Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
January 12, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33458
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
Summary
U.S. policy toward the Central Asian states has aimed at facilitating their cooperation with U.S.
and NATO stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and their efforts to combat terrorism, proliferation,
and trafficking in arms, drugs, and persons. Other U.S. objectives have included promoting free
markets, democratization, human rights, energy development, and the forging of East-West and
Central Asia-South Asia trade links. Such policies aim to help the states become what various
U.S. administrations have considered to be responsible members of the international community
rather than to degenerate into xenophobic, extremist, and anti-Western regimes that contribute to
wider regional conflict and instability.
Soon after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian
“front-line” states offered over-flight and other support for coalition anti-terrorism operations in
Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition troops and provided access
to airbases. In 2003, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also endorsed coalition military action in Iraq.
About two dozen Kazakhstani troops served in Iraq until late 2008. Uzbekistan rescinded U.S.
basing rights in 2005 after the United States criticized the reported killing of civilians in the town
of Andijon. In early 2009, Kyrgyzstan ordered a U.S. base in that country to close, allegedly
because of Russian inducements and U.S. reluctance to meet Kyrgyz requests for greatly
increased lease payments. An agreement on continued U.S. use of the Manas Transit Center was
reached in June 2009. In 2009, most of the regional states also agreed to become part of a
Northern Distribution Network for the transport of U.S. and NATO supplies to Afghanistan. The
status of the Manas Transit Center was in doubt after an April 2010 coup in Kyrgyzstan, but the
new leadership soon stated that the Manas Transit Center arrangement would remain in place.
Policymakers have tailored U.S. policy in Central Asia to the varying characteristics of these
states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan have included securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear and
biological weapons materials and facilities. U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas
development in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and successive administrations have backed
diverse export routes to the West for these resources. U.S. policy toward Kyrgyzstan has long
included support for its civil society. In Tajikistan, the United States pledged to assist in its
economic reconstruction following that country’s 1992-1997 civil war. U.S. relations with
Uzbekistan—the most populous state in the heart of the region—were cool after 2005, but
recently have improved. Since the 2008 global economic downturn, more U.S. humanitarian,
health, and education assistance has been provided to hard-struck Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Congress has been at the forefront in advocating increased U.S. ties with Central Asia, and in
providing backing for the region for the transit of equipment and supplies for U.S.-led
stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Congress has pursued these goals through hearings and
legislation on humanitarian, economic, and democratization assistance, security issues, and
human rights. During the first session, the 112th Congress may review assistance for bolstering
regional border and customs controls and other safeguards to prevent the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), combating trafficking in persons and drugs, encouraging regional
integration with South Asia and Europe, advancing energy security, and countering terrorism.
Support for these goals also has been viewed as contributing to stabilization and reconstruction
operations by the United States and NATO in Afghanistan. For several years, Congress has placed
conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—because of concerns about human rights
abuses and lagging democratization—which have affected some U.S. security ties. Congress will
continue to consider how to balance these varied U.S. interests in the region.
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Contents
Most Recent Developments......................................................................................................... 1
Historical Background ................................................................................................................ 1
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns .............................................................................................. 2
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan ...................................................................................... 5
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom..................................................................................... 6
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations ............................................................................................. 6
Russia’s Role ........................................................................................................................ 8
Obstacles to Peace and Independence: Regional Tensions and Conflicts .................................... 10
The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan ................................................................................ 12
The Incursions into Kyrgyzstan ........................................................................................... 12
Attacks in Uzbekistan ......................................................................................................... 12
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan.................................................................... 13
The Summer 2009 Suicide Bombings and Attacks in Uzbekistan................................... 14
The 2010 Ethnic Clashes in Kyrgyzstan .............................................................................. 15
The 2010 Attacks in Tajikistan ............................................................................................ 16
U.S. Designation of the IMU and IJU as Terrorist Organizations ......................................... 17
Democratization and Human Rights .......................................................................................... 18
Recent Developments in Kyrgyzstan ................................................................................... 19
Human Rights ..................................................................................................................... 21
Kazakhstan and the Presidency of the OSCE ....................................................................... 24
Security and Arms Control ........................................................................................................ 26
Programs and Assistance ..................................................................................................... 27
Closure of the Karshi-Khanabad Airbase ............................................................................. 30
Efforts to Improve Security Relations............................................................................ 30
The Manas Airbase/Transit Center....................................................................................... 31
The Manas Transit Center Agreement............................................................................ 32
The Status of the Manas Transit Center After the April 2010 Coup ................................ 33
The December 2010 Congressional Report on Fuel Contracts........................................ 34
The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to Afghanistan.................................................. 35
Weapons of Mass Destruction ............................................................................................. 37
Trade and Investment ................................................................................................................ 38
Energy Resources................................................................................................................ 40
Kazakhstan’s Oil and Gas.............................................................................................. 42
Turkmenistan’s Gas....................................................................................................... 43
Electricity ..................................................................................................................... 45
U.S. Aid Overview.................................................................................................................... 47
Congressional Conditions on Kazakh and Uzbek Aid .......................................................... 48
Legislation ................................................................................................................................ 49
P.L. 111-117 (H.R. 3288) (FY2010)..................................................................................... 49
Figures
Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan........ 51
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Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia, FY1992 to FY2010, and the FY2011
Request .................................................................................................................................. 50
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 52
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Most Recent Developments
In late 2010, over 200,000 supporters of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev reportedly
petitioned the legislature to change the constitution so that he could remain president without an
election until December 2020. The Kazakh legislature quickly approved holding a referendum on
changing the constitution, but on January 6, 2011, President Nazarbayev issued a decree turning
down the motion to hold a national referendum. The legislature may override Nazarbayev’s veto
so the referendum can be held. The U.S. Embassy in Astana, Kazakhstan, called for the existing
constitution to be respected and for Kazakhstan to uphold its commitment to democratization, as
exemplified by its just-concluded chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE).
On January 10, 2011, a Kyrgyz commission issued its findings on the causes of the June 2010
violence in southern Kyrgyzstan between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks. The report largely
blamed ethnic Uzbek “extremists” and some supporters of former Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek
Bakiyev for fomenting the violence. The report also blamed interim government officials of
ineptness in dealing with the escalating ethnic tensions. The commission also called for the
government to give an award to Uzbek President Islam Karimov for his country’s efforts to
temporarily shelter ethnic Uzbeks fleeing the fighting (see below, “The 2010 Ethnic Clashes in
Kyrgyzstan”).
After weeks of uncertainty, three winning parties in Kyrgyzstan’s October 2010 legislature
election formed a coalition on December 17, 2010, and agreed on Almazbek Atambayev to be
prime minister. He has pledged to support the U.S. military’s Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan
in carrying out operations in Afghanistan.
At the end of 2010, Tajik authorities reportedly ordered the closure of the only functioning
synagogue, claiming that it had failed to present documents certifying that it had the requisite
number of ten members necessary for registration. Authorities had razed a former synagogue
building in 2008 but another building had been donated to congregants in 2009. Although most
Jews of Tajikistan emigrated following the country’s civil war, some 900 may remain, according
to some sources. The government increasingly constrains non-approved religious expression,
according to some human rights organizations.
Historical Background
Central Asia consists of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; it
borders Russia, China, the Middle East, and South Asia. The major peoples of all but Tajikistan
speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks speak an Iranian language), and most are Sunni Muslims
(some Tajiks are Shiia Muslims). Most are closely related historically and culturally. By the late
19th century, Russian tsars had conquered the last independent khanates and nomadic lands of
Central Asia. By the early 1920s, Soviet power had been imposed; by 1936, five “Soviet Socialist
Republics” had been created. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, they
gained independence.1
1 See CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 97-690,
Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan: Recent
(continued...)
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Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, then-President George H.W. Bush sent
the “FREEDOM Support Act” (FSA) aid authorization to Congress, which was amended and
signed into law in October 1992 (P.L. 102-511). In 1999, congressional concerns led to passage of
the “Silk Road Strategy Act” (P.L. 106-113), which authorized enhanced policy and aid to support
conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and
communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia.
U.S. policymakers and others hold various
Central Asia: Basic Facts
views on the appropriate types and levels of
Total area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India;
U.S. involvement in the region. Some have
Kazakhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000 sq. mi.;
argued that ties with “energy behemoth”
Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan: 190,000 sq. mi.;
Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi.
Kazakhstan are crucial to U.S. interests.2
Others have argued that Uzbekistan is the
Total population: 61.3 million, slightly less than France;
“linchpin” of the region (it is the most
Kazakhstan: 15.5 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 5.5 m.; Tajikistan: 7.5
m.; Turkmenistan: 4.9 m.; Uzbekistan: 27.9 m. (July 2010
populous regional state and is centrally
est., The World Factbook.)
located, shaping the range and scope of
regional cooperation) and should receive the
Total gross domestic product: $319 billion in 2009;
per capita GDP is about $5,200, but there are large
most U.S. attention.
income disparities and relatively large percentages of
people in each country are in poverty. Kazakhstan:
In general, U.S. aid and investment have been
$182.3 b.; Kyrgyzstan: $11.7 b.; Tajikistan: $13.8 b.;
viewed as strengthening the independence of
Turkmenistan: $33.6 b.; Uzbekistan: $77.6 b. (The World
Factbook, purchasing power parity.)
the Central Asian states and forestalling
Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or other efforts to
subvert them. Advocates of such ties have argued that political turmoil and the growth of terrorist
enclaves in Central Asia could produce spillover effects both in nearby states, including U.S.
allies and friends such as Turkey, and worldwide. They also have argued that the United States
has a major interest in preventing terrorist regimes or groups from illicitly acquiring Soviet-era
technology for making weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They have maintained that U.S.
interests do not perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that Turkey and other actors
possess limited aid resources, and that the United States is in the strongest position as the sole
superpower to influence democratization and respect for human rights. They have stressed that
such U.S. influence will help alleviate social tensions exploited by Islamic extremist groups to
(...continued)
Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol, CRS Report 97-1055, Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S.
Interests, by Jim Nichol, and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim
Nichol.
2 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Remarks: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice At Eurasian
National University, October 13, 2005. Perhaps indicative of the boosted emphasis on U.S. interests in Kazakhstan,
former Secretary Rice argued that the country had the potential to be the “engine for growth” in Central Asia. More
recently, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake stated in November 2010 that “our relations with Kazakhstan are
perhaps our deepest and broadest in Central Asia.” U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, Hearing on the Emerging Importance of the U.S.-
Central Asia Partnership, Testimony of Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs, November 17 2010.
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gain adherents. They also have argued that for all these reasons, the United States should maintain
military access to the region even when Afghanistan becomes more stable.3
Some views of policymakers and academics who previously objected to a more forward U.S.
policy toward Central Asia appeared less salient after September 11, 2001—when the United
States came to stress counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan—but aspects of these views
could again come to the fore in debates over U.S. security policy in Afghanistan and Central Asia.
These observers argued that the United States historically had few interests in Central Asia and
that developments there remained largely marginal to U.S. interests. They discounted fears that
anti-Western Islamic extremism would make enough headway to threaten secular regimes or
otherwise harm U.S. interests in Central Asia. They also argued that the United States should not
try to foster democratization among cultures they claimed are historically attuned to
authoritarianism. Some observers rejected arguments that U.S. interests in anti-terrorism, non-
proliferation, regional cooperation, and trade outweighed concerns over democratization and
human rights, and urged reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive Central Asian states. A few
observers pointed to instability in the region as a reason to eschew deeper U.S. involvement such
as military access that could needlessly place more U.S. personnel and citizens in danger.
The Obama Administration has listed five objectives of what it terms an enhanced U.S.
engagement policy in Central Asia:
1. to maximize the cooperation of the states of the region with coalition counter-
terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan (particularly cooperation on hosting
U.S. and NATO airbases and on the transit of troops and supplies to Afghanistan
along the “Northern Distribution Network”; see below);
2. to increase the development and diversification of the region’s energy resources
and supply routes;
3. to promote the eventual emergence of good governance and respect for human
rights;
4. to foster competitive market economies; and
5. to increase the capacity of the states to govern themselves, and in particular to
prevent state failure in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, including by enhancing food
security assistance.
Signs of this enhanced engagement include the establishment of high-level Annual Bilateral
Consultations (ABCs) with each of the regional states on counter-narcotics, counter- terrorism,
democratic reform, rule of law, human rights, trade, investment, health, and education. According
to Assistant Secretary Blake, the first round of ABCs took place in late 2009-2010 in all the
regional states except Kyrgyzstan (because of instability there; see below) and the 2nd round will
commence in early 2011.4
3 At least some of these views seemed to be reflected in the former Bush Administration’s 2006 National Security
Strategy of the United States, which proclaimed that “Central Asia is an enduring priority for our foreign policy.” The
Obama Administration’s May 2010 National Security Strategy does not specifically mention Central Asia or the
Caspian region. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, March 16, 2006, p. 40; National
Security Strategy, May 2010.
4 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs,
Hearing on Reevaluating U.S. Policy in Central Asia, Testimony of George Krol, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
(continued...)
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In February 2010, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair appeared to characterize the
subsequent April 2010 coup and June 2010 violence in Kyrgyzstan (see below) when he warned
in testimony that “the region’s autocratic leadership, highly personalized politics, weak
institutions, and social inequality make predicting succession politics difficult and increase the
possibility that the process could lead to violence or an increase in anti-US sentiment.” He also
raised concerns that the regional states, “especially Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan,”
might not be able to “manage the challenges if Islamic extremism spreads to the region from
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The risks are compounded by the economic crisis … and by perennial
food and energy shortages in some parts of Central Asia. Competition over water, cultivable land,
and ethnic tensions could serve as sparks for conflict.”5
In July 2010, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake refuted the arguments of critics “that this
Administration is too focused on the security relationship with [Central Asian] countries and
forgets about human rights,” He stated that human rights and civil society issues “will remain an
essential part of our dialogue equal in importance to our discussion on security issues,” He also
rejected criticism that the Administration “was too interested in maintaining the Transit Center at
Manas International Airport in Kyrgyzstan and refused to criticize the Bakiyev regime on its
human rights performance,” asserting that “we … never spurned meeting with the then opposition
in Bishkek or in Washington.”6
In September 2010, Assistant Secretary Blake stressed that closer U.S.-Russia ties were
facilitating U.S. engagement in Central Asia, and stated that “we want to not only build on that
progress with respect to our relations in Kyrgyzstan, but also to look at other ways that the United
States and Russia can cooperate in the region.”7 Other observers have disputed this
characterization in regard to Kyrgyzstan, arguing that Russia and the United States disagreed
about the significance of democratic elections there.8
In testimony in November 2011, Assistant Secretary Blake appeared to emphasize U.S. security
interests when he stated that “Central Asia plays a vital role in our Afghanistan strategy…. A
stable future for Afghanistan depends on the continued assistance of its Central Asian neighbors,
just as a stable, prosperous future for the Central Asian states depends on bringing peace, stability
and prosperity to Afghanistan.” He also discussed the other four U.S. goals of “increased U.S.
engagement” in the region. Appearing at the same hearing as Blake, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense Robert Sedney stated that “from the Department of Defense perspective … our focus
is on the support for the effort in Afghanistan, but that is accompanied by the longer-term security
(...continued)
Bureau of South And Central Asian Affairs, December 15, 2009; U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, Hearing on the Emerging Importance of the
U.S.-Central Asia Partnership, Testimony of Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central
Asian Affairs, November 17 2010.
5 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, Statement of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 2, 2010.
6 U.S. Department of State, Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S.
Policy Towards Central Asia, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, July 30, 2010. For criticism of warming U.S.-Uzbek
ties, see Joshua Kucera, “The US and its ‘Friendly’ Dictator,” Eurasianet, November 14, 2010.
7 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, On-the-Record Briefing: Assistant Secretary for South and
Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake on Developments in Central Asia, September 22, 2010.
8 Joshua Kucera, “State Department Touts Russia Reset’s Positive Role in Central Asia,” Eurasianet, September 23,
2010.
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assistance projects, including a variety of training efforts in areas from counterterrorism to
counternarcotics that are building capabilities in those countries that are important for reasons
well beyond Afghanistan.” 9
Among recent contacts between President Obama and Central Asian leaders, the President met on
April 11, 2010, with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev on the sidelines of the Nuclear
Security Summit in Washington, DC. A joint statement reported that they “pledged to intensify
bilateral cooperation to promote nuclear safety and non-proliferation, regional stability in Central
Asia, economic prosperity, and universal values.” President Obama encouraged Kazakhstan to
fully implement its 2009-2012 National Human Rights Action Plan. President Nazarbayev agreed
to facilitate U.S. military air flights along a new trans-polar route that transits Kazakhstan to
Afghanistan, and President Obama praised Kazakh assistance to Afghanistan.10
On September 28, 2010, President Obama met with Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva on the
sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly’s opening autumn session. He praised “President
Otunbayeva’s courageous efforts to rebuild democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan,” and thanked
her for Kyrgyzstan’s support for Afghan stabilization. He urged her to support an international
investigation of the June 2010 ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan and to approve the
deployment of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) police advisory
group as steps to prevent the renewal of ethnic violence.11
Secretary Clinton visited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in early December 2010. In
Kazakhstan, she participated in the OSCE Summit (see below, “Kazakhstan and the Presidency of
the OSCE”). She also met briefly with Tajik President Rahmon and Turkmen President
Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov on the sidelines of the Astana Summit. In Uzbekistan, she signed
an accord on scientific cooperation as one means, she explained, to further U.S. engagement with
the country. According to some reports, on January 11, 2011, Vice President Joe Biden visited
Uzbekistan in transit to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan
After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, then-Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State B. Lynn Pascoe testified that the former Bush Administration realized that “it
was critical to the national interests of the United States that we greatly enhance our relations
with the five Central Asian countries” to prevent them from becoming harbors for terrorism.12 All
the Central Asian states soon offered overflight and other assistance to U.S.-led anti-terrorism
coalition operations in Afghanistan. The states were predisposed to welcome such operations.
9 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global
Environment, Hearing on the Emerging Importance of the U.S.-Central Asia Partnership, Testimony of Robert O.
Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, and Testimony of Robert Sedney, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense, November 17 2010.
10 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement on the meeting between President Obama and
Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev April 11, 2010.
11 U.S. Embassy, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Read-out of President Obama's Meeting with Kyrgyzstani President Roza
Otunbayeva, September 28, 2010.
12 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus, The U.S. Role
in Central Asia. Testimony of B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, June 27,
2002.
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Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had long supported the Afghan Northern Alliance’s combat against the
Taliban, and all the Central Asian states feared Afghanistan as a base for terrorism, crime, and
drug trafficking (even Turkmenistan, which tried to reach some accommodation with the Taliban).
In 2005, however, Uzbekistan rescinded its basing agreement with the United States. Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan have maintained their basing support for NATO peacekeeping operations, and
Kyrgyzstan for U.S. and NATO operations, in Afghanistan. In 2009, most Central Asian states
agreed to facilitate the air and land transport of U.S. and NATO non-lethal (and later of lethal)
supplies to Afghanistan as an alternative to land transport via increasingly volatile Pakistan (see
“Security and Arms Control” below). They also have provided aid and increased trade and
transport links with Afghanistan.
In October 2010, Kazakh President Nazarbayev announced that the country would send some
officers to ISAF headquarters in Afghanistan.
