Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
This report discusses the current status of Central Asian states and U.S. policy, which has been aimed at facilitating their cooperation with U.S. and NATO stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and their efforts to combat terrorism, proliferation, and trafficking in arms, drugs, and persons.
Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
March 21, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33458
Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
Summary
U.S. policy toward the Central Asian states has aimed at facilitating their cooperation with U.S.
and NATO stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and their efforts to combat terrorism; proliferation;
and trafficking in arms, drugs, and persons. Other U.S. objectives have included promoting free
markets, democratization, human rights, energy development, and the forging of East-West and
Central Asia-South Asia trade links. Successive Administrations have argued that such policies
will help the states to become responsible members of the international community rather than to
degenerate into xenophobic, extremist, and anti-Western regimes that contribute to wider regional
conflict and instability. Soon after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11,
2001, all the Central Asian “front-line” states offered over-flight and other support for coalition
anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition
troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also endorsed
coalition military action in Iraq. About two dozen Kazakhstani troops served in Iraq until late
2008. Uzbekistan rescinded U.S. basing rights to support operations in Afghanistan in 2005 after
the United States criticized the reported killing of civilians in the town of Andijon. The Kyrgyz
leadership has notified the United States that it will not extend the basing agreement. U.S. forces
will exit the “Manas Transit Center” by mid-2014 and move operations to other locations. In
recent years, most of the regional states also have participated in the Northern Distribution
Network for the transport of U.S. and NATO supplies into and out of Afghanistan.
Policy makers have tailored U.S. policy in Central Asia to the varying characteristics of these
states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan have included securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear and
biological weapons materials and facilities. U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas
development in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and successive administrations have backed
diverse export routes to the West for these resources. U.S. policy toward Kyrgyzstan has long
included support for its civil society. In Tajikistan, the United States focuses on developmental
assistance to bolster the fragile economy and address high poverty rates. The United States and
others have urged the regional states to cooperate in managing their water resources. U.S.
relations with Uzbekistan—the most populous state in the heart of the region—were cool after
2005, but recently have improved. Congress has been at the forefront in advocating increased
U.S. ties with Central Asia, and in providing backing for the region for the transit of U.S. and
NATO equipment and supplies into and out of Afghanistan. Congress has pursued these goals
through hearings and legislation on humanitarian, economic, and democratization assistance;
security issues; and human rights.
During the 113th Congress, the Members may review assistance for bolstering regional border and
customs controls and other safeguards, in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), combat trafficking in persons and drugs, and counter terrorism. Other
possible interests include encouraging regional integration with South Asia and Europe and
fostering energy and other resource security. Support for these goals also has been viewed as
contributing to U.S. and NATO stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. For several
years, Congress has placed conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan because of
concerns about human rights abuses and lagging democratization (the Secretary of State may
waive such conditions). Congress will continue to consider how to balance these varied U.S.
interests in the region as U.S. and NATO military operations wind down in Afghanistan.
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Contents
Most Recent Developments ............................................................................................................. 1
Historical Background ..................................................................................................................... 2
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns .................................................................................................. 3
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan .......................................................................................... 8
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom ........................................................................................ 9
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations ................................................................................................. 9
Russia’s Role ........................................................................................................................... 11
China’s Role ............................................................................................................................ 15
Obstacles to Peace and Independence: Regional Tensions and Conflicts ...................................... 17
Islamic Extremism and Terrorism ........................................................................................... 21
Terrorism and Conflict in Kazakhstan ............................................................................... 22
Incursions and Violence in Kyrgyzstan ............................................................................. 24
The 2010 Ethnic Clashes in Kyrgyzstan ............................................................................ 24
Attacks by Jama’at Kyrgyzstan Jaish al-Mahdi in 2010-2011 .......................................... 25
Terrorism and Conflict in Tajikistan .................................................................................. 26
The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan .............................................................................. 26
The 2010-2011 Attacks in Tajikistan.................................................................................. 26
The 2012 Instability in Mountainous Badakhshan ............................................................ 27
Terrorism and Conflict in Uzbekistan ............................................................................... 28
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan ........................................................................ 29
The Summer 2009 Suicide Bombings and Attacks in Uzbekistan ...................................... 30
U.S. Designation of the IMU and IJU as Terrorist Organizations ........................................... 30
Democratization and Human Rights .............................................................................................. 32
Recent Political Developments in Kazakhstan ........................................................................ 33
Recent Political Developments in Kyrgyzstan ........................................................................ 34
Recent Political Developments in Tajikistan ........................................................................... 36
Recent Political Developments in Turkmenistan ..................................................................... 37
Recent Political Developments in Uzbekistan ......................................................................... 39
Human Rights .......................................................................................................................... 39
Trade and Investment ..................................................................................................................... 42
U.S. Regional Economic and Trade Policy ............................................................................. 43
The New Silk Road Vision ................................................................................................ 45
Energy Resources .................................................................................................................... 48
Kazakhstan’s Oil and Gas ................................................................................................. 49
Turkmenistan’s Gas ........................................................................................................... 51
Uzbekistan’s Oil and Gas .................................................................................................. 54
U.S. Regional Energy Policy ............................................................................................. 55
U.S. Aid Overview ......................................................................................................................... 57
Congressional Conditions on Kazakh and Uzbek Aid ............................................................. 58
U.S. Security and Arms Control Programs and Assistance............................................................ 60
Closure of the Karshi-Khanabad Airbase ................................................................................ 65
Efforts to Improve Security Relations ............................................................................... 65
The Manas Airbase/Transit Center .......................................................................................... 67
The Status of the Manas Transit Center after the April 2010 Coup .................................. 68
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Fuel Contract Developments ............................................................................................. 69
The Wind-down of the Manas Transit Facility .................................................................. 70
The Northern Distribution Network to and from Afghanistan ................................................ 71
Weapons of Mass Destruction ................................................................................................. 74
113th Congress Legislation ............................................................................................................. 75
Figures
Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan .................................................................................................................................. 78
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Trade Turnover, 2013 ............................................................................................... 44
Table 2. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia, FY1992 to FY2015 ......................................... 76
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY1992-FY2001 .......................................................... 77
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY2002-FY2010 (and Totals, FY1992-FY2010) ......... 77
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 79
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Most Recent Developments
Visiting Uzbekistan on March 16-19, 2014, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Fatema Sumar
reportedly stressed that the United States wanted to deepen its cooperation with the country. She
highlighted Uzbekistan’s central role in the Administration’s New Silk Road Vision for Central
and South Asia, which includes fostering regional resource and energy markets, trade and
transport infrastructure, and customs service and border protection (see below, “The New Silk
Road Vision”).
Kazakh officials have raised concerns about Russia’s military actions in Ukraine and its
annexation of the Crimea region. These concerns have been exacerbated by renewed calls in
recent days by some Russian ultra-nationalists for annexing northern Kazakhstan, where many
ethnic Russians reside. These developments could spur Kazakhstan to reassess its close ties to
Russia, according to some observers.1 On March 10, 2014, President Obama and Kazakhstan’s
President Nursultan Nazarbayev discussed developments in Ukraine during a telephone call.
President Nazarbayev called for the crisis to be settled peacefully with Ukraine’s territorial
integrity maintained. He reportedly accepted Obama’s request to assist in mediating the crisis.
President Nazarbayev also had called German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President
Vladimir Putin to discuss developments in Ukraine. Nazarbayev’s press spokesman stated that the
president sympathized with Russia’s view that Russian citizens and speakers should be
safeguarded, but urged Putin to preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty in line with international law. He
also raised concerns (including in another call to Putin on March 3) that the crisis might impact
economies belonging to the Customs Union (Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) and ties within the
Commonwealth of Independent States (Putin placed the blame on actions by the Ukrainian
interim government). After President Putin issued a decree on March 17 recognizing Crimea’s
“independence” following its referendum vote, and ordered the legislature to approve annexation,
the Kazakh Foreign Ministry issued a statement recognizing the referendum as a free expression
of the people’s will and indicating “understanding” of Russia’s annexation decision.2
On March 11, 2014, the Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry issued a statement that since former Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych had lost the trust of his people and had fled Ukraine, he was no
longer the legitimate president. The ministry called for the peaceful resolution of the crisis. After
the Crimean referendum on March 16, the Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry stated that the vote
represented the will of the people. At the same time, the ministry appeared cautious not to judge
Russia’s actions, urging “all sides to demonstrative maximum restraint and resolve all the
disputed issues through peaceful talks.”3
In early March 2014, President Nazarbayev called for the Defense Ministry to accelerate weapons
acquisition and reform efforts, and ordered boosted military deployments in the south and west of
the country to deal with rising threats, including those associated with possible instability in
Afghanistan after U.S. and NATO forces are drawn down.
1 Marlene Laruelle and Sean Roberts, “Why Ukraine's Crisis Keeps Central Asian Leaders up at Night,” The Monkey
Cage Blog, Washington Post, March 7, 2014.
2 BBC Monitoring, March 10, 2014; Open Source Center, Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), March 18,
2014, Doc. No. CEL-56291072; March 10, 2014, Doc. No. CEL-49462352; March 3, 2014, Doc. No. CEN-30561349;
The Kremlin, President of Russia, March 3, 2014.
3 CEDR, March 20, 2014, Doc. No. CEL-50392923.
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In late February 2014, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu announced that additional
helicopters and airborne troops had been deployed at Russia’s Kant airbase in Kyrgyzstan.
In mid-February, the Los Angeles Times alleged that the U.S. government was exploring possible
access to air bases in Central Asia for unmanned aerial vehicle missions in northwest Pakistan in
case all U.S. forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of the year.4
On February 11, 2014, Kazakhstan effectively devalued its currency by about 20% compared to
the U.S. dollar. Several protests occurred in Almaty and other cities and some runs on banks were
reported. President Nursultan Nazarbayev argued that the devaluation was necessary to promote
economic growth in 2014. Just three weeks previously, he had pledged to uphold the stability of
the Kazakh economy in his state-of-the-nation address.
In early February 2014, Kyrgyz security personnel arrested six alleged terrorists in southern
Kyrgyzstan, some of whom were said to have received combat experience in Syria. The group
reportedly was active in recruiting Kyrgyz citizens to fight in Syria. The Kyrgyz National
Security Committee reportedly stated that up to 50 Kyrgyz citizens were fighting in Syria. Later
in the month, the agency announced the arrest of four more alleged terrorists, who were said to
have received training abroad and were planning attacks in Kyrgyzstan. On March 12, 2014, a
Kyrgyz official reported that Islamic extremist activities were increasing in southern Kyrgyzstan,
and that Kyrgyz citizens who had returned from fighting in Syria were contributing to the
problem.
Uzbekistan has praised language in Consolidated Appropriations for FY2014 (P.L. 113-76) that
directs that international financial institutions be informed that it is U.S. policy to oppose
assistance for building large hydroelectric dams. Uzbekistan views the language as opposing
Kyrgyzstan’s Kambar-Ata-1 and Tajikistan’s Roghun hydroelectric dam projects.5
Historical Background
Central Asia consists of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; it
borders Russia, China, the Middle East, and South Asia. The major peoples of all but Tajikistan
speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks speak an Iranian language), and most are Sunni Muslims
(some Tajiks are Shiia Muslims). Most are closely related historically and culturally. By the late
19th century, Russian tsars had conquered the last independent khanates and nomadic lands of
Central Asia. By the early 1920s, Soviet power had been imposed; by 1936, five “Soviet Socialist
Republics” had been created in the region. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in December
1991, they gained independence.6
4 Ken Dilanian and David Cloud, “U.S. Seeks New Bases for Drones Targeting Al Qaeda in Pakistan,” Los Angeles
Times, February 16, 2014.
5 CEDR, March 4, 2014, Doc. No. CEN-63727921.
6 See CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 97-690,
Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan: Recent
Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol, CRS Report 97-1055, Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S.
Interests, by Jim Nichol, and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim
Nichol.
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Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, then-President George H. W. Bush sent
the “FREEDOM Support Act” aid authorization to Congress, which was amended and signed into
law in October 1992 (P.L. 102-511; aid provisions were included as Part I, Chapter 11 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, P.L. 87-195). In 1999, congressional concerns led to passage of
the “Silk Road Strategy Act” (P.L. 106-113), which authorized enhanced policy and aid to support
conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and
communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia. Since FY2003, Congress has conditioned foreign assistance to
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on their progress in respecting human rights (with national security
waivers for Kazakhstan, and more recently, for Uzbekistan) (see below, “Congressional
Conditions on Kazakh and Uzbek Aid”). Since FY2013, the Administration has included
assistance to Central Asia under the authority of the Economic Support Fund (Part II, Chapter 4
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, P.L. 87-195).
U.S. policy makers and others hold various views on the appropriate types and levels of U.S.
involvement in the region. Some have argued that ties with “energy behemoth” Kazakhstan are
crucial to U.S. interests.7 Others have argued that Uzbekistan is the “linchpin” of the region (it is
the most populous regional state and is centrally located, shaping the range and scope of regional
cooperation) and should receive the most U.S. attention.
In general, U.S. aid and investment have been
Central Asia: Basic Facts
viewed as strengthening the independence of
Total area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India;
the Central Asian states and forestalling
Kazakhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000 sq. mi.;
Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or other efforts to
Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan: 190,000 sq. mi.;
subvert them. Advocates of U.S. ties have
Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi.
argued that political turmoil and the growth of
Total population: 64.97 million, slightly less than
terrorist enclaves in Central Asia could
France; Kazakhstan: 17.74 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 5.55 m.;
produce spillover effects both in nearby states,
Tajikistan: 7.91 m.; Turkmenistan: 5.11 m.; Uzbekistan:
28.66 m. (July 2013 est., The World Factbook.)
including U.S. allies and friends such as
Turkey, and worldwide. They also have argued
Total gross domestic product: $414.74 billion in
2012, slightly less than Belgium. Per capita GDP is about
that the United States has a major interest in
$6,400, slightly less than Bhutan. There are large income
preventing terrorist regimes or groups from
disparities and relatively large percentages of people in
illicitly acquiring Soviet-era technology for
each country are in poverty. Kazakhstan: $231.3 b.;
making weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Kyrgyzstan: $13.47 b.; Tajikistan: $17.72 b.;
They have maintained that U.S. interests do
Turkmenistan: $47.55 b.; Uzbekistan: $104.7 b. (The
World Factbook, purchasing power parity.)
not perfectly coincide with those of its allies
and friends, that Turkey and other actors
possess limited aid resources, and that the United States is in the strongest position as the sole
superpower to influence democratization and respect for human rights. They have stressed that
such U.S. influence will help alleviate social tensions exploited by Islamic extremist groups to
7 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Remarks: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice At Eurasian
National University, October 13, 2005. In August 2012, then-Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake stated that “our
relations with Kazakhstan ... are the deepest and broadest of all countries in Central Asia.” U.S. Department of State,
On-the-Record Briefing With International Media: Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and
Central Asian Affairs, August 15, 2012.
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gain adherents. They also have argued that for all these reasons, the United States should maintain
military access to the region even after most or all U.S. and NATO forces exit Afghanistan.8
Some views of policy makers and academics who previously objected to a more forward U.S.
policy toward Central Asia appeared less salient after September 11, 2001—when the United
States came to stress counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan—but aspects of these views
could again come to the fore as such operations wind down in Afghanistan in 2014. These
observers argued that the United States historically had few interests in Central Asia and that
developments there remained largely marginal to U.S. interests. They also argued that the United
States should not try to foster democratization among cultures they claimed are historically
attuned to authoritarianism. Some observers rejected arguments that U.S. interests in anti-
terrorism, nonproliferation, regional cooperation, and trade outweighed concerns over
democratization and human rights, and urged reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive
Central Asian states. A few observers pointed to instability in the region as a reason to eschew
deeper U.S. involvement such as military access that could needlessly place more U.S. personnel
and citizens in danger.
The Obama Administration has listed six objectives of what it terms an enhanced U.S.
engagement policy in Central Asia:
• to maximize the cooperation of the states of the region with coalition counter-
terrorism efforts in Afghanistan, particularly cooperation on hosting U.S. and
NATO airbases and on the transit of troops and supplies to and from Afghanistan
along the Northern Distribution Network (NDN; see below, “The Northern
Distribution Network to and from Afghanistan”). This objective is becoming less
central as coalition efforts wind down.
• A related goal is a stable region to serve as part of a “Silk Road” of north-south
trade and communications links to increase the development and diversification
of the region’s energy and other resources and supply routes;
• to promote the eventual emergence of good governance and respect for human
rights;
• to foster competitive market economies;
• to combat the trafficking of narcotics and people; and
• to sustain nonproliferation.
Signs of this enhanced engagement have included U.S. senior-level diplomatic visits and annual
meetings of the U.S.-Central Asia Council on Trade and Investment (see below). In 2009, the
Obama Administration also launched high-level Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABCs) with each
of the regional states on counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, democratic reforms, the rule of law,
human rights, trade, investment, health, and education.
8 At least some of these views seemed to be reflected in the former Bush Administration’s 2006 National Security
Strategy of the United States, which proclaimed that “Central Asia is an enduring priority for our foreign policy.” The
Obama Administration’s May 2010 National Security Strategy does not specifically mention Central Asia or the
Caspian region. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, March 16, 2006, p. 40; National
Security Strategy, May 2010.
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In February 2012, the State Department announced that it was elevating relations with
Kazakhstan to the level of a strategic partnership dialogue by transforming the bilateral ABC into
a Strategic Partnership Commission, similar to the ones with Georgia and Ukraine. However,
unlike these, no formal charter has been released. The first meeting of this Commission took
place in April 2012 in Washington, DC, during which political, economic, and scientific working
groups discussed plans for bilateral projects. The second meeting took place in July 2013 in
Washington, DC, hosted by visiting Kazakh Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov and Secretary Kerry.
The United States praised Kazakhstan’s “leadership role” in supporting security in Afghanistan,
including through assistance to the Afghan National Security Forces and a university scholarship
program. The United States pledged continued support for Kazakhstan’s peacekeeping brigade
and the annual Steppe Eagle military exercise and for its efforts to join the World Trade
Organization, and agreed to a U.S. trade and investment delegation visit to Kazakhstan during
2014.9
In late January 2014, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified that the
governments of the Central Asian states continue to be concerned about regional instability
following the drawdown of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. He suggested that Central
Asian militants currently harbored in Afghanistan and Pakistan would continue to pose a threat to
the Central Asian region, but sources of internal regional instability would probably remain more
of a threat. Such instability includes uncertain political succession contingencies, endemic
corruption, weak economies, ethnic tensions, and political repression. Regional cooperation
remains stymied by personal leadership rivalries and disputes over water, borders, and energy.
While intra-regional relations are tense, chances of conflict are reduced by the attention the
regional leaders must devote to maintaining internal control.10
Among relevant policy statements, former Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake appeared to
emphasize U.S. security interests in testimony in November 2010 when he stated that “Central
Asia plays a vital role in our Afghanistan strategy…. A stable future for Afghanistan depends on
the continued assistance of its Central Asian neighbors, just as a stable, prosperous future for the
Central Asian states depends on bringing peace, stability and prosperity to Afghanistan.”
Appearing at the same hearing as Blake, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Sedney
stated that “from the Department of Defense perspective … our focus is on the support for the
effort in Afghanistan, but that is accompanied by the longer-term security assistance projects,
including a variety of training efforts in areas from counterterrorism to counternarcotics that are
building capabilities in those countries that are important for reasons well beyond Afghanistan.”11
At the same time, then-Assistant Secretary Blake in July 2010 refuted the arguments of critics
“that this Administration is too focused on the security relationship with [Central Asian] countries
and forgets about human rights.” He stated that human rights and civil society issues “will remain
an essential part of our dialogue equal in importance to our discussion on security issues.”12
9 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Joint Statement of Second Kazakhstan-United States Strategic
Partnership Dialogue, July 10, 2013.
10 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community, James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, January 29, 2014.
11 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global
Environment, Hearing on the Emerging Importance of the U.S.-Central Asia Partnership, Testimony of Robert O.
Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, and Testimony of David Sedney, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense, November 17, 2010.
12 U.S. Department of State, Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S.
(continued...)
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Similarly, in congressional testimony in July 2012, he argued that “the path to progress on
[human rights] is more engagement with these governments, not less.”13
In a speech in October 2012, then-Assistant Secretary Blake underlined that the Central Asian
countries have an important role in ensuring the security of Afghanistan after 2014. He averred
that the Silk Road Vision (see below, aimed to integrate Afghanistan into the larger regional
economy and hailed the NDN (see below, “The Northern Distribution Network to and from
Afghanistan”) as one means to boost private sector trade between Central and South Asia. He
praised Central Asian economic cooperation with Afghanistan and stated that U.S. efforts to
encourage economic and security ties between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan had
provided opportunities to advocate for greater democratization and respect for human rights in
Central Asia.14
Nisha Biswal was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs on
October 21, 2013. At her confirmation hearing, she praised Kazakhstan as a leader among the
Central Asian states in supporting stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. She stated that “expanding
greater regional connectivity and linking economies and markets will be one of my top
priorities.” She stated that “Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have agreed to build a rail line linking
their two countries via Afghanistan,” as one example of developing “important regional
infrastructure linkages” (although the mentioned links go around Uzbekistan), and pointed to
Turkmenistan’s long-time promotion of a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan as another
example. She claimed that all the regional states were working toward or thinking of accession to
the World Trade Organization. She stated that she would encourage U.S. private sector and
academic collaboration with regional organizations on issues of food security, water management,
climate change, and infectious diseases. She stressed that although the United States would work
with the regional states to counter terrorism and extremism, she would advocate democratization
so that people have peaceful avenues for expressing dissent. She pledged to remain engaged with
Uzbekistan to end forced labor and to address other human rights concerns, and to champion
freedom of religion throughout the region.15
Recent contacts between Central Asian leaders and President Obama and Secretaries Clinton and
Kerry and other U.S. officials have included the following:
• The President met on April 11, 2010, with Kazakh President Nursultan
Nazarbayev on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC.
A joint statement reported that they “pledged to intensify bilateral cooperation to
(...continued)
Policy Towards Central Asia, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, July 30, 2010. See also U.S. Department of State,
Robert O. Blake, Jr., Remarks:U.S. Policy in Central Asia, Forum of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, January 25,
2012.
13 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Hearing: U.S.
Engagement in Central Asia, Testimony by Robert Blake, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Central and South Asian
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, July 24, 2012
14 U.S. Department of State, Remarks, Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs, [at] Indiana University’s Inner Asian and Uralic Natural Resource Center, October 18, 2012. Similarly, see
Remarks, Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, [at] the Conference on
U.S and European Policy in Central Asia at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 12, 2012.
15 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination Hearing, Statement for the Record: Hon. Nisha Desai
Biswal, Nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, September 12, 2013.
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promote nuclear safety and nonproliferation, regional stability in Central Asia,
economic prosperity, and universal values.” President Obama encouraged
Kazakhstan to fully implement its 2009-2012 National Human Rights Action
Plan. President Nazarbayev agreed to facilitate U.S. military air flights along a
new trans-polar route that transits Kazakhstan to Afghanistan, and President
Obama praised Kazakh assistance to Afghanistan.16
• Then-Secretary Clinton visited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in early
December 2010. In Kazakhstan, she participated in the OSCE Summit. She also
met briefly with Tajik President Rahmon and Turkmen President Gurbanguly
Berdimuhamedow on the sidelines of the Astana Summit. In Uzbekistan, she
signed an accord on scientific cooperation as one means, she explained, to further
U.S. engagement with the country.
• During her October 22-23, 2011, visit to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, then-
Secretary Clinton discussed the Silk Road Vision (see below, “Trade and
Investment”) to turn Afghanistan into a regional transportation, trade, and energy
hub linked to Central Asia. She also warned the presidents of both countries that
restrictions on religious freedom could contribute to rising religious discontent.
• President Obama met with President Nazarbayev at the nuclear security summit
in Seoul, South Korea, in March 2012. President Obama hailed Kazakhstan’s
efforts to secure nuclear materials inherited from the former Soviet Union.17
• Secretary Kerry met with visiting Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov in
March 2013. Kerry stated that Uzbekistan is providing “very important” support
for the NDN and infrastructure aid to Afghanistan, but also emphasized that
bilateral ties were not limited to Afghan-related issues.18
• Secretary Kerry met with visiting Kazakh Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov in July
2013 to convene a session of the bilateral Strategic Partnership Commission (see
above). During the visit, Idrissov also met with Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel,
Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman, and
National Security Advisor Susan Rice.
• (However, during Kamilov’s December 2013 U.S. visit, he reportedly met with
the State Department’s Deputy Secretary William Burns, among others.)
• (However, during his mid-March 2014 U.S. visit, Tajik Foreign Minister
Sirojiddin Aslov reportedly met with Deputy Secretary Burns, among others.)
16 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement on the meeting between President Obama and
Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev April 11, 2010.
17 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and President Nursultan Nazarbayev
of the Republic of Kazakhstan Before Bilateral Meeting, March 26, 2012; Joint Statement of the Presidents of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America Regarding the Trilateral
Cooperation at the Former Semipalatinsk Test Site, March 26, 2012.
18 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Kerry Meets With Uzbek Foreign Minister Kamilov, March 13, 2013.
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Post-September 11 and Afghanistan
After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, then-Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State B. Lynn Pascoe testified that the former Bush Administration realized that “it
was critical to the national interests of the United States that we greatly enhance our relations
with the five Central Asian countries” to prevent them from becoming harbors for terrorism.19 All
the Central Asian states soon offered over-flight and other assistance to U.S.-led anti-terrorism
coalition operations in Afghanistan. The states were predisposed to welcome such operations.
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had long supported the Afghan Northern Alliance’s combat against the
Taliban, and all the Central Asian states feared Afghanistan as a base for terrorism, crime, and
drug trafficking (even Turkmenistan, which had tried to reach some accommodation with the
Taliban). The U.S.-led coalition’s overthrow of the Taliban and routing of Al Qaeda and Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IIMU; see below) terrorists in Afghanistan increased the security of
Central Asia.
According to then-Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch in testimony in June 2002, “our
military relationships with each [Central Asian] nation have matured on a scale not imaginable
prior to September 11th.” Crouch averred that “for the foreseeable future, U.S. defense and
security cooperation in Central Asia must continue to support actions to deter or defeat terrorist
threats” and to build effective armed forces under civilian control.
As outlined by Crouch and as affected by subsequent developments, security relationships
include
• a “critical regional partnership” with Kyrgyzstan in OEF, providing basing for
U.S. and coalition forces at Manas. The Defense Department plans to transition
from the base by July 10, 2014 (see below).
• a base in Uzbekistan for U.S. operations at Karshi-Khanabad (K2; U.S. troops
reportedly numbered less than 900 just before the 2005 pullout, see below), a
base for German units near Termez (in early 2014, The Military Balance reported
that there were 100 German troops at the base), and a land corridor to
Afghanistan for aid via the Friendship Bridge and a rail link at Termez.
• an agreement with Tajikistan to use its international airport in Dushanbe for
refueling (“gas-and-go”) and the country’s hosting of a French air detachment
(these troops departed in 2013).
• over-flight and other support by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.20
To obtain Uzbekistan’s approval for basing, the 2002 U.S.-Uzbek Strategic Partnership
Declaration included a nonspecific security guarantee. The United States affirmed that “it would
regard with grave concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan’s security and would consult with
Uzbekistan “on an urgent basis” regarding a response. The two states pledged to intensify military
cooperation, including “reequipping the Armed Forces” of Uzbekistan.
19 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus, The U.S. Role
in Central Asia. Testimony of B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, June 27,
2002.
20 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus, Statement of J.D.
Crouch II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, June 27, 2002.
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In 2009, most Central Asian states agreed to facilitate the air and land transport of U.S. and
NATO nonlethal supplies (and later of lethal equipment by air) to Afghanistan as an alternative to
land transport via increasingly volatile Pakistan. In 2012, most of the states approved the reverse
transit of supplies and equipment out of Afghanistan. For further details, see below, “The
Northern Distribution Network to and from Afghanistan.”
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were the only Central Asian states that joined the “coalition of the
willing” in 2003 that endorsed U.S.-led coalition military operations in Iraq. Uzbekistan
subsequently decided not to send troops to Iraq. In August 2003, Kazakhstan deployed some two
dozen troops to Iraq who served under Polish command and carried out water-purification,
demining, and medical activities. They pulled out in late 2008.
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible members of the
international community by providing bilateral aid and through coordination with other aid
donors. The stated policy goal is to discourage radical anti-democratic regimes and terrorist
groups from gaining influence. All the Central Asian leaders publicly embrace Islam but display
hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have established some trade and
aid ties with Iran. Some observers argue that, in the longer run, their foreign policies may not be
anti-Western but may more closely reflect some concerns of other Islamic states. Some Western
organizational ties with the region have suffered in recent years, in particular those of the OSCE,
which has been criticized by some Central Asian governments for advocating democratization
and respect for human rights.21 Despite this criticism, President Nazarbayev successfully pushed
for Kazakhstan to hold the presidency of the OSCE in 2010 (see below).
