U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2022 Request

May 5, 2020 – September 7, 2021 R46344

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East:
September 7, 2021
Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the Jeremy M. Sharp
FY2022 Request
Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs
This report is an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to the Middle East and North Africa

(MENA). It includes a brief historical review of foreign aid levels, a description of specific
Carla E. Humud
country programs, and analysis of current foreign aid issues. It also provides analysis of the
Analyst in Middle Eastern
Administration’s FY2022 budget request for State Department and U.S. Agency for International
Affairs
Development (USAID) Foreign Operations and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations in the

MENA region.
Sarah R. Collins
Research Assistant
The foreign aid data in this report are compiled by the Congressional Research Service from a

number of resources, including USAID’s U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (also known as the
“Greenbook”), CRS communications with the State Department and USAID, executive branch
agencies’ notifications to Congress, and annual State De

partment and USAID Congressional
Budget Justifications. For foreign aid terminology and abbreviations, see Appendix A.
Since 1946, the United States has provided an estimated total of $351 billion (obligations in current dollars) in foreign
assistance to the MENA region. For FY2022, overall aid requested for the MENA region amounts to $7.6 billion, or about
13% of the State Department’s International Affairs budget request. The State Department estimates that the Middle East
stands to receive 39% of the geographically specific assistance in the overall budget request, more than any other region. As
in previous years, assistance for Israel, Egypt, and Jordan constitute the majority of the Middle East funding request. The
region also receives a sizable portion of annual humanitarian assistance appropriations, which are not included in the region-
specific aid figures.
The Biden Administration’s FY2022 request of $7.6 billion for the MENA region is $0.1 billion more than what Congress
appropriated for FY2021 ($7.5 billion) and approximately $1.1 billion more than the previous Administration’s request for
FY2021 ($6.5 billion). Congress regularly appropriated more in foreign assistance than the Trump Administration requested.
Of the total FY2022 request, the Administration is seeking $1.9 billion (25%) in bilateral economic assistance.
Another point of departure between the two Administration requests concerns the Palestinians. In the spring of 2021, the
Biden Administration resumed various forms of aid to the Palestinians that had been discontinued under the Trump
Administration. For FY2022, the Biden Administration is requesting a total of $219 million in bilateral aid for the
Palestinians, which its budget justification asserts will further “the Administration's goals for peace and stability in the
region.”
In order to more accurately compare the Administration’s FY2022 foreign assistance request to previous years'
appropriations, aid figures in this report (except where otherwise indicated) refer only to funding that is administered by the
State Department or USAID and requested for individual countries or regional programs. While this represents the majority
of U.S. assistance to the Middle East, several other sources of U.S. aid to the region exist, such as Transition Initiatives (TI)
and the aforementioned humanitarian aid provided through the Food for Peace Act, Title II (FFP), International Disaster
Assistance (IDA), and Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) accounts. Other U.S. federal entities—such as the
Departments of Defense, Commerce, and the Treasury, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation—administer additional
types of assistance. Funding for such activities is generally not requested for individual countries and regions, and it is largely
excluded here.
The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has led to severe public health and economic consequences in the
Middle East and North Africa region, in many cases exacerbating the region’s numerous pre-existing challenges. In April
2021, the Biden Administration stated that it had allocated over $225 million in emergency humanitarian assistance to the
region in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Congressional Research Service

link to page 33 link to page 34 U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Appendixes
Appendix A. Common Foreign Assistance Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................... 29

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 30

Congressional Research Service

link to page 5 link to page 33

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Introduction
This report is an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA).1 It includes a brief historical review of foreign aid levels, a description of specific
country programs,2 and analysis of current foreign aid issues.3 It also provides analysis of the
Administration’s FY2022 budget request for State Department and U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) Foreign Operations and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations in the
MENA region.
Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance and conducts oversight of executive
agencies’ management of aid programs. As the largest regional recipient of U.S. economic and
security assistance (see Figure 1), the Middle East is perennially a major focus of interest as
Congress exercises these powers.
Figure 1. FY2022 Request for Regional Bilateral Aid
current U.S. dollars in billions

Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justification
FY2022.

1 For the purposes of this report, the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), or what the State Department calls
“Near East” Affairs (NEA), is defined as an area stretching from Morocco in the west to the Persian/Arabian Gulf in
the east, excluding Turkey. It comprises: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank/Gaza, and Yemen. The
governments of Iran (since 1984) and Syria (since 1979) are prohibited under law from receiving U.S. bilateral aid
because they are U.S.-designated State Sponsors of Terrorism. See CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of
International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by Dianne E. Rennack. Since 2012, the United States has
provided foreign assistance in Syria under special authorities that allow for assistance notwithstanding these terrorism
related restrictions.
2 While foreign assistance can take many forms, in most cases, U.S. foreign assistance is channeled through a U.S.
government-managed economic or military program rather than a direct cash transfer to a recipient nation. In the
MENA region, most U.S. military aid to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan finances the procurement of weapons systems and
services from U.S. defense contractors. For general information on U.S. foreign assistance, see CRS Report R40213,
Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, by Marian L. Lawson and Emily M. Morgenstern.
3 For assistance with foreign aid terminology and abbreviations, please see the glossary in Appendix A.
Congressional Research Service

1

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

The foreign aid data in this report are compiled by the Congressional Research Service from a
number of resources, including the USAID’s U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (also known as the
“Greenbook”), CRS communications with the State Department and USAID, executive branch
agencies’ notifications to Congress, and annual State Department and USAID Congressional
Budget Justifications.
Foreign Aid to Support Key U.S. Policy Goals
U.S. bilateral assistance to MENA countries is intended to support long-standing U.S. foreign
policy goals for the region, such as containing Iranian influence, countering terrorism, preventing
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, preserving the free-flow of maritime commerce
and energy resources, promoting Israeli-Arab peace, and preserving the territorial integrity and
stability of the region’s states. U.S. foreign assistance (from global accounts/non-bilateral) also is
devoted to ameliorating major humanitarian crises stemming from ongoing conflicts in Syria,
Yemen, and elsewhere.
Figure 2. U.S. Foreign Aid to MENA Countries: FY1946-FY2019
current U.S. dollars in billions

Source: Funding administered by/appropriated to the State Department, USAID, and Defense Department and
recorded, by law, in USAID’s “Greenbook.”
Note: Totals for Israel do not include funding for missile defense.
As in previous years, the United States provides the bulk of U.S. foreign aid in the MENA region
(mostly in the form of military assistance) to three countries: Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. Almost all
current U.S. aid to Israel is in the form of military assistance, and U.S. military aid for Israel has
been designed to maintain Israel’s “qualitative military edge” (QME) over neighboring militaries.
U.S. military aid to Egypt and Jordan (which have been at peace with Israel since 1979 and 1994,
respectively) is designed to encourage continued Israeli-Arab cooperation on security issues
while also facilitating interoperability between the United States and its Arab partners in the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility.

Congressional Research Service

2

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Other Sources of U.S. Foreign Aid to the Middle East
For the past two decades, successive Administrations and Congresses have drawn on sources of funding beyond
State Department/USAID-administered bilateral aid appropriations to address challenges created by conflicts in
the MENA region. The United States has devoted significant resources toward several major humanitarian crises
stemming from ongoing conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere. For example, between FY2012 and FY2021,
successive Administrations provided nearly $13 bil ion in response to the Syrian refugee crisis, most of which
came from humanitarian assistance accounts.4
The Mil ennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an independent U.S. government entity established in 2004,
provides assistance to support multiyear, large-scale development projects by foreign governments that have
implemented free market, education, and democratic reforms. Since MCC’s inception, it has concluded three aid
compacts (five-year grant agreements) with MENA countries: two with Morocco (2007-2012, $697 mil ion, and
2017-2022, $450 mil ion) and one with Jordan (2011-2016, $275 mil ion). In July 2021, the MCC notified Congress
of its intent to sign a new $498.7 mil ion compact with the government of Tunisia focused on transport/trade and
water scarcity.5
The United States is also a top funder of multilateral financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and World Bank Group, which support economic stabilization and development in in MENA countries
through loans, grants, and technical advice. The IMF has provided loans to multiple MENA countries in recent
years, including Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan, to improve their ability to achieve fiscal balance and promote
their macroeconomic stability, in exchange for various policy reform commitments.
Separately, Congress has authorized and appropriated funds to the Department of Defense (DOD) to train and
equip foreign security forces for a range of purposes, including counterterrorism. Countries such as Iraq, Lebanon,
Jordan, and Tunisia have been prominent beneficiaries of such programs. As directed by Congress, many DOD
security cooperation programs are subject to State Department joint planning and/or concurrence. Major security
cooperation authorities and programs under which DOD has provided assistance to MENA countries include the
fol owing: 10 U.S.C. 333 (DOD’s global “authority to build capacity,” which was previously referred to as “global
train and equip”),6 the Coalition Support Fund (CSF),7 the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF),8 and the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program.9

4 USAID, “U.S. Announces Additional Humanitarian Assistance for the People of Syria,” press release, June 3, 2021.
5 See Millennium Challenge Corporation Congressional Notification July 7, 2021, available at www.mcc.gov.
6 Congress originally authorized DOD’s global train and equip activities under Section 1206 of the FY2006 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 109-163), as amended. The authority was codified as 10 U.S.C. 2282 in the
FY2015 NDAA (P.L. 113-291). These authorities were incorporated into and superseded by a new, broader global train
and equip authority, 10 U.S.C. 333, under Section 1241(c) of the FY2017 NDAA. This provision also repealed other
prior authorities, such as Section 1204 (FY2014 NDAA, P.L. 113-66): Authority to conduct activities to enhance the
capabilities of foreign countries to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; Section 1207 (FY2014
NDAA, P.L. 113-66): Assistance to the Government of Jordan for border security operations; and Section 1033
(FY1998 NDAA, P.L. 105-85, as amended): Assistance for additional counternarcotics support for specified countries.
7 CSF authorizes the Secretary of Defense to reimburse key cooperating countries for logistical, military, and other
support, including access, to or in connection with U.S. military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Syria and to assist
such nations with U.S.-funded equipment, supplies, and training. CSF is authorized under Section 1233 (FY2008
NDAA, P.L. 110-181), as amended and extended.
8 The FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31) established the
Counter-ISIL Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), since renamed the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund. The CTEF allows
the Secretary of Defense, “in coordination with” the Secretary of State, to transfer funds, equipment, and related
capabilities to partner countries in order to counter emergent ISIS threats. The CTEF is the primary account for funding
the Syria and Iraq Train and Equip Programs, having replaced the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF). The underlying
authorities for DOD’s Syria and Iraq train and equip programs are Sections 1209 and 1236 of P.L. 113-291, as
amended. The Biden Administration has requested $522 million in CTEF funding for FY2022.
9 Chapter 48 of Title 10, U.S.C., authorizes DOD to build foreign countries’ capacity to prevent nuclear proliferation.
Over the past five years, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency has provided training and equipment to border security
forces in several Middle Eastern countries under this authority, including Jordan, Iraq, and Tunisia. See CRS Report
R43143, The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress, by Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Amy F.
Woolf.
Congressional Research Service

