Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests

Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
January 9, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
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CRS Report for Congress
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epared for Members and Committees of Congress

Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests

Summary
U.S. policy toward the Central Asian states has aimed at facilitating their cooperation with U.S.
and NATO stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and their efforts to combat terrorism; proliferation;
and trafficking in arms, drugs, and persons. Other U.S. objectives have included promoting free
markets, democratization, human rights, energy development, and the forging of East-West and
Central Asia-South Asia trade links. Such policies aim to help the states become what various
U.S. administrations have considered to be responsible members of the international community
rather than to degenerate into xenophobic, extremist, and anti-Western regimes that contribute to
wider regional conflict and instability.
Soon after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian
“front-line” states offered over-flight and other support for coalition anti-terrorism operations in
Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition troops and provided access
to airbases. In 2003, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also endorsed coalition military action in Iraq.
About two dozen Kazakhstani troops served in Iraq until late 2008. Uzbekistan rescinded U.S.
basing rights to support operations in Afghanistan in 2005 after the United States criticized the
reported killing of civilians in the town of Andijon. In early 2009, Kyrgyzstan ordered a U.S. base
in that country to close, allegedly because of Russian inducements and U.S. reluctance to meet
Kyrgyz requests for greatly increased lease payments. An agreement on continued U.S. use of the
Manas Transit Center was reached in June 2009. The Kyrgyz leadership has declared that it will
not extend the basing agreement when it comes up for renewal in 2014. In recent years, most of
the regional states also participate in the Northern Distribution Network for the transport of U.S.
and NATO supplies into and out of Afghanistan.
Policymakers have tailored U.S. policy in Central Asia to the varying characteristics of these
states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan have included securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear and
biological weapons materials and facilities. U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas
development in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and successive administrations have backed
diverse export routes to the West for these resources. U.S. policy toward Kyrgyzstan has long
included support for its civil society. In Tajikistan, the United States focuses on developmental
assistance to bolster the fragile economy and address high poverty rates. Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan, as well as the region, can gain economically if water resources are properly
developed and managed. U.S. relations with Uzbekistan—the most populous state in the heart of
the region—were cool after 2005, but recently have improved.
Congress has been at the forefront in advocating increased U.S. ties with Central Asia, and in
providing backing for the region for the transit of equipment and supplies for U.S.-led
stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Congress has pursued these goals through hearings and
legislation on humanitarian, economic, and democratization assistance; security issues; and
human rights. During the 113th Congress, the Members may review assistance for bolstering
regional border and customs controls and other safeguards to prevent the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), combating trafficking in persons and drugs, encouraging regional
integration with South Asia and Europe, advancing energy and other resource security, and
countering terrorism. Support for these goals also has been viewed as contributing to U.S. and
NATO stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. For several years, Congress has
placed conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan because of concerns about human
rights abuses and lagging democratization (the Secretary of State may waive such conditions).
Congress will continue to consider how to balance these varied U.S. interests in the region.
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Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests

Contents
Most Recent Developments ............................................................................................................. 1
Historical Background ..................................................................................................................... 1
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns .................................................................................................. 1
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan .......................................................................................... 5
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom ........................................................................................ 6
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations ................................................................................................. 6
Russia’s Role ............................................................................................................................. 8
Obstacles to Peace and Independence: Regional Tensions and Conflicts ...................................... 12
Terrorism and Conflict in Kazakhstan ..................................................................................... 14
Incursions and Violence in Kyrgyzstan ................................................................................... 16
The 2010 Ethnic Clashes in Kyrgyzstan ........................................................................... 17
Attacks by Jama’at Kyrgyzstan Jaish al-Mahdi in 2010-2011 .......................................... 19
Terrorism and Conflict in Tajikistan ........................................................................................ 19
The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan ............................................................................. 19
The 2010 Attacks in Tajikistan .......................................................................................... 20
The 2012 Instability in Mountainous Badakhshan ............................................................ 21
Terrorism and Conflict in Uzbekistan...................................................................................... 22
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan ....................................................................... 23
The Summer 2009 Suicide Bombings and Attacks in Uzbekistan .................................... 24
U.S. Designation of the IMU and IJU as Terrorist Organizations ........................................... 24
Democratization and Human Rights .............................................................................................. 25
Recent Political Developments in Kazakhstan ........................................................................ 27
Recent Political Developments in Kyrgyzstan ........................................................................ 29
Recent Political Developments in Turkmenistan ..................................................................... 30
Recent Political Developments in Uzbekistan ......................................................................... 30
Human Rights .......................................................................................................................... 31
Kazakhstan and the Presidency of the OSCE .......................................................................... 35
Trade and Investment ..................................................................................................................... 36
Energy Resources .................................................................................................................... 39
Kazakhstan’s Oil and Gas ................................................................................................. 41
Turkmenistan’s Gas ........................................................................................................... 44
Uzbekistan’s Oil and Gas .................................................................................................. 47
U.S. Aid Overview ......................................................................................................................... 48
Congressional Conditions on Kazakh and Uzbek Aid ............................................................. 49
U.S. Security and Arms Control Programs and Assistance............................................................ 51
Closure of the Karshi-Khanabad Airbase ................................................................................ 54
Efforts to Improve Security Relations ............................................................................... 54
The Manas Airbase/Transit Center .......................................................................................... 56
The Manas Transit Center Agreement ............................................................................... 56
The Status of the Manas Transit Center After the April 2010 Coup.................................. 57
The December 2010 Congressional Report on Fuel Contracts ......................................... 58
Recent Fuel Contract Developments ................................................................................. 59
The Northern Distribution Network to Afghanistan ................................................................ 60
Weapons of Mass Destruction ................................................................................................. 63
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Figures
Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan .................................................................................................................................. 66

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia, FY1992 to FY2012 ......................................... 64
Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY1992-FY2001 .......................................................... 65
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY2002-FY2010 (and Totals, FY1992-FY2010) ......... 65

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 67

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Most Recent Developments
On January 5, 2012, Kyrgyz border guards wounded five Uzbeks in the Uzbek enclave of Sokh in
Kyrgyzstan’s Batken Region, bordering Uzbekistan. The Uzbeks allegedly had attempted to block
an incursion into Sokh by the Kyrgyz border guards. Up to 1,000 local Uzbeks then took over
three dozen Kyrgyz hostage, and several hundred Kyrgyz then allegedly gathered at the border to
demand the release of the hostages. On January 7, the last hostages were released, but rallies by
Kyrgyz reportedly have continued. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have agreed that the Kyrgyz
border guards spurred escalating tensions by entering Sokh and carrying out work, although
Kyrgyz authorities claim that the Uzbeks first attacked the Kyrgyz border guards. One Kyrgyz
legislator called for stepped-up negotiations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on border
demarcation and border control measures.1
Historical Background
Central Asia consists of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; it
borders Russia, China, the Middle East, and South Asia. The major peoples of all but Tajikistan
speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks speak an Iranian language), and most are Sunni Muslims
(some Tajiks are Shiia Muslims). Most are closely related historically and culturally. By the late
19th century, Russian tsars had conquered the last independent khanates and nomadic lands of
Central Asia. By the early 1920s, Soviet power had been imposed; by 1936, five “Soviet Socialist
Republics” had been created. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, they
gained independence.2
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, then-President George H. W. Bush sent
the “FREEDOM Support Act” (FSA) aid authorization to Congress, which was amended and
signed into law in October 1992 (P.L. 102-511). In 1999, congressional concerns led to passage of
the “Silk Road Strategy Act” (P.L. 106-113), which authorized enhanced policy and aid to support
conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and
communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia. Since FY2003, Congress has conditioned foreign assistance to
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on their progress in respecting human rights (with national security
waivers for Kazakhstan, and more recently, for Uzbekistan) (see below, “Congressional
Conditions on Kazakh and Uzbek Aid”).

1 Open Source Center, Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter, CEDR), January 7, 2013, Doc. Nos. CEP-7950026,
CEP-950027, CEP-950043, CEP-950025, CEP-950014, and CEP-950005; January 9, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950134;
Interfax, January 6 and January 9, 2013.
2 See CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 97-690,
Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan: Recent
Developments and U.S. Interests
, by Jim Nichol, CRS Report 97-1055, Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S.
Interests
, by Jim Nichol, and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim
Nichol.
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U.S. policymakers and others hold various views on the appropriate types and levels of U.S.
involvement in the region. Some have argued that ties with “energy behemoth” Kazakhstan are
crucial to U.S. interests.3 Others have argued that Uzbekistan is the “linchpin” of the region (it is
the most populous regional state and is centrally located, shaping the range and scope of regional
cooperation) and should receive the most U.S. attention.
In general, U.S. aid and investment have been
Central Asia: Basic Facts
viewed as strengthening the independence of
Total area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India;
the Central Asian states and forestalling
Kazakhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000 sq. mi.;
Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or other efforts to
Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan: 190,000 sq. mi.;
subvert them. Advocates of U.S. ties have
Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi.
argued that political turmoil and the growth of
Total population: approximately 64.23 million, slightly
terrorist enclaves in Central Asia could
less than France; Kazakhstan: 17.52 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 5.5
produce spillover effects both in nearby states,
m.; Tajikistan: 7.77 m.; Turkmenistan: 5.05 m.;
Uzbekistan: 28.39 m. (July 2012 est., The World Factbook.)
including U.S. allies and friends such as
Turkey, and worldwide. They also have argued
Total gross domestic product: approximately
that the United States has a major interest in
$389.69 billion in 2011; per capita GDP is about $6,070,
but there are large income disparities and relatively large
preventing terrorist regimes or groups from
percentages of people in each country are in poverty.
illicitly acquiring Soviet-era technology for
Kazakhstan: $219.6 b.; Kyrgyzstan: $13.29 b.; Tajikistan:
making weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
$16.43 b.; Turkmenistan: $43.91 b.; Uzbekistan: $96.46 b.
They have maintained that U.S. interests do
(The World Factbook, purchasing power parity.)
not perfectly coincide with those of its allies
and friends, that Turkey and other actors possess limited aid resources, and that the United States
is in the strongest position as the sole superpower to influence democratization and respect for
human rights. They have stressed that such U.S. influence will help alleviate social tensions
exploited by Islamic extremist groups to gain adherents. They also have argued that for all these
reasons, the United States should maintain military access to the region even when Afghanistan
becomes more stable.4
Some views of policymakers and academics who previously objected to a more forward U.S.
policy toward Central Asia appeared less salient after September 11, 2001—when the United
States came to stress counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan—but aspects of these views
could again come to the fore in debates over U.S. security policy in Afghanistan and Central Asia.
These observers argued that the United States historically had few interests in Central Asia and
that developments there remained largely marginal to U.S. interests. They discounted fears that
anti-Western Islamic extremism would make enough headway to threaten secular regimes or
otherwise harm U.S. interests in Central Asia. They also argued that the United States should not
try to foster democratization among cultures they claimed are historically attuned to
authoritarianism. Some observers rejected arguments that U.S. interests in anti-terrorism,

3 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Remarks: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice At Eurasian
National University
, October 13, 2005. More recently, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake has reiterated that “our
relations with Kazakhstan ... are the deepest and broadest of all countries in Central Asia.” U.S. Department of State,
On-the-Record Briefing With International Media: Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and
Central Asian Affairs
, August 15, 2012.
4 At least some of these views seemed to be reflected in the former Bush Administration’s 2006 National Security
Strategy of the United States, which proclaimed that “Central Asia is an enduring priority for our foreign policy.” The
Obama Administration’s May 2010 National Security Strategy does not specifically mention Central Asia or the
Caspian region. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, March 16, 2006, p. 40; National
Security Strategy
, May 2010.
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nonproliferation, regional cooperation, and trade outweighed concerns over democratization and
human rights, and urged reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive Central Asian states. A few
observers pointed to instability in the region as a reason to eschew deeper U.S. involvement such
as military access that could needlessly place more U.S. personnel and citizens in danger.
The Obama Administration has listed six objectives of what it terms an enhanced U.S.
engagement policy in Central Asia:
• to maximize the cooperation of the states of the region with coalition counter-
terrorism efforts in Afghanistan (particularly cooperation on hosting U.S. and
NATO airbases and on the transit of troops and supplies to and from Afghanistan
along the “Northern Distribution Network”; see below);
• to increase the development and diversification of the region’s energy and other
resources and supply routes;
• to promote the eventual emergence of good governance and respect for human
rights;
• to foster competitive market economies;
• to combat the trafficking of narcotics and people; and
• to sustain nonproliferation.
Signs of this enhanced engagement include U.S. senior-level diplomatic visits and annual
meetings of the U.S.-Central Asia Council on Trade and Investment (see below). In 2009, the
Obama Administration also launched high-level Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABCs) with each
of the regional states on counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, democratic reforms, the rule of law,
human rights, trade, investment, health, and education. In February 2012, the State Department
announced that it was elevating relations with Kazakhstan to the level of a strategic partnership
dialogue by transforming the bilateral ABC into a Strategic Partnership Commission, similar to
the ones with Georgia and Ukraine. The first meeting of this Commission took place in April
2012 in Washington, DC, during which political, economic, and scientific working groups
discussed plans for bilateral projects.
In February 2012, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified that Central Asian
states were unstable and increasingly vulnerable to violent extremism. He appeared to argue that
most of the regional governments have reacted to “Arab Spring” developments by further
constraining civil liberties and human rights. He warned that ethnic violence might recur in
Kyrgyzstan’s southern regions.5
Among relevant policy statements, in July 2010, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake refuted
the arguments of critics “that this Administration is too focused on the security relationship with
[Central Asian] countries and forgets about human rights.” He stated that human rights and civil
society issues “will remain an essential part of our dialogue equal in importance to our discussion
on security issues.”6 Similarly, in Congressional testimony in July 2012, he argued that “the path
to progress on [human rights] is more engagement with these governments, not less.”7

5 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Worldwide Security Threats, Statement of James R. Clapper
Director, National Intelligence Office of the Director of National Intelligence
, February 16, 2012.
6 U.S. Department of State, Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S.
(continued...)
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In testimony in November 2010, Assistant Secretary Blake appeared to emphasize U.S. security
interests when he stated that “Central Asia plays a vital role in our Afghanistan strategy…. A
stable future for Afghanistan depends on the continued assistance of its Central Asian neighbors,
just as a stable, prosperous future for the Central Asian states depends on bringing peace, stability
and prosperity to Afghanistan.” Appearing at the same hearing as Blake, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense Robert Sedney stated that “from the Department of Defense perspective …
our focus is on the support for the effort in Afghanistan, but that is accompanied by the longer-
term security assistance projects, including a variety of training efforts in areas from
counterterrorism to counternarcotics that are building capabilities in those countries that are
important for reasons well beyond Afghanistan.”8
In a speech in October 2012, Assistant Secretary Blake appeared to emphasize that U.S. policy
initiatives in Central Asia were closely associated with U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. He stated
that the Central Asian countries have an important role in ensuring the security of Afghanistan
after 2014. He averred that the Silk Road Vision aimed to integrate Afghanistan into the larger
regional economy and hailed the NDN as providing a means for boosting private sector trade
between Central and South Asia. He praised Central Asian economic cooperation with
Afghanistan and stated that U.S. efforts to encourage economic and security ties between the
Central Asian states and Afghanistan had expanded opportunities to advocate for greater
democratization and respect for human rights in Central Asia.9
Recent contacts between President Obama and Secretary Clinton and Central Asian leaders have
included the following.
• The President met on April 11, 2010, with Kazakh President Nursultan
Nazarbayev on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC.
A joint statement reported that they “pledged to intensify bilateral cooperation to
promote nuclear safety and nonproliferation, regional stability in Central Asia,
economic prosperity, and universal values.” President Obama encouraged
Kazakhstan to fully implement its 2009-2012 National Human Rights Action
Plan. President Nazarbayev agreed to facilitate U.S. military air flights along a
new trans-polar route that transits Kazakhstan to Afghanistan, and President
Obama praised Kazakh assistance to Afghanistan.10

(...continued)
Policy Towards Central Asia, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, July 30, 2010. See also U.S. Department of State,
Robert O. Blake, Jr., Remarks:U.S. Policy in Central Asia, Forum of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, January 25,
2012.
7 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Hearing: U.S.
Engagement in Central Asia, Testimony by Robert Blake, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Central and South Asian
Affairs, U.S. Department of State
, July 24, 2012
8 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global
Environment, Hearing on the Emerging Importance of the U.S.-Central Asia Partnership, Testimony of Robert O.
Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
, and Testimony of Robert Sedney, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense,
November 17 2010.
9 U.S. Department of State, Remarks, Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs, [at] Indiana University's Inner Asian and Uralic Natural Resource Center
, October 18, 2012. Similarly, see
Remarks, Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, [at] the Conference on
U.S and European Policy in Central Asia at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
, July 12, 2012.
10 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement on the meeting between President Obama and
Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev
April 11, 2010.
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Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests

• Secretary Clinton visited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in early
December 2010. In Kazakhstan, she participated in the OSCE Summit (see
below, “Kazakhstan and the Presidency of the OSCE”). She also met briefly with
Tajik President Rahmon and Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow
on the sidelines of the Astana Summit. In Uzbekistan, she signed an accord on
scientific cooperation as one means, she explained, to further U.S. engagement
with the country.
• President Obama telephoned President Karimov on September 28, 2011, to thank
him for Uzbekistan’s cooperation in stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, and
reportedly to urge him to facilitate the transit of U.S. and NATO cargoes into and
out of Afghanistan.
• During her October 22-23, 2011, visit to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Secretary
Clinton discussed the U.S. “New Silk Road Vision” (see below, “Trade and
Investment”) to turn Afghanistan into a regional transportation, trade, and energy
hub linked to Central Asia. She also warned the presidents of both countries that
restrictions on religious freedom could contribute to rising religious discontent.
• President Obama met with President Nazarbayev at the nuclear security summit
in Seoul, South Korea, in March 2012. President Obama hailed Kazakhstan’s
efforts to secure nuclear materials inherited from the former Soviet Union.11
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan
After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, then-Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State B. Lynn Pascoe testified that the former Bush Administration realized that “it
was critical to the national interests of the United States that we greatly enhance our relations
with the five Central Asian countries” to prevent them from becoming harbors for terrorism.12 All
the Central Asian states soon offered overflight and other assistance to U.S.-led anti-terrorism
coalition operations in Afghanistan. The states were predisposed to welcome such operations.
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had long supported the Afghan Northern Alliance’s combat against the
Taliban, and all the Central Asian states feared Afghanistan as a base for terrorism, crime, and
drug trafficking (even Turkmenistan, which had tried to reach some accommodation with the
Taliban). The U.S.-led coalition’s overthrow of the Taliban and routing of Al Qaeda and IMU
terrorists in Afghanistan (termed Operation Enduring Freedom or OEF) increased the security of
Central Asia.
According to then-Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch in testimony in June 2002, “our
military relationships with each [Central Asian] nation have matured on a scale not imaginable
prior to September 11th.” Crouch averred that “for the foreseeable future, U.S. defense and
security cooperation in Central Asia must continue to support actions to deter or defeat terrorist
threats” and to build effective armed forces under civilian control.

11 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and President Nursultan Nazarbayev
of the Republic of Kazakhstan Before Bilateral Meeting
, March 26, 2012; Joint Statement of the Presidents of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America Regarding the Trilateral
Cooperation at the Former Semipalatinsk Test Site
, March 26, 2012.
12 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus, The U.S. Role
in Central Asia. Testimony of B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, June 27,
2002.
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As outlined by Crouch and as affected by subsequent developments, security relationships
include
• a “critical regional partnership” with Kyrgyzstan in OEF, providing basing for
U.S. and coalition forces at Manas (in 2012, the U.S. Air Force reported that
there were about 1,500 U.S. troops and U.S. contractors and about 700 Kyrgyz
contractors at Manas).
• a base in Uzbekistan for U.S. operations at Karshi-Khanabad (K2; U.S. troops
reportedly numbered less than 900 just before the 2005 pullout, see below), a
base for German units near Termez (in 2012, The Military Balance reported that
there were 163 German troops at the base), and a land corridor to Afghanistan for
aid via the Friendship Bridge and a rail link at Termez.
• an agreement with Tajikistan to use its international airport in Dushanbe for
refueling (“gas-and-go”) and the country’s hosting of a French force (in 2012,
media reported that there are 100 French troops based in Tajikistan).
• overflight and other support by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.13
To obtain Uzbekistan’s approval for basing, the 2002 U.S.-Uzbek Strategic Partnership
Declaration included a nonspecific security guarantee. The United States affirmed that “it would
regard with grave concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan’s security and would consult with
Uzbekistan “on an urgent basis” regarding a response. The two states pledged to intensify military
cooperation, including “reequipping the Armed Forces” of Uzbekistan.
In 2005, however, Uzbekistan rescinded its basing agreement with the United States. Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan have maintained their basing support for NATO peacekeeping operations, and
Kyrgyzstan for U.S. and NATO operations, in Afghanistan. In 2009, most Central Asian states
agreed to facilitate the air and land transport of U.S. and NATO nonlethal supplies (and later of
lethal equipment by air) to Afghanistan as an alternative to land transport via increasingly volatile
Pakistan. In 2012, most of the states approved the reverse transit of supplies and equipment out of
Afghanistan. For further details, see below, “U.S. Security and Arms Control.”
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were the only Central Asian state that joined the “coalition of the
willing” in 2003 that endorsed U.S.-led coalition military operations in Iraq. Uzbekistan
subsequently decided not to send troops to Iraq. In August 2003, Kazakhstan deployed some two
dozen troops to Iraq who served under Polish command and carried out water-purification,
demining, and medical activities. They pulled out in late 2008.
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible members of the
international community, supporting integrative goals through bilateral aid and through

13 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus, Statement of J.D.
Crouch II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy
, June 27, 2002.
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coordination with other aid donors. The stated policy goal is to discourage radical anti-democratic
regimes and terrorist groups from gaining influence. All the Central Asian leaders publicly
embrace Islam but display hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have
established some trade and aid ties with Iran. Some observers argue that, in the longer run, their
foreign policies may not be anti-Western but may more closely reflect some concerns of other
Islamic states. Some Western organizational ties with the region have suffered in recent years, in
particular those of the OSCE, which has been criticized by some Central Asian governments for
advocating democratization and respect for human rights.14 Despite this criticism, President
Nazarbayev successfully pushed for Kazakhstan to hold the presidency of the OSCE in 2010 (see
below).
In early 2006, the State Department incorporated Central Asia into a revamped Bureau of South
and Central Asian Affairs. According to former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Steven Mann, “institutions such as NATO and the OSCE will continue to draw the nations of
Central Asia closer to Europe and the United States,” but the United States also will encourage
the states to develop “new ties and synergies with nations to the south,” such as Afghanistan,
India, and Pakistan.15 Other observers, however, criticized the State Department action, arguing
that it deemphasized efforts to integrate the region into European institutions, subordinated U.S.
ties with Central Asia to the U.S. strategic calculus regarding Afghanistan and to other U.S. ties
with South Asia, and provided an opportunity for Russia and China to move into the breach to
assert greater influence.16
The European Union (EU) has become more interested in Central Asia in recent years as the
region has become more of a security threat as an originator and transit zone for drugs, weapons
of mass destruction, refugees, and persons smuggled for prostitution or labor. Russia’s cutoff of
gas supplies in 2006 and 2009 to Ukraine—which hindered gas supplies transiting Ukraine to
European customers—also bolstered EU interest in Central Asia as an alternative supplier of oil
and gas. Such interests contributed to the launch of a Strategy Paper for assistance for 2002-2006
and a follow-on for 2007-2013 (see below), and the EU’s appointment of a Special
Representative to the region. The EU has implemented Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
(PCAs, which set forth political, economic, and trade relations) with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Uzbekistan. An existing Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) program was
supplemented in 2004 and 2006 by a Baku Energy Initiative and Astana Energy Ministerial
Declaration to diversify energy supplies. One project involved the proposed Nabucco pipeline,
which would transport Caspian region gas to Austria (see “Energy Resources,” below).
In June 2007, the EU approved a new “Central Asian strategy” for enhanced aid and relations for
2007-2013. It argues that the EU ties with the region need to be enhanced because EU
enlargement and EU relations with the South Caucasus and Black Sea states bring it to Central
Asia’s borders. The strategy also stresses that “the dependency of the EU on external energy

14 See also CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
15 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central
Asia, Hearing on Assessing Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia, Testimony of Steven Mann, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs
, July 25, 2006. The State Department appointed a Senior
Advisor on Regional Integration in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Robert Deutsch, who focused on
bolstering trade and transport ties between South and Central Asia.
16 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export, and Trade,
Hearing on Energy Supplies in Eurasia and Implications for U.S. Energy Security, Testimony by Zeyno Baran,
September 27, 2005.
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sources and the need for a diversified energy supply policy in order to increase energy security
open further perspectives for cooperation between the EU and Central Asia,” and that the “EU
will conduct an enhanced regular energy dialogue” with the states. Under the strategy, the EU set
up offices in each regional state and pledged regional assistance of $1 billion. EU emissaries hold
dozens of meetings and seminars each year with the Central Asian states on such issues as human
rights, civil society development, foreign policy and assistance, trade and investment,
environmental and energy cooperation, and other issues.17
Russia’s Role
During most of the 1990s, successive U.S. administrations generally viewed a democratizing
Russia as serving as a role model in Central Asia. Despite growing authoritarian tendencies in
Russia during the presidencies of Vladimir Putin (2000-2008, and again in 2012-2017) and
Dmitriy Medvedev (2008-2012), successive U.S. administrations have emphasized that Russia’s
counter-terrorism efforts in the region broadly support U.S. interests. At the same time, successive
administrations have stressed to Russia that it should not seek to dominate the region or exclude
Western and other involvement. Virtually all U.S. analysts agree that Russia’s actions should be
monitored to ensure that the independence of the Central Asian states is not vitiated.
Soon after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Russia acquiesced to
increased U.S. and coalition presence in the region for operations against Al Qaeda and its
supporters in Afghanistan. Besides Russia’s own concerns about Islamic extremism in
Afghanistan, Central Asia, and its own North Caucasus, it was interested in boosting its economic
and other ties to the West and regaining some influence in Afghanistan. In the later part of the
2000s, however, Russia appeared to step up efforts to counter U.S. influence in Central Asia and
reassert its own “great power” status by advocating that the states increase economic and strategic
ties with Russia and limit such ties with the United States. This stance included backing and
encouragement for Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to close their U.S. airbases. Such a stance
appeared paradoxical to U.S. officials, since Russia (and China) benefitted from anti-terrorism
operations carried out by U.S. (and NATO) forces in Afghanistan. Closer U.S.-Russia relations
that developed after 2009 appeared to include some Russian cooperation with U.S. and NATO
stabilization efforts in Afghanistan.
During the 1990s, Russia’s economic decline and demands by Central Asia caused it to reduce its
security presence, a trend that Vladimir Putin since 2000 has appeared determined to reverse. In
1999, Russian border guards were largely phased out in Kyrgyzstan, the last Russian military
advisors left Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty (CST;
see below) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in part because the treaty
members failed to help Uzbekistan meet the growing Taliban threat in Afghanistan, according to
Uzbek President Islam Karimov.

