Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
January 11, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33458
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
Summary
U.S. policy toward the Central Asian states has emphasized maximizing their assistance in U.S.
and NATO stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and in helping them combat terrorism,
proliferation, and arms and drug trafficking. Other U.S. objectives have included promoting free
markets, democratization, human rights, energy development, and the forging of east-west and
Central Asia-South Asia trade links. Such policies aim to help the states become what various
U.S. Administrations have considered to be responsible members of the international community
rather than to degenerate into xenophobic, extremist, and anti-Western regimes that contribute to
wider regional conflict and instability.
Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian “front-
line” states offered overflight and other support for coalition anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan.
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In
2003, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also endorsed coalition military action in Iraq. About two
dozen Kazakhstani troops served in Iraq until late 2008. Uzbekistan rescinded U.S. basing rights
in 2005 after the United States criticized the reported killing of civilians in the town of Andijon.
In early 2009, Kyrgyzstan ordered a U.S. base in that country to close, allegedly because of
Russian inducements and U.S. reluctance to meet Kyrgyz requests for greatly increased lease
payments. An agreement on continued U.S. use of the “transit center” was reached in June 2009.
In 2009, most of the regional states also agreed to become part of a Northern Distribution Route
for the transport of U.S. and NATO military and related materials to Afghanistan.
Policymakers have tailored U.S. policy in Central Asia to the varying characteristics of these
states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan have included securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear and
biological weapons materials and facilities. U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas
development in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and successive Administrations have backed
diverse export routes to the West for these resources. Economic and democratic reforms have
been among U.S. concerns in Kyrgyzstan. In Tajikistan, U.S. aid has focused on economic
reconstruction following that country’s 1992-1997 civil war. U.S. relations with Uzbekistan—the
most populous state in the heart of the region—were cool after 2005, but recently have improved.
During its second session, the 111th Congress is likely to continue advocating increased U.S. ties
with Central Asia, and providing backing for the region for the transit of equipment and supplies
for U.S.-led stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Congress is likely to pursue these goals through
hearings and legislation on humanitarian, economic, and democratization assistance, security
issues, and human rights. Ongoing congressional interests are likely to include boosting regional
border and customs controls and other safeguards to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), combat trafficking in persons and drugs, encourage regional integration with
South Asia and Europe, advance energy security, and counter terrorism. Support for these goals
also contributes to stabilization and reconstruction operations by the United States and NATO in
Afghanistan. Congress will continue to consider whether and how to balance these interests
against its concerns about human rights abuses and lagging democratization in the regional states.
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Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
Contents
Most Recent Developments......................................................................................................... 1
Historical Background ................................................................................................................ 1
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns .............................................................................................. 1
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan ...................................................................................... 3
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom..................................................................................... 4
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations ............................................................................................. 4
Russia’s Role ........................................................................................................................ 5
Obstacles to Peace and Independence: Regional Tensions and Conflicts ...................................... 7
The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan .................................................................................. 9
The Incursions into Kyrgyzstan ............................................................................................. 9
Attacks in Uzbekistan ........................................................................................................... 9
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan.................................................................... 10
The Summer 2009 Suicide Bombings and Attacks in Uzbekistan................................... 11
Actions of the IMU and IJU in Pakistan and Afghanistan .................................................... 11
Actions of the IMU and IJU in Germany and Elsewhere...................................................... 13
U.S. Designation of the IMU and IJU as Terrorist Organizations ......................................... 14
Democratization and Human Rights .......................................................................................... 14
Recent Developments in Kazakhstan................................................................................... 15
Recent Developments in Kyrgyzstan ................................................................................... 17
Recent Developments in Turkmenistan................................................................................ 17
Recent Developments in Uzbekistan ................................................................................... 17
Human Rights ..................................................................................................................... 18
Security and Arms Control ........................................................................................................ 20
Closure of the Karshi-Khanabad Airbase ............................................................................. 23
The Manas Airbase ............................................................................................................. 24
The “Transit Center” Agreement ................................................................................... 24
The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to Afghanistan.................................................. 25
Weapons of Mass Destruction ............................................................................................. 26
Trade and Investment ................................................................................................................ 27
Energy Resources................................................................................................................ 29
Kazakhstan ................................................................................................................... 32
Turkmenistan ................................................................................................................ 33
U.S. Aid Overview.................................................................................................................... 35
Congressional Conditions on Kazakh and Uzbek Aid .......................................................... 36
Legislation ................................................................................................................................ 37
P.L. 111-117 (H.R. 3288) (FY2010)..................................................................................... 37
Figures
Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan ............................................................................................................................. 38
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Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia, FY1992 to FY2009....................................... 38
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 39
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Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
Most Recent Developments
Kazakhstan assumed the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) on January 1, 2010. The new OSCE chairperson-in-office, Foreign Minister
Kanat Saudabayev, stated that Kazakhstan would emphasize the security role of the OSCE and
would seek to convene a summit on the issue. He will outline Kazakhstan’s objectives at a
meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council in mid-January.
Historical Background
Central Asia consists of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; it
borders Russia, China, the Middle East, and South Asia. The major peoples of all but Tajikistan
speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks speak an Iranian language), and most are Sunni Muslims
(some Tajiks are Shiia Muslims). Most are closely related historically and culturally. By the late
19th century, Russian tsars had conquered the last independent khanates and nomadic lands of
Central Asia. By the early 1920s, Soviet power had been imposed; by 1936, five “Soviet Socialist
Republics” had been created. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, they
gained independence.1
Central Asia: Basic Facts
Overview of U.S. Policy
Total Area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India;
Kazakhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000 sq. mi.;
Concerns
Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan: 190,000 sq. mi.;
Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi.
Total Population: 60.6 million, slightly less than France;
After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the
Kazakhstan: 15.4 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 5.4 m.; Tajikistan: 7.3
end of 1991, then-President George H.W.
m.; Turkmenistan: 4.9 m.; Uzbekistan: 27.6 m. (July 2009
Bush sent the “FREEDOM Support Act”
est., The World Factbook).
(FSA) aid authorization to Congress, which
Total Gross Domestic Product: $305 billion in 2008;
was amended and signed into law in October
per capita GDP is about $5,000, but there are large
1992 (P.L. 102-511). In 1999, congressional
income disparities and relatively large percentages of
concerns led to passage of the “Silk Road
people in each country are in poverty. Kazakhstan:
Strategy Act” (P.L. 106-113), which
$176.9 b.; Kyrgyzstan: $11.4 b.; Tajikistan: $15.4 b.;
Turkmenistan: $29.7 b.; Uzbekistan: $71.6 b. (The World
authorized enhanced policy and aid to support
Factbook, purchasing power parity).
conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs,
economic development, transport and
communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia.
U.S. policymakers and others hold various views on the appropriate types and levels of U.S.
involvement in the region. Some have argued that ties with “energy behemoth” Kazakhstan are
1 See CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 97-690,
Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan: Recent
Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol, CRS Report 97-1055, Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S.
Interests, by Jim Nichol, and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim
Nichol.
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crucial to U.S. interests.2 Others have argued that Uzbekistan is the “linchpin” of the region (it is
the most populous regional state and is centrally located, shaping the range and scope of regional
cooperation) and should receive the most U.S. attention.
In general, U.S. aid and investment have been viewed as strengthening the independence of the
Central Asian states and forestalling Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or other efforts to subvert them.
Advocates of such ties have argued that political turmoil and the growth of terrorist enclaves in
Central Asia could produce spillover effects both in nearby states, including U.S. allies and
friends such as Turkey, and worldwide. They also have argued that the United States has a major
interest in preventing terrorist regimes or groups from illicitly acquiring Soviet-era technology for
making weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They have maintained that U.S. interests do not
perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that Turkey and other actors possess limited
aid resources, and that the United States is in the strongest position as the sole superpower to
influence democratization and respect for human rights. They have stressed that such U.S.
influence will help alleviate social tensions exploited by Islamic extremist groups to gain
adherents. They also have argued that for all these reasons, the United States should maintain
military access to the region even when Afghanistan becomes more stable. At least some of these
views seemed to be reflected in the former Bush Administration’s 2006 National Security
Strategy of the United States, which proclaimed that “Central Asia is an enduring priority for our
foreign policy.”3
Some views of policymakers and academics who previously objected to a more forward U.S.
policy toward Central Asia appeared less salient after September 11, 2001, when the United States
came to stress counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan, but aspects of these views could again
come to the fore in debates over U.S. security policy in Afghanistan and Central Asia. These
observers argued that the United States historically had few interests in Central Asia and that
developments there remained largely marginal to U.S. interests. They discounted fears that anti-
Western Islamic extremism would make enough headway to threaten secular regimes or
otherwise harm U.S. interests in Central Asia. They also argued that the United States should not
try to foster democratization among cultures they claimed are historically attuned to
authoritarianism. Some observers rejected arguments that U.S. interests in anti-terrorism, non-
proliferation, regional cooperation, and trade outweighed concerns over democratization and
human rights, and urged reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive Central Asian states. A few
observers pointed to instability in the region as a reason to eschew deeper U.S. involvement such
as military access that could needlessly place more U.S. personnel and citizens in danger.
Participating with Members on November 18, 2009, in launching the Congressional Caucus on
Central Asia, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake, Jr. stated that the Obama Administration
“has placed a high priority on building partnerships and enhancing our political engagement in
Central Asia.” Signs of this enhanced engagement include the establishment of high-level annual
bilateral consultations with each of the regional states on counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism,
democratic reform, rule of law, human rights, relations with NGOs, trade and investment, health,
and education, he stated. In testimony on December 15, 2009, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
George Krol listed five objectives of U.S. policy in Central Asia: to maximize the cooperation of
2 U.S. Department of State. Office of the Spokesman. Remarks: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice At Eurasian
National University, October 13, 2005. Perhaps indicative of the boosted emphasis on U.S. interests in Kazakhstan,
former Secretary Rice argued that the country had the potential to be the “engine for growth” in Central Asia.
3 The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States, March 16, 2006, p. 40.
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the regional states with coalition counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan; to
increase the development and diversification of the region’s energy resources and supply routes;
to promote the eventual emergence of good governance and respect for human rights; to foster
competitive market economies; and to prevent state failure in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,
including by enhancing food security assistance.4
Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair warned in testimony on March 10, 2009, that
growing challenges to Central Asia’s stability ultimately “could threaten the security of critical
U.S. and NATO lines of communication to Afghanistan through Central Asia.” He stated that the
“highly personalized politics, weak institutions, and growing inequalities” in the Central Asian
countries make them “ill-equipped to deal with the challenges posed by Islamic violent
extremism, poor economic development, and problems associated with energy, water, and food
distribution.” Although Kazakhstan’s energy revenues had made it a regional economic power, he
cautioned that “any sustained decline in oil prices would affect revenues, could lead to societal
discontent, and will derail the momentum for domestic reforms.” Similarly, he counseled that the
global economic downturn will severely affect Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, because they are
“heavily depend[ent] on migrant worker remittances from both Russia and Kazakhstan for a
significant portion of their gross domestic product (up to 45% in the case of Tajikistan).
Tajikistan, in particular, faces increased threats to internal stability from the loss of these critical
revenue streams.”5
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan
After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, then-Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State B. Lynn Pascoe testified that the former Bush Administration realized that “it
was critical to the national interests of the United States that we greatly enhance our relations
with the five Central Asian countries” to prevent them from becoming harbors for terrorism.6 All
the Central Asian states soon offered overflight and other assistance to U.S.-led anti-terrorism
coalition operations in Afghanistan. The states were predisposed to welcome such operations.
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had long supported the Afghan Northern Alliance’s combat against the
Taliban, and all the Central Asian states feared Afghanistan as a base for terrorism, crime, and
drug trafficking (even Turkmenistan, which tried to reach some accommodation with the Taliban).
In 2005, however, Uzbekistan rescinded its basing agreement with the United States. Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan have maintained their basing support for NATO peacekeeping operations—and
Kyrgyzstan until recently for U.S. operations—in Afghanistan. In 2009, most Central Asian states
agreed to facilitate the air and land transport of U.S. and NATO non-lethal and lethal supplies to
Afghanistan as an alternative to land transport via increasingly volatile Pakistan (see also below,
“Security and Arms Control”).
4 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs.
Hearing on Re-evaluating U.S. Policy in Central Asia. Testimony of George Krol, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of South And Central Asian Affairs, December 15, 2009.
5 U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Hearing on National Security Threats. Statement of Dennis C. Blair,
Director of National Intelligence, March 10, 2009.
6 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The U.S. Role
in Central Asia. Testimony of B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, June 27,
2002.
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Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom
Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian state that joined the “coalition of the willing” in February-
March 2003 that endorsed prospective U.S.-led coalition military operations in Iraq (Kazakhstan
joined later). Uzbekistan subsequently decided not to send troops to Iraq, but Kazakhstan
deployed some two dozen troops to Iraq who reportedly did not take part in combat operations.
They pulled out in late 2008.
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible members of the
international community, supporting integrative goals through bilateral aid and through
coordination with other aid donors. The stated policy goal is to discourage radical anti-democratic
regimes and terrorist groups from gaining influence. All the Central Asian leaders publicly
embrace Islam but display hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have
established some trade and aid ties with Iran. Although they have had greater success in attracting
development aid from the West than from the East, some observers argue that, in the longer run,
their foreign policies may not be anti-Western but may more closely reflect some concerns of
other Islamic states. Some Western organizational ties with the region have suffered in recent
years, in particular those of the OSCE, which has been criticized by some Central Asian
governments for advocating democratization and respect for human rights.7 Despite this criticism,
President Nazarbayev successfully pushed for Kazakhstan to hold the presidency of the OSCE
(see “Recent Developments in Kazakhstan” below).
The State Department in 2006 included Central Asia in a revamped Bureau of South and Central
Asian Affairs. According to former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Steven Mann,
“institutions such as NATO and the OSCE will continue to draw the nations of Central Asia closer
to Europe and the United States,” but the United States also will encourage the states to develop
“new ties and synergies with nations to the south,” such as Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan.8 In
May 2007, Defense Secretary Robert Gates urged Asian countries to provide Central Asia with
road and rail, telecommunications, and electricity generation and distribution aid to link the
region with Asia; to help it combat terrorism and narcotics trafficking; to send technical advisors
to ministries to promote political and economic reforms; to offer more military trainers,
peacekeepers, and advisors for defense reforms; and to more actively integrate the regional states
into “the Asian security structure.”9 (See also below, “Trade and Investment.”)
