Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
September 21, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33458
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
Summary
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the independence of
all the former Central Asian republics, supported their admission into Western organizations, and
elicited regional support to counter Iranian influence in the region. Congress was at the forefront
in urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the
former Soviet Union.
Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states
offered overflight and other support for coalition anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan.
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In
2003, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also endorsed coalition military action in Iraq. About two
dozen Kazakhstani troops served in Iraq until late 2008. Uzbekistan rescinded U.S. basing rights
in 2005 after the United States criticized the reported killing of civilians in the town of Andijon.
In early 2009, Kyrgyzstan ordered a U.S. base in that country to close, allegedly because of
Russian inducements and U.S. reluctance to meet Kyrgyz requests for greatly increased lease
payments. An agreement on continued U.S. use of the “transit center” was reached in June 2009.
U.S. policy has emphasized bolstering the security of the Central Asian “front-line” states to help
them combat terrorism, proliferation, and arms and drug trafficking. Other U.S. objectives have
included promoting free markets, democratization, human rights, energy development, and the
forging of east-west and Central Asia-South Asia trade links. Such policies aim to help the states
become what various U.S. Administrations have considered to be responsible members of the
international community rather than to degenerate into xenophobic, extremist, and anti-Western
regimes that threaten international peace and stability.
Policymakers have tailored U.S. policy in Central Asia to the varying characteristics of these
states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan have included securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear and
biological weapons materials and facilities. U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas
development in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and successive Administrations have backed
diverse export routes to the West for these resources. Economic and democratic reforms have
been among U.S. concerns in Kyrgyzstan. In Tajikistan, U.S. aid has focused on economic
reconstruction following that country’s 1992-1997 civil war. U.S. relations with Uzbekistan
suffered following the Uzbek government’s violent crackdown on armed and unarmed protesters
in the city of Andijon in May 2005.
The 111th Congress is likely to continue to be at the forefront in advocating increased U.S. ties
with Central Asia, and in providing backing for the region for the transit of equipment and
supplies for U.S.-led stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Congress is likely to pursue these goals
through hearings and legislation on humanitarian, economic, and democratization assistance,
security issues, and human rights. Ongoing congressional interests are likely to include boosting
regional border and customs controls and other safeguards to prevent the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), combat trafficking in persons and drugs, encourage regional
integration with South Asia and Europe, advance energy security, and counter terrorism. Support
for these goals also contributes to stabilization and reconstruction operations by the United States
and NATO in Afghanistan. Congress will continue to consider whether and how to balance these
interests against its concerns about human rights abuses and lagging democratization in the
regional states.
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Contents
Most Recent Developments......................................................................................................... 1
Historical Background ................................................................................................................ 1
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns .............................................................................................. 2
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan ................................................................................ 4
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom............................................................................... 4
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations ............................................................................................. 4
Russia’s Role ........................................................................................................................ 6
Obstacles to Peace and Independence: Regional Tensions and Conflicts ...................................... 8
The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan .................................................................................. 9
The Incursions into Kyrgyzstan ........................................................................................... 10
Attacks in Uzbekistan ......................................................................................................... 10
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan.................................................................... 11
The Summer 2009 Suicide Bombings and Attacks......................................................... 12
Actions of the IMU and IJU in Pakistan and Afghanistan .................................................... 12
Actions of the IMU and IJU in Germany and Elsewhere...................................................... 13
U.S. Designation of the IMU and IJU as Terrorist Organizations ......................................... 14
Democratization and Human Rights .......................................................................................... 15
Recent Developments in Kazakhstan............................................................................. 16
Recent Developments in Kyrgyzstan ............................................................................. 18
Recent Developments in Turkmenistan.......................................................................... 19
Recent Developments in Uzbekistan ............................................................................. 19
Human Rights ............................................................................................................... 20
Security and Arms Control ........................................................................................................ 22
Closure of the Karshi-Khanabad Airbase ............................................................................. 24
The Manas Airbase ............................................................................................................. 25
The “Transit Center” Agreement ................................................................................... 26
The Northern Distribution Route to Afghanistan.................................................................. 27
Weapons of Mass Destruction ............................................................................................. 28
Trade and Investment ................................................................................................................ 29
Energy Resources................................................................................................................ 30
Kazakhstan ................................................................................................................... 34
Turkmenistan ................................................................................................................ 35
U.S. Aid Overview.................................................................................................................... 37
Congressional Conditions on Kazakh and Uzbek Aid .................................................... 37
Legislation ................................................................................................................................ 38
P.L. 111-8 (H.R. 1105) (FY2009) ........................................................................................ 38
H.R. 3081 (Lowey)/S. 1434 (Leahy) (FY2010) ................................................................... 39
Figures
Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan ............................................................................................................................. 40
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Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia, FY1992 to FY2009....................................... 39
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 40
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Most Recent Developments
On September 14, 2009, the European Union-Uzbekistan Cooperation Council held a meeting to
discuss implementation of the EU-Uzbekistan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (a plan to
encourage political, commercial, economic, and cultural understanding and mutual benefit) and
the EU’s Strategy for Central Asia (a plan for enhanced cooperation with the region). The EU
urged Uzbek authorities to take further steps to improve human rights and to ensure that a
legislative election scheduled for December 2009 meets international standards. The EU also
called on Uzbekistan to improve its business and investment climate, including by combating
corruption and securing an independent judiciary, and to cooperate with other regional states on
water-sharing and energy issues. Uzbekistan in turn stated that ties should not be based on
ideological stances, “dividing countries into those leading and those being led, [or] double
standards.... No distortion of priorities in favor of [tackling] humanitarian problems is allowed
here.... Attempts to thrust Western models [of development] and ... democracy in any form are
counterproductive. No one has given the right to the EU to monitor the situation in Uzbekistan.”
Perhaps referring to visa restrictions the EU placed for a time on Uzbek officials deemed to have
been involved in the government crackdown in the town of Andijon in 2005 (see “The 2005
Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan” below), Uzbek officials decried “singling out of leaders,” and
stressed having “a balanced and objective approach when assessing this or that event.”1
In recent years, several reporters, human rights activists, and opposition politicians in Kazakhstan
have been killed by motor vehicles under allegedly mysterious conditions. In a new twist,
prominent reporter Tokhniyaz Kuchukov and activist Yevgeniy Zhovtis were given four-year
prison sentences for separate instances in July 2009 of hitting and killing pedestrians. Both
argued that the deaths were accidents and that their trials were not fair. Some observers raised
questions about circumstances surrounding the automobile crashes.
Historical Background
Central Asia consists of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; it
borders Russia, China, the Middle East, and South Asia. The major peoples of all but Tajikistan
speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks speak an Iranian language); and most are Sunni Muslims
(some Tajiks are Shiia Muslims). Most are closely related historically and culturally. By the late
19th century, Russian tsars had conquered the last independent khanates and nomadic lands of
Central Asia. By the early 1920s, Soviet power had been imposed; by 1936, five “Soviet Socialist
Republics” had been created. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, they
gained independence.2
1 EU. Press Release: Ninth meeting of the Cooperation Council between the European Union and the Republic of
Uzbekistan, September 14, 2009; Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), Uzbek
Foreign Ministry Statement, September 16, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950224.
2 See CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 97-690,
Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan: Recent
Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol, CRS Report 97-1055, Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S.
Interests, by Jim Nichol, and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim
Nichol.
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Overview of U.S. Policy
Central Asia: Basic Facts
Total Area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India;
Concerns
Kazakhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000 sq. mi.;
Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan: 190,000 sq. mi.;
Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the
Total Population: 60.6 million, slightly less than France;
end of 1991, then-President George H.W.
Kazakhstan: 15.4 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 5.4 m.; Tajikistan: 7.3
Bush sent the “FREEDOM Support Act”
m.; Turkmenistan: 4.9 m.; Uzbekistan: 27.6 m. (July 2009
(FSA) aid authorization to Congress, which
est., The World Factbook).
was amended and signed into law in October
Total Gross Domestic Product: $305 billion in 2008;
1992 (P.L. 102-511). In 1999, congressional
per capita GDP is about $5,000, but there are large
concerns led to passage of the “Silk Road
income disparities and relatively large percentages of
Strategy Act” (P.L. 106-113), which
people in each country are in poverty. Kazakhstan:
authorized enhanced policy and aid to support
$176.9 b.; Kyrgyzstan: $11.4 b.; Tajikistan: $15.4 b.;
Turkmenistan: $29.7 b.; Uzbekistan: $71.6 b. (The World
conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs,
Factbook, purchasing power parity).
economic development, transport and
communications, border controls, democracy,
and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
U.S. policymakers and others hold various views on the appropriate types and levels of U.S.
involvement in the region. Some have argued that ties with “energy behemoth” Kazakhstan are
crucial to U.S. interests.3 Others have argued that Uzbekistan is the “linchpin” of the region (it is
the most populous regional state and is centrally located, shaping the range and scope of regional
cooperation) and should receive the most U.S. attention.
In general, U.S. aid and investment have been viewed as strengthening the independence of the
Central Asian states and forestalling Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or other efforts to subvert them.
Advocates of such ties have argued that political turmoil and the growth of terrorist enclaves in
Central Asia could produce spillover effects both in nearby states, including U.S. allies and
friends such as Turkey, and worldwide. They also have argued that the United States has a major
interest in preventing terrorist regimes or groups from illicitly acquiring Soviet-era technology for
making weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They have maintained that U.S. interests do not
perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that Turkey and other actors possess limited
aid resources, and that the United States is in the strongest position as the sole superpower to
influence democratization and respect for human rights. They have stressed that such U.S.
influence will help alleviate social tensions exploited by Islamic extremist groups to gain
adherents. They also have argued that for all these reasons, the United States should maintain
military access to the region even when Afghanistan becomes more stable. At least some of these
views seemed to be reflected in the former Bush Administration’s 2006 National Security
Strategy of the United States, which proclaimed that “Central Asia is an enduring priority for our
foreign policy.”4
Some views of policymakers and academics who previously objected to a more forward U.S.
policy toward Central Asia appeared less salient after September 11, 2001, but aspects of these
views could gain more credence if Afghanistan becomes more stable. These observers argued that
3 U.S. Department of State. Office of the Spokesman. Remarks: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice At Eurasian
National University, October 13, 2005. Perhaps indicative of the boosted emphasis on U.S. interests in Kazakhstan,
former Secretary Rice argued that the country had the potential to be the “engine for growth” in Central Asia.
4 The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States, March 16, 2006, p. 40.
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the United States historically had few interests in this region and that developments there
remained largely marginal to U.S. interests. They discounted fears that anti-Western Islamic
extremism would make enough headway to threaten secular regimes or otherwise harm U.S.
interests. They also argued that the United States should not try to foster democratization among
cultures they claimed are historically attuned to authoritarianism. Some observers rejected
arguments that U.S. interests in anti-terrorism, non-proliferation, regional cooperation, and trade
outweighed concerns over democratization and human rights, and urged reducing or cutting off
most aid to repressive states. A few observers pointed to instability in the region as a reason to
eschew deeper U.S. involvement such as military access that could needlessly place more U.S.
personnel and citizens in danger.
The Obama Administration’s request for foreign assistance for FY2010 terms Central Asia an
“alarmingly fragile” region vulnerable to corruption, drug trafficking, and terrorism. The
Administration stresses that good relations with the states of the region are important to
Afghanistan’s stabilization. The request prioritizes foreign assistance to Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan. The regional request is in keeping with President Obama’s call in March 2009 for
forming a new contact group on Afghanistan that includes the Central Asian states.5 Outgoing
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher stated in April 2009 that the Obama Administration
seeks expanded U.S. ties with Central Asia that will include more U.S. visits by high-ranking
officials, cooperation in bringing stability to Afghanistan, and “engagement on issues like
agriculture and energy.... I think we are trying to increase our [regional] aid budgets.” He averred
that regional security, energy diversification, and human rights were equal priorities in U.S.
policy toward the Central Asian countries. He asserted that the United States is encouraging the
regional states to diversify their energy export routes so that they “have a stable use of their
natural resources [and] get the maximum benefit from their natural resources.”6
During his April 2009 visit to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, Assistant Secretary Boucher pledged
that the Obama Administration would work “with countries in [Central Asia] ... to protect borders,
work together to stop narcotics, and work together to develop the economic opportunities of an
open Afghanistan that trades with its neighbors.” He dismissed the view that the United States
was competing against Russia and China for regional influence, stating that the Central Asian
states need many outside states for “education, trade, exports, [and] partners.” He also rejected
the view that the Obama Administration was boosting relations with the region only because of
U.S. interests in Afghanistan, stating that the United States has had a long-time relationship with
the countries of Central Asia.7
Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair warned in testimony on March 10, 2009, that
growing challenges to Central Asia’s stability ultimately “could threaten the security of critical
U.S. and NATO lines of communication to Afghanistan through Central Asia.” He stated that the
“highly personalized politics, weak institutions, and growing inequalities” in the Central Asian
countries make them “ill-equipped to deal with the challenges posed by Islamic violent
extremism, poor economic development, and problems associated with energy, water, and food
distribution.” Although Kazakhstan’s energy revenues had made it a regional economic power, he
5 The White House. Remarks By President Barack Obama on a Comprehensive Strategy For Afghanistan and Pakistan,
March 27, 2009.
6 “Top Diplomat says U.S. Building Central, South Asian Capabilities for Development,” Radio Free Europe, April 17,
2009.
7 U.S. Department of State. Tajikistan-U.S. Relations, April 20, 2009; U.S.-Turkmen Relations, April 20, 2009.
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cautioned that “any sustained decline in oil prices would affect revenues, could lead to societal
discontent, and will derail the momentum for domestic reforms.” Similarly, he counseled that the
global economic downturn will severely affect Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, because they are
“heavily depend[ent] on migrant worker remittances from both Russia and Kazakhstan for a
significant portion of their gross domestic product (up to 45% in the case of Tajikistan).
Tajikistan, in particular, faces increased threats to internal stability from the loss of these critical
revenue streams.”8
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan
After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, then-Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State B. Lynn Pascoe testified that the former Bush Administration realized that “it
was critical to the national interests of the United States that we greatly enhance our relations
with the five Central Asian countries” to prevent them from becoming harbors for terrorism.9 All
the Central Asian states soon offered overflight and other assistance to U.S.-led anti-terrorism
coalition operations in Afghanistan. The states were predisposed to welcome such operations.
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had long supported the Afghan Northern Alliance’s combat against the
Taliban, and all the Central Asian states feared Afghanistan as a base for terrorism, crime, and
drug trafficking (even Turkmenistan, which tried to reach some accommodation with the Taliban).
In 2005, however, Uzbekistan rescinded its basing agreement with the United States. Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan have maintained their basing support for NATO peacekeeping operations—and
Kyrgyzstan until recently for U.S. operations—in Afghanistan. In 2009, the Central Asian states
agreed to facilitate the land transport of NATO non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan as an
alternative to land transport via increasingly volatile Pakistan (see also below, “Security and Arms
Control”).
