Updated March 25, 2024
Saudi Arabia
A Changing Kingdom and Partnership
State policy changes have created more opportunities for
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ruled by the Al Saud family
Saudi women to participate in the kingdom’s economy and
since its founding in 1932, wields considerable global
public life, amid strict limitations on activism, expression,
influence through its administration of the birthplace of the
and dissent that spur U.S. and international human rights
Islamic faith and by virtue of holding the world’s second
concerns. In his roles as Crown Prince and Prime Minister,
largest proven oil reserves. In exchange for protection,
Mohammed bin Salman acts as the kingdom’s principal
advice, technology, and armaments from the United States,
decision maker. The king’s age and health challenges
the Saudi government has welcomed American investment
suggest that a leadership transition could occur at any time.
in the kingdom and has served as a U.S. security and
Saudi leaders appear to have considerably narrowed
counterterrorism partner for decades.
opportunities for citizens to express dissent since 2017.
The Biden Administration has pursued a policy of
Security forces have detained dozens of activists, clerics,
reengagement with Saudi Arabia after an initial period of
Islamist figures, and journalists, releasing some
reevaluation, limited retrenchment, and apparent strain in
conditionally during 2021 and 2022. In late 2017,
the bilateral relationship linked to Saudi participation in the
authorities imprisoned dozens of wealthy individuals (and
war in neighboring Yemen, human rights concerns, and
potential family rivals of the crown prince) for months as
U.S. concerns about Saudi policies that influence global oil
part of a nominal anticorruption campaign. Reports of
prices. Mutual interests and close security ties built on
additional detentions and questioning of leading royals
decades of arms sales, training, and advisory support
since 2020 drew attention to reported succession tensions.
anchored the relationship through recent difficulties.
Saudi decisionmaking has shifted from what had been a
President Biden visited the kingdom in July 2022 and the
relatively risk-averse posture rooted in rulers’ concerns for
two governments are pursuing cooperative global
maintaining elite consensus, to one characterized by bolder,
infrastructure investment and communications technology
centrally directed changes. The Crown Prince’s leadership
initiatives. Negotiations over possible U.S.-Saudi
and decisions have challenged key interest groups,
agreements to incentivize Saudi-Israeli normalization were
including factions of the royal family, business elites, and
disrupted by the October 2023 terrorist attacks on Israel and
conservative religious figures, creating new opportunities
ensuing Israel-Hamas war, but have since resumed. In
for the kingdom while raising the potential costs of failure.
February 2024, Saudi Arabia linked possible normalization
Vision 2030 and Social Change
with Israel to recognition of an independent Palestinian
The centerpiece of Saudi leaders’ domestic agenda is the
state “on the June 4, 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its
Vision 2030 initiative, which seeks to transform the
capital,” among other conditions (see below). Senior U.S.
kingdom’s economy by diversifying the government’s
and Saudi officials remain in regular contact concerning the
sources of revenue and reducing long-standing oil export
Israel-Hamas war and regional security issues, including
dependence through investment and private sector growth.
attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of
Aden by the Yemen-based Ansar Allah/Houthi movement.
Figure 1. Saudi Arabia
Congressional oversight of U.S.-Saudi bilateral cooperation
continues, and Congress may review any proposed U.S.-
Saudi agreements in support of Israeli-Saudi normalization.
Leadership and Public Confidence
Under the leadership of King Salman bin Abd al Aziz Al
Saud (born 1935) and his son, the Crown Prince and Prime
Minister Mohammed bin Salman (born 1985, aka MBS),
Saudi Arabia is pursuing an economic and social
transformation agenda at home and a multifaceted foreign
policy involving complex relationships with the United
States, U.S. rivals, other G-20 economies, and the
Source: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
developing world. These initiatives suggest Saudi leaders
Successive Saudi leaders have pursued these goals, but with
are attempting to leverage the kingdom’s potential and
more narrow and gradual targets than those of
Vision 2030.
resources to retain and expand Saudi influence in a world
Historically, Saudi policymakers have faced challenges in
shaped by great power competition and expectations of
balancing these types of reforms with concerns for the
global energy transition and reduced fossil fuel
preservation of regime and national security, social
consumption.
stability, and cultural and religious values. The kingdom’s
finances and ability to implement its ambitious economic
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Saudi Arabia
and green energy transformation agendas remain dependent
2015, organized a military coalition of mostly Arab states in
on revenue derived from oil exports.
efforts to reverse Houthi military gains. Iran has provided
arms and aid to the Houthis, who have attacked
Along with its
Vision 2030 initiative, the state has made
international shipping and sites in Saudi Arabia and the
major but sensitive social changes. Authorities reversed the
kingdom’s ban
United Arab Emirates (UAE). An April 2022 truce between
on women driving in June 2018, in part to
expand women’s participation in the workforce. Parallel
the ROYG and the Houthis has held, bringing a halt to cross
border missile attacks from Yemen and to Saudi-led
changes have created more public space for women in some
coalition airstrikes. The Biden Administration continues to
social and cultural events. Authorities have partially
provide defensive support to the kingdom and endorses
amended male guardianship rules restricting women’s
Saudi dialogue with Iran and parties to the Yemen conflict.