The European Union (EU) has become more interested in Central Asia in recent years as the
region has become more of a security threat as an originator and transit zone for drugs, weapons
of mass destruction, refugees, and persons smuggled for prostitution or labor. Russia’s cutoff of
7 See also CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
8 U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central
Asia. Assessing Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia. Testimony of Steven Mann, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, July 25, 2006. The State Department appointed a Senior Advisor on
Regional Integration in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Robert Deutsch, who focused on bolstering
trade and transport ties between South and Central Asia.
9 U.S. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Documents. International Institute for Strategic Studies -
Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Singapore, June 1, 2007.
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gas supplies to Ukraine in early 2006 also bolstered EU interest in Central Asia as an alternative
supplier of oil and gas. Such interests contributed to the launch of a Strategy Paper for assistance
for 2002-2006 and a follow-on for 2007-2013 (see below), and the EU’s appointment of a Special
Representative to the region. The EU has implemented Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
(PCAs, which set forth political, economic, and trade relations) with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Uzbekistan. An existing Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) program was
supplemented in 2004 and 2006 by a Baku Energy Initiative to diversify energy supplies. One
project involves the proposed Nabucco pipeline, which could transport Caspian region gas to
Austria.10
In June 2007, the EU approved a new “Central Asian strategy” for enhanced aid and relations for
2007-2013. It calls for establishing offices in each regional state and assistance of $1 billion over
the next five years. The strategy argues that the EU ties with the region need to be enhanced
because EU enlargement and EU relations with the South Caucasus and Black Sea states bring it
to Central Asia’s borders. The strategy also stresses that “the dependency of the EU on external
energy sources and the need for a diversified energy supply policy in order to increase energy
security open further perspectives for cooperation between the EU and Central Asia,” and that the
“EU will conduct an enhanced regular energy dialogue” with the states.11 Under the strategy, the
EU holds dozens of meetings and seminars each year with the Central Asian states on such issues
as human rights, civil society development, foreign policy and assistance, trade and investment,
environmental and energy cooperation, and other issues.
Russia’s Role
During most of the 1990s, successive U.S. administrations generally viewed a democratizing
Russia as serving as a role model in Central Asia. Despite growing authoritarian tendencies in
Russia during the presidency of Vladimir Putin (2000-2008), the former Bush Administration
emphasized that Russia’s counter-terrorism efforts in the region broadly supported U.S. interests.
At the same time, successive administrations have stressed to Russia that it should not seek to
dominate the region or exclude Western and other involvement. Virtually all U.S. analysts agree
that Russia’s actions should be monitored to ensure that the independence of the Central Asian
states is not vitiated.
Soon after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Russia acquiesced to
increased U.S. and coalition presence in the region for operations against Al Qaeda and its
supporters in Afghanistan. Besides Russia’s own concerns about Islamic extremism in
Afghanistan and Central Asia, it was interested in boosting its economic and other ties to the West
and regaining some influence in Afghanistan. More recently, however, Russia has appeared to
step up efforts to counter U.S. influence in Central Asia by advocating that the states increase
economic and strategic ties with Russia and limit such ties with the United States. Such a stance
10 For details, see CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, by Paul Belkin. See also
European Union. “The EU and the Countries of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea Regions Agree on a Common Energy
Strategy,” Press Release, November 30, 2006.
11 European Commission. Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the Period 2007-2013, June 2007;
Council of the European Union. Presidency Conclusions, 11177/07, June 23, 2007, p. 12; European Commission.
External Relations. Joint Progress Report by the Council and the European Commission to the European Council on
the implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy, June 24, 2008.
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appears paradoxical to some observers, since Russia (and China) benefit from anti-terrorism
operations carried out by U.S. (and NATO) forces in Afghanistan.
During the 1990s, Russia’s economic decline and demands by Central Asia caused it to reduce its
security presence, a trend that Vladimir Putin appeared determined to reverse during his
presidency (2000-2008). In 1999, Russian border guards were largely phased out in Kyrgyzstan,
the last Russian military advisors left Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the
Collective Security Treaty (CST; see below) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
in part because the treaty members failed to help Uzbekistan meet the growing Taliban threat in
Afghanistan, according to Uzbek President Islam Karimov.
Despite these moves, Russia appeared determined to maintain a military presence in Tajikistan. It
has retained from the Soviet period the 201st motorized infantry division of about 8,000 troops
subordinate to Russia’s Volga-Ural Military District. Some Russian officers reportedly help
oversee these troops, many or most of whom are ethnic Tajik noncommissioned officers and
soldiers. Some 14,500 Tajik Frontier Force border guards receive support as necessary from the
201st division.12 Russia’s efforts to formalize a basing agreement with Tajikistan dragged on for
years, as Tajikistan endeavored to charge rent and assert its sovereignty. In October 2004, the
basing agreement was signed, formalizing Russia’s largest military presence abroad, besides its
Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, Tajikistan demanded full control over border policing. Russia
announced in June 2005 that it had handed over the last guard-house along the Afghan-Tajik
border to Tajik troops. In October 2009, visiting President Rahmon reportedly urged President
Medvedev to pay rent on Russia’s base facilities in Tajikistan, but Moscow only agreed to
consider the issue when the current basing agreement comes up for renewal in 2014.
In a seeming shift toward a more activist role in Central Asia, in April 2000, Russia called for the
signatories of the CST to approve the creation of rapid reaction forces to combat terrorism and
hinted that such forces might launch pre-emptive strikes on Afghan terrorist bases. These hints
elicited U.S. calls for Russia to exercise restraint. Presidents Clinton and Putin agreed in 2000 to
set up a working group to examine Afghan-related terrorism (this working group later broadened
its discussions to other counter-terrorism cooperation; it has continued to meet under the Obama
Administration). CST members agreed in 2001 to set up the Central Asian rapid reaction force
headquartered in Kyrgyzstan, with Russia’s troops in Tajikistan comprising most of the force (this
force remained largely moribund, however, and a “new and improved” version was announced in
2009). CIS members in 2001 also approved setting up an Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC) in
Moscow, with a branch in Kyrgyzstan, giving Russia influence over regional intelligence
gathering.
Perhaps as a result of the establishment of a U.S. airbase in Kyrgyzstan after the September 11,
2001, attacks (see “The Manas Airbase” below), Russia in September 2003 signed a 15-year
military basing accord with Kyrgyzstan providing access to the Kant airfield, near Kyrgyzstan’s
capital of Bishkek. The base is a few miles from the U.S.-led coalition’s airbase. After Kyrgyzstan
agreed to continued U.S. use of the airbase in mid-2009 as a “transit center” (see below), Russia
requested that Kyrgyzstan grant Moscow rights to another airbase near Uzbekistan’s border.
Uzbekistan denounced this plan, and it appeared to be put on hold. Besides Russia’s military
12 The Military Balance 1998/99. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, October 1998; The Military
Balance 2009, February 2009.
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presence in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, it has also asserted its maritime dominance in the Caspian
Sea. Russia’s Caspian Sea Flotilla has been bolstered by troops and equipment in recent years.
Taking advantage of Uzbekistan’s souring relations with many Western countries in 2005 (see
below), Russia signed a Treaty on Allied Relations with Uzbekistan in November 2005 that calls
for mutual defense consultations in the event of a threat to either party (similar to language in the
CST). Uzbekistan re-joined the CST Organization (CSTO; see below) in June 2006 at a meeting
where the member-states also agreed that basing agreements by any member with a third party
had to be approved by all members, in effect providing supreme veto power to Russia over future
basing arrangements. Despite rejoining the CSTO, Uzbekistan has appeared wary of Russian
intentions in the organization, including by insisting that Tashkent will not participate in the new
rapid reaction forces established in June 2009 unless they pledge to not become involved in
disputes within the CIS.
Many observers suggest that the appreciative attitude of Central Asian states toward the United
States in the early 2000s—for their added security accomplished through U.S.-led actions in
Afghanistan—has declined over time. Reasons may include perceptions that the United States has
not provided adequate security or economic assistance. Also, Russia and China are pledging
security support to the states to get them to forget their pre-September 11, 2001, dissatisfaction
with Russian and Chinese efforts. Russia also encourages the leaders to believe that the United
States backs democratic “revolutions” to replace them. Lastly, Russia has claimed that it can
ensure regional security in the face of the recently deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan.
As Russia’s economy improved in the 2000s—as a result of increases in oil and gas prices—
Russia reasserted its economic interests in Central Asia. Russia endeavored to counter Western
business and gain substantial influence over energy resources through participation in joint
ventures and by insisting that pipelines cross Russian territory. After an Energy Cooperation
Statement was signed at the May 2002 U.S.-Russia summit, it appeared that Russia would accept
a Western role in the Caspian region, including the construction of oil and gas pipelines from
Azerbaijan to Turkey. Subsequently, however, Russian officials have urged the Central Asian
states to rely on Russian-controlled export routes (see below, “Energy Resources”).
After Russia’s economic growth slowed in 2008 as a result of decreasing oil and gas prices and
other shocks associated with the global economic downturn, it has appeared that Russia has tried
to maintain economic leverage, including by giving stabilization grants and loans to Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan. In other areas, such as commodity trade and the remittances from Russia by
migrant workers, Russian economic influence has been reduced, although it is still significant. In
contrast, China has appeared to be substantially increasing its aid and trade activities in the
region.13
Obstacles to Peace and Independence: Regional
Tensions and Conflicts
The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups, convoluted borders, and emerging national identities
pose challenges to stability in all the Central Asian states. Emerging national identities accentuate
13 Matt Siegel, “Crisis.... What Crisis? China Spends Big in Central Asia,” Agence France Presse, May 24, 2009.
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clan, family, regional, and Islamic self-identifications. Central Asia’s convoluted borders fail to
accurately reflect ethnic distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to regional
tensions. Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries and
Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, they make up almost a quarter of the population. More ethnic Turkmen
reside in Iran and Afghanistan—over 3 million—than in Turkmenistan. Sizeable numbers of
ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and 7 million in Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in
China’s Xinjiang province. The fertile Ferghana Valley is shared by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Uzbekistan. The central governments have struggled to gain control over administrative subunits.
Most observers agree that the term “Central Asia” currently denotes a geographic area more than
a region of shared identities and aspirations, although it is clear that the land-locked, poverty-
stricken, and sparsely populated region will need more integration in order to develop.
Regional cooperation remains stymied by tensions among the states. Such tensions continue to
exist despite the membership of the states in various cooperation groups such as the CST
Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and NATO’s Partnership
for Peace (PFP). The CST was signed by Russia, Belarus, the South Caucasus countries, and the
Central Asian states (except Turkmenistan) in May 1992 and called for military cooperation and
joint consultations in the event of security threats to any member. At the time to renew the treaty
in 1999, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan formally withdrew. The remaining members
formed the CSTO in late 2002, and a secretariat opened in Moscow at the beginning of 2004.
Through the CSTO, Russia has attempted to involve the members in joint efforts to combat
international terrorism and drug trafficking.14 Former Kyrgyz President Akayev apparently did
not call for the aid of the CSTO during the coup that overthrew him in 2005, and the CSTO has
appeared inactive during other crises in the region. In September 2008, its members agreed to
condemn Georgia’s “aggression” against its breakaway South Ossetia region but refused a request
by Russia to extend diplomatic recognition to South Ossetia and Georgia’s breakaway region of
Abkhazia.
In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed the “Shanghai treaty” with China
pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in 1997 they signed a
follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300 mile former Soviet-Chinese border. China has used the
treaty to pressure the Central Asian states to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting
separatism in China’s Xinjiang province, and to get them to extradite Uighurs fleeing China. In
2001, Uzbekistan joined the group, re-named the SCO, and in 2003 the SCO Regional Anti-
Terrorism Structure (RATS) was set up there. Military exercises have become a major form of
cooperation. According to some observers, a major aim of these “anti-terrorism” exercises is to
convince the Central Asian states that Russia and China are able to supplant the United States in
helping the region to combat terrorism. China also has stressed economic cooperation with the
region to build east-west transport routes, and these efforts may facilitate progress toward
regional integration.15
14 Roger McDermott, Eurasia Insight, August 28, 2002.
15 Roger McDermott, The Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007, Occasional Paper, The Jamestown Foundation,
October 2007; S. Frederick Starr, ed., The New Silk Roads: Transport and Trade in Greater Central Asia (Washington
DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2007).
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The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan
Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward
independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of
nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and groups tried to take power. Kulyabi and Khojenti
regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by
the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced
persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. After the two sides agreed to a cease-fire, the
U.N. Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in
December 1994. In June 1997, Tajik President Rahmon and the late rebel leader Seyed Abdullo
Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Benchmarks of the peace process were largely
met, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000. To encourage the peace process, the United States
initially pledged to help Tajikistan rebuild. Some observers point to events in the city of Andijon
in Uzbekistan (see “The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan” below) as indicating that
conflicts similar to the Tajik civil war could engulf other regional states where large numbers of
people are disenfranchised and poverty-stricken.
The Incursions into Kyrgyzstan
Several hundred Islamic extremists and others harboring in Tajikistan and Afghanistan first
invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Jama Namanganiy, the co-leader of the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU; see below), headed the largest guerrilla group. They seized
hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a
springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan.16 With Uzbek and Kazakh air and other support, Kyrgyz
forces forced the guerrillas out in October 1999. Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again
invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August 2000. Uzbekistan provided air and other support,
but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000. The
IMU did not invade the region in the summer before September 11, 2001, in part because Osama
bin Laden had secured its aid for a Taliban offensive against the Afghan Northern Alliance.
About a dozen alleged IMU members invaded from Tajikistan in May 2006 but soon were
defeated (some escaped). After this, the Kyrgyz defense minister claimed that the IMU, HT, and
other such groups increasingly menaced national security.
Attacks in Uzbekistan
A series of explosions in Tashkent in February 1999 were among early signs that the Uzbek
government was vulnerable to terrorism. By various reports, the explosions killed 16 to 28 and
wounded 100 to 351 people. The aftermath involved wide-scale arrests of political dissidents and
others deemed by some observers as unlikely conspirators. Karimov in April 1999 accused
Mohammad Solikh (former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of
masterminding what he termed an assassination plot, along with Tohir Yuldashev (co-leader of the
IMU) and the Taliban. The first trial of 22 suspects in June resulted in six receiving death
sentences. The suspects said in court that they received terrorist training in Afghanistan,
16 According to Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, and Svante Cornell, the incursions of the IMU into Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000 were largely driven by efforts to secure drug trafficking routes. Islamic Radicalism in
Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU, Silk Road Paper, July 2006.