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were the only Central Asian state that joined the “coalition of the
willing” in 2003 that endorsed U.S.-led coalition military operations in Iraq. Uzbekistan
subsequently decided not to send troops to Iraq. In August 2003, Kazakhstan deployed some two
dozen troops to Iraq who served under Polish command and carried out water-purification,
demining, and medical activities. They pulled out in late 2008.
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible members of the
international community, supporting integrative goals through bilateral aid and through
coordination with other aid donors. The stated policy goal is to discourage radical anti-democratic
regimes and terrorist groups from gaining influence. All the Central Asian leaders publicly
embrace Islam but display hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have
established some trade and aid ties with Iran. Some observers argue that, in the longer run, their
foreign policies may not be anti-Western but may more closely reflect some concerns of other
Islamic states. Some Western organizational ties with the region have suffered in recent years, in
particular those of the OSCE, which has been criticized by some Central Asian governments for
advocating democratization and respect for human rights.13 Despite this criticism, President
Nazarbayev successfully pushed for Kazakhstan to hold the presidency of the OSCE (see below).
The State Department in 2006 included Central Asia in a revamped Bureau of South and Central
Asian Affairs. According to former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Steven Mann,
“institutions such as NATO and the OSCE will continue to draw the nations of Central Asia closer
to Europe and the United States,” but the United States also will encourage the states to develop
“new ties and synergies with nations to the south,” such as Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan.14
13 See also CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
14 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central
Asia, Assessing Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia, Testimony of Steven Mann, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, July 25, 2006. The State Department appointed a Senior Advisor on
Regional Integration in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Robert Deutsch, who focused on bolstering
trade and transport ties between South and Central Asia.
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Other observers, however, criticized the move, arguing that it threatened to deemphasize efforts to
integrate the region into European institutions.15 In May 2007, Defense Secretary Robert Gates
urged Asian countries to provide Central Asia with road and rail, telecommunications, and
electricity generation and distribution aid to link the region with Asia; to help it combat terrorism
and narcotics trafficking; to send technical advisors to ministries to promote political and
economic reforms; to offer more military trainers, peacekeepers, and advisors for defense
reforms; and to more actively integrate the regional states into “the Asian security structure.”16
(See “Trade and Investment,” below.)
The European Union (EU) has become more interested in Central Asia in recent years as the
region has become more of a security threat as an originator and transit zone for drugs, weapons
of mass destruction, refugees, and persons smuggled for prostitution or labor. Russia’s cutoff of
gas supplies to Ukraine in early 2006 and 2009 also bolstered EU interest in Central Asia as an
alternative supplier of oil and gas. Such interests contributed to the launch of a Strategy Paper for
assistance for 2002-2006 and a follow-on for 2007-2013 (see below), and the EU’s appointment
of a Special Representative to the region. The EU has implemented Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements (PCAs, which set forth political, economic, and trade relations) with Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. An existing Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE)
program was supplemented in 2004 and 2006 by a Baku Energy Initiative and Astana Energy
Ministerial Declaration to diversify energy supplies. One project involves the proposed Nabucco
pipeline, which could transport Caspian region gas to Austria (see “Energy Resources,” below).17
In June 2007, the EU approved a new “Central Asian strategy” for enhanced aid and relations for
2007-2013. It calls for establishing offices in each regional state and assistance of $1 billion over
the next five years. The strategy argues that the EU ties with the region need to be enhanced
because EU enlargement and EU relations with the South Caucasus and Black Sea states bring it
to Central Asia’s borders. The strategy also stresses that “the dependency of the EU on external
energy sources and the need for a diversified energy supply policy in order to increase energy
security open further perspectives for cooperation between the EU and Central Asia,” and that the
“EU will conduct an enhanced regular energy dialogue” with the states.18 Under the strategy, the
EU holds dozens of meetings and seminars each year with the Central Asian states on such issues
as human rights, civil society development, foreign policy and assistance, trade and investment,
environmental and energy cooperation, and other issues.
In May 2007, the United Nations Secretary General agreed to a request by the Central Asian
states to establish a U.N. Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy, with headquarters in
15 Zeyno Baran, “Energy Supplies in Eurasia and Implications for U.S. Energy Security,” Nixon Center, September 27,
2005.
16 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Documents, International Institute for Strategic Studies -
Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Singapore, June 1, 2007.
17 For details, see CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, by Paul Belkin. See also
European Union, “The EU and the Countries of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea Regions Agree on a Common Energy
Strategy,” Press Release, November 30, 2006, at http://www.inogate.org.
18 European Commission, Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the Period 2007-2013, June 2007;
Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, 11177/07, June 23, 2007, p. 12; European Commission,
External Relations, Joint Progress Report by the Council and the European Commission to the European Council on
the implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy, June 24, 2008; European Commission, External Relations
Directorate, Central Asia DCI Indicative Program 2011 – 2013, September 2010; Into Eurasia: Monitoring The EU’s
Central Asia Strategy, Center For European Policy Studies, February, 2010.
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Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan. The Center, opened on December 10, 2007, was intended to take on
some of the duties of the U.N. Tajikistan Office of Peace-Building, which established after the
Tajik Civil War and was being closed. The Center’s mandate includes monitoring regional threats
and working together and with other regional organizations to facilitate peacemaking and conflict
prevention. Priority concerns include cross-border terrorism, organized crime and drug
trafficking; regional water and energy management; environmental degradation; and stabilization
in Afghanistan.
Russia’s Role
During most of the 1990s, successive U.S. administrations generally viewed a democratizing
Russia as serving as a role model in Central Asia. Despite growing authoritarian tendencies in
Russia during the presidency of Vladimir Putin (2000-2008), the former Bush Administration
emphasized that Russia’s counter-terrorism efforts in the region broadly supported U.S. interests.
At the same time, successive administrations have stressed to Russia that it should not seek to
dominate the region or exclude Western and other involvement. Virtually all U.S. analysts agree
that Russia’s actions should be monitored to ensure that the independence of the Central Asian
states is not vitiated.
Soon after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Russia acquiesced to
increased U.S. and coalition presence in the region for operations against Al Qaeda and its
supporters in Afghanistan. Besides Russia’s own concerns about Islamic extremism in
Afghanistan and Central Asia, it was interested in boosting its economic and other ties to the West
and regaining some influence in Afghanistan. In the later part of the 2000s, however, Russia
appeared to step up efforts to counter U.S. influence in Central Asia by advocating that the states
increase economic and strategic ties with Russia and limit such ties with the United States. This
stance included efforts to persuade Kyrgyzstan to close its U.S. airbase. Such a stance appeared
paradoxical to U.S. officials, since Russia (and China) benefitted from anti-terrorism operations
carried out by U.S. (and NATO) forces in Afghanistan. Closer U.S.-Russia relations that
developed during 2009-2010 appear to have included greater Russian cooperation with U.S. and
NATO stabilization efforts in Afghanistan.
During the 1990s, Russia’s economic decline and demands by Central Asia caused it to reduce its
security presence, a trend that Vladimir Putin appeared determined to reverse during his
presidency (2000-2008). In 1999, Russian border guards were largely phased out in Kyrgyzstan,
the last Russian military advisors left Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the
Collective Security Treaty (CST; see below) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
in part because the treaty members failed to help Uzbekistan meet the growing Taliban threat in
Afghanistan, according to Uzbek President Islam Karimov.
Despite these moves, Russia appeared determined to maintain a military presence in Tajikistan. It
has retained from the Soviet period the 201st motorized infantry division of about 5,500 troops
subordinate to Russia’s Volga-Ural Military District. Some Russian officers reportedly help
oversee these troops, many or most of whom are ethnic Tajik noncommissioned officers and
soldiers. Thousands of Tajik Frontier Force border guards receive support as necessary from the
201st division.19 Russia’s efforts to formalize a basing agreement with Tajikistan dragged on for
19 The Military Balance 2010, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, February 3, 2010. Besides this
border security assistance, the OSCE established a Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe in May 2009 to train
(continued...)
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years, as Tajikistan endeavored to charge rent and assert its sovereignty. In October 2004, the
basing agreement was signed, formalizing Russia’s largest military presence abroad, besides its
Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, Tajikistan demanded full control over border policing. Russia
announced in June 2005 that it had handed over the last guard-house along the Afghan-Tajik
border to Tajik troops. In October 2009, visiting President Rahmon reportedly urged President
Medvedev to pay rent on Russia’s base facilities in Tajikistan, but Moscow only agreed to
consider the issue when the current basing agreement comes up for renewal in 2014.
In a seeming shift toward a more activist role in Central Asia, in April 2000, Russia called for the
signatories of the CST to approve the creation of rapid reaction forces to combat terrorism and
hinted that such forces might launch preemptive strikes on Afghan terrorist bases. These hints
elicited U.S. calls for Russia to exercise restraint. Presidents Clinton and Putin agreed in 2000 to
set up a working group to examine Afghan-related terrorism (this working group later broadened
its discussions to other counter-terrorism cooperation; it has continued to meet under the Obama
Administration). CST members agreed in 2001 to set up the Central Asian rapid reaction force
headquartered in Kyrgyzstan, with Russia’s troops in Tajikistan comprising most of the force (this
small force of 3,000 to 5,000 troops has held exercises and supposedly is dedicated to border
protection; in 2009 it was supplemented by a larger 20,000-troop rapid reaction force with a
supposedly wider mission).20 CIS members in 2001 also approved setting up an Anti-Terrorism
Center (ATC) in Moscow, with a branch in Kyrgyzstan, giving Russia influence over regional
intelligence gathering.
Perhaps as a result of the establishment of a U.S. airbase in Kyrgyzstan after the September 11,
2001, attacks (see “The Manas Airbase” below), Russia in September 2003 signed a 15-year
military basing accord with Kyrgyzstan providing access to the Kant airfield, near Kyrgyzstan’s
capital of Bishkek. The base is a few miles from the U.S.-led coalition’s airbase. Russia attempted
to entice Kyrgyzstan in early 2009 to close the Manas airbase by offering the country hundreds of
millions of dollars in grants and loans. However, after Kyrgyzstan agreed to continued U.S. use of
the airbase in mid-2009 as a transit center, Russia reneged on some of this funding and requested
that Kyrgyzstan grant Moscow rights to another airbase near Uzbekistan’s border. Uzbekistan
denounced this plan, and it appeared to be put on hold. With the U.S.-Russia “reset” of relations,
Russia’s opposition to the continued operation of the Manas Transit Center seemingly has
changed.
Besides Russia’s military presence in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Russia’s 2009 National Security
Strategy called for the country to play a dominant role in Caspian basin security. Russia’s Caspian
Sea Flotilla has been bolstered by troops and equipment in recent years. A security cooperation
agreement signed at a Caspian littoral state summit on November 18, 2010, states that Caspian
basin security is the exclusive preserve of the littoral states. Some observers have viewed this
agreement as reflecting Russia’s objections to the U.S. Caspian Guard program and other
maritime security initiatives (see below, “Security and Arms Control”).21
Taking advantage of Uzbekistan’s souring relations with many Western countries in 2005 (see
below, “The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan”), Russia signed a Treaty on Allied Relations
(...continued)
officers from OSCE member and partner countries, including Afghanistan.
20 CEDR, February 25, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950282.
21 CEDR, November 19, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-4002.
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with Uzbekistan in November 2005 that calls for mutual defense consultations in the event of a
threat to either party (similar to language in the CST). Uzbekistan rejoined the CST Organization
(CSTO; see below) in June 2006 at a meeting where the member-states also agreed that basing
agreements by any member with a third party had to be approved by all members, in effect
providing supreme veto power to Russia over future basing arrangements. Despite rejoining the
CSTO, Uzbekistan has appeared wary of Russian intentions in the organization, including by
insisting that Tashkent will not participate in the CSTO rapid reaction force established in June
2009.
Many observers suggest that the appreciative attitude of Central Asian states toward the United
States in the early 2000s—for their added security accomplished through U.S.-led actions in
Afghanistan—has declined over time. Reasons may include perceptions that the United States has
not provided adequate security or economic assistance. Also, Russia and China are pledging
security support to the states to get them to forget their pre-September 11, 2001, dissatisfaction
with Russian and Chinese efforts. Russia also encourages the leaders to believe that the United
States backs democratic “revolutions” to replace them. Lastly, Russia has claimed that it can
ensure regional security in the face of the continuing fragile security situation in Afghanistan.
As Russia’s economy improved in the 2000s—as a result of increases in oil and gas prices—
Russia reasserted its economic interests in Central Asia. Russia endeavored to counter Western
business and gain substantial influence over energy resources through participation in joint
ventures and by insisting that pipelines cross Russian territory. After Russia’s economic growth
slowed in 2008 as a result of decreasing oil and gas prices and other shocks associated with the
global economic downturn, it appeared that Russia tried to maintain economic leverage in the
region, including by giving stabilization grants and loans to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In other
areas, such as commodity trade, Russian economic influence has been reduced, although it is still
significant. In contrast, China has appeared to be substantially increasing its aid and trade
activities in the region.22
Obstacles to Peace and Independence:
Regional Tensions and Conflicts
The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups, convoluted borders, and emerging national identities
pose challenges to stability in all the Central Asian states. Emerging national identities accentuate
clan, family, regional, and Islamic self-identifications. Central Asia’s convoluted borders fail to
accurately reflect ethnic distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to regional
tensions. Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries and
Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, they make up almost one-quarter of the population and in Kyrgyzstan
they make up over one-seventh. More ethnic Turkmen reside in Iran and Afghanistan—over 3
million—than in Turkmenistan. Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and 7
million in Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China’s Xinjiang province. The fertile
Ferghana Valley is shared by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The central governments
have struggled to gain control over administrative subunits. Most observers agree that the term
“Central Asia” currently denotes a geographic area more than a region of shared identities and
22 Matt Siegel, “Crisis.... What Crisis? China Spends Big in Central Asia,” Agence France Presse, May 24, 2009.
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aspirations, although it is clear that the land-locked, poverty-stricken, and sparsely populated
region will need more integration in order to develop.
Regional cooperation remains stymied by tensions among the states. Such tensions continue to
exist despite the membership of the states in various cooperation groups such as the CST
Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and NATO’s Partnership
for Peace (PFP). The CST was signed by Russia, Belarus, the South Caucasus countries, and the
Central Asian states (except Turkmenistan) in May 1992 and called for military cooperation and
joint consultations in the event of security threats to any member. At the time to renew the treaty
in 1999, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan formally withdrew. The remaining members
formed the CSTO in late 2002, and a secretariat opened in Moscow at the beginning of 2004.
Through the CSTO, Russia has attempted to involve the members in joint efforts to combat
international terrorism and drug trafficking.23 Neither former Kyrgyz President Akayev nor
former President Bakiyev apparently requested the aid of the CSTO during the coups that
overthrew them (on the latter coup, see below, “Recent Developments in Kyrgyzstan”), and the
CSTO has appeared inactive during other crises in the region. In September 2008, its members
agreed to condemn Georgia’s “aggression” against its breakaway South Ossetia region but
refused a request by Russia to extend diplomatic recognition to South Ossetia and Georgia’s
breakaway region of Abkhazia.
In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed the “Shanghai treaty” with China
pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in 1997 they signed a
follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300-mile former Soviet-Chinese border. China has used the
treaty to pressure the Central Asian states to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting
separatism in China’s Xinjiang province, and to get them to extradite Uighurs fleeing China. In
2001, Uzbekistan joined the group, renamed the SCO, and in 2003 the SCO Regional Anti-
Terrorism Structure (RATS) was set up there. Several military exercises have been held, the most
recent of which was “Peace Mission 2010” in September 2010 in Kazakhstan, which involved
5,000 troops from China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (Uzbekistan declined to
participate).24
In late 2007, the Central Asian states prevailed on the U.N. to set up a Regional Center for
Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) to facilitate diplomatic and other cooperation
to prevent internal and external threats to regional security. UNRCCA is based in Tashkent and is
headed by a special representative of the U.N. secretary-general. UNRCCA’s plan for action for
2009-2011 calls for diplomacy to combat “trans-border illegal networks of weapons, drugs and
crime and terrorism; environmental degradation, conflicting water and border management; and
ongoing instability in Afghanistan.” The plan calls for facilitating common efforts by regional
governments to combat these threats, encouraging the peacemaking efforts of the OSCE, CIS,
SCO, EU and other regional organizations, and monitoring and analyzing the situation in Central
Asia in order to give early warning and make recommendations to the U.N. Secretary General
and regional leaders. The UNRCCA has held several regional conferences on such issues as Aral
Sea desiccation, water-sharing, and Afghanistan. The UNRCCA special representative visited
23 Roger McDermott, Eurasia Insight, August 28, 2002.
24 Roger McDermott, The Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007, Occasional Paper, The Jamestown Foundation,
October 2007; Bruce Pannier, “Unspoken Russian-Chinese Rivalry is Subtext of SCO Summit,” RFE/RL, June 10,
2010.
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Kyrgyzstan several times in the wake of the April 2010 coup to discuss U.N. aid to the interim
government to ensure peace and stability.
The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan
Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward
independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of
nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and groups tried to take power. Kulyabi and Khojenti
regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by
the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced
persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. After the two sides agreed to a cease-fire, the
U.N. Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in
December 1994. In June 1997, Tajik President Rahmon and the late rebel leader Seyed Abdullo
Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Benchmarks of the peace process were largely
met, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000. To encourage the peace process, the United States
initially pledged to help Tajikistan rebuild. Some observers point to events in the city of Andijon
in Uzbekistan (see “The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan” below) as indicating that
conflicts similar to the Tajik Civil War could engulf other regional states where large numbers of
people are disenfranchised and poverty-stricken.
The Incursions into Kyrgyzstan
Several hundred Islamic extremists and others harboring in Tajikistan and Afghanistan first
invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Jama Namanganiy, the co-leader of the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU; see below), headed the largest guerrilla group. They seized
hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a
springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan.25 With Uzbek and Kazakh air and other support, Kyrgyz
forces forced the guerrillas out in October 1999. Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again
invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August 2000. Uzbekistan provided air and other support,
but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000. The
IMU did not invade the region in the summer before September 11, 2001, in part because Osama
bin Laden had secured its aid for a Taliban offensive against the Afghan Northern Alliance.
About a dozen alleged IMU members invaded from Tajikistan in May 2006 but soon were
defeated (some escaped). After this, the Kyrgyz defense minister claimed that the IMU, HT, and
other such groups increasingly menaced national security.
Attacks in Uzbekistan
A series of explosions in Tashkent in February 1999 were among early signs that the Uzbek
government was vulnerable to terrorism. By various reports, the explosions killed 16 to 28 and
wounded 100 to 351 people. The aftermath involved wide-scale arrests of political dissidents and
others deemed by some observers as unlikely conspirators. Karimov in April 1999 accused
25 According to Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, and Svante Cornell, the incursions of the IMU into Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000 were largely driven by efforts to secure drug trafficking routes. Islamic Radicalism in
Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU, Silk Road Paper, July 2006.
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Mohammad Solikh (former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of
masterminding what he termed an assassination plot, along with Tohir Yuldashev (co-leader of the
IMU) and the Taliban. The first trial of 22 suspects in June resulted in six receiving death
sentences. The suspects said in court that they received terrorist training in Afghanistan,
Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia and were led by Solikh, Yuldashev and Namanganiy. In 2000,
Yuldashev and Namanganiy received death sentences in absentia, and Solikh received a 15.5 year
prison sentence. Solikh denied membership in IMU, and he and Yuldashev denied involvement in
the bombings.
