Order Code RL33458
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
June 5, 2006
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Central Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
Summary
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the
independence of all the former Central Asian republics, supported their admission
into Western organizations, and elicited Turkish support to counter Iranian influence
in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S.
policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union.
Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the
Central Asian states offered overflight and other support to coalition anti-terrorist
efforts in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition
troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Uzbekistan endorsed coalition
military action in Iraq; Kazakhstan provided about two dozen troops for rebuilding.
After September 11, 2001, U.S. policy emphasized bolstering the security of the
Central Asian states to help them combat terrorism, proliferation, and arms
trafficking. Other strategic U.S. objectives include promoting democratization, free
markets, human rights, and energy development. Administration policy also aims to
integrate these states into the international community so that they follow responsible
security and other policies, and to discourage the growth of xenophobic,
fundamentalist, and anti-Western orientations that threaten peace and stability.
The Administration’s diverse goals in Central Asia reflect the differing
characteristics of these states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan include securing and
eliminating Soviet-era nuclear and biological weapons materials and facilities. In
Tajikistan, U.S. aid focuses on economic reconstruction. U.S. energy firms have
invested in oil and natural gas development in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Some
observers call for different emphases or levels of U.S. involvement in the region.
Some call for strengthening conditions linking aid to progress in improving human
rights or in making adequate progress in democratization and the creation of free
markets. Some dispute the importance of energy resources in the region to U.S.
national security. Others argue that the risks posed by civil and ethnic tensions in the
region outweigh the benefits of U.S. involvement. Heightened congressional interest
in Central Asia was reflected in passage of “Silk Road” language in 1999 (P.L. 106-
113) authorizing enhanced U.S. policy attention and aid to support conflict
amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport (including
energy pipelines) and communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation
of civil societies in South Caucasian and Central Asian states.
Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 was signed into law November
14, 2005 (P.L. 109-102). Conferees (H.Rept. 109-265) called for $25 million in
Freedom Support Act aid to Kazakhstan, $25 million to Kyrgyzstan, $24 million to
Tajikistan, $5 million to Turkmenistan, and $20 million to Uzbekistan. The law
continues prior year language conditioning aid to the governments of Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan on progress in democratization and respect for human rights and adds that
the Uzbek government should permit an international investigation of the mid-2005
violence against civilians in Andijon. This CRS report replaces CRS Issue Brief
IB93108, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests.

Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Russia’s Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Obstacles to Peace and Independence:Regional Tensions and Conflicts . . . . . . . 6
The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The 1999 and 2000 Incursions into Kyrgyzstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The 1999 and 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Democratization and Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Democracy Pledges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Security and Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Closure of Karshi-Khanabad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Weapons of Mass Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Trade and Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Energy Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
U.S. Aid Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
109th Congress Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
List of Figures
Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia, FY1992-FY2006,
and the FY2007 Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
Most Recent Developments
On June 2, 2006, Kyrgyz authorities announced that two days of talks with a
visiting U.S. delegation on the status of the U.S.-led coalition airbase at Manas had
gone well and would be continued. In light of this progress, Kyrgyz President
Kurmanbek Bakiyev lifted a warning that the base might be closed if the United
States did not agree by June 1 on higher lease payments.
The European Union warned the Kyrgyz government on May 2 that “there are
worrying indications that circles connected with organized crime are attempting to
gain influence over political life and state institutions” and urged the government to
combat this growing crime and political violence. The U.S. Ambassador on April 17
also had raised concerns that crime and corruption increasingly threaten Kyrgyzstan’s
stability. Days before, there had been an assassination attempt against democracy
and human rights advocate Edil Baysalov, after he had met with visiting U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher and reportedly warned him that
democratization in Kyrgyzstan was faltering.
According to a report issued by the non-governmental organization Global
Witness in late April 2006, Turkmen President Saparamurad Niyazov personally
controls a vast portion of the wealth generated from natural gas exports. The report
also raises concerns about the involvement of alleged organized crime groups in the
export business and urges the European Union to limit trade ties with Turkmenistan.1
Historical Background
Central Asia consists of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan; it borders Russia, China, the Middle East, and South Asia. The major
peoples of all but Tajikistan speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks speak an Iranian
language); and most are Sunni Muslims (some Tajiks are Shiia Muslims). Most are
closely related historically and culturally. By the late 19th century, Russian tsars had
conquered the last independent khanates and nomadic lands of Central Asia. By the
early 1920s, Soviet power had been imposed; by 1936, five “Soviet Socialist
1 Global Witness. It’s a Gas: Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade, April
2006.

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Republics” had been created. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in December
1991, they gained independence. 2
Central Asia: Basic Facts
Total Area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India; Kazakhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000
sq. mi.; Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan: 190,000 sq. mi.; Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi.
Total Population: 59.4 million, slightly less than France; Kazakhstan: 15.2 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 5.1 m.;
Tajikistan: 7.2 m.; Turkmenistan: 5.0 m.; Uzbekistan: 26.9 m. (2005 est., CIA World Factbook).
Total Gross Domestic Product: $223.6 billion in 2005; per capita GDP is about $3,900; poverty is
rampant. Kazakhstan: $133.2 b.; Kyrgyzstan: $9.3 b.; Tajikistan: $8.8 b.; Turkmenistan: $29.4 b.;
Uzbekistan: $52.2 b. (CIA Factbook, purchasing power parity).
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, then-President George
H.W. Bush sent the “FREEDOM Support Act” (FSA) to Congress, which was
amended and signed into law in October 1992 (P.L. 102-511). In 1999,
congressional concerns led to passage of the “Silk Road Strategy Act” authorizing
language (P.L. 106-113) calling for enhanced policy and aid to support conflict
amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and
communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the
South Caucasus and Central Asia.
U.S. policymakers and others hold various views on the types and levels of U.S.
involvement in the region. Some argue that ties with “energy behemoth” Kazakhstan
are crucial to U.S. interests. At least until recently, others argued that Uzbekistan is
the “linchpin” of the region (it is the most populous regional state and is centrally
located, shaping the range and scope of regional cooperation) and should receive the
most U.S. attention. In general, however, U.S. aid and investment are viewed as
strengthening the independence of the Central Asian states and forestalling Russian,
Chinese, Iranian, or other efforts to subvert them. Such advocates argue that political
turmoil and the growth of terrorist enclaves in Central Asia could produce spillover
effects both in nearby states, including U.S. allies and friends such as Turkey, and
worldwide. They also argue that the United States has a major interest in preventing
terrorist regimes or groups from illicitly acquiring Soviet-era technology for making
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They maintain that U.S. interests do not
perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that Turkey and other actors
possess limited aid resources, and that the United States is in the strongest position
as the sole superpower to influence democratization and respect for human rights.
They stress that such U.S. influence will help alleviate social tensions exploited by
Islamic extremist groups to gain adherents.
Some views of policymakers and academics who previously objected to a more
forward U.S. policy toward Central Asia appeared less salient after September 11,
2 See CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan; CRS Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan; CRS Report 98-
594, Tajikistan; CRS Report 97-1055, Turkmenistan; and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan,
all by Jim Nichol.