3

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Questioning Long-standing U.S. Aid Policy to the MENA Region
A number of developments have led outside observers to question the level of U.S. involvement in the Middle
East, including: the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, concern over Iran’s nuclear program, popular protests across the
Arab world, continued transnational terrorism, failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process coupled with Israel’s
improved ties to some Arab states (the Abraham Accords), and increased competition from Russia and China (and
to a lesser extent Turkey). In light of these dynamics, experts have vigorously debated the importance of the
MENA region to U.S. foreign policy and how to properly align U.S. military and economic investments in the
MENA region based on changing geopolitical realities.10
As an instrument of U.S. policy, foreign assistance—and calls to reform or restructure it in the MENA region—has
become part of a broader debate over the extent of the U.S. commitment to the Middle East. Trump
Administration officials attempted to carry out President Trump’s vision of “ending the era of endless wars” and
“putting America first,” sometimes putting U.S. budget officials at odds with lawmakers over the Administration’s
proposals to cut foreign aid, particularly to key regional recipients such as Jordan.11 In recent years, several studies
have asserted that the United States should rebalance its foreign assistance approach to the Middle East by
prioritizing economic aid over military assistance.12 Other analysts have focused more on reforming U.S. military
aid to the region with calls to monitor and evaluate security assistance to major partners.13 At the country level,
some U.S. groups have become more vocal in challenging continued military aid to Israel and Egypt and arms sales
to Saudi Arabia based on human rights concerns.14 Others have countered that continued threats from Iran,
terrorist groups, and non-state actors make U.S. assistance essential for protecting long-standing partners in the
region, such as Israel. 15 During an August 2021 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on security assistance
in the Middle East, Senator Todd Young remarked that “this committee wil not be serving the national security
interests of the American people if we act as a roadblock to security assistance and arms sales to the Middle East.
Security assistance is a highly imperfect tool, and it carries its own degree of risk, but removing it from the table
or conditioning it in a way that creates insurmountable barriers or creating false choices between defensive and
offensive systems, undermines our ability to exert our influence in the region and provides excuses to those who
wil seek new sources of security assistance.” 16
With debates ongoing, Congress may consider how and to what extent foreign aid to MENA states provides
opportunities to engage or remain engaged with partner government officials and civil society actors.
The United States also has provided economic assistance to some MENA countries focusing on
education, water, health, and economic growth initiatives. In part, U.S. bilateral economic
assistance is premised on the idea that governments across the MENA region have had increasing

10 For example, see Elliott Abrams, United States Policy in the Middle East and North Africa, Council on Foreign
Relations; Tamara Cofman Wittes, “What to Do – and What not to Do – in the Middle East,” Brookings Institution,
January 25, 2021; Eric Edelman, “U.S. Middle East Policy In The Next Four Years,” Hoover Institution, December 8,
2020; and Jon Alterman, “The Yemen Model: The Future of U.S. Middle East Policy,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies, February 21, 2018.
11 William Douglas, “S.C.’s Graham and Mulvaney Battle over Trump’s Proposed Foreign-Aid Cuts,” McClatchy, May
25, 2017.
12 For example, see Dalia Dassa Kaye, Linda Robinson, Jeffrey Martini, Nathan Vest, and Ashley L. Rhoades,
Reimagining U.S. Strategy in the Middle East, Sustainable Partnerships, Strategic Investments, Rand Corporation,
2021; Ilan Goldenberg, Daphne McCurdy, Kaleigh Thomas and Sydney Scarlata, A People-First U.S. Assistance
Strategy for the Middle East, Center for a New American Security, June 10, 2021; and Daniel Serwer, “Recalculating
U.S. Policy in the Middle East: Less Military, More Civilian,” Middle East Institute, April 11, 2016.
13 Andrew Miller and Richard Sokolsky, “What Has $49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not Much,”
American Conservative, February 27, 2018.
14 Alex Ward, “The Progressive Foreign Policy Moment Has Arrived,” Vox.com, May 26, 2021; William D. Hartung
and Seth Binder, U.S. Security Assistance to Egypt: Examining the Return on Investment, Project on Middle East
Democracy, May 5, 2020.
15 Representative Stephanie Murphy and Michael Makovsky, “Don't Cut or Condition US military Aid to Israel,” The
Hill, March 19, 2021.
16 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism,
Hearing on Middle East Security Assistance, August 10, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

4

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

difficulty meeting the expectations of their citizens, particularly their youth. Public dissatisfaction
over quality of life issues and lack of economic opportunities persist in many MENA countries.
According to the Arab Youth Survey, addressing government corruption is a top priority for Arab
youth; nearly half of all Arabs surveyed have considered leaving their country for better economic
opportunities elsewhere.17 Arab Barometer, a U.S.-funded, nonpartisan research network that
provides insight into Arab public attitudes, notes that widespread youth discontent about their
economic prospects translates into broad frustration with government efforts to create
employment opportunities.18
In recent years, systemic socioeconomic challenges, such as corruption, inequality, poverty, and
poor governance, have sparked popular protests across the MENA region.19 In lower and middle
income states the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has exacerbated these
preexisting challenges, further straining the social compact between state and citizen (see below).
The International Monetary Fund and World Bank warn of the risks posed by continued deficit
spending by already indebted governments (such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan,
Iraq, Oman, and Bahrain) and recommend structural reforms to improve the prospects for MENA
citizens.20
COVID-19 in the MENA Region
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to severe public health and economic consequences in the
Middle East and North Africa region. Governments have instituted a range of public health and
safety measures, which United Nations public health experts view as remaining necessary given
ongoing limits to vaccine access in the region.21
Economic Impact
Since early 2020, countries in the MENA region have experienced economic downturns as a
result of the pandemic, including its impact on global trade and travel and the physical lockdown
measures imposed to reduce the spread of COVID-19. Declines in global demand for some of the
region’s key exports—including tourism services and oil (the price of which has fluctuated during
the pandemic)—exacerbated local economic challenges.22 Prior to the pandemic, tourism
spending by foreigners accounted for more than 5% of gross domestic product (GDP) on average
in the region, and substantially more in several countries (such as Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia).23
In June 2021, the World Bank estimated the region’s GDP contracted by 3.9% in 2020, a 6.4%
decline from its October 2019 forecast for the region’s 2020 economic growth.24 As a result of

17 The 12th Annual ASDA’A BCW Arab Youth Survey 2020 was conducted by international polling firm PSB to
explore attitudes among Arab youth in 17 countries and territories in the Middle East and North Africa. See,
http://arabyouthsurvey.com/findings.html.
18 See, Arab Barometer, Youth in Middle East and North Africa, August 2019.
19 International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, April 2021.
20 The World Bank, Living with Debt: How Institutions Can Chart a Path to Recovery in the Middle East and North
Africa, April 2021.
21 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), COVID-19 Data Explorer: Global
Humanitarian Operations, May 31, 2021.
22 World Bank Group, Global Economic Prospects, June 2021, p. 4.
23 Ibid, p. 81.
24 Ibid, p. 4.
Congressional Research Service

5

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

this economic contraction, regional unemployment increased significantly, particularly youth
unemployment.25 In addition, the MENA region’s economic recovery appears to be on a slower
trajectory relative to some other regions. For example, the World Bank projects global growth of
5.6% in 2021 (6.8% in the United States), with the MENA region forecast to grow at 2.4%.26
Within the region, there is considerable divergence in economic outlook among countries.27
Wealthier countries, which were able to implement stronger fiscal support during the pandemic
and have higher vaccination rates, are expected to recover more quickly. Oil-exporting countries,
which are benefitting from the return of oil prices to pre-pandemic levels and beyond, also have a
more positive outlook. In contrast, the countries that entered the pandemic in states of conflict,
political instability, or economic crises (e.g., Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Yemen) and those
most dependent on tourism (e.g., Tunisia) face the prospect of long-term economic challenges.
Many countries in the region face difficult fiscal choices. The pandemic continues to place
heightened demands on public health and anti-poverty spending, but growing debt levels
increasingly create risk for debt sustainability. The region’s aggregate government revenue fell by
24% from 2019 to 2020, and due to the increased demands on public spending, the World Bank
estimates that average fiscal deficits in 2020 as a share of GDP roughly doubled from their pre-
pandemic forecasts from 4.6% to 9.4%.28 The World Bank estimates that the region’s public debt
will grow from 46% of GDP in 2019 to 54% of GDP in 2021, which would be the largest increase
in the past two decades.29
Selected U.S. Government Responses
Since early 2020, Members of Congress have debated the scale and scope of U.S. foreign
assistance to address COVID-19 abroad, including in the MENA region. Globally, Congress has
provided more than $16 billion in emergency foreign assistance resources via four appropriations
measures.30 USAID is using funds from these appropriations measures for a variety of public
health activities in MENA countries, in conjunction with international assistance and technical
cooperation activities of the State Department and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC).31 For example, in Iraq, USAID reports that, among other activities, it has aided the
government in updating some health centers with new equipment, improving access to personal
protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare workers, launching educational outreach programs
about COVID-19, and distributing hygiene kits, particularly within underserved communities.32
According to the State Department’s Office of Foreign Assistance, as of April 25, 2021, the State
Department and USAID had allocated more than $225 million in the MENA region for the

25 International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, April 2021, p. 4.
26 World Bank Group, Global Economic Prospects, June 2021, p. 4.
27 International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, April 2021, pp. 6-7.
28 World Bank Group, Living with Debt: How Institutions Can Chart a Path to Recovery in the Middle East and North
Africa, MENA Economic Update, April 2021, p. 15.
29 Ibid, p. 2.
30 Two emergency supplemental measures enacted in March 2020—P.L. 116-123 and P.L. 116-136—included nearly
$1.5 billion in FY2020 foreign assistance resources. The FY2021 omnibus appropriations act, P.L. 116-260, included
$4.0 billion in emergency foreign assistance funds and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, P.L. 117-2, provided
nearly $10.6 billion in FY2021 in emergency foreign assistance resources.
31 See https://www.usaid.gov/coronavirus for more information. USAID, USAID: COVID-19 Global Response - Fact
Sheet #8 FY20, August 21, 2020.
32 USAID, COVID-19 Response: Iraq, February 26, 2021, at https://www.usaid.gov/iraq/fact-sheets/covid-19-response.
Congressional Research Service