On March 28 through April 1, 2004, a series of suicide bombings and other attacks were launched
in Uzbekistan, reportedly killing 47. An obscure Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan (IJG; Jama’at
al-Jihad al-Islami, a breakaway part of the IMU) claimed responsibility.26 In subsequent trials, the
alleged attackers were accused of being members of IJG or of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT; an Islamic
fundamentalist movement ostensibly pledged to peace but banned in Uzbekistan) and of
attempting to overthrow the government. Some defendants testified that they were trained by
Arabs and others at camps in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. They testified that Najmiddin
Kamolitdinovich Jalolov (convicted in absentia in 2000) was the leader of IJG, and linked him to
Taliban head Mohammad Omar, Uighur extremist Abu Mohammad, and Osama bin Laden. On
July 30, 2004, explosions occurred at the U.S. and Israeli embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor-
General’s Office in Tashkent. The IMU and IJG claimed responsibility and stated that the suicide
bombings were aimed against Uzbek and other “apostate” governments.27
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan
Dozens or perhaps hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded on May 13, 2005, after Uzbek
troops fired on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon. The protestors had gathered to
demand the end of a trial of local businessmen charged with belonging to an Islamic terrorist
group. The night before, a group stormed a prison where those on trial were held and released
hundreds of inmates.28 Many freed inmates then joined others in storming government buildings.
President Karimov flew to the city to direct operations, and reportedly had restored order by late
on May 13.29 On July 29, 439 people who had fled from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan were airlifted
to Romania for resettlement processing, after the United States and others raised concerns that
they might be tortured if returned to Uzbekistan.30
26 The IJG changed its name to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in 2005.
27 See also CRS Report RS21818, The 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim
Nichol.
28 There is a great deal of controversy about whether this group contained foreign-trained terrorists or was composed
mainly of the friends and families of the accused. See U.S. Congress. Commission on Security and Cooperation In
Europe. Briefing: The Uzbekistan Crisis. Testimony of Galima Bukharbayeva, Correspondent. Institute for War and
Peace Reporting, June 29, 2005. For a contrasting assessment, see Shirin Akiner, Violence in Andijon, 13 May 2005:
An Independent Assessment, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, July 2005; and AbduMannob Polat, Reassessing Andijan:
The Road to Restoring U.S.-Uzbek Relations, Jamestown Foundation, June 2007.
29 Analyst Adeeb Khalid draws a parallel between the Uzbek government’s actions at Andijon and at a large student
demonstration in Tashkent in January 1992. In the latter case, Karimov allegedly ordered troops to fire on the marchers,
resulting in up to six deaths and two dozen or more injuries. Islam After Communism (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2007), p. 155. See also Reuters, January 17, 1992.
30 See also CRS Report RS22161, Unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan: Context and Implications, by Jim Nichol.
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The United States and others in the international community repeatedly called for an international
inquiry into events in Andijon, which the Uzbek government rejected as violating its sovereignty.
In November 2005, the EU Council approved a visa ban on 12 Uzbek officials it stated were
“directly responsible for the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in Andijon and for
the obstruction of an independent inquiry.” The Council also embargoed exports of “arms,
military equipment, and other equipment that might be used for internal repression.”31 In October
2007 and April 2008, the EU Council suspended the visa ban for six months but left the arms
embargo in place. In October 2008, the EU Council praised what it viewed as some positive
trends in human rights in Uzbekistan and lifted the visa ban, although it left the arms embargo in
place.32 In October 2009, it lifted the arms embargo.
At the first major trial of 15 alleged perpetrators of the Andijon unrest in late 2005, the accused
all confessed and asked for death penalties. They testified that they were members of Akramiya, a
branch of HT launched in 1994 by Akram Yuldashev that allegedly aimed to use force to create a
caliphate in the area of the Fergana Valley located in Uzbekistan. Besides receiving assistance
from HT, Akramiya was alleged to receive financial aid and arms training from the IMU. The
defendants also claimed that the U.S. and Kyrgyz governments helped finance and support their
effort to overthrow the government, and that international media colluded with local human rights
groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in this effort. The U.S. and Kyrgyz
governments denied involvement, and many observers criticized the trial as appearing stage-
managed. Reportedly, 100 or more individuals were arrested and sentenced, including some
Uzbek opposition party members and media and NGO representatives.33 Partly in response, the
U.S. Congress tightened conditions on aid to Uzbekistan.
The Summer 2009 Suicide Bombings and Attacks in Uzbekistan
On May 25-26, 2009, a police checkpoint was attacked on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, attacks took
place in the border town of Khanabad, and four bombings occurred in Andijon in the commercial
district, including at least one by suicide bombers. Several deaths and injuries were alleged,
although reporting was suppressed. Uzbek officials blamed the IMU, although the IJU allegedly
claimed responsibility. President Karimov flew to Andijon on May 31. In late August 2009,
shooting took place in Tashkent that resulted in the deaths of three alleged IMU members and the
apprehension of other group members. The Uzbek government alleged that the group had been
involved in the 1999 explosions and in recent assassinations in Tashkent. In early December
2009, the Andijon regional court reportedly convicted 22 individuals on charges of involvement
in the May 2009 events, and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from five to 18 years.
31 Council of the European Union, Uzbekistan: Council Adopts Restrictive Measures, Press Release 14392/05,
November 14, 2005. U.S. officials argued that the United States already had been limiting military assistance—at
congressional request—because of human rights abuses.
32 Council of the European Union, 2824th General Affairs Council Meeting, Press Release, October 15-16, 2007; 2864th
and 2865th General Affairs and External Relations Council Meetings, Press Release, April 29, 2008; 2897th General
Affairs and External Relations Council Meeting, Press Release, October 13, 2008. Some international human rights
groups protested against a visit by the head of the Uzbek state security service—who had been subject to the visa ban
lifted by the COE—to Germany in late October 2008. He reportedly advised German officials on IJU activities in
Central Asia.
33 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Report from the OSCE/ODIHR Trial
Monitoring in Uzbekistan, April 21, 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Uzbekistan, Comments on the
Report Prepared by the OSCE ODIHR, April 19, 2006.
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The 2010 Ethnic Clashes in Kyrgyzstan
Deep-seated tensions between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan erupted
on June 10-11, 2010. Grievances included perceptions among some ethnic Kyrgyz in the south
that ethnic Uzbeks controlled commerce, discontent among some ethnic Uzbeks that they were
excluded from the political process, and views among many Bakiyev supporters in the south that
ethnic Uzbeks were supporting their opponents. Allegedly, fighting began between rival ethnic-
based gangs at a casino in the city of Osh and quickly escalated, fuelled by rumors of rapes and
other atrocities committed by each side. The fighting over the next few days resulted in an official
death toll of 426 (of which 276 were ethnic Uzbeks and 105 were ethnic Kyrgyz) and over 2,000
injuries. The violence also resulted in an initial wave of 400,000 refugees and IDPs and the
destruction of thousands of homes and businesses in Osh and Jalal-abad. Otunbayeva appealed to
Russia for troops to help end the fighting, but the CSTO, meeting in emergency session on June
14, 2010, agreed to only provide humanitarian assistance. The Kyrgyz interim government
variously blamed Bakiyev’s supporters, Uzbek secessionists, Islamic extremists, and drug
traffickers for fuelling the violence.34 There are some reports that elements of the police and
armed forces in the south defied central authority and were involved in the violence and
subsequent attacks on ethnic Uzbeks.
The Kyrgyz government has formed a commission to analyze the conflict and also requested that
the U.N. and OSCE support forming an international commission. The OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly’s Special Representative for Central Asia, Kimmo Kiljunen, has set up such a
commission.35 After delays, a team of OSCE investigators held its first meeting in mid-October
2010 and began to interview Kyrgyz citizens. The report of the commission, with
recommendations, is planned to be released in early 2011.
Although critical of the Kyrgyz government, Uzbekistan did not intervene militarily or permit its
citizens to enter Kyrgyzstan to join in the June fighting. After some hesitation, the Uzbek
government permitted 90,000 ethnic Uzbeks to settle in temporary camps in Uzbekistan. Virtually
all had returned to Kyrgyzstan by the end of June.36 According to Assistant Secretary of State Eric
Schwartz, “the Government of Uzbekistan acted quickly and constructively in response to the
humanitarian crisis, [and] cooperated closely with U.N. agencies, the International Committee of
the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations. These efforts helped many people in a time
of dire need.”37 While also stating that “Uzbekistan … behaved admirably” by hosting the
refugees, Assistant Secretary Blake has testified that “although there were no reports of force to
promote returns, reports of psychological pressure, monetary incentives, threats of loss of
citizenship, coercion and/or encouragement to participate in the June 27 referendum and concerns
about family members who remained in Kyrgyzstan all may have factored into the rapid
repatriation of those who were displaced.” Presumably, Kyrgyz officials were involved in these
actions.38
34 Bruce Pannier, “Kyrgyzstan: Anatomy of a Conflict,” RFE/RL, July 02, 2010.
35 “Kyrgyz Commission Begins Investigating Ethnic Clashes,” RFE/RL, August 2, 2010; “OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly Supports Kyrgyz Inquiry; UN Response Awaited,” Eurasianet, July 28, 2010.
36 UNHCR, Final Report on UNHCR Emergency Operations in the Republic of Uzbekistan, July 23, 2010.
37 U.S. Department of State, Opening Statement of Assistant Secretary Schwartz, June 29, 2010.
38 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hearing on Instability in Krygyzstan: The International
Response, Testimony by Robert O. Blake, Assistant Secretary Of State For South And Central Asia, July 27, 2010.
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An OSCE informal foreign ministers’ meeting in July 2010 endorsed sending a 52-member police
advisory group for an initial period of four months to help facilitate peace in southern
Kyrgyzstan. It was proposed that the mission could later be extended and another 50 advisors
deployed.39 Concerns about the presence of the OSCE police advisory group from the Osh mayor
and other Kyrgyz ultranationalists delayed its deployment. On November 18, 2010, the OSCE
Permanent Council reached agreement with Kyrgyzstan on an alternative one-year police training
program.
International donors meeting in Bishkek on July 27, 2010 pledged $1.1 billion in grants and loans
to help Kyrgyzstan recover from the June violence. The United States pledged $48.6 million in
addition to FY2010 planned aid of $54 million and FY2011 requested aid of $47 million (see
below, Table 1). In addition, the United States provided $4.1 million in humanitarian assistance to
Kyrgyzstan immediately after the April and June events. Assistant Secretary Blake has reported
that part of the new aid will be used to bolster democratization, including support for the planned
October 2010 parliamentary election.40 Analyst Martha Olcott has warned that the pledged aid
will not be enough to meet the yawning economic challenges of rebuilding and development
faced by the government in the coming year, so that the Kyrgyz people will need to adjust to a
hopefully temporary period of greater austerity. She also has claimed that the discrimination by
ethnic Kyrgyz against ethnic Uzbeks has contributed in some cases to young ethnic Uzbeks being
attracted to Islamic extremism.41
The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has estimated that there are
75,000 people in southern Kyrgyzstan still displaced who need shelter.42 Human Rights Watch
warned in July 2010 that many ethnic Uzbeks wanted to (re)enter Uzbekistan because of
harassment and attacks—allegedly including by some members of Kyrgyz security forces—but
that both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have closed their borders.43 The government of the Osh
Region has reported that about 4% of the population of the region has emigrated to Russia,
Kazakhstan, or other countries since the June violence.
The 2010 Attacks in Tajikistan
In late August 2010, over two dozen individuals sentenced as terrorists escaped from prison in
Dushanbe and launched attacks as they travelled to various regions of the country. Many of these
individuals had been opposition fighters during the Tajik Civil War and had been arrested in
eastern Tajikistan during government sweeps in 2009. In early September 2010, a suicide car
39 OSCE, Press Release, OSCE and Kyrgyzstan Agree on Principles for OSCE Police Advisory Group, July 16, 2010;
OSCE Chairperson Says Presence of Police Advisory Group in Kyrgyzstan will Facilitate Strengthening Trust,
Stability and Order in Country, July 22, 2010.
40 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, United States Announces Additional Support for Kyrgyz
Republic, July 27, 2010; U.S. Embassy, Bishkek, Opening Statement by Daniel Rosenblum, Coordinator of U.S.
Assistance to Europe and Eurasia and Tatiana Gfoeller, U.S. Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic: High-Level Donors
Meeting, “Emergency Response to the Kyrgyz Republic, Reconciliation and Recovery,” July 27, 2010; Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hearing on Instability in Kyrgyzstan: The International Response, Testimony of
Robert O. Blake, July 27, 2010.
41 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hearing on Instability in Krygyzstan: The International
Response, Testimony of Martha Brill Olcott, July 27, 2010.
42 UNHCR, Kyrgyzstan: UNHCR Needs US$23 Million to Shelter, Protect Displaced, July 27, 2010.
43 Kyrgyzstan/Uzbekistan: Governments Should Open Border; With New Abuse Reported, Kyrgyz Government Should
Protect Uzbek Minority, Human Rights Watch, July 20, 2010.
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bombing resulted in over two dozen deaths or injuries among police in the northern city of
Khujand. An obscure terrorist group, Jamaat Ansarullah, supposedly related to the IMU, claimed
responsibility. Some escapees and their allies, allegedly including IMU terrorists, attacked a
military convoy in the Rasht Valley (formerly known as Karategin) east of Dushanbe on
September 19, 2010, reportedly resulting in dozens of deaths and injuries to government forces,
leading to concerns among some observers that Tajikistan was becoming more unstable.
However, the government has claimed in early 2011 that it has stabilized the situation in eastern
Tajikistan. In early January 2011, the Tajik Interior (police) Ministry reported that its forces had
killed former Tajik opposition fighter Alovuddin Davlatov, alias Ali Bedak, the alleged leader of
one major insurgent group. Rumors are that Abdullo Rakhimov, aka Mullo Abdullo—a former
Tajik opposition paramilitary leader who spurned the peace settlement and travelled to
Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he maintained links with al Qaeda and the Taliban—reentered
Tajikistan in 2009 and remains there in 2011.44
U.S. Designation of the IMU and IJU as Terrorist Organizations
In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,
stating that the IMU, aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by Osama bin Laden, resorts to
terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. The “main goal of the
IMU is to topple the current government in Uzbekistan,” the State Department warned, and it
linked the IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. IMU forces assisting the
Taliban and Al Qaeda suffered major losses during coalition actions in Afghanistan, and
Namanganiy was probably killed.45
Former CIA Director Porter Goss testified in March 2005 that the IJG/IJU “has become a more
virulent threat to U.S. interests and local governments.”46 In May 2005, the State Department
designated the IJG/IJU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global
Terrorist, and in June, the U.N. Security Council added the IJG/IJU to its terrorism list.47 In June
2008, Jalolov and his associate Suhayl Fatilloevich Buranov were added to the U.N. 1267
Sanctions Committee’s Consolidated List of individuals and entities associated with bin Laden, al
Qaeda, and the Taliban. Also, the U.S. Treasury Department ordered that any of their assets under
U.S. jurisdiction be frozen and prohibited U.S. citizens from financial dealings with the
terrorists.48
44 Lola Olimova and Nargis Hamrabaeva, “Tajik Authorities Struggle to Quell Militants,” Report News: Central Asia,
Institute for War and Peace Reporting, October 4, 2010; Tilav Rasulzoda and Parvina Khamidova, “New Militant Force
in Tajikistan?” Report News: Central Asia, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, October 21, 2010; CEDR, January
12, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-950136.
45 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, April 2004.
46 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Testimony of the Director of Central Intelligence, The Honorable Porter
J. Goss, March 17, 2005.
47 U.S. Department of State, Press Statement: U.S. Department of State Designates the Islamic Jihad Group Under
Executive Order 13224, May 26, 2005; U.N. Security Council, The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, Press
Release: Security Council Committee Adds One Entity to Al-Qaida Section of Consolidated List, SC/8405, June 3,
2005.
48 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release: Treasury Designates Leadership of the IJU Terrorist Group, June
18, 2008.
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Democratization and Human Rights
A major goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term development of
democratic institutions and respect for human rights. Particularly since September 11, 2001, the
United States has attempted to harmonize its concerns about democratization and human rights in
the region with its interests in regional support for counter-terrorism. According to some
allegations, the former Bush Administration may have sent suspected terrorists in its custody to
Uzbekistan for questioning, a process termed “extraordinary rendition.”49 Although not verifying
such transfers specifically to Uzbekistan, the former Bush Administration stated that it received
diplomatic assurances that transferees would not be tortured. Several citizens of Central Asian
states who were held in U.S. custody at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base have been returned to
their home countries.50
All of the Central Asian leaders have declared that they are committed to democratization.
Despite such pledges, the states have made little progress, according to the State Department.51
During Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed a Charter on
Democratic Partnership that recognized Kazakhstan’s commitments to the rule of law, respect for
human rights, and economic reform. During his December 2001 and September 2006 visits,
Nazarbayev repeated these pledges in joint statements with then-President Bush. In March 2002,
a U.S.-Uzbek Strategic Partnership Declaration was signed pledging Uzbekistan to “intensify the
democratic transformation” and improve freedom of the press. During his December 2002 U.S.
visit, Tajikistan’s President Rahmon pledged to “expand fundamental freedoms and human
rights.”
Despite their pledges to democratize, during the 1990s and early 2000s, almost all the leaders in
Central Asia held onto power by orchestrating extensions of their terms, holding suspect
elections, eliminating possible contenders, and providing emoluments to supporters and relatives
(the exception was the leader of Tajikistan, who had been ousted in the early 1990s during a civil
war). After this long period of leadership stability, President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan was
toppled in a coup in 2005, and President Niyazov of Turkmenistan died in late 2006, marking the
passing of three out of five Soviet-era regional leaders from the scene. Soviet-era leaders
Nazarbayev and Karimov remain in power, and Tajikistan has been headed since the civil war by
Rahmon, the Soviet-era head of a state farm.
Possible scenarios of political futures in Central Asia have ranged from continued rule in most of
the states by elite groups that became ensconced during the Soviet era to violent transitions to
Islamic fundamentalist rule. Relatively peaceful transitions to more or less democratic and
Western-oriented political systems have been considered decreasingly likely by many observers.
49 The New Yorker, February 14, 2005; New York Times, May 1, 2005; New York Times, December 31, 2005;
Representative Edward Markey, Congressional Record, December 13, 2005, p. H11337; European Parliament.
Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transport And Illegal Detention
of Prisoners, Draft Interim Report, 2006/2027(INI), April 24, 2006; and On the Testimony by Craig Murray, Former
British Ambassador, Working Document No. 5, June 1, 2006.
50 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight,
Hearing: City on the Hill or Prison on the Bay? The Mistakes of Guantanamo and the Decline of America’s Image,
May 6, 2008; Hearing: Rendition and the Department of State, June 10, 2008. At least three Tajiks returned to
Tajikistan from Guantanamo were then tried and imprisoned on charges of belonging to al Qaeda or the IMU.
51 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007.
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While some observers warn that Islamic extremism could increase dramatically in the region,
others discount the risk that the existing secular governments soon will be overthrown by Islamic
extremists.52
In the case of the three succession transitions so far, Tajikistan’s resulted in a shift in the Soviet-
era regional/clan elite configuration and some limited inclusion of the Islamic Renaissance Party.