In early 2006, the State Department incorporated Central Asia into a revamped Bureau of South
and Central Asian Affairs. According to former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Steven Mann, “institutions such as NATO and the OSCE will continue to draw the nations of
Central Asia closer to Europe and the United States,” but the United States also will encourage
the states to develop “new ties and synergies with nations to the south,” such as Afghanistan,
India, and Pakistan.22 Other observers, however, criticized the State Department action, arguing
that it deemphasized efforts to integrate the region into European institutions, subordinated U.S.
ties with Central Asia to the U.S. strategic calculus regarding Afghanistan and to other U.S. ties
with South Asia, and provided an opportunity for Russia and China to move into the breach to
assert greater influence.23
21 See also CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
22 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central
Asia, Hearing on Assessing Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia, Testimony of Steven Mann, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, July 25, 2006. The State Department appointed a Senior
Advisor on Regional Integration in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Robert Deutsch, who focused on
bolstering trade and transport ties between South and Central Asia.
23 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export, and Trade,
Hearing on Energy Supplies in Eurasia and Implications for U.S. Energy Security, Testimony by Zeyno Baran,
September 27, 2005.
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Some observers warn that after the U.S. and NATO drawdown in Afghanistan, Russian and
Chinese influence will grow in the region. Russia’s CSTO may seek greater military influence in
the region, while Russia and China may compete more openly and intensively for economic
influence. Russia will seek to strengthen economic influence through the Customs Union and
other integration initiatives. These observers also suggest that European Union (EU) influence
will remain constrained for some time by its economic recovery problems.24
The EU has been more interested in Central Asia in recent years as the region became more of a
security threat as an originator and transit zone for drugs, weapons of mass destruction, refugees,
and persons smuggled for prostitution or labor. Russia’s cutoff of gas supplies in 2006 and 2009
to Ukraine—which hindered gas supplies transiting Ukraine to European customers—also
bolstered EU interest in Central Asia as an alternative supplier of oil and gas. Such interests
contributed to the launch of a Strategy Paper for assistance for 2002-2006 and a follow-on for
2007-2013 (see below), and the EU’s appointment of a Special Representative to the region. The
EU implemented Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs, which set forth political,
economic, and trade relations) with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. An existing
Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) program was supplemented in 2004 and
2006 by a Baku Energy Initiative and an Astana Energy Ministerial Declaration to diversify
energy supplies (see “Energy Resources,” below).
In June 2007, the EU approved a new “Central Asian strategy” for enhanced aid and relations for
2007-2013. It argued that the EU ties with the region needed to be enhanced because EU
enlargement and EU relations with the South Caucasus and Black Sea states brought it to Central
Asia’s borders. The strategy also stressed that “the dependency of the EU on external energy
sources and the need for a diversified energy supply policy in order to increase energy security
open further perspectives for cooperation between the EU and Central Asia,” and that the “EU
will conduct an enhanced regular energy dialogue” with the states. Under the strategy and an
associated Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the Period 2007-2013, also
promulgated in 2007, the EU set up offices in all the regional stated except Turkmenistan. The
EU reports that allocations over the period 2007-2012 totaled 435 million euros. Kazakhstan
received about 50 million euros, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan each received over 100 million euros,
and regional programs received 133 million euros. EU emissaries held dozens of meetings and
seminars each year with the Central Asian states on such issues as human rights, civil society
development, foreign policy and assistance, trade and investment, environmental and energy
cooperation, and other issues.25
In November 2013, the EU announced a new development program for Central Asia with funding
of one billion euros over the period 2014-2020. The EU program calls for the largest amount of
assistance to be devoted to democratization and sustainable economic growth. Kazakhstan was
deemed to not need bilateral assistance but remained eligible for thematic and regional aid.26 In
24 Vahan Dilanyan and Armen Sahakyan, Afghanistan After America: Ripples in Russia and the Caucasus, The
National Interest, January 31, 2014.
25 European Commission, Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the Period 2007-2013, June 2007;
European Commission, External Relations Directorate, Central Asia DCI Indicative Program 2011 – 2013, September
2010; European Union, Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton Following the EU-Central Asia Ministerial
Meeting in Kyrgyzstan, Press Release, November 27, 2012; European Court of Auditors, EU Development Assistance
to Central Asia, Special Report No. 13, January 14, 2014.
26 European Commission, Press Release, EU announces Future Commitments for Development with Central Asia
Region, IP/13/1119, November 20, 2013. See also Paolo Bartolozzi, “A European Policy in Central Asia,” EP Today,
(continued...)
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late January 2014, the EU’s Special Representative to Central Asia stepped down, and the
responsibilities were assumed by officials in the European External Action Service. Some
observers raised concerns about this lower-level official engagement with Central Asia.27
Russia’s Role
During most of the 1990s, successive U.S. administrations generally viewed a democratizing
Russia as serving as a role model in Central Asia. Despite growing authoritarian tendencies in
Russia during the presidencies of Vladimir Putin (2000-2008, and again after his re-election in
2012) and Dmitriy Medvedev (2008-2012), successive U.S. administrations have emphasized that
Russia’s counter-terrorism efforts in the region broadly support U.S. interests. At the same time,
successive administrations have stressed to Russia that it should not seek to dominate the region
or exclude Western and other involvement. Virtually all U.S. analysts agree that Russia’s actions
should be monitored to gauge whether it is vitiating the independence of the Central Asian states.
Soon after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Russia acquiesced to
increased U.S. and coalition presence in the region for operations against Al Qaeda and its
supporters in Afghanistan. Besides Russia’s own concerns about Islamic extremism in
Afghanistan, Central Asia, and its own North Caucasus, it was interested in boosting its economic
and other ties to the West and regaining some influence in Afghanistan. In the later part of the
2000s, however, Russia appeared to step up efforts to counter U.S. influence in Central Asia and
reassert its own “great power” status by advocating that the states increase economic and strategic
ties with Russia and limit such ties with the United States. This stance included backing and
encouragement for Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to close their U.S. airbases. Such a stance
appeared paradoxical to U.S. officials, since Russia (and China) benefitted from anti-terrorism
operations carried out by U.S. (and NATO) forces in Afghanistan. Improved U.S.-Russia relations
during President Obama’s first term in office appeared to include some Russian cooperation with
U.S. and NATO stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, but the status of such cooperation has
appeared more uncertain in recent months, according to some observers.
During the 1990s, Russia’s economic decline and demands by Central Asia caused it to reduce its
security presence, a trend that Vladimir Putin since 2000 has appeared determined to reverse. In
1999, Russian border guards were largely phased out in Kyrgyzstan, the last Russian military
advisors left Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty (CST;
see below) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in part because the treaty
members failed to help Uzbekistan meet the growing Taliban threat in Afghanistan, according to
Uzbek President Islam Karimov.
Despite these moves, Russia appeared determined to maintain a military presence in Tajikistan. It
has retained from the Soviet period the 201st motorized infantry division of about 5,000 troops
subordinate to Russia’s Central Military District. Some Russian officers reportedly help oversee
(...continued)
February 9, 2014.
27 Jos Boonstra, “Is the EU Downscaling Political Engagement in Central Asia? EUCAM Commentary, Foundation for
International Relations and Foreign Dialogue, February 2014.
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these troops, many or most of whom are ethnic Tajik noncommissioned officers and soldiers.
Tajik Frontier Force border guards also receive support from the 201st division.28
Russia’s efforts to formalize a basing agreement with Tajikistan dragged on for years, as
Tajikistan endeavored to charge rent and assert its sovereignty. In October 2004, a 10-year basing
agreement was signed, formalizing Russia’s largest military presence abroad, besides its Black
Sea Fleet. At the same time, Tajikistan demanded full control over border policing. Russia
announced in June 2005 that it had handed over the last guard-house along the Afghan-Tajik
border to Tajik troops (a few dozen Russian border advisors remained).
In October 2009, visiting President Rahmon reportedly urged then-President Medvedev to pay
rent on Russia’s base facilities in Tajikistan. At a meeting in Dushanbe in September 2011, then-
President Medvedev announced that he and Rahmon had made progress in reaching agreement on
extending the basing agreement for another 49 years, and that an accord would be signed in early
2012. Some media reported that Tajikistan was calling for up to $300 million in annual rent
payments. Also at the meeting, the two presidents agreed that the number of Russian border
advisors reportedly would be reduced from 350 to 200, and that they would more closely
cooperate with the Tajik border force.
President Rahmon met with newly inaugurated President Putin in Moscow on the sidelines of a
CIS summit in mid-May 2012, and the two leaders agreed to continue the apparently contentious
discussions on extending the basing agreement. During President Putin’s early October 2012 visit,
the two leaders agreed to a basing agreement through the year 2042.President Rahmon was
unsuccessful in getting Russia to pay more on the base lease, but Russia pledged added military
modernization assistance. Of great significance for Tajikistan, Putin agreed that work permits for
Tajik migrant laborers would be extended from one to three years. Tensions rose, however, as
Tajikistan lagged in ratifying the accord. According to some observers, President Rahmon
delayed ratification of the basing agreement pending Moscow’s full support for his re-election in
November 2013. Other observers point to President Rahmon’s late May 2013 visit to China,
where he and President Xi Jinping signed a strategic partnership agreement that included pledges
to deepen cooperation on security issues and to support Tajikistan as it assumed the rotating
leadership of the SCO in late 2013. According to another view, Tajikistan was resisting pressure
from Moscow to re-admit Russian border forces along the Tajik-Afghan border.
Meeting with President Putin in Moscow on August 1, 2013, President Rahmon announced that
he soon would submit the basing agreement for legislative approval, and the legislature duly
affirmed the accord in early October 2013.29
In a seeming shift toward a more activist role in Central Asia, in April 2000, Russia called for the
signatories of the CST to approve the creation of rapid reaction forces to combat terrorism and
hinted that such forces might launch preemptive strikes on Afghan terrorist bases. These hints
elicited U.S. calls for Russia to exercise restraint. Then-President Clinton and Putin agreed in
2000 to set up a working group to examine Afghan-related terrorism (this working group later
broadened its discussions to other counter-terrorism cooperation; it has continued to meet under
the Obama Administration). CST members agreed in 2001 to set up the Central Asian rapid
28 The Military Balance, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, February 5, 2014.
29 CEDR, August 2, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-34127664; “Tajikistan: Rahmon Likely to Face Increasing Russian Political
Pressure,” Open Source Center Analysis, October 22, 2013.
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reaction force headquartered in Kyrgyzstan, with Russia’s troops in Tajikistan comprising most of
the force (this small force of 3,000 to 5,000 troops has held exercises and supposedly is dedicated
to border protection; in 2009 it was supplemented by a larger 20,000-troop rapid reaction force
with a supposedly wider mission).30 CIS members in 2001 also approved setting up an Anti-
Terrorism Center (ATC) in Moscow, with a branch in Kyrgyzstan, giving Russia influence over
regional intelligence gathering.
Perhaps as a result of the establishment of a U.S. airbase in Kyrgyzstan after the September 11,
2001, attacks (see “The Manas Airbase” below), Russia in September 2003 signed a 15-year
military basing accord with Kyrgyzstan providing access to the Kant airfield, near Kyrgyzstan’s
capital of Bishkek. The base is a few miles from the U.S.-led coalition’s airbase. Russia attempted
to entice Kyrgyzstan in early 2009 to close the Manas airbase by offering the country hundreds of
millions of dollars in grants and loans. However, after Kyrgyzstan agreed to continued U.S. use of
the airbase in mid-2009 as a “Transit Center,” Russia reneged on some of this funding and
requested that Kyrgyzstan grant Moscow rights to another airbase near Uzbekistan’s border.
Uzbekistan denounced this plan, and it appeared to be put on hold. With the U.S.-Russia “reset”
of relations during President Obama’s first term in office, Russia’s opposition to the continued
operation of the Manas Transit Center seemingly diminished, but by May 2012, the Russian
Foreign Ministry hailed a statement by Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev that he had
decided not to renew the lease on the U.S. Transit Center.
Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Kyrgyzstan and met with President Atambayev on
September 20, 2012. The two sides signed a 15-year extension to Russia’s lease on “unified”
military facilities in the country, including the Kant airbase, operated as part of the CSTO.
Russia’s rent payment for using the facilities—reportedly $4.5 million per year—reportedly did
not change, although issues of training and Kyrgyzstan’s supply of free utilities to the facilities
reportedly were addressed. The two sides also signed accords canceling one $190 million Kyrgyz
debt and restructuring another $300 million loan (the latter had been given by Putin to
Kyrgyzstan in 2009). Another agreement pledged assistance by Russian firms in building several
hydropower projects, including a renewed commitment to assist with the Kambarata-1 dam and
hydroelectric power station (see also below). In a joint statement, Atambayev pledged to close the
U.S. Transit Center at Manas in 2014, and Putin pledged to consider assistance to help convert the
Transit Center facilities to civilian use. Hailing agreements that further integrated the two
countries militarily and economically, President Atambayev stated at a press conference that
“Russia is our main strategic partner.... We do not have a future separate from Russia.”31
Besides Russia’s military presence in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Russia’s 2009 National Security
Strategy called for the country to play a dominant role in Caspian basin security. Russia’s Caspian
Sea Flotilla has been bolstered by troops and equipment in recent years. A security cooperation
agreement signed at a Caspian littoral state summit on November 18, 2010, states that Caspian
basin security is the exclusive preserve of the littoral states. Some observers have viewed this
agreement as reflecting Russia’s objections to U.S. maritime security cooperation initiatives (see
below, “U.S. Security and Arms Control”).32
30 CEDR, February 25, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950282.
31 CEDR, September 20, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950131, CEP-950107, and CEP-950085; Interfax, September 20, 2012.
32 CEDR, November 19, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-4002.
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Taking advantage of Uzbekistan’s souring relations with many Western countries in 2005 (see
below, “The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan”), Russia signed a Treaty on Allied Relations
with Uzbekistan in November 2005 that called for mutual defense consultations in the event of a
threat to either party (similar to language in the CST). Uzbekistan rejoined the CST Organization
(CSTO; see below) in June 2006. Uzbekistan declined to participate in rapid reaction forces
established in June 2009 because of concerns that the forces could become involved in disputes
between member states. On June 20, 2012, Uzbekistan informed the CSTO that it was suspending
its membership in the organization, including because the CSTO was ignoring its concerns.
However, Uzbek officials stated that the country would continue to participate in the CIS air
defense system and other military affairs under the Allied Relations Treaty. According to some
observers, the withdrawal of Central Asia’s largest military from the CSTO highlighted the
organization’s ineffectiveness.33 In June 2012, President Karimov visited China and met with
then-President Hu Jintao, and the two leaders signed a strategic partnership agreement.
Commenting on this accord in September 2012, President Karimov stated that “China is indeed
the most reliable strategic partner for us.”34 Some observers also have suggested that Uzbekistan’s
withdrawal from the CSTO was linked to a hoped-for greater role in the NDN for the transit of
equipment and materials to and from Afghanistan (see below, “The Northern Distribution
Network to and from Afghanistan”).
Uzbekistan strongly objected to the September 2012 Russia-Kyrgyz agreement on constructing
the Kambarata-1 dam, asserting that talks should include all countries along the watershed (the
Naryn River, the proposed site of the dam, flows into the Syr Darya River through Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan). At a meeting of the Russia-Uzbek Intergovernmental Economic Cooperation
Commission in December 2012, the two sides agreed to seek an international assessment of the
dam’s environmental impact before construction is started. A report in March 2014 did not
mention this assessment, but indicated that Russia was finalizing a feasibility study for the
Kambarata-1 hydropower station and that a funding decision would be made thereafter.35
On November 11, 2013, visiting President Nazarbayev and President Putin signed a treaty on
good neighborly relations and cooperation. As a prelude to the visit, Putin submitted a
Kazakhstan-Russia agreement on joint air defenses, signed in January 2013, to the Russian
Federal Assembly for approval. The air defense cooperation is reportedly more robust than that
provided under the joint CIS air defense system shared by Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Belarus,
and Kyrgyzstan. Under the accord, a headquarters will be set up in Almaty. Kazakhstan nominally
will still be in charge of its air defense system in peacetime, but the system will be jointly
operated in case of war.36
Many observers suggest that the appreciative attitude of Central Asian states toward the United
States in the early 2000s—for their added security accomplished through U.S.-led actions in
Afghanistan—has declined over time. Reasons may include perceptions by the states that the
United States has not provided adequate security or economic assistance. Russian media outlets in
Central Asia also have propagandized heavily against U.S. activities and policies, and this
propaganda may well have influenced public opinion in the region. Russia likewise has warned
33 “Interview: Analyst Says Uzbekistan’s Suspension Shows CSTO Is ‘Irrelevant,’” RFE/RL, June 29, 2012.
34 CEDR, September 13, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950016.
35 Tatyana Kudryavtseva, “Russia to Decide on Kambarata HPP-1 Funding in Next 3 Months,” 24.kg News Agency,
March 3, 2014.
36 CEDR, November 1, 2013, Doc. No. CER-68306473.
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regional leaders that the United States backs democratic “revolutions” to replace them. Lastly,
Russia has claimed that it can ensure regional security after the planned drawdown of U.S. and
NATO forces in Afghanistan by the end of 2014.37
As Russia’s economy improved in the 2000s—as a result of increases in oil and gas prices—
Russia reasserted its economic interests in Central Asia. Russia has endeavored to counter
Western business and gain substantial influence over energy resources through participation in
joint ventures and by insisting that pipelines cross Russian territory. The numbers of migrant
workers from Central Asia have increased, and worker remittances from Russia are significant to
the GDPs of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and are a source of Russian leverage.
However, Russia’s efforts to maintain substantial economic interests in Central Asia face
increasing competition from China, which has substantially increased its regional aid and trade
activities. Perhaps to constrict growing Chinese economic influence, a Russia-Belarus-
Kazakhstan customs union began operating in mid-2011. In an article in October 2011, then-
Prime Minister Putin called for boosting Russian influence over Soviet successor states through
the creation of an economic, political, and military “Eurasian Union.” In late October 2013,
President Nazarbayev accused Russia of controlling the governing body of the Customs Union,
even though the staffers were supposed to be international bureaucrats. He also complained that
the Customs Union had resulted in an increase in imports into Kazakhstan and a decrease in
exports, harming Kazakh businesses. During a November 2013 visit to Russia, President Putin
reportedly refuted this assertion, arguing that Kazakhstan’s exports to Russia were increasing.38
At a meeting of the Eurasian Economic Commission (governing body of the Customs Union and
the larger Eurasian Economic Community) in early March 2014—after Russian forces had
entered Ukraine’s Crimea—Kazakhstan and Moldova indicated that they were ready to move
forward with plans to form a Eurasian Union. However, Nazarbayev reportedly called for a
secretariat to be formed before the rules and procedures of the Eurasian Union are worked out,
perhaps indicating some concerns about protecting Kazakhstan’s sovereignty within the Eurasian
Union, according to some observers.39
Even before he was elected president of Kyrgyzstan, Almazbek Atambayev called for the country
to join the Customs Union. In December 2013, however, President Atambayev rejected a road
map promulgated by the Eurasian Economic Commission for Kyrgyzstan’s admission to the
Customs Union. Kyrgyz officials complained they had not been invited to participate in drawing
up the plan and that their written proposals had been inadequately addressed.
China’s Role
China’s objectives in Central Asia include ensuring border security, non-belligerent neighbors,
and access to trade and natural resources. In April 1996, the presidents of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan traveled to Shanghai to sign a treaty with China’s then-
President Jiang Zemin pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of borders. They
37 Joshua Kucera, “Washington Must Adapt to Diminished Role in Central Asia,” Eurasianet, December 4, 2012; Mark
Katz, “Russia, Iran, and Central Asia: Impact of the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Iran Regional Forum, Elliot
School of International Affairs, February 2013.
38 CEDR, November 12, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-37689807.
39 Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Analyses: Customs Union Summit in the Context of Ukraine, Center for Eastern Studies,
Warsaw, March 12, 2014.
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signed protocols that they would not harbor or support separatists, aimed at China’s efforts to
quash separatism in its Uighur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang Province, which borders Central
Asia. In April 1997, the five presidents met again in Moscow to sign a follow-on treaty
demilitarizing the 4,000 mile former Soviet border with China. In May 2001, the parties admitted
Uzbekistan as a member and formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), agreeing to
combat the “three evils” of terrorism, extremism and separatism (see also below, “Obstacles to
Peace and Independence: Regional Tensions and Conflicts”).
After September 11, 2001, SCO members did not respond collectively to U.S. overtures but
mainly as individual states. China encouraged Pakistan to cooperate with the United States. China
benefitted from the U.S.-led coalition actions in Afghanistan against the IMU and the Taliban,
since these groups had been providing training and sustenance to Uighur extremists.
Most analysts do not anticipate Chinese territorial expansion into Central Asia, though China is
seeking greater economic influence. China is a major trading partner for the Central Asian states
and may become the dominant economic influence in the region. In comparison, Turkey’s trade
with the region is much less than China’s. Central Asia’s China trade turnover exceeded $1 billion
annually by the late 1990s and thereafter expanded greatly, reportedly reaching $40 billion in
2013. Chinese purchases of oil and gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan accounted for most of
this expansion.40
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been deft in building relations with China. They have
cooperated with China in delineating borders, building roads, and increasing trade ties. The
construction of oil and gas pipelines from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to China’s Xinjiang
region mark China’s growing economic influence in the region. However, officials in these states
also have been concerned about Chinese intentions and the spillover effects of tensions in
Xinjiang. Some have raised concerns about growing numbers of Chinese traders and immigrants,
and there are tensions over issues like water resources. China’s crackdown on dissidence in
Xinjiang creates particular concern in Kazakhstan, because over one million ethnic Kazakhs
reside in Xinjiang and many Uighurs reside in Kazakhstan. Some ethnic Kyrgyz also reside in
Xinjiang. On the other hand, Kazakhstan fears that Uighur separatism in Xinjiang could spread
among Uighurs residing in Kazakhstan, who may demand an alteration of Kazakh borders to
create a unified Uighur “East Turkestan.” China’s relations with Tajikistan improved with the
signing of a major agreement in May 2002 delineating a final section of borders in the Pamir
Mountains shared by the two states.
In 1993, China abandoned its policy of energy self-sufficiency, making Central Asia’s energy
resources attractive. In September 1997, Kazakhstan granted the China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) production rights to develop major oil fields, including the Aktyubinsk
Region of northwestern Kazakhstan. In succeeding years, China greatly increased its energy
investments in Central Asia, including in oil and gas fields and pipelines. According to some
observers, China’s energy investments in Central Asia may soon eclipse Russia’s (For more
recent information on China’s energy role in Central Asia, see below, “Energy Resources.”).41
40 “China-Central Asia Trade Seeing Fast Growth,” Xinhua News Agency, February 13, 2014.
41 Robert M. Cutler, “China Deepens Energy Cooperation in Central Asia,” CACI Analyst, May 1, 2013; Alexandros
Petersen, “A Hungry China Sets Its Sights on Central Asia,” The Atlantic, March 5, 2013; Alexandros Petersen,
“Inadvertent Empire,” China in Central Asia, April 16, 2013, at http://chinaincentralasia.com/2013/04/16/inadvertent-
empire; Alexandros Petersen and Katinka Barysch, Russia, China, and the Geopolitics of Energy in Central Asia,
(continued...)
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In September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited all the regional states except Tajikistan
(President Rahmon had visited China and met with President Xi Jinping in May 2013). The
Chinese president reportedly signed agreements in Kazakhstan for up to $30 billion, in
Turkmenistan for $8 billion, in Uzbekistan for $15 billion, and in Kyrgyzstan for $3 billion, as
part of a more robust policy of increasing trade with the region and encouraging the development
of east-west transport links. In a speech at Nazarbayev University in Astana on September 7,
2013, President Xi Jinping stressed that China had worked in Central Asia more than 2,100 years
ago to establish the silk road to Europe, and was endeavoring since the Central Asian states
gained independence to re-vitalize the silk road as a priority area of China’s foreign policy. He
pledged that China would never interfere in the internal affairs of the regional states, would not
seek to dominate regional affairs, and would not establish a sphere of influence over the region.
He called for the Central Asian governments to share information with China on economic
policies and for greater cooperation between the SCO and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic
Community in order to strengthen a “silk road economic belt.” As a practical matter, he called for
finishing road interconnections between the Pacific Ocean and Baltic Sea ports.42
The increased U.S. and NATO presence in Central Asia and Afghanistan since the early 2000s
may have delayed China’s objective of becoming the dominant Asian power. Some observers
suggest that after the drawdown of U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan in 2014, there may
be greater competition between Russia and China for influence in the region. This competition
had previously been set aside to some degree as both powers were focused on monitoring and
limiting the scope of U.S. and NATO regional influence, according to these observers. China may
seek to gain greater influence in Central Asia to counter a U.S. pivot to Asia, which it considers to
be a containment policy, in this view.43
Obstacles to Peace and Independence:
Regional Tensions and Conflicts
The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups, convoluted borders, and emerging national identities
pose challenges to stability in all the Central Asian states. Emerging national identities accentuate
clan, family, regional, and Islamic self-identifications. Central Asia’s convoluted borders fail to
accurately reflect ethnic distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to regional
tensions. Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries and
Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, they make up almost one-quarter of the population and in Kyrgyzstan
they make up over one-seventh. More ethnic Turkmen reside in Iran and Afghanistan—over 3
million—than in Turkmenistan. Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and 7
million in Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China’s Xinjiang province. The fertile
(...continued)
Center for European Reform, November 2011.
42 Open Source Center, China: Daily Report, September 7, 2013, Doc. No. CHO-51691029.
43 Zara Rabinovitch, “The Influence of China and Russia in Central Asia: Ongoing Rivalry and Shifting Strategies, An
Interview with Stephen Blank,” National Bureau of Asian Research, April, 9, 2013, at http://www.nbr.org/research/
activity.aspx?id=329; Stephen Blank, Toward a New Chinese Order in Asia: Russia’s Failure, National Bureau of
Asian Research, March 2011; Henrik Bergsager, China, Russia and Central Asia: The Energy Dilemma, Fridtjof
Nansen Institute, September 2012; Robert Cutler, “China-Russia Summit Meeting Underscores Entente Over Central
Asia,” CACI Analyst, April 3, 2012.
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Ferghana Valley is shared by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The central governments
have struggled to maintain control over administrative subunits. Most observers agree that the
term “Central Asia” currently denotes a geographic area more than a region of shared identities
and aspirations, although it is clear that the land-locked, poverty-stricken, and sparsely populated
region will need more integration in order to fully develop.
On the one hand, the Central Asian states have wrangled over water-sharing, border delineation,
trade and transit, and other issues:
• Tajikistan’s relations with Uzbekistan have been problematic, including
disagreements about water-sharing, Uzbek gas supplies, the mining of borders,
border demarcation, and environmental pollution. In July 2008, the head of the
Tajik Supreme Court asserted that Uzbek security forces had bombed the
Supreme Court building the previous summer as part of efforts to topple the
government. In late 2010, Uzbekistan began a transit slowdown and other
economic measures to pressure Tajikistan to halt building the Roghun power
plant (see below, “Trade and Investment”).
• Turkmenistan’s relations with Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have been tense.
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have rival claims to some Caspian Sea oil and gas
fields. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have vied for regional influence and argued
over water-sharing. In 2002, the Turkmen government accused Uzbek officials of
conspiring to overthrow it. Uzbekistan also objected to the treatment of ethnic
Uzbeks in Turkmenistan under the previous president. In February 2014,
Uzbekistan sentenced four citizens to 15-18 years in prison on charges of spying
for Turkmen intelligence on water-supply, border security, and other issues.
• The Kyrgyz premier rejected claims by Karimov in 2005 that Kyrgyzstan had
provided training facilities and other support for the Andijon militants (see below,
“The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan”). Karimov again accused
Kyrgyzstan in late May 2009 of harboring terrorists whom had attacked across
the border. After the April 2010 coup in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan tightened border
controls with this country, greatly harming its economy. Conflict between ethnic
Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 further strained
relations between the two countries (see below, “The 2010 Ethnic Clashes in
Kyrgyzstan”). In January 2013, Kyrgyz border guards wounded five residents of
the Uzbek enclave of Sokh in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken Region, bordering
Uzbekistan. The residents allegedly had attempted to block an incursion into
Sokh by the Kyrgyz border guards. Up to 1,000 residents then temporarily took
over three dozen Kyrgyz hostage.44 Kyrgyzstan closed a road from Uzbekistan to
the enclave and began construction of a barbed wire fence around the enclave,
and in response, Uzbekistan closed a road from Kyrgyzstan to the Kyrgyz
enclave of Barak in Uzbekistan. In late July 2013, gunfire was exchanged by
border troops along a section of the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border, resulting in
some Uzbek casualties. Further tightening of Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan borders
44 Open Source Center, Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter, CEDR), January 7, 2013, Doc. Nos. CEP-7950026,
CEP-950027, CEP-950043, CEP-950025, CEP-950014, and CEP-950005; January 9, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950134;
Interfax, January 6 and January 9, 2013.
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ensued. However, border demarcation talks have been stepped up in 2014,
apparently in an effort to ameliorate some border tensions.45
On the other hand, there have been some high-level bilateral contacts:
• The leaders of regional powers Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have held occasional
bilateral summits in recent years. In September 2012, visiting President Karimov
issued a joint statement with President Nazarbayev on regional water-sharing.