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom
Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian state that joined the “coalition of the willing” in February-
March 2003 that endorsed prospective U.S.-led coalition military operations in Iraq (Kazakhstan
joined later). Uzbekistan subsequently decided not to send troops to Iraq, but Kazakhstan
deployed some two dozen troops to Iraq who reportedly did not take part in combat operations.
They pulled out in late 2008.
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible members of the
international community, supporting integrative goals through bilateral aid and through
coordination with other aid donors. The stated policy goal is to discourage radical anti-democratic
regimes and terrorist groups from gaining influence. All the Central Asian leaders publicly
embrace Islam but display hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have
8 U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Hearing on National Security Threats. Statement of Dennis C. Blair,
Director of National Intelligence, March 10, 2009.
9 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The U.S. Role
in Central Asia. Testimony of B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, June 27,
2002.
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established some trade and aid ties with Iran. Although they have had greater success in attracting
development aid from the West than from the East, some observers argue that, in the longer run,
their foreign policies may not be anti-Western but may more closely reflect some concerns of
other Islamic states. Some Western organizational ties with the region have suffered in recent
years, in particular those of the OSCE, which has been criticized by some Central Asian
governments for advocating democratization and respect for human rights.10 Despite this
criticism, President Nazarbayev successfully pushed for Kazakhstan to hold the presidency of the
OSCE (see below).
The State Department in 2006 included Central Asia in a revamped Bureau of South and Central
Asian Affairs. According to former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Steven Mann,
“institutions such as NATO and the OSCE will continue to draw the nations of Central Asia closer
to Europe and the United States,” but the United States also will encourage the states to develop
“new ties and synergies with nations to the south,” such as Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan.11 In
May 2007, Defense Secretary Robert Gates urged Asian countries to provide Central Asia with
road and rail, telecommunications, and electricity generation and distribution aid to link the
region with Asia; to help it combat terrorism and narcotics trafficking; to send technical advisors
to ministries to promote political and economic reforms; to offer more military trainers,
peacekeepers, and advisors for defense reforms; and to more actively integrate the regional states
into “the Asian security structure.”12 (See also below, “Trade and Investment.”)
The European Union (EU) has become more interested in Central Asia in recent years as the
region has become more of a security threat as an originator and transit zone for drugs, weapons
of mass destruction, refugees, and persons smuggled for prostitution or labor. Russia’s cutoff of
gas supplies to Ukraine in early 2006 also bolstered EU interest in Central Asia as an alternative
supplier of oil and gas. Such interests contributed to the launch of a Strategy Paper for assistance
for 2002-2006 and a follow-on for 2007-2013 (see below), and the EU’s appointment of a Special
Representative to the region. The EU has implemented Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
(PCAs, which set forth political, economic, and trade relations) with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Uzbekistan. An existing Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) program was
supplemented in 2004 and 2006 by a Baku Energy Initiative to diversify energy supplies. One
project involves the proposed Nabucco pipeline, which could transport Caspian region gas to
Austria.13
In June 2007, the EU approved a new “Central Asian strategy” for enhanced aid and relations for
2007-2013. It calls for establishing offices in each regional state and assistance of $1 billion over
the next five years. The strategy argues that the EU ties with the region need to be enhanced
because EU enlargement and EU relations with the South Caucasus and Black Sea states bring it
10 See also CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
11 U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central
Asia. Assessing Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia. Testimony of Steven Mann, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, July 25, 2006. The State Department appointed a Senior Advisor on
Regional Integration in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Robert Deutsch, who focused on bolstering
trade and transport ties between South and Central Asia.
12 U.S. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Documents. International Institute for Strategic Studies -
Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Singapore, June 1, 2007.
13 For details, see CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, by Paul Belkin. See also
European Union. “The EU and the Countries of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea Regions Agree on a Common Energy
Strategy,” Press Release, November 30, 2006.
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to Central Asia’s borders. The strategy also stresses that “the dependency of the EU on external
energy sources and the need for a diversified energy supply policy in order to increase energy
security open further perspectives for cooperation between the EU and Central Asia,” and that the
“EU will conduct an enhanced regular energy dialogue” with the states.14 Under the strategy, the
EU holds dozens of meetings and seminars each year with the Central Asian states on such issues
as human rights, civil society development, foreign policy and assistance, trade and investment,
environmental and energy cooperation, and other issues.
Russia’s Role
During most of the 1990s, successive U.S. administrations generally viewed a democratizing
Russia as serving as a role model in Central Asia. Despite growing authoritarian tendencies in
Russia during the presidency of Vladimir Putin (2000-2008), the former Bush Administration
emphasized that Russia’s counter-terrorism efforts in the region broadly supported U.S. interests.
At the same time, successive administrations have stressed to Russia that it should not seek to
dominate the region or exclude Western and other involvement. Virtually all U.S. analysts agree
that Russia’s actions should be monitored to ensure that the independence of the Central Asian
states is not vitiated.
Soon after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Russia acquiesced to
increased U.S. and coalition presence in the region for operations against Al Qaeda and its
supporters in Afghanistan. Besides Russia’s own concerns about Islamic extremism in
Afghanistan and Central Asia, it was interested in boosting its economic and other ties to the West
and regaining some influence in Afghanistan. More recently, however, Russia has appeared to
step up efforts to counter U.S. influence in Central Asia by advocating that the states increase
economic and strategic ties with Russia and limit such ties with the United States. Such a stance
appears paradoxical to some observers, since Russia (and China) benefit from anti-terrorism
operations carried out by U.S. (and NATO) forces in Afghanistan.
During the 1990s, Russia’s economic decline and demands by Central Asia caused it to reduce its
security presence, a trend that Vladimir Putin appeared determined to reverse during his
presidency (2000-2008). In 1999, Russian border guards were largely phased out in Kyrgyzstan,
the last Russian military advisors left Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the
Collective Security Treaty (CST; see below) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
in part because the treaty members failed to help Uzbekistan meet the growing Taliban threat in
Afghanistan, according to Uzbek President Islam Karimov. However, Russia has appeared
determined to maintain a military presence in Tajikistan. It long retained about 14,500 Federal
Border Guards in Tajikistan, most of whom were Tajik conscripts, and 7,800 Russian troops of
the 201st motorized rifle division.15
Russia’s efforts to formalize a basing agreement with Tajikistan dragged on for years, as
Tajikistan endeavored to maximize rents and assert its sovereignty. In October 2004, the basing
agreement was signed, formalizing Russia’s largest military presence abroad, besides its Black
14 European Commission. Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the Period 2007-2013, June 2007;
Council of the European Union. Presidency Conclusions, 11177/07, June 23, 2007, p. 12; European Commission.
External Relations. Joint Progress Report by the Council and the European Commission to the European Council on
the implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy, June 24, 2008.
15 The Military Balance 2005-2006. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2005.
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Sea Fleet. At the same time, Tajikistan demanded full control over border policing. Russia
announced in June 2005 that it had handed over the last guard-house along the Afghan-Tajik
border to Tajik troops. Reportedly, some Russian “advisory” border troops remain. Tajik
President Emomali Rahmon (or Rakhmonov) and others emphasize that growing drug production
and trafficking from Afghanistan pose increasing challenges.16
In a seeming shift toward a more activist role in Central Asia, in April 2000, Russia called for the
signatories of the CST to approve the creation of rapid reaction forces to combat terrorism and
hinted that such forces might launch pre-emptive strikes on Afghan terrorist bases. These hints
elicited U.S. calls for Russia to exercise restraint and consult the U.N. Presidents Clinton and
Putin agreed in 2000 to set up a working group to examine Afghan-related terrorism (this working
later discussed counter-terrorism). CST members agreed in 2001 to set up the Central Asian rapid
reaction force headquartered in Kyrgyzstan, with Russia’s troops in Tajikistan comprising most of
the force. CIS members in 2001 also approved setting up an Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC) in
Moscow, with a branch in Kyrgyzstan, giving Russia influence over regional intelligence
gathering.
Perhaps as a result of the establishment of a U.S. airbase in Kyrgyzstan after the September 11,
2001, attacks (see “The Manas Airbase” below), Russia in September 2003 signed a 15-year
military basing accord with Kyrgyzstan providing access to the Kant airfield, near Kyrgyzstan’s
capital of Bishkek. The base is a few miles from the U.S.-led coalition’s airbase. After Kyrgyzstan
agreed to continued U.S. use of the airbase in mid-2009 (see “The “Transit Center” Agreement”
below), Russia requested that Kyrgyzstan grant Moscow rights to another airbase. Besides
Russia’s military presence in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, it has also asserted its maritime
dominance in the Caspian Sea. Russia’s Caspian Sea Flotilla has been bolstered by troops and
equipment in recent years.
Taking advantage of Uzbekistan’s souring relations with many Western countries in 2005 (see
below), Russia signed a Treaty on Allied Relations with Uzbekistan in November 2005 that calls
for mutual defense consultations in the event of a threat to either party (similar to language in the
CST). Uzbekistan re-joined the CST Organization (CSTO; see below) in June 2006 at a meeting
where the member-states also agreed that basing agreements by any member with a third party
had to be approved by all members, in effect providing supreme veto power to Russia over future
basing arrangements.
Despite rejoining the CSTO, Uzbekistan has appeared wary of Russian intentions in the
organization, including by insisting that Tashkent will not participate in rapid reaction forces
established in June 2009 unless they pledge to not become involved in disputes within the CIS.
Following a Kyrgyzstan-Russia agreement in early August 2009 to enhance Russia’s military
presence in Kyrgyzstan—which was widely expected to include the creation of an airbase near
the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border—the Uzbek Foreign Ministry strongly warned that “the
implementation of such projects ... where the borders of three Central Asian republics directly
16 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008, August 2008. UNODC stated that
opium production declined slightly in 2008 after setting a record in 2007, but that Afghanistan remained the source of
most of the world’s opiates. UNODC estimated that about one-fifth of Afghan-produced morphine and heroin transit
Central Asia. Only a tiny percentage of Afghan drugs reaches U.S. consumers, and most does not appear to be
smuggled through Central Asia.
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converge may give impetus to the strengthening of militarization processes and initiate all kinds
of nationalistic confrontations,” as well as serve as a lightening rod for militant attacks.17
Many observers suggest that the appreciative attitude of Central Asian states toward the United
States in the early 2000s—for their added security accomplished through U.S.-led actions in
Afghanistan—has declined over time. Reasons may include perceptions that the United States has
not provided adequate security or economic assistance. Also, Russia and China are pledging
security support to the states to get them to forget their pre-September 11, 2001, dissatisfaction
with Russian and Chinese efforts. Russia also encourages the leaders to believe that the United
States backs democratic “revolutions” to replace them. Lastly, Russia has claimed that it can
ensure regional security in the face of the recently deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan.
As Russia’s economy improved in the 2000s—as a result of increases in oil and gas prices—
Russia reasserted its economic interests in Central Asia. Russia endeavored to counter Western
business and gain substantial influence over energy resources through participation in joint
ventures and by insisting that pipelines cross Russian territory. After an Energy Cooperation
Statement was signed at the May 2002 U.S.-Russia summit, it appeared that Russia would accept
a Western role in the Caspian region, including the construction of oil and gas pipelines from
Azerbaijan to Turkey. Subsequently, however, Russian officials urged the Central Asian states to
rely on Russian-controlled export routes (see below, “Energy Resources”).
As Russia’s economic growth has slowed in 2008-2009—as a result of decreasing oil and gas
prices and other shocks associated with the global economic downturn—it has appeared that
Russia has tried to maintain economic leverage, including by extending stabilization loans to
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In other areas, such as commodity trade and the remittances from
Russia by migrant workers, Russian economic influence has been lessened, although it is still
significant. In contrast, China has appeared to be stepping up its aid and trade activities in the
region.18
Obstacles to Peace and Independence: Regional
Tensions and Conflicts
The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups, convoluted borders, and emerging national identities
pose challenges to stability in all the Central Asian states. Emerging national identities accentuate
clan, family, regional, and Islamic self-identifications. Central Asia’s convoluted borders fail to
accurately reflect ethnic distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to regional
tensions. Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries and
Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, they make up almost a quarter of the population. More ethnic Turkmen
reside in Iran and Afghanistan—over three million—than in Turkmenistan. Sizeable numbers of
ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and seven million in Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks
live in China’s Xinjiang province. The fertile Ferghana Valley is shared by Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The central governments have struggled to gain control over
administrative subunits. Most observers agree that the term “Central Asia” currently denotes a
geographic area more than a region of shared identities and aspirations, although it is clear that
17 CEDR, August 3, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950224.
18 Matt Siegel, “Crisis.... What Crisis? China Spends Big in Central Asia,” Agence France Presse, May 24, 2009.
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the land-locked, poverty-stricken, and sparsely populated region will need more integration in
order to develop.
Regional cooperation remains stymied by tensions among the states. Such tensions continue to
exist despite the membership of the states in various cooperation groups such as the CST
Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and NATO’s Partnership
for Peace (PFP). The CST was signed by Russia, Belarus, the South Caucasus countries, and the
Central Asian states (except Turkmenistan) in May 1992 and called for military cooperation and
joint consultations in the event of security threats to any member. At the time to renew the treaty
in 1999, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan formally withdrew. The remaining members
formed the CSTO in late 2002, and a secretariat opened in Moscow at the beginning of 2004.
Through the CSTO, Russia has attempted to involve the members in joint efforts to combat
international terrorism and drug trafficking.19 Former Kyrgyz President Akayev apparently did
not call for the aid of the CSTO during the coup that overthrew him in 2005 (see below), and the
CSTO has appeared inactive during other crises in the region. In September 2008, its members
agreed to condemn Georgia’s “aggression” against its breakaway South Ossetia region but
refused a request by Russia to extend diplomatic recognition to South Ossetia and Georgia’s
breakaway region of Abkhazia. In February 2009, the largely moribund CSTO Central Asian
rapid reaction forces were formally disbanded with the creation of CSTO Operative Deployment
Forces, which Russia proclaimed would be comparable to NATO forces. Uzbekistan announced,
however, that it would participate in the new forces only on a case-by-case basis.
In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed the “Shanghai treaty” with China
pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in 1997 they signed a
follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300 mile former Soviet-Chinese border. China has used the
treaty to pressure the Central Asian states to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting
separatism in China’s Xinjiang province, and to get them to extradite Uighurs fleeing China. In
2001, Uzbekistan joined the group, re-named the SCO, and in 2003 the SCO Regional Anti-
Terrorism Structure (RATS) was set up there. Military exercises have become a major form of
cooperation. According to some observers, a major aim of these “anti-terrorism” exercises is to
convince the Central Asian states that Russia and China are able to supplant the United States in
helping the region to combat terrorism. China also has stressed economic cooperation with the
region to build east-west transport routes, and these efforts may facilitate progress toward
regional integration.20
The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan
Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward
independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of
nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and groups tried to take power. Kulyabi and Khojenti
regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by
the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced
persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. After the two sides agreed to a cease-fire, the
U.N. Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in
19 Roger McDermott, Eurasia Insight, August 28, 2002.
20 Roger McDermott, The Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007, Occasional Paper, The Jamestown Foundation,
October 2007; S. Frederick Starr, ed., The New Silk Roads: Transport and Trade in Greater Central Asia (Washington
D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2007).