Perhaps worrisome, Tajik President Rahmon has written a “spiritual guide” reminiscent of the one
penned by Turkmenistan’s late authoritarian president, and has given orders on how citizens
should live and dress. In Turkmenistan, it appears that Soviet-era elites have retained power
following Niyazov’s death and have eschewed meaningful democratization. Kyrgyzstan’s
transition appeared to involve the gradual consolidation of influence of southern regional/clan
ethnic Kyrgyz elites linked to Bakiyev until April 2010, when northern regional/clan ethnic
Kyrgyz elites reasserted influence by ousting then-President Bakiyev (see below).
Recent Developments in Kyrgyzstan
After two days of popular unrest in the capital of Bishkek and other cities that appeared to be
linked to rising utility prices and government repression, opposition politicians ousted the
Bakiyev administration on April 8, 2010, and declared an interim government. Roza Otunbayeva,
a former foreign minister and ambassador to the United States, was declared the acting prime
minister. Bakiyev initially fled to his native region in southern Kyrgyzstan but was given refuge
in Belarus on April 19. The interim leadership formed a commission on May 4 to draft a new
constitution to establish a system of governance with greater balance between the legislative and
executive branches. Pro-Bakiyev demonstrators occupied government offices in Batken, Jalal-
abad, and Osh on May 13-14, but after clashes that resulted in at least one death and dozens of
injuries, the interim leadership reestablished control. Renewed clashes took place in Jalal-abad on
May 19 that reportedly resulted in two deaths and dozens of injuries.53 Deep-seated tensions
between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan erupted on June 10-11, 2010
(see above, “The 2010 Ethnic Clashes in Kyrgyzstan”).
Despite the violence, the interim government felt strongly that the country’s stability would be
enhanced by going ahead with a June 27, 2010, referendum on the draft constitution. According
to the government, the turnout was 72% and over 90% approved the draft constitution. A limited
OSCE observer mission reported that vote-counting procedures seemed problematic in the polling
stations visited.54 Although at least some ethnic Uzbeks felt that the draft constitution failed to
protect or enhance their interests, voting was reported to be largely supportive of the draft
constitution, although turnout was lower. Under the law implementing the new constitution,
Otunbayeva was designated the president, although it also was stipulated that she cannot run
when presidential elections are held at the end of 2011. She was sworn in as president on July 3,
2010.
52 Analyst Adeeb Khalid argues that the elites and populations of the regional states still hold many attitudes and follow
many practices imposed during the Soviet period of rule. This “Sovietism” makes it difficult for either Islamic
extremism or democratization to make headway, he suggests. Khalid, p. 193. For a perhaps more troubling view of the
threat of Islamic extremism, see above, “Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns.”
53 CRS Report R41178, The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan and its Aftermath: Context and Implications for U.S.
Interests, by Jim Nichol.
54 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, The Kyrgyz Republic Constitutional Referendum, 27
June 2010: OSCE/ODIHR Limited Referendum Observation Mission Report, June 27, 2010.
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A legislative election was held on October 10, 2010. Twenty-nine political parties participated for
the 120 legislative seats. OSCE monitors reported that the election “constituted a further
consolidation of the democratic process and brought the country closer to meeting its
international commitments on democratic elections.” Morten Høglund, the head of the short-term
OSCE observer mission, stated that ‘this election reflected the will of the people of the Kyrgyz
Republic.” The mission’s preliminary report stated, however, that vote-counting was poorly
organized and that tabulation procedures were not followed properly in half of the polling stations
visited and in one-third of territorial electoral commissions.55 Five parties were determined to
have overcome a 5% vote hurdle to gain seats. The Ata Jurt Party, linked to former Bakiyev
officials and to ultra-nationalists, received the largest percentage of 1.7 million votes, 8.7%, and
28 seats; the Social-Democratic Party (SDP; Otunbayeva’s party) won 7.8% of the vote and 26
seats; the opposition Ar Namys won 7.57% of the vote and 25 seats; the centrist opposition
Respublika won 6.93% of the vote and 23 seats; and the pro-government Ata Mekan won 5.49%
of the vote and 18 seats. About 35% of 1.7 million votes went to parties that did not pass the vote
hurdle to gain seats. Since no one party obtained over one-half of the legislative seats, they
negotiated on forming a ruling coalition.
President Obama hailed the election as demonstrating “important and positive attributes of a
genuine democracy.” Secretary Clinton saluted “the resolve that the President and the people
showed in holding these elections, which were widely applauded as being free, fair, and
legitimate. Countries with a much longer history of elections have not achieved the high quality
of election that was held here in Kyrgyzstan.” Assistant Secretary Blake argued that the “United
States played an active role in facilitating this democratic [election in Kyrgyzstan] through our
assistance programs and grants to the Kyrgyz government and civil society, and our participation
in the election monitoring mission.”56
Respublika and Ata Meken clash on their attitudes toward Russia, with Ata Meken considered
anti-Russian while all other winning parties hold expectations that Russia will help Kyrgyzstan
economically. Russian media strongly criticized Ata Meken during the election campaign,
reportedly reducing the party’s appeal to voters. Some observers raised concerns that Ata Jurt
Party co-head Kamchibek Tashiyev called during the campaign for recreating a strong
presidential form of rule in contravention of the new constitution and for closing the Manas
Transit Center. However, more recently he has averred that the future of the Manas Transit Center
will depend on consultations with U.S. and Russian officials. Ar-Namys head Feliks Kulov also
has called for such consultations, This stance appears to provide a veto to Russia on the issue of
the continued presence of the Manas Transit Center, according to some observers.57
Initially, President Otunbayeva asked the SDP to take the lead in forming a coalition, but this
effort failed when the coalition’s candidate for speaker was not approved by the legislature and
55 OSCE, Kyrgyz Republic: Parliamentary Elections, 10 October 2010, Statement of Preliminary Findings and
Conclusions, October 11, 2010.
56 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Obama on the Parliamentary Elections in
Kyrgyzstan, October 11, 2010; U.S. Department of State, Remarks With President Otunbayeva After Their Meeting,
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, December 2, 2010; U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, Hearing on the Emerging Importance of the
U.S.-Central Asia Partnership, Testimony of Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central
Asian Affairs, November 17 2010.
57 David Trilling, “Kyrgyzstan: Q&A with Ata-Jurt Leader Kamchybek Tashiev,” Eurasianet, October 13, 2010;
CEDR, November 17, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950185.
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the coalition broke up. She then asked Respublika to form a coalition, and on December 17, 2010,
it announced a coalition with the SDP and the Ata Jurt Party, controlling 77 seats out of 120. The
coalition nominated SDP official Almazbek Atambayev as prime minister and he was approved
by 92 votes by the legislature. Ata Jurt official Akhmatbek Keldibekov was approved as speaker,
In a speech to the legislators and other public comments, Atambayev pledged to solidify a
“strategic partnership” with Russia, since the two countries have a “common history,” and to seek
to join the Russia-Kazakh-Belarus customs union. He also called for close relations with the
United States, and pledged not challenge the U.S.-Kyrgyz accord on the Manas airbase, which he
reported extended to 2014.
Human Rights
The NGO Freedom House has included Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan among countries such as
Cuba, Myanmar, North Korea, and Sudan that have the lowest possible ratings on political rights
and civil liberties.58 In all the Central Asian states, adherents of non-favored faiths, missionaries,
and pious Muslims face religious rights abuses, and unfair elections increase political alienation
and violence aimed against the regimes.
Visiting Uzbekistan in June 2010, Assistant Secretary of State Michael Posner stated that “there
are a number of [human rights] fields that the government here has made progress in, such as last
autumn’s decision to allow the Red Cross to visit prisons, its submission to the UN of a human
rights report under Universal Periodic Review, and President Karimov’s encouragement of
strengthening the parliament here and parliamentary exchanges with the U.S. Congress. We also
discussed a wide range of issues and specific cases where we continue to have differences. Those
discussions were respectful, frank and detailed, and I think it’s an indication of the growing
confidence of the relationship that we were able to have these discussions.”59
Attending a meeting of NGO representatives in Astana, Kazakhstan, on November 30, 2010 (on
the eve of the Astana OSCE Summit, see below), Secretary Clinton hailed recent progress by the
Kazakh government in respecting human rights, stating that “this government has made more
progress than any other in the region and has committed itself to continuing that progress.”
However, she also qualified this praise by stating that “I know that there is still much more work
to be done. I know that there are many issues that are not yet satisfying the people about what
should be done in the human rights regime, in the democracy development.” She urged a
“balanced view of Kazakhstan’s human rights status, stating “let us be proud of the positive
success, let us be fair about the criticisms, and let us encourage the changes that will benefit the
people of Kazakhstan in terms of democracy and human rights.”60
Some observers alleged that Kazakhstan continued to commit human rights abuses during its
chairmanship of the OSCE. In September 2010, the Committee to Protect Journalists, a non-
governmental organization, alleged that the Kazakh government had “intensified its repressive
58 The Worst of the Worst: The World’s Most Repressive Societies, Freedom House, September 6, 2006; May 9, 2007;
May 6, 2008; and March 9, 2009.
59 U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Press Conference with Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor Michael Posner, June 18, 2010.
60 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Town Hall on Empowering Civil Society for Central Asia’s
Future, Eurasian University, Astana, Kazakhstan, November 30, 2010.
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practices…. Attacks on the press have continued unabated in this, the year of Kazakhstan’s
chairmanship.”61
In November 2006, the State Department designated Uzbekistan a “country of particular concern”
(CPC) for severe religious and other human rights violations that could lead to U.S. sanctions. In
its most recent report in May 2010, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
(USCIRF) reported that Uzbekistan had made scant efforts to address religious freedom abuses
and should retain its CPC designation. In the case of religious freedom in Turkmenistan, the
USCIRF recommended in its 2010 annual report—as it had since 2000—that Turkmenistan be
designated a CPC.62
On human trafficking, the State Department downgraded Uzbekistan in mid-2006 to “Tier 3”
(designating a source country for human trafficking that did not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking and was not making significant efforts to do so). No
U.S. aid sanctions were reported as a direct result of the Tier 3 designation. In June 2008,
Uzbekistan was found to have made some modest progress in addressing human trafficking
problems, and was upgraded to the “Tier 2 Watch List.” According to the State Department,
Uzbekistan in 2008 adopted an anti-trafficking law and demonstrated modest improvement in its
victim assistance and protection efforts. In June 2010, the State Department reported that
although Uzbekistan was making significant efforts to meet minimum standards for the
elimination of human trafficking, it did not work to eliminate the use of forced child and forced
adult labor in the annual cotton harvest, so would remain on the “Tier 2 Watch List.” In regard to
other Central Asian countries, Tajikistan was downgraded from “Tier 2” to the “Tier 2 Watch
List” in 2008 and remained on the watch list in 2009 and 2010. Although Tajikistan had made
“significant efforts” in 2010 to eliminate trafficking, it continued to be on the “Tier 2 Watch List”
because of continued government complicity in the use of forced adult and child labor to pick
cotton. Kazakhstan was downgraded to the “Tier 2 Watch List” in 2010, even though it was
making significant efforts to eliminate trafficking, because the government did not assist victims
of forced labor and was complicit in the use of forced labor, including to pick cotton.63
In 2009, the U.S. Department of Labor listed all the Central Asian states as countries that use
child labor to pick cotton. This list was meant to inform the choices made by the buying public. In
addition, on July 20, 2010, cotton from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was added to a list that requires
U.S. government contractors purchasing products to certify that they have made a good faith
effort to determine whether forced or indentured child labor was used to produce the cotton.64
Among U.N. actions, the General Assembly in 2003 and 2004 approved resolutions expressing
“grave concern” about human rights abuses in Turkmenistan and urging reforms. The U.N.
61 “CPJ Special Report: Disdaining Press Freedom, Kazakhstan Undermines OSCE,” Committee to Protect Journalists,
September 16, 2010.
62 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report, May 1, 2009 and Annual Report, May 1,
2010. USCIRF first urged that Uzbekistan be designated a CPC in its 2005 Annual Report.
63 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2006, June 2007, June 2008, June 2009, and June
2010. On Uzbekistan, see also Invisible To The World? The Dynamics of Forced Child Labor in the Cotton Sector of
Uzbekistan, The School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2009.
64 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human
Trafficking, The Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, September 3, 2009;
Executive Order 13126, Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor, at
http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/regs/eo13126/main.htm.
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Rapporteur on Torture in early 2003 completed a report that concluded that police and prison
officials in Uzbekistan “systematically” employed torture.65 In late 2005, the U.N. General
Assembly’s Third Committee approved resolutions critical of human rights violations in
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The resolution on Turkmenistan expressed “grave concern” about
political repression, media censorship, religious minority group harassment, and detainee torture.
The resolution on Uzbekistan expressed “grave concern” about violence against civilians in
Andijon and called on the government to permit an international investigation. The Uzbek
representative asserted that the resolution contained no credible facts and ignored Uzbekistan’s
right to defend its constitutional order against terrorists.66 In late 2007, the U.N. Committee
Against Torture stated that it “remained concerned that [in Uzbekistan] there were numerous
reports of abuses in custody, and many deaths, some of which were alleged to have followed
torture or ill-treatment.”67
Amnesty International was among NGOs that submitted petitions to the December 2008 session
of the revamped U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC) alleging ongoing Uzbek human rights
abuses.68 UNHRC also examined human rights in Turkmenistan at this session. On Uzbekistan,
the UNHRC agreed to a report by its working group that called for the government to give
accreditation to major international human rights organizations, adopt legislation to promote
gender equality, modify the criminal code to establish a definition of torture, take measures to
prevent torture, and eliminate forced child labor, among other recommendations. On
Turkmenistan, the UNHRC agreed to a report by its working group that called for the government
to eliminate the use of torture, protect the human rights of journalists and human rights defenders,
ensure greater independence of the judiciary, and ensure that opposition parties are permitted to
participate freely, among other recommendations.69
In recent years, several reporters, human rights activists, and opposition politicians in Kazakhstan
have been killed by motor vehicles under seemingly mysterious conditions. In a new twist,
prominent reporter Tokhniyaz Kuchukov and activist Yevgeniy Zhovtis were given four-year
prison sentences for separate instances in July 2009 of hitting and killing pedestrians. Both
argued that there were extenuating or suspicious circumstances surrounding their accidents and
that their trials were not fair. In Uzbekistan, photographer Umida Ahmedova received a two-year
65 U.N. General Assembly, Resolution: Situation of Human Rights in Turkmenistan, 58/194, December 22, 2003;
Resolution: Situation of Human Rights in Turkmenistan, 59/206, December 20, 2004. U.N. Economic and Social
Council, Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture, Theo van Boven, Report of the
Special Rapporteur Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 2002/38. Addendum: Mission to Uzbekistan,
E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2, annex, February 3, 2003. U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture, Manfred
Nowak, Report by the Special Rapporteur. Addendum: Follow-up to the Recommendations Made by the Special
Rapporteur, E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.2, March 21, 2006.
66 U.N. General Assembly, Third Committee, Draft Resolution: Situation of Human Rights in Turkmenistan,
A/C.3/60/L.46, November 2, 2005; Draft Resolution: Situation of Human Rights in Uzbekistan, A/C.3/60/L.51,
November 2, 2005; Press Release: Third Committee ... Approves Text Expressing Deep Concern over Human Rights
Situation in Uzbekistan, GA/SHC/3843, November 22, 2005.
67 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee Against Torture, Press Release: Committee
Against Torture Concludes Thirty-ninth Session, November 23, 2007.
68 Uzbekistan: Submission to the U.N. Universal Periodic Review Working Group, Amnesty International, July 21,
2008.
69 U.N. General Assembly, UNHRC, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Uzbekistan,
A/HRC/10/83, March 11, 2009; Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Turkmenistan,
A/HRC/10/79, January 6, 2009; Draft Report of the Human Rights Council on its Tenth Session, A/HRC/10/L.11,
March 31, 2009.
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prison sentence in February 2010—but immediately received amnesty—for allegedly “insulting
and slandering the Uzbek people” by taking everyday photographs that embarrassed the
government by showing abject poverty, according to critics of the sentence.
Kazakhstan and the Presidency of the OSCE
The 15th Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE in Madrid in late November 2007 decided that
Kazakhstan would hold the OSCE chairmanship in 2010, the first post-Soviet, Eurasian, Muslim-
majority country to host an OSCE summit. This decision was made despite the appearance in
early November 2007 of the final report of the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR), which assessed Kazakhstan’s August 2007 legislative election as not
meeting OSCE commitments (although the election was considered improved over previous
races). Kazakhstan was among several CIS members that called in 2007 for restricting the scope
of election observation by ODIHR. Also in late October 2007, Kazakh authorities were alleged to
have closed down several independent newspapers and Internet sites.
Kazakhstan’s then-Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin pledged at the Ministerial Meeting that
suggestions made by ODIHR for changes to media, electoral, and political party laws would soon
be examined by the Kazakh legislature. He pledged that amendments to the media law would
include reducing criminal penalties for libel by the media, setting up “media self-regulation
mechanisms” to address libel issues, and easing the registration process for media. He also
promised that the Kazakh government would soon move to increase local self-government. He
assured the OSCE that Kazakhstan “consider[s] the human dimension to be one of the most
important directions of the OSCE activity,” and that in chairing the OSCE, Kazakhstan would
ensure that NGOs are able to participate in OSCE events and that ODIHR’s mandate is preserved.
He argued that Kazakhstan’s chairmanship would be “a powerful catalyst of the reform process
[in Kazakhstan] and an additional confirmation of the rightly chosen path of further liberalization
and openness.”70 Addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE in Astana in June 2008,
President Nazarbayev stated that his country’s preparations for holding the chairmanship included
the elaboration of a blueprint he termed “the path to Europe,” which envisaged Kazakhstan’s
integration into Europe in the areas of energy, transport, technology transfers, education, culture,
and democratization.
Kazakhstan’s progress in meeting these pledges has been mixed, according to most observers. In
early February 2009, President Nazarbayev approved changes to laws on the media, elections,
and political parties. Political parties that did not gain at least 7% of votes cast in an Majlis
election were accorded the right to participate in some legislative affairs; the number of
signatures necessary for registering a party for a Majlis election was reduced from 50,000 to
40,000; and requirements for registering media were eased. Critics termed the changes minor.71
One positive sign was an action by the constitutional court in February 2009 to strike down a
proposed law that would have tightened restrictions on religious freedom. In July 2009, changes
to the media law were signed into law that restricted access to the Internet, barred foreign
broadcasts from “complicat[ing] or support[ing] the nomination or election” of candidates or
parties, and broadly banned media reporting that “interfere[s] with election campaigns,” takes
70 OSCE, 15th Ministerial Council Meeting, Address of Marat Tazhin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, November 29, 2007.
71 An Atmosphere of Quiet Repression: Freedom of Religion, Assembly and Expression in Kazakhstan, Human Rights
Watch, December 2008.
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place during times when campaign news is not allowed, tries to influence election results, or
influences participation in strikes. ODIHR had urged the legislature not to enact the changes.72
Kazakhstan assumed the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) on January 1, 2010. It followed a varied agenda with emphasis on each of the
military/security, democratic/human rights, and economic/environmental “dimensions” or
“baskets” of activity of the OSCE. Kazakhstan stressed that it would emphasize several issues of
concern to Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and Russia, among them: bolstering nuclear disarmament;
continuing the “Corfu Process” dialogue on the future of European security (including discussion
of Russia’s draft European Security Treaty); appointing a Special Representative of the OSCE
Chairman to promote dialogue on protracted conflicts in the former Soviet Union; and supporting
several initiatives regarding Afghanistan. The latter included bolstering cooperation between
NATO and other regional security organizations; supporting better governance, cross-border
trade, and law enforcement; and strengthening counter-narcotics efforts.