One observer suggested that this summit was an effort by the two major regional
powers to join together to spur greater region-wide integration, including
common responses to security threats such as terrorism and instability in
Afghanistan.46 In June 2013, visiting President Nazarbayev and President
Karimov signed a strategic partnership treaty pledging both sides to develop
economic, transportation, communications, military-technical, and cultural
cooperation. The treaty also called for cooperation in resolving regional water
sharing issues. Both leaders asserted that since they headed the leading states in
the region, they needed to meet regularly to discuss regional and global
cooperation. Karimov argued that the two countries are not regional economic
rivals, since they have complementary natural resources and can provide for their
own food and energy needs, and Uzbekistan emphasizes cotton growing while
Kazakhstan emphasizes grain. He also stated that the two leaders had agreed that
“any hydroelectric plants, which are planned for construction on the upstream of
the [Syr Darya and Amu Darya] rivers ... must undergo an international and
independent expert examination under the U.N. auspices and have to be agreed
with the downstream countries.” Nazarbayev indicated interest in developing
transport routes through Uzbekistan to the south.47
• Since Berdimuhamedow came to power, relations between Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan have improved. In October 2012, President Karimov visited
Turkmenistan and met with President Berdimuhamedow, and the two leaders
discussed boosting trade and other cooperation. They also called for region-wide
talks before Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan build dams that could affect water-
sharing. President Berdimuhamedow visited Uzbekistan in late November 2013.
The two leaders signed a joint declaration outlining the basic principles of
bilateral cooperation. It called for jointly advocating a regional water
management system. The two sides reported that they discussed enhancing
security cooperation in preparation for the U.S. and NATO wind-down of
operations in Afghanistan. The two leaders also met in February 2014 when both
attended the Sochi Olympics. In recent months, both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan
have worked more with Turkmenistan than with Uzbekistan on developing
southern transport routes.
45 CEDR, January 29, 2014, Doc. No. CEL-43836597; March 2, 2014, Doc. No. CEN-37869013. Complicating the
situation, most of the approximately 65,000 inhabitants of the Sokh enclave are ethnic Tajiks, and they have reportedly
have suffered from some discrimination as a result of tensions in Tajikistan-Uzbekistan relations. See Farangis
Najibullah, “Uzbek, Kyrgyz, And Tajik Lives Collide In Sokh,” RFE/RL, June 03, 2010.
46 Richard Weitz, “Nazarbayev-Karimov Summit Imparts New Momentum to Kazakhstani-Uzbekistani Relations,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 14, 2012.
47 CEDR, June 16, 2013, Doc. No. CEN-70043496.
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Regional cooperation remains stymied by tensions among the states, despite their membership in
various groups such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP). The Collective
Security Treaty was signed by Russia, Belarus, the South Caucasus countries, and the Central
Asian states (except Turkmenistan) in May 1992 and called for military cooperation and joint
consultations in the event of security threats to any member. At the time to renew the treaty in
1999, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan formally withdrew. The remaining members formed
the CSTO in late 2002, and a secretariat opened in Moscow at the beginning of 2004. Through the
CSTO, Russia has attempted to involve the members in joint efforts to combat international
terrorism and drug trafficking. Although the charter of the CSTO does not mention internal or
external peacekeeping functions, follow-on agreements have provided for such activities.
Neither former Kyrgyz President Akayev nor former President Bakiyev apparently requested the
aid of the CSTO during the coups that overthrew them, and the CSTO has appeared inactive
during other crises in the region. At a CSTO meeting in June 2010 to consider an urgent request
by interim Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva for troops to assist in quelling ethnic violence, a
consensus could not be reached and the members only agreed to provide equipment. At a CSTO
summit in December 2011, the members reportedly agreed on detailed procedures for intervening
in domestic “emergency” situations within a member state at the behest of the member.48 At a
CSTO summit in December 2012, President Rahmon reportedly complained that although many
documents had been signed over the years, there had been “no practical results.”49
The SCO was established in 2001 by Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan. In 2003, what is now termed the SCO Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure (RCTS)
was set up in Uzbekistan. Several military and security exercises have been held. According to
some reports, in recent years Russia has discouraged the holding of major SCO military exercises
as well as the strengthening of economic ties within the SCO, although Moscow has been
amenable to cooperation within the SCO on regional oil and gas issues.50
In late 2007, the Central Asian states prevailed on the U.N. to set up a Regional Center for
Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) to facilitate diplomatic and other cooperation
to prevent internal and external threats to regional security. With its headquarters in Ashkhabad,
the Center is headed by a special representative of the U.N. secretary-general. The Center was
intended to take on some of the duties of the U.N. Tajikistan Office of Peace-Building, which had
been established after the Tajik Civil War and was being closed. The Center’s mandate includes
monitoring regional threats and working together and with other regional organizations to
facilitate peacemaking and conflict prevention. Priority concerns include cross-border terrorism,
organized crime and drug trafficking, regional water and energy management, environmental
degradation, and stabilization in Afghanistan. The Center’s special representative visited
Kyrgyzstan several times in the wake of the April 2010 coup to discuss U.N. aid to the interim
government to ensure peace and stability. The Center has held several regional conferences on
such issues as Aral Sea desiccation, water-sharing, and Afghanistan. In approving a report by the
head of UNRCCA to the UNSC in January 2014, the UNSC stressed the need for further
cooperation among the regional states in overcoming challenges to peace and stability, including
in countering terrorism and dealing with regional water-sharing issues. They welcomed regional
48 Interfax, December 21, 2011.
49 CEDR, December 19, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950108.
50 Joshua Kucera, “Russia ‘Increasingly Distrustful’ of SCO,” Eurasianet, March 5, 2013.
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cooperation with the U.N. Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force and UNRCCA’s liaison
with the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime.
In May 2009, the OSCE established a Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe to train
officers from OSCE member and partner countries, including Afghanistan.
Islamic Extremism and Terrorism
Calls for government to be based on Sharia (Islamic law) and the Koran are supported by small
but increasing minorities in most of Central Asia. Most of Central Asia’s Muslims appear to
support the concept of secular government, but the influence of fundamentalist Salafist and
extremist Islamic groups is growing.51 In particular, Central Asian leaders have pointed to the
ongoing conflict against the Taliban in Afghanistan as justifying constraints on Islamic expression
in their countries. They also have pointed to Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, when Islamic
extremism played some role, and Russia’s conflict with its breakaway Chechnya region and other
areas in Russia’s North Caucasus as evidence of the terrorist threat. In some regions of Central
Asia, such as Uzbekistan’s portion of the Fergana Valley, some Uzbeks kept Islamic practices
alive throughout the repressive Soviet period, and some now oppose the secular-oriented Uzbek
government. Islamic extremist threats to the regimes may be fueled somewhat by economic
distress among sections of the population. Heavy unemployment and poverty rates among youth
in the Fergana Valley are widely cited by observers as making youth more vulnerable to
recruitment into religious extremist organizations.52
Although much of the attraction of Islamic extremism in Central Asia is generated by factors such
as poverty and repression, it is facilitated by groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and
elsewhere that provide funding, education, training, and manpower to individuals and groups in
the region. Some of these ties were at least partially disrupted by the U.S.-led coalition actions in
Afghanistan and the U.S. call for worldwide cooperation in combating terrorism.53
The Central Asian states impose several controls over religious freedom. All except Tajikistan
forbid religious parties such as the Islamic Renaissance Party (Tajikistan’s civil war settlement
included the party’s legalization), and maintain Soviet-era religious oversight bodies, official
Muftiates, and approved clergy. The governments censor religious literature and sermons.
According to some analysts, the close government religious control may leave a spiritual gulf that
underground radical Islamic groups seek to fill.
Terrorist actions aimed at overthrowing regimes have been of growing concern in all the Central
Asian states. Some analysts caution that many activities the regimes label as terrorist—such as
hijacking, kidnapping, robbery, assault, and murder—are often carried out by individuals or
groups for economic benefit or for revenge, rather than for political or religious purposes. Also,
so-called counter-terrorism may mask clan or other ethnic and political repression.
51 Most Central Asian Muslims traditionally have belonged to the Sunni branch and the Hanafi school of interpretation.
Islamic Sufiism has been significant, as have pre-Islamic customs such as ancestor veneration and visits to shrines.
52 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Yale: Yale University Press, 2002; T. Jeremy
Gunn, Sociology of Religion, Fall 2003, pp. 389-410; Pinar Akcali, Central Asian Survey, June 1998, pp. 267-284; Aziz
Niyazi, Religion, State & Society, March 1998, pp. 39-50.
53 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell, Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus:
Implications for the EU, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2006.
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Terrorist activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and similar groups in the
region were at least temporarily disrupted by U.S.-led coalition actions in Afghanistan, where
several of the groups were based or harbored.54 Many observers, however, warn that terrorist cells
have re-formed and are expanding in Central Asia and that surviving elements of the IMU and
other terrorist groups are infiltrating from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere. Ominously, the
IMU and its splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Group/Union (IJU), have become even more closely
allied with international terrorist groups, particularly Al Qaeda. Moreover, the IMU and IJU have
expanded their activities beyond Central and South Asia to other areas of the globe.
In congressional testimony in February 2013, then-Assistant Secretary Blake stated that “we do
not assess that there is an imminent Islamist militant threat to Central Asian states.” Nonetheless,
he stated that the United States was providing security assistance to the regional states to address
transnational threats.55 However, other U.S. officials and observers have raised concerns that if
the Taliban gains more influence and power in Afghanistan post-2014, the allied IMU and IJU
may well also establish a greater presence in the country, from which they could expand their
activities in Central Asia.56
Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states have arrested many members of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT;
Liberation Party, a politically oriented Islamic movement calling for the establishment of Sharia
rule), sentencing them to lengthy prison terms or even death for pamphleteering, but HT
reportedly continues to gain adherents. Uzbekistan argues that HT not only advocates terrorism
and the killing of apostates but is carrying out such acts.57 Kyrgyz authorities emphasize the anti-
American and anti-Semitic nature of several HT statements and agree with the Uzbek government
on designating the group as an illegal terrorist organization, but some prominent observers in
Kyrgyzstan argue that the group is largely pacific and should not be harassed.58
Terrorism and Conflict in Kazakhstan59
Kazakhstan long maintained that there were few terrorists within the country, but this stance
began to change in late 2003 with the establishment of an Anti-Terrorist Center as part of the
54 Also, Russia’s military operations in its breakaway Chechnya region after 1999 may have helped disrupt Al Qaeda
plans for Central Asia. The terrorist group was operating terrorist training camps in Chechnya in the late 1990s that it
planned to use in part as launching pads for establishing new cells and camps throughout Central Asia. Defense
Intelligence [Agency] Report Details al Qaeda’s Plans for Russia, Chechnya & WMD, Judicial Watch, Press Office,
November 16, 2004. The declassified Intelligence Information Report is dated October 1998.
55 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging
Threats and Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Hearing on Islamic Militant Threats in Eurasia,
Testimony of Robert Blake, February 27, 2013.
56 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National
Security of the United States, Testimony by Michael Flynn, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, February 11, 2014;
Richard Weitz, Eurasia Awaits Post-2014 Afghan Storm, International Relations and Security Network (ISN),
December 12, 2013.
57 Cheryl Bernard has argued that HT writings borrow heavily from Marxism-Leninism and rely much less on Islamic
principles. HT publications have stated that the movement “has adopted the amount [of Islam] which it needs as a
political party,” that the Islamic world is the last hope for establishing communism, and that terrorist acts against
Western interests are appropriate. Hizb ut Tahrir—Bolsheviks in the Mosque, RAND Corporation, nd.
58 HT literature has demanded the withdrawal of U.S.-led coalition forces and the closure of the coalition’s Manas
airbase in Kyrgyzstan. CEDR, March 13, 2003, Doc. No. CEP -104; CEDR, January 7, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-91.
59 For background, see CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
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National Security Committee. Shocking many Kazakhs, it reported the apprehension in late 2004
of over a dozen members of the IJU.
Several suicide bombings and other alleged terrorist attacks occurred in Kazakhstan in 2011. In
addition, in late December 2011, energy sector workers on strike since May 2011 and others
reportedly extensively damaged and burned government and other buildings and clashed with
police in the town of Zhanaozen, in the Mangistau Region of Kazakhstan, resulting in 16 deaths
and dozens of injuries, the government reported. Some observers alleged that there were more
casualties and that the riots were triggered or exacerbated by police firing on the demonstrators
(video posted on the Internet appeared to back this claim).60 Protests and violence also spread to
other areas of the region.
At a meeting with policemen on July 12, 2012, President Nazarbayev criticized them for not
taking preventive measures against terrorism, and stated that “over 100 crimes connected with
terrorism were committed in Kazakhstan in 2011-12. As a result, dozens of [terrorists and
policemen] have died.... And we have to admit the fact that radical and extremist groups are
putting enormous pressure on the government and society” (for what seems a different accounting
of terrorist incidents, see below).61 According to a Kazakh Security Council official, over 300
individuals have been convicted in Kazakhstan on charges of terrorism from 2005 to 2012.62
In late July 2012, one policeman was killed and one wounded in Almaty, and the alleged
assailants later engaged in a gun battle with security forces and most were killed. In mid-August
2012, a gun battle with alleged terrorists took place in Almaty, reportedly resulting in the deaths
of several alleged terrorists and the capture of others. In early September 2012, a bomb-maker
blew himself up in Atyrau Region, leading police to engage in a gun battle with other members of
the alleged group, killing five of them.
In November 2012, Nazarbayev called for tightening legislation to facilitate government efforts
to combat terrorism, with the government explaining that the changes in law were necessitated by
increasing radicalization of the population and growing terrorist incidents in the country. The bill
was passed and signed into law in early January 2013. The changes included an apparently
expansive definition of terrorism to include an “ideology of violence” and acts or threats aimed at
influencing the government, including violence and “frightening people.”63
In February 2013, the Kazakh National Security Committee reported that law and security forces
had prevented 35 violent extremist actions and neutralized 42 extremist groups in 2011-2012.
However, it also reported that it had failed to avert 18 extremist actions, including 7 explosions.
In May 2013, six alleged terrorists were put on trial on charges of conspiring to commit robberies,
to bomb civic sites and the National Security Committee building in Astana, and to assassinate
senior officials. At the opening of the trial, the prosecutor alleged that they aimed to establish an
Islamic caliphate in Kazakhstan.
60 Striking Oil, Striking Workers: Violations of Labor Rights in Kazakhstan’s Oil Sector, Human Rights Watch,
September 2012.
61 CEDR, July 13, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950108.
62 CEDR, June 27, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950051.
63 CEDR, November 23, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950005.
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In early October 2013, a State Program on Counteracting Religious Extremism and Terrorism for
2013-2017 was published, which some observers warn could further restrict the dissemination of
religious literature and increase monitoring of religious groups, including through the installation
of video surveillance cameras in places of worship and the monitoring of students studying
religion abroad.64 As part of stepped-up efforts, the Spiritual Board of the Muslims of Kazakhstan
set up six regional groups of Imams to monitor religious expression and encourage individuals
termed Salafis to return to traditional Islam under the umbrella of the Spiritual Board.65
In November 2013, an unnamed individual was sentenced to 20 years in prison on charges of
setting up and leading a terrorist group that had carried out arson and bomb attacks. In January
2014, the Interior Minister reported that the activities of three terrorist groups had been halted and
24 of their members had been arrested in 2013. He and the Prosecutor-General reported that they
had confiscated thousands of copies of extremist literature and closed down dozens of extremist
websites. A Kazakh draft criminal code being finalized in early 2014 calls for increased jail
sentences for terrorism. In February 2014, four Kazakhstanis were put on trial on charges of
traveling to Syria for terrorist training to fight against the Syrian government.
Incursions and Violence in Kyrgyzstan66
Several hundred Islamic extremists and others harboring in Tajikistan and Afghanistan first
invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Jama Namanganiy, the co-leader of the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU; see below), headed the largest guerrilla group. They seized
hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a
springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan.67 With Uzbek and Kazakh air and other support, Kyrgyz
forces forced the guerrillas out in October 1999. Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again
invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August 2000. Uzbekistan provided air and other support,
but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000. The
IMU did not invade the region in the summer before September 11, 2001, in part because Osama
bin Laden had secured its aid for a Taliban offensive against the Afghan Northern Alliance.
About a dozen alleged IMU members invaded from Tajikistan in May 2006 but soon were
defeated (some escaped). After this, the Kyrgyz defense minister claimed that the IMU, HT, and
other such groups increasingly menaced national security.
The 2010 Ethnic Clashes in Kyrgyzstan
Deep-seated tensions between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan erupted
on June 10-11, 2010. Grievances included perceptions among some ethnic Kyrgyz in the south
that ethnic Uzbeks controlled commerce, discontent among some ethnic Uzbeks that they were
excluded from the political process, and views among many Bakiyev supporters in the south that
ethnic Uzbeks were supporting their opponents. The fighting over the next few days resulted in an
64 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Astana Mulls Expansion of Anti-Terror Controls,” Eurasianet, June 19, 2013.
65 CEDR, October 2, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-54764765.
66 For background, see CRS Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
67 According to Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, and Svante Cornell, the incursions of the IMU into Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000 were largely driven by efforts to secure drug trafficking routes. Islamic Radicalism in
Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU, Silk Road Paper, July 2006.
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official death toll of 426 (of which 276 were ethnic Uzbeks and 105 were ethnic Kyrgyz) and
over 2,000 injuries. The violence also resulted in an initial wave of 400,000 refugees and IDPs
and the destruction of thousands of homes and businesses in Osh and Jalal-abad.
Although critical of the Kyrgyz government, Uzbekistan did not intervene militarily or permit its
citizens to enter Kyrgyzstan to join in the June fighting (according to some reports, the Uzbek
government had considered military intervention). After some hesitation, the Uzbek government
permitted 90,000 ethnic Uzbeks to settle in temporary camps in Uzbekistan. Virtually all had
returned to Kyrgyzstan by the end of June.68
International donors meeting in Bishkek on July 27, 2010, pledged $1.1 billion in grants and
loans to help Kyrgyzstan recover from the June violence. The United States pledged $48.6 million
in addition to FY2010 and FY2011 planned aid. In addition, the United States provided $4.1
million in humanitarian assistance to Kyrgyzstan immediately after the April and June events.69
On January 10, 2011, a Kyrgyz commission issued its findings on the causes of the June 2010
violence in southern Kyrgyzstan between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks. The report largely
blamed ethnic Uzbek “extremists” and some supporters of former Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek
Bakiyev for fomenting the violence. The report also blamed interim government officials of
ineptness in dealing with the escalating ethnic tensions. On May 2, 2011, an international
commission formed under the leadership of Kimmo Kiljunen, the Special Representative for
Central Asia of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, released its report of findings regarding the
June 2010 violence. The commission concluded that the Kyrgyz provisional government failed to
adequately provide security and leadership to stifle rising tensions and incidents in May or to
minimize the effects of the June ethnic violence. The commission also raised concerns that
security forces were directly or indirectly complicit in the violence (according to the commission,
most police, military, and other security personnel are ethnic Kyrgyz). The commission called for
the Kyrgyz government to condemn ultra-nationalism and proclaim that the state is multi-
national, promote gender equality, provide special rights for Uzbek language use in the south,
train security forces to uphold human rights and not subvert state interests through parochial
loyalties, impartially investigate and prosecute those responsible for the violence, establish a truth
and reconciliation commission, and provide reparations.70 The Kyrgyz government has rejected
the finding that security forces were complicit in the violence, continued to blame the former
Bakiyev regime and Islamic extremists for fomenting the clashes, and stated that ethnic Uzbeks
shared substantial blame for committing human rights abuses.
Attacks by Jama’at Kyrgyzstan Jaish al-Mahdi in 2010-2011
According to Kyrgyz security authorities, Jamaat Kyrgyzstan Jaish al-Mahdi (Kyrgyz Army of
the Righteous Ruler), an ethnic Kyrgyz terrorist group, bombed a synagogue and sports facility
68 UNHCR, Final Report on UNHCR Emergency Operations in the Republic of Uzbekistan, July 23, 2010.
69 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, United States Announces Additional Support for Kyrgyz
Republic, July 27, 2010; U.S. Embassy, Bishkek, Opening Statement by Daniel Rosenblum, Coordinator of U.S.
Assistance to Europe and Eurasia and Tatiana Gfoeller, U.S. Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic: High-Level Donors
Meeting, “Emergency Response to the Kyrgyz Republic, Reconciliation and Recovery,” July 27, 2010; Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hearing on Instability in Kyrgyzstan: The International Response, Testimony of
Robert O. Blake, July 27, 2010.
70 OSCE, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in
June 2010, May 2, 2011.
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and attempted to bomb a police station in late 2010, and killed three policemen in early 2011. The
group also allegedly planned to attack the U.S. embassy and U.S. military Manas “transit center.”
Kyrgyz security forces reportedly killed or apprehended a dozen or more members of the group,
including its leader, in January 2011. Ten alleged members of the group were put on trial in May
2011. At least some group members allegedly had received training by the Caucasus Emirate
terrorist group in Russia, but also in late 2010 the group reportedly pledged solidarity with the
Taliban.
Terrorism and Conflict in Tajikistan71
The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan
Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward
independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of
nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and groups tried to take power. Kulyabi and Khojenti
regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by
the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced
persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. After the two sides agreed to a cease-fire, the
U.N. Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in
December 1994. In June 1997, Tajik President Rahmon and the late rebel leader Seyed Abdullo
Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Benchmarks of the peace process were largely
met, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000. To encourage the peace process, the United States
initially pledged to help Tajikistan rebuild. Some observers point to events in the city of Andijon
in Uzbekistan (see “The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan” below) as indicating that
conflicts similar to the Tajik Civil War could engulf other regional states where large numbers of
people are disenfranchised and poverty-stricken.
The 2010-2011 Attacks in Tajikistan
In late August 2010, over two dozen individuals sentenced as terrorists escaped from prison in
Dushanbe and launched attacks as they travelled to various regions of the country. Many of these
individuals had been opposition fighters during the Tajik Civil War and had been arrested in
eastern Tajikistan during government sweeps in 2009. In early September 2010, a suicide car
bombing resulted in over two dozen deaths or injuries among police in the northern city of
Khujand. An obscure terrorist group, Jamaat Ansarullah, allegedly the Tajik branch of the IMU,
claimed responsibility. Some escapees and their allies, allegedly including IMU terrorists,
attacked a military convoy in the Rasht Valley (formerly known as Karategin) east of Dushanbe
on September 19, 2010, reportedly resulting in dozens of deaths and injuries to government
forces. Heavy fighting in the Rasht Valley over the next month reportedly led to dozens of
additional casualties among government forces.
In early January 2011, the Tajik Interior (police) Ministry reported that its forces had killed
former Tajik opposition fighter Alovuddin Davlatov, alias Ali Bedaki, the alleged leader of one
major insurgent group involved in the ambush in the Rasht Valley. Another leader of the ambush,
Abdullo Rakhimov, aka Mullo Abdullo—a former Tajik opposition paramilitary leader who
spurned the peace settlement and travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he allegedly
71 For background, see CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
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maintained links with al Qaeda and the Taliban, and who reentered Tajikistan in 2009—was
reportedly killed by Tajik security forces on April 15, 2011.72
The 2012 Instability in Mountainous Badakhshan
On July 21, 2012, a national security official, General Abdullo Nazarov, was killed near the city
of Khorog, the capital of the Mountainous Badakhshan Autonomous Region in eastern Tajikistan.
According to some reports, the region is a major transit point for drugs and other goods trafficked
from Afghanistan and for weapons and money smuggled to terrorist groups in Afghanistan. The
government responded by launching security operations to force the local “criminal group” to
surrender. The government asserted that the “criminals” were led by Tolib Ayembekov, a former
UTO fighter who was the head of an Interior Ministry border guard troops unit in the Ishkohim
District (Khorog is in this district), bordering Afghanistan. The government also alleged that the
“criminals” had ties with organized crime groups throughout the world, and were linked to
members of the IMU, who were infiltrating from Afghanistan to support the “criminals.”73
Ayembekov denied that he was responsible for Nazarov’s death. Over 3,000 security personnel
entered Khorog on July 24, and subsequent fighting resulted in 17 casualties among the security
personnel and 30 among the alleged “criminals,” according to the government. Forty-one
surviving “criminals” were arrested. Although the government officially acknowledged only one
civilian casualty, some observers reported that dozens of civilians had been killed or injured.
Among the forces deployed to the region were extra border guards who sealed the Tajik-Afghan
border to prevent the Tajik “criminals” from escaping across the border or receiving assistance
from groups in Afghanistan. Some information about the fighting leaked out of the region despite
the “accidental” severing of Internet and cell phone connections to the region. The government
declared a unilateral ceasefire the next day. On July 26, 2012, the U.S. Embassy raised concerns
about reports of civilian casualties and urged the government not to suppress media reporting in
the region. In early August 2012, Ayembekov pledged fealty to the Rahmon government and
readiness to prove his innocence in a court of law.
The ceasefire was broken by the government early on August 22, when unidentified assailants
attacked the home of a popular former UTO fighter, the invalid Imomnazar Imomnazarov, and
killed him. His death led some protesters to attack the administration building in Khorog a few
hours later, and police allegedly fired at them, injuring three. A large memorial service for
Imomnazarov was held the next day in Khorog. A ceasefire agreement was reached between the
government and local officials and prominent citizens later that evening. In accordance with the
agreement, some security personnel subsequently were withdrawn from the city, but many have
stayed in the region to prepare for a visit by Rahmon in late September 2012.
Some observers have questioned the Tajik government’s official explanations of events in
Khorog. One local commentator has argued that General Nazarov was acting at the behest of a
group in the Tajik security service to seize control over lucrative smuggling operations or
otherwise was involved in extorting money.74 A think tank in Dushanbe asserted that the Tajik
72 Lola Olimova and Nargis Hamrabaeva, “Tajik Authorities Struggle to Quell Militants,” Report News: Central Asia,
Institute for War and Peace Reporting, October 4, 2010; Tilav Rasulzoda and Parvina Khamidova, “New Militant Force
in Tajikistan?” Report News: Central Asia, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, October 21, 2010; CEDR, January
12, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-950136; Dilafruz Nabiyeva, “Mullo Abdullo Killed,” Central Asia Online, April 15, 2011.
73 CEDR, August 8, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950127.
74 CEDR, August 25, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950018; Sébastien Peyrouse, “Battle on Top of the World: Rising Tensions
(continued...)
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government deployed security forces in the region after Ayembekov threatened to enlist up to
1,000 terrorists massed across the border in Afghanistan to help him if the government moved to
arrest him.75 Several accounts have suggested by many residents of Khorog had taken up arms on
July 24 in opposition against the deployment of security forces. Accusations that Ayembekov was
a “criminal” must be squared with the fact that Khorog is the location of the regional Border
Guard Training Center, where the International Organization for Migration has used State
Department funding to carry out training for Tajik and Afghan border guards, including on-site at
regional border posts. Seeming to refer to this situation, then-Assistant Secretary Blake in August
2012 stated that the United States supports Tajik government efforts in the region “to address
some of the corrupt activities of their own border guards and others who are helping to facilitate
some of this [narcotics] trade.”76
Other observers have speculated that at least part of the reason for the government actions in
Mountainous Badakhshan may have been to secure the loyalty of regional officials in the run-up
to presidential elections held in early November 2013. During the deployment of security forces
to the region, the regional IRP head was detained and later found dead, a regional IRP office was
sacked, and another IRP official was detained and transferred to Dushanbe. Before he was killed,
Imomnazarov speculated that Nazarov had falsely reported to his superiors that the UTO fighters
were planning to launch a coup against Rahmon, and that this was the main cause of the
government security actions.
Terrorism and Conflict in Uzbekistan77
Officials in Uzbekistan believe that the country is increasingly vulnerable to Islamic extremism,
and they have been at the forefront in Central Asia in combating this threat. Reportedly,
thousands of alleged Islamic extremists have been imprisoned and many mosques have been
closed. A series of explosions in Tashkent in February 1999 were among early signs that the
Uzbek government was vulnerable to terrorism. By various reports, the explosions killed 16 to 28
and wounded 100 to 351 people. The aftermath involved wide-scale arrests of political dissidents
and others deemed by some observers as unlikely conspirators. Karimov in April 1999 accused
Mohammad Solikh (former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of
masterminding what he termed an assassination plot, along with Tohir Yuldashev (co-leader of the
IMU) and the Taliban. In 2000, Yuldashev and Namanganiy received death sentences in absentia,
and Solikh received a 15.5 year prison sentence. Solikh denied membership in IMU, and he and
Yuldashev denied involvement in the bombings.
On March 28 through April 1, 2004, a series of suicide bombings and other attacks were launched
in Uzbekistan, reportedly killing 47. An obscure Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan (IJG; Jama’at
al-Jihad al-Islami, a breakaway part of the IMU) claimed responsibility.78 In subsequent trials, the
alleged attackers were accused of being members of IJG or of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT; an Islamic
(...continued)
in Tajikistan’s Pamir Region,” On Wider Europe, German Marshall Fund, August 2012.
75 Interfax, August 3, 2012.
76 U.S. Department of State, On-the-Record Briefing With International Media, Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Almaty, Kazakhstan, August 15, 2012.
77 For background, see CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
78 The IJG changed its name to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in 2005.
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fundamentalist movement ostensibly pledged to peace but banned in Uzbekistan) and of
attempting to overthrow the government. Some defendants testified that they were trained by
Arabs and others at camps in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. They testified that Najmiddin
Kamolitdinovich Jalolov (convicted in absentia in 2000) was the leader of IJG, and linked him to
Taliban head Mohammad Omar, Uighur extremist Abu Mohammad, and Osama bin Laden. On
July 30, 2004, explosions occurred at the U.S. and Israeli embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor-
General’s Office in Tashkent. The IMU and IJG claimed responsibility and stated that the suicide
bombings were aimed against Uzbek and other “apostate” governments.79
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan
Dozens or perhaps hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded on May 13, 2005, after Uzbek
troops fired on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon. The protestors had gathered to
demand the end of a trial of local businessmen charged with belonging to an Islamic terrorist
group. The night before, a group stormed a prison where those on trial were held and released
hundreds of inmates. Many freed inmates then joined others in storming government buildings.80
President Karimov flew to the city to direct operations, and reportedly had restored order by late
on May 13.81 On July 29, 439 people who had fled from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan were airlifted
to Romania for resettlement processing, after the United States and others raised concerns that
they might be tortured if returned to Uzbekistan.82
The United States and others in the international community repeatedly called for an international
inquiry into events in Andijon, which the Uzbek government rejected as violating its sovereignty.