17 European Commission, Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the Period 2007-2013, June 2007;
European Commission, External Relations Directorate, Central Asia DCI Indicative Program 2011 – 2013, September
2010; European External Action Service, Delegation of the EU to Kazakhstan, Joint Press Release Following the EU-
Central Asia Ministerial Meeting in Tashkent
, April 7, 2011; European Union, Remarks by High Representative
Catherine Ashton Following the EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting in Kyrgyzstan
, Press Release, November 27,
2012.
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Despite these moves, Russia appeared determined to maintain a military presence in Tajikistan. It
has retained from the Soviet period the 201st motorized infantry division of about 5,000 troops
subordinate to Russia’s Central Military District. Some Russian officers reportedly help oversee
these troops, many or most of whom are ethnic Tajik noncommissioned officers and soldiers.
Thousands of Tajik Frontier Force border guards receive support as necessary from the 201st
division.18 Russia’s efforts to formalize a basing agreement with Tajikistan dragged on for years,
as Tajikistan endeavored to charge rent and assert its sovereignty. In October 2004, a 10-year
basing agreement was signed, formalizing Russia’s largest military presence abroad, besides its
Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, Tajikistan demanded full control over border policing. Russia
announced in June 2005 that it had handed over the last guard-house along the Afghan-Tajik
border to Tajik troops (some Russian border advisors remained).
In October 2009, visiting President Rahmon reportedly urged then-President Medvedev to pay
rent on Russia’s base facilities in Tajikistan. At a meeting in Dushanbe in September 2011, then-
President Medvedev announced that he and Rahmon had made progress in reaching agreement on
extending the basing agreement for another 49 years, and that an accord would be signed in early
2012. Some media reported that Tajikistan was calling for up to $300 million in annual rent
payments. Also at the meeting, the two presidents agreed that the number of Russian border
advisors reportedly would be reduced from 350 to 200, and that they would more closely
cooperate with the Tajik border force. President Rahmon met with newly inaugurated President
Putin in Moscow on the sidelines of a CIS summit in mid-May 2012, and the two leaders agreed
to continue the apparently contentious discussions on extending the basing agreement. During
President Putin’s early October 2012, the two leaders agreed to a basing agreement through the
year 2042.President Rahmon was unsuccessful in getting Russia to pay more on the base lease,
but Russia pledged added military modernization assistance. Of great significance for Tajikistan,
Putin agreed that work permits for Tajik migrant laborers would be extended from one to three
years.
In a seeming shift toward a more activist role in Central Asia, in April 2000, Russia called for the
signatories of the CST to approve the creation of rapid reaction forces to combat terrorism and
hinted that such forces might launch preemptive strikes on Afghan terrorist bases. These hints
elicited U.S. calls for Russia to exercise restraint. Then-President Clinton and Putin agreed in
2000 to set up a working group to examine Afghan-related terrorism (this working group later
broadened its discussions to other counter-terrorism cooperation; it has continued to meet under
the Obama Administration). CST members agreed in 2001 to set up the Central Asian rapid
reaction force headquartered in Kyrgyzstan, with Russia’s troops in Tajikistan comprising most of
the force (this small force of 3,000 to 5,000 troops has held exercises and supposedly is dedicated
to border protection; in 2009 it was supplemented by a larger 20,000-troop rapid reaction force
with a supposedly wider mission).19 CIS members in 2001 also approved setting up an Anti-
Terrorism Center (ATC) in Moscow, with a branch in Kyrgyzstan, giving Russia influence over
regional intelligence gathering.
Perhaps as a result of the establishment of a U.S. airbase in Kyrgyzstan after the September 11,
2001, attacks (see “The Manas Airbase” below), Russia in September 2003 signed a 15-year
military basing accord with Kyrgyzstan providing access to the Kant airfield, near Kyrgyzstan’s
capital of Bishkek. The base is a few miles from the U.S.-led coalition’s airbase. Russia attempted

18 The Military Balance, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, March 7, 2012.
19 CEDR, February 25, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950282.
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to entice Kyrgyzstan in early 2009 to close the Manas airbase by offering the country hundreds of
millions of dollars in grants and loans. However, after Kyrgyzstan agreed to continued U.S. use of
the airbase in mid-2009 as a “Transit Center,” Russia reneged on some of this funding and
requested that Kyrgyzstan grant Moscow rights to another airbase near Uzbekistan’s border.
Uzbekistan denounced this plan, and it appeared to be put on hold. With the U.S.-Russia “reset”
of relations, Russia’s opposition to the continued operation of the Manas Transit Center
seemingly diminished, but in May 2012, the Russian Foreign Ministry hailed a statement by
President Atambayev that he intended not to renew the lease on the U.S. Transit Center.
Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Kyrgyzstan and met with President Almazbek
Atambayev on September 20, 2012. The two sides signed a 15-year extension to Russia’s lease on
“unified” military facilities in the country, including the Kant airbase, operated as part of the
CSTO. Russia’s rent payment for using the facilities—reportedly $4.5 million per year—
reportedly did not change, although issues of training and Kyrgyzstan’s supply of free utilities to
the facilities reportedly were addressed. The two sides also signed accords canceling one $190
million Kyrgyz debt and restructuring another $300 million loan (the latter had been given by
Putin to Kyrgyzstan in 2009). Another agreement pledged assistance by Russian firms in building
several hydropower projects, including a renewed commitment to assist with the Kambarata-1
dam and hydroelectric power station (see also below). In a joint statement, Atambayev pledged to
close the U.S. Transit Center at Manas in 2014, and Putin pledged to consider assistance to help
convert the Transit Center facilities to civilian use. Hailing agreements that further integrated the
two countries militarily and economically, President Atambayev stated at a press conference that
“Russia is our main strategic partner.... We do not have a future separate from Russia.”20
Besides Russia’s military presence in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Russia’s 2009 National Security
Strategy called for the country to play a dominant role in Caspian basin security. Russia’s Caspian
Sea Flotilla has been bolstered by troops and equipment in recent years. A security cooperation
agreement signed at a Caspian littoral state summit on November 18, 2010, states that Caspian
basin security is the exclusive preserve of the littoral states. Some observers have viewed this
agreement as reflecting Russia’s objections to the U.S. Caspian Guard program and other
maritime security initiatives (see below, “U.S. Security and Arms Control”).21
Taking advantage of Uzbekistan’s souring relations with many Western countries in 2005 (see
below, “The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan”), Russia signed a Treaty on Allied Relations
with Uzbekistan in November 2005 that called for mutual defense consultations in the event of a
threat to either party (similar to language in the CST). Uzbekistan rejoined the CST Organization
(CSTO; see below) in June 2006. Uzbekistan declined to participate in rapid reaction forces
established in June 2009 because of concerns that the forces could become involved in disputes
between member states. On June 20, 2012, Uzbekistan informed the CSTO that it was suspending
its membership in the organization, including because the CSTO was ignoring its concerns.
However, Uzbek officials stated that the country would continue to participate in the CIS air
defense system and other military affairs under the Allied Relations Treaty. According to some
observers, the withdrawal of Central Asia’s largest military from the CSTO highlighted the
organization’s ineffectiveness.22 In June 2012, President Karimov visited China and met with
President Hu Jintao, and the two leaders signed a strategic partnership agreement. Commenting

20 CEDR, September 20, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950131, CEP-950107, and CEP-950085; Interfax, September 20, 2012.
21 CEDR, November 19, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-4002.
22 “Interview: Analyst Says Uzbekistan’s Suspension Shows CSTO Is ‘Irrelevant,’” RFE/RL, June 29, 2012.
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on this accord in September 2012, President Karimov stated that “China is indeed the most
reliable strategic partner for us.”23 Some observers also have suggested that Uzbekistan’s
withdrawal from the CSTO is linked to positioning for a greater role in the U.S.-NATO Northern
Distribution Network (NDN) for the transit of equipment and materials to and from Afghanistan
(see below, “The Northern Distribution Network to Afghanistan”).
Uzbekistan strongly objected to the September 2012 Russia-Kyrgyz agreement on constructing
the Kambarata-1 dam, asserting that talks should include all countries along the watershed (the
Naryn River, the proposed site of the dam, flows into the Syr Darya River through Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan). At a meeting of the Russia-Uzbek Intergovernmental Economic Cooperation
Commission in December 2012, the two sides agreed to seek an international assessment of the
dam’s environmental impact before construction is started.
Many observers suggest that the appreciative attitude of Central Asian states toward the United
States in the early 2000s—for their added security accomplished through U.S.-led actions in
Afghanistan—has declined over time. Reasons may include perceptions that the United States has
not provided adequate security or economic assistance. Also, Russia and China are pledging
security support to the states to get them to forget their pre-September 11, 2001, dissatisfaction
with Russian and Chinese efforts. Russia also encourages the leaders to believe that the United
States backs democratic “revolutions” to replace them. Lastly, Russia has claimed that it can
ensure regional security after the planned drawdown of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan by
the end of 2014.24
As Russia’s economy improved in the 2000s—as a result of increases in oil and gas prices—
Russia reasserted its economic interests in Central Asia. Russia endeavored to counter Western
business and gain substantial influence over energy resources through participation in joint
ventures and by insisting that pipelines cross Russian territory. Although Russia experienced a
decline in gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009 and only modest growth in GDP in 2010-2011
as a result of shocks associated with the global economic downturn, it has appeared that Russia
has tried to maintain economic leverage in the region, including by giving stabilization grants and
loans to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In other areas, such as commodity trade, Russian economic
influence has been reduced, although it is still significant. In 2009, the number of Central Asian
migrant workers in Russia decreased, and the country imposed quotas on the number of migrant
laborers. The numbers of migrant workers from Central Asia have increased since then, and
worker remittances from Russia remain significant to the GDPs of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan.
Russia’s efforts to maintain substantial economic interests in Central Asia face increasing
challenges from China, which has substantially increased its aid and trade activities in the region.
Perhaps to use institutional means to constrict growing Chinese economic influence, a Russia-
Belarus-Kazakhstan customs union began operating in mid-2011. Russian officials and state-
owned media have called for the customs union to expand to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
In an article in early October 2011, Prime Minister Putin called for boosting Russian influence

23 CEDR, September 13, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950016.
24 Roger Kangas has argued that U.S. influence in Central Asia is challenged by the growing mistrust of U.S. intentions
by Central Asian elites. Joshua Kucera, “Washington Must Adapt to Diminished Role in Central Asia,” Eurasianet,
December 4, 2012. Also, Russian media outlets in Central Asia heavily have propagandized against U.S. activities and
policies, and this propaganda may well have influenced public opinion in the region. Interfax, November 13, 2012.
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over Soviet successor states through the creation of an economic, political, and military “Eurasian
Union.”
Obstacles to Peace and Independence:
Regional Tensions and Conflicts

The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups, convoluted borders, and emerging national identities
pose challenges to stability in all the Central Asian states. Emerging national identities accentuate
clan, family, regional, and Islamic self-identifications. Central Asia’s convoluted borders fail to
accurately reflect ethnic distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to regional
tensions. Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries and
Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, they make up almost one-quarter of the population and in Kyrgyzstan
they make up over one-seventh. More ethnic Turkmen reside in Iran and Afghanistan—over 3
million—than in Turkmenistan. Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and 7
million in Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China’s Xinjiang province. The fertile
Ferghana Valley is shared by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The central governments
have struggled to gain control over administrative subunits. Most observers agree that the term
“Central Asia” currently denotes a geographic area more than a region of shared identities and
aspirations, although it is clear that the land-locked, poverty-stricken, and sparsely populated
region will need more integration in order to develop.
On the one hand, the Central Asian states have wrangled over water-sharing, border delineation,
trade and transit, and other issues:
• Tajikistan’s relations with Uzbekistan have been problematic, including
disagreements about water-sharing, Uzbek gas supplies, the mining of borders,
border demarcation, and environmental pollution. In July 2008, the head of the
Tajik Supreme Court asserted that Uzbek security forces had bombed the
Supreme Court building the previous summer as part of efforts to topple the
government. In late 2010, Uzbekistan began a transit slowdown and other
economic measures to pressure Tajikistan to halt building the Rogun power plant
(see below, “Trade and Investment”).
• Turkmenistan’s relations with Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have been tense.
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have rival claims to some Caspian Sea oil and gas
fields. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have vied for regional influence and argued
over water sharing. In 2002, the Turkmen government accused Uzbek officials of
conspiring to overthrow it.
• The Kyrgyz premier rejected claims by Karimov in 2005 that Kyrgyzstan had
provided training facilities and other support for the Andijon militants. Karimov
again accused Kyrgyzstan in late May 2009 of harboring terrorists that had
attacked across the border. After the April 2010 coup in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan
tightened border controls with this country, greatly harming its economy. Conflict
between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010
further strained relations between the two countries (see below, “The 2010 Ethnic
Clashes in Kyrgyzstan”). On July 17, 2012, border guards exchanged gunfire at a
Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border post, reportedly killing a guard on each side.
Uzbekistan responded by restricting border crossings at this post.
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On the other hand, there have been some high-level bilateral contacts:
• The leaders of regional powers Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have held occasional bilateral
summits in recent years. Most recently, on September 6-7, 2012, President Karimov
visited Kazakhstan for a bilateral summit. One observer suggested that this summit was
an effort by the two major regional powers to join together to spur greater region-wide
integration, including common responses to security threats such as terrorism and
instability in Afghanistan. The two leaders also aimed to bolster significant trade ties and
to raise joint concerns about regional water-sharing.25
• Since Berdimuhamedow came to power, relations between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
have improved. Most recently, in early October 2012, President Karimov visited
Turkmenistan and met with President Berdimuhamedow, and the two leaders discussed
boosting trade and other cooperation. They also called for region-wide talks before
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan build dams that could affect water-sharing.
Regional cooperation remains stymied by tensions among the states, despite their membership in
various cooperation groups such as the CST Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP). The CST was signed by Russia,
Belarus, the South Caucasus countries, and the Central Asian states (except Turkmenistan) in
May 1992 and called for military cooperation and joint consultations in the event of security
threats to any member. At the time to renew the treaty in 1999, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and
Azerbaijan formally withdrew. The remaining members formed the CSTO in late 2002, and a
secretariat opened in Moscow at the beginning of 2004. Through the CSTO, Russia has attempted
to involve the members in joint efforts to combat international terrorism and drug trafficking.
Although the charter of the CSTO does not mention internal or external peacekeeping functions,
other agreements have provided for such activities.
Neither former Kyrgyz President Akayev nor former President Bakiyev apparently requested the
aid of the CSTO during the coups that overthrew them, and the CSTO has appeared inactive
during other crises in the region. At a CSTO meeting in June 2010 to consider an urgent request
by interim Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva for troops to assist in quelling ethnic violence, a
consensus could not be reached and the members only agreed to provide equipment. At a CSTO
summit in December 2011, all the members signed a pledge that no nonmember military bases
could be established on their territories unless all members agreed. They also reportedly agreed
on detailed procedures for intervening in domestic “emergency” situations within a member state
at the behest of the member.26 At a CSTO summit in December 2012, President Rahmon
reportedly complained that although many documents had been signed over the years, there had
been “no practical results.”27
In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed the “Shanghai treaty” with China
pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in 1997 they signed a
follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300-mile former Soviet-Chinese border. China has used the
treaty to pressure the Central Asian states to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting

25 Richard Weitz, “Nazarbayev-Karimov Summit Imparts New Momentum to Kazakhstani-Uzbekistani Relations,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 14, 2012.
26 Interfax, December 21, 2011.
27 CEDR, December 19, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950108.
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separatism in China’s Xinjiang province, and to get them to extradite Uighurs fleeing China. In
2001, Uzbekistan joined the group, renamed the SCO, and in 2003 the SCO Regional Anti-
Terrorism Structure (RATS) was set up there. Several military and security exercises have been
held. According to some reports, in recent years Russia has discouraged the holding of major
SCO military exercises as well as the strengthening of economic ties within the SCO, although
Moscow has been amenable to cooperation within the SCO on regional oil and gas issues.28
Perhaps marking new initiatives, an SCO summit will be held in Beijing and a “Peace Mission-
2012” military exercise will take place in Tajikistan in June 2012.
In late 2007, the Central Asian states prevailed on the U.N. to set up a Regional Center for
Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) to facilitate diplomatic and other cooperation
to prevent internal and external threats to regional security. With its headquarters in Ashkhabad,
the Center is headed by a special representative of the U.N. secretary-general. The Center was
intended to take on some of the duties of the U.N. Tajikistan Office of Peace-Building, which had
been established after the Tajik Civil War and was being closed. The Center’s mandate includes
monitoring regional threats and working together and with other regional organizations to
facilitate peacemaking and conflict prevention. Priority concerns include cross-border terrorism,
organized crime and drug trafficking, regional water and energy management, environmental
degradation, and stabilization in Afghanistan. The Center has held several regional conferences
on such issues as Aral Sea desiccation, water-sharing, and Afghanistan. The Center’s special
representative visited Kyrgyzstan several times in the wake of the April 2010 coup to discuss
U.N. aid to the interim government to ensure peace and stability.
In May 2009, the OSCE established a Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe to train
officers from OSCE member and partner countries, including Afghanistan.
Terrorism and Conflict in Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan long argued that there were few terrorists within the country but this stance began to
change in late 2003 with the establishment of an Anti-Terrorist Center as part of the National
Security Committee. Shocking many Kazakhs, it reported the apprehension in late 2004 of over a
dozen members of the obscure Islamic Jihad Group/Union (IJU) of Uzbekistan (reportedly an
offshoot of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan). It alleged that the group had ties to Al Qaeda;
had cells in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia; and had been involved in attacks in Uzbekistan.
In mid-2006, authorities detained 15-30 members of the banned Hizb ut-Tahrir group. In April
2007, 16 alleged terrorists were arrested on charges of planning attacks against security and
police forces. In February 2008, security forces arrested five members of an alleged Salafi Jihadi
Jamaat, whose leader had received training in Syria. In September 2009, six alleged terrorists
were sentenced to 12-17 years in prison for planning to attack foreign oil companies and non-
Muslims. In late 2009, the Kazakh National Security Committee reported that the government
had prevented four terrorist attacks in 2008 and three in 2009.
Several suicide bombings and other alleged terrorist attacks occurred in Kazakhstan in 2011,
although the government appeared reluctant to release many details and trials of alleged terrorists
were usually closed to outside observers. A suicide bombing took place in a security office on
May 17, 2011, in the city of Aktoke, and a car bombing took place at another security office on

28 CEDR, November 8, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-6008.
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May 24 in Astana. On the night of June 30, alleged terrorists killed three police officers in the
village of Shubarshi in Aktobe Region. Apparently shaken by these and other bombings and
terrorist attacks, President Nazarbayev directed changes to the law on religion that were duly
approved in late September. On October 31, two explosions occurred in the city of Atyrau, one at
the regional administration building and the other a suicide bombing in a residential area. A week
after these bombings, two police officers were killed in Almaty by alleged terrorists. On
November 12, in the town of Taraz, one person killed several police and attacked a security
office. The same day, an attempted explosion reportedly was foiled and an attack on a roadblock
was carried out in Taraz, resulting in additional police deaths. The Jund al-Khilafah (Soldiers of
the Caliphate) claimed responsibility for the bombings in Atyrau and may have been involved in
other incidents.
Kazakhstan’s Office of the Prosecutor-General claimed that Jund al-Khilafah was formed in mid-
2011 by Kazakh citizens Renat Khabibuly, Orynbasarov Unasov, and Damir Nabiyev, was allied
with the Taliban, was headquartered in Pakistan’s tribal area, and was dedicated to “waging a
jihad on the territory of Kazakhstan.” At the end of November 2011, Kazakhstan banned Jund al-
Khilafah as a terrorist organization.29 Jund al-Khilafah also has claimed responsibility for attacks
on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In April 2012, 47 alleged members or accomplices of the Jund al-
Khilafah were sentenced for the October 31 attacks.
On December 16, 2011, energy sector workers on strike since May 2011 and others reportedly
extensively damaged and burned government and other buildings and clashed with police in the
town of Zhanaozen, in the Mangistau Region of Kazakhstan, resulting in 16 deaths and dozens of
injuries, the government reported. Some observers alleged that there were more casualties and
that the riots were triggered or exacerbated by police firing on the demonstrators (video posted on
the Internet appeared to back this claim).30 Protests and violence also spread to other areas of the
region.
President Nursultan Nazarbayev declared a state of emergency and curfew in the town on
December 17, 2011, and sent military and security forces to the region. He claimed that the
violence was pre-planned and financed, perhaps from abroad, that the rioters had been given
alcohol and money, and that police had shot into the crowds only in self-defense. At the same
time, he charged that local officials had not heeded the grievances of the striking oil workers and
had given him misinformation. In response, he fired the head of Kazmunaigaz, the state-owned
energy firm; ousted his son-in-law as head of the national fund that owned Kazmunaigaz;
replaced the governor of the region; and pledged new employment and retraining for oil workers
who had been fired during their long strike. Critics charged that he took these moves to protect
his popularity and that of the ruling political party during an electoral campaign (see below,
“Recent Political Developments in Kazakhstan”). The government reported that dozens of
individuals have been detained so far in connection with the protests.
A trial against 37 individuals charged with crimes associated with the Zhanaozen riot opened in
late March 2012. The bulk of the defendants were striking workers and youths, who were accused
of initiating the violence, although five police officers were being tried for abuses in quelling the
unrest. In late April 2012, the Human Rights Watch NGO called for the trial to be suspended

29 CEDR, November 9, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-950038; Interfax, November 30, 2011.
30 Striking Oil, Striking Workers: Violations of Labor Rights in Kazakhstan’s Oil Sector, Human Rights Watch,
September 2012.
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while an investigation of alleged torture and other abuses against those on trial is carried out. In
June 2012, a court sentenced about one-half of the defendants to 3-7 years in prison and gave
suspended sentences, pardons, or acquittals to the rest. Another trial of 12 suspects resulted in
four being sentenced to 4-7 years and the others being acquitted, pardoned, or amnestied. Other
arrests have occurred (see also below, “Recent Political Developments in Kazakhstan”). The
Kazakh government has argued that it has convicted some police for excesses during the riot,
disciplined some government officials, given unemployed workers new jobs, and otherwise
admitted that it mishandled the labor strife in Zhanaozen.31
At a meeting with policemen on July 12, 2012, President Nazarbayev criticized them for not
taking preventive measures against terrorism, and stated that “over 100 crimes connected with
terrorism were committed in Kazakhstan in 2011-12. As a result, dozens of [terrorists and
policemen] have died.... And we have to admit the fact that radical and extremist groups are
putting enormous pressure on the government and society.”32 According to a Kazakh Security
Council official, over 300 individuals have been convicted in Kazakhstan on charges of terrorism
since 2005.33
Among recent incidents, in late July 2012, one policeman was killed and one wounded in Almaty,
and the alleged assailants later engaged in a gun battle with security forces and most were killed.
In mid-August 2012, a gun battle with alleged terrorists took place in Almaty, reportedly resulting
in the deaths of several alleged terrorists and the capture of others. Authorities claimed that these
terrorists were linked to an explosion at a house in a village near Almaty in July and to the killing
of several individuals whose bodies were found in a park near Almaty. The terrorists were
planning widespread operations, according to the authorities. In early September 2012, a bomb-
maker blew himself up in Atyrau Region, leading police to engage in a gun battle with other
members of the alleged group, killing five of them. Some observers have warned that these recent
incidents may have marked the revival of terrorist actions in Kazakhstan after several months of
seeming quietude.
In November 2012, Nazarbayev called for tightening legislation to facilitate government efforts
to combat terrorism, with the government explaining that the changes in law were necessitated by
increasing radicalization of the population and growing terrorist incidents in the country. The bill
was passed and signed into law in early January 2013. The changes included an apparently
expansive definition of terrorism to include an “ideology of violence” and acts or threats aimed at
influencing the government, including violence and “frightening people.”34
Incursions and Violence in Kyrgyzstan
Several hundred Islamic extremists and others harboring in Tajikistan and Afghanistan first
invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Jama Namanganiy, the co-leader of the Islamic