autonomy and have acted to provide for more uniform
judicial rulings in related cases. Many younger Saudis
Israel, the Palestinians, and Possible Normalization
welcome changes made to date and call for more; roughly
Saudi Arabia publicly supports key Palestinian demands,
two-thirds of Saudi nationals are under the age of 35. Other
while Saudi leaders have engaged quietly with Israel about
Saudis express opposition or concern about the changes’
shared concerns over Iran. Saudi Arabia has called for a
potential effects on religious and social values.
ceasefire in the war between Israel and Hamas, and Saudi
Human Rights
officials indicate that they remain open to possible
normalization with Israel while insisting on a solution that
More aggressive human rights restrictions have
enables Palestinian statehood. The Biden Administration
accompanied recent social change. The imprisonment and
has identified Saudi-Israeli normalization as a U.S. national
trial of several women’s right activists and other vocal
security interest and is engaged in talks with senior Saudi
figures prompted congressional scrutiny of the kingdom’s
and Israeli leaders on the issue, saying in March 2024 that
use of its Specialized Criminal Court and anti-terrorism
U.S. and Saudi officials were making “good progress.”
laws to confront dissent. Since December 2020, Saudi
courts have reduced or suspended sentences for some
“...there will be no diplomatic relations with Israel
prominent detainees and released others conditionally,
unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized
while imposing new lengthy sentences on others. In
on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital,
February 2021, the U.S. intelligence community released a
and that the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip stops
report assessing that the Crown Prince “approved an
and all Israeli occupation forces withdraw from the
operation in Istanbul, Turkey to capture or kill” Saudi
Gaza Strip. The Kingdom reiterates its call to the
journalist and U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi. Saudi
permanent members of the UN Security Council that
officials disputed the report’s conclusions.
have not yet recognized the Palestinian state to
Saudi Nuclear Plans
expedite the recognition of a Palestinian state on the
Saudi leaders seek to recast the role of energy resources in
1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.”
the kingdom’s economy and plan to develop domestic
— Saudi Foreign Ministry Statement, February 7, 2024
civilian nuclear power infrastructure. In 2022, they solicited
technical bids related to the planned construction of two
Relations with China and Russia
nuclear power reactors. The Trump Administration
Saudi Arabia is a major source of oil imports for the
expedited consideration of required regulatory approvals for
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Sino-Saudi economic
U.S. nuclear firms to provide marketing information to
and diplomatic ties have deepened since the 1990s. PRC
Saudi officials. Saudi officials have not forsworn uranium
President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia in 2022, and
enrichment. They state that they intend to use domestic
Saudi officials joined other Arab officials in China in
uranium resources to produce nuclear fuel. Saudi nuclear
November 2023 to demand a ceasefire in Gaza. Media
facilities are subject to International Atomic Energy
reports claim that China has provided the kingdom with
Agency (IAEA) safeguards, though some press reports have
ballistic missile production technology and that the two
located possibly undeclared sites. The IAEA has reviewed
governments have cooperated on a uranium milling plant.
declared Saudi nuclear infrastructure and recommends
Saudi Arabia coordinates with Russia on oil production
adoption and implementation of an Additional Protocol.
decisions, although the two producers at times have differed
Saudi Foreign Policy
over output. Saudi Arabia voted at the United Nations to
Iran and Yemen
condemn Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Saudi officials
After a long estrangement, Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023
have offered to mediate between Ukraine and Russia and
reached an agreement facilitated by Iraq, Oman, and China
have facilitated related prisoner exchanges.
to reestablish diplomatic relations and reopen their
Saudi-U.S. Relations
respective embassies. Saudi officials remain concerned
More than 2,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed to
about Iranian support for armed actors, especially the Ansar
Saudi Arabia to counter and deter Iranian threats and to
Allah/Houthi movement in Yemen, Lebanon’s Hezbollah,
implement defense and security cooperation programs.
and Shia militias in Iraq. Saudi officials praised the Trump
Administration’s decision to withdraw from the Joint
U.S.-Saudi harmony or discord over the Israel-Hamas war
and its aftermath could affect prospects for U.S.-Saudi
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, and the
collaboration on other issues, including potential Saudi-
Crown Prince has said that if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon,
Israeli normalization and other U.S. priorities.
Saudi Arabia will follow suit.
Saudi Arabia opposed the 2014-2015 Houthi ouster of the
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Republic of Yemen government (ROYG), and, in March
Affairs
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Saudi Arabia
IF10822
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10822 · VERSION 24 · UPDATED