6

link to page 6 link to page 13 U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

COVID-19 response.33 The countries in the region that have received the most funds include Iraq
($49.5 million), Lebanon ($41.6 million), Syria ($37.4 million), and Jordan ($36.5 million).
Inspector-General reports indicate that USAID, in particular, has obligated and disbursed only a
portion of the emergency funds provided by Congress for the global COVID-19 response.34
The Biden Administration’s FY2022 Aid Budget
Request for the MENA Region
Since 1946, the MENA region has received the most U.S. foreign assistance worldwide,
reflecting significant support for U.S. partners in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq (see Figure 2).35
For FY2022, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan combined account for nearly 10% of the total international
affairs request. For FY2022, the Biden Administration is requesting $7.6 billion for the MENA
region (see Table 1), which is $0.1 billion more than what Congress appropriated for FY2021
($7.5 billion) and $1.1 billion more than the previous Administration’s request for FY2021 ($6.5
billion). Of that total, the Administration is seeking $1.9 billion (25%) in bilateral economic
assistance.
While the Biden Administration has requested bilateral funding for the top country recipients
(Israel, Egypt, and Jordan) at levels consistent with past years and bilateral understandings, it is
requesting increased spending for countries/populations either experiencing a current crisis or
recovering from one.36 Compared to FY2021 enacted levels, the President is seeking $50 million
more in military aid for Lebanon, which is undergoing one of the world’s worst economic
collapses since the mid-19th century.37 In FY2021, Congress appropriated $40 million for
nonlethal stabilization aid in Syria; the Biden Administration is now requesting $140 million for
FY2022. (The Trump Administration did not request any Syria-specific nonlethal aid over the last
two fiscal years, but Congress authorized assistance and allocated funds specifically for use in
Syria.) The Biden Administration’s request would increase bilateral aid to Libya ($13 million
above FY2021 enacted) and Yemen ($4 million above FY2021 enacted); in the case of Yemen,
since 2015 the State Department and USAID generally have provided several hundred million
dollars annually in additional humanitarian aid.
In the spring of 2021, the Biden Administration resumed various forms of aid (see “The
Resumption of U.S. Aid to the Palestinians”) to the Palestinians that had been discontinued under
the Trump Administration. For FY2022, the Administration is requesting a total of $219 million
in bilateral aid for the Palestinians, which its budget justification asserts will further U.S. goals

33 Department of State, Office of Foreign Assistance, COVID-19 Virus Response, Regional and Operating Unit Topline
as of April 25, 2021. Document provided to CRS upon request.
34 According to the USAID OIG, as of March 31, 2021, the agency had obligated $3.3 billion of the $11.2 billion in
emergency funds it received. Of those obligations, $2.8 billion had been disbursed as of March 31, 2021. USAID OIG,
COVID-19 Information Brief #3, June 9, 2021.
35 Israel, Egypt and Jordan combined have received $280.1 billion (in current dollars) from 1945-2018. USAID, U.S.
Overseas Grants and Loans, July 1, 1945 through September 30, 2018.
36 According to the FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, “The request will enable the United States to work with coalition, international, and regional
partners to resolve the ongoing conflicts destabilizing the region, including in Syria, through an increase in U.S.-funded
stabilization assistance; support efforts to bring stability, security, and effective governance to areas emerging from
conflict or enduring ongoing conflict such as in Libya and Yemen; and deliver vital assistance to the people of Lebanon
as they weather economic and political crises.”
37 “Lebanon Crisis among World's Worst since 1850s: World Bank,” Agence France Presse, January 6, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

7

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

for peace and stability in the region. After the Trump Administration suspended voluntary
contributions to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA) in August 2018, peacebuilding programs involving Palestinians in September 2018,
and Economic Support Fund (ESF) and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) aid in January 2019,38 it did not request any funds for the Palestinians in FY2020 or
FY2021. Congress, however, appropriated $150 million in bilateral aid for both years. The Biden
Administration’s FY2022 request would increase annual bilateral aid amounts by nearly $70
million.
While the Biden Administration has sought to increase foreign aid overall, it has acknowledged in
its budget justification documents that U.S. foreign assistance alone will be insufficient to resolve
the MENA region’s numerous socio-economic challenges. Similarly, the Trump Administration’s
FY2020 and FY2021 congressional budget justification documents noted that the United States
sought to “share the burden” of economically aiding MENA countries with the international
community while aiming to build countries’ “capacities for self-reliance.”39 In his FY2022 budget
request, President Biden notes that the Administration plans to “invest in multilateral approaches
to prioritize investments matched by commitments by both host countries and other international
partners, to share the burden of economic and development assistance; and seek to improve
resilience to shocks and stressors caused by climate change.”
Figure 3. Bilateral MENA Aid Budget Requests vs. Appropriations: FY2018-FY2022
current U.S. dollars in billions

Source: State Department annual Congressional Budget Justifications FY2017 - FY2022 and Department of
State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report.

38 CRS Report R46274, The Palestinians and Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal
Jurisdiction, by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim
Zanotti.
39 Then-USAID Administrator Mark Green was a proponent of moving certain countries away from a dependency on
foreign assistance. See, e.g., USAID, “Statement by Administrator Mark Green on the Launch of USAID’s Self-
Reliance Roadmaps,” October 4, 2018.

Congressional Research Service

8

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Aid to MENA Countries: FY2017 - FY2022
current U.S. dollars in millions
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022

actual
actual
actual
actual
allocated
request
Algeria
1.82
2.12
1.48
1.78
1.30
3.30
Bahrain
1.04
0.29
0.57
0.08
3.70
4.95
Egypt
1,353.54
1,413.67
1,419.30
1,430.50
1,430.15
1,430.30
Iraq
861.33
403.28
451.51
454.11
454.11
448.50
Israel
3,175.00
3,100.00
3,300.00
3,300.00
3,300.00
3,300.00
Jordan
1,319.83
1,525.01
1,524.99
1,525.00
1,650.00
1,275.00
Lebanon
208.41
245.94
242.29
216.00
258.32
295.96
Libya
139.20
33.00
33.00
28.67
22.60
43.00
Morocco
38.58
38.65
38.49
45.00
41.00
35.90
Oman
3.94
3.75
3.12
2.50
2.80
3.00
Saudi Arabia
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Syria
422.65
0.00
40.00
45.00
40.00
145.00
Tunisia
205.23
165.31
191.32
191.40
191.40
197.10
West Bank & Gaza
291.14
61.00
0.60
75.00
76.28
219.00
Yemen
370.60
315.52
37.30
17.30
14.60
45.10
Total
8,392.32
7,307.55
7,283.96
7,332.33
7,486.26
7,446.11
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs (SFOPS) Congressional Budget
Justifications (FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS
calculations. FY2020 actuals includes supplemental COVID-19 funding for Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Yemen
from P.L. 116-123 and P.L. 116-136 as reported in the FY2022 SFOPS Congressional Budget Justification. Figures
may reflect rounding.

Congressional Research Service

9

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Selected Country Summaries
Israel40
Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. To date,
the United States has provided Israel $146 billion (current, or non-inflation-adjusted, dollars) in
bilateral assistance and missile defense funding. Almost all U.S. bilateral aid to Israel is in the
form of military assistance.
In 2016, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed a 10-year Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on military aid, covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of the MOU, the United
States pledges (pending congressional appropriation) to provide Israel $38 billion in military aid
($33 billion in Foreign Military Financing or FMF grants plus $5 billion in missile defense
appropriations). This MOU replaced a previous $30 billion 10-year agreement, which ran through
FY2018. Israel is the largest recipient of FMF (see textbox). For FY2022, the President’s request
for Israel would encompass approximately 53% of total requested FMF funding worldwide. Israel
uses most FMF to finance the procurement of advanced U.S. weapons systems.
In May 2021, Israel and several Palestinian armed groups based
Top Ten FMF Recipients:
in the Gaza Strip fought their fourth major armed conflict since
FY2022 Request
2007. To replenish its munitions stocks, Israel has requested
1. Israel: $3.3 bil ion
additional U.S. military aid. Under the terms of the 2016 MOU,
2. Egypt: $1.3 bil ion
the agreement stipulates that under exceptional circumstances
3. Jordan: $350 mil ion
(major armed conflict involving Israel), both sides may agree on
4. Iraq: $250 mil ion
additional U.S. support for missile defense.41
5. Lebanon: $160 mil ion
In the report accompanying its annual FY2022 bill, the House
6. Ukraine: $115 mil ion
Appropriations Subcommittee for State, Foreign Operations,
7. Tunisia: $85 mil ion
and Related Programs reaffirmed its support for the MOU, while
8. Colombia: $40 mil ion
also urging the Secretary of State to ensure that “MOU-
9. Philippines: $40 mil ion
supported equipment is not used in any way that undermines the
10. Georgia: $25 mil ion
prospects of a negotiated two-state solution.”42
Table 2. Bilateral Aid to Israel
current U.S. dollars in millions

FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
actual
actual
actual
actual
allocated
request
FMF
3,175.00
3,100.00
3,300.00
3,300.00
3,300.00
3,300.00
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications
(FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS calculations.
Notes: Funding totals do not include monies allocated through Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA).

