressures that had required the KRG to
impose payment limits that had fueled protests by Kurdish civil servants and others. However,
disputes over export levels and budget transfers remained unresolved, and attempts to reach a
new agreement stal ed after Prime Minister Abd al Mahdi’s resignation.
In April 2020, the Iraqi government announced that it would not transfer an expected round of
funding, citing the need to resolve outstanding differences. In May, Prime Minister Al Kadhimi
agreed to transfer one additional month’s payment in anticipation of renewed high-level talks
between KRG and national government officials in Baghdad. Talks were held in June as KRG
officials announced plans for some salary and benefit cuts for KRG employees, but reports
suggest that the two sides continue to differ over key proposals to resolve the budget dispute.30
Protests have resumed in the Kurdistan region, with civil servants demanding delayed salaries and
farmers protesting difficult market conditions.
Iraq, Iran, and U.S. Sanctions
Broad U.S. efforts to put pressure on Iran extend to the Iraqi energy sector, where years of sanctions, conflict,
neglect, and mismanagement have left Iraq dependent on purchases of natural gas and electricity from its Iranian
neighbors.31 Since 2018, Iraqi leaders have sought relief from U.S. sanctions on related transactions with Iran. The
Trump Administration has renewed repeated temporary permissions for Iraq to continue these transactions, with
the provision that the proceeds are held in escrow in Iraq and not returned to Iran. In May, the Trump
Administration issued a 120-day waiver on related sanctions.
Ongoing U.S. initiatives encourage Iraq to diversify its energy ties with its neighbors and develop more
independence for its energy sector. U.S. assistance programs have supported electricity interconnection projects
in neighboring Jordan, and Iraqi officials have discussed potential energy sector investments with Saudi officials in
2020. U.S. officials promote U.S. companies as potential partners for Iraq through the expansion of domestic
electricity generation capacity and the introduction of technology to capture the large amounts of natural gas that
are flared (burned at wel heads). As of July 2020, related contracts with U.S. firms had not been finalized.
Ongoing Militia Tensions Influence Domestic Politics and Foreign Ties
Prime Minister Al Kadhimi and his backers remained engaged in a complicated political,
bureaucratic, diplomatic, and security contest with rivals and adversaries over the future of Iraqi
militia forces and the U.S. and coalition military presence in Iraq.32 One of Prime Minister Al
Kadhimi’s first acts upon taking office in May 2020 was to personal y visit and publicly consult
with the heads of Iraq’s military, Ministry of Interior, and Counterterrorism Service (CTS), as
wel as the interim leaders of the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) and its associated

30 Lawk Ghafuri, “KRG announces salary cuts to cope with economic crisis,” Rudaw (Erbil), June 21, 2020.
31 Isabel Coles and Ali Nabhan, “Oil-Rich Iraq Can’t Keep the Lights On,” Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2018.
32 See Phillip Smyth, “Iranian Militias in Iraq’s Parliament: Political Outcomes and U.S. Response,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 2979, June 11, 2018; Michael Knights, “ Kadhimi as Commander-in-Chief:
First Steps in Iraqi Security Sector Reform,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 19, 2020; and, Shahla Al
Kli, “Al-Kadhimi and the Kataib Hezbollah raid,” Middle East Institute, June 30, 2020.
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militias—the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). In echoing his predecessors’ intention to
ensure that armed groups only hold and use weapons with state authorization and through the
chain of command to the prime minister’s office, Al Kadhimi is chal enging the network of Iran-
aligned militia actors associated with and outside of the PMC/PMF (see Figure 3 and textbox
below). Some of these actors seek to preserve their autonomy and ties to Iran while continuing to
enjoy Iraqi state protection and benefits under the Iraqi law. Others more outwardly chal enge the
prime minister’s authority and include suspects in the murder of Iraqi civilians and ongoing
indirect fire attacks against facilities hosting U.S. and coalition personnel and on supply convoys.
The PMC and PMF were founded in 2014 and continue to participate in Iraq’s fight against the
Islamic State. However, some groups with PMF units have come to present an implicit, and, at
times, explicit chal enge to the authority of the state, even as the overal PMC/PMF structure has
been recognized as a permanent state security force.33 The PMF are largely but not solely drawn
from Iraq’s Shia Arab majority: Sunni, Turkmen, and Christian PMF militia also remain active.
Among Shia units, groups organized by and associated with certain shrines and clerics in the city
of Najaf have struggled for resources and influence in the PMC/PMF with Iran-linked figures.
Prime Minister Al Kadhimi’s predecessors attempted to regularize and place bureaucratic
guardrails around the PMC/PMF enterprise through a 2016 law and a series of decrees and
organizational directives, with mixed results.34 In early June 2020, the prime minister’s office
issued new implementation guidance for measures intended to strengthen state control of the
PMC/PMF.35 The guidance follows up on a July 2019 decree reiterating demands that the PMF
and PMC conform to Iraqi law. According to the U.S. Defense Intel igence Agency (DIA), “some
PMF brigades followed the [July 2019] decree by shutting down headquarters and turning in
weapons, but several Iranian-aligned groups refused to comply.”36 The DIA judged in 2019 that
“Iranian-affiliated groups within the PMF are unlikely to change their loyalties because of [Abd
Al Mahdi’s] order.”37 The PMC adopted a reorganization plan in September 2019, but the
reshuffle left Iran-aligned individuals in key internal PMC/PMF leadership positions.
Following the January 2020 U.S. strike against Qasem Soleimani and PMF Deputy
Commander/KH leader Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, several Iraqi militia forces, including some that
participate in PMF operations, have vowed revenge against the United States and stated their
renewed commitment to expel ing U.S. forces. Others cal ed for a measured approach and
disavowed potential attacks on non-military targets as a means of fulfil ing their objectives. In
monitoring U.S.-Iraqi talks, KH and some Fatah leaders continue to insist that U.S. forces depart.

33 Some Shia forces discussed recruiting militia to resist IS attacks prior to Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani’s June 2014
call for citizens to help fight the Islamic State. Many Shia volunteers responded to Sistani’s call by joining militias that
became the PMF. T hen-Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki established the PMC in June 2014 to give volunteer forces “ a
sense of legal justification and a degree of institutionalization.” For background, see Fanar Haddad, “ Understanding
Iraq’s Hashd al-Sha’bi,” T he Century Foundation, March 5, 2018; Renad Mansour, “More T han Militias: Iraq’s
Popular Mobilization Forces Are Here to Stay,” War on the Rocks, April 3, 2018; Renad Mansour and Faleh Jabar,
“T he Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future,” Carnegie Middle East Center, April 28, 2017.
34 In addition to outlining salary and benefit arrangements important to individual PMF volunteers, th e 2016 law and
subsequent decrees call for all PMF units to be placed fully under the authority of the commander -in-chief (Prime
Minister) and to be subject to military discipline and organization. See Michael Knights, Hamdi Malik, and Aymenn
Jawad Al-T amimi, Honored, Not Contained The Future Of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, March 2020.
35 Michael Knights and Hamdi Malik, “Hashd Reforms in Iraq Conceal More T han T hey Reveal,” Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, June 9, 2020.
36 Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations (LIG-OCO), Report to Congress on Operation Inherent
Resolve, July 1, 2019-October 25, 2019.
37 Ibid.
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Figure 3. Select Iraqi Shia Political Groups, Leaders, and Militias

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In March 2020, a new group cal ing itself Usbat al Tha’ireen (League of the Revolutionaries)
emerged and since then has claimed responsibility for actual and attempted attacks against U.S.
targets, posting aerial surveil ance footage of key U.S. instal ations in Iraq.38 The late Iraqi
security analyst Hisham al Hashimi—who was close to government leaders and who gunmen
assassinated in Baghdad in July 202039—described the new group in March “as a faction that
revives the ideology of the 2007 Special Groups, which were dubbed the death squads by
research experts. These were radical Shia cel s who believed that the answer lay in resistance,
arms, and fighting U.S. troops via hybrid tactics or gueril a warfare or irregular warfare.”40 Al
Hashimi judged that the group seeks “to provoke these [U.S.] troops into an uncalculated
retaliation that causes kil ing of Iraqi security or military forces or civilians. This way they can
create public resentment against the foreign presence.” Prime Minister Al Kadhimi has vowed to
find and punish Al Hashimi’s kil ers.
In late June, CTS forces arrested fourteen KH members and a foreign national in a highly
publicized operation to disrupt rocket fire on U.S. and Iraqi facilities in and around Baghdad.41
Authorities subsequently released most of the KH detainees, and KH figures responded with their
own shows of force and critiques of the prime minister in the wake of the arrests. KH retains
PMF units under the PMC’s jurisdiction, and its former secretary general has served as the
PMC’s interim chief of staff since February, after a U.S. strike kil ed his predecessor and mentor,
the late Abu Mahdi al Muhandis.42
In July, Prime Minister Al Kadhimi replaced long serving National Security Adviser and National
Security Service head Falih al Fayyad with a former Interior Minister and a Badr Organization
leader, Qasim al Araji, and Maj. Gen. Abdul Ghani al Asadi, respectively. Al Fayyad retained his
position as PMC head. The prime minister in May had restored Lt. Gen. Abdul Wahhab al Saadi
as CTS commander; Saadi’s September 2019 dismissal drew protests that contributed to broader
popular criticism of the Abd al Mahdi government.43
Further steps to recast the internal leadership of the PMC and/or to reorganize or demobilize
specific PMF units could indicate the relative outcome of rivalries within the organizations and
between the Prime Minister and Iran-aligned PMC/PMF individuals and units.44 Further security
force operations against militia members suspected of attacks and assassinations and/or additional
attacks by anti-U.S. militia groups could lead to an escalation in tensions and affect the prospects
for ongoing U.S.-Iraq dialogue and security cooperation.45

38 Louisa Loveluck and Missy Ryan, “Militia attacks on Americans in Iraq are becoming more audacious. T he U.S. is
wrestling with how to respond,” Washington Post, March 28, 2020.
39 Isabel Coles, “Pompeo Urges Iraq to Act Against Killers of T op Security Analyst,” Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2020.
40 Al Nas News (Baghdad), “ Recent Shellings Attributed to Group: Who are the League of the Revolutionaries?”
March 19, 2020. T he Special Groups were Iran -backed militia forces that targeted U.S. personnel in Iraq. See Michael
Knights, “T he Evolution of Iran’s Special Groups in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, Issue 11, November 2010.
41 Associated Press, “Iraqi Forces Arrest Men Suspected of Attacks T argeting US,” June 26, 2020.
42 In February 2020, some PMC/PMF officials named KH official Abd al Aziz al Muhammadawi (aka Abu Fadak) as
deputy commander of the PMC/PMF. However, several PMC/PMF officials associated with shrines based in Najaf
(and viewed as more independent of Iranian influence) reportedly rejected the appointment, and the prime minister’s
office had not confirmed the appointment formally as of July 2020.
43 Al Saadi became nationally prominent for his role in leading CT S operations against the Islamic State. Bassem
Mroue, “Iraq’s removal of counterterrorism chief sparks controversy,” Associated Press, September 29, 2019.
44 See Ali Alfoneh, “Succession Crisis in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces,” Arab Gulf States Institute in
Washington, April 3, 2020.
45 Associated Press, “Iran-Backed Militia Says PM’s Actions Could Bring Escalation,” July 8, 2020.
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U.S. Policy and the Popular Mobilization Forces
U.S. officials have recognized the contributions that PMF volunteers have made to Iraq’s fight against the Islamic
State; they have also remained wary for years about Iran-linked elements of the PMF that the U.S. government
believes operate as Iranian proxy forces outside formal Iraqi government and military control.46 The U.S.
Intel igence Community in 2019 described Iran-linked Shia militia—whether PMF or not—as the “primary threat”
to U.S. personnel in Iraq, and suggested that the threat posed by Iran-linked groups wil grow as they press for the
United States to withdraw its forces from Iraq.47
In general, the popularity of the PMF and broadly expressed popular respect for the sacrifices made by individual
volunteers in the fight against the Islamic State have created vexing political questions for Iraqi leaders and U.S.
officials. These issues are complicated further by the apparent involvement of PMF fighters in human rights abuses
and attacks on foreign military forces present in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government. Since 2019, U.S.
officials have accused some PMF personnel and associated figures of a range of human rights abuses.

