Order Code RL33458
Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
Updated March 19, 2008
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Central Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
Summary
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the
independence of all the former Central Asian republics, supported their admission
into Western organizations, and elicited Turkish support to counter Iranian influence
in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S.
policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union.
Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the
Central Asian states offered overflight and other support to coalition anti-terrorist
efforts in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition
troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also
endorsed coalition military action in Iraq, and Kazakhstan provided about two dozen
troops for rebuilding. U.S. policy has emphasized bolstering the security of the
Central Asian “front-line” states to help them combat terrorism, proliferation, and
arms trafficking. Other strategic U.S. objectives have included promoting free
markets, democratization, human rights, and energy development. Such policies aim
to help the states become what the Administration considers to be responsible
members of the international community rather than to degenerate into xenophobic,
extremist, and anti-Western regimes that threaten international peace and stability.
The Administration’s diverse goals in Central Asia have reflected the differing
characteristics of these states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan have included securing
and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear and biological weapons materials and facilities.
U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas development in Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan. Economic and democratic reforms and border security have been
among U.S. concerns in Kyrgyzstan. In Tajikistan, U.S. aid has focused on economic
reconstruction following that country’s 1992-1997 civil war. U.S. relations with
Uzbekistan suffered following the Uzbek government’s violent crackdown on armed
and unarmed protesters in the city of Andijon in May 2005.
The second session of the 110th Congress is likely to continue to be at the
forefront in advocating increased U.S. ties with Central Asia, and in providing
backing for use of the region as a staging area for supporting U.S.-led stabilization
efforts in Afghanistan. Congress is likely to pursue these goals through hearings and
legislation on humanitarian assistance, economic development, security issues,
human rights, and democratization. The July 2006 U.S.-Kyrgyzstan agreement on
the continued U.S. use of airbase facilities in Kyrgyzstan included U.S. pledges of
boosted foreign assistance and other compensation, which are subject to regular
congressional appropriations and oversight. Assistance for border and customs
controls and other safeguards to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) will likely be ongoing congressional concerns. Congress will
continue to consider whether and how to balance its concerns about human rights
abuses and lagging democratization against other U.S. interests in continued
engagement with the region to advance energy security and prosecute the Global War
on Terror.

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Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Russia’s Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Obstacles to Peace and Independence: Regional Tensions and Conflicts . . . . . . . 8
The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Incursions into Kyrgyzstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The 1999 and 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Democratization and Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The Coup in Kyrgyzstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Turkmanbashi’s Death and Succession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Recent Developments in Kazakhstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Recent Developments in Tajikistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Recent Developments in Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Security and Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Closure of Karshi-Khanabad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Weapons of Mass Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Trade and Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Oil and Natural Gas Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Kazakhstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Turkmenistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
U.S. Aid Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Congressional Conditions on Kazakh and Uzbek Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
110th Congress Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
List of Figures
Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia, FY1992 to FY2008 . . . . . . . 40

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Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
Most Recent Developments
Uzbekistan reportedly will permit U.S. military personnel under NATO
command, on a case-by-case basis, to transit through an airbase near the town of
Termez that it has permitted Germany to operate as part of NATO peacekeeping
operations in Afghanistan.1 Some observers have viewed this permission as a sign
of improving U.S.-Uzbek relations, which deteriorated following U.S. criticism of
an Uzbek government crackdown on demonstrators in mid-2005 (see below, Security
and Arms Control).
On March 11, 2008, the heads of the national gas companies of Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan announced that their countries would raise gas export
prices to the European level in 2009. They signed an agreement on the prices with
Russia’s Gazprom state-controlled gas firm, which controls most export pipelines.
At the end of January 2008, the Tajik government declared a humanitarian crisis
and asked the United Nations for assistance. Severe winter weather and electricity,
gas, and food shortages contributed to what the U.N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs declared to be an emergency that reportedly resulted in a
number of deaths. The U.S. State Department announced in mid-February that it was
boosting fuel and food aid by $2.5 million. Warming temperatures in March raised
the incidence of typhoid from tainted water from broken pipes. Opposition
politicians in Tajikistan have accused the government of laxity in meeting the crisis
and more broadly as culpable for widespread poverty, crime, and corruption.
Historical Background
Central Asia consists of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan; it borders Russia, China, the Middle East, and South Asia. The major
peoples of all but Tajikistan speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks speak an Iranian
language); and most are Sunni Muslims (some Tajiks are Shiia Muslims). Most are
closely related historically and culturally. By the late 19th century, Russian tsars had
conquered the last independent khanates and nomadic lands of Central Asia. By the
early 1920s, Soviet power had been imposed; by 1936, five “Soviet Socialist
1 “U.S. Military Returns to Ex-Soviet Uzbekistan,” Agence France Presse, March 6, 2008;
“Only Germany Can Use Uzbek Bases Now,” United Press International, December 13,
2005.

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CRS-2
Republics” had been created. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in December
1991, they gained independence.2
Central Asia: Basic Facts
Total Area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India; Kazakhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000
sq. mi.; Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan: 190,000 sq. mi.; Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi.
Total Population: 61.38 million, slightly less than France; Kazakhstan: 15.24 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 5.28
m.; Tajikistan: 7.08 m.; Turkmenistan: 6 m.; Uzbekistan: 27.78 m. (July 2007 est., CIA World
Factbook).
Total Gross Domestic Product: $302.19 billion in 2007; per capita GDP is about $4,900, but there
are large income disparities and relatively large percentages of people in each country are in poverty.
Kazakhstan: $170.3 b.; Kyrgyzstan: $10.38 b.; Tajikistan: $11.87 b.; Turkmenistan: $47.37 b.;
Uzbekistan: $62.27 b. (CIA World Factbook, purchasing power parity).
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, then-President George
H.W. Bush sent the “FREEDOM Support Act” (FSA) aid authorization to Congress,
which was amended and signed into law in October 1992 (P.L. 102-511). In 1999,
congressional concerns led to passage of the “Silk Road Strategy Act” (P.L. 106-
113), which authorized enhanced policy and aid to support conflict amelioration,
humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and communications, border
controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasus and
Central Asia.
U.S. policymakers and others hold various views on the appropriate types and
levels of U.S. involvement in the region. Some have argued that ties with “energy
behemoth” Kazakhstan are crucial to U.S. interests.3 At least until recently, others
have argued that Uzbekistan is the “linchpin” of the region (it is the most populous
regional state and is centrally located, shaping the range and scope of regional
cooperation) and should receive the most U.S. attention.
In general, U.S. aid and investment have been viewed as strengthening the
independence of the Central Asian states and forestalling Russian, Chinese, Iranian,
or other efforts to subvert them. Advocates of such ties have argued that political
turmoil and the growth of terrorist enclaves in Central Asia could produce spillover
effects both in nearby states, including U.S. allies and friends such as Turkey, and
worldwide. They also have argued that the United States has a major interest in
2 See CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan; CRS Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan; CRS Report 98-
594, Tajikistan; CRS Report 97-1055, Turkmenistan; and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan,
all by Jim Nichol.
3 U.S. Department of State. Office of the Spokesman. Remarks: Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice At Eurasian National University, October 13, 2005. Perhaps indicative
of the boosted emphasis on U.S. interests in Kazakhstan, Secretary Rice argued that the
country has the potential to be the “engine for growth” in Central Asia. See also National
Committee on American Foreign Policy, Stability in Central Asia: Engaging Kazakhstan,
May 2005.

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CRS-3
preventing terrorist regimes or groups from illicitly acquiring Soviet-era technology
for making weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They have maintained that U.S.
interests do not perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that Turkey and
other actors possess limited aid resources, and that the United States is in the
strongest position as the sole superpower to influence democratization and respect
for human rights. They have stressed that such U.S. influence will help alleviate
social tensions exploited by Islamic extremist groups to gain adherents. They also
have argued that for all these reasons, the United States should maintain military
access to the region even when Afghanistan becomes more stable. At least some of
these views appear to be reflected in the Administration’s most recent National
Security Strategy of the United States, which proclaims that “Central Asia is an
enduring priority for our foreign policy.”4
Some views of policymakers and academics who previously objected to a more
forward U.S. policy toward Central Asia appeared less salient after September 11,
2001, but aspects of these views could gain more credence if Afghanistan becomes
more stable. These observers argued that the United States historically had few
interests in this region and that developments there remained largely marginal to U.S.
interests. They discounted fears that anti-Western Islamic extremism would make
enough headway to threaten secular regimes or otherwise harm U.S. interests. At
least until the coup in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 (see below, Democratization), these
observers argued that the United States should not try to foster democratization
among cultures they claimed are historically attuned to authoritarianism. Some
observers reject arguments that U.S. interests in anti-terrorism, non-proliferation,
regional cooperation, and trade outweigh concerns over democratization and human
rights, and urge reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive states. A few observers
point to instability in the region as a reason to eschew deeper U.S. involvement such
as military access that might needlessly place more U.S. personnel and citizens in
danger.
Appearing to indicate a more negative assessment of developmental prospects
in Central Asia, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Thomas Fingar,
testified to Congress in July 2007 that “there is no guarantee that elite and societal
turmoil across Central Asia would stay within the confines of existing autocratic
systems. In the worst, but not implausible case, central authority in one or more of
these states could be challenged, leading to potential for increased terrorist and
criminal activities.”5 However, in February 2008, the Director of National
Intelligence, J. Michael McConnell, seemed to de-emphasize these threats, stating
that “Central Asia remains fertile ground for radical Islamic sentiment and
movements, due to socioeconomic and other factors,” but appearing to evaluate the
regional governments as presently stable.6
4 The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States, March 16, 2006, p. 40.
5 U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Global Security
Assessment: Testimony by Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Thomas Fingar, July
11, 2007.
6 U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Annual Threat Assessment: Testimony by
the Director of National Intelligence, J. Mitchell McConnell, February 5, 2008.

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Post-September 11 and Afghanistan. Since the terrorist attacks on the
United States on September 11, 2001, the Administration has stated that U.S. policy
toward Central Asia focuses on the promotion of security, domestic reforms, and
energy development. According to then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State B. Lynn
Pascoe in testimony in June 2002, the September 11 attacks led the Administration
to realize that “it was critical to the national interests of the United States that we
greatly enhance our relations with the five Central Asian countries” to prevent them
from becoming harbors for terrorism.7 After September 11, 2001, all the Central
Asian states soon offered overflight and other assistance to U.S.-led anti-terrorism
coalition operations in Afghanistan. The states were predisposed to welcome such
operations. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had long supported the Afghan Northern
Alliance’s combat against the Taliban, and all the Central Asian states feared
Afghanistan as a base for terrorism, crime, and drug trafficking (even Turkmenistan,
which tried to reach some accommodation with the Taliban). In 2005, however,
Uzbekistan rescinded its basing agreement with the United States. Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan have maintained their basing support for NATO peacekeeping operations
— and Kyrgyzstan has continued its basing support for U.S. operations — in
Afghanistan (see also below, Security).
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Uzbekistan was the only Central
Asian state that joined the “coalition of the willing” in February-March 2003 that
endorsed prospective U.S.-led coalition military operations in Iraq (Kazakhstan
joined later). Uzbekistan subsequently decided not to send troops to Iraq, but
Kazakhstan has deployed some two dozen troops to Iraq who reportedly do not take
part in combat operations. Some observers in Central Asia have raised concerns
about the deaths of Muslim civilians in Iraq.
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become
responsible members of the international community, supporting integrative goals
through bilateral aid and through coordination with other aid donors. The stated
policy goal is to discourage radical anti-democratic regimes and terrorist groups from
gaining influence. All the Central Asian leaders publicly embrace Islam but display
hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have established
some trade and aid ties with Iran. Although they have had greater success in
attracting development aid from the West than from the East, some observers argue
that, in the longer run, their foreign policies may not be anti-Western but may more
closely reflect some concerns of other Islamic states. Some Western organizational
ties with the region have suffered in recent years, in particular those of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has been
7 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Central Asia and the
South Caucasus. The U.S. Role in Central Asia. Testimony of B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, June 27, 2002.