At an informal OSCE foreign ministerial meeting in Almaty (Kazakhstan’s largest city) in July
2010, an agreement was reached to hold an OSCE heads of state and government summit on
December 1-2, 2010, in Astana (Kazakhstan’s capital), the first since the Istanbul summit in 1999.
Kazakhstan had strongly urged holding this summit to “modernize” the activities of the OSCE.
The United States earlier had raised concerns about the necessity of holding such a summit, but
received assurances from Kazakhstan and others that a summit would address substantive issues
of U.S. interest.73 At a meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council (the main decision-making body;
it convenes weekly in Vienna) on November 15, 2010, Kazakh Foreign Minister and OSCE
Chairman-in-Office Kanat Saudabayev asserted that Kazakhstan was successfully carrying out
the goals it outlined at the beginning of its chairmanship and that the upcoming summit would
further these goals. He called for the summit to “outline a strategic vision for the development of
a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian community of common and indivisible security and a way of
improving the [OSCE].” Among the summit deliverables, he called for enhancing the OSCE’s
efforts in Afghanistan; bolstering early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms; reaffirming
the rule of law and the role of civil society; promoting cooperation among international security
organizations; and formulating an action plan to update the 1999 Vienna Document (provisions
for confidence and security-building, including the exchange and verification of information on
armed forces, defense policies, and military activities).74
In response to Foreign Minister Saudabayev’s November 15, 2010, speech, Ian Kelly, the U.S.
Ambassador to the OSCE Permanent Council, stated that the United States viewed the upcoming
summit “as an opportunity to revitalize the OSCE in [the military/security, democratic/human
rights, and economic/environmental] dimensions and reinforce the development of the OSCE as a
democratic and cooperative security community.”75 Although Saudabayev had argued that
Kazakhstan had “exceeded” its commitments to the OSCE to uphold democratization and human
rights, the U.S. Mission to the OSCE criticized Kazakhstan’s efforts to exclude some civil society
72 Human Rights in Kazakhstan: Seven Months before the OSCE Chairmanship, Human Rights Watch Memorandum,
Human Rights Watch, May 20, 2009.
73 Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Articles, OSCE 2010 Informal Ministerial: Kazakhstan
Persistence Earns A Summit In Astana, by Winsome Packer, November 1, 2010.
74 OSCE Permanent Council, Countdown to the OSCE Summit: Statement by Mr. Kanat Saudabayev, Chairperson-in-
Office of the OSCE and Secretary of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs, November 15, 2010.
75 United States Mission to the OSCE, Response to Kazakhstani Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev as delivered by
Ambassador Ian Kelly to the Permanent Council, November 15, 2010.
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representatives from a Review Conference held in Warsaw, Poland, on September 30-October 8,
2010, to prepare the agenda for the summit.76 During three Review Conference meetings, the
United States had stressed, in addition to the measures mentioned by Saudabayev, reestablishing
an OSCE Mission in Georgia; empowering ODIHR to better monitor elections; and strengthening
the powers of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, among other measures. At the
same time, the United States reiterated that it did not see the need for new treaties or institutions
to safeguard European Security as urged by Russia.77
According to many observers, the December 1-2, 2010, OSCE Summit accomplished a few of the
goals set by Kazakhstan but fell short on most. Summit participants could not agree on an action
plan, but issued the Astana Commemorative Declaration toward a Security Community. There
appeared to be some progress in bolstering Afghanistan’s security and development and in
reaffirming the centrality of democracy and human rights as core principles. The United States
and Russia clashed over the issue of Georgia’s territorial integrity, including whether Russia had
complied with ceasefire accords, and over Russia’s failure to carry out its pledge to withdraw
troops from Moldova. Lack of progress in resolving the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over the
breakaway Nagorno Karabakh also was mentioned by the United States as a reason the summit
could not agree on an action plan (however, a statement was issued calling for a settlement of the
conflict). Although the summit declaration called for building on the so-called Corfu process to
further European security cooperation, the United States and some other members of the OSCE
had objected to Russia’s call (supported by Kazakhstan) for a new European Security Treaty.
Security and Arms Control
The U.S.-led coalition’s overthrow of the Taliban and routing of Al Qaeda and IMU terrorists in
Afghanistan (termed Operation Enduring Freedom or OEF) increased the security of Central
Asia. According to then-Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch in testimony in June 2002,
“our military relationships with each [Central Asian] nation have matured on a scale not
imaginable prior to September 11th.” Crouch averred that “for the foreseeable future, U.S. defense
and security cooperation in Central Asia must continue to support actions to deter or defeat
terrorist threats” and to build effective armed forces under civilian control.
According to Crouch
• Kyrgyzstan became a “critical regional partner” in OEF, providing basing for
U.S. and coalition forces at Manas (in 2011, the U.S. Air Force reported that
there were 850 U.S. troops and 750 U.S. and host nation civilian employees and
contractors at Manas).
• Uzbekistan provided a base for U.S. operations at Karshi-Khanabad (K2; just
before the 2005 pullout, U.S. troops reportedly numbered less than 900), a base
76 United States Mission to the OSCE, OSCE Review Conference, Vienna, Austria, As delivered by Julie Raschka,
October 25, 2010; Catherine Fitzpatrick, “Turkmen Activists Denied Entry to OSCE Review Conference in Warsaw,”
Eurasianet, October 4, 2010.
77 United States Mission to the OSCE, Opening Plenary Session at the OSCE Review Conference, Vienna, Austria, As
delivered by Dr. Michael Haltzel, U.S. Head of Delegation, OSCE Review Conference, October 18, 2010; Closing
Plenary Session of OSCE Review Conference in Vienna, Austria, As delivered by Dr. Michael Haltzel, October 26,
2010.
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for German units at Termez (in 2010, The Military Balance reported that there
were 163 German troops at Termez), and a land corridor to Afghanistan for
humanitarian aid via the Friendship Bridge at Termez.
• Tajikistan permitted use of its international airport in Dushanbe for refueling
(“gas-and-go”) and hosted a French force (in 2010, The Military Balance
reported that there were 160 French troops based at Dushanbe).
• Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan provided overflight and other support.78
To obtain Uzbekistan’s approval for basing, the 2002 U.S.-Uzbek Strategic Partnership
Declaration included a nonspecific security guarantee. The United States affirmed that “it would
regard with grave concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan’s security and would consult with
Uzbekistan “on an urgent basis” regarding a response. The two states pledged to intensify military
cooperation, including “reequipping the Armed Forces” of Uzbekistan, a pledge that appeared to
be repudiated by Uzbekistan following events in Andijon.
Programs and Assistance
In November 2010, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Sedney testified that “the focus
of the Department of Defense’s efforts in Central Asia today in the short term are the transport of
goods and equipment and personnel through the ground and air lines of communication through
Central Asia…. But beyond our focus on the immediate goals in Afghanistan, we also have long-
term security assistance goals in Central Asia. Our security assistance focuses on the
professionalization of the military, the border guards, counternarcotics forces and
counterterrorism forces.”79 Indicative of these goals, he mentioned that over 1,000 Central Asian
security personnel had been trained at the U.S.-German Marshall Center and that the U.S.
National Guard had provided training in civil-military relations (but not combat training) in
support of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM; see below) throughout Central Asia as part of
the National Guard State Partnership Program, funded by Partnership for Peace and
USCENTCOM appropriations. In regard to the latter program, the Arizona National Guard has
provided training for Kazakh active and reserve forces, interagency partners, and international
non-governmental organizations, the Louisiana National Guard for Uzbek participants, the
Montana National Guard for Kyrgyz participants, the Virginia National Guard for Tajik
participants, and the Nevada National Guard for Turkmen participants.80
Although U.S. security assistance to the region was boosted in the aftermath of 9/11, such aid has
lessened since then as a percentage of all such aid to Eurasia, particularly after aid to Uzbekistan
was cut in FY2004 and subsequent years (see below). Security and law enforcement aid to
Central Asia was 31% ($188 million) of all such aid to Eurasia in FY2002, but had declined to
14% ($203 million) in FY2007. Of all budgeted assistance to Central Asia over the period from
78 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus, Statement of J.D.
Crouch II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, June 27, 2002.
79 .S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global
Environment, Hearing on the Emerging Importance of the U.S.-Central Asia Partnership, Testimony of Robert Sedney,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, November 17 2010.
80 Lt. Col. Gail A. Ross, The National Guard State Partnership Program, USAWC Strategy Research Project, U.S.
Army War College, May 3, 2004; Maj. Colleen M. Kelly, National Guard Bureau – State Partnership Program, Air
Command And Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, April 2006.
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FY1992-FY2008, security and law enforcement aid accounted for a little over one-fifth. Security
and law enforcement programs include Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military
Education and Training (IMET), Excess Defense Articles (EDA), and border security aid to
combat trafficking in drugs, humans, and WMD.
A new Defense Department counter-terrorism train and equip program (created under Section
1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006; P.L. 109-163) provided $20 million
to Kazakhstan in FY2006, $19.2 million in FY2007, and $12.5 million in FY2008 (the latter to
respond to threats in the North Caspian Sea). It also provided $12 million to Kyrgyzstan in
FY2008 and $9.6 million in FY2009. Another new Defense Department program for defense
articles, services, training or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities
(created under Section 1207 of P.L. 109-163) provided $9.9 million to Tajikistan in FY2008.81
In 2010, the Defense Department announced assistance to set up training facilities in Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan. The training center in southern Kyrgyzstan, planned to be built in the Batken
region, was planned to cost $5.5 million. The facility in Tajikistan, to be built near Dushanbe in
2011, was planned to cost $10 million. It was stated that no U.S. troops would be stationed at the
facilities, which were envisaged to bolster regional security by training military personnel to
combat drug-trafficking and terrorism.82 Construction of the Batken facility was reportedly
postponed because of instability in Kyrgyzstan in 2010.
To help counter burgeoning drug trafficking from Afghanistan, war supplementals for FY2005
(P.L. 109-13), FY2006 (P.L. 109-234), FY2008 (P.L. 110-252), and FY2009 (P.L. 111-32) have
provided some assistance to Central Asia. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-
32) provided $52.89 million for combating drug-trafficking in Central Asia.
In addition to the aid reported by the Coordinator’s Office, the Defense Department provides
coalition support payments to Kyrgyzstan, including base lease payments and landing and
overflight fees (see below).
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in 1999 became responsible for U.S. military
engagement in Central Asia. It cooperates with the European Command (USEUCOM), on the
Caspian Maritime Security Cooperation program (similar to the former Caspian [Sea] Guard
program). Gen. Bantz Craddock, Commander of USEUCOM, testified in 2008 that the Caspian
Maritime Security Cooperation program coordinates security assistance provided by U.S.
agencies to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. He stated that U.S. Naval Forces Europe cooperates with
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command “to promote maritime safety and security and maritime
domain awareness in the Caspian Sea.”83 Russia objects to the involvement of non-littoral
81 For background, see CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for
Congress, by Nina M. Serafino, and CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and
Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns, by Nina M. Serafino.
82 Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: U.S. Intends to Construct Military Training Center in Batken,” Eurasianet, March 3,
2010; Stratfor, June 25, 2010. The EU also has built or refurbished military training and border facilities in Central
Asia, including in Kyrgyzstan. See The EU’s Border Management Program in Central Asia (BOMCA), at
http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/about.
83 House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander,
United States European Command, March 13, 2008. Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention aid to Kazakhstan
was $4 million in FY2005, $5 million in FY2006, and $7 million in FY2007, and $8 million was requested for each of
FY2008 and FY2009. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, FY2008-FY2009 Budget
Estimates: Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, February 2007.
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countries in Caspian maritime security and has appeared to counter U.S. maritime security aid by
boosting the capabilities of its Caspian Sea Flotilla and by urging the littoral states to coordinate
their naval activities exclusively with Russia.
All the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined NATO’s PFP by mid-1994 (Tajikistan joined
in 2002). Central Asian troops have participated in periodic PFP (or “PFP-style”) exercises in the
United States since 1995, and U.S. troops have participated in exercises in Central Asia since
1997. A June 2004 NATO summit communique pledged enhanced Alliance attention to the
countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and the NATO Secretary General appointed a
Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia. Uzbekistan sharply reduced its
participation in PFP after NATO raised concerns that Uzbek security forces had used excessive
and disproportionate force in Andijon (however, it continued to permit Germany to use a base at
Termez). Relations with NATO appeared to improve in 2008-2009 (see below).
Kazakhstan’s progress in military reform enabled NATO in January 2006 to elevate it to
participation in an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). Kazakhstan has stated that it does
not plan to join NATO but wants to modernize its armed forces. According to analyst Roger
McDermott, despite Kazakhstan’s cooperation with NATO, “the defense relationship between
Kazakhstan and Russia has, in fact, substantially deepened.”84 The Kazakh defense ministry has
reported, for instance, that “1,259 Kazakh servicemen are now studying at Russian military
educational establishments,” constituting a substantial boost over previous years.85
According to some reports, during the former Bush Administration the Defense Department was
considering possibly setting up long-term military facilities in Central Asia termed Cooperative
Security Locations (CSLs; they contain pre-positioned equipment and are managed by private
contractors, and few if any U.S. military personnel are present). The Overseas Basing
Commission in 2005 acknowledged that U.S. national security might be enhanced by future CSLs
in Central Asia but urged Congress to seek inter-agency answers to “what constitutes vital U.S.
interests in the area that would require long-term U.S. presence.”86 According to former
USCENTCOM Commander Admiral William Fallon, the Bagram airbase in Afghanistan is the
Forward Operating Site (basing intended for rotational use by operating forces with limited U.S.
military support presence and possibly pre-positioned equipment) for access to and operations in
Central Asia. USCENTCOM’s FY2008 Master Plan for infrastructure requirements at its U.S.
overseas military facilities reportedly placed a high priority on sustaining long-term access to
locations across its area of responsibility.87
84 Roger McDermott, Kazakhstan’s Defense Policy: An Assessment Of The Trends, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, February 2009.
85 CEDR, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950316.
86 Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, Interim Report, May 9,
2005.
87 House of Representatives. Appropriations Committee. Subcommittee on Military Construction. Statement of Admiral
William J. Fallon, Commander, U.S. Central Command, on Military Construction in U.S. Central Command, April 17,
2007; General Accountability Office. Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs
to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam, GAO Report No. GAO-07-1015,
September 12, 2007.
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Closure of the Karshi-Khanabad Airbase
On July 5, 2005, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed a declaration
issued during a meeting of the SCO (see above, “Obstacles to Peace and Independence:
Regional Tensions and Conflicts”) that stated that “as large-scale military operations against
terrorism have come to an end in Afghanistan, the SCO member states maintain that the relevant
parties to the anti-terrorist coalition should set a deadline for the temporary use of ...
infrastructure facilities of the SCO member states and for their military presence in these
countries.”88 Despite this declaration, none of the Central Asian leaders immediately called for
closing the coalition bases. However, after the United States and others interceded so that
refugees who fled from Andijon to Kyrgyzstan could fly to Romania, Uzbekistan on July 29
demanded that the United States vacate K2 within six months. On November 21, 2005, the United
States officially ceased operations to support Afghanistan at K2. Perhaps indicative of the reversal
of U.S. military-to-military and other ties, former pro-U.S. defense minister Qodir Gulomov was
convicted of treason and received seven years in prison, later suspended. Many K2 activities
shifted to the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. Some observers viewed the closure of K2 and souring
U.S.-Uzbek relations as setbacks to U.S. influence in the region and as gains for Russian and
Chinese influence. Others suggested that U.S. ties with other regional states provided continuing
influence and that U.S. criticism of human rights abuses might pay future dividends among
regional populations.89
Efforts to Improve Security Relations
Appearing to signal improving U.S.-Uzbek relations, in early 2008 Uzbekistan permitted U.S.
military personnel under NATO command, on a case-by-case basis, to transit through an airbase
near the town of Termez that it has permitted Germany to operate.90 President Karimov attended
the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, in early April 2008 and stated that Uzbekistan was
ready to discuss the transit of non-lethal goods and equipment by NATO through Uzbekistan to
Afghanistan. He announced in May 2009 that the United States and NATO had been permitted to
use the Navoi airport (located between Samarkand and Bukhara in east-central Uzbekistan) for
transporting non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan.
Representing the Obama Administration, Under Secretary of State William Burns visited
Uzbekistan in early July 2009, and President Karimov assessed his talks with Burns as “positive.”
In August 2009, Gen. Petraus traveled to Uzbekistan and signed an accord on boosting military
educational exchanges and training. Reportedly, these visits also resulted in permission by
Uzbekistan for military air overflights of weapons to Afghanistan. Assistant Secretary Blake
visited Uzbekistan in November 2009 and stated that his meetings there were “a reflection of the
determination of President Obama and Secretary Clinton to strengthen ties between the United
States and Uzbekistan.” He proposed that the two countries set up high-level annual consultations
to “build our partnership across a wide range of areas. These include trade and development,
88 CEDR, July 5, 2005, Doc. No. CPP-249.
89 On growing Chinese regional influence, see Michael Mihalka, “Counter-insurgency, Counter-terrorism, State-
Building and Security Cooperation in Central Asia,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, May 2006.
90 “U.S. Military Returns to Ex-Soviet Uzbekistan,” Agence France Presse, March 6, 2008; “Only Germany Can Use
Uzbek Bases Now,” United Press International, December 13, 2005.
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border security, cooperation on narcotics, the development of civil society, and individual
rights.”91
The first Bilateral Consultation meeting took place in late December 2009 with a U.S. visit by an
Uzbek delegation led by Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov. The two sides drew up a plan for
cooperation for 2010. According to the published Uzbek text, the plan called for a visit by
Secretary Clinton; a visit by the Congressional Central Asia Caucus; Uzbekistan’s support for the
United States to participate as an observer at the SCO Summit in Ashkhabad; a visit by State and
Defense Department officials to evaluate Uzbekistan’s military equipment and supply needs
under the FMF and Excess Defense Articles programs; an expanded IMET program for
Uzbekistan (see “Legislation,” below); the seconding of an Uzbek military emissary to
CENTCOM in Tampa, FL, and the convocation of an investment conference in Washington,
among other measures.92 All of these cooperative efforts have been carried out or are underway.
For 2011, the Commander of U.S. Central Command, Gen. James Mattis visited Tashkent in
November 2010 and signed a 2011 Program of Security Cooperation during a meeting with
Uzbekistan’s Minister of Defense.
The Manas Airbase/Transit Center
The Manas airbase (since 2009 called the Manas Transit Center; see below) became operational
in December 2001 and uses some facilities of the international airport near Bishkek, the capital of
Kyrgyzstan. According to a fact sheet prepared in early 2009 by the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing
of the U.S. Air Force, the Manas airbase serves as the “premier air mobility hub” for operations in
Afghanistan. Missions include support for personnel and cargo transiting in and out of the theater,
aerial refueling, airlift and airdrop, and medical evacuation. Secretary Clinton was told during her
December 2010 visit to the Manas Transit Center that up to 3,500 troops every day, over 13
million pounds of cargo each month, and 117 million gallons of fuel each year are handled by the
airbase.