31 Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Washington, DC, “Response to the Human Rights Watch Report,” News
Bulletin
, September 18, 2012. The response is to Human Rights Watch, Striking Oil, Striking Workers: Violations of
Labor Rights in Kazakhstan’s Oil Sector
, September 4, 2012. The News Bulletin claims that HRW ignored “facts” put
forward by the Kazakh government, but HRW states that the Kazakh government did not respond to its request for
information and alleges that the government attempted to block its investigation.
32 CEDR, July 13, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950108.
33 CEDR, June 27, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950051.
34 CEDR, November 23, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950005.
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Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU; see below), headed the largest guerrilla group. They seized
hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a
springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan.35 With Uzbek and Kazakh air and other support, Kyrgyz
forces forced the guerrillas out in October 1999. Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again
invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August 2000. Uzbekistan provided air and other support,
but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000. The
IMU did not invade the region in the summer before September 11, 2001, in part because Osama
bin Laden had secured its aid for a Taliban offensive against the Afghan Northern Alliance.
About a dozen alleged IMU members invaded from Tajikistan in May 2006 but soon were
defeated (some escaped). After this, the Kyrgyz defense minister claimed that the IMU, HT, and
other such groups increasingly menaced national security.
The 2010 Ethnic Clashes in Kyrgyzstan
Deep-seated tensions between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan erupted
on June 10-11, 2010. Grievances included perceptions among some ethnic Kyrgyz in the south
that ethnic Uzbeks controlled commerce, discontent among some ethnic Uzbeks that they were
excluded from the political process, and views among many Bakiyev supporters in the south that
ethnic Uzbeks were supporting their opponents. Allegedly, fighting began between rival ethnic-
based gangs at a casino in the city of Osh and quickly escalated, fuelled by rumors of rapes and
other atrocities committed by each side. The fighting over the next few days resulted in an official
death toll of 426 (of which 276 were ethnic Uzbeks and 105 were ethnic Kyrgyz) and over 2,000
injuries. The violence also resulted in an initial wave of 400,000 refugees and IDPs and the
destruction of thousands of homes and businesses in Osh and Jalal-abad. Otunbayeva appealed to
Russia for troops to help end the fighting, but the CSTO, meeting in emergency session on June
14, 2010, agreed to only provide humanitarian assistance. The Kyrgyz interim government
variously blamed Bakiyev’s supporters, Uzbek secessionists, Islamic extremists, and drug
traffickers for fuelling the violence.36 There were some reports that elements of the police and
armed forces in the south defied central authority and were involved in the violence and
subsequent attacks on ethnic Uzbeks.
Although critical of the Kyrgyz government, Uzbekistan did not intervene militarily or permit its
citizens to enter Kyrgyzstan to join in the June fighting (according to some reports, the Uzbek
government had considered military intervention). After some hesitation, the Uzbek government
permitted 90,000 ethnic Uzbeks to settle in temporary camps in Uzbekistan. Virtually all had
returned to Kyrgyzstan by the end of June.37 According to Assistant Secretary of State Eric
Schwartz, “the Government of Uzbekistan acted quickly and constructively in response to the
humanitarian crisis, [and] cooperated closely with U.N. agencies, the International Committee of
the Red Cross and nongovernmental organizations. These efforts helped many people.”38 While
also stating that “Uzbekistan … behaved admirably” by hosting the refugees, Assistant Secretary
Blake has testified that “although there were no reports of force to promote returns, reports of

35 According to Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, and Svante Cornell, the incursions of the IMU into Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000 were largely driven by efforts to secure drug trafficking routes. Islamic Radicalism in
Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
, Silk Road Paper, July 2006.
36 Bruce Pannier, “Kyrgyzstan: Anatomy of a Conflict,” RFE/RL, July 02, 2010.
37 UNHCR, Final Report on UNHCR Emergency Operations in the Republic of Uzbekistan, July 23, 2010.
38 U.S. Department of State, Opening Statement of Assistant Secretary Schwartz, June 29, 2010.
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psychological pressure, monetary incentives, threats of loss of citizenship, coercion and/or
encouragement to participate in the June 27 referendum and concerns about family members who
remained in Kyrgyzstan all may have factored into the rapid repatriation of those who were
displaced.” Presumably, Kyrgyz officials were involved in these actions.39
An OSCE informal foreign ministers’ meeting in July 2010 endorsed sending a 52-member police
advisory group for an initial period of four months to help facilitate peace in southern
Kyrgyzstan. It was proposed that the mission could later be extended and another 50 advisors
deployed.40 Concerns about the presence of the OSCE police advisory group from the Osh mayor
and other Kyrgyz ultranationalists delayed its deployment. On November 18, 2010, the OSCE
Permanent Council reached agreement with Kyrgyzstan on an alternative one-year police training
program.
International donors meeting in Bishkek on July 27, 2010, pledged $1.1 billion in grants and
loans to help Kyrgyzstan recover from the June violence. The United States pledged $48.6 million
in addition to FY2010 and FY2011 planned aid. In addition, the United States provided $4.1
million in humanitarian assistance to Kyrgyzstan immediately after the April and June events.41
Analyst Martha Olcott has warned that the discrimination by ethnic Kyrgyz against ethnic Uzbeks
has contributed in some cases to young ethnic Uzbeks being attracted to Islamic extremism.42
On January 10, 2011, a Kyrgyz commission issued its findings on the causes of the June 2010
violence in southern Kyrgyzstan between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks. The report largely
blamed ethnic Uzbek “extremists” and some supporters of former Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek
Bakiyev for fomenting the violence. The report also blamed interim government officials of
ineptness in dealing with the escalating ethnic tensions.
On May 2, 2011, an international commission formed under the leadership of Kimmo Kiljunen,
the Special Representative for Central Asia of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, released its
report of findings regarding the June 2010 violence. The commission concluded that the Kyrgyz
provisional government failed to adequately provide security and leadership to stifle rising
tensions and incidents in May or to minimize the effects of the June ethnic violence. The
commission also raised concerns that security forces were directly or indirectly complicit in the
violence (according to the commission, most police, military, and other security personnel are
ethnic Kyrgyz). The commission called for the Kyrgyz government to condemn ultra-nationalism
and proclaim that the state is multi-national, promote gender equality, provide special rights for
Uzbek language use in the south, train security forces to uphold human rights and not subvert

39 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hearing on Instability in Krygyzstan: The International
Response, Testimony by Robert O. Blake, Assistant Secretary Of State For South And Central Asia, July 27, 2010.
40 OSCE, Press Release, OSCE and Kyrgyzstan Agree on Principles for OSCE Police Advisory Group, July 16, 2010;
OSCE Chairperson Says Presence of Police Advisory Group in Kyrgyzstan will Facilitate Strengthening Trust,
Stability and Order in Country
, July 22, 2010.
41 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, United States Announces Additional Support for Kyrgyz
Republic
, July 27, 2010; U.S. Embassy, Bishkek, Opening Statement by Daniel Rosenblum, Coordinator of U.S.
Assistance to Europe and Eurasia and Tatiana Gfoeller, U.S. Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic: High-Level Donors
Meeting, “Emergency Response to the Kyrgyz Republic, Reconciliation and Recovery,”
July 27, 2010; Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hearing on Instability in Kyrgyzstan: The International Response, Testimony of
Robert O. Blake,
July 27, 2010.
42 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hearing on Instability in Krygyzstan: The International
Response, Testimony of Martha Brill Olcott, July 27, 2010.
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state interests through parochial loyalties, impartially investigate and prosecute those responsible
for the violence, establish a truth and reconciliation commission, and provide reparations.43 The
Kyrgyz government has rejected the finding that security forces were complicit in the violence,
continued to blame the former Bakiyev regime and Islamic extremists for fomenting the clashes,
and stated that ethnic Uzbeks shared substantial blame for committing human rights abuses.
Some observers have raised concerns that what they view as inadequate efforts by the Kyrgyz
government to foster ethnic reconciliation could result in new ethnic unrest. Among such
concerns, the IMU reportedly vowed actions against the Kyrgyz government for its alleged
abuses against ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan. Former President Otunbayeva and other
observers have warned that some ethnic Uzbek youth in the south are being recruited by the
IMU.44
Attacks by Jama’at Kyrgyzstan Jaish al-Mahdi in 2010-2011
According to Kyrgyz security authorities, Jamaat Kyrgyzstan Jaish al-Mahdi (Kyrgyz Army of
the Righteous Ruler), an ethnic Kyrgyz terrorist group, bombed a synagogue and sports facility
and attempted to bomb a police station in late 2010, and killed three policemen in early 2011. The
group also allegedly planned to attack the U.S. embassy and U.S. military Manas “transit center.”
Kyrgyz security forces reportedly killed or apprehended a dozen or more members of the group,
including its leader, in January 2011. Ten alleged members of the group were put on trial in May
2011. At least some group members allegedly had received training by the Caucasus Emirate
terrorist group in Russia, but also in late 2010 the group reportedly pledged solidarity with the
Taliban.
Terrorism and Conflict in Tajikistan
The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan
Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward
independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of
nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and groups tried to take power. Kulyabi and Khojenti
regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by
the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced
persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. After the two sides agreed to a cease-fire, the
U.N. Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in
December 1994. In June 1997, Tajik President Rahmon and the late rebel leader Seyed Abdullo
Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Benchmarks of the peace process were largely
met, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000. To encourage the peace process, the United States
initially pledged to help Tajikistan rebuild. Some observers point to events in the city of Andijon
in Uzbekistan (see “The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan” below) as indicating that

43 OSCE, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in
June 2010
, May 2, 2011.
44 Neil Melvin, Promoting a Stable and Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan: Overcoming the Causes and Legacies of Violence,
Open Society Foundations, March 7, 2011; .Bruce Pannier, “The Growing Threat of Militants in a Corner of Central
Asia,” RFE/RL, April 23, 2011; “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Says It Has New Leader and Can Attack Targets in
Central Asia,” Report News: Central Asia, Issue 631, Institute of War and Peace Reporting, October 13, 2010.
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conflicts similar to the Tajik Civil War could engulf other regional states where large numbers of
people are disenfranchised and poverty-stricken.
The 2010 Attacks in Tajikistan
In late August 2010, over two dozen individuals sentenced as terrorists escaped from prison in
Dushanbe and launched attacks as they travelled to various regions of the country. Many of these
individuals had been opposition fighters during the Tajik Civil War and had been arrested in
eastern Tajikistan during government sweeps in 2009. In early September 2010, a suicide car
bombing resulted in over two dozen deaths or injuries among police in the northern city of
Khujand. An obscure terrorist group, Jamaat Ansarullah, allegedly the Tajik branch of the IMU,
claimed responsibility. Some escapees and their allies, allegedly including IMU terrorists,
attacked a military convoy in the Rasht Valley (formerly known as Karategin) east of Dushanbe
on September 19, 2010, reportedly resulting in dozens of deaths and injuries to government
forces. Heavy fighting in the Rasht Valley over the next month reportedly led to dozens of
additional casualties among government forces.
In early January 2011, the Tajik Interior (police) Ministry reported that its forces had killed
former Tajik opposition fighter Alovuddin Davlatov, alias Ali Bedaki, the alleged leader of one
major insurgent group involved in the ambush in the Rasht Valley. Another leader of the ambush,
Abdullo Rakhimov, aka Mullo Abdullo—a former Tajik opposition paramilitary leader who
spurned the peace settlement and travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he allegedly
maintained links with al Qaeda and the Taliban, and who reentered Tajikistan in 2009—was
reportedly killed by Tajik security forces on April 15, 2011.45 In September 2011, Jamaat
Ansarullah reportedly issued a directive to its followers in Tajikistan to kill pro-democracy
advocates, who by its definition were “unbelievers” even if they were practicing Muslims. In
December 2011, several dozen alleged IMU members said to be involved in the suicide car
bombing in Khujand received prison sentences ranging from eight years to life. Several
defendants had reported that they had been tortured to agree to false changes. In September 2012,
a court sentenced 12 more alleged participants to terms ranging from 5 to 24 years. They had
been charged with being members of Abdullo’s terrorist group and of Jamaat Ansarullah, and of
receiving training in al-Qaeda camps in Pakistan.46 According to some observers, underlying
causes of the violence may be related to the failure of the Rahmon government to share power
and economic benefits with minority groups and clans, and more immediate causes may be
related to the increasing repressiveness and exclusiveness of the government and the ability of
disaffected populations to obtain countervailing armed support from relatives and others abroad.47

45 Lola Olimova and Nargis Hamrabaeva, “Tajik Authorities Struggle to Quell Militants,” Report News: Central Asia,
Institute for War and Peace Reporting, October 4, 2010; Tilav Rasulzoda and Parvina Khamidova, “New Militant Force
in Tajikistan?” Report News: Central Asia, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, October 21, 2010; CEDR, January
12, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-950136; Dilafruz Nabiyeva, “Mullo Abdullo Killed,” Central Asia Online, April 15, 2011.
46 CEDR, September 11, 2012, Doc. No. 950123.
47 Lola Olimova and Nargis Hamrabaeva, “Tajik Authorities Struggle to Quell Militants,” Report News: Central Asia,
Institute for War and Peace Reporting, October 4, 2010; Umida Hashimova, “The Islamist Insurgency in Tajikistan,”
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, October 12, 2010; Tilav Rasulzoda and Parvina Khamidova, “New Militant Force in
Tajikistan?” Report News: Central Asia, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, October 21, 2010; CEDR, January 12,
2011, Doc. No. CEP-950136.
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The 2012 Instability in Mountainous Badakhshan
On July 21, 2012, a national security official, General Abdullo Nazarov, was killed near the city
of Khorog, the capital of the Mountainous Badakhshan Autonomous Region in eastern Tajikistan.
According to some reports, the region is a major transit point for drugs and other goods trafficked
from Afghanistan and for weapons and money smuggled to terrorist groups in Afghanistan. The
government responded by launching security operations to force the local “criminal group” to
surrender. The government asserted that the “criminals” were led by Tolib Ayembekov, a former
UTO fighter who was the head of an Interior Ministry border guard troops unit in the Ishkohim
District (Khorog is in this district), bordering Afghanistan. The government also alleged that the
“criminals” had ties with organized crime groups throughout the world, and were linked to
members of the IMU, who were infiltrating from Afghanistan to support the “criminals.”48
Ayembekov denied that he was responsible for Nazarov’s death. Over 3,000 security personnel
entered Khorog on July 24, and subsequent fighting resulted in 17 casualties among the security
personnel and 30 among the alleged “criminals,” according to the government. Forty-one
surviving “criminals” were arrested. Although the government officially acknowledged only one
civilian casualty, some observers reported that dozens of civilians had been killed or injured.
Among the forces deployed to the region were extra border guards who sealed the Tajik-Afghan
border to prevent the Tajik “criminals” from escaping across the border or receiving assistance
from groups in Afghanistan. Some information about the fighting leaked out of the region despite
the “accidental” severing of Internet and cell phone connections to the region. The government
declared a unilateral ceasefire the next day. On July 26, 2012, the U.S. Embassy raised concerns
about reports of civilian casualties and urged the government not to suppress media reporting in
the region. In early August 2012, Ayembekov pledged fealty to the Rahmon government and
readiness to prove his innocence in a court of law.
The ceasefire was broken by the government early on August 22, when security forces attacked
the home of a popular former UTO fighter, the invalid Imomnazar Imomnazarov, and killed him.
His death led some protesters to attack the administration building in Khorog a few hours later,
and police allegedly fired at them, injuring three. A large memorial service for Imomnazarov was
held the next day in Khorog. A ceasefire agreement was reached between the government and
local officials and prominent citizens later that evening. In accordance with the agreement, some
security personnel subsequently were withdrawn from the city, but many have stayed in the
region to prepare for a visit by Rahmon in late September 2012.
Some observers have questioned the Tajik government’s official explanations of events in
Khorog. One local commentator has argued that General Nazarov was acting at the behest of a
group in the Tajik security service to seize control over lucrative smuggling operations or
otherwise was involved in extorting money.49 A think tank in Dushanbe asserted that the Tajik
government deployed security forces in the region after Ayembekov threatened to enlist up to
1,000 terrorists massed across the border in Afghanistan to help him if the government moved to
arrest him.50 Several accounts have suggested by many residents of Khorog had taken up arms on
July 24 in opposition against the deployment of security forces. Accusations that Ayembekov was
a “criminal” must be squared with the fact that Khorog is the location of the regional Border

48 CEDR, August 8, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950127.
49 CEDR, August 25, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950018; Sébastien Peyrouse, “Battle on Top of the World: Rising Tensions
in Tajikistan’s Pamir Region,” On Wider Europe, German Marshall Fund, August 2012.
50 Interfax, August 3, 2012.
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Guard Training Center, where the International Organization for Migration has used State
Department funding to carry out training for Tajik and Afghan border guards, including on-site at
regional border posts. Seeming to refer to this situation, Assistant Secretary Blake in August 2012
stated that the United States supports Tajik government efforts in the region “to address some of
the corrupt activities of their own border guards and others who are helping to facilitate some of
this [narcotics] trade.”51
Other observers have speculated that at least part of the reason for the government actions in
Mountainous Badakhshan may have been to secure the loyalty of regional officials in the run-up
to presidential elections planned in 2013. During the deployment of security forces to the region,
the regional IRP head was detained and later found dead, a regional IRP office was sacked, and
another IRP official was detained and transferred to Dushanbe. Before he was killed,
Imomnazarov speculated that Nazarov had falsely reported to his superiors that the UTO fighters
were planning to launch a coup against Rahmon, and that this was the main cause of the
government security actions.
Terrorism and Conflict in Uzbekistan
A series of explosions in Tashkent in February 1999 were among early signs that the Uzbek
government was vulnerable to terrorism. By various reports, the explosions killed 16 to 28 and
wounded 100 to 351 people. The aftermath involved wide-scale arrests of political dissidents and
others deemed by some observers as unlikely conspirators. Karimov in April 1999 accused
Mohammad Solikh (former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of
masterminding what he termed an assassination plot, along with Tohir Yuldashev (co-leader of the
IMU) and the Taliban. The first trial of 22 suspects in June resulted in six receiving death
sentences. The suspects said in court that they received terrorist training in Afghanistan,
Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia and were led by Solikh, Yuldashev, and Namanganiy. In 2000,
Yuldashev and Namanganiy received death sentences in absentia, and Solikh received a 15.5 year
prison sentence. Solikh denied membership in IMU, and he and Yuldashev denied involvement in
the bombings.
On March 28 through April 1, 2004, a series of suicide bombings and other attacks were launched
in Uzbekistan, reportedly killing 47. An obscure Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan (IJG; Jama’at
al-Jihad al-Islami, a breakaway part of the IMU) claimed responsibility.52 In subsequent trials, the
alleged attackers were accused of being members of IJG or of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT; an Islamic
fundamentalist movement ostensibly pledged to peace but banned in Uzbekistan) and of
attempting to overthrow the government. Some defendants testified that they were trained by
Arabs and others at camps in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. They testified that Najmiddin
Kamolitdinovich Jalolov (convicted in absentia in 2000) was the leader of IJG, and linked him to
Taliban head Mohammad Omar, Uighur extremist Abu Mohammad, and Osama bin Laden. On
July 30, 2004, explosions occurred at the U.S. and Israeli embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor-
General’s Office in Tashkent. The IMU and IJG claimed responsibility and stated that the suicide
bombings were aimed against Uzbek and other “apostate” governments.53

51 U.S. Department of State, On-the-Record Briefing With International Media, Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Almaty, Kazakhstan, August 15, 2012.
52 The IJG changed its name to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in 2005.
53 See also CRS Report RS21818, The 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim
(continued...)
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The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan
Dozens or perhaps hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded on May 13, 2005, after Uzbek
troops fired on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon. The protestors had gathered to
demand the end of a trial of local businessmen charged with belonging to an Islamic terrorist
group. The night before, a group stormed a prison where those on trial were held and released
hundreds of inmates. Many freed inmates then joined others in storming government buildings.54
President Karimov flew to the city to direct operations, and reportedly had restored order by late
on May 13.55 On July 29, 439 people who had fled from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan were airlifted
to Romania for resettlement processing, after the United States and others raised concerns that
they might be tortured if returned to Uzbekistan.56
The United States and others in the international community repeatedly called for an international
inquiry into events in Andijon, which the Uzbek government rejected as violating its sovereignty.
In November 2005, the EU Council approved a visa ban on 12 Uzbek officials it stated were
“directly responsible for the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in Andijon and for
the obstruction of an independent inquiry.” The Council also embargoed exports of “arms,
military equipment, and other equipment that might be used for internal repression.”57 In October
2007 and April 2008, the EU Council suspended the visa ban for six months but left the arms
embargo in place. In October 2008, the EU Council praised what it viewed as some positive
trends in human rights in Uzbekistan and lifted the visa ban, although it left the arms embargo in
place.58 In October 2009, it lifted the arms embargo.