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criticized by some Central Asian governments for advocating democratization and
respect for human rights.8
The State Department in 2006 included Central Asia in a revamped Bureau of
South and Central Asian Affairs. According to Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State Steven Mann, “institutions such as NATO and the OSCE will continue to
draw the nations of Central Asia closer to Europe and the United States,” but the
United States also will encourage the states to develop “new ties and synergies with
nations to the south,” such as Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan.9 Secretary Rice
emphasized these ties when she heralded Kazakhstan’s role as part of “a new Silk
Road, a great corridor of reform linking the provinces of northern Russia to the ports
of South Asia, the republics of Western Europe to the democracies of East Asia.”10
In May 2007, Defense Secretary Robert Gates urged Asian countries to provide
Central Asia with road and rail, telecommunications, and electricity generation and
distribution aid to link the region with Asia; to help it combat terrorism and narcotics
trafficking; to send technical advisors to ministries to promote political and economic
reforms; to offer more military trainers, peacekeepers, and advisors for defense
reforms; and to more actively integrate the regional states into “the Asian security
structure.”11 (See also below, Trade.)
The European Union (EU) has become more interested in Central Asia in recent
years as the region has become more of a security threat as an originator and transit
zone for drugs, weapons of mass destruction, refugees, and persons smuggled for
prostitution or labor. Russia’s cutoff of gas supplies to Ukraine in early 2006 also
bolstered EU interest in Central Asia as an alternative supplier of oil and gas. Such
interests contributed to the launch of a Strategy Paper for assistance for 2002-2006
and a follow-on for 2007-2013 (see below), and the EU’s appointment of a Special
Representative to the region. The EU has implemented Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements (PCAs, which set forth political, economic, and trade relations) with
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. An existing Interstate Oil and Gas
Transport to Europe (INOGATE) program was supplemented in 2004 and 2006 by
8 See also CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S.
Interests, by Jim Nichol.
9 U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on
the Middle East and Central Asia. Assessing Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia.
Testimony of Steven Mann, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central
Asian Affairs, July 25, 2006. The State Department has appointed a Senior Advisor on
Regional Integration in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Robert Deutsch, who
has focused on bolstering trade and transport ties between South and Central Asia.
10 Remarks at Eurasian National University, October 13, 2005. Some observers in Russia
maintain that the State Department is encouraging ties between South and Central Asia in
an effort to reduce Russia’s influence in Central Asia. CEDR, January 23, 2007, Doc. No.
CEP-436006.
11 U.S. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Documents. International Institute
for Strategic Studies - Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,
Singapore, June 1, 2007.

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CRS-6
a Baku Energy Initiative to diversify energy supplies. One project involves the
proposed Nabucco pipeline, which could transport Caspian region gas to Austria.12
In June 2007, the EU approved a new “Central Asian strategy” for enhanced aid
and relations for 2007-2013. It calls for establishing offices in each regional state
and assistance of $1 billion over the next five years. The strategy argues that the EU
ties with the region need to be enhanced because EU enlargement and EU relations
with the South Caucasus and Black Sea states bring it to Central Asia’s borders. The
strategy also stresses that “the dependency of the EU on external energy sources and
the need for a diversified energy supply policy in order to increase energy security
open further perspectives for cooperation between the EU and Central Asia,” and that
the “EU will conduct an enhanced regular energy dialogue” with the states.13 (See
also below, Oil and Natural Gas Resources.)
Russia’s Role
During most of the 1990s, U.S. administrations generally viewed a
democratizing Russia as serving as a role model in Central Asia. Despite growing
authoritarian tendencies in Russia since Vladimir Putin became its president in 2000,
the Bush Administration has emphasized that Russia’s counter-terrorism efforts in
the region broadly support U.S. interests. At the same time, the United States long
has stressed to Russia that it should not seek to dominate the region or exclude
Western and other involvement. Virtually all U.S. analysts agree that Russia’s
actions should be monitored to ensure that the independence of the Central Asian
states is not threatened.
Soon after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001,
Russia acquiesced to increased U.S. and coalition presence in the region for
operations against Al Qaeda and its supporters in Afghanistan. Besides Russia’s own
concerns about Islamic extremism in Afghanistan and Central Asia, it was interested
in boosting its economic and other ties to the West and regaining some influence in
Afghanistan. More recently, however, Russia has appeared to step up efforts to
counter U.S. influence in Central Asia by advocating that the states increase
economic and strategic ties with Russia and limit such ties with the United States.
Such a stance appears paradoxical to some observers, since Russia (and China)
benefit from anti-terrorism operations carried out by U.S. (and NATO) forces in
Afghanistan.
During the 1990s, Russia’s economic decline and demands by Central Asia
caused it to reduce its security presence, a trend that President Putin has appeared
to retard or reverse. In 1999, Russian border guards were largely phased out in
12 For details, see CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security
Challenges, by Paul Belkin. See also European Union. “The EU and the Countries of the
Black Sea and Caspian Sea Regions Agree on a Common Energy Strategy,” Press Release,
November 30, 2006.
13 European Community. Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the
Period 2007-2013, June 2007; Council of the European Union. Presidency Conclusions,
11177/07, June 23, 2007, p. 12.

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Kyrgyzstan, the last Russian military advisors left Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty (CST; see below) of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in part because the treaty members
failed to help Uzbekistan meet the growing Taliban threat in Afghanistan, according
to Uzbek President Islam Karimov. However, Russia has appeared determined to
maintain a military presence in Tajikistan. It long retained about 14,500 Federal
Border Guards in Tajikistan, most of whom were Tajik conscripts, and 7,800 Russian
troops of the 201st motorized rifle division.14
Russia’s efforts to formalize a basing agreement with Tajikistan dragged on for
years, as Tajikistan endeavored to maximize rents and assert its sovereignty. In
October 2004, the basing agreement was signed, formalizing Russia’s largest military
presence abroad, besides its Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, Tajikistan demanded
full control over border policing. Russia announced in June 2005 that it had handed
over the last guard-house along the Afghan-Tajik border to Tajik troops. Reportedly,
350 Russian “advisory” border troops remain. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon (or
Rakhmonov) and others emphasize that growing drug production and trafficking
from Afghanistan pose increasing challenges.15
In a seeming shift toward a more activist role in Central Asia, in April 2000,
Russia called for the members of the CST to approve the creation of rapid reaction
forces to combat terrorism and hinted that such forces might launch pre-emptive
strikes on Afghan terrorist bases. These hints elicited U.S. calls for Russia to
exercise restraint and consult the U.N. Presidents Clinton and Putin agreed in 2000
to set up a working group to examine Afghan-related terrorism (this working group
now examines global terrorism issues). CST members agreed in 2001 to set up the
Central Asian rapid reaction force headquartered in Kyrgyzstan, with Russia’s troops
in Tajikistan comprising most of the force. CIS members in 2001 also approved
setting up an Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC) in Moscow, with a branch in Kyrgyzstan,
giving Russia influence over regional intelligence gathering.
Perhaps to counteract the U.S.-led military coalition presence in Kyrgyzstan
established after the September 11, 2001, attacks (see below), Russia in September
2003 signed a 15-year military basing accord with Kyrgyzstan providing access to the
Kant airfield, near Kyrgyzstan’s capital of Bishkek. The nearly two dozen Russian
aircraft and several hundred troops at the base also serve as part of the Central Asian
rapid reaction force. The base is a few miles from the U.S.-led coalition’s airbase.
14 The Military Balance 2005-2006. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies,
2005.
15 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, August
2007. UNODC warns that opium production in 2007 has set a record and that Afghanistan
is now the source of 93% of the world’s opiates. UNODC has estimated that about one-fifth
of Afghan-produced morphine and heroin transit Central Asia. For another assessment, see
U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on
the Middle East and Central Asia. U.S. Policy in Central Asia: Balancing Priorities.
Testimony of Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian
Affairs, April 26, 2006. Of the tiny percentage of Afghan drugs that reach U.S. consumers,
most do not appear to be smuggled through Central Asia.

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Besides its military presence in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Putin government has
also asserted its maritime dominance in the Caspian Sea. Russia’s Caspian Sea
Flotilla has been bolstered by troops and equipment.
Taking advantage of Uzbekistan’s souring relations with many Western
countries (see below), Russia signed a Treaty on Allied Relations with Uzbekistan
in November 2005 that calls for mutual defense consultations in the event of a threat
to either party (similar to language in the CST). Uzbekistan re-joined the CST in
June 2006, consolidating its strategic security ties with Russia. The member-states
of the CST agreed in June 2006 that basing agreements by any member with a third
party had to be approved by all members, in effect providing supreme veto power to
Russia over future basing arrangements.
Pointing to the deterioration of U.S.-Uzbek ties, many observers suggest that the
appreciative attitude of Central Asian states toward the United States — for their
added security accomplished through U.S.-led actions in Afghanistan — has declined
over time. Reasons may include perceptions that the United States has not provided
adequate security or economic assistance and growing concerns among the
authoritarian leaders that the United States advocates democratic “revolutions” to
replace them. Also, Russia and China are pledging security support to the states to
get them to forget their pre-September 11, 2001, dissatisfaction with Russian and
Chinese efforts. Russia also encourages the leaders to believe that the United States
backs democratic “revolutions” to replace them.
Russia’s economic interests in Central Asia are being reasserted as its economy
improves and may constitute its most effective lever of influence. Russia seeks to
counter Western business and gain substantial influence over energy resources
through participation in joint ventures and by insisting that pipelines cross Russian
territory. After an Energy Cooperation Statement was signed at the May 2002 U.S.-
Russia summit, it appeared that Russia would accept a Western role in the Caspian
region, including construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline.
Subsequently, however, Russian officials have urged the Central Asian states to rely
on Russian-controlled export routes. Russia’s Gazprom gas firm has used this
control to pay the countries much less than the price it charges European customers
for the gas (see below, Energy Resources).
Obstacles to Peace and Independence:
Regional Tensions and Conflicts
The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups, convoluted borders, and emerging
national identities pose challenges to stability in all the Central Asian states.
Emerging national identities accentuate clan, family, regional, and Islamic self-
identifications. Central Asia’s convoluted borders fail to accurately reflect ethnic
distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to regional tensions. Ethnic
Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries and
Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, they make up almost a quarter of the population. More
ethnic Turkmen reside in Iran and Afghanistan — over three million — than in
Turkmenistan. Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and seven

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CRS-9
million in Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China’s Xinjiang province.
The fertile Ferghana Valley is shared by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The
central governments have struggled to gain control over administrative subunits.
Most observers agree that the term “Central Asia” currently denotes a geographic
area more than a region of shared identities and aspirations, although it is clear that
the land-locked, poverty-stricken, and sparsely-populated region will need more
integration in order to develop.
Regional cooperation remains stymied by tensions among the states. Such
tensions continue to exist despite the membership of the states in various cooperation
groups such as the CST Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP). The CST was signed by Russia,
Belarus, the South Caucasus countries, and the Central Asian states (except
Turkmenistan) in May 1992 and called for military cooperation and joint
consultations in the event of security threats to any member. At the time to renew the
treaty in 1999, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan formally withdrew. The
remaining members formed the CST Organization (CSTO) in late 2002, and a
secretariat opened in Moscow at the beginning of 2004. Through the CSTO, Russia
has attempted to involve the members in joint support for the Central Asian rapid
reaction forces and joint efforts to combat international terrorism and drug
trafficking.16
In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed the “Shanghai
treaty” with China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual
borders, and in 1997 they signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300 mile
former Soviet-Chinese border. China has used the treaty to pressure the Central
Asian states to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting separatism in
China’s Xinjiang province, and to get them to extradite Uighurs fleeing China. In
2001, Uzbekistan joined the group, re-named the SCO, and in 2003 the SCO
Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) was set up there. Military exercises have
become a major form of cooperation, with the most recent — involving some 5,000
troops — taking place in August 2007 in southern Russia and northwestern China.
According to some observers, a major aim of these “anti-terrorism” exercises is to
convince the Central Asian states that Russia and China are able to supplant the
United States in helping the region to combat terrorism. China also has stressed
economic cooperation with the region to build east-west transport routes, and these
efforts may mark some emerging progress toward regional integration.17
The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan
Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined
toward independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose
16 Roger McDermott, “Collective Security Group Reinvents Itself in a New World,” Eurasia
Insight, August 28, 2002.
17 Roger McDermott, The Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007, Occasional Paper, The
Jamestown Foundation, October 2007; S. Frederick Starr, ed., The New Silk Roads:
Transport and Trade in Greater Central Asia (Washington D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2007).

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CRS-10
coalition of nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and groups tried to take
power. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia,
launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in
20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about
80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. After the two sides agreed to a cease-fire, the
U.N. Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
(UNMOT) in December 1994. In June 1997, Tajik President Rahmon and the late
rebel leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement.
Benchmarks of the peace process were largely met, and UNMOT pulled out in May
2000. To encourage the peace process, the United States initially pledged to help
Tajikistan rebuild. Some observers point to events in the city of Andijon in
Uzbekistan (see below) as indicating that conflicts similar to the Tajik civil war could
engulf other regional states where large numbers of people are disenfranchised and
poverty-stricken.
The Incursions into Kyrgyzstan
Several hundred Islamic extremists and others first invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-
August 1999. Jama Namanganiy, the co-leader of the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU; see below), headed the largest guerrilla group. They seized
hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to create an Islamic state in south
Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan.18 With Uzbek and Kazakh air
and other support, Kyrgyz forces forced the guerrillas out in October 1999. Dozens
of IMU and other insurgents again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August
2000. Uzbekistan provided air and other support, but Kyrgyz forces were largely
responsible for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000. The IMU did not
invade the region in the summer before September 11, 2001, in part because bin
Laden had secured its aid for a Taliban offensive against the Afghan Northern
Alliance.
About a dozen alleged IMU members invaded from Tajikistan in May 2006 but
soon were defeated (some escaped). After this, the Kyrgyz defense minister claimed
that the IMU, HT, and other such groups increasingly menaced national security.
The 1999 and 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan
A series of explosions in Tashkent in February 1999 were among early signs
that the Uzbek government was vulnerable to terrorism. By various reports, the
explosions killed 16 to 28 and wounded 100 to 351 people. The aftermath involved
wide-scale arrests of political dissidents and others deemed by some observers as
unlikely conspirators. Karimov in April 1999 accused Mohammad Solikh (former
Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of masterminding
what he termed an assassination plot, along with Tohir Yuldashev (co-leader of the
IMU) and the Taliban. The first trial of 22 suspects in June resulted in six receiving
18 According to Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, and Svante Cornell, the incursions of the
IMU into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000 were largely driven by efforts to
secure drug trafficking routes. Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus:
Implications for the EU, Silk Road Paper, July 2006.