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2001, but aspects of these views could gain more credence if Afghanistan becomes
more stable. These observers argued that the United States historically had few
interests in this region and that developments there remained largely marginal to U.S.
interests. They discounted fears that anti-Western Islamic extremism would make
enough headway to threaten secular regimes or otherwise harm U.S. interests. At
least until the coup in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 (see below, Democratization), these
observers argued that the United States should not try to foster democratization
among cultures they claimed are historically attuned to authoritarianism. Some
observers reject arguments that U.S. interests in anti-terrorism, non-proliferation,
regional cooperation, and trade outweigh concerns over democratization and human
rights, and urge reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive states. A few
observers point to instability in the region as a reason to eschew deeper U.S.
involvement such as military access that might needlessly place more U.S. personnel
and citizens in danger.
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan. Since the terrorist attacks on the
United States on September 11, 2001, the Administration has stated that U.S. policy
toward Central Asia focuses on the promotion of security, domestic reforms, and
energy development. According to then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State B. Lynn
Pascoe in testimony in June 2002, the September 11 attacks led the Administration
to realize that “it was critical to the national interests of the United States that we
greatly enhance our relations with the five Central Asian countries” to prevent them
from becoming harbors for terrorism.3 After September 11, 2001, all the Central
Asian states soon offered overflight and other assistance to U.S.-led anti-terrorism
efforts in Afghanistan. The states were predisposed to welcome such operations.
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had long supported the Afghan Northern Alliance’s
combat against the Taliban, and all the Central Asian states feared Afghanistan as a
base for terrorism, crime, and drug trafficking (even Turkmenistan, which tried to
reach some accommodation with the Taliban) (see also below, Security).
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Uzbekistan was the only Central
Asian state that joined the “coalition of the willing” in February-March 2003 that
endorsed prospective U.S.-led coalition military operations in Iraq (Kazakhstan
joined later). Uzbekistan subsequently decided not to send troops to Iraq, but
Kazakhstan has deployed some two dozen troops to Iraq who are engaged in de-
mining and water purification.
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become
responsible members of the international community, supporting integrative goals
through bilateral aid and through coordination with other aid donors. The stated
policy goal is to discourage radical anti-democratic regimes and terrorist groups from
gaining influence. All the Central Asian leaders publicly embrace Islam, but display
3 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Central Asia and the
South Caucasus. The U.S. Role in Central Asia. Testimony of B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs
, June 27, 2002.

CRS-4
hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have established
some trade and aid ties with Iran. While they have had greater success in attracting
development aid from the West than from the East, some observers argue that, in the
long run, their foreign policies may not be anti-Western, but may more closely reflect
some concerns of other Islamic states.4
Russia’s Role
During most of the 1990s, U.S. administrations generally viewed a
democratizing Russia as serving as a role model in Central Asia. Despite growing
authoritarian tendencies in Russia since Vladimir Putin became its president in 2000,
the Bush Administration has emphasized that Russia’s counter-terrorism efforts in
the region broadly support U.S. interests. At the same time, the United States long
has stressed to Russia that it should not seek to dominate the region or exclude
Western and other involvement. Virtually all U.S. analysts agree that Russia’s
actions should be monitored to ensure that the independence of the Central Asian
states is not threatened.
The long-term impact of the events of September 11, 2001, on the Central Asian
states may depend upon the durability and scope of U.S. and coalition presence in the
region, Russia’s countervailing policies, and the fate of Afghanistan. Among
Russia’s reasons for acquiescing to increased U.S. and coalition presence in the
region after the September 2001 attacks were its interests in boosting some economic
and other ties to the West and its hopes of regaining influence in Afghanistan. More
recently, however, Russia has appeared to step up efforts to counter U.S. influence.
Russian officials have emphasized interests in strategic security and economic
ties with Central Asia. Strategic concerns have focused on drug trafficking and
regional conflict, and the region’s role as a buffer to Islamic extremism. During the
1990s, Russia’s economic decline and demands by Central Asia caused it to reduce
its security presence, a trend that President Putin has tried to retard or reverse. In
1999, Russian border guards were largely phased out in Kyrgyzstan, the last Russian
military advisors left Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective
Security Treaty (CST) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), citing its
ineffectiveness and obtrusiveness. However, Russia has appeared determined to
maintain a military presence in Tajikistan. It long retained about 14,500 Federal
Border Guards in Tajikistan, most of whom were Tajik conscripts, and 7,800 Russian
troops of the 201st motorized rifle division.5
Russia’s efforts to formalize a basing agreement with Tajikistan dragged on for
years, as Tajikistan endeavored to maximize rents and assert its sovereignty. In
October 2004, the basing agreement was signed, formalizing Russia’s largest
military presence abroad, besides its Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, Tajikistan
demanded full control over border policing. Russia announced in June 2005 that it
4 See also CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S.
Interests
, by Jim Nichol.
5 The Military Balance 2005-2006. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies,
2005.

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had handed over the last guard-house along the Afghan-Tajik border to Tajik troops.
The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime reported in early 2006 that the amount of
heroin seized in Tajikistan during 2005 had declined, perhaps in part because of
complications during the phase-in of full border control by Tajikistan. Tajik
President Rakhmanov and others emphasize that growing drug production and
trafficking from Afghanistan pose increasing challenges.6
In a seeming shift toward a more activist role in Central Asia, in April 2000,
Russia called for the members of the CST to approve the creation of rapid reaction
forces to combat terrorism and hinted that such forces might launch pre-emptive
strikes on Afghan terrorist bases. These hints elicited U.S. calls for Russia to
exercise restraint and consult the U.N. Presidents Clinton and Putin agreed in 2000
to set up a working group to examine Afghan-related terrorism (this working group
now examines global terrorism issues). CST members agreed in 2001 to set up a
Central Asian rapid reaction force headquartered in Kyrgyzstan, with Russia’s troops
in Tajikistan comprising most of the force. CIS members in 2001 also approved
setting up an Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC) in Moscow, with a branch in Kyrgyzstan,
giving Russia influence over regional intelligence gathering.
Perhaps to counteract the increased U.S. presence in Kyrgyzstan, Russia in
September 2003 signed a 15-year military basing accord with Kyrgyzstan providing
access to the Kant airfield, near Kyrgyzstan’s capital of Bishkek. The nearly two
dozen Russian aircraft and several hundred troops at the base also serve as part of the
Central Asian rapid reaction force. The base is a few miles from the U.S.-led
coalition’s Manas airbase. Taking advantage of Uzbekistan’s souring relations with
many Western countries (see below), Russia signed a Treaty on Allied Relations with
Uzbekistan in November 2005 that calls for mutual defense consultations in the event
of a threat to either party (similar to language in the CST).
Some observers suggest that the appreciative attitude of the Central Asian states
toward the United States — for their added security accomplished through U.S.-led
actions in Afghanistan — has declined over time. Reasons may include perceptions
that the United States has not adequately addressed economic distress and drug
trafficking. Also, Russia is pledging security support to the states to get them to
forget their pre-September 11, 2001, dissatisfaction with its support. Russia’s efforts
have benefitted too from growing concerns among Central Asia’s authoritarian
leaders that the United States advocates democratic “revolutions” to replace them.
Russia’s economic interests in Central Asia are being reasserted as its economy
improves and may constitute its most effective lever of influence. Russia seeks to
counter Western business and gain substantial influence over energy resources
through participation in joint ventures and by insisting that pipelines cross Russian
territory. After an Energy Cooperation Statement was signed at the May 2002 U.S.-
6 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime. Regional Office for Central Asia. Regional Drug
Situation Analysis, Milestones, April 2006, p. 6; for another assessment, see U.S. House of
Representatives. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on the Middle East
and Central Asia. U.S. Policy in Central Asia: Balancing Priorities. Testimony of Richard
A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs
, April 26, 2006.