(...continued)
Nichol.
54 There is a great deal of controversy about whether this group contained foreign-trained terrorists or was composed
mainly of the friends and families of the accused and other disgruntled citizenry. See U.S. Congress, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Briefing: The Uzbekistan Crisis, Testimony of Galima Bukharbayeva,
Correspondent. Institute for War and Peace Reporting,
June 29, 2005. A declassified Defense Intelligence Agency
memorandum prepared soon after the events stated that “no credible information indicates extremist groups participated
in the attacks,” but stressed that evidence was not definitive on this point. See Uzbekistan: Review of Information on
Unrest in Andijon, 12-13 May 2005
, Info Memo, 5-0549/DR, July 30, 2005 (the memo is part of the Rumsfeld Archive,
see below). For alternative views on terrorist involvement and casualties, see Shirin Akiner, Violence in Andijon, 13
May 2005: An Independent Assessment
, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, July 2005; AbduMannob Polat, Reassessing
Andijan: The Road to Restoring U.S.-Uzbek Relations
, Jamestown Foundation, June 2007; Scott Radnitz, Weapons of
the Wealthy
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), p. 172-176; Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown (New York:
Penguin Group Publishers, 2011) (the book’s references include an Internet archive of memos and other documents).
See also James Kirchick, “Did Donald Rumsfeld Whitewash Massacre in Uzbekistan?” RFE/RL, May 13, 2011.
55 Analyst Adeeb Khalid draws a parallel between the Uzbek government’s actions at Andijon and at a large student
demonstration in Tashkent in January 1992. In the latter case, Karimov allegedly ordered troops to fire on the marchers,
resulting in up to six deaths and two dozen or more injuries. Islam After Communism (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2007), p. 155. See also Reuters, January 17, 1992.
56 See also CRS Report RS22161, Unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan: Context and Implications, by Jim Nichol.
57 Council of the European Union, Uzbekistan: Council Adopts Restrictive Measures, Press Release 14392/05,
November 14, 2005. U.S. officials argued that the United States already had been limiting military assistance—at
congressional request—because of human rights abuses.
58 Council of the European Union, 2824th General Affairs Council Meeting, Press Release, October 15-16, 2007; 2864th
and 2865th General Affairs and External Relations Council Meetings, Press Release, April 29, 2008; 2897th General
Affairs and External Relations Council Meeting, Press Release, October 13, 2008. Some international human rights
groups protested against a visit by the head of the Uzbek state security service—who had been subject to the visa ban
lifted by the Council—to Germany in late October 2008. He reportedly advised German officials on IJU activities in
Central Asia.
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At the first major trial of 15 alleged perpetrators of the Andijon unrest in late 2005, the accused
all confessed and asked for death penalties. They testified that they were members of Akramiya, a
branch of HT launched in 1994 by Akram Yuldashev that allegedly aimed to use force to create a
caliphate in the area of the Fergana Valley located in Uzbekistan. Besides receiving assistance
from HT, Akramiya was alleged to receive financial aid and arms training from the IMU. The
defendants also claimed that the U.S. and Kyrgyz governments helped finance and support their
effort to overthrow the government, and that international media colluded with local human rights
groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in this effort. The U.S. and Kyrgyz
governments denied involvement, and many observers criticized the trial as appearing stage-
managed. Reportedly, 100 or more individuals were arrested and sentenced, including some
Uzbek opposition party members and media and NGO representatives.59 Partly in response, the
U.S. Congress tightened conditions on aid to Uzbekistan.
The Summer 2009 Suicide Bombings and Attacks in Uzbekistan
On May 25-26, 2009, a police checkpoint was attacked on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, attacks took
place in the border town of Khanabad, and four bombings occurred in Andijon in the commercial
district, including at least one by suicide bombers. Several deaths and injuries were alleged,
although reporting was suppressed. Uzbek officials blamed the IMU, although the IJU allegedly
claimed responsibility. President Karimov flew to Andijon on May 31. In late August 2009,
shooting took place in Tashkent that resulted in the deaths of three alleged IMU members and the
apprehension of other group members. The Uzbek government alleged that the group had been
involved in the 1999 explosions and in recent assassinations in Tashkent. In early December
2009, the Andijon regional court reportedly convicted 22 individuals on charges of involvement
in the May 2009 events, and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 5 to 18 years.
U.S. Designation of the IMU and IJU as Terrorist Organizations
In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,
stating that the IMU, aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by Osama bin Laden, resorts to
terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. The “main goal of the
IMU is to topple the current government in Uzbekistan,” the State Department warned, and it
linked the IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. IMU forces assisting the
Taliban and Al Qaeda suffered major losses during coalition actions in Afghanistan, and IMU co-
head Namanganiy was probably killed.60
Former CIA Director Porter Goss testified in March 2005 that the IJG/IJU “has become a more
virulent threat to U.S. interests and local governments.”61 In May 2005, the State Department
designated the IJG/IJU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global
Terrorist, and in June, the U.N. Security Council added the IJG/IJU to its terrorism list.62 In June

59 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Report from the OSCE/ODIHR Trial
Monitoring in Uzbekistan
, April 21, 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Uzbekistan, Comments on the
Report Prepared by the OSCE ODIHR
, April 19, 2006.
60 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, April 2004.
61 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Testimony of the Director of Central Intelligence, The Honorable Porter
J. Goss, March 17, 2005.
62 U.S. Department of State, Press Statement: U.S. Department of State Designates the Islamic Jihad Group Under
Executive Order 13224, May 26, 2005; U.N. Security Council, The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, Press
(continued...)
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2008, IJG head Jalolov and his associate Suhayl Fatilloevich Buranov were added to the U.N.
1267 Sanctions Committee’s Consolidated List of individuals and entities associated with bin
Laden, al Qaeda, and the Taliban. Also, the U.S. Treasury Department ordered that any of their
assets under U.S. jurisdiction be frozen and prohibited U.S. citizens from financial dealings with
the terrorists.63
IMU head Yuldashev reportedly was killed in late August 2009 in Pakistan by a U.S. drone
missile, and Jalalov allegedly similarly was killed in late September 2009. After Yuldashev’s
death, Abu Usman Adil became the head of the IMU. The IMU military commander, Abbas
Mansur, allegedly was killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2011. In April 2012, Adil reportedly was
similarly killed, and was succeeded by Usman Ghazi some months later. Ghazi, a non-Uzbek, has
focused the IMU on attacking Afghanistani and Pakistani government targets, possibly lessening
its immediate threat to Central Asia, according to some observers.64
In July 2011, an Uzbek citizen on an expired student visa was arrested on charges of being
directed by IMU terrorists to assassinate President Obama. He confessed and was sentenced in
2012. Two other ethnic Uzbeks were arrested in the United States in early 2012 on charges of
collaborating with the IJU. One of the Uzbeks had been granted refugee status after he fled the
Uzbek government crackdown in Andijon in 2005. He was arrested at a U.S. airport while
allegedly planning to join IJU terrorists abroad.
Democratization and Human Rights
A major goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term development of
democratic institutions and respect for human rights. Particularly since September 11, 2001, the
United States has attempted to harmonize its concerns about democratization and human rights in
the region with its interests in regional support for counter-terrorism. According to some
allegations, the former Bush Administration may have sent suspected terrorists in its custody to
Uzbekistan for questioning, a process termed “extraordinary rendition.”65 Although not verifying
such transfers specifically to Uzbekistan, the former Bush Administration stated that it received
diplomatic assurances that transferees would not be tortured. Several citizens of Central Asian

(...continued)
Release: Security Council Committee Adds One Entity to Al-Qaida Section of Consolidated List, SC/8405, June 3,
2005.
63 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release: Treasury Designates Leadership of the IJU Terrorist Group, June
18, 2008.
64 Jacob Zenn, “IMU Announces Usman Ghazi as New Amir after Months of Deliberation,” Militant Leadership
Monitor
, Jamestown Foundation, August 21, 2012; Christopher Anzalone, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan:
Down but Not Out,” Foreign Policy, November 20, 2012; Joshua Kucera, “What are the IMU's Designs in Central
Asia?” Eurasianet, December 11, 2012. However, U.S. Colonel Ted Donnelly has argued that after U.S. and NATO
forces are drawn down in Afghanistan in 2014, the Fergana Valley could become a focus for operations by the IMU
and other terrorist groups. See Fergana as FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas]? A Post-2014 Strategy for
Central Asia
, U.S. Army War College, Master’s Thesis, March 2012.
65 The New Yorker, February 14, 2005; New York Times, May 1, 2005; New York Times, December 31, 2005;
Representative Edward Markey, Congressional Record, December 13, 2005, p. H11337; European Parliament,
Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transport and Illegal Detention of
Prisoners, Draft Interim Report, 2006/2027(INI), April 24, 2006, and On the Testimony by Craig Murray, Former
British Ambassador
, Working Document No. 5, June 1, 2006; Craig Murray, Murder in Samarkand (Edinburgh:
Mainstream Publishing, 2006).
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states who were held in U.S. custody at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base have been returned to
their home countries.66
All of the Central Asian leaders have declared that they are committed to democratization. During
Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed a Charter on Democratic
Partnership that recognized Kazakhstan’s commitments to the rule of law, respect for human
rights, and economic reform. During his December 2001 and September 2006 visits, Nazarbayev
repeated these pledges in joint statements with then-President Bush. In March 2002, a U.S.-
Uzbek Strategic Partnership Declaration was signed pledging Uzbekistan to “intensify the
democratic transformation” and improve freedom of the press. During his December 2002 U.S.
visit, Tajikistan’s President Rahmon pledged to “expand fundamental freedoms and human
rights.”
Despite such democratization pledges, the states have made little progress, according to the State
Department. In testimony in May 2011, Assistant Secretary Blake stated that leaders in Central
Asia “are suspicious of democratic reforms, and with some exceptions have maintained tight
restrictions on political, social, religious, and economic life in their countries…. Kyrgyzstan has
been the primary exception in Central Asia. The democratic gains recently made in Kyrgyzstan …
are cause for optimism.”67 The nongovernmental organization Freedom House has rated all of
Central Asia’s governments except Kyrgyzstan’s as among the most repressive in the world in
terms of political rights and civil liberties, with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan being rated as
similar to North Korea. Kyrgyzstan was alone in being ranked “partly free,” since it had a
competitive presidential election in October 2011, although the country continues to have
problems with the treatment of national minorities, due process, torture, and judicial
independence.68
During the 1990s and early 2000s, almost all the leaders in Central Asia held onto power by
orchestrating extensions of their terms, holding suspect elections, eliminating possible
contenders, and providing emoluments to supporters and relatives (the exception was the leader
of Tajikistan, who had been ousted in the early 1990s during a civil war). After this long period of
leadership stability, President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan was toppled in a coup in 2005, and
President Niyazov of Turkmenistan died in late 2006, marking the passing of three out of five
Soviet-era regional leaders from the scene. Soviet-era leaders Nazarbayev and Karimov remain in
power, and Tajikistan has been headed since the civil war by Rahmon, the Soviet-era head of a
state farm.
Possible scenarios of political futures in Central Asia have ranged from continued rule in most of
the states by elite groups that became ensconced during the Soviet era to violent transitions to

66 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight,
Hearing: City on the Hill or Prison on the Bay? The Mistakes of Guantanamo and the Decline of America’s Image,
May 6, 2008; Hearing: Rendition and the Department of State, June 10, 2008. At least three Tajiks returned to
Tajikistan from Guantanamo were then tried and imprisoned on charges of belonging to al Qaeda or the IMU.
67 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hearing on Central Asia and the Arab Spring: Growing
Pressure For Human Rights? Testimony of Robert Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs
, May 11, 2011.
68 “Combined Average Ratings: Independent Countries,” Freedom in the World 2012, Freedom House, at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2012; Worst of the Worst 2012: The World's Most
Repressive Societies
, Freedom House, July 2, 2012, at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/worst-
worst-2012-worlds-most-repressive-societies.
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Islamic fundamentalist rule. Peaceful transitions to more or less democratic political systems have
not occurred and appear unlikely for some time to come (although the peaceful October 2011
Kyrgyz presidential election may offer some hope; see below). While some observers warn that
Islamic extremism could increase dramatically in the region, others discount the risk that the
existing secular governments soon will be overthrown by Islamic extremists.69
In the case of the three succession transitions so far, Tajikistan’s resulted in a shift in the Soviet-
era regional/clan elite configuration and some limited inclusion of the Islamic Renaissance Party.
Perhaps worrisome, Tajik President Rahmon has written a “spiritual guide” reminiscent of the one
penned by Turkmenistan’s late authoritarian president Niyazov, and has given orders on how
citizens should live and dress. In Turkmenistan, it appears that Soviet-era elites have retained
power following Niyazov’s death and have eschewed meaningful democratization. Kyrgyzstan’s
transition after Akayev’s 2005 ouster appeared to involve the gradual increase in influence of
southern regional/clan ethnic Kyrgyz elites linked to Bakiyev until April 2010, when northern
regional/clan ethnic Kyrgyz elites reasserted influence by ousting then-President Bakiyev. An
interim president held office until an election was held on October 30, 2011, the first contested
electoral transfer of power in Central Asia. This election was won by Almazbek Atambayev, who
represents northern interests (see below).70
Recent Political Developments in Kazakhstan
For the third time during his period of rule, Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev issued a decree
on November 16, 2011, dismissing the legislature and setting early elections for January 15,
2012. Of the 107 seats in the lower legislative chamber (the Majlis), 98 were to be allocated
through party list voting, with the remaining 9 members selected by a presidential advisory body.
Critics complained that the holding of an early election appeared aimed to hinder the political
opposition from preparing for the election. Seven parties were registered to run. According to the
final results issued by the CEC, the ruling Nur Otun Party received 80.99% of 7.02 million votes
cast and won 83 seats, Ak Zhol received 7.47% of the vote and 8 seats, and Communist People’s
Party received 7.19% and 7 seats. Critics charged that both of these minor parties were pro-
Nazarbayev. OSCE monitors judged that the election did not meet fundamental principles of
democratic elections. They reported that the legal framework for holding democratic elections
was inadequate, only selected parties were permitted to run, voters had no assurance of which
candidates on the winning lists might end up with seats, the open exchange of views during the
campaign was restricted, and there were “significant irregularities” on voting day, including ballot
box stuffing and “significant changes” by higher electoral bodies to vote totals reported at the
precinct level.71

69 Analyst Adeeb Khalid argues that the elites and populations of the regional states still hold many attitudes and follow
many practices imposed during the Soviet period of rule. This “Sovietism” makes it difficult for either Islamic
extremism or democratization to make headway, he suggests. Khalid, p. 193. For a perhaps more troubling view of the
threat of Islamic extremism, see above, “Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns.
70 For background on political developments, see CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S.
Interests
, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol;
CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol, CRS Report 97-1055,
Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol, and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Recent
Developments and U.S. Interests
, by Jim Nichol.
71 OSCE, ODIHR, Republic Of Kazakhstan, Early Parliamentary Elections, 15 January 2012: OSCE/ODIHR Election
Observation Mission Final Report
, April 3, 2012.
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In early March 2012, President Nazarbayev threatened that Kazakhstan might cease inviting the
OSCE to monitor elections. Kazakh officials have maintained that other election monitors,
including those from the CIS, have considered Kazakhstan’s elections as free and fair.
Even before the election was over, observers reported that government arrests and harassment of
journalists and opposition party politicians were increasing. In late January 2012, one prominent
opposition newspaper editor was arrested on charges that were two years old, and Vladimir
Kozlov, the head of the unregistered Alga Party, was arrested on charges of inciting social
disorder in Zhanaozen. Several leading politicians of the National Social Democratic Party Azat
and others have been arrested and fined following protests that have been held every month since
late January 2012 against alleged electoral violations and the government crackdown in
Zhanaozen. In mid-March 2012, the European Parliament approved a resolution that expressed
indignation for the incarceration of opposition politicians and journalists since the election on
political grounds and called for their release. The resolution urged the Kazakh government to
reverse the recent further deterioration of human rights by undertaking reforms to ensure future
pluralistic elections, to safeguard a free press, and to permit NGOs to operate freely. The
resolution also “strongly condemn[ed] the violent crackdown by the police against demonstrators
in Zhanaozen,” and called for an independent and credible investigation of the incident.72 On
April 19, 2012, journalist Lukpan Akhmedyarov was attacked and wounded in western
Kazakhstan. He has alleged that the attackers are linked to local officials. In mid-August 2012,
Assistant Secretary Blake praised the January legislative election as marking progress in the
creation of a “multi-party democracy,” but raised hopes that the then-pending trial of Alga Party
leader Kozlov would be fair, impartial, and open, and not jeopardize this democratization
progress.73
In October 2012, several Kazakh human rights activists and others issued an appeal for the U.S.
government to deny entrance visas to over three dozen Kazakh officials involved in the
Zhanaozen violence, including President Nazarbayev. The Kazakh Consulate General in New
York denounced the appeal, stating that officials and others involved in the Zhanaozen violence
duly had been tried and found guilty in proceedings that were transparent and followed the rule of
law.74
In November 2012, an appeals court upheld the 7.5 year prison sentence handed down in October
to the head of the unregistered Alga opposition party, Vladimir Kozlov, convicted on charges that
he organized the Zhanaozen riots as part of a coup attempt against Nazarbayev. The U.S.
Ambassador to the Permanent Council of the OSCE, Ian Kelly, raised concerns that the case was
used to silence a leading oppositionist and stated that the irregularities of the trial “casts serious
doubts on [Kazakhstan’s] respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.”
He also correctly predicted that the charge of “inciting social hatred” against Kozlov could be
used to prosecute other oppositionists, civil society organizations, and members of the media.75
On December 21, 2012, the Alga Party was banned as an extremist organization by the Almaty

72 European Parliament, Resolution of 15 March 2012 on Kazakhstan, 2012/2553(RSP), March 15, 2012.
73 U.S. Department of State, On-the-Record Briefing With International Media: Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
, August 15, 2012.
74 About the Abuses of Kazakhstan’s Dictatorship and Its Ruler Nursultan Nazarbayev, Human Rights Foundation,
October 17, 2012; Washington Examiner, October 17, 2012; Consulate General of the Republic of Kazakhstan in New
York, Kazakhstan's Response to the Recent Ad in Washington Examiner, October 24, 2012; Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan:
Nazarbayev Friends and Foes Sling Mud,” Eurasianet, November 14, 2012.
75 U.S. Department of State, Ambassador Kelly on Sentencing of Vladimir Kozlov in Kazakhstan, 11 October 2012.
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district court, silencing what one observer has characterized as the main opposition party in the
country.76
A new holiday was celebrated on December 1, 2012, entitled “Day of the First President,” to
celebrate President Nazarbayev’s rule. Some commentators in Kazakhstan speculated that this
holiday was established to further consolidate presidential power and quell dissenting views.77
In November 2012, the Kazakh General Prosecutor’s Office recommended the closure of most
opposition media on the grounds that they contained calls for the violent overthrow of the
government and otherwise undermined national security. Courts quickly ruled that these media
were “extremist,” reportedly without substantial evidence, and ordered their closure. Reporters
Without Borders has set up some Internet sites for several of the banned media.78
Recent Political Developments in Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan’s most recent presidential election was held on October 30, 2011, the first involving
the peaceful contested transfer of presidential power in Central Asia. Sixteen candidates were on
the ballot, most of whom ran as independents without a specific party endorsement. The interim
Prime Minister, Almazbek Atambayev, temporarily stepped down so that he could run. After a
lengthy vote-counting period, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) announced final election
results on November 12, 2011, proclaiming Atambayev as the winner with 62.52% of 1.86
million votes cast. Monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) judged that the election had “shortcomings” that needed to be addressed “to consolidate
democratic practice in line with international commitments.” They stated that although there was
a wide choice of candidates and the electoral campaign “was open and respected fundamental
freedoms,” there were “significant irregularities ... during the counting and [the] tabulation of
votes,” including interference by outsiders in the vote count, pre-signed voting tallies, failure to
post voting tallies, and alteration of completed tallies.79
Atambayev was sworn in as president on December 1, 2011. The next day, the Social Democratic
Party acted to form a new coalition, and on December 15, a coalition was formed comprising the
Social Democratic Party, Respublika, Ata-Meken, and Ar-Namys. The coalition held 92 seats,
leaving the Ata-Jurt Party, with 28 seats, as the opposition in the legislature. On December 23, the
legislature approved Respublika Party member Omurbek Babanov as the prime minister along
with a slate of ministers. The distribution of power in the new government appeared to revivify
northern dominance over southern interests, intensifying regional tensions.
In the face of a growing dispute between Prime Minister Babanov and ruling coalition members
Ata-Meken and Ar-Namys—which accused the government of malfeasance and corruption—the
two parties withdrew from the coalition on August 22, 2012, triggering the fall of the Babanov
government. On August 27, President Atambayev called for the Social Democratic Party to form

76 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Political Trial Fails to Provoke Outcry,” Eurasianet, October 10, 2012.
77 “New 'Leader's Day' Suggests Power Consolidation Ahead of Handover,” Open Source Center Analysis, November
30, 2012; Interfax, November 29, 2012.
78 “Main Opposition Media Silenced in Space of a Month,” Reporters Without Borders, December 28, 2012, and
January 2, 2013, at http://en.rsf.org/kazakhstan-main-opposition-media-silenced-in-28-12-2012,43751.html.
79 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Kyrgyz Republic Presidential Election, 30
October 2011, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission: Final Report
, January 10, 2012.
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a new coalition. The Social Democratic Party, Ar-Namys and Ata-Meken, along with a few
deputies from the other two parties, formed a new ruling coalition on September 3, and two days
later the legislature approved a cabinet government led by former chief of the presidential staff
Jantoro Satybaldiyev.
On October 3, 2012, the leader of the Ata-Jurt Party and former presidential candidate
Kamchybek Tashiyev, along with fellow party members and legislators Sadyr Japarov and Talant
Mamytov, addressed a group of about 800 protesters outside the legislative building in Bishkek.
According to some accounts, they allegedly urged the demonstrators to storm the legislature to
demand that it nationalize the Kumtor gold mine run by Canada’s Centerra Gold firm. If the
legislature did not act, they reportedly warned, its members would be forcibly dispersed.80 After
initially breaking into the legislative building, the protesters were repulsed by police, who later
foiled another attempt. The government detained the three legislators on the grounds that they
were publically advocating and using force to attempt to overthrow the constitutional system.81
The detentions triggered additional protests in southern Kyrgyzstan, the power base of the Ata-
Jurt Party. On October 18, 2012, the Ata-Jurt Party faction in the legislature selected Myktybek
Abdyldayev as its new leader pending resolution of the court case against Tashiyev. The case
against Tashiyev remained under investigation as of early 2012 and he remained in custody.
Recent Political Developments in Turkmenistan
In October 2011, the Turkmen Central Electoral Commission (CEC) announced that a presidential
election would be held on February 12, 2012. During the last two weeks of December 2011,
initiative groups nominated candidates for president and gathered 10,000 signatures in a majority
of the country’s districts in order to gain registration of their candidates. The National Revival
Movement, a civic association headed by the president, nominated President Berdimuhamedow
as its candidate. In January 2012, the CEC registered eight candidates. All of Berdimuhamedow’s
challengers were ministerial officials or state plant managers. Based on an inadequate legal and
political framework to ensure a pluralistic election, the OSCE decided not to formally monitor the
election. The CEC announced that Berdimuhamedow won over 97% of the vote and that turnout
was over 96%.
Recent Political Developments in Uzbekistan
On December 5, 2011, the legislature approved amendments to the constitution reducing the
presidential term from seven to five years. The change was hailed as advancing democratization,
but was a reversion to the pre-2002 term in office. In March 2012, the legislature approved
holding legislative elections on December 28, 2014, and the presidential election in March or
April 2015. Some observers suggest that President Karimov might consider succession
contingencies at that time, such as designating a possible heir.
In April 2012, Uzbek legislators and officials visiting the United States reported that bills had
been introduced to provide for the legislature to hold hearings to question the prime minister, to

80 The legislature had considered and rejected nationalizing the Kumtor gold mine in late June 2012.
81 In mid-September 2012, the prosecutor general’s office had launched a criminal investigation against Sadyr Japarov
on suspicions that he had “illegally privatized” property formerly belonging to ousted President Bakiyev.
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hold a vote of non-confidence in the government, and to strengthen the rights of NGOs.82 U.S.
analyst Martha Olcott has argued that Uzbek society is becoming more religiously traditional
(although not radical), and that politics will probably be influenced by these societal views, so
that a secular liberal democratic political system may not soon emerge.83
In December 2012, President Karimov stressed that the country was following a path of
“evolutionary” democratization, including by increasing the checks and balances among the three
branches of power and strengthening political parties. At the same time, he stated that the
government’s power would continue to increase in the “transitional period” in order for it to
direct the reforms, and cautioned that the process of democratization was lengthy and never-
ending.
Human Rights
According to the NGO Human Rights Watch, Central Asian governments in 2011 fell short in
respect for human rights in many areas:
• Kazakhstan failed to carry out long-promised human rights reforms in the year
following its OSCE chairmanship (see below). Instead, its rights record suffered
further setbacks. Control over the prison system was transferred from the Justice
Ministry back to the Interior Ministry, putting prisons back in police control, and
a new restrictive religion law was adopted. Websites were blocked and legal
amendments limiting media freedoms remained. The government continued to
restrict freedom of assembly.
• In Kyrgyzstan, torture and arbitrary detention in the aftermath of the June 2010
ethnic violence remained rampant and largely unpunished, with ethnic Uzbeks in
the south being particularly vulnerable to police torture and other violations of
the rule of law. Freedom of media generally improved in 2011, but authorities at
times attempted to limit freedom of expression.
• The human rights situation in Tajikistan remained poor. The government
persisted with enforcing a repressive law on religion and introduced new
legislation further restricting religious expression. Authorities continued to
restrict freedom of the media, including by harassing and arresting journalists.
The judiciary remained neither independent nor effective.
• Turkmenistan remained one of the world’s most repressive countries. Media and
religious freedoms were subject to draconian restrictions, and human rights
defenders faced constant threat of government reprisal. International observers
expressed concern about allegations of widespread torture and ill-treatment, and
of disappearances in custody.
• Uzbekistan’s human rights record remained appalling. Security officers were
responsible for the endemic torture of prisoners and detainees. Authorities
continued to target civil society activists, opposition members, and journalists,

82 Carnegie Endowment, Current Developments in Uzbekistan’s Parliament, April 26, 2012, at
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/26/current-developments-in-uzbekistan-s-parliament/acih.
83 Martha Olcott, In the Whirlwind of Jihad (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2012).
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and to persecute religious believers who worshiped outside state-approved
channels. Freedom of expression was severely limited. The Uzbek government
increased the presence of security forces across the country and widened its
already-tight control over the internet.84
Turkmenistan’s former Minister for Tourism and Culture, Geldimurat Nurmuhamedow,
was detained in October 2012 and reportedly was forcibly institutionalized at a drug
rehabilitation clinic. Amnesty International and other human rights activists have claimed
that he was prosecuted because he had criticized the human rights and democratization
situation in the country.85
On human trafficking:
• The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report 2012 reports that
Turkmenistan is a source, and to a lesser extent, destination, country for forced
labor and sex trafficking. The Turkmen government does not fully comply with
the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making
significant efforts to do so. The government made some progress in convicting
traffickers and registering an NGO-operated shelter, but did not demonstrate
increasing efforts to identify and protect victims, so the country was raised from
“Tier 3” status (the government was given this least satisfactory rating the
previous year) to the still-cautionary “Tier 2 Watch List.”
• Uzbekistan was downgraded in 2006 to “Tier 3.” No U.S. aid sanctions were
reported as a direct result of the Tier 3 designation. In 2008, Uzbekistan was
found to have made some modest progress in addressing human trafficking
problems, and was upgraded to the “Tier 2 Watch List.” According to the State
Department, Uzbekistan in 2008 had adopted an anti-trafficking law and
demonstrated modest improvement in its victim assistance and protection efforts.
In June 2012, the State Department reported that Uzbekistan is a source country
for human trafficking for forced labor and sex, and that the government
demonstrated negligible progress in ceasing forced labor, including forced child
labor, in the annual cotton harvest. The State Department also stated that
Uzbekistan did not make efforts to investigate or prosecute government officials
suspected to be complicit in forced labor, so would remain on the “Tier 2 Watch
List” of countries that do not fully comply with the minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking.86
• Tajikistan was downgraded from “Tier 2” to the “Tier 2 Watch List” in 2007
through 2009, a ranking that reflected growing concern that the country was
faltering in its efforts to combat trafficking. In 2010, it was upgraded slightly to
“Tier 2,” a status it retained in 2011, because the country was making significant
efforts … [to] comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking.” In 2011, the State Department states, “the government continued to
make progress in reducing the use of forced labor in the annual cotton harvest.”
The government also convicted more traffickers in 2011 than previously.