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December 1994. In June 1997, Tajik President Rahmon and the late rebel leader Seyed Abdullo
Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Benchmarks of the peace process were largely
met, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000. To encourage the peace process, the United States
initially pledged to help Tajikistan rebuild. Some observers point to events in the city of Andijon
in Uzbekistan (see “The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan” below) as indicating that
conflicts similar to the Tajik civil war could engulf other regional states where large numbers of
people are disenfranchised and poverty-stricken.
The Incursions into Kyrgyzstan
Several hundred Islamic extremists and others first invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999.
Jama Namanganiy, the co-leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU; see below),
headed the largest guerrilla group. They seized hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to
create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan.21 With
Uzbek and Kazakh air and other support, Kyrgyz forces forced the guerrillas out in October 1999.
Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August 2000.
Uzbekistan provided air and other support, but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for
defeating the insurgents by late October 2000. The IMU did not invade the region in the summer
before September 11, 2001, in part because Osama bin Laden had secured its aid for a Taliban
offensive against the Afghan Northern Alliance.
About a dozen alleged IMU members invaded from Tajikistan in May 2006 but soon were
defeated (some escaped). After this, the Kyrgyz defense minister claimed that the IMU, HT, and
other such groups increasingly menaced national security.
Attacks in Uzbekistan
A series of explosions in Tashkent in February 1999 were among early signs that the Uzbek
government was vulnerable to terrorism. By various reports, the explosions killed 16 to 28 and
wounded 100 to 351 people. The aftermath involved wide-scale arrests of political dissidents and
others deemed by some observers as unlikely conspirators. Karimov in April 1999 accused
Mohammad Solikh (former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of
masterminding what he termed an assassination plot, along with Tohir Yuldashev (co-leader of the
IMU) and the Taliban. The first trial of 22 suspects in June resulted in six receiving death
sentences. The suspects said in court that they received terrorist training in Afghanistan,
Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia and were led by Solikh, Yuldashev and Namanganiy. In 2000,
Yuldashev and Namanganiy received death sentences in absentia, and Solikh received a 15.5 year
prison sentence. Solikh denied membership in IMU, and he and Yuldashev denied involvement in
the bombings.
On March 28 through April 1, 2004, a series of suicide bombings and other attacks were launched
in Uzbekistan, reportedly killing 47. An obscure Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan (IJG; Jama’at
al-Jihad al-Islami, a breakaway part of the IMU) claimed responsibility.22 In subsequent trials, the
21 According to Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, and Svante Cornell, the incursions of the IMU into Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000 were largely driven by efforts to secure drug trafficking routes. Islamic Radicalism in
Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU, Silk Road Paper, July 2006.
22 The IJG changed its name to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in 2005.
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alleged attackers were accused of being members of IJG or of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT; an Islamic
fundamentalist movement ostensibly pledged to peace but banned in Uzbekistan) and of
attempting to overthrow the government. Some defendants testified that they were trained by
Arabs and others at camps in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. They testified that Najmiddin
Kamolitdinovich Jalolov (convicted in absentia in 2000) was the leader of IJG, and linked him to
Taliban head Mohammad Omar, Uighur extremist Abu Mohammad, and Osama bin Laden. On
July 30, 2004, explosions occurred at the U.S. and Israeli embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor-
General’s Office in Tashkent. The IMU and IJG claimed responsibility and stated that the suicide
bombings were aimed against Uzbek and other “apostate” governments.23
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan
Dozens or perhaps hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded on May 13, 2005, after Uzbek
troops fired on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon. The protestors had gathered to
demand the end of a trial of local businessmen charged with belonging to an Islamic terrorist
group. The night before, a group stormed a prison where those on trial were held and released
hundreds of inmates.24 Many freed inmates then joined others in storming government buildings.
President Karimov flew to the city to direct operations, and reportedly had restored order by late
on May 13.25 On July 29, 439 people who had fled from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan were airlifted
to Romania for resettlement processing, after the United States and others raised concerns that
they might be tortured if returned to Uzbekistan.26
The United States and others in the international community repeatedly called for an international
inquiry into events in Andijon, which the Uzbek government rejected as violating its sovereignty.
In November 2005, the EU Council approved a visa ban on 12 Uzbek officials it stated were
“directly responsible for the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in Andijon and for
the obstruction of an independent inquiry.” The Council also embargoed exports of “arms,
military equipment, and other equipment that might be used for internal repression.”27 In October
2007 and April 2008, the EU Council suspended the visa ban for six months but left the arms
embargo in place. In October 2008, the EU Council praised what it viewed as some positive
trends in human rights in Uzbekistan and lifted the visa ban, although it left the arms embargo in
place.28
23 See also CRS Report RS21818, The 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim
Nichol.
24 There is a great deal of controversy about whether this group contained foreign-trained terrorists or was composed
mainly of the friends and families of the accused. See U.S. Congress. Commission on Security and Cooperation In
Europe. Briefing: The Uzbekistan Crisis. Testimony of Galima Bukharbayeva, Correspondent. Institute for War and
Peace Reporting, June 29, 2005. For a contrasting assessment, see Shirin Akiner, Violence in Andijon, 13 May 2005:
An Independent Assessment, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, July 2005; and AbduMannob Polat, Reassessing Andijan:
The Road to Restoring U.S.-Uzbek Relations, Jamestown Foundation, June 2007.
25 Analyst Adeeb Khalid draws a parallel between the Uzbek government’s actions at Andijon and at a large student
demonstration in Tashkent in January 1992. In the latter case, Karimov allegedly ordered troops to fire on the marchers,
resulting in up to six deaths and two dozen or more injuries. Islam After Communism (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2007), p. 155. See also Reuters, January 17, 1992.
26 See also CRS Report RS22161, Unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan: Context and Implications, by Jim Nichol.
27 Council of the European Union. Uzbekistan: Council Adopts Restrictive Measures, Press Release 14392/05,
November 14, 2005. U.S. officials argued that the United States already had been limiting military assistance—at
congressional request—because of human rights abuses.
28 Council of the European Union. 2824th General Affairs Council Meeting. Press Release, October 15-16, 2007; 2864th
(continued...)
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At the first major trial of fifteen alleged perpetrators of the Andijon unrest in late 2005, the
accused all confessed and asked for death penalties. They testified that they were members of
Akramiya, a branch of HT launched in 1994 by Akram Yuldashev that allegedly aimed to use
force to create a caliphate in the area of the Fergana Valley located in Uzbekistan. Besides
receiving assistance from HT, Akramiya was alleged to receive financial aid and arms training
from the IMU. The defendants also claimed that the U.S. and Kyrgyz governments helped finance
and support their effort to overthrow the government, and that international media colluded with
local human rights groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in this effort. The U.S.
and Kyrgyz governments denied involvement, and many observers criticized the trial as
appearing stage-managed. Reportedly, 100 or more individuals were arrested and sentenced,
including some Uzbek opposition party members and media and NGO representatives. Partly in
response, Congress tightened conditions on aid to Uzbekistan.29
The Summer 2009 Suicide Bombings and Attacks
On May 25-26, 2009, a police checkpoint was attacked on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, attacks took
place in the border town of Khanabad, and four bombings occurred in Andijon in the commercial
district, including at least one by suicide bombers. Several deaths and injuries were alleged,
although reporting was suppressed. Uzbek officials blamed the IMU, although the IJU allegedly
claimed responsibility. President Karimov flew to Andijon on May 31. In late August 2009,
shooting took place in Tashkent that resulted in the deaths of three alleged IMU members and the
apprehension of other group members. The Uzbek government alleged that the group had been
involved in the 1999 explosions and in recent assassinations in Tashkent.
Actions of the IMU and IJU in Pakistan and Afghanistan
Pakistan reported in November 2006 that it had arrested IJU members who had placed rockets
near presidential offices, the legislature, and the headquarters of military intelligence in
Islamabad. Reportedly, the IJU was targeting the government because of its support for the
United States.30 Pakistani media reported in March-April 2007 that dozens of IMU members had
been killed in northern Pakistan when local tribes turned against them, possibly reducing their
strength or forcing them to move into Afghanistan and Central Asia. More alleged IMU and IJU
members were reported killed by Pakistani forces during fighting in North Waziristan in October
2007. Indicating a widening of the IMU’s focus, Tohir Yuldashev called in January 2008 for
creating a Shariah state in Pakistan.
(...continued)
and 2865th General Affairs and External Relations Council Meetings. Press Release, April 29, 2008; 2897th General
Affairs and External Relations Council Meeting, Press Release, October 13, 2008. Some international human rights
groups protested against a visit by the head of the Uzbek state security service—who had been subject to the visa ban
lifted by the COE—to Germany in late October 2008. He reportedly advised German officials on IJU activities in
Central Asia.
29 OSCE. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Report from the OSCE/ODIHR Trial
Monitoring in Uzbekistan, April 21, 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Republic of Uzbekistan. Comments on the
Report Prepared by the OSCE ODIHR, April 19, 2006.
30 BBC Monitoring South Asia, November 4, 2006.
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In January 2008, an IJU website seemed to indicate that Abu Laith al-Libi—an al Qaeda official
who had been killed by the United States in Pakistan—had been one of the leaders of the IJU.31
In March 2008, an IJU website claimed that one of its members—the German-born Cunyt Ciftci
(alias Saad Abu Fourkan)—had assisted Taliban forces in Afghanistan by carrying out a suicide
bombing that killed two Afghan and two U.S. troops and wounded several others.32 According to
the IJU website and other sources, IJU is playing a more significant role in fighting in
Afghanistan.
In June 2008, an IJU video claimed that one Uzbek IJU member had taken part in the 1999 attack
in Kyrgyzstan, and later had fought in Afghanistan against the Northern Alliance and then against
U.S. and NATO forces. Another Uzbek member had been trained in Chechnya by Khattab in 1998
and also had fought against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.33
In July 2009, ISAF and the Afghan military reportedly launched an operation in the northern
Konduz province against IMU terrorists who supposedly had moved into the province after being
forced out of Pakistan. In August 2009, Afghan media reported that four IMU members had been
captured in Konduz province.
Actions of the IMU and IJU in Germany and Elsewhere
Officials in Germany arrested four individuals on September 5, 2007, on charges of planning
explosions at the U.S. airbase at Ramstein, at U.S. and Uzbek diplomatic offices, and other targets
in Germany. The IJU claimed responsibility and stated that it was targeting U.S. and Uzbek
interests because of these countries’ “brutal policies towards Muslims,” and targeting Germany
because it has a small military base in Termez, Uzbekistan, which is used to support NATO
operations in Afghanistan. Reportedly, the suspects had received their orders from Gofir Salimov
(not apprehended), who is wanted in Uzbekistan in connection with the 2004 bombings. The
suspects were part of a larger IJU branch in Germany. In U.S. Congressional testimony on
September 10, 2007, the then-Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, John Redd, and
the then-Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, stated that U.S. communications
intercepts shared with Germany had facilitated foiling the plot. In July 2009, German media
reported that the suspects had confessed that they were trained at an IJU terrorist training camp in
Afghanistan. The leader of the IJU was identified as Najmiddin Jalolov (mentioned above), a.k.a.
“commander Ahmad.” In testimony in September 2009, two of the defendants admitted that while
in Afghanistan in 2006, they had launched attacks against two U.S. military camps.34
In May 2008, French, German, and Dutch authorities reported that they had detained 10
individuals for suspicion of running a network to funnel money to the IMU in Uzbekistan.
31 Guido Steinberg, A Turkish al-Qaeda: The Islamic Jihad Union and the Internationalization of Uzbek Jihadism,
Center for Contemporary Conflict, 2008; U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Prepared Testimony of
Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell: The Annual Threat Assessment, February 5, 2008.
32 Guido Steinberg, A Turkish al-Qaeda; UPI, March 17, 2008.
33 CEDR, August 4, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-318001.
34 Guido Steinberg has argued that several dozen recruits of various ethnic groups have travelled from Germany to
Pakistan for training in IMU and IJU camps. Open Source Center. Europe: Daily Report, August 10, 2009, Doc. No.
EUP-72003.
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In late September 2008, German authorities reported the arrest of two suspected members of IJU
and issued wanted posters for two other suspected members. The four allegedly had received
terrorist training in Pakistani IJU camps. German authorities also arrested two people allegedly
attempting to leave the country to undergo terrorism training in Pakistan by the IJU (they later
were released on the grounds of inconclusive evidence).35
A video released by the IJU in late October 2008 stated that as long as Germany supports NATO
operations in Afghanistan, and uses a base in Uzbekistan to support these operations, it is subject
to IJU attacks.
A video was released by the IJU in January 2009 that threatened German “occupation” troops in
Afghanistan.
Turkish authorities arrested over three dozen alleged IJU members in April 2009.
German media reported in June 2009 that a video released by the IJU provided more evidence
that the terrorist organization was linked to al Qaeda.36
U.S. Designation of the IMU and IJU as Terrorist Organizations
In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,
stating that the IMU, aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by Osama bin Laden, resorts to
terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. The “main goal of the
IMU is to topple the current government in Uzbekistan,” the State Department warned, and it
linked the IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. IMU forces assisting the
Taliban and Al Qaeda suffered major losses during coalition actions in Afghanistan, and
Namanganiy was probably killed.37
Former CIA Director Porter Goss testified in March 2005 that the IJG/IJU “has become a more
virulent threat to U.S. interests and local governments.”38 In May 2005, the State Department
designated the IJG/IJU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global
Terrorist, and in June, the U.N. Security Council added the IJG/IJU to its terrorism list.39 In June
2008, Jalolov and his associate Suhayl Fatilloevich Buranov were added to the U.N. 1267
Sanctions Committee’s Consolidated List of individuals and entities associated with bin Laden, al
Qaeda, and the Taliban. Also, the U.S. Treasury Department ordered that any of their assets under
35 Simon Sturdee, “German Commandos Arrest Two Terror Suspects on Aircraft,” Agence France Presse, September
26, 2008; Craig Whitlock, “Germany Pulls Two Suspected Terrorism Trainees from Plane,” Washington Post,
September 27, 2008, p. A14.
36 Open Source Center. Europe: Daily Report (hereafter EDR), June 5, 2009, Doc. No. EUP-85023.
37 U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, April 2004.
38 U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Testimony of the Director of Central Intelligence, The Honorable Porter
J. Goss, March 17, 2005.
39 U.S. Department of State. Press Statement: U.S. Department of State Designates the Islamic Jihad Group Under
Executive Order 13224, May 26, 2005; U.N. Security Council. The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee. Press
Release: Security Council Committee Adds One Entity to Al-Qaida Section of Consolidated List, SC/8405, June 3,
2005.