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CRS-11
death sentences. The suspects said in court that they received terrorist training in
Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia and were led by Solikh, Yuldashev and
Namanganiy. In 2000, Yuldashev and Namanganiy received death sentences in
absentia, and Solikh received a 15.5 year prison sentence. Solikh denied membership
in IMU, and he and Yuldashev denied involvement in the bombings.
On March 28 through April 1, 2004, a series of bombings and armed attacks
were launched in Uzbekistan, reportedly killing 47. An obscure Islamic Jihad Group
of Uzbekistan (IJG; Jama’at al-Jihad al-Islami, a breakaway part of the IMU) claimed
responsibility. In subsequent trials, the alleged attackers were accused of being
members of IJG or of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT; an Islamic fundamentalist movement
ostensibly pledged to peace but banned in Uzbekistan) and of attempting to
overthrow the government. Some defendants testified that they were trained by
Arabs and others at camps in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. They testified that IMU
member Najmiddin Jalolov (in some sources Nadzhmiddin Kamilidinovich Janov;
convicted in absentia in 2000) was the leader of IJG, and linked him to Taliban head
Mohammad Omar, Uighur extremist Abu Mohammad, and Osama bin Laden. On
July 30, 2004, explosions occurred at the U.S. and Israeli embassies and the Uzbek
Prosecutor-General’s Office in Tashkent. The IMU and IJG claimed responsibility
and stated that the bombings were aimed against Uzbek and other “apostate”
governments. A Kazakh security official in late 2004 announced the apprehension
of several IJG members. He alleged that the IJG had ties to Al Qaeda; had other cells
in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia; and was planning assassinations.19
Pakistan reported in November 2006 that it had arrested IJG members who had
placed rockets near presidential offices, the legislature, and the headquarters of
military intelligence in Islamabad. Reportedly, the IJG was targeting the government
because of its support for the United States.20 Pakistani media reported in March-
April 2007 that dozens of IMU/IJG members had been killed in northern Pakistan
when local tribes turned against them, possibly reducing their strength or forcing
them to move into Afghanistan and Central Asia.
In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization, stating that the IMU, aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by
Osama bin Laden, resorts to terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks
American citizens. The “main goal of the IMU is to topple the current government
in Uzbekistan,” the State Department warned, and it linked the IMU to bombings and
attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. IMU forces assisting the Taliban and Al Qaeda
suffered major losses during coalition actions in Afghanistan, and Namanganiy was
probably killed.21 Former CIA Director Porter Goss testified in March 2005 that IJG
“has become a more virulent threat to U.S. interests and local governments.”22 In
19 See also CRS Report RS21818, The 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan: Context and Implications
for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
20 BBC Monitoring South Asia, November 4, 2006.
21 U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, April 2004.
22 U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Testimony of the Director of Central
(continued...)

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CRS-12
May 2005, the State Department designated IJG as a global terrorist group, and in
June, the U.N. Security Council added IJG to its terrorism list.23
Officials in Germany arrested several individuals on September 5, 2007, on
charges of planning explosions at the U.S. airbase at Ramstein, at U.S. and Uzbek
diplomatic offices, and other targets in Germany. The IJG claimed responsibility and
stated that it was targeting U.S. and Uzbek interests because of these countries’
“brutal policies towards Muslims,” and targeting Germany because it has a small
military base in Termez, Uzbekistan, which is used to support NATO operations in
Afghanistan. Reportedly, the suspects had received training at IMU and al Qaeda
terrorist training camps in Pakistan. In U.S. Congressional testimony on September
10, 2007, John Redd, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, and Mike
Mcconnell, the Director of National Intelligence, stated that U.S. communications
intercepts shared with Germany had facilitated foiling the plot.
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan
Dozens or perhaps hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded on May 13,
2005, after Uzbek troops fired on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon. The
protestors had gathered to demand the end of a trial of local businessmen charged
with belonging to an Islamic terrorist group. The night before, a group stormed a
prison where those on trial were held and released hundreds of inmates.24 Many
freed inmates then joined others in storming government buildings. President
Karimov flew to the city to direct operations, and reportedly had restored order by
late on May 13.25 On July 29, 439 people who had fled from Uzbekistan to
Kyrgyzstan were airlifted to Romania for resettlement processing, after the United
22 (...continued)
Intelligence, The Honorable Porter J. Goss, March 17, 2005.
23 U.S. Department of State. Press Statement: U.S. Department of State Designates the
Islamic Jihad Group Under Executive Order 13224, May 26, 2005; U.N. Security Council.
The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee. Press Release: Security Council
Committee Adds One Entity to Al-Qaida Section of Consolidated List, SC/8405, June 3,
2005.
24 There is a great deal of controversy about whether this group contained foreign-trained
terrorists or was composed mainly of the friends and families of the accused. See U.S.
Congress. Commission on Security and Cooperation In Europe. Briefing: The Uzbekistan
Crisis. Testimony of Galima Bukharbayeva, Correspondent. Institute for War and Peace
Reporting, June 29, 2005. For a contrasting assessment, see Shirin Akiner, Violence in
Andijon, 13 May 2005: An Independent Assessment, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, July
2005; and AbduMannob Polat, Reassessing Andijan: The Road to Restoring U.S.-Uzbek
Relations, Jamestown Foundation, June 2007.
25 Analyst Adeeb Khalid draws a parallel between the Uzbek government’s actions at
Andijon and at a large student demonstration in Tashkent in January 1992. In the latter case,
Karimov allegedly ordered troops to fire on the marchers, resulting in up to six deaths and
two dozen or more injuries. Islam After Communism (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2007), p. 155. See also Reuters, January 17, 1992.

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CRS-13
States and others raised concerns that they might be tortured if returned to
Uzbekistan.26
The United States and others in the international community repeatedly have
called for an international inquiry into events in Andijon, which the Uzbek
government has rejected as violating its sovereignty. In November 2005, the EU
Council approved a visa ban on twelve Uzbek officials it stated were “directly
responsible for the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in Andijon and
for the obstruction of an independent inquiry.” The Council also embargoed exports
of “arms, military equipment, and other equipment that might be used for internal
repression.”27 The EU Council in November 2006 permitted some bilateral
consultations to help Uzbekistan comply “with the principles of respect for human
rights, the rule of law, and fundamental freedoms.” The EU Council most recently
revisited the sanctions in October 2007. It decided to lift the visa ban for six months
and then re-evaluate the human rights situation, and to leave the arms embargo in
place.28
At the first major trial of fifteen alleged perpetrators of the Andijon unrest in
late 2005, the accused all confessed and asked for death penalties. They testified that
they were members of Akramiya, a branch of HT launched in 1994 by Akram
Yuldashev that aimed to use force to create a caliphate in the area of the Fergana
Valley located in Uzbekistan. Besides receiving assistance from HT, Akramiya was
alleged to receive financial aid and arms training from the IMU. The defendants also
claimed that the U.S. and Kyrgyz governments helped finance and support their effort
to overthrow the government, and that international media colluded with local human
rights groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in this effort. The U.S.
and Kyrgyz governments denied involvement, and many observers criticized the trial
as appearing stage-managed. Reportedly, 100 or more individuals have been arrested
and sentenced, including some Uzbek opposition party members and media and NGO
representatives. Partly in response, Congress has amplified calls for conditioning aid
to Uzbekistan on its democracy and human rights record (see below, Legislation).29
Since the unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan has closed down over 200 NGOs, many
of them U.S.-based or U.S.-supported, on the grounds that they are involved in illegal
activities. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Evan Feigenbaum visited Uzbekistan
in March 2007, and stated afterward that he hoped that a “difficult” period in bilateral
26 See also CRS Report RS22161, Unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan: Context and Implications,
by Jim Nichol.
27 Council of the European Union. Uzbekistan: Council Adopts Restrictive Measures, Press
Release 14392/05, November 14, 2005. U.S. officials argued that the United States already
had been limiting military assistance — at congressional request — because of human rights
abuses.
28 Council of the European Union. 2824th General Affairs Council Meeting. Press Release,
13720/07 (Presse 227), October 15-16, 2007.
29 OSCE. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Report from the
OSCE/ODIHR Trial Monitoring in Uzbekistan, April 21, 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Republic of Uzbekistan. Comments on the Report Prepared by the OSCE ODIHR, April 19,
2006.

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CRS-14
relations was ending. Some observers suggest that U.S.-Uzbek relations are thawing
slightly in late 2007.30
Democratization and Human Rights
A major goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term
development of democratic institutions and respect for human rights. Particularly
since September 11, 2001, the United States has attempted to harmonize its concerns
about democratization and human rights in the region with its interests in regional
support for the Global War on Terrorism. According to some allegations, the
Administration may have sent suspected terrorists in its custody to Uzbekistan for
questioning, a process termed “extraordinary rendition.”31 Although not verifying
such transfers specifically to Uzbekistan, the Administration stated that, under the
rendition policy, it received diplomatic assurances that transferees would not be
tortured. Several citizens of Central Asian states who were held in U.S. custody at
the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base have been returned to their home countries.
Several of the Central Asian leaders have declared that they are committed to
democratization. Despite such pledges, the states have made little progress,
according to the State Department.32 During Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and
then-President Clinton signed a Charter on Democratic Partnership that recognized
Kazakhstan’s commitments to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and
economic reform. During his December 2001 and September 2006 visits,
Nazarbayev repeated these pledges in joint statements with President Bush. In March
2002, a U.S.-Uzbek Strategic Partnership Declaration was signed pledging
Uzbekistan to “intensify the democratic transformation” and improve freedom of the
press. During his December 2002 U.S. visit, Tajikistan’s President Rahmon pledged
to “expand fundamental freedoms and human rights.”
Until recently, almost all the leaders in Central Asia had been in place since
before the breakup of the Soviet Union (the exception was the leader of Tajikistan,
who had been ousted in the early 1990s during a civil war). These leaders long held
onto power by orchestrating extensions of their terms, holding suspect elections,
eliminating possible contenders, and providing emoluments to supporters and
relatives. After this long period of leadership stability, President Akayev of
Kyrgyzstan was toppled in a coup in 2005 (see below), and President Niyazov of
30 U.S. Department of State. Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations for
FY2008; CEDR, March 8, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950059; “Uzbekistan: New U.S.
Ambassador, New Policy?” Eurasia Insight, November 13, 2007.
31 The New Yorker, February 14, 2005; New York Times, May 1, 2005; New York Times,
December 31, 2005; Representative Edward Markey, Congressional Record, December 13,
2005, p. H11337; European Parliament. Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of
European Countries by the CIA for the Transport And Illegal Detention of Prisoners, Draft
Interim Report, 2006/2027(INI), April 24, 2006; and On the Testimony by Craig Murray,
Former British Ambassador, Working Document No. 5, June 1, 2006.
32 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006.

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Turkmenistan died in late 2006, marking the passing of three out of five Soviet-era
regional leaders from the scene.
Possible scenarios of political futures in Central Asia have ranged from
continued rule in most of the states by elite groups that became ensconced during the
Soviet era to violent transitions to Islamic fundamentalist rule. Relatively peaceful
and quick transitions to more or less democratic and Western-oriented political
systems have been considered less likely by many observers. While some observers
warn that Islamic extremism could increase dramatically in the region, others
discount the risk that the existing secular governments soon will be overthrown by
Islamic extremists.33
In the case of the three succession transitions so far, Tajikistan’s resulted in a
shift in the Soviet-era regional/clan elite configuration and some limited inclusion of
the Islamic Renaissance Party. Perhaps worrisome, Tajik President Rahmon has
written a “spiritual guide” reminiscent of the one penned by Turkmenistan’s late
authoritarian president, and has given orders on how citizens should live and dress.
It is perhaps too early to discern the outcome of transitions in Kyrgyzstan and
Turkmenistan, but Kyrgyzstan’s appears to involve power-sharing by Soviet-era
regional/clan elites and possibly, fitful democratization.34 In Turkmenistan, it
appears that Soviet-era elites have retained power.
The Coup in Kyrgyzstan. Demonstrations in Kyrgyzstan against a tainted
legislative election and economic distress resulted in President Akayev’s relatively
peaceful overthrow in March 2005. Some observers hailed this coup as the third so-
called “democratic revolution” in Eurasia, after those in Georgia and Ukraine, and
the first in Central Asia. They suggested that the country, because of its slightly
wider scope of civil liberties compared to the rest of Central Asia, might lead the
region in democratic reforms. Other observers have cautioned that governmental
corruption, institutional weakness, and pro-Russian overtures could jeopardize
Kyrgyzstan’s independence.35 In late October 2006, U.S. media reported that the
U.S. FBI allegedly had determined that former President Akayev and his family had
33 Analyst Adeeb Khalid argues that the elites and populations of the regional states still
hold many attitudes and follow many practices imposed during the Soviet period of rule.
This “Sovietism” makes it difficult for either Islamic extremism or democratization to make
headway, he suggests. Khalid, p. 193. For a perhaps more troubling view of the threat of
Islamic extremism, see above, Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns.
34 Mark Katz, “Revolutionary Change in Central Asia,” World Affairs, Spring 2006, pp. 157-
72.
35 Analyst Matthew Fuhrmann, who was in Kyrgyzstan during the coup, states that it
fundamentally was an action led by citizens who mobilized to replace what they viewed as
a corrupt and undemocratic regime, and was not merely a clan-based or criminal-led effort.
“A Tale of Two Social Capitals: Revolutionary Collective Action in Kyrgyzstan,” Problems
of Post-Communism, November/December 2006, pp. 16-29. Other observers suggest that
the coup was more a clan-based shift of power than a spontaneous popular uprising.
Kathleen Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian
Trajectories,” World Politics, January 2004, pp. 224-261; S. Frederick Starr, Clans,
Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia, Silk Road Paper, June 2006.