In January 2020, the U.S. government designated Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,
and named two of its leaders, Qais and Laith al Khazali, as Special y Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).

In December 2019, the U.S. government designated the Khazalis for Global Magnitsky human rights-related
sanctions. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, “during the late 2019 protests in many cities in Iraq,
AAH has opened fire on and kil ed protesters.”48

The U.S. government similarly designated for human rights sanctions Husayn Falih Aziz (aka Abu Zaynab) al
Lami, the security director for the PMF.49 According to the human rights designation notices, Qais al Khazali
and Al Lami were “part of a committee of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)
proxies that approved the use of lethal violence against protesters for the purpose of public intimidation.”

Earlier in 2019, the U.S. government listed Harakat Hezbol ah al Nujaba and its leader, Akram al Kabi, as
SDGTs, and designated the commanders of the PMF 30th and 50th brigades for Global Magnitsky sanctions.
U.S. policy seeks to support the long-term development of Iraq’s military, counterterrorism, and police services as
alternatives to the continued use of PMF units to secure Iraq’s borders, communities, and territory recaptured
from the Islamic State. PMF units continue to conduce operations against IS fighters in some areas, and
redeployments or demobilization of PMF units could create new opportunities for IS fighters to exploit. U.S.
military officials predicted in early 2019 that “competition over areas to operate and influence between the PMF
and the ISF wil likely result in violence, abuse, and tension in areas where both entities operate.”50
Planning for New Elections
Among protestors’ demands was a cal for early elections before those expected in 2022. For
early elections to occur, two-thirds of the COR would have to vote to dissolve its current
membership or the prime minister and president would have to jointly cal for early elections, to
be held within 60 days. Both Prime Minister Al Kadhimi and President Salih have signaled their
support for early elections. Amid protestor appeals, the COR adopted a new electoral law in
December 2019 that would replace Iraq’s list-based election system with an individual candidate-
and district-based system.51 However, the legislation did not fully define the terms and boundaries

46 See, U.S. Embassy Baghdad, “ Arming Ceremony at Al-T aqaddum Air Base in al-Habbaniya,” September 5, 2017;
and, Ambassador Matthew H. T ueller, Statement for the Record, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 6, 2019.
47 Worldwide T hreat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 13, 2018. In Januar y 2019, the U.S.
intelligence community assessed that the PMC/PMF “ plan to use newfound political power gained through positions in
the new government to reduce or remove the U.S. military presence while competing with the Iraqi security forces for
state resources.” Worldwide T hreat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, January 29, 2019.
48 T reasury Sanctions Iran-Backed Militia Leaders Who Killed Innocent Demonstrators in Iraq, December 6, 2019.
49 See Reuters, “Exclusive: Iran-backed militias deployed snipers in Iraq protests – sources,” October 17, 2019;
Michael Knights, “Punishing Iran’s T riggermen in Iraq: Opening Moves in a Long Campaign,” Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 3223, December 6, 2019.
50 LIG-OCO, Report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve, October 1-December 31, 2018.
51 In May, the U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq reported to the Security Council that, “The final text of the electoral law,
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for electoral districts or set out how the new system would provide for existing gender and
ethnicity membership quotas.52 Some Sunni and Kurdish groups rejected the proposed law. As
debate over refinement or amendment of the legislation continues, Iraqi leaders have not yet
agreed on specific plans for holding an early national election. A new law for the Independent
High Electoral Commission (IHEC) also adopted in December 2019 cal s for a panel of judges to
lead expanded IHEC operations, creating new capacity and funding needs. The United Nations
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) works closely with IHEC, with U.S. support.
Observers expect that Iraqi could hold elections in 2021 at the earliest, but differ over whether
elections before the current early 2022 deadline should be a priority for Iraqis. In April and May,
the Atlantic Council’s Abbas Khadim argued that “a snap election ...would not be held and
introduce another government before the second half of 2021 at best.” Citing constitutional
concerns, preparation costs, and political considerations, Khadim judged that “there would be no
gain from such a process.”53 Writing in support of holding elections at the end of 2021, former
U.S. National Security Council Director for Iraq Douglas Ol ivant argued that an early election
would “have the virtue of a) giving the government time to prepare, b) costing the existing power
structure little, by leaving power only four-six months early, and c) giving a smal win to the
protesters, who can truthful y say they pushed elections into the preceding year.”54
Early elections under a revamped system could introduce new political currents and leaders, but
fiscal pressures, political rivalries, and the limited capacity of some state institutions may present
lasting hurdles to reform. The Administration told Senators in December that,
...nothing will change [in Iraq] until political leaders decide that government agencies
should provide public services rather than serve as ATM machines for their parties. Until
that happens, the people’s demands for a clean and effective government will not be met,
no matter who serves as Prime Minister or in Cabinet positions.55
Following any new election—early or otherwise—government formation negotiations would
recur, taking into consideration domestic and international developments over the interim period.
Iraqi domestic debates over corruption, governance, and security, as wel as the ongoing regional
struggle between Iran and the United States, have shaped the government formation and bilateral
strategic dialogue in 2020 and would likely shape any forthcoming election in 2021 or beyond.
Counterinsurgency and Stabilization Challenges
Combatting Islamic State Insurgents
Although the Islamic State’s exclusive control over distinct territories in Iraq ended in 2017, the
U.S. intel igence community assessed in 2018 that the Islamic State had “started—and probably

approved by the parliament in December 2019, has yet to be published in the official parliamentary gazette in the
absence of a parliamentary decision on the delineation of constituencies and the apportionment of parliamentary seats
among constituencies.” A consistent, nationwide districting process could require a census, which Iraq has not
conducted since 1997. Census plans discussed since 2003 have been accompanied by significant political tensions.
52 See IFES, Elections in Iraq 2018: Council of Representatives Elections - Frequently Asked Questions, 2018.
53 Abbas Khadim, “ New Iraqi government must face a pandemic and oil price drop,” Atlantic Council – MENASource,
May 7, 2020; Khadim, “Challenges for Iraq’s new government under Mustafa Al-Kadhimi,” Atlantic Council –
MENASource, April 22, 2020.
54 Douglas Ollivant, “Keep Expectations Modest for Iraq’s New Government,” War on the Rocks, May 13, 2020.
55 Hood, Statement for the Record, SFRC-ME, op cit.
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wil maintain—a robust insurgency in Iraq and Syria as part of a long-term strategy to ultimately
enable the reemergence of its so-cal ed caliphate.”56 In January 2019, then-Director of National
Intel igence Dan Coats told Congress that the Islamic State “remains a terrorist and insurgent
threat and wil seek to exploit Sunni grievances with Baghdad and societal instability to
eventual y regain Iraqi territory against Iraqi security forces that are stretched thin.”57
IS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi kil ed himself to avoid capture by U.S. forces in an October 2019
operation against his compound in Idlib, Syria, though according to defense officials, his death
“did not result in any immediate degradation to ISIS’s capabilities.”58 His replacement, Amir
Mohammed Said Abd al Rahman al Mawla (aka al Mawla), has not established a comparable
international profile. Thousands of IS fighters have dispersed in rural and remote areas of Syria
and Iraq, posing a threat to local security forces, U.S. and coalition forces, and civilians. In May
2020, Combined Joint Task Force- Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) reported that the
Islamic State continues to wage “a low-level insurgency” but cannot hold territory in Iraq and
Syria.59 In March 2020, CENTCOM reported to Congress that “most of the U.S. intel igence
community predicts that without sustained pressure levied against it, ISIS has the potential to
reconstitute in Iraq and Syria in short order, beyond the current capabilities of the U.S. to
neutralize it without a capable, partnered ground force.”60 In July, U.S. CENTCOM Commander
Gen. Kenneth McKenzie predicted that a low-level IS threat would remain “endemic.”61
U.S. officials have noted the ability of Islamic State insurgents to exploit weak security and
governance in territory disputed between the Kurdistan region and the rest of Iraq. In July 2020,
Iraqi national government officials announced that they would establish cooperative security
centers with KRG counterparts to monitor security in some disputed areas.62
At the Iraqi government’s invitation, U.S. and other international military forces have remained in
Iraq in the wake of the Islamic State’s 2017 defeat in order to help Iraqi forces combat remaining
IS fighters and build the capacity of Iraqi partner forces (see “Security Cooperation and U.S.
Training” below). U.S. military officials stopped official y reporting the size of the U.S. force in
Iraq in 2017, but have confirmed that there has been a reduction in the number of U.S. military
personnel and changes in U.S. capabilities in Iraq since that time.63 Oversight reporting in 2020
has referred to “roughly 5,000 troops” in Iraq.64 As of July 2020, 96 U.S. troops have been kil ed
or have died as part of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), and 230 have been wounded.65

56 Worldwide T hreat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 13, 2018.
57 Worldwide T hreat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, January 29, 2019.
58 LIG-OCO, Report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve, October 1-December 31, 2019.
59 LIG-OCO, Report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve, January 1-March 31, 2020.
60 U.S. CENT COM Commander Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, House Armed Services Committee, March 10, 2020.
61 Jeff Seldin, “U.S. Efforts to Deal Islamic State ‘Enduring Defeat’ on Hold,” Voice of America, July 16, 2020.
62 Lawk Ghafuri, “Security gap in some of Iraq’s disputed territories reaches up to 13 square kilometers in size: Iraqi
military official,” Rudaw (Erbil), July 10, 2020.
63 In February 2019, outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Douglas Silliman said, “At the request of the Iraqi Government
and in full cooperat ion with Baghdad, just over 5,000 American forces continue to partner with the Iraqi Security
Forces on their bases to advise, train, and equip them to ensure the lasting defeat of Daesh and to defend Iraq’s
borders.” See Gen. Votel, T estimony before the House Armed Services Committee, February 27, 2018; and U.S.
Embassy Baghdad, “Ambassador Silliman bids Farewell to Iraq,” February 5, 2019.
64 LIG-OCO, Report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve, October 1-December 31, 2019.
65 Department of Defense Casualty Analysis System, U.S. Military Casualties - Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)
Military Deaths and Wounded in Action, July 10, 2020. Among military deaths, 21 were the result of hostile action.
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U.S. military officials credit their Iraqi partners with conducting increasingly independent
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. As noted above, U.S.-Iran tensions and
violence led to the temporary suspension of U.S. and Coalition counter-IS operations and related
training in January 2020 for force-protection reasons. Cooperation later resumed, but training has
remained limited due to distancing imposed by COVID-19 transmission concerns.
Iraqi operations seek to disrupt IS fighters’ efforts to reestablish themselves as an organized
threat, keep them separated from population centers, and pursue them in remote redoubts. Press
accounts and U.S. government reports describe continuing IS attacks on Iraqi Security Forces and
Popular Mobilization Forces, particularly in rural areas. Independent analysts have described
dynamics in parts of these governorates in which IS fighters threaten, intimidate, and kil citizens
in areas at night or where Iraq’s national security forces are absent.66 In some areas, new
displacement has occurred as civilians have fled IS attacks.
Violence against civilians dropped considerably from its 2014 highs through the end of 2018
(Figure 4), but some independent analysts argue that the Islamic State is showing “very
significant resilience” in Iraq and warn that the effects of COVID-19 and U.S.-Iran tensions may
create “unexpectedly favorable conditions in which to continue—or even accelerate—its
recovery.”67 Press reports and IS claims suggest that attacks increased relative to 2019 (Figure 5)
during the period before and during Ramadan in 2020, with most attacks and security operations
occurring in Kirkuk, Diyala, Salah al-Din, Ninewa, and Anbar governorates (Figure 6).
Figure 4. Estimated Iraqi Civilian Casualties from Conflict and Terrorism
United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) Estimates of Monthly Casualties, 2012-2018

Source: United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq.
Notes: Some months lack data from some governorates. UNAMI stopped metric reporting in December 2018.

