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Congressional interest in Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding has continued as Members debate ways of funding priorities without breaching discretionary spending limits set in law.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority designated as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT) in support of the broad U.S. government response to the 9/11 attacks and for other related international affairs activities. This figure amounts to approximately 9.4% of total discretionary spending during this period.
Congress has used supplemental appropriation acts or designated funding for emergency requirements or OCO/GWOT—or both—in statute. These funds are not subject to limits on discretionary spending in congressional budget resolutions or to the statutory discretionary spending limits established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-125). The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P.L. 99-177) allows emergency funding to be excluded from budget control limits. The BCA added the OCO/GWOT designation to the BBEDCA exemption, thereby providing Congress and the President with an alternate way to exclude funding from the BCA spending limits.
While there is no overall statutory limit on the amount of emergency or OCO/GWOT spending, both Congress and the President have fundamental roles in determining how much of the spending to provide each fiscal year. Congress must designate any such funding in statute on an account-by-account basis. The President is also required to designate it as such after it is appropriatedThe Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that through FY2016 Congress has appropriated $1.6 trillion for DOD war-related activities since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. When combined with an estimated $123.2 billion in related State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations, the DOD, Department of State (DOS), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have received an estimated $1.7 trillion for activities and operations in support of the broad U.S. government response to the 9/11 attacks.
Funding for these activities has been largely provided through supplemental appropriation acts or has been designated as an "emergency" or "Overseas Contingency Operation/Global War on Terror" (OCO/GWOT) requirement in annual agency budget requests—or both. Funds designated as such are not subject to procedural limits on discretionary spending in congressional budget resolutions or to the statutory discretionary spending limits established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). While there is no overall statutory limit on the amount of emergency or OCO/GWOT-designated spending, both Congress and the President have a fundamental role in determining how much OCO/GWOT and emergency spending is provided each fiscal year. Congress must designate any such funding as OCO/GWOT in statute on an account by account basis. The President is also required to designate it as such after it is appropriated in order for it to be available for expenditure.
Some defense officials and policymakers argue OCO funding allows for flexible response to contingencies, and provides a "safety valve" to the spending caps and threat of sequestration—the automatic cancellation of budget authority largely through across-the-board reductions of nonexempt programs and activities—under the BCA. Critics, however, have described OCO/GWOT as a loophole or "gimmick"—morphing from an account for replacing combat losses of equipment, resupplying expended munitions, and transporting troops through war zones, to a "slush fund" for activities unrelated to contingency operations. Congress appropriated approximately $103 billion for OCO in FY2017 (8.5% of all discretionary appropriations), $78 billion for OCO in FY2018 (5.5% of all discretionary appropriations), and $68.8 billion for OCO so far in FY2019. Discretionary appropriations for FY2019 are not yet final; a continuing resolution expired December 21, 2018. Following passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), which raised discretionary budget caps for defense and foreign affairs agencies in FY2018 and FY2019, the Administration proposed shifting some OCO funding into the base, or regular, budget. Although Congress has generally not followed Administration requests for reduced funding for foreign affairs and domestic activities and has increased funding for defense, the President has asked cabinet secretaries to propose spending cuts of 5% in FY2020. Such proposals, if requested in a budget submission, may create difficult choices for Congress in FY2020 and FY2021—the final two years of the BCA discretionary spending limits. Congress's decisions on OCO/GWOT designations will affect how much agency funding is available for military operations and foreign affairs activities overseas, how much is subject to the BCA caps, and how much is incorporated into regular budgets and long-term budget projections. This report provides background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on war-related and other international emergency or contingency-designated funding since FY2001. This CRS report is meant to serve as a reference on certain funding designated as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT), as well as related budgetary and policy issues. It does not provide an estimate of war costs within the OCO/GWOT account (all of which may not be for activities associated with war or defense) or such costs in the DOD base budget or other agency funding (which may be related to war activities, such as the cost of health care for combat veterans). For additional information on the FY2019 budget and related issues, see CRS Report R45202, The Federal Budget: Overview and Issues for FY2019 and Beyond, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS In Focus IF10942, FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: An Overview of H.R. 5515, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R45168, Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2019 Budget and Appropriations, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. For additional information on the Budget Control Act as amended, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed]. For additional information on U.S. policy in Afghanistan and the Middle East, see CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report R45096, Iraq: Issues in the 115th Congress, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
(in billions of dollars) Source: CRS analysis of Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, Table 2-1: Base Budget, War Funding and Supplementals by Military Department, by P.L. Title (FY2001-FY2019), April 2019; Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2001-FY2019; Department of Homeland Security, Budget in Brief documents, FY2001-FY2019; Congressional Budget Office, Final Fiscal Year 2018 House Current Status of Discretionary Appropriations, as of September 30, 2018; Congressional Budget Office, Fiscal Year 2019 House Current Status of Discretionary Appropriations, as of October 5, 2018. Notes: Figures in nominal, or current, dollars (not adjusted for inflation). Totals may not sum due to rounding. FY2019 figure for State/USAID and DHS were not available because continuing resolutions P.L. 115-245 and P.L. 115-298 included partial-year funding. DHS (Coast Guard) figures do not include funding redirected from P.L. 107-38. Figures do not include funding for domestic programs, or other agency funding identified for OCO/GWOT or related purposes amounting to less than 1% of the total. Congress may consider one or more supplemental appropriations bills (colloquially called supplementals) for a fiscal year to provide funding for unforeseen needs (such as a response to a national security threat or a natural disaster), or to increase appropriations for other activities that have already been funded.3 Supplemental appropriations measures generally provide additional funding for selected activities over and above the amount provided through annual or continuing appropriations.4 Throughout the 20th century, Congress relied on supplemental appropriations to fund war-related activities, particularly in the period immediately following the start of hostilities. For example, in 1951, a year after the start of the Korean War, Congress approved DOD supplemental appropriations totaling $32.8 billion ($268 billion in constant FY2019 dollars). In 1952, DOD supplemental appropriations totaled just $1.4 billion ($11 billion in constant FY2019), as the base budget incorporated costs related to the war effort. A similar pattern occurred, to varying degrees, during the Vietnam War and 1990-1991 Gulf War.5 Supplemental appropriations can provide flexibility for policymakers to address demands that arise after funding has been appropriated. However, that flexibility has caused some to question whether supplementals should only be used to respond to unforeseen events, or whether they should also provide funding for activities that could reasonably be covered in regular appropriations acts.7 Congress used supplemental appropriations to provide funds for defense and foreign affairs activities related to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq following 9/11, and each subsequent fiscal year through FY2010. Initially understood as reflecting needs that were not anticipated during the regular appropriations cycle, supplemental appropriations were generally enacted as requested, and almost always designated as emergency requirements.
(in billions of constant FY2019 dollars) Sources: CRS analysis of Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, "Table 6-8: DOD Budget Authority by Public Law Title (FY1948-FY2023)," "Table 2-1: Base Budget, War Funding and Supplementals by Military Department, by P.L. Title (FY2001-FY2019)," and "Table 1-9: National Defense Budget Authority-Discretionary and Mandatory," April 2019; Department of Defense, FAD-809 table, January 1978; Congressional Budget Office, Final Fiscal Year 2018 House Current Status of Discretionary Appropriations, as of September 30, 2018; Congressional Budget Office, Fiscal Year 2019 House Current Status of Discretionary Appropriations, as of October 5, 2018; Congressional Budget Office, Supplemental appropriations reports from the 1970s-2000s; Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, "Table 10.1-Gross Domestic Product and Deflators Used in the Historical Tables: 1940–2023." Notes: 1950-2017 nominal DOD funding from DOD Table 6-8; 2018-2019 nominal DOD funding from CBO Current Status of Discretionary Appropriations tables; 1950-1977 nominal DOD non-base funding from DOD FAD-809 table; 1978-2000 nominal DOD non-base funding from CRS research; 2001-2017 nominal DOD non-base funding from DOD Table 2-1; 2018-2019 nominal DOD non-base funding from CBO Current Status of Discretionary Appropriations tables and DOD Table 1-9; nominal figures adjusted to constant FY2019 dollars using calculations based deflators in OMB Table 10.1. Beginning in FY2004, DOD received some of its war-related funding in its regular annual appropriations; these funds were designated as emergency. When funding needs for war and non-war-related activities were higher than anticipated, the Bush Administration submitted supplemental requests.8 In the FY2011 appropriations cycle, the Obama Administration moved away from submitting supplemental appropriations requests to Congress for war-related activities and used the regular budget and appropriation process to fund operations. This approach implied that while the funds might be war-related, they largely supported predictable ongoing activities rather than unanticipated needs. In concert with this change in budgetary approach, the Obama Administration began formally using the term Overseas Contingency Operations in place of the Bush Administration's term Global War on Terror.9 Both the Obama and Trump Administrations requested that OCO funding be designated in a manner that would effectively exempt such funding from the BCA limits on discretionary defense spending. Currently, there is no overall procedural or statutory limit on the amount of emergency or OCO/GWOT-designated spending that may be appropriated on an annual basis. Both Congress and the President have roles in determining how much emergency or OCO/GWOT spending is provided to federal agencies each fiscal year. Such spending must be designated as such within the President's budget request for congressional consideration. The President must separately designate the spending after Congress enacts appropriations for it to be available for expenditure. The emergency funding designation predated the OCO/GWOT designation. Through definitions statutorily established by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P.L. 99-177), spending designated as emergency requirements is for "unanticipated" purposes, such as those that are "sudden ... urgent ... unforeseen ... and temporary."10 The BBEDCA does not further specify the types of activities that are eligible for that designation. Thus, any discretionary funding designated by Congress and the President as being for an emergency is effectively exempted from certain statutory and procedural budget enforcement mechanisms, such as the BCA limits on discretionary spending.11 Debate of what should constitute OCO/GWOT or emergency activities and expenses has shifted over time, reflecting differing viewpoints about the extent, nature, and duration of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Over the years, both Congress and the President have at times adopted more, and at times less, expansive definitions of such designations to accommodate the strategic, budgetary, and political needs of the moment. Prior to February 2009, U.S. operations in response to the 9/11 attacks were collectively referred to as the Global War on Terror, or GWOT. Between September 2001 and February 2009, there was no separate budgetary designation for GWOT funds—instead, funding associated with those operations was designated as an emergency requirement.Definitions of what constitutes emergency or OCO/GWOTto be available for expenditure. Debate over what should constitute OCO/GWOT or emergency activities and expenses havehas shifted over time, reflecting differing viewpoints about the extent, nature, and duration of the wars in Iraq and AfghanistanU.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Funding designated for OCO/GWOT has also been recently used to fund base -budget requirements of the DOD and DOS and to provide fundingState Department and to prevent or respond to crises abroad, including armed conflict, as well as human-caused and natural disasters.
Introduction
Background
Increase in War-Related Appropriations after 9/11
to prevent or respond to crises abroad, including armed conflict, as well as human-caused and natural disasters. The first use of an OCO/GWOT designation in budgetary law was in the 2011 BCA. Prior to the BCA, the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA) only allowed "emergency" requirements to be excluded from budget control limits. The BCA added the designation "Overseas Contingency Operation/Global War on Terror" to the BBEDCA exemption, thereby providing Congress and the President with an alternate way to exclude funding from the BCA limits without using the "emergency" designation.
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA) raised the BCA discretionary spending limits for fiscal year (FY) 2016 and FY2017 for both the defense and nondefense categories, and also specified an expected level for OCO spending for those years. The President's February 2016 OCO budget request of $58.8 billion for defense activities and $14.9 billion for non-defense OCO matched BBA-directed levels for FY2017. However, the Administration submitted an amendment in November 2016, raising both the defense and non-defense requests by $5.8 billion each to $64.6 billion and $20.7 billion, respectively. The Administration stated that the additional resources are needed to maintain approximately 8,400 troops in Afghanistan and to fund additional troops and requirements in Iraq/Syria.