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Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia and were led by Solikh, Yuldashev and Namanganiy. In 2000,
Yuldashev and Namanganiy received death sentences in absentia, and Solikh received a 15.5 year
prison sentence. Solikh denied membership in IMU, and he and Yuldashev denied involvement in
the bombings.
On March 28 through April 1, 2004, a series of suicide bombings and other attacks were launched
in Uzbekistan, reportedly killing 47. An obscure Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan (IJG; Jama’at
al-Jihad al-Islami, a breakaway part of the IMU) claimed responsibility.17 In subsequent trials, the
alleged attackers were accused of being members of IJG or of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT; an Islamic
fundamentalist movement ostensibly pledged to peace but banned in Uzbekistan) and of
attempting to overthrow the government. Some defendants testified that they were trained by
Arabs and others at camps in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. They testified that Najmiddin
Kamolitdinovich Jalolov (convicted in absentia in 2000) was the leader of IJG, and linked him to
Taliban head Mohammad Omar, Uighur extremist Abu Mohammad, and Osama bin Laden. On
July 30, 2004, explosions occurred at the U.S. and Israeli embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor-
General’s Office in Tashkent. The IMU and IJG claimed responsibility and stated that the suicide
bombings were aimed against Uzbek and other “apostate” governments.18
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan
Dozens or perhaps hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded on May 13, 2005, after Uzbek
troops fired on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon. The protestors had gathered to
demand the end of a trial of local businessmen charged with belonging to an Islamic terrorist
group. The night before, a group stormed a prison where those on trial were held and released
hundreds of inmates.19 Many freed inmates then joined others in storming government buildings.
President Karimov flew to the city to direct operations, and reportedly had restored order by late
on May 13.20 On July 29, 439 people who had fled from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan were airlifted
to Romania for resettlement processing, after the United States and others raised concerns that
they might be tortured if returned to Uzbekistan.21
The United States and others in the international community repeatedly called for an international
inquiry into events in Andijon, which the Uzbek government rejected as violating its sovereignty.
In November 2005, the EU Council approved a visa ban on 12 Uzbek officials it stated were
“directly responsible for the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in Andijon and for
the obstruction of an independent inquiry.” The Council also embargoed exports of “arms,
17 The IJG changed its name to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in 2005.
18 See also CRS Report RS21818, The 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim
Nichol.
19 There is a great deal of controversy about whether this group contained foreign-trained terrorists or was composed
mainly of the friends and families of the accused. See U.S. Congress. Commission on Security and Cooperation In
Europe. Briefing: The Uzbekistan Crisis. Testimony of Galima Bukharbayeva, Correspondent. Institute for War and
Peace Reporting, June 29, 2005. For a contrasting assessment, see Shirin Akiner, Violence in Andijon, 13 May 2005:
An Independent Assessment, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, July 2005; and AbduMannob Polat, Reassessing Andijan:
The Road to Restoring U.S.-Uzbek Relations, Jamestown Foundation, June 2007.
20 Analyst Adeeb Khalid draws a parallel between the Uzbek government’s actions at Andijon and at a large student
demonstration in Tashkent in January 1992. In the latter case, Karimov allegedly ordered troops to fire on the marchers,
resulting in up to six deaths and two dozen or more injuries. Islam After Communism (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2007), p. 155. See also Reuters, January 17, 1992.
21 See also CRS Report RS22161, Unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan: Context and Implications, by Jim Nichol.
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military equipment, and other equipment that might be used for internal repression.”22 In October
2007 and April 2008, the EU Council suspended the visa ban for six months but left the arms
embargo in place. In October 2008, the EU Council praised what it viewed as some positive
trends in human rights in Uzbekistan and lifted the visa ban, although it left the arms embargo in
place.23 In October 2009, it lifted the arms embargo.
At the first major trial of 15 alleged perpetrators of the Andijon unrest in late 2005, the accused
all confessed and asked for death penalties. They testified that they were members of Akramiya, a
branch of HT launched in 1994 by Akram Yuldashev that allegedly aimed to use force to create a
caliphate in the area of the Fergana Valley located in Uzbekistan. Besides receiving assistance
from HT, Akramiya was alleged to receive financial aid and arms training from the IMU. The
defendants also claimed that the U.S. and Kyrgyz governments helped finance and support their
effort to overthrow the government, and that international media colluded with local human rights
groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in this effort. The U.S. and Kyrgyz
governments denied involvement, and many observers criticized the trial as appearing stage-
managed. Reportedly, 100 or more individuals were arrested and sentenced, including some
Uzbek opposition party members and media and NGO representatives.24 Partly in response, the
U.S. Congress tightened conditions on aid to Uzbekistan.
The Summer 2009 Suicide Bombings and Attacks in Uzbekistan
On May 25-26, 2009, a police checkpoint was attacked on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, attacks took
place in the border town of Khanabad, and four bombings occurred in Andijon in the commercial
district, including at least one by suicide bombers. Several deaths and injuries were alleged,
although reporting was suppressed. Uzbek officials blamed the IMU, although the IJU allegedly
claimed responsibility. President Karimov flew to Andijon on May 31. In late August 2009,
shooting took place in Tashkent that resulted in the deaths of three alleged IMU members and the
apprehension of other group members. The Uzbek government alleged that the group had been
involved in the 1999 explosions and in recent assassinations in Tashkent. In early December
2009, the Andijon regional court reportedly convicted 22 individuals on charges of involvement
in the May 2009 events, and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from five to 18 years.
Actions of the IMU and IJU in Pakistan and Afghanistan
Pakistan reported in November 2006 that it had arrested IJU members who had placed rockets
near presidential offices, the legislature, and the headquarters of military intelligence in
22 Council of the European Union. Uzbekistan: Council Adopts Restrictive Measures, Press Release 14392/05,
November 14, 2005. U.S. officials argued that the United States already had been limiting military assistance—at
congressional request—because of human rights abuses.
23 Council of the European Union. 2824th General Affairs Council Meeting. Press Release, October 15-16, 2007; 2864th
and 2865th General Affairs and External Relations Council Meetings. Press Release, April 29, 2008; 2897th General
Affairs and External Relations Council Meeting, Press Release, October 13, 2008. Some international human rights
groups protested against a visit by the head of the Uzbek state security service—who had been subject to the visa ban
lifted by the COE—to Germany in late October 2008. He reportedly advised German officials on IJU activities in
Central Asia.
24 OSCE. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Report from the OSCE/ODIHR Trial
Monitoring in Uzbekistan, April 21, 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Republic of Uzbekistan. Comments on the
Report Prepared by the OSCE ODIHR, April 19, 2006.
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Islamabad. Reportedly, the IJU was targeting the government because of its support for the
United States.25 Pakistani media reported in March-April 2007 that dozens of IMU members had
been killed in northern Pakistan when local tribes turned against them, possibly reducing their
strength or forcing them to move into Afghanistan and Central Asia. More alleged IMU and IJU
members were reported killed by Pakistani forces during fighting in North Waziristan in October
2007. Indicating a widening of the IMU’s focus, Tohir Yuldashev called in January 2008 for
creating a Shariah state in Pakistan.
Among other incidents:
• In January 2008, an IJU website seemed to indicate that Abu Laith al-Libi—an al
Qaeda official who had been killed by the United States in Pakistan—had been
one of the leaders of the IJU.26
• In March 2008, an IJU website claimed that one of its members—the German-
born Cunyt Ciftci (alias Saad Abu Fourkan)—had assisted Taliban forces in
Afghanistan by carrying out a suicide bombing that killed two Afghan and two
U.S. troops and wounded several others.27 According to the IJU website and other
sources, IJU is playing a more significant role in fighting in Afghanistan.
• In June 2008, an IJU video claimed that one Uzbek IJU member had taken part in
the 1999 attack in Kyrgyzstan, and later had fought in Afghanistan against the
Northern Alliance and then against U.S. and NATO forces. Another Uzbek
member had been trained in Chechnya by Khattab in 1998 and also had fought
against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.28
• In July and September 2009, ISAF and the Afghan military reportedly carried out
operations in the northern Konduz province against IMU terrorists who
supposedly had moved into the province after being forced out of Pakistan.
• Tohir Yuldashev allegedly was killed in Pakistan by a U.S. predator missile on
September 26, 2009.
• On October 11, 2009, 10 terrorists attacked the army headquarters in Rawalpindi,
resulting in 20 deaths. The government alleges that three of the attackers
belonged to the IMU.
• In late October 2009, Pakistani armed forces reportedly were attacking an IMU
base in the town of Kaniguram in South Waziristan.
Some officials in Central Asia have warned that the crackdown on the IMU and IJU in Pakistan
and Afghanistan may be forcing some of the terrorists to return to Central Asia. Other officials
have stated that a large-scale influx has not yet occurred.
25 BBC Monitoring South Asia, November 4, 2006.
26 Guido Steinberg, A Turkish al-Qaeda: The Islamic Jihad Union and the Internationalization of Uzbek Jihadism,
Center for Contemporary Conflict, 2008; U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Prepared Testimony of
Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell: The Annual Threat Assessment, February 5, 2008.
27 Guido Steinberg, A Turkish al-Qaeda; UPI, March 17, 2008.
28 CEDR, August 4, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-318001.
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Actions of the IMU and IJU in Germany and Elsewhere
Officials in Germany arrested four individuals on September 5, 2007, on charges of planning
explosions at the U.S. airbase at Ramstein, at U.S. and Uzbek diplomatic offices, and other targets
in Germany. The IJU claimed responsibility and stated that it was targeting U.S. and Uzbek
interests because of these countries’ “brutal policies towards Muslims,” and targeting Germany
because it has a small military base in Termez, Uzbekistan, which is used to support NATO
operations in Afghanistan. Reportedly, the suspects had received their orders from Gofir Salimov
(not apprehended), who is wanted in Uzbekistan in connection with the 2004 bombings. The
suspects were part of a larger IJU branch in Germany. In U.S. congressional testimony on
September 10, 2007, the then-Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, John Redd, and
the then-Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, stated that U.S. communications
intercepts shared with Germany had facilitated foiling the plot. In July 2009, German media
reported that the suspects had confessed that they were trained at an IJU terrorist training camp in
Afghanistan. The leader of the IJU was identified as Najmiddin Jalolov (mentioned above), a.k.a.
“commander Ahmad.” In testimony in September 2009, two of the defendants admitted that while
in Afghanistan in 2006, they had launched attacks against two U.S. military camps.29
Among other incidents:
• In May 2008, French, German, and Dutch authorities reported that they had
detained 10 individuals for suspicion of running a network to funnel money to
the IMU in Uzbekistan.
• In late September 2008, German authorities reported the arrest of two suspected
members of IJU and issued wanted posters for two other suspected members. The
four allegedly had received terrorist training in Pakistani IJU camps. German
authorities also arrested two people allegedly attempting to leave the country to
undergo terrorism training in Pakistan by the IJU (they later were released on the
grounds of inconclusive evidence).30
• A video released by the IJU in late October 2008 stated that as long as Germany
supports NATO operations in Afghanistan, and uses a base in Uzbekistan to
support these operations, it is subject to IJU attacks.
• A video was released by the IJU in January 2009 that threatened German
“occupation” troops in Afghanistan.
• Turkish authorities arrested over three dozen alleged IJU members in April 2009.
• German media reported in June 2009 that a video released by the IJU provided
more evidence that the terrorist organization was linked to al Qaeda.31
29 Guido Steinberg has argued that several dozen recruits of various ethnic groups have travelled from Germany to
Pakistan for training in IMU and IJU camps. Open Source Center. Europe: Daily Report, August 10, 2009, Doc. No.
EUP-72003.
30 Simon Sturdee, “German Commandos Arrest Two Terror Suspects on Aircraft,” Agence France Presse, September
26, 2008; Craig Whitlock, “Germany Pulls Two Suspected Terrorism Trainees from Plane,” Washington Post,
September 27, 2008, p. A14.
31 Open Source Center. Europe: Daily Report (hereafter EDR), June 5, 2009, Doc. No. EUP-85023.
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U.S. Designation of the IMU and IJU as Terrorist Organizations
In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,
stating that the IMU, aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by Osama bin Laden, resorts to
terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. The “main goal of the
IMU is to topple the current government in Uzbekistan,” the State Department warned, and it
linked the IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. IMU forces assisting the
Taliban and Al Qaeda suffered major losses during coalition actions in Afghanistan, and
Namanganiy was probably killed.32
Former CIA Director Porter Goss testified in March 2005 that the IJG/IJU “has become a more
virulent threat to U.S. interests and local governments.”33 In May 2005, the State Department
designated the IJG/IJU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global
Terrorist, and in June, the U.N. Security Council added the IJG/IJU to its terrorism list.34 In June
2008, Jalolov and his associate Suhayl Fatilloevich Buranov were added to the U.N. 1267
Sanctions Committee’s Consolidated List of individuals and entities associated with bin Laden, al
Qaeda, and the Taliban. Also, the U.S. Treasury Department ordered that any of their assets under
U.S. jurisdiction be frozen and prohibited U.S. citizens from financial dealings with the
terrorists.35
Democratization and Human Rights
A major goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term development of
democratic institutions and respect for human rights. Particularly since September 11, 2001, the
United States has attempted to harmonize its concerns about democratization and human rights in
the region with its interests in regional support for counter-terrorism. According to some
allegations, the former Bush Administration may have sent suspected terrorists in its custody to
Uzbekistan for questioning, a process termed “extraordinary rendition.”36 Although not verifying
such transfers specifically to Uzbekistan, the former Bush Administration stated that it received
diplomatic assurances that transferees would not be tortured. Several citizens of Central Asian
states who were held in U.S. custody at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base have been returned to
their home countries.37
32 U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, April 2004.
33 U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Testimony of the Director of Central Intelligence, The Honorable Porter
J. Goss, March 17, 2005.
34 U.S. Department of State. Press Statement: U.S. Department of State Designates the Islamic Jihad Group Under
Executive Order 13224, May 26, 2005; U.N. Security Council. The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee. Press
Release: Security Council Committee Adds One Entity to Al-Qaida Section of Consolidated List, SC/8405, June 3,
2005.
35 U.S. Department of the Treasury. Press Release: Treasury Designates Leadership of the IJU Terrorist Group, June
18, 2008.
36 The New Yorker, February 14, 2005; New York Times, May 1, 2005; New York Times, December 31, 2005;
Representative Edward Markey, Congressional Record, December 13, 2005, p. H11337; European Parliament.
Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transport And Illegal Detention
of Prisoners, Draft Interim Report, 2006/2027(INI), April 24, 2006; and On the Testimony by Craig Murray, Former
British Ambassador, Working Document No. 5, June 1, 2006.
37 House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight.
Hearing: City on the Hill or Prison on the Bay? The Mistakes of Guantanamo and the Decline of America’s Image,
(continued...)
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Several of the Central Asian leaders have declared that they are committed to democratization.
Despite such pledges, the states have made little progress, according to the State Department.38
During Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed a Charter on
Democratic Partnership that recognized Kazakhstan’s commitments to the rule of law, respect for
human rights, and economic reform. During his December 2001 and September 2006 visits,
Nazarbayev repeated these pledges in joint statements with then-President Bush. In March 2002,
a U.S.-Uzbek Strategic Partnership Declaration was signed pledging Uzbekistan to “intensify the
democratic transformation” and improve freedom of the press. During his December 2002 U.S.
visit, Tajikistan’s President Rahmon pledged to “expand fundamental freedoms and human
rights.”
During the 1990s and early 2000s, almost all the leaders in Central Asia held onto power by
orchestrating extensions of their terms, holding suspect elections, eliminating possible
contenders, and providing emoluments to supporters and relatives (the exception was the leader
of Tajikistan, who had been ousted in the early 1990s during a civil war). After this long period of
leadership stability, President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan was toppled in a coup in 2005, and
President Niyazov of Turkmenistan died in late 2006, marking the passing of three out of five
Soviet-era regional leaders from the scene.
Possible scenarios of political futures in Central Asia have ranged from continued rule in most of
the states by elite groups that became ensconced during the Soviet era to violent transitions to
Islamic fundamentalist rule. Relatively peaceful transitions to more or less democratic and
Western-oriented political systems have been considered decreasingly likely by many observers.
While some observers warn that Islamic extremism could increase dramatically in the region,
others discount the risk that the existing secular governments soon will be overthrown by Islamic
extremists.39
In the case of the three succession transitions so far, Tajikistan’s resulted in a shift in the Soviet-
era regional/clan elite configuration and some limited inclusion of the Islamic Renaissance Party.
Perhaps worrisome, Tajik President Rahmon has written a “spiritual guide” reminiscent of the one
penned by Turkmenistan’s late authoritarian president, and has given orders on how citizens
should live and dress. Kyrgyzstan’s transition appears to involve power-sharing by Soviet-era
regional/clan elites. The current Kyrgyz government appears to have substantially reversed earlier
progress in democratization. In Turkmenistan, it appears that Soviet-era elites have retained
power following Niyazov’s death and have eschewed meaningful democratization.
Recent Developments in Kazakhstan
Although Kazakhstan lobbied extensively for holding the presidency of the OSCE in 2009, the
15th Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE in Madrid in late November 2007 decided that Greece
(...continued)
May 6, 2008; Hearing: Rendition and the Department of State, June 10, 2008. At least three Tajiks returned to
Tajikistan from Guantanamo were then tried and imprisoned on charges of belonging to al Qaeda or the IMU.
38 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007.
39 Analyst Adeeb Khalid argues that the elites and populations of the regional states still hold many attitudes and follow
many practices imposed during the Soviet period of rule. This “Sovietism” makes it difficult for either Islamic
extremism or democratization to make headway, he suggests. Khalid, p. 193. For a perhaps more troubling view of the
threat of Islamic extremism, see above, “Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns.”
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would hold the OSCE presidency in 2009, followed in 2010 by Kazakhstan. This positive
decision was made despite the appearance in early November of the final report of the OSCE’s
Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which assessed Kazakhstan’s
August legislative election as not meeting OSCE commitments (although the election was
considered improved over previous races). Kazakhstan was among several CIS members that
called in 2007 for restricting the scope of election observation by ODIHR. Also in late October
2007, Kazakh authorities were alleged to have closed down several independent newspapers and
Internet sites.
Foreign Minister Tazhin pledged at the Ministerial Meeting that suggestions made by ODIHR for
changes to media, electoral, and political party laws would be submitted for consideration by the
Kazakh legislature by the end of 2008. He stated that amendments to the media law would
include reducing criminal penalties for libel by the media, setting up “media self-regulation
mechanisms” to address libel issues, and easing the registration process for media. He also
promised that the Kazakh government would soon move to increase local self-government. He
assured the OSCE that Kazakhstan “consider[s] the human dimension to be one of the most
important directions of the OSCE activity,” and that in chairing the OSCE, Kazakhstan would
ensure that NGOs are able to participate in OSCE events and that ODIHR’s mandate is preserved.
He argued that Kazakhstan’s chairmanship would be “a powerful catalyst of the reform process
[in Kazakhstan] and an additional confirmation of the rightly chosen path of further liberalization
and openness.”40 Addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE in Astana on June 29,
2008, President Nazarbayev stated that his country’s preparations for holding the chairmanship
included the elaboration of a blueprint he termed “the path to Europe,” which envisages
Kazakhstan’s integration into Europe in the areas of energy, transport, technology transfers,
education, culture, and democratization.
In early February 2009, President Nazarbayev approved changes to laws on the media, elections,
and political parties. Political parties that did not gain at least 7% of votes cast in an Majlis
election were accorded the right to participate in some legislative affairs, the number of signatures
necessary for registering a party for a Majlis election was reduced from 50,000 to 40,000, and
requirements for registering media were eased. Critics termed the changes minor.41 One positive
sign was an action by the constitutional court in February 2009 to strike down a proposed law that
would have tightened restrictions on religious freedom. In April 2009, ODIHR criticized
proposed further amendments to the media law that would restrict access to the Internet. Other
changes would bar media reporting that “interfere[s] with election campaigns,” takes place during
times when campaign news is not allowed, tries to influence election results, or influences
participation in strikes. Further amendments would bar foreign broadcasts from “complicat[ing]
or support[ing] the nomination or election” of candidates or parties. The changes were signed into
law in July 2009.42
40 OSCE. 15th Ministerial Council Meeting. Address of Marat Tazhin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, November 29, 2007.
41 Human Rights Watch. An Atmosphere of Quiet Repression: Freedom of Religion, Assembly and Expression in
Kazakhstan, December 2008.
42 Human Rights Watch. Human Rights in Kazakhstan: Seven Months before the OSCE Chairmanship, Human Rights
Watch Memorandum, May 20, 2009.
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Recent Developments in Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan’s legislature voted in late March 2009 to hold an early presidential election on July
23, 2009. The CEC declared that six candidates, including Bakiyev, had met the requirements to
run. Several opposition party leaders refused to run in what they considered a hastily called
election. Two candidates were considered to be true opposition figures, the main one of which
was Almazbek Atambayev. He was a former prime minister and was backed by the United
Popular Movement, a bloc of opposition parties. According to the CEC, Bakiyev received 76.43%
of 2.25 million votes cast, followed by Atambayev with 8.9%. Almost as many people checked a
box “against all candidates” as voted for Atambayev. OSCE election monitors stated that despite
some positive aspects of the election, such as real choices among candidates and the involvement
of civil society, the election “was marred by ... evidence of ballot box stuffing, inaccuracies in the
voter lists and some evidence of multiple voting. The process further deteriorated during the
counting and tabulation.” The observers also criticized the bias of state-owned media toward
Bakiyev, the use of government resources by Bakiyev’s campaign, pressure and intimidation by
Bakiyev’s supporters against other candidates, and irregularities in forming electoral
commissions.43 Several opposition parties denounced the election as fraudulent (even before
voting was over) and launched protests, which resulted in hundreds of detentions and arrests by
the police.
Recent Developments in Turkmenistan
A constitutional commission unveiled a draft constitution in July 2008 that after public debate
was approved by the Halk Maslahaty (HM or People’s Council, a supreme legislative-executive-
regional conclave) on September 26, 2008. The new constitution abolishes the HM and divides its
powers between the Mejlis and the president. It calls for enlarging the Mejlis from 65 to 125
members. An early legislative election was held on December 14, 2008. An OSCE pre-election
needs assessment mission raised concerns that “a lack of distinction between civil society
organizations, the party, and the State,” had resulted in only government-approved candidates
running for seats.44 The Turkmen Central Electoral Commission reported that almost 94% of the
electorate voted. At least two approved candidates ran in each district. President
Berdimuhamedow hailed the election as advancing Turkmen democracy.45
Recent Developments in Uzbekistan
The People’s Democratic Party, founded by President Karimov and which has 31 members in its
faction in the Legislative Chamber (the lower legislative chamber), declared in November 2009
that it is the “minority opposition” party, and that the Liberal Democratic Party (which is also
pro-Karimov and has 39 members in its faction) is the chamber’s majority party. The latter party
is the leader of a “majority democratic bloc” in the legislature that includes two other pro-
Karimov parties. The ability to run as an independent (non-party) candidate was abolished in late
43 OSCE. Election Observation Mission, Kyrgyz Republic—Presidential Election 23 July 2009: Statement of
Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, July 24, 2009. See also CEDR, July 28, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-6005.
44 OSCE. ODIHR. Turkmenistan, Early Parliamentary Elections: OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report,
October 20, 2008.
45 CEDR, December 19, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950107.
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2008, although the Uzbek government had highlighted the 12 non-party members elected to the
Legislative Chamber as a sign of democratization.
Legislative Chamber elections were held on December 27, 2009. Over 500 candidates ran for 135
seats, and an additional 15 seats were filled by voting at a conference of the Environmental
Movement (a group of NGOs formed in 2008). Turnout reportedly was almost 88% of 17.2
million registered voters. The Central Electoral Commission reported that the Liberal Democratic
Party had won 33 seats, the Milliy Tiklanish Democratic Party had won 25 seats, and the Adolat
Social Democratic Party had won 16 seats, so that they remained the “majority bloc” in the
Legislative Chamber, and that the “opposition” People’s Democratic Party had won 22 seats.
Run-offs were to be held on January 10 in 39 districts where no candidate received over 50% of
the vote. The OSCE declined to send observers, stating that the electoral environment did not
permit a free and fair contest. Some U.S. embassy personnel observed some of the voting, and the
embassy stated afterward that the election campaign failed to reflect diverse viewpoints, since
candidates from only pro-Karimov parties were permitted to run.46
Human Rights
The NGO Freedom House has included Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan among countries such as
Cuba, Myanmar, North Korea, and Sudan that have the lowest possible ratings on political rights
and civil liberties.47 In all the Central Asian states, adherents of non-favored faiths, missionaries,
and pious Muslims face religious rights abuses, and unfair elections increase political alienation
and violence aimed against the regimes.
Since 2001, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has
recommended that the Secretary of State designate Uzbekistan a “country of particular concern”
(CPC), where severe human rights violations could lead to U.S. sanctions. In November 2006,
then-Secretary Rice designated Uzbekistan a CPC. In its most recent report in 2009, USCIRF
reported that Uzbekistan had made scant efforts to address religious freedom abuses and should
retain its CPC designation. In the case of religious freedom in Turkmenistan, USCIRF
recommended in its 2009 annual report—as it had since 2000—that Turkmenistan be designated a
CPC.48
On human trafficking, the State Department downgraded Uzbekistan in mid-2006 to “Tier 3”
(designating a source country for human trafficking that did not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking and was not making significant efforts to do so). No
U.S. aid sanctions were reported as a direct result of the Tier 3 designation. In June 2008,
Uzbekistan was found to have made some modest progress in addressing human trafficking
problems, and was upgraded to the “Tier 2 Watch List.” According to the State Department,
Uzbekistan in 2008 adopted an anti-trafficking law and demonstrated modest improvement in its
victim assistance and protection efforts. In June 2009, the State Department reported that
46 OSCE. ODIHR. Republic of Uzbekistan Parliamentary Elections 27 December 2009: OSCE/ODIHR Needs
Assessment Mission Report, October 21-22, 2009; Deirdre Tynan, “Uzbekistan: Tashkent Holds Parliamentary
Elections,” Eurasia Insight, December 28, 2009.
47 Freedom House. The Worst of the Worst: The World’s Most Repressive Societies, September 6, 2006; May 9, 2007;
May 6, 2008; and March 9, 2009.
48 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. Annual Report, May 1, 2007; Annual Report, May 1, 2008;
and Annual Report, May 1, 2009. USCIRF first urged that Uzbekistan be designated a CPC in its 2005 Annual Report.
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Uzbekistan would remain on its “Tier 2 Watch List” because the country had not made progress
in ending forced child labor. In regard to other Central Asian countries, Tajikistan was
downgraded from “Tier 2” to the “Tier 2 Watch List” in 2008 and remained on the watch list in
2009 because “the government did not demonstrate progress in prosecuting and convicting
officials complicit in trafficking and ensuring that victims have access to protection.” The State
Department has averred that coerced child laborers are used to pick cotton in Kazakhstan and
Tajikistan, as well as in Uzbekistan.49
Among U.N. actions, the General Assembly in 2003 and 2004 approved resolutions expressing
“grave concern” about human rights abuses in Turkmenistan and urging reforms. The U.N.
Rapporteur on Torture in early 2003 completed a report that concluded that police and prison
officials in Uzbekistan “systematically” employed torture.50 In late 2005, the U.N. General
Assembly’s Third Committee approved resolutions critical of human rights violations in
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The resolution on Turkmenistan expressed “grave concern” about
political repression, media censorship, religious minority group harassment, and detainee torture.
The resolution on Uzbekistan expressed “grave concern” about violence against civilians in
Andijon and called on the government to permit an international investigation. The Uzbek
representative asserted that the resolution contained no credible facts and ignored Uzbekistan’s
right to defend its constitutional order against terrorists.51 In late 2007, the U.N. Committee
Against Torture stated that it “remained concerned that [in Uzbekistan] there were numerous
reports of abuses in custody, and many deaths, some of which were alleged to have followed
torture or ill-treatment.”52
Amnesty International was among NGOs that submitted petitions to the December 2008 session
of the revamped U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC) alleging ongoing Uzbek human rights
abuses.53 UNHRC also examined human rights in Turkmenistan at this session. On Uzbekistan,
the UNHRC agreed to a report by its working group that called for the government to give
accreditation to major international human rights organizations, adopt legislation to promote
gender equality, modify the criminal code to establish a definition of torture, take measures to
prevent torture, and eliminate forced child labor, among other recommendations. On
Turkmenistan, the UNHRC agreed to a report by its working group that called for the government
to eliminate the use of torture, protect the human rights of journalists and human rights defenders,
49 U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2006, June 2007, June 2008, and June 2009. On
Uzbekistan, see also Invisible To The World? The Dynamics of Forced Child Labor in the Cotton Sector of Uzbekistan,
The School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2009.