66 See Hassan Hassan, “Insurgents Again: T he Islamic State’s Calculated Reversion to Attrition in the Syria-Iraq
Border Region and Beyond,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 10, Issue 11, December 2017; Derek Henry Flood, “From Caliphate to
Caves: T he Islamic State’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq,” USMA CT C Sentinel, Vol. 11, Issue 8, September
2018; Anthony H. Cordesman, Abdullah T oukan, and Max Molot, The Return of ISIS in Iraq, Syria, and the Middle
East, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 3, 2019; and Louisa Loveluck and Must afa Salim, “ ISIS
exploits Iraq’s coronavirus lockdown to step up attacks,” Washington Post, May 8, 2020.
67 Michael Knights and Alex Almeida, “Remaining and Expanding: T he Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq
in 2019-2020,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020.
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Figure 5. Iraq: Reported Islamic State-Related Security Incidents with Fatalities,
2019
January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019

Source: Prepared by CRS. Incident data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).
Available at https://acleddata.com. Area of Influence data from IHS Janes Conflict Monitor, December 2, 2019.

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Figure 6. Iraq: Reported Islamic State-Related Security Incidents with Fatalities,
2020
January 1, 2020 to June 30, 2020

Source: Prepared by CRS. Incident data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).
Available at https://acleddata.com. Area of Influence data from IHS Janes Conflict Monitor, July 8, 2020.
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U.S. Assessments of the Iraqi Security Forces
U.S. assessments of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in 2020 have emphasized the “increasingly
independent” nature of Iraqi operations, stating that Iraqi forces can now “handle most aspects of
a counter-insurgency autonomously.”68 U.S. tactical assistance to Iraqi operations appears limited
to joint special operations missions, intel igence sharing, and some combat air support. Iraqi
commanders’ use of their own air assets for intel igence, surveil ance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
remains limited, according to U.S. officials.69 In July 2020, the coalition announced a transition of
its Task Force-Iraq advising element to a smal er Military Advisor Group central y located in and
around Baghdad to advise Iraqi commanders on operational-level planning.70
U.S. assessments in late 2019 had emphasized limitations in the wil and capability of ISF units to
“find and fix” targets or exploit intel igence without assistance from coalition partners.71 More
recent assessments note increased ISF efforts to clear remote areas where IS fighters operate, but
judge that “the ISF continued to struggle to integrate the use of ISR and fires assets into their
operations.”72 Similarly, U.S. assessments acknowledge the intel igence and reconnaissance
capabilities of specialized Counterterrorism Service (CTS) units, but judge that “most CTS units”
in early 2020 “were limited in their capacity to coordinate the maneuver of multiple subordinate
elements in complex operations.”73 PMF units continue to conduct anti-IS operations in areas of
eastern Iraq, and frequently suffer casualties in clashes with IS fighters and from IS attacks.
These conditions and trends suggest that while the capabilities of IS fighters remain limited at
present, IS personnel and other armed groups could exploit persistent weaknesses in ISF and/or
CTS/PMF capabilities to gradual y reconstitute the IS threat to Iraq and neighboring countries.
This may be particularly true with regard to remote areas of Iraq or under circumstances where
security forces face additional crowd control or force-protection duties that divert personnel or
limited ISR assets.

NATO Mission Iraq
In paral el to coalition efforts, NATO agreed in 2018 to launch NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) to support Iraqi security
sector reform and military professional development. NMI’s 500 personnel advise Iraq’s Ministry of Defense,
Office of the National Security Advisor, and the Prime Minister’s National Operations Centre among others, and
provide “train-the-trainer” programs at Iraqi military academies.74

68 LIG-OCO, Report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve, January 1 -March 31, 2020.
69 Ibid.
70 CJT F-OIR, Coalition T ask Force-Iraq transitions to Military Advisor Group, July 4, 2020.
71 LIG-OCO, Report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve, July 1-October 25, 2019. “ CJT F-OIR said that most
commands within the ISF will not conduct operations to clear ISIS insurgents in mountainous and desert terrain
without Coalition air cover, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and coordination. Instead, ISF
commands rely on the Coalition to monitor “points of interest” and collect ISR for them. Despite ongoing training,
CJT F-OIR said that the ISF has not changed its level of reliance on Coalition forces for the last 9 months and tha t Iraqi
commanders continue to request Coalition assets instead of utilizing their own systems. ”
72 LIG-OCO, Report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve, January 1 -March 31, 2020.
73 Ibid.
74 NAT O Mission Iraq, Fact Sheet, June 2020.
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Stabilization and Reconstruction
U.S. Support for U.N. Stabilization
Stabilizing areas formerly held by the Islamic State group and/or damaged in counter-operations
has required investments in infrastructure and housing along with support for economic
development and communal dialogue. In a June 2020 visit to Mosul, Prime Minister Al Kadhimi
solicited opinions from citizens on the region’s most pressing reconstruction needs, in turn
articulating his own list of needs, including government revenue, a reconstruction ethos free from
corruption, and reconciliation within the community.The U.S. government directs most
stabilization assistance to areas of Iraq liberated from the Islamic State through the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP)-administered Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS).75
According to UNDP data as of April 2020, the FFS has received $1.29 bil ion in resources since
its inception in mid-2015, with 2,320 projects reported completed with the support of UNDP-
managed funding.76 Looking forward, UNDP is proposing a second phase of its stabilization
efforts in Iraq—Stabilization Plus—which would extend the mandate of FFS until December
2023, to fulfil stabilization needs within the same geographic areas and sector under its mandate.
According to UNDP, a steering committee chaired by the government of Iraq sets overal
stabilization priorities for the FFS program, with governorate-level Iraqi authorities directly
responsible for implementation. In January 2019, UNDP identified $426 mil ion in stabilization
program funding shortfal s in five priority areas in Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al Din governorates
“deemed to be the most at risk to future conflict” and “integral for the broader stabilization of
Iraq.”77 By the end of 2019, that funding gap had narrowed to $205 mil ion.78 While the 2019
mass protests did not take place in areas where FFS operates, UNDP noted that greater
programmatic agility was required to adapt to a changing security and political context.79 UNDP
officials have reported that earmarking of funding by donors “can result in funding being directed
away from areas highlighted by the Iraqi authorities as being in great need.”80
Trump Administration requests to Congress for FY2018-FY2021 monies for Iraq programs
included proposals to fund continued U.S. contributions to post-IS stabilization. The Trump
Administration has notified Congress of foreign aid obligations for U.N.-managed stabilization
programs during 2018, 2019, and 2020. This included funds to support stabilization in Anbar
governorate, beyond the areas of Ninewa governorate where the Administration has directed most
U.S. stabilization assistance since 2017 (see “Issues Affecting Religious and Ethnic Minorities”
below). U.S. officials continue to seek greater Iraqi and international contributions to stabilization
efforts in both Iraq and Syria.

75 FFS includes a Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization (FFIS), a Funding Facility for Expanded Stabilization
(FFES), and Economic Reform Facilities for the national government and the KRI. U.S. contributions to FFIS support
stabilization activities under each of its “ Four Windows”: (1) light infrastructure rehabilitation, (2) livelihoods support,
(3) local official capacity building, and (4) community reconciliation programs.
76 UNDP-Iraq, Funding Facility for Stabilization Annual Report 2019, April 15 , 2020.
77 UNDP-Iraq, Funding Facility for Stabilization Quarter III Report - 2018, January 3, 2019.
78 UNDP-Iraq, Funding Facility for Stabilization Annual Report 2019, April 15, 2020.
79 UNDP also cited challenges in 2019 arising from “the inherently complex and unpredictable nature of large-scale
rehabilitation work.” Past UNDP FFS self-assessments highlighted rapid growth in the number of projects undertaken
nationwide since 2016 and resulting strains created on program systems including procurement, management, and
monitoring. UNDP-Iraq, Funding Facility for Stabilization Annual Report 2019, April 15, 2020.
80 UNDP response to CRS inquiry, May 2018.
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Donor Support and Development Prospects
At a February 2018 reconstruction conference in Kuwait, Iraqi authorities described more than
$88 bil ion in short- and medium-term reconstruction needs, spanning various sectors and
different areas of the country.81 Countries participating in the conference offered approximately
$30 bil ion worth of loans, investment pledges, export credit arrangements, and grants in
response. The Trump Administration actively supported the participation of U.S. companies in the
conference and announced its intent to pursue $3 bil ion in Export-Import Bank support for Iraq.
In October 2019, Iraq and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding increasing
this potential support to $5 bil ion.82
Iraqi leaders have hoped to attract considerable private sector investment to help finance
reconstruction needs and underwrite a new economic chapter for the country, but investment has
not met hoped for levels since the Islamic State’s defeat at the end of 2017. The size of Iraq’s
internal market and its advantages as a low-cost energy producer with identified infrastructure
investment needs help make it attractive to investors. However, overcoming persistent concerns
about security, service reliability, and corruption has proven chal enging. Foreign firms active in
Iraq’s oil sector evacuated some foreign personnel during U.S.-Iran confrontations in December
2019 and January 2020, and further departures have accompanied the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic. Parties exploring investment opportunities may consider the security situation, Iraqi
government’s ongoing response to the demands of protestors, COVID-19 outcomes, and the
success or failure of new authorities in pursuing reforms.
Is the United States Considering Sanctions on Iraq?83
In January 2020, President Trump threatened to impose sanctions on Iraq if Iraqi leaders force U.S. troops to
withdraw on unfriendly terms.84 U.S. and Iraqi officials since have engaged in strategic dialogue that U.S. military
officials expect wil result in a sustained, if reduced U.S. presence. The United States government has waived
existing Iran-related sanctions on Iraqi energy transactions, but not permanently. U.S. officials have sanctioned
some Iran-linked Iraqi groups and individuals for threatening Iraq’s stability, for violating the human rights of Iraqis,
and for involvement in terrorism. Some analysts have argued “the timing and sequencing” of sanctions “is critical
to maximizing desired effects and minimizing Tehran’s ability to exploit Iraqi blowback.”85 This logic may similarly
apply to any forceful U.S. responses to attacks or provocations by Iran-aligned Iraqis.
On May 20, 2020, the Trump Administration renewed the national emergency with respect to the stabilization of
Iraq declared in Executive Order 13303 (2003) as modified by subsequent executive orders.86 Any future
sanctions could be based on the national emergency declared in the 2003 Executive Order, or the President could
declare that related events constitute a new, separate emergency under authorities stated in the National
Emergency Act and International Emergency Economic Powers Act (NEA and IEEPA, respectively). Sanctions
under IEEPA target U.S.-based assets and transactions with designated individuals; while a designation might not
reap significant economic disruption, it can send a significant signal to the international community about an
individual or entity. The National Emergencies Act, at 50 U.S.C. 1622, provides a legislative mechanism for
Congress to terminate a national emergency with enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval.