The DOD Comptroller indicated that the majority of the original $58.8 billion in FY2017 OCO request for DOD centers on supporting Operation Freedom's Sentinel in Afghanistan, Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria, and increased efforts to support European allies and deter Russian aggression—all while supporting what is referred to as a "partnership-focused approach to counterterrorism." However, the President's FY2017 DOD OCO request also includes $5.1 billion for base budget activities—normal military operations and procurement that could not be funded in the DOD's base budget due to the BCA statutory limits.
The original FY2017 OCO request for the State Department included funding needed to "provide support to, respond to, recover from, or prevent crises abroad, including armed conflict, as well as human-caused and natural disasters." Specifically, the DOS request included funding to contribute to peacekeeping missions and special political missions, increase efforts to destroy the Islamic State, and sustain security programs and embassy construction at high risk posts. The November 2016 request seeks an additional $5.8 billion for State and USAID to "support the Administration's counter-ISIL and counterterrorism objectives ... and respond to relief and recovery needs, as well as provide additional humanitarian assistance for areas liberated from ISIL and other unforeseen needs."
The House-passed National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2017 provided for an additional $18.0 billion in base budget requirements in the OCO authorization—funding that would be exempt from the spending caps set by the BCA. However, the House and Senate conference agreement on the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328) authorizes a total of $8.3 billion in OCO funding for base budget requirements ($5.1 billion requested by the Administration and $3.2 billion added by Congress) without an equivalent increase in spending for nondefense programs. The Obama Administration and the minority leadership in both congressional chambers objected to allowing an increase in defense spending by raising the defense cap—or adding OCO spending for defense—without providing a comparable increase for nondefense spending in the overall federal budget.
Having not reached agreement on most FY2017 annual appropriations bill before the start of the fiscal year, Congress enacted two continuing resolutions to provide temporary funding for federal programs. The first, the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act (H.R. 5325/P.L. 114-223), provided budget authority through December 9, 2016, for programs and activities for which regular appropriations bills for FY2017 had not been enacted. The second, the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 2028/P.L. 114-254) was enacted December 12, 2016. Division A of H.R. 2028 extends H.R. 5323 through April 28, 2017, and provides DOD and State/USAID OCO budget authority at a rate of operations equivalent to the FY2016 appropriated level. Division B of H.R. 2028 is a supplemental security assistance appropriations bill, providing an additional $5.8 billion for DOD and $4.3 billion for DOS, available through September 30, 2017, unless otherwise specified.
For additional information on related FY2017 budget issues see CRS Report R44428, The Federal Budget: Overview and Issues for FY2017 and Beyond, by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report R44454, Defense: FY2017 Budget Request, Authorization, and Appropriations, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], CRS Report R44636, FY2017 Defense Spending Under an Interim Continuing Resolution (CR): In Brief, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R44391, State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2017 Budget and Appropriations, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].
The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that through FY2016 Congress has appropriated $1.6 trillion to DOD for war-related operational costs, support for deployed troops, and transportation of personnel and equipment since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001.1 When combined with an estimated $123.2 billion in amounts appropriated for war-related activities of the State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS), these agencies have received an estimated $1.7 trillion for activities and operations related to the broad U.S. response to the attacks, including extended operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (see Figure 1).2
Funding for war-related activities has been largely provided through supplemental appropriation acts or has been designated as an "emergency" or "overseas contingency operation/global war on terror" (OCO/GWOT) requirement—or both. Funds designated as "emergency" or "OCO/GWOT" are not subject to procedural limits on discretionary spending in congressional budget resolutions, or the statutory discretionary spending limits provided through the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA).3
Some DOD officials argue that this funding approach is essential to enable a timely military response to a dynamic enemy operating in a complex battlespace.4 Critics however, have described the DOD's continued use of the OCO/GWOT account as creating a "slush fund" for military spending.5 These critics have suggested that the emergency or OCO/GWOT exception has inappropriately provided a "safety valve" to preserve base budget programs, helping federal agencies comply with statutory discretionary spending limits established by the BCA through designating funding intended to support base budget activities as OCO/GWOT requirements.6 Others have asserted that the spending limits—sometimes colloquially referred to as "caps"—established by the BCA have intensified the impetus for agencies to use OCO funding for activities not directly related to contingency operations. They warn that what was once generally restricted to a fund for replacing combat losses of equipment, resupply of expended munitions, and transporting troops to and through war zones has "ballooned into an ambiguous part of the budget to which government financiers increasingly turn to pay for other, at times unrelated, costs."7
Exacerbating observers' concerns is the two-year impact of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA).8 The 2015 Act raised the overall discretionary spending limits set by the BCA in 2011, and also set expected OCO funding levels for defense and nondefense for fiscal years FY2016 and FY2017. The enactment of the BBA resulted in the appropriation of an additional $7.7 billion for FY2016 defense OCO and $7.8 billion for SFOPS OCO. The Administration included $5.1 billion in base requirements in the FY2017 DOD OCO request using the BBA as justification.9 Similarly, with the BBA setting a $14.9 billion nondefense OCO minimum—more than double the Administration's FY2015 and FY2016 OCO requests―the Administration appears to have moved some base requirements into the OCO category for FY2017.
In marking-up the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 on April 27, 2016, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) designated an additional $18.0 billion in requirements from the President's base budget request as OCO/GWOT. The House passed this measure on May 18, 2016, and the measure was reflected in the House-passed Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 5293). Despite House efforts to greatly increase the use of OCO funding for base requirements the conference agreement on the NDAA (H.Rept. 114-840) provides a total of $8.3 billion in OCO funding for base budget requirements ($5.1 billion requested by the Administration and $3.2 billion added by Congress).
Having not reached agreement on most FY2017 annual appropriations bill before the start of the fiscal year, Congress enacted two continuing resolutions to provide temporary funding for federal programs. The first, the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act (H.R. 5325/P.L. 114-223) provided budget authority through December 9, 2016, for programs and activities for which regular appropriations bills for FY2017 had not been enacted. The second, the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 2028/P.L. 114-254) was enacted December 12, 2016. Division A of H.R. 2028 extends H.R. 5323 through April 28, 2017, and provides budget authority DOD and State/USAID OCO budget authority at a rate of operations equivalent to the FY2016 appropriated level. Division B of H.R. 2028 is a supplemental security assistance appropriations bill, providing an additional $5.8 billion for DOD and $4.3 billion for DOS, available through September 30, 2017, unless otherwise specified.
FY2001-FY2016 |
Source: Department of Defense National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2017 (Table 2-1) and Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2001-FY2017. Note: Amounts are not adjusted for inflation. This figure does not include amounts provided by H.R. 5325(P.L. 114-223), the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act or H.R. 2028 (P.L. 114-254) Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017. |
Supplemental appropriations were used to provide funds for defense and foreign affairs activities related to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and each subsequent fiscal year through FY2010. Understood as reflecting needs unanticipated during the regular appropriations cycle, supplemental appropriations were generally enacted as requested, and almost always designated as emergency funding.
In the FY2011 appropriations cycle, the Obama administration moved away from submitting supplemental appropriations requests to Congress for war-related activities, and has since used the annual budget and appropriation process to fund operations. In concert with this change in budgetary approach, the Obama administration began formally using the term "Overseas Contingency Operations" in place of the Bush administration's "Global War on Terror."10 Despite this change in label, the Obama administration has continued to request that OCO funding be designated in a manner that would effectively exempt such funding from the BCA limits on defense spending. Currently, there is no overall procedural or statutory limit on the amount of emergency or OCO-designated spending that may be appropriated on an annual basis. However, both Congress and the President have a role in determining how much OCO or emergency spending is provided each fiscal year to federal agencies. Such spending must be so designated as Congress considers the President's Budget request. The President must separately designate such spending after it is enacted in order for it to be available for expenditure.
Congress may consider one or more supplemental appropriations measures (sometimes colloquially referred to as supplementals) for a fiscal year to provide funding for unforeseen needs (such as funds to recover from a natural disaster), or to increase appropriations for other activities that have already been funded.11 Beginning in FY2004, DOD received some of its war-related funding in Title IX of its regular annual appropriation act, but these funds were designated as "emergency." When funding needs for war and non-war-related activities were higher than anticipated, the Administration submitted supplemental requests. Over the years, Congress has also provided appropriations in a lump sum to special accounts to meet unanticipated wartime needs.12
What's a "Supplemental"? The term "supplemental" is used by some as a colloquialism to describe the OCO budget request rather than a supplemental appropriation measure. While the OCO budget request is in addition, or supplemental, to an agency's base budget requirements, OCO funding may be provided through all three types of appropriations measures discussed below. The reader should not confuse a reference to a "supplemental appropriation measure" with a request for funds to supplement an agency's base budget requirements. Congress annually considers several appropriations measures that provide discretionary funding for numerous activities—such as national defense, education, and homeland security—as well as general government operations. In general, these appropriations measures are of three different types: regular appropriations bills, continuing resolutions, and supplemental appropriations measures. During a calendar year, Congress may consider the following:
Supplemental appropriations measures (or supplementals) generally provide additional funding for selected activities over and above the amount provided through annual or continuing appropriations. In general, supplemental funding may be provided to address cases in which resources provided through the annual appropriations process are determined to be inadequate or not timely. Supplementals have been used to provide funding for unforeseen needs, such as response and recovery costs due to a disaster. One recent example is the supplemental appropriations bill enacted in the wake of Hurricane Sandy in 2013. Titles containing supplemental appropriations can also be included in regular bills and continuing resolutions, rather than in separate supplemental bills. For further information, see CRS Report R42388, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction. |
Supplemental appropriations can provide important and necessary flexibility for policymakers to address needs that arise after funding has been appropriated. However, that flexibility has caused some to question whether supplementals are only used to respond to unforeseen events, or whether they also provide funding for activities that could reasonably be covered in regular appropriations acts.
Through definitions statutorily established by the BBEDCA, "emergency" spending is defined as spending that is for "unanticipated" purposes, such as those that are "sudden ... urgent ... unforeseen ... and temporary."13 The BBEDCA does not further specify the types of activities that are eligible for that designation. Thus, any discretionary funding designated by Congress and the President to be for an emergency requirement is effectively exempted from certain statutory and procedural budget enforcement mechanisms, such as the BCA limits on discretionary spending.
The designation of certain war-related activities and expenses as "emergency" requirements has shifted over time, reflecting differing viewpoints about the extent, nature, and duration of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over the years, both Congress and the President have at times adopted more, and at times less, expansive definitions to support such a designation to accommodate the needs and pressures of the moment.14
Prior to February 2009, U.S. operations in response to the 9/11 attacks were collectively referred to as the "Global War on Terror," or GWOT. Between September 2001 and February 2009, there was no separate budgetary designation for GWOT funds—instead, funding associated with those operations was designated as emergency.
The specific label "OCO" was not applied to the post-9/11 military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan until 2009. In February 2009, the Obama administration released "A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America's Promise,," a presidential fiscal policy document.1512 That document did not mention or reference GWOT; instead, it used the term OCO in discussingreference to ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The first request for "emergency"emergency funding for "OCO"—not "GWOT"OCO—not GWOT—was delivered to Congress in April 2009."16
Congress likewise transitioned to the OCO label in the NDAA for FY2010, with Title XV of the annual bill now known as "Authorization of Additional Appropriations for Overseas Contingency Operations" instead of "Authorization of Additional Appropriations for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom." The first use of an "overseas contingency operation" designation in budgetary law was in the 2011 BCA, which created an "Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism" designation by amending the 1985 BBEDCA (2 U.S.C 902). This was in addition to a BBEDCA designation for "emergency requirements." Doing so provided Congress and the President with an alternate way to exempt funding from the BCA caps without using the "emergency" designation. These designations were first in effect for FY2012 appropriations.