50 U.N. General Assembly. Resolution: Situation of Human Rights in Turkmenistan, 58/194, December 22, 2003;
Resolution: Situation of Human Rights in Turkmenistan, 59/206, December 20, 2004. U.N. Economic and Social
Council. Commission on Human Rights. Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture, Theo van Boven. Report of the
Special Rapporteur Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 2002/38. Addendum: Mission to Uzbekistan,
E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2, annex, February 3, 2003. U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture, Manfred
Nowak. Report by the Special Rapporteur. Addendum: Follow-up to the Recommendations Made by the Special
Rapporteur, E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.2, March 21, 2006.
51 U.N. General Assembly. Third Committee. Draft Resolution: Situation of Human Rights in Turkmenistan,
A/C.3/60/L.46, November 2, 2005; Draft Resolution: Situation of Human Rights in Uzbekistan, A/C.3/60/L.51,
November 2, 2005; Press Release: Third Committee ... Approves Text Expressing Deep Concern over Human Rights
Situation in Uzbekistan, GA/SHC/3843, November 22, 2005.
52 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Committee Against Torture. Press Release: Committee
Against Torture Concludes Thirty-ninth Session, November 23, 2007.
53 Amnesty International. Uzbekistan: Submission to the U.N. Universal Periodic Review Working Group, U.N.
Human Rights Council, July 21, 2008.
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ensure greater independence of the judiciary, and ensure that opposition parties are permitted to
participate freely, among other recommendations.54
In recent years, several reporters, human rights activists, and opposition politicians in Kazakhstan
have been killed by motor vehicles under allegedly mysterious conditions. In a new twist,
prominent reporter Tokhniyaz Kuchukov and activist Yevgeniy Zhovtis were given four-year
prison sentences for separate instances in July 2009 of hitting and killing pedestrians. Both
argued that there were extenuating or suspicious circumstances surrounding their accidents and
that their trials were not fair.
Security and Arms Control
The U.S.-led coalition’s overthrow of the Taliban and routing of Al Qaeda and IMU terrorists in
Afghanistan (termed Operation Enduring Freedom or OEF) increased the security of Central
Asia. According to then-Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch in testimony in June 2002,
“our military relationships with each [Central Asian] nation have matured on a scale not
imaginable prior to September 11th.” Crouch averred that “for the foreseeable future, U.S. defense
and security cooperation in Central Asia must continue to support actions to deter or defeat
terrorist threats” and to build effective armed forces under civilian control.
According to Crouch:
• Kyrgyzstan became a “critical regional partner” in OEF, providing basing for
U.S. and coalition forces at Manas (in late 2009, U.S. troops and contract
personnel reportedly numbered about 1,550).
• Uzbekistan provided a base for U.S. operations at Karshi-Khanabad (K2; just
before the 2005 pullout, U.S. troops reportedly numbered less than 900), a base
for German units at Termez (in early 2009, German troops reportedly numbered
about 163), and a land corridor to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid via the
Friendship Bridge at Termez.
• Tajikistan permitted use of its international airport in Dushanbe for refueling
(“gas-and-go”) and hosted a French force (in late 2009, French troops reportedly
numbered 240).
• Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan provided overflight and other support.55
To obtain Uzbekistan’s approval for basing, the 2002 U.S.-Uzbek Strategic Partnership
Declaration included a nonspecific security guarantee. The United States affirmed that “it would
regard with grave concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan’s security and would consult with
Uzbekistan “on an urgent basis” regarding a response. The two states pledged to intensify military
cooperation, including “re-equipping the Armed Forces” of Uzbekistan, a pledge that appeared to
54 U.N. General Assembly. UNHRC. Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Uzbekistan,
A/HRC/10/83, March 11, 2009; Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Turkmenistan,
A/HRC/10/79, January 6, 2009; Draft Report of the Human Rights Council on its Tenth Session, A/HRC/10/L.11,
March 31, 2009.
55 Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Statement of J.D.
Crouch II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, June 27, 2002.
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be repudiated by Uzbekistan following events in Andijon. Bilateral military ties appeared boosted
when Commander of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. David Petraeus, visited Tashkent on
August 18 and signed an accord on military exchanges and training.
Although U.S. security assistance to the region was boosted in the aftermath of 9/11, such aid has
lessened since then as a percentage of all such aid to Eurasia, particularly after aid to Uzbekistan
was cut in FY2004 and subsequent years (see below). Security and law enforcement aid to
Central Asia was 31% ($188 million) of all such aid to Eurasia in FY2002, but had declined to
14% ($203 million) in FY2007. Of all budgeted assistance to Central Asia over the period from
FY1992-FY2007, security and law enforcement aid accounted for a little over one-fifth. Security
and law enforcement programs include Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military
Education and Training (IMET), Excess Defense Articles (EDA), and border security aid to
combat trafficking in drugs, humans, and WMD. A new Defense Department counter-terrorism
train and equip program (created under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for FY2006; P.L. 109-163) provided $20 million to Kazakhstan in FY2006, $19.3 million in
FY2007, and $12.5 million in FY2008. It also provided $12 million to Kyrgyzstan in FY2008.
Another new Defense Department program for defense articles, services, training or other support
for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities (created under Section 1207 of P.L. 109-
163) provided $9.9 million to Tajikistan in FY2008.56
To help counter burgeoning drug trafficking from Afghanistan, war supplementals for FY2005
(P.L. 109-13), FY2006 (P.L. 109-234), FY2008 (P.L. 110-252), and FY2009 (P.L. 111-32) have
provided some assistance to Central Asia. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-
32) provided $52.89 million for combating drug-trafficking in Central Asia.
In addition to the aid reported by the Coordinator’s Office, the Defense Department provides
coalition support payments to Kyrgyzstan, including base lease payments and landing and
overflight fees (see below). Uzbekistan received a payment of $15.7 million for use of K2 and
associated services. On October 5, 2005, an amendment to Defense Appropriations for FY2006
(H.R. 2863) was approved in the Senate to place a one-year hold on Defense Department plans to
pay another $23 million. Despite this congressional concern, the Defense Department transferred
the payment in November 2005. The conferees on H.R. 2863 later dropped the amendment
(H.Rept. 109-360; P.L. 109-163).
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in 1999 became responsible for U.S. military
engagement in Central Asia. It cooperates with the European Command (USEUCOM), on the
Caspian Maritime Security Cooperation program (similar to the former Caspian [Sea] Guard
program). Gen. Bantz Craddock, Commander of USEUCOM, testified in 2008 that the Caspian
Maritime Security Cooperation program coordinates security assistance provided by U.S.
agencies to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. He stated that U.S. Naval Forces Europe cooperates with
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command “to promote maritime safety and security and maritime
domain awareness in the Caspian Sea.”57 Russia objects to the involvement of non-littoral
56 For background, see CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for
Congress, by Nina M. Serafino, and CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and
Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns, by Nina M. Serafino.
57 House of Representatives. Armed Services Committee. Statement of General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander,
United States European Command, March 13, 2008. Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention aid to Kazakhstan
was $4 million in FY2005, $5 million in FY2006, and $7 million in FY2007, and $8 million was requested for each of
FY2008 and FY2009. U.S. Department of Defense. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. FY2008-FY2009 Budget
(continued...)
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countries in Caspian maritime security and has appeared to counter U.S. maritime security aid by
boosting the capabilities of its Caspian Sea Flotilla and by urging the littoral states to coordinate
their naval activities exclusively with Russia.
All the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined NATO’s PFP by mid-1994 (Tajikistan joined
in 2002). Central Asian troops have participated in periodic PFP (or “PFP-style”) exercises in the
United States since 1995, and U.S. troops have participated in exercises in Central Asia since
1997. A June 2004 NATO summit communique pledged enhanced Alliance attention to the
countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and the NATO Secretary General appointed a
Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia. Uzbekistan sharply reduced its
participation in PFP after NATO raised concerns that Uzbek security forces had used excessive
and disproportionate force in Andijon (however, it continued to permit Germany to use a base at
Termez). Relations with NATO appeared to improve in 2008-2009 (see below).
Kazakhstan’s progress in military reform enabled NATO in January 2006 to elevate it to
participation in an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). Kazakhstan has stated that it does
not plan to join NATO but wants to modernize its armed forces. According to analyst Roger
McDermott, despite Kazakhstan’s cooperation with NATO, “the defense relationship between
Kazakhstan and Russia has, in fact, substantially deepened.”58 The Kazakh defense ministry has
reported, for instance, that “1,259 Kazakh servicemen are now studying at Russian military
educational establishments,” constituting a substantial boost over previous years.59
According to some reports, during the former Bush Administration the Defense Department was
considering possibly setting up long-term military facilities in Central Asia termed Cooperative
Security Locations (CSLs; they contain pre-positioned equipment and are managed by private
contractors, and few if any U.S. military personnel are present). The Overseas Basing
Commission in 2005 acknowledged that U.S. national security might be enhanced by future CSLs
in Central Asia but urged Congress to seek inter-agency answers to “what constitutes vital U.S.
interests in the area that would require long-term U.S. presence.”60 According to former
USCENTCOM Commander Admiral William Fallon, the Bagram airbase in Afghanistan is the
Forward Operating Site (basing intended for rotational use by operating forces with limited U.S.
military support presence and possibly pre-positioned equipment) for access to and operations in
Central Asia. USCENTCOM’s FY2008 Master Plan for infrastructure requirements at its U.S.
overseas military facilities reportedly placed a high priority on sustaining long-term access to
locations across its area of responsibility.61
(...continued)
Estimates: Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, February 2007.
58 Roger McDermott, Kazakhstan’s Defense Policy: An Assessment Of The Trends, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, February 2009.
59 CEDR, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950316.
60 Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States. Interim Report, May 9,
2005.
61 House of Representatives. Appropriations Committee. Subcommittee on Military Construction. Statement of Admiral
William J. Fallon, Commander, U.S. Central Command, on Military Construction in U.S. Central Command, April 17,
2007; General Accountability Office. Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs
to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam, GAO Report No. GAO-07-1015,
September 12, 2007.
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Closure of the Karshi-Khanabad Airbase
On July 5, 2005, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed a declaration
issued during a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO; see above, “Obstacles
to Peace and Independence: Regional Tensions and Conflicts”) that stated that “as large-scale
military operations against terrorism have come to an end in Afghanistan, the SCO member states
maintain that the relevant parties to the anti-terrorist coalition should set a deadline for the
temporary use of ... infrastructure facilities of the SCO member states and for their military
presence in these countries.”62 Despite this declaration, none of the Central Asian leaders
immediately called for closing the coalition bases. However, after the United States and others
interceded so that refugees who fled from Andijon to Kyrgyzstan could fly to Romania,
Uzbekistan on July 29 demanded that the United States vacate K2 within six months. On
November 21, 2005, the United States officially ceased operations to support Afghanistan at K2.
Perhaps indicative of the reversal of U.S. military-to-military and other ties, former pro-U.S.
defense minister Qodir Gulomov was convicted of treason and received seven years in prison,
later suspended. Many K2 activities shifted to the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. Some observers
viewed the closure of K2 and souring U.S.-Uzbek relations as setbacks to U.S. influence in the
region and as gains for Russian and Chinese influence. Others suggested that U.S. ties with other
regional states provided continuing influence and that U.S. criticism of human rights abuses
might pay future dividends among regional populations.63
Appearing to signal improving U.S.-Uzbek relations, in early 2008 Uzbekistan permitted U.S.
military personnel under NATO command, on a case-by-case basis, to transit through an airbase
near the town of Termez that it has permitted Germany to operate.64 President Karimov attended
the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, in early April 2008 and stated that Uzbekistan was
ready to discuss the transit of non-lethal goods and equipment by NATO through Uzbekistan to
Afghanistan. He announced in May 2009 that the United States and NATO had been permitted to
use the Navoi airport (located between Samarkand and Bukhara in east-central Uzbekistan) for
transporting non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan.
Representing the Obama Administration, Undersecretary of State William Burns visited
Uzbekistan in early July 2009, and President Karimov assessed his talks with Burns as “positive.”
In August 2009, Gen. Petraus traveled to Uzbekistan and signed an accord on boosting military
educational exchanges and training. Reportedly, these visits also resulted in permission by
Uzbekistan for military air overflights of weapons to Afghanistan. Assistant Secretary Blake
visited Uzbekistan in November 2009 and stated that his meetings there were “a reflection of the
determination of President Obama and Secretary Clinton to strengthen ties between the United
States and Uzbekistan.” He proposed that the two countries set up high-level annual consultations
to “build our partnership across a wide range of areas. These include trade and development,
border security, cooperation on narcotics, the development of civil society, and individual
rights.”65 The first Bilateral Consultation meeting took place in late December 2009 with a U.S.
visit by an Uzbek delegation led by Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov.
62 CEDR, July 5, 2005, Doc. No. CPP-249.
63 On growing Chinese regional influence, see Michael Mihalka, “Counter-insurgency, Counter-terrorism, State-
Building and Security Cooperation in Central Asia,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, May 2006.
64 “U.S. Military Returns to Ex-Soviet Uzbekistan,” Agence France Presse, March 6, 2008; “Only Germany Can Use
Uzbek Bases Now,” United Press International, December 13, 2005.
65 U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Press Conference of Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs
(continued...)
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The Manas Airbase
The Manas airbase became operational in December 2001 and uses some facilities of the
international airport near Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. According to a fact sheet prepared in
early 2009 by the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing of the U.S. Air Force, the Manas airbase serves as
the “premier air mobility hub” for operations in Afghanistan. Missions include support for
personnel and cargo transiting in and out of the theater, aerial refueling, airlift and airdrop, and
medical evacuation. The fact sheet reports that 170,000 troops transited through the base to
Afghanistan in 2008, as well as 5,000 tons of cargo, and that KC-135 Stratotankers had refueled
over 11,400 aircraft over Afghanistan. About 1,000 military personnel from the United States,
France, and Spain are stationed at the base. They are assisted by 650 contract personnel, of which
the majority are Kyrgyz citizens. The base contributed $64 million to the local economy in
FY2008, which included $17.4 million in rent for use of the base, $22.5 million for airport
operations and land lease fees, nearly $500,000 for upgrading Kyrgyz Air Navigation operations,
and about $24 million for local contracts and humanitarian aid.66
In early 2006, Kyrgyz President Bakiyev reportedly requested that lease payments for use of the
Manas airbase be increased to more than $200 million per year but at the same time re-affirmed
Russia’s free use of its nearby base.67 By mid-July 2006, however, the United States and
Kyrgyzstan announced that they had reached a settlement for the continued U.S. use of the
airbase. Although not specifically mentioning U.S. basing payments, it was announced that the
United States would provide $150 million in “total assistance and compensation over the next
year,” subject to congressional approval.
