Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress

March 26, 2019 – July 17, 2020 R45633

Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress
July 17, 2020
Iraq’s unicameral legislature, the Council of Representatives (COR), voted to approve Prime
Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi’s government program in May 2020 and finished confirmation of
Christopher M. Blanchard
his cabinet in June, ending a months-long political vacuum. Al Kadhimi has billed his
Specialist in Middle
government as transitional, pledging to move to early elections as soon as they can be held safely
Eastern Affairs
and fairly. He has acknowledged and begun acting to address the demands of protestors, whose

mass demonstrations paralyzed Iraq in late 2019 and early 2020, and led to former prime minister
Adel Abd al Mahdi’s resignation in November 2019. Kadhimi and his cabinet are contending

with difficult choices and risks stemming from ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, diminished oil
revenues, resulting fiscal pressures, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and remnants of the Islamic State
organization (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL).
U.S.-Iraqi cooperation has achieved several shared goals in recent years, but joint efforts also have faced significant
challenges. U.S. and coalition military assistance aided Iraqi efforts to end IS control of Iraqi territory from 2014 through
2018, and since have continued to support Iraqi counterterrorism operations and efforts to stabilize recovered areas and build
the capacity of Iraqi security forces. U.S. military personnel and coalition counterparts remain in Iraq at the government’s
invitation, subject to bilateral executive-to-executive agreements. Iraqi forces evicted IS forces from urban strongholds with
coalition assistance, but IS fighters continue to prosecute attacks from rural and remote areas, with the pace and scope of
attacks increasing since mid-2019.
During 2019 and early 2020, deepening U.S.-Iranian-Iraqi security strains amplified underlying political disputes among
Iraqis over the leadership of their government and the future of Iraq’s international orientation and partnerships. These
disputes were a significant factor in the delayed formation of the new Iraqi government. As confrontation between the United
States and Iran has intensified, some Iraqis have grown more insistent in demanding an end to the presence of U.S. and other
coalition military forces in Iraq.
Tensions increased during 2019 as Iran-backed Iraqi militia targeted U.S. and Iraqi military and civilian personnel in a series
of rocket attacks, and as unclaimed airstrikes in Iraq targeted Iranian officials and Iraqi militia facilities and fighters. After a
rocket attack killed and wounded U.S. contractors in December 2019, President Donald Trump cited U.S. concerns about the
imminent threat of new attacks in ordering the U.S. military to kill Iranian Major General Qas em Soleimani and Iraqi Popular
Mobilization Commission leader Abu Mahdi al Muhandis in Iraq on January 2, 2020. Days later, the Iraqi Council of
Representatives voted to direct the Iraqi government to end operations by international military forces in Iraq. When another
Iraqi militia attack killed and wounded U.S. and United Kingdom (U.K.) forces in March 2020, t he U.S. military conducted
retaliatory airstrikes. Intermittent rocket attacks have continued, with Iraqi officials taking some steps to disrupt hostile
operations by suspects, some of whom are Iran-aligned militia members.
In general, U.S. engagement in Iraq since 2011 has sought to support Iraq’s development as a secure, sovereign democracy.
Successive Administrations have trained and supported Iraqi security forces (including Kurdish peshmerga), while
expressing concern about Iranian influence. Mass protests in Iraq have highlighted underlying demands for systemic political
change amid intensifying economic and social pressures created by the COVID-19 pandemic. To address security issues and
a broader range of shared economic, stabilization, and cultural exchange concerns, U.S. and Iraqi officials began a high-level
strategic dialogue in June 2020 pursuant to the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. The dialogue is set to
address the future of the U.S. military presence in Iraq and develop shared understandings regarding U.S. foreign assistance
and Iraqi reform efforts. The Trump Administration repeatedly has extended a temporary waiver of U.S. sanctions to allow
Iraq to purchase electricity and natural gas from Iran, but the issue may remain a recurrent irritant until Iraq completes plans
to become more energy self-sufficient and diversify its energy partners. In July, Iraqi Finance Minister Ali Allawi announced
that Iraq seeks $5 billion in support from the International Monetary Fund.
In 2019, Congress appropriated additional military and civilian aid for Iraq without certainty about the future of Iraq’s
governing arrangements or about how change in Iraq and to the U.S. military and civilian presence there might affect U.S.
interests. Having appropriated hundreds of millions of dollars more for Iraq programs and authorized continued military
assistance efforts through December 2020, Congress may seek to clarify the Trump Administration’s intentions toward
partnership with Iraq and offer its own perspectives during consideration of the Administration’s FY2021 appropriations
requests and the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act. For background on Iraq, see CRS Report R45025, Iraq:
Back ground and U.S. Policy.