Beginning with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (NDAA; P.L. 111-84), the annual defense authorization bills have referenced the authorization of additional appropriations for OCO rather than the names of U.S. military operations conducted primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq.15 In 2011, the BCA (P.L. 112-125) amended the BBEDCA to create the Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism designation, which provided Congress and the President with an alternate way to exempt funding from the BCA caps without using the emergency designation.16 Beginning with the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74), annual appropriations bills have referenced the OCO/GWOT designation.17
The foreign affairs agencies began formally requesting OCO/GWOT funding in FY2012, distinguishing between what is referred to as enduring, , ongoing or base costs versus costs versus any extraordinary, temporary costs of the State Department (DOS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in and USAID in supporting ongoing U.S. operations and policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.17 .18 Congress, having usedused OCO/GWOT exemption for DOD, adopted this approach for foreign affairs, although its uses for SFOPSthough its uses for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) activities have never been permanently defined in statute. For the first foreign affairs OCO/GWOT appropriation, in FY2012, funds were provided for a wide range of recipient countries beyond the countries in the President's request, including Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, and the Philippines. In addition to country-specific uses, OCO/GWOT-designated funds were also appropriated for the Global Security Contingency Fund.18
All budgetary legislation is subject to a set of enforcement procedures associated with the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), as well as other rules, such as those imposed by the BCA.19Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-125) as amended. Those rules provide mechanisms to enforce both procedural and statutory limits on discretionary spending. The procedural limits associated with congressional budget resolutions are enforced through points of order that can be made while discretionary spending legislation is under consideration.20 If discretionary spending is enacted in excess of the statutory limits during any given budget cycle, enforcement primarily occurs through "sequestration," which is the automatic cancellation of budget authority through largely across-the-board reductions of nonexempt programs and activities.21 Appropriations that have been designated as "emergency requirements" or in support of "OCO/GWOT," however, are effectively exempted from those limits under current law.22
Enacted on August 2, 2011, the BCA as amended sets limits on defense and nondefense spending. As part of an agreement to increase the statutory limit on public debt, the BCA aimed to reduce annual federal budget deficits by a total of at least $2.1 trillion from FY2012 through FY2021, with approximately half of the savings to come from defense.22 The spending limits (or caps) apply separately to defense and nondefense discretionary budget authority.23 The caps are enforced by a mechanism called sequestration. Sequestration automatically cancels previously enacted appropriations (a form of budget authority) by an amount necessary to reach prespecified levels.24 The BCA effectively exempted certain types of discretionary spending from the statutory limits, including funding designated for OCO/GWOT.25Recently, Congress and the President have designated as "OCO/GWOT" funds for a variety of activities that had previously been contained in the base budget. This relabeling of funds20
The Budget Control Act of 201121
ongoingfunding for OCO for certain activities not directly related to contingency operations as "OCO,", Congress and the President can effectively continue to increase topline defense, foreign affairs, and other related discretionary spending, without triggering sequestration.
Section 101 of Title10, United States Code, defines a "contingency operation" as any Secretary of Defense-designated military operation "in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force." Since the 1990s NATO intervention in the Balkans, DOD financial management regulations (FMR) have defined contingency operations costs as those expenses necessary to cover incremental costs "that would not have been incurred had the contingency operation not been supported (emphasis added)."23 Such costs would not include, for example, base pay for troops or planned equipment modernization, as those expenditures are normal peacetime needs of the DOD. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued criteria to be used by the DOD in making war/overseas contingency operations funding requests in September 2010, and the DOD FMR was updated accordingly (see Appendix A).
The current DOD FMR states that only those costs in addition to DOD's normal peacetime activities, such as those incurred because troops are deployed in support of a contingency operation, are to be considered OCO.24 To aid in the identification of such activities, the DOD regulation requires the military services to show how additional contingency operation deployments and operations affect peacetime assumptions about troop levels and operational tempo. Long-term equipment procurement or similar investment costs are only to be included if "necessary to support a contingency operation" and are "not to be used to procure durable and expendable items in excess of what is required."25 Table 1 includes the general cost categories DOD uses in accounting for costs of contingency operations.
Category |
Activity |
Personnel |
Incremental pay and allowances of DOD military and civilians participating in or supporting a contingency operation. |
Personnel Support |
Materials and services required to support Active and Reserve Component personnel and DOD civilian personnel engaged in the contingency operation. |
Operating Support |
Incremental costs of material and services used to conduct or support an operation, including contract services. |
Transportation |
Transportation costs associated with supporting the contingency operation, including contract services, for all phases of the operation (i.e., deployment, sustainment and redeployment). |
Working Capital Fund Support Costs |
Costs associated with supporting the contingency operation accepted by Defense Working Capital Fund organizations for contingency operations. |
Investment Costs |
Costs associated with supporting the contingency operation, appropriately financed in the Procurement; Research Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E); and in the Military Construction appropriations for projects in support of contingency operations. |
Other Support Costs |
Includes various departmental programs designed to reimburse coalition countries for logistical and military support; to provide lift to and to sustain coalition partners during military operations; and to execute the Commander's Emergency Response Program. |
Source: DOD, "Financial Management Regulation," Contingency Operations, Table 23-1 (September 2007); http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/fmr/current/12/12_23.pdf.
Note: The current FMR also includes training and equipping the "Afghan National Army and the Armed Forces of Iraq" in the Other Support Costs category.
There is no detailed statutory or regulatory definition of "OCO" or "OCO/GWOT" in the nondefense context. The Obama administration's FY2012 International Affairs budget request was the first of its kind to include separate OCO funds for "extraordinary and temporary costs of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan."26 At the time, the Administration indicated that the use of this designation was intended to provide a transparent, whole-of-government approach to the exceptional war-related costs incurred in those three countries, thus better aligning the associated military and civilian costs. This first foreign affairs OCO request identified the significant resource demands placed on the State Department as a result of the transitions from a military-led to a civilian-led mission in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the importance of a stable Pakistan for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. The FY2012 foreign affairs OCO request included
In subsequent years, the Administration designated certain activities in Syria and other peacekeeping activities as OCO; in the FY2017 budget request, the Administration broadened its use of DOS OCO funds, including countering Russian aggression, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and aid to Africa. In addition to OCO funds requested through the normal appropriations process, the Administration in FY2015 and FY2016 also requested emergency supplemental funding (designated as OCO) to support DOS/USAID efforts in countering the Islamic State, as well as responding to global health threats such as the Ebola and Zika viruses.
See Appendix A for more information on statutory authorities and regulatory guidance related to emergency requests and appropriations.
In addition to the supplemental appropriations and emergency or OCO/GWOT designation, DOD and DOS also have the authority to shift funds from one budget account to another in response to operational needs. For DOD, these transfers (sometimes colloquially called "reprogrammings"), are statutorily authorized by 10 U.S.C §2214 ("Transfer of funds: procedure and limitations"), which allows the Secretary of Defense to reallocate funds for higher priority items, based on unforeseen military requirements, after receiving written approval from the four congressional defense committees. DOD may also reprogram funds within an account from one activity to another, as long as the general purpose for the use of those funds remains unchanged.27 Specific authorities, or limits to transfer or reprogramming authorities, have also been added to these general authorities through provisions in annual defense authorization and appropriation acts.28
Annual caps on transfers between DOD accounts for both base budget funds and emergency or OCO-designated funds are generally established through provisions in annual appropriation or authorization bills. In FY2016, the base budget transfer cap was $4.5 billion, or less than 1% of the total enacted DOD base budget in that year.29 In recent years, Congress has authorized the DOD, after meeting certain stipulations, to transfer base budget "funds made available…for military functions" to other base accounts, or to OCO-designated accounts, with military functions.30 Recognizing the greater uncertainty in predicting overseas contingency operation spending, defense appropriations acts have typically set a higher transfer cap for such funds—in FY2016, the OCO budget transfer caps were $4.5 billion, or about 7.7% of the total enacted DOD OCO budget.31 In recent years, Congress has also authorized the DOD to transfer OCO-designated funds to other OCO-designated accounts.32
The Department of State's OCO transfer authority has been provided in appropriations acts and has specifically authorized the Administration to transfer OCO funds only to other OCO funds within Title VIII SFOPS appropriations, not between OCO and base accounts. The transfer authority is capped, specified by account, and requires regular congressional notification procedures.
The OCOTF was established for DOD in FY1997 as a "no year" transfer account (meaning amounts are available until expended) in order to provide additional flexibility to meet operational requirements.33 Transfers from the OCOTF are processed using existing reprogramming procedures. A quarterly report is submitted to the congressional oversight committees, documenting all transfers from the OCOTF to DOD components baseline accounts. Beginning in FY2002, funds to support Southwest Asia, Kosovo, and Bosnia contingency requirements were appropriated directly to DOD components' Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel accounts, rather than allocation to the OCOTF for later disbursement. FY2014 was the last year a request was made by the Administration for a direct appropriation to the OCOTF.34
Through the DOS and DOD OCO authorization and appropriation process, Congress has created numerous funds and programs that are designed to finance specific overseas contingency operations-related activities that do not fit into traditional budgetary accounts. Many of these funds and programs are supplied with amounts that are available until expended—however, authorization for the specified fund or program has an expiration date, thereby requiring further congressional action for reauthorization of affected funds or programs.35 Congress has also provided increased transfer authority to provide greater flexibility for U.S. government activities in situations that are typically unpredictable.36 For example, in order to facilitate assistance for multiple ongoing international migration and refugee crises, the FY2016 appropriations law authorized transfers between the International Disaster Assistance and Migration and Refugee Assistance accounts, subject to an annual limit of $600 million.37 Examples of these types of congressionally-authorized OCO programs or funds include
CRS estimates a total of $1.7 trillion has been provided to the DOD and DOS through FY2016 for combat operations, certain diplomatic operations, and related foreign assistance since the attacks on September 11, 2001. DOD activities account for $1.6 trillion—or 93%―of the total enacted funding designated for these purposes. Diplomatic operations and foreign aid programs of the DOS account for another $123.2 billion, or 7.0% of the total.48
For FY2017, the Administration initially requested $73.7 billion be designated as OCO/GWOT funding ($58.8 billion for DOD and $14.9 billion for DOS). In November 2016, the Administration amended its OCO request, increasing the total to $85.3 billion ($64.6 billion for DOD and $20.7 billion for State/USAID) (see Table 2).
dollars in billions |
percentage of total |
|||||||||
|
|
FY2001-FY2016 Enacted |
FY2017 Amended Request |
|||||||
DOD |
|
|
|
| ||||||
State/USAID |
|
|
|
| ||||||
|
|
|
|
|
Source: DOD National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2017 (Table 2-1), Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2001-FY2017 and DOD Overview: Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Amendment FY2017.
a.
The FY2017 OCO request was amended on November 10, 2016, and included an additional $11.6 billion ($5.8 billion for DOD and $5.8 billion for State/USAID).
b.
This figure does not include amounts provided by H.R. 5325 (P.L. 114-223), the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act or H.R. 2028 (P.L. 114-254) Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017.
Terms Commonly Used in Discussing the Budget Process Appropriation means a provision of law providing legal authority for the obligation of funds for a given purpose. In most cases this is provided in the form of budget authority. Budget authority means the authority provided by law to incur financial obligations that will result in outlays. Discretionary spending means budgetary resources (except those provided to finance obligations for mandatory spending programs) provided in appropriations acts. Mandatory spending means spending controlled by laws other than appropriations acts (including spending for entitlement programs) and spending for the food stamp program. Obligation means a binding agreement that will result in outlays, immediately or in the future. Budgetary resources must be available before obligations can be incurred legally. Outlay means a payment to liquidate an obligation. Source: OMB Circular No. A–11 (2015). Section 20, Terms and Concepts. |
The majority of the $9.4 trillion in total DOD spending since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 has been for base budget funding (82%), with approximately 18% of the budget allocated for war funding. Less than 1% of that cumulative total has been authorized for emergency relief (such as hurricane response) and a variety of unrelated programs detailed in Table 3.