40 For additional background, please see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
41 In 2014, Congress passed P.L. 113-145, the FY2014 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Resolution, which
provided $225 million in Iron Dome funding requested by Israel on an expedited basis during the summer 2014 Israel-
Gaza conflict. It also exempted those funds from co-production requirements.
42 See H.Rept. 117-84 accompanying H.R. 4373, the State, Foreign Operations, And Related Programs Appropriations
Bill, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

10

link to page 27 U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Egypt43
Since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the United States has provided Egypt with large
amounts of foreign assistance. U.S. policymakers have routinely justified this aid to Egypt as an
investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and the
perceived need to sustain the treaty. Egypt has used FMF to purchase major U.S. defense systems,
such as the F-16 fighter aircraft, the M1A1 Abrams battle tank, and the AH-64 Apache attack
helicopter.
U.S. economic aid to Egypt (funded through ESF) is divided into two components: (1) USAID-
managed programs (public health, education, economic development, democracy and
governance); and (2) the Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund (EAEF).44 Since its inception in
FY2012, Congress has appropriated $300 million in ESF for the EAEF, which has, in turn,
invested over $220 million in Egyptian businesses and attracted $447 million in foreign capital to
Egypt.45
Egypt’s governance and human rights record has sparked regular criticism from U.S. officials and
some Members of Congress (see “Human Rights and Foreign Aid to MENA” section below).
Since FY2012, Congress has passed appropriations legislation that withholds the obligation of
FMF to Egypt until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking various steps toward
supporting democracy and human rights. With the exception of FY2014, lawmakers have
included a national security waiver to allow the Administration to waive these congressionally
mandated certification requirements under certain conditions. The Consolidated Appropriations
Act for FY2021 (P.L. 116-260) withholds $225 million in FMF from obligation until the
Secretary of State makes democracy-related certifications and provides waiver authority on
national security grounds. P.L. 116-260 also includes a condition that withholds $75 million in
FMF until the Secretary of State determines that the Government of Egypt is making clear and
consistent progress in releasing political prisoners and providing detainees with due process of
law. This condition is new in the FY2021 act, and affords no national security waiver.
Table 3. Bilateral Aid to Egypt
current U.S. dollars in millions

FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
actual
actual
actual
actual
allocated
request
ESF
112.50
106.87
112.50
125.00
125.00
125.00
FMF
1,234.30
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
IMET
1.74
1.80
1.80
0.00
1.80
1.80
INCLE
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
0.35
0.00
NADR
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.50
3.00
3.50
Total
1,353.54
1,413.67
1,419.30
1,430.50
1,430.15
1,430.30
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications
(FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS calculations.

43 For additional background, see CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
44 “Here’s One U.S. - Egypt Success Story,” Washington Post, April 5, 2019.
45 Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, 2020 Impact Report. https://www.eaefund.org/
Congressional Research Service

11

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Jordan46
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is also one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid
globally. Like Israel, the United States and Jordan have signed an MOU on foreign assistance,
most recently in 2018. The MOU, the third such agreement between the United States and Jordan,
commits the United States (pending congressional appropriation) to provide $1.275 billion per
year in bilateral foreign assistance over a five-year period for a total of $6.375 billion (FY2018-
FY2022).47 U.S. military assistance primarily enables the Jordanian military to procure and
maintain U.S.-origin conventional weapons systems. FMF overseen by the State Department
supports the Jordanian Armed Forces’ multi-year procurement plans, while DOD-administered
security assistance supports ad hoc defense systems to respond to emerging threats.
The United States provides economic aid to
Jordan for (1) budgetary support (cash
Figure 4. U.S. Cash Transfers to Jordan
transfer), (2) USAID programs, and (3) loan
Obligated funds in millions of U.S. dollars
guarantees. The cash transfer portion of U.S.
economic assistance to Jordan is the largest
amount of budget support given to any U.S.
foreign aid recipient.48 U.S. cash assistance is
provided to help the kingdom with foreign
debt payments, Syrian refugee support, and
fuel import costs (Jordan is almost entirely
reliant on imports for its domestic energy
needs). Separately, the State Department

estimates that, since FY2012, it has allocated
more than $1.8 billion in humanitarian
Source: USAID Foreign Aid Explorer.
assistance from global accounts for Syrian refugees in Jordan.
Table 4. Bilateral Aid to Jordan
current U.S. dollars in millions

FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
actual
actual
actual
actual
allocated
request
DA
-
-
-
-
85.00
-
ESF
832.35
1,082.40
1,082.40
1,082.40
1,122.40
910.80
FMF
470.00
425.00
425.00
425.00
425.00
350.00
IMET
3.88
4.01
3.99
4.00
4.00
3.80
NADR
13.60
13.60
13.60
13.60
13.60
10.40
Total
1,319.83
1,525.01
1,524.99
1,525.00
1,650.00
1,275.00
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications
(FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS calculations.
Notes: Prior-year funds not included in this table: $125 mil ion in ESF in FY2020 (P.L. 116-93); $50 mil ion in
Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF) aid in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6).

46 For additional background, see CRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
47 U.S. State Department, New U.S.-Jordan Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Jordan,
Fact Sheet, February 14, 2018.
48 Other budget support aid recipients include: the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau.
Congressional Research Service

12

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Iraq49
The State Department and USAID fund military, economic, stabilization, and security programs
in Iraq, with additional security assistance funding provided through the Defense Department
Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF).50 Iraq began purchasing U.S.-origin weapons
systems using its own national funds through the Foreign Military Sales program in 2005,51 and
the United States began providing FMF to Iraq in 2012 in order to help Iraq sustain U.S.-origin
systems. A $250 million FY2016 FMF allocation subsidized the costs of a $2.7 billion FMF loan
to support acquisition, training, and continued sustainment of U.S.-origin defense systems. Recent
Iraqi acquisitions include: Armed Bell 407GX Helicopters, pilot training for C-172, C-208, and T-
6 aircraft, and equipment for two Peshmerga infantry brigades and two artillery battalions.52
The United States provides foreign aid to Iraq in support of de-mining programs, public sector
financial management reform, civil society, economic development, U.N.-coordinated
stabilization, and other goals.53 In FY2021, U.S. assistance is supporting Iraqi preparations for
national elections planned for October 2021. The U.S. government has obligated more than $405
million for stabilization of liberated areas of Iraq since 2016, including funds for religious and
ethnic minority communities. USAID contributes to the Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund,
which aids the victims of conflict in Iraq.54 The United States is the top humanitarian funding
donor for Iraq and provided more than $348 million in humanitarian aid for Iraq in FY2020 and
FY2021, including more than $47 million for COVID-19 programs.
Table 5. Bilateral Aid to Iraq
current U.S. dollars in millions

FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
actual
actual
actual
actual
allocated
request
ESF
553.50
100.00
150.00
150.00
150.00
150.00
FMF
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
IMET
0.70
0.82
0.91
1.00
1.00
1.00
INCLE
0.20
5.60
5.60
5.60
5.60
-
NADR
56.92
46.86
45.00
47.51
47.51
47.50
Total
861.33
403.28
451.51
451.60
454.11
448.50
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications
(FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS calculations.

49 For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10404, Iraq and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard, and CRS
Report R45633, Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
50 U.S. State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Iraq,” factsheet, January 20, 2021. From FY2015 through
FY2021, Congress authorized and appropriated nearly $7 billion in Defense Department funding for train and equip
assistance in Iraq. The Biden Administration's FY2022 defense appropriations request seeks $345 million for train and
equip efforts under Iraq-specific authorities, including $240 million for Kurdistan Regional Government Peshmerga
stipends.
51 Solomon Moore, “Secret Iraqi Deal Shows Problems in Arms Orders,” New York Times, April 13, 2008; and U.S.
State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Iraq,” factsheet, March 22, 2017.
52 op.cit., State Department, January 20, 2021.
53 USAID, Congressional Notification #19, Country Narrative, Iraq, October 30, 2020.
54 Available online at https://www.usaid.gov/iraq/marla-ruzicka-iraqi-war-victims-fund.
Congressional Research Service

13

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Tunisia55
After its 2011 popular uprising, Tunisia adopted a democratic political system and constitution
enshrining various civil liberties. Political crises and worsening economic conditions have
stymied structural reforms and undermined public faith in government. President Kaïs Saïed’s
decision in July 2021 to suspend parliament and assert sweeping extraconstitutional executive
powers introduced new political uncertainty, even as many Tunisians welcomed his moves.
U.S.-Tunisia security cooperation has expanded since 2011, as Tunisia has sought to maintain its
U.S.-origin defense materiel, reform its security institutions, and respond to terrorist threats.
Congress has appropriated $85 million per year in FMF for Tunisia since FY2019, the highest
level for any country within U.S. Africa Command’s area of responsibility. Congress has also
provided $13 million per year in State Department-administered bilateral aid for law enforcement
strengthening and reform; Tunisia has received additional internal security force aid under State’s
global Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund. DOD has provided substantial additional
counterterrorism and border security assistance for Tunisia under its global “authority to build
capacity” (currently, 10 U.S.C. 333) and separate nonproliferation and Libya-related authorities.
President Biden’s FY2022 request seeks to channel bilateral economic aid to Tunisia through the
ESF account only, instead of providing half as Development Assistance (DA) as in FY2020 and
FY2021. U.S. economic aid has recently focused on promoting private sector growth,
strengthening democratic governance, bolstering civil society, and countering the drivers of
violent extremist recruitment. Reflecting the rise in U.S. economic aid since 2011, USAID
elevated its presence in Tunisia to a full bilateral Mission in 2019. In early July 2021, the MCC
announced plans to sign a $499 million development compact with Tunisia.56
Table 6. Bilateral Aid to Tunisia
current U.S. dollars in millions

FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
actual
actual
actual
actual
allocated
request
DA
-
-
-
40.00
45.00
-
ESF
89.00
79.00
85.00
45.00
40.00
85.00
FMF
95.00
65.00
85.00
85.00
85.00
85.00
IMET
2.13
2.21
2.22
2.30
2.30
2.30
INCLE
13.00
13.00
13.00
13.00
13.00
22.80
NADR
6.10
6.10
6.10
6.10
6.10
2.00
Total
205.23
165.31
191.32
191.40
191.40
197.10
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications
(FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS calculations.
Notes: Prior-year funds not included in this table: an additional $50 mil ion in ESF funds in FY2021 (P.L. 116-
260); an additional $50 mil ion in ESF funds in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94); and an additional $50 mil ion in Relief and
Recovery Fund (RRF) aid in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6).