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Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress

Iraq: Map and Country Data

Area: 438,317 sq. km (slightly more than three times the size of New York State)
Population: 38,872,655 (July 2020 estimate), ~59% are 24 years of age or under
Internally Displaced Persons: 1.3 mil ion (April 2020)
Religions: Muslim 95-98% (64-69% Shia, 29-34% Sunni), Christian 1%, Yazidi 1-4% (2015 est.)
Ethnic Groups: Arab 75-80%; Kurdish 15-20%; Turkmen, Assyrian, Shabak, Yazidi, other ~5%. (1987 est.)
Gross Domestic Product [GDP; growth rate]: $227.2 bil ion (2019); 3.9% (2019 est.)
Budget (revenues; expenditure; balance): $89 bil ion, $112 bil ion, -$23 bil ion (2019 est.)
Percentage of Revenue from Oil Exports: 92% (2018)
Current Account Balance (% of GDP): -4.6% (2019 projected)
Foreign Reserves: $68 bil ion (August 2019)
Oil and natural gas reserves: 142.5 bil ion barrels (2017 est., fifth largest); 3.158 tril ion meters3 (2017 est.)
External Debt: $73.43 bil ion (2017 est.)
Sources: Graphic created by CRS using data from U.S. State Department and Esri. Country data from CIA, The World Factbook,
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Iraq Ministry of Finance, and International Organization for Migration.
Note: Select cities in bold.

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link to page 41 link to page 31 Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress

Overview
After more than 17 years of conflict and zero-sum political competition, Iraqis are struggling to
redefine their country’s future and are reconsidering their relationships with the United States,
Iran, and other third parties. Since seeking international military assistance in 2014 to regain
territory seized by the Islamic State organization (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL), Iraqi leaders have implored
international actors to avoid using Iraq as a battleground for their own rivalries and have
attempted to build positive, nonexclusive ties to their neighbors and to global powers.
Nevertheless, Iraq has become a venue for competition and conflict between the United States
and Iran, with resulting violence now raising basic questions about the future of the U.S.-Iraqi
partnership and regional security. When a new government took office in Baghdad in June 2020
after a months-long delay, U.S. and Iraqi officials opened talks on a new foundation for bilateral
ties through a high-level strategic dialogue. In the meantime, Iraqi leaders are grappling with
chal enges posed by lower oil revenues, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic,
and the latent demands of protestors whose demonstrations toppled last Iraqi government.
Iraq: Select History and Background
Iraqis have persevered through intermittent wars, internal conflicts, sanctions, displacements, unrest, and
terrorism for decades. A 2003 U.S.-led invasion ousted the dictatorial government of Saddam Hussein and ended
the decades-long rule of the Baath Party. This created an opportunity for Iraq to establish new democratic, federal
political institutions and reconstitute its security forces. It also ushered in a period of chaos, violence, and political
transition from which the country is stil emerging. Latent tensions among Iraqis that were suppressed and
manipulated under the Baath regime were amplified in the wake of its col apse. Political parties, ethnic groups, an d
religious communities competed with rivals and among themselves for influence in the post-2003 order, amid
sectarian violence, insurgency, and terrorism. Misrule, foreign interference, and corruption also took a heavy tol
on Iraqi society during this period, and continue to undermine public trust and social cohesion.
In 2011, when the United States completed an agreed military withdrawal, Iraq’s gains proved fragile. Security
conditions deteriorated from 2012 through 2014, as the insurgent terrorists of the Islamic State organization (IS,
also cal ed ISIS/ISIL)—the successor to Al Qaeda-linked groups active during the post-2003 transition—drew
strength from conflict in neighboring Syria and seized large areas of northern and western Iraq. From 2014
through 2017, war against the Islamic State dominated events in Iraq, and many pressing social, economic, and
governance chal enges remain to be addressed (See Table 1 for a statistical profile of Iraq). Iraqi security forces
and their foreign partners wrested control of northern and western Iraq back from the Islamic State, but the
group’s remnants remain dangerous and Iraqi politics have grown increasingly fraught.
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) maintains considerable administrative autonomy under Iraq's 2005
constitution. From mid-2014 through October 2017, Kurdish forces took control of many areas that had been
subject to territorial disputes with national authorities prior to the Islamic State’s 2014 advance, including much of
the oil-rich governorate of Kirkuk. However, after the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held a
controversial advisory referendum on independence from Iraq on September 25, 2017 , Iraqi government forces
reasserted security control in many of these areas, leading to some armed confrontations and casualties on both
sides and setting back some Kurds’ aspirations for independence (Figure 7). A reduced security presence in some
disputed territories since then has al owed some IS fighters to regroup and operate.
Across Iraq, including in the KRI, long-standing popular demands for improved service delivery, security, and
effective, honest governance remain widespread. Opposition to uninvited foreign political and security
interference also is shared broadly. Stabilization and reconstruction needs in areas liberated from the Islamic State
are extensive. Paramilitary forces mobilized to fight IS terrorists have grown stronger and more numerous since
the Islamic State's rapid advance in 2014, but have yet to be ful y integrated into national security institutions.
Iraqis are grappling with these political and security issues in an environment shaped by ethnic, religious, regional,
and tribal identities, partisan and ideological differences, personal rivalries, economic disparities, and natural
resource imbalances. Iraq’s neighbors and other international powers are actively pursuing their diplomatic,
economic, and security interests in the country. Iraq’s strategic location, its economic potential, and its diverse
population with ties to neighboring countries underlie its importance to U.S. officials, U.S. partners, and U.S. rivals.
For background and additional sources, see CRS Report R45025, Iraq: Background and U.S. Policy.
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Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress

Figure 1. Iraq: Areas of Influence and Operation
As of July 8, 2020

Source: Congressional Research Service using ArcGIS, IHS Markit Conflict Monitor, U.S. government, and
United Nations data.
Notes: Areas of influence are approximate and subject to change.

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Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress

Political Dynamics
Since the U.S.-led ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq’s Shia Arab majority has exercised
greater national power both in concert and in competition with the country’s Sunni Arab and
Kurdish minorities. Sunni Arabs led Hussein’s regime, which repressed opposition movements
drawn from al elements of Iraq’s population. Governance in Iraq since 2003 has reflected an
informal quota-based distribution of leadership and administrative positions based on ethno-
sectarian identity and political affiliation. Extensive negotiations following national elections in
2005, 2010, 2014, and 2018 resulted in prime ministers drawn from Iraq’s Shia Arab majority. By
agreement, Iraq’s presidency has been held by a member of the Kurdish minority, and the speaker
of the unicameral legislature, the Council of Representatives (COR), has been a Sunni. Groups in
turn have sought ministry and agency positions with ethnic and sectarian considerations in mind.
Voters have elected legislative representatives based on a party list system, but government
formation has been determined by deal-making that has often included unelected elites and been
influenced by foreign powers, including Iran and the United States. In principle, this
apportionment system, referred to in Iraq as muhassasa, has deferred most conflict between
identity groups and political rivals by dividing influence and access to state resources along
negotiated lines that do not completely exclude any major group.1 In practice, the system has
enabled patronage networks to treat administrative functions as a source of private benefit and
political sustenance. Government service delivery and economic opportunity have suffered.
Corruption has spread, resulting in abuse of power and enabling foreign exploitation.2
Communal identities and rivalries remain
Iraq’s 2018 National Legislative Election
political y relevant, but over time,
Seats won by Coalition/Party
competition among Shia movements and
coalition building across communal groups
Coalition/Party
Seats Won
also have become stronger factors in Iraqi
politics. Notwithstanding their ethnic and
Sa’irun
54
religious diversity and political differences,
Fatah
48
many Iraqis advance similar demands for
Nasr
42
improved security, honest and effective
Kurdistan Democratic Party
25
government, and greater economic
opportunity. Some Iraqi politicians have
State of Law
25
broadened their outreach to appeal across
Wataniya
21
communal lines, but others continue to
Hikma
19
pursue power to benefit discrete groups.
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
18
Iraq’s national election in May 2018 held
Qarar
14
out the promise of a fresh start for the
country after the war with the Islamic State
Others
63
group, but low turnout and an inconclusive
Source: Iraq Independent High Electoral Commission.
result instead produced paralysis. The
Sa’irun (On the March) coalition led by populist Shia cleric and longtime U.S. antagonist
Muqtada al Sadr’s Istiqama (Integrity) list placed first in the election (54 seats), followed by the
predominantly Shia Fatah (Conquest) coalition led by Hadi al Ameri of the Badr Organization
(48 seats). Fatah includes several individuals formerly associated with the Popular Mobilization