Type of Spending |
Amount |
Percentage of Spending |
||
Base |
|
81.8% |
||
OCO/GWOT |
|
17.9% |
||
|
|
0.3% |
||
|
|
100% |
Source: DOD National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2017 (Table 2-1) and DOD Overview: Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Amendment FY2017.
a.
This category includes funding for hurricane relief, avian flu and Ebola assistance, Iron Dome, and several accounts related to personnel readiness and medical care. FY2017 amounts reflect the Administration request.
b.
This figure does not include amounts provided by H.R. 5325(P.L. 114-223), the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act or H.R. 2028 (P.L. 114-254) Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017.
War-related funding for DOD peaked at $187 billion during the FY2008 Iraq troop surge, and rose from a subsequent decline as cost reductions in Iraq were offset by a second surge in Afghanistan, beginning in FY2010 (see Figure 2). The Administration's FY2015 request began stabilization in OCO/GWOT funding following the drawndown in Iraq and Afghanistan, with FY2015-FY2017 levels averaging $61 billion.
Since 9/11, the U.S. Armed Forces, under guidance from the DOD, have conducted the following named military operations:
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began immediately after the 9/11 attacks and included operations in Afghanistan and other small GWOT operations. OEF formally concluded in December 2014 and was succeeded by Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). OEF was comprised of several related missions:
Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS) began in January 2015 and continues today. It is the successor to OEF and is the U.S. contribution to the NATO-led Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan.54 OFS also includes related missions previously covered under OEF:
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began in the fall of 2002 with the buildup of troops for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and continued under counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq until September 2010.
Operation New Dawn (OND) began in September 2010 and concluded in December 2011. OND was the immediate successor to OIF; under OND U.S. troops conducted stability operations and focused on advising, assisting and training Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) was authorized by the President on August 7, 2014 and was the beginning of U.S. air strikes in Iraq and Syria to "degrade and ultimately defeat" the Islamic State (IS) without deploying U.S. ground troops. OIR operations continue, including some OND-related activities, such as the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq.55
Operation Odyssey Lightning (OOL) began August 1, 2016, in support of the Libyan government's (Government of National Accord) counter-ISIL operations. The Administration's November 2016 amendment to the OCO budget includes $20 million in funding to support U.S. counter-ISIL efforts and to finance the incremental Navy and Air Force cost of operations, flying hours, and deployments in Libya.56
Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) was initiated as an immediate response to defend the U.S. homeland in the wake of the attacks of 9/11 and it continues today. ONE provides enhanced security for U.S. military bases, and conducts other homeland defense activities.57
Figure 3 depicts amounts obligated by DOD in Afghanistan and Iraq, and for ONE from FY2001-FY2016. As of July 2016, DOD had obligated a total of $1.4 trillion for emergency or OCO/GWOT requirements for these named operations.
Afghanistan
Iraq
Enhanced U.S. Security/Noble Eagle
dollars in billions |
Source: Department of Defense Cost of War Report, July 2016. |
Figure 4 depicts the allocation of GWOT/OCO funding by military service. Emergency appropriations were initially provided as general "defense-wide" appropriations. Beginning in FY2003, as operations evolved and planning improved, allocations increased and were provided more specifically. While heavily weighted toward ground forces through FY2013, the percent of total funding allocated for the Air Force and Navy has increased, reflecting the Administration's policies in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Although other significant variables affecting overall contingency operation costs, a major factor in determining OCO costs for DOD since September 11, 2001 has been the number of U.S. uniformed military personnel deployed to the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters of operation at different points in time. Between 2001 and 2016, uniformed military personnel levels in Iraq and in Afghanistan changed dramatically. See Figure 5 for more information on deployed uniformed military personnel levels over time.
DOD, DOS, and USAID have also relied extensively on individual service contractors and subcontractors to support a wide range of activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recent contingency operations have highlighted the critical role that service contractors play in supporting U.S. uniformed military personnel—both in terms of the number of contractors and the type of work being performed. During recent U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors frequently averaged 50% or more of the total DOD presence in-country.60 See Figure 6 and Figure 7 for more information on DOD-funded contractors and uniformed military personnel levels in Afghanistan and Iraq over time. Analysts and observers, including the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), have raised questions about the reliability of data documenting contractors employed in support of contingency operations gathered by DOD, DOS, and USAID. They have also recently called attention to "systemic challenges" at the DOS and USAID that may continue to limit agency management and oversight of contracts in contingency environments.61
As discussed above, 10 U.S.C §101 defines a contingency operation as any Secretary of Defense-designated military operation "in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force." Most contingency operations are designated as "emergency" or "OCO/GWOT" per the BBEDCA exemption and many have historically been funded through supplemental appropriations. However, funding for certain DOD contingency operations has been moved to the base budget request, and is no longer designated as emergency or OCO/GWOT requirements. This movement of funding from the OCO request to the base budget request typically occurs as the operational activities of an enduring contingency operation evolve over time, and DOD determines that certain elements of the associated military operations have become stable enough to be planned, financed, and executed within the DOD's base budget. For example, funding for Operation Noble Eagle, which provides fighter aircraft on 24/7 alert at several U.S. military bases, was moved from the GWOT request to the base request in 2005.
As first mandated by section 8091 of P.L. 110-116, Congress has required DOD to provide separate annual budget justification documents detailing the costs of U.S. Armed Forces participation in all named contingency operations where the total cost of the operation exceeds $100 million, or is staffed by more than a thousand U.S. military personnel.63
Funding requests in the base budget for overseas contingency operations are not designated as emergency or OCO/GWOT in accordance with the BCA exception and are therefore counted against the DOD's total discretionary spending limit. For information on contingency operations funded wholly or in part through the DOD's base budget funding request, and therefore subject to the BCA caps, see Appendix B.
The estimated $123.2 billion in emergency or OCO/GWOT appropriations enacted to date for the State Department/USAID funds diplomatic operations (e.g., paying staff, providing security, and building and maintaining embassies) and funds a variety of foreign aid programs in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, which range from the Economic Support Fund to counter-narcotics activities.
With the exception of a one-time appropriation of $20.0 billion for Iraq reconstruction made in FY2004, supplemental annual foreign aid and diplomatic operations funding hovered between $4 billion and $5 billion each year until FY2011 with one exception in FY2010. When the State Department began to designate related spending as OCO, associated funding levels rose to $11 billion in FY2012 and $9 billion in FY2013, partly as a result of DOS leveraging the budgetary advantage of the OCO designation. Enacted State/USAID OCO funding fell to $6.5 billion in FY2014.
Figure 8 depicts the emergency or OCO appropriations for foreign affairs activities. Since 2012, more OCO funds have been appropriated than were requested each year, and those have also been authorized to be used in additional countries.
dollars in billions |
Source: Department of State Congressional Budget Justifications and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113). Note: Totals include rescissions. |
President Obama submitted his FY2016 federal budget request to Congress on February 2, 2015. The $4.1 trillion request exceeded the BCA discretionary budget caps by $74.0 billion, which left Congress with the option of triggering sequestration, or cutting the President's request to eliminate funds for agencies and programs they would otherwise support. In his letter to Congress accompanying the FY2016 budget request, the President justified his request for an increase in spending by saying:
With a growing economy, shrinking deficits, bustling industry, and booming energy production, we have risen from recession freer to write our own future than any other Nation on Earth ... . Fifteen years into this new century, and six years after the darkest days of the financial crisis, we have picked ourselves up, dusted ourselves off, and begun again the work of remaking America.64
The national defense portion of the request was $611.9 billion, which exceeded the associated BCA caps by $37.9 billion. In an effort to avoid sequestration and still provide the requested funding for national defense, Congress moved $38.3 billion from the base defense budget to the OCO allocation in their bicameral agreement on the NDAA for FY2016 (H.R. 1735). Even though the authorization fully funded the President's request, he vetoed H.R. 1735 on October 22, 2015, stating:
This bill fails to authorize funding for our national defense in a fiscally responsible manner. It underfunds our military in the base budget, and instead relies on an irresponsible budget gimmick that has been criticized by members of both parties. Specifically, the bill's use of $38 billion in [OCO] funding—which was meant to fund wars and is not subject to budget caps—does not provide the stable, multi-year budget upon which sound defense planning depends. Because this bill authorizes base budget funding at sequestration levels, it threatens the readiness and capabilities of our military and fails to provide the support our men and women in uniform deserve. The decision reflected in this bill to circumvent rather than reverse sequestration further harms our national security by locking in unacceptable funding cuts for crucial national security activities carried out by non-defense agencies.65
The veto of the FY2016 NDAA added pressure to ongoing negotiations related to the budget caps. By the end of October 2015, Congress and the President had negotiated a deal that raised both the defense and nondefense discretionary spending caps by $25 billion each in FY2016 and $15 billion each in FY2017. As a result, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74) was enacted November 2, 2015. In addition to raising the BCA caps, it also specified an expected level for defense OCO funding of $58.8 billion, and $14.9 billion for nondefense OCO, for both FY2016 and FY2017.66
Immediately following passage of the BBA, Congress authorized and appropriated $58.6 billion for defense OCO in FY2016—$7.7 billion above the President's budget request for OCO—noting that the funds were provided "in support of base budget requirements as requested by the President for fiscal year 2016."67
With the BBA of 2015 as a backdrop, President Obama submitted his FY2017 federal budget request to Congress on February 9, 2016. The $4.1 trillion request complied with the newly-adjusted BCA discretionary budget caps, and also met the OCO targets set forth in the BBA–$58.8 billion for DOD and $14.9 billion for SFOPS.
In November 2016, President Obama amended his FY2017 request, requesting an additional $11.8 billion in OCO funding – $5.8 billion for DOD and $5.8 billion for SFOPS. Between FY2012 and FY2016, overall OCO spending declined by approximately 42%. In conjunction with this decline, the DOS share as a percentage of total OCO spending has increased. From FY2001 to FY2016 the DOS share of total OCO spending was approximately 7%. The original FY2017 request would have raised the DOS share of total OCO spending to 20%, and the revised request for FY2017 would have increased it to 24%. This change generally reflects the Administration's policies and military drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan (see Figure 9), along with a desire by many congressional Democrats for parity between increases in defense and nondefense spending.68
The President's original FY2017 OCO budget request of $58.8 billion for defense activities matched the nonbinding level included in the BCA. The request included $5.1 billion for base budget activities that were not funded in the base budget due to the caps.69 As amended in November 2016, the budget request exceeds the BCA level by $5.8 billion, but does not seek additional funding for base requirements.70
According to the DOD Comptroller, the FY2017 OCO request focused on Operation Freedom's Sentinel in Afghanistan, Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria, and increased efforts to support European allies and deter Russian aggression—all while supporting what is referred to as a "partnership-focused approach to counterterrorism."71 The FY2017 OCO request reflected the President's plan to extend the presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, intensify operations to counter the Islamic State, and expand the U.S. presence in Europe, while complying with the BBA funding caps.72
dollars in billions |
Source: Department of Defense National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2017 (Table 2-1); Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2001-FY2017 and DOD Overview: Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Amendment FY2017. Notes: * Includes FY2017 OCO Budget Amendment. This figure does not include amounts provided by H.R. 5325(P.L. 114-223), the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act or H.R. 2028 (P.L. 114-254) Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017. |
DOD estimates the extended U.S. presence in Afghanistan would consume the largest share of its amended FY2017 OCO request (70%), while intensifying operations in Syria and Iraq (Operation Inherent Resolve) represented roughly 15% of the request.73 The November 2016 amendment to the FY2017 OCO request added $5.8 billion to the original DOD request. According to the Comptroller, these additional resources are needed to:
The Administration's February 2016 request also included $3.4 billion―roughly 5% of OCO spending―for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), a sharp increase in funding for the program designed to signal the U.S. commitment to the security of NATO allies and partners through an expanded U.S. presence. The November 2016 amendment to the OCO request did not increase the ERI request for FY2017.