CRS-6
Russia summit, it appeared that Russia would accept a Western role in the Caspian
region, including construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline.
Subsequently, however, Russian officials tried (unsuccessfully) to persuade
Kazakhstan not to commit to use the BTC pipeline.
Obstacles to Peace and Independence:
Regional Tensions and Conflicts
The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups, convoluted borders, and emerging
national identities pose challenges to stability in all the Central Asian states.
Emerging national identities compete with those of the clan, family, region, and
Islam. Central Asia’s convoluted borders fail to accurately reflect ethnic distributions
and are hard to police, hence contributing to regional tensions. Ethnic Uzbeks make
up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. In
Tajikistan, they make up almost a quarter of the population. More ethnic Turkmen
reside in Iran and Afghanistan — over three million — than in Turkmenistan.
Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and seven million in
Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China’s Xinjiang province. The fertile
Ferghana Valley is shared by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The central
governments have struggled to gain control over administrative subunits. Most
observers agree that the term “Central Asia” currently denotes a geographic area
more than a region of shared identities and aspirations, although it is clear that the
land-locked, poverty-stricken, and sparsely-populated region will need more
integration in order to develop.
Regional cooperation remains stymied by tensions among the states. Such
tensions continue to exist despite the membership of the states in various cooperation
groups such as the CST Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP). The CST was signed by Russia,
Belarus, the South Caucasus countries, and the Central Asian states (except
Turkmenistan) in May 1992 and called for military cooperation and joint
consultations in the event of security threats to any member. Of ten-years duration,
at the time of its renewal in 2002, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan formally
withdrew. The remaining members formed the CST Organization in late 2002, and
a secretariat opened in Moscow at the beginning of 2004. Through the CSTO, Russia
has attempted to involve the members in joint support for the Central Asian rapid
reaction forces and joint efforts to combat international terrorism and drug
trafficking.7 In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed the
“Shanghai treaty” with China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization
of mutual borders, and in 1997 they signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the
4,300 mile former Soviet-Chinese border. China has used the treaty to pressure the
Central Asian states to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting
separatism in China’s Xinjiang province, and to get them to extradite Uighurs fleeing
7 Roger N McDermott, Collective Security Group Reinvents Itself in a New World, Eurasia
Insight
, August 28, 2002.

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China. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined the group, re-named the SCO, and in 2003 the
SCO Anti-Terrorism Center was established there.
The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan
Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined
toward independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose
coalition of nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and groups tried to take
power. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia,
launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in
20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about
80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. After the two sides agreed to a cease-fire, the
U.N. Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
(UNMOT) in December 1994. In June 1997, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov
and rebel leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement.
Benchmarks of the peace process were largely met, and UNMOT pulled out in May
2000. The United States has pledged to help Tajikistan rebuild. Some observers
point to events in the city of Andijon in Uzbekistan (see below) as indicating that
conflicts similar to the Tajik civil war could engulf other regional states where large
numbers of people are disenfranchised and poverty-stricken.
The 1999 and 2000 Incursions into Kyrgyzstan
Several hundred Islamic extremists and others first invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-
August 1999. Jama Namanganiy, the co-leader of the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU; see below), headed the largest guerrilla group. They seized
hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to create an Islamic state in south
Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. With Uzbek and Kazakh air
and other support, Kyrgyz forces forced the guerrillas out in October 1999. Dozens
of IMU and other insurgents again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August
2000. Uzbekistan provided air and other support, but Kyrgyz forces were largely
responsible for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000. The IMU did not
invade the region in the summer before September 11, 2001, in part because bin
Laden had secured its aid for a Taliban offensive against the Afghan Northern
Alliance.
The 1999 and 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan
A series of explosions in Tashkent in February 1999 were among early signs
that the Uzbek government was vulnerable to terrorism. By various reports, the
explosions killed 16 to 28 and wounded 100 to 351 people. The aftermath involved
wide-scale arrests of political dissidents and others deemed by some observers as
unlikely conspirators. Karimov in April 1999 accused Mohammad Solikh (former
Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of masterminding
what he termed an assassination plot, along with Tohir Yuldashev (co-leader of the
IMU) and the Taliban. The first trial of 22 suspects in June resulted in six receiving
death sentences. The suspects said in court that they received terrorist training in
Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia and were led by Solikh, Yuldashev and
Namanganiy. In 2000, Yuldashev and Namanganiy received death sentences in