In September 2007, a U.S. military officer stated that the Manas airbase was moving toward “a
sustainment posture,” with the replacement of most tents and the building of aircraft maintenance,
medical, and other facilities.68
On February 3, 2009, President Bakiyev announced during a visit to Moscow that he intended to
close the Manas airbase. Many observers speculated that the decision was spurred by Russia,
which offered Bakiyev a $300 million loan for economic development and a $150 million grant
for budget stabilization in the wake of the world economic downturn. Russia also stated that it
would write off most of a $180 million debt. The United States was notified on February 19,
2009, that under the terms of the status of forces agreement it had 180 days to vacate the airbase.
The “Transit Center” Agreement
The Defense Department announced on June 24, 2009, that an agreement of “mutual benefit” had
been concluded with the Kyrgyz government “to continu[e] to work, with them, to supply our
(...continued)
Robert Blake, October 14, 2009.
66 U.S. Air Force. 376th Air Expeditionary Wing. Fact Sheet: 376th Air Expeditionary Wing, Manas Air Base,
Kyrgyzstan, February 2009, at http://preview.afnews.af.mil/manas/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=12682.
67 For background, see CRS Report RS22295, Uzbekistan’s Closure of the Airbase at Karshi-Khanabad: Context and
Implications, by Jim Nichol. Perhaps indicating Kyrgyz pressure on Russia to compensate for use of the base, Russia in
October 2006 pledged grant military assistance to Kyrgyzstan.
68 Lt. Col. Michael Borgert, “Liberandos: Thank You for a Job Well Done,” 376th Expeditionary Services Squadron
Public Affairs, September 9, 2007.
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troops in Afghanistan, so that we can help with the overall security situation in the region.”69 The
agreement was approved by the legislature and signed into law by President Bakiyev, to take
effect on July 14, 2009. According to Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Kadyrbek Sarbayev, the
government decided to conclude the annually renewable “intergovernmental agreement with the
United States on cooperation and the formation of a transit center at Manas airport,” because of
growing alarm about “the worrying situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” A yearly rent payment
for use of land and facilities at the Manas airport would be increased from $17.4 million to $60
million per year and the United States had pledged more than $36 million for infrastructure
improvements and $30 million for air traffic control system upgrades for the airport. Sarbayev
also stated that the United States had pledged $20 million dollars for a U.S.-Kyrgyz Joint
Development Fund for economic projects, $21 million for counter-narcotics efforts, and $10
million for counter-terrorism efforts.70 All except the increased rent had already been appropriated
or requested (see below, Congressional Concerns). The agreement also reportedly includes
stricter host-country conditions on U.S. military personnel. One Kyrgyz legislator claimed that
the agreement was not a volte-face for Kyrgyzstan because Russia and other Central Asian states
had signed agreements with NATO to permit the transit of supplies to Afghanistan (see below).71
Undersecretary William Burns visited Kyrgyzstan in early July 2009 and reportedly stated that
“we welcome a new decision of President Bakiyev regarding the set up of a transport and
logistics hub in Manas Airport.... [The agreement] is an important contribution into our common
goals in Afghanistan.” He also stated that “the new administration believes that we should expand
and deepen the level and scope of our bilateral relations” with Kyrgyzstan, and he announced that
a U.S.-Kyrgyzstan bilateral commission on trade and investment would be set up.72
Kyrgyzstan had also requested that French and Spanish troops who were deployed at Manas had
to leave, and they had pulled out by October 2009. The French detachment (reportedly 35 troops
and a tanker aircraft) moved temporarily to Dushanbe. The Spanish unit (reportedly 60 troops and
two transport aircraft) moved temporarily to Herat, west Afghanistan, and Dushanbe is being used
temporarily as a stopover for troop relief flights. France and Spain are negotiating with
Kyrgyzstan on their return to Manas.
The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to Afghanistan
Because supplies transiting Pakistan to Afghanistan frequently were subject to attacks, Gen.
David Petraeus, the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, visited Kazakhstan and Tajikistan
in late January 2009 to negotiate alternative air, rail, road, and water routes for the commercial
shipping of supplies to support NATO and U.S. operations in Afghanistan (he also visited
Kyrgyzstan to discuss airbase issues; see below). To encourage a positive response, the U.S.
embassies in the region announced that the United States hoped to purchase many non-military
goods locally to transport to the troops in Afghanistan. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan permitted such
transit in February 2009, Uzbekistan permitted it in April 2009, and Kyrgyzstan permitted it in
69 U.S. Department of Defense. DoD News Briefing, June 24, 2009. See also U.S. Department of State. Daily Press
Briefing, June 25, 2009.
70 Tolkun Namatbayeva, “Kyrgyzstan Allows U.S. to Keep Using Base,” Agence France Presse, June 23, 2009.
71 See also CRS Report R40564, Kyrgyzstan and the Status of the U.S. Manas Airbase: Context and Implications, by
Jim Nichol.
72 “U.S. Welcomes Decision of Kyrgyzstan to Set Up Transport and Logistics Hub,” AKIpress News Agency, July 13,
2009.
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July 2009 (Georgia had given such permission in 2005, Russia in 2008, and Azerbaijan in March
2009). A first rail shipment of non-lethal supplies entered Afghanistan in late March 2009 after
transiting Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.73 Uzbekistan’s Navoi airport also reportedly is
being used to transport supplies to Afghanistan. Besides this commercial shipping, U.S. military
aircraft have been given overflight privileges for the transport of weapons to Afghanistan. At the
July 2009 U.S.-Russia summit, Russia agreed to permit such military overflights. Some observers
suggested that the commitment was linked to the assertion of some Russian officials that such
transport could substitute for U.S. and NATO use of Manas and other Central Asian airbases.
In testimony on December 15, 2009, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Sedney
reported that 4,769 containers had been moved through Central Asia to Afghanistan as of the end
of November. Most of the containers had entered Afghanistan from Uzbekistan, with a fewer
number entering from Tajikistan. Some containers transited the Caucasus countries, the Caspian
Sea, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, while others transited Russia and Kazakhstan, and thence either
through Uzbekistan or (far less frequently) through Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. He also stated that
the United States supported the building of a railroad to run from Uzbekistan’s border town of
Hairaton across the Friendship Bridge over the Amu Darya to Mazar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan.74
In early September 2009, two tanker trucks from Tajikistan that were delivering fuel to NATO
forces were hijacked by Taliban insurgents in Kunduz Province in Afghanistan. After the hijacked
trucks had stalled while crossing the Kunduz River, German forces called in a U.S. airstrike,
which reportedly resulted in dozens of civilian and insurgent casualties. Some observers warn that
Taliban insurgency may increase along the NDN.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Major U.S. security interests have included elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in
Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation
in Central Asia. The United States has tendered aid aimed at bolstering their export and physical
controls over nuclear technology and materials, in part because of concerns that Iran is targeting
these countries.75
After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons power (in reality
Russia controlled these weapons). In December 1993, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement for the “safe and secure” dismantling
of 104 SS-18s, the destruction of silos, and related purposes. All bombers and their air-launched
cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994 (except seven bombers destroyed with U.S.
aid in 1998). The SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994. On April 21, 1995, the last of about 1,040
73 ITAR-TASS, February 10, 2009; CEDR, April 16, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950025.
74 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs.
Hearing on Re-evaluating U.S. Policy in Central Asia, December 15, 2009. At the same hearing, analyst Stephen Blank
called for building “upon the NDN to invest in further large-scale infrastructural projects.... Neither Russia nor China
could compete with a truly serious investment of U.S. resources and time” in Central Asia.... We cannot pretend that a
geopolitical struggle is not occurring in this increasingly critical region of the world.” Testimony on Problems in
Central Asian Security.
75 A Treaty on the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone entered into force in January 2009. All five Central
Asian states are signatories. The Treaty prohibits the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, or possession
of nuclear explosive devices within the zone. See CRS Report RL31559, Proliferation Control Regimes:
Background and Status, coordinated by Mary Beth Nikitin.
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nuclear warheads had been removed from SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and
Kazakhstan announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. The United States reported that 147 silos
had been destroyed by September 1999. A U.S.-Kazakh Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in Almaty
was set up to facilitate verification and compliance with arms control agreements to prevent the
proliferation of WMD.
Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium mines, milling
facilities, and dozens of radioactive tailing and waste dumps in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Many of these reportedly remain inadequately protected against theft.
Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan have been among the world’s top producers of low-enriched uranium. Kazakhstan
had a fast breeder reactor at Aktau that was the world’s only nuclear desalinization facility. In
1997 and 1999, U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on decommissioning the Aktau reactor. Shut
down in 1999, it had nearly 300 metric tons of uranium (some highly enriched) and plutonium
(some weapons-grade) spent fuel in storage pools. CTR aid has been used to safeguard the 300
metric tons of spent fuel.
CTR aid was used to facilitate transporting 600 kg of weapons-grade uranium from Kazakhstan to
the United States in 1994, 2,900 kg of up to 26% enriched nuclear fuel from Aktau to
Kazakhstan’s Ulba facility in 2001 (which Ulba converted into less-enriched fuel), eleven kg of
uranium in fuel rods from Uzbekistan to Russia in 2004, and 63 kg of uranium from Uzbekistan
to Russia in April 2006. On May 19, 2009, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration
announced that CTR funds had been used to remove 162.5 lb. of highly enriched uranium “spent”
fuel from Kazakhstan. The material originally had been provided by Russia to Kazakhstan, and
was returned to Russia by rail for storage in a series of four shipments between December 2008
and May 2009.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities
during the Soviet era. CTR and Energy Department (DOE) funds have been used in Kazakhstan
to dismantle a former anthrax production facility in Stepnogorsk, to remove some strains to the
United States, to secure two other BW sites, and to retrain scientists. CTR funding was used to
dismantle Uzbekistan’s Nukus chemical weapons research facility. CTR aid also was used to
eliminate active anthrax spores at a former CBW test site on an island in the Aral Sea. These latter
two projects were completed in 2002. Other CTR aid helps keep former Uzbek CBW scientists
employed in peaceful research. Uzbekistan has continued to cooperate with DOD and DOE—
even after it restricted other ties with the United States in 2005—to receive portal and hand-held
radiation monitoring equipment and training.
Trade and Investment
Successive U.S. administrations have endorsed free market reforms in Central Asia, since these
directly serve U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services and
sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to Central Asia has greatly
exceeded that provided to Russia or most other Eurasian states except Azerbaijan. U.S. trade
agreements have been signed and entered into force with all the Central Asian states, but bilateral
investment treaties are in force only with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In line with Kyrgyzstan’s
accession to the World Trade Organization, the United States established permanent normal trade
relations with Kyrgyzstan by law in June 2000, so that “Jackson-Vanik” trade provisions no
longer apply that call for presidential reports and waivers concerning freedom of emigration.
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In June 2004, The U.S. Trade Representative signed a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) with ambassadors of the regional states to establish a U.S.-Central Asia
Council on Trade and Investment. The Council has met yearly to address intellectual property,
labor, environmental protection, and other issues that impede trade and private investment flows
between the United States and Central Asia. The United States also has called for greater intra-
regional cooperation on trade and encouraged the development of regional trade and transport ties
with Afghanistan and South Asia. The reorganization of the State Department in 2006 to create
the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs facilitated this emphasis.76 At the fifth annual
meeting of the Council on Trade and Investment in October 2009 in Washington, DC, U.S. Trade
Representative Ron Kirk and Commerce Secretary Gary Locke stressed that the Obama
Administration was making a “broad-based commitment ... to deepen U.S. relationships in the
region.” Kirk announced that mid-year meetings of a TIFA working group would be initiated “to
maintain consistent dialogue on TIFA issues,” and that bilateral meetings would be held on the
sidelines of the TIFA session to deal with country-specific issues. Officials from the U.S. Defense
Department and other agencies participated in the TIFA session to discuss how the Central Asian
states might provide goods and services for U.S. stabilization operations in Afghanistan.77
All the states of the region possess large-scale resources that could contribute to the region
becoming a “new silk road” of trade and commerce. The Kazakh and Turkmen economies are
mostly geared to energy exports but need added foreign investment for production and transport.
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are major cotton producers, a legacy of central
economic planning during the Soviet period. Uzbekistan’s cotton and gold production rank
among the highest in the world and much is exported. It has moderate gas reserves but needs
investment to upgrade infrastructure. Kyrgyzstan has major gold mines and strategic mineral
reserves, is a major wool producer, and could benefit from tourism. Tajikistan has one of the
world’s largest aluminum processing plants. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan possess the bulk of the
region’s water resources, but in recent years both countries have suffered from droughts.
Despite the region’s development potential, the challenges of corruption, inadequate transport
infrastructure, punitive tariffs, border tensions, and uncertain respect for contracts discourage
major foreign investment (except for some investment in the energy sector). Cotton-growing has
contributed to environmental pollution and water shortages, leading some observers to argue that
cotton-growing is not suited to the largely arid region.
The global economic downturn has depressed prices for Tajik commodity exports (mainly
aluminum and cotton) and reduced worker remittances. The Tajik currency, the somoni, has lost
over one-quarter of its value against the dollar, which has greatly increased the costs of imported
food and other goods. The NGO International Crisis Group (ICG) has warned that increasingly
serious economic problems will condemn the “desperately poor population ... to yet more
deprivation.... To address the situation, the international community ... should ensure any
assistance reaches those who truly need it, place issues of governance and corruption at the centre
76 Remarks at Eurasian National University, October 13, 2005; and U.S. Congress. House International Relations
Committee. Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia. Testimony by Steven R. Mann, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary, July 25, 2006. See also U.S. Embassy Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan and the United States in a Changed
World, August 23, 2006.
77 U.S. Chamber of Commerce. United States Trade Representative Kirk Hosts Meeting of US-Central Asia Trade &
Investment Framework Council, October 7, 2009; Remarks by Ambassador Demetrios Marantis at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, October 7, 2009.