In November 2005, the EU Council approved a visa ban on 12 Uzbek officials it stated were
“directly responsible for the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in Andijon and for
the obstruction of an independent inquiry.” The Council also embargoed exports of “arms,
military equipment, and other equipment that might be used for internal repression.”83 In October
2007 and April 2008, the EU Council suspended the visa ban for six months but left the arms
79 See also CRS Report RS21818, The 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim
Nichol.
80 There is a great deal of controversy about whether this group contained foreign-trained terrorists or was composed
mainly of the friends and families of the accused and other disgruntled citizenry. See U.S. Congress, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Briefing: The Uzbekistan Crisis, Testimony of Galima Bukharbayeva,
Correspondent. Institute for War and Peace Reporting, June 29, 2005. A declassified Defense Intelligence Agency
memorandum prepared soon after the events stated that “no credible information indicates extremist groups participated
in the attacks,” but stressed that evidence was not definitive on this point. See Uzbekistan: Review of Information on
Unrest in Andijon, 12-13 May 2005, Info Memo, 5-0549/DR, July 30, 2005 (the memo is part of the Rumsfeld Archive,
see below). For alternative views on terrorist involvement and casualties, see Shirin Akiner, Violence in Andijon, 13
May 2005: An Independent Assessment, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, July 2005; AbduMannob Polat, Reassessing
Andijan: The Road to Restoring U.S.-Uzbek Relations, Jamestown Foundation, June 2007; Scott Radnitz, Weapons of
the Wealthy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), p. 172-176; Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown (New York:
Penguin Group Publishers, 2011) (the book’s references include an Internet archive of memos and other documents).
See also James Kirchick, “Did Donald Rumsfeld Whitewash Massacre in Uzbekistan?” RFE/RL, May 13, 2011.
81 Analyst Adeeb Khalid draws a parallel between the Uzbek government’s actions at Andijon and at a large student
demonstration in Tashkent in January 1992. In the latter case, Karimov allegedly ordered troops to fire on the marchers,
resulting in up to six deaths and two dozen or more injuries. Islam After Communism (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2007), p. 155. See also Reuters, January 17, 1992.
82 See also CRS Report RS22161, Unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan: Context and Implications, by Jim Nichol.
83 Council of the European Union, Uzbekistan: Council Adopts Restrictive Measures, Press Release 14392/05,
November 14, 2005. U.S. officials argued that the United States already had been limiting military assistance—at
congressional request—because of human rights abuses.
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embargo in place. In October 2008, the EU Council praised what it viewed as some positive
trends in human rights in Uzbekistan and lifted the visa ban, although it left the arms embargo in
place.84 In October 2009, it lifted the arms embargo.
At the first major trial of 15 alleged perpetrators of the Andijon unrest in late 2005, the accused
all confessed and asked for death penalties. They testified that they were members of Akramiya, a
branch of HT launched in 1994 by Akram Yuldashev that allegedly aimed to use force to create a
caliphate in the area of the Fergana Valley located in Uzbekistan. Besides receiving assistance
from HT, Akramiya was alleged to receive financial aid and arms training from the IMU. The
defendants also claimed that the U.S. and Kyrgyz governments helped finance and support their
effort to overthrow the government, and that international media colluded with local human rights
groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in this effort. The U.S. and Kyrgyz
governments denied involvement, and many observers criticized the trial as appearing stage-
managed. Partly in response to events at Andijon, the U.S. Congress tightened conditions on aid
to Uzbekistan.
The Summer 2009 Suicide Bombings and Attacks in Uzbekistan
On May 25-26, 2009, a police checkpoint was attacked on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, attacks took
place in the border town of Khanabad, and four bombings occurred in Andijon in the commercial
district, including at least one by suicide bombers. Several deaths and injuries were alleged,
although reporting was suppressed. Uzbek officials blamed the IMU, although the IJU allegedly
claimed responsibility. President Karimov flew to Andijon on May 31. In late August 2009,
shooting took place in Tashkent that resulted in the deaths of three alleged IMU members and the
apprehension of other group members. The Uzbek government alleged that the group had been
involved in the 1999 explosions and in recent assassinations in Tashkent.
U.S. Designation of the IMU and IJU as Terrorist Organizations
In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,
stating that the IMU, aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by Al Qaeda, resorted to terrorism,
actively threatened U.S. interests, and attacked American citizens. At that time, the State
Department argued that the “main goal of the IMU is to topple the current government in
Uzbekistan,” and it linked the IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-2000.
Former CIA Director Porter Goss testified in March 2005 that the IJG/IJU “has become a more
virulent threat to U.S. interests and local governments.”85 In May 2005, the State Department
designated the IJG/IJU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global
Terrorist, and in June, the U.N. Security Council added the IJG/IJU to its terrorism list.86 In June
84 Council of the European Union, 2824th General Affairs Council Meeting, Press Release, October 15-16, 2007; 2864th
and 2865th General Affairs and External Relations Council Meetings, Press Release, April 29, 2008; 2897th General
Affairs and External Relations Council Meeting, Press Release, October 13, 2008. Some international human rights
groups protested against a visit by the head of the Uzbek state security service—who had been subject to the visa ban
lifted by the Council—to Germany in late October 2008. He reportedly advised German officials on IJU activities in
Central Asia.
85 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Testimony of the Director of Central Intelligence, The Honorable
Porter J. Goss, March 17, 2005.
86 U.S. Department of State, Press Statement: U.S. Department of State Designates the Islamic Jihad Group Under
(continued...)
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2008, IJG head Jalolov and his associate Suhayl Fatilloevich Buranov were added to the U.N.
1267 Sanctions Committee’s Consolidated List of individuals and entities associated with bin
Laden, al Qaeda, and the Taliban. Also, the U.S. Treasury Department ordered that any of their
assets under U.S. jurisdiction be frozen and prohibited U.S. citizens from financial dealings with
the terrorists.87
After U.S. military operations began in Afghanistan in late 2001, IMU forces assisting the Taliban
and Al Qaeda suffered major losses, and IMU co-head Namanganiy was killed.88 Surviving IMU
forces moved to Pakistan, and became heavily involved in actions against the Pakistani
government, although some IMU fighters later resumed attacks on coalition forces in
Afghanistan.89
IMU head Yuldashev reportedly was killed in late August 2009 in Pakistan by a U.S. drone
missile, and Jalalov allegedly similarly was killed in late September 2009. After Yuldashev’s
death, Abu Usman Adil became the head of the IMU. The IMU military commander, Abbas
Mansur, allegedly was killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2011. In April 2012, Adil reportedly was
similarly killed, and was succeeded by Usman Ghazi some months later. Ghazi, a non-Uzbek, has
focused the IMU on attacking Afghanistani and Pakistani government targets, possibly lessening
its immediate threat to Central Asia, according to some observers.90 However, as mentioned
above, U.S. officials and others have raised concerns that the IMU and other terrorist groups may
re-focus on Central Asia after the U.S. and NATO drawdown in Afghanistan in 2014.
In July 2011, an Uzbek citizen on an expired student visa was arrested on charges of being
directed by IMU terrorists to assassinate President Obama. He confessed and was sentenced in
2012. Two other ethnic Uzbeks were arrested in the United States in early 2012 on charges of
collaborating with the IJU. One of the Uzbeks had been granted refugee status after he fled the
Uzbek government crackdown in Andijon in 2005. He was arrested at a U.S. airport while
allegedly planning to join IJU terrorists abroad.
(...continued)
Executive Order 13224, May 26, 2005; U.N. Security Council, The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, Press
Release: Security Council Committee Adds One Entity to Al-Qaida Section of Consolidated List, SC/8405, June 3,
2005.
87 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release: Treasury Designates Leadership of the IJU Terrorist Group, June
18, 2008.
88 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, April 2004.
89 Jacob Zenn, “The Growing Alliance between Uzbek Extremists and the Pakistani Taliban,” Terrorism Monitor,
Jamestown Foundation, March 8, 2013; U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee
on Europe, Eurasia and Emerging Threats and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-proliferation, and Trade, Hearing
on Islamist Militant Threats to Eurasia, Testimony of Justin Siberell, Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S.
Department of State, February 27, 2013.
90 Jacob Zenn, “IMU Announces Usman Ghazi as New Amir after Months of Deliberation,” Militant Leadership
Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, August 21, 2012; Christopher Anzalone, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan:
Down but Not Out,” Foreign Policy, November 20, 2012; Joshua Kucera, “What are the IMU’s Designs in Central
Asia?” Eurasianet, December 11, 2012. However, U.S. Colonel Ted Donnelly has argued that after U.S. and NATO
forces are drawn down in Afghanistan in 2014, the Fergana Valley could become a focus for operations by the IMU
and other terrorist groups. See Fergana as FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas]? A Post-2014 Strategy for
Central Asia, U.S. Army War College, Master’s Thesis, March 2012. For actions by the IMU, Taliban, and the Haqqani
group in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province, see Bill Roggio, “Afghan Intel Captures 2 IMU Fighters in Kabul,” Long
War Journal, November 5, 2013.
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Democratization and Human Rights
A major goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term development of
democratic institutions and respect for human rights. Particularly since September 11, 2001, the
United States has attempted to harmonize its concerns about democratization and human rights in
the region with its interests in regional support for counter-terrorism. According to some
allegations, the former Bush Administration may have sent suspected terrorists in its custody to
Uzbekistan for questioning, a process termed “extraordinary rendition.”91 Although not verifying
such transfers specifically to Uzbekistan, the former Bush Administration stated that it received
diplomatic assurances that transferees would not be tortured. Several citizens of Central Asian
states who were held in U.S. custody at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base have been returned to
their home countries.92
All of the Central Asian leaders have declared that they are committed to democratization. During
Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed a Charter on Democratic
Partnership that recognized Kazakhstan’s commitments to the rule of law, respect for human
rights, and economic reform. During his December 2001 and September 2006 visits, Nazarbayev
repeated these pledges in joint statements with then-President Bush. In March 2002, a U.S.-
Uzbek Strategic Partnership Declaration was signed pledging Uzbekistan to “intensify the
democratic transformation” and improve freedom of the press. During his December 2002 U.S.
visit, Tajikistan’s President Rahmon pledged to “expand fundamental freedoms and human
rights.”
Despite such democratization pledges, the states have made little progress, according to the State
Department. In testimony in May 2011, then-Assistant Secretary Blake stated that leaders in
Central Asia “are suspicious of democratic reforms, and with some exceptions have maintained
tight restrictions on political, social, religious, and economic life in their countries…. Kyrgyzstan
has been the primary exception in Central Asia. The democratic gains recently made in
Kyrgyzstan … are cause for optimism.”93
During the 1990s and early 2000s, almost all the leaders in Central Asia held onto power by
orchestrating extensions of their terms, holding suspect elections, eliminating possible
contenders, and providing emoluments to supporters and relatives (the exception was the leader
of Tajikistan, who had been ousted in the early 1990s during a civil war). After this long period of
leadership stability, President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan was toppled in a coup in 2005, and
President Niyazov of Turkmenistan died in late 2006, marking the passing of three out of five
91 The New Yorker, February 14, 2005; New York Times, May 1, 2005; New York Times, December 31, 2005;
Representative Edward Markey, Congressional Record, December 13, 2005, p. H11337; European Parliament,
Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transport and Illegal Detention of
Prisoners, Draft Interim Report, 2006/2027(INI), April 24, 2006, and On the Testimony by Craig Murray, Former
British Ambassador, Working Document No. 5, June 1, 2006; Craig Murray, Murder in Samarkand (Edinburgh:
Mainstream Publishing, 2006).
92 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight,
Hearing: City on the Hill or Prison on the Bay? The Mistakes of Guantanamo and the Decline of America’s Image,
May 6, 2008; Hearing: Rendition and the Department of State, June 10, 2008. At least three Tajiks returned to
Tajikistan from Guantanamo were then tried and imprisoned on charges of belonging to al Qaeda or the IMU.
93 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hearing on Central Asia and the Arab Spring: Growing
Pressure For Human Rights? Testimony of Robert Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs, May 11, 2011.
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Soviet-era regional leaders from the scene. Soviet-era leaders Nazarbayev and Karimov remain in
power, and Tajikistan has been headed since the civil war by Rahmon, the Soviet-era head of a
state farm.
Possible scenarios of political futures in Central Asia have ranged from continued rule in most of
the states by elite groups that became ensconced during the Soviet era to violent transitions to
Islamic fundamentalist rule. Peaceful transitions to more or less democratic political systems have
not occurred and appear unlikely for some time to come (although the peaceful October 2011
Kyrgyz presidential election may offer some hope; see below). While some observers warn that
Islamic extremism could increase dramatically in the region, others discount the risk that the
existing secular governments soon could be overthrown by Islamic extremists.94
In the case of the three succession transitions so far, Tajikistan’s resulted in a shift in the Soviet-
era regional/clan elite configuration and some limited inclusion of the Islamic Renaissance Party.
Perhaps worrisome, Tajik President Rahmon has written a “spiritual guide” reminiscent of the one
penned by Turkmenistan’s late authoritarian president Niyazov, and has given orders on how
citizens should live and dress. In Turkmenistan, it appears that Soviet-era elites have retained
power following Niyazov’s death and have eschewed meaningful democratization. Kyrgyzstan’s
transition after Akayev’s 2005 ouster appeared to involve the gradual increase in influence of
southern regional/clan ethnic Kyrgyz elites linked to Bakiyev until April 2010, when northern
regional/clan ethnic Kyrgyz elites reasserted influence by ousting then-President Bakiyev. An
interim president held office until an election was held on October 30, 2011, the first contested
electoral transfer of power in Central Asia. This election was won by Almazbek Atambayev, who
represents northern interests (see below).95
Recent Political Developments in Kazakhstan96
In November 2012, an appeals court upheld the 7.5 year prison sentence handed down in October
to the head of the unregistered Alga opposition party, Vladimir Kozlov, convicted on charges that
he organized the Zhanaozen riots as part of a coup attempt against Nazarbayev. The U.S.
Ambassador to the Permanent Council of the OSCE, Ian Kelly, raised concerns that the case was
used to silence a leading oppositionist and stated that the irregularities of the trial “casts serious
doubts on [Kazakhstan’s] respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.”
He also correctly predicted that the charge of “inciting social hatred” against Kozlov could be
used to prosecute other oppositionists, civil society organizations, and members of the media.97
On December 21, 2012, the Alga Party was banned as an extremist organization by the Almaty
94 Analyst Adeeb Khalid argues that the elites and populations of the regional states still hold many attitudes and follow
many practices imposed during the Soviet period of rule. This “Sovietism” makes it difficult for either Islamic
extremism or democratization to make headway, he suggests. Khalid, p. 193. For a perhaps more troubling view of the
threat of Islamic extremism, see above, “Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns.”
95 For background on political developments, see CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S.
Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol;
CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol, CRS Report 97-1055,
Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol, and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Recent
Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
96 For background, see CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
97 U.S. Department of State, Ambassador Kelly on Sentencing of Vladimir Kozlov in Kazakhstan, 11 October 2012.
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district court, silencing what one observer has characterized as the main opposition party in the
country.98 Kozlov remains imprisoned.
In November 2012, the Kazakh General Prosecutor’s Office recommended the closure of most
opposition media on the grounds that they contained calls for the violent overthrow of the
government and otherwise undermined national security. Courts quickly ruled that these media
were “extremist,” reportedly without substantial evidence, and ordered their closure. Reporters
Without Borders has set up some Internet sites for several of the banned media.99
A new holiday was celebrated on December 1, 2012, entitled “Day of the First President,” to
celebrate President Nazarbayev’s rule. Some commentators in Kazakhstan speculated that this
holiday was established to further consolidate presidential power and quell dissenting views.100
In April 2013, the European Parliament approved a resolution decrying the deterioration of
human rights in Kazakhstan since the Zhanaozen disturbance. The resolution “strongly criticized”
court decisions to ban the Alga Party and independent media, urged the release of political
prisoners, and called for easing restrictions on the registration and practice of religion.
In October 2013, President Nazarbayev issued a statement that he intends to stay in office, and
plans to run in the 2016 presidential election.
According to the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, an NGO, independent media have faced
increasing restrictions on their operations, including fines and orders to temporarily suspend
publication. One newspaper that had just published its first issue allegedly was fined for not
appearing regularly. Some cases involve suspension of publication for not printing as many
copies as set forth in the registration documents or for altering their publishing schedule. Some
observers claim that the restrictions are politically motivated, including because the publications
had carried articles critical of the government or presenting viewpoints not favored by the
government.101
Recent Political Developments in Kyrgyzstan102
On October 3, 2012, the leader of the Ata-Jurt Party and former presidential candidate
Kamchybek Tashiyev, along with fellow party members and legislators Sadyr Japarov and Talant
Mamytov, addressed a group of about 800 protesters outside the legislative building in Bishkek.
According to some accounts, they allegedly urged the demonstrators to storm the legislature to
demand that it nationalize the Kumtor gold mine run by Canada’s Centerra Gold firm. If the
legislature did not act, they reportedly warned, its members would be forcibly dispersed.103 After
initially breaking into the legislative building, the protesters were repulsed by police, who later
98 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Political Trial Fails to Provoke Outcry,” Eurasianet, October 10, 2012.
99 “Main Opposition Media Silenced in Space of a Month,” Reporters Without Borders, December 28, 2012, and
January 2, 2013, at http://en.rsf.org/kazakhstan-main-opposition-media-silenced-in-28-12-2012,43751.html.
100 “New ‘Leader’s Day’ Suggests Power Consolidation Ahead of Handover,” Open Source Center Analysis, November
30, 2012; Interfax, November 29, 2012.
101 Critical Newspapers in Kazakhstan 'Being Squeezed Out of Existence,’ Institute of War and Peace Reporting,
January 10, 2014.
102 For background, see CRS Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
103 The legislature had considered and rejected nationalizing the Kumtor gold mine in late June 2012.
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foiled another attempt. The government arrested the three legislators on the grounds that they
were publically advocating and using force to attempt to overthrow the constitutional system.104
The arrests triggered additional protests in southern Kyrgyzstan, the power base of the Ata-Jurt
Party. In March 2013, a Bishkek district court sentenced the three legislators to prison terms
ranging from one year to 18 months. According to many observers, violent popular reactions to
the sentences— including the seizure of a regional administration building and a blockage of the
main highway from Osh to Bishkek in early June—may have influenced an appeals court
decision in June 2013 to acquit and release the three legislators. Perhaps also relevant, courtroom
bystanders physically attacked the appellate judges, demanding acquittals. The prosecutor
appealed the acquittals. In early August 2013, the Supreme Court re-instated the sentences, but
ruled that the defendants had served their time and would not be imprisoned. The opposition
deputies were stripped of their legislative mandates, however.
In early October 2013, a rally by local villagers calling for the nationalization of the Kumtor gold
mine turned violent, reportedly after policemen tried to disperse the demonstrators, resulting in
injuries to six policemen and the detention of over 20 demonstrators. The local villagers launched
another protest and road blockage at the mine in February 2014. In late February 2014, four of
eight defendants in the October 2013 incident received sentences of 4-8 years (the rest received
suspended sentences).
In December 2013, Centerra and the Kyrgyz government signed a memorandum on of
understanding (MOU) on setting up a new joint venture with both sides owning 50% of shares.
Centerra also offered other concessions. The legislature approved the MOU on February 6, 2014.
The Kyrgyz government has voiced the hope that the two sides will reach final agreement on the
ownership shares and other details of the joint venture by August 2014.
Opponents of the MOU have called for the government to own over two-thirds of the shares or
for the mine to be nationalized. Omurbek Tekebaev, the leader of the Ata-Meken Party, a member
party of the ruling coalition, has been prominent in calling for nationalizing the mine. On March
18, 2014, the Ata Meken Party withdrew from the ruling coalition. A new coalition must be
formed and a new cabinet of ministers approved. Tekebaev stated that the party had objected to
the government’s agreement on Kumtor mine operations, socioeconomic conditions, and alleged
embezzlement during urban renewal efforts led by Prime Minister Jantoro Satybaldiev in Osh and
Jalal-abad.
President Atambayev has pointed to his pledge to serve only one term as president as a sign of his
honesty and adherence to the division of executive and legislative power established by the 2010
constitution.
According to analyst Johan Engvall, Kyrgyzstan’s new semi-parliamentary system, established in
2010, has contributed to the replacement of the one-family rule of former President Bakiyev with
a “system of coalition-based corruption, where the country’s major economic, political, and
territorial assets are divided among political parties with a detrimental impact on their ability to
govern the country.” He states that the legislative parties making up the ruling coalition have
parceled out responsibility over ministries and regional administrations, and even over some
businesses, so that various sectors of business and administration and regions of the country are
104 In mid-September 2012, the prosecutor general’s office had launched a criminal investigation against Sadyr Japarov
on suspicions that he had “illegally privatized” property formerly belonging to ousted President Bakiyev.
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controlled by one or another party. He also warns that this system may be in flux, as President
Atambayev has attempted to gain greater authority. Engvall argues that “the new system has yet
to produce the desired effect in terms of relieving the strained relations between center and
periphery, or urban and rural areas, nor has it been able to moderate intra-elite relations.”105
Recent Political Developments in Tajikistan106
In March 2013, oppositionist and businessman Zayd Saidov announced his intention to form the
New Tajikistan Party to participate in planned 2015 legislative elections. He was arrested in May
on charges of economic crimes and in late December 2013 was sentenced to 26 years in prison
with confiscation of property. In early March, authorities arrested Saidov’s defense lawyer on
fraud charges. Many observers view Saidov’s conviction and his lawyer’s arrest as politically
motivated.
A presidential election was held on November 6, 2013. The regime argued that since the
constitution was changed in 2003, including by extending the presidential term from five to seven
years, Rahmon’s constitutionally mandated two-term limit was reset, and he could run for a third
term in 2006 and a fourth term in 2013. Seven prospective candidates were put forward by their
parties. Five of the parties held legislative seats and two were outside the legislature. The
prospects were required to gather at least 210,000 signatures (said to represent 5% of registered
voters) in order to be registered as candidates. The difficulty of gathering the signatures led three
prospective candidates to request an extension to the 20-day limit for obtaining signatures, and
the Central Commission for Elections (CCE) granted a few days extension. Six candidates
successfully registered. However, human rights activist Oynihol Bobonazarova—nominated by
the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and supported by the opposition
Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan (SDPT) and some other groups making up the Union of
Reformist Forces of Tajikistan—proved unable to obtain the required 210,000 signatures. She
alleged that local authorities had hindered her gathering of signatures.
Many observers viewed the candidates running against Rahmon as pro-government, even
Communist Party candidate Ismoil Talbakov, who had run against Rahmon in 2006. Other
candidates who had run against Rahmon in 2006 included Abduhalim Ghafforov of the Socialist
Party and Olimjon Boboyev of the Party of Economic Reforms. After Bobonazarova failed to be
registered as a candidate, the SDPT called for boycotting the election. IRPT leaders stated that
they would not vote, but did not call for boycotting the election. During his campaign, Talbakov
called for Tajikistan’s integration with Russia, lauded Lenin and Stalin, urged abolition of full-
time clergy, pointed out that the president had given him an award for his support during the civil
war, and stated that if elected, he would rule as a Soviet-style dictator who would widely use the
death penalty against rapists and drug traffickers and deport homosexual “non-humans.”
The CCE reported that 90.1% of 4.2 million registered voters turned out and that Rahmon won
84.23% of the vote, followed by Talbakov with 4.93%. Some election observers and media
questioned the high turnout figure, given the number of labor migrants outside the country. Media
reported that at least some voters were able to cast ballots for relatives who were working abroad
105 Johan Engvall, “The Political Sources of Kyrgyzstan's Recent Unrest,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, June 26,
2013.
106 For background, see CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
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on election day. The SDPT and IRPT maintained that the results were fraudulent and that
Rahmon’s win was illegitimate.
According to monitors from the OSCE and the European Parliament, the election was peaceful
but the candidate registration process, campaign environment, and vote counting were
significantly flawed and fell short of genuine pluralism. The OSCE criticized the electoral law for
unduly restrictive conditions on candidacy and campaigning that were not conducive to
democratic elections, including requirements that effectively barred labor migrants from signing
in support of a candidate, an unreasonable number of required signatures, and restrictions on
campaign activities that limited freedom of expression. The monitors received numerous credible
allegations that local officials were unwilling, unavailable, or otherwise lax in carrying out their
required duty to certify signatures. While the IRPT alleged that it was blocked in its efforts to
gather the required number of signatures, or that individuals feared repercussions from the
government if they signed in support of Bobonazarova, some officials of the ruling People’s
Democratic Party of Tajikistan admitted that they assisted some other parties in gathering
signatures.
The monitors judged that campaigning was formalistic and devoid of the diversity of views that
would provide voters with an informed choice. They stated that President Rahmon enjoyed a
significant advantage from state media coverage of his official activities, which included visits to
several localities around the country. Monitors also observed local officials campaigning for the
president. Campaign debates usually were held in a pro forma style moderated by election
officials and campaign posters adhered to a standard format. President Rahmon declined debating
his opponents, and most of the candidates steered clear of criticism of the president or
government. The monitors witnessed significant problems on election day, including lax control
over unused ballots and ballot boxes, widespread proxy voting, multiple voting, and ballot box
stuffing. Vote counting was assessed as seriously problematic in over one-third of 61 polling
stations observed, including inconsistent counting procedures, lack of visibility of vote-counting,
and errors in filling out results protocols. Vote tabulation was assessed negatively in nearly one-
fifth of 48 district election commissions observed, including the correction or filling in of
protocols from the polling stations.107
Recent Political Developments in Turkmenistan108
In October 2011, the Turkmen Central Electoral Commission (CEC) announced that a presidential
election would be held on February 12, 2012. During the last two weeks of December 2011,
initiative groups nominated candidates for president and gathered 10,000 signatures in a majority
of the country’s districts in order to gain registration of their candidates. The National Revival
Movement, a civic association headed by the president, nominated President Berdimuhamedow
as its candidate. In January 2012, the CEC registered eight candidates. All of Berdimuhamedow’s
challengers were ministerial officials or state plant managers. Based on an inadequate legal and
political framework to ensure a pluralistic election, the OSCE decided not to formally monitor the
election. The CEC announced that Berdimuhamedow won over 97% of the vote and that turnout
was over 96%.
107 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Republic Of Tajikistan Presidential Election, 6
November 2013, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission: Final Report, February 5, 2014.
108 For background, see CRS Report 97-1055, Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
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In January 2012, the legislature approved a Law on Political Parties that set forth procedures for
establishing new political parties. In May 2012, the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, a
public association, announced that it intended to form a party, and it held a founding congress in
August 2012 to form the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (PIE). The platform of the new
party is virtually the same as that of the DPT and is regarded as a pro-government party by most
observers. In a by-election to fill vacant legislative seats in June 2013, the head of the new party,
Ovezmammed Mammedov, became the first member of a party other than the DPT to be elected
to the legislature.
Legislative elections were held on December 15, 2013. Candidates were nominated by the DPT
and PIE, public associations, and citizen groups. All 283 candidates nominated by parties,
associations, and groups were registered, including 66 women. DPT nominated 99 candidates,
and PIE nominated 21 candidates. Among the public associations, the Trade Unions nominated 89
candidates, the Union of Women nominated 37 candidates and the Youth Union nominated 22
candidates.109 Fifteen candidates also were nominated by groups of citizens. The majority of
constituencies had 2 candidates, 31 constituencies had 3 candidates, and 2 constituencies had 4
candidates.
A fifteen-member OSCE Election Assessment Mission observed the election, along with a
twelve-member team from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. According to the final assessment
of the OSCE, the election took place in a strictly controlled political environment characterized
by a lack of respect for fundamental freedoms that are central to democratic elections. Although
there was a second political party participating in the race, it did not provide voters with a
genuine choice. The election needed to be significantly improved to live up to OSCE
commitments and other international obligations for genuine and democratic elections. Among
problems identified by the OSCE, members of electoral commissions were appointees of the
government. The Central Electoral Commission did not convene regular meetings and key
electoral information was not published and disseminated. Registered candidates proclaimed their
support for presidential policies rather than offering different political platforms. Campaigning
was minimal, and election and local government officials were prominent among the audiences as
candidate campaign meetings. Media was strictly controlled by the government, restricting any
possible dissemination of diverse viewpoints.
In almost all polling stations visited, the OSCE observed several instances of voters presenting
multiple identification documents, presumably for other family members, and getting multiple
ballots in return. The mission observed numerous instances of seemingly identical signatures on
the voter lists in the polling stations visited, which could be indications of proxy voting or
multiple voting. OSCE monitors also noticed several instances of clumps of ballot papers in
ballot boxes, suggesting multiple voting or ballot box stuffing. These irregularities may cast doubt
on the level of turnout reported. The vote tabulation process was not transparent, with protocols
not being publicly displayed and final results not broken down by the number of voters, turnout,
votes for each candidate, and invalid votes for each precinct.110
109 According to the OSCE, the public associations lack real independence from the state. It has observed that although
public associations fielded candidates who won in the December 2008 legislative election, representatives of the
associations were unable to fully identify or discuss the work of their putative members in the outgoing parliament.