55 For more background, see CRS Report RS21666, Tunisia: In Brief, by Alexis Arieff.
56 MCC Congressional Notification, “Tunisia Intent to Sign,” July 7, 2021; available at www.mcc.gov.
Congressional Research Service

14

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Lebanon57
U.S. military and economic assistance programs in Lebanon seek to bolster forces that could help
counter Syrian and Iranian influence. U.S. security assistance priorities reflect long-standing U.S.
concerns about the role of Hezbollah, while U.S. economic aid to Lebanon seeks to stabilize the
economy, boost employment, strengthen the delivery of public services, and address the needs of
vulnerable communities. Some in Congress have expressed concern about the potential for U.S.
assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to be diverted to Hezbollah or other designated
terrorists. Others assert that U.S. aid to the LAF is key to containing Hezbollah’s influence.
Congress places several certification requirements on U.S. assistance funds for Lebanon annually
in an effort to prevent their misuse or the retransfer of U.S. equipment.
FMF has been one of the primary sources of U.S. funding for the LAF, along with the Counter-
ISIL Train and Equip Fund (CTEF). According to the State Department, in FY2020, the United
States provided $216 million in combined State Department and DOD military aid.58 These funds
have been used to procure, among other things, light attack helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles,
transport helicopters, and night vision devices.
The United States has long provided relatively modest amounts of ESF to Lebanon for
scholarships and USAID programs. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, U.S. programs have
been aimed at increasing the capacity of the public sector to provide basic services to both
refugees and Lebanese host communities, including reliable access to potable water, sanitation,
and health services. U.S. programs have also aimed to increase the capacity of the public
education system to cope with the refugee influx.
To assist with Lebanon’s worsening economic crisis, for FY2022, the President is requesting
$296 million in total bilateral aid to Lebanon, which is 22% more than what Congress provided
for Lebanon in FY2021.
Table 7. Bilateral Aid to Lebanon
current U.S. dollars in millions

FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
actual
actual
actual
actual
allocated
request
DA
-
-
-
7.55
-
-
ESF
110.00
117.00
112.50
78.95
112.5
112.50
FMF
80.00
105.00
105.00
105.00
120.00
160.00
IMET
2.65
3.12
2.97
2.68
3.00
3.50
INCLE
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
8.20
NADR
5.76
10.82
11.82
11.82
12.82
11.76
Total
208.41
245.94
242.29
216.00
258.32
295.96
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications
(FY2019-FY2022), of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS calculations.

57 For additional background, please see CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud.
58 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Lebanon,” factsheet, May 21, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

15

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Regional Program Aid
In addition to assistance provided directly to certain countries, the United States provides aid to
Middle Eastern countries through regional programs, including the following.
 Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). MEPI is an office within the
Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs at the State Department that specifically supports
political reform, women’s and youth empowerment, quality education, and
promoting economic opportunity in the Arab world. Since MEPI’s inception in
2002, Congress has provided an estimated $1.1 billion in ESF for the initiative.
One of MEPI’s tools is its ability to fund directly the operations of small local
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) through its Local Grants Program.59
However, in countries with legal restrictions prohibiting foreign funding of local
NGOs, U.S. officials and grant recipients may weigh the potential risks of doing
so. In 2013, Egypt convicted local and foreign staff of U.S. and German
democracy NGOs on charges of operating illegally in the country.60 For FY2022,
the Administration is requesting $27.2 million in ESF for MEPI; Congress
provided $20 million in FY2021.
 Middle East Regional (MER). A USAID-managed program usually funded
through the ESF and DA accounts, MER supports multi-country programs
focusing on issues such as women’s rights, public health, water scarcity, climate
change, and education. For FY2022, the Administration is requesting $16.3
million in DA funding for MER. In recent years, USAID has allocated $10 to $20
million annually for MER.
 Near East Regional Democracy (NERD). A State Department-managed
program funded through ESF, NERD promotes democracy and human rights in
Iran (though there is no legal requirement to focus exclusively on Iran). NERD-
funded training for Iranian activists (e.g. pertaining to internet freedom, legal aid)
takes place outside the country due to the regime’s resistance to opposition
activities supported by foreign donors. For FY2022, the Administration has
requested $55 million in ESF for NERD. For FY2021, Congress specified $70
million in ESF for NERD ($55 million base allocation plus $15 million for the
State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor or DRL) in
Division K of the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying P.L. 116-260.
 Middle East Regional Cooperation (MERC). A USAID-managed program
funded through ESF, MERC supports scientific cooperation between Israelis and
Arabs.61 First established in an amendment to the SFOPS bill in 1979, MERC

59 Other ongoing MEPI programs include the Tomorrow’s Leaders Scholarship Program, which provides scholarships
for students across the Arab world. MEPI also funds a mid-career training program called the Leaders for Democracy
Fellowship program, which provides professionals with training in democracy studies and political mobilization.
60 Using the appropriations process, Congress has acted to ensure that “democracy and governance activities shall not
be subject to the prior approval by the government of any foreign country.” Originally referred to as the Brownback
amendment, this legislative language began in reference to Egypt, but was expanded in FY2009 to include “any foreign
country.” See Section 7032(e) of P.L. 116-260.
61 According to the State Department, “MERC is one of the few programs where universities, government laboratories,
and non-governmental organizations in Arab countries and Israel are willing to cooperatively sign and actively
implement a joint project award.” See, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Appendix 2,
FY2022.
Congressional Research Service

16

link to page 22 U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

was designed to encourage cooperation between Egyptian and Israeli scientists.
Today, MERC is an open-topic, peer-reviewed competitive grants program that
funds joint Israeli-Arab research covering the water, agriculture, environment,
and health sectors. For FY2022, the Administration is requesting $5 million in
ESF for MERC. Congress specified $5 million for MERC in the report language
accompanying FY2021 appropriations (Division K of the Joint Explanatory
Statement accompanying P.L. 116-260).
 Middle East Multilaterals (MEM). A State Department-managed program
funded through ESF, MEM supports initiatives aimed at promoting greater
technical cooperation between Arab and Israeli parties on issues such as water
scarcity, environmental protection, and renewable energy.62 For FY2022, the
Administration is requesting $500,000 in ESF for MEM.
 The Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act (MEPPA).
Enacted as part of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act, the Nita M.
Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (Div. K, Title VIII of P.L.
116-260) authorized the establishment of a USAID-managed “People-to-People
Partnership for Peace Fund (PPF)” and a U.S. International Development Finance
Corporation (DFC)-managed “Joint Investment for Peace Initiative.” Congress
appropriated $50 million in ESF for each of the next five years (FY2022-
FY2026). The PPF is expected to support programs to promote coexistence
between Israelis and Palestinians, and the DFC is to use funds to develop the
Palestinian private sector.
 Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). A State Department-
led, interagency initiative funded through multiple foreign assistance accounts
(including Peacekeeping Operations or PKO, NADR, INCLE, DA, and ESF),
TSCTP seeks to improve the capacity of countries in North and West Africa to
counter terrorism and prevent Islamist radicalization. Three North African
countries—Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco—participate in TSCTP, and Libya is
also notionally part of the partnership, but the program focuses overwhelmingly
on the adjacent Sahel region of West Africa. The FY2022 budget request includes
$2 million in NADR funds specifically for Near East countries under TSCTP,
along with $38.5 million in military aid (via the PKO account) for the program’s
12 country participants.
Funding for Complex Humanitarian Crises
For nearly a decade, the United States has continued to devote foreign assistance resources
toward several major humanitarian crises stemming from ongoing conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and
elsewhere (see Figure 5). Since 2010, the United States has provided about $20 billion in
humanitarian response funding to the Middle East.63
 The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to the Syria
crisis and since FY2012 has allocated more than $13 billion to meet

62 MEM grants support the Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC) based in Muscat, Oman. According to
the State Department, “MEDRC is one of two international institutions housed in the Arab world of which Israel is a
member and can work with Arab partners.” See, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Appendix
2, FY2022.
63 CRS calculation based on USAID Complex Emergency Factsheets.
Congressional Research Service

17

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

humanitarian needs using existing funding from global humanitarian accounts
and some reprogrammed funding.
 According to the United Nations, Yemen’s humanitarian crisis is one of the
worst in the world, with close to 80% of Yemen’s population of nearly 30 million
needing some form of assistance. The United States, Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates, and Kuwait are the largest donors to annual U.N. appeals for aid
for Yemen. Since 2010, the United States has provided nearly $4 billion in
humanitarian aid for Yemen. Most of these funds are provided through USAID’s
Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance to support the U.N. World Food Programme
in Yemen.
 During the government of Iraq’s confrontation with the Islamic State, the
United States was one of the largest donors of humanitarian assistance. Since
2014, it has provided nearly $3 billion in humanitarian assistance for food,
improved sanitation and hygiene, and other assistance for displaced and
vulnerable communities.
The State Department and USAID provide this humanitarian assistance through implementing
partners, including international aid organizations and nongovernmental organizations.
Humanitarian assistance is primarily managed by USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance
(USAID/BHA) and the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration (State/PRM) using “global accounts” (rather than bilateral assistance), such as IDA,
FFP, and MRA.
Figure 5. Select U.S. Humanitarian Funding to Certain Middle East Crises
current U.S. dollars in billions

Source: USAID Complex Emergency Factsheets (as reported for Syria through June 3, 2021; Iraq through June
16, 2021; and Yemen through May 14, 2021).
Notes: USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/BHA). U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM). Total includes supplemental FY2020 funding through
USAID/BHA and State/PRM for COVID-19 preparedness and response activities.
Congressional Research Service

18

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Select Foreign Aid Issues
Resumption of U.S. Aid to the Palestinians64
From 2018 to early 2021, policy changes made by the Trump Administration, coupled with
legislation passed by Congress halted various types of U.S. aid to the Palestinians. The Trump
Administration withheld bilateral economic assistance, reprogrammed it elsewhere, and ceased
requesting it altogether after Palestinian leadership broke off high-level political contacts in
protest of President Trump’s December 2017 recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. In 2018,
the United States suspended its contributions to UNRWA. In January 2019, after Congress passed
the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 (ATCA, P.L. 115-253), the Palestinian Authority
(PA) ceased accepting any U.S. aid, including security assistance and legacy economic assistance
from prior fiscal years.65
In January 2021, the Biden Administration announced its intent to “restore credible U.S.
engagement with Palestinians” by renewing U.S. relations with the Palestinian leadership,
reopening diplomatic missions closed by the Trump Administration, and restarting U.S. assistance
programs that “support economic development and humanitarian aid for the Palestinian people.”66
In March, the Biden Administration allocated $15 million in International Disaster Assistance
(IDA) for COVID-19 response needs and emergency food assistance in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. In April, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that in conjunction with Congress,
the Biden Administration would restart major aid programs to the Palestinians to include:
 $75 million in bilateral economic aid (FY2020 ESF) for the West Bank and Gaza;
 $150 million in humanitarian assistance (MRA) for UNRWA;
 $10 million for peacebuilding programs through USAID (DA).67
Secretary Blinken also announced the “resumption of vital security assistance programs.”68
In May 2021, several days after a cease-fire was reached between Israel and Hamas ending their
11-day conflict, Secretary Blinken announced another round of Palestinian aid to include: $33
million for UNRWA, $75 million in bilateral aid (FY2021 ESF), and $5.5 million for Gaza from