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of all contacts with the Tajik government, and initiate an energetic dialogue with President
Rahmon on democratization.”78
Other regional states also reported economic setbacks as a result of the world economic
downturn. Kazakhstan announced that it was withdrawing $10 billion from its sovereign wealth
fund for welfare and other needs and was setting up a Toxic Assets Fund. In early 2009, Russia
contributed nearly $300 million to Kyrgyzstan’s Development Fund (formed in 2007) as part of
aid and investment reportedly aimed to encourage Kyrgyzstan to close the Manas airbase. The
Fund aims to support the construction and repair of energy infrastructure, agricultural reform, and
tourism growth. In September 2009, President Bakiyev appointed his son to oversee the Central
Agency for Development, Investment and Innovation, under which the Fund operates, raising
concerns among some observers about transparency and accountability issues.79
Energy Resources
U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central Asian and South Caucasian states
have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the West, supporting U.S. private
investment, promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers, assisting ally
Turkey, and opposing the building of pipelines that transit “energy competitor” Iran or otherwise
give it undue influence over the region. The encouragement of regional electricity, oil, and gas
exports to South Asia and security for Caspian region pipelines and energy resources also have
been recent interests.
Until 2004, the Bush Administration retained a Clinton-era position, Special Advisor on Caspian
Energy Diplomacy, to help further U.S. policy and counter the efforts of Russia’s Viktor
Kaluzhny, deputy foreign minister and Special Presidential Representative for Energy Matters in
the Caspian. After the Administration abolished this post as no longer necessary, its
responsibilities were shifted at least in part to a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
(responsibilities of a former Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and Eurasian Conflicts
also were shifted to the Deputy Assistant Secretary). Some critics juxtaposed Russia’s close
interest in securing Caspian energy resources to what they termed halting U.S. efforts.80 A post of
Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy issues was (re-)created in March 2008, with the former Bush
Administration stating that there were “new opportunities” for the export of Caspian oil and gas.
In April 2009, Secretary of State Clinton appointed Richard Morningstar as Special Envoy for
Eurasian Energy.
The Caspian region is emerging as a notable source of oil and gas for world markets, although
many experts emphasize that regional exports will constitute only a small fraction of world
supplies. According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the region’s proven natural gas
78 ICG. Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure, February 12, 2009.
79 According to one article in the Kyrgyz press, Prime Minister Putin allegedly raised concerns with Kyrgyz Prime
Minister Daniyar Usenov that “talk is reaching me of family business in Kyrgyzstan at state level. What is going on?
How should this be understood? Why is money granted to Kyrgyzstan by our side being channeled into commercial
banks? ... I wish to remind you also that one of the conditions for receiving the loan was the withdrawal of the US
military base from Kyrgyzstan.” Usenov reportedly requested that Russia provide the pledged $1.7 billion balance of
the loan. CEDR, December 7, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-9008.
80 Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 31, 2007.
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reserves are estimated at 232 trillion cubic feet (tcf), comparable to Saudi Arabia.81 The region’s
proven oil reserves are estimated to be between 17-49 billion barrels, comparable to Qatar on the
low end and Libya on the high end. Kazakhstan possesses the region’s largest proven oil reserves
at 9-40 billion barrels, according to DOE, and also possesses 100tcf of natural gas. Kazakhstan’s
oil exports are about 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd).82 Some U.S. energy firms and other private
foreign investors have become discouraged in recent months by harsher Kazakh government
terms, taxes, and fines that some allege reflect corruption within the ruling elite.83 Turkmenistan
possesses about 100tcf and Uzbekistan about 65tcf of proven gas reserves, according to DOE.84
Russia’s temporary cutoffs of gas to Ukraine in January 2006 and January 2009 and a brief
slowdown of oil shipments to Belarus in January 2010 (Belarus and Ukraine are transit states for
oil and gas pipelines to other European states) have highlighted Europe’s energy insecurity. The
United States has supported EU efforts to reduce its overall reliance on Russian oil and gas by
increasing the number of possible alternative suppliers. Part of this policy has involved
encouraging Central Asian countries to transport their energy exports to Europe through pipelines
that cross the Caspian Sea, thereby bypassing Russian (and Iranian) territory, although these
amounts are expected at most to satisfy only a small fraction of EU needs.85
The Central Asian states long were pressured by Russia to yield large portions of their energy
wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controlled most existing export pipelines.86 Russia
attempted to strengthen this control over export routes for Central Asian energy in May 2007
when visiting former President Putin reached agreement in Kazakhstan on supplying more
Kazakh oil to Russia. Putin also reached agreement with the presidents of Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan on the construction of a new pipeline to transport Turkmen and Kazakh gas to Russia.
The first agreement appeared to compete with U.S. and Turkish efforts to foster more oil exports
through the BTC. The latter agreement appeared to compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster
building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline to link to the SCP to Turkey. The latter also appeared to
compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster building a pipeline from Turkey through Greece,
Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to Austria (the so-called Nabucco pipeline).
Seeming to indicate a direct challenge to these plans by Russia and the West, China signed an
agreement in August 2007 with Kazakhstan on completing the last section of an oil pipeline from
the Caspian seacoast to China, and signed an agreement with Turkmenistan on building a gas
81 Including the countries of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
82 U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Kazakhstan Country Analysis Brief, February 2008.
83 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) warned in late 2009 that Kazakhstan has prosecuted myriad foreign investors
for evading taxes and customs duties, for environmental pollution, and for other reasons, and can “demand changes in
the terms of contracts with private investors [such as Kashagan and Karachaganak oilfield investors] on the grounds of
national security.” Nonetheless, the EIU argued that “most foreign investors are maintaining or increasing their
involvement in the country, despite unattractive aspects of the business environment—albeit with delays or reservations
in some cases.” “Kazakhstan Economy: Investors Beware, the Rules Are Changing,” November 13, 2009.
84 U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Central Asia Country Analysis Brief, February
2008.
85 For details, see CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, by Paul Belkin. See also
International Crisis Group. Central Asia’s Energy Risks, May 24, 2007.
86 According to a plan published by Russia’s Institute of Energy Strategy covering the period 2007-2030, “Russian
control over a large share of Central Asian gas needs to be maintained.” See Minpromenergo (Ministry of Industry and
Energy), Institut energeticheskoi strategii, Kontseptsiya energeticheskoi strategii Rossii na period do 2030g., 2007. As
reported by Philip Hanson, “How Sustainable Is Russia’s Energy Power?” Russian Analytical Digest, No. 38 (2008).
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pipeline to China (see also below).87 In March 2008, the heads of the national gas companies of
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan announced that their countries would raise the gas
export price to the European level in future years. They signed a memorandum of understanding
on the price with Russia’s Gazprom state-controlled gas firm, which controls most export
pipelines. According to analyst Martha Olcott, “the increased bargaining power of the Central
Asian states owes more to the entry of China into the market than to the opening of [the BTC
pipeline and the SCP]. Russia’s offer to pay higher purchase prices for Central Asian gas in 2008
and 2009 came only after China signed a long-term purchase agreement for Turkmen gas at a
base price that was higher than what Moscow was offering.”88
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran export electricity to Afghanistan. Major foci of the
U.S. Trade and Development Agency’s (TDA’s) Central Asian Infrastructure Integration Initiative
(launched in 2005) and USAID’s Regional Energy Market Assistance Program (launched in
2006) include encouraging energy, transportation, and communications projects, including the
development of electrical power infrastructure and power sharing between Central Asia,
Afghanistan, and eventually Pakistan and India.89 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) launched
a Central Asia-South Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM) project in 2006 and
approved $3 million for feasibility and project design studies of the potential for Pakistan to
import electricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. As part of the CASAREM project, ADB
supports a Regional Power Transmission Interconnection Project to build a 220-kilovolt twin-
circuit power transmission line by 2010 from hydropower plants on the River Vakhsh in
Tajikistan to the Afghan border town of Sher Khan Bandar. Construction of this line reportedly
began in July 2009. In May 2009, Uzbekistan inaugurated a 220-kilovolt transmission line to
Kabul, Afghanistan.
In August 2008, an inter-governmental agreement was signed by Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Pakistan, and Tajikistan to build a 500-kilovolt electric power transmission line from Central Asia
through Afghanistan to Pakistan. The project cost is estimated to be $935 million to be provided
by the ADB, World Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank. About two-thirds of the electricity
would be provided to Pakistan and one-third to Afghanistan. The power line is planned to be
completed by 2013.
While the Central Asian states have cooperated on some electric power projects, they have failed
to cooperate on others.90 For instance, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have accused Tajikistan of
illicitly siphoning electricity from the Soviet-era Central Asian Unified Energy System grid.
Kazakhstan twice cut off energy flows to the regional grid in 2009 in retaliation, but at the end of
the year stated that it had not yet decided to withdraw completely from the grid. Tajik officials
have denied the Uzbek charges and accused Uzbekistan of illicitly siphoning electricity.
Uzbekistan cut itself off from the regional grid on December 1, 2009. The cutoff severed the
supply of electricity to Kyrgyzstan’s southern regions (since the lines cross Uzbekistan) and to
87 An oil and gas conference involving Kazakh, Chinese, and Russian energy ministries and firms has met annually
since 2004 to “exchange views” on possible regional cooperation. ITAR-TASS, December 5, 2007.
88 Martha Olcott, “A New Direction for U.S. Policy in the Caspian Region.”
89 U.S. Trade and Development Agency. Press Release: USTDA Launches Central Asian Infrastructure Integration
Initiative, October 14, 2005; Joshua Kucera, “Washington Seeks to Steer Central Asian States Toward South Asian
Allies,” Eurasia Insight, April 28, 2006; Joshua Kucera, “USAID Official Outlines Plan to Build Central-South Asian
Electricity Links,” Eurasia Insight, May 4, 2006.
90 Diana Bayzakova, “Gauging Integration Of Electricity Markets In Central Asia,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst,
January 28, 2009.
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some parts of Tajikistan, and prevented Tajikistan from importing electricity from Turkmenistan
to address winter weather. One Tajik analyst called for the country to retaliate against Uzbekistan
by reducing cooperation in water-sharing. Another analyst warned that another Tajik winter
without adequate power supplies could further erode popular trust in the Rahmon government.
Another related issue clouding relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is the latter’s
construction of the Roghun hydro-electric power dam on a tributary of the Amu Darya River.
Uzbekistan claims that the dam will limit water flows downstream to its territory, while Tajikistan
is spurred to complete the power plant by Uzbekistan’s energy policies. In a state-of-the nation
address on January 5, 2009, President Rahmon stated that the nation’s future prosperity and pride
depended on completing the power plant. He called for citizens to cut their living expenses in
order to buy shares in the plant and urged all Tajiks and Persian-speakers worldwide to contribute
funds.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan’s main oil export route has been a 930-mile pipeline completed in 2001—owned by
the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), in which Russian shareholders have a controlling
interest—that carries 234.56 million barrels per year of oil from Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black
Sea port of Novorossiysk. Lengthy Russian resistance to increasing the pumping capacity of the
pipeline and demands for higher transit and other fees, along with the necessity of offloading the
oil into tankers at Novorossiysk to transit the clogged Turkish Straits, spurred Kazakh President
Nazarbayev to sign a treaty with visiting Azerbaijani President Aliyev in June 2006 to barge
Kazakh oil across the Caspian Sea to Baku to the BTC pipeline. Kazakhstan began shipping about
70,000 bpd of oil through the BTC pipeline at the end of October 2008. Another accord resulted
from a visit by President Nazarbayev to Azerbaijan in September 2009 that provides that up to
500,000 bpd of oil will be barged across the Caspian to enter the BTC or the Baku-Supsa
pipeline. When the volumes exceed 500,000 bpd, a trans-Caspian pipeline may be built.
Apparently to counter Kazakhstan’s export plans via Azerbaijan, then-President Putin’s May 2007
agreement with Nazarbayev (see above) envisaged boosting the capacity of the CPC pipeline.
Despite this Russian pledge to increase the capacity of the CPC, Kazakhstan has proceeded to
upgrade its Caspian Sea port facilities and in May 2008, the Kazakh legislature ratified the 2006
treaty. Kazakhstan also barges some oil to Baku to ship by rail to Georgia’s Black Sea oil terminal
at Batumi, of which Kazakhstan became the sole owner in early 2008. Kazakhstan began barging
oil from Batumi to the Romanian port of Constantsa in late 2008 for processing at two refineries
it purchased. Some Kazakh oil arriving in Baku also could be transported through small pipelines
to Georgia’s Black Sea port of Supsa or to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiisk, although in
the latter case Kazakhstan might be faced with high transit charges by Russia.91
In addition to these oil export routes to Europe not controlled by Russia, Kazakhstan and China
have completed an oil pipeline from Atasu in central Kazakhstan to the Xinjiang region of China
(a distance of about 597 miles). Kazakhstan began delivering oil through the pipeline in mid-
2006. As of the end of 2008, the pipeline reportedly had delivered about 92 million barrels (well
below initial capacity of 146.6 million barrels per year). At Atasu, it links to another pipeline
from the town of Kumkol, also in central Kazakhstan. On Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea border,
China has finished construction of an oil pipeline from the port city of Atyrau eastward to the
91 ITAR-TASS, May 29, 2008; CEDR, December 11, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950096; April 26, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-
950045.
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town of Kerkiyak. The last section of the route from the Caspian Sea to China, a link between the
towns of Kerkiyak and Kumkol, was completed in October 2009. Now that all sections of the
pipeline have been completed, it is expected to carry 200,000 bpd to China.
In November 2007, Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement permitting Russia to export 10.6
million barrels of oil per year from Atasu through the pipeline to China. According to Chinese
sources, Russia had exported about 5.5 million barrels of oil through this pipeline in 2008. This is
the first Russian oil to be transported by pipeline to China.
At the end of October 2008, China and Kazakhstan signed a framework agreement on
constructing a gas pipeline from western Kazakhstan (near the Caspian Sea) to China that is
planned initially to supply 176.6 bcf to southern Kazakhstan and 176.6 bcf to China. Plans call
for pipeline construction to begin in 2010 and to be completed by 2015.