81 Iraq Ministry of Planning, Reconstruction and Development Framework, February 2018.
82 Export-Import Bank of the United States, October 16, 2019.
83 Dianne Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation contributed to this section.
84 Maggie Haberman, “ T rump T hreatens Iranian Cultural Sites, and Warns of Sanctions on Iraq,” New York Times,
January 5, 2020. Some press reporting suggests that Administration officials have begun preparing to implement the
President’s sanctions threat if necessary and considering potential effects and consequences. Jeff Stein and Josh
Dawsey, “After T rump’s threat, administration begins drafting possible sanctions on Iraq,” Washington Post, January
6, 2019.
85 Michael Knights, et al., “T he Smart Way to Sanction Iranian -Backed Militias in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, September 17, 2018.
86 Notice of May 20, 2020: Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Stabilization of Iraq.
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Short of declaring a national emergency, however, the President has broad authority to curtail foreign assistance
(throughout the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), and related authorizations and
appropriations), sales and leases of defense articles and services (particularly section 3 of the Arms Export
Control Act; 22 U.S.C. 2753), and entry into the United States of Iraqi nationals (Immigration and N ationality Act;
particularly at 8 U.S.C. 1189).
Should U.S.-Iraqi negotiations fail or future discord reemerge, any new punitive U.S. sanctions could complicate
Iraq’s economic ties to its neighbors and to U.S. partners in Europe and Asia. Broad sanctions could elicit
reciprocal hostility from Iraq. If denied opportunities to build economic ties to the United States and U.S.
partners, Iraqis could instead mover closer to Iran, Russia, and/or China with whom they already have established
economic ties.
The Kurdistan Region and Relations with Baghdad
The Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq (KRI)
Kurdistan Region Legislative Election
enjoys considerable administrative autonomy
Seats won by Coalition/Party
under the terms of Iraq’s 2005 federal
constitution, but issues concerning territory,
Coalition/Party
Seats Won
security, energy, and revenue sharing
Kurdistan Democratic Party
45
continue to strain ties between the Kurdistan
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
21
Regional Government (KRG) and the
government in Baghdad. In September 2017,
Gorran (Change) Movement
12
the KRG held a controversial advisory
New Generation
8
referendum on independence; amplifying
Komal
7
political tensions with the national
government (see textbox below).87
Reform List
[Kurdistan Islamic Union
The referendum was followed by a security
5
(KIU)-Islamic Movement of
crisis as Iraqi Security Forces and PMF
Kurdistan (IMK)]
fighters reentered some disputed territories
Azadi List
that had been held by KRG peshmerga
1
(Communist Party)
forces. Peshmerga fighters also withdrew
from the city of Kirkuk and much of the
Modern Coalition
1
governorate. Baghdad and the KRG have
Turkmen Parties
5
since agreed on a number of issues, including
Christian Parties
5
some border and customs controls issues, but
have differed over the export of oil from
Armenian Independent
1
some KRG-controlled fields and the transfer
Source: Kurdistan Region Electoral Commission.
of funds to pay the salaries of some KRG
civil servants. While talks have continued,
the ISF and peshmerga have remained deployed across from each other at various fronts
throughout the disputed territories (Figure 7). In June 2020, Iraq protested Turkish violations of
its airspace and territory in connection with ongoing Turkish military operations against
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) forces inside northern Iraq. The KRI’s leading political
movements have distinct relationships with the Turkish and Iranian governments, and anti-PKK
operations may create domestic political chal enges for them.
The KRG delayed overdue legislative elections for the Kurdistan National Assembly in the wake
of the referendum crisis and held them on September 30, 2018. The KDP won a plurality (45) of

87 For background on the Kurdistan region, see CRS Report R45025, Iraq: Background and U.S. Policy.
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the 111 KNA seats, with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and smal er opposition and
Islamist parties splitting the balance. With longtime KDP leader Masoud Barzani’s term as
president having expired in 2015, his nephew, KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani succeeded
him in June 2019 (Figure 2). Masoud Barzani’s son, security official Masrour Barzani, assumed
the KRG prime ministership.
After the election, factions within the PUK appeared to differ over KRG cabinet formation, while
KDP and PUK differences were apparent at the national level. During 2018 government
formation talks in Baghdad, the KDP sought to name the Kurdish candidate for the Iraqi national
presidency, but a majority of COR members instead chose Barham Salih, a PUK member.
In March 2019, KDP and PUK leaders announced a four-year political agreement that al owed for
the formation of the KRG cabinet and set joint positions on the national cabinet and the
governorship of Kirkuk.88 During mass protests in central and southern Iraq during 2019 and
2020, Kurdish leaders recognized Arab Iraqi protestors’ concerns and criticized repressive
violence, while convening to unify positions on proposed reforms that some Kurds fear could
undermine the federal y recognized Kurdistan region’s rights under Iraq’s constitution.89
Prior to Prime Minister Abd al Mahdi’s November 2019 resignation announcement, KRG leaders
reportedly planned to visit Baghdad to finalize an agreement over the export of 250,000 barrels
per day of oil from the Kurdistan region under the national government’s marketing authority.90
In exchange, Baghdad was to continue to make budget transfers in 2020 that pay KRG salaries.
Disagreement over this issue had lingered throughout 2019 in light of the KRG’s apparent failure
to comply with previously agreed export arrangements. KRG officials and Abd al Mahdi did not
finalize their nascent agreement during Abd al Mahdi’s tenure as caretaker prime minister, and
prospects for negotiations over exports and financial transfers appeared to shape Kurdish leaders’
positions with regard to the formation of the current national cabinet. KRG-Baghdad fiscal issues
remain outstanding (see “Economic and Fiscal Chal enges” above).
U.S. and U.N. officials encourage Kurds and other Iraqis to engage on issues of dispute and to
avoid unilateral military actions.91 U.S. officials also encourage improved security cooperation
between the KRG and Baghdad, especial y since IS remnants appear to be exploiting gaps created
by the standoff in the disputed territories. KRG officials continue to express concern about the
potential for an IS resurgence and chafe at operations by some PMF units in areas adjacent to the
KRI. In July 2020, Iraqi military officials announced plans to establish some security
coordination centers to jointly monitor security conditions in disputed areas w ith Kurdish
peshmerga. This may include Regional Guard Brigades that receive U.S. military assistance (see
“Security Cooperation and U.S. Training” below).

88 “Gov’t formation in Iraq Kurdish region closer after KDP -PUK deal,” Al Jazeera English, March 4, 2019.
89 Dana T aib Menmy, “As Iraqi calls to amend constitution rise, Kurds fear loss of political gains,” Al Monitor,
November 18, 2019.
90 Associated Press, “ Iraqi Officials Cite Progress on Oil Deal With Kurds,” November 25, 2019.
91 Halgurd Sherwani, “Kurdistan PM, UN envoy discuss Erbil-Baghdad disputes,” K24 News (Erbil), July 7, 2020.
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Figure 7. Disputed Territories in Iraq
Areas of Influence as of July 8, 2020

Sources: Congressional Research Service using ArcGIS, IHS Markit Conflict Monitor, U.S. government, and
United Nations data.

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The Kurdistan Region’s September 2017 Referendum on Independence
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held an official advisory referendum on independence from Iraq on
September 25, 2017, despite requests from the national government of Iraq, the United States, and other external
actors to delay or cancel it. More than 72% of eligible voters participated and roughly 92% voted “Yes.” The
referendum was held across the KRI and in other areas that were then under the control of Kurdish forces. These
include areas subject to territorial disputes between the KRG and the national government, such as the
multiethnic city of Kirkuk, adjacent oil-rich areas, and parts of Ninewa governorate populated by religious and
ethnic minorities. Kurdish forces had secured many of these areas fol owing the retreat of national government
forces in the face of the Islamic State’s rapid advance across northern Iraq in 2014.
After the referendum, Iraqi national government leaders imposed a ban on international flights to and from the
Kurdistan region. In October 2017, Prime Minister Abadi ordered Iraqi forces to return to the disputed territories
that had been under the control of national forces prior to the Islamic State’s 2014 advance. Much of the oil-rich
governorate of Kirkuk—long claimed by Iraqi Kurds—returned to national government control, and resulting
controversies have riven Kurdish politics. Iraqi authorities rescinded the international flight ban in 2018 after
reaching some agreements on border control, customs, and security at Kurdistan’s international airports.
Humanitarian Issues and Iraqi Minorities
Humanitarian Conditions
U.N. officials report several issues of ongoing humanitarian and protection concerns for displaced
and returning populations and the host communities assisting them. With a range of needs and
vulnerabilities, these populations require different forms of support, from immediate
humanitarian assistance to resources for early recovery. Protection is a key priority in areas of
displacement, where for example, harassment of displaced persons by armed actors and threats of
forced return have occurred, as wel as in areas of return. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 2020 humanitarian needs assessment anticipates that as many
as 4.1 mil ion Iraqis wil need some form of humanitarian assistance in 2020. In June, Iraq’s
Ministry of Planning estimated that an additional 4.5 mil ion Iraqis are at risk of fal ing below the
poverty line because of socio-economic disruptions attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic.92
As of April 2020, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated that more than
4.7 mil ion Iraqis displaced after 2014 had returned to their districts, while nearly 1.4 mil ion
individuals remained as displaced persons (IDPs).93 Ninewa and Dohuk governorates host the
most IDPs (more than 40 percent of the total), reflecting the lingering effects of intense military
operations against the Islamic State in Mosul and other areas of Ninewa during 2017 (Figure 8).94
IOM estimates that the Kurdistan region hosts nearly 700,000 IDPs (close to 50 percent of the
remaining IDPs nationwide). IDP numbers in the KRI have declined since 2017, though not as
rapidly as elsewhere. UNDP reported in June 2020 that “68 percent of IDPs and 59 percent of
refugees across the KRI live in private residences outside of camp settings” and warned that “As
protracted displacement drives more IDPs and refugees into private residences, community

92 UNAMI, Children make up the majority of up to 4.5 million Iraqis at risk of falling into poverty and deprivation due
to the impact of covid-19, June 6, 2020.
93 IOM, Iraq Displacement T racking Monitor, Master List Report 115, March-April 2020.
94 Estimates suggest thousands of civilians were killed or wounded during the Mosul battle, which displaced more than
1 million people.
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infrastructure is stretched, and the quality of access to water, sewerage networks and sealed roads
diminishes.”95
The 2020 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) seeks $660.7 mil ion and as of July 2020, the
appeal had received $188.2 mil ion, with an additional $160.8 mil ion received outside the plan.96
The United States was the top donor to the 2018 and 2019 Iraq HRPs. Since 2014, the United
States has contributed nearly $2.7 bil ion to humanitarian relief efforts in Iraq, including more
than $470 mil ion in humanitarian support in FY2019 and $32 mil ion in FY2020.97
Figure 8. IOM Estimates of IDPs by Location in Iraq
As of June 30, 2020, Select Governorates