84 World Report 2012, Human Rights Watch, January 22, 2012.
85 Urgent Action: Former Government Minister Detained, Press Release, Amnesty International, October 26, 2012.
86 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 19, 2012. See also Ashley Cleek, “Uzbekistan: Police
Reportedly Regulating Sex Market,” Choihona—Eurasianet, May 9, 2012.
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However, the country was deemed to retain a “Tier 2” ranking because it did not
use its embassies in other countries to identify Tajik victims of trafficking or
devote funds for domestic shelters for trafficking victims.
• Kazakhstan was downgraded to the “Tier 2 Watch List” in 2010, even though it
was making significant efforts to eliminate trafficking, because the government
did not assist victims of forced labor and was complicit in the use of forced labor,
including for picking cotton. The Trafficking in Persons Report 2012 reported
that the Kazakh government continued to reduce the use of forced child labor in
the cotton harvest and to increase law enforcement efforts against human
trafficking. However, the State Department averred that Kazakhstan had not
addressed the issue of official complicity in trafficking, among other issues, so
would retain its “Tier 2” status as a country that does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant
efforts to comply.87
In 2009, the U.S. Department of Labor listed all the Central Asian states as countries that use
child labor to pick cotton. This list was meant to inform the choices made by the buying public. In
addition, on July 20, 2010, cotton from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was added to a list that requires
U.S. government contractors purchasing products to certify that they have made a good faith
effort to determine whether forced or indentured child labor was used to produce the cotton.88 The
U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) was permitted to monitor the Autumn 2011 cotton harvest, but
Uzbekistan continues to bar monitors from the U.N.’s International Labor Organization.
The Uzbek Ministry of Labor asserted in early September 2012 that the use of forced child labor
in the agricultural sector was not permitted in Uzbekistan, and that the cotton harvest would be
monitored to prevent the participation of school children. However, all cotton in the country is
produced on private “family farms,” where international legal norms permit children who are
members of farmers’ families to assist in chores, he stated.89
On religious freedom:
• The State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report for 2011 reports
that the Turkmen government “demonstrated a trend toward deterioration in
respect for and protection of the right to religious freedom.” While the
government generally respected the religious freedom of most registered
religious groups, it fined, raided, and detained members of unregistered and
minority religious groups. A new religion law has set onerous requirements for
the re-registration of religious groups, provided for government inspection of
religious literature, and banned religious ceremonies in government facilities.
The Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
(USCIRF; an advisory body) has called since 2000 for the State Department to

87 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2012, June 19, 2012 (covers developments in 2011).
88 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human
Trafficking, The Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, September 3, 2009;
Executive Order 13126, Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor, at
http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/regs/eo13126/main.htm.
89 CEDR, September 7, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950095.
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list Turkmenistan as a “Country of Particular Concern,” where severe violations
of religious freedom could result in U.S. sanctions.
• Since November 2006, the State Department has designated Uzbekistan a
“country of particular concern” (CPC), for severe religious and other human
rights violations that could lead to U.S. sanctions. However, since 2009, the State
Department has issued waivers for Uzbekistan, so that no U.S. sanctions have
been taken. In its most recent report, USCIRF reported that the Uzbek
government “harshly penalizes individuals for independent religious activity
regardless of their religious affiliation.... The government continues to arrest
Muslims and repress individuals, groups, and mosques that do not conform to
officially prescribed practices or that it claims are associated with extremist
political programs. ...Uzbek police and security forces continue to raid and detain
members of unregistered, and sometimes registered, religious groups for peaceful
religious activity.” In its most recent report in July 2012, the State Department
followed the recommendation of the Commission in again designating
Uzbekistan as a CPC, because the government “did not demonstrate a trend
toward improvement in respect for and protection of the right to religious
freedom.”
• In its March 2012 report, USCIRF assessed religious rights as further
deteriorating in Tajikistan, and for the first time recommended that the country be
designated a Country of Particular Concern (CPC), which could lead to U.S.
sanctions. USCIRF called for the U.S. government to step up engagement with
Tajikistan on religious freedom issues. The State Department may follow this
recommendation to designate Tajikistan as a CPC later in the year. The agency’s
July 2012 International Religious Freedom Report concurred with USCIRF that
religious rights had further deteriorated in Tajikistan during 2011. During this
period, new laws and penalties had been implemented, including prohibiting the
participation of children in public religious services and activities and increasing
fines for teaching religion without a permit and for producing, distributing,
importing, or exporting unapproved religious literature.
• The State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report stated that the
Kazakh government demonstrated a trend toward deterioration in respect for and
protection of the right to religious freedom during 2011. A religion law passed in
October 2011 imposed stringent registration requirements on religious groups. A
new Religious Affairs Agency monitored the activities of religious groups and
was able to initiate action to ban a group that violated the law. Its activities
included the inspection and approval of religious literature.90
October 2012 was the deadline under a harsh new religion law, passed a year previously,
for religious organizations to re-register in Kazakhstan. Authorities announced that over
one-quarter of the previously registered 4,551 organizations had lost their legal status,
and that the number of legally recognized faiths had been slashed from 46 to 17. Under
the new law, unregistered religious expression is prohibited. According to a report from

90 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report, March 2012; U.S. Department of State,
International Religious Freedom Report for 2011, July 30, 2012.
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one region of Kazakhstan, out of 25 congregations ordered to be liquidated, most were
evangelical Christian or Jewish groups.91
Kazakhstan and the Presidency of the OSCE
The 15th Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE in Madrid in late November 2007 decided that
Kazakhstan would hold the OSCE chairmanship in 2010, the first post-Soviet, Eurasian, Muslim-
majority country to host an OSCE chairmanship. Kazakhstan’s then-Foreign Minister Marat
Tazhin pledged at the Ministerial Meeting that Kazakhstan would enact human rights reforms
prior to assuming the chairmanship and that during the chairmanship, Kazakhstan would ensure
that NGOs were able to participate in OSCE events and that ODIHR’s mandate was preserved.92
Addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE in Astana in June 2008, President
Nazarbayev stated that his country’s preparations for holding the chairmanship included the
elaboration of a blueprint he termed “the path to Europe,” which envisaged Kazakhstan’s
integration into Europe in the areas of energy, transport, technology transfers, education, culture,
and democratization. Kazakhstan’s progress in meeting its pledges on human rights and
democratization reforms were mixed at best, according to most observers.93
Upon assuming the OSCE chairmanship in January 2010, Kazakhstan followed a varied agenda
with emphases on each of the military/security, democratic/human rights, and
economic/environmental “dimensions” or “baskets” of activity of the OSCE. Kazakhstan stressed
that it would emphasize several issues of concern to Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and Russia, among
them: bolstering nuclear disarmament; continuing the “Corfu Process” dialogue on the future of
European security (including discussion of Russia’s draft European Security Treaty); appointing a
Special Representative of the OSCE Chairman to promote dialogue on protracted conflicts in the
former Soviet Union; and supporting several initiatives regarding Afghanistan.
At an informal OSCE foreign ministerial meeting in Almaty (Kazakhstan’s largest city) in July
2010, an agreement was reached to hold an OSCE heads of state and government summit on
December 1-2, 2010, in Astana (Kazakhstan’s capital), the first since the Istanbul summit in 1999.
The United States earlier had raised concerns about the necessity of holding such a summit, but
received assurances from Kazakhstan and others that a summit would address substantive issues
of U.S. interest.94 At a meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council (the main decision-making body;
it convenes weekly in Vienna) on November 15, 2010, Kazakhstan’s then-Foreign Minister and
OSCE Chairman-in-Office Kanat Saudabayev called for the summit agenda to include enhancing
the OSCE’s efforts in Afghanistan; bolstering early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms;
reaffirming the rule of law and the role of civil society; promoting cooperation among
international security organizations; and formulating an action plan to update the 1999 Vienna

91 Mushfig Bayram, “Kazakhstan: Mosques and Churches Forcibly Closed,” Forum 18 News, December 11, 2012;
CEDR, November 30, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950116.
92 OSCE, 15th Ministerial Council Meeting, Address of Marat Tazhin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Kazakhstan
, November 29, 2007.
93 An Atmosphere of Quiet Repression: Freedom of Religion, Assembly and Expression in Kazakhstan, Human Rights
Watch, December 2008; Human Rights in Kazakhstan: Seven Months before the OSCE Chairmanship, Human Rights
Watch Memorandum, Human Rights Watch, May 20, 2009.
94 Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Articles, OSCE 2010 Informal Ministerial: Kazakhstan
Persistence Earns A Summit In Astana
, by Winsome Packer, November 1, 2010.
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Document (provisions for confidence and security-building, including the exchange and
verification of information on armed forces, defense policies, and military activities).95
During three Review Conference meetings to prepare the agenda for the summit, the United
States stressed that in addition to the measures mentioned by Saudabayev, the agenda should
include reestablishing an OSCE Mission in Georgia; empowering ODIHR to better monitor
elections; and strengthening the powers of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media,
among other measures. At the same time, the United States reiterated that it did not see the need
for new treaties or institutions to safeguard European Security as urged by Russia.96 The United
States also criticized Kazakhstan’s efforts to exclude some civil society representatives from the
September 30-October 8, 2010, Review Conference held in Warsaw, Poland.97
According to many observers, the December 1-2, 2010, OSCE Summit accomplished a few of the
goals set by Kazakhstan but fell short on most. Summit participants could not agree on an action
plan, but issued the Astana Commemorative Declaration toward a Security Community. There
appeared to be some progress in bolstering Afghanistan’s security and development and in
reaffirming the centrality of democracy and human rights as core principles. The United States
and Russia clashed over the issue of Georgia’s territorial integrity, including whether Russia had
complied with ceasefire accords, and over Russia’s failure to carry out its pledge to withdraw
troops from Moldova. Lack of progress in resolving the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over the
breakaway Nagorno Karabakh also was mentioned by the United States as a reason the summit
could not agree on an action plan (however, a statement was issued calling for a settlement of the
conflict). Although the summit declaration called for building on the so-called Corfu process to
further European security cooperation, the United States and some other members of the OSCE
had objected to Russia’s call (supported by Kazakhstan) for a new European Security Treaty.
Trade and Investment
Successive U.S. administrations have endorsed free market reforms in Central Asia, since these
directly serve U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services and
sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to Central Asia has greatly
exceeded that provided to Russia or most other Eurasian states except Azerbaijan. U.S. trade
agreements have been signed and entered into force with all the Central Asian states, but bilateral
investment treaties are in force only with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In line with Kyrgyzstan’s
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States established permanent
normal trade relations with Kyrgyzstan by law in June 2000, so that “Jackson-Vanik” trade
provisions no longer apply that call for presidential reports and waivers concerning freedom of
emigration. The United States provided technical assistance that enabled Tajikistan to join the

95 OSCE Permanent Council, Countdown to the OSCE Summit: Statement by Mr. Kanat Saudabayev, Chairperson-in-
Office of the OSCE and Secretary of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs
, November 15, 2010.
96 United States Mission to the OSCE, Opening Plenary Session at the OSCE Review Conference, Vienna, Austria, As
delivered by Dr. Michael Haltzel, U.S. Head of Delegation, OSCE Review Conference
, October 18, 2010; Closing
Plenary Session of OSCE Review Conference in Vienna, Austria, As delivered by Dr. Michael Haltzel
, October 26,
2010.
97 United States Mission to the OSCE, OSCE Review Conference, Vienna, Austria, As delivered by Julie Raschka,
October 25, 2010; Catherine Fitzpatrick, “Turkmen Activists Denied Entry to OSCE Review Conference in Warsaw,”
Eurasianet, October 4, 2010.
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WTO in December 2012, and the 113th Congress may consider offering permanent normal trade
relations status to the country in line with WTO requirements.98
In June 2004, The U.S. Trade Representative signed a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) with ambassadors of the regional states to establish a U.S.-Central Asia
Council on Trade and Investment. The Council has met yearly to address intellectual property,
labor, environmental protection, and other issues that impede trade and private investment flows
between the United States and Central Asia. The United States also has called for greater intra-
regional cooperation on trade and encouraged the development of regional trade and transport ties
with Afghanistan and South Asia. The reorganization of the State Department in 2006 to create
the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs facilitated this emphasis.99
The sixth meeting of the U.S.-Central Asia TIFA was held on September 14-15, 2011, in
Washington, DC, and included emissaries from Afghanistan participating as observers. Bilateral
sessions and meetings with private industry took place. Kazakhstan provided an overview of the
newly formed Kazakhstan-Belarus-Russia Customs Union, and other attendees provided updates
on efforts to accede to the WTO. The United States stressed adherence to intellectual property
protections and discussed its “new silk road vision” (see below) with the emissaries.100 The
seventh meeting of the U.S.-Central Asia TIFA took place in Almaty, Kazakhstan in October
2012. The U.S. side released few details, but the delegations reportedly discussed fostering
greater investment and transit in Central Asia, enhancing regional ties with Afghanistan, and
securing Tajikistan’s and Kazakhstan’s membership in the WTO.
Building on U.S. government efforts since the mid-2000s to encourage energy and other trade
linkages between Central and South Asia, in July 2011 Secretary Clinton announced that U.S.
policy toward Afghanistan in coming years would focus on encouraging “stronger economic ties
through South and Central Asia so that goods, capital, and people can flow more easily across
borders.”101 She further explained this “new Silk Road vision” at a meeting of regional ministers
and others in September 2011, stating that
as we look to the future of this region, let us take this precedent [of a past Silk Road] as
inspiration for a long-term vision for Afghanistan and its neighbors. Let us set our sights on a
new Silk Road—a web of economic and transit connections that will bind together a region
too long torn apart by conflict and division…. Turkmen gas fields could help meet both
Pakistan’s and India’s growing energy needs and provide significant transit revenues for both
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Tajik cotton could be turned into Indian linens. Furniture and fruit
from Afghanistan could find its way to the markets of Astana or Mumbai and beyond.102

98 US Embassy Dushanbe, U.S. Statement on Tajikistan’s Accession to the World Trade Organization, December 11,
2012.
99 Remarks at Eurasian National University, October 13, 2005; and U.S. Congress, House International Relations
Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Testimony by Steven R. Mann, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary
, July 25, 2006. See also U.S. Embassy, Astana, Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan and the United States in a
Changed World
, August 23, 2006.
100 Office the U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Central Asian Countries Evaluate Progress on Trade and
Investment Relationship
, Press Release, September 2011.
101 U.S. Department of State, Travel Diary: “India and the United States—A Vision for the 21st Century,” DipNote,
July 20, 2011.
102 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Clinton Co-Chairs the New Silk Road Ministerial Meeting,” DipNote,
September 23, 2011; Fact Sheet on New Silk Road Ministerial, September 22, 2011. See also U.S. Department of State,
Remarks, Robert D. Hormats, Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs, Address to the SAIS
(continued...)
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The Silk Road Vision further was adumbrated during meetings in Turkey and Germany in late
2011. The Istanbul Conference Communiqué called for connecting Afghanistan to Central Asian
and Iranian railways and for bolstering regional energy linkages.103
This “new Silk Road vision” seems congruent with suggestions made by a bipartisan group of
analysts and former U.S. officials who have called for enhanced U.S. economic assistance to
Central Asia to bolster the TIFA by focusing on highway and other projects. The group also has
proposed moving beyond TIFA through involvement of foreign and economic ministers in
discussions about regional economic and security cooperation, akin to those undertaken by the
CSTO and the SCO.104
All the states of the region possess large-scale resources that could contribute to the region
becoming a “new silk road” of trade and commerce. The Kazakh and Turkmen economies are
mostly geared to energy exports but need added foreign investment for production and transport.
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are major cotton producers, a legacy of central
economic planning during the Soviet period. Uzbekistan’s cotton and gold production rank
among the highest in the world and much is exported. It has moderate gas reserves but needs
investment to upgrade infrastructure. Kyrgyzstan has major gold mines and strategic mineral
reserves, is a major wool producer, and could benefit from tourism. Tajikistan has one of the
world’s largest aluminum processing plants. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan possess the bulk of the
region’s water resources, but in recent years both countries have suffered from droughts.
Despite the region’s development potential, the challenges of corruption, inadequate transport
infrastructure, punitive tariffs, border tensions, and uncertain respect for contracts discourage
major foreign investment (except for some investment in the energy sector). Cotton-growing has
contributed to environmental pollution and water shortages, leading some observers to argue that
cotton-growing is not suited to the largely arid region.
Tajikistan has alleged that Uzbekistan delays rail freight shipments, purportedly to pressure
Tajikistan to halt construction of the Rogun hydro-electric power dam on the Vakhsh River, which
Uzbekistan fears could limit the flow of water into the country. In November 2011, it closed a rail
link to southern Tajikistan, reporting that a bridge was damaged, but since then has not reopened
the span. Uzbekistan also has periodically cut off gas supplies to Tajikistan, most recently in early
April 2012. Uzbekistan at first stated that it needed to divert gas shipments to fulfill contracts
with China, but later maintained that the cutoff merely represented the fulfillment of a supply
contract with Tajikistan. In early April 2012, Tajikistan’s prime minister and its foreign ministry
denounced the cutoff and the rail restrictions as part of an “economic blockade” aiming to
destabilize Tajikistan. The Uzbek prime minister responded that all Uzbek actions were in
accordance with bilateral agreements or responses to Tajik actions, so that the accusations were
“groundless.” Gas supplies were resumed in mid-April 2012.105

(...continued)
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and CSIS Forum, September 29, 2011.
103 Andrew Kuchins, “Laying the Groundwork for Afghanistan’s New Silk Road: How Washington and Kabul Can
Turn a Vision Into a Plan,” Foreign Affairs, December 5, 2011.
104 Strengthening Fragile Partnerships: An Agenda for the Future of U.S.-Central Asia Relations, The Project 2049
Institute, February, 2011.
105 Yulia Goryaynova, Galim Faskhutdinov, and Saule Mukhametrakhimov, “A Gas Row Highlights Tajik-Uzbek
Tensions,” IWPR, April 24, 2012; CEDR, April 3, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950105; April 4, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950127.
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According to some reports, Uzbek officials have stepped-up arrests, fines, and other actions
against international business interests in recent months, perhaps due in part to elite infighting
and growing corruption.106 Other international businesses continue to carry out operations.
Energy Resources
U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central Asian and South Caucasian states
have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the West, supporting U.S. private
investment, promoting NATO and European energy security through diversified suppliers,
assisting ally Turkey, and opposing the building of pipelines that transit “energy competitor” Iran
or otherwise give it undue influence over the region. Other interests have included encouraging
regional electricity, oil, and gas exports to South Asia and added security for Caspian region
pipelines and energy resources.
To bolster NATO and other European energy supply diversity, the United States supported the
building of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC; completed in 2006) and the South
Caucasus Pipeline (SCP; completed in 2007). The United States also endorsed the building of a
trans-Caspian gas pipeline to link Central Asian producers to European markets. In testimony in
June 2011, then-Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Richard Morningstar stated that current U.S.
policy encourages the development of new Eurasian oil and gas resources to increase the diversity
of world energy supplies. In the case of oil, increased supplies may directly benefit the United
States, he stated. A second U.S. goal is to increase European energy security, so that some
countries in Europe that largely rely on a single supplier (presumably Russia) may in the future
have diverse suppliers. A third goal is assisting Caspian regional states to develop new routes to
market, so that they can obtain more competitive prices and become more prosperous. In order to
achieve these goals, the Administration supports the development of the Southern Corridor of
Caspian (and perhaps Iraq) gas export routes transiting Turkey to Europe. Of various competing
pipeline proposals, the Administration will support the proposal “that brings the most gas, soonest
and most reliably, to those parts of Europe that need it most.” The Administration also supports
the diversification of Kazakhstan’s export routes and the boosting of oil production as a
significant addition to world oil supplies. At the same time, Morningstar rejected views that
Russia and the United States are competing for influence over Caspian energy supplies, stating
that the Administration has formed a Working Group on Energy under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral
Presidential Commission.107
At the fourth meeting of the U.S.-EU Energy Council in early December 2012 in Brussels, the
parties issued a statement supporting the development of the Southern Gas Corridor, which they
stated “remains a pivotal opportunity to diversify supply and allow new providers to participate in
the EU energy market.” The sides also stressed that they continued to encourage Central Asian
producers to link up to the Southern Gas Corridor.108

106 Catherine Fitzpatrick, “Uzbekistan: Foreign Investors Suffering amid Tashkent’s “Bizarre” Business Behavior,”
Eurasianet, August 16, 2011.
107 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Hearing on
European and Eurasian Energy: Developing Capabilities for Security and Prosperity, Testimony of Ambassador
Richard L. Morningstar, Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy
, June 2, 2011.
108 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Joint Statement on the U.S.-EU Energy Council, December 5,
2012.
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Until 2004, the Bush Administration retained a Clinton-era position, Special Advisor on Caspian
Energy Diplomacy, to help further U.S. policy and counter the efforts of Russia’s Viktor
Kaluzhny, the then-deputy foreign minister and Special Presidential Representative for Energy
Matters in the Caspian. After the Administration abolished this post as no longer necessary, its
responsibilities were shifted at least in part to a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
(responsibilities of a former Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and Eurasian Conflicts
also were shifted to the Deputy Assistant Secretary). Some critics juxtaposed Russia’s close
interest in securing Caspian energy resources to what they termed halting U.S. efforts.109
Following some Congressional urging, a post of Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy issues was
(re-)created in March 2008, with the former Bush Administration stating that there were “new
opportunities” for the export of Caspian oil and gas.110 In April 2009, Secretary of State Clinton
appointed Richard Morningstar as Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy. After he left this post in
mid-2012, the Administration proposed that the functions of the post be assumed by the Assistant
Secretary of State for Energy Resources. A minority staff report from the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has recommended that the State Department retain a dedicated Special
Envoy position.111
The Caspian region is emerging as a notable source of oil and gas for world markets. The U.S.
Energy Information Administration has estimated that gas exports from the region could account
for 11% of global gas export sales by 2035, belying arguments by some observers in the 1990s
that the region would be marginal as a contributor to world energy supplies. According to British
Petroleum (BP), the proven natural gas reserves of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan are estimated at over 450 trillion cubic feet (tcf), among the largest in the world.112
The region’s proven oil reserves are estimated to be 48 billion barrels, comparable to Libya.
Russia’s temporary cutoffs of gas to Ukraine in January 2006 and January 2009 and a brief
slowdown of oil shipments to Belarus in January 2010 (Belarus and Ukraine are transit states for
oil and gas pipelines to other European states) have highlighted Europe’s energy insecurity. The
United States has supported EU efforts to reduce its overall reliance on Russian oil and gas by
increasing the number of possible alternative suppliers. Part of this policy has involved
encouraging Central Asian countries to transport their energy exports to Europe through pipelines
that cross the Caspian Sea, thereby bypassing Russian (and Iranian) territory, although these
amounts are expected at most to satisfy only a small fraction of EU needs.113
The Central Asian states long were pressured by Russia to yield large portions of their energy
wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controlled most existing export pipelines.114 Russia
attempted to strengthen this control over export routes for Central Asian energy in May 2007

109 Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 31, 2007.
110 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Energy and Security from the Caspian to Europe: A
Minority Staff Report
, December 12, 2012, pp. 61-62.
111 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Energy and Security from the Caspian to Europe: A
Minority Staff Report
, December 12, 2012, p. 9.
112 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2010.
113 For details, see CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, by Paul Belkin. See also
International Crisis Group. Central Asia’s Energy Risks, May 24, 2007.
114 According to a plan published by Russia’s Institute of Energy Strategy covering the period 2007-2030, “Russian
control over a large share of Central Asian gas needs to be maintained.” See Minpromenergo (Ministry of Industry and
Energy), Institut energeticheskoi strategii, Kontseptsiya energeticheskoi strategii Rossii na period do 2030g., 2007. As
reported by Philip Hanson, “How Sustainable Is Russia’s Energy Power?” Russian Analytical Digest, No. 38 (2008).
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when President Putin reached agreement in Kazakhstan on supplying more Kazakh oil to Russia.
Putin also reached agreement with the presidents of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan on the
construction of a new pipeline to transport Turkmen and Kazakh gas to Russia. The first
agreement appeared to compete with U.S. and Turkish efforts to foster more oil exports through
the BTC. The latter agreement appeared to compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster building a
trans-Caspian gas pipeline. The latter also appeared to compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster
building a pipeline from Turkey through Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to Austria (the
so-called Nabucco pipeline).
Seeming to indicate a direct challenge to these plans by Russia and the West, China signed an
agreement in August 2007 with Kazakhstan on completing the last section of an oil pipeline from
the Caspian seacoast to China, and signed an agreement with Turkmenistan on building a gas
pipeline to China (see also below).115 In March 2008, the heads of the national gas companies of
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan announced that their countries would raise the gas
export price to the European level in future years. They signed a memorandum of understanding
on the price with Russia’s Gazprom state-controlled gas firm, which controls most export
pipelines. According to analyst Martha Olcott, “the increased bargaining power of the Central
Asian states owes more to the entry of China into the market than to the opening of [the BTC
pipeline and the SCP]. Russia’s offer to pay higher purchase prices for Central Asian gas in 2008
and 2009 came only after China signed a long-term purchase agreement for Turkmen gas at a
base price that was higher than what Moscow was offering.”116
After having failed in several other Soviet successor states, Gazprom reportedly succeeded in
purchasing Kyrgyzstan’s entire gas distribution system in December 2012.
Kazakhstan’s Oil and Gas
According to British Petroleum, Kazakhstan possesses 30 billion barrels of proven oil reserves
(about 2% of world reserves) and 66.4 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves (about 1% of
world gas reserves). There are five major onshore oil fields—Tengiz, Karachaganak, Aktobe,
Mangistau, and Uzen—which account for about half of the proven reserves. There are two major
offshore oil fields in Kazakhstan’s sector of the Caspian Sea—Kashagan and Kurmangazy—
which are estimated to contain at least 14 billion barrels of recoverable reserves.
Nazarbayev’s development goals for Kazakhstan rely heavily on increases in oil and gas
production and exports, which account for a significant share of government revenues and GDP
growth. The government has anticipated growing revenues in particular from expanding
production at the Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan oil fields. While production is increasing
at the former two oil fields, the latter oil field has not yet produced oil. Development of the
Kashagan oil field began soon after its discovery in 2000, but has faced numerous delays and cost
overruns, attributable to the harsh offshore environment; the high pressure, depth, and sulfur
content of the oil; reported management problems; and Kazakh government interference.
Members of the North Caspian Operating Consortium developing the oil field currently include
Italy’s Eni energy firm, the Anglo-Dutch Shell, the U.S.’s ExxonMobil, France’s Total and
Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGaz (all with a 16.81% stake) as well as the U.S.’s ConocoPhillips