110 OSCE, ODIHR, Turkmenistan Parliamentary Elections, 15 December 2013, OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment
Mission: Final Report, March 4, 2014.
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Recent Political Developments in Uzbekistan111
In December 2012, President Karimov stressed that the country was following a path of
“evolutionary” democratization, including by increasing the checks and balances among the three
branches of power and strengthening political parties. At the same time, he stated that the
government’s power would continue to increase in the “transitional period” in order for it to
direct the reforms, and cautioned that the process of democratization was lengthy and never-
ending.
In late 2013, President Karimov’s elder daughter, Gulnara, became more involved in political
scandal, particularly involving criminal investigations by authorities in Switzerland, Sweden,
France, and Gibraltar of her business dealing. She and other observers have viewed such events
as the closure of her media outlets as efforts to eliminate her as a possible political successor.
According to some accounts, President Karimov had ordered the closure of her media outlets.
Oxford Analytica has pointed out that President Karimov is the oldest political leader in Central
Asia (born in 1938) and long has been rumored to be in ill-health. It suggests that a political
succession might follow a similar course to that in Turkmenistan after the death of President
Niyazov, where constitutional provisions on succession were ignored and the elite clans settled on
a successor. According to Oxford Analytica, current Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev and his
deputy Rustam Azimov are likely successors, but it also states that that National Security Service
head Rustam Inoyatov might play a “decisive role.”112
In December 2013, President Karimov proposed changing the constitution to give the legislature
more power and to pass laws facilitating multi-party competition in order to “build a democratic
state.” He also called for studying the United States in order to improve the judicial system and
foster independent media.113 Legislative elections are planned for December 2014.
Human Rights
The State Department’s latest Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 characterized
all the Central Asian governments except Kyrgyzstan as authoritarian and as falling short in
respect for human rights in many areas:
• In Kazakhstan, the president and his Nur Otan Party dominated the political
system. Significant human rights problems included severe limits on citizens’
rights to change their government and restrictions on freedom of speech, press,
assembly, religion, and association. There was lack of due process in dealing with
abuses by law enforcement and judicial officials. Other reported abuses included:
arbitrary or unlawful killings; detainee and prisoner torture and other abuse;
arbitrary arrest and detention; prohibitive political party registration
requirements; restrictions on the activities of NGOs; sex and labor trafficking;
and child labor. Corruption was widespread, although he government took
modest steps to prosecute some officials who committed abuses.
111 For background, see CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
112 Uzbekistan: Succession will Follow Turkmenistani Model, OxResearch Daily Brief Service, Oxford Analytica,
January 9, 2014.
113 CEDR, December 8, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-66966896.
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• In Kyrgyzstan, the constitution established a parliamentary form of government
intended to limit presidential power and enhance the role of parliament and the
prime minister. Some security forces appeared at times to operate independently
of civilian control in the South and committed human rights abuses. Significant
human rights problems included abuses related to continued ethnic tensions in
the South; denial of due process and lack of accountability in judicial and law
enforcement proceedings; law enforcement officials’ use of arbitrary arrest; and
various forms of mistreatment, torture, and extortion against all demographic
groups, particularly against ethnic Uzbeks. The following additional human
rights problems existed: harassment of NGOs, activists, and journalists; pressure
on independent media; restrictions on religious freedom; pervasive corruption;
discrimination and violence against ethnic and religious minorities; child abuse;
trafficking in persons; and child labor. The central government allowed security
forces to act arbitrarily, emboldening law enforcement officials to prey on
vulnerable citizens, and allowing mobs to disrupt trials by attacking defendants,
attorneys, witnesses, and judges.
• In Tajikistan, an authoritarian president and his supporters, drawn mainly from
one region of the country, dominated the political system. The government
obstructed political pluralism. Security forces reported to civilian authorities.
Significant human rights problems included torture and abuse of detainees and
other persons by security forces; repression of political activism and the repeated
blockage of several independent news and social networking websites; and poor
religious freedom conditions. Other human rights problems included arbitrary
arrest; denial of the right to a fair trial; corruption; and trafficking in persons,
including sex and labor trafficking. Officials in the security services and
elsewhere in the government acted with impunity. There were very few
prosecutions of government officials for human rights abuses.
• In Turkmenistan, an authoritarian president and his Democratic Party controlled
the government. Significant human rights problems included arbitrary arrest;
torture; and disregard for civil liberties, including restrictions on freedoms of
speech, press, assembly, and movement. Other continuing human rights problems
included citizens’ inability to change their government; interference in the
practice of religion; denial of due process and fair trial; arbitrary interference
with privacy, home, and correspondence; and trafficking in persons. Officials in
the security services and elsewhere in the government acted with impunity. There
were no reported prosecutions of government officials for human rights abuses.
• In Uzbekistan, the authoritarian president dominated political life and exercised
nearly complete control over the other branches of government. Significant
human rights problems included torture and abuse of detainees by security
forces; denial of due process and fair trial; and widespread restrictions on
religious freedom, including harassment of religious minority group members
and continued imprisonment of believers of all faiths. Other continuing human
rights problems included: incommunicado and prolonged detention; arbitrary
arrest and detention; restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and
association; governmental restrictions on civil society activity; restrictions on
freedom of movement; and government-organized forced labor. Authorities
subjected human rights activists, journalists, and others who criticized the
government, as well as their family members, to harassment, arbitrary arrest, and
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politically motivated prosecution and detention. Government officials frequently
engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.114
In June 2013, the State Department reported that Uzbekistan was a source country for human
trafficking for forced labor and sex, and that while the government greatly reduced the number of
children under 15 years of age involved in the 2012 cotton harvest, the government continued to
subject older children and adults to forced labor in the harvest. Also, Uzbekistan did not
demonstratively investigate or prosecute government officials suspected to be complicit in forced
labor. The State Department estimated that there were over 1 million individuals subject to state-
imposed internal forced labor in Uzbekistan. Since designations began in 2003, Uzbekistan has
ranked as a Tier 2, Tier 2 Watch List, or Tier 3 country (a Tier 2 country does not fully comply
with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to
comply; a Watch List country does not fully comply, the number of victims may be increasing,
and efforts to comply are slipping; a Tier 3 country does not fully comply and is not making
significant efforts to do so). In the 2003, 2006, and 2007 reports, Uzbekistan was listed as a Tier 3
country, but in the 2008-2012 reports, Uzbekistan was on the Tier 2 Watch List. In the 2011-2012
reports, Uzbekistan was granted waivers from an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3 because
the government had written plans to comply, according to the State Department. However, the
government plans were not realized, and since Uzbekistan had exhausted its maximum of two
consecutive waivers, it was placed on Tier 3 in the 2013 report. Countries placed on Tier 3 are
subject to certain sanctions, including the withholding of non-humanitarian, non-trade-related
foreign assistance. However, Uzbekistan has received partial or full waivers, most recently in
September 2013, when the president determined that a waiver would promote further efforts to
combat trafficking and would safeguard unspecified U.S. national security interests.115
In 2009, the U.S. Department of Labor listed all the Central Asian states as countries that use
child labor to pick cotton. This list was meant to inform the choices made by the buying public. In
addition, on July 23, 2013, cotton from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan again was included on a list
that requires U.S. government contractors to certify that they have made a good faith effort to
determine whether forced or indentured child labor was used to produce the cotton.116
In testimony to Congress in April 2013, an official of the U.S. International Labor Rights Forum
(IRLF), an NGO, reported that as a member of the Cotton Campaign, an international coalition of
NGOs, industries, and trade unions, the IRLF had supported diplomatic and economic pressure on
Uzbekistan to end forced child and adult labor in cotton production. He reported that forced child
and adult labor continued to be used in the autumn 2012 cotton harvest, and that security
personnel were deployed on the farms to enforce production quotas and to prevent pickers from
taking pictures or otherwise documenting the use of forced labor. Ostensibly, the pickers were
“volunteers” recruited from government agencies, private firms, colleges, and high schools, the
latter including a majority of all faculty members. Children under age 15 were officially excused
from the harvest, although many aged 11-15 were observed in the fields. Individuals could pay a
fee in lieu of participating in the harvest, but most reportedly were afraid of repercussions such as
114 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, February 27, 2014.
115 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 19, 2013; The White House, Memorandum for the
Secretary of State: Presidential Determination with Respect to Foreign Governments' Efforts Regarding Trafficking in
Persons, Presidential Determination No. 2013-16, September 17, 2013. See also Uzbekistan: Forced Labor Widespread
in Cotton Harvest, Human Rights Watch, January 25, 2013.
116 U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of International Labor Affairs. Executive Order 13126, Prohibition of
Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor, at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/regs/eo13126/.
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dismissal from a job or university if they did not participate, according to the ILRF official. He
also reported that the use of forced labor throughout the economy was increasing. The IRLF has
called for the U.S. Customs Service to enforce the Tariff Act of 1930 to block the importation of
Uzbek cotton materials produced by forced labor.117
Uzbekistan long barred monitors from the U.N.’s International Labor Organization from
observing the cotton harvest, but permitted them to monitor the Fall 2013 harvest under escort by
Uzbek officials. A delegation reported systematic state mobilization of the forced labor of
children in the 2013 cotton harvest.118 The Cotton Campaign, a group of human rights
organizations, also reported that the government had continued a practice implemented last year
of not pressing most young children into picking cotton, but of stepping-up the use of forced
labor by older youth and adults, including civil servants.119
Trade and Investment
All the states of the region possess large-scale resources that could contribute to the region
becoming a “new silk road” of trade and commerce. The Kazakh and Turkmen economies are
mostly geared to energy exports but need added foreign investment for production and transport.
Kazakhstan is the world’s largest exporter of uranium. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
are major cotton producers, a legacy of central economic planning during the Soviet period.
Uzbekistan’s cotton and gold production rank among the highest in the world and much is
exported. It has moderate gas reserves but needs investment to upgrade infrastructure. Kyrgyzstan
has major gold mines and strategic mineral reserves, is a major wool producer, and could benefit
more from tourism. Tajikistan has one of the world’s largest aluminum processing plants.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan possess the bulk of the region’s water resources, but in recent years
both countries have suffered from droughts.
Despite the region’s development potential, the challenges of corruption, inadequate transport
infrastructure, punitive tariffs, border tensions, and uncertain respect for contracts and
entrepreneurial activity have discouraged major foreign investment (except for some investment
in the energy sector). Cotton-growing has contributed to environmental pollution and water
shortages, leading some observers to argue that cotton-growing is not suited to the largely arid
region.
Tajikistan has alleged that Uzbekistan delays rail freight shipments, purportedly to pressure
Tajikistan to halt construction of the Roghun hydro-electric power dam on the Vakhsh River,
117 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global
Human Rights, and International Organizations, Hearing on Tier Rankings in the Fight Against Human Trafficking,
Testimony of Brian Campbell, Director of Policy and Legal Programs, International Labor Rights Forum, April 18,
2013; ILRF, Press Release: Leading Labor Rights Watchdog Calls on U.S. Customs Service to Halt Imports of Forced
Labor Cotton from Uzbekistan, May 15, 2013. See also Uzbekistan: Forced Labor Widespread in Cotton Harvest,
More Adults, Older Children Required to Work, Abuses Persist, Human Rights Watch, January 26, 2013.
118 U.N. International Labor Organization, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) – Uzbekistan,
Observation (CEACR) Adopted 2013, and Published at the 103rd ILC Session, 2014.
119 Review of the 2013 Cotton Harvest in Uzbekistan: State Forced-Labor System Continues, The Cotton Campaign,
November 2013.
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which Uzbekistan fears could limit the flow of water into the country. In November 2011, it
closed a rail link to southern Tajikistan, reporting that a bridge was damaged, but since then has
not reopened the span. Uzbekistan also has periodically cut off gas supplies to Tajikistan. In early
April 2012, Tajikistan’s prime minister and its foreign ministry denounced the rail restrictions and
a gas supply disruption as part of an “economic blockade” aiming to destabilize Tajikistan. The
Uzbek prime minister responded that all Uzbek actions were in accordance with bilateral
agreements or responses to Tajik actions, so that the accusations were “groundless.”120
According to some reports, Uzbek officials have stepped-up arrests, fines, and other actions
against international business interests in recent months, perhaps due in part to elite infighting
and growing corruption.121 Other international businesses continue to carry out operations.
Protests and government actions that have disrupted mining operations at the Kumtor gold mine,
operated as a joint venture between the Kyrgyz government and a Canadian-based mining firm,
have exacerbated concerns among foreign investors about the business climate in Kyrgyzstan.
Gold production at the mine reportedly accounts for 10-12% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP, and the
disruptions of mine operations have harmed the country’s economy.
U.S. Regional Economic and Trade Policy
Successive U.S. administrations have endorsed free market reforms in Central Asia, since these
directly serve U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services and
sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to Central Asia has greatly
exceeded that provided to Russia or most other Eurasian states except Azerbaijan. U.S. trade
agreements have been signed and entered into force with all the Central Asian states, but bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) are in force only with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Some observers
have called for updating Kazakhstan’s BIT. Efforts to finalize a BIT with Uzbekistan are
complicated by currency conversion issues. In line with Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the United States established permanent normal trade relations with
Kyrgyzstan by law in June 2000, so that “Jackson-Vanik” trade provisions no longer apply that
call for presidential reports and waivers concerning freedom of emigration. The United States
provided technical assistance that enabled Tajikistan to join the WTO in March 2013, and the
113th Congress may consider offering permanent normal trade relations status to the country in
line with WTO requirements.122
The United States has been providing technical assistance for Kazakhstan’s efforts to join the
WTO. Kazakhstan’s leadership has been eager for the country to soon join the WTO. However, in
June 2013, the WTO Working Group negotiating with Kazakhstan on accession reported that
major problems remained, including Kazakhstan’s restrictions on the operation of international
firms in the country and inequitable tariffs.123 In October 2013, President Nazarbayev called for
120 Yulia Goryaynova, Galim Faskhutdinov, and Saule Mukhametrakhimov, “A Gas Row Highlights Tajik-Uzbek
Tensions,” IWPR, April 24, 2012; CEDR, April 3, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950105; April 4, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950127.
121 Catherine Fitzpatrick, “Uzbekistan: Foreign Investors Suffering amid Tashkent’s “Bizarre” Business Behavior,”
Eurasianet, August 16, 2011.
122 US Embassy Dushanbe, U.S. Statement on Tajikistan’s Accession to the World Trade Organization, December 11,
2012.
123 WTO, News Item: Kazakhstan Accession Negotiations make Incremental Progress but Major Questions
Unresolved, July 23, 2013.
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Russia to assist it in the accession talks to combat what he termed EU and U.S. objections. In
early March 2014, the State Department informed a Kazakh delegation preparing to depart for the
United States to discuss the country’s World Trade Organization (WTO) accession progress that a
visit by other participants from Russia’s Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary
Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor) was unacceptable. The Rosselkhoznadzor spokesman
speculated that the cancellation was linked to Russia’s moves in Ukraine.
In June 2004, The U.S. Trade Representative signed a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) with ambassadors of the regional states to establish a U.S.-Central Asia
Council on Trade and Investment. The Council has met yearly to address intellectual property,
labor, environmental protection, and other issues that impede trade and private investment flows
between the United States and Central Asia. The United States also has called for greater intra-
regional cooperation on trade and encouraged the development of regional trade and transport ties
with Afghanistan and South Asia. The reorganization of the State Department in 2006 to create
the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs facilitated this emphasis.124
The eighth meeting of the U.S.-Central Asia TIFA was held in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan, in
November 2013. Few details were released, but the U.S. statement mentioned that working
groups on customs, energy trade, and women’s economic empowerment had met, and that the
United States had proposed in the plenary meeting that a memorandum of understanding be
developed on promoting women’s entrepreneurship. The meeting also discussed possible WTO
accession for Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and the development of regional trade
with Afghanistan.125
U.S. trade with Central Asia accounts for less than 1% of U.S. global trade, and in 2013, mostly
involved exports of poultry, inorganic chemicals, industrial valves, farm machinery, mining
machinery, oil and gas field machinery, motors and generators, engine equipment, automobiles,
railroad rolling stock, and civilian aircraft to Kazakhstan and imports of uranium ores, petroleum
products, inorganic chemicals, iron and steel, and refined nonferrous metals from Kazakhstan.
Table 1. U.S. Trade Turnover, 2013
million current dollars
U.S.
U.S.
Imports
Main Categories of
Exports
Main Categories of U.S.
Total
County
from
U.S. Imports
to
Exports
Turnover
Kazakhstan 1,390.4 petroleum
refinery 1,095.7
civilian aircraft, railroad rolling
2,486.1
products, iron & steel,
stock, other engine equipment,
inorganic chemicals
poultry
Kyrgyzstan
3.5
paper, textiles, fish,
106.1 automobiles,
poultry
109.6
coffee, liquor
124 Remarks at Eurasian National University, October 13, 2005; and U.S. Congress, House International Relations
Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Testimony by Steven R. Mann, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary, July 25, 2006. See also U.S. Embassy, Astana, Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan and the United States in a
Changed World, August 23, 2006.
125 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Joint Statement: U.S.-Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement, Meeting of the TIFA Council, November 14, 2013.
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U.S.
U.S.
Imports
Main Categories of
Exports
Main Categories of U.S.
Total
County
from
U.S. Imports
to
Exports
Turnover
Tajikistan 0.7 measuring
devices, 52.6 poultry,
communications
53.3
dried food
equipment, civilian aircraft
Turkmenistan 31.1
agricultural
products, 260.8
poultry, industrial valves, oil & gas 291.9
linens, fabrics,
field machinery, turbines, air &
petroleum refinery
gas compressors, civilian aircraft
products
Uzbekistan 26.6 inorganic
chemicals, 320.9 poultry,
petroleum
refinery 347.5
spices, dried foods
products, pharmaceuticals,
turbines, air & gas compressors,
industrial furnaces, civilian aircraft
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. International Trade Data.
Some U.S. foreign investors have become discouraged in recent years by harsher Kazakh
government terms, taxes, and fines that some allege reflect corruption within the ruling elite. In
2009, the Karachaganak Petroleum Operating (KPO) consortium (the main shareholder is British
Gas, and U.S. Chevron is among other shareholders), which extracts oil and gas from the
Karachaganak fields in northwest Kazakhstan, was faced with an effort by the Kazakh
government to obtain 10% of the shares of the consortium. Facing resistance, the government
imposed hundreds of millions of dollars in tax, environmental, and labor fines and oil export
duties against KPO. Both the government and KPO appealed to international arbitration. In
December 2011, KPO agreed to transfer 10% of its shares to the Kazakh government, basically
gratis, and in exchange the government mostly lifted the fines and duties.126 In May 2012,
President Nazarbayev suggested that foreign energy firms operating in the country could help
finance domestic industrial projects.127 Kazakhstan also has required that international firms use
local products. Some U.S. businesses have called for modernizing the 1992 U.S.-Kazakh Bilateral
Investment Treaty to close loopholes that permit Kazakhstan to levy many fines on U.S. firms. In
mid-February 2014, President Nazarbayev ordered his government to increase the pace of foreign
investment, or he would fire them and form a new government.
The New Silk Road Vision
Building on U.S. government efforts since the mid-2000s to encourage energy and other trade
linkages between Central and South Asia, in July 2011 then-Secretary Clinton announced that
U.S. policy toward Afghanistan in coming years would focus on encouraging “stronger economic
ties through South and Central Asia so that goods, capital, and people can flow more easily across
borders.”128 She further explained this “New Silk Road Vision” at a meeting of regional ministers
and others in September 2011, stating that
126 Press Release: Agreement Reached with Republic of Kazakhstan on Karachaganak, BG Group, December 14, 2011,
at http://www.bg-group.com/MEDIACENTRE/PRESS/Pages/14Dec2010.aspx.
127 Georgiy Voloshin, “Kazakhstan’s Economic Proposals Reveal Fears about Political Instability,” CACI Analyst, June
13, 2012.
128 U.S. Department of State, Travel Diary: “India and the United States—A Vision for the 21st Century,” DipNote,
July 20, 2011.
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as we look to the future of this region, let us take this precedent [of a past Silk Road] as
inspiration for a long-term vision for Afghanistan and its neighbors. Let us set our sights on a
new Silk Road—a web of economic and transit connections that will bind together a region
too long torn apart by conflict and division…. Turkmen gas fields could help meet both
Pakistan’s and India’s growing energy needs and provide significant transit revenues for both
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Tajik cotton could be turned into Indian linens. Furniture and fruit
from Afghanistan could find its way to the markets of Astana or Mumbai and beyond.129
The Silk Road Vision further was adumbrated during meetings in Turkey and Germany in late
2011. The Istanbul Conference Communiqué called for connecting Afghanistan to Central Asian
and Iranian railways and for bolstering regional energy linkages.130
In a speech in October 2012, then-Assistant Secretary Blake claimed that the NDN routes could
serve after the U.S. and NATO drawdown in 2014 in Afghanistan as components of the U.S. “Silk
Road Vision,” of enhanced trade within and between Central and South Asia.131
In April 2013 in meetings in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, then-Assistant Secretary Blake deemed
that progress on the Administration’s Silk Road Vision included plans to build the Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, plans for financing for the Central Asia-South
Asia (CASA-1000) electricity transmission project, and plans by Turkmenistan to build a rail line
transiting Afghanistan to Tajikistan. He also praised the cross-border transport agreement between
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan, concluded under the auspices of the Central Asia
Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program, administered by the Asian Development
Bank. Similarly, he highlighted plans by Turkey, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to
develop a Black Sea Corridor from Europe to Afghanistan and China. He hailed progress at the
Istanbul Process ministerial meeting in Almaty to advance these and other regional integration
efforts that include Afghanistan. At the same time, he stated that the United States would increase
cooperation with Central Asia to strengthen border security, reduce corruption, and enhance
information-sharing to combat narcotics trafficking and cross-border terrorism.
In January 2014, U.S. Ambassador to Latvia Mark Pekula praised the NDN as “efficiently” and
“smoothly” moving military-related materials to and from Afghanistan through Latvia. He stated
that Latvia and the United States supported transforming the NDN into a “new silk road” with
Latvia serving as a commercial hub for shipments of raw materials, cars, and other goods as far as
the Pacific Coast. This “new silk road” will be a basis for economic development along the route,
including Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, he suggested.132
According to an Economic Impact Assessment (EIA) report released by the State Department in
2011 as part of the conceptualization of the Administration’s Silk Road Vision, nine projects were
viewed as among the most significant and economically beneficial to Central Asia as well as
129 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Clinton Co-Chairs the New Silk Road Ministerial Meeting,” DipNote,
September 23, 2011; Fact Sheet on New Silk Road Ministerial, September 22, 2011. See also U.S. Department of State,
Remarks, Robert D. Hormats, Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs, Address to the SAIS
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and CSIS Forum, September 29, 2011.
130 Andrew Kuchins, “Laying the Groundwork for Afghanistan’s New Silk Road: How Washington and Kabul Can
Turn a Vision Into a Plan,” Foreign Affairs, December 5, 2011.
131 U.S. Department of State, Remarks, Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs, [at] Indiana University’s Inner Asian and Uralic Natural Resource Center, October 18, 2012.
132 USEUCOM, U.S. Ambassador to Latvia Talks about the ‘New Silk Road,’ January 9, 2014, at
http://www.eucom.mil/video/25518/u-s-amb-to-latvia-talks-about-the-new-silk-road.
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Afghanistan. Of these, the State Department reported that four had been started. Since then, one
other project has been started as of early 2014. Projects where some progress has occurred
include rehabilitating the Salang tunnel rehabilitation and construction of a by-pass; upgrading
two sections of roadway in central Afghanistan, from Mazar-i-Sharif to Dar-e-Suf, and from
Yakawlang to Bamiyan; building the Mazar-i-Sharif to Hairatan rail link as part of Afghanistan’s
national rail system; building a rail link from Sher Khan Bandar to Herat and developing the
Hairatan/Naibabad land port facilities; and burying fiber optic cables linking major cities in
Afghanistan to sites in Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The Central Asia-South Asia
Regional Electricity Trade Project (CASAREM/CASA-1000) and the Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project are among the projects identified by the
State Department that have not started as of early 2014.133
In December 2014, the State Department announced a $15 million financing for CASA-1000,
which when completed will permit Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to sell about 1,300MW of
electricity generated in the summertime through transmission lines to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The State Department states that the electricity will be provided from existing hydropower
generation so will not exacerbate water-sharing tensions with down-stream states. The State
Department voiced the hope that the financing would encourage other donors to support the
project, including the World Bank (the Asian Development Bank had pulled out of the project). At
a meeting sponsored by the World Bank in Washington, D.C., in February 2014, energy ministers
from Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan signed an agreement in principle on the
terms and conditions of purchasing power. However, some observers caution that the hazard of
the route through Afghanistan remains an obstacle to funding and constructing the transmission
lines.134
Critics have charged that the Silk Road Vision is less a program than an inspiration. They point
out that the Administration’s vision of Central-South Asia trade links is only one variant of what
might be considered the “Silk Road,” which usually has described historical trade routes from
China to the Mediterranean Sea. They also have suggested that the NDN has failed to convince
Central Asia states to adapt their border control regimes and trade practices to facilitate such free
trade.135
133 U.S. Department of State, Afghanistan & Regional Economic Cooperation Economic Impact Assessment, June 7,
2011, pp. 63, 69. See also U.S. Department of State, International Support for Afghanistan and Regional Economic
Cooperation: A Mapping and Gap Analysis Review for the Afghanistan Strategy for Prosperity, Infrastructure, and
Regional Engagement (ASPIRE) Initiative, May 22, 2011.
134 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Media Note: U.S. Announces $15 Million in Funding for
CASA-1000 Electricity Project, December 11, 2013; “CASA-1000: Pakistan, Central Asia Agree in Principle to Terms
for Power Project,” The Express Tribune, February 19, 2014; Mushtaq Ghumman, “CASA-1000 Prospects Hit by
Snags,” The Business Recorder, February 20, 2014..
135 Graham Lee, The New Silk Road and the Northern Distribution Network: A Golden Road to Central Asian Trade
Reform? Open Society Foundations, October 2012; Joshua Kucera, “NDN And The New Silk Road, Together Again,”
Eurasianet, October 25, 2012; Joshua Kucera, “U.S. General Says NDN Will Lead To New Silk Road,” Eurasianet,
December 1, 2012; Roger McDermott, “NDN ‘Reverse Transit,’ Uzbekistan and the Failure of Western Grand
Strategy,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Part 1, March 26, 2013, and Part 2, April 2, 2013; Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, Briefing on the New Silk Road Strategy: Implications for Economic Development in Central
Asia, July 31, 2013.
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Energy Resources
The Caspian region is emerging as a notable source of oil and gas for world markets. The U.S.
Energy Information Administration has estimated that gas exports from the region could account
for 11% of global gas export sales by 2035, belying arguments by some observers in the 1990s
that the region would be marginal as a contributor to world energy supplies. According to British
Petroleum (BP), the proven natural gas reserves of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
are estimated at over 700 trillion cubic feet (tcf), among the largest in the world. The region’s
proven oil reserves are estimated to be over 30 billion barrels, slightly less than those of the
United States.136
Russia’s temporary cutoffs of gas to Ukraine in January 2006 and January 2009 and a brief
slowdown of oil shipments to Belarus in January 2010 (Belarus and Ukraine are transit states for
oil and gas pipelines to other European states) have highlighted Europe’s energy insecurity. The
United States has supported EU efforts to reduce its overall reliance on Russian oil and gas by
increasing the number of possible alternative suppliers. Part of this policy has involved
encouraging Central Asian countries to transport their energy exports to Europe through pipelines
that cross the Caspian Sea, thereby bypassing Russian (and Iranian) territory, although these
amounts are expected at most to satisfy only a small fraction of EU needs.137
The Central Asian states long were pressured by Russia to yield large portions of their energy
wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controlled most existing export pipelines.138 Russia
attempted to strengthen this control over export routes for Central Asian energy in May 2007
when President Putin reached agreement in Kazakhstan on supplying more Kazakh oil to Russia.
Putin also reached agreement with the presidents of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan on the
construction of a new pipeline to transport Turkmen and Kazakh gas to Russia. The first
agreement appeared to compete with U.S. and Turkish efforts to foster more oil exports through
the BTC. The latter agreement appeared to compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster building a
trans-Caspian gas pipeline. The latter also appeared to compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster
building a pipeline from Turkey through Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to Austria (the
so-called Nabucco pipeline).
Seeming to indicate a direct challenge to these plans by Russia and the West, China signed an
agreement in August 2007 with Kazakhstan on completing the last section of an oil pipeline from
the Caspian seacoast to China, and signed an agreement with Turkmenistan on building a gas
pipeline to China (see also below).139 In March 2008, the heads of the national gas companies of
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan announced that their countries would raise the gas
export price to the European level in future years. They signed a memorandum of understanding
on the price with Russia’s Gazprom state-controlled gas firm, which controls most export
pipelines. According to analyst Martha Olcott, “the increased bargaining power of the Central
136 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2013.
137 For details, see CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, by Paul Belkin. See also
International Crisis Group. Central Asia’s Energy Risks, May 24, 2007.