Source: CRS. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Iraq Displacement Tracking Monitor Data.
Factors Influencing Return Decisions
Overal , returns by the displaced to their home areas increased in late 2017 and by December
2017, more Iraqis had returned to their home areas than those who had remained as IDPs or who
were becoming newly displaced. Nevertheless, rates of return “slowed significantly in 2019,
leading to a substantial proportion of the internal y displaced population in Iraq experiencing
prolonged displacement.”98 In some areas, acute health, electricity, and water sector needs remain

95 UNDP, Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Program (ICRRP), Annual Report 2019, June 2020.
96 United Nations Financial T racking Service, Iraq 2020 (Humanitarian Response P lan), July 9, 2020.
97 U.S. humanitarian assistance has comprised a range of support such as emergency food and nutrition assistance, safe
drinking water and hygiene kits, emergency shelter, medical services, and protection for displaced Iraqis. See USAID,
Iraq: Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #2, Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, May 8, 2020.
98 U.N. Document S/2020/363, Report of UNAMI on Implementation of Resolution 2470, May 6, 2020.
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to be addressed, and, in others, protection concerns remain high, and have been amplified by the
impact of COVID-19 and related economic pressures.99 Retaliation against people associated with
(or perceived to be affiliated with) IS and sectarian-related violence also remains a complicated
problem.100
Those choosing to return have cited “improvements in the security situation, the provision of
services, and the rehabilitation of houses in areas of origin”101 as facilitating factors, although
COVID-19 related restrictions have erected new barriers to movement between some
governorates. In November 2019, the U.N. Secretary General reported to the Security Council
and emphasized that returns of internal y displaced persons to their districts of origin should be
“informed, safe, dignified, and voluntary.”102 However, according to UNOCHA, in late 2019 the
Iraqi government affected “a rapid consolidation and closure of IDP camps, particularly in
Ninewa. During that period, many IDPs left camps fearing security screening and/or involuntary
relocation, often becoming secondarily displaced in out-of-camp settings due to an inability to
successfully return to their areas of origin.”103
Issues Affecting Religious and Ethnic Minorities
State Department reports on human rights conditions and religious freedom in Iraq have
documented the difficulties faced by religious and ethnic minorities in the country for years .
Violent extremist groups have targeted members of some Iraqi religious and ethnic minority
groups aggressively. From 2014 through 2017, the Islamic State waged a particularly brutal
campaign against Yezidis, Christians, and Shia Muslims in northern Iraq, which both the Obama
and Trump Administrations have described as constituting genocide.104 Related difficulties and
security risks have continuously driven members of minority groups to flee Iraq or to take shelter
in areas perceived as safer, whether with fel ow group members or in new communities.
The State Department reports that some minority groups have declined as a relative share of the
country’s population since 2003 because of attacks, displacement, and discrimination. Estimates
suggest that the Iraqi Christian population has declined particularly precipitously since the 2003
U.S. invasion, with hundreds of thousands of Christians having fled the country. In June 2019, the
U.S. State Department reported that

99 UNOCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Bulletin, May 2020. See also, Special Representative of the United Nations
Secretary-General for Iraq Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, Briefing to the Security Council, August 28, 2019.
100 Hisham al Hashimi, “ISIS in Iraq: T he Challenge of Reintegrating ‘ISIS Families’” Center for Global Policy, July 7,
2020. T he State Department’s 2019 International Religious Freedom Report on Iraq states that “ According to multiple
sources, many alleged Sunni ISIS sympathizers or their families whom government forces and militia groups had
expelled in 2018 from their homes in several provinces had not returned home by year’s end. Some of these IDPs said
PMF groups, including Saraya al-Khorasani and Kata’ib Hezballah, continued to block their return. ”
101 IOM, Iraq Displacement T racking Monitor, Master List Report 115, March-April 2020.
102 U.N. Document S/2019/903, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 2470 (2019), November 22,
2019. In October 2018, the U.N. Secretary General reported to the Security Council that many remaining IDPs then
expressed “ an unwillingness to return to their areas of origin owing to concerns regarding security and community
reconciliation, the destruction of property, insufficient services and livelihoods and the lack of progress in clearing
explosive hazards.” U.N. Document S/2018/975, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 2421 (2018),
October 31, 2018.
103 UNOCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Bulletin, April 2020.
104 Secretary of State John Kerry, “Remarks on Daesh and Genocide,” March 17, 2016; and, Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker, Special Briefing On the U.S.-Iraq Dialogue, June 11, 2020.
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Christian leaders estimate there are fewer than 250,000 Christians remaining in the country,
with the largest population – at least 200,000 – living in the Ninewa Plain and the IKR
[Kurdistan Region of Iraq, or KRI]. The Christian population has declined over the past 16
years from a pre-2002 population estimate of between 800,000 and 1.4 million persons.105
Islamic State threats compounded these trends and spurred mass displacement among other
groups. The State Department reported in 2019 that of the 400-500,000 Yezidis estimated by
community leaders to remain in Iraq, approximately 360,000 were displaced at the end of 2018.
The State Department reported in June 2020 that, “Restrictions on freedom of religion, as wel as
violence against and harassment of minority groups committed by government security forces,
remained widespread outside the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR), according to religious leaders and
representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).”106 Christian and Yezidi leaders have
claimed that their communities experience political y and territorial y motivated movement
restrictions in both the Ninewa Plains area (aka Nineveh Plain)107 and the KRI as a result of
decisions by KRG officials, Kurdish peshmerga and asayish (special police) forces, and PMF).108
According to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, “religious minorities,
including the Yazidi and Christian communities, are skeptical of the Iraqi government’s
wil ingness and capability to protect them from both Shi’a and Sunni violent armed groups,
including ISIS and sectarian elements of the PMF.”109 In August 2019, U.S. officials urged Iraq’s
government “to make urgent progress” in supporting threatened religious and ethnic
communities, “including by preventing armed groups from blocking their return to their homes
and vil ages.”110
One complicating factor is the overlay of intra-Iraqi politics and competition over territory in
areas where Christians and other minority groups have historical y resided. Minority groups that
live in areas subject to long-running territorial disputes between Iraq’s national government and
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) face additional interference and exploitation by
larger groups for political, economic, or security reasons. Members of diverse minority
communities express a variety of territorial claims and administrative preferences, both among
and within their own groups. While much attention is focused on potential intimidation or
coercion of minorities by majority groups, disputes within minority communities over various
options also have the potential to generate intra-group tension and violence.111 In June 2020, the

105 State Department, Report on International Religious Freedom, June 2019. “ Approximately 67 percent of Christians
are Chaldean Catholics (an Eastern Rite of the Roman Catholic Church), and nearly 20 percent are members of the
Assyrian Church of the East. T he remainder are Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Armenian
Apostolic, and Anglican and other Protestants. T here are approximately 2,000 registered members of evangelical
Christian churches in the IKR, while an unknown number, mostly converts from Islam, practice the religion secretly. ”
106 State Department, Report on International Religious Freedom, June 2020. T he 2017 report said that such harassment
took place “particularly inside the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR).”
107 Ninewa Governorate and the Ninewa Plain also are referred to as Nineveh Governorate and the Nineveh Plain. T he
Arabic spelling and pronunciation is Ninewa, and pronunciations of the Kurdish and Syriac names mirror the Arabic.
T he alternate English transliteration Nineveh is a historical reference to the ancient Assyrian city of the same name, the
Latin word for which was Ninive. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, English usage evolved from Niniue to
Nineveh in the 17th century.
108 Ibid.
109 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Iraq Annual Report 2019.
110 Acting U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Jonathan Cohen, Remarks at a UN
Security Council Meeting on the Situation in Iraq (UNAMI), August 28, 2019.
111 See Yousif Kalian, “T he Nineveh Plains and the Future of Minorities in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, February 7, 2016; Bryant Harris, “Congress fuels Christian rivalries with bid to arm Iraqi militias, ” Al Monitor,
September 15, 2017; Mac Skelton and Karam Bahnam, “T he Bishop and the Prime Minister: Mediating Conflict in the
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State Department reported that “Some Yezidi and Christian leaders continued to report physical
abuse and verbal harassment by KRG Peshmerga and Asayish forces in the KRG-controlled
portion of Ninewa; some [minority group] leaders said the majority of such cases were motivated
more by territorial disputes rather than religious discrimination.”112
In April 2020, IOM reported that more than 262,000 individuals had returned to the Ninewa Plain
districts of Hamdaniya and Telkaif east of Mosul out of an overal returnee population in Ninewa
governorate of more than 1.76 mil ion.113 These districts have historical y been home to large
communities of Iraqi Christians. IOM rated conditions for returnees in Hamdaniya and Telkaif as
considerably less severe than districts further west that are home to Yazidi and Shia minorities
such as Sinjar and Telafar. This may reflect some results of the prioritized stabilization assistance
the Ninewa Plains areas have received with U.S. direction.
In October 2017, Vice President Mike Pence said the U.S. government would direct more support
to persecuted religious minority groups in the Middle East, including in Iraq.114 As part of this
initiative, the Trump Administration negotiated with UNDP to direct U.S. contributions to the
UNDP Funding Facility for Stabilization to the Ninewa Plains and other minority-populated areas
of northern Iraq. In January 2018, USAID officials announced a “renegotiated” contribution
agreement with UNDP so that U.S. contributions would “address the needs of vulnerable
religious and ethnic minority communities in Ninewa Province, especial y those who have been
victims of atrocities by ISIS” with a focus on “restoring services such as water, electricity,
sewage, health, and education.”115 As noted above, subsequent U.S. contributions to the FFS have
sought to address stabilization needs in Anbar governorate and aid in supporting the Iraqi health
system’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The United Nations Security Council and Iraq
The United Nations Security Council voted unanimously in May 2020 to extend the mandate for the U.N.
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) through May 2021. Resolution 2522 (2020) outlines priority issues for UNAMI
to address in response to the Al Kadhimi government’s request. Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-
General Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert of the Netherlands leads UNAMI.
Resolution 2379 (2017) established an Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by
Da'esh/ISIL (UNITAD). Led by Karim A. A. Khan QC of the United Kingdom, UNITAD continues to consult with
Iraqi authorities on related accountability issues involving IS crimes and victims. His June 2020 report to the
Council cited “close col aboration with national and local authorities across the country.”116
Pursuant to Resolution 2107 (2013), UNAMI continues to support Iraq -Kuwait cooperation on “developments
pertaining to missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property, including the national
archives” dating to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
A sanctions committee established pursuant to Resolution 1518 (2003) continues to monitor and administer a list
of individuals and entities subject to sanctions under Resolution 1483 (2003), which targets members of the
former Saddam Hussein regime.
Iraq remains liable for $2.8 bil ion in outstanding payments to Kuwait under claims submitted to the United
Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) related to the 1990 invasion.