115 An oil and gas conference involving Kazakh, Chinese, and Russian energy ministries and firms has met annually
since 2004 to “exchange views” on possible regional cooperation. ITAR-TASS, December 5, 2007.
116 Martha Olcott, “A New Direction for U.S. Policy in the Caspian Region.”
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(8.4%) and Japan’s Inpex (7.56%). Phase one experimental/industrial production rising to
375,000-450,000 bpd is now expected to begin by mid-2013. The developmental cost of Phase
one has risen to $46 billion. The anticipated difficulty and cost of further development of the oil
field—which could result in production of up to 1.5 million bpd, but which could cost an added
$100 billion or more—have raised questions among the foreign consortium members about the
timeline and feasibility of such efforts, and contributed to rising concerns by the Kazakh
government that its hopes for rising revenues from the oil field might need to be revised.117
Until recently U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) played a dominant role in the development of
Kazakhstani oil and gas resources, amounting to about $16.5 billion in Kazakhstan (over one-
third of all FDI in the country) from 1993-2012.118 According to some reports, China provided
about $13 billion in investments and loans to Kazakhstan’s energy sector in 2009, so its
cumulative FDI may eclipse U.S. FDI.
Some U.S. energy firms and other private foreign investors have become discouraged in recent
years by harsher Kazakh government terms, taxes, and fines that some allege reflect corruption
within the ruling elite. In 2009, the Karachaganak Petroleum Operating (KPO) consortium (the
main shareholder is British Gas, and U.S. Chevron is among other shareholders), which extracts
oil and gas from the Karachaganak fields in northwest Kazakhstan, was faced with an effort by
the Kazakh government to obtain 10% of the shares of the consortium. Facing resistance, the
government imposed hundreds of millions of dollars in tax, environmental, and labor fines and oil
export duties against KPO. Both the government and KPO appealed to international arbitration.
In December 2011, KPO agreed to transfer 10% of its shares to the Kazakh government, basically
gratis, and in exchange the government mostly lifted the fines and duties.119 In May 2012,
President Nazarbayev suggested that foreign energy firms operating in the country could help
finance domestic industrial projects.120
Kazakhstan’s main oil export route from the Tengiz oil field has been a 930-mile pipeline
completed in 2001—owned by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), in which Russian
shareholders have a controlling interest—that carried 693,000 bpd of oil in 2009 from Kazakhstan
to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Kazakhstan’s other major oil export pipeline, from
Atyrau to Samara, Russia, has a capacity of approximately 730,000 bpd. Lengthy Russian
resistance to increasing the pumping capacity of the CPC pipeline and demands for higher transit
and other fees, along with the necessity of offloading the oil into tankers at Novorossiysk to
transit the clogged Turkish Straits, spurred Kazakh President Nazarbayev to sign a treaty with
visiting Azerbaijani President Aliyev in June 2006 to barge Kazakh oil across the Caspian Sea to
Baku to the BTC pipeline. Kazakhstan began shipping about 70,000 bpd of oil through the BTC

117 Alla Afanasyeva, “Kashagan’s Big Oil Coming to Market in Mid-2013,” Reuters, August 10, 2012; “Kazakh Oil
and Gas Ministry Hopes for Speedy Settling of Budget of Kashagan Field’s First Phase,” Trend News Agency, April 26,
2012; “Total Wants First Oil from Kashagan before Year-End-CEO,” Reuters, May 11 2012; Robert Cutler, “Kashagan
Costs Surge,” Asia Times, January 21, 2012; Nariman Gizitdinov, “Biggest Find in Decades Becomes $39 Billion
Cautionary Tale,” Bloomberg, November 16, 2011.
118 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Hearing; U.S.
Engagement in Central Asia, Testimony by Robert Blake, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Central and South Asian
Affairs
, July 24, 2012.
119 Press Release: Agreement Reached with Republic of Kazakhstan on Karachaganak, BG Group, December 14, 2011,
at http://www.bg-group.com/MEDIACENTRE/PRESS/Pages/14Dec2010.aspx.
120 Georgiy Voloshin, “Kazakhstan’s Economic Proposals Reveal Fears about Political Instability,” CACI Analyst, June
13, 2012.
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pipeline at the end of October 2008. Another accord resulted from a visit by President
Nazarbayev to Azerbaijan in September 2009 that provides that up to 500,000 bpd of oil from the
Kashagan field may be barged across the Caspian to enter the BTC or the Baku-Supsa pipeline.
When the volumes exceed 500,000 bpd, a trans-Caspian pipeline may be built.
Apparently to counter Kazakh’s export plans via Azerbaijan, then-President Putin’s May 2007
agreement with Nazarbayev (see above) envisaged boosting the capacity of the CPC pipeline.
However, this project did not materialize in a timely fashion, so Kazakhstan proceeded to upgrade
its Caspian Sea port facilities. Kazakhstan also barges some oil to Baku to ship by rail to
Georgia’s Black Sea oil terminal at Batumi, of which Kazakhstan became the sole owner in early
2008. Kazakhstan began barging oil from Batumi to the Romanian port of Constantsa in late 2008
for processing at two refineries it purchased. Some Kazakh oil arriving in Baku also could be
transported through small pipelines to Georgia’s Black Sea port of Supsa or to Russia’s Black Sea
port of Novorossiisk, although in the latter case Kazakhstan might be faced with high transit
charges by Russia.121
In December 2010, the CPC approved a plan to upgrade the pumping capacity of the oil pipeline
to 1.4 million bpd, with several phases of construction through 2015. The increased capacity will
accommodate boosted production from the Tengiz and Karachaganak oil fields, as well as from
anticipated development of the Kashagan and Filanovsky oil fields (the latter is owned by
Russia). Construction reportedly has faced delays.
In addition to these oil export routes to Europe not controlled by Russia, in 2009 Kazakhstan and
China completed an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan’s port city of Atyrau to the Xinjiang region of
China that initially carries 200,000 bpd to China. Some Russian oil has been transported to China
through this pipeline, the first Russian oil to be transported by pipeline to China.
Russia is the major purchaser of Kazakh gas through the Central Asia-Center gas pipeline
network. According to British Petroleum (BP) data, Kazakhstan exported 402.6 bcf of gas to
Russia in 2011 (almost the same as in 2010), virtually all of its exported gas.122 Kazakhstan
completed its sections of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline in 2009-2010. At the end of October
2008, China and Kazakhstan signed a framework agreement on constructing a gas pipeline from
Beyneu, north of the Aral Sea, eastward to Shymkent, where it will connect with the Central Asia-
China gas pipeline. The pipeline is planned initially to supply 176.6 bcf to southern Kazakhstan
and 176.6 bcf to China. Pipeline construction began in September 2011 and to be completed by
2015.
Kazakh officials have appeared to make contradictory statements about providing gas for
European customers via a possible trans-Caspian pipeline traversing the South Caucasus and
Turkey. President Nazarbayev appeared to support the possible transit of Kazakh gas through
Turkey when he stated on October 22, 2009, during a visit to Turkey, that “Turkey ... will become
a transit country. And if Kazakhstan’s oil and gas are transported via this corridor then this will be
advantageous to both Turkey and Kazakhstan.”123 Reacting to the decision of the European
Commission to facilitate talks on building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline, Minister of Oil and Gas

121 ITAR-TASS, May 29, 2008; CEDR, December 11, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950096; April 26, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-
950045.
122 “Natural Gas: Trade Movements 2011 by Pipeline,” BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012, p. 28.
123 CEDR, October 22, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950337.
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Sauat Mynabyev stated in early October 2011 that “we do not have available resources for the gas
pipeline yet.”124
Turkmenistan’s Gas
Turkmenistan’s proven natural gas reserves—859 trillion cubic feet—are among the highest in
the world, according to British Petroleum (BP) data. Its oil reserves are significant but not among
the world’s largest.125
At the time it gained independence at the end of 1991, Turkmenistan largely was dependent on
Russian energy export routes, and gas and oil production were held back by aging infrastructure,
inadequate investment, and poor management. In 1993, Russia halted Turkmen gas exports to
Western markets through its pipelines, diverting Turkmen gas to other Eurasian states that had
trouble paying for the gas. In 1997, Russia cut off these shipments because of transit fee arrears
and as leverage to obtain Turkmenistan’s agreement to terms offered by Russia’s state-owned gas
firm Gazprom.
The late President Niyazov signed a 25-year accord with then-President Putin in 2003 on
supplying Russia up to 211.9 billion cubic feet (bcf) of gas in 2004 (about 12% of production at
that time), rising up to 2.83 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2009-2028 (perhaps amounting to the bulk
of anticipated production). Turkmenistan halted gas shipments to Russia at the end of 2004 in an
attempt to get a higher gas price but settled for all-cash rather than partial barter payments.
Turkmenistan and Russia continued to clash in subsequent years over gas prices and finally
agreed in late 2007 that gas prices based on “market principles” would be established in 2009.
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed accords in May and December 2007 on building a
new gas pipeline that was planned to carry 353 bcf of Turkmen and 353 bcf of Kazakh gas to
Russia. However, the Turkmen government appeared to have reservations about building another
pipeline to Russia, and the project reportedly is on hold.
Seeking alternatives to pipeline routes through Russia, in December 1997 Turkmenistan opened
the first pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile gas pipeline
linkage to Iran. In mid-2009, Turkmenistan reportedly agreed to increase gas supplies to up to
706 bcf per year.126 In January 2010, a second gas pipeline to Iran was completed—from a field
that until April 2009 had supplied gas to Russia (see below)—to more than double
Turkmenistan’s export capacity to Iran. However, Turkmen gas exports to Iran were about 290
bcf in 2010 and 360 bcf in 2011, according to BP. Turkmenistan has appeared to arbitrarily
interrupt gas shipments twice in winter months, most recently in late 2012 for what it claimed
was pipeline repair work.
As another alternative to pipelines through Russia, in April 2006, Turkmenistan and China signed
a framework agreement calling for Chinese investment in developing gas fields in Turkmenistan
and in building a gas pipeline with a capacity of about 1.4 tcf per year through Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan to China. All three Central Asian states plan to send gas through this pipeline to
China. Construction of the pipeline began in August 2007 and gas began to be delivered through

124 Interfax, October 6, 2011.
125 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, British Petroleum, June 2012.
126 Iran: Daily Report, January 21, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-11017; January 24, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950014; April 26,
2008, Doc. No. IAP-950049; and May 6, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950052.; CEDR, July 12, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950097.
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the pipeline to Xinjiang and beyond in December 2009. In 2011, Turkmenistan provided about
505 bcf of gas to China, according to BP. In June 2012, Turkmenistan’s Turkmengaz and China’s
National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) signed accords to increase Turkmenistan’s natural gas
shipments to China up to 2.3 tcf per year.
Perhaps in an additional attempt to diversify gas export routes, Berdimuhamedow first signaled in
2007 that Turkmenistan was interested in building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Turkmenistan
signed a memorandum of understanding in April 2008 with the EU to supply 353.1 bcf of gas per
year starting in 2009, presumably through a trans-Caspian pipeline that might at first link to the
SCP and later to the proposed trans-Anatolian pipeline. President Berdimuhamedow asserted in
March 2011 that “Turkmenistan intends to promote cooperation in the fuel and energy sector with
European countries … through construction of Trans-Caspian gas pipelines.”127 Russia and Iran
remain opposed to trans-Caspian pipelines, ostensibly on the grounds that they could pose
environmental hazards to the littoral states.
Berdimuhamedow also revived Niyazov’s proposal to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to
Pakistan and India. In December 2010, the presidents of Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan
and the prime minister of India signed an agreement on constructing the Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. The Asian Development Bank has indicated that
it may provide partial funding for the TAPI pipeline, but other financing for the project remains
problematic because of ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Support for TAPI is part of the
Administration’s “new Silk Road vision” (see above).
On May 23, 2012, Turkmenistan signed purchase agreements with India and Pakistan to supply
up to 1.2 tcf of gas per year via the prospective TAPI pipeline. U.S. State Department
spokesperson Victoria Nuland hailed the signing as “a perfect example of energy diversification,
energy integration, done right. We are very strong supporters of the TAPI pipeline.... We consider
it a very positive step forward and sort of a key example of what we’re seeking with our New Silk
Road Initiative, which aims at regional integration to lift all boats and create prosperity across the
region.”128 Financing for the project remains problematic, however, because of ongoing conflict
in Afghanistan.
On the night of April 8-9, 2009, a section of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Russia
exploded, halting Turkmen gas shipments. Russia claimed that it had notified Turkmenistan that it
was reducing its gas imports because European demand for gas had declined, but Turkmenistan
denied that it had been properly informed.129 After extended talks, visiting former Russian
President Dmitriy Medvedev and President Berdimuhamedow agreed on December 22, 2009, that
Turkmen gas exports to Russia would be resumed, and that the existing supply contract would be
altered to reduce Turkmen gas exports to up to 1 tcf per year and to increase the price paid for the
gas. Turkmenistan announced in January 2010 that some gas exports to Russia had resumed. The
incident appeared to further validate Turkmenistan’s policy of diversifying its gas export routes.

127 “President’s Welcoming Address,” Turkmenistan: The Golden Age, March 3, 2011, at
http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/_en/?idr=4&id=110303a.
128 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, May 23, 2012.
129 Open Source Center. OSC Feature, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. FEA-844966; CEDR, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-
950339; ITAR-TASS, April 3, 2009; Sergey Blagov, “Turkmenistan: Ashgabat Wonders Whether Russia Still Has Deep
Pockets,” Eurasia Insight, March 26, 2009.
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In 2010, Russia’s Gazprom gas firm purchased only 371 bcf of Turkmen gas, a sharp drop-off
from past purchases. Unfortunately, Turkmen gas exports to Iran and China were not
compensatory. Overall Turkmen gas exports fell in 2010 to about 865 bcf, down from 1.7 tcf in
2008, before the Russian gas cutoff.130 In 2011, according to BP, Russia purchased 356.7 bcf of
Turkmen gas. Overall, Turkmen gas exports rose to 1.2 tcf in 2011, buoyed by Chinese and
Iranian purchases. Reportedly, Russia gains most of its cash revenue from these exports to Russia.
Iran pays for its gas at least in part with goods, and Turkmen gas exports to China initially are
being used to pay off Chinese energy development and pipeline loans.131
In September 2011, the Council of the EU approved opening talks with Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan to facilitate an accord on building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Such a link would
provide added gas to ensure adequate supplies for EU Southern Corridor diversification efforts.
Hailing the decision, EU Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger stated that “Europe is now
speaking with one voice. The trans-Caspian pipeline is a major project in the Southern Corridor to
bring new sources of gas to Europe. We have the intention of achieving this as soon as
possible.”132 The Russian Foreign Ministry denounced the plans for the talks, and claimed that the
Caspian Sea littoral states had agreed in a declaration issued in October 2007 that decisions
regarding the Sea would be adopted by consensus among all the littoral states (Russia itself has
violated this provision by agreeing with Kazakhstan and with Azerbaijan on oil and gas field
development). It also claimed that the proposed pipeline was different from existing sub-sea
pipelines in posing an environmental threat.
In June 2012, Azerbaijani border forces turned back a Turkmen ship carrying out seismic work in
or near the area of the disputed and undeveloped offshore Serder/Kyapaz oil and gas field. Two
other disputed fields have been developed by Azerbaijan. Each side lodged diplomatic protests
against the other. The heightened tensions over the disputed field decreases the likelihood that a
trans-Caspian pipeline soon will be built that could supply gas for the planned Trans-Anatolian
Pipeline to Europe, according to the EIU.
Despite these tensions, EU Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger argued at the Frankfurt Gas
Forum meeting in November 2012 that for the Southern Corridor to supply 10-20% of EU gas
needs within the next decade, a trans-Caspian pipeline to Turkmenistan is necessary. Likewise, at
a meeting of the EU-Azerbaijan Cooperation Council in Brussels in December 2012, both sides
voiced the hope that an Azerbaijani-Turkmen-EU accord on building the trans-Caspian pipeline
could be reached. At an energy conference in Turkmenistan in mid-November 2012, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Lynne Tracy stated that the U.S. position was that if such an accord is
reached, “no other country has veto power over that decision.” However, some observers reported
that Turkmen officials reportedly emphasized their interest in the TAPI pipeline and de-
emphasized interest in the trans-Caspian pipeline. 133A Senate Foreign Relations Committee
minority staff report issued in December 2012 called for Turkmenistan to make a political
decision to build a trans-Caspian gas pipeline and invite major Western firms to develop oil and
gas fields, for the United States to push for international funding for this pipeline, and for the EU

130 “Turkmen Gas Could Find Chinese Outlet,” Central Asia Online, March 26, 2011.
131 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Energy and Security from the Caspian to Europe: A
Minority Staff Report
, December 12, 2012, p. 24.
132 European Commission, Press release: EU Starts Negotiations on Caspian Pipeline to Bring Gas to Europe,
September 12, 2011.
133 Natallia Moore, “Turkmenistan Weekly News Analysis,” Eurasianet, November 22, 2012 and November 30, 2012.
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to involve its members as well as Azerbaijan and Turkey in gas purchase talks with Turkmenistan.
The report also suggested that in order to acquaint Turkmenistan with Western markets, a small
undersea pipeline with a capacity of about 353 bcf quickly could be built to connect existing
Azerbaijani and Turkmen offshore platforms.134
Uzbekistan’s Oil and Gas
The U.S. Energy Department reports estimates that Uzbekistan has 594 million barrels of proven
oil reserves and an estimated 65 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves as of 2012
(negligible in terms of world oil reserves but about 1% of world gas reserves).135 Uzbekistan is a
net importer of oil. Uzbek oil production has been declining for many years, attributable to lack
of investment. The country consumes the bulk of its gas production domestically, but has used its
network of Soviet-era gas pipelines to export some gas to Russia and to other Central Asian states
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). Gas exports to the latter two states have been
substantially reduced in recent years because of payment arrears. According to BP, Uzbekistan
exported about 479 bcf of gas in 2010: 364 bcf of gas to Russia; 102 bcf to Kazakhstan; about 7
bcf to Kyrgyzstan; and about 6 bcf to Tajikistan. According to one report, gas exports declined to
424 bcf in 2011, but the government hopes to export 530 bcf in 2012. Gas is provided to Russia
and Kazakhstan through the Russian-owned Central Asia-Center Pipeline system. Uzbekistan
began to export some gas through this pipeline system to Ukraine in 2011. Reportedly,
Uzbekistan was an unreliable gas exporter during the winters of 2010-2011 and 2011-2012,
restricting supplies to divert them to cold-weather domestic use. In November 2011, Kazakhstan’s
major city of Almaty experienced shortages of gas imported from Uzbekistan, leading it to
urgently conclude an agreement with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to
obtain gas from the Central Asia-China Pipeline.136
Uzbekistan largely has been closed to Western energy investment, although efforts to attract
international energy firms have appeared to increase in recent years. Russian firms Gazprom and
Lukoil are the largest investors in Uzbek gas development and production. Reportedly, Gazprom
pays European-pegged gas prices for only a fraction of imports from Uzbekistan. In 2005, CNPC
and Uzbekistan’s state-owned Uzbekneftegaz firm announced that they would form a joint
venture to develop oil and gas resources. In 2007, Uzbekistan and China signed an agreement on
building a 326-mile section of the Central Asia-China Pipeline, and a construction and operation
joint venture between Uzbekneftegaz and CNPC began construction in 2008. Two side-by-side
pipelines have been completed, and the third is under construction. In October 2011, Uztransgaz
(Uzbek gas transportation firm) and a subsidiary of CNPC signed a contract to supply up to 353
billion cubic feet of gas in 2012 though this pipeline (other sources stated that Uzbekistan
planned to supply up to 141 billion cubic feet). However, Uzbekistan has reported that these
shipments began only in August 2012. In April 2012, China announced it would spend $15 billion
for oil and gas exploration in Uzbekistan. A production sharing consortium composed of

134 Najia Badykova, “US-EU Energy Council Reiterates Support for Southern Corridor,” FSU Oil and Gas Monitor,
December 12, 2012; Jennifer DeLay, “Russia, Azerbaijan Remain Rivals in Race for European Gas Markets,” FSU Oil
and Gas Monitor
, December 19, 2012; United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Energy and Security
from the Caspian to Europe: A Minority Staff Report
, December 12, 2012.
135 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Uzbekistan Country Analysis Brief, January 19,
2012.
136 Interfax, November 14, 2011.
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Uzbekneftegaz, Lukoil, the Korea National Oil Corporation, and CNPC is exploring for gas in the
Aral Sea region.
U.S. Aid Overview
For much of the 1990s and until September 11, 2001, the United States provided much more aid
each year to Russia and Ukraine than to any Central Asian state (most such aid was funded from
the Freedom Support Act account in Foreign Operations Appropriations, but some derived from
other program and agency budgets). Cumulative foreign aid budgeted to Central Asia for FY1992
through FY2010 amounted to $5.7 billion, about 14% of the amount budgeted to all the Eurasian
states, reflecting the lesser priority given to these states prior to September 11.
Budgeted spending for FY2002 for Central Asia, during OEF, was greatly boosted in absolute
amounts ($584 million) and as a share of total aid to Eurasia (about one-quarter of such aid). The
former Bush Administration since then requested smaller amounts of aid, although the
Administration continued to stress that there were important U.S. interests in the region. The
former Bush Administration highlighted the phase-out of economic aid to Kazakhstan and the
congressionally imposed restrictions on aid to Uzbekistan (see below) as among the reasons for
declining aid requests. In April 2008, then-Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher stated
that another reason for declining U.S. aid to the region was a more constrained U.S. budgetary
situation. Aid to Central Asia in recent years has been about the same or less in absolute and
percentage terms than that provided to the South Caucasian region.
The Obama Administration boosted aid to Central Asia in FY2009 to about $494.5 million (all
agencies and programs), but aid declined to $436.3 million in FY2010, despite a boost in
assistance to Kyrgyzstan (see below). Budgeted “function 150” foreign assistance to Central Asia
was $125.8 in FY2011 and an estimated $133.7 million in FY2012 (see Table 1, Table 2 and
Table 3).137 Under the Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY2013, signed into law on
September 28, 2012 (P.L. 112-175), regular foreign aid accounts are funded until late March 2012
at the same level as in FY2012 plus .612%, and most country allocations may be adjusted at
agency discretion.
The Administration stated in FY2010 and FY2011 that it was prioritizing foreign assistance to
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In Tajikistan, the Administration stated that aid would help increase
the stability of a country “situated on the frontline of our ongoing military stabilization efforts in
Afghanistan.” In Kyrgyzstan, the Administration stated that aid would improve security, combat
drug-trafficking, reform the economy, and address food insecurity.138 Following the April and
June 2010 instability in Kyrgyzstan, the Administration provided $77.6 million in addition to
regular appropriated aid for stabilizing the economy, holding elections, and training police as well
as urgent food and shelter aid.