1 Safwan Al Amin, “What “Inclusivity” Means in Iraq,” Atlantic Council – MENASource, March 28, 2016.
2 See Ahmed T abaqchali and Renad Mansour, “Webinar: Will COVID-19 Mark the Endgame for Iraq’s Muhasasa
T a'ifia?” Chatham House (UK), April 30, 2020.
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Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress

Commission (PMC) and the mostly Shia Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The Fatah list, as
wel as former prime minister Nouri al Maliki’s separate State of Law list, included figures with
ties to Iran. Fatah’s rivals secured representation, but did not present unified leadership or a
shared alternative agenda. Former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi’s Nasr (Victory) coalition
placed third (42 seats), while Ammar al Hakim’s Hikma (Wisdom) list and former interim prime
minister and Vice President Iyad Al awi’s Wataniya (National) list also won large blocs of seats.
Among Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) won the most seats, and smal er Kurdish opposition lists protested al eged
irregularities. As negotiations continued, Nasr and Sa’irun members joined with others to form
the Islah (Reform) bloc in the COR, while Fatah and State of Law formed the core of a rival
Bin’a (Reconstruction) bloc. Months of negotiation in 2018 produced a compromise government
under the leadership of Prime Minister Adel Abd al Mahdi, but his lack of an individual political
mandate and his reliance on the consensus of fractious political blocs diluted his reform efforts.
Meanwhile, tensions between the United States and Iran increased steadily during this period (see
textbox below), as U.S. officials implemented more intense sanctions on Iran and Iranian leaders
used proxies to undermine regional security in defiance of the Trump Administration’s
“maximum pressure” campaign.3 In 2018 and 2019, U.S. officials attributed a series of indirect
fire attacks on some U.S. and Iraqi instal ations to Iranian proxy forces, including a December
2019 rocket attack on an Iraqi military base that kil ed a U.S. citizen contractor and wounded
others. Tensions crested as U.S. retaliatory strikes targeted pro-Iranian militia forces operating as
PMF units and armed Iraqi demonstrations surrounded the U.S. Embassy.
After a January 2020, U.S. military strike in Baghdad kil ed Iranian Major General and Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) commander Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi
PMF leader Jamal Ja’far al Ibrahimi (commonly referred to as Abu Mahdi al Muhandis), the
future of U.S. and other foreign forces in Iraq reemerged as a pivotal political issue. Iraqi leaders
condemned the U.S. strike and Iranian counterstrikes as violations of Iraqi sovereignty, and the
COR voted to direct then-acting Prime Minister Adel Abd Al Mahdi to ask al foreign military
forces to leave the country.4 Abd Al Mahdi deferred the question of the presence of foreign forces
until the seating of the new government, even after a deadly militia attack and U.S. counterstrike
in March. Meanwhile, U.S. forces consolidated their presence on fewer bases with enhanced
force protection, and the counter-IS coalition has shifted to a more streamlined advising posture.
In June 2020, U.S. and Iraqi officials engaged in talks on security, economic cooperation, public
health, and other matters under the rubric of a high-level strategic dialogue. Iran-aligned factions
continue to insist that the United States withdraw al military forces. Years of conflict, poor
service delivery, corruption, sacrifice, and foreign interference have strained the Iraqi
population’s patience with the status quo, adding to the pressures that their leaders face from the
country’s uncertain domestic and regional security environment. Some U.S. officials perceive a
“growing revulsion for Iraq’s political elite by the rest of the population,”5 but it is with these
divided elites that U.S. officials are now engaged to develop a new vision for bilateral relations.

3 See also, CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy.
4 T hose COR members present adopted by voice vote a parliamentary decision directing the Iraqi government inter alia
to withdraw its request to the international anti-IS coalition for military support and to remove all foreign forces from
Iraq and end the use of Iraq’s territory, waters, and airspace by foreign militaries. Under Iraq’s constitution, binding
legislation originates with the executive and is reviewed and amended by the legislature. Iraqi courts have not
consistently considered COR decisions (akin to concurrent resolutions under the U.S. system) to be binding.
5 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Joey Hood, Statement for the Record, Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism (SFRC-ME), December 4, 2019.
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