64 For more information, see CRS InFocus CRS In Focus IF10644, The Palestinians: Overview, 2021 Aid, and U.S.
Policy Issues, by Jim Zanotti; CRS Insight IN11649, U.S. Resumption of Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim
Zanotti and Rhoda Margesson; and CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim
Zanotti,
65 ATCA provided for a defendant’s consent to U.S. federal court jurisdiction over the defendant for lawsuits related to
international terrorism if the defendant accepted U.S. foreign aid from any of the three accounts from which U.S.
bilateral aid to the Palestinians has traditionally flowed (ESF, INCLE, and NADR). The PA made the decision not to
accept bilateral aid, most likely to avoid being subjected to U.S. jurisdiction in lawsuits filed by U.S. victims of
Palestinian terrorism. In December 2019, Congress passed the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism
Act of 2019, or PSJVTA, as § 903 of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, P.L. 116-94. PSJVTA
changes the legal framework applicable to terrorism-related offenses by replacing the provisions in ATCA that
provided for consent to personal jurisdiction for accepting U.S. aid. However, because PSJVTA did include other
possible triggers of consent to personal jurisdiction. See, CRS Report R46274, The Palestinians and Amendments to the
Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction, by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea.
66 United States Mission to the United Nations, "Remarks at a UN Security Council Open Debate on the Situation in the
Middle East, Ambassador Richard Mills, Acting Representative, January 26, 2021.
67 U.S. Department of State, “The United States Restores Assistance for the Palestinians,” press statement, April 7,
2021.
68 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service

19

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

the IDA account. In July, the Administration contributed an additional $135.8 million for
UNRWA.
Historically, Congress has enacted numerous restrictions on U.S. aid to the Palestinians both in
standing law and annual appropriations acts.69 The Taylor Force Act or TFA (Div. S, Title X of
P.L. 115-141) prohibits most ESF aid from directly benefitting the Palestinian Authority unless
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)/PA curtails domestically popular payments that
arguably incentivize acts of terror. While the Biden Administration has claimed that all U.S. funds
“will be administered in a way that benefit the Palestinian people — not Hamas” and will be
“consistent with applicable U.S. law,”70 some lawmakers have attempted to halt the resumption of
U.S. assistance. After the Biden Administration announced its intention to resume aid, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Jim Risch and House Foreign Affairs Committee
Ranking Member Michael McCaul issued a joint statement arguing that U.S. funding should be
linked to PA concessions and UNRWA reforms and reportedly placed an informal congressional
hold on the FY2020 ESF assistance.71 Also, 18 Senators sent a letter to Secretary Blinken urging
him to pause the ESF until the Administration takes some steps to justify it in light of the TFA’s
general restriction on ESF directly benefitting the PA.72 The letter also calls on the Administration
to implement recommendations from a March 2021 Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report to ensure that aid disbursements to implementing partner organizations, including sub-
grantees, fully comply with anti-terrorism vetting requirements. In early June 2021, 145 House
Democrats sent a letter to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Risch asking
him to “release your hold on tens of millions of dollars in appropriated humanitarian aid that is so
desperately needed to meet the needs of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians rebuilding
their lives in the wake of the fighting between Hamas and Israel earlier this month.”73 In a June
15, 2021, response to that letter, according to press reports, Ranking Member Risch wrote that the
continuing hold on a portion of the FY2020 ESF did not affect the humanitarian aid provided for
Palestinians to UNRWA (via the MRA account) or from IDA. He also explained that the hold on
what he characterized as “longer-term development projects” continues because of potentially
differing views between the Administration and some Members about whether the ESF funds in
question would directly benefit the PA.74
Lebanon’s Economic Crisis75
According to the World Bank, Lebanon’s ongoing economic collapse, a result of overlapping
governance, currency, debt, fiscal, and banking crises, “is likely to rank in the top 10, possibly top
3, most severe crises episodes globally since the mid-nineteenth century.”76 The Lebanese lira
(also known as the pound), pegged to the dollar, has lost more than 90% of its value in black-
market trading since October 2019. It dropped precipitously in March 2020, after the country

69 See Sections 7037-7040, 7041(k), and 7048(d) of P.L. 116-260.
70 op.cit., Department of State, May 26, 2021.
71 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Risch, McCaul: Biden Administration Should Have Secured Concessions
Before Resuming Assistance to Palestinians,” April 7, 2021.
72 Available online at https://www.cotton.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/palestine_letter.pdf.
73 Available online at https://raskin.house.gov/_cache/files/4/6/46b7d344-a52a-4747-8cdd-
49bcda9620ac/B649B27DDB83548BF673082A8A24EF97.final-raskin-letter-to-risch-re-gaza-aid.pdf.
74 Available online at https://freebeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/210615-TO-House-of-Representatives-
Jamie-Raskin-Response-to-Israel-Gaza-Letter-1.pdf.
75 For more information, see CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud.
76 The World Bank, Lebanon Economic Monitor, Spring 2021: Lebanon Sinking (To the Top 3), May 31, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

20

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

defaulted on $31 billion in Eurobond debt; Lebanon had not previously defaulted on its foreign
debt. Lebanon’s debt-to-GDP ratio (which economists project to reach 194% by the end of 2021)
is among the highest in the world.77
Lebanon’s currency depreciation has led to hyperinflation that has crippled the purchasing power
of average citizens; it is estimated that more than half the population now lives below the poverty
line.78 The inflation rate rose tenfold in 2020 (from 10% in January 2020 to 120% in August
2020) and is projected to remain at 96.6% throughout 2021. Food price inflation has soared to
more than 200% in 2021; in 2020, it briefly reached 400%.79
Without a fully formed government that can undertake economic reforms sought by international
financial institutions, Lebanon remains in stasis. In May 2020, the Lebanese government formally
requested a $10 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, IMF talks
over a potential rescue package for Lebanon have stalled, as Lebanese officials, among other
disputes, have not provided all the documents considered necessary to conduct a forensic audit of
Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon’s central bank.80An external forensic audit would allow
analysts to assess more accurately Lebanon’s economic and financial losses, and would
investigate potential fraud, negligence, missing funds, and bank compliance with Lebanese law.
Talks also stalled over questions regarding the exchange rate, government finances, and banking
reforms. U.S. and European officials have conditioned their support for an IMF program for
Lebanon on the implementation of structural reforms. Many of the reforms sought by outside
donors would require the formation of a new government.
According to one forecast from the Economic Intelligence Unit:
We expect that once a new government has been appointed and gained parliamentary
support for its reform agenda, a short-term [International Monetary] Fund agreement will
follow, probably in the third quarter of 2021. The next government will seek between
US$10bn and US$15bn in financial assistance from the IMF. The Fund will only provide
US$3bn-5bn—with the remainder supplied by bilateral source— and disbursement will
only commence once it sees a cohesive policy agenda with broad-based support. As a
result, much will depend on the government's ability to draft a compelling blueprint that
can achieve parliamentary support.81
Stabilization in Areas Liberated from the Islamic State
As Congress considers the President’s FY2022 budget request for MENA, Members have
continued to discuss what the appropriate level of U.S. assistance should be to stabilize and
reconstruct areas recaptured from the Islamic State organization (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL). According to
U.S. intelligence estimates, ISIS is “capable of waging a prolonged insurgency in Iraq and Syria
and leading its global organization, despite compounding senior leadership losses.”82 From
FY2017 to FY2020, the State Department and USAID obligated nearly $1 billion (see Table 8)
from various accounts (ESF, INCLE, NADR, PKO, and FMF) as part of the “Relief and

77 The World Bank, Lebanon Economic Monitor, Fall 2020: The Deliberate Depression, December 1, 2020.
78 “ANALYSIS-Lebanon Frozen by Political Intransigence as It Hurtles Towards Collapse,” Reuters, March 26, 2021.
79 Emiko Terazono and Judith Evans, “Global Food Prices Post Biggest Jump in Decade,” Financial Times, June 3,
2021.
80 Nabil Makkari, “A tale of two audits,” Executive Magazine, April – May 2021.
81 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Lebanon, generated on June 16, 2021.
82 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, April 9,
2021.
Congressional Research Service

21

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Recovery Fund (RRF)” 83 to help areas liberated or at risk from the Islamic State and other
terrorist organizations.84
Table 8. Relief and Recovery Fund
current U.S. dollars in millions
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022

actual
actual
actual
actual
(PSF)
(PSF)
allocated
request
ESF
95.00
209.00
28.00
0.70
45.00
75.00
FMF
100.00
75.00
25.00
25.00
17.50
17.50
INCLE
15.00
25.00
25.00
19.44
5.00
10.00
NADR
-
50.00
23.00
23.50
10.00
0.00
PKO
25.00
80.00
40.00
40.00
12.50
12.50
Total
235.00
439.00
141.00
108.64
90.00
115.00
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications
(FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Allocation Report, and CRS calculations.
Notes: Pursuant to the Global Fragility Act (Title V, Division J, P.L. 116-94) the FY2021 Omnibus (Division K,
P.L. 116-260) replaced the RRF with a new Prevention and Stabilization Fund (PSF).
In the 116th Congress, lawmakers replaced the RRF with a new “Prevention and Stabilization
Fund” or PSF.85 The PSF, which received a $200 million per year authorization through FY2024,
may provide assistance to “areas liberated or at risk from, or under the control of, the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria, other terrorist organizations, or violent extremist organizations, including
for stabilization assistance for vulnerable ethnic and religious minority communities affected by
conflict.”
For stabilization efforts in Iraq, USAID has used ESF and ESF-OCO (Overseas Contingency
Operations) funds to contribute to the United Nations Development Program’s Funding Facility
for Stabilization (FFS). To date, more than $405 million in U.S. stabilization aid has flowed to
liberated areas of Iraq through the FFS—which remains the main international conduit for post-IS
stabilization assistance in liberated areas of Iraq. USAID is the largest donor to the FFS, which
has received $1.4 billion from 28 global donors since 2015.86
The United States has provided more than $1.3 billion in stabilization assistance for Syria since
2011.87 Stabilization assistance focuses on projects in non-regime held areas, particularly those