137 The “function 150” aid numbers include funds from the Aid for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)
account, Global Health and Child Survival (GHCS), Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related
Programs (NADR), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and
Food for Peace. The totals do not include Defense or Energy Department funds, funding for exchanges, the value of
privately donated cargoes, or Millennium Challenge Corporation aid to Kyrgyzstan.
138 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for FY2010, May 2009, p. 44;
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for FY2011, Volume II, March 2010, p. 85.
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The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), created in 2004 to provide U.S. aid to countries
with promising development records, announced in late 2005 that Kyrgyzstan was eligible to
apply for assistance as a country on the “threshold” of meeting the criteria for full-scale
development aid. In March 2008, the MCC signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan to provide $16
million over the next two years to help the country combat corruption and bolster the rule of law.
This threshold program was completed in June 2010, and Kyrgyzstan has requested another
threshold grant. In its FY2013 assessment, the MCC named Krygyzstan as a candidate for a
Millennium Challenge Compact.
Peace Corps programs in most of the Central Asian states have ended (Tajikistan was deemed too
insecure for volunteers), with Kyrgyzstan currently the only country in the region hosting
volunteers. Most recently, the U.S. embassy in Ashkhabad announced in late August 2012 that the
last Peace Corps volunteers would leave Turkmenistan by the end of the year, reportedly in the
wake of growing tensions between the Turkmen government and the Peace Corps. According to
some accounts, similar tensions had resulted in the termination of Peace Corps activities in
Kazakhstan the previous year.139
Congressional Conditions on Kazakh and Uzbek Aid
In Congress, Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7) forbade FREEDOM Support Act
(FSA) assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determined and
reported that it was making substantial progress in meeting commitments under the Strategic
Partnership Declaration to democratize and respect human rights. The conference report (H.Rept.
108-10) also introduced language that forbade assistance to the Kazakh government unless the
Secretary of State determined and reported that it significantly had improved its human rights
record during the preceding six months. However, the legislation permitted the Secretary to waive
the requirement on national security grounds.140 The Secretary reported in mid-2003 that
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were making such progress. Some in Congress were critical of these
findings. By late 2003, the former Bush Administration had decided that progress was inadequate
in Uzbekistan, so that new Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military
Education and Training (IMET) aid was cut off. Since FY2005, the Secretary of State annually
has reported that Kazakhstan has failed to significantly improve its human rights record, but aid
restrictions have been waived on national security grounds.
Consolidated Appropriations for FY2004, including foreign operations (P.L. 108-199) and for
FY2005 (P.L. 108-447), and Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 (P.L. 109-102)
retained these conditions, while clarifying that the prohibition on aid to Uzbekistan pertained to
the central government and that conditions included respecting human rights, establishing a
“genuine” multi-party system, and ensuring free and fair elections and freedom of expression and
media. These conditions remained in place under the continuing resolution for FY2007 (P.L. 109-
289, as amended). In appropriations for FY2008 (Consolidated Appropriations; P.L. 110-161),
another condition was added blocking the admission of Uzbek officials to the United States if the

139 Ashley Cleek, “Peace Corps Pulling Out of Turkmenistan,” Eurasianet, September 3, 2012.
140 The language calling for “substantial progress” in respecting human rights differs from the grounds of ineligibility
for assistance under Section 498(b) of Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), which includes as
grounds a presidential determination that a Soviet successor state has “engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights.” The Administration has stated annually that the president has
not determined that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have engaged in “gross violations” of human rights.
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Secretary of State determined that they were involved in abuses in Andijon. Omnibus
Appropriations for FY2009 (P.L. 111-8, Sections 7075 [Kazakhstan] and 7076 [Uzbekistan])
reiterated these conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Consolidated
Appropriations for FY2010 (P.L. 111-117) referenced Sections 7075 and 7076, but added that
Uzbekistan would be eligible for expanded IMET, permitting the first such assistance since
FY2004. The Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, FY2011 (P.L.
112-10), directed that assistance would be provided under the authorities and conditions of
FY2010 foreign operations appropriations.
In late 2009, Congress permitted (P.L. 111-84, §801)—for the first time since restrictions on aid
to Uzbekistan were put in place—the provision of some assistance on national security grounds to
facilitate the acquisition of supplies for U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan from countries
along the Northern Distribution Network. Using this authority, the Administration requested in
April 2011 a small amount of FMF assistance for FY2012 for nonlethal equipment to facilitate
Uzbekistan’s protection of the Northern Distribution Network (estimated FMF spending for
FY2012 later increased substantially over that requested, to $1.5 million).
On September 22, 2011, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved a foreign operations
appropriations bill, S. 1601 (Leahy), that provides for a waiver for assistance to Uzbekistan on
national security grounds and to facilitate U.S. access to and from Afghanistan. According to one
media account, the Administration had called for such a waiver in order to facilitate security
assistance, including FMF, for Uzbekistan.141 Some human rights groups have protested against
the possible bolstering of U.S. security assistance to Uzbekistan.142 Consolidated Appropriations
for FY2012 (P.L. 112-74; signed into law on December 23, 2011) provides for the Secretary of
State to waive conditions on assistance to Uzbekistan for a period of not more than six months
and every six months thereafter until September 30, 2013, on national security grounds and as
necessary to facilitate U.S. access to and from Afghanistan. The law requires that the waiver
include an assessment of democratization progress, and calls for a report on aid provided to
Uzbekistan, including expenditures made in support of the NDN in Uzbekistan and any credible
information that such assistance or expenditures are being diverted for corrupt purposes. The law
also extends a provision permitting expanded IMET assistance for Uzbekistan. Soon after the bill
was signed into law, the waiver was exercised in order to supply non-lethal equipment to help
secure the NDN.143
Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States contributes to international financial
institutions that aid Central Asia. Recurrent policy issues regarding U.S. aid include what it
should be used for, who should receive it, and whether it is effective.

141 Joshua Kucera, “Uzbekistan: Military Aid to Tashkent Would Help Protect NDN - State Department,” Eurasianet,
September 28, 2011.
142 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Joint Letter to Secretary Clinton Regarding Uzbekistan,” States News Service,
September 27, 2011; Human Rights Watch, “Don't Lift Restrictions Linked to Human Rights until Tashkent Shows
Improvement,” States News Service, September 7, 2011. The joint letter by ICG and other human rights groups called
on Secretary Clinton to affirm that “U.S. policies towards the Uzbek government will not fundamentally change absent
meaningful human rights improvements, including the release of imprisoned pro-democracy activists, an end to
harassment of civil society groups, effective steps to end torture, and the elimination of forced child labor in the cotton
sector.”
143 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, February 1, 2012.
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U.S. Security and Arms Control Programs and
Assistance

In November 2010, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Sedney testified that:
The focus of the Department of Defense’s efforts in Central Asia today in the short term are
the transport of goods and equipment and personnel through the ground and air lines of
communication through Central Asia…. But beyond our focus on the immediate goals in
Afghanistan, we also have long-term security assistance goals in Central Asia. Our security
assistance focuses on the professionalization of the military, the border guards,
counternarcotics forces and counterterrorism forces.144
Indicative of these goals, he mentioned that over 1,000 Central Asian security personnel had been
trained at the U.S.-German Marshall Center and that the U.S. National Guard had provided
training in civil-military relations (but not combat training) throughout Central Asia as part of the
National Guard State Partnership Program, funded by Partnership for Peace and USCENTCOM
(see below) appropriations. For example, the Arizona National Guard has provided training for
Kazakh active and reserve forces, interagency partners, and international nongovernmental
organizations; the Louisiana and Mississippi National Guard for Uzbek participants; the Montana
National Guard for Kyrgyz participants; the Virginia National Guard for Tajik participants; and
the Nevada National Guard for Turkmen participants.145
Although U.S. security assistance to the region was boosted in the aftermath of 9/11, such aid has
lessened since then as a percentage of all such aid to Eurasia, particularly after aid to Uzbekistan
was cut in FY2004 and subsequent years (see above, “Congressional Conditions on Kazakh and
Uzbek Aid”). Security and law enforcement aid to Central Asia was 31% ($188 million) of all
such aid to Eurasia in FY2002, but had declined to 18% ($247 million) in FY2010. Of all
budgeted assistance to Central Asia over the period from FY1992-FY2010, security and law
enforcement aid accounted for a little over one-fifth. Security and law enforcement programs
include Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training
(IMET), Excess Defense Articles (EDA), and border security aid to combat trafficking in drugs,
humans, and WMD.
A Defense Department counter-terrorism train and equip program (created under Section 1206 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006; P.L. 109-163) provided $20 million to
Kazakhstan in FY2006, $19.2 million in FY2007, and $12.5 million in FY2008 (the latter to
respond to threats in the North Caspian Sea). It also provided $12 million to Kyrgyzstan in
FY2008 and $9.6 million in FY2009. Another Defense Department program for defense articles,
services, training or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities (created
under Section 1207 of P.L. 109-163; Section 1207 has expired and been replaced by a USAID

144 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global
Environment, Hearing on the Emerging Importance of the U.S.-Central Asia Partnership, Testimony of Robert Sedney,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
, November 17 2010.
145 For background, see CRS Report R41957, The National Guard State Partnership Program: Background, Issues,
and Options for Congress
, by Lawrence Kapp and Nina M. Serafino; U.S. Government Accountability Office, State
Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needed for National Guard's Efforts with Foreign
Partners
, May 2012.
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Complex Crises Fund) provided $9.9 million to Tajikistan in FY2008.146 In FY2010, the Defense
Department transferred $15.8 million in Section 1207 funds to the State Department’s Civilian
Response Corps to assist in reconstruction in Kyrgyzstan following the April 2010 coup and the
June 2010 ethnic violence.147
In 2010, the Defense Department announced assistance to set up training facilities in Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan to bolster regional efforts to combat drug-trafficking and terrorism. It was stated
that no U.S. troops would be stationed at either facility.148 The anti-terrorism training center in
southern Kyrgyzstan, planned to be built in the Batken region, was planned to cost $5.5 million.
Construction was reportedly postponed because of instability in Kyrgyzstan, but currently is
being reconsidered. The facility in Tajikistan, to be built near Dushanbe in 2011 for the national
guard for live-fire training, was planned to cost up to $10 million. Although the U.S. Embassy
reported that the construction of the training center in Tajikistan began in mid-2011, completion
apparently has been delayed, with one solicitation notice for construction being issued in mid-
2012.149
According to the State Department’s 2012 Narcotics Control Strategy Report, up to one-fifth of
opium and heroin produced in Afghanistan are transited through Central Asia to markets in Russia
and Central Europe. Most of these drugs transit the Afghan-Tajik border, and from there are
shipped in bulk by trucks travelling along the relatively good road system in Uzbekistan.
Governmental corruption facilitates these shipments, according to the State Department. During
his visits to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan in late June 2011, U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) William Brownfield
announced the launch of a new $4.2 million Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative (CACI) to
provide training and equipment to set up counternarcotics task forces in each of the Central Asian
states. The initiative also aims to encourage regional cooperation by the task forces, including
through the U.S. supported Central Asia Regional Information Coordination Center (CARICC),
as well as broader cooperation with existing task forces in Afghanistan and Russia. Besides INL,
the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is involved in the initiative. A factsheet reports
that the State Department will closely coordinate with the Defense Department, which has
expended over $100 million in counter-narcotics program in Central Asia.150 Reportedly, Russia
has objected to the implementation of CACI.151

146 For background, see CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for
Congress
, by Nina M. Serafino, and CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and
Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns, FY2006-FY2010
, by Nina M. Serafino.
147 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Stabilization Capabilities: Lessons Learned From Kyrgyzstan,” Dipnote, October
04, 2010; U.S. Department of Defense, Section 1209 and Section 1203(b) Report to Congress on Foreign-Assistance
Related Programs for Fiscal Years 2008, 2009, and 2010
, April 2012, p. 71.
148 Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: U.S. Intends to Construct Military Training Center in Batken,” Eurasianet, March 3,
2010; Stratfor, June 25, 2010. The EU also has built or refurbished military training and border facilities in Central
Asia, including in Kyrgyzstan. See The EU’s Border Management Program in Central Asia (BOMCA), at
http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/about.
149 “U.S., Tajik Officials Initiate Construction of Military Training Center,” RFE/RL, July 7, 2011; U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, Solicitation Notice: National Training Center at Karatog, Tajikistan, May 11, 2012, at
http://dushanbe.usembassy.gov/ct_05112012.html.
150 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fact Sheet: The Central
Asia Counternarcotics Initiative (CACI)
, February 21, 2012.
151 Joshua Kucera, “Russia Thwarts U.S. Central Asian Counterdrug Program,” The Bug Pit, Eurasianet, February 18,
2012.
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In addition to the aid reported by the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator of Assistance
to Europe and Eurasia, the Defense Department provides classified and other aid to Central Asia,
such as coalition support payments to Kyrgyzstan, including base lease payments and landing and
overflight fees (see below).152
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in 1999 became responsible for U.S. military
engagement in Central Asia. It cooperates with the European Command (USEUCOM), on the
Caspian Maritime Security Cooperation program (similar to the former Caspian [Sea] Guard
program). In 2008, General Bantz Craddock, then-Commander of USEUCOM, testified that the
Caspian Maritime Security Cooperation program coordinates security assistance provided by U.S.
agencies to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. He stated that U.S. Naval Forces Europe cooperates with
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command “to promote maritime safety and security and maritime
domain awareness in the Caspian Sea.”153 Russia objects to the involvement of non-littoral
countries in Caspian maritime security and has appeared to counter U.S. maritime security aid by
boosting the capabilities of its Caspian Sea Flotilla and by urging the littoral states to coordinate
their naval activities exclusively with Russia.
All the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined NATO’s PFP by mid-1994 (Tajikistan joined
in 2002). Central Asian troops have participated in periodic PFP (or “PFP-style”) exercises in the
United States since 1995, and U.S. troops have participated in exercises in Central Asia since
1997. A June 2004 NATO summit communiqué pledged enhanced Alliance attention to the
countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and the NATO Secretary General appointed a
Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia. Uzbekistan sharply reduced its
participation in PFP after NATO raised concerns that Uzbek security forces had used excessive
and disproportionate force in Andijon (however, it continued to permit Germany to use a base
near Termez). Relations with NATO appeared to improve in 2008-2009 (see below).
Kazakhstan’s progress in military reform enabled NATO in January 2006 to elevate it to
participation in an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). The third phase of the IPAP was
approved in August 2012 and reportedly involves continued training for the peacekeeping
battalion “Kazbat” (Kazakh battalion)and the peacekeeping brigade “Kazbrig” (Kazakh brigade),
including at the PFP Training Center at the Military Institute of the Army in Almaty. Kazakhstan
has stated that it does not plan to join NATO but wants to modernize its armed forces. According
to analyst Roger McDermott, Kazakhstan has chosen to rely on Russia for its national security, so
that its ties with NATO—while the most significant in Central Asia—will remain limited.154
Perhaps an example of Kazakhstan’s use of training from the United States, NATO, and Russia, a
regular NATO PFP “Steppe Eagle” military exercise was held in Kazakhstan in September 2012,

152 Analyst Joshua Kucera has called for the U.S. government to provide more comprehensive information on the level
and type of U.S. security assistance to Central Asia. He also urges greater policy attention to the possible misuse of
security assistance by Central Asian governments, and for more emphasis on developmental and democratization
assistance. See U.S. Military Aid to Central Asia: Who Benefits? Open Society Foundations, September 2012.
153 House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander,
United States European Command
, March 13, 2008. Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention aid to Kazakhstan
was $4 million in FY2005, $5 million in FY2006, and $7 million in FY2007, and $8 million was requested for each of
FY2008 and FY2009. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, FY2008-FY2009 Budget
Estimates: Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction
, February 2007.
154 Roger McDermott, Kazakhstan–Russia: Enduring Eurasian Defense Partners, Danish Institute for International
Studies, 2012.
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involving the Kazbat and Kazbrig, which will be followed by the CSTO Collective Peacekeeping
Forces’ “Unbreakable Brotherhood 2012” exercise in Kazakhstan in October 2012.
According to former USCENTCOM Commander Admiral William Fallon, the Bagram airbase in
Afghanistan is the Forward Operating Site (basing intended for rotational use by operating forces
with limited U.S. military support presence and possibly pre-positioned equipment) for access to
and operations in Central Asia.155
Closure of the Karshi-Khanabad Airbase
On July 5, 2005, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed a declaration
issued during a meeting of the SCO (see above, “Obstacles to Peace and Independence:
Regional Tensions and Conflicts”) that stated that “as large-scale military operations against
terrorism have come to an end in Afghanistan, the SCO member states maintain that the relevant
parties to the anti-terrorist coalition should set a deadline for the temporary use of ...
infrastructure facilities of the SCO member states and for their military presence in these
countries.”156 Despite this declaration, none of the Central Asian leaders immediately called for
closing the coalition bases. However, after the United States and others interceded so that
refugees who fled from Andijon to Kyrgyzstan could fly to Romania, Uzbekistan on July 29
demanded that the United States vacate K2 within six months. On November 21, 2005, the United
States officially ceased operations to support Afghanistan at K2. Perhaps indicative of the reversal
of U.S. military-to-military and other ties, former pro-U.S. defense minister Qodir Gulomov was
convicted of treason and received seven years in prison, later suspended. Many K2 activities
shifted to the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. Some observers viewed the closure of K2 and souring
U.S.-Uzbek relations as setbacks to U.S. influence in the region and as gains for Russian and
Chinese influence. Others suggested that U.S. ties with other regional states provided continuing
influence and that U.S. criticism of human rights abuses might pay future dividends among
regional populations.157
Efforts to Improve Security Relations
Appearing to signal improving U.S.-Uzbek relations, in early 2008 Uzbekistan permitted U.S.
military personnel under NATO command, on a case-by-case basis, to transit through an airbase
near the town of Termez that it has permitted Germany to operate.158 President Karimov attended
the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, in early April 2008 and stated that Uzbekistan was
ready to discuss the transit of nonlethal goods and equipment by NATO through Uzbekistan to
Afghanistan. He announced in May 2009 that the United States and NATO had been permitted to
use the Navoi airport (located between Samarkand and Bukhara in east-central Uzbekistan) for
transporting nonlethal supplies to Afghanistan.

155 House of Representatives. Appropriations Committee. Subcommittee on Military Construction. Statement of
Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander, U.S. Central Command, on Military Construction in U.S. Central Command
,
April 17, 2007.
156 CEDR, July 5, 2005, Doc. No. CPP-249.
157 For further information, see CRS Report RS22295, Uzbekistan's Closure of the Airbase at Karshi-Khanabad:
Context and Implications
, by Jim Nichol.
158 “U.S. Military Returns to Ex-Soviet Uzbekistan,” Agence France Presse, March 6, 2008; “Only Germany Can Use
Uzbek Bases Now,” United Press International, December 13, 2005.
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Representing the Obama Administration, Under Secretary of State William Burns visited
Uzbekistan in early July 2009, and President Karimov assessed his talks with Burns as “positive.”
In August 2009, General David Petraeus traveled to Uzbekistan and signed an accord on boosting
military educational exchanges and training. Reportedly, these visits also resulted in permission
by Uzbekistan for military air overflights of weapons to Afghanistan. Assistant Secretary Blake
visited Uzbekistan in November 2009 and stated that his meetings there were “a reflection of the
determination of President Obama and Secretary Clinton to strengthen ties between the United
States and Uzbekistan.” He proposed that the two countries set up high-level annual consultations
to “build our partnership across a wide range of areas. These include trade and development,
border security, cooperation on narcotics, the development of civil society, and individual
rights.”159
The first Bilateral Consultation meeting took place in late December 2009 with a visit to the
United States by an Uzbek delegation led by Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov. The two sides
drew up a plan for cooperation for 2010 that involved an extensive range of diplomatic visits,
increased military-to-military contacts, and investment and trade overtures, including the
provision of Expanded IMET.160 The second U.S.-Uzbek Bilateral Consultation meeting took
place in February 2011 with a visit to Uzbekistan led by Assistant Secretary Blake. The talks
reportedly included security cooperation, trade and development, science and technology,
counter-narcotics, civil society development, and human rights. A U.S. business delegation
discussed means to increase trade ties. Blake reported that the United States had purchased $23
million in Uzbek goods for transit to Afghanistan in FY2010. The third U.S.-Uzbek Bilateral
Consultation was held in August 2012, and like the second involved a visit to Tashkent by a U.S.
delegation led by Assistant Secretary Blake. He reported that the meeting covered Uzbekistan’s
support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, energy, agriculture, health, parliamentary exchanges,
education, science and technology, counter-narcotics, border security, counter-terrorism, religious
freedom, trafficking in persons, and human rights. At an associated U.S.-Uzbek business forum,
Assistant Secretary of State Blake raised concerns about currency convertibility and contract
sanctity that hamper foreign investment. In a speech in October 2012, Blake stated that because
of Uzbekistan’s poor human rights record, the United States provided it only non-lethal security
assistance.161

159 U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Press Conference of Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs
Robert Blake
, October 14, 2009.
160 CEDR, January 29, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-4019. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) defines
Expanded IMET as a group of courses aimed at “educating U.S. friends and allies in the proper management of their
defense resources, improving their systems of military justice ... and fostering a greater respect for, and understanding
of, the principle of civilian control of the military. The program is based upon the premise that active promotion of
democratic values is one of the most effective means available for achieving U.S. national security and foreign policy
objectives.... For a country whose international military training program is very politically sensitive, the entire IMET
program may consist of Expanded IMET training only.” See DSCA. What is Expanded IMET? At
http://www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/eimet/eimet_default.htm.
161 U.S. Department of State, Press Availability Following the U.S.-Uzbekistan Annual Bilateral Consultations, August
17, 2012; Daniil Kislov, “U.S. Ambassador in Uzbekistan George Krol: ‘We Recognize Democracy May Develop and
Look Differently in Uzbekistan,’” Journal of Turkish Weekly, September 25, 2012; Remarks, Robert O. Blake, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, [at] Indiana University's Inner Asian and Uralic
Natural Resource Center
, October 18, 2012.
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The Manas Airbase/Transit Center
The Manas airbase (since 2009 called the Manas Transit Center; see below) became operational
in December 2001 and uses some facilities of the international airport near Bishkek, the capital of
Kyrgyzstan. According to a fact sheet prepared in early 2009 by the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing
of the U.S. Air Force, the Manas airbase serves as the “premier air mobility hub” for operations in
Afghanistan. Missions include support for personnel and cargo transiting in and out of the theater,
aerial refueling, airlift and airdrop, and medical evacuation. Secretary Clinton was told during her
December 2010 visit to the Manas Transit Center that up to 3,500 troops every day, over 13
million pounds of cargo each month, and 117 million gallons of fuel each year are handled by the
airbase.
In early 2006, Kyrgyz President Bakiyev reportedly requested that lease payments for use of the
Manas airbase be increased to more than $200 million per year but at the same time reaffirmed
Russia’s free use of its nearby base.162 By mid-July 2006, however, the United States and
Kyrgyzstan announced that they had reached a settlement for the continued U.S. use of the
airbase. Although not specifically mentioning U.S. basing payments, it was announced that the
United States would provide $150 million in “total assistance and compensation over the next
year,” subject to congressional approval.
In September 2007, a U.S. military officer stated that the Manas airbase was moving toward “a
sustainment posture,” with the replacement of most tents and the building of aircraft maintenance,
medical, and other facilities.163
On February 3, 2009, then-President Bakiyev announced during a visit to Moscow that he
intended to close the Manas airbase. Many observers speculated that the decision was spurred by
Russia, which offered Bakiyev a $300 million loan for economic development and a $150 million
grant for budget stabilization in the wake of the world economic downturn. Russia also stated that
it would write off most of a $180 million debt. The United States was notified on February 19,
2009, that under the terms of the status of forces agreement it had 180 days to vacate the airbase.
The Manas Transit Center Agreement
The Defense Department announced on June 24, 2009, that an agreement of “mutual benefit” had
been concluded with the Kyrgyz government “to continu[e] to work, with them, to supply our
troops in Afghanistan, so that we can help with the overall security situation in the region.”164 The
agreement was approved by the Kyrgyz legislature and signed into law by then-President
Bakiyev, to take effect on July 14, 2009. According to the then-Kyrgyz foreign minister, the
government decided to conclude the annually renewable “intergovernmental agreement with the
United States on cooperation and the formation of a transit center at Manas airport,” because of
growing alarm about “the worrying situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” The agreement is for
five years and is renewed yearly, unless both parties agree to end it. A yearly rent payment for use