In early 2006, Kyrgyz President Bakiyev reportedly requested that lease payments for use of the
Manas airbase be increased to more than $200 million per year but at the same time reaffirmed
Russia’s free use of its nearby base.93 By mid-July 2006, however, the United States and
Kyrgyzstan announced that they had reached a settlement for the continued U.S. use of the
airbase. Although not specifically mentioning U.S. basing payments, it was announced that the
91 U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Press Conference of Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs
Robert Blake, October 14, 2009.
92 CEDR, January 29, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-4019. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) defines
Expanded IMET as a group of courses aimed at “educating U.S. friends and allies in the proper management of their
defense resources, improving their systems of military justice ... and fostering a greater respect for, and understanding
of, the principle of civilian control of the military. The program is based upon the premise that active promotion of
democratic values is one of the most effective means available for achieving U.S. national security and foreign policy
objectives.... For a country whose international military training program is very politically sensitive, the entire IMET
program may consist of Expanded IMET training only.” See DSCA. What is Expanded IMET? At
http://www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/eimet/eimet_default.htm.
93 For background, see CRS Report RS22295, Uzbekistan’s Closure of the Airbase at Karshi-Khanabad: Context and
Implications, by Jim Nichol. Perhaps indicating Kyrgyz pressure on Russia to compensate for use of the base, Russia in
October 2006 pledged grant military assistance to Kyrgyzstan.
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United States would provide $150 million in “total assistance and compensation over the next
year,” subject to congressional approval.
In September 2007, a U.S. military officer stated that the Manas airbase was moving toward “a
sustainment posture,” with the replacement of most tents and the building of aircraft maintenance,
medical, and other facilities.94
On February 3, 2009, then-President Bakiyev announced during a visit to Moscow that he
intended to close the Manas airbase. Many observers speculated that the decision was spurred by
Russia, which offered Bakiyev a $300 million loan for economic development and a $150 million
grant for budget stabilization in the wake of the world economic downturn. Russia also stated that
it would write off most of a $180 million debt. The United States was notified on February 19,
2009, that under the terms of the status of forces agreement it had 180 days to vacate the airbase.
The Manas Transit Center Agreement
The Defense Department announced on June 24, 2009, that an agreement of “mutual benefit” had
been concluded with the Kyrgyz government “to continu[e] to work, with them, to supply our
troops in Afghanistan, so that we can help with the overall security situation in the region.”95 The
agreement was approved by the Kyrgyz legislature and signed into law by then-President
Bakiyev, to take effect on July 14, 2009. According to the then-Kyrgyz Foreign Minister, the
government decided to conclude the annually renewable “intergovernmental agreement with the
United States on cooperation and the formation of a transit center at Manas airport,” because of
growing alarm about “the worrying situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” According to some
reports, the agreement is for five years and is renewed yearly, unless both parties agree to end it.
A yearly rent payment for use of land and facilities at the Manas airport would be increased from
$17.4 million to $60 million per year and the United States had pledged more than $36 million for
infrastructure improvements and $30 million for air traffic control system upgrades for the
airport. Sarbayev also stated that the United States had pledged $20 million dollars for a U.S.-
Kyrgyz Joint Development Fund for economic projects, $21 million for counter-narcotics efforts,
and $10 million for counter-terrorism efforts.96 All except the increased rent had already been
appropriated or requested. The agreement also reportedly includes stricter host-country conditions
on U.S. military personnel. One Kyrgyz legislator claimed that the agreement was not a volte-face
for Kyrgyzstan because Russia and other Central Asian states had signed agreements with NATO
to permit the transit of supplies to Afghanistan (see below).97
Under Secretary William Burns visited Kyrgyzstan in early July 2009 and reportedly stated that
“we welcome a new decision of President Bakiyev regarding the set up of a transport and
logistics hub in Manas Airport.... [The agreement] is an important contribution into our common
goals in Afghanistan.” He also stated that “the new administration believes that we should expand
94 Lt. Col. Michael Borgert, “Liberandos: Thank You for a Job Well Done,” 376th Expeditionary Services Squadron
Public Affairs, September 9, 2007.
95 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD News Briefing, June 24, 2009. See also U.S. Department of State, Daily Press
Briefing, June 25, 2009.
96 Tolkun Namatbayeva, “Kyrgyzstan Allows U.S. to Keep Using Base,” Agence France Presse, June 23, 2009.
97 See also CRS Report R40564, Kyrgyzstan and the Status of the U.S. Manas Airbase: Context and Implications, by
Jim Nichol.
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and deepen the level and scope of our bilateral relations” with Kyrgyzstan, and he announced that
a U.S.-Kyrgyzstan bilateral commission on trade and investment would be set up.98
Kyrgyzstan had also requested that French and Spanish troops who were deployed at Manas had
to leave, and they had pulled out by October 2009. The French detachment (reportedly 35 troops
and a tanker aircraft) moved temporarily to Dushanbe. The Spanish unit (reportedly 60 troops and
two transport aircraft) moved temporarily to Herat, west Afghanistan, and Dushanbe was used
temporarily as a stopover for troop relief flights. France and Spain have since reached accords
with Kyrgyzstan and have returned to Manas.
The Status of the Manas Transit Center After the April 2010 Coup
Initially after the April 2010 ouster of then-President Bakiyev, some officials in the interim
government stated or implied that the conditions of the lease would be examined. Interim acting
Prime Minister Roza Otunbayeva warned on April 8 that questions of corruption involving
commercial supplies for the Manas Transit Center would be one matter of investigation. On April
12, she stated that she realized that 2010 was a seminal year for U.S. operations in Afghanistan
and that President Obama planned on drawing down troops thereafter, and implied that ultimately
she hoped there were no bases in the country.99 On April 13, Otunbayeva announced that the lease
on the Manas Transit Center would be “automatically” renewed for one year. Meeting with
Secretary Clinton on December 2, 2010, Otunbayeva stressed that the Manas Transit Center was a
significant contributor to regional security and that Kyrgyzstan would support its operation at
least through 2014 in line with U.S. Administration objectives for drawing down U.S. forces.100
The status of the Manas Transit Center was not a dominant campaign issue in the October 2010
legislative election but may have influenced some contests. The issue could become more
prominent during campaigning for the planned October 2011 presidential election. In
congressional testimony in April 2010, analyst Eugene Huskey warned that a party bloc might
emerge before the presidential election that would campaign on anti-corruption and opposition to
the continued operation of the Manas Transit Center. At the same hearing, diplomat Baktybek
Abdrisaev argued that Kyrgyz policymakers would not demand the closure of the Manas Transit
Center as long as terrorism continues to threaten Afghanistan, since the operations of the Manas
Transit Center benefit Kyrgyzstan’s national security.101
The U.S. Embassy in Bishkek has reported that in FY2009, the United States provided $105.94
million in direct, indirect, and charitable expenses in connection with the Manas “Transit Center,”
and $124.02 million in FY2010.
Of this FY2010 amount:
98 “U.S. Welcomes Decision of Kyrgyzstan to Set Up Transport and Logistics Hub,” AKIpress News Agency, July 13,
2009.
99 CEDR, April 12, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-600.
100 U.S. Department of State, Remarks With President Otunbayeva After Their Meeting, Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Secretary of State, December 2, 2010.
101 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs, Hearing on the Crisis in Kyrgyzstan: Fuel, Contracts, and Revolution along the Afghan
Supply Chain, April 22, 2010.
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• $60 million was a lease payment
• $22 million was landing and other fees for use of the Manas International Airport
• $38.7 million was for local contracts and leases
• $2.3 million was for “programmatic humanitarian assistance”
• $1 million was for other local spending
The December 2010 Congressional Report on Fuel Contracts
In December 2010, the majority staff of the Subcommittee for National Security and Foreign
Affairs of the House Oversight Committee released a report on contracts awarded by the Defense
Department’s Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to the privately owned Red Star and its sister
Mina firms for the supply of jet fuel for the Manas Transit Center.102 The report stressed that
many citizens of Kyrgyzstan, and even current Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva, supposed that
former Kyrgyz Presidents Askar Akayev and Bakiyev and their families had benefitted from the
contracts in a corrupt fashion. Perceptions of corruption regarding the fuel contracts, according to
the report, were significant factors in the overthrow of the presidents and in growing tensions
between the United States and Kyrgyzstan. The Subcommittee reported evidence from the FBI
that the Akayev family was corruptly involved in fuel supplies to the Manas Transit Center, but
the subcommittee found no direct evidence of illicit involvement by the Bakiyev family. President
Otunbayeva had called for transparency in the fuel contracts in a speech at the U.N. General
Assembly in September 2010 and during an associated meeting with President Barack Obama.
According to the report’s findings, DLA did not know who owned Red Star or Mina until late
2010, did not claim to care whether contract funds were being misappropriated by Akayev’s
family, did not know that Russia’s state-owned Gazprom gas firm had an ownership interest in a
subsidiary of the firms, and did not claim to know that the firms were using false certifications to
obtain fuel from Russia. On the latter issue, Red Star and Mina had repeatedly informed DLA of
the false certifications scheme, according to emails and other documents. In a 2006 Red Star
proposal for a fuel contract, for instance, the firm spelled out that it was participating in a scheme
to circumvent supposed Russian restrictions on fuel exports for military uses, and warned DLA
that opening up the contracting process to other bidders might expose this scheme and lead to a
fuel cut-off by Russia. The 2006 contract was subsequently awarded to Red Star without
competition. A 2009 contract to Mina also was awarded without competition on “national
security” grounds. The Subcommittee argued that the use of such a scheme to obtain fuel and
DLA’s apparent lack of reaction to the scheme opened the United States to excessive strategic
vulnerability, since a sudden fuel cutoff by Russia could jeopardize U.S. military operations in
Afghanistan.
Red Star and Mina reported that the Russian government knew that Gazprom was the source of
jet fuel for the Manas Transit Center. The firms claimed, however, that they still had to falsely
certify that the aviation fuel was being used for civilian purposes so that Russian authorities could
claim that their ban on aviation fuel exports for military uses was not being circumvented. After
then-President Putin apparently decided in early 2009 that the U.S. airbase at Manas should be
102 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs, Mystery at Manas: Strategic Blind Spots in the Department of Defense’s Fuel Contracts
in Kyrgyzstan, Report of the Majority Staff, December 2010.
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closed and offered assistance to Kyrgyzstan as a seeming quid pro quo, Gazprom initiated a
slowdown in fuel shipments, according to the report. Although Kyrgyzstan’s then-President
Bakiyev had pledged to Putin that he would close the airbase, in mid-2009 Bakiyev instead
redesignated it as the “Manas Transit Center” and permitted it to continue operations. Russia then
“discovered” that Gazprom’s fuel shipments were being used by the airbase, imposed a high
export tariff on all fuel exports to Kyrgyzstan on April 1, 2010, and later cut off all fuel shipments
to Kyrgyzstan through Mina and Red Star.
The report also criticized the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek for ignoring the
ramifications of the fuel contracts on U.S.-Kyrgyz relations. Even after Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton became engaged with the issue during her December 2010 visit to Kyrgyzstan (see
below), the embassy reportedly asserted that issues involving the fuel contract were beyond its
concern, according to the report.
Among the recommendations on improving the transparency and due diligence of fuel contracts
for the Manas Transit Center, the Subcommittee called for an interagency analysis of the U.S.
military’s “extraordinary reliance on Mina and Red Star for jet fuel” and on the risks associated
with increased Russian influence over the fuel supply chain supporting U.S. operations in
Afghanistan. The Subcommittee also stated that “ability to perform and financial viability are
necessary but not sufficient objects of due diligence. Business history, litigation exposure,
insurance posture, affiliated companies, and ownership are also important for U.S. contacting
authorities to understand in order to make competent judgments about contractors.” Knowledge
of ownership, for instance, is needed to satisfy a Federal Acquisition Regulations requirement that
principals be checked against sanctions lists, it stated.
In November 2010, DLA awarded Mina a $315 million contract to continue supplying up to 120
million gallons of fuel to the Manas Transit Center for at least one more year. An amendment to
the contract later highlighted by Secretary Clinton during her December 2010 visit to Kyrgyzstan
provides for the possible addition of a second supplier for between 20 and 50% of the fuel. 103 The
Kyrgyz government has called for the Manas Refueling Complex—established in mid-2010 as a
joint venture between the Kyrgyz government and Gazprom—to be named as the sole supplier
and for Mina to be suspended from the contract. 104 If Manas Refueling Complex becomes a
supplier, Gazprom may now receive direct U.S. payments for fuel. Mina alleged in December
2010 that the Kyrgyz government had attempted to raid its local office in a bid to exclude the firm
from supplying fuel to the Manas Transit Center. The report by the House Subcommittee raises
concerns about more direct Russian involvement in fuel supplies, since the country has appeared
to use its energy exports as a tool in foreign relations.
The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to Afghanistan
Because supplies transiting Pakistan to Afghanistan frequently were subject to attacks, Gen.
David Petraeus, the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, visited Kazakhstan and Tajikistan
103 U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, November 4, 2010.
104 Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Manas Fuel Supplier Doubles Down on Good News,” Eurasianet, November 4, 2010;
Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Is Manas Fuel Contract Award Only the Start, not End of Intrigue?” Eurasianet,
November 5, 2010; Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Manas Fuel Supply Contract to Be Re-Opened?” Eurasianet,
December 22, 2010; Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Manas Fuel Supplier Hitting Back at Bishkek,” Eurasianet, January
4, 2011.
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in late January 2009 to negotiate alternative air, rail, road, and water routes for the commercial
shipping of supplies to support NATO and U.S. operations in Afghanistan (he also visited
Kyrgyzstan to discuss airbase issues; see below). To encourage a positive response for this
Northern Distribution Network, the U.S. embassies in the region announced that the United States
hoped to purchase many non-military goods locally to transport to the troops in Afghanistan.
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan permitted such transit in February 2009, Uzbekistan permitted it in
April 2009, and Kyrgyzstan permitted it in July 2009 (Georgia had given such permission in
2005, Russia in 2008, and Azerbaijan in March 2009).
There are broadly three land routes: one through the South Caucasus into Central Asia; one from
Latvia through Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan; and one from Latvia through Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Although some small cargoes reportedly were sent along
the route on an ad hoc basis as early as late 2008, a much-publicized rail shipment of non-lethal
supplies entered Afghanistan in late March 2009 after transiting Latvia, Russia, Kazakhstan, and
Uzbekistan. According to the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency, some 15,000 containers had
transited the port of Riga, Latvia, from that time until September 2010.105 The U.S. Transportation
Command reports that about one-half of the non-lethal surface shipments to Afghanistan are
being transported via the NDN.106 Non-lethal supplies reportedly being shipped to Afghanistan
include cement, lumber, blast barriers, septic tanks, and matting. In addition, increasing volumes
of jet fuel are being purchased in Azerbaijan and Central Asia and transported to Afghanistan.
Supplementing land routes, Uzbekistan’s Navoi airport reportedly is being used to transport
supplies to Afghanistan. After aircraft land at Navoi, the supplies are sent by rail and truck to
Afghanistan. According to one report, U.S. Defense Department officials are concerned that
Uzbek officials are delaying the transit of freight across the border into Afghanistan, including by
delaying shipments until bribes are paid. Construction was completed in November 2010 on a 50-
mile rail line from the Uzbek border to the town of Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan, which may
ameliorate some of the delays.107
Besides commercial shipping of non-lethal cargoes, most regional governments allegedly have
quietly given U.S. and NATO military aircraft over-flight privileges for the transport of weapons
and troops to Afghanistan. At the July 2009 U.S.-Russia summit, Russia openly announced that it
was permitting such overflights. Some observers suggested that the announcement was linked to
the assertion of some Russian officials that such transport could substitute for U.S. and NATO use
of Manas and other Central Asian airbases. Presidents Obama and Nazarbayev reportedly agreed
in principle to air flights of troops and unspecified equipment, including along a circum-polar
route transiting Kazakhstan, during their meeting in April 2010, and an air transit agreement was
signed on November 12, 2010.
Some observers warn that Taliban insurgency appears to be increasing along the NDN. In July
2010, six Afghan border guards reportedly were killed near the border with Tajikistan. In August
2010, over two dozen inmates escaped from a prison in Dushanbe. Many of these prisoners were
105 Heather Athey, “Distribution Network Yields New Prospects for U.S., Latvia,” Defense Logistics Agency News,
September 15, 2010.
106 “Northern Route Eases Supplies to U.S, forces in Afghanistan,” International Institute of Strategic Studies, August
2010; Steve Geary, “Northern Distribution Network to Shore Up Afghan Supply Chain,” Defense Logistics, June 28,
2010; “Supply Chain Council Recognizes Alternative Afghanistan Distribution Network,” Journal of Transportation,
May 8, 2010.
107 “Uzbek Corridor of Afghan Supply Plagued by ‘Informal Payments,’” The Times of Central Asia, July 2, 2010;
“Construction of Hairatan-Mazar-e-Sharif Railroad Completed” Uzbekistan Daily, November 16, 2010.
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convicted as Islamic terrorists or former rebel fighters during the Tajik Civil War and sentenced
for war crimes. Government efforts to recapture the prisoners resulted in several gun battles and
the resurgence of open conflict between the government and former rebel or other anti-
government forces. Allegedly, this broadening of violence was abetted by the return of former
rebels from Pakistan. In September 2010, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake stated that the
fighting in Tajikistan had not yet affected the NDN, but that the United States assists the countries
participating in the NDN “to improve border security and to … cooperate on things like
counternarcotics and counterterrorism … to help them face this threat.”108
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Major U.S. security interests have included elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in
Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation
in Central Asia. The United States has tendered aid aimed at bolstering their export and physical
controls over nuclear technology and materials, in part because of concerns that Iran is targeting
these countries.109
After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons power (in reality
Russia controlled these weapons). In December 1993, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement for the “safe and secure” dismantling
of 104 SS-18s, the destruction of silos, and related purposes. All bombers and their air-launched
cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994 (except seven bombers destroyed with U.S.
aid in 1998). The SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994. On April 21, 1995, the last of about 1,040
nuclear warheads had been removed from SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and
Kazakhstan announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. The United States reported that 147 silos
had been destroyed by September 1999. A U.S.-Kazakh Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in Almaty
was set up to facilitate verification and compliance with arms control agreements to prevent the
proliferation of WMD.
Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium mines, milling
facilities, and dozens of radioactive tailing and waste dumps in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Many of these reportedly remain inadequately protected against theft.
Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan have been among the world’s top producers of low-enriched uranium.
Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at Aktau that was the world’s only nuclear desalinization
facility. In 1997 and 1999, U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on decommissioning the Aktau
reactor. Shut down in 1999, it had nearly 300 metric tons of uranium (some highly enriched) and
plutonium (some weapons-grade) spent fuel in storage pools. CTR aid was used to facilitate
transporting 600 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Kazakhstan to the United States in
1994, 2,900 kg of up to 26% enriched nuclear fuel from Aktau to Kazakhstan’s Ulba facility in
2001 (which Ulba converted into less-enriched fuel), and 162.5 lb. of HEU spent fuel from Aktau
108 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, On-the-Record Briefing: Assistant Secretary for South and
Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake On Developments in Central Asia, September 22, 2010.
109 A Treaty on the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone entered into force in January 2009. All five Central
Asian states are signatories. The Treaty prohibits the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, or possession
of nuclear explosive devices within the zone. See CRS Report RL31559, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background
and Status, coordinated by Mary Beth Nikitin.