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U.S. jurisdiction be frozen and prohibited U.S. citizens from financial dealings with the
terrorists.40
Democratization and Human Rights
A major goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term development of
democratic institutions and respect for human rights. Particularly since September 11, 2001, the
United States has attempted to harmonize its concerns about democratization and human rights in
the region with its interests in regional support for counter-terrorism. According to some
allegations, the former Bush Administration may have sent suspected terrorists in its custody to
Uzbekistan for questioning, a process termed “extraordinary rendition.”41 Although not verifying
such transfers specifically to Uzbekistan, the former Bush Administration stated that it received
diplomatic assurances that transferees would not be tortured. Several citizens of Central Asian
states who were held in U.S. custody at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base have been returned to
their home countries.42
Several of the Central Asian leaders have declared that they are committed to democratization.
Despite such pledges, the states have made little progress, according to the State Department.43
During Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed a Charter on
Democratic Partnership that recognized Kazakhstan’s commitments to the rule of law, respect for
human rights, and economic reform. During his December 2001 and September 2006 visits,
Nazarbayev repeated these pledges in joint statements with then-President Bush. In March 2002,
a U.S.-Uzbek Strategic Partnership Declaration was signed pledging Uzbekistan to “intensify the
democratic transformation” and improve freedom of the press. During his December 2002 U.S.
visit, Tajikistan’s President Rahmon pledged to “expand fundamental freedoms and human
rights.”
During the 1990s and early 2000s, almost all the leaders in Central Asia held onto power by
orchestrating extensions of their terms, holding suspect elections, eliminating possible
contenders, and providing emoluments to supporters and relatives (the exception was the leader
of Tajikistan, who had been ousted in the early 1990s during a civil war). After this long period of
leadership stability, President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan was toppled in a coup in 2005, and
President Niyazov of Turkmenistan died in late 2006, marking the passing of three out of five
Soviet-era regional leaders from the scene.
40 U.S. Department of the Treasury. Press Release: Treasury Designates Leadership of the IJU Terrorist Group, June
18, 2008.
41 The New Yorker, February 14, 2005; New York Times, May 1, 2005; New York Times, December 31, 2005;
Representative Edward Markey, Congressional Record, December 13, 2005, p. H11337; European Parliament.
Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transport And Illegal Detention
of Prisoners, Draft Interim Report, 2006/2027(INI), April 24, 2006; and On the Testimony by Craig Murray, Former
British Ambassador, Working Document No. 5, June 1, 2006.
42 House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight.
Hearing: City on the Hill or Prison on the Bay? The Mistakes of Guantanamo and the Decline of America’s Image,
May 6, 2008; Hearing: Rendition and the Department of State, June 10, 2008. At least three Tajiks returned to
Tajikistan from Guantanamo were then tried and imprisoned on charges of belonging to al Qaeda or the IMU.
43 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007.
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Possible scenarios of political futures in Central Asia have ranged from continued rule in most of
the states by elite groups that became ensconced during the Soviet era to violent transitions to
Islamic fundamentalist rule. Relatively peaceful transitions to more or less democratic and
Western-oriented political systems have been considered decreasingly likely by many observers.
While some observers warn that Islamic extremism could increase dramatically in the region,
others discount the risk that the existing secular governments soon will be overthrown by Islamic
extremists.44
In the case of the three succession transitions so far, Tajikistan’s resulted in a shift in the Soviet-
era regional/clan elite configuration and some limited inclusion of the Islamic Renaissance Party.
Perhaps worrisome, Tajik President Rahmon has written a “spiritual guide” reminiscent of the one
penned by Turkmenistan’s late authoritarian president, and has given orders on how citizens
should live and dress. Kyrgyzstan’s transition appears to involve power-sharing by Soviet-era
regional/clan elites. The Kyrgyz government appears recently to be backsliding on
democratization. In Turkmenistan, it appears that Soviet-era elites have retained power following
Niyazov’s death and have eschewed meaningful democratization.
Recent Developments in Kazakhstan
In May 2007, President Nazarbayev proposed changes to the constitution that he claimed would
increase legislative power and boost democratization. He explained that after Kazakhstan gained
independence, “the need to build Kazakh statehood and a market economy from scratch
demanded [that] I assume all the responsibility.... But today, when the process of modernization
of the country is irreversible ... the time has come [for] a new system of checks and balances.”
The legislature approved the changes the next day. The changes included increasing the number
of deputies in both legislative chambers, decreasing the president’s term in office from seven to
five years, and requiring a court order in case of detention or arrest. Seemingly non-reformist
changes included a requirement for a two-thirds vote in each legislative chamber to override
presidential alterations to approved bills, a provision that nine deputies of the Majilis (the lower
legislative chamber) are appointed by the People’s Assembly, and a change “initiated” by the
legislature excluding Nazarbayev from term limits. Visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
Richard Boucher stated in June 2007 that “these constitutional amendments go in the right
direction.... [and] point the way to a stable, democratic system.”45
Similar to the events of late 1993, deputies in Kazakhstan’s Majilis (the lower legislative
chamber) in June 2007 ostensibly requested that President Nursultan Nazarbayev cut short their
terms and hold early elections. He acceded to the request the next day and the election was
scheduled for August 18, 2007. As per constitutional amendments and election law changes, the
size of the Majilis increased from 77 to 107 members. Ninety-eight members are elected by party
lists and nine by the People’s Assembly (which is headed by the president). Seven parties were
registered for the election, six of which were pro-government and one of which was an opposition
party. The main pro-government party, Nur-Otan (Fatherland’s Ray of Light), reportedly received
44 Analyst Adeeb Khalid argues that the elites and populations of the regional states still hold many attitudes and follow
many practices imposed during the Soviet period of rule. This “Sovietism” makes it difficult for either Islamic
extremism or democratization to make headway, he suggests. Khalid, p. 193. For a perhaps more troubling view of the
threat of Islamic extremism, see above, “Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns.”
45 U.S. Embassy, Astana, Kazakhstan. Interview by ... Richard A. Boucher with Aybek Aldabergenov of Era TV,
June 6, 2007.
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88.05% of 8.87 million votes cast and won all 98 seats. The other six parties running were unable
to clear a 7% threshold needed to win seats. Observers from the OSCE praised some positive
aspects of the vote, but judged it as falling short of a free and fair race. They were critical of
irregularities in counting ballots, a high vote hurdle for parties to win seats, the appointment of
nine deputies, and no provision for candidates who were not party-affiliated to run. U.S. analyst
Ariel Cohen hailed “a relatively clean election that demonstrates high popular support.”46
Although Kazakhstan lobbied extensively for holding the presidency of the OSCE in 2009, the
15th Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE in Madrid in late November 2007 decided that Greece
would hold the OSCE presidency in 2009, followed in 2010 by Kazakhstan. This positive
decision was made despite the appearance in early November of the final report of the OSCE’s
Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which assessed Kazakhstan’s
August legislative election as not meeting OSCE commitments (although the election was
considered improved over previous races). Kazakhstan was among several CIS members that
called in 2007 for restricting the scope of election observation by ODIHR. Also in late October
2007, Kazakh authorities were alleged to have closed down several independent newspapers and
Internet sites.
Foreign Minister Tazhin pledged at the Ministerial Meeting that suggestions made by ODIHR for
changes to media, electoral, and political party laws would be submitted for consideration by the
Kazakh legislature by the end of 2008. He stated that amendments to the media law would
include reducing criminal penalties for libel by the media, setting up “media self-regulation
mechanisms” to address libel issues, and easing the registration process for media. He also
promised that the Kazakh government would soon move to increase local self-government. He
assured the OSCE that Kazakhstan “consider[s] the human dimension to be one of the most
important directions of the OSCE activity,” and that in chairing the OSCE, Kazakhstan would
ensure that NGOs are able to participate in OSCE events and that ODIHR’s mandate is preserved.
He argued that Kazakhstan’s chairmanship would be “a powerful catalyst of the reform process
[in Kazakhstan] and an additional confirmation of the rightly chosen path of further liberalization
and openness.”47 Addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE in Astana on June 29,
2008, President Nazarbayev stated that his country’s preparations for holding the chairmanship
included the elaboration of a blueprint he termed “the path to Europe,” which envisages
Kazakhstan’s integration into Europe in the areas of energy, transport, technology transfers,
education, culture, and democratization.
In early February 2009, President Nazarbayev approved changes to laws on the media, elections,
and political parties. Political parties that did not gain at least 7% of votes cast in an Majlis
election were accorded the right to participate in some legislative affairs, the number of signatures
necessary for registering a party for a Majlis election was reduced from 50,000 to 40,000, and
requirements for registering media were eased. Critics termed the changes minor.48 One positive
sign was an action by the constitutional court in February 2009 to strike down a proposed law that
would have tightened restrictions on religious freedom. In April 2009, ODIHR criticized
46 OSCE. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections, 18
August 2007: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report, October 30, 2007; CEDR, August 22, 2007, Doc.
No. CEP-950376; Ariel Cohen, “Kazakh Vote: A Step Forward,” Washington Times, August 21, 2007.
47 OSCE. 15th Ministerial Council Meeting. Address of Marat Tazhin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, November 29, 2007.
48 Human Rights Watch. An Atmosphere of Quiet Repression: Freedom of Religion, Assembly and Expression in
Kazakhstan, December 2008.
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proposed further amendments to the media law that would restrict access to the Internet. Other
changes would bar media reporting that “interfere[s] with election campaigns,” takes place during
times when campaign news is not allowed, tries to influence election results, or influences
participation in strikes. Further amendments would bar foreign broadcasts from “complicat[ing]
or support[ing] the nomination or election” of candidates or parties. The changes were signed into
law in July 2009.49
In May 2009, Human Rights Watch, a non-governmental organization, suggested that while
“Kazakhstan has made a number of modest improvements in [human rights in] the past several
months ... it should be doing a lot more to show that it is ready to lead an organization that works
to make sure human rights are respected.”50
Recent Developments in Kyrgyzstan
In late September 2007, the Kyrgyz constitutional court, heavily influenced by President
Kurmanbek Bakiyev, invalidated all constitutional changes since the adoption of the 2003
constitution. Bakiyev announced a few days later that he was setting up and supporting a new
political party, the Ak Jol People’s Party. He then pushed through a snap referendum in October
2007 on a draft constitution he unveiled that set forth strong presidential powers.51 A day after the
referendum, he dissolved the legislature and set new elections for December 2007, a move many
observers viewed as preventing opposition parties from carrying out effective campaigns during
the short period of time.52 Some of those who observed the vote on the new constitution alleged
that many irregularities took place.
Twelve parties were registered for the December 2007 election. The new constitution established
a 90-seat legislature elected by party lists. A new election law stated that a party could not win
seats unless it received 5% or more of the vote of all registered voters. Another provision stated
that a party could not win seats unless it gained at least 0.5% of the vote in each region. This
provision did not specify how the percentage was to be calculated, leading to controversy that
was eventually settled by a Supreme Court decision. On election day, initial results appeared to
indicate that only Ak Jol and Ata Mekan had surpassed the 5% hurdle. The CEC later disqualified
Ata Mekan because it had not received 0.5% of the vote in one region and announced that Ak Jol
had won 71 legislative seats, the Social Democrats 11 seats, and the Communists 8 seats. In its
final report on the election, observers from the OSCE assessed the race as “fail[ing] to meet a
number of OSCE commitments.” Although the observers fell short in declaring the results
49 Human Rights Watch. Human Rights in Kazakhstan: Seven Months before the OSCE Chairmanship, Human Rights
Watch Memorandum, May 20, 2009.
50 Human Rights Watch. “Holly Cartner, Europe and Central Asia Director: Changes Needed for Upcoming OSCE
Leadership Role,” Press Release, May 20, 2009; “Human Rights in Kazakhstan: Seven Months before the OSCE
Chairmanship,” Human Rights Watch Memorandum, May 20, 2009.
51 The Venice Commission concluded that the draft constitution placed an “excessive concentration of power in the
hands of the president,” so that “the powers of the president are almost unrestricted.” European Commission for
Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic,
Opinion No. 457/2007, December 17, 2007.
52 In a perhaps telling move, the Ak Dzhol Party placed Cholpon Bayekova, the chairwoman of the Constitutional
Court and a relative of Bakiyev, at the head of its party list.
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invalid, they stated that there were “serious irregularities and inconsistencies” in vote-counting,
and that there was “questionable consistency” between reported preliminary and final results.53
Kyrgyzstan’s legislature voted in late March 2009 to hold an early presidential election on July
23, 2009. The CEC declared that six candidates, including Bakiyev, had met the requirements to
run. Several opposition party leaders refused to run in what they considered a hastily called
election. Two candidates were considered to be true opposition figures, the main one of which
was Almazbek Atambayev. He was a former prime minister and was backed by the United
Popular Movement, a bloc of opposition parties. According to the CEC, Bakiyev received 76.43%
of 2.25 million votes cast, followed by Atambayev with 8.9%. Almost as many people checked a
box “against all candidates” as voted for Atambayev. OSCE election monitors stated that despite
some positive aspects of the election, such as real choices among candidates and the involvement
of civil society, the election “was marred by ... evidence of ballot box stuffing, inaccuracies in the
voter lists and some evidence of multiple voting. The process further deteriorated during the
counting and tabulation.” The observers also criticized the bias of state-owned media toward
Bakiyev, the use of government resources by Bakiyev’s campaign, pressure and intimidation by
Bakiyev’s supporters against other candidates, and irregularities in forming electoral
commissions.54 Several opposition parties denounced the election as fraudulent (even before
voting was over) and launched protests, which resulted in hundreds of detentions and arrests by
the police.
Recent Developments in Turkmenistan
A constitutional commission unveiled a draft constitution in July 2008 that after public debate
was approved by the Halk Maslahaty (HM or People’s Council, a supreme legislative-executive-
regional conclave) on September 26, 2008. The new constitution abolishes the HM and divides its
powers between the Mejlis and the president. It calls for enlarging the Mejlis from 65 to 125
members. An early legislative election was held on December 14, 2008. An OSCE pre-election
needs assessment mission raised concerns that “a lack of distinction between civil society
organizations, the party, and the State,” had resulted in only government-approved candidates
running for seats.55 The Turkmen Central Electoral Commission reported that almost 94% of the
electorate voted on December 14. At least two approved candidates ran in each district. President
Berdimuhamedow hailed the election as advancing Turkmen democracy.56
Recent Developments in Uzbekistan
The Uzbek CEC in mid-November 2007 approved four candidates to run in the prospective
December 23, 2007, presidential election. Three of the candidates were nominated by pro-
government political parties and one by a supposedly independent citizens’ initiative committee.
53 OSCE. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Kyrgyz Republic Pre-Term Parliamentary Elections,
16 December 2007, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, April 24, 2008. Referring to the OSCE
preliminary assessment, the State Department evinced “serious concerns” about the conduct of the election and called
for reforms. U.S. Department of State. Press Release, December 21, 2007.
54 OSCE. Election Observation Mission, Kyrgyz Republic--- Presidential Election 23 July 2009: Statement of
Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, July 24, 2009. See also CEDR, July 28, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-6005.
55 OSCE. ODIHR. Turkmenistan, Early Parliamentary Elections: OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report,
October 20, 2008.