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CRS-16
skimmed off Kyrgyz state assets, including U.S. payments for use of the Manas
airbase.
In November and December 2006, conflict between the executive and legislative
branches over the balance of powers resulted in the passage of successive
constitutions, with President Bakiyev appearing to lose and then win back some
presidential powers (for background, see CRS Report RL32864, Coup in Kyrgyzstan:
Developments and Implications; and CRS Report RS22546, Kyrgyzstan’s
Constitutional Crisis, both by Jim Nichol).
In late September 2007, the pro-Bakiyev constitutional court invalidated all
constitutional changes since the adoption of the 2003 constitution. Bakiyev
announced a few days later that he was setting up and supporting a new political
party, the Ak Dzhol People’s Party. He then pushed through a snap referendum on
October 21, 2007 on a draft constitution he unveiled that set forth strong presidential
powers. The next day, he dissolved the legislature and set new elections for
December 16, 2007, a move many observers viewed as preventing opposition parties
from carrying out effective campaigns during the short period of time.36 Some of
those who observed the vote on the new constitution alleged that many irregularities
took place, and warned that similar problems might be repeated in the December
election.
Twelve parties were registered for the December 2007 election. The new
constitution established a 90-seat legislature elected by party lists. A new election
law stated that a party could not win seats unless it received 5% or more of the vote
of all registered voters. Another provision stated that a party could not win seats
unless it gained at least 0.5% of the vote in each region. This provision did not
specify how the percentage was to be calculated, leading to controversy that was
eventually settled by a Supreme Court decision.
Voting on election day was essentially peaceful. Initial results appeared to
indicate that only Ak Dzol and Ata Mekan had surpassed the 5% hurdle, but that Ata
Mekan might be disqualified because it had not received 0.5% of the vote in one
region. On December 18, media initially reported that the Supreme Court had struck
down the 0.5% hurdle, but it was later reported that the court had required a different
means of calculation, which still resulted in Ata Mekan reputedly being disqualified.
Finally, the CEC announced on December 19 that Ak Dzhol, the Social Democratic
Party, and the Communist Party had surpassed the hurdles and had won seats in the
legislature, and that Ata Mekan had been disqualified based on the amended 0.5%
rule. The next day, the CEC declared that Ak Zhol had won 71 legislative seats, the
Social Democrats 11 seats, and the Communists 8 seats, although it did not release
final election results.
In a preliminary statement, the OSCE assessed the election as “fail[ing] to meet
a number of OSCE commitments.... Overall the election represented a missed
opportunity, and fell short of public expectations for further consolidation of the
36 In a perhaps telling move, the Ak Dzhol Party placed Cholpon Bayekova, the chairwoman
of the Constitutional Court, at the head of its party list.

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CRS-17
election process.” The OSCE observers mentioned court cases involving election
procedures and complaints that appeared biased in favor of Ak Dhzol, biased and
inadequate media coverage, and many problems with vote counting.37

Bakiyev moved quickly to convene the legislature on December 21. Among its
first tasks, the legislature approved Igor Chudinov as prime minister, who claimed
that his poor command of the Kyrgyz language thankfully insulated him from politics
and allowed him to focus on economic development. One new legislator, Roza
Otunbayeva of the Social Democratic Party, stated on January 14 that she would
seek a review of the election results and that the party would push democratization
and human rights initiatives in the legislature. She and others also raised concerns
that the disqualification of Ata Mekan had harmed the representation of northern
regions in the legislature, since many of the party’s votes were in the north.
Turkmanbashi’s Death and Succession. President Niyazov died on
December 21, 2006, at age 66, ostensibly from a heart attack. The morning of his
death, the government announced that deputy prime minister and health minister
Gurbanguly Malikgulyyewic Berdimuhamedow would serve as acting president. The
Halk Maslahaty (HM or People’s Council, a supreme legislative-executive-regional
conclave) convened on December 26 and changed the constitution to make legitimate
Berdimuhamedow’s position as acting president. It quickly approved an electoral
law and announced that the next presidential election would be held on February 11,
2007.
The HM designated six candidates for the presidential election, one from each
region, all of whom were government officials and members of the ruling Democratic
Party. The ruling Democratic Party endorsed Berdimuhamedow as its candidate,
thereby seemingly anointing him as Niyazov’s heir-apparent. Reportedly, 94% of 2.6
million voters turned out and 89.23% endorsed acting president Berdimuhamedow.
A needs assessment mission from the OSCE visited Turkmenistan during the
campaign. It praised some provisions of a new presidential election law, such as
those permitting multiple candidacies and access by electoral observers, but criticized
others, including those permitting only citizens approved by the legislature and who
had served as state officials to run. A small delegation from the OSCE allegedly was
not allowed to view the election vote-counting and one member reportedly termed
the vote a “play” rather than “real” election. According to the U.S. State Department,
the election “represent[ed] a modest step toward political electoral change that could
help create the conditions in the future for a free, fair, open and truly competitive
37 OSCE. The Kyrgyz Republic, Pre-Term Parliamentary Elections, 16 December 2007:
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, December 17, 2007. The head of the
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly observers’ delegation, Kimmo Kiljunen, stated that “there
is now a backsliding in the elections process. Political pluralism which I have seen develop
[in previous elections] is undermined by this missed opportunity.” OSCE. Press Release,
December 17, 2007. Referring to the OSCE preliminary assessment, State Department
Spokesman Sean McCormack evinced “serious concerns” about the conduct of the election
and called for reforms. U.S. Department of State. Press Release, December 21, 2007.

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elections.”38 Berdimuhamedow has not announced any fundamental policy changes,
and some critics allege that there has been little or no progress in democratization and
respect for human rights.
Recent Developments in Kazakhstan. Incumbent Kazakh President
Nazarbayev won another term with 91% of the vote in a five-man race on December
4, 2005. Many observers credited economic growth in the country and promises of
increased wages and pensions as bolstering his popularity. He campaigned widely
and pledged democratic reforms and poverty relief. Observers from the OSCE, the
Council of Europe (COE), and the European Parliament assessed the election as
progressive but still falling short of a free and fair race. Problems included
restrictions on campaigning and harassment of opposition candidates.39 Then-
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs Daniel Fried averred
that “in the case of ... countries whose elections were not free and fair but not a
travesty — perhaps Kazakhstan is in that category — we need to be very clear about
what it is we want, which is democracy” and that the United States should continue
engagement with such governments “as long as they are moving in roughly the right
direction.”40
President Nazarbayev proposed changes to the constitution on May 17, 2007,
that he claimed would increase legislative power and boost democratization. He
explained that after Kazakhstan gained independence, “the need to build Kazakh
statehood and a market economy from scratch demanded [that] I assume all the
responsibility.... But today, when the process of modernization of the country is
irreversible ... the time has come [for] a new system of checks and balances.” The
legislature approved the changes the next day. The changes include increasing the
number of deputies in the Majilis and Senate, permitting the president to be active
in a political party, and decreasing the president’s term in office from seven to five
years (reversing a 1998 change from five to seven years). One change requires a two-
thirds vote in each legislative chamber to override presidential alterations to
approved bills. Another provision specifies that nine Majilis deputies are appointed
by the People’s Assembly, which is mentioned in the constitution for the first time.
An implementing Constitutional Act on Elections approved in June 2007 provides
for electing the other 98 Majilis deputies by party lists.
Some critics considered that many of the changes were superficially reformist
and perhaps aimed at convincing the OSCE that Kazakhstan was democratizing and
should be granted its request to chair the OSCE in 2009. Other observers praised
some of the changes as progressive if fully implemented, such as the requirement for
a court order in case of detention or arrest. Perhaps indicating another reason for the
changes, a legislative “initiative” excluded Nazarbayev from term limits. Visiting
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher met with Kazakhstani officials in
38 CEDR, February 12, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950160. U.S. Department of State. Daily Press
Briefing, February 15, 2007.
39 OSCE. ODIHR. Election Observation Mission. Republic of Kazakhstan Presidential
Election 4 December 2005: Final Report, February 21, 2006.
40 “Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Addresses American Enterprise
Institute,” US Fed News, December 14, 2005.

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CRS-19
June 2007 and stated that “these constitutional amendments go in the right direction.
The overall effect over the long term could be to strengthen political parties [and] the
power of parliament. There have been concerns about the lifting of term limits on
the president, but it remains to be seen how that will work out in the longer term. I
think our overall view would be this is a step forward. It’s a good legal framework.
It points the way to a stable, democratic system.”41
Similar to the events of late 1993, deputies in Kazakhstan’s Majilis (the lower
legislative chamber) on June 19, 2007, ostensibly requested that President Nursultan
Nazarbayev cut short their terms and hold early elections. He acceded to the request
the next day and the election was scheduled for August 18, 2007. As per
constitutional amendments and election law changes, the size of the Majilis increased
from 77 to 107 members. Ninety-eight members are elected by party lists and nine
by the People’s Assembly (which is headed by the president). At the opening of the
headquarters for the main pro-government party, Nur-Otan (Fatherland’s Ray of
Light), on July 2, Nazarbayev appeared to endorse a predominant role for Nur-Otan
when he allegedly claimed (erroneously) that since World War II, Japan has
flourished under the one party rule of the Liberal Democrats. Seven parties were
registered for the election, six of which are pro-government and one of which is an
opposition party. Local legislative elections also took place, but these involved
voting for individuals rather than party lists.
Nur-Otan reportedly received 88.05% of 8.87 million votes cast and won all 98
seats in the August 18, 2007, election. The other six parties running were unable to
clear a 7% threshold needed to win seats. In a preliminary assessment, observers
from the OSCE praised some positive aspects of the vote, but judged it as falling
short of a free and fair race. They were critical of irregularities in counting ballots,
a high vote hurdle for parties to win seats, the appointment of nine deputies, and no
provision for candidates who were not party-affiliated to run. One Russian pundit
observed that an ever-dwindling number of parties have won seats in legislative
elections since Kazakhstan gained independence, and that now only the presidential
party holds seats. On the other hand, U.S. analyst Ariel Cohen hailed “a relatively
clean election that demonstrates high popular support.”42
Although Kazakhstan lobbied extensively for holding the presidency of the
OSCE in 2009, the 15th Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE at the end of November
2007 decided that Greece would hold the OSCE presidency in 2009, followed in
2010 by Kazakhstan. This decision was made despite the appearance in early
November of the final report of the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR), which assessed Kazakhstan’s August legislative election
41 U.S. Embassy, Astana, Kazakhstan. Interview by Assistant Secretary for South and
Central Asian Affairs Richard A. Boucher with Aybek Aldabergenov of Era TV, June 6,
2007.
42 OSCE. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Republic of Kazakhstan
Parliamentary Elections, 18 August 2007: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission
Report, October 30, 2007; Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter
CEDR), August 22, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950376; Ariel Cohen, “Kazakh Vote: A Step
Forward,” Washington Times, August 21, 2007.