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absentia, and Solikh received a 15.5 year prison sentence. Solikh denied membership
in IMU, and he and Yuldashev denied involvement in the bombings.
On March 28 through April 1, 2004, a series of bombings and armed attacks
were launched in Uzbekistan, reportedly killing 47. An obscure Islamic Jihad Group
of Uzbekistan (IJG; Jama’at al-Jihad al-Islami, a breakaway part of the IMU) claimed
responsibility. In subsequent trials, the alleged attackers were accused of being
members of IJG or of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT; an Islamic fundamentalist movement
ostensibly pledged to peace but banned in Uzbekistan) and of attempting to
overthrow the government. Some defendants testified that they were trained by
Arabs and others at camps in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. They testified that IMU
member Najmiddin Jalolov (convicted in absentia in 2000) was the leader of IJG, and
linked him to Taliban head Mohammad Omar, Uighur extremist Abu Mohammad,
and Osama bin Laden. On July 30, 2004, explosions occurred at the U.S. and Israeli
embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor-General’s Office in Tashkent. The IMU and
IJG claimed responsibility and stated that the bombings were aimed against Uzbek
and other “apostate” governments. A Kazakh security official in late 2004
announced the apprehension of several IJG members. He alleged that the IJG had
ties to Al Qaeda; had other cells in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia; and was
planning assassinations.8
In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization, stating that the IMU, aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by
Osama bin Laden, resorts to terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks
American citizens. The “main goal of the IMU is to topple the current government
in Uzbekistan,” the State Department warned, and it linked the IMU to bombings and
attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. IMU forces assisting the Taliban and Al Qaeda
suffered major losses during coalition actions in Afghanistan, and Namanganiy was
probably killed.9 Former CIA Director Porter Goss testified in March 2005 that IJG
“has become a more virulent threat to U.S. interests and local governments.”10 In
May 2005, the State Department designated IJG as a global terrorist group, and in
June, the U.N. Security Council added IJG to its terrorism list.11
8 See also CRS Report RS21818, The 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan: Context and Implications
for U.S. Interests
, by Jim Nichol.
9 U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, April 2004.
10 U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Testimony of the Director of Central
Intelligence, The Honorable Porter J. Goss
, March 17, 2005.
11 U.S. Department of State. Press Statement: U.S. Department of State Designates the
Islamic Jihad Group Under Executive Order 13224
, May 26, 2005; U.N. Security Council.
The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee. Press Release: Security Council
Committee Adds One Entity to Al-Qaida Section of Consolidated List
, SC/8405, June 3,
2005.

CRS-9
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan
Dozens or perhaps hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded on May 13,
2005, after Uzbek troops fired on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon. The
protestors had gathered to demand the end of a trial of local businessmen charged
with belonging to an Islamic terrorist group. The night before, a group stormed a
prison where those on trial were held and released hundreds of inmates.12 Many
freed inmates then joined others in storming government buildings. President Islam
Karimov flew to the city to direct operations, and reportedly had restored order by
late on May 13. The United States and others in the international community have
called for an international inquiry, which the Uzbek government has rejected. On
July 29, 439 people who had fled from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan were airlifted to
Romania for resettlement processing, after the United States and others raised
concerns that they might be tortured if returned to Uzbekistan.13
At the first major trial of fifteen alleged perpetrators of the Andijon unrest in
late 2005, the accused all confessed and asked for death penalties, and testified that
the U.S. and Kyrgyz governments helped finance and support the violence, and
international media colluded with local human rights groups and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in this effort. The U.S. and Kyrgyz governments denied such
involvement, and many observers criticized the trial as appearing stage managed.
Many Uzbek opposition party members and media and NGO representatives have
been arrested. Partly in response, Congress has amplified calls for conditioning aid
to Uzbekistan on its democracy and human rights record (see below, Legislation).
Democratization and Human Rights
A major goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term
development of democratic institutions and policies upholding human rights. The
United States has worked with the ex-Communist Party officials who lead in the five
states (even in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where the current presidents were once
lower-level party officials). Particularly since September 11, 2001, the United States
has attempted to harmonize its concerns about democratization and human rights in
the region with its interests in regional support for the Global War on Terrorism.
According to some allegations, the Administration may have sent suspected terrorists
in its custody to Uzbekistan for questioning, a process termed “rendition.”14
12 There is a great deal of controversy about whether this group contained foreign-trained
terrorists or was composed mainly of the friends and families of the accused. See U.S.
Congress. Commission on Security and Cooperation In Europe. Briefing: The Uzbekistan
Crisis. Testimony of Galima Bukharbayeva, Correspondent. Institute for War and Peace
Reporting,
June 29, 2005. For another viewpoint, see Shirin Akiner, Violence in Andijan,
13 May 2005: An Independent Assessment
, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, July 2005.
13 See also CRS Report RS22161, Unrest in Uzbekistan: Context and Implications, by Jim
Nichol.
14 The New Yorker, February 14, 2005; New York Times, May 1, 2005; New York Times,
(continued...)

CRS-10
Although not verifying such transfers specifically to Uzbekistan, the Administration
has stated that, under the rendition policy, it receives diplomatic assurances that
transferees will not be tortured.
Possible scenarios of political development in Central Asia have ranged from
continued rule in most of the states by former Soviet elites to violent transitions to
Islamic fundamentalist or xenophobic rule. Relatively peaceful and quick transitions
to more or less democratic and Western-oriented political systems have been
considered less likely by many observers. Some have suggested that Kyrgyzstan —
because of its slightly wider scope of civil liberties compared to the rest of Central
Asia — could lead the region in democratic reforms, All the Central Asian leaders
have remained in power by orchestrating extensions of their terms and by eliminating
possible contenders. Besides the recent coup in Kyrgyzstan (see below), there have
been alleged coup attempts in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, and the
leaders in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan face rising popular protests. The NGO
Freedom House has given Turkmenistan its lowest possible rating on political rights
and civil liberties, and Uzbekistan its next-to-lowest rating, including them among
such countries as North Korea, Libya, Cuba, Syria, Sudan, and Myanmar.15

Popular protests in Kyrgyzstan against a tainted legislative election and
economic distress resulted in President Akayev’s relatively peaceful overthrow in
March 2005. Some observers hailed this coup as the third so-called “democratic
revolution” in Eurasia, after those in Georgia and Ukraine, and the first in Central
Asia.16
Democracy Pledges
During Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed a
Charter on Democratic Partnership recognizing Kazakhstan’s commitments to the
rule of law, respect for human rights, and economic reform. During his December
2001 visit, Nazarbayev repeated these pledges in a joint statement with President
Bush. In March 2002, a U.S.-Uzbek Strategic Partnership Declaration was signed
pledging Uzbekistan to “intensify the democratic transformation” and improve
freedom of the press. During his December 2002 U.S. visit, Tajikistan’s President
Rakhmanov pledged to “expand fundamental freedoms and human rights.” Despite
such democracy pledges (the United States still regards the U.S.-Uzbek Declaration
as valid), the states have made little progress, according to the State Department.17
14 (...continued)
December 31, 2005; Repr. Edward Markey, Congressional Record, December 13, 2005, p.
H11337; European Parliament. Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of European
Countries by the CIA for the Transport And Illegal Detention of Prisoners, Draft Interim
Report
, 2006/2027(INI), April 24, 2006.
15 Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2005, December 19, 2005.
16 See also CRS Report RL32864, Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Developments and Implications, by
Jim Nichol.
17 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2005.