FY2016 Enacted |
FY2017 Request |
Nov 2016 Change |
FY2017 Amended Request |
|||||||||
Military Personnel |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Operation and Maintenance |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Procurement |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
RDT&E |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Revolving and Management Funds |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Military Construction |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Total OCO |
|
|
|
|
Source: Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request Overview, Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Amendment, Table 1.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
The amended OCO request was based on the force level projections (average annual troop strength) in Table 5.
Table 5. Assumed FY2017 Troop Levels for Overseas Contingency Operations
average annual number of military personnel
Force |
FY2015 Actual |
FY2016 Actual |
FY2017 Projected (Original Request) |
FY2017 Projected (Amended Request) |
||||
Afghanistan (OFS) |
|
|
|
| ||||
Iraq (OIR) |
|
|
|
| ||||
In-theater Support |
|
|
|
| ||||
U.S. and other locations |
|
|
|
|
Source: Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request, Overseas Contingency Operations and DOD Overview: Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Amendment FY2017 (figure 2).
Notes: In-theater support includes Afghanistan, Iraq, Horn of Africa, and the European Reassurance Initiative (including approximately 10,500 afloat forces).
In his February 2013 State of the Union address, the President outlined a schedule for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan and announced that by the end of 2014, "our war in Afghanistan will be over."75 OEF formally ended on December 31, 2014, signaling the end of the 13-year U.S. combat role in Afghanistan. On the following day, January 1, 2015, OEF was succeeded in Afghanistan by "Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS)," a new contingency operation with a narrower mission and more limited geographic scope. OFS authorizes
The President's FY2017 OCO budget request, as amended, included $45.1 billion associated with OFS and overall theater posture (activities supporting related contingency and counter-terrorism operations). DOD has obligated roughly $66.9 billion in OFS funds, according to data provided in ongoing DOD cost of war estimates.77 Roughly three quarters of this amount has funded Army depot-level maintenance, service contracts, C4I (command, control communications, computers and intelligence), and the procurement of fuel.78 The Army has obligated the greatest portion of OFS funds (62%), followed by the Air Force (17%) and the Navy (14%).79
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
The ASFF represents the third largest obligation account (14%) within Operation Freedom's Sentinel, following O&M for the U.S. Army and Air Force. The Fund was established as a means of sustaining and improving the professionalization of the Afghan security forces, which have relied on external funding for most security costs.80 As part of Operation Freedom's Sentinel, the ASFF has obligated $9.4 billion. 81 See Table 6.
Cost Breakdown Structure |
Defense Forces |
Interior Forces |
Total |
Percentage |
Equipment and Transportation |
$1.7 |
$0.7 |
$2.3 |
25% |
Infrastructure |
$0.2 |
$0.1 |
$0.3 |
3% |
Sustainment |
$4.0 |
$1.9 |
$6.0 |
64% |
Training and Operations |
$0.7 |
$0.1 |
$0.8 |
9% |
Total* |
$6.5 |
$2.9 |
$9.4 |
100% |
Source: CRS Analysis of DOD Cost of War data, July 2016, sum of obligations (inception to date) for FY2017,
Notes: * Includes $20.3 million in detainee operations sustainment. Totals may not add due to rounding.
The President's FY2017 OCO request, as amended, would provide $4.3 billion to the ASFF for supporting the sustainment, operations, training, and equipping of 382,000 Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). This amount would comprise approximately 75% of the total required to fully fund the ANDSF for FY2017.82 DOD anticipates the remainder will be funded through contributions from the Afghan government ($544 million), and international donors ($915 million). According to the DOD budget justification materials, the request fully funds the ANDSF at the force structure levels established in the FY2015 manning and equipment document, or tashkil:
Despite assertions by U.S. commanders that the ANDSF have performed well under difficult combat conditions, U.S. military concerns were raised in 2015, when the Taliban inflicted heavy casualties on Afghan forces and made important—though temporary—territorial gains in northern Helmand and Kunduz.84 In written testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in October 2015, General John Campbell, Commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, described persistent performance shortfalls among Afghan forces and a 70% noncombat personnel attrition rate.85 In the same month, President Obama announced a revision to the planned withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan, noting recent gains by the Taliban.
The Administration again revised the planned drawdown in July 2016, by raising the number of U.S. troops devoted to non-combatant and counter-terrorism missions in Afghanistan to 8,400, beginning January 1, 2017. Though the number represents a small percentage of the 40,000 troops in country when President Obama first took office, it represents a significant adjustment of the administration's prior plans, which called for 2,900 fewer troops by 2017.86
U.S. commanders assert that, after 2014, their rules of engagement have allowed for operations against Al Qaeda and associated groups, and against the Taliban and other insurgent groups if they pose an imminent threat to U.S. forces or the ANDSF and the Afghan government. As of December 2015, U.S. commanders also have authority to engage members of the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan.87
DOD estimates that $10 billion has been spent in operations against the Islamic State since air strikes began in August 2014, amounting to an average of $12 million per day.88 Initially, U.S. operations primarily used OCO funds previously appropriated for FY2014. DOD also used OCO-designated FY2015 Navy O&M and Air Force O&M funds to conduct air strikes in Iraq and Syria.89 On November 10, 2014, DOD submitted to Congress an amendment to its FY2015 OCO request for an additional $5 billion to cover emerging requirements.90 The FY2016 OIR operations funding level was also approximately $5 billion.
Iraq Train and Equip Program/Fund (ITEF)91
DOD's continuing efforts to respond to the evolving nature of the IS threat prompted a request for $919.5 million in FY2017. The request includes $630 million—slightly more than the amount requested in FY2016—for the ITEF to enhance the Iraqi Security Forces' ability to liberate and secure lost territory, secure borders, protect the Iraqi population, and improve the quality of provincial and national defenses.92 The Administration's November 2016 amendment to the FY2017 OCO budget request added $289.5 million to the ITEF for support to the Kurdish peshmerga.
Congress authorized and appropriated $715 million for the ITEF in FY2016. Section 1223 of the FY2016 NDAA required DOD and the DOS to report on Iraqi government efforts to engage with and support all national groups in the campaign against the Islamic State.93 Section 1223 also granted the President new authorities to facilitate U.S. assistance to the peshmerga and certain Sunni and other local security forces with an Iraqi national security mission. The section authorizes the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and "in coordination to the extent practicable with the Government of Iraq," to provide support directly to these groups. Such support is contingent on the President determining—and notifying Congress—that the Government of Iraq has failed to
The authorities in Section 1223 would allow the President to waive provisions of U.S. law that require that certain types of U.S. security assistance be provided to central government authorities rather than to subnational entities. In March 2016, DOD and DOS reported to Congress that the Government of Iraq had taken meaningful steps toward integrating minorities into military and political structures and is governing more inclusively.
In April 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced the Administration's intent to provide more than $400 million in financial and in-kind assistance to the peshmerga in coordination with the Baghdad government. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi, other leading Iraqi public figures, and some armed Iraqi Shia groups criticized other proposals considered in the first session of the 114th Congress because they would have authorized more broadly the provision of U.S. assistance directly to security forces other than the ISF.
The FY2017 NDAA (S. 2943/P.L. 114-328) enacted in late 2016 extended the authorization to provide funding to peshmerga and other forces with a "national mission" through December 31, 2018. It also extended the authorization to use Foreign Military Financing (FMF)-Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds for loans usable by Iraq for U.S. arms purchases, while adding the requirement that any loan notification submitted to Congress shall include "a detailed summary of the terms and conditions of such loan and an assessment of the extent to which use of the proposed loan proceeds would place special emphasis on the Kurdish Peshmerga, Sunni tribal security forces, or other local security forces, with a national security mission."
The 2017 NDAA conference report (H.Rept. 114-840) explicitly identified $50 million of the $969.5 million authorized for ITEF as allocated for peshmerga and Sunni tribal security forces in Iraq "for operations in Mosul." The Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 2028/P.L. 114-254), enacted in December 2016, appropriated $289.5 million to ITEF as part of OCO funding to "support counter-terrorism operations."94 This appropriation followed a November 2016 Administration request for the same amount in ITEF/OCO funding for "conditions-based sustainment assistance to the Kurdish Peshmerga through the Government of Iraq, including stipends and other sustainment, training, and equipment."95 According to the request:
This assistance is not only helping the Kurdish Peshmerga to continue the fight, but it is also responding to economic pressures faced by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Support to KRG and Peshmerga helps enable and assure their cooperation in, and contributions to, the continuing campaign against ISIL.96
If used for the peshmerga, this $289.5 million would presumably supplement the more than $400 million subject to the July 2016 MOU mentioned above.
Syria Train and Equip (STE) Program/Fund97
The STE program is also part of the U.S. Government's strategy to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately defeat IS. The Administration's request includes $250 million to train, equip, and/or sustain appropriately-vetted Syrian forces engaged in the counter-IS fight.98
The Obama Administration's FY2017 request for $250 million in defense funding for the Syria Train and Equip Fund described training, equipping, and sustaining select vetted Syrian forces as "one of the keys to successfully countering" the Islamic State.99 Of the amount requested, $210.8 million would support the procurement and provision of weapons, ammunition, and equipment; $18.6 million would support lift and transportation costs; and $20.6 million would support trainee stipends and operational sustainment. The Administration requested FY2016 funding for the program in a stand-alone account, but Congress did not appropriate specific funds to such an account and directed the department to submit reprogramming requests for FY2016 Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) monies in order to continue the program.100
In March 2016, the Obama Administration requested congressional approval to reprogram $300 million in FY2016 CTPF funding to support the continuation of the program. The congressional defense committees approved the reprogramming action after a period of review and debate.101 In total, Congress has reviewed and approved Defense Department requests to reprogram more than $1.03 billion in monies from other accounts for the program since 2014.
The FY2017 NDAA (S. 2943) extends the authorization for the program through December 31, 2018, and authorized the appropriation of funds for the program in a new $1.16 billion "Counter-ISIL" fund to support Iraq and Syria training activities. Funding transfers for the Syria train and equip program will remain subject to the prior approval of congressional defense and appropriations committees. These requests would need to be accompanied by certifications that the Administration had developed a plan to take and hold Raqqah, Syria and to deploy numbers and types of U.S. personnel necessary to enable trained and equipped Syrian forces to defend themselves against the Islamic State and the Syrian government.102
The Obama Administration first launched the ERI in June 2014, as part of a broader U.S. response to Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory in March 2014.104 As originally conceived, the ERI sought to "reassure" NATO allies and partners in Europe of the United States' commitment to their "security and territorial integrity" through funding activities along lines of effort that "increase the capability, readiness, and responsiveness of NATO forces to address any threat and that aid in deterring further destabilizing activities."105 Congress provided the DOD with $985 million in ERI funding in FY2015 and $789.3 million in funding in FY2016.106
The FY2017 OCO request included $3.4 billion—four times the amount provided for FY2016—for the ERI. The FY2017 ERI request divided its funding between two broad funding categories—"assurance" funding intended to provide ongoing support to NATO partners and allies, and "deterrence" funding intended to fund measures intended to dissuade regional "aggressive actors," such as Russia, from further regional destabilization or military activity.107 About two-thirds of the FY2017 ERI request would be used to increase the presence in Europe of U.S. Army armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs), including
Other components of the FY2017 ERI request included $163.0 million for additional training exercises with NATO allies and $217 million for improvements to airfields and other facilities for U.S. forces deployed in Europe.