56 CEDR, December 19, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950107.
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Although the Uzbek constitution bars a president from more than two terms, the Uzbek CEC
argued that since the most recent constitution was approved in 1992, Karimov’s “first term”
should be considered as following his election in January 2000, and that he is eligible to run for a
“second term” in December 2007.
Karimov won with 88% of 14.8 million votes with a 90.6% turnout.57 A small election
observation mission sponsored by OSCE ODIHR assessed the election as “generally fail[ing] to
meet many OSCE commitments for democratic elections.” OSCE ODIHR reported that there
were no campaign debates or open public meetings, and that media coverage was minimal. Each
“opposing” candidate used similar language to laud the policies of the incumbent president. State-
owned media urged the electorate to vote for the incumbent.58 In his inaugural address on January
16, 2008, Karimov stated that the “historic election” might be remembered for centuries and
thanked the citizenry “who gave me a massive vote of confidence by freely expressing their will
[in an] election which was held in full compliance with our constitution and laws, international
legal norms, and universally recognized democratic standards.”59
Human Rights
The NGO Freedom House has included Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan among countries such as
Cuba, Myanmar, North Korea, and Sudan that have the lowest possible ratings on political rights
and civil liberties.60 In all the Central Asian states, adherents of non-favored faiths, missionaries,
and pious Muslims face religious rights abuses, and unfair elections increase political alienation
and violence aimed against the regimes.
Since 2001, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has
recommended that the Secretary of State designate Uzbekistan a “country of particular concern”
(CPC), where severe human rights violations could lead to U.S. sanctions. In November 2006,
then-Secretary Rice designated Uzbekistan a CPC. In its most recent report in 2009, USCIRF
reported that Uzbekistan had made scant efforts to address religious freedom abuses and should
retain its CPC designation. In the case of religious freedom in Turkmenistan, USCIRF
recommended in its 2009 annual report—as it had since 2000—that Turkmenistan be designated a
CPC.61
On human trafficking, the State Department downgraded Uzbekistan in mid-2006 to “Tier 3”
(designating a source country for human trafficking that did not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking and was not making significant efforts to do so). No
U.S. aid sanctions were reported as a direct result of the Tier 3 designation. In June 2008,
Uzbekistan was found to have made some modest progress in addressing human trafficking
problems, and was upgraded to the “Tier 2 Watch List.” According to the State Department,
Uzbekistan in 2008 adopted an anti-trafficking law and demonstrated modest improvement in its
57 The final vote turnout was reported two hours after the polls closed. Results that were termed “preliminary” were
reported the next day (December 24), which were identical to “final” results reported on December 28.
58 OSCE. ODIHR. Final Report on the 23 December 2007 Presidential Election in Uzbekistan, April 23, 2008.
59 CEDR, January 16, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950404.
60 Freedom House. The Worst of the Worst: The World’s Most Repressive Societies, September 6, 2006; May 9, 2007;
May 6, 2008; and March 9, 2009.
61 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. Annual Report, May 1, 2007; Annual Report, May 1, 2008;
and Annual Report, May 1, 2009. USCIRF first urged that Uzbekistan be designated a CPC in its 2005 Annual Report.
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victim assistance and protection efforts. In June 2009, the State Department reported that
Uzbekistan would remain on its “Tier 2 Watch List” because the country had not made progress
in ending forced child labor. In regard to other Central Asian countries, Tajikistan was
downgraded from “Tier 2” to the “Tier 2 Watch List” in 2008 and remained on the watch list in
2009 because “the government did not demonstrate progress in prosecuting and convicting
officials complicit in trafficking and ensuring that victims have access to protection.” The State
Department has averred that coerced child laborers are used to pick cotton in Kazakhstan and
Tajikistan, as well as in Uzbekistan.62
Among U.N. actions, the General Assembly in 2003 and 2004 approved resolutions expressing
“grave concern” about human rights abuses in Turkmenistan and urging reforms. The U.N.
Rapporteur on Torture in early 2003 completed a report that concluded that police and prison
officials in Uzbekistan “systematically” employed torture.63 In late 2005, the U.N. General
Assembly’s Third Committee approved resolutions critical of human rights violations in
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The resolution on Turkmenistan expressed “grave concern” about
political repression, media censorship, religious minority group harassment, and detainee torture.
The resolution on Uzbekistan expressed “grave concern” about violence against civilians in
Andijon and called on the government to permit an international investigation. The Uzbek
representative asserted that the resolution contained no credible facts and ignored Uzbekistan’s
right to defend its constitutional order against terrorists.64 In late 2007, the U.N. Committee
Against Torture stated that it “remained concerned that [in Uzbekistan] there were numerous
reports of abuses in custody, and many deaths, some of which were alleged to have followed
torture or ill-treatment.”65
Amnesty International was among NGOs that submitted petitions to the December 2008 session
of the revamped U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC) alleging ongoing Uzbek human rights
abuses.66 UNHRC also examined human rights in Turkmenistan at this session. On Uzbekistan,
the UNHRC agreed to a report by its working group that called for the government to give
accreditation to major international human rights organizations, adopt legislation to promote
gender equality, modify the criminal code to establish a definition of torture, take measures to
prevent torture, and eliminate forced child labor, among other recommendations. On
Turkmenistan, the UNHRC agreed to a report by its working group that called for the government
62 U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2006, June 2007, June 2008, and June 2009. On
Uzbekistan, see also Invisible To The World? The Dynamics of Forced Child Labor in the Cotton Sector of Uzbekistan,
The School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2009.
63 U.N. General Assembly. Resolution: Situation of Human Rights in Turkmenistan, 58/194, December 22, 2003;
Resolution: Situation of Human Rights in Turkmenistan, 59/206, December 20, 2004. U.N. Economic and Social
Council. Commission on Human Rights. Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture, Theo van Boven. Report of the
Special Rapporteur Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 2002/38. Addendum: Mission to Uzbekistan,
E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2, annex, February 3, 2003. U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture, Manfred
Nowak. Report by the Special Rapporteur. Addendum: Follow-up to the Recommendations Made by the Special
Rapporteur, E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.2, March 21, 2006.
64 U.N. General Assembly. Third Committee. Draft Resolution: Situation of Human Rights in Turkmenistan,
A/C.3/60/L.46, November 2, 2005; Draft Resolution: Situation of Human Rights in Uzbekistan, A/C.3/60/L.51,
November 2, 2005; Press Release: Third Committee ... Approves Text Expressing Deep Concern over Human Rights
Situation in Uzbekistan, GA/SHC/3843, November 22, 2005.
65 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Committee Against Torture. Press Release: Committee
Against Torture Concludes Thirty-ninth Session, November 23, 2007.
66 Amnesty International. Uzbekistan: Submission to the U.N. Universal Periodic Review Working Group, U.N.
Human Rights Council, July 21, 2008.
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to eliminate the use of torture, protect the human rights of journalists and human rights defenders,
ensure greater independence of the judiciary, and ensure that opposition parties are permitted to
participate freely, among other recommendations.67
Security and Arms Control
The U.S.-led coalition’s overthrow of the Taliban and routing of Al Qaeda and IMU terrorists in
Afghanistan (termed Operation Enduring Freedom or OEF) increased the security of Central
Asia. According to then-Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch in testimony in June 2002,
“our military relationships with each [Central Asian] nation have matured on a scale not
imaginable prior to September 11th.” Crouch averred that “for the foreseeable future, U.S. defense
and security cooperation in Central Asia must continue to support actions to deter or defeat
terrorist threats” and to build effective armed forces under civilian control.
According to Crouch:
• Kyrgyzstan became a “critical regional partner” in OEF, providing basing for
U.S. and coalition forces at Manas (in mid-2009, U.S., French, and Spanish
troops and contract personnel reportedly numbered about 1,650).
• Uzbekistan provided a base for U.S. operations at Karshi-Khanabad (K2; just
before the pullout, U.S. troops reportedly numbered less than 900), a base for
German units at Termez (in early 2009, German troops reportedly numbered
about 163), and a land corridor to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid via the
Friendship Bridge at Termez.
• Tajikistan permitted use of its international airport in Dushanbe for refueling
(“gas-and-go”) and hosted a French force (in early 2009, French troops numbered
100-200).
• Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan provided overflight and other support.68
To obtain Uzbekistan’s approval for basing, the 2002 U.S.-Uzbek Strategic Partnership
Declaration included a nonspecific security guarantee. The United States affirmed that “it would
regard with grave concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan’s security and would consult with
Uzbekistan “on an urgent basis” regarding a response. The two states pledged to intensify military
cooperation, including “re-equipping the Armed Forces” of Uzbekistan, a pledge that appeared to
be repudiated by Uzbekistan following events in Andijon. Bilateral military ties appeared boosted
when Commander of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. David Petraeus, visited Tashkent on
August 18 and signed an accord on military exchanges and training.
Although U.S. security assistance to the region was boosted in the aftermath of 9/11, such aid has
lessened since then as a percentage of all such aid to Eurasia, particularly after aid to Uzbekistan
67 U.N. General Assembly. UNHRC. Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Uzbekistan,
A/HRC/10/83, March 11, 2009; Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Turkmenistan,
A/HRC/10/79, January 6, 2009; Draft Report of the Human Rights Council on its Tenth Session, A/HRC/10/L.11,
March 31, 2009.
68 Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Statement of J.D.
Crouch II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, June 27, 2002.
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was cut in FY2004 and subsequent years (see below). Security and law enforcement aid to
Central Asia was 31% ($188 million) of all such aid to Eurasia in FY2002, but had declined to
14% ($203 million) in FY2007. Of all budgeted assistance to Central Asia over the period from
FY1992-FY2007, security and law enforcement aid accounted for a little over one-fifth. Security
and law enforcement aid includes Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military
Education and Training (IMET), Excess Defense Articles (EDA) programs, and border security
aid to combat trafficking in drugs, humans, and WMD. A new Defense Department counter-
terrorism train and equip program (created under Section 1206 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2006; P.L. 109-163) provided $20 million to Kazakhstan in FY2006,
$19.3 million in FY2007, and $12.5 million in FY2008. It also provided $12 million to
Kyrgyzstan in FY2008. Another new Defense Department program for defense articles, services,
training or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities (created under
Section 1207 of P.L. 109-163) provided $9.9 million to Tajikistan in FY2008.69
To help counter burgeoning drug trafficking from Afghanistan, war supplementals for FY2005
(P.L. 109-13), FY2006 (P.L. 109-234), FY2008 (P.L. 110-252), and FY2009 (P.L. 111-32) have
provided some assistance to Central Asia. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-
32) provided $52.89 million for combating drug-trafficking in Central Asia.
In addition to the aid reported by the Coordinator’s Office, the Defense Department provides
coalition support payments to Kyrgyzstan, including base lease payments and landing and
overflight fees that amount to about $64 million (see below). Uzbekistan received a payment of
$15.7 million for use of K2 and associated services. On October 5, 2005, an amendment to
Defense Appropriations for FY2006 (H.R. 2863) was approved in the Senate to place a one-year
hold on Defense Department plans to pay another $23 million. Despite this congressional
concern, the Defense Department transferred the payment in November 2005. The conferees on
H.R. 2863 later dropped the amendment (H.Rept. 109-360; P.L. 109-163).
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in 1999 became responsible for U.S. military
engagement in Central Asia. It cooperates with the European Command (USEUCOM), on the
Caspian Maritime Security Cooperation program (similar to the former Caspian [Sea] Guard
program). Gen. Bantz Craddock, Commander of USEUCOM, testified in 2008 that the Caspian
Maritime Security Cooperation program coordinates security assistance provided by U.S.
agencies to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. He stated that U.S. Naval Forces Europe cooperates with
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command “to promote maritime safety and security and maritime
domain awareness in the Caspian Sea.”70 Russia objects to the involvement of non-littoral
countries in Caspian maritime security and has appeared to counter U.S. maritime security aid by
boosting the capabilities of its Caspian Sea Flotilla and by urging the littoral states to coordinate
their naval activities exclusively with Russia.
69 For background, see CRS Report RS22855, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006: A
Fact Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces, by Nina M. Serafino, and
CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and
Congressional Concerns, by Nina M. Serafino.
70 House of Representatives. Armed Services Committee. Statement of General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander,
United States European Command, March 13, 2008. Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention aid to Kazakhstan
was $4 million in FY2005, $5 million in FY2006, and $7 million in FY2007, and $8 million was requested for each of
FY2008 and FY2009. U.S. Department of Defense. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. FY2008-FY2009 Budget
Estimates: Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, February 2007.
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All the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined NATO’s PFP by mid-1994 (Tajikistan joined
in 2002). Central Asian troops have participated in periodic PFP (or “PFP-style”) exercises in the
United States since 1995, and U.S. troops have participated in exercises in Central Asia since
1997. A June 2004 NATO summit communique pledged enhanced Alliance attention to the
countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and the NATO Secretary General appointed a
Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia. Uzbekistan sharply reduced its
participation in PFP after NATO raised concerns that Uzbek security forces had used excessive
and disproportionate force in Andijon (however, it continued to permit Germany to use a base at
Termez). Relations with NATO appeared to improve in 2008-2009 (see below).
Kazakhstan’s progress in military reform enabled NATO in January 2006 to elevate it to
participation in an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). The NATO Secretary General’s
Special Envoy for the Caucasus and Central Asia, Robert Simmons, in April 2008 announced that
Kazakhstan was making good progress in implementing the IPAP. Kazakhstan has stated that it
does not plan to join NATO but wants to modernize its armed forces. According to analyst Roger
McDermott, despite Kazakhstan’s cooperation with NATO, “the defense relationship between
Kazakhstan and Russia has, in fact, substantially deepened.”71 The Kazakh defense ministry has
reported, for instance, that “1,259 Kazakh servicemen are now studying at Russian military
educational establishments,” constituting a substantial boost over previous years.72
According to some reports, the Defense Department has been considering possibly setting up
long-term military facilities in Central Asia termed Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs; they
might contain pre-positioned equipment and be managed by private contractors, and few if any
U.S. military personnel may be present). The Overseas Basing Commission in 2005
acknowledged that U.S. national security might be enhanced by future CSLs in Central Asia but
urged Congress to seek inter-agency answers to “what constitutes vital U.S. interests in the area
that would require long-term U.S. presence.”73 According to former USCENTCOM Commander
Fallon, the Bagram airbase in Afghanistan is the Forward Operating Site (basing intended for
rotational use by operating forces with limited U.S. military support presence and possibly pre-
positioned equipment) for access to and operations in Central Asia. USCENTCOM’s FY2008
Master Plan for infrastructure requirements at its U.S. overseas military facilities reportedly
placed a high priority on sustaining long-term access to locations across its area of
responsibility.74
Closure of the Karshi-Khanabad Airbase
On July 5, 2005, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed a declaration
issued during a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO; see above, “Obstacles
71 Roger McDermott, Kazakhstan’s Defense Policy: An Assessment Of The Trends, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, February 2009.
72 CEDR, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950316.
73 Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States. Interim Report, May 9,
2005.