Kazakh officials have appeared to make contradictory statements about providing gas for the
prospective Nabucco pipeline. Kazakhstan’s Deputy Energy and Mineral Resources Minister Aset
Magaulov stated at a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Security Forum in June 2009 that
Kazakhstan would not have a surplus of gas that it could send through the Nabucco pipeline.92
President Nazarbayev appeared to support the possible transit of Kazakh gas through Turkey
when he stated on October 22, 2009, during a visit to Turkey, that “Turkey ... will become a
transit country. And if Kazakhstan’s oil and gas are transported via this corridor then this will be
advantageous to both Turkey and Kazakhstan.”93 In late October 2009, however, the Kazakh
Ministry of Energy reiterated that “the main problem for our country [regarding the supply of
natural gas to Nabucco] is the limited availability of gas” because of existing contracts for
projected gas production. It suggested that Kazakhstan might be a potential supplier for Nabucco
if gas production exceeds expectations, but that Kazakhstan could not transport any gas via
Nabucco until the legal status of the Caspian Sea was resolved, which would permit building a
connection to Nabucco.94
Turkmenistan
The late President Niyazov signed a 25-year accord with then-President Putin in 2003 on
supplying Russia up to 211.9 billion cubic feet (bcf) of gas in 2004 (about 12% of production),
rising up to 2.83 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2009-2028 (perhaps then constituting an even larger
percentage of production). Turkmenistan halted gas shipments to Russia at the end of 2004 in an
attempt to get a higher gas price but settled for all-cash rather than partial barter payments.
Turkmenistan and Russia continued to clash in subsequent years over gas prices and finally
agreed in late 2007 that gas prices based on “market principles” would be established in 2009.
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed accords in May and December 2007 on building a
new gas pipeline that was planned to carry 353 bcf of Turkmen and 353 bcf of Kazakh gas to
Russia. However, the Turkmen government appeared to have reservations about building another
pipeline to Russia. In late 2009, however, it indicated greater willingness to build this pipeline
during negotiations on the renewal of Turkmen gas exports to Russia (see below).
92 ITAR-TASS, June 25, 2009.
93 CEDR, October 22, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950337.
94 ITAR-TASS, October 31, 2009.
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Seeking alternatives to pipeline routes through Russia, in December 1997 Turkmenistan opened
the first pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile gas pipeline
linkage to Iran. Turkmenistan provided 282.5 bcf of gas to Iran in 2006 and reportedly a larger
amount in 2007. At the end of 2007, however, Turkmenistan suddenly suspended gas shipments,
causing hardship in northern Iran. Turkmen demands for higher payments were the main reason
for the cut-off. Gas shipments resumed in late April 2008 after Iran agreed to a price boost. In
mid-2009, Turkmenistan reportedly agreed to increase gas supplies to up to 706 bcf per year.95 At
the end of 2009, a second gas pipeline to Iran was completed—from a field that until April 2009
had supplied gas to Russia (see below)—to more than double Turkmenistan’s export capacity to
Iran.
As another alternative to pipelines through Russia, in April 2006, Turkmenistan and China signed
a framework agreement calling for Chinese investment in developing gas fields in Turkmenistan
and in building a gas pipeline with a capacity of about 1.0 tcf per year through Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan to China. All three Central Asian states plan to send gas through this pipeline to
China. Construction of the pipeline began in August 2007 and gas began to be delivered through
the pipeline to Xinjiang and beyond in December 2009.
Perhaps an additional attempt to diversify gas export routes, Berdimuhammedow first signaled in
2007 that Turkmenistan was interested in building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Turkmenistan
signed a memorandum of understanding in April 2008 with the EU to supply 353.1 bcf of gas per
year starting in 2009, presumably through a trans-Caspian pipeline that might at first link to the
SCP and later to the proposed Nabucco pipeline. Berdimuhammedow also revived Niyazov’s
proposal to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India, but investment
remains elusive.
On the night of April 8-9, 2009, a section of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Russia
exploded, halting Turkmen gas shipments. Russia claimed that it had notified Turkmenistan that it
was reducing its gas imports because European demand for gas had declined, but Turkmenistan
denied that it had been properly informed.96 After extended talks, visiting President Medvedev
and President Berdimuhamedow agreed on December 22, 2009, that Turkmen gas exports to
Russia would be resumed, and that the existing supply contract had been altered to reduce
Turkmen gas exports to up to 1 tcf per year and to increase the price paid for the gas.
Turkmenistan announced on January 9, 2010, that its gas exports to Russia had resumed. The
incident appeared to further validate Turkmenistan’s policy of diversifying its gas export routes.
At a late April 2009 Turkmen energy conference, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George
Krol reportedly stressed that Turkmenistan and other states should continue to diversify their
energy export routes.97 Turkmen President Berdimuhamedow pledged to continue such
diversification. At an EU energy summit in Prague in early May 2009, U.S. Special Envoy for
Eurasian Energy Richard Morningstar endorsed further development of the “southern corridor”
for the shipment of gas and oil to Western markets. However, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
95 Iran: Daily Report, January 21, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-11017; January 24, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950014; April 26, 2008,
Doc. No. IAP-950049; and May 6, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950052.; CEDR, July 12, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950097.
96 Open Source Center. OSC Feature, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. FEA-844966; CEDR, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-
950339; ITAR-TASS, April 3, 2009; Sergey Blagov, “Turkmenistan: Ashgabat Wonders Whether Russia Still Has Deep
Pockets,” Eurasia Insight, March 26, 2009.
97 Alexander Vershinin, “U.S. Urges Central Asia to Boost Gas Export Routes,” Associated Press, April 24, 2009.
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Uzbekistan balked at signing a communique pledging the states to back the Nabucco pipeline.
Despite this move, Berdimuhamedow asserted on July 10, 2009, that there are “immense volumes
of natural gas in Turkmenistan [that] make it possible for us to carry out certain work related to
the implementation of various [gas export] projects, including the Nabucco project.”98 In
September 2009, he further suggested that Turkmenistan could provide even more gas than
previously mentioned in 2008 for Nabucco—1.1 tcf per year—because an audit indicated that the
South Yoloten-Osman and Yaslar gas fields held vast reserves. Russia and Iran remain opposed to
trans-Caspian pipelines, ostensibly on the grounds that they could pose environmental hazards to
the littoral states.
Some observers argue that Turkmenistan’s construction of gas pipelines to Iran and China
indicate that it does not envisage a trans-Caspian pipeline to supply gas to Nabucco. Even in the
event that Iran eventually becomes a supplier to Nabucco, these observers maintain, it might
resist permitting Turkmenistan to have direct access to European customers via its pipelines.99
U.S. Aid Overview
For much of the 1990s and until September 11, 2001, the United States provided much more aid
each year to Russia and Ukraine than to any Central Asian state (most such aid was funded from
the FSA account in Foreign Operations Appropriations, but some derived from other program and
agency budgets). Cumulative foreign aid budgeted to Central Asia for FY1992 through FY2007
amounted to $4.3 billion, 14% of the amount budgeted to all the Eurasian states, reflecting the
lesser priority given to these states prior to September 11.100 Budgeted spending for FY2002 for
Central Asia, during OEF, was greatly boosted in absolute amounts ($584 million) and as a share
of total aid to Eurasia (about one-quarter of such aid). The former Bush Administration since then
requested smaller amounts of aid, although the Administration continued to stress that there were
important U.S. interests in the region. The former Bush Administration highlighted the phase-out
of economic aid to Kazakhstan and the congressionally imposed restrictions on aid to Uzbekistan
(see below) as among the reasons for declining aid requests. In April 2008, then-Assistant
Secretary of State Richard Boucher stated that another reason for declining U.S. aid to the region
was a more constrained U.S. budgetary situation. Aid to Central Asia in recent years has been
about the same or less in absolute and percentage terms than that provided to the South Caucasian
region. (See Table 1.)
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), created in 2004 to provide U.S. aid to countries
with promising development records, announced in late 2005 that Kyrgyzstan was eligible to
apply for assistance as a country on the “threshold” of meeting the criteria for full-scale
development aid. In March 2008, the MCC signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan to provide $16
98 CEDR, July 11, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950124.
99 Igor Naumov, “Turkmenistan No Longer Sees Russia as Reliable Partner,” Bizekon-Russica Izvestia, November 16,
2009; “Energy Agreement between Turkey and Iran Changes Essence of Nabucco Project: Chairman of CSS of
Turkey,” Trend News Agency (Azerbaijan), November 13, 2009.
100 In comparison, the EU has reported that it has provided approximately 1.39 billion euros ($2.13 billion at current
exchange rates) in assistance to the region since 1991. Its planned aid of about $1 billion in 2007-2013 may prove to be
more than projected U.S. aid to the region. European Community. Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central
Asia for the period 2007-2013, June 2007; Council of the European Union. Presidency Conclusions, 11177/07, June
23, 2007, p. 12.
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million over the next two years to help the country combat corruption and bolster the rule of
law.101
Congressional Conditions on Kazakh and Uzbek Aid
In Congress, Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7) forbade FREEDOM Support Act
(FSA) assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determined and
reported that it was making substantial progress in meeting commitments under the Strategic
Partnership Declaration to democratize and respect human rights. The conference report (H.Rept.
108-10) also introduced language that forbade assistance to the Kazakh government unless the
Secretary of State determined and reported that it significantly had improved its human rights
record during the preceding six months. However, the legislation permitted the Secretary to waive
the requirement on national security grounds.102 The Secretary reported in mid-2003 that
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were making such progress. Some in Congress were critical of these
findings. By late 2003, the former Bush Administration had decided that progress was inadequate
in Uzbekistan.
Consolidated Appropriations for FY2004, including foreign operations (P.L. 108-199) and for
FY2005 (P.L. 108-447), and Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 (P.L. 109-102)
retained these conditions, while clarifying that the prohibition on aid to Uzbekistan pertained to
the central government and that conditions included respecting human rights, establishing a
“genuine” multi-party system, and ensuring free and fair elections and freedom of expression and
media. These conditions remained in place under the continuing resolution for FY2007 (P.L. 109-
289, as amended). In appropriations for FY2008 (Consolidated Appropriations; P.L. 110-161),
another condition was added blocking the admission of Uzbek officials to the United States if the
Secretary of State determines that they were involved in abuses in Andijon. Omnibus
Appropriations for FY2009 (P.L. 111-8, Secs. 7075 [Kazakhstan] and 7076 [Uzbekistan])
reiterated these conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Consolidated
Appropriations for FY2010 (P.L. 111-117) referenced Secs. 7075 and 7076, but added that
Uzbekistan would be eligible for IMET.
Among recent determinations and reports:
• Then-Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte reported to Congress in
February 2008 that Kazakhstan had failed to significantly improve its human
rights record but that he had waived aid restrictions on national security grounds.
He did not determine and report to Congress that Uzbekistan was making
significant progress in respecting human rights, so aid restrictions remained in
place (IMET and FMF programs were among the affected programs that did not
receive funding).
• Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg reported to Congress in February
2009 that Kazakhstan had taken steps forward, but had fallen short in meeting
101 ITAR-TASS, March 18, 2008.
102 The language calling for “substantial progress” in respecting human rights differs from the grounds of ineligibility
for assistance under Section 498(b) of Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), which includes as
grounds a presidential determination that a Soviet successor state has “engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights.” The Administration has stated annually that the president has
not determined that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have engaged in “gross violations” of human rights.
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reform commitments agreed to at the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in
Madrid in November 2007 on media, political parties, and elections, and on the
preservation of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR). A national security waiver was issued. He did not determine and report
to Congress that Uzbekistan was making significant progress in respecting
human rights, so aid restrictions remained in place (IMET and FMF programs
were among the affected programs that did not receive funding).
Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States contributes to international financial
institutions that aid Central Asia. Recurrent policy issues regarding U.S. aid include what it
should be used for, who should receive it, and whether it is effective.
Legislation
P.L. 111-117 (H.R. 3288) (FY2010)
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010. Introduced on July 22, 2009. Signed into law on
December 16, 2009. The Explanatory Statement calls for $10.4 million in FREEDOM Support
Act aid to Kazakhstan, $46 million to Kyrgyzstan, $42.5 million to Tajikistan, $12.5 million to
Turkmenistan, $8.25 million to Uzbekistan, and $11 million for Central Asia regional programs.
Of the assistance provided to Kyrgyzstan, the conferees call for $11.5 million to go to the U.S.-
Kyrgyz Joint Development Fund. They also call for $3 million in Foreign Military Financing aid
for Kazakhstan, $3.5 million for Kyrgyzstan, $1.5 million for Tajikistan, and $2 million for
Turkmenistan. The act continues prior-year language conditioning aid to the government of
Kazakhstan on progress in democratization and respect for human rights, including obligations to
the OSCE to implement reforms in elections, media freedom, freedom of assembly, and minority
rights, and in meeting the commitments it made in connection with its assumption of the
chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010. The Secretary of State is permitted a waiver on national
security grounds. As proposed by the Senate but not by the House, the conference agreement
conditions aid to the government of Uzbekistan on its meeting commitments put forth in the U.S.-
Uzbek Declaration on Strategic Partnership and on prosecuting the individuals responsible for
killings of civilians in Andijon. If the Secretary of State has evidence of persons responsible for
the killings of civilians in Andijon, that person is to be deemed ineligible for admission to the
United States. The condition may be lifted if the Secretary reports that Uzbekistan has taken
concrete and measureable steps to respect human rights. The Secretary may permit such a person
to enter for U.N. activities or to further law enforcement. A new provision permits International
Military Education and Training assistance for Uzbekistan. The conferees call for the Secretary of
State to submit a report detailing actions by the Kazakh government to implement the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative and other efforts to achieve transparency and accountability in
managing revenues from oil, gas, and mining. They also call for a report describing defense
articles, defense services, and financial aid provided to Central Asian states and their use by the
security forces.
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Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia,
FY1992 to FY2009
(millions of dollars)
FY1992 thru
FY2009
Central Asian Country
FY2007 Budgeteda FY2008
Actualb
Estimateb FY2010 Requestb
Kazakhstan 1,470.88
21.1
19.3
17.3
Kyrgyzstan 905.01
29.96
29.1
48.2
Tajikistan 747.36
31.3
29.9
52.3
Turkmenistan 276.82
7.2
8.9
16.7
Uzbekistan 833.08
9.5
8.6
10.8
Regional 87.15
2.98
3.0
12.0
Total 4,320.3
102.04
98.8
157.3
Percent
14
24
25
31
Sources: State Department, Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, information as of
November 1, 2008; Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2009: South and Central Asia.
a. FSA and Agency funds. Excludes some classified coalition support funding. Includes $19.3 million in Defense
Department Section 1206 train and equip funds for Kazakhstan in FY2007.
b. FSA and other Function 150 funds. Does not include Defense or Energy Department funds, funding for
exchanges, or Millennium Challenge Corporation aid to Kyrgyzstan.
Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
Source: Map Resources adapted by CRS
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Author Contact Information
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289
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