CRS-11
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are generally viewed as having the most
repressive governments. Tajikistan experienced many human rights abuses during
its civil war, and the government appears in recent years to be backtracking on
respect for human rights. Non-favored faiths, missionaries, and pious Muslims face
religious rights abuses in all the states. Unfair elections increase political alienation
and violence aimed against the regimes. In mid-2005, the State Department placed
Uzbekistan on a “Tier 2 Watch List,” for having problems as a source country for
human trafficking that they are making some progress in addressing. Kazakhstan and
Tajikistan were taken off the watch list but were listed (as was Kyrgyzstan) as “Tier
2” countries that have human trafficking problems they are addressing.18
Among U.N. actions, the United States, Russia, and other countries in December
2003 approved a General Assembly resolution urging Turkmenistan to implement
human rights reforms. The U.N. Rapporteur on Torture in early 2003 completed a
report that concluded that police and prison officials in Uzbekistan “systematically”
employed torture.19 In November 2005, a U.N. committee approved a draft
resolution (it has not been considered by the General Assembly) condemning the
Uzbek government’s violence against civilians in Andijon and to call on it to permit
an international investigation. The Uzbek representative asserted that the draft
contained no credible facts and ignored Uzbekistan’s right to defend its constitutional
order against terrorists.20
In Congress, Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7) forbade
FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless
the Secretary of State determined and reported that it was making substantial progress
in meeting commitments under the Strategic Partnership Declaration to democratize
and respect human rights. P.L. 108-7 also forbade assistance to the Kazakh
government unless the Secretary of State determined and reported that it significantly
had improved its human rights record during the preceding six months. However,
the legislation permitted the Secretary to waive the requirement on national security
grounds. The Secretary reported in May 2003, that Uzbekistan was making such
progress (by late 2003, the Administration had decided that it could no longer make
this claim; see below, Weapons of Mass Destruction). In July 2003, the Secretary
reported that Kazakhstan was making progress. Some in Congress were critical of
these findings. Consolidated Appropriations for FY2004, including foreign
18 U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2005.
19 U.N. Economic and Social Council. Commission on Human Rights. Special Rapporteur
on the Question of Torture, Theo van Boven. Report of the Special Rapporteur Submitted
in Accordance with Commission Resolution 2002/38. Addendum: Mission to Uzbekistan
,
E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2, annex, February 3, 2003. In early 2006, the Rapporteur reported
allegations by some NGOs that Uzbekistan still had not implemented many of the
recommendations. See Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture, Manfred Nowak.
Report by the Special Rapporteur. Addendum: Follow-up to the Recommendations Made
by the Special Rapporteur,
E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.2, March 21, 2006.
20 U.N. General Assembly. Third Committee. Draft Resolution: Situation of Human Rights
in Uzbekistan
, A/C.3/60/L.51, November 2, 2005; Press Release: Third Committee ...
Approves Text Expressing Deep Concern over Human Rights Situation in Uzbekistan
,
GA/SHC/3843, November 22, 2005.

CRS-12
operations (P.L. 108-199) and for FY2005 (P.L. 108-447, Section 578), and Foreign
Operations Appropriations for FY2006 (P.L. 109-102) retained these conditions,
while clarifying that the prohibition on aid to Uzbekistan pertained to the central
government and that conditions included respecting human rights, establishing a
“genuine” multi-party system, and ensuring free and fair elections and freedom of
expression and media.
In July 2004, the State Department announced that, despite some “encouraging
progress” in respecting human rights, up to $18 million in aid to Uzbekistan would
be withheld because of “lack of progress on democratic reform and restrictions put
on U.S. assistance partners on the ground” (in contrast, progress was reported
regarding Kazakhstan).21 International Military Education and Training (IMET) and
FMF programs, which are conditioned on respect for human rights, were among
those affected. The State Department reprogrammed or used notwithstanding
authority (after consultation with Congress) to expend some of the funds, so that
about $8.5 million was ultimately withheld. During an August 2004 visit to
Uzbekistan, Gen. Myers criticized the cutoff of IMET and FMF programs as
“shortsighted” and not “productive,” since it reduced U.S. military influence (see also
below, Weapons of Mass Destruction).22 For FY2005, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice reported to Congress in May 2005 that Kazakhstan had failed to
significantly improve its human rights record, but that she had waived aid restrictions
on national security grounds. The Secretary of State in FY2005 did not determine
and report to Congress that Uzbekistan was making significant progress in respecting
human rights, so Section 578 aid restrictions remained in place.
Among recent elections, incumbent Kazakh President Nazarbayev won another
term with 91% of the vote in a five-man race on December 4, 2005. Many observers
credited economic growth in the country and some recent increases in wages and
pensions as bolstering his popularity. He campaigned widely and pledged democratic
reforms and poverty relief. Observers from the OSCE, COE, and the European
Parliament assessed the election as progressive but still falling short of a free and fair
race. Problems included restrictions on campaigning and harassment of opposition
candidates.23
On February 23, 2006, Kazakhstan’s interior (police) ministry announced that
it had detained Yerzhan Otembayev, the top aide to Nurtay Abykayev, the speaker
of the Senate (the upper legislative chamber), on suspicion of involvement in the
February abduction and murder of Altynbek Sarsenbayev, leader of the opposition
Nagyz Ak Zhol (True Bright Path) Party. Arrests included personnel in the national
security committee. The police reported that Otembayev had confessed to having
Sarsenbayev killed for personal reasons. Opposition politicians and others asserted
that Otembayev’s alleged involvement indicated that the assassination was ordered
21 U.S. Department of State. Office of the Spokesman. Secretary of State Decision Not to
Certify Uzbekistan
, July 13, 2004.
22 Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, August 16, 2004.
23 OSCE. ODIHR. Election Observation Mission. Republic of Kazakhstan Presidential
Election 4 December 2005: Final Report
, February 21, 2006.