Nineveh Plains,” London School of Economics Middle East Centre, January 25, 2019; and Saad Salloum, “Iraqi
decision to remove Shabak PMU from Ninevah Plains stirs conflict,” Al Monitor, August 31, 2019.
112 State Department, Report on International Religious Freedom in Iraq, June 2020.
113 IOM, Displacement T racking Monitor: Iraq, Return Index Governorate Profile: Return Dynamics in Ninewa
Governorate, April 2020.
114 Remarks by the Vice President at In Defense of Christians Solidarity Dinner, October 25, 2017.
115 USAID, “Continued U.S. Assistance to Better Meet the Needs of Minorities in Iraq,” January 8, 2018.
116 U.N. Document S/2020/547, June 23, 2020.
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U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress
The United States has long faced difficult choices in Iraq, and recent U.S.-Iran violence there
appears to be complicating U.S. choices further. Even as the 2003 invasion unseated an
adversarial regime, it unleashed more than a decade of violent insurgency and terrorism that
divided Iraqis. This created opportunities for Iran to strengthen its influence in Iraq and across the
region. Since 2003, the United States has invested both militarily and financial y in stabilizing
Iraq, but successive Administrations and Congresses have expressed frustration with the results of
U.S. efforts. The U.S. government withdrew military forces from Iraq in accordance with Iraq’s
sovereign requests in 2011, but deteriorating security conditions soon led Iraqi leaders to request
that U.S. and other international forces return.
Since 2014, U.S. policy toward Iraq has focused on ensuring the defeat of the Islamic State as a
transnational insurgent and terrorist threat, while laying the groundwork for what successive U.S.
Administrations have expressed hope could be a long-term bilateral security, diplomatic, and
economic partnership with Iraqis. U.S. and other foreign troops have operated in Iraq at the
invitation of the Iraqi government to conduct operations against Islamic State fighters, advise and
assist Iraqi operations, and train and equip Iraqi security forces, including peshmerga forces
associated with the Kurdistan Regional Government. Cooperative efforts have reduced the
Islamic State threat, but Iraqi security needs remain considerable.
Security cooperation has been the cornerstone of U.S.-Iraqi relations since 2014, but leaders in
both countries have faced pressure to reexamine the impetus and terms for continued bilateral
partnership. Some Iraqi political groups—including some with ties to Iran—pushed for U.S. and
other foreign troops to depart in 2019, launching a campaign in the COR for a vote to evict U.S.
forces. However, leading Iraqi officials rebuffed their efforts, citing the continued importance of
foreign support to Iraq’s security and the government’s desire for security training for Iraqi
forces. The U.S.-Iran confrontation in December 2019 and January 2020 and the subsequent COR
vote directing the expulsion of foreign forces il ustrated the potential stakes of conflict involving
Iran and the United States in Iraq for these issues.
As the Trump Administration has sought proactively to chal enge, contain, and roll back Iran’s
regional influence, in Iraq it has reduced U.S. commitments while exploring possibilities for a
long-term partnership with the Iraqi government. U.S. officials have continued to declare U.S.
support for Iraq’s sovereignty, unity, security, and economic stability.117 These paral el (and
sometimes competing) goals may raise several policy questions for, including with regard to
 the makeup and viability of Iraq’s governing coalitions;
 Iraqi leaders’ approaches to Iran-backed groups and the future of militia forces;
 Iraq’s compliance with U.S. sanctions on Iran;
 the future extent and roles of the U.S. military presence in Iraq;
 the terms and conditions associated with U.S. security assistance to Iraqi forces;
 U.S. relations with Iraqi constituent groups such as the Kurds; and
 potential responses to U.S. efforts to contain or confront Iran-aligned entities in
Iraq or elsewhere in the region.

117 Briefing with Special Representative for Iran and Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State Brian Hook, December 5,
2019; and, Principal Deputy Secretary of State for Near East Affairs (PDAS) Joey Hood, Statement for the Record,
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism (SFRC-
ME), December 4, 2019.
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U.S.-Iraq Strategic Dialogue
On June 11, 2020, U.S. and Iraqi officials met virtual y to begin a high level strategic dialogue “in accordance with
the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement.” The talks are structured to address four principal areas: security and
counterterrorism, economics and energy, political issues, and cultural relations. According to a joint statement,
officials in the June meeting “reaffirmed the principles agreed upon by the two sides in the Strategic Framework
Agreement (SFA), as wel as the principles in the exchange of diplomatic notes and the letters of the Republic of
Iraq to the United Nations Security Council dated 25 June 2014 (S/2014/440) and 20 September 2014
[S/2014/691] respectively. The United States reaffirmed its respect for Iraq’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
relevant decisions of the Iraqi legislative and executive authorities.”118
While other policy issues are relevant to the bilateral relationship, most attention in Iraq’s media and political
debates focuses on whether or how the dialogue wil clarify questions surrounding the future of U.S. military
forces and operations in Iraq. Commander, U.S. Central Command Gen. Kenneth McKenzie visited Iraq in July
2020 and afterward stated his expectation that Iraq wil seek to sustain a coalition military presence in the
country, notwithstanding the Iraqi COR’s January 2020 vote directing the government to affect the withdrawal of
foreign personnel.119 Praising the government of Iraq’s recent steps to improve force protection, McKenzie
described his conversations with Iraqi leaders, saying,
we established a good back and forth that whatever the future posture is for us in Iraq and for our NATO
and coalition partners as wel , it's going to be in col aboration with the government of Iraq. We al agree
that's the case, and we al agree we're going to be focused on finishing the final victory again. So the final
final conclusion of the campaign against Da’esh, they're no longer holding ground. We just need to finish
the insurgency. ...It is my belief that the government of Iraq recognizes the value that we bring for them in
their fight against Da’esh. They’re going to want us to stay.
As discussed above, several anti-U.S. factions in Iraq continue to insist on the departure of U.S. and coalition
forces. Commenting on McKenzie’s statement, Fatah/AAH-affiliated COR member Sa’ad al Sa’adi said
The decision of the Iraqi Council of Representatives dictating the expulsion of al foreign forces, and
principal y the U.S. forces, is compulsory for Mustafa al Kadhimi’s government and al the government
bodies concerned with this issue. It is not possible for any personality or body to procrastinate in
implementing this decision, regardless of the pretexts or excuse. ...The government is obligated to
implement this matter. ...There can be no accepting any occupying forces remaining in Iraq, especial y
since we are in no need of any foreign forces on the ground.120
Possible Issues for Congress
Although current policy questions relate to the potential reduction or elimination of ongoing U.S.
military efforts in Iraq, successive U.S. Administrations already have sought to keep U.S.
involvement and investment minimal relative to the 2003-2011 era. The Obama and Trump
Administrations have pursued U.S. interests through partnership with various entities in Iraq and
the development of those partners’ capabilities, rather than through extensive U.S. military
deployments or outsized U.S. aid investments. That said, the United States remains the leading
provider of security and humanitarian assistance to Iraq and supports post-IS stabilization
activities across the country through grants to United Nations agencies and other entities.
According to inspectors general reporting, reductions in the size of the U.S. civilian presence in
Iraq during 2019 affected the ability of U.S. agencies to implement and monitor U.S. programs.121
Significant further reductions in U.S. civilian or military personnel levels could have additional

118 U.S. State Department and Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Statement on the U.S. -Iraq Strategic Dialogue,
June 11, 2020.
119 CENT COM, Gen McKenzie Interview T ranscript with Lolita Baldor, Luis Martinez, and Missy Ryan, July 8, 2020.
120 “Strongly Worded Iraqi Parliamentary Response to the U.S. Central Command’s Announcement of the Iraqis’
Desire for Its Forces to Stay in the Country ,” Baghdad T oday, July 8, 2020.
121 LIG-OCO, Report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve, July 1 -October 25, 2019.
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implications for U.S. programs, and conditions in Iraq and may require U.S. and Iraqi leaders to
consider and pursue alternatives.
Congress has continued to authorize and appropriate aid for Iraq, but has not enacted
comprehensive legislation defining its views on Iraq or offering alternative frameworks for
bilateral partnership. Several enacted provisions have encouraged or required the executive
branch to submit strategy and spending plans with regard to Iraq since 2017. The Trump
Administration has requested appropriation of additional U.S. assistance since 2017, but also has
cal ed on Iraq to increase its contributions to security and stabilization efforts, while reorienting
U.S. train and equip efforts to prioritize minimal y viable counterterrorism capabilities and
deemphasizing comprehensive goals for strengthening Iraq’s security forces. The consolidation of
U.S. forces to a smal er number of bases in Iraq concentrated remaining forces in anticipation of
further diplomatic and security discussions between U.S. and Iraqi officials about the future of the
bilateral partnership.
In December 2019, Congress enacted appropriations (P.L. 116-93 and P.L. 116-94) and
authorization (P.L. 116-92) legislation providing for continued defense and civilian aid and
partnership programs in Iraq in response to the Trump Administration’s FY2020 requests.
Appropriated funds in some cases are set to remain available through September 2021 to support
military and civilian assistance should U.S.-Iraqi negotiations al ow.
Members of Congress monitoring developments in Iraq, considering new Administration aid
requests, and/or conducting oversight of executive branch initiatives may consider a range of
related questions, including:
 What are U.S. interests in Iraq, and how can they best be secured?
 How necessary is a continued U.S. military presence in Iraq? What alternatives
exist? What tradeoffs and benefits might these alternatives pose?
 What effect might a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Iraq have on the security
of Iraq? How might the redeployment of Iraq-based forces to other countries in
the CENTCOM area of responsibility affect regional perceptions and security?
 How might the withdrawal of U.S. and other international forces shape Iraqi
political dynamics, including the behavior of government and militia forces
toward protestors and the relationships between majority and minority
communities across the country?
 If U.S.-Iraqi security cooperation were to end, how might Iraq compensate? If the
United States were to impose sanctions on Iraq or defy Iraqi orders to leave, how
might Iraq respond? How might related scenarios affect U.S. security interests?
Authorities for Military Operations and Assistance
The Trump Administration, like the Obama Administration, has cited the 2001 Authorization for
Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40) and the 2002 Authorization for Use of Force in Iraq
(P.L. 107-243) as domestic legal authorizations for U.S. military operations against the Islamic
State in Iraq.122 Successive Presidents have notified Congress of operations against the Islamic
State in periodic reports on the 2002 Iraq AUMF and in letters to Congress concerning war
powers. Iraq requested international military intervention to address the threat posed by the

122 Reports on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States’ Use of Military Force and Related National
Security Operations, December 2016 and March 2018.
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Islamic State group in 2014.123 The U.S. government has referred to both collective and
individual self-defense provisions of the U.N. Charter as the relevant international legal
justifications for ongoing U.S. operations in Iraq and Syria.124
On a bilateral basis, the U.S. military presence in Iraq is governed by an exchange of diplomatic
notes that reference the security provisions of the 2008 bilateral Strategic Framework
Agreement.125 To date, this arrangement has not required the approval of a separate security
agreement by Iraq’s Council of Representatives. According to former Special Presidential Envoy
for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL Brett McGurk, the 2014 U.S.-Iraq diplomatic notes,
which are not public, contain a one-year cancelation clause.126
U.S. and coalition training efforts for various Iraqi security forces have been implemented at
different locations, including in the Kurdistan region, with U.S. training activities carried out
pursuant to the authorities granted by Congress for the Iraq Train and Equip Program and the
Office of Security Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad (OSC-I).127 OSC-I helps
administer training and support programs funded through Foreign Military Sales and Foreign
Military Financing assistance.128
Congress has authorized the continuation of train and equip program activities through December
2020 and appropriated funding for related programs that remains available through FY2021.
House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2021 would extend
the program authorization through December 2021 on different terms (H.R. 6395 and S. 4049).
U.S. arms transfers and security assistance to Iraq and counter-IS partners in Syria are provided
with the understanding that U.S. equipment wil be responsibly used by its intended recipients. As
of May 2020, the coalition had provided Iraqi and Syria partners “more than $4 bil ion worth of
armored trucks, weapons, body armor, heavy engineering equipment, as wel as conditions-based
stipends.”129 The 115th Congress was informed about the unintended or inappropriate use of U.S.-
origin defense equipment, including a now-resolved case involving the possession and use of
U.S.-origin tanks by elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces.130