83 Funds designated for the Relief and Recovery Fund were subject to the authorities and availability of the specific
accounts in which such funds were appropriated. For example, funds appropriated by acts for ESF, INCLE, and NADR
are available for two fiscal years, while PKO and FMF funds are made available for one fiscal year, except for funds in
those accounts that are designated as Overseas Contingency Operations funds, which are also available for two years.
84 Prior to the creation of the RRF, Congress had already appropriated more than $1 billion in Economic Support Fund-
Overseas Contingency Operations (ESF-OCO) funding “for programs to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, other terrorist organizations, and violent extremism, and address the needs of populations impacted by such
organizations.” See, P.L. 114-254, Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act. Congress has
appropriated foreign assistance designated for the RRF in: P.L. 115-31 (FY2017 - $169 million), P.L. 115-141
(FY2018 - $500 million), P.L. 116-6 (FY2019 - $200 million), and P.L. 116-94 (FY2020 - $200 million).
85 Pursuant to the Global Fragility Act (Title V, Division J, P.L. 116-94) the FY2021 Omnibus (Division K, P.L. 116-
260), replaced the RRF with the PSF.
86 See https://www.usaid.gov/iraq/stabilization.
87 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations With Syria,” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 10, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

22

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

liberated from Islamic State control. It aims to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State, and to
enable the restoration of essential services—which would allow the safe return of displaced
persons. The State Department also has described stabilization assistance as a “counterweight” to
the destabilizing influence of Iran, Russia, and the Syrian government.88 In 2020, State
Department and USAID stabilization programs in Syria included vocational training, seed and
fertilizer distribution, and the rehabilitation of several bakeries and a desalination plant.
Human Rights and Foreign Aid to MENA
In conducting diplomacy in the Middle East and providing foreign aid to friendly states, the
United States has faced the challenge of balancing national security interests with the promotion
of democratic principles. Executive branch officials and some Members of Congress have judged
that ensuring stability and facilitating counterterrorism cooperation at times requires partnering
with governments that do not meet basic standards of democracy, good governance, or respect for
human rights.
Successive Administrations and Congress at times have used policy levers, such as conditional
foreign aid, to try to promote changes in behavior from partner governments accused of either
suppressing their own populations or committing human rights abuses in military operations. In
some instances, policymakers have taken action intended to reinforce democratic principles in
U.S.-MENA diplomacy and to comply with U.S. and international law, while preserving basic
security cooperation.
Examples of provisions of U.S. law that limit the provision of U.S. foreign assistance in instances
when a possible gross violation of human rights has occurred include, among others:
 The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, contains general
provisions on the use of U.S.-supplied military equipment (e.g., Section 502B,
Human Rights - 22 U.S.C. 2304). Section 502B(a)(2) of the FAA stipulates that,
absent the exercise of a presidential waiver, “no security assistance may be
provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern
of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” As a general
matter, the executive branch appears to have rarely restricted assistance pursuant
to this provision, and there is no statutory requirement for the executive branch to
notify Congress when it chooses to invoke 502B. Pursuant to Section 502B(c),
Congress also may, through a resolution of the House or Senate or by request of
the Senate Foreign Relations or House Foreign Affairs committees, require a
report within 30 days from the Secretary of State concerning human rights in a
specific country, including an assessment of whether extraordinary circumstances
exist that necessitate a continuation of security assistance. 89 Congress, by joint

88 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 1,
2020—December 31, 2020, February 9, 2021.
89 In the 116th Congress, several lawmakers introduced resolutions that, among other things, would have required the
Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress pursuant to section 502B(c), including: S.Res. 409 - A resolution
requesting information on Turkey’s human rights practices in Syria pursuant to section 502B(c) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961; S.Res. 243 - A resolution requesting information on Saudi Arabia’s human rights practices in
Yemen pursuant to section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; S.Res. 754 - A resolution requesting
information on the Government of Azerbaijan’s human rights practices pursuant to section 502B(c) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961; and S.Res. 169 - A resolution requesting a statement under section 502B(c) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 with respect to violations of human rights by the Government of Saudi Arabia.
Congressional Research Service

23

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

resolution, may act to terminate, restrict, or continue security assistance to such
country.
 The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, contains several general
provisions and conditions for the export of U.S.-origin defense articles that may
indirectly address human rights concerns.90 For example, Section 4 of the AECA
(22 U.S.C. 2754) states that defense articles may be sold or leased for specific
purposes only, including internal security, legitimate self-defense, and
participation in collective measures requested by the United Nations or
comparable organizations. Section 3(c)(1)(B) of the AECA (22 U.S.C.
2753(c)(1)(B)) prohibits the sale or delivery of U.S.-origin defense articles when
either the President or Congress find that a recipient country has used such
articles in substantial violation of an agreement with the United States governing
their provision or “for a purpose not authorized” by Section 4 of the AECA or
Section 502 of the FAA.
 Standard Terms and Conditions in a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA)
Pursuant to the AECA, when a foreign nation purchases U.S. defense articles and
services (using FMF or national funds), it must sign a Letter of Offer and
Acceptance (LOA) with the United States government. The LOA lists the items
and/or services, estimated costs, and the terms and conditions of sale. The
standard terms and conditions permit the recipient government to use such items
only for certain specified purposes such as legitimate self-defense or preventing
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.91 Standard LOA language also
includes the phrase: “The purchaser notes its obligations under International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law.”92
 The “Leahy Laws” Section 620M of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2378d) and 10 U.S.C.
362 prohibit U.S. security assistance to a foreign security force unit when there is
credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human
rights. The State Department and U.S. embassies overseas implement Leahy
vetting to determine which foreign security individuals and units are eligible to
receive U.S. assistance or training.
 End-Use Monitoring It is the statutory responsibility of the Departments of
State and Defense, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), to conduct
end-use monitoring (EUM) to ensure that FMS/Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)
recipients use such items solely for their intended purposes. The AECA also
provides authority to the President (through a presidential determination) and
Congress (joint resolution) to prohibit the sale or delivery of U.S.-origin defense
articles to a recipient country if it has used such articles “for a purpose not
authorized” by the AECA or the FAA.93

90 See CRS In Focus IF11197, U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions,
by Paul K. Kerr and Liana W. Rosen.
91 For a sample LOA, see Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance Management Manual, available
at https://www.samm.dsca.mil/figure/figure-c5f4.
92 op.cit., Security Assistance Management Manual.
93 See CRS In Focus IF11197, U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions,
by Paul K. Kerr and Liana W. Rosen and CRS In Focus IF10392, Foreign Military Sales Congressional Review
Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
Congressional Research Service

24

link to page 15 link to page 30 U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

In addition to the U.S. Code, annual appropriations legislation contains several general and
MENA-specific provisions that restrict aid to human rights violators.94 Recent annual
appropriations legislation conditioning U.S. aid to Egypt is one of the more prominent examples
of how policymakers have attempted to leverage foreign aid as a tool to promote U.S. values
abroad (see “Egypt” above).
Members of Congress and the broader foreign policy community continue to debate the efficacy
of using foreign aid as leverage to promote greater respect for human rights in the Middle East
and elsewhere.95 In the 117th Congress, some House lawmakers have called for conditioning U.S.
military aid to Israel based on its treatment of the Palestinians.96 For the third consecutive
Congress, Representative Betty McCollum has introduced legislation focused on Israel’s
treatment of the Palestinians (H.R. 2590).97 This legislation would, “notwithstanding any other
provision of law,” prohibit foreign assistance funds to the Government of Israel from being used
for, among other things, (1) “Supporting the military detention, interrogation, abuse, or ill-
treatment of Palestinian children,” (2) “Supporting the seizure, appropriation, or destruction of
Palestinian property and forcible transfer of civilians in the Israeli-controlled and occupied West
Bank,” and (3) “Deploying, or supporting the deployment of personnel, training, services, lethal
materials, equipment, facilities, logistics, transportation, or any other activity to territory in the
occupied West Bank to facilitate or support further unilateral annexation by Israel.”98
FY2022 MENA Legislative Summary
On July 6, 2021, the House Committee on Appropriations introduced and reported (H.Rept. 117-
84) the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022
(H.R. 4373). The bill passed the House by the Yeas and Nays 217 – 212 (Roll no. 243) on July 28,
2021. As of September 2, the Senate has not yet taken up its version of the bill. Summarized in
Table 9 are provisions related to the MENA region contained in the House bill text and
accompanying report.

94 For example, see Section 7008 of P.L. 116-94, the FY2020 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act. For
background information on Section 7008, see CRS In Focus IF11267, Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid
Appropriations, by Alexis Arieff, Marian L. Lawson, and Susan G. Chesser.
95 In 2021, the journal Democracy in Exile, published by the human rights organization known as Dawn (Democracy
for the Arab World Now), published a series of articles on foreign aid conditionality in the Middle East. See,
[https://dawnmena.org/dawns-advocacy/aid-conditionality/]
96 Rebecca Kheel, “Progressives Ramp Up Scrutiny of US Funding for Israel,” The Hill, May 23, 2021.
97 In the 115th Congress, Representative McCollum introduced H.R. 4391, Promoting Human Rights by Ending Israeli
Military Detention of Palestinian Children Act, that would have, among other things, prohibited U.S. assistance to
Israel (notwithstanding any other provision of law) from being used to support the military detention, interrogation, or
ill-treatment of Palestinian children in violation of international humanitarian law. This bill was referred to the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, and it did not see further committee or floor action. In the 116th Congress, Representative
McCollum introduced a similar version of the legislation (H.R. 2407) that, rather than specifically addressing U.S.
military assistance to Israel, would have altered Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d;
commonly known as the “Leahy Law”) by prohibiting foreign assistance to a foreign country that may be used to
support the military detention, interrogation, abuse, or ill-treatment of children in violation of international
humanitarian law. H.R. 2407 in the 116th Congress also would have authorized $19 million each year for
nongovernmental organizations monitoring possible human rights abuses associated with reported Israeli military
detention of Palestinian children. This bill also was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and it did not see
further committee or floor action.
98 Section 5 of H.R. 2590.
Congressional Research Service