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as not meeting OSCE commitments (although the election was considered improved
over previous races). Kazakhstan was among several CIS members that called in
2007 for restricting the scope of election observation by ODIHR. Also in late
October 2007, Kazakh authorities were alleged to have closed down several
independent newspapers and Internet sites. Deputy Assistant Secretary Feigenbaum
in December 2007 stated that the Administration nonetheless had supported
Kazakhstan’s presidency in 2010 as “a historic opportunity for Kazakhstan.... [It] is
a chance, as Kazakhstan itself has said, to really meld, they say, East and West within
the organization [and] to help create a ... sustainable institution for the long term.”
He stressed that Kazakhstan at the Ministerial Meeting had pledged to uphold the
mandate of ODIHR and to implement various democratization reforms by the end of
2008.43
Recent Developments in Tajikistan. Five candidates ran in the
presidential election in Tajikistan held on November 6, 2006, including incumbent
President Rahmon. All the four “challengers” praised Rahmon and campaigned
little. The opposition Democratic and Social-Democratic Parties boycotted the race,
claiming it was undemocratic, and the Islamic Renaissance Party chose not to field
a candidate. Rahmon officially received 79.3% of 2.88 million votes with a nearly
91% turnout. According to OSCE and COE observers, the race was slightly
improved over the 1999 presidential election but “did not fully test democratic
electoral practices ... due to a lack of genuine choice and meaningful pluralism.” The
observers criticized the lack of meaningful debate by the candidates, improbable
turnout figures in some precincts, use of administrative resources, and non-
transparent vote-counting.44
Recent Developments in Uzbekistan. The Uzbek CEC in mid-November
2007 approved four candidates to run in the prospective December 23, 2007,
presidential election. Incumbent President Islam Karimov was nominated by the
Liberal Democratic Party, composed of leading businessmen. The party which
Karimov once headed, the Popular Democratic Party, nominated its current head,
Asliddin Rustamov. The Adolat (Justice) Social Democratic Party nominated its
head, Dilorom Toshmuhammadova. A citizen’s initiative committee nominated
Akmal Saidov, chairman of the lower legislative chamber’s Committee on
Democratic Institutions.45 The CEC disqualified the candidates nominated by the
Milliy Taklanish and Fidokorlar parties at their conventions (the latter party had
sponsored Karimov during his 2000 election), saying they had not gathered enough
signatures. Although the Uzbek constitution bars a president from more than two
terms, the Uzbek CEC argued that since the most recent constitution was approved
43 U.S. Department of State. Evan Feigenbaum ... Interview With Navbahor Imamova of
Voice of America, December 17, 2007.
44 OSCE. ODIHR. Presidential Election, Republic of Tajikistan — 6 November 2006:
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, November 7, 2006.
45 The report of the legislative election in 2004 states that Saidov was a member of the
Popular Democratic Party who was nominated by an independent group of voters. He
headed the national center for supporting independent candidates. CEDR, January 10, 2005,
Doc. No. CEP-224. The Uzbek CEC reported in late 2007 that he did not belong to a
political party.

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CRS-21
in 1992, Karimov’s “first term” should be considered as following his election in
January 2000, and that he is eligible to run for a “second term” in December 2007.
According to an interim report by a small election observation mission
sponsored by OSCE ODIHR, the Uzbek CEC and local electoral commissions
controlled public appearances and spending by the candidates. There were no
campaign debates and media coverage was minimal, according to OSCE ODIHR.
Each presidential candidate used similar language to laud economic development
and democratization under the incumbent president. State-owned media urged the
electorate to vote for Karimov. According to the CEC, Karimov received 88% of
14.8 million votes with a 90.6% Turnout.46 Each of the remaining three candidates
received about 3% of the vote. The OSCE OHIDR election mission issued a press
statement assessing the election as “generally fail[ing] to meet many OSCE
commitments for democratic elections.” Besides the problems noted above, others
included lax rules regarding early voting, frequent voting by one member of a
household for all members, and an observed low turnout.47 The Legislative Chamber
(lower legislative house) of the Uzbek Supreme Assembly (Oliy Majlis) accepted
Toshmuhammadova as its new speaker in January 2008, reputedly in line with
President Karimov’s pledges to give the legislature greater authority in the political
system.
In his inaugural address on January 16, 2008, Karimov stated that the “historic
election” might be remembered for centuries and thanked the citizenry “who gave me
a massive vote of confidence by freely expressing their will [in an] election which
was held in full compliance with our constitution and laws, international legal norms,
and universally recognized democratic standards.”48
Human Rights. The NGO Freedom House has included Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan among countries such as North Korea and Myanmar that have the lowest
possible ratings on political rights and civil liberties.49 Adherents to non-favored
faiths, missionaries, and pious Muslims face religious rights abuses in all the states.
Unfair elections increase political alienation and violence aimed against the regimes.
According to the State Department, religious freedom deteriorated in Uzbekistan
in 2005-2006, with increased repression against Christians and observant Muslims.50
As recommended by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
46 The final vote turnout was reported two hours after the polls closed. Results that were
termed “preliminary” were reported the next day (December 24), which were identical to
“final” results reported on December 28.
47 OSCE. ODIHR. Limited Election Observation Mission: Republic of Uzbekistan
Presidential Election 2007, Interim Report, December 15, 2007; Press Release: Limited
Election Observation Mission — Uzbekistan 2007, December 24, 2007.
48 CEDR, January 16, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950404.
49 Freedom House. The Worst of the Worst: The World’s Most Repressive Societies,
September 6, 2006 and May 9, 2007.
50 U.S. Department of State. International Religious Freedom Report 2006, September 15,
2006.

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CRS-22
(USCIRF), Secretary Rice in November 2006 designated Uzbekistan a “country of
particular concern” (CPC), where severe human rights violations could lead to U.S.
sanctions. In June 2006, the State Department downgraded Uzbekistan to “Tier 3,”
for having problems as a source country for human trafficking that does not fully
comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not
making significant efforts to do so.51
In the case of religious freedom in Turkmenistan, the State Department
maintained that conditions there had improved somewhat in 2005-2006, because the
Turkmen Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) was more willing to assist minority
religious groups in dealing with the government, and authorities hosted a late 2005
roundtable discussion to inform religious leaders on registration procedures. The
USCIRF in 2006 termed this State Department claim that religious freedom had
improved “disturbing” and “startling” and recommended — as it had since 2000 —
that Turkmenistan be designated a CPC, because the country “is among the most
repressive states in the world today and engages in systematic and egregious
violations of freedom of religion.” The USCIRF in May 2007 recommended that
Turkmenistan be designated a CPC, despite the change in leadership, because
reforms had not yet been implemented.52
Among U.N. actions, the General Assembly in December 2003 and November
2004 approved resolutions expressing “grave concern” about human rights abuses in
Turkmenistan and urging reforms. The U.N. Rapporteur on Torture in early 2003
completed a report that concluded that police and prison officials in Uzbekistan
“systematically” employed torture.53 In November 2005, the U.N. General
Assembly’s Third Committee approved resolutions critical of human rights violations
in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The resolution on Turkmenistan expressed “grave
concern” about political repression, media censorship, religious minority group
harassment, and detainee torture. The resolution on Uzbekistan expressed “grave
concern” about violence against civilians in Andijon and called on the government
to permit an international investigation. The Uzbek representative asserted that the
51 U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2006.
52 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. Annual Report, May 3, 2006, and
Annual Report, May 1, 2007. USCIRF first urged that Uzbekistan be designated a CPC in
its 2005 Annual Report. Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom John
V. Hanford III on the Release of the State Department’s 2006 Designations of Countries of
Particular Concern for Severe Violations of Religious Freedom, November 13, 2006.
53 U.N. General Assembly. Resolution: Situation of Human Rights in Turkmenistan, 58/194,
December 22, 2003; Resolution: Situation of Human Rights in Turkmenistan, 59/206,
December 20, 2004. U.N. Economic and Social Council. Commission on Human Rights.
Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture, Theo van Boven. Report of the Special
Rapporteur Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 2002/38. Addendum:
Mission to Uzbekistan, E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2, annex, February 3, 2003. U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the Question of Torture, Manfred Nowak. Report by the Special Rapporteur.
Addendum: Follow-up to the Recommendations Made by the Special Rapporteur,
E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.2, March 21, 2006.

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resolution contained no credible facts and ignored Uzbekistan’s right to defend its
constitutional order against terrorists.54
In November 2007, the U.N. Committee Against Torture stated that it “remained
concerned that [in Uzbekistan] there were numerous reports of abuses in custody, and
many deaths, some of which were alleged to have followed torture or ill-treatment.
The Committee was also concerned at the information received about the
intimidation, restrictions and imprisonment of members of human rights monitoring
organizations, human rights defenders and other civil society groups and the closing
down of numerous national and international organizations....” The Committee
called on Uzbekistan to strengthen its laws against torture and provide for impartial
domestic and international monitoring of detention centers and prisons.55
Security and Arms Control
The U.S.-led coalition’s overthrow of the Taliban and routing of Al Qaeda and
IMU terrorists in Afghanistan (termed Operation Enduring Freedom or OEF)
increased the security of Central Asia. According to then-Assistant Secretary of
Defense J. D. Crouch in testimony in June 2002, “our military relationships with each
[Central Asian] nation have matured on a scale not imaginable prior to September
11th.” Crouch averred that “for the foreseeable future, U.S. defense and security
cooperation in Central Asia must continue to support actions to deter or defeat
terrorist threats” and to build effective armed forces under civilian control.
According to Crouch:
! Kyrgyzstan became a “critical regional partner” in OEF, providing
basing for U.S. and coalition forces at Manas (in late 2007, U.S. and
Spanish troops and personnel reportedly numbered about 1,200).
! Uzbekistan provided a base for U.S. operations at Karshi-Khanabad
(K2; just before the pullout, U.S. troops reportedly numbered less
than 900), a base for German units at Termez (in mid-2006, German
troops reportedly numbered about 300), and a land corridor to
Afghanistan for humanitarian aid via the Friendship Bridge at
Termez.
! Tajikistan permitted use of its international airport in Dushanbe for
refueling (“gas-and-go”) and hosted a French force (it reportedly was
relocating to Afghanistan in late 2007).
54 U.N. General Assembly. Third Committee. Draft Resolution: Situation of Human Rights
in Turkmenistan, A/C.3/60/L.46, November 2, 2005; Draft Resolution: Situation of Human
Rights in Uzbekistan, A/C.3/60/L.51, November 2, 2005; Press Release: Third Committee
... Approves Text Expressing Deep Concern over Human Rights Situation in Uzbekistan,
GA/SHC/3843, November 22, 2005.
55 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Committee Against Torture.
Press Release: Committee Against Torture Concludes Thirty-ninth Session, November 23,
2007.

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! Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan provided overflight and other
support.56
To obtain Uzbekistan’s approval for basing, the 2002 U.S.-Uzbek Strategic
Partnership Declaration included a nonspecific security guarantee. The United States
affirmed that “it would regard with grave concern any external threat” to
Uzbekistan’s security and would consult with Uzbekistan “on an urgent basis”
regarding a response. The two states pledged to intensify military cooperation,
including “re-equipping the Armed Forces” of Uzbekistan, a pledge that appeared to
be repudiated by Uzbekistan following events in Andijon.
Although U.S. security assistance was boosted in the aftermath of 9/11, such aid
has lessened since then as a percentage of all such aid to Eurasia, particularly after
aid to Uzbekistan was cut in FY2004 and subsequent years (see below). Security and
law enforcement aid was $188 million in FY2002 (31% of all such aid to Eurasia),
$102 million (33%) in FY2003, $133 million (11.2%) in FY2004, $149 million in
FY2005 (11.3%), and $111 (7.6%) in FY2006. Of all budgeted assistance to Central
Asia over the period from FY1992-FY2006, security and law enforcement aid
accounted for a little over one-fifth. Security and law enforcement aid included
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training
(IMET), and Excess Defense Articles (EDA) programs and border security aid to
combat trafficking in drugs, humans, and WMD. To help counter burgeoning drug
trafficking from Afghanistan, emergency supplementals for FY2005 (P.L. 109-13)
and FY2006 (P.L. 109-234) have provided some assistance to Central Asia, and the
FY2008 baseline and supplemental request for the Defense Department called for
about $44.8 million in counter-narcotics aid for Central Asia.
In addition to the aid reported by the Coordinator’s Office, the Defense
Department provides coalition support payments to Kyrgyzstan, including base lease
payments and landing and overflight fees (overall authority and funding have been
provided in emergency supplemental appropriations for military operations and
maintenance). According to one 2005 report, the United States had paid a total of
$28 million in landing fees, parking fees, and airport fees; $114 million for fuel, and
$17 million to Kyrgyz contractors. Uzbekistan received a payment of $15.7 million
for use of K2 and associated services, and the Defense Department in September
2005 announced an intention to pay another $23 million. On October 5, 2005, an
amendment to Defense Appropriations for FY2006 (H.R. 2863) was approved in the
Senate to place a one-year hold on the payment. Despite this congressional concern,
the Defense Department transferred the payment in November 2005. The conferees
on H.R. 2863 later dropped the amendment (H.Rept. 109-360; P.L. 109-359).
56 Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South
Caucasus. Statement of J.D. Crouch II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy, June 27, 2002. India reportedly provided aid to revamp a Soviet-era base
near Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Xinhua General News Service, February 27, 2007; Eurasia
Daily Monitor, May 24, 2007; BBC Monitoring International Reports, September 20, 2007.