74 House of Representatives. Appropriations Committee. Subcommittee on Military Construction. Statement of Admiral
William J. Fallon, Commander, U.S. Central Command, on Military Construction in U.S. Central Command, April 17,
2007; General Accountability Office. Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs
to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam, GAO Report No. GAO-07-1015,
September 12, 2007.
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to Peace and Independence: Regional Tensions and Conflicts”) that stated that “as large-scale
military operations against terrorism have come to an end in Afghanistan, the SCO member states
maintain that the relevant parties to the anti-terrorist coalition should set a deadline for the
temporary use of ... infrastructure facilities of the SCO member states and for their military
presence in these countries.”75 Despite this declaration, none of the Central Asian leaders
immediately called for closing the coalition bases. However, after the United States and others
interceded so that refugees who fled from Andijon to Kyrgyzstan could fly to Romania,
Uzbekistan on July 29 demanded that the United States vacate K2 within six months. On
November 21, 2005, the United States officially ceased operations to support Afghanistan at K2.
Perhaps indicative of the reversal of U.S. military-to-military and other ties, former pro-U.S.
defense minister Qodir Gulomov was convicted of treason and received seven years in prison,
later suspended. Many K2 activities shifted to the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. Some observers
viewed the closure of K2 and souring U.S.-Uzbek relations as setbacks to U.S. influence in the
region and as gains for Russian and Chinese influence. Others suggested that U.S. ties with other
regional states provided continuing influence and that U.S. criticism of human rights abuses
might pay future dividends among regional populations.76
Possibly a sign of improving U.S.-Uzbek relations, in early 2008 Uzbekistan reportedly permitted
U.S. military personnel under NATO command, on a case-by-case basis, to transit through an
airbase near the town of Termez that it has permitted Germany to operate.77 President Karimov
attended the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, in early April 2008 and stated that
Uzbekistan was ready to discuss the transit of non-lethal goods and equipment by NATO through
Uzbekistan to Afghanistan. This issue was part of the agenda during Assistant Secretary
Boucher’s May 30-June 3, 2008, visit to Uzbekistan. He praised some recent progress by the
government in respecting human rights. President Karimov reportedly told Boucher that he was
“pleased” about “positive changes in bilateral relations.” President Karimov announced in May
2009 that the United States and NATO had been permitted to use the Navoi airport (located
between Samarkand and Bukhara in east-central Uzbekistan) for transporting non-lethal supplies
to Afghanistan. Representing the Obama Administration, Undersecretary of State William Burns
visited Uzbekistan in early July 2009, and President Karimov assessed his talks with Burns as
“positive.” In August 2009, Gen. Petraus traveled to Uzbekistan and signed an accord on boosting
military educational exchanges and training.
The Manas Airbase
The Manas airbase became operational in December 2001 and uses some facilities of the
international airport near Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. According to a fact sheet prepared
by the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing of the U.S. Air Force, the Manas airbase serves as the
“premier air mobility hub” for operations in Afghanistan. Missions include support for personnel
and cargo transiting in and out of the theater, aerial refueling, airlift and airdrop, and medical
evacuation. The fact sheet reports that 170,000 troops transited through the base to Afghanistan in
2008, as well as 5,000 tons of cargo, and that KC-135 Stratotankers had refueled over 11,400
aircraft over Afghanistan. About 1,000 military personnel from the United States, France, and
75 CEDR, July 5, 2005, Doc. No. CPP-249.
76 On growing Chinese regional influence, see Michael Mihalka, “Counter-insurgency, Counter-terrorism, State-
Building and Security Cooperation in Central Asia,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, May 2006.
77 “U.S. Military Returns to Ex-Soviet Uzbekistan,” Agence France Presse, March 6, 2008; “Only Germany Can Use
Uzbek Bases Now,” United Press International, December 13, 2005.
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Spain are stationed at the base. They are assisted by 650 contract personnel, of which the majority
are Kyrgyz citizens. The base contributed $64 million to the local economy in FY2008, which
included $17.4 million in rent for use of the base, $22.5 million for airport operations and land
lease fees, nearly $500,000 for upgrading Kyrgyz Air Navigation operations, and about $24
million for local contracts and humanitarian aid.78
In early 2006, Kyrgyz President Bakiyev reportedly requested that lease payments for use of the
Manas airbase be increased to more than $200 million per year but at the same time re-affirmed
Russia’s free use of its nearby base.79 By mid-July 2006, however, the United States and
Kyrgyzstan announced that they had reached a settlement for the continued U.S. use of the
airbase. Although not specifically mentioning U.S. basing payments, it was announced that the
United States would provide $150 million in “total assistance and compensation over the next
year,” subject to congressional approval.
In September 2007, a U.S. military officer stated that the Manas airbase was moving toward “a
sustainment posture,” with the replacement of most tents and the building of aircraft maintenance,
medical, and other facilities.80
On February 3, 2009, President Bakiyev announced during a visit to Moscow that he intended to
close the Manas airbase. Many observers speculated that the decision was spurred by Russia,
which offered Bakiyev a $300 million loan for economic development and a $150 million grant
for budget stabilization in the wake of the world economic downturn. Russia also stated that it
would write off most of a $180 million debt. The United States was notified on February 19,
2009, that under the terms of the status of forces agreement it had 180 days to vacate the airbase.
The “Transit Center” Agreement
The Defense Department announced on June 24, 2009, that an agreement of “mutual benefit” had
been concluded with the Kyrgyz government “to continu[e] to work, with them, to supply our
troops in Afghanistan, so that we can help with the overall security situation in the region.”81 The
agreement was approved by the legislature and signed into law by President Bakiyev, to take
effect on July 14, 2009. According to Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Kadyrbek Sarbayev, the
government decided to conclude the annually renewable “intergovernmental agreement with the
United States on cooperation and the formation of a transit center at Manas airport,” because of
growing alarm about “the worrying situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” The agreement
permits the transit of personnel and non-lethal cargoes, although Kyrgyzstan is not permitted to
inspect the cargoes, he stated. A yearly rent payment for use of land and facilities at the Manas
airport would be increased from $17.4 million to $60 million per year and the United States had
pledged more than $36 million for infrastructure improvements and $30 million for air traffic
78 U.S. Air Force. 376th Air Expeditionary Wing. Fact Sheet: 376th Air Expeditionary Wing, Manas Air Base,
Kyrgyzstan, February 2009, at http://preview.afnews.af.mil/manas/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=12682.
79 For background, see CRS Report RS22295, Uzbekistan’s Closure of the Airbase at Karshi-Khanabad: Context and
Implications, by Jim Nichol. Perhaps indicating Kyrgyz pressure on Russia to compensate for use of the base, Russia in
October 2006 pledged grant military assistance to Kyrgyzstan.
80 Lt. Col. Michael Borgert, “Liberandos: Thank You for a Job Well Done,” 376th Expeditionary Services Squadron
Public Affairs, September 9, 2007.
81 U.S. Department of Defense. DoD News Briefing, June 24, 2009. See also U.S. Department of State. Daily Press
Briefing, June 25, 2009.
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control system upgrades for the airport. Sarbayev also stated that the United States had pledged
$20 million dollars for economic development, $21 million for counter-narcotics efforts, and $10
million for counter-terrorism efforts.82 All except the increased rent have already been
appropriated or requested (see below, Congressional Concerns). The agreement also reportedly
includes stricter host-country conditions on U.S. military personnel. One Kyrgyz legislator
claimed that the agreement was not a volte-face for Kyrgyzstan because Russia and other Central
Asian states had signed agreements with NATO to permit the transit of supplies to Afghanistan
(see below).83
Undersecretary William Burns visited Kyrgyzstan in early July 2009 and reportedly stated that
“we welcome a new decision of President Bakiyev regarding the set up of a transport and
logistics hub in Manas Airport.... [The agreement] is an important contribution into our common
goals in Afghanistan.” He also stated that “the new administration believes that we should expand
and deepen the level and scope of our bilateral relations” with Kyrgyzstan, and he announced that
a U.S.-Kyrgyzstan bilateral commission on trade and investment would be set up.84
The Northern Distribution Route to Afghanistan
Because supply routes through Pakistan frequently were being attacked, Gen. David Petraeus, the
Commander of the U.S. Central Command, visited Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in late January
2009 to negotiate alternative routes for supplies for NATO and U.S. operations in Afghanistan (he
also visited Kyrgyzstan to discuss airbase issues; see below). In testimony to Congress in March
2009, Gen. Petraeus reported that USCENTCOM, with the support of the U.S. Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM), had “established a Northern Distribution Network through several
Central Asian States to help reduce costs of transporting non-military supplies to support NATO,
U.S., and Afghan security operations, while decreasing our exposure to risks associated with our
supply lines running through Pakistan.”85 To encourage a positive response, the U.S. embassies in
the region announced that the United States hoped to purchase many non-military goods locally
to transport to the troops in Afghanistan. A first rail shipment of non-lethal supplies entered
Afghanistan in late March 2009 after transiting Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.86
Uzbekistan’s Navoi airport also reportedly is being used to transport non-lethal supplies to
Afghanistan. At the July 2009 U.S.-Russia summit, Russia agreed to permit NATO overflights of
lethal weapons and personnel to Afghanistan (it already was permitting land transport of
nonlethal supplies). Some observers suggested that the commitment was linked to the assertion of
some Russian officials that such transport could substitute for U.S. and NATO use of Manas and
other Central Asian airbases.
82 Tolkun Namatbayeva, “Kyrgyzstan Allows U.S. to Keep Using Base,” Agence France Presse, June 23, 2009.
83 See also CRS Report R40564, Kyrgyzstan and the Status of the U.S. Manas Airbase: Context and Implications, by
Jim Nichol.
84 “U.S. Welcomes Decision of Kyrgyzstan to Set Up Transport and Logistics Hub,” AKIpress News Agency, July 13,
2009.
85 U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Hearing on U.S. Policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Statement of
David H. Petraeus Commander U.S. Central Command, April 1, 2009.
86 ITAR-TASS, February 10, 2009; CEDR, April 16, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950025.
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Weapons of Mass Destruction
Major U.S. security interests have included elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in
Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation
in Central Asia. The United States has tendered aid aimed at bolstering their export and physical
controls over nuclear technology and materials, in part because of concerns that Iran is targeting
these countries.87
After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons power (in reality
Russia controlled these weapons). In December 1993, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement for the “safe and secure” dismantling
of 104 SS-18s, the destruction of silos, and related purposes. All bombers and their air-launched
cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994 (except seven bombers destroyed with U.S.
aid in 1998). The SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994. On April 21, 1995, the last of about 1,040
nuclear warheads had been removed from SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and
Kazakhstan announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. The United States reported that 147 silos
had been destroyed by September 1999. A U.S.-Kazakh Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in Almaty
was set up to facilitate verification and compliance with arms control agreements to prevent the
proliferation of WMD.
Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium mines, milling
facilities, and dozens of radioactive tailing and waste dumps in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Many of these reportedly remain inadequately protected against theft.
Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan have been among the world’s top producers of low-enriched uranium. Kazakhstan
had a fast breeder reactor at Aktau that was the world’s only nuclear desalinization facility. In
1997 and 1999, U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on decommissioning the Aktau reactor. Shut
down in 1999, it had nearly 300 metric tons of uranium (some highly enriched) and plutonium
(some weapons-grade) spent fuel in storage pools. CTR aid has been used to safeguard the 300
metric tons of spent fuel.
CTR aid was used to facilitate transporting 600 kg of weapons-grade uranium from Kazakhstan to
the United States in 1994, 2,900 kg of up to 26% enriched nuclear fuel from Aktau to
Kazakhstan’s Ulba facility in 2001 (which Ulba converted into less-enriched fuel), eleven kg of
uranium in fuel rods from Uzbekistan to Russia in 2004, and 63 kg of uranium from Uzbekistan
to Russia in April 2006. On May 19, 2009, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration
announced that CTR funds had been used to remove 162.5 lb. of highly enriched uranium “spent”
fuel from Kazakhstan. The material originally had been provided by Russia to Kazakhstan, and
was returned to Russia by rail for storage in a series of four shipments between December 2008
and May 2009.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities
during the Soviet era. CTR and Energy Department (DOE) funds have been used in Kazakhstan
to dismantle a former anthrax production facility in Stepnogorsk, to remove some strains to the
87 A Treaty on the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone entered into force in January 2009. All five Central
Asian states are signatories. The Treaty prohibits the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, or possession
of nuclear explosive devices within the zone. See CRS Report RL31559, Proliferation Control Regimes:
Background and Status, coordinated by Mary Beth Nikitin.
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United States, to secure two other BW sites, and to retrain scientists. CTR funding was used to
dismantle Uzbekistan’s Nukus chemical weapons research facility. CTR aid also was used to
eliminate active anthrax spores at a former CBW test site on an island in the Aral Sea. These latter
two projects were completed in 2002. Other CTR aid helps keep former Uzbek CBW scientists
employed in peaceful research. Uzbekistan has continued to cooperate with DOD and DOE—
even after it restricted other ties with the United States in 2005—to receive portal and hand-held
radiation monitoring equipment and training.
Trade and Investment
Successive U.S. administrations have endorsed free market reforms in Central Asia, since these
directly serve U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services and
sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to Central Asia has greatly
exceeded that provided to Russia or most other Eurasian states except Azerbaijan. U.S. trade
agreements have been signed and entered into force with all the Central Asian states, but bilateral
investment treaties are in force only with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In line with Kyrgyzstan’s
accession to the World Trade Organization, the United States established permanent normal trade
relations with Kyrgyzstan by law in June 2000, so that “Jackson-Vanik” trade provisions no
longer apply that call for presidential reports and waivers concerning freedom of emigration.
In June 2004, The U.S. Trade Representative signed a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) with ambassadors of the regional states to establish a U.S.-Central Asia
Council on Trade and Investment. The Council has met yearly to address intellectual property,
labor, environmental protection, and other issues that impede trade and private investment flows
between the United States and Central Asia. The United States also has called for greater intra-
regional cooperation on trade and encouraged the development of regional trade and transport ties
with Afghanistan and South Asia. The reorganization of the State Department in 2006 to create
the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs facilitated this emphasis.88 At the fourth annual
meeting of the Council on Trade and Investment in mid-June 2008 in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, then-
Acting Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Mark Mowrey discussed simplifying regional import
and export procedures and improving the regional investment climate.89 Reportedly, the Obama
Administration is planning future meetings of the U.S.-Central Asia Council on Trade and
Investment.
All the states of the region possess large-scale resources that could contribute to the region
becoming a “new silk road” of trade and commerce. The Kazakh and Turkmen economies are
mostly geared to energy exports but need added foreign investment for production and transport.
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are major cotton producers, a legacy of central
economic planning during the Soviet period. Uzbekistan’s cotton and gold production rank
among the highest in the world and much is exported. It has moderate gas reserves but needs
investment to upgrade infrastructure. Kyrgyzstan has major gold mines and strategic mineral
reserves, is a major wool producer, and could benefit from tourism. Tajikistan has one of the
88 Remarks at Eurasian National University, October 13, 2005; and U.S. Congress. House International Relations
Committee. Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia. Testimony by Steven R. Mann, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary, July 25, 2006. See also U.S. Embassy Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan and the United States in a Changed
World, August 23, 2006.