CRS-13
by other top officials. The U.S. FBI reportedly assisted in investigating
Sarsenbayev’s murder.
Security and Arms Control
The U.S.-led coalition’s overthrow of the Taliban and routing of Al Qaeda and
IMU terrorists in Afghanistan (termed Operation Enduring Freedom or OEF)
increased the security of Central Asia. According to then-Assistant Secretary of
Defense J. D. Crouch in testimony in June 2002, “our military relationships with each
[Central Asian] nation have matured on a scale not imaginable prior to September
11th.” Crouch averred that “for the foreseeable future, U.S. defense and security
cooperation in Central Asia must continue to support actions to deter or defeat
terrorist threats” and to build effective armed forces under civilian control.
Kyrgyzstan, Crouch related, became a “critical regional partner” in OEF, providing
basing for U.S. and coalition forces at Manas (in 2005, U.S. troops reportedly
numbered about 1,500). Uzbekistan provided a base for U.S. operations at Karshi-
Khanabad (K2; just before the pullout, U.S. troops reportedly numbered less than
900), a base for German units at Termez (in early 2006, German troops reportedly
numbered about 300), and a land corridor to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid via the
Friendship Bridge at Termez. Tajikistan permitted use of its international airport in
Dushanbe for refueling and hosted a French force (France reported 130 troops there
in early 2005; they pulled out in November 2005). Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
provided overflight and other support.24
To obtain Uzbekistan’s approval for basing, the 2002 U.S.-Uzbek Strategic
Partnership Declaration included a nonspecific security guarantee. The United States
affirmed that “it would regard with grave concern any external threat” to
Uzbekistan’s security and would consult with Uzbekistan “on an urgent basis”
regarding a response. The two states pledged to intensify military cooperation,
including “re-equipping the Armed Forces” of Uzbekistan, a pledge that appeared to
be repudiated by Uzbekistan following events in Andijon.
Although U.S. security assistance was boosted in the aftermath of 9/11, such aid
has lessened somewhat since then as a percentage of all such aid to Eurasia,
particularly in FY2004-FY2005 after some aid to Uzbekistan was cut (see below).
Security and law enforcement aid was $187.55 million in FY2002 (31% of all such
aid to Eurasia), $101.5 million (33%) in FY2003, $132.5 million (11.2%) in FY2004,
and $148.5 million in FY2005 (11.3%). Of all budgeted assistance to Central Asia
over the period from FY1992-FY2004, security and law enforcement aid accounted
for a little over one-fifth. Security and law enforcement aid included FMF, IMET,
and EDA programs and border security aid to combat trafficking in drugs, humans,
and WMD. To help counter burgeoning drug trafficking from Afghanistan, the
emergency supplemental for FY2005 (P.L. 109-13) provided $242 million for Central
Asia and Afghanistan.
24 Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South
Caucasus. Statement of J.D. Crouch II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy
, June 27, 2002.

CRS-14
In addition to the aid reported by the Coordinator’s Office, the Defense
Department provides coalition support payments to Kyrgyzstan, including base lease
payments and landing and overflight fees (overall authority and funding have been
provided in FY2002-FY2005 emergency supplemental appropriations for military
operations and maintenance). According to one 2005 report, the United States had
paid $28 million in lease payments, and landing and takeoff fees at Manas; $114
million for fuel, and $17 million to Kyrgyz contractors. Uzbekistan received a
payment of $15.7 million for use of K2 and associated services, and the Defense
Department in September 2005 announced an intention to pay another $23 million.
On October 5, an amendment to Defense Appropriations for FY2006 (H.R. 2863)
was approved in the Senate to place a one-year hold on the payment. Despite
congressional concern, the Defense Department transferred the payment in November
2005. The conferees on H.R. 2863 later dropped the amendment (H.Rept. 109-360;
P.L. 109-359).
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in 1999 became responsible for U.S.
military engagement in Central Asia. It cooperates with the European Command
(USEUCOM), on the Caspian [Sea] Guard program, launched in 2003, to enhance
and coordinate security assistance provided by U.S. agencies to establish an
“integrated airspace, maritime and border control regime” for Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan. A related hydrocarbons initiative provides maritime security, crisis
response, and consequence management aid to help the Caspian regional states
protect energy transport to the West.25 Russia has appeared to counter U.S. maritime
security aid by boosting the capabilities of its Caspian Sea Flotilla and by urging the
littoral states to coordinate their naval activities with Russia’s.
All the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined NATO’s PFP by mid-1994
(Tajikistan joined in 2002). Central Asian troops have participated in periodic PFP
(or “PFP-style”) exercises in the United States since 1995, and U.S. troops have
participated in exercises in Central Asia since 1997 (Uzbekistan’s participation in
PFP has been in abeyance since events in Andijon). A June 2004 NATO summit
communique pledged enhanced Alliance attention to the countries of the South
Caucasus and Central Asia.
According to some reports, the Defense Department has been considering
possibly setting up long-term military facilities in Central Asia termed Cooperative
Security Locations (CSLs; they might contain pre-positioned equipment and be
managed by private contractors, and few if any U.S. military personnel may be
present). The Overseas Basing Commission in 2005 acknowledged that U.S. national
security might be enhanced by future CSLs in Central Asia but urged Congress to
seek inter-agency answers to “what constitutes vital U.S. interests in the area that
would require long-term U.S. presence.”26
25 Senate Armed Services Committee. Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC,
Commander, United States European Command
, March 1, 2005.
26 Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States.
Interim Report, May 9, 2005.

CRS-15
Closure of Karshi-Khanabad
On July 5, 2005, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan
signed a declaration issued during a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO; see below, Regional Tensions) that stated that “as large-scale
military operations against terrorism have come to an end in Afghanistan, the SCO
member states maintain that the relevant parties to the anti-terrorist coalition should
set a deadline for the temporary use of ... infrastructure facilities of the SCO member
states and for their military presence in these countries.”27 Despite this declaration,
none of the Central Asian leaders immediately called for closing the coalition bases.
However, after the United States and others interceded so that refugees who fled
from Andijon to Kyrgyzstan could fly to Romania, Uzbekistan on July 29 demanded
that the United States vacate K2 within six months. On November 21, 2005, the
United States officially ceased operations to support Afghanistan at K2. In early
2006, Kyrgyz President Bakiyev reportedly requested that lease payments for use of
the Manas airbase be increased to more than $200 million per year and at the same
time re-affirmed Russia’s free use of its nearby base.28
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Major U.S. security interests have included elimination of nuclear weapons
remaining in Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union and other efforts to
control nuclear proliferation in Central Asia. The United States has tendered aid
aimed at bolstering their export and physical controls over nuclear technology and
materials, including because of concerns that Iran is targeting these countries.
After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons
power (in reality Russia controlled these weapons). In December 1993, the United
States and Kazakhstan signed a CTR umbrella agreement for the “safe and secure”
dismantling of 104 SS-18s, the destruction of silos, and related purposes. All
bombers and their air-launched cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994
(except seven bombers destroyed with U.S. aid in 1998). On April 21, 1995, the last
of about 1,040 nuclear warheads had been removed from SS-18 missiles and
transferred to Russia, and Kazakhstan announced that it was nuclear weapons-free.
The SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994. The United States reported that 147 silos
had been destroyed by September 1999. A U.S.-Kazakh Nuclear Risk Reduction
Center in Almaty was set up to facilitate verification and compliance with arms
control agreements to prevent the proliferation of WMD. S.Res. 122, approved on
May 25, 2005, commends Kazakhstan for eliminating its nuclear weapons.
Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium
mines, milling facilities, and nuclear waste dumps in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, many of which reportedly remain inadequately protected
against theft. Also, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and
27 FBIS, July 5, 2005, Doc. No. CPP-249.
28 For background, see CRS Report RS22295, Uzbekistan’s Closure of the Airbase at
Karshi-Khanabad: Context and Implications
, by Jim Nichol.