162 Perhaps indicating Kyrgyz pressure on Russia to compensate for use of the base, Russia in October 2006 pledged
grant military assistance to Kyrgyzstan.
163 Lt. Col. Michael Borgert, “Liberandos: Thank You for a Job Well Done,” 376th Expeditionary Services Squadron
Public Affairs, September 9, 2007.
164 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD News Briefing, June 24, 2009. See also U.S. Department of State, Daily Press
Briefing
, June 25, 2009.
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of land and facilities at the Manas airport would be increased from $17.4 million to $60 million
per year and the United States had pledged more than $36 million for infrastructure
improvements and $30 million for air traffic control system upgrades for the airport. The Kyrgyz
foreign minister also stated that the United States had pledged $20 million dollars for a U.S.-
Kyrgyz Joint Development Fund for economic projects, $21 million for counter-narcotics efforts,
and $10 million for counter-terrorism efforts.165 All except the increased rent had already been
appropriated or requested. The agreement also reportedly includes stricter host-country conditions
on U.S. military personnel. One Kyrgyz legislator claimed that the agreement was not a volte-face
for Kyrgyzstan because Russia and other Central Asian states had signed agreements with NATO
to permit the transit of supplies to Afghanistan (see below).166
Kyrgyzstan had also requested that French and Spanish troops who were deployed at Manas had
to leave, and they had pulled out by October 2009. The French detachment (reportedly 35 troops
and a tanker aircraft) moved temporarily to Dushanbe. The Spanish unit (reportedly 60 troops and
two transport aircraft) moved temporarily to Herat, west Afghanistan, and Dushanbe was used
temporarily as a stopover for troop relief flights. France and Spain have since reached accords
with Kyrgyzstan and have returned to Manas.
The Status of the Manas Transit Center After the April 2010 Coup
Initially after the April 2010 ouster of then-President Bakiyev, some officials in the interim
government stated or implied that the conditions of the lease would be examined. Then-acting
Prime Minister Roza Otunbayeva warned on April 8 that questions of corruption involving
commercial supplies for the Manas Transit Center would be one matter of investigation. On April
12, she stated that she realized that 2010 was a seminal year for U.S. operations in Afghanistan
and that President Obama planned on drawing down troops thereafter, and implied that ultimately
she hoped there were no bases in the country.167 On April 13, Otunbayeva announced that the
lease on the Manas Transit Center would be “automatically” renewed for one year. Meeting with
Secretary Clinton on December 2, 2010, Otunbayeva stressed that the Manas Transit Center was a
significant contributor to regional security and that Kyrgyzstan would support its operation at
least through 2014 in line with U.S. Administration objectives for drawing down U.S. forces.168
In March 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visited Bishkek, reportedly to obtain
reassurances about the Kyrgyz government’s basing commitments. In early May 2012, however,
President Atambayev reiterated that the basing accord would not be extended when it came up for
renewal in 2014, an announcement that was hailed by the Russian Foreign Ministry.
The U.S. Embassy in Bishkek has reported that in FY2012, the United States provided $142.1
million in direct, indirect, and charitable expenses in connection with the Manas Transit Center;
$150.6 million in FY2011, $131.5 million in FY2010; and $108 million in FY2009.
Of this FY2012 amount:

165 Tolkun Namatbayeva, “Kyrgyzstan Allows U.S. to Keep Using Base,” Agence France Presse, June 23, 2009.
166 See also CRS Report R40564, Kyrgyzstan and the Status of the U.S. Manas Airbase: Context and Implications, by
Jim Nichol.
167 CEDR, April 12, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-600.
168 U.S. Department of State, Remarks With President Otunbayeva After Their Meeting, Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Secretary of State
, December 2, 2010.
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• $60 million was a lease payment;
• $25.89 million was landing and other fees and leases;
• $60,505 was a contribution to Kyrgyz Aeronavigation;
• $52.23 million was for building renovations and road repairs, for furniture and
other equipment, for supplies and services, and other airport improvements;
• $ 1.89 million was for “programmatic humanitarian assistance”; and
• $2.0 million was for other local spending
The December 2010 Congressional Report on Fuel Contracts
In December 2010, the majority staff of the Subcommittee for National Security and Foreign
Affairs of the House Oversight Committee released a report on contracts awarded by the Defense
Department’s Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to the privately owned Red Star and its sister
Mina firms for the supply of jet fuel for the Manas Transit Center.169 The report stressed that
many citizens of Kyrgyzstan, and even then-Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva, supposed that
former Kyrgyz Presidents Askar Akayev and Bakiyev and their families had benefitted from the
contracts in a corrupt fashion. Perceptions of corruption regarding the fuel contracts, according to
the report, were significant factors in the overthrow of the presidents and in growing tensions
between the United States and Kyrgyzstan. The subcommittee reported evidence from the FBI
that the Akayev family was corruptly involved in fuel supplies to the Manas Transit Center, but
the subcommittee found no direct evidence of illicit involvement by the Bakiyev family. President
Otunbayeva had called for transparency in the fuel contracts in a speech at the U.N. General
Assembly in September 2010 and during an associated meeting with President Barack Obama.
According to the report’s findings, DLA did not know who owned Red Star or Mina until late
2010, did not claim to care whether contract funds were being misappropriated by Akayev’s
family, did not know that Russia’s state-owned Gazprom gas firm had an ownership interest in a
subsidiary of the firms, and did not claim to know that the firms were using false certifications to
obtain fuel from Russia. On the latter issue, Red Star and Mina had repeatedly informed DLA of
the false certifications scheme, according to emails and other documents. In a 2006 Red Star
proposal for a fuel contract, for instance, the firm spelled out that it was participating in a scheme
to circumvent supposed Russian restrictions on fuel exports for military uses, and warned DLA
that opening up the contracting process to other bidders might expose this scheme and lead to a
fuel cut-off by Russia. The 2006 contract was subsequently awarded to Red Star without
competition. A 2009 contract to Mina also was awarded without competition on “national
security” grounds. The subcommittee argued that the use of such a scheme to obtain fuel and
DLA’s apparent lack of reaction to the scheme opened the United States to excessive strategic
vulnerability, since a sudden fuel cutoff by Russia could jeopardize U.S. military operations in
Afghanistan.
Red Star and Mina reported that the Russian government knew that Gazprom was the source of
jet fuel for the Manas Transit Center. The firms claimed, however, that they still had to falsely

169 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs, Mystery at Manas: Strategic Blind Spots in the Department of Defense’s Fuel Contracts
in Kyrgyzstan
, Report of the Majority Staff, December 2010.
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certify that the aviation fuel was being used for civilian purposes so that Russian authorities could
claim that their ban on aviation fuel exports for military uses was not being circumvented. After
then-President Putin apparently decided in early 2009 that the U.S. airbase at Manas should be
closed and offered assistance to Kyrgyzstan as a seeming quid pro quo, Gazprom initiated a
slowdown in fuel shipments, according to the report. Although Kyrgyzstan’s then-President
Bakiyev had pledged to Putin that he would close the airbase, in mid-2009 Bakiyev instead
redesignated it as the “Manas Transit Center” and permitted it to continue operations. Russia then
“discovered” that Gazprom’s fuel shipments were being used by the airbase, imposed a high
export tariff on all fuel exports to Kyrgyzstan on April 1, 2010, and later cut off all fuel shipments
to Kyrgyzstan through Mina and Red Star.
The report also criticized the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek for ignoring the
ramifications of the fuel contracts on U.S.-Kyrgyz relations. Even after Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton became engaged with the issue during her December 2010 visit to Kyrgyzstan (see
below), the embassy reportedly asserted that issues involving the fuel contract were beyond its
concern, according to the report.
Among the recommendations on improving the transparency and due diligence of fuel contracts
for the Manas Transit Center, the subcommittee called for an interagency analysis of the U.S.
military’s “extraordinary reliance on Mina and Red Star for jet fuel” and on the risks associated
with increased Russian influence over the fuel supply chain supporting U.S. operations in
Afghanistan. The subcommittee also stated that “ability to perform and financial viability are
necessary but not sufficient objects of due diligence. Business history, litigation exposure,
insurance posture, affiliated companies, and ownership are also important for U.S. contacting
authorities to understand in order to make competent judgments about contractors.” Knowledge
of ownership, for instance, is needed to satisfy a Federal Acquisition Regulations requirement that
principals be checked against sanctions lists, it stated.
Recent Fuel Contract Developments
In November 2010, DLA awarded Mina a $315 million contract to continue supplying up to 120
million gallons of fuel to the Manas Transit Center for at least one more year. An amendment to
the contract later highlighted by Secretary Clinton during her December 2010 visit to Kyrgyzstan
provided for the possible addition of a second supplier for between 20 and 50% of the fuel.170 The
Kyrgyz government called for the Manas Refueling Complex—established in mid-2010 as a joint
venture between the Kyrgyz government and Gazprom—to be named as the sole supplier and for
Mina to be suspended from the contract. The report by the House Subcommittee raised concerns
about more direct Russian involvement in fuel supplies, since the country has appeared to use its
energy exports as a tool in foreign relations.171
In early February 2011, a U.S.-Kyrgyz agreement on fuel supplies was signed. A few days later,
the Manas Refueling Complex was reincorporated as the Gazpromneft-Aero-Kyrgyzstan joint

170 U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, November 4, 2010.
171 Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Manas Fuel Supplier Doubles Down on Good News,” Eurasianet, November 4, 2010;
Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Is Manas Fuel Contract Award Only the Start, not End of Intrigue?” Eurasianet,
November 5, 2010; Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Manas Fuel Supply Contract to Be Re-Opened?” Eurasianet,
December 22, 2010; Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Manas Fuel Supplier Hitting Back at Bishkek,” Eurasianet, January
4, 2011.
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venture, with Kyrgyzstan as the minority partner (with 49% of the shares). The U.S. Defense
Logistics Agency placed its first order for fuel with Gazpromneft-Aero-Kyrgyzstan on September
26, 2011, to initially supply 20% of the Transit Center’s aviation fuel needs (estimated at up to 12
million gallons per month), potentially reaching 50% or more by the end of the year. According to
one report, the fuel is directly supplied from Gazprom’s oil refineries and transported by the
Russian Transoil company to the transit center.172
On October 26, 2011, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) announced that it had awarded a one-
year contract for 2012 for the provision of fuel to the Manas Transit Center to World Fuel
Services Europe (WFSE), a subsidiary of a U.S.-based firm. Under the contract, WFSE will
cooperate with Gazpromneft-Aero Kyrgyzstan (GAK) to fulfill the aviation fuel needs of the
Transit Center. WFSE is to provide a minimum of 10% of the fuel requirements of the Transit
Center and a maximum of 100%, but GAK may eventually be called upon to provide up to 90%
of the monthly aviation fuel supplies based on its capabilities and performance. The new contract
does not mention any role for Mina Corporation in providing fuel. The U.S. Embassy in Bishkek
stated that the new contract aimed “to ensure a stable, secure, and uninterrupted supply of fuel” to
the Transit Center.173
The U.S. Embassy in Bishkek reported in October 2012 that DLA had provided $208.1 million to
GAK for jet fuel in FY2012. According to some reports, DLA also may have purchased jet fuel
from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, in order to diversify the sources of supply and not rely
exclusively on Russia as a source.174
The Northern Distribution Network to Afghanistan
Because supplies transiting Pakistan to Afghanistan frequently were subject to attacks, General
David Petraeus, the then-Commander of the U.S. Central Command, visited Kazakhstan and
Tajikistan in late January 2009 to negotiate alternative air, rail, road, and water routes for the
commercial shipping of supplies to support NATO and U.S. operations in Afghanistan (he also
visited Kyrgyzstan to discuss airbase issues; see below). To encourage a positive response for this
Northern Distribution Network (NDN), the U.S. embassies in the region announced that the
United States hoped to purchase many nonmilitary goods locally to transport to the troops in
Afghanistan. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan permitted such transit in February 2009, Uzbekistan
permitted it in April 2009, and Kyrgyzstan permitted it in July 2009 (Georgia had given such
permission in 2005, Russia in 2008, and Azerbaijan in March 2009).
There are broadly three land routes: one through the South Caucasus into Central Asia; one from
the Baltic states through Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan; and one from the Baltic states
through Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Although some small cargoes reportedly
were sent along the route on an ad hoc basis in late 2008, a much-publicized rail shipment of
nonlethal supplies entered Afghanistan in late March 2009 after transiting Latvia, Russia,

172 Deidre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Manas Fuel Contract Goes to Kyrgyz-Russian Venture,” Eurasianet, September 27,
2011; CEDR, September 28, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-950073.
173 U.S. Department of State, Embassy of the United States in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Manas Fuel Contract Award,
October 27, 2011; Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: The End of an Era at Manas Air Base,” Eurasianet, October 27, 2011.
174 Joshua Kucera, “Turkmenistan Big Beneficiary Of Pentagon Money, While Uzbekistan Lags,” Eurasianet,
December 3, 2012.
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Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.175 During his confirmation hearing in July 2011 as Commander of
the U.S. Transportation Command, General William Fraser stated that the aim was to boost the
percentage of surface transit through the NDN.176 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
reported in late 2011 that almost three-fourths of the nonlethal surface shipments to Afghanistan
were being transported via the NDN (this amount increased to virtually all surface transport
following Pakistan’s halt to shipments from late November 2011 to early July 2012).177
Supplementing land routes, Uzbekistan’s Navoi airport reportedly is being used to transport
supplies to Afghanistan. After aircraft land at Navoi, the supplies are sent by rail and truck to
Afghanistan.178
In August 2011, shipments began along a 50-mile rail line that was completed from the town of
Hairatan, on Afghanistan’s border with Uzbekistan, to the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in
Afghanistan.179 Reportedly, the bulk of ISAF cargo containers shipped through the NDN
eventually enter Afghanistan via this Uzbekistan-Afghanistan rail link. U.S. Defense Department
officials reportedly long have been concerned that officials in Uzbekistan delay the transit of
freight across the border into Afghanistan until bribes are paid by various commercial shippers.
Among the reported local purchases of supplies as incentives to regional countries to facilitate
NDN shipments are food items, lumber, cement, rebar, corrugated and galvanized steel, and fuel
drums. According to one report, the U.S. military greatly increased its purchases of local supplies
for Afghanistan in FY2012, spending about $1.3 billion, including $820.5 million in
Turkmenistan (presumably for jet fuel and transport). To expand such purchases, the Defense
Logistics Agency reportedly posted liaison officers in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and it planned
to at least match this pace of purchases in FY2013.180
Besides commercial shipping of nonlethal cargoes, the regional governments allegedly have
quietly given U.S. and NATO military aircraft over-flight privileges for the transport of weapons
and troops to Afghanistan. At the July 2009 U.S.-Russia summit, Russia openly announced that it
was permitting such overflights. Some observers suggested that the announcement was linked to
the assertion of some Russian officials that such transport could substitute for U.S. and NATO use
of Manas and other Central Asian airbases. Presidents Obama and Nazarbayev reportedly agreed
in principle to air flights of troops and unspecified equipment, including along a circumpolar

175 “Northern Route Eases Supplies to U.S, forces in Afghanistan,” International Institute of Strategic Studies, August
2010; Steve Geary, “Northern Distribution Network to Shore Up Afghan Supply Chain,” Defense Logistics, June 28,
2010; “Supply Chain Council Recognizes Alternative Afghanistan Distribution Network,” Journal of Transportation,
May 8, 2010.
176 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Confirmation Hearing for William M. Fraser to be Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command, August 2, 2011. See also Subcommittee on Seapower, Hearing on the FY2012 Budget
Request for Strategic Airlift Aircraft, July 13, 2011.
177 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Central Asia And The Transition In Afghanistan: A Majority Staff
Report,
December 19, 2011.
178 A circum-polar air route from the United States transiting Russia and Central Asia to Afghanistan also has begun to
be used. Marcus Weisgerber, “Afghanistan War Spurred Big Changes for Logistics Community,” Federal Times,
September 19, 2011.
179 “Uzbek Corridor of Afghan Supply Plagued by ‘Informal Payments,’” The Times of Central Asia, July 2, 2010;
“Construction of Hairatan-Mazar-e-Sharif Railroad Completed” Uzbekistan Daily, November 16, 2010.
180 Joshua Kucera, “Turkmenistan Big Beneficiary Of Pentagon Money, While Uzbekistan Lags,” Eurasianet,
December 3, 2012. Purchases were reported to be $137.3 million in Kazakhstan, $218.1 million in Kyrgyzstan, $11.7
million in Tajikistan, and $105.9 million in Uzbekistan.
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route transiting Kazakhstan, during their meeting in April 2010, and an air transit agreement was
signed on November 12, 2010.
Most of the Central Asian governments gave permission in 2012 for the egress of supplies and
troops from Afghanistan in line with U.S. and NATO plans to draw down military operations in
Afghanistan by late 2014. Assistant Secretary Blake reported in August 2012 that discussions are
underway within the U.S. government on how much and what types of equipment removed from
Afghanistan might be declared Excess Defense Articles (EDA) and provided to regional
governments. He indicated that the U.S. government probably would not provide Uzbekistan with
lethal EDA (weaponry), but might well provide military vehicles. He suggested that Uzbekistan’s
support for the NDN may have raised the ire of terrorist organizations, so that “it is very much in
our interest to help Uzbekistan defend itself against such attacks.” At the same time, he dismissed
concerns that military assistance provided to Uzbekistan could be misused.181 According to some
observers, Uzbekistan withdrew from the CSTO at least in part in the hope of obtaining funds and
equipment from the United States and NATO during the withdrawal of forces from
Afghanistan.182 One Russian newspaper reported in November 2012 that Russian officials had
offered large military aid packages to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, at least in part to convince these
countries not to accept excess equipment from the United States, which these officials presumed
would come with strings attached, including technical advisory assistance.183
According to one plan discussed by USCENTCOM in late 2012 for the egress from Afghanistan
of rolling stock (equipment with wheels or tracks that is self-propelled or can be towed) or non-
rolling stock (all other equipment), almost one-quarter (500 out of 2,200 containers and vehicles)
may be evacuated by rail or road through Central Asia. The plan envisages that almost one-
quarter of containers and vehicles may be flown to Dubai or Jordan, and that over one-half may
be able to egress through Pakistan.184
In a speech in October 2012, Assistant Secretary Blake claimed that the NDN routes could serve
after the U.S. and NATO drawdown in 2014 in Afghanistan as components of the U.S. “Silk Road
Vision,” of enhanced trade within and between Central and South Asia (see above, “Trade and
Investment”). Some observers have discounted whether the Central Asian states will be willing or
able to adapt their border regimes to permit such free trade.185

181 U.S. Department of State, On-the-Record Briefing With International Media:Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
, August 15, 2012.
182 Karimjan Akhmedov and Evgeniya Usmanova, “Afghanistan Withdrawal: The Pros and Cons of Using the Northern
Distribution Network,” Eurasianet, September 12, 2012.
183 Kommersant, November 6, 2012; Joshua Kucera, “Report: Russia Spending $1.3 Billion To Arm Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan,” Eurasianet, November 7, 2012. Other reasons for the boosted aid reportedly included preparing these
countries for the post-2014 security situation in Afghanistan. Lastly, the boosted aid had been pledged as a quid pro
quo
after both countries had extended military basing leases with Moscow.
184 Joshua Kucera, “U.S. Mapping Out Afghanistan Exit,” Eurasianet, November 21, 2012.
185 U.S. Department of State, Remarks, Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs, [at] Indiana University's Inner Asian and Uralic Natural Resource Center
, October 18, 2012; Graham Lee, The
New Silk Road and the Northern Distribution Network: A Golden Road to Central Asian Trade Reform?
Open Society
Foundations, October 2012; Joshua Kucera, “NDN And The New Silk Road, Together Again,” Eurasianet, October 25,
2012; Joshua Kucera, “U.S. General Says NDN Will Lead To New Silk Road,” Eurasianet, December 1, 2012.
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Weapons of Mass Destruction
Major U.S. security interests have included elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in
Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation
in Central Asia. The United States has tendered aid aimed at bolstering their export and physical
controls over nuclear technology and materials, in part because of concerns that Iran is targeting
these countries.186
After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons power (in reality
Russia controlled these weapons). In December 1993, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement for the “safe and secure” dismantling
of 104 SS-18s, the destruction of silos, and related purposes. All bombers and their air-launched
cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994 (except seven bombers destroyed with U.S.
aid in 1998). The SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994. On April 21, 1995, the last of about 1,040
nuclear warheads had been removed from SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and
Kazakhstan announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. The United States reported that 147 silos
had been destroyed by September 1999. A U.S.-Kazakh Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in Almaty
was set up to facilitate verification and compliance with arms control agreements to prevent the
proliferation of WMD.
Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium mines, milling
facilities, and dozens of radioactive tailing and waste dumps in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Many of these reportedly remain inadequately protected against theft.
Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan have been among the world’s top producers of low-enriched uranium.
Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at Aktau that was the world’s only nuclear desalinization
facility. In 1997 and 1999, U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on decommissioning the Aktau
reactor. Shut down in 1999, it had nearly 300 metric tons of uranium (some highly enriched) and
plutonium (some weapons-grade) spent fuel in storage pools. CTR aid was used to facilitate
transporting 600 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Kazakhstan to the United States in
1994, 2,900 kg of up to 26% enriched nuclear fuel from Aktau to Kazakhstan’s Ulba facility in
2001 (which Ulba converted into less-enriched fuel), and 162.5 lb. of HEU spent fuel from Aktau
to Russia in May 2009. In the latter instance, the material originally had been provided by Russia
to Kazakhstan, and was returned to Russia by rail for storage in a series of four shipments
between December 2008 and May 2009. In November 2010, CTR aid was used to facilitate the
shipment of the last of more than 10 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and three metric tons
of weapons-grade plutonium from Aktau to a newly constructed storage site 1,800 miles away at
the former Semipalatinsk Test Site in East Kazakhstan Region.187

186 A Treaty on the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone entered into force in January 2009. All five Central
Asian states are signatories. The Treaty prohibits the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, or possession
of nuclear explosive devices within the zone. See CRS Report RL31559, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background
and Status
, coordinated by Mary Beth Nikitin.
187 U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Press Release: Joint Statement By Co-
Chairs of the U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership On Successful Completion of the U.S.-Kazakhstan BN-350 Spent
Fuel Program,
November 17, 2010; Press Release: NNSA Secures 775 Nuclear Weapons Worth of Weapons-Grade
Nuclear Material from BN-350 Fast Reactor in Kazakhstan
, November 18, 2010.
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Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities
during the Soviet era. CTR and Energy Department (DOE) funds have been used in Kazakhstan
to dismantle a former anthrax production facility in Stepnogorsk, to remove some strains to the
United States, to secure two other BW sites, and to retrain scientists. CTR funding was used to
dismantle Uzbekistan’s Nukus chemical weapons research facility. CTR aid also was used to
eliminate active anthrax spores at a former CBW test site on an island in the Aral Sea. These latter
two projects were completed in 2002. Other CTR aid helps keep former Uzbek CBW scientists
employed in peaceful research. Uzbekistan has continued to cooperate with the Departments of
Defense and Energy—even after it restricted other ties with the United States in 2005—to receive
radiation monitoring equipment and training.
In a joint U.S.-Kazakhstan-Russia statement and other remarks at the nuclear security summit in
Seoul, South Korea, in March 2012, the United States hailed Kazakhstan’s efforts to secure
nuclear materials inherited from the former Soviet Union as guidelines for other global nuclear
non-proliferation efforts.188
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia,
FY1992 to FY2012
(millions of current dollars)
FY1992 thru
Central Asian
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
Country
Budgeteda
Actualb
Estimateb
Kazakhstan 2,050.4
17.57
18.79
Kyrgyzstan 1,221.71
41.36
47.05
Tajikistan 988.57
44.48
45.02
Turkmenistan 351.55
11.01
9.89
Uzbekistan 971.36
11.34
12.94
Regional 130.44


Total 5,714.03
125.76
133.69
As a percentage of
aid to Eurasia
14% 23%
25%
Sources: State Department, Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, Congressional
Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2013, Annex: Regional Programs
, March 2012.
a. Includes funds from the Aid for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) account and Agency budgets.
Excludes some classified coalition support funding.
b. Includes funds from the Aid for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia account (AEECA; now these funds are
part of Economic Support Funds) and other “Function 150” programs. Does not include Defense or Energy
Department funds or funding for exchanges.



188 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and President Nursultan Nazarbayev
of the Republic of Kazakhstan Before Bilateral Meeting
, March 26, 2012; Joint Statement of the Presidents of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America Regarding the Trilateral
Cooperation at the Former Semipalatinsk Test Site
, March 26, 2012.
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Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY1992-FY2001
(millions of current dollars)
Country
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Kazakhstan 20.33 51.47 202.75 138.85 79.32 53.52 75.85 72.60 77.95 80.01
Kyrgyzstan 13.03
108.22 90.36 44.43 63.63 23.85 50.29 61.12 49.73 43.07
Tajikistan
11.61 33.72 45.26 33.71 45.36 14.75 36.57 38.16 38.69 76.48
Turkmenistan 14.71 57.28 22.38 21.82 25.33 6.25 8.94 15.94 10.91 12.57
Uzbekistan
5.62 15.00 34.07 14.44 23.34 30.88 26.84 46.88 39.06 48.33
Regional
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 0.60 7.87 0.00 4.50 7.57
Total
65.3 265.69 394.82 253.25 256.98 129.85 206.36 234.7 220.84 268.03
Source: Derived from U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Europe and Eurasia.
Note: Includes all agencies and accounts.
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY2002-FY2010 (and Totals, FY1992-FY2010)
(millions of current dollars)
Total
(FY1992-
Country
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
FY2010)
Kazakhstan
97.4 97.88 111.00 84.91 81.31 167.55 179.52 220.28 157.90
2,050.4
Kyrgyzstan 94.47 53.85 55.25 55.23 43.44 71.25 71.23
111.74
117.52
1,221.71
Tajikistan 136.34 48.71 53.01 65.69 42.81 49.94 67.33 67.44 82.99
988.57
Turkmenistan 18.93 10.98 10.42 18.94 10.44 19.84 16.83 20.78 28.26
351.55
Uzbekistan 224.14 90.77 84.25 78.28 49.30 35.90 38.33 48.55 37.38
971.36
Regional
13.88 9.99 3.41 5.02 5.43 7.59 6.66
25.71
12.21
130.44
Total
585.16 312.18 317.34 308.07 232.73 352.07 379.9 494.5 436.26
5,714.03
Source: Derived from U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Europe and Eurasia.
Note: Includes all agencies and accounts.
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Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests

Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan

Source: CRS (September 2010).
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Author Contact Information

Jim Nichol

Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289

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