25

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Table 9. FY2022 MENA Foreign Operations Appropriations
Country
Provisions in H.R. 4373 and H.Rept. 117-84
Egypt
The Act provides not less than $125 mil ion in ESF, of which not less than $40 mil ion
should be made available for higher education programs, including not less than $15
mil ion for scholarships, and not less than $1.3 bil ion in FMF, provided that $150 mil ion
of FMF funds shall be withheld from obligation until the Secretary of State certifies that
the Government of Egypt is taking sustained and effective steps to, among other things,
strengthen the rule of law, democratic institutions and, human rights in Egypt, implement
reforms to protect civil liberties, hold Egyptian security forces accountable, investigate
and prosecute cases of extrajudicial kil ing and forced disappearances, provide access for
U.S. officials to monitor such assistance, and prevent the intimidation and harassment of
American citizens. This certification shall not apply to funds appropriated for
counterterrorism, border security, and non-proliferation programs, and may be waived if
the Secretary determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States.
An additional $135 mil ion in FMF, not subject to a waiver, is to be withheld until the
Secretary of State determines and reports that the Government of Egypt is making
progress in releasing political prisoners. An additional $15 mil ion in FMF, not subject to
a waiver, is to be withheld until the Secretary of State determines and reports that the
Government of Egypt has provided American citizens with fair and commensurate
compensation for injuries suffered as a result of an attack against a tour group by the
Egyptian military. The Act also includes authority for loan guarantees and financing for
the procurement of defense articles to Egypt. The accompanying House report allocates
$3.5 mil ion for NADR programs, and $1.8 mil ion for IMET.
Iran
Continues language from the prior year. Funds appropriated under the Diplomatic
Programs, ESF, and NADR accounts shall be made available 1) to support U.S. policy to
prevent Iran from achieving the capability to produce or otherwise obtain a nuclear
weapon; 2) support an expeditious response to any violation of UNSC resolutions; 3) to
support the implementation, enforcement, and renewal of sanctions against Iran; and 4)
for democracy programs in Iran. The Act also requires a semi-annual report required by
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and a report on sanctions.
Iraq
The Act makes funds available under Titles III and IV for bilateral economic and
international security assistance, including in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and for
the Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund ($7.5 mil ion); stabilization assistance, including
in Anbar Province; justice sector strengthening ($2.5 mil ion); humanitarian assistance;
and programs to protect religious and ethnic minority populations, and for scholarships
($10 mil ion). The House Report states that the Secretary of State “shall work with the
Government of Iraq to ensure security forces reflect the ethno-sectarian makeup of the
areas in which they operate.. .” The Act would prohibit funds appropriated for use to
enter into a permanent basing rights agreement between the U.S. and Iraq. The
accompanying report allocates funds from the fol owing accounts: $150 mil ion in ESF,
$47.5 mil ion in NADR, $1 mil ion in IMET, and $250 mil ion in FMF. The report also
directs funds be made available under IDA and MRA accounts to support programs that
address the needs of IDPs and refugees in Iraq. The Committee encourages the State
Department to expedite the processing of Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa applications and
to expand the days and hours of operation for consular services in Erbil in the KRI.
Israel
The Act provides $3.3 bil ion in FMF and $5 mil ion in MRA for refugee resettlement.
The report recommends $50 mil ion in ESF for the Nita M. Lowey Middle East
Partnership for Peace Act regarding programs to promote reconciliation between
Israelis and Palestinians.
Jordan
The Act provides not less than $1.65 bil ion for assistance to Jordan, including not less
than $845.1 mil ion for budget support for the Government of Jordan, $425 mil ion in
FMF, and $1.2074 bil ion in ESF. The Act also includes authority for loan guarantees for
Jordan, and authorizes Foreign Military Financing direct loans for Jordan, not to exceed
$4 bil ion.
Congressional Research Service

26

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Country
Provisions in H.R. 4373 and H.Rept. 117-84
Lebanon
The Act makes funds available under Titles III and IV, and the Committee supports
increasing assistance for Lebanon above the prior fiscal year. The Act specifies that
INCLE and FMF funds may be made available for the Lebanese Internal Security Forces
(ISF) and the LAF to address security and stability requirements in areas affected by the
conflict in Syria. FMF funds may be used only to professionalize the LAF, to strengthen
border security and combat terrorism, and to implement U.N. Security Resolution 1701.
FMF funds may not be obligated for assistance for the LAF until the Secretary of State
submits to the Committees on Appropriations a spend plan, including actions to be
taken to ensure equipment provided to the LAF is only used for the intended purposes,
not later than June 1, 2022. Aid shall not be made available for the ISF or the LAF if these
entities fall under control by a foreign terrorist organization.
Libya
The Act makes available funds under Title III and IV for stabilization assistance for Libya,
provided that the Secretary of State certifies that mechanisms are in place for
monitoring, oversight, and control of such funds. The Committee recommends increased
assistance for Libya above the prior fiscal year in support of a U.N.-facilitated, Libyan-led,
inclusive, and negotiated political solution to conflict there.
Morocco and
The Act makes funds available under Title III for assistance for the Western Sahara,
Western Sahara
provided that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the USAID Administrator,
consult with the Committees on Appropriations on the proposed uses of such funds
within 90 days. The Act also states that FMF may only be used for the purposes
requested in the Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year
2017. The report allocates not less than $10 mil ion in DA, $10 mil ion in ESF, and $10
mil ion FMF.
Saudi Arabia
The Act continues prior year language specifying that no IMET funds may be made
available for assistance for the Government of Saudi Arabia, and that none of the funds
made available by this Act and prior Acts may be "obligated or expended by the Export-
Import Bank of the United States to guarantee, insure, or extend (or participate in the
extension of) credit in connection with the export of nuclear technology, equipment,
fuel, materials, or other nuclear technology-related goods or services to Saudi Arabia
unless the Government of Saudi Arabia—(A) has in effect a nuclear cooperation
agreement pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153);
(B) has committed to renounce uranium enrichment and reprocessing on its territory
under that agreement; and (C) has signed and implemented an Additional Protocol to its
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.”
Syria
The Act provides funds under Titles III and IV for nonlethal stabilization assistance for
Syria, including emergency medical and rescue response and chemical weapons use
investigations, provided that the Secretary of State takes all practicable steps to ensure
that mechanisms are in place for monitoring, oversight, and control of such funds. The
Act prohibits any funds from supporting or otherwise legitimizing the government of Iran
or proxy of Iran, furthering the strategic objectives of the Government of the Russian
Federation, or for use in areas control ed by the Asad government.
Tunisia
The Act provides not less than $197.1 mil ion for Tunisia under Titles III and IV and
prior Acts. The bil also includes authority for loan guarantees for Tunisia. The report
allocates funds according to the fol owing breakdown: $45 mil ion (DA), $40 mil ion
(ESF), $22 mil ion (INCLE), $2 mil ion (NADR), $2.3 mil ion (IMET), and $85 mil ion
(FMF).
Congressional Research Service

27

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Country
Provisions in H.R. 4373 and H.Rept. 117-84
West Bank/Gaza
The Act makes available not less than $225 mil ion in ESF funds for the West Bank and
Gaza. Prior to obligating ESF funds to the West Bank and Gaza, the Secretary of State
shall report to the Committees on Appropriations that the purpose of this assistance is
to “advance Middle East peace; improve security in the region; continue support for
transparent and accountable government institutions; promote a private sector
economy; or address urgent humanitarian needs.” No ESF funds shall be made available if
the Palestinians obtain ful membership at the United Nations outside an agreement
negotiated with Israel or initiate an International Criminal Court investigation that
subjects Israeli nationals to an investigation for alleged crimes against Palestinians, subject
to waiver by the Secretary of State. Funds appropriated by this act are made available
consistent with Section 1004(a) of the Taylor Force Act (Title X of Division S of P.L.
115-141). The Act also requires the Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress
detailing steps taken by the PA to counter incitement of violence against Israelis and to
promote peace with Israel.
Yemen
The Act makes Title III funds, funds under INCLE and NADR, and prior year funds
available for health, humanitarian, and stabilization assistance for Yemen. The report
directs the Secretary of State to continue pressing government officials in Saudi Arabia
to unconditionally ease all restrictions on Yemen’s ports and airports and to enable the
free flow of fuel, food, and medicine into and throughout Yemen.
Amendments Passed (H.Rept. 117-10)
Israel
2. Bowman (NY), Malinowski (NJ), Nadler (NY): Increases and decreases funding by $1
mil ion for the Economic Support Fund, which funds the Nita M. Lowey Partnership for
Peace Act, to express support for diplomatic efforts.
Yemen
5. Dingell (MI): Increases and decreases funds in the Department of State Administrative
Account by $1,000,000 to highlight opposition to U.S. political or diplomatic support for
the Saudi blockade of Yemen.
Saudi Arabia
25. Ocasio-Cortez (NY): Increases and decreases funds in the Department of State
Administrative Account by $1,000,000 to highlight the need for stronger congressional
oversight, robust human rights measures, and transparency in U.S. arms sales to
countries such as Saudi Arabia.
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 4373)
engrossed in the House (September 28, 2021), and accompanying report (H.Rept. 117-84).
Notes: For brevity, authors have paraphrased bil text and accompanying committee report. Amendments 5 and
25 were considered as part of en bloc amendment #3 to H.R. 4373 (H.Amdt. 91) which was agreed to by Yeas
and Nays: 217 - 200 (rol call vote no. 241). Amendment 2 was considered as part of en bloc amendment #2 to
H.R. 4373 (H.Amdt. 89) which was agreed to by voice vote.

Congressional Research Service

28

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Appendix A. Common Foreign Assistance
Acronyms and Abbreviations
1206
Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provides the Secretary of
Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military forces
CCF
Complex Crises Fund
CTPF
Counter-Terrorism Partnerships Fund
DA
Development Assistance
DOD
Department of Defense
DOS
Department of State
ERMA
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance
ESF
Economic Support Fund
ESDF
Economic Support and Development Fund (account requested by the Trump Administration to
replace ESF and DA but not supported by Congress)
FMF
Foreign Military Financing
GHCS
Global Health Child Survival
IDA
International Disaster Assistance
IMET
International Military Education and Training
IMF
International Monetary Fund
INCLE
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
JES
Joint Explanatory Statement
MCC
Mil ennium Challenge Corporation
MOU
Memorandum of Understanding
MRA
Migration and Refugee Assistance
NADR
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs
NGO
Non-Governmental Organization
OCO
Overseas Contingency Operations
ODA
Official Development Assistance
PKO
Peacekeeping Operations
P.L. 480
Food for Peace/Food Aid
T&E
Train & Equip
TI
Transition Initiatives
USAID
U.S. Agency for International Development

Congressional Research Service

29

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East

Author Information

Jeremy M. Sharp
Sarah R. Collins
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Research Assistant

Carla E. Humud

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R46344 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED
30

Download PDF

Download EPUB

Revision History

Sep. 7, 2021

HTML · PDF

35% changed

May. 5, 2020

HTML · PDF

Metadata

Topic areas

Foreign Affairs

Intelligence and National Security