CRS-16
biological warfare (CBW) facilities during the Soviet era. Kazakhstan is reported
to possess one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan are among the world’s top producers of low enriched uranium.
Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at Aktau that was the world’s only nuclear
desalinization facility. Shut down in 1999, it had nearly 300 metric tons of uranium
and plutonium spent fuel in storage pools (three tons of which were weapons-grade).
In 1997 and 1999, U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on decommissioning the Aktau
reactor.
CTR aid was used to facilitate the transport of 600 kg of weapons-grade
uranium from Kazakhstan to the United States in 1994, of 2,900 kg of up to 26%
enriched nuclear fuel from Aktau to Kazakhstan’s Ulba facility in 2001 (which Ulba
converted into less-enriched fuel), and of eleven kg of uranium in fuel rods from
Uzbekistan to Russia in 2004. CTR and Energy Department funds have been used
in Kazakhstan to dismantle a former anthrax production facility in Stepnogorsk, to
remove some strains to the United States, to secure two other BW sites, and to retrain
scientists. CTR funding was used to dismantle Uzbekistan’s Nukus chemical
weapons research facility. CTR aid also was used to eliminate active anthrax spores
at a former CBW test site on an island in the Aral Sea. These latter two projects were
completed in 2002. Other CTR aid helps keep Uzbek weapons scientists employed
in peaceful research.
The FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314, Sec. 1306)
provided for the president to waive prohibitions on CTR aid (as contained in
Sec.1203 of P.L. 103-160) to a state of the former Soviet Union if he certified that
the waiver was necessary for national security and submitted a report outlining why
the waiver was necessary and how he planned to promote future compliance with the
restrictions on CTR aid. The waiver authority, exercisable each fiscal year, expired
at the end of FY2005. (The six restrictions in P.L. 103-160 include a call for CTR
recipients to observe internationally recognized human rights.) In FY2004 and
FY2005, the President explained that Uzbekistan’s human rights problems
necessitated waivers.29 Defense Authorizations for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163) provide
a non-sunset waiver authority, exercisable annually (see below, Legislation).
29 The White House. Presidential Determination: No. 2004-19. Waiver of Restrictions on
Assistance to the Republic of Uzbekistan under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of
1993 and Title V of the FREEDOM Support Act
, December 30, 2003; Presidential
Determination: No. 2005-13. Waiver of Restrictions..., December 14, 2004.

CRS-17
Trade and Investment
The Administration and others stress that U.S. support for free market reforms
directly serves U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and
services and sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to
Central Asia has greatly exceeded that provided to Russia or most other Eurasian
states except Azerbaijan. U.S. trade agreements have been signed and entered into
force with all the Central Asian states, but bilateral investment treaties are in force
only with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Permanent normal trade relations with
Kyrgyzstan were established by law in June 2000, so that “Jackson-Vanik” trade
provisions no longer apply that call for presidential reports and waivers concerning
freedom of emigration.
The emergence of Central Asia as a “new silk road” of trade and commerce is
challenged by corruption, inadequate roads, punitive tariffs, border tensions, and the
uncertain respect for contracts. Uzbekistan’s restrictions on travel have encouraged
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to explore building a major road to Kazakhstan that
bypasses Uzbekistan. All the states of the region possess large-scale resources that
could yield export earnings, but these challenges discourage major foreign
investment (except for some investment in the energy sector) to revamp, develop, or
market the resources. The Kazakh and Turkmen economies are dependent on energy
exports but need added foreign investment for production and transport.
Uzbekistan’s state-controlled cotton and gold production rank among the highest in
the world and much is exported. It also has moderate energy reserves. Kyrgyzstan
has major gold mines and strategic mineral reserves, is a major wool producer, and
could benefit from tourism. Tajikistan has one of the world’s largest aluminum
processing plants and is a major cotton grower.
Energy Resources
U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central Asian and South
Caucasian states have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the West,
supporting U.S. private investment, promoting Western energy security through
diversified suppliers, assisting ally Turkey, and opposing the building of pipelines
that transit “energy competitor” Iran or otherwise give it undue influence over the
region. Security for Caspian region pipelines and energy resources also has been a
recent interest. President Bush’s 2001 National Energy Policy report suggests that
greater oil production in the Caspian region could not only benefit regional
economies, but also help mitigate possible world supply disruptions. It recommends
U.S. support for building the BTC pipeline and an Azerbaijan-Turkey gas pipeline,
coaxing Kazakhstan to use the oil pipeline, and otherwise encouraging the regional
states to provide a stable and inviting business climate for energy development.30
According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Caspian region is
emerging as a significant source of oil and gas for world markets. Kazakhstan
possesses the Caspian region’s largest proven oil reserves at 9-29 billion barrels,
according to DOE, and also possesses 65 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas.
30 The White House. National Energy Policy, May 2001.

CRS-18
Kazakhstan’s oil exports currently are about 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd). Some
U.S. energy firms and other private foreign investors have become discouraged in
recent months by harsher government terms, taxes, and fines. Turkmenistan
possesses about 101tcf of proven gas reserves, according to DOE, among the largest
in the world.31
The Central Asian states have been pressured by Russia to yield portions of their
energy wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controls most existing export
pipelines. Russian shareholders have a controlling interest in the Caspian Pipeline
Consortium, which in 2001 completed a 930-mile pipeline that initially carried
560,000 bpd of oil from Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. In
December 1997, Turkmenistan opened the first pipeline from Central Asia to the
outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile pipeline linkage to Iran. Niyazov signed
a 25-year accord with Putin in 2003 on supplying Russia about 200 billion cubic feet
of gas in 2004 (about 12% of production), rising to 2.8 tcf in 2009, perhaps then tying
up a large part of Turkmenistan’s production.
Turkmenistan halted gas shipments to Russia at the end of 2004 in an attempt
to get a higher gas price but settled for all-cash rather than partial barter payments.
In early 2006, Turkmenistan again requested higher gas prices from Russia. In
October 2005, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan agreed in principle to ship some Kazakh
oil through the BTC pipeline, giving Kazakhstan an export route not transiting
Russia. The first Kazakh oil export pipeline not transiting Russia (with an eventual
capacity of 400,000 bpd) was completed from Atasu in central Kazakhstan to the
Xinjiang region of China (a distance of about 600 miles), and began delivering oil in
May 2006. At Atasu, it links to another pipeline from Kumkol, also in central
Kazakhstan, and will eventually link to Atyrau on Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea coast.
In early April 2006, Turkmenistan and China signed a framework agreement calling
for Chinese investment in developing gas fields in Turkmenistan and in building a
gas pipeline through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China.
U.S. Aid Overview
For much of the 1990s and until September 11, 2001, the United States provided
much more aid each year to Russia and Ukraine than to any Central Asian state (most
such aid was funded from the FSA account in Foreign Operations Appropriations,
but some derived from other program and agency budgets). Cumulative foreign aid
budgeted to Central Asia for FY1992 through FY2005 amounted to $3.8 billion,
13.6% of the amount budgeted to all the Eurasian states, reflecting the lesser priority
given to these states prior to 9/11. Budgeted spending for FY2002 for Central Asia,
during OEF, was greatly boosted in absolute amounts ($584 million) and as a share
of total aid to Eurasia (about one-quarter of such aid). The Administration’s aid
requests since then have gradually declined in absolute amounts, although it has
31 U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Information Adminstration. Kazakhstan Country
Analysis Brief,
July 2005; Caspian Sea Country Analysis Brief, September 2005. See also
CRS Report RS21190, Caspian Oil and Gas: Production and Prospects, by Bernard A.
Gelb.