89 U.S. Fed News, June 18, 2008; BBC Monitoring International Reports, June 20, 2008.
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world’s largest aluminum processing plants. According to the IMF, the Central Asian countries
exported $37.9 billion in goods and services in 2006 and imported $37.7 billion. Major export
partners included Russia, China, Turkey, and Italy. Major import partners included Russia, China,
Turkey, and Germany.90
Despite the region’s development potential, the challenges of corruption, inadequate transport
infrastructure, punitive tariffs, border tensions, and uncertain respect for contracts discourage
major foreign investment (except for some investment in the energy sector). Examples of such
challenges include Uzbekistan’s restrictions on land transit, which have encouraged Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan to explore building a major road to Kazakhstan that bypasses Uzbekistan. Cotton-
growing has contributed to environmental pollution and water shortages, leading some observers
to argue that cotton-growing is not suited to the largely arid region.
The global economic downturn has depressed prices for Tajik commodity exports (mainly
aluminum and cotton) and reduced worker remittances 30% in the first quarter of 2009 from the
previous quarter. The Tajik currency, the somoni, has lost over one-quarter of its value against the
dollar in recent months, which has greatly increased the costs of imported food and other goods.
In late June 2009, Rahmon boosted salaries for various government workers to counteract their
declining purchasing power. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) warns that a decline of
industrial production and commodity export prices, along with the return of many migrant
workers, may result in a 3% contraction of GDP in 2009. The EIU views the Rahmon regime as
moving to head off possible instability posed by these trends by cracking down on perceived
Islamic fundamentalism, urging the opposition to focus on the upcoming 2010 legislative
election, and being prepared to use force to quell social unrest.91 The NGO International Crisis
Group (ICG) similarly has warned that increasingly serious economic problems will condemn the
“desperately poor population ... to yet more deprivation.... To address the situation, the
international community ... should ensure any assistance reaches those who truly need it, place
issues of governance and corruption at the centre of all contacts with the Tajik government, and
initiate an energetic dialogue with President Rahmon on democratization.”92
Other regional states also reported economic setbacks as a result of the world economic
downturn. Kazakhstan announced that it was withdrawing $10 billion from its sovereign wealth
fund for welfare and other needs and was setting up a Toxic Assets Fund. Kyrgyz authorities
reported that citizens working abroad had sent home nearly $900 million in 2008 (an important
part of the country’s GDP), almost double the previous year’s remittances. However, such
remittances reportedly had declined in early 2009.
Energy Resources
U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central Asian and South Caucasian states
have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the West, supporting U.S. private
investment, promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers, assisting ally
Turkey, and opposing the building of pipelines that transit “energy competitor” Iran or otherwise
give it undue influence over the region. The encouragement of regional electricity, oil, and gas
90 IMF. Direction of Trade Statistics, September 2007.
91 Economist Intelligence Unit. Tajikistan Country Report, June 15, 2009.
92 ICG. Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure, February 12, 2009.
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exports to South Asia and security for Caspian region pipelines and energy resources also have
been recent interests.
Until 2004, the Bush Administration retained a Clinton-era position, Special Advisor on Caspian
Energy Diplomacy, to help further U.S. policy and counter the efforts of Russia’s Viktor
Kaluzhny, deputy foreign minister and Special Presidential Representative for Energy Matters in
the Caspian. After abolishing this post, its responsibilities were shifted at least in part to the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs along with responsibilities
of the former Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and Eurasian Conflicts.93 Some critics
juxtaposed Russia’s close interest in securing Caspian energy resources to what they termed
sporadic U.S. efforts.94
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140; signed into law on December
19, 2007) called for the appointment of a Coordinator for International Energy Affairs under the
Secretary of State to help develop and coordinate U.S. energy policy. In January 2008, the State
Department created the post of Coordinator of Eurasian Energy Diplomacy and named Steven
Mann to the post (he had been the last Special Advisor on Caspian Energy Diplomacy before the
post was abolished). At the end of March 2008, the Secretary of State designated the then-Under
Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs, Reuben Jeffery, as the Department’s
Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, and Boyden Gray was named to be the Special
Envoy for Eurasian Energy issues. In testimony in April 2008, Assistant Secretary Boucher
claimed that the State Department had realized that there were “new opportunities” for the export
of Caspian oil and gas—beyond the existing BTC and SCP—so that Mann had returned to work
“full time” on Caspian energy diplomacy.95 In April 2009, Secretary of State Clinton appointed
Richard Morningstar as Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy.
The Caspian region is emerging as a notable source of oil and gas for world markets, although
many experts emphasize that regional exports will constitute only a small fraction of world
supplies. According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the region’s proven natural gas
reserves are estimated at 232 trillion cubic feet (tcf), comparable to Saudi Arabia.96 The region’s
proven oil reserves are estimated to be between 17-49 billion barrels, comparable to Qatar on the
low end and Libya on the high end. Kazakhstan possesses the region’s largest proven oil reserves
at 9-40 billion barrels, according to DOE, and also possesses 100tcf of natural gas. Kazakhstan’s
oil exports currently are about 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd).97 Some U.S. energy firms and
other private foreign investors have become discouraged in recent months by harsher Kazakh
government terms, taxes, and fines that some allege reflect corruption within the ruling elite.98
93 In 2004, the Department of State’s Inspector General recommended that the post of Special Advisor on Caspian
Energy Diplomacy might “now be phased out, with residual responsibilities folded into other units,” because the
purpose for which it was created was achieved. Office of the Inspector General. Semiannual Report to the Congress,
October 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004. The Special Advisor’s duties included “realizing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline, in the launch of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) line, and a range of other Eurasian energy issues.”
Office of the Spokesman. Press Release, April 16, 2004.
94 Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 31, 2007.
95 House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment. Hearing on
Central Asia. Testimony by Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher, April 8, 2008.
96 Including the countries of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
97 U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Kazakhstan Country Analysis Brief, February 2008.
98 A perhaps troubling case concerns Kazakhstan’s August 2007 suspension of the activities of the international
consortium developing the Kashagan offshore oilfield. Kazakhstan and the consortium of companies developing
(continued...)
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Turkmenistan possesses about 100tcf and Uzbekistan about 65tcf of proven gas reserves,
according to DOE.99
Especially since Russia’s temporary cutoff of gas to Ukraine in January 2006 (and again in
January 2009) highlighted European vulnerability, the United States has supported EU efforts to
reduce its overall reliance on Russian oil and gas by increasing the number of possible alternative
suppliers. Part of this policy has involved encouraging Central Asian countries to transport their
energy exports to Europe through pipelines that cross the Caspian Sea, thereby bypassing Russian
(and Iranian) territory, although these amounts are expected at most to satisfy only a tiny fraction
of EU needs.100
The Central Asian states have been pressured by Russia to yield large portions of their energy
wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controls most existing export pipelines.101 Russia
attempted to strengthen this control over export routes for Central Asian energy in May 2007
when visiting former President Putin reached agreement in Kazakhstan on supplying more
Kazakh oil to Russia. Putin also reached agreement with the presidents of Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan on the construction of a new pipeline to transport Turkmen and Kazakh gas to Russia.
The first agreement appeared to compete with U.S. and Turkish efforts to foster more oil exports
through the BTC. The latter agreement appeared to compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster
building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline to link to the SCP to Turkey. The latter also appeared to
compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster building a pipeline from Turkey through Greece,
Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to Austria (the so-called Nabucco pipeline). Seeming to indicate
a direct challenge to these plans by Russia and the West, China signed an agreement in August
2007 with Kazakhstan on completing the last section of an oil pipeline from the Caspian seacoast
to China, and signed an agreement with Turkmenistan on building a gas pipeline to China (see
also below).102
On March 11, 2008, the heads of the national gas companies of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan announced that their countries would raise the gas export price to the European
level in 2009. They signed a memorandum of understanding on the price with Russia’s Gazprom
state-controlled gas firm, which controls most export pipelines. According to analyst Martha
(...continued)
Kashagan reached an agreement that permitted Kazakhstan to pay a below market price to increase its share to about
17% (making it the largest shareholder) and levied several billion dollars in fines against the consortium for delays. The
shares of U.S. firms ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips were among those reduced. Economist Intelligence Unit, January
21, 2008. In July 2008, ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson stated that the Kazakh government should stop interfering in
the project. International Oil Daily, July 2, 2008. In October 2008, a new management system for the project was
worked out. Production is planned to begin in late 2012 and to initially reach 300,000 bpd. “New Kashagan Deal
Signed,” International Petroleum Finance, November 10, 2008. In April 2009, Kazakh police announced that Eni and
the U.S. firm Parker Drilling were being investigated for tax evasion.
99 U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Central Asia Country Analysis Brief, February
2008.
100 For details, see CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, by Paul Belkin. See also
International Crisis Group. Central Asia’s Energy Risks, May 24, 2007.
101 According to a plan published by Russia’s Institute of Energy Strategy covering the period 2007-2030, “Russian
control over a large share of Central Asian gas needs to be maintained.” See Minpromenergo (Ministry of Industry and
Energy), Institut energeticheskoi strategii, Kontseptsiya energeticheskoi strategii Rossii na period do 2030g., 2007. As
reported by Philip Hanson, “How Sustainable Is Russia’s Energy Power?” Russian Analytical Digest, No. 38 (2008).
102 An oil and gas conference involving Kazakh, Chinese, and Russian energy ministries and firms has met annually
since 2004 to “exchange views” on possible regional cooperation. ITAR-TASS, December 5, 2007.
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Olcott, “the increased bargaining power of the Central Asian states owes more to the entry of
China into the market than to the opening of [the BTC pipeline and the SCP]. Russia’s offer to
pay higher purchase prices for Central Asian gas in 2008 and 2009 came only after China signed
a long-term purchase agreement for Turkmen gas at a base price that was higher than what
Moscow was offering.”103
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran export electricity to Afghanistan. Major foci of the
U.S. Trade and Development Agency’s (TDA’s) Central Asian Infrastructure Integration Initiative
and USAID’s Regional Energy Market Assistance Program include encouraging energy,
transportation, and communications projects, including the development of electrical power
infrastructure and power sharing between Central Asia, Afghanistan, and eventually Pakistan and
India.104 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) launched a Central Asia-South Asia Regional
Electricity Market (CASAREM) project in 2006 and approved $3 million for feasibility and
project design studies of the potential for Pakistan to import electricity from Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan. As part of the CASAREM project, ADB supports a Regional Power Transmission
Interconnection Project to build a 220-kilovolt twin-circuit power transmission line by 2010 from
hydropower plants on the River Vakhsh in Tajikistan to the Afghan border town of Sher Khan
Bandar. Construction of this line reportedly began in July 2009. In May 2009, Uzbekistan
inaugurated a 220-kilovolt transmission line to Kabul, Afghanistan.
On August 4, 2008, an inter-governmental agreement was signed by Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Pakistan, and Tajikistan to build a 500-kilovolt electric power transmission line from Central Asia
through Afghanistan to Pakistan. The project cost is estimated to be $935 million to be provided
by the ADB, World Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank. About two-thirds of the electricity
would be provided to Pakistan and one-third to Afghanistan. The power line is planned to be
completed by 2013.
Analyst Diana Bayzakova has argued that the electrical energy policies of the Central Asian states
are increasingly at cross-variance as each country competes for customers outside the region.105
For instance, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are in a dispute over the latter’s construction of the Rogun
hydro-electric power dam on a tributary of the Amu Darya River. Uzbekistan claims that the dam
will limit water flows downstream to its territory. This dispute may have contributed to a decision
by Uzbekistan in December 2008 to cut off the transmission of electricity from Turkmenistan to
Tajikistan. Uzbekistan also reportedly halved gas supplies to Tajikistan because of debts,
increasing the energy crisis in Tajikistan. The Tajik government viewed as unfriendly a statement
by Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev in January 2009 that all the Central Asian states should
agree before dams are built on trans-border rivers.106 Tajik authorities launched severe power
rationing to safeguard water levels in the Norak hydro-electric power reservoir, which supplies
about one-half of the country’s electricity. Electricity was supplied only a few hours in Dushanbe,
103 Martha Olcott, “A New Direction for U.S. Policy in the Caspian Region.”
104 U.S. Trade and Development Agency. Press Release: USTDA Launches Central Asian Infrastructure Integration
Initiative, October 14, 2005; Joshua Kucera, “Washington Seeks to Steer Central Asian States Toward South Asian
Allies,” Eurasia Insight, April 28, 2006; Joshua Kucera, “USAID Official Outlines Plan to Build Central-South Asian
Electricity Links,” Eurasia Insight, May 4, 2006.
105 Diana Bayzakova, “Gauging Integration Of Electricity Markets In Central Asia,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst,
January 28, 2009.
106 Perhaps ironically, President Medvedev had agreed during by visit by Kyrgyz President Bakiyev in early February
2009 to finance the construction of the Kambar-Ata 1 hydroelectric power station, which down-stream Uzbekistan also
opposes.
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the capital, and was reportedly substantially or completely cut off in other areas of the country. In
mid-February 2009, Uzbekistan reportedly ended the electricity cutoff. In April 2009, Tajik
authorities announced that the increase in water levels would permit the lifting of power
rationing.107
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan’s main oil export route has been a 930-mile pipeline—owned by the Caspian Pipeline
Consortium (CPC), in which Russian shareholders have a controlling interest—that carries
234.56 million barrels per year of oil from Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of
Novorossiysk. Lengthy Russian resistance to increasing the pumping capacity of the pipeline and
demands for higher transit and other fees, along with the necessity of offloading the oil into
tankers at Novorossiysk to transit the clogged Turkish Straits, spurred Kazakh President
Nazarbayev to sign a treaty with visiting Azerbaijani President Aliyev in June 2006 to barge
Kazakh oil across the Caspian Sea to Baku to the BTC pipeline. Kazakhstan began shipping about
70,000 bpd of oil through the BTC pipeline at the end of October 2008.
Apparently to counter this plan, then-President Putin’s May 2007 agreement with Nazarbayev
(see above) envisaged boosting the capacity of the CPC pipeline. Despite this Russian pledge to
increase the capacity of the CPC, Kazakhstan has proceeded to upgrade its Caspian Sea port
facilities and in May 2008, the Kazakh legislature ratified the 2006 treaty. Kazakhstan also barges
some oil to Baku to ship by rail to Georgia’s Black Sea oil terminal at Batumi, of which
Kazakhstan became the sole owner in early 2008. Kazakhstan began barging oil from Batumi to
the Romanian port of Constantsa in late 2008 for processing at two refineries it purchased. Some
Kazakh oil arriving in Baku also could be transported through small pipelines to Georgia’s Black
Sea port of Supsa or to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiisk, although in the latter case
Kazakhstan might be faced with high transit charges by Russia.108
In addition to these oil export routes to Europe not controlled by Russia, Kazakhstan and China
have completed an oil pipeline from Atasu in central Kazakhstan to the Xinjiang region of China
(a distance of about 597 miles). Kazakhstan began delivering oil through the pipeline in mid-
2006. As of the end of 2008, the pipeline reportedly had delivered about 92 million barrels (well
below initial capacity of 146.6 million barrels per year). At Atasu, it links to another pipeline
from the town of Kumkol, also in central Kazakhstan. On Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea border,
China has finished construction of an oil pipeline from the port city of Atyrau eastward to the
town of Kerkiyak. The last section of the route from the Caspian Sea to China, a link between the
towns of Kerkiyak and Kumkol, began to be built in late 2007 and is expected to be completed in
2009.