123 U.N. Documents S/2014/691 annex and S/2014/440 annex, Letters from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Iraq
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, September 20, 2014 an d June 25, 2014.
124 U.N. Document S/2014/695, Letter Dated 23 September 201 from the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General, September 23, 2014.
125 Section III of the agreement states: “In order to strengthen security and stability in Iraq, and thereby contribute to
international peace and stability, and to enhance the ability of the Republic of Iraq to deter all threats against its
sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, the Parties shall continue to foster close cooperation concerning defense
and security arrangements without prejudice to Iraqi sovereignty over its land, sea, and air territory.”
126 Brett McGurk (@brett_mcgurk), T witter, January 8, 2020, 10:07 AM.
127 Specific authority for the Iraq train and equip program is provided in Section 1236 of the FY2015 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 113-291), as amended. OSC-I activities are authorized by Section 1215 of the FY2012
National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81), as amended.
128 See description in LIG-OCO, Report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve, January 1-March 31, 2020.
129 Special Briefing - Lieutenant General Pat White, Commanding Gen., CJT F-OIR, May 8, 2020.
130 LIG-OCO, Report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve and Operation Pacific Eagle–Philippines for the
period October 1-December 31, 2017.
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Appropriations for Military Operations and Assistance
Through September 2019, OIR operations in Iraq and Syria since August 2014 had cost $40.5
bil ion, with $11.8 bil ion spent in FY2019.131 This includes some of the more than $6.5 bil ion
Congress authorized and appropriated for train and equip assistance in Iraq from FY2015 through
FY2020 (Table 1). In FY2020, Congress appropriated $745 mil ion in defense funding for Iraq
programs under the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF). The Administration’s FY2021
request for $650 mil ion in defense funding proposes support to the Iraqi Army, Counterterrorism
Service (CTS), Special Forces (Qwat Khasah), Ministry of Interior Emergency Response
Battalions, Federal Police (FP), and Territorial Interdiction Forces (TIF); and KRG Ministry of
Peshmerga Regional Guard Brigades (see textbox on “Assistance to the Kurdistan Regional
Government” below).132
Congress also authorized $30 mil ion in FY2020 funding for OSC-I, but limited the availability
of some OSC-I funding until the Administration certifies that it has, among other things, initiated
a “bilateral engagement... with the objective of establishing a joint mechanism for security
assistance planning, including a five-year security assistance roadmap for developing sustainable
military capacity and capabilities and enabling defense institution building and reform.”
Table 1. Iraq Train and Equip Program: FY2015-FY2020 Appropriations and FY2021
Request
in mil ions of dol ars
FY2021
FY2015
FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020

Request
Iraq Train and
630
Equip Fund
1,618
715
-
-
-
-
289.5
(ITEF)
(FY17 CR)
Counter-ISIS
Train and Equip
Fund (CTEF)—
-
-
446.4
1,269
850
745
650
Iraq Al ocation
Total
1,618
715
1,365.9
1,269
850
745
650
Source: Executive branch appropriations requests and appropriations legislation.
Security Cooperation and U.S. Training
The U.S.-Iran confrontation in Iraq has raised fundamental questions about the future of U.S. and
coalition operations and training programs in Iraq. As discussed above (“Combatting Islamic
State Insurgents”), Iraqi military and counterterrorism operations against remnants of the Islamic
State group are ongoing, and the United States military and its coalition partners in the Combined
Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) have continued to provide support to
those efforts at the request of the Iraqi government.133

131 LIG-OCO, Report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve, January 1-March 31, 2020.
132 DOD Justification for FY2020 Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria T rain and Equip Fund (CT EF), March 2019.
133 See CJT F-OIR, “Coalition” at http://www.inherentresolve.mil/About-CJT F-OIR/Coalition/.
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To date, the coalition campaign plan has sought to assist Iraqi forces in defeating IS forces,
maintain security in recaptured areas, and pursue remaining IS insurgents. Oversight reporting to
Congress in 2018 suggested that DOD then-estimated that the Iraq Security Forces were “years, if
not decades” away from ending their “reliance on Coalition assistance,” and DOD expected “a
generation of Iraqi officers with continuous exposure to Coalition advisers” would be required to
establish a self-reliant Iraqi fighting force.134 At the time, the Lead Inspector General for Overseas
Contingency Operations (LIG-OCO) judged that these conditions raised “questions about the
duration of the OIR mission since the goal of that mission is defined as the ‘enduring defeat’ of
ISIS.”135 More recent oversight reporting citing U.S. officials emphasizes the independent
capabilities and operations of some Iraqi units relative to the reduced IS threats they face.
As of October 2019, U.S. and coalition forces had trained more than 200,000 Iraqi security
personnel since 2014, including more than 30,000 Kurdish peshmerga.136 More than 50,000 Iraqis
participated in coalition training during 2019.137 While remaining Iraqi capability gaps identified
by U.S. officials reflect long-standing weaknesses that in some cases date back to the U.S.
military’s 2003-2011 presence in Iraq, this reporting states that officials believe conditions for
transition toward higher level and more long term capacity building effort—“Phase IV” of
coalition campaign plan (Figure 9)—is now possible.
Figure 9. Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve Campaign Plan

Source: CJTF-OIR, July 2020. CJOA – Combined Joint Operations Area.

134 LIG-OCO, Report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve, July 1-September 30, 2018.
135 Ibid.
136 LIG-OCO, Report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve, July 1-October 25, 2019.
137 CJT F-OIR, CJT F-OIR reflects on significant gains in 2019, February 9, 2020.
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Ongoing changes in the scope, footprint, and missions of U.S. and coalition personnel in Iraq may
reflect reported improvements in Iraqi capabilities, but also may be influenced by health and
security-related force protection concerns and evolving political conditions in the country. As
noted above, in July 2020, the coalition announced a transition of its Task Force-Iraq advising
element to a smal er Military Advisor Group that wil be central y located in Baghdad and advise
Iraqi commanders on operational-level planning.138
Counter-IS operations and trainings were paused for force-protection reasons during heightened
U.S.-Iran confrontations in January 2020, and training was again paused with the onset of
COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. Any future increases in force-protection concerns could
similarly disrupt or delay U.S. and coalition partnership activities.

Assistance to the Kurdistan Regional Government and in the Kurdistan Region
Congress has authorized the President to provide U.S. assistance to the Kurdish peshmerga (and certain Sunni and
other local security forces with a national security mission) in coordination with the Iraqi government, and to do
so directly under certain circumstances. Pursuant to a 2016 U.S.-KRG memorandum of understanding (MOU), the
United States has funded stipends, training, and in-kind support to the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq.
Successive Administrations have requested funding for these purposes, and Congress has directed defense and
foreign assistance spending for programs with the KRG and for the benefit of populations in the Kurdistan Region.

The December 2016 continuing resolution (P.L. 114-254) included $289.5 mil ion in FY2017 Iraq training
program funds to continue support for peshmerga forces.

In 2017, the Trump Administration requested an additional $365 mil ion in defense funding to support
programs with the KRG and KRG-Baghdad cooperation as part of the FY2018 train and equip request. The
Administration also proposed a sale of infantry and artil ery equipment for peshmerga forces that Iraq agreed
to finance using a portion of its U.S.-subsidized Foreign Military Financing loan proceeds. The Department of
Defense paused stipend payments to peshmerga personnel in units aligned with the Ministry of Peshmerga
fol owing the September 2017 independence referendum, but resumed them thereafter.

The Administration’s FY2019 Iraq Train and Equip program funding request referred to the peshmerga as a
component of the ISF and discussed the peshmerga in the context of a $290 mil ion request for potential ISF-
wide sustainment aid. The conference report (H.Rept. 115-952) accompanying the FY2019 Defense
Appropriations Act (Division A of P.L. 115-245) said the United States “should” provide this amount for
“operational sustainment” for Ministry of Peshmerga forces.

The Administration’s FY2020 Iraq Train and Equip funding request sought more than $249 mil ion to
continue U.S. support to KRG peshmerga reform efforts, including the continued equipping and organization
of Ministry of Peshmerga Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs) “equivalent to a U.S. light infantry brigade
standard” and the payment of RGB stipends and logistical support.139

The Administration’ s FY2021request seeks to complete the force generation of the twelve planned 1,500-
person peshmerga RGBs. Equipping of the forces would be completed through FY2022. The request notes
that “CTEF is not used to provide support to any of the other Kurdish security services other than the RGBs
because of their political y aligned nature,140” and states that although stipend support is set to end in FY2020,
U.S. forces plan to continue “training, equipment divestitures, and sustainment support” for the RGBs.
Kurdish officials report that U.S. training support and consultation on plans to reform the KRG Ministry of
Peshmerga and its forces continue. As discussed below, Congress also has directed in recent years that U.S.
foreign assistance, humanitarian aid, and loan guarantees be implemented in Iraq in ways that benefit Iraqis in all
areas of the country, including in the Kurdistan region.

138 CJT F-OIR, Coalition T ask Force-Iraq transitions to Military Advisor Group, July 4, 2020.
139 DOD Justification for FY2020 OCO Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) T rain and Equip Fund (CT EF).
140 DOD Justification for FY2021 OCO Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) T rain and Equip Fund (CT EF).
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U.S. Foreign Assistance
Since 2014, the U.S. government has provided Iraq with State Department- and USAID-
administered assistance to support a range of security and economic objectives (in addition to the
humanitarian assistance mentioned above). U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds have
supported the costs of continued loan-funded purchases of U.S. defense equipment and have
helped fund other Iraqi acquisitions, training, and defense institution-building efforts. U.S. loan
guarantees also have supported Iraqi bond issues to help Baghdad cover its fiscal deficits. The
Trump Administration requested $124.5 mil ion for foreign assistance programs in Iraq for
FY2021 (Table 2). Congress al ocated $451.6 mil ion for Iraq programs in FY2020. The Trump
Administration continues to notify congressional committees of jurisdiction about plans for
obligating funds appropriated for foreign assistance activities in Iraq.
Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Iraq: Select Obligations, Allocations, and Requests
(in mil ions of dol ars)
Account
FMF
ESF/ESDF
INCLE
NADR
DF
IMET
Total
FY2012
Obligated
79.56
275.90
309.35
16.55
0.54
1.99
683.90
FY2013
37.29
128.04
-
9.46
26.36
1.12
202.27
Obligated
FY2014
Obligated
300.00
61.24
11.20
18.32
18.11
1.47
410.33
FY2015
Obligated
150.00
50.28
3.53
4.04
-
0.90
208.75
FY2016
Obligated
250.00
116.45
-
38.31
0.03
0.99
405.78
FY2017
Actual
250.00
553.50
0.20
56.92
-
0.70
1061.12
FY2018
250.00
100.00
5.60
46.86
-
0.82
403.28
Actual
FY2019
Al ocation
250.00
150.00
5.60
45.00
-
0.91
451.51
FY2020
Al ocation
250.00
150.00
5.60
45.00
-
1.00
451.60
FY2021
-
75.00
1.00
47.50
-
1.00
124.50
Request
Sources: Obligations data derived from U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), January 2017. FY2017-
FY2021 data from joint explanatory statements and State Department Congressional Budget Justifications.
Notes: FMF = Foreign Military Financing; ESF/ESDF = Economic Support Fund/Economic Support and
Development Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; DF = Democracy Fund; IMET = International Military Education
and Training.