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to Russia in May 2009. In the latter instance, the material originally had been provided by Russia
to Kazakhstan, and was returned to Russia by rail for storage in a series of four shipments
between December 2008 and May 2009. In November 2010, CTR aid was used to facilitate the
shipment of the last of more than 10 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and three metric tons
of weapons-grade plutonium from Aktau to a newly constructed storage site 1,800 miles away at
the former Semipalatinsk Test Site in East Kazakhstan Region.110
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities
during the Soviet era. CTR and Energy Department (DOE) funds have been used in Kazakhstan
to dismantle a former anthrax production facility in Stepnogorsk, to remove some strains to the
United States, to secure two other BW sites, and to retrain scientists. CTR funding was used to
dismantle Uzbekistan’s Nukus chemical weapons research facility. CTR aid also was used to
eliminate active anthrax spores at a former CBW test site on an island in the Aral Sea. These latter
two projects were completed in 2002. Other CTR aid helps keep former Uzbek CBW scientists
employed in peaceful research. Uzbekistan has continued to cooperate with DOD and DOE—
even after it restricted other ties with the United States in 2005—to receive radiation monitoring
equipment and training.
Trade and Investment
Successive U.S. administrations have endorsed free market reforms in Central Asia, since these
directly serve U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services and
sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to Central Asia has greatly
exceeded that provided to Russia or most other Eurasian states except Azerbaijan. U.S. trade
agreements have been signed and entered into force with all the Central Asian states, but bilateral
investment treaties are in force only with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In line with Kyrgyzstan’s
accession to the World Trade Organization, the United States established permanent normal trade
relations with Kyrgyzstan by law in June 2000, so that “Jackson-Vanik” trade provisions no
longer apply that call for presidential reports and waivers concerning freedom of emigration.
In June 2004, The U.S. Trade Representative signed a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) with ambassadors of the regional states to establish a U.S.-Central Asia
Council on Trade and Investment. The Council has met yearly to address intellectual property,
labor, environmental protection, and other issues that impede trade and private investment flows
between the United States and Central Asia. The United States also has called for greater intra-
regional cooperation on trade and encouraged the development of regional trade and transport ties
with Afghanistan and South Asia. The reorganization of the State Department in 2006 to create
the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs facilitated this emphasis.111
110 U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Press Release: Joint Statement By Co-
Chairs of the U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership On Successful Completion of the U.S.-Kazakhstan BN-350 Spent
Fuel Program, November 17, 2010; Press Release: NNSA Secures 775 Nuclear Weapons Worth of Weapons-Grade
Nuclear Material from BN-350 Fast Reactor in Kazakhstan, November 18, 2010.
111 Remarks at Eurasian National University, October 13, 2005; and U.S. Congress, House International Relations
Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Testimony by Steven R. Mann, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary, July 25, 2006. See also U.S. Embassy, Astana, Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan and the United States in a
Changed World, August 23, 2006.
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A working group meeting of the U.S.-Central Asia TIFA was held in May 2010 in Tashkent. U.S.
delegation head Madelyn Spirnak, the Senior Advisor for Biotechnology in the State
Department’s Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, hailed the session as advancing the U.S.-
Central Asian business and government partnership. A major U.S. emphasis was on educating
regional businesses on opportunities to sell supplies that could be transported via the Northern
Distribution Network to support U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The U.S. delegation and
emissaries from Afghanistan, which is an observer to the U.S.-Central Asian TIFA, also urged the
expansion of regional trade with Afghanistan.112
All the states of the region possess large-scale resources that could contribute to the region
becoming a “new silk road” of trade and commerce. The Kazakh and Turkmen economies are
mostly geared to energy exports but need added foreign investment for production and transport.
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are major cotton producers, a legacy of central
economic planning during the Soviet period. Uzbekistan’s cotton and gold production rank
among the highest in the world and much is exported. It has moderate gas reserves but needs
investment to upgrade infrastructure. Kyrgyzstan has major gold mines and strategic mineral
reserves, is a major wool producer, and could benefit from tourism. Tajikistan has one of the
world’s largest aluminum processing plants. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan possess the bulk of the
region’s water resources, but in recent years both countries have suffered from droughts.
Despite the region’s development potential, the challenges of corruption, inadequate transport
infrastructure, punitive tariffs, border tensions, and uncertain respect for contracts discourage
major foreign investment (except for some investment in the energy sector). Cotton-growing has
contributed to environmental pollution and water shortages, leading some observers to argue that
cotton-growing is not suited to the largely arid region.
The global economic downturn has depressed prices for Tajik commodity exports (mainly
aluminum and cotton) and reduced worker remittances. The Tajik currency, the somoni, has lost
over one-quarter of its value against the dollar, which has greatly increased the costs of imported
food and other goods. The NGO International Crisis Group (ICG) has warned that increasingly
serious economic problems will condemn the “desperately poor population ... to yet more
deprivation.... To address the situation, the international community ... should ensure any
assistance reaches those who truly need it, place issues of governance and corruption at the centre
of all contacts with the Tajik government, and initiate an energetic dialogue with President
Rahmon on democratization.”113 The Tajik government reported that its worker remittances
plunged by almost 30% in 2009, mainly because of economic distress in Russia, where about
90% of migrant workers had been employed.
Other regional states also reported economic setbacks as a result of the world economic
downturn. Kazakhstan announced that it was withdrawing $10 billion from its sovereign wealth
fund for welfare and other needs and was setting up a Toxic Assets Fund. In early 2009, Russia
pledged nearly $300 million to Kyrgyzstan’s Development Fund (formed in 2007) as part of aid
and investment reportedly aimed to encourage Kyrgyzstan to close the Manas airbase. The Fund
supposedly aimed to support the construction and repair of energy infrastructure, agricultural
reform, and tourism growth. Russia condemned the Fund as corrupt after Kyrgyzstan retained the
112 U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, U.S.-Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Partners
Meet in Tashkent, May 5, 2010.
113 ICG. Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure, February 12, 2009.
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airbase. This view of the Fund also was held by the opposition that ousted Bakiyev in April 2010
and it abolished the Fund.
All the Central Asian states have reported that their economies have begun to recover in recent
months from the global financial crisis. The Tajik national bank has reported that remittances
from migrant workers during the first half of 2010 had grown 25% over the same period in 2009,
amounting to $869 million, or over 39% of the country’s GDP.114 The Kyrgyz national bank has
reported remittances rose nearly 33% during the first five months of 2010 over the same period in
2009, amounting to $399 million.
Uzbekistan began to restrict railway and road transport to and from Tajikistan in February 2010,
reportedly to pressure Tajikistan not to build the Roghun dam on the Vakhsh River that might
limit water flows to Uzbekistan. Reportedly, thousands of railcars and trucks have faced delays,
including those carrying construction materials bound for Afghanistan to support ISAF, materials
for building the Roghun dam, materials from Iran for completing the Sangtuda-2 hydro-electric
power plant on the Vakhsh River, fuel and seeds for Tajik farmers, flour, and materials for road
construction in Tajikistan. Uzbekistan also has boosted tariffs twice this year on trucks crossing
into Tajikistan. Uzbekistan has rejected Tajik assertions that shipping delays are political and has
claimed that they are caused by increased ISAF rail traffic to Afghanistan, a backup of railcars
headed to Turkmenistan, and track repairs. Tajikistan has repeatedly appealed to the OSCE that
Uzbekistan continues to delay rail transit to and from Tajikistan.115
Energy Resources
U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central Asian and South Caucasian states
have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the West, supporting U.S. private
investment, promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers, assisting ally
Turkey, and opposing the building of pipelines that transit “energy competitor” Iran or otherwise
give it undue influence over the region. The encouragement of regional electricity, oil, and gas
exports to South Asia and security for Caspian region pipelines and energy resources also have
been recent interests.
Until 2004, the Bush Administration retained a Clinton-era position, Special Advisor on Caspian
Energy Diplomacy, to help further U.S. policy and counter the efforts of Russia’s Viktor
Kaluzhny, deputy foreign minister and Special Presidential Representative for Energy Matters in
the Caspian. After the Administration abolished this post as no longer necessary, its
responsibilities were shifted at least in part to a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
(responsibilities of a former Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and Eurasian Conflicts
also were shifted to the Deputy Assistant Secretary). Some critics juxtaposed Russia’s close
interest in securing Caspian energy resources to what they termed halting U.S. efforts.116 A post of
Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy issues was (re-)created in March 2008, with the former Bush
Administration stating that there were “new opportunities” for the export of Caspian oil and gas.
114 ITAR-TASS, July 29, 2010.
115 Konstantin Parshin, “Tajikistan: Repercussions of Tajik-Uzbek Feud May Be Felt All the Way to Afghanistan,”
Eurasianet, April 1, 2010; Konrad Mathesius, “Boxcar Diplomacy Puts Tajik Businesses at Tashkent’s Mercy,”
Eurasianet, August 6, 2010; CEDR, November 18, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950138; November 19, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-
950234 and Doc. No. CEP950214; and December 30, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950116.
116 Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 31, 2007.
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In April 2009, Secretary of State Clinton appointed Richard Morningstar as Special Envoy for
Eurasian Energy.
The Caspian region is emerging as a notable source of oil and gas for world markets, although
many experts emphasize that regional exports will constitute only a small fraction of world
supplies. According to British Petroleum (BP), the proven natural gas reserves of Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are estimated at over 450 trillion cubic feet (tcf),
among the largest in the world.117 The region’s proven oil reserves are estimated to be 48 billion
barrels, comparable to Libya. Kazakhstan possesses the region’s largest proven oil reserves at
about 40 billion barrels, and also possesses 64tcf of natural gas. Kazakhstan is increasingly
producing more gas than it consumes, but since it reinjects some of its gas into the fields, it still
must import a small amount of gas. Kazakhstan’s oil exports are about 1.3 million barrels per day
(bpd). Turkmenistan possesses about 286tcf and Uzbekistan about 59tcf of proven gas reserves.
Russia’s temporary cutoffs of gas to Ukraine in January 2006 and January 2009 and a brief
slowdown of oil shipments to Belarus in January 2010 (Belarus and Ukraine are transit states for
oil and gas pipelines to other European states) have highlighted Europe’s energy insecurity. The
United States has supported EU efforts to reduce its overall reliance on Russian oil and gas by
increasing the number of possible alternative suppliers. Part of this policy has involved
encouraging Central Asian countries to transport their energy exports to Europe through pipelines
that cross the Caspian Sea, thereby bypassing Russian (and Iranian) territory, although these
amounts are expected at most to satisfy only a small fraction of EU needs.118
The Central Asian states long were pressured by Russia to yield large portions of their energy
wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controlled most existing export pipelines.119 Russia
attempted to strengthen this control over export routes for Central Asian energy in May 2007
when visiting former President Putin reached agreement in Kazakhstan on supplying more
Kazakh oil to Russia. Putin also reached agreement with the presidents of Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan on the construction of a new pipeline to transport Turkmen and Kazakh gas to Russia.
The first agreement appeared to compete with U.S. and Turkish efforts to foster more oil exports
through the BTC. The latter agreement appeared to compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster
building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline to link to the SCP to Turkey. The latter also appeared to
compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster building a pipeline from Turkey through Greece,
Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to Austria (the so-called Nabucco pipeline).
Seeming to indicate a direct challenge to these plans by Russia and the West, China signed an
agreement in August 2007 with Kazakhstan on completing the last section of an oil pipeline from
the Caspian seacoast to China, and signed an agreement with Turkmenistan on building a gas
pipeline to China (see also below).120 In March 2008, the heads of the national gas companies of
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan announced that their countries would raise the gas
117 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2010.
118 For details, see CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, by Paul Belkin. See also
International Crisis Group. Central Asia’s Energy Risks, May 24, 2007.
119 According to a plan published by Russia’s Institute of Energy Strategy covering the period 2007-2030, “Russian
control over a large share of Central Asian gas needs to be maintained.” See Minpromenergo (Ministry of Industry and
Energy), Institut energeticheskoi strategii, Kontseptsiya energeticheskoi strategii Rossii na period do 2030g., 2007. As
reported by Philip Hanson, “How Sustainable Is Russia’s Energy Power?” Russian Analytical Digest, No. 38 (2008).
120 An oil and gas conference involving Kazakh, Chinese, and Russian energy ministries and firms has met annually
since 2004 to “exchange views” on possible regional cooperation. ITAR-TASS, December 5, 2007.
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export price to the European level in future years. They signed a memorandum of understanding
on the price with Russia’s Gazprom state-controlled gas firm, which controls most export
pipelines. According to analyst Martha Olcott, “the increased bargaining power of the Central
Asian states owes more to the entry of China into the market than to the opening of [the BTC
pipeline and the SCP]. Russia’s offer to pay higher purchase prices for Central Asian gas in 2008
and 2009 came only after China signed a long-term purchase agreement for Turkmen gas at a
base price that was higher than what Moscow was offering.”121
Kazakhstan’s Oil and Gas
Until recently U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) played a dominant role in the development of
Kazakhstani oil and gas resources, amounting to about $29 billion in Kazakhstan (over one-third
of all FDI in the country) from 1993-2009.122 According to some reports, China provided about
$13 billion in investments and loans to Kazakhstan’s energy sector in 2009, eclipsing U.S. FDI.
Some U.S. energy firms and other private foreign investors have become discouraged in recent
months by harsher Kazakh government terms, taxes, and fines that some allege reflect corruption
within the ruling elite.123
Kazakhstan’s main oil export route has been a 930-mile pipeline completed in 2001—owned by
the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), in which Russian shareholders have a controlling
interest—that carried 693,000 bpd of oil in 2009 from Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of
Novorossiysk. Kazakhstan's other major oil export pipeline, from Atyrau to Samara, Russia, has a
capacity of approximately 600,000 bpd. Lengthy Russian resistance to increasing the pumping
capacity of the CPC pipeline and demands for higher transit and other fees, along with the
necessity of offloading the oil into tankers at Novorossiysk to transit the clogged Turkish Straits,
spurred Kazakh President Nazarbayev to sign a treaty with visiting Azerbaijani President Aliyev
in June 2006 to barge Kazakh oil across the Caspian Sea to Baku to the BTC pipeline.
Kazakhstan began shipping about 70,000 bpd of oil through the BTC pipeline at the end of
October 2008. Another accord resulted from a visit by President Nazarbayev to Azerbaijan in
September 2009 that provides that up to 500,000 bpd of oil will be barged across the Caspian to
enter the BTC or the Baku-Supsa pipeline. When the volumes exceed 500,000 bpd, a trans-
Caspian pipeline may be built.
Apparently to counter Kazakh’s export plans via Azerbaijan, then-President Putin’s May 2007
agreement with Nazarbayev (see above) envisaged boosting the capacity of the CPC pipeline.
Despite this Russian pledge to increase the capacity of the CPC, Kazakhstan has proceeded to
upgrade its Caspian Sea port facilities and in May 2008, the Kazakh legislature ratified the 2006
121 Martha Olcott, “A New Direction for U.S. Policy in the Caspian Region.”
122 U.S. Department of State. Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs:
Remarks Before the Washington International Business Council, February 24, 2010.
123 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) warned in late 2009 that Kazakhstan has prosecuted myriad foreign investors
for evading taxes and customs duties, for environmental pollution, and for other reasons, and can “demand changes in
the terms of contracts with private investors [such as Kashagan and Karachaganak oilfield investors] on the grounds of
national security.” Nonetheless, the EIU argued that “most foreign investors are maintaining or increasing their
involvement in the country, despite unattractive aspects of the business environment—albeit with delays or reservations
in some cases.” “Kazakhstan Economy: Investors Beware, the Rules Are Changing,” November 13, 2009. For recent
reports alleging corruption, see Simon Goodley, “Court Documents Allege 'Corrupt' Kazakhstan Regime’s Link to
FTSE Firms,” The Guardian, December 2, 2010; Risky Business: Kazakhstan, Kazakhmys, PLC, and the London Stock
Exchange, Global Witness, July 2010.
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treaty. Kazakhstan also barges some oil to Baku to ship by rail to Georgia’s Black Sea oil terminal
at Batumi, of which Kazakhstan became the sole owner in early 2008. Kazakhstan began barging
oil from Batumi to the Romanian port of Constantsa in late 2008 for processing at two refineries
it purchased. Some Kazakh oil arriving in Baku also could be transported through small pipelines
to Georgia’s Black Sea port of Supsa or to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiisk, although in
the latter case Kazakhstan might be faced with high transit charges by Russia.124
In addition to these oil export routes to Europe not controlled by Russia, in 2009 Kazakhstan and
China completed an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan’s port city of Atyrau to the Xinjiang region of
China that initially carries 200,000 bpd to China. Some Russian oil has been transported to China
through this pipeline, the first Russian oil to be transported by pipeline to China.
At the end of October 2008, China and Kazakhstan signed a framework agreement on
constructing a gas pipeline from Beyneu, north of the Aral Sea, eastward to Shymkent, where it
will connect with the Central Asian gas pipeline to China. The pipeline is planned initially to
supply 176.6 bcf to southern Kazakhstan and 176.6 bcf to China. Plans call for pipeline
construction to begin in 2011 and to be completed by 2015.
Kazakh officials have appeared to make contradictory statements about providing gas for the
prospective Nabucco pipeline. Kazakhstan’s Deputy Energy and Mineral Resources Minister Aset
Magaulov stated at a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Security Forum in June 2009 that
Kazakhstan would not have a surplus of gas that it could send through the Nabucco pipeline.125
President Nazarbayev appeared to support the possible transit of Kazakh gas through Turkey
when he stated on October 22, 2009, during a visit to Turkey, that “Turkey ... will become a
transit country. And if Kazakhstan’s oil and gas are transported via this corridor then this will be
advantageous to both Turkey and Kazakhstan.”126 In late October 2009, however, the Kazakh
Ministry of Energy reiterated that “the main problem for our country [regarding the supply of
natural gas to Nabucco] is the limited availability of gas” because of existing contracts for
projected gas production. It suggested that Kazakhstan might be a potential supplier for Nabucco
if gas production exceeds expectations, but that Kazakhstan could not transport any gas via
Nabucco until the legal status of the Caspian Sea was resolved, which would permit building a
connection to Nabucco.127
Turkmenistan’s Gas
The late President Niyazov signed a 25-year accord with then-President Putin in 2003 on
supplying Russia up to 211.9 billion cubic feet (bcf) of gas in 2004 (about 12% of production),
rising up to 2.83 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2009-2028 (perhaps then constituting an even larger
percentage of production). Turkmenistan halted gas shipments to Russia at the end of 2004 in an
attempt to get a higher gas price but settled for all-cash rather than partial barter payments.
Turkmenistan and Russia continued to clash in subsequent years over gas prices and finally
agreed in late 2007 that gas prices based on “market principles” would be established in 2009.
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed accords in May and December 2007 on building a
124 ITAR-TASS, May 29, 2008; CEDR, December 11, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950096; April 26, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-
950045.
125 ITAR-TASS, June 25, 2009.
126 CEDR, October 22, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950337.
127 ITAR-TASS, October 31, 2009.
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new gas pipeline that was planned to carry 353 bcf of Turkmen and 353 bcf of Kazakh gas to
Russia. However, the Turkmen government appeared to have reservations about building another
pipeline to Russia.
Seeking alternatives to pipeline routes through Russia, in December 1997 Turkmenistan opened
the first pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile gas pipeline
linkage to Iran. Turkmenistan provided 282.5 bcf of gas to Iran in 2006 and reportedly a larger
amount in 2007. At the end of 2007, however, Turkmenistan suddenly suspended gas shipments,
causing hardship in northern Iran. Turkmen demands for higher payments were the main reason
for the cut-off. Gas shipments resumed in late April 2008 after Iran agreed to a price boost. In
mid-2009, Turkmenistan reportedly agreed to increase gas supplies to up to 706 bcf per year.128 At
the end of 2009, a second gas pipeline to Iran was completed—from a field that until April 2009
had supplied gas to Russia (see below)—to more than double Turkmenistan’s export capacity to
Iran.