138 According to a plan published by Russia’s Institute of Energy Strategy covering the period 2007-2030, “Russian
control over a large share of Central Asian gas needs to be maintained.” See Minpromenergo (Ministry of Industry and
Energy), Institut energeticheskoi strategii, Kontseptsiya energeticheskoi strategii Rossii na period do 2030g., 2007. As
reported by Philip Hanson, “How Sustainable Is Russia’s Energy Power?” Russian Analytical Digest, No. 38 (2008).
139 An oil and gas conference involving Kazakh, Chinese, and Russian energy ministries and firms has met annually
since 2004 to “exchange views” on possible regional cooperation. ITAR-TASS, December 5, 2007.
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Asian states owes more to the entry of China into the market than to the opening of [the BTC
pipeline and the SCP]. Russia’s offer to pay higher purchase prices for Central Asian gas in 2008
and 2009 came only after China signed a long-term purchase agreement for Turkmen gas at a
base price that was higher than what Moscow was offering.”140
After having failed in several other Soviet successor states, Gazprom reportedly succeeded in
purchasing Kyrgyzstan’s entire gas distribution system in December 2012.
Kazakhstan’s Oil and Gas
According to British Petroleum, Kazakhstan possesses 30 billion barrels of proven oil reserves
(about 2% of world reserves) and 45.7 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves (about 1% of
world gas reserves).141 There are five major onshore oil fields—Tengiz, Karachaganak, Aktobe,
Mangistau, and Uzen—which account for about half of the proven reserves. There are two major
offshore oil fields in Kazakhstan’s sector of the Caspian Sea—Kashagan and Kurmangazy—
which are estimated to contain at least 14 billion barrels of recoverable reserves.
Nazarbayev’s development goals for Kazakhstan rely heavily on increases in oil and gas
production and exports, which account for a significant share of government revenues and GDP
growth. The government has anticipated growing revenues in particular from expanding
production at the Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan oil fields. While production is increasing
at the former two oil fields, the latter oil field has not yet produced oil. Development of the
Kashagan oil field began soon after its discovery in 2000, but has faced numerous delays and cost
overruns, attributable to the harsh offshore environment; the high pressure, depth, and sulfur
content of the oil; reported management problems; and Kazakh government interference.
Members of the North Caspian Operating Consortium developing the oil field currently include
Italy’s Eni energy firm, the Anglo-Dutch Shell, the U.S.’s ExxonMobil, and France’s Total (all
with a 16.81% stake), Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGaz (16.88%), the China National Petroleum
Corporation (8.33%), and Japan’s Inpex (7.56%). The developmental cost of Phase one has risen
to about $50 billion. The anticipated difficulty and cost of further development of the oil field—
which could result in production of up to 1.5 million bpd, but which could cost an added $100
billion or more—have raised questions among the foreign consortium members about the timeline
and feasibility of such efforts, and contributed to rising concerns by the Kazakh government that
its hopes for rising revenues from the oil field might need to be revised.
Production at Kashagan began in September 2013, but was halted weeks later following a toxic
waste processing leak. A new development plan reportedly will be worked out by the end of
March 2014 and production of around 100,000 bpd may not resume until late in the year or even
2015. Kazakhstan fined the consortium $737 million for environmental pollution, viewed by
some observers as a means by which Kazakhstan may gain further shares in the project.142
Dutch and U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) have played dominant roles in the development of
Kazakhstani oil and gas and other resources. Dutch FDI from 2005 through the 3rd quarter of
2013 was $49.9 billion and U.S. FDI was $16.1 billion. Chinese FDI in Kazakhstan was $10.3
140 Martha Olcott, “A New Direction for U.S. Policy in the Caspian Region.”
141 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, British Petroleum, June 2013.
142 Neil Hume, “Kashagan Fails to Live Up to Promise,” Financial Times, March 6, 2014.
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billion, and Russian FDI was $7.0 billion.143 Chinese President Xi Jinping’s September 2013
Central Asian visit resulted in boosted Chinese FDI in the region.
Kazakhstan’s main oil export route from the Tengiz oil field has been a 930-mile pipeline
completed in 2001—owned by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), in which Russian
shareholders have a controlling interest—that carried 693,000 bpd of oil in 2009 from Kazakhstan
to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Kazakhstan’s other major oil export pipeline, from
Atyrau to Samara, Russia, has a capacity of approximately 730,000 bpd.
Lengthy Russian resistance to increasing the pumping capacity of the CPC pipeline and demands
for higher transit and other fees, along with the necessity of offloading the oil into tankers at
Novorossiysk to transit the clogged Turkish Straits, spurred Kazakh President Nazarbayev to sign
a treaty with visiting Azerbaijani President Aliyev in June 2006 to barge Kazakh oil across the
Caspian Sea to Baku to the BTC pipeline. Kazakhstan began shipping about 70,000 bpd of oil
through the BTC pipeline at the end of October 2008. Another accord resulted from a visit by
President Nazarbayev to Azerbaijan in September 2009 that provides that up to 500,000 bpd of oil
from the Kashagan field eventually may be barged across the Caspian to enter the BTC or the
pipeline from Baku to Georgia’s seaport of Supsa. Central Asian media reported in November
2013 that Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan had discussed the transit of about 22 million barrels of
Kazakh oil through the BTC pipeline and 7.3 million barrels through the Baku-Supsa pipeline in
2014 (in total, about 80,000 bpd). Kazakhstan also has barged some oil to Baku to ship by rail to
Georgia’s seaports of Kulevi and Batumi. At the latter seaport, Kazakhstan became the sole owner
of an oil terminal in early 2008. Kazakhstan began barging oil to the Romanian port of
Constantsa in late 2008 for processing at two refineries it purchased.144
In December 2010, the CPC approved a plan to upgrade the pumping capacity of the oil pipeline
to 1.4 million bpd, with several phases of construction through 2015. The increased capacity will
accommodate boosted production from the Tengiz and Karachaganak oil fields, as well as from
anticipated development of the Kashagan and Filanovsky oil fields (the latter is owned by
Russia). Construction reportedly has faced delays.
In addition to these oil export routes to Europe not controlled by Russia, in 2009 Kazakhstan and
China completed an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan’s port city of Atyrau to the Xinjiang region of
China that initially carries 200,000 bpd to China. Some Russian oil has been transported to China
through this pipeline, the first Russian oil to be transported by pipeline to China.
Russia is the major purchaser of Kazakh gas through the Central Asia-Center gas pipeline
network. According to British Petroleum (BP) data, Kazakhstan exported 388.5 bcf of gas to
Russia in 2012 (slightly less than in 2011), virtually all of its exported gas.145
Kazakhstan completed its sections of the first phase of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline in
2009-2010. At the end of October 2008, China and Kazakhstan signed a framework agreement on
constructing a gas pipeline from Beyneu, north of the Aral Sea, eastward to Shymkent, where it
143 “Invest in Kazakhstan,” website sponsored by the President of Kazakhstan, the Ministry of Industry, the Investment
Committee, and the Foreign Ministry, at http://invest.gov.kz/?option=content§ion=4&itemid=75.
144 ITAR-TASS, May 29, 2008; CEDR, December 11, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950096; April 26, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-
950045.
145 “Natural Gas: Trade Movements 2012 by Pipeline,” BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2013, p. 28.
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will connect with the Central Asia-China gas pipeline. The pipeline is planned initially to supply
176.6 bcf to southern Kazakhstan and 176.6 bcf to China. Pipeline construction began in
September 2011 and to be completed by 2015.
Kazakh officials have appeared to make contradictory statements about providing gas for
European customers via a possible trans-Caspian pipeline traversing the South Caucasus and
Turkey. President Nazarbayev appeared to support the possible transit of Kazakh gas through
Turkey when he stated on October 22, 2009, during a visit to Turkey, that “Turkey ... will become
a transit country. And if Kazakhstan’s oil and gas are transported via this corridor then this will be
advantageous to both Turkey and Kazakhstan.”146 Reacting to the decision of the European
Commission to facilitate talks on building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline, Minister of Oil and Gas
Sauat Mynabyev stated in October 2011 that “we do not have available resources for the gas
pipeline yet.”147
During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit in September 2013, accords were signed reportedly
amounting to up to $30 billion to build the Beyneu-Bozoy gas pipeline and an oil refinery, among
other projects. It was announced that Kazakhstan had reallocated shares in the consortium
developing Kashagan (including those transferred by Conoco-Phillips in 2013) to provide the
China National Petroleum Corporation with an 8.33% stake.
Turkmenistan’s Gas
Turkmenistan’s proven natural gas reserves—618.1 trillion cubic feet—are among the highest in
the world, according to British Petroleum (BP) data. Its oil reserves are about 600 million barrels,
less than one-tenth of one percent of the world’s proven reserves.148
At the time it gained independence at the end of 1991, Turkmenistan largely was dependent on
Russian energy export routes, and gas and oil production were held back by aging infrastructure,
inadequate investment, and poor management. In 1993, Russia halted Turkmen gas exports to
Western markets through its pipelines, diverting Turkmen gas to other Eurasian states that had
trouble paying for the gas. In 1997, Russia cut off these shipments because of transit fee arrears
and as leverage to obtain Turkmenistan’s agreement to terms offered by Russia’s state-owned gas
firm Gazprom.
The late President Niyazov signed a 25-year accord with then-President Putin in 2003 on
supplying Russia up to 211.9 billion cubic feet (bcf) of gas in 2004 (about 12% of production at
that time), rising up to 2.83 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2009-2028 (perhaps amounting to the bulk
of anticipated production). Turkmenistan halted gas shipments to Russia at the end of 2004 in an
attempt to get a higher gas price but settled for all-cash rather than partial barter payments.
Turkmenistan and Russia continued to clash in subsequent years over gas prices and finally
agreed in late 2007 that gas prices based on “market principles” would be established in 2009.
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed accords in May and December 2007 on building a
new gas pipeline that was planned to carry 353 bcf of Turkmen and 353 bcf of Kazakh gas to
146 CEDR, October 22, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950337.
147 Interfax, October 6, 2011.
148 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, British Petroleum, June 2013.
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Russia. However, the Turkmen government appeared to have reservations about building another
pipeline to Russia, and the project reportedly is on hold.
Seeking alternatives to pipeline routes through Russia, in December 1997 Turkmenistan opened
the first pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile gas pipeline
linkage to Iran. In mid-2009, Turkmenistan reportedly agreed to increase gas supplies to up to
706 bcf per year.149 In January 2010, a second gas pipeline to Iran was completed—from a field
that until April 2009 had supplied gas to Russia (see below)—to more than double
Turkmenistan’s export capacity to Iran. However, Turkmen gas exports to Iran were about 290
bcf in 2010 and 360 bcf in 2011, according to BP. Turkmenistan has appeared to arbitrarily
interrupt gas shipments to northern Iran in winter months. In January 2014, the intergovernmental
Turkmen-Iranian joint commission on economic cooperation held a meeting in Ashkhabad and
signed an accord on enhanced cooperation in the oil and gas sphere and other areas.
As another alternative to pipelines through Russia, in April 2006, Turkmenistan and China signed
a framework agreement calling for Chinese investment in developing gas fields in Turkmenistan
and in building a gas pipeline with a capacity of about 1.4 tcf per year through Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan to China. Construction of the pipeline began in August 2007 and gas began to be
delivered through the pipeline to Xinjiang and beyond in December 2009. In 2011, Turkmenistan
provided about 505 bcf of gas to China, according to BP. In June 2012, Turkmenistan’s
Turkmengaz and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed accords to increase
Turkmenistan’s natural gas shipments to China up to 2.8 tcf per year by 2020.
Perhaps in an additional attempt to diversify gas export routes, Berdimuhamedow first signaled in
2007 that Turkmenistan was interested in building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Turkmenistan
signed a memorandum of understanding in April 2008 with the EU to supply 353.1 bcf of gas per
year starting in 2009, presumably through a trans-Caspian pipeline that might at first link to the
SCP and later to the proposed trans-Anatolian pipeline. President Berdimuhamedow asserted in
March 2011 that “Turkmenistan intends to promote cooperation in the fuel and energy sector with
European countries … through construction of Trans-Caspian gas pipelines.”150 Russia and Iran
remain opposed to trans-Caspian pipelines, ostensibly on the grounds that they could pose
environmental hazards to the littoral states. According to one recent report, Turkmenistan has
prioritized providing gas to China and moving forward on plans to construct the Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline (see below). Plans for a trans-Caspian pipeline
are a lower priority, including because of ongoing tensions between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan
on ownership of undersea oil and gas fields.151
Berdimuhamedow also revived Niyazov’s proposal to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to
Pakistan and India. In December 2010, the presidents of Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan
and the prime minister of India signed an agreement on constructing the TAPI pipeline. On May
23, 2012, Turkmenistan signed purchase agreements with India and Pakistan to supply up to 1.2
tcf of gas per year via the prospective TAPI pipeline. Then-U.S. State Department spokesperson
Victoria Nuland hailed the signing as “a perfect example of energy diversification, energy
149 Iran: Daily Report, January 21, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-11017; January 24, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950014; April 26,
2008, Doc. No. IAP-950049; and May 6, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950052.; CEDR, July 12, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950097.
150 “President’s Welcoming Address,” Turkmenistan: The Golden Age, March 3, 2011, at
http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/_en/?idr=4&id=110303a.
151 CEDR, November 22, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-54453905.
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integration, done right. We are very strong supporters of the TAPI pipeline.... We consider it a
very positive step forward and sort of a key example of what we’re seeking with our New Silk
Road Initiative, which aims at regional integration to lift all boats and create prosperity across the
region.”152 In mid-November 2013, Turkmenistan’s Turkmengaz state-owned gas firm,
Afghanistan’s state-owned gas firm, Pakistan’s Interstate Gas Systems, India’s Gali energy firm,
and the Asian Development Bank signed an agreement to work toward finding added investors,
attracting other energy companies, and acquiring funding for TAPI.
On the night of April 8-9, 2009, a section of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Russia
exploded, halting Turkmen gas shipments. Russia claimed that it had notified Turkmenistan that it
was reducing its gas imports because European demand for gas had declined, but Turkmenistan
denied that it had been properly informed.153 After extended talks, visiting former Russian
President Dmitriy Medvedev and President Berdimuhamedow agreed on December 22, 2009, that
Turkmen gas exports to Russia would be resumed, and that the existing supply contract would be
altered to reduce Turkmen gas exports to up to 1 tcf per year and to increase the price paid for the
gas. Turkmenistan announced in January 2010 that some gas exports to Russia had resumed. The
incident appeared to further validate Turkmenistan’s policy of diversifying its gas export routes.
In 2010, Russia’s Gazprom gas firm purchased only 371 bcf of Turkmen gas, a sharp drop-off
from past purchases. Unfortunately, Turkmen gas exports to Iran and China were not
compensatory. Overall Turkmen gas exports fell in 2010 to about 865 bcf, down from 1.7 tcf in
2008, before the Russian gas cutoff.154 In 2011, according to BP, Russia purchased 356.7 bcf of
Turkmen gas. Overall, Turkmen gas exports rose to 1.2 tcf in 2011, buoyed by Chinese and
Iranian purchases. Reportedly, Russia gains most of its cash revenue from these exports to Russia.
Iran pays for its gas at least in part with goods, and Turkmen gas exports to China initially are
being used to pay off Chinese energy development and pipeline loans.155
In September 2011, the Council of the EU approved opening talks with Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan to facilitate an accord on building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Such a link would
provide added gas to ensure adequate supplies for EU Southern Corridor diversification efforts.
Hailing the decision, EU Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger stated that “Europe is now
speaking with one voice. The trans-Caspian pipeline is a major project in the Southern Corridor to
bring new sources of gas to Europe. We have the intention of achieving this as soon as
possible.”156 The Russian Foreign Ministry denounced the plans for the talks, and claimed that the
Caspian Sea littoral states had agreed in a declaration issued in October 2007 that decisions
regarding the Sea would be adopted by consensus among all the littoral states (Russia itself has
violated this provision by agreeing with Kazakhstan and with Azerbaijan on oil and gas field
development). It also claimed that the proposed pipeline was different from existing sub-sea
pipelines in posing an environmental threat.
152 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, May 23, 2012.
153 Open Source Center. OSC Feature, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. FEA-844966; CEDR, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-
950339; ITAR-TASS, April 3, 2009; Sergey Blagov, “Turkmenistan: Ashgabat Wonders Whether Russia Still Has Deep
Pockets,” Eurasia Insight, March 26, 2009.
154 “Turkmen Gas Could Find Chinese Outlet,” Central Asia Online, March 26, 2011.
155 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Energy and Security from the Caspian to Europe: A
Minority Staff Report, December 12, 2012, p. 24.
156 European Commission, Press release: EU Starts Negotiations on Caspian Pipeline to Bring Gas to Europe,
September 12, 2011.
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In June 2012, Azerbaijani border forces turned back a Turkmen ship carrying out seismic work in
or near the area of the disputed and undeveloped offshore Serder/Kyapaz oil and gas field. Two
other disputed fields have been developed by Azerbaijan. Each side lodged diplomatic protests
against the other. The heightened tensions over the disputed field decreases the likelihood that a
trans-Caspian pipeline soon will be built that could supply gas for the planned Trans-Anatolian
Pipeline to Europe, according to the EIU.
Despite these tensions, EU Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger argued at the Frankfurt Gas
Forum meeting in November 2012 that for the Southern Corridor to supply 10-20% of EU gas
needs within the next decade, a trans-Caspian pipeline to Turkmenistan is necessary. Likewise, at
a meeting of the EU-Azerbaijan Cooperation Council in Brussels in December 2012, both sides
voiced the hope that an Azerbaijani-Turkmen-EU accord on building the trans-Caspian pipeline
could be reached. At an energy conference in Turkmenistan in mid-November 2012, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Lynne Tracy stated that the U.S. position was that if such an accord is
reached, “no other country has veto power over that decision.” However, some observers reported
that Turkmen officials emphasized their interest in the TAPI pipeline and de-emphasized interest
in the trans-Caspian pipeline.157A Senate Foreign Relations Committee minority staff report
issued in December 2012 called for Turkmenistan to make a political decision to build a trans-
Caspian gas pipeline and invite major Western firms to develop oil and gas fields, for the United
States to push for international funding for this pipeline, and for the EU to involve its members as
well as Azerbaijan and Turkey in gas purchase talks with Turkmenistan. The report also suggested
that in order to acquaint Turkmenistan with Western markets, a small undersea pipeline with a
capacity of about 353 bcf quickly could be built to connect existing Azerbaijani and Turkmen
offshore platforms.158
During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s September 2013 visit to Turkmenistan, accords were
signed boosting gas purchases and further developing the Galkynysh (South Yolotan) gas field,
where the China National Petroleum Corporation has participating in building gas processing
facilities.
Uzbekistan’s Oil and Gas
British Petroleum has estimated that Uzbekistan has about 600 million barrels of proven oil
reserves and an estimated 39.7 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves as of the end of
2012 (negligible in terms of world oil reserves but about 1% of world gas reserves).159 Uzbekistan
is a net importer of oil. Uzbek oil production has been declining for many years, attributable to
lack of investment. The country consumes the bulk of its gas production domestically, but has
used its network of Soviet-era gas pipelines to export some gas to Russia and to other Central
Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). Gas exports to the latter two states have
been substantially reduced in recent years because of payment arrears. According to BP,
Uzbekistan exported about 479 bcf of gas in 2010: 364 bcf of gas to Russia; 102 bcf to
Kazakhstan; about 7 bcf to Kyrgyzstan; and about 6 bcf to Tajikistan. According to one report,
157 Natallia Moore, “Turkmenistan Weekly News Analysis,” Eurasianet, November 22, 2012 and November 30, 2012.
158 Najia Badykova, “US-EU Energy Council Reiterates Support for Southern Corridor,” FSU Oil and Gas Monitor,
December 12, 2012; Jennifer DeLay, “Russia, Azerbaijan Remain Rivals in Race for European Gas Markets,” FSU Oil
and Gas Monitor, December 19, 2012; United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Energy and Security
from the Caspian to Europe: A Minority Staff Report, December 12, 2012.
159 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, British Petroleum, June 2013.
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gas exports declined to 424 bcf in 2011, but the government hopes to export 530 bcf in 2012. Gas
is provided to Russia and Kazakhstan through the Russian-owned Central Asia-Center Pipeline
system. Uzbekistan began to export some gas through this pipeline system to Ukraine in 2011.
Reportedly, Uzbekistan was an unreliable gas exporter during the winters of 2010-2011 and 2011-
2012, restricting supplies to divert them to cold-weather domestic use. In November 2011,
Kazakhstan’s major city of Almaty experienced shortages of gas imported from Uzbekistan,
leading it to urgently conclude an agreement with the China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) to obtain gas from the Central Asia-China Pipeline.160
Uzbekistan largely has been closed to Western energy investment, although efforts to attract
international energy firms have appeared to increase in recent years. Russian firms Gazprom and
Lukoil are the largest investors in Uzbek gas development and production. Reportedly, Gazprom
pays European-pegged gas prices for only a fraction of imports from Uzbekistan. In 2005, CNPC
and Uzbekistan’s state-owned Uzbekneftegaz firm announced that they would form a joint
venture to develop oil and gas resources. In 2007, Uzbekistan and China signed an agreement on
building a 326-mile section of the Central Asia-China Pipeline, and a construction and operation
joint venture between Uzbekneftegaz and CNPC began construction in 2008. Two side-by-side
pipelines have been completed, and the third is under construction. In October 2011, Uztransgaz
(Uzbek gas transportation firm) and a subsidiary of CNPC signed a contract to supply up to 353
billion cubic feet of gas in 2012 though this pipeline (other sources stated that Uzbekistan
planned to supply up to 141 billion cubic feet). However, Uzbekistan has reported that these
shipments began only in August 2012. In April 2012, China announced it would spend $15 billion
for oil and gas exploration in Uzbekistan. A production sharing consortium composed of
Uzbekneftegaz, Lukoil, the Korea National Oil Corporation, and CNPC is exploring for gas in the
Aral Sea region.
During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s September 2013 visit to Uzbekistan, 31 accords were
reportedly signed worth $15 billion to develop oil, gas, and uranium deposits.
U.S. Regional Energy Policy
U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central Asian and South Caucasian states
have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the West, supporting U.S. private
investment, promoting NATO and European energy security through diversified suppliers,
assisting ally Turkey, and opposing the building of pipelines that transit “energy competitor” Iran
or otherwise give it undue influence over the region. Other interests have included encouraging
regional electricity, oil, and gas exports to South Asia and added security for Caspian region
pipelines and energy resources.
To bolster NATO and other European energy supply diversity, the United States supported the
building of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC; completed in 2006) and the South
Caucasus Pipeline (SCP; completed in 2007). The United States also endorsed the building of a
trans-Caspian gas pipeline to link Central Asian producers to European markets. In testimony in
June 2011, then-Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Richard Morningstar stated that current U.S.
policy encourages the development of new Eurasian oil and gas resources to increase the diversity
of world energy supplies. In the case of oil, increased supplies may directly benefit the United
States, he stated. A second U.S. goal is to increase European energy security, so that some
160 Interfax, November 14, 2011.
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countries in Europe that largely rely on a single supplier (presumably Russia) may in the future
have diverse suppliers. A third goal is assisting Caspian regional states to develop new routes to
market, so that they can obtain more competitive prices and become more prosperous. In order to
achieve these goals, the Administration supports the development of the Southern Corridor of
Caspian (and perhaps Iraq) gas export routes transiting Turkey to Europe.161 Of various
competing pipeline proposals, the Administration will support the proposal “that brings the most
gas, soonest and most reliably, to those parts of Europe that need it most.” The Administration
also supports the diversification of Kazakhstan’s export routes and the boosting of oil production
as a significant addition to world oil supplies. At the same time, Morningstar rejected views that
Russia and the United States are competing for influence over Caspian energy supplies, stating
that the Administration has formed a Working Group on Energy under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral
Presidential Commission.162
At the fourth meeting of the U.S.-EU Energy Council in early December 2012 in Brussels, the
parties issued a statement supporting the development of the Southern Gas Corridor, which they
stated “remains a pivotal opportunity to diversify supply and allow new providers to participate in
the EU energy market.” The sides also stressed that they continued to encourage Central Asian
producers to link up to the Southern Gas Corridor.163
Until 2004, the Bush Administration retained a Clinton-era position, Special Advisor on Caspian
Energy Diplomacy, to help further U.S. policy and counter the efforts of Russia’s Viktor
Kaluzhny, the then-deputy foreign minister and Special Presidential Representative for Energy
Matters in the Caspian. After the Administration abolished this post as no longer necessary, its
responsibilities were shifted at least in part to a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
(responsibilities of a former Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and Eurasian Conflicts
also were shifted to the Deputy Assistant Secretary). Some critics juxtaposed Russia’s close
interest in securing Caspian energy resources to what they termed halting U.S. efforts.164
Following some congressional urging, a post of Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy issues was
(re-)created in March 2008, with the former Bush Administration stating that there were “new
opportunities” for the export of Caspian oil and gas.165 In April 2009, then-Secretary of State
Clinton appointed Richard Morningstar as Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, reporting directly
to the Secretary of State. After he left this post in mid-2012, the Administration proposed that the
functions of the post be assumed by an official in the State Department’s Bureau of Energy
Resources. In late 2012, minority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended
that the State Department retain a dedicated Special Envoy position.166 The position continues to
be listed on the State Department’s website, but it has not been filled as of early 2014.167
161 The term “Southern Gas Corridor” was mentioned in Commission of the European Communities, Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee, and
the Committee of the Regions, Second Strategic Energy Review: An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan,
Com(2008) 781 Final, November 13, 2008.
162 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Hearing on
European and Eurasian Energy: Developing Capabilities for Security and Prosperity, Testimony of Ambassador
Richard L. Morningstar, Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, June 2, 2011.
163 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Joint Statement on the U.S.-EU Energy Council, December 5,
2012.
164 Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 31, 2007.
165 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Energy and Security from the Caspian to Europe: A
Minority Staff Report, December 12, 2012, pp. 61-62.
166 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Energy and Security from the Caspian to Europe: A
(continued...)
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U.S. Aid Overview
For much of the 1990s and until September 11, 2001, the United States provided much more aid
each year to Russia and Ukraine than to any Central Asian state (most such aid was funded from
the Freedom Support Act account in Foreign Operations Appropriations, but some derived from
other program and agency budgets). Cumulative foreign aid budgeted to Central Asia for FY1992
through FY2010 amounted to $5.7 billion, about 14% of the amount budgeted to all the Eurasian
states, reflecting the lesser priority given to these states prior to September 11.
Budgeted spending for FY2002 for Central Asia, during OEF, was greatly boosted in absolute
amounts ($584 million) and as a share of total aid to Eurasia (about one-quarter of such aid). The
former Bush Administration since then requested smaller amounts of aid, although the
Administration continued to stress that there were important U.S. interests in the region. The
former Bush Administration highlighted the phase-out of economic aid to Kazakhstan and the
congressionally imposed restrictions on aid to Uzbekistan (see below) as among the reasons for
declining aid requests. In April 2008, then-Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher stated
that another reason for declining U.S. aid to the region was a more constrained U.S. budgetary
situation. Aid to Central Asia in recent years has been about the same or less in absolute and
percentage terms than that provided to the South Caucasian region.
The Obama Administration boosted aid to Central Asia in FY2009 to about $494.5 million (all
agencies and programs), but aid declined to $436.3 million in FY2010. The Administration stated
in FY2010 and FY2011 that it was prioritizing foreign assistance to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In
Tajikistan, the Administration stated that aid would help increase the stability of a country
“situated on the frontline of our ongoing military stabilization efforts in Afghanistan.” In
Kyrgyzstan, the Administration stated that aid would improve security, combat drug-trafficking,
reform the economy, and address food insecurity.168 Following the April and June 2010 instability
in Kyrgyzstan, the Administration provided $77.6 million in addition to regular appropriated aid
for stabilizing the economy, holding elections, and training police as well as urgent food and
shelter aid.
The Administration’s budget request for FY2015 called for $113.7 million for the Central Asian
countries, a decrease from FY2014 (the account tables used for “Function 150” assistance do not
break out NADR funding by country, so the amount given is provisional pending an
announcement of NADR funding by country) (see Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4). 169
(...continued)
Minority Staff Report, December 12, 2012, p. 9.
167 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, at http://www.state.gov/s/eee/, accessed
on March 18, 2014.
168 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for FY2010, May 2009, p. 44;
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for FY2011, Volume II, March 2010, p. 85.
169 The “function 150” aid numbers include amounts from the Economic Support Fund (ESF), Global Health and Child
Survival (GHCS) program, Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR), Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) program, International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and the Food for
Peace program. The totals do not include Defense or Energy Department funds, funding for exchanges, the value of
privately donated cargoes, or Millennium Challenge Corporation aid to Kyrgyzstan.
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The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), created in 2004 to provide U.S. aid to countries
with promising development records, announced in late 2005 that Kyrgyzstan was eligible to
apply for assistance as a country on the “threshold” of meeting the criteria for full-scale
development aid. In March 2008, the MCC signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan to provide $16
million over the next two years to help the country combat corruption and bolster the rule of law.
This threshold program was completed in June 2010, and Kyrgyzstan has requested another
threshold grant. In its FY2014 assessment, the MCC scored Krygyzstan as above the median for
candidate countries on more than one-half of various economic, democratic, health, education,
and conservation indicators, but as inadequately controlling corruption and slightly lagging in
upholding political rights and civil liberties. The MCC board did not select Kyrgyzstan when it
met in December 2013 to select countries for FY2014 compact and threshold program eligibility.