With the exception of noticeable increases in funding for the ERI and in-theater support activities, there is little change in the FY2017 budget request from the FY2016 enacted budget for OCO. See Table 7 for a breakdown of activities funded. For FY2017, the President's Budget requested no additional funding for the OCOTF.109
Activity |
FY2016 Enacted |
FY2017 Request |
FY2017 Amended Request |
Change from FY2016 to FY2017 Amended Request |
|
Operations/Force Protection |
$8.8 |
$8.6 |
$11.4 |
$2.6 |
|
In-theater Support |
$14.8 |
$17.0 |
$18.3 |
$3.5 |
|
Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Fund |
$0.4 |
$0.4 |
$0.5 |
$0.1 |
|
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund |
$3.6 |
$3.4 |
$4.2 |
$0.6 |
|
Support for Coalition Forces |
$1.4 |
$1.4 |
$1.4 |
$0.0 |
|
Iraq Train and Equip Fund |
$0.7 |
$0.6 |
$0.9 |
$0.2 |
|
Syria Train and Equip Fund |
$0.0 |
$0.3 |
$0.3 |
$0.3 |
|
Equipment Reset and Readiness |
$10.1 |
$9.4 |
$9.5 |
-$0.6 |
|
Classified Programs |
$8.1 |
$8.1 |
$8.5 |
$0.4 |
|
Counterterrorism Partnership Fund |
$1.1 |
$1.0 |
$1.0 |
-$0.1 |
|
European Reassurance Initiative |
$0.8 |
$3.4 |
$3.4 |
$2.6 |
|
National Guard and Reserve Equipment/Military Readiness |
$1.5 |
$0.0 |
$0.0 |
-$1.5 |
|
|
-$0.4 |
—- |
—- |
n/a |
|
|
$7.7 |
$5.2 |
$5.1 |
-$2.6 |
|
Total |
$58.6 |
$58.8 |
$64.6 |
$6.0 |
Source: Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request Overview, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/CFO, Figure 7.3, February 9, 2016, and Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request Overview, Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Amendment, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/CFO, Figure 4, November 10, 2016.
Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding
a.
From FY2015 Afghanistan Security Assistance Fund.
b.
Additional funding provided in accordance with non-binding level set by BBA.
The amended request for FY2017 included $11.4 billion in OCO for the incremental cost of U.S. operations and force protection associated with OFS and OIR. These funds would cover expenses such as
The amended request included $18.3 billion for In-Theater Support: the incremental cost of U.S. forces located outside Afghanistan and Iraq—including air and naval forces—that contribute to the missions of forces in those countries.110 It also included funding for some supporting activities operating from the United States (such as remotely piloted aircraft and reach-back intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities).111 In addition, the original In-Theater Support request included $5.0 million for Commander's Emergency Response Program.
This category includes $85.0 million for the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) whose long-term goal is to build partnership capacity in the Iraqi Security Forces. OSC-I conducts traditional security cooperation activities such as joint exercise planning and combined arms training. It also conducts counterterrorism training, logistic capacity building, and intelligence integration in support of the Iraqi Security Forces.112
The FY2017 request of $1.0 billion for the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund would continue the President's initiative to support counterterrorism efforts by other governments in Africa and the Middle East. Of that total, $450 million would go to U.S. Africa Command and $550 million would to U.S. Central Command.113
Over the past decade, the Administration has submitted appropriations requests for OCO military construction funding ranging from a high of more than $2.4 billion for FY2008 to under $200 million in the past few years. The FY2017 OCO request included $172.4 million for military construction, of which $38.4 million was for the planning and design of a medical/dental clinic in Camp Lemmonier, Djbouti. This funding was identified as a base requirement that was moved to OCO by the Department (for more information, see "Contingency Operations Funding in the DOD Base Budget").115
Over the past six years, the emphasis in OCO military construction has swung from the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (primarily Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf region) to Africa Command (AFRICOM, Djibouti and nearby states) and European Command (EUCOM, principally eastern Europe and the Baltic States). This shift reflects the end of ground combat in CENTCOM's area of responsibility and tensions have risen along Russia's western border. While construction early in the shift to EUCOM was devoted to the creation of missile defense facilities in Romania and Poland, construction since 2015 and funding for FY2016 and FY2017 have been devoted to the European Reassurance Initiative. Table 8 illustrates this shift in emphasis.
Table 8. OCO Construction Projects: Geographic Distribution
percentage of OCO Construction Appropriation, selected years
FY2011 |
FY2013 |
FY2017 |
|
CENTCOM |
100% |
15% |
0% |
AFRICOM |
0% |
28% |
35% |
EUCOM |
0% |
57% |
65% |
Source: CRS analysis of Department of Defense budget justification documentation, various years.
The $8.5 billion amended request for "Classified Programs," included a number of defense-related activities such as the research and development of weapons systems, special operations, and intelligence. Those appropriated for intelligence-related activities may be related to either the National Intelligence Program (NIP), which covers the programs, projects, and activities of the Intelligence Community (IC) oriented towards the strategic needs of decision makers, or the (2) the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), which funds defense intelligence activities intended to support tactical military operations and priorities.
The NIP is an aggregation of 14 capabilities-based programs that span the entire IC, such as cryptology, reconnaissance, and signals collection that include several IC components. The NIP funds the Central Intelligence Agency and the strategic-level intelligence activities associated with the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. It also funds Secure Compartmented Intelligence Communications throughout the IC.
MIP spending is confined to those IC components that fall within the DOD. A program is primarily MIP if it funds an activity that addresses a unique DOD requirement. Additionally, MIP funds may be used to "sustain, enhance, or increase capacity/capability of NIP systems." The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence [USD(I)] work to facilitate the "seamless integration" of NIP and MIP intelligence efforts. Mutually beneficial programs may receive both NIP and MIP resources.
Only the NIP and MIP aggregate (or "topline") figures are disclosed annually. For FY2017, the DNI's NIP request was $53.5 billion and the USD(I)'s MIP request was $16.8 billion. These aggregate numbers are reported to include OCO dollars; however, the base and OCO distribution percentage of NIP and MIP funds is classified.117
The FY2017 DOD OCO request includes $5.1 billion in funding labeled as "Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 Compliance." According to the DOD Comptroller, the amount specified for FY2017 OCO in the BBA was $5.1 billion more than anticipated for operations.118 DOD would use the additional funding to cover requirements that are not directly related to on-going contingency operations such as:
The President's FY2107 budget request included $1.6 billion for contingency operations funded in the base budget.119 These activities are not designated as emergency or OCO/GWOT and are subject to the BCA limits.
Activity |
Base Enacted FY2016 |
OCO EnactedFY2016 |
Total Enacted FY2016 |
Base Request FY2017 |
OCO Request FY2017 |
Total Request FY2017 |
NATO Support in Bosnia |
$7.3 |
— |
$7.3 |
$7.0 |
— |
$7.0 |
NATO Support in Kosovo |
$112.0 |
— |
$112.0 |
$87.2 |
— |
$87.2 |
Joint Task Force Bravo |
$33.0 |
— |
$33.0 |
$30.0 |
— |
$30.0 |
OEF-Trans Sahara |
$90.0 |
$7.0 |
$97.0 |
$76.1 |
$7.0 |
$83.2 |
OEF-Horn of Africa |
$302.4 |
$791.2 |
$1,093. 4 |
$59.0 |
$1,154.3 |
$1,213.1 |
Operation Noble Eagle |
$104.0 |
— |
$104.0 |
$110.0 |
— |
$110.0 |
Operation Observant Compass |
$22.3 |
— |
$22.3 |
$23.0 |
— |
$23.0 |
Total |
$671.0 |
$798.2 |
$1,469.2 |
$392.3 |
$1,166.7 |
$1,553.6 |
Source: Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 2017: Justification for Base Funded Contingency Operations and the Overseas Contingency Operation Transfer Fund, February 2016
The FY2017 SFOPs appropriations request was significantly higher ($14.9 billion) than SFOPs OCO spending in prior years. The Administration request and House and Senate SFOPs bills all called for $14.9 billion in OCO funds for FY2017, which was level with the FY2016 OCO funding but represented an increase of 59% from the FY2015 funding.
In addition to the $14.89 billion, on November 10, 2016, the Administration submitted to Congress an amended request that included an additional $5.8 billion for the DOS OCO accounts, primarily to counter IS and fund various related expenses. They included additional funds for diplomatic engagement to support the strategy to counter ISIS, security assistance, and emergency humanitarian needs.
When comparing the FY2015 SFOPS request with the FY2017 amended request, the foreign affairs base budget decreased by 11%, and the foreign affairs OCO budget increased by 165%—thereby meeting the budgetary caps without reducing overall foreign affairs funding.120 Because of the two-year budget agreement in the BBA, a shifting of foreign affairs appropriations from regular to OCO accounts seems to be occurring again in FY2017.
With the BBA setting a $14.9 billion nondefense OCO minimum—more than double the Administration's FY2015 and FY2016 OCO requests―the Administration appears to have labelled some previously considered "enduring" requirements in the FY2015 and FY2016 requests as OCO for FY2017 (see Figure 10). For example, the FY2017 request for State Department Operations and Related Accounts enduring funds declined by $3-4 billion compared to the FY2015 and FY2016 requests, while the FY2017 OCO request increased by a comparable amount.
Funding requests for International Organizations showed a similar transfer of funds in the FY2017 request, as did Foreign Operations funding overall, and more specifically Bilateral Economic Assistance and International Security Assistance. See Table 10 below.
Table 10. Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Enduring vs. OCO Requests, FY2015, FY2016, and FY2017, Select Accounts
dollars in millions
FY2015 Request |
FY2016 Request |
FY2017 Request |
||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
| |||||||||||||
State Operations and Related Accounts |
|
|
|
|
|
| ||||||||||||
Administration of Foreign Affairs |
|
|
|
|
|
| ||||||||||||
International Organizations |
|
|
|
|
|
| ||||||||||||
Foreign Operations Total |
|
|
|
|
|
| ||||||||||||
Bilateral Economic Assistance |
|
|
|
|
|
| ||||||||||||
International Security Assistance |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations Summary Tables (see Table 1 in each of FY2015, FY2016, and FY2017 documents).
Note: In FY2016 and FY2017 Summary Tables, "State Operations and Related Accounts" are referred to as "Diplomatic Engagement and Related Accounts."
The $20.7 billion in the amended FY2017 OCO request are to "provide support to, respond to, recover from, or prevent crises abroad, including armed conflict, as well as human-caused and natural disasters."121 Specifically, the Department of State (DOS) request included funding to
In its FY2017 budget justification documents, DOS included a request that the BCA caps be further increased:
While the Department welcomes the revised budget levels set by the Bipartisan Budget Act, shifts in funding for FY2016 and FY2017 result in OCO funding covering greater than 50 percent of select ongoing programs. The FY2017 President's Budget assumes that further adjustments to the Budget Control Act's discretionary spending limits will be needed to sustain these activities in FY2018. To mitigate perceptions that some of our core programs, including ongoing assistance to key partners such as Iraq and Afghanistan, our UN treaty commitments, and security and humanitarian responsibilities, are 'temporary' contingencies, the Department's enduring funding for ongoing operations must remain at a sustainable level as we move into FY2018.123
As Congress considered the FY2017 federal budget, the authorization and appropriation of OCO funding for FY2017 was central to the policy debate. Matters considered by Congress included
On March 23, 2016, the House Budget Committee reported the 2017 House Budget Resolution (H.Con.Res. 125), which assumes $551.1 billion in discretionary authority in compliance with the BBA and designates $73.7 billion for OCO, with the stated assumption that $23.0 billion in OCO funding would be dedicated to base defense requirements (H.Rept. 114-470). If the House Budget Committee's proposals were to be adopted without further amendment by Congress, the resolution would provide a discretionary base budget at the level of the $574.0 billion marker set by the 2015 negotiations.