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U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in 1999 became responsible for U.S.
military engagement in Central Asia. It cooperates with the European Command
(USEUCOM), on the Caspian Maritime Security Cooperation program (similar to the
former Caspian [Sea] Guard program). Gen. Bantz Craddock, Commander of
EUCOM, testified in 2008 that the Caspian Maritime Security Cooperation program
coordinates security assistance provided by U.S. agencies to Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan. He stated that U.S. Naval Forces Europe cooperates with U.S. Naval
Forces Central Command “to promote maritime safety and security and maritime
domain awareness in the Caspian Sea.”57 Russia objects to the involvement of non-
littoral countries in Caspian maritime security and has appeared to counter U.S.
maritime security aid by boosting the capabilities of its Caspian Sea Flotilla and by
urging the littoral states to coordinate their naval activities exclusively with Russia.
The Commander of USCENTCOM periodically visits the Central Asian states.
During a visit to Kazakhstan in November 2007, then-Commander William Fallon
discussed a new five-year military cooperation with Kazakhstan’s defense minister.
The defense ministry praised the previous five-year plan for providing training for
200 troops in the United States, a number of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles (Humvees), the imminent delivery of two UH-1H Huey-2 helicopters, and
the refurbishment of the base in Atyrau for the Western Military Command’s infantry
battalion, among other cooperation. President Karimov hailed a visit by Fallon to
Uzbekistan in January 2008 as a sign of improving U.S.-Uzbek relations. Fallon also
visited Turkmenistan and Tajikistan in January 2008. In Tajikistan, he welcomed
Tajik offers to help train Afghan military forces.
All the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined NATO’s PFP by mid-1994
(Tajikistan joined in 2002). Central Asian troops have participated in periodic PFP
(or “PFP-style”) exercises in the United States since 1995, and U.S. troops have
participated in exercises in Central Asia since 1997. A June 2004 NATO summit
communique pledged enhanced Alliance attention to the countries of the South
Caucasus and Central Asia. Uzbekistan sharply reduced its participation in PFP after
NATO raised concerns that Uzbek security forces had used excessive and
disproportionate force in Andijon. In contrast to Uzbekistan’s participation,
Kazakhstan’s progress in military reform enabled NATO in January 2006 to elevate
it to participation in an Individual Partnership Action Plan.
According to some reports, the Defense Department has been considering
possibly setting up long-term military facilities in Central Asia termed Cooperative
Security Locations (CSLs; they might contain pre-positioned equipment and be
managed by private contractors, and few if any U.S. military personnel may be
present). The Overseas Basing Commission in 2005 acknowledged that U.S. national
security might be enhanced by future CSLs in Central Asia but urged Congress to
57 House of Representatives. Armed Services Committee. Statement of General Bantz J.
Craddock, Commander, United States European Command, March 13, 2008. Caspian Sea
Maritime Proliferation Prevention aid to Kazakhstan was $4 million in FY2005, $5 million
in FY2006, and $7 million in FY2007, and $8 million was requested for each of FY2008 and
FY2009. U.S. Department of Defense. Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
FY2008/FY2009 Budget Estimates: Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, February 2007.

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seek inter-agency answers to “what constitutes vital U.S. interests in the area that
would require long-term U.S. presence.”58 According to former CENTCOM
Commander Fallon, the Bagram airbase in Afghanistan is the Forward Operating Site
(basing intended for rotational use by operating forces with limited U.S. military
support presence and possibly pre-positioned equipment) for access to and operations
in Central Asia. CENTCOM’s FY2008 Master Plan for infrastructure requirements
at its U.S. overseas military facilities reportedly placed a high priority on sustaining
long-term access to locations across its area of responsibility.59
Closure of Karshi-Khanabad
On July 5, 2005, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan
signed a declaration issued during a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO; see above, Regional Tensions) that stated that “as large-scale
military operations against terrorism have come to an end in Afghanistan, the SCO
member states maintain that the relevant parties to the anti-terrorist coalition should
set a deadline for the temporary use of ... infrastructure facilities of the SCO member
states and for their military presence in these countries.”60 Despite this declaration,
none of the Central Asian leaders immediately called for closing the coalition bases.
However, after the United States and others interceded so that refugees who fled
from Andijon to Kyrgyzstan could fly to Romania, Uzbekistan on July 29 demanded
that the United States vacate K2 within six months. On November 21, 2005, the
United States officially ceased operations to support Afghanistan at K2. Perhaps
indicative of the reversal of U.S. military-to-military and other ties, former pro-U.S.
defense minister Qodir Gulomov was convicted of treason and received seven years
in prison, later suspended. Many K2 activities shifted to the Manas airbase in
Kyrgyzstan. In early 2006, Kyrgyz President Bakiyev reportedly requested that lease
payments for use of the Manas airbase be increased to more than $200 million per
year and at the same time re-affirmed Russia’s free use of its nearby base.61
Some observers viewed the closure of K2 and souring U.S.-Uzbek relations as
setbacks to U.S. influence in the region and as gains for Russian and Chinese
influence. Others suggested that U.S. ties with other regional states provided
58 Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States.
Interim Report, May 9, 2005.
59 House of Representatives. Appropriations Committee. Subcommittee on Military
Construction. Statement of Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander, U.S. Central
Command, on Military Construction in U.S. Central Command, April 17, 2007; General
Accountability Office. Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but
DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on
Guam, GAO Report No. GAO-07-1015, September 12, 2007.
60 CEDR, July 5, 2005, Doc. No. CPP-249.
61 For background, see CRS Report RS22295, Uzbekistan’s Closure of the Airbase at
Karshi-Khanabad: Context and Implications, by Jim Nichol. Perhaps indicating Kyrgyz
pressure on Russia to compensate for use of the base, Russia in October 2006 pledged grant
military assistance to Kyrgyzstan. The Russian defense minister announced in June 2007
the transfer of $2 million in military equipment as compensation. ITAR-TASS, June 27,
2007; CEDR, June 29, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-380002.

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continuing influence and that U.S. criticism of human rights abuses might pay future
dividends among regional populations.62
On July 14, 2006, the United States and Kyrgyzstan issued a joint statement that
the two sides had resolved the issue of the continued U.S. use of airbase facilities at
Manas. Although not specifically mentioning U.S. basing payments, it was
announced that the United States would provide $150 million in “total assistance and
compensation over the next year,” subject to congressional approval (some reports
indicated that the “land lease” portion amounts to around $17-$20 million). Kyrgyz
Security Council Secretary Miroslav Niyazov and U.S. Deputy Assistant Defense
Secretary James MacDougall also signed a Protocol of Intentions affirming that the
United States would compensate the Kyrgyz government and businesses for goods,
services, and support of coalition operations. Some observers suggested that
increased terrorist activities in Afghanistan and a May 2006 terrorist incursion from
Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan may have contributed to a Kyrgyz evaluation that the U.S.
coalition presence was still necessary. In September 2007, a U.S. military officer
stated that the Manas airbase was moving toward “a sustainment posture,” with the
replacement of virtually all tents and the building of aircraft maintenance, medical,
and other facilities.63
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Major U.S. security interests have included elimination of nuclear weapons
remaining in Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union and other efforts to
control nuclear proliferation in Central Asia. The United States has tendered aid
aimed at bolstering their export and physical controls over nuclear technology and
materials, in part because of concerns that Iran is targeting these countries.
After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons
power (in reality Russia controlled these weapons). In December 1993, the United
States and Kazakhstan signed a Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) umbrella
agreement for the “safe and secure” dismantling of 104 SS-18s, the destruction of
silos, and related purposes. All bombers and their air-launched cruise missiles were
removed by late February 1994 (except seven bombers destroyed with U.S. aid in
1998). On April 21, 1995, the last of about 1,040 nuclear warheads had been
removed from SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and Kazakhstan announced
that it was nuclear weapons-free. The SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994. The
United States reported that 147 silos had been destroyed by September 1999. A U.S.-
Kazakh Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in Almaty was set up to facilitate verification
and compliance with arms control agreements to prevent the proliferation of WMD.
Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium
mines, milling facilities, and dozens of radioactive tailing and waste dumps in
62 On growing Chinese regional influence, see Michael Mihalka, “Counter-insurgency,
Counter-terrorism, State-Building and Security Cooperation in Central Asia,” The China and
Eurasia Forum Quarterly, May 2006.
63 Lt. Col. Michael Borgert, “Liberandos: Thank You for a Job Well Done,” 376th
Expeditionary Services Squadron Public Affairs, September 9, 2007.

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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Many of these reportedly
remain inadequately protected against theft. Kazakhstan is reported to possess
one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have
been among the world’s top producers of low enriched uranium. Kazakhstan had a
fast breeder reactor at Aktau that was the world’s only nuclear desalinization facility.
Shut down in 1999, it had nearly 300 metric tons of uranium and plutonium spent
fuel in storage pools (three tons of which were weapons-grade). In 1997 and 1999,
U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on decommissioning the Aktau reactor.
CTR aid was used to facilitate transporting 600 kg of weapons-grade uranium
from Kazakhstan to the United States in 1994, 2,900 kg of up to 26% enriched
nuclear fuel from Aktau to Kazakhstan’s Ulba facility in 2001 (which Ulba
converted into less-enriched fuel), eleven kg of uranium in fuel rods from Uzbekistan
to Russia in 2004, and 63 kg of uranium from Uzbekistan to Russia in April 2006.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare
(CBW) facilities during the Soviet era. CTR and Energy Department (DOE) funds
have been used in Kazakhstan to dismantle a former anthrax production facility in
Stepnogorsk, to remove some strains to the United States, to secure two other BW
sites, and to retrain scientists. CTR funding was used to dismantle Uzbekistan’s
Nukus chemical weapons research facility. CTR aid also was used to eliminate
active anthrax spores at a former CBW test site on an island in the Aral Sea. These
latter two projects were completed in 2002. Other CTR aid helps keep former Uzbek
CBW scientists employed in peaceful research. Uzbekistan has continued to
cooperate with DOD and DOE — even after it restricted other ties with the United
States in 2005 — to receive portal and hand-held radiation monitoring equipment and
training.
The FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314, Sec. 1306)
provided for the president to waive prohibitions on CTR aid (as contained in
Sec.1203 of P.L. 103-160) to a state of the former Soviet Union if he certified that
the waiver was necessary for national security and submitted a report outlining why
the waiver was necessary and how he planned to promote future compliance with the
restrictions on CTR aid. The waiver authority, exercisable each fiscal year, expired
at the end of FY2005. (The six restrictions in P.L. 103-160 include a call for CTR
recipients to observe internationally recognized human rights.) In FY2004 and
FY2005, the President explained that Uzbekistan’s human rights problems
necessitated waivers. Defense Authorizations for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163) provide a
non-sunset waiver authority, exercisable annually. Waivers for Uzbekistan were
issued for FY2006 and FY2007. In the 110th Congress, Senator Sam Nunn
introduced S. 198 on January 8, 2007, to amend P.L. 103-160 to eliminate the
restrictions on CTR aid, including respect for human rights. Although waivers can
be and are exercised when the conditions are not met, he stated, the lengthy process
of making determinations and exercising waivers threatens the primary U.S. national
security goal of combating WMD. Language similar to S. 198 was incorporated into
H.R. 1 (P.L. 110-53; signed into law on August 3, 2007, see below, Legislation).64
64 Congressional Record, January 8, 2007, pp. S237-S238.

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Trade and Investment
The Administration and others stress that U.S. support for free market reforms
directly serves U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and
services and sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to
Central Asia has greatly exceeded that provided to Russia or most other Eurasian
states except Azerbaijan. U.S. trade agreements have been signed and entered into
force with all the Central Asian states, but bilateral investment treaties are in force
only with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In line with Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the
World Trade Organization, the United States established permanent normal trade
relations with Kyrgyzstan by law in June 2000, so that “Jackson-Vanik” trade
provisions no longer apply that call for presidential reports and waivers concerning
freedom of emigration.
In June 2004, The U.S. Trade Representative signed a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA) with ambassadors of the regional states to establish
a U.S.-Central Asia Council on Trade and Investment. The Council meets yearly to
address intellectual property, labor, environmental protection, and other issues that
impede trade and private investment flows between the United States and Central
Asia. The Bush Administration at the annual meetings also has called for greater
intra-regional cooperation on trade and encouraged the development of regional trade
and transport ties with Afghanistan and South Asia. As stated by Secretary Rice,
these efforts support a “new Silk Road, a great corridor of reform” extending from
Europe southward to Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean. According to Evan
Feigenbaum, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, “we are
... promoting options and opportunities omni-directionally but increasingly to the
south — the least developed direction.” The reorganization of the State Department
in 2006 to create the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs facilitated this
emphasis.65
At the third annual meeting of the Council on Trade and Investment in mid-July
2007, Assistant Secretary of State Boucher and Deputy Assistant Secretary
Feigenbaum stressed transport, electricity, and other links between South and Central
Asia as well as U.S. private investment in the region.66 Major foci of the U.S. Trade
and Development Agency’s Central Asian Infrastructure Integration Initiative and
USAID’s Regional Energy Market Assistance Program include encouraging energy,
transportation, and communications projects, including the development of electrical
65 Remarks at Eurasian National University, October 13, 2005; and U.S. Congress. House
International Relations Committee. Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia.
Testimony by Steven R. Mann, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, July 25, 2006. See
also U.S. Embassy Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan and the United States in a Changed World,
August 23, 2006.
66 U.S. Department of State. Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and
Central Asia. Remarks at the South and Central Asia Regional Economic Integration
Meeting, July 18, 2007; Evan A. Feigenbaum, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State South and
Central Asian Affairs. Remarks to Participants of the Third Annual Meeting of the
U.S.-Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, July 18, 2007.