Peace Corps programs in most of the Central Asian states have ended (Tajikistan was deemed too
insecure for volunteers). Kyrgyzstan is the only country in the region currently hosting
volunteers. Most recently, Peace Corps volunteers wound up activities in Turkmenistan at the end
of 2012, reportedly in the wake of growing tensions between the Turkmen government and the
Peace Corps. According to some accounts, similar tensions had resulted in the termination of
Peace Corps activities in Kazakhstan the previous year.170
Congressional Conditions on Kazakh and Uzbek Aid
In Congress, Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7) forbade FREEDOM Support Act
(FSA) assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determined and
reported that it was making substantial progress in meeting commitments under the Strategic
Partnership Declaration to democratize and respect human rights. The conference report (H.Rept.
108-10) also introduced language that forbade assistance to the Kazakh government unless the
Secretary of State determined and reported that it significantly had improved its human rights
record during the preceding six months. However, the legislation permitted the Secretary to waive
the requirement on national security grounds.171 The Secretary reported in mid-2003 that
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were making such progress. Some in Congress were critical of these
findings. By late 2003, the former Bush Administration had decided that progress was inadequate
in Uzbekistan, so that new Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military
Education and Training (IMET) aid was cut off. Since FY2005, the Secretary of State annually
has reported that Kazakhstan has failed to significantly improve its human rights record, but aid
restrictions have been waived on national security grounds.
Consolidated Appropriations for FY2004, including foreign operations (P.L. 108-199) and for
FY2005 (P.L. 108-447), and Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 (P.L. 109-102)
retained these conditions, while clarifying that the prohibition on aid to Uzbekistan pertained to
the central government and that conditions included respecting human rights, establishing a
“genuine” multi-party system, and ensuring free and fair elections and freedom of expression and
media. These conditions remained in place under the continuing resolution for FY2007 (P.L. 109-
170 Ashley Cleek, “Peace Corps Pulling Out of Turkmenistan,” Eurasianet, September 3, 2012.
171 The language calling for “substantial progress” in respecting human rights differs from the grounds of ineligibility
for assistance under Section 498(b) of Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), which includes as
grounds a presidential determination that a Soviet successor state has “engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights.” The Administration has stated annually that the president has
not determined that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have engaged in “gross violations” of human rights.
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289, as amended). In appropriations for FY2008 (Consolidated Appropriations; P.L. 110-161),
another condition was added blocking the admission of Uzbek officials to the United States if the
Secretary of State determined that they were involved in abuses in Andijon. Omnibus
Appropriations for FY2009 (P.L. 111-8, Sections 7075 [Kazakhstan] and 7076 [Uzbekistan])
reiterated these conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Consolidated
Appropriations for FY2010 (P.L. 111-117) referenced Sections 7075 and 7076, but added that
Uzbekistan would be eligible for expanded IMET, permitting the first such assistance since
FY2004. The Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, FY2011 (P.L.
112-10), directed that assistance would be provided under the authorities and conditions of
FY2010 foreign operations appropriations.
In late 2009, Congress permitted (P.L. 111-84, §801)—for the first time since restrictions on aid
to Uzbekistan were put in place—the provision of some assistance on national security grounds to
facilitate the acquisition of supplies for U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan from countries
along the NDN. Using this authority, the Administration requested in April 2011 a small amount
of FMF assistance for FY2012 for nonlethal equipment to facilitate Uzbekistan’s protection of the
NDN (estimated FMF spending for FY2012 later increased substantially over that requested, to
$1.5 million).
On September 22, 2011, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved a foreign operations
appropriations bill, S. 1601 (Leahy), that provided for a waiver for assistance to Uzbekistan on
national security grounds and to facilitate U.S. access to and from Afghanistan. According to one
media account, the Administration had called for such a waiver in order to facilitate security
assistance, including FMF, for Uzbekistan.172 Some human rights groups protested against the
possible bolstering of U.S. security assistance to Uzbekistan.173 Consolidated Appropriations for
FY2012 (P.L. 112-74; signed into law on December 23, 2011) repeated conditions on assistance
to Kazakhstan (referencing Sec. 7075 of P.L. 111-8) and Uzbekistan (referencing Sec. 7076 of
P.L. 111-8). It newly provided for the Secretary of State to waive conditions on assistance to
Uzbekistan for a period of not more than six months and every six months thereafter until
September 30, 2013, on national security grounds and as necessary to facilitate U.S. access to and
from Afghanistan. The law required that the waiver include an assessment of democratization
progress, and called for a report on aid provided to Uzbekistan, including expenditures made in
support of the NDN in Uzbekistan and any credible information that such assistance or
expenditures are being diverted for corrupt purposes. The law also extended a provision
permitting expanded IMET assistance for Uzbekistan. Soon after the bill was signed into law, the
waiver was exercised in order to supply non-lethal equipment to help secure the NDN.174
The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2013 (H.R. 933; P.L. 113-6,
signed by the President on March 26, 2013) funded State-Foreign Operations accounts through
172 Joshua Kucera, “Uzbekistan: Military Aid to Tashkent Would Help Protect NDN - State Department,” Eurasianet,
September 28, 2011.
173 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Joint Letter to Secretary Clinton Regarding Uzbekistan,” States News Service,
September 27, 2011; Human Rights Watch, “Don't Lift Restrictions Linked to Human Rights until Tashkent Shows
Improvement,” States News Service, September 7, 2011. The joint letter by ICG and other human rights groups called
on Secretary Clinton to affirm that “U.S. policies towards the Uzbek government will not fundamentally change absent
meaningful human rights improvements, including the release of imprisoned pro-democracy activists, an end to
harassment of civil society groups, effective steps to end torture, and the elimination of forced child labor in the cotton
sector.”
174 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, February 1, 2012.
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the end of FY2013 through a continuing resolution at the same level and requirements as in
FY2012, with some changes. It also approved the State Department’s retirement of the AEECA
account and the allocation of funds to Eurasia through the Global Health Programs (GHP),
Economic Support Fund (ESF), and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) accounts. S. 3241, Making Appropriations for the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs, had continued conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan, but the House bill, H.R. 5857, had dropped conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014 (H.R. 3547; P.L. 113-76, signed into law on
January 17, 2014) continues conditions (Sec. 7061) of previous years on assistance to the
government of Uzbekistan, and continues a waiver provision. The law also extends a provision
permitting expanded IMET assistance for Uzbekistan.
After eleven years in place, P.L. 113-76, Sec. 7061 drops conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan.
Both S. 1372, Making Appropriations for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, and the House version, H.R. 2855, had dropped the language pertaining to
Kazakhstan while maintaining the language pertaining to Uzbekistan, with some added
requirements. Some observers have pointed out that the most recent human rights report from the
State Department does not seem to indicate a dramatic improvement from previous years in
democratization and human rights conditions in the country (see above, “Human Rights”).
Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States contributes to international financial
institutions that aid Central Asia. Recurrent policy issues regarding U.S. aid include what it
should be used for, who should receive it, and whether it is effective.
U.S. Security and Arms Control Programs
and Assistance
In testimony on March 5, 2014, before the House Armed Services Committee, General Lloyd
Austin, Commander of USCENTCOM, underlined that
Central Asia’s position, bordering Russia, China, Iran and Afghanistan, assures its long-term
importance to the United States. By improving upon our military-to-military relationships we
will be better able to maintain access and influence, counter malign activity, protect lines of
communication and deny [violent extremist organizations] access to ungoverned spaces and
restrict their freedom of movement. Going forward, initiatives will be tailored to transform
our current limited transactional-based relationships into more constructive cooperative
exchanges based on common interests and focused on training and equipping them to
conduct more effective [counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, and counter-narcotics]
operations.
He warned that there is growing uncertainty regarding U.S. and NATO commitments to
Afghanistan and the Central Asia-South Asia region post-2014. He stated that Afghanistan and the
neighboring states are pursuing efforts to boost their security post-2014, and that the United
States is adjusting its strategy in the region to support partners and confront regional threats.
USCENCOM efforts include encouraging the Central Asian states to boost intra-regional
military-to-military ties. He warned that al Qaeda and other terrorist groups might be forced by
pressure on their activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan to move their activities to other areas of
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Central and South Asia. He also reported that Russia, China, and Iran are attempting to expand
their economic and security influence in Central and South Asia.
Commander Austin stated that counter-narcotics funding through Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) appropriations has been “one of the largest sources of security assistance for
Central Asia, and it provides leverage for access, builds security infrastructure, promotes rule of
law, and reduces funding for violent extremists and insurgents in the Central Region. He stressed
that in order to “maintain the additional gains we have made in disrupting the flow of [violent
extremist organizations] and illicit narcotics trafficking, we must maintain our counter-narcotics
programs in the Central Asian states.”
Surveying the Central Asian region, he reported that
• “Kazakhstan remains an enduring and reliable partner,” for USCENTCOM, and is “well
positioned to serve as a bulwark for increased stability in the region.” He reported that
Kazakhstan’s military is transforming itself into a western-type expeditionary,
professional, and technologically-advanced force capable of meeting post-2014
challenges. A 2013-2017 military cooperation plan details areas of bilateral engagement.
Kazakhstan has provided the most significant support for Afghanistan’s post-2014
stability and security, offering funding and technical support and education to the Afghan
military.
• USCENTCOM is redefining its relationship with Kyrgyzstan in the wake of the planned
July 2014 closure of the Manas Transit Center. He stated that until USCENTCOM is able
to negotiate a new Framework Defense Cooperation Agreement with Kyrgyzstan,
security cooperation will likely decrease, although some counter-terrorism and border
security cooperation may continue.
• USCENTCOM’s modest investment in force modernization in Tajikistan has included
counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and border security cooperation. Also, the country
continues to participate in the NDN.
• Turkmenistan is an “enabler for regional stability,” including by supporting development
projects in Afghanistan and humanitarian overflights to Afghanistan. Although
Turkmenistan’s neutrality imposes some restrictions on bilateral military cooperation,
there is some assistance for enhancing border security and the capabilities of its Caspian
Sea Fleet.
• USCENTCOM’s relations with Uzbekistan are progressing, and include resumed Special
Forces training and a five-year framework plan that includes counter-terrorism and
counter-narcotics training. Uzbekistan continues to support the NDN.175
Although U.S. security assistance to the region was boosted in the aftermath of 9/11, such aid has
lessened since then as a percentage of all such aid to Eurasia, particularly after aid to Uzbekistan
175 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense
Authorization Budget Requests from the U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Africa Command,
Statement of General Lloyd J. Austin III, Commander U.S. Central Command, on the Posture of U.S. Central
Command, March 5, 2014.
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was cut in FY2004 and subsequent years (see above, “Congressional Conditions on Kazakh and
Uzbek Aid”). According to the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator of Assistance to
Europe and Eurasia, security and law enforcement aid to Central Asia was 31% ($188 million) of
all such aid to Eurasia in FY2002, but had declined to 18% ($247 million) in FY2010. Of all
budgeted assistance to Central Asia over the period from FY1992-FY2010, security and law
enforcement aid accounted for a little over one-fifth. Security and law enforcement programs
include Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training
(IMET), Excess Defense Articles (EDA), and border security aid to combat trafficking in drugs,
humans, and WMD.
A Defense Department counter-terrorism train and equip program (created under Section 1206 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006; P.L. 109-163) provided $20 million to
Kazakhstan in FY2006, $19.2 million in FY2007, and $12.5 million in FY2008 (the latter to
respond to threats in the North Caspian Sea). It also provided $12 million to Kyrgyzstan in
FY2008 and $9.6 million in FY2009.
Another Defense Department program for defense articles, services, training or other support for
reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities (created under Section 1207 of P.L. 109-163;
Section 1207 has expired and been replaced by a USAID Complex Crises Fund) provided $9.9
million to Tajikistan in FY2008.176 In FY2010, the Defense Department transferred $15.8 million
in Section 1207 funds to the State Department’s Civilian Response Corps to assist in
reconstruction in Kyrgyzstan following the April 2010 coup and the June 2010 ethnic violence.177
According to the latest State-Defense Department’s Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to
Congress, covering FY2012, $2.1 million was expended for military and security training for 327
Kazakh students, $4.23 million was expended for 345 Kyrgyz students, $3.9 million was
expended for 511 Tajik students, $641,000 was expended for 81 Turkmen students, and $343,000
was expended for 121 Uzbek students. Training was provided under various programs, including
Foreign Military Sales, IMET, Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), Regional Centers for
Security Studies, Section 1004 Counter-Drug Training Support (CDTS), Combating Terrorism
Fellowship Program (CTFP), and Service Academy Foreign Student Program. Most Central
Asian military and security personnel received training in counter-narcotics under the Section
1004 program (as defined in the NDAA for FY1991). U.S. Special Operations Forces and
conventional forces conduct the training for regional military personnel and law enforcement
staffs involved in counter-drug operations.
In 2010, the Defense Department announced assistance to set up training facilities in Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan to bolster regional efforts to combat drug-trafficking and terrorism. It was stated
that no U.S. troops would be stationed at either facility.178 The anti-terrorism training center in
176 For background, see CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for
Congress, by Nina M. Serafino, and CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and
Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns, FY2006-FY2010, by Nina M. Serafino.
177 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Stabilization Capabilities: Lessons Learned From Kyrgyzstan,” Dipnote, October
04, 2010; U.S. Department of Defense, Section 1209 and Section 1203(b) Report to Congress on Foreign-Assistance
Related Programs for Fiscal Years 2008, 2009, and 2010, April 2012, p. 71.
178 Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: U.S. Intends to Construct Military Training Center in Batken,” Eurasianet, March 3,
2010; Stratfor, June 25, 2010. The EU also has built or refurbished military training and border facilities in Central
Asia, including in Kyrgyzstan. See The EU’s Border Management Program in Central Asia (BOMCA), at
http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/about.
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southern Kyrgyzstan, planned to be built in the Batken region, was planned to cost $5.5 million.
Construction reportedly was delayed due to the change of government and ethnic violence in
Kyrgyzstan, and then was canceled. The National Training Facility in Tajikistan, valued at up to
$10 million, was designed for the National Guard training. Design and construction began in mid-
2011, but completion apparently was delayed, with one solicitation notice for construction being
issued in mid-2012. The National Training Facility reportedly since has been completed and
includes classrooms, gun ranges, a tank driving range, and rappelling tower. Another training
facility for the Tajik Customs Service, built at a cost of $2 million, was completed in January
2014.179
According to the State Department’s 2013 Narcotics Control Strategy Report, about one-fourth of
the opium and heroin produced in Afghanistan transits through Central Asia to markets in Russia
and Central Europe. The bulk of these drugs transit the Afghan-Tajik border, and from there are
shipped by trucks travelling along the relatively good road system in Uzbekistan. Governmental
corruption facilitates these shipments, according to the State Department.180 During his visits to
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan in late June 2011, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) William Brownfield announced the
launch of a new $4.2 million Central Asia Counter-narcotics Initiative (CACI) to provide training
and equipment to set up counter-narcotics task forces in each of the Central Asian states. The
initiative also aimed to encourage regional cooperation by the task forces, including through the
U.S. supported Central Asia Regional Information Coordination Center (CARICC), as well as
broader cooperation with existing task forces in Afghanistan and Russia. Besides INL, the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was involved in the initiative. A factsheet reported that
the State Department planned to closely coordinate with the Defense Department, which had
provided over $100 million in counter-narcotics aid to Central Asia.181 Reportedly, Russia
objected to the implementation of CACI.182
In testimony in February 2014, Assistant Secretary Brownfield reported that CACI “has not yet
been a resounding success.” He stated that problems included cooperation among the regional
states on counter-narcotics efforts and verified that there was a lack of enthusiasm in Russia for
cooperation with the United States that would include sharing of intelligence and operations in
Afghanistan. He averred that there was some regional country-by-country cooperation.183
Several Central Asian states also participate in the State Partnership Program which pairs
National Guard units with military units in Central Asia and elsewhere. The Arizona National
179 “U.S., Tajik Officials Initiate Construction of Military Training Center,” RFE/RL, July 7, 2011; U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, Solicitation Notice: National Training Center at Karatog, Tajikistan, May 11, 2012, at
http://dushanbe.usembassy.gov/ct_05112012.html; Tajikistan National Training Center, AHNTech, at
http://ahntech.com/past-projects/tajikistan-construction; U.S. Embassy, Dushanbe, U.S. Embassy Donates Practical
Exercise Training Area Facility to Tajikistan’s Customs Service, January 21, 2014.
180 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, March 5, 2013.
181 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fact Sheet: The Central
Asia Counternarcotics Initiative (CACI), February 21, 2012.
182 Joshua Kucera, “Russia Thwarts U.S. Central Asian Counterdrug Program,” The Bug Pit, Eurasianet, February 18,
2012; Chris Rickleton, “Central Asia: Cold-War Attitudes Hindering Drug War,” Eurasianet, February 6, 2013; Reid
Standish, “Still No Anti-Drug Trafficking Progress in Central Asia,” The Hidden Transcript, March 1, 2013;
“Cooperation and Geopolitics in the Central Asian Drug Trade,” Center for World Conflict and Peace, May 17, 2013.
183 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Hearing on U.S. Counter-narcotics Operations in Afghanistan, February 5, 2014.
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Guard and Kazakhstan forged the first Central Asian partnership in 1993. Kyrgyzstan and the
Montana National Guard began a partnership in 1996. Tajikistan and the Virginia National Guard
launched a partnership in 2003, and the Mississippi National Guard and Uzbekistan formed a
partnership in 2012 (previously, Uzbekistan and the Louisiana National Guard had formed a
partnership in 1996).184
In addition to the aid reported by the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator of Assistance
to Europe and Eurasia, the Defense Department provides classified and other aid to Central
Asia.185
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in 1999 became responsible for U.S. military
engagement in Central Asia. It cooperated with the European Command (USEUCOM), on the
Caspian Maritime Security Cooperation program (similar to the former Caspian [Sea] Guard
program). In 2008, General Bantz Craddock, then-Commander of USEUCOM, testified that the
Caspian Maritime Security Cooperation program coordinated security assistance provided by
U.S. agencies to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. He stated that U.S. Naval Forces Europe cooperated
with U.S. Naval Forces Central Command “to promote maritime safety and security and maritime
domain awareness in the Caspian Sea.” Defense Department support for this program for
Kazakhstan wound down in FY2008.186 Russia objects to the involvement of non-littoral
countries in Caspian maritime security and has appeared to counter U.S. maritime security aid by
boosting the capabilities of its Caspian Sea Flotilla and by urging the littoral states to coordinate
their naval activities exclusively with Russia.
All the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined NATO’s PFP by mid-1994 (Tajikistan joined
in 2002). Central Asian troops have participated in periodic PFP (or “PFP-style”) exercises in the
United States since 1995, and U.S. troops have participated in exercises in Central Asia since
1997. A June 2004 NATO summit communiqué pledged enhanced Alliance attention to the
countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and the NATO Secretary General appointed a
Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia. Uzbekistan sharply reduced its
participation in PFP after NATO raised concerns that Uzbek security forces had used excessive
and disproportionate force in Andijon (however, it continued to permit Germany to use a base
near Termez). Relations with NATO appeared to improve after 2008 (see below).
Kazakhstan’s progress in military reform enabled NATO in January 2006 to elevate it to
participation in an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). The third phase of the IPAP was
approved in August 2012 and reportedly involves continued training for the Air-mobile Forces
Brigade (Kazbrig) for possible peacekeeping support for U.N. or NATO operations. Such training
184 Donna Miles, “Guard Program Builds Partner Capacity, Relationships in USCENTCOM,” American Forces Press
Service, November 1, 2013; Daniel Resnick, “The National Guard State Partnership Program in Central Asia,” Security
Assistance Monitor, June 19, 2013.
185 Analyst Joshua Kucera has called for the U.S. government to provide more comprehensive information on the level
and type of U.S. security assistance to Central Asia. He also has urged greater policy attention to the possible misuse of
security assistance by Central Asian governments, and for more emphasis on developmental and democratization
assistance. See U.S. Military Aid to Central Asia: Who Benefits? Open Society Foundations, September 2012.
186 House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander,
United States European Command, March 13, 2008. Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention aid to Kazakhstan
was $4 million in FY2005, $5 million in FY2006, $603,000 in FY2007, and $153,000 in FY2008. Much more had been
planned for FY2007-FY2008. No aid was requested for FY2009 or thereafter. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Fiscal Year
(FY) 2009 Budget Estimates, 2008.
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has taken place at the PFP Training Center at the Military Institute of the Army in Almaty.
Kazakhstan has stated that it does not plan to join NATO but wants to modernize its armed forces.
According to analyst Roger McDermott, Kazakhstan has chosen to rely on Russia for its national
security, so that its ties with NATO—while the most significant in Central Asia—will remain
limited.187 Examples of Kazakhstan’s use of training from the United States and NATO, as well as
Russia, include the country’s hosting of a regular NATO PFP “Steppe Eagle” military exercise in
August 2013, involving Kazbrig, which was followed by the CSTO Collective Peacekeeping
Forces’ “Unbreakable Brotherhood 2013” exercise in Russia in October 2013.188
On March 7, 2014, the Kazakh Defense Ministry announced that it had informed the United
Nations that it had selected 20 military officers as prepared for possible participation as U.N.
peacekeepers.
Closure of the Karshi-Khanabad Airbase
On July 5, 2005, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed a declaration
issued during a meeting of the SCO that stated that “as large-scale military operations against
terrorism have come to an end in Afghanistan, the SCO member states maintain that the relevant
parties to the anti-terrorist coalition should set a deadline for the temporary use of ...
infrastructure facilities of the SCO member states and for their military presence in these
countries.”189 Despite this declaration, none of the Central Asian leaders immediately called for
closing the coalition bases. However, after the United States and others interceded so that
refugees who fled from Andijon to Kyrgyzstan could fly to Romania, Uzbekistan on July 29
demanded that the United States vacate K2 within six months. On November 21, 2005, the United
States officially ceased operations to support Afghanistan at K2. Perhaps indicative of the reversal
of U.S. military-to-military and other ties, former pro-U.S. defense minister Qodir Gulomov was
convicted of treason and received seven years in prison, later suspended. Many K2 activities
shifted to the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. Some observers viewed the closure of K2 and souring
U.S.-Uzbek relations as setbacks to U.S. influence in the region and as gains for Russian and
Chinese influence. Others suggested that U.S. ties with other regional states provided continuing
influence and that U.S. criticism of human rights abuses might pay future dividends among
regional populations.190
Efforts to Improve Security Relations
Appearing to signal improving U.S.-Uzbek relations, in early 2008 Uzbekistan permitted U.S.
military personnel under NATO command, on a case-by-case basis, to transit through an airbase
near the town of Termez that it has permitted Germany to operate.191 President Karimov attended
the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, in early April 2008 and stated that Uzbekistan was
187 Roger McDermott, Kazakhstan–Russia: Enduring Eurasian Defense Partners, Danish Institute for International
Studies, 2012.
188 Richard Weitz, “Kazakhstan Steppe Eagle Exercise Helps Sustain NATO Ties,” CACI Analyst, September 18, 2013.
189 CEDR, July 5, 2005, Doc. No. CPP-249.
190 For further information, see CRS Report RS22295, Uzbekistan's Closure of the Airbase at Karshi-Khanabad:
Context and Implications, by Jim Nichol.
191 “U.S. Military Returns to Ex-Soviet Uzbekistan,” Agence France Presse, March 6, 2008; “Only Germany Can Use
Uzbek Bases Now,” United Press International, December 13, 2005.
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ready to discuss the transit of nonlethal goods and equipment by NATO through Uzbekistan to
Afghanistan. He announced in May 2009 that the United States and NATO had been permitted to
use the Navoi airport (located between Samarkand and Bukhara in east-central Uzbekistan) for
transporting nonlethal supplies to Afghanistan.
Representing the Obama Administration, Under Secretary of State William Burns visited
Uzbekistan in early July 2009, and President Karimov assessed his talks with Burns as “positive.”
In August 2009, General David Petraeus traveled to Uzbekistan and signed an accord on boosting
military educational exchanges and training. Reportedly, these visits also resulted in permission
by Uzbekistan for military air overflights of weapons to Afghanistan. Then-Assistant Secretary
Blake visited Uzbekistan in November 2009 and stated that his meetings there were “a reflection
of the determination of President Obama” to strengthen ties. He proposed that the two countries
set up high-level annual consultations to “build our partnership across a wide range of areas.
These include trade and development, border security, cooperation on narcotics, the development
of civil society, and individual rights.”192
The first Annual Bilateral Consultation (ABC) took place in late December 2009 with a visit to
the United States by an Uzbek delegation led by Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov. The two sides
drew up a plan for cooperation for 2010 that involved an extensive range of diplomatic visits,
increased military-to-military contacts, and investment and trade overtures, including the
provision of Expanded IMET.193 The second ABC took place in February 2011 with a visit to
Uzbekistan led by then-Assistant Secretary Blake. The talks reportedly included security
cooperation, trade and development, science and technology, counter-narcotics, civil society
development, and human rights. A U.S. business delegation discussed means to increase trade
ties. Blake reported that the United States had purchased $23 million in Uzbek goods for transit to
Afghanistan in FY2010.
The third ABC was held in August 2012, and like the second involved a visit to Tashkent by a
U.S. delegation led by then-Assistant Secretary Blake. He reported that the meeting covered
Uzbekistan’s support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, energy, agriculture, health,
parliamentary exchanges, education, science and technology, counter-narcotics, border security,
counter-terrorism, religious freedom, trafficking in persons, and human rights. At an associated
U.S.-Uzbek business forum, Assistant Secretary of State Blake raised concerns about currency
convertibility and contract sanctity that hamper foreign investment. In a speech in October 2012,
Blake stated that because of Uzbekistan’s poor human rights record, the United States provided it
only non-lethal security assistance.194
192 U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Press Conference of Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs
Robert Blake, October 14, 2009.
193 CEDR, January 29, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-4019. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) defines
Expanded IMET as a group of courses aimed at “educating U.S. friends and allies in the proper management of their
defense resources, improving their systems of military justice ... and fostering a greater respect for, and understanding
of, the principle of civilian control of the military. The program is based upon the premise that active promotion of
democratic values is one of the most effective means available for achieving U.S. national security and foreign policy
objectives.... For a country whose international military training program is very politically sensitive, the entire IMET
program may consist of Expanded IMET training only.” See DSCA. What is Expanded IMET? At
http://www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/eimet/eimet_default.htm.
194 U.S. Department of State, Press Availability Following the U.S.-Uzbekistan Annual Bilateral Consultations, August
17, 2012; Daniil Kislov, “U.S. Ambassador in Uzbekistan George Krol: ‘We Recognize Democracy May Develop and
Look Differently in Uzbekistan,’” Journal of Turkish Weekly, September 25, 2012; Remarks, Robert O. Blake, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, [at] Indiana University's Inner Asian and Uralic
(continued...)
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The fourth ABC was held in December 2013 with a visit to Washington, D.C., by Uzbek Foreign
Minister Kamilov. The ABC was chaired on the U.S. side by Assistant Secretary Biswal. The
State Department reported that political developments, regional stability and security, human
rights and labor, education and cultural exchanges, and economic development and trade were
discussed, but neither side provided any details.195
The Manas Airbase/Transit Center
The Manas airbase (since 2009 called the Manas Transit Center; see below) became operational
in December 2001 and uses some facilities of the international airport near Bishkek, the capital of
Kyrgyzstan. According to a fact sheet prepared in early 2009 by the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing
of the U.S. Air Force, the Manas airbase serves as the “premier air mobility hub” for operations in
Afghanistan. Missions include support for personnel and cargo transiting in and out of the theater,
aerial refueling, airlift and airdrop, and medical evacuation. Then-Secretary Clinton was told
during her December 2010 visit to the Manas Transit Center that up to 3,500 troops every day,
over 13 million pounds of cargo each month, and 117 million gallons of fuel each year were
handled by the airbase.
In early 2006, Kyrgyz President Bakiyev reportedly requested that lease payments for use of the
Manas airbase be increased to more than $200 million per year but at the same time reaffirmed
Russia’s free use of its nearby base.196 By mid-July 2006, however, the United States and
Kyrgyzstan announced that they had reached a settlement for the continued U.S. use of the
airbase. Although not specifically mentioning U.S. basing payments, it was announced that the
United States would provide $150 million in “total assistance and compensation over the next
year,” subject to congressional approval.
In September 2007, a U.S. military officer stated that the Manas airbase was moving toward “a
sustainment posture,” with the replacement of most tents and the building of aircraft maintenance,
medical, and other facilities.197
On February 3, 2009, then-President Bakiyev announced during a visit to Moscow that he
intended to close the Manas airbase. Many observers speculated that the decision was spurred by
Russia, which offered Bakiyev a $300 million loan for economic development and a $150 million
grant for budget stabilization in the wake of the world economic downturn. Russia also stated that
it would write off most of a $180 million debt. The United States was notified on February 19,
2009, that under the terms of the status of forces agreement it had 180 days to vacate the airbase.
The Defense Department announced on June 24, 2009, that an agreement of “mutual benefit” had
been concluded with the Kyrgyz government “to continu[e] to work, with them, to supply our
(...continued)
Natural Resource Center, October 18, 2012.
195 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Media Note: U.S.-Uzbekistan Annual Bilateral
Consultations, December 11, 2013.