In November 2007, Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement permitting Russia to export 10.6
million barrels of oil per year from Atasu through the pipeline to China. According to Chinese
107 Analyst Sergey Medrea points out that Uzbekistan’s energy policies have helped spur Tajikistan to build to Rogun
dam to supply itself with electricity, and have caused Tajikistan to release more of its water in the winter to generate
electricity, leaving less for down-stream Uzbekistan in the summer. “Energy Update [for] Tajikistan: An Eye For An
Eye?” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, January 28, 2009.
108 ITAR-TASS, May 29, 2008; CEDR, December 11, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950096; April 26, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-
950045.
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sources, Russia had exported about 5.5 million barrels of oil through this pipeline in 2008. This is
the first Russian oil to be transported by pipeline to China.
At the end of October 2008, China and Kazakhstan signed a framework agreement on
constructing a gas pipeline from western Kazakhstan (near the Caspian Sea) to China that is
planned initially to supply 176.6 bcf to southern Kazakhstan and 176.6 bcf to China. Plans call
for pipeline construction to begin in 2010 and to be completed by 2015, but financing remains
uncertain.
Turkmenistan
The late President Niyazov signed a 25-year accord with then-President Putin in 2003 on
supplying Russia up to 211.9 billion cubic feet (bcf) of gas in 2004 (about 12% of production),
rising up to 2.83 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2009-2028, perhaps then tying up most if not all of
Turkmenistan’s future production. Turkmenistan halted gas shipments to Russia at the end of
2004 in an attempt to get a higher gas price but settled for all-cash rather than partial barter
payments. In early 2006, Turkmenistan again requested higher gas prices from Russia, because
Russia’s state-controlled Gazprom gas firm had raised the price it charged for customers
receiving the gas that it had purchased from Turkmenistan. In November 2007, Turkmenistan
requested still another price increase, and the two sides agreed on a price of $130 per 35.314
thousand cubic feet for the first half of 2008 and $150 for the remainder of 2008, and a price
thereafter based on “market principles.”
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed accords in May and December 2007 on building a
new gas pipeline that is planned to carry 353 bcf of Turkmen and 353 bcf of Kazakh gas to
Russia. Although the Turkmen government may have had reservations about building another
pipeline to Russia, in July 2008, it announced that it would soon invite bids to construct the
Turkmen section of the “high priority” pipeline.
Although appearing to continue to rely mainly on pipeline export routes to or traversing Russia,
Berdimuhammedow has declared that “adherence to diverse fuel export schemes will remain as a
basic principle of [Turkmenistan’s] economic development strategy.”109 In 2007,
Berdimuhammedow signaled Turkmen interest in building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. The
United States has advocated building trans-Caspian oil and gas pipelines, because Central Asia
could transport some of its energy through routes not controlled by Russia and Iran. The United
States also has endorsed his proposal to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and
India, but investment remains elusive. Some observers warn that Turkmenistan has pledged large
amounts of gas to Russia, China, and other customers in coming years, although it is unclear
whether production can be ramped up in a timely fashion to meet these pledges.
Seeking alternatives to pipeline routes through Russia, in December 1997 Turkmenistan opened
the first pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile gas pipeline
linkage to Iran. Turkmenistan provided 282.5 bcf of gas to Iran in 2006 and reportedly a larger
amount in 2007. At the end of 2007, however, Turkmenistan suddenly suspended gas shipments,
causing hardship in northern Iran. Turkmen demands for higher payments were the main reason
for the cut-off. Gas shipments resumed in late April 2008 after Iran agreed to a price boost. In
109 CEDR, February 9, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950154.
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mid-2009, Turkmenistan reportedly agreed to increase gas supplies to up to 706 bcf per year.110 In
July 2009, Turkmenistan announced that a new gas pipeline---from a field that until April 2009
had supplied gas to Russia (see below)---would be completed by the end of 2009 to more than
double Turkmenistan’s export capacity to Iran.
As another alternative to pipelines through Russia, in April 2006, Turkmenistan and China signed
a framework agreement calling for Chinese investment in developing gas fields in Turkmenistan
and in building a gas pipeline with a capacity of about 1.0 tcf per year through Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan to China. All three Central Asian states will send gas through this pipeline to China.
Construction of the Turkmen section of the gas pipeline reportedly began in August 2007.
Construction of Uzbek section started in June 2008, and construction of the Kazakh section began
in July 2008. In March 2009, China raised concerns that the pipeline would not be completed by
the end of 2009, but Turkmenistan gave assurances that construction was on schedule.
Perhaps a further effort to diversify export routes, Turkmenistan signed a memorandum of
understanding in April 2008 with the EU to supply 353.1 bcf of gas per year starting in 2009,
presumably through a trans-Caspian pipeline that might link to the SCP and to the proposed
Nabucco pipeline.
On the night of April 8-9, 2009, a section of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Russia
exploded, halting Turkmen gas shipments. Each side blamed the other for the explosion.111 About
two weeks previously, visiting Turkmenistani President Gurbanguli Berdimuhammedow had
failed to reach agreement with Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev on Moscow’s financing for
an east-west gas pipeline across Turkmenistan, to be linked to a proposed pipeline to Russia.
Turkmenistan had then announced an international tender for the east-west pipeline to ensure
“reliable and safe supplies of energy resources to world markets,” and hinted that the pipeline
could link to a possible trans-Caspian pipeline to Azerbaijan and European markets.
At a late April 2009 Turkmen energy conference, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George
Krol reportedly stressed that Turkmenistan and other states should diversify their energy export
routes.112 Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow also called for such diversification
and for closer European-Turkmen ties. At an EU energy summit in Prague in early May 2009,
U.S. Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Richard Morningstar endorsed further development of
the “southern corridor” for the shipment of gas and oil to Western markets. However, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan balked at signing a communique pledging the states to back the
Nabucco pipeline. Despite this move, Berdimuhamedow asserted on July 10, 2009, that there are
“immense volumes of natural gas in Turkmenistan [that] make it possible for us to carry out
certain work related to the implementation of various [gas export] projects, including the
Nabucco project.”113
110 Iran: Daily Report, January 21, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-11017; January 24, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950014; April 26,
2008, Doc. No. IAP-950049; and May 6, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950052.; CEDR, July 12, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950097.
111 Open Source Center. OSC Feature, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. FEA-844966; CEDR, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-
950339; ITAR-TASS, April 3, 2009; Sergey Blagov, “Turkmenistan: Ashgabat Wonders Whether Russia Still Has Deep
Pockets,” Eurasia Insight, March 26, 2009.
112 Alexander Vershinin, “U.S. Urges Central Asia to Boost Gas Export Routes,” Associated Press, April 24, 2009.
113 CEDR, July 11, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950124.
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U.S. Aid Overview
For much of the 1990s and until September 11, 2001, the United States provided much more aid
each year to Russia and Ukraine than to any Central Asian state (most such aid was funded from
the FSA account in Foreign Operations Appropriations, but some derived from other program and
agency budgets). Cumulative foreign aid budgeted to Central Asia for FY1992 through FY2007
amounted to $4.3 billion, 14% of the amount budgeted to all the Eurasian states, reflecting the
lesser priority given to these states prior to September 11.114 Budgeted spending for FY2002 for
Central Asia, during OEF, was greatly boosted in absolute amounts ($584 million) and as a share
of total aid to Eurasia (about one-quarter of such aid). The former Bush Administration since then
requested smaller amounts of aid, although the Administration continued to stress that there were
important U.S. interests in the region. The former Bush Administration highlighted the phase-out
of economic aid to Kazakhstan and restrictions on aid to Uzbekistan (see below) as among the
reasons for declining aid requests. In April 2008, Assistant Secretary of State Boucher stated that
another reason for declining U.S. aid to the region was a more constrained U.S. budgetary
situation. Aid to Central Asia in recent years has been about the same or less in absolute and
percentage terms than that provided to the South Caucasian region. (See Table 1).
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), created in 2004 to provide U.S. aid to countries
with promising development records, announced in late 2005 that Kyrgyzstan was eligible to
apply for assistance as a country on the “threshold” of meeting the criteria for full-scale
development aid. On March 14, 2008, the MCC signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan to provide
$16 million over the next two years to help the country combat corruption and bolster the rule of
law.115
Congressional Conditions on Kazakh and Uzbek Aid
In Congress, Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7) forbade FREEDOM Support Act
(FSA) assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determined and
reported that it was making substantial progress in meeting commitments under the Strategic
Partnership Declaration to democratize and respect human rights. The conference report (H.Rept.
108-10) also introduced language that forbade assistance to the Kazakh government unless the
Secretary of State determined and reported that it significantly had improved its human rights
record during the preceding six months. However, the legislation permitted the Secretary to waive
the requirement on national security grounds.116 The Secretary reported in May 2003, that
Uzbekistan was making such progress (by late 2003, the former Bush Administration had decided
114 In comparison, the EU has reported that it has provided approximately 1.39 billion euros ($2.13 billion at current
exchange rates) in assistance to the region since 1991. Its planned aid of about $1 billion in 2007-2013 may prove to be
more than projected U.S. aid to the region. European Community. Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central
Asia for the period 2007-2013, June 2007; Council of the European Union. Presidency Conclusions, 11177/07, June
23, 2007, p. 12.
115 ITAR-TASS, March 18, 2008.
116 The language calling for “substantial progress” in respecting human rights differs from the grounds of ineligibility
for assistance under Section 498(b) of Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), which includes as
grounds a presidential determination that a Soviet successor state has “engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights.” The Administration has stated annually that the president has
not determined that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have engaged in “gross violations” of human rights.
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that it could no longer make this claim). In July 2003, the Secretary reported that Kazakhstan was
making progress. Some in Congress were critical of these findings.
Consolidated Appropriations for FY2004, including foreign operations (P.L. 108-199) and for
FY2005 (P.L. 108-447), and Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 (P.L. 109-102)
retained these conditions, while clarifying that the prohibition on aid to Uzbekistan pertained to
the central government and that conditions included respecting human rights, establishing a
“genuine” multi-party system, and ensuring free and fair elections and freedom of expression and
media. These conditions remained in place under the continuing resolution for FY2007 (P.L. 109-
289, as amended). In appropriations for FY2008 (Consolidated Appropriations; P.L. 110-161),
another condition was added blocking the admission of Uzbek officials to the United States if the
Secretary of State determines that they were involved in abuses in Andijon. Omnibus
Appropriations for FY2009 (P.L. 111-8, Secs. 7075 [Kazakhstan] and 7076 [Uzbekistan])
reiterate these conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Among recent determinations and reports:
• Then-Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte reported to Congress in
February 2008 that Kazakhstan had failed to significantly improve its human
rights record but that he had waived aid restrictions on national security grounds.
He did not determine and report to Congress that Uzbekistan was making
significant progress in respecting human rights, so aid restrictions remained in
place (IMET and FMF programs were among the affected programs that did not
receive funding).
• Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg reported to Congress in February
2009 that Kazakhstan had taken steps forward, but had fallen short in meeting
reform commitments agreed to at the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in
Madrid in November 2007 on media, political parties, and elections, and on the
preservation of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR). A national security waiver was issued. He did not determine and report
to Congress that Uzbekistan was making significant progress in respecting
human rights, so aid restrictions remained in place (IMET and FMF programs
were among the affected programs that did not receive funding).
Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States contributes to international financial
institutions that aid Central Asia. Recurrent policy issues regarding U.S. aid include what it
should be used for, who should receive it, and whether it is effective.
Legislation
P.L. 111-8 (H.R. 1105) (FY2009)
Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009. Introduced on February 23, 2009. Signed into law on March
11, 2009. The Explanatory Statement calls for $13.5 million in FREEDOM Support Act aid to
Kazakhstan, $24.4 million to Kyrgyzstan, $25.233 million to Tajikistan, $7 million to
Turkmenistan, and $7 million to Uzbekistan. The Act continues prior-year language conditioning
aid to the government of Kazakhstan on progress in democratization and respect for human
rights, including obligations to the OSCE to implement reforms in elections, media freedom,
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freedom of assembly, and minority rights, and in meeting the commitments it made in connection
with its assumption of the chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010. The Secretary of State is permitted
a waiver on national security grounds. Aid to the government of Uzbekistan is conditioned on its
meeting commitments put forth in the U.S.-Uzbek Declaration on Strategic Partnership and on
prosecuting the individuals responsible for killings of civilians in Andijon. If the Secretary of
State has evidence of persons responsible for the killings of civilians in Andijon, that person is to
be deemed ineligible for admission to the United States. The condition may be lifted if the
Secretary reports that Uzbekistan has taken concrete and measureable steps to respect human
rights. The Secretary may issue a waiver if admission is necessary for U.N. activities or to further
law enforcement.
H.R. 3081 (Lowey)/S. 1434 (Leahy) (FY2010)
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010. H.R.
3081 was passed by the House on July 9, 2009. It does not place conditions on assistance to
Kazakhstan but does place conditions on assistance to Uzbekistan. These provisions are similar to
House language in previous years. S. 1434 was introduced in the Senate on July 9, 2009. It
contains conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and blocks admission to Uzbek
officials deemed culpable for events in Andijon or other abuses. These provisions are similar to
Senate language in previous years.
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia,
FY1992 to FY2009
(millions of dollars)
FY2009
FY2010 Requestb
Central Asian Country
FY1992 thru
FY2007 Budgeteda
FY2008
Actualb
Estimateb
Kazakhstan
1,470.88
21.1
19.3
17.3
Kyrgyzstan
905.01
29.96
29.1
48.2
Tajikistan
747.36
31.3
29.9
52.3
Turkmenistan
276.82
7.2
8.9
16.7
Uzbekistan
833.08
9.5
8.6
10.8
Regional
87.15
2.98
3.0
12.0
Total
4,320.3
102.04
98.8
157.3
Percent
14
24
25
31
Sources: State Department, Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, information as of
November 1, 2008; Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2009: South and Central Asia.
a. FSA and Agency funds. Excludes some classified coalition support funding. Includes $19.3 million in Defense
Department Section 1206 train and equip funds for Kazakhstan in FY2007.
b. FSA and other Function 150 funds. Does not include Defense or Energy Department funds, funding for
exchanges, or Millennium Challenge Corporation aid to Kyrgyzstan.
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Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
Source: Map Resources Adapted by CRS. (08/02 M. Chin)
Author Contact Information
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289
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