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power infrastructure and power sharing between Central Asia, Afghanistan, and
eventually Pakistan and India.67
All the states of the region possess large-scale resources that could contribute
to the region becoming a “new silk road” of trade and commerce. The Kazakh and
Turkmen economies are mostly geared to energy exports but need added foreign
investment for production and transport. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
are major cotton producers, a legacy of central economic planning during the Soviet
period. Cotton production has contributed to environmental pollution and water
shortages. Uzbekistan’s cotton and gold production rank among the highest in the
world and much is exported. It has moderate gas reserves but needs investment to
upgrade infrastructure. Kyrgyzstan has major gold mines and strategic mineral
reserves, is a major wool producer, and could benefit from tourism. Tajikistan has
one of the world’s largest aluminum processing plants. According to the IMF, the
Central Asian countries exported $37.9 billion in goods and services in 2006 and
imported $37.7 billion. Major export partners included Russia, China, Turkey, and
Italy. Major import partners included Russia, China, Turkey, and Germany.68
Despite the region’s development potential, the challenges of corruption,
inadequate transport infrastructure, punitive tariffs, border tensions, and uncertain
respect for contracts discourage major foreign investment (except for some
investment in the energy sector). Examples of such challenges include Uzbekistan’s
restrictions on land transit, which have encouraged Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to
explore building a major road to Kazakhstan that bypasses Uzbekistan. The
challenge of corruption was underscored by a report issued in 2006 by the non-
governmental organization Global Witness, which alleged that then-Turkmen
President Niyazov personally controlled a vast portion of the wealth generated from
natural gas exports. The NGO raised concerns that organized crime groups were
involved in these exports and urged the EU to limit trade ties with Turkmenistan.69
Oil and Natural Gas Resources
U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central Asian and South
Caucasian states have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the West,
supporting U.S. private investment, promoting Western energy security through
diversified suppliers, assisting ally Turkey, and opposing the building of pipelines
that transit “energy competitor” Iran or otherwise give it undue influence over the
region. Security for Caspian region pipelines and energy resources also has been a
recent interest. President Bush’s 2001 National Energy Policy report suggested that
67 U.S. Trade and Development Agency. Press Release: USTDA Launches Central Asian
Infrastructure Integration Initiative, October 14, 2005; Richard A. Boucher, Remarks at
Electricity Beyond Borders: A Central Asia Power Sector Forum, Istanbul, Turkey, June 13,
2006; Joshua Kucera, “Washington Seeks to Steer Central Asian States Toward South Asian
Allies,” Eurasia Insight, April 28, 2006; Joshua Kucera, “USAID Official Outlines Plan to
Build Central-South Asian Electricity Links,” Eurasia Insight, May 4, 2006.
68 IMF. Direction of Trade Statistics, September 2007.
69 Global Witness. It’s a Gas: Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade, April
2006.

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greater oil production in the Caspian region could not only benefit regional
economies, but also help mitigate possible world supply disruptions. It
recommended U.S. support for building the BTC pipeline and an Azerbaijan-Turkey
gas pipeline, coaxing Kazakhstan to use the oil pipeline, and otherwise encouraging
the regional states to provide a stable and inviting business climate for energy
development.70
Until 2004, the Administration retained a Special Advisor on Caspian Energy
Diplomacy, who helped to further U.S. policy and counter the efforts of Russia’s
Viktor Kaluzhny, deputy foreign minister and Special Presidential Representative for
Energy Matters in the Caspian. This responsibility came to be shifted at least in part
to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs in 2005-
2006 along with responsibilities of the former Special Negotiator for
Nagorno-Karabakh and Eurasian Conflicts.71 Some critics have juxtaposed Putin’s
close interest in securing Caspian energy resources to what they term sporadic U.S.
efforts.72 Deputy Assistant Secretary Steven Mann, who once served as the Caspian
energy advisor, has in recent months become more active in energy issues, including
encouraging regional governments to support building trans-Caspian pipelines.
The Caspian region is emerging as a notable source of oil and gas for world
markets, although many experts emphasize that regional exports will constitute only
a small fraction of world supplies. According to the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE), the region’s proven natural gas reserves are estimated at 232 trillion cubic
feet (tcf), comparable to Saudi Arabia.73 The region’s proven oil reserves are
estimated to be between 17-49 billion barrels, comparable to Qatar on the low end
and Libya on the high end. Kazakhstan possesses the region’s largest proven oil
reserves at 9-40 billion barrels, according to DOE, and also possesses 65tcf of natural
gas. Kazakhstan’s oil exports currently are about 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd).
Some U.S. energy firms and other private foreign investors have become discouraged
in recent months by harsher Kazakh government terms, taxes, and fines that some
70 The White House. National Energy Policy, May 2001. The BTC pipeline began
delivering oil to Turkey’s port of Ceyhan in mid-2006. The South Caucasus Pipeline was
completed in early 2007.
71 In 2004, the Department of State’s Inspector General recommended that the post of
Special Advisor on Caspian Energy Diplomacy might “now be phased out, with residual
responsibilities folded into other units,” because the purpose for which it was created was
achieved. Office of the Inspector General. Semiannual Report to the Congress, October 1,
2003 to March 31, 2004. The Special Advisor’s duties included “realizing the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, in the launch of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium
(CPC) line, and a range of other Eurasian energy issues.” Office of the Spokesman. Press
Release, April 16, 2004.
72 Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 31, 2007.
73 Including the countries of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan.

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allege reflect corruption within the ruling elite.74 Turkmenistan possesses about 71tcf
and Uzbekistan about 66tcf of proven gas reserves, according to DOE.75
Especially since Russia’s temporary cutoff of gas to Ukraine in January 2006
highlighted European vulnerability, the United States has supported EU efforts to
reduce its overall reliance on Russian oil and gas by increasing the number of
possible alternative suppliers. Part of this policy has involved encouraging Central
Asian countries to transport their energy exports to Europe through pipelines that
cross the Caspian Sea, thereby bypassing Russian (and Iranian) territory, although
these amounts are expected at most to satisfy only a tiny fraction of EU needs.76
The Central Asian states have been pressured by Russia to yield large portions
of their energy wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controls most existing export
pipelines.77 Russia attempted to strengthen this control over export routes for Central
Asian energy in May 2007 when visiting President Putin reached agreement in
Kazakhstan on supplying more Kazakh oil to Russia, which Nazarbayev hoped could
eventually be routed through a proposed pipeline from Burgas, Bulgaria to
Alexandropoulis, Greece. Putin also reached agreement with the presidents of
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan on the construction of a new pipeline to transport
Turkmen and Kazakh gas to Russia. The first agreement appeared to compete with
U.S. and Turkish efforts to foster more oil exports through the BTC. The latter
agreement appeared to compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster building a trans-
Caspian gas pipeline to link to the SCP to Turkey.78 The latter also appeared to
compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster building a pipeline from Turkey through
Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to Austria (the so-called Nabucco pipeline).
74 A recent perhaps troubling case concerns Kazakhstan’s August 2007 suspension of the
activities of the international consortium developing the Kashagan offshore oilfield. In
January 2008, Kazakhstan and the consortium of companies developing Kashagan reached
an agreement that permitted Kazakhstan to pay a below market price to increase its share
to about 17% (making it the largest shareholder) and levied several billion dollars in fines
against the consortium for delays. The start-up date for production is now set for 2011,
although further delays might extend this to 2013 or even 2015. Economist Intelligence
Unit, January 21, 2008. Visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary Mann reportedly hailed the
resolution of the dispute over operations at Kashagan as a “positive solution” that permitted
development of Kashagan to resume. BBC Monitoring Central Asia, January 26, 2008.
75 U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Caspian Sea Country
Analysis Brief, January 2007; Caspian Sea Region: Survey of Key Oil and Gas Statistics and
Forecasts, July 2006.
76 For details, see CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security
Challenges, by Paul Belkin. See also International Crisis Group. Central Asia’s Energy
Risks, May 24, 2007.
77 Jeronim Perovic, “From Disengagement to Active Economic Competition: Russia’s
Return to the South Caucasus and Central Asia,” Demokratizatsiya, Winter 2005, pp. 61-86;
Kimberly Marten, “Disrupting the Balance: Russian Efforts to Control Kazakhstan’s Oil,”
PONARS Policy Memo No. 428, December 2006.
78 Reportedly, the head of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, and the
Commissioner on External Affairs, Benito Ferrero-Waldner, urged visiting President
Berdimuhamedow in Brussels in November 2007 to begin democratization.

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Seeming to indicate a direct challenge to these plans by Russia and the West, China
signed an agreement in August 2007 with Kazakhstan on completing the last section
of an oil pipeline from the Caspian seacoast to China, and signed an agreement with
Turkmenistan on building a gas pipeline to China (see also below).79

Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s main oil export route has been a 930-mile pipeline
— owned by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), in which Russian shareholders
have a controlling interest — that carries 234.56 million barrels per year of oil from
Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Lengthy Russian resistance
to increasing the pumping capacity of the pipeline and demands for higher transit and
other fees, along with the necessity of offloading the oil into tankers at Novorossiysk
to transit the clogged Turkish Straits, spurred a decision in mid-2006 by U.S. and
Western investors and Kazakhstan to increase oil barging across the Caspian Sea to
Azerbaijan to the BTC pipeline. Up to 500,000 barrels per day of Kazakh oil from
the Kashagan field may transit through the BTC pipeline. Putin’s May 2007
agreement with Nazarbayev (see above) envisages boosting the capacity of the CPC
pipeline. Nonetheless, Kazakhstan is upgrading its port at Atyrau and in August
2007 signed a memorandum of understanding with Azerbaijan on using the BTC as
an added export route.80

Besides Kazakhstan’s use of the BTC pipeline as an oil export route not
controlled by Russia, Kazakhstan and China have completed an oil pipeline from
Atasu in central Kazakhstan to the Xinjiang region of China (a distance of about 597
miles). Kazakhstan began delivering oil through the pipeline in May 2006. Initial
capacity is 146.6 million barrels per year. At Atasu, it links to another pipeline from
Kumkol, also in central Kazakhstan, and will eventually link to Atyrau on
Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea coast. Work on this 473-mile pipeline from Kumkol to
Atyrau began in late 2007 and is expected to be completed in 2009.
Turkmenistan. The late President Niyazov signed a 25-year accord with Putin
in 2003 on supplying Russia up to 211.9 billion cubic feet (bcf) of gas in 2004 (about
12% of production), rising up to 2.83 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2009-2028, perhaps
then tying up most if not all of Turkmenistan’s future production. Turkmenistan
halted gas shipments to Russia at the end of 2004 in an attempt to get a higher gas
price but settled for all-cash rather than partial barter payments. In early 2006,
Turkmenistan again requested higher gas prices from Russia, because Russia’s state-
controlled Gazprom gas firm had raised the price it charged for customers receiving
79 An oil and gas conference involving Kazakh, Chinese, and Russian energy ministries and
firms has met annually since 2004 to “exchange views” on possible regional cooperation.
ITAR-TASS, December 5, 2007.
80 On January 24, 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed by the firms
in the TengizChevroil consortium (ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, LukoilArco, and the
Kazakh state oil and gas firm KazMunayGaz) and those in the KCO consortium (Eni-Agip,
Total, ExxonMobil, Royal-Dutch Shell, ConocoPhillips, Inpex, and KazMunayGaz) to put
together port facilities and tankers to transport Kazakh oil to Azerbaijan. Vladimir Socor,
Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 25, 2007. See also Dow Jones Commodities Service, June
28, 2007. Another MOU was signed by KazMunayGaz and Azerbaijan’s SOCAR state oil
company on August 8, 2007, on oil transport cooperation.

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the gas that it had purchased from Turkmenistan. In early September 2006, Gazprom
agreed to pay $100 per 35.314 thousand cubic feet from 2007 to the end of 2009, and
Turkmenistan pledged to supply 1.483 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2006, 1.765 tcf in
2007-2008, and 2.83 tcf from 2009-2028. In November 2007, however,
Turkmenistan requested still another price increase, and the two sides agreed on a
price of $130 per 35.314 thousand cubic feet for the first half of 2008 and $150 for
the remainder of 2008, and a price thereafter based on “market principles.”
Although the presidents of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan signed an accord with
Putin in May 2007 (mentioned above) on building a Caspian gas pipeline to Russia,
a follow-on accord signed in December 2007 appeared to indicate lessening support
by these Central Asian states to commit much future production for the pipeline,
according to some observers.
Seeking alternatives to pipeline routes through Russia, in December 1997
Turkmenistan opened the first pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world
beyond Russia, a 125-mile gas pipeline linkage to Iran. Turkmenistan provided
282.5 bcf of gas to Iran in 2006 and reportedly a larger amount in 2007. At the end
of 2007, however, Turkmenistan suddenly suspended gas shipments, causing
hardship in northern Iran. The National Iranian Gas Company allegedly termed the
suspension “immoral behavior,” and Iranian legislators also criticized Turkmenistan.
It was widely reported in Iranian media that Turkmen demands for higher payments
were the main reason for the cut-off. This was denied by the Turkmen Foreign
Ministry, although it accused Iran of payment arrearages, a charge in turn rejected by
the Iranian Foreign Ministry.81
As another alternative to pipelines through Russia, in early April 2006,
Turkmenistan and China signed a framework agreement calling for Chinese
investment in developing gas fields in Turkmenistan and in building a gas pipeline
through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China. Follow-on accords were signed in
August 2007, and construction of the gas pipeline reportedly began in late August
2007.
Some observers warn that Turkmenistan has pledged large amounts of gas to
both Russia and China in coming years, although it is unclear whether production can
be ramped up in a timely fashion to meet these and other pledges.
U.S. Aid Overview
For much of the 1990s and until September 11, 2001, the United States provided
much more aid each year to Russia and Ukraine than to any Central Asian state (most
such aid was funded from the FSA account in Foreign Operations Appropriations,
81 CEDR, January 22, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950327; January 24, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-
950304; Iran: Daily Report, January 21, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-11017 and Doc. No. IAP-
950027; and January 24, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950014. Iranian President Mahmud
Ahmadinezhad visited northern areas to indicate government concern about the energy crisis
during the cold season.