196 Perhaps indicating Kyrgyz pressure on Russia to compensate for use of the base, Russia in October 2006 pledged
grant military assistance to Kyrgyzstan.
197 Lt. Col. Michael Borgert, “Liberandos: Thank You for a Job Well Done,” 376th Expeditionary Services Squadron
Public Affairs, September 9, 2007.
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troops in Afghanistan, so that we can help with the overall security situation in the region.”198 The
agreement was approved by the Kyrgyz legislature and signed into law by then-President
Bakiyev, to take effect on July 14, 2009. The agreement is for five years and is renewed yearly,
unless both parties agree to end it. A yearly rent payment for use of land and facilities at the
Manas airport would be increased from $17.4 million to $60 million per year and the United
States had pledged more than $36 million for infrastructure improvements and $30 million for air
traffic control system upgrades for the airport. The Kyrgyz foreign minister also stated that the
United States had pledged $20 million dollars for a U.S.-Kyrgyz Joint Development Fund for
economic projects, $21 million for counter-narcotics efforts, and $10 million for counter-
terrorism efforts.199 All except the increased rent had already been appropriated or requested. The
agreement also reportedly includes stricter host-country conditions on U.S. military personnel.200
Kyrgyzstan had also requested that French and Spanish troops who were deployed at Manas had
to leave, and they had pulled out by October 2009. The French detachment (reportedly 35 troops
and a tanker aircraft) moved temporarily to Dushanbe. The Spanish unit (reportedly 60 troops and
two transport aircraft) moved temporarily to Herat, west Afghanistan, and Dushanbe was used
temporarily as a stopover for troop relief flights. France and Spain have since reached accords
with Kyrgyzstan and have returned to Manas.
The Status of the Manas Transit Center after the April 2010 Coup
Initially after the April 2010 ouster of then-President Bakiyev, some officials in the interim
government stated or implied that the conditions of the lease would be examined. However, on
April 13, 2012, then-acting Prime Minister Roza Otunbayeva announced that the lease on the
Manas Transit Center would be “automatically” renewed for one year. Meeting with then-
Secretary Clinton on December 2, 2010, Otunbayeva stressed that the Manas Transit Center was a
significant contributor to regional security and that Kyrgyzstan would support its operation at
least through 2014 in line with U.S. Administration objectives for drawing down U.S. forces.201
In March 2012, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visited Bishkek, reportedly to obtain
reassurances about the Kyrgyz government’s basing commitments. In early May 2012, however,
President Atambayev stressed that the basing accord would not be extended when it came up for
renewal in 2014, an announcement that was hailed by the Russian Foreign Ministry.
The U.S. Embassy in Bishkek has reported that in FY2013, the United States provided $104.03
million (CRS total) in direct, indirect, and charitable expenses in connection with the Manas
Transit Center; $142.1 million in FY2012; $150.6 million in FY2011, $131.5 million in FY2010;
and $107.9 million in FY2009.
Of this FY2013 amount:
198 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD News Briefing, June 24, 2009. See also U.S. Department of State, Daily Press
Briefing, June 25, 2009.
199 Tolkun Namatbayeva, “Kyrgyzstan Allows U.S. to Keep Using Base,” Agence France Presse, June 23, 2009.
200 See also CRS Report R40564, Kyrgyzstan and the Status of the U.S. Manas Airbase: Context and Implications, by
Jim Nichol.
201 U.S. Department of State, Remarks With President Otunbayeva After Their Meeting, Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Secretary of State, December 2, 2010.
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• $60 million was a lease payment;
• $16.75 million was landing and other fees and leases;
• $58,800 was a contribution to Kyrgyz Aeronavigation;
• $24.71 million was for building renovations and road repairs, for furniture and
other equipment, for supplies and services, and other airport improvements;
• $354,000 was for “programmatic humanitarian assistance”; and
• $2.16 million was for other local spending
Fuel Contract Developments
In December 2010, the majority staff of the Subcommittee for National Security and Foreign
Affairs of the House Oversight Committee released a report on contracts awarded by the Defense
Department’s Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to the privately owned Red Star and its sister
Mina firms for the supply of jet fuel for the Manas Transit Center.202 According to the report’s
findings, DLA did not know who owned Red Star or Mina until late 2010, did not claim to care
whether contract funds were being misappropriated by the family of the then-president of
Kyrgyzstan and his family, did not know that Russia’s state-owned Gazprom gas firm had an
ownership interest in a subsidiary of the firms, and did not claim to know that the firms were
using false certifications to obtain fuel from Russia. On the latter issue, Red Star and Mina had
repeatedly informed DLA of the false certifications scheme, according to emails and other
documents. The subcommittee argued that the use of such a scheme to obtain fuel and DLA’s
apparent lack of reaction to the scheme opened the United States to excessive strategic
vulnerability, since a sudden fuel cutoff by Russia could jeopardize U.S. military operations in
Afghanistan.
In November 2010, DLA awarded Mina a $315 million contract to continue supplying up to 120
million gallons of fuel to the Manas Transit Center for at least one more year. An amendment to
the contract later highlighted by then-Secretary Clinton during her December 2010 visit to
Kyrgyzstan provided for the possible addition of a second supplier for between 20 and 50% of the
fuel.203 The Kyrgyz government called for the Manas Refueling Complex—established in mid-
2010 as a joint venture between the Kyrgyz government and Gazprom—to be named as the sole
supplier and for Mina to be suspended from the contract. The report by the House Subcommittee
raised concerns about more direct Russian involvement in fuel supplies, since the country has
appeared to use its energy exports as a tool in foreign relations.204
In early February 2011, a U.S.-Kyrgyz agreement on fuel supplies was signed. A few days later,
the Manas Refueling Complex was reincorporated as the Gazpromneft-Aero-Kyrgyzstan joint
202 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs, Mystery at Manas: Strategic Blind Spots in the Department of Defense’s Fuel Contracts
in Kyrgyzstan, Report of the Majority Staff, December 2010.
203 U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, November 4, 2010.
204 Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Manas Fuel Supplier Doubles Down on Good News,” Eurasianet, November 4, 2010;
Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Is Manas Fuel Contract Award Only the Start, not End of Intrigue?” Eurasianet,
November 5, 2010; Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Manas Fuel Supply Contract to Be Re-Opened?” Eurasianet,
December 22, 2010; Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Manas Fuel Supplier Hitting Back at Bishkek,” Eurasianet, January
4, 2011.
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venture, with Kyrgyzstan as the minority partner (with 49% of the shares). The U.S. Defense
Logistics Agency placed its first order for fuel with Gazpromneft-Aero-Kyrgyzstan on September
26, 2011, to initially supply 20% of the Transit Center’s aviation fuel needs (estimated at up to 12
million gallons per month), potentially reaching 50% or more by the end of the year. According to
one report, the fuel is directly supplied from Gazprom’s oil refineries and transported by the
Russian Transoil company to the transit center.205
On October 26, 2011, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) announced that it had awarded a one-
year contract for 2012 for the provision of fuel to the Manas Transit Center to World Fuel
Services Europe (WFSE), a subsidiary of a U.S.-based firm. Under the contract, WFSE
cooperated with Gazpromneft-Aero Kyrgyzstan (GAK) to fulfill the aviation fuel needs of the
Transit Center. WFSE was to provide a minimum of 10% of the fuel requirements of the Transit
Center and a maximum of 100%, with GAK possibly being called upon to provide up to 90% of
the monthly aviation fuel supplies based on its capabilities and performance. The U.S. Embassy
in Bishkek stated that the new contract aimed “to ensure a stable, secure, and uninterrupted
supply of fuel” to the Transit Center.206
The U.S. Embassy in Bishkek has reported that DLA provided $208.1 million to GAK for jet fuel
in FY2012 and $158.8 million in FY2013. According to some reports, DLA also may have
purchased jet fuel from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, in order to diversify the sources of supply
and not rely exclusively on Russia as a source.207
The Wind-down of the Manas Transit Facility
In June 2013, the Kyrgyz legislature approved a bill to close the Manas Transit Center when its
lease expired in July 2013, and it was signed into law by President Atambayev on June 26, 2013.
On October 18, 2013, the Defense Department issued a release stating that it had begun to
relocate personnel and material from the Manas Transit Center and planned to transfer the
facilities to the Kyrgyz government by July 2014.208
The Mihail Kogalniceanu air base in eastern Romania has begun to serve as a transit hub for
military personnel entering Afghanistan and for the egress of some material from Afghanistan.209
Refueling functions carried out by the Manas Transit Center were transferred to Mazar-i-Sharif,
according to one report.
The Transit Center reported that the air refueling mission at Manas ended on February 24, 2014.
On March 3, 2014, the Transit Center reported that remaining missions, including personnel and
cargo airlift and humanitarian programs in Kyrgyzstan had ceased. Reuters reported that Colonel
205 Deidre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Manas Fuel Contract Goes to Kyrgyz-Russian Venture,” Eurasianet, September 27,
2011; CEDR, September 28, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-950073.
206 U.S. Department of State, Embassy of the United States in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Manas Fuel Contract Award,
October 27, 2011; Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: The End of an Era at Manas Air Base,” Eurasianet, October 27, 2011.
207 Joshua Kucera, “Turkmenistan Big Beneficiary Of Pentagon Money, While Uzbekistan Lags,” Eurasianet,
December 3, 2012.
208 U.S. Department of Defense, News Release: DOD to Relocate from the Transit Center at Manas International
Airport and Return Facilities to the Government of Kyrgyzstan, October 18, 2013.
209 Chris Carroll, “DOD to Shift Air Transit from Manas to Romania,” Stars and Stripes, October 18, 2013.
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John Millard, commander of the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing and the head of the Transit
Center, stated that “we will have this installation and all U.S. personnel moved no later than July
10.” He also reportedly stated that during the base’s operation, it had handled more than 33,500
refueling missions, transported more than 5.3 million servicemen into and out of Afghanistan, and
carried out 42,000 cargo missions.210
In late February 2014, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the Kyrgyz
government and Russia’s Rosneft state-controlled oil firm on investing in the Manas international
airport.
The Northern Distribution Network to and from Afghanistan
Because supplies transiting Pakistan to Afghanistan frequently were subject to attacks, General
David Petraeus, the then-Commander of the U.S. Central Command, visited Kazakhstan and
Tajikistan in late January 2009 to negotiate alternative air, rail, road, and water routes for the
commercial shipping of supplies to support NATO and U.S. operations in Afghanistan (he also
visited Kyrgyzstan to discuss airbase issues; see below). To encourage a positive response for this
Northern Distribution Network (NDN), the U.S. embassies in the region announced that the
United States hoped to purchase many nonmilitary goods locally to transport to the troops in
Afghanistan. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan permitted such transit in February 2009, Uzbekistan
permitted it in April 2009, and Kyrgyzstan permitted it in July 2009 (Georgia had given such
permission in 2005, Russia in 2008, and Azerbaijan in March 2009).
There are broadly three land routes: one through the South Caucasus into Central Asia; one from
the Baltic states through Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan; and one from the Baltic states
through Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Although some small cargoes reportedly
were sent along the route on an ad hoc basis in late 2008, a much-publicized rail shipment of
nonlethal supplies entered Afghanistan in late March 2009 after transiting Latvia, Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.211 During his confirmation hearing in July 2011 as Commander of
the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), General William Fraser stated that the aim
then was to boost the percentage of surface transit through the NDN.212 The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee reported in late 2011 that almost three-fourths of the nonlethal surface
shipments to Afghanistan were being transported via the NDN (this amount increased to virtually
all surface transport following Pakistan’s halt to shipments from late November 2011 to early July
2012).213 Supplementing land routes, Uzbekistan’s Navoi airport reportedly is being used to
210 U.S. Air Force, Transit Center at Manas, Staff Sgt. Travis Edwards, “Manas KC-135s Complete Final Mission,
Leave Kyrgyzstan,” at http://www.manas.afcent.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123401264, February 25, 2014; Jeff
Schogol, “End Draws Near for U.S. Military Hub in Kyrgyzstan,” Marine Times, February 26, 2014; Transit Center at
Manas, “Goodbye Airlift, Hello Closure,” March 3, 2014, at
http://www.manas.afcent.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123402047; “’Mission Accomplished’ for U.S. Air Base in Pro-
Moscow Kyrgyzstan,” Reuters, March 6, 2014.
211 “Northern Route Eases Supplies to U.S, forces in Afghanistan,” International Institute of Strategic Studies, August
2010; Steve Geary, “Northern Distribution Network to Shore Up Afghan Supply Chain,” Defense Logistics, June 28,
2010; “Supply Chain Council Recognizes Alternative Afghanistan Distribution Network,” Journal of Transportation,
May 8, 2010.
212 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Confirmation Hearing for William M. Fraser to be Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command, August 2, 2011. See also Subcommittee on Seapower, Hearing on the FY2012 Budget
Request for Strategic Airlift Aircraft, July 13, 2011.
213 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Central Asia And The Transition In Afghanistan: A Majority Staff
(continued...)
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transport supplies to Afghanistan. After aircraft land at Navoi, the supplies are sent by rail and
truck to Afghanistan.214
In August 2011, shipments began along a 50-mile rail line that was completed from the town of
Hairatan, on Afghanistan’s border with Uzbekistan, to the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in
Afghanistan.215 Reportedly, the bulk of ISAF cargo containers shipped through the NDN
eventually enter Afghanistan via this Uzbekistan-Afghanistan rail link. U.S. Defense Department
officials reportedly long have been concerned that officials in Uzbekistan delay the transit of
freight across the border into Afghanistan until bribes are paid by various commercial shippers.
Among the reported local purchases of supplies as incentives to regional countries to facilitate
NDN shipments are food items, lumber, cement, rebar, corrugated and galvanized steel, and fuel
drums. According to one report, the U.S. military greatly increased its purchases of local supplies
for Afghanistan in FY2012, spending about $1.3 billion, including $820.5 million in
Turkmenistan (presumably for jet fuel and transport). To expand such purchases, the Defense
Logistics Agency reportedly posted liaison officers in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and it planned
to at least match this pace of purchases in FY2013.216
Besides commercial shipping of nonlethal cargoes, the regional governments allegedly have
quietly given U.S. and NATO military aircraft over-flight privileges for the transport of weapons
and troops to Afghanistan. At the July 2009 U.S.-Russia summit, Russia openly announced that it
was permitting such overflights. Some observers suggested that the announcement was linked to
the assertion of some Russian officials that such transport could substitute for U.S. and NATO use
of Manas and other Central Asian airbases. Presidents Obama and Nazarbayev reportedly agreed
in principle to air flights of troops and unspecified equipment, including along a circumpolar
route transiting Kazakhstan, during their meeting in April 2010, and an air transit agreement was
signed on November 12, 2010.
Most of the Central Asian governments gave permission in 2012 for the egress of supplies and
troops from Afghanistan in line with U.S. and NATO plans to draw down military operations in
Afghanistan by late 2014. Then-Assistant Secretary Blake reported in August 2012 that
discussions were underway within the U.S. government on how much and what types of
equipment removed from Afghanistan might be declared Excess Defense Articles (EDA) and
provided to regional governments. He indicated that the U.S. government probably would not
provide Uzbekistan with lethal EDA (weaponry), but might well provide military vehicles. He
suggested that Uzbekistan’s support for the NDN may have raised the ire of terrorist
organizations, so that “it is very much in our interest to help Uzbekistan defend itself against such
attacks.” At the same time, he dismissed concerns that military assistance provided to Uzbekistan
(...continued)
Report, December 19, 2011.
214 A circum-polar air route from the United States transiting Russia and Central Asia to Afghanistan also has begun to
be used. Marcus Weisgerber, “Afghanistan War Spurred Big Changes for Logistics Community,” Federal Times,
September 19, 2011.
215 “Uzbek Corridor of Afghan Supply Plagued by ‘Informal Payments,’” The Times of Central Asia, July 2, 2010;
“Construction of Hairatan-Mazar-e-Sharif Railroad Completed” Uzbekistan Daily, November 16, 2010.
216 Joshua Kucera, “Turkmenistan Big Beneficiary Of Pentagon Money, While Uzbekistan Lags,” Eurasianet,
December 3, 2012. Purchases were reported to be $137.3 million in Kazakhstan, $218.1 million in Kyrgyzstan, $11.7
million in Tajikistan, and $105.9 million in Uzbekistan.
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could be misused.217 According to some observers, Uzbekistan withdrew from the CSTO at least
in part in the hope of obtaining funds and equipment from the United States and NATO during the
withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan.218 One Russian newspaper reported in November 2012
that Russian officials had offered large military aid packages to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, at
least in part to convince these countries not to accept excess equipment from the United States,
which these officials presumed would come with strings attached, including technical advisory
assistance.219
According to one plan discussed by USCENTCOM in late 2012 for the egress from Afghanistan
of rolling stock (equipment with wheels or tracks that is self-propelled or can be towed) or non-
rolling stock (all other equipment), almost one-quarter (500 out of 2,200 containers and vehicles)
was proposed to be evacuated by rail or road through Central Asia. It was proposed that over one-
half be evacuated through Pakistan, and almost one-quarter of containers and vehicles be flown to
Dubai or Jordan.220
These plans changed somewhat during 2013, however, reportedly at least in part because of
continuing problems with cargo transit through Uzbekistan. According to one USTRANSCOM
official in October 2013, the command was still keeping NDN routes “warm as a result of
needing to possibly go back” to heavier use of the routes in case of renewed problems with egress
through Pakistan. The official stated that the shipment of material through the NDN took two to
three times longer than through Pakistan, because of the necessity of clearing customs in several
transit states and trans-loading from truck to rail to ship.221 According to some reports, only a
small percentage of material entering or leaving Afghanistan was moving through the NDN
during the latter part of 2013 and early 2014, although efforts are being made, as noted, to
preserve and enhance the NDN for future possible shipments.222
In testimony on February 27, 2014, Air Force General William Fraser, Commander of
USTRANSCOM, stated that the possible removal of all U.S. troops and material from
Afghanistan could be accomplished by the end of 2014 if a U.S.-Afghanistan status of forces
agreement is not renewed, including by using the NDN.223 Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine’s
Crimea region at the end of February 2014, the reliability of NDN routes through Russia may
become more problematic.
217 U.S. Department of State, On-the-Record Briefing With International Media:Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, August 15, 2012.
218 Karimjan Akhmedov and Evgeniya Usmanova, “Afghanistan Withdrawal: The Pros and Cons of Using the Northern
Distribution Network,” Eurasianet, September 12, 2012.
219 Kommersant, November 6, 2012; Joshua Kucera, “Report: Russia Spending $1.3 Billion To Arm Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan,” Eurasianet, November 7, 2012. Other reasons for the boosted aid reportedly included preparing these
countries for the post-2014 security situation in Afghanistan. Lastly, the boosted aid had been pledged as a quid pro
quo after both countries had extended military basing leases with Moscow.
220 Joshua Kucera, “U.S. Mapping Out Afghanistan Exit,” Eurasianet, November 21, 2012.
221 Marcus Weisgerber, “Interview: Lt. Gen. Kathleen Gainey, Retiring No. 2 at U.S. Transportation Command,”
Defense News, October 20, 2013.
222 U.S. Army, Lt. Col. Charmaine Lywe and Lt. Col. Brittany Stewart, “Building support for NDN Retrograde,”
Translog, January 30, 2014.
223 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on the Posture of the U.S. Special
Operations Command and U.S. Transportation Command, Testimony of General William M Fraser III, USAF
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, February 27, 2014; Sandra Erwin, “Afghanistan ‘Zero Option’ Creates
Challenges for Military Logisticians, National Defense, February 27, 2014.
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Consolidated Appropriations for FY2012 requires the Secretary of State to submit a report to
Congress on all U.S. assistance to Uzbekistan and “expenditures made in support of” the NDN, to
include credible information on the diversion of assistance or expenditures for corrupt purposes.
Consolidated Appropriations for FY2014 likewise requires this report, but also directs that the
report be unclassified, though it may be accompanied by a classified annex (see below, “113th
Congress Legislation”).
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Major U.S. security interests have included elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in
Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation
in Central Asia. The United States has tendered aid aimed at bolstering their export and physical
controls over nuclear technology and materials, in part because of concerns that Iran is targeting
these countries.224
After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons power (in reality
Russia controlled these weapons). In December 1993, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement for the “safe and secure” dismantling
of 104 SS-18s, the destruction of silos, and related purposes. All bombers and their air-launched
cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994 (except seven bombers destroyed with U.S.
aid in 1998). The SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994. On April 21, 1995, the last of about 1,040
nuclear warheads had been removed from SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and
Kazakhstan announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. The United States reported that 147 silos
had been destroyed by September 1999. A U.S.-Kazakh Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in Almaty
was set up to facilitate verification and compliance with arms control agreements to prevent the
proliferation of WMD.
Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium mines, milling
facilities, and dozens of radioactive tailing and waste dumps in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Many of these sites reportedly were inadequately protected against
theft and CTR aid has been used to assist in securing them. Kazakhstan is reported to possess
one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been among the
world’s top producers of low-enriched uranium.
Among Kazakhstan’s nuclear sites was a fast breeder reactor at Aktau that was the world’s only
nuclear desalinization facility. In 1997 and 1999, U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on
decommissioning the Aktau reactor. Shut down in 1999, it had nearly 300 metric tons of uranium
(some highly enriched) and plutonium (some weapons-grade) spent fuel in storage pools. CTR
aid was used to facilitate transporting 600 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Kazakhstan
to the United States in 1994, 2,900 kg of up to 26% enriched nuclear fuel from Aktau to
Kazakhstan’s Ulba facility in 2001 (which Ulba converted into less-enriched fuel), and 162.5 lb.
of HEU spent fuel from Aktau to Russia in May 2009. In the latter instance, the material
originally had been provided by Russia to Kazakhstan, and was returned to Russia in a series of
four shipments by rail for storage between December 2008 and May 2009. In November 2010,
224 A Treaty on the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone entered into force in January 2009. All five Central
Asian states are signatories. The Treaty prohibits the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, or possession
of nuclear explosive devices within the zone. See CRS Report RL31559, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background
and Status, coordinated by Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
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CTR aid was used to facilitate the shipment of the last of more than 10 metric tons of highly
enriched uranium and three metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium from Aktau to a newly
constructed storage site 1,800 miles away at the former Semipalatinsk Test Site in East
Kazakhstan Region.225
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities
during the Soviet era. CTR and Energy Department (DOE) funds have been used in Kazakhstan
to dismantle a former anthrax production facility in Stepnogorsk, to remove some strains to the
United States, to secure two other BW sites, and to retrain scientists. CTR funding was used to
dismantle Uzbekistan’s Nukus chemical weapons research facility. CTR aid also was used to
eliminate active anthrax spores at a former CBW test site on an island in the Aral Sea. These latter
two projects were completed in 2002. Other CTR aid helps keep former Uzbek CBW scientists
employed in peaceful research. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan receive ongoing Cooperative
Biological Engagement assistance for disease surveillance and diagnostic laboratories and
electronic disease reporting. Uzbekistan has continued to cooperate with the Departments of
Defense and Energy—even after it restricted other ties with the United States in 2005—to receive
radiation monitoring equipment and training.
In a joint U.S.-Kazakhstan-Russia statement and other remarks at the nuclear security summit in
Seoul, South Korea, in March 2012, the United States hailed Kazakhstan’s efforts to secure
nuclear materials inherited from the former Soviet Union as guidelines for other global nuclear
non-proliferation efforts.226
113th Congress Legislation
H.R. 3547 (Lamar), Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014. Introduced on November 20, 2013.
Passed the House on December 2, 2013. Passed the Senate on December 12, 2013. House agreed
to the Senate amendment on January 15, 2014. Senate concurred in the House amendment on
January 16, 2014. Signed into law on January 17, 2014 (P.L. 113-76). Sec. 7044 calls for $150
million for programs in South and Central Asia related to the transition in Afghanistan, including
expanding linkages between Afghanistan and the wider region. The section also calls for funds
provided under the heading `Economic Support Fund' for assistance for Afghanistan and Pakistan
to be expended for cross border stabilization and development programs between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, or between either country and the Central Asian countries. Sec. 7060, sector allocations,
Part (c) environmental programs, directs that international financial institutions be informed that
it is the policy of the United States to oppose any loan, grant, strategy or policy of such institution
to support the construction of any large hydroelectric dam. Sec. 7061 continues conditions of
previous years on assistance to the government of Uzbekistan, and continues a waiver provision.
The section also continues language requiring the Secretary of State to submit a report to
Congress on all U.S. assistance to Uzbekistan and “expenditures made in support of” the NDN,
225 U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Press Release: Joint Statement By Co-
Chairs of the U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership On Successful Completion of the U.S.-Kazakhstan BN-350 Spent
Fuel Program, November 17, 2010; Press Release: NNSA Secures 775 Nuclear Weapons Worth of Weapons-Grade
Nuclear Material from BN-350 Fast Reactor in Kazakhstan, November 18, 2010.
226 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and President Nursultan Nazarbayev
of the Republic of Kazakhstan Before Bilateral Meeting, March 26, 2012; Joint Statement of the Presidents of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America Regarding the Trilateral
Cooperation at the Former Semipalatinsk Test Site, March 26, 2012.
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but specifies that the report be unclassified, although it may be accompanied by a classified
annex. The law also extends a provision permitting expanded IMET assistance for Uzbekistan.
Sec. 7071 calls for funds to be made available for democracy and rule of law programs in Soviet
successor states, and for a report to be submitted on a multi-year strategy for such programs
H.R. 301 (Wolf). To provide for the establishment of the Special Envoy to Promote Religious
Freedom of Religious Minorities in the Near East and South Central Asia. Introduced on January
15, 2013. Passed the House on September 18, 2013. On September 19, 2013, received in the
Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
H.Res. 284 (Turner). Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives with respect to
promoting energy security of European allies through opening up the Southern Gas Corridor.
Calls for working with the Governments of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and its partners to
make available additional gas and oil supplies to that market. Introduced on June 27, 2013. On
September 19, 2013, was forwarded by the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging
Threats to the Full Committee on Foreign Affairs (Amended) by unanimous consent.
Table 2. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia,
FY1992 to FY2015
(millions of current dollars)
FY1992
thru
Central Asian
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
FY2015
Country
Budgeteda
Actualb
Actualb
Actualb
Estimateb
Requestb
Kazakhstan 2,050.4 17.57 19.29 12.526 9.761 8.347
Kyrgyzstan 1,221.71 41.36 47.4 47.11 45.287 40.05
Tajikistan
988.57 44.48 45.09 37.47 34.479 26.89
Turkmenistan 351.55 11.01 9.2 5.468 5.473 4.85
Uzbekistan
971.36 11.34 16.73 11.378 11.278 9.79
Regional
130.44 23.15 8.22 17.105 25.928 23.8
Total
5,714.03 148.91 145.92 131.057 132.206 113.727
As a percentage
of aid to Eurasia
14% 26% 34% 37% 40% 54%
Sources: State Department, Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia; State
Department, Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs for
FY2015, March 4, 2014 (Account Tables added March 21, 2014).
a. Includes funds from the Aid for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) account and Agency budgets.
Excludes some classified coalition support funding.
b. Includes funds from the Aid for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia account (AEECA) and other “Function
150” programs through FY2012; since FY2013, aid to Central Asia has been included in the Economic
Support Fund and other “Function 150” programs,. Does not include Defense or Energy Department funds
or funding for exchanges. Country totals for FY2013-FY2015 do not include NADR, which is not broken
out in the account tables cited above.
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Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY1992-FY2001
(millions of current dollars)
Country
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Kazakhstan 20.33 51.47 202.75 138.85 79.32 53.52 75.85 72.60 77.95 80.01
Kyrgyzstan 13.03
108.22 90.36 44.43 63.63 23.85 50.29 61.12 49.73 43.07
Tajikistan
11.61 33.72 45.26 33.71 45.36 14.75 36.57 38.16 38.69 76.48
Turkmenistan 14.71 57.28 22.38 21.82 25.33 6.25 8.94 15.94 10.91 12.57
Uzbekistan
5.62 15.00 34.07 14.44 23.34 30.88 26.84 46.88 39.06 48.33
Regional
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 0.60 7.87 0.00 4.50 7.57
Total
2057.3 2258.69 2388.82 2248.25 2252.98 2126.85 2204.36 2233.7 2220.84 2269.03
Source: Derived from U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Europe and Eurasia.
Note: Includes all agencies and accounts.
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY2002-FY2010 (and Totals, FY1992-FY2010)
(millions of current dollars)
Total
(FY1992-
Country
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
FY2010)
Kazakhstan
97.4 97.88 111.00 84.91 81.31 167.55 179.52 220.28 157.90
2,050.4
Kyrgyzstan 94.47 53.85 55.25 55.23 43.44 71.25 71.23
111.74
117.52
1,221.71
Tajikistan 136.34 48.71 53.01 65.69 42.81 49.94 67.33 67.44 82.99
988.57
Turkmenistan 18.93 10.98 10.42 18.94 10.44 19.84 16.83 20.78 28.26
351.55
Uzbekistan 224.14 90.77 84.25 78.28 49.30 35.90 38.33 48.55 37.38
971.36
Regional
13.88 9.99 3.41 5.02 5.43 7.59 6.66
25.71
12.21
130.44
Total
2587.16 2315.18 2321.34 2313.07 2238.73 2359.07 2387.9 2503.5 2446.26 5,714.03
Source: Derived from U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Europe and Eurasia.
Note: Includes all agencies and accounts.
CRS-77
Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
Source: CRS (September 2010).
CRS-78
Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
Author Contact Information
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289
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