As another alternative to pipelines through Russia, in April 2006, Turkmenistan and China signed
a framework agreement calling for Chinese investment in developing gas fields in Turkmenistan
and in building a gas pipeline with a capacity of about 1.0 tcf per year through Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan to China. All three Central Asian states plan to send gas through this pipeline to
China. Construction of the pipeline began in August 2007 and gas began to be delivered through
the pipeline to Xinjiang and beyond in December 2009.
Perhaps an additional attempt to diversify gas export routes, Berdimuhammedow first signaled in
2007 that Turkmenistan was interested in building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Turkmenistan
signed a memorandum of understanding in April 2008 with the EU to supply 353.1 bcf of gas per
year starting in 2009, presumably through a trans-Caspian pipeline that might at first link to the
SCP and later to the proposed Nabucco pipeline. Berdimuhammedow also revived Niyazov’s
proposal to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India, but investment
remains elusive.
On the night of April 8-9, 2009, a section of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Russia
exploded, halting Turkmen gas shipments. Russia claimed that it had notified Turkmenistan that it
was reducing its gas imports because European demand for gas had declined, but Turkmenistan
denied that it had been properly informed.129 After extended talks, visiting President Medvedev
and President Berdimuhamedow agreed in December 2009 that Turkmen gas exports to Russia
would be resumed, and that the existing supply contract would be altered to reduce Turkmen gas
exports and to increase the price paid for the gas. Turkmenistan announced on January 9, 2010,
that its gas exports to Russia had resumed. The incident appeared to further validate
Turkmenistan’s policy of diversifying its gas export routes.
At a late April 2009 Turkmen energy conference, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George
Krol reportedly stressed that Turkmenistan and other states should continue to diversify their
energy export routes.130 Turkmen President Berdimuhamedow pledged to continue such
128 Iran: Daily Report, January 21, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-11017; January 24, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950014; April 26,
2008, Doc. No. IAP-950049; and May 6, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950052.; CEDR, July 12, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950097.
129 OSC Feature, Open Source Center, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. FEA-844966; CEDR, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-
950339; ITAR-TASS, April 3, 2009; Sergey Blagov, “Turkmenistan: Ashgabat Wonders Whether Russia Still Has Deep
Pockets,” Eurasia Insight, March 26, 2009.
130 Alexander Vershinin, “U.S. Urges Central Asia to Boost Gas Export Routes,” Associated Press, April 24, 2009.
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diversification. At an EU energy summit in Prague in early May 2009, U.S. Special Envoy for
Eurasian Energy Richard Morningstar endorsed further development of the “southern corridor”
for the shipment of gas and oil to Western markets. However, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan balked at signing a communique pledging the states to back the Nabucco pipeline.
Despite this move, Berdimuhamedow asserted on July 10, 2009, that there are “immense volumes
of natural gas in Turkmenistan [that] make it possible for us to carry out certain work related to
the implementation of various [gas export] projects, including the Nabucco project.”131 In May
2010, Morningstar suggested that “some might question whether gas exports from Turkmenistan
to China come at the expense of Nabucco or other Southern Corridor projects meant to supply
Europe.… It is not yet clear where Turkmen gas for European energy projects might come from,
but given the economics, they are much more likely to be supplied with gas from Turkmenistan’s
offshore blocks.”132 Perhaps accentuating these concerns, Berdimuhammedow announced in June
2010 that a trans-Turkmen pipeline would be built that would link Turkmenistan’s huge western
gas fields to the pipeline to China.
However, at an international oil and gas conference held in November 2010 in Ashkhabad,
Turkmen Deputy Prime Minister Baimurad Khodzhamukhamedov stated that the country would
have an excess of 1.4 tcf of gas, more than enough to fill the proposed Nabucco pipeline, and that
“the construction of the trans-Caspian gas pipeline will be coordinated in compliance with all
environmental standards and after expert examinations, which meets the policy of diversification
of natural gas sales pursued by Turkmenistan.”133 Russia and Iran remain opposed to trans-
Caspian pipelines, ostensibly on the grounds that they could pose environmental hazards to the
littoral states.
In December 2010, the presidents of Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and the prime
minister of India signed an agreement on constructing the Turkmenistan- Afghanistan-Pakistan-
India (TAPI) gas pipeline. Turkmenistan long has called for building this pipeline to diversify its
export options, but financing for the project remains problematic because of ongoing conflict in
Afghanistan.
Electricity
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran export electricity to Afghanistan. The U.S. Trade
and Development Agency’s Central Asian Infrastructure Integration Initiative (launched in 2005)
and USAID’s Regional Energy Market Assistance Program (launched in 2006) concentrate on
encouraging energy, transportation, and communications projects, including the development of
electrical power infrastructure and power sharing between Central Asia, Afghanistan, and
eventually Pakistan and India.134 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) launched a Central Asia-
South Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM) project in 2006 and approved $3 million
131 CEDR, July 11, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950124.
132 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, Pipeline Politics in Asia: The
Intersection of Demand, Energy Markets, and Supply Routes, Richard Morningstar, Special Envoy for Eurasian
Energy, May 4, 2010.
133 ITAR-TASS, November 19, 2010.
134 U.S. Trade and Development Agency, Press Release: USTDA Launches Central Asian Infrastructure Integration
Initiative, October 14, 2005; Joshua Kucera, “Washington Seeks to Steer Central Asian States Toward South Asian
Allies,” Eurasia Insight, April 28, 2006; Joshua Kucera, “USAID Official Outlines Plan to Build Central-South Asian
Electricity Links,” Eurasia Insight, May 4, 2006.
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for feasibility and project design studies of the potential for Pakistan to import electricity from
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Under the aegis of CASAREM, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan formed an
intergovernmental council in 2007. The four countries signed an agreement in August 2008 to
launch the Central Asia-South Asia Transmission Project (CASA-1000 Project) to build a 220
kilovolt transmission link between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan by-passing Uzbekistan and a 750-
km, 500-kilovolt, transmission link from the Nurek hydropower plant in Tajikistan to Afghanistan
and Pakistan, which will facilitate export of 1,300 MWs of electricity. About two-thirds of the
electricity would be provided to Pakistan and one-third to Afghanistan. The project cost is
estimated to be $935 million. ADB pulled out of CASA-1000 in 2009 when the countries
involved placed less priority on the project as a result of the global economic downturn, but the
World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, and the International Finance Corporation remain
committed. Reportedly, the Pakistani and Tajik governments reiterated intentions to go forward
with the project in April 2010. Also part of the CASAREM project, a 220-kilovolt twin-circuit
power transmission line is being built from a hydroelectric power plant on the River Vakhsh in
Tajikistan (the Sangtuda-1 plant) to the Afghan border town of Sher Khan Bandar. Construction
of this line reportedly began in July 2009. It was due to be finished in May 2010 but progress has
been delayed. Outside of CASAREM, Uzbekistan inaugurated a 220-kilovolt transmission line to
Kabul, Afghanistan in May 2009.
While the Central Asian states have cooperated on some electric power projects, they have failed
to cooperate on others.135 For instance, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have accused Tajikistan of
illicitly siphoning electricity from the Soviet-era Central Asian Unified Energy System grid.
Kazakhstan twice cut off energy flows to the regional grid in 2009 in retaliation, but at the end of
the year stated that it had not yet decided to withdraw completely from the grid. Tajik officials
have denied the Uzbek charges and accused Uzbekistan of illicitly siphoning electricity.
Uzbekistan cut itself off from the regional grid on December 1, 2009. The cutoff severed the
supply of electricity to Kyrgyzstan’s southern regions (since the lines cross Uzbekistan) and to
some parts of Tajikistan, and prevented Tajikistan from importing electricity from Turkmenistan
to address winter weather. The cutoff also has prevented Tajikistan from selling excess electricity
to Kazakhstan and Russia during the summer of 2010, further harming its economy. An
alternative purchaser, Afghanistan, cannot receive the electricity until the 500 kw line is built.
Another related issue clouding relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is the latter’s
construction of the Roghun hydro-electric power dam on a tributary of the Amu Darya River.
Uzbekistan claims that the dam will limit water flows downstream to its territory, while Tajikistan
is spurred to complete the power plant by Uzbekistan’s energy policies. In a state-of-the nation
address on January 5, 2009, President Rahmon stated that the nation’s future prosperity and pride
depended on completing the power plant. He called for citizens to cut their living expenses in
order to buy shares in the plant and urged all Tajiks and Persian-speakers worldwide to contribute
funds. Uzbekistan has received the support of Russia in calling for an international expert
commission to examine proposed water and hydropower projects in the region. In January 2010,
Kyrgyzstan agreed that its proposal to build the Kambarata dam could be examined by such a
commission. In early March 2010, the World Bank announced that it would help fund a
consortium to build the Roghun project if the results of a financial and environmental feasibility
135 Diana Bayzakova, “Gauging Integration Of Electricity Markets In Central Asia,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst,
January 28, 2009.
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study were positive. A few days later, Presidents Karimov and Nazarbayev endorsed carrying out
such an assessment. During his April 2010 visit to Central Asia, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon likewise called for construction on Roghun to await the completion of the World Bank
assessment. The World Bank study could take up to two years, however, delaying construction.
In September 2010, Assistant Secretary of State Blake declined to endorse either the CASA-1000
proposed project or the construction of the Roghun dam, stating that the United States was
awaiting the completion of feasibility studies for both projects.136
U.S. Aid Overview
For much of the 1990s and until September 11, 2001, the United States provided much more aid
each year to Russia and Ukraine than to any Central Asian state (most such aid was funded from
the FSA account in Foreign Operations Appropriations, but some derived from other program and
agency budgets). Cumulative foreign aid budgeted to Central Asia for FY1992 through FY2008
amounted to $4.7 billion, about 14% of the amount budgeted to all the Eurasian states, reflecting
the lesser priority given to these states prior to September 11.137
Budgeted spending for FY2002 for Central Asia, during OEF, was greatly boosted in absolute
amounts ($584 million) and as a share of total aid to Eurasia (about one-quarter of such aid). The
former Bush Administration since then requested smaller amounts of aid, although the
Administration continued to stress that there were important U.S. interests in the region. The
former Bush Administration highlighted the phase-out of economic aid to Kazakhstan and the
Congressionally imposed restrictions on aid to Uzbekistan (see below) as among the reasons for
declining aid requests. In April 2008, then-Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher stated
that another reason for declining U.S. aid to the region was a more constrained U.S. budgetary
situation. Aid to Central Asia in recent years has been about the same or less in absolute and
percentage terms than that provided to the South Caucasian region.
The Obama Administration boosted aid to Central Asia in FY2010 to about $250 million
(including $77.6 million in additional assistance provided to Kyrgyzstan in the wake of the April
2010 coup and the June 2010 ethnic violence; see below), compared to $149.5 million in FY2009.
The Administration has requested $156.9 million for FY2011 (see Table 1).138 The
Administration stated in FY2010 and FY2011 that it was prioritizing foreign assistance to
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In Tajikistan, the Administration stated that aid would help increase
the stability of a country “situated on the frontline of our ongoing military stabilization efforts in
Afghanistan.” In Kyrgyzstan, the Administration stated that aid would improve security, combat
136 U.S. Department of State, Press Conference: Review of Annual Bilateral Consultations, Robert O. Blake, Jr.,
Dushanbe, Tajikistan, September 1, 2010.
137 In comparison, the EU has reported that it has provided approximately 1.39 billion euros ($2.13 billion at current
exchange rates) in assistance to the region since 1991. Its planned aid of about $1 billion in 2007-2013 may prove to be
more than projected U.S. aid to the region. European Community, Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central
Asia for the period 2007-2013, June 2007; Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, 11177/07, June
23, 2007, p. 12.
138 Aid numbers include funds from the Aid for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia account and other “Function 150”
programs. The totals do not include Defense or Energy Department funds, funding for exchanges, the value of
privately-donated cargoes, or Millennium Challenge Corporation aid to Kyrgyzstan.
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drug-trafficking, reform the economy, and address food insecurity.139 Following the April and
June 2010 instability in Kyrgyzstan, the Administration provided $77.6 million in addition to
regular appropriated aid for stabilizing the economy, holding elections, and training police as well
as urgent food and shelter aid.
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), created in 2004 to provide U.S. aid to countries
with promising development records, announced in late 2005 that Kyrgyzstan was eligible to
apply for assistance as a country on the “threshold” of meeting the criteria for full-scale
development aid. In March 2008, the MCC signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan to provide $16
million over the next two years to help the country combat corruption and bolster the rule of law.
This threshold program was completed in June 2010, and Kyrgyzstan has requested another
threshold grant.
Congressional Conditions on Kazakh and Uzbek Aid
In Congress, Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7) forbade FREEDOM Support Act
(FSA) assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determined and
reported that it was making substantial progress in meeting commitments under the Strategic
Partnership Declaration to democratize and respect human rights. The conference report (H.Rept.
108-10) also introduced language that forbade assistance to the Kazakh government unless the
Secretary of State determined and reported that it significantly had improved its human rights
record during the preceding six months. However, the legislation permitted the Secretary to waive
the requirement on national security grounds.140 The Secretary reported in mid-2003 that
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were making such progress. Some in Congress were critical of these
findings. By late 2003, the former Bush Administration had decided that progress was inadequate
in Uzbekistan.
Consolidated Appropriations for FY2004, including foreign operations (P.L. 108-199) and for
FY2005 (P.L. 108-447), and Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 (P.L. 109-102)
retained these conditions, while clarifying that the prohibition on aid to Uzbekistan pertained to
the central government and that conditions included respecting human rights, establishing a
“genuine” multi-party system, and ensuring free and fair elections and freedom of expression and
media. These conditions remained in place under the continuing resolution for FY2007 (P.L. 109-
289, as amended). In appropriations for FY2008 (Consolidated Appropriations; P.L. 110-161),
another condition was added blocking the admission of Uzbek officials to the United States if the
Secretary of State determines that they were involved in abuses in Andijon. Omnibus
Appropriations for FY2009 (P.L. 111-8, Secs. 7075 [Kazakhstan] and 7076 [Uzbekistan])
reiterated these conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Consolidated
Appropriations for FY2010 (P.L. 111-117) referenced Secs. 7075 and 7076, but added that
Uzbekistan would be eligible for expanded IMET.
139 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for FY2010, May 2009, p. 44;
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for FY2011, Volume II, March 2010, p. 85.
140 The language calling for “substantial progress” in respecting human rights differs from the grounds of ineligibility
for assistance under Section 498(b) of Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), which includes as
grounds a presidential determination that a Soviet successor state has “engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights.” The Administration has stated annually that the president has
not determined that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have engaged in “gross violations” of human rights.
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Among recent determinations and reports:
• Then-Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte reported to Congress in
February 2008 that Kazakhstan had failed to significantly improve its human
rights record but that he had waived aid restrictions on national security grounds.
He did not determine and report to Congress that Uzbekistan was making
significant progress in respecting human rights, so aid restrictions remained in
place (IMET and FMF programs were among the affected programs that did not
receive funding).
• Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg reported to Congress in February
2009 that Kazakhstan had taken steps forward, but had fallen short in meeting
reform commitments agreed to at the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in
Madrid in November 2007 on media, political parties, and elections, and on the
preservation of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR). A national security waiver was issued. He did not determine and report
to Congress that Uzbekistan was making significant progress in respecting
human rights, so aid restrictions remained in place (IMET and FMF programs
were among the affected programs that did not receive funding).
• A waiver was issued for Kazakhstan in early 2010.
Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States contributes to international financial
institutions that aid Central Asia. Recurrent policy issues regarding U.S. aid include what it
should be used for, who should receive it, and whether it is effective.
Legislation
P.L. 111-117 (H.R. 3288) (FY2010)
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010. Introduced on July 22, 2009. Signed into law on
December 16, 2009. The conference report (H.Rept. 111-366) calls for $10.4 million in
FREEDOM Support Act aid to Kazakhstan, $46 million to Kyrgyzstan, $42.5 million to
Tajikistan, $12.5 million to Turkmenistan, $8.25 million to Uzbekistan, and $11 million for
Central Asia regional programs. Of the assistance provided to Kyrgyzstan, the conferees call for
$11.5 million to go to the U.S.-Kyrgyz Joint Development Fund. They also call for $3 million in
Foreign Military Financing aid for Kazakhstan, $3.5 million for Kyrgyzstan, $1.5 million for
Tajikistan, and $2 million for Turkmenistan. The conference agreement includes a provision
which carries forward by reference the terms and conditions of P.L. 111-8 conditioning aid to the
governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The House had proposed a limitation only on
assistance for Uzbekistan. Aid to Kazakhstan is conditioned on progress in democratization and
respect for human rights, including obligations to the OSCE to implement reforms in elections,
media freedom, freedom of assembly, and minority rights, and in meeting the commitments it
made in connection with its assumption of the chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010. The Secretary
of State is permitted a waiver on national security grounds. Aid to the government of Uzbekistan
is conditioned on its meeting commitments put forth in the U.S.-Uzbek Declaration on Strategic
Partnership and on prosecuting the individuals responsible for killings of civilians in Andijon. If
the Secretary of State has evidence of persons responsible for the killings of civilians in Andijon,
that person is to be deemed ineligible for admission to the United States. The condition may be
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lifted if the Secretary reports that Uzbekistan has taken concrete and measureable steps to respect
human rights. The Secretary may permit such a person to enter for U.N. activities or to further
law enforcement. A new provision in FY2010 permits expanded International Military Education
and Training (IMET) assistance for Uzbekistan. The conferees call for the Secretary of State to
submit a report detailing actions by the Kazakh government to implement the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative and other efforts to achieve transparency and accountability in
managing revenues from oil, gas, and mining. They also call for a report describing defense
articles, defense services, and financial aid provided to Central Asian states and their use by the
security forces.
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia,
FY1992 to FY2010, and the FY2011 Request
(millions of dollars)
FY1992 thru
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
Central Asian Country
Budgeteda
Actualb
Estimateb
Requestb
Kazakhstan 1,665.55
22.422
18.885
18.3
Kyrgyzstan 953.5
58.932
131.37d
46.925
Tajikistan 819.48
35.765
48.299
47.089
Turkmenistan 298.5
8.851
16.35
13.325
Uzbekistan 885.31
8.555
12.04
12.14
Regional 89.18
15.0c 23.4c 19.1c
Total 4,711.52
149.525
250.339d 156.879
As a Percentage of aid to
Eurasia
14%
19%
41%
26%
Sources: State Department, Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia; Congressional Budget
Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2011.
a. Includes funds from the Aid for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) account and Agency budgets.
Excludes some classified coalition support funding.
b. Includes funds from the Aid for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) account and other “Function
150” programs. Does not include Defense or Energy Department funds, funding for exchanges, or
Millennium Challenge Corporation aid to Kyrgyzstan.
c. Includes only funds from the AEECA account and the State Department’s Child Survival and Health
programs.
d. Includes $77.6 million provided after the April 2010 coup and June 2010 ethnic violence.
Congressional Research Service
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Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
Source: CRS (September 2010)
CRS-51
Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
Author Contact Information
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289
Congressional Research Service
52