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Since 2014, the United States also has contributed nearly $2.7 bil ion to humanitarian relief
efforts in Iraq, including more than $470 mil ion in humanitarian support in FY2019.141 The
Trump Administration also has directed additional support since 2017 to persecuted religious
minority groups in Iraq, negotiating with UNDP to direct U.S. contributions to the UNDP
Funding Facility for Stabilization to the Ninewa Plains and other minority populated areas of
northern Iraq (see “Issues Affecting Religious and Ethnic Minorities” above).
U.S. funding supported Iraqi programs to stabilize the Mosul Dam on the Tigris River, which
remains at risk of collapse due to structural flaws and its compromised underlying geology.
Collapse of the dam could cause deadly, catastrophic damage downstream. Major U.S.-supported
efforts to stabilize the dam reached completion in 2019, but the State Department continues to
warn that “it is impossible to accurately predict the likelihood of the dam’s failing.”142

Changes to the U.S. Civilian Presence in Iraq in 2019 and 2020
In early 2019, the State Department conducted a “zero-based” review of the U.S. citizen direct hire and
contractor personnel footprint at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. The review considered options for maintaining
then-current U.S. policy efforts in Iraq while reducing costs, decreasing U.S. citizen deployments, and increasing
the use of Iraqi and other third-country national personnel.143 In May 2019, the State Department ordered the
departure of nonemergency U.S. government personnel from Iraq, citing an “increased threat stream.”144 This
order resulted in the departure of personnel from the State Department, U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and other federal agencies. The Administration extended the ordered departure through
November 2019, and, in December 2019, notified Congress of plans to reduce personnel levels permanently.
According to USAID officials’ reports to the USAID OIG, “staff reductions associated with the ordered departure
have had significant adverse effects on program planning, management, and oversight activities in Iraq.”145 In
December 2019, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Joey Hood stated the Administration’s view that
the then-current posture was “exactly what we need—no more, no less—to get the mission accomplished.”146
The FY2020 Foreign Operations appropriations act states that “any change in the status of operations at United
States Consulate General Basrah, including the return of Consulate property located adjacent to the Basrah
International Airport to the Government of Iraq, shal be subject to prior consultation with the appropriate
congressional committees and the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.”
On March 25, 2020, the State Department ordered the departure of designated U.S. government employees from
the U.S. Embassy, the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center, and the U.S. Consulate General in Erbil due to security
conditions and restricted means of international travel as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Outlook
Systemic change, foreign ties, and core issues of sovereignty remain under review in Iraq, and
continuity in U.S.-Iraqi cooperation is not guaranteed. New bilateral consensus through strategic
dialogue and systemic reform in Iraq might present new opportunities for partnership, but
political and economic upheaval in Iraq also might further empower groups seeking to minimize
U.S. influence and/or weaken bilateral ties. The Iraqi government is engaged with U.S. officials
to define the future of the U.S. military presence in Iraq, amid continuing cal s from other Iraqis,

141 Iraq-Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #5, Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, September 30, 2019.
142 State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs, Iraq Country Information Page: Iraq, July 2020.
143 Executive branch communications to Congress, May 2019.
144 Security Alert – U. S. Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, May 15, 2019; and, Chad Garland, “State Department orders
evacuation of non-emergency US government employees from Iraq,” Stars and Stripes, May 15, 2019.
145 LIG-OCO, Report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve, July 1-October 25, 2019, pp. 59-60.
146 SFRC-ME, December 4, 2019.
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Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress

especial y Iran-aligned voices, for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The United States has sought
Iraq’s cooperation in its maximum pressure campaign against Iran, but has acknowledged limits
on Iraq’s ability to reduce some ties to its neighbor. U.S. officials welcome Iraqi efforts to assert
more state control over militias and have insisted that Iraq fulfil its responsibilities to protect U.S.
personnel, but have not publicly encouraged Iraqi counterparts to use force against pro-Iranian
armed groups comprehensively.
As Iraqis debated government formation after the 2018 elections, the Trump Administration
signaled that decisions about future U.S. assistance efforts would be shaped by the outcome of
government formation negotiations. Specifical y, the Administration stated at the time that if
Iraqis they viewed as close to or controlled by Iran were to assume authority in the new
government, then the United States would reconsider its support for and approach to Iraq.147 In
the end, Iraqis excluded figures with close ties to Iran from cabinet positions. Nevertheless, Prime
Minister Abd al Mahdi’s tenure was a product of consensus among leading Iraqi parties, and its
failures reflected the limits of status quo approaches to decision making. Prime Minister Mustafa
Al Kadhimi’s cabinet similarly reflects political consensus, but the pressures created by U.S.-Iran
confrontation, COVID-19, and Iraq’s economic and fiscal crises may create opportunities for and
demand different approaches.
U.S. officials have argued that the United States government does not seek to compel Iraq to
sever al of its relationships with neighboring Iran, but striking a balance in competing with Iran-
linked Iraqi groups and respecting Iraq’s independence may continue to pose chal enges for U.S.
policymakers.148 New or existing U.S. attempts to sideline Iran-backed Iraqi groups, via sanctions
or other means, might chal enge Iran’s influence in Iraq in ways that could serve stated U.S.
government goals vis-a-vis Iran, but also might entail risk inside Iraq and international y (see
textbox “Is the United States Considering Sanctions on Iraq?” above). While a wide range of Iraqi
actors have ties to Iran, the nature of those ties differs, and treating these diverse groups
uniformly risks ostracizing potential U.S. partners or neglecting opportunities to create divisions
between these groups and Iran.
U.S. efforts to counter Iranian activities in Iraq and elsewhere in the region also have the potential
to complicate the pursuit of other U.S. objectives in Iraq; including U.S. counter-IS operations
and training. When President Trump in a February 2019 interview referred to the U.S. presence in
Iraq as a tool to monitor Iranian activity, several Iraqi leaders raised concerns.149 Iran-aligned
Iraqi groups then referred to President Trump’s statements in their 2019 political campaign to
force a U.S. withdrawal. As discussed above, U.S. strikes against Iranian and Iranian-aligned
personnel in Iraq have precipitated a renewed effort to force Iraq’s government to rescind its
invitation to foreign militaries to operate in Iraq. More broadly, future U.S. conflict with Iran and

147 “U.S. Official: We May Cut Support for Iraq If New Government Seats Pro -Iran Politicians,” Defense One, Sept.
26, 2018.
148 Ambassador Matthew H. T ueller, Statement for the Record, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 6, 2019.
149 Alissa J. Rubin and Eric Schmitt, “T rump’s Plan for U.S. Forces in Iraq Met With Unified Rejection in Baghdad,”
New York Tim es, February 4, 2019. In an interview with CBS News correspondent Margaret Brennan, President T rump
said, “We spent a fortune on building this incredible base [Iraq’s Al Asad Air Base]. We might as well keep it. [Note:
T he base belongs to the government of Iraq. U.S. forces operate from the base at the invitation of the Iraqi
government.] And one of the reasons I want to keep it is because I want to be looking a little bit at Iran because Iran is
a real problem.” When Brennan asked the President if he wants to keep troops in Iraq because he wants to be able to
strike Iran, the President replied “No, because I want to be able to watch Iran. All I want to do is be able to watch. We
have an unbelievable and expensive military base built in Iraq. It’s perfectly situated for looking at all over different
parts of the troubled Middle East rather than pulling up.... We're going to keep watchin g and we're going to keep seeing
and if there’s trouble, if somebody is looking to do nuclear weapons or other things, we’re going to know it before they
do.” T ranscript: President T rump on “Face the Nation,” CBS News, February 3, 2019.
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Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress

its al ies in Iraq could disrupt relations among parties to the transitional government in Baghdad,
or even contribute to conditions leading to civil conflict among Iraqis, undermining the U.S. goal
of ensuring the stability and authority of the Iraqi government. Iran also may seek to avoid these
outcomes, concerned that conflict in Iraq could threaten its security.
The U.S.-Iraq strategic dialogue may produce a new understanding that al ows U.S. military
advisers and forces to remain in Iraq, but supporters of Iran and others who oppose a continued
U.S. and foreign military presence could seek to re-litigate the issue of withdrawal and assert
related demands as a condition of cooperation with political rivals or support for future
governments. Armed groups could adopt a more actively hostile posture under circumstances in
which the United States is perceived to be ignoring or defying requests from Iraqi authorities or to
be violating Iraq’s sovereignty. More broadly, current or future U.S. threats to withhold or
terminate assistance may not influence Iraqis seeking to ensure a U.S. departure in any case.
A reduced and redefined U.S. military presence—if acceptable to Iraqis—could pursue a limited
and less controversial mission set (e.g., more proscribed military operations or a focus solely on
training), but also might stil entail considerable force-protection requirements if prevailing
security conditions persist or confrontation recurs. Other international actors appear more wil ing
and capable of contributing to training efforts than to active counterterrorism operations and
could compensate for that component of any reduced U.S. presence if Iraq’s government endorses
new arrangements. However, foreign troop contributors rely implicitly on force protection from
the United States and Iraq, and persistent threats could limit contributions.
Recent U.S. assessments of the counter-IS campaign and the capabilities of Iraqi forces suggest
that a reduced or training-only presence could create security risks. U.S. officials judge that the
Islamic State poses a continuing and reorganizing threat in Iraq, while Iraqi forces continue to use
international intel igence and air support to conduct effective operations. Islamic State fighters
and other armed groups presumably could take advantage of any reduced operating capacity or
tempo by Iraqi security forces associated with changes in coalition support or presence. A
precipitous withdrawal of most or al U.S. and/or coalition military forces, whether preemptive or
required, could carry greater security risks.
Under circumstances in which Iraqi authorities insist on changes or reductions in U.S. and
coalition posture, compliance might have some diplomatic and strategic benefits. While Iranian
al ies might welcome such changes, other nationalist Iraqis might see the United States and other
international actors as respecting Iraqi sovereignty and thus remain open to further partnership.
As noted above, U.S. defiance, whether real or perceived, could invite backlash.
Iraqis are likely to continue to assess and respond to U.S. initiatives (and those of other outsiders)
primarily through the lenses of their own domestic political rivalries, anxieties, hopes, and
agendas. Reconciling U.S. preferences and interests with Iraq’s evolving politics and security
conditions may require continued creativity, flexibility, and patience.

Author Information

Christopher M. Blanchard

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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42

Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress

Acknowledgments
CRS Visual Information Specialist Amber Hope Wilhelm, CRS Geospatial Information Systems Analyst
Calvin DeSouza, and CRS Research Assistant Sarah Collins contributed to the maps and graphics in this
report.

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This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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