On April 27, 2016, the HASC favorably reported H.R. 4909, the NDAA for FY2017.The measure designated $18.0 billion in funding requested by the President Obama for DOD base budget requirements as OCO (see Figure 11). Such designation effectively exempts funding from being counted against the BCA spending caps. Section 1501 of H.R. 4909, as agreed to in the House, designated these amounts for OCO and also directed apportionment of the funds without application of existing OCO criteria. This addition of base requirements to the OCO authorization was offset by a corresponding reduction of authorized funding for contingency operations, and provided no increase to the total amount of OCO. Furthermore, the amounts authorized for certain accounts – such as operation and maintenance (O&M) and military personnel – would only be available through April 30, 2017, under the provisions of the House bill.
The House adopted the NDAA (H.R. 4909) by a vote of 277-147 on May 18, 2016, without amendment to the HASC OCO recommendations. The House appropriators generally followed the HASC in H.R. 5293, which was agreed to by the House on June 16, 2016, by a vote of 282-138. The Senate, however, held closely to the President's budget request for OCO and did not increase the amount of OCO funding designated for base budget requirements in either the Senate-passed NDAA (S. 2943) or the Senate committee-passed defense appropriations bill (S. 3000).
as agreed to in the House, May 18, 2016; dollars in billions |
Source: P.L. 114-74, H.R. 1735, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2016, "Green Book", Table 1-9, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2017, "Green Book", Table 1-9, and H.R. 4909, as agreed to by the House, May 18, 2016, and the FY2017 Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Amendment. |
On November 10, 2016, the Administration provided Congress an amendment to the FY2017 OCO budget request, increasing the request by $11.6 billion ($5.8 billion for DOD and $5.8 billion for DOS/USAID). This boosted the total FY2017 OCO request from an original request of $73.7 billion to an amended request of $85.3 billion. The budget amendment did not make any changes to the base budget request, nor did it request any additional funding in the OCO accounts for base budget purposes.
The House and Senate NDAA conference committee concluded its work on S. 2943 in early December 2016. The enacted FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328) includes funding requested in the November 2016 amendment to the FY2017 OCO budget request, authorizing a total of $67.8 billion in OCO funding for DOD. However, the House position regarding the use of OCO for base budget purposes was largely rejected. Instead of providing $23.1 billion in OCO for base budget purposes, S. 2943 allocates $8.3 billion in OCO-designated funding for base requirements—$5.2 billion stemming from the Administration's request and $3.2 billion added by Congress during the conference negotiations on S. 2943.124
February 2016 Budget Request |
November 2016 OCO Amendment |
NDAA Conference Agreement |
|||||||
OCO |
OCO for Base |
OCO |
OCO for Base |
OCO |
OCO |
OCO for Base |
OCO |
OCO for Base |
|
Procurement |
$8,226.5 |
$1,287.9 |
$7,043.1 |
$10,782.2 |
$9,504.1 |
$8,614.2 |
$1,287.9 |
$8,704.9 |
$1,918.6 |
RDT&E |
$336.1 |
$38.0 |
$336.1 |
$452.1 |
$374.2 |
$478.3 |
$38.0 |
$478.3 |
$38.0 |
O&M |
$39,860.2 |
$3,604.7 |
$24,629.2 |
$9,186.9 |
$43,097.8 |
$44,957.9 |
$3,604.7 |
$45,516.4 |
$4,881.1 |
MILPERS |
$3,499.3 |
$62.9 |
$2,199.6 |
$2,622.6 |
$3,562.3 |
$3,644.2 |
$62.9 |
$3,644.2 |
$1,350.5 |
Otherb |
$1,399.9 |
$23.8 |
$1,399.9 |
$23.8 |
$2,179,8 |
$1,688.5 |
$23.8 |
$1,038.5 |
$23.8 |
Military Construction |
$134.0 |
$38.4 |
$133.6 |
$38.4 |
― |
$134.0 |
― |
$133.6 |
― |
Total |
$53,742.2 |
$5,055.8 |
$35,741.5 |
$23,052.0 |
$58,890.6 |
$59,517.2 |
$5,055.8 |
$59,516.0 |
$8,250.4 |
Grand Total |
$58,798.0 |
$58,793.5 |
$58,890.6 |
$64,573.0 |
$67,766.4 |
Sources: H.Rept. 114-537 to accompany H.R. 4909, S.Rept. 114-255 to accompany S. 2943, and the FY2017 NDAA Conference Report (H.Rept. 114-840 ).
Notes: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
a. S.Rept. 114-255 does not distinguish between OCO and OCO for base requirements.
b. Includes funding associated with accounts such as the Defense Health Program; the Joint IED Defeat Fund; and the Defense Working Capital Fund.
Congress passed and the President signed H.R. 5325 (P.L. 114-223), the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act, in absence of an agreement on most FY2017 appropriations measures before the start of the fiscal year. Division C of H.R. 5325 is termed continuing resolution (CR) which provided funding through December 9, 2016, for programs and activities typically covered by regular appropriations bills—including the Department of Defense (DOD). H.R. 5325 provided for OCO funding at the rate at which it was funded in FY2016.
On December 12, 2016, the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 2028/P.L. 114-254) was enacted, extending the CR to April 28, 2017. Division B of H.R. 2028 also provided supplemental appropriations for DOD and DOS/USAID security assistance activities. Title I of Division B of H.R. 2028 provides $5.8 billion in additional OCO budget authority for DOD and Title II provides $4.3 billion for State, Foreign Operations and Related programs
The $5.8 billion provided for DOD OCO generally aligns with the President's November 2016 budget amendment. However, H.R. 2028 (P.L. 114-254) provides $652.3 million for activities related to the European Reassurance Initiative (approximately one-half of the amounts requested for O&M and military personnel) and a similar portion – approximately one-half – of procurement funding requested for certain missiles and ammunition. See Table 12.
Table 12. Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017: DOD
H.R. 2028, Division B, Title I (dollars in millions)
Account |
Nov 2016 Budget Amendment Increase |
H.R. 2028 Counter-terrorism Operations |
H.R. 2028 European Reassurance Initiative |
H.R. 2028Total |
||||||||
Military Personnel |
| |||||||||||
Army |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Navy |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Air Force |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Marine Corps |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Operation and Maintenance |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Army |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Navy |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Air Force |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Marine Corps |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Defense-wide |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Procurement |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Missile Procurement, Army |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Other Procurement, Army |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Procurement of Ammunition, Air Force |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Missile Procurement, Air Force |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Other Procurement, Air Force |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
RDT&E |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
RDT&E, Army |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
RDT&E, Defense-Wide |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Other |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Iraq Train and Equip Fund |
|
|
|
| ||||||||
Total, DOD |
|
|
|
|
Source: H.R. 2028 (P.L. 114-254).
Note: All amounts appropriated are designated for OCO/GWOT pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and are not subject to the BCA caps.
Title II of Division B of the second CR (H.R. 2028/P.L. 114-254) provides $4.3 billion in additional OCO funds for State, Foreign Operations and Related programs. A comparison of the additional amounts requested by the Administration in its amendment of November 10, 2016, and those provided by Congress are shown in Table 13. Note that some amounts are available until the end of FY2017, while others are available until expended.
Table 13. Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017: SFOPS
H.R. 2028, Division B, Title II (dollars in millions)
Account |
Nov 2016 Budget Amendment Increase |
H.R. 2028 |
Time of funding availability |
||||
D&CP |
|
|
September 30, 2018 |
||||
OIG/State |
|
|
September 30, 2018 |
||||
ESCM |
|
|
until expended |
||||
MRA |
|
|
until expended |
||||
INCLE |
|
|
September 30, 2018 |
||||
ESF |
|
|
September 30, 2018 |
||||
PKO |
|
|
September 30, 2018 |
||||
FMF |
|
|
September 30, 2018 |
||||
NADR |
|
|
September 30, 2018 |
||||
IDA |
|
|
until expended |
||||
OE/USAID |
|
|
September 30, 2018 |
||||
TI |
|
|
until expended |
||||
IG/USAID |
|
|
September 30, 2018 |
||||
CIF/USAID |
|
|
until expended |
||||
AEECA |
|
|
September 30, 2018 |
||||
Total |
|
|
Source: Letter from the Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Amendments to the FY2017 Budget, November 10, 2016, and P.L. 114-254, Div. B, Title II.
Notes: D&CP = Diplomatic and Consular Programs; OIG/State = State Department Office of Inspector General; ESCM = Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance; MRA = Migration and Refugees Assistance; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; ESF=Economic Support Fund; PKO = Peacekeeping Operations; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs; IDA=International Disaster Assistance; OE/USAID=USAID Operating Expenses; TI = Transition Initiatives; IG/USAID=USAID Inspector General; CIF/USAID=Capital Investment Fund/USAID; AEECA = Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia.
All amounts appropriated are designated for OCO/GWOT pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and are not subject to the BCA caps.
Appendix A.
Designation of Funds as Emergency or for Overseas Contingency Operations
The designation of funds as "emergency" or for "overseas contingency operations" is governed by several statutes as well as Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and the DOD Financial Management Regulation. For more information on the federal budget process see CRS Report 98-721, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA) of 1985
BBEDCA, as amended, includes the statutory definitions of "emergency" and "unanticipated" requirements as they related to budget enforcement through sequestration. The act also allows for appropriations to be designated by Congress and the President as "emergency" or "for Overseas Contingency Operations." Such appropriations are effectively exempt from the statutory discretionary spending limits.
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (2 U.S.C. §900) Definitions (20) The term "emergency" means a situation that- (A) requires new budget authority and outlays (or new budget authority and the outlays flowing therefrom) for the prevention or mitigation of, or response to, loss of life or property, or a threat to national security; and (B) is unanticipated. (21) The term "unanticipated" means that the underlying situation is- (A) sudden, which means quickly coming into being or not building up over time; (B) urgent, which means a pressing and compelling need requiring immediate action; (C) unforeseen, which means not predicted or anticipated as an emerging need; and (D) temporary, which means not of a permanent duration. Notes: As amended by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25). |
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (2 U.S.C. §901) Enforcing Discretionary Spending Limits (1) Sequestration Within 15 calendar days after Congress adjourns to end a session there shall be a sequestration to eliminate a budget-year breach, if any, within any category. Each non-exempt account within a category shall be reduced by a dollar amount calculated by multiplying the enacted level of sequestrable budgetary resources in that account at that time by the uniform percentage necessary to eliminate a breach within that category. ...
(1) Concepts and definitions When the President submits the budget under section 1105 of title 31, OMB shall calculate and the budget shall include adjustments to discretionary spending limits (and those limits as cumulatively adjusted) for the budget year and each outyear to reflect changes in concepts and definitions. Such changes shall equal the baseline levels of new budget authority and outlays using up-to-date concepts and definitions, minus those levels using the concepts and definitions in effect before such changes. Such changes may only be made after consultation with the Committees on Appropriations and the Budget of the House of Representatives and the Senate, and that consultation shall include written communication to such committees that affords such committees the opportunity to comment before official action is taken with respect to such changes. (2) Sequestration reports When OMB submits a sequestration report under section 904(e), (f), or (g) of this title for a fiscal year, OMB shall calculate, and the sequestration report and subsequent budgets submitted by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31 shall include adjustments to discretionary spending limits (and those limits as adjusted) for the fiscal year and each succeeding year, as follows: (A) Emergency appropriations; overseas contingency operations/global war on terrorism If, for any fiscal year, appropriations for discretionary accounts are enacted that - (i) the Congress designates as emergency requirements in statute on an account by account basis and the President subsequently so designates, or (ii) the Congress designates for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism in statute on an account by account basis and the President subsequently so designates, the adjustment shall be the total of such appropriations in discretionary accounts designated as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism, as applicable. ... Notes: As amended by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25). |
Title 10, United States Code—Armed Forces
10 U.S.C. §101—Definitions
Section 101 provides definitions of terms applicable to Title 10. While it does not define "overseas contingency operations", it does include a definition of a "contingency operations."