CRS-19
continued to stress important U.S. interests in the region. Some observers argue that
although aid amounts have declined in dollar amounts in recent years, they appear to
loom somewhat larger as percentages of the total FSA and other Function 150 aid to
Eurasia (although such regional aid in recent years is still proportionately less than
that provided to the South Caucasian region).
Appearing to reflect growing concern about human rights abuses, lessening
interest in the region, and a push to reduce spending, Congress approved $99 million
in FSA aid for the states of Central Asia for FY2006, $17.5 million below the
presidential request (P.L. 109-102). Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United
States contributes to international financial institutions that aid Central Asia.
Recurrent policy issues regarding U.S. aid include what it should be used for, who
should receive it, and whether it is effective.
109th Congress Legislation
H.Con.Res. 187 (Ros-Lehtinen)
Expressing the Sense of Congress Concerning Uzbekistan. Introduced June 22,
2005. Calls for Uzbekistan to permit an international inquiry into the May 2005
violence there and to carry out democratic and human rights reforms.
H.R. 3545 (William Delahunt)
Uzbekistan Freedom Promotion Act of 2005. Introduced July 28, 2005.
Amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to limit foreign assistance to the
government of Uzbekistan, unless the President certifies each fiscal year that it is
upholding democratic and human rights. The bill restricts arms exports and visas for
Uzbek officials involved in human rights abuses and permits freezing their assets.
It calls for expedited U.S. admission of Uzbek pro-democracy advocates fearing
prosecution and a report to Congress on moving U.S. military operations out of
Uzbekistan.
H.R. 3189 (Christopher Smith)
Central Asia Democracy and Human Rights Act of 2005. Introduced June 30,
2005. Authorizes $188 million for FY2006 and each subsequent fiscal year to
encourage democratization and respect for human rights in Central Asia. Similarly
authorizes $15 million for expanding broadcasting to the region. Conditions aid to
the governments based on their progress on reforms.
H.R. 5122 (Hunter)
National Defense Reauthorization Act for FY2007. Sec. 1022 restates and
revises Defense Department authority to provide support for counter-drug activities
of certain foreign governments. Adds Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as eligible for
assistance, including possible nonlethal equipment, boats, aircraft, and vehicles.
Amount obligated and expended is not to exceed $40 million in FY2006 or $60
million in FY2007 or FY2008. Sec. 1025 calls for the Defense Secretary to submit
a report by the end of 2006 updating the interagency counter-narcotics plan for
Afghanistan and South and Central Asia. Introduced on April 6, 2006. Passed
House on May 11, 2006.

CRS-20
H.Res. 545 (Ros-Lehtinen)/S.Res. 295 (Lugar)
A resolution expressing the sense of the Congress on the arrest of Sanjar
Umarov in Uzbekistan. Introduced on November 10, 2005. Passed House on
December 18, 2005. S.Res. 295 introduced on November 2, 2005. Passed Senate
on November 2, 2005.
S. 2749 (Brownback)
To update the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999 to modify targeting of assistance
in recognition of political and economic changes in the Central Asian and South
Caucasian countries since 1999. Introduced May 4, 2006. Designates Afghanistan
as a Silk Road country. States that support for democracy, mineral and other
property rights, the rule of law, and U.S. trade with energy-rich Kazakhstan,
Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, and with energy-transporting states will strengthen
U.S. energy security by enhancing access to diversified energy resources. Urges
close U.S. relations with the Silk Road states to facilitate maintaining military bases
near Afghanistan and Iraq. Recognizing that China and Russia have acted at odds
with U.S. security interests, such as by curbing the U.S. military presence in
Uzbekistan, calls for U.S. observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) in order to promote stability and security. Calls for providing greater access
to Export-Import Bank loans, promoting the development of trans-Caspian oil and
gas pipelines, and supporting the building of a rail link in Kazakhstan that will
facilitate the shipment of oil and other goods to Europe. Calls for the Export-Import
Bank and OPIC to help set up a Caspian Bank of Reconstruction and Development.
Urges consideration for setting up a Silk Road Advisory Board (consisting of experts
in agriculture, democratization, banking, finance, legal reform, infrastructure
planning, and oil and gas extraction and transport), a private sector energy
consultancy (to coordinate business projects and promote production, transportation,
and refining investments), and an annual meeting of Silk Road aid sponsors and
beneficiaries to be held in conjunction with the Energy Security Forum of the U.N.
Economic Council of Europe.





CRS-21
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia,
FY1992-FY2006, and the FY2007 Request
(millions of dollars)
Cumulative
Central Asian
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
Funds Budgeted
Country
Budgeteda
Estimateb
Requestb
FY1992-FY2005a
Kazakhstan
1,244.8
84.6
33.43
28.95
Kyrgyzstan
806.5
54.21
33.74
37.86
Tajikistan
679.7
65.69
29.88
38.53
Turkmenistan
255.4
18.44
7.65
7.68
Uzbekistan
760.9
75.87
18.41
16.25
Regional
73.2
3.34
1.7
1.57
Total
3,820.5
302.15
124.81
130.84
Percent 14
15
21
25
Sources: State Department, U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative
Activities with Eurasia: FY2005 Annual Report
; Congressional Budget Justification
for Foreign Operations, FY2007: Europe and Eurasia
, and South and Central Asia.
a. FSA and Agency funds. Excludes some classified coalition support funding.
b. FSA and other Function 150 funds, not including Defense or Energy Department
funds; in FY2004 and thereafter, funding for exchanges is excluded.
Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
Ast ana
MON.
Aral
Sea
Alma Ata
Bishkek
Caspian
UZBEKISTAN
KYRGYZSTAN
Sea
Am
Tashkent
AZER.
u Da
Baku
ry
TURKMENISTAN
a
Dushanbe
Ashgabat
TAJIK.
0
500 Miles
Tehran
Kabul
Islamabad
0
500 KM
AFGHANISTAN
INDIA
Parallel scale at 40û
N 0û
E
PAKISTAN
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (08/02 M. Chin)