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but some derived from other program and agency budgets). Cumulative foreign aid
budgeted to Central Asia for FY1992 through FY2005 amounted to $3.8 billion,
13.6% of the amount budgeted to all the Eurasian states, reflecting the lesser priority
given to these states prior to September 11.82 Budgeted spending for FY2002 for
Central Asia, during OEF, was greatly boosted in absolute amounts ($584 million)
and as a share of total aid to Eurasia (about one-quarter of such aid). The
Administration’s aid requests since then have gradually declined in absolute amounts,
although it has continued to stress important U.S. interests in the region. The
Administration has highlighted the phase-out of economic aid to Kazakhstan and
restrictions on aid to Uzbekistan (see below) as among the reasons for declining aid
requests. Aid to Central Asia in FY2005 and thereafter has been about the same or
less in absolute and percentage terms than that provided to the South Caucasian
region. (See Table 1).
Looking only at FSA funding, Congress approved $99 million for the states of
Central Asia for FY2006, $17.5 million below the presidential request (P.L.
109-102), perhaps reflecting growing concern about human rights abuses and a push
to reduce spending. The Administration proposed phasing out economic reform aid
to Kazakhstan by FY2009, because of “quantifiable reform progress” in the
democratic, economic, and social sectors. In its FY2008 budget request, the
Administration called for $79.07 million in FSA aid for the states of Central Asia,
and stated that the focus was on Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, “where
there are opportunities to consolidate stability and promote democratization.”83
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), created in 2004 to provide U.S.
aid to countries with promising development records, announced in late 2005 that
Kyrgyzstan was eligible to apply for assistance as a country on the “threshold” of
meeting the criteria for full-scale development aid. On March 14, 2008, the MCC
signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan to provide $16 million over the next two years
to help the country combat corruption and bolster the rule of law. According to one
report, the signing of the agreement had been delayed over U.S. concerns over non-
transparency of the vote count in the December 2007 Kyrgyz legislative election (see
above).84
Congressional Conditions on Kazakh and Uzbek Aid. In Congress,
Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7) forbade FREEDOM Support Act
(FSA) assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State
determined and reported that it was making substantial progress in meeting
commitments under the Strategic Partnership Declaration to democratize and respect
human rights. The act also forbade assistance to the Kazakh government unless the
82 In comparison, the EU has reported that it has provided approximately 1.39 billion euros
($2.13 billion at current exchange rates) in assistance to the region since 1991. It planned
aid of about $1 billion in 2007-2013 may prove to be more than projected U.S. aid to the
region. European Community. Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for
the period 2007-2013, June 2007; Council of the European Union. Presidency Conclusions,
11177/07, June 23, 2007, p. 12.
83 Congressional Budget Presentation for Foreign Operations FY2008.
84 ITAR-TASS, March 18, 2008.

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Secretary of State determined and reported that it significantly had improved its
human rights record during the preceding six months. However, the legislation
permitted the Secretary to waive the requirement on national security grounds.85 The
Secretary reported in May 2003, that Uzbekistan was making such progress (by late
2003, the Administration had decided that it could no longer make this claim; see
above, Weapons of Mass Destruction). In July 2003, the Secretary reported that
Kazakhstan was making progress. Some in Congress were critical of these findings.
Consolidated Appropriations for FY2004, including foreign operations (P.L.
108-199) and for FY2005 (P.L. 108-447, Section 578), and Foreign Operations
Appropriations for FY2006 (P.L. 109-102, Sections 586 and 587) retained these
conditions, while clarifying that the prohibition on aid to Uzbekistan pertained to the
central government and that conditions included respecting human rights,
establishing a “genuine” multi-party system, and ensuring free and fair elections and
freedom of expression and media. The State Department has indicated that these
conditions remain in place under the continuing resolution for FY2007 (P.L.
109-289, as amended; see above).
State Department Implementation in FY2004. In July 2004, the State
Department announced that, despite some “encouraging progress” in respecting
human rights, up to $18 million in aid to Uzbekistan might be withheld because of
“lack of progress on democratic reform and restrictions put on U.S. assistance
partners on the ground” (in contrast, progress was reported regarding Kazakhstan).86
This determination potentially affected IMET and FMF programs as well as
FREEDOM Support Act funding, since legislative provisions condition IMET and
FMF on respect for human rights.87 The State Department reprogrammed or used
notwithstanding authority (after consultation with Congress) to expend some of the
funds, so that about $8.5 million was ultimately withheld. Notwithstanding authority
was used for funding health care reforms, promoting better treatment of detainees,
85 The language calling for “substantial progress” in respecting human rights differs from
the grounds of ineligibility for assistance under Section 498(b) of Part I of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), which includes as grounds a presidential
determination that a Soviet successor state has “engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights.” The Administration has stated
annually that the president has not determined that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have
engaged in “gross violations” of human rights.
86 U.S. Department of State. Office of the Spokesman. Secretary of State Decision Not to
Certify Uzbekistan, July 13, 2004.
87 Sec.502B of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195) states that “no
security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” Sec.502B
also specifies that IMET cannot be provided “to a country the government of which engages
in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,” unless
the President certifies in writing that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting the
provision of IMET. Notwithstanding authority is provided for the president to furnish
security assistance if there is “significant improvement” in a government’s human rights
record. Some IMET and FMF was provided to Uzbekistan in FY2004. See U.S.
Departments of Defense and State. Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress,
FY2004-FY2005, April 2005.

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combating HIV/AIDS, combating trafficking in drugs and persons, and supporting
World Trade Organization accession. During an August 2004 visit to Uzbekistan,
Gen. Myers criticized the cutoff of IMET and FMF programs as “shortsighted” and
not “productive,” since it reduced U.S. military influence (see also above, Weapons
of Mass Destruction).88
State Department Implementation in FY2005. For FY2005, Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice reported to Congress in May 2005 that Kazakhstan had
failed to significantly improve its human rights record, but that she had waived aid
restrictions on national security grounds. The Secretary of State in FY2005 did not
determine and report to Congress that Uzbekistan was making significant progress
in respecting human rights, so Section 578 aid restrictions remained in place. The
State Department reported that it used notwithstanding authority to allocate $4.16
million in FREEDOM Support Act aid to Uzbekistan to continue the same programs
it used the authority for in FY2004.89
State Department Implementation in FY2006. For FY2006, Secretary
of State Rice reported to Congress in May 2006 that Kazakhstan had failed to
significantly improve its human rights record but that she had waived aid restrictions
on national security grounds. She did not determine and report to Congress that
Uzbekistan was making significant progress in respecting human rights, so Section
586 restrictions remained in place (IMET and FMF programs were among the
affected programs that did not receive funding). The State Department repeated its
FY2005 statement that it used notwithstanding authority to allocate $4.16 million in
FREEDOM Support Act aid to Uzbekistan in FY2006.
State Department Implementation in FY2007. Operating under the
direction of the continuing resolution (P.L. 109-289, as amended), the Secretary of
State reported to Congress in April 2007 that Kazakhstan had failed to significantly
improve its human rights record but that it had waived aid restrictions on national
security grounds. It did not determine and report to Congress that Uzbekistan was
making significant progress in respecting human rights, so Section 586 restrictions
remained in place (IMET and FMF programs were among the affected programs that
did not receive funding).
Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States contributes to international
financial institutions that aid Central Asia. Recurrent policy issues regarding U.S.
aid include what it should be used for, who should receive it, and whether it is
effective.
88 Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, August 16, 2004.
89 Some IMET aid was provided to Uzbekistan in FY2005. See U.S. Departments of
Defense and State. Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, FY2005-FY2006,
September 2006. For FY2006, no IMET aid was provided to Uzbekistan, but three Uzbeks
received military training through other Defense Department programs. Foreign Military
Training: Joint Report to Congress, FY2006-FY2007, August 2007.

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110th Congress Legislation
P.L. 110-53 (H.R. 1, Bennie Thompson)
Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007. Introduced
on January 5, 2007. Passed the House on January 9, 2007. Passed the Senate with
an amendment in the nature of a substitute on July 9, 2007. Conference report
(H.Rept. 110-259) agreed to in the Senate on July 26 and in the House on July 27.
Signed into law on August 3, 2007 (P.L. 110-53). Sec. 1811 repeals specified
restrictions on the use of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program funds and
activities. Title 21 calls for the executive branch to promote democratization and
respect for human rights in nondemocratic and democratic transition countries. Sec.
2033 calls for expanding scholarship, exchange, and library programs in
predominantly Muslim countries to enhance respect for democracy and human rights.

S. 198 (Nunn)
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2007. Introduced on January
8, 2007; referred to the Committee on Armed Services and the Foreign Relations
Committee. Amends the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993, and the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2000 to repeal specified restrictions on the use of Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) program funds and activities. Amends the FREEDOM
Support Act of 1992 to make specified funding requirements respecting independent
countries of the former Soviet Union inapplicable to CTR programs. Similar
language was incorporated into H.R. 1 (see above).
S. 328 (Menendez)
Ensuring Implementation of the 9/11 Commission Report Act. Introduced on
January 17, 2007. Sec. 324 contains language similar to that in S. 198 (above).
P.L. 110-161, H.R. 2764 (FY2008)
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008. On December 17, 2007, the
House considered two amendments to H.R. 2764 as received from the Senate. The
first amendment inserted a Consolidated Appropriations Act covering 11 regular
appropriations bills, including Division J: Department of State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs. The second amendment dealt with emergency supplemental
military funding. Agreed to in the House on December 17, 2007. The Senate offered
an amendment to House amendment 2, and concurred with House amendment 1. On
December 19, the message on the Senate action was received in the House. The
House agreed with the Senate amendment to the House amendment 2, and the bill
was cleared for the White House. Signed into law on December 26, 2007. Provides
$83.224 million in Freedom Support Act assistance for Central Asia.
Sec. 685 calls for assistance to be provided for the central government of
Uzbekistan only if the Secretary of State reports that Uzbekistan is making
substantial and continuing progress in meeting its commitments under the
Declaration of Strategic Partnership, including respect for human rights, establishing
a multi-party system, ensuring free and fair elections, freedom of expression, and the
independence of the media, and that the government is supporting a credible
international investigation of events in Andijon. Assistance includes excess defense

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CRS-39
articles. Provides that if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that Uzbek
officials may be linked to the “deliberate killings of civilians in Andijon ... or for
other gross violations of human rights,” these individuals shall be ineligible for
admission to the United States. The Secretary may waive this ineligibility if
admission is necessary to attend the United Nations or to further U.S. law
enforcement. Sec. 698 on Central Asia directs that assistance may be provided to the
Kazakh government only if the Secretary of State reports that Kazakhstan has made
significant improvements in the protection of human rights. A national security
waiver is provided. The Secretary is to provide a report at the end of the fiscal year
describing the defense aid and financial services provided to (and how they were
used by) the Central Asian states during the fiscal year.
H.R. 2869 (Pitts)
The Central Asia Education Enhancement Act of 2007. Introduced on June 26,
2007; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Establishes a pilot program of
fifty Central Asian scholarships in each of the fiscal years FY2008-FY2010 for
undergraduate and graduate level public policy internships in the United States.

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CRS-40
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia,
FY1992 to FY2008
(millions of dollars)
FY1992 thru
Central Asian
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2005
Country
Budgeteda Budgeteda Estimatea Requestb
Budgeteda
Kazakhstan
1,244.8
84.6
80.16
70.70
24.32
Kyrgyzstan
806.5
54.21
43.29
36.55
31.43
Tajikistan
679.7
65.69
44.84
35.86
32.12
Turkmenistan
255.4
18.44
10.44
12.48
8.43
Uzbekistan
760.9
75.87
49.30
18.99
9.37
Regional
73.2
3.34
4.83
3.46
2.5
Total
3,820.5
302.15
232.86
178.04
108.17
Percent 14
15
12
11
25
Sources: State Department, Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe
and Eurasia, information as of January 9, 2008; Congressional Budget Justification
for Foreign Operations, FY2008: South and Central Asia.
a. FSA and Agency funds. Excludes some classified coalition support funding.
b. FSA and other Function 150 funds, including Peace Corps. Does not include
Defense or Energy Department funds, funding for exchanges, or Millennium
Challenge Corporation aid to Kyrgyzstan.

Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
Ast ana
MON.
Aral
Sea
Alma Ata
Bishkek
Caspian
UZBEKISTAN
KYRGYZSTAN
Sea
Am
Tashkent
AZER.
u Da
Baku
ry
TURKMENISTAN
a
Dushanbe
Ashgabat
TAJIK.
0
500 Miles
Tehran
Kabul
Islamabad
0
500 KM
AFGHANISTAN
INDIA
Parallel scale at 40û
N 0û
E
PAKISTAN
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (08/02 M. Chin)
crsphpgw

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