10 U.S.C. §127a—Operations for which funds are not provided in advance: funding mechanisms
Section 127 provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to transfer funds appropriated for certain operations to established DOD accounts in order to reimburse those accounts for the incremental expenses incurred in the conduct of such an operation. This section specifies the criteria for covered operations and establishes thresholds for applicability of the authority based on the expected incremental costs of the operation.
10 USC §127a - Operations for which funds are not provided in advance: funding mechanisms (a) In General.-(1) The Secretary of Defense shall use the procedures prescribed by this section with respect to any operation specified in paragraph (2) that involves- (A) the deployment (other than for a training exercise) of elements of the armed forces for a purpose other than a purpose for which funds have been specifically provided in advance; or (B) the provision of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or support for law enforcement (including immigration control) for which funds have not been specifically provided in advance. (2) This section applies to- (A) any operation the incremental cost of which is expected to exceed $50,000,000; and (B) any other operation the expected incremental cost of which, when added to the expected incremental costs of other operations that are currently ongoing, is expected to result in a cumulative incremental cost of ongoing operations of the Department of Defense in excess of $100,000,000. Any operation the incremental cost of which is expected not to exceed $10,000,000 shall be disregarded for the purposes of subparagraph (B). (3) This section does not provide authority for the President or the Secretary of Defense to carry out any operation, but establishes mechanisms for the Department of Defense by which funds are provided for operations that the armed forces are required to carry out under some other authority. (b) Waiver of Requirement To Reimburse Support Units.-(1) The Secretary of Defense shall direct that, when a unit of the armed forces participating in an operation described in subsection (a) receives services from an element of the Department of Defense that operates through the Defense Business Operations Fund (or a successor fund), such unit of the armed forces may not be required to reimburse that element for the incremental costs incurred by that element in providing such services, notwithstanding any other provision of law or any Government accounting practice. (2) The amounts which but for paragraph (1) would be required to be reimbursed to an element of the Department of Defense (or a fund) shall be recorded as an expense attributable to the operation and shall be accounted for separately. (c) Transfer Authority.-(1) Whenever there is an operation of the Department of Defense described in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense may transfer amounts described in paragraph (3) to accounts from which incremental expenses for that operation were incurred in order to reimburse those accounts for those incremental expenses. Amounts so transferred shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes as the accounts to which transferred. (2) The total amount that the Secretary of Defense may transfer under the authority of this section in any fiscal year is $200,000,000. (3) Transfers under this subsection may only be made from amounts appropriated to the Department of Defense for any fiscal year that remain available for obligation, other than amounts within any operation and maintenance appropriation that are available for (A) an account (known as a budget activity 1 account) that is specified as being for operating forces, or (B) an account (known as a budget activity 2 account) that is specified as being for mobilization. (4) The authority provided by this subsection is in addition to any other authority provided by law authorizing the transfer of amounts available to the Department of Defense. However, the Secretary may not use any such authority under another provision of law for a purpose described in paragraph (1) if there is authority available under this subsection for that purpose. (5) The authority provided by this subsection to transfer amounts may not be used to provide authority for an activity that has been denied authorization by Congress. (6) A transfer made from one account to another under the authority of this subsection shall be deemed to increase the amount authorized for the account to which the amount is transferred by an amount equal to the amount transferred. [(d) Repealed. Pub. L. 108–136, div. A, title X, §1031(a)(3), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1596 .] (e) Limitations.-(1) The Secretary may not restore balances in the Defense Business Operations Fund through increases in rates charged by that fund in order to compensate for costs incurred and not reimbursed due to subsection (b). (2) The Secretary may not restore balances in the Defense Business Operations Fund or any other fund or account through the use of unobligated amounts in an operation and maintenance appropriation that are available within that appropriation for (A) an account (known as a budget activity 1 account) that is specified as being for operating forces, or (B) an account (known as a budget activity 2 account) that is specified as being for mobilization. (f) Submission of Requests for Supplemental Appropriations.-It is the sense of Congress that whenever there is an operation described in subsection (a), the President should, not later than 90 days after the date on which notification is provided pursuant to subsection (a)(3), submit to Congress a request for the enactment of supplemental appropriations for the then-current fiscal year in order to provide funds to replenish the Defense Business Operations Fund or any other fund or account of the Department of Defense from which funds for the incremental expenses of that operation were derived under this section and should, as necessary, submit subsequent requests for the enactment of such appropriations. (g) Incremental Costs.-For purposes of this section, incremental costs of the Department of Defense with respect to an operation are the costs of the Department that are directly attributable to the operation (and would not have been incurred but for the operation). Incremental costs do not include the cost of property or services acquired by the Department that are paid for by a source outside the Department or out of funds contributed by such a source. (h) Relationship to War Powers Resolution.-This section may not be construed as altering or superseding the War Powers Resolution. This section does not provide authority to conduct any military operation. (i) GAO Compliance Reviews.-The Comptroller General of the United States shall from time to time, and when requested by a committee of Congress, conduct a review of the defense funding structure under this section to determine whether the Department of Defense is complying with the requirements and limitations of this section. |
Title 22, United States Code—Foreign Relations and Intercourse
22 U.S.C. §2421f—Sustainability requirements for certain capital projects in connection with overseas contingency operations
Subsection (e) includes the definition of an "overseas contingency operation" as it relates to this section. The subsection cross-references the term "contingency operation" defined in 10 U.S.C. 101(a)(13) but adds a qualifier that it be "a military operation outside the United States and its territories and possessions.... "
Title 41, United States Code—Public Contracts
41 U.S.C. §1702—Chief Acquisition Officers and senior procurement executives
Subsection (d) includes the definition of an "overseas contingency operation" pertaining to this section providing for the appointment of a Chief Acquisition Officer of a federal agency. As in 22 U.S.C. §2421f (described above), the subsection cross-references the term "contingency operation" defined in 10 U.S.C. 101(a)(13) but adds a qualifier that it be "a military operation outside the United States and its territories and possessions.... "
Administration and Internal Guidance
In addition to statutory requirements, DOD and DOS are subject to guidance on OCO spending from the Administration. In October 2006, under the Bush Presidency, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England directed the services to break with long-standing DOD regulatory policies and expand their request for supplemental funding to reflect incremental costs related to the "longer war on terror." There was no specific definition for the "longer war on terror," now one of the core missions of the Department of Defense.
In February 2009, at the beginning of the Obama administration, OMB issued updated budget guidance that required DOD to move some OCO costs back into the base budget. However, within six months of issuing the new criteria, officials waived restrictions related to pay and that would have prohibited end strength growth.125 In a letter from OMB to the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Robert Hale, the agency characterized its 2009 criteria as "very successful" for delineating base and OCO spending, but stated, "This update clarifies language, eliminates areas of confusion and provides guidance for areas previously unanticipated."126 GAO subsequently reported that the revised guidance significantly changed the criteria used to build the fiscal year 2010 OCO funding request by
OMB again revised its guidance in September 2010 following a number of Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that had concluded DOD reporting on OCO costs was of 'questionable reliability,' due in part to imprecisely defined financial management regulations related to OCO spending.128
Table A-1. OMB Criteria for War/Overseas Contingency Operations Funding Requests
as of September 9, 2010
Congress has repeatedly amended the legislation to raise the spending limits (thus lowering its deficit-reduction effect by corresponding amounts). Congress has passed four bills that revised the automatic spending caps initially established by the BCA, including the following:
On February 9, 2018, three days before President Donald Trump submitted his FY2019 budget request, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P.L. 115-123). The act raised the discretionary spending limits set by the BCA from $1.069 trillion for FY2017 to $1.208 trillion for FY2018 and to $1.244 trillion for FY2019. The BBA 2018 increased FY2019 discretionary defense funding levels (excluding OCO) by the largest amounts to date—$85 billion, from $562 billion to $647 billion, and nondefense funding (including SFOPS) by $68 billion, from $529 billion to $597 billion. It did not change discretionary spending limits for FY2020 and FY2021.26
OCO Funds for Non-War DOD ActivitiesDOD documents indicate the department in recent years has used OCO funding for activities viewed as unrelated to war.
For example, the department's FY2019 budget request estimates $358 billion in OCO funding from FY2015 through FY2019. Of that amount, DOD categorizes $68 billion (19%) for activities unrelated to operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. These activities are described as "EDI/Non-War," referring in part to the European Deterrence Initiative, and "Base-to-OCO," referring to OCO funding used for base-budget requirements.27
Similarly, a DOD Cost of War report from June 2018 shows $1.8 trillion in war-related appropriations from FY2001 through FY2018 for operations primarily conducted in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Of that total, DOD categorizes $219 billion (12%) as other than "war funds." These funds are described as "Classified," "Modularity," "Fuel (non-war)," "Noble Eagle (Base)," and "Non-War."28
International affairs agencies also began increasing the share of their budgets designated for OCO, and applying the designation to an increasing range of activities apparently unrelated to conflicts. OCO as a share of the international affairs budget grew from about 21% in FY2012 to nearly 35% in FY2017. Unlike DOD, however, the State Department and USAID have not specified whether any OCO-designated funds are considered part of the agencies' base budgets.
Previous Proposal to Move OCO Funding to Base BudgetAccording to a DOD budget document from FY2016, the Obama Administration planned to "transition all enduring costs currently funded in the OCO budget to the base budget beginning in 2017 and ending by 2020."29 The plan was to describe "which OCO costs should endure as the United States shifts from major combat operations, how the Administration will budget for the uncertainty surrounding unforeseen future crises, and the implications for the base budgets of DOD, the Intelligence Community, and State/OIP. This transition will not be possible if the sequester-level discretionary spending caps remain in place."30 The BCA remained in effect and OCO funding was used for base-budget requirements.
OCO: Safety Valve, Slush Fund, or Practical Solution?Some defense officials and policymakers say OCO funding enables a flexible and timely response to an emergency or contingency and provides a political and fiscal safety valve to the BCA caps and threat of sequestration.31 They say if OCO funding were not used in such a manner and discretionary spending limits remained in place, DOD and other federal agencies would be forced to cut base budgets and revise strategic priorities. For example, former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has said if Congress allows the FY2020 and FY2021 defense spending caps to take effect, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which calls for the United States to bolster its military advantage against potential competitors such as Russia and China, "is not sustainable."32
Critics, including Acting White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, have described the OCO account as a "slush fund" for military and foreign affairs spending unrelated to contingency operations.33 Mulvaney, former director of the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), has described the use of OCO funding for base budget requirements as "budget gimmicks."34 Critics argue what was once generally restricted to a fund for replacing combat losses of equipment, resupplying expended munitions, transporting troops to and through war zones, and distributing foreign aid to frontline states has "ballooned into an ambiguous part of the budget to which government financiers increasingly turn to pay for other, at times unrelated, costs."35
OMB criteria for OCO funding include the combat losses of ground vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment; replenishment of munitions expended in combat operations; facilities and infrastructure in the theater of operations; transport of personnel, equipment, and supplies to and from the theater; among other items and activities.36
Determining which activities are directly related, tangentially related, or unrelated to war operations is often a point of debate. Some have questioned the use of OCO funding to purchase F-35 fighter jets: "It is jumping the shark.... There's no pretense that it has anything to do with the region."37 Others have argued it makes sense for the military to use OCO funding to purchase new aircraft to replace planes used in current conflicts and no longer in production: "What are the conditions that are making the combatant commanders and those with train/equip authority to say, 'We need more of this?'"38
GWOT/OCO Appropriations by Agency, FY2001-FY2019 Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority for war-related and other international emergency or contingency-designated activities since 9/11. This figure is a CRS estimate of funding designated for emergencies or OCO/GWOT in support of the broad U.S. government response to the 9/11 attacks, as well as other foreign affairs activities, from FY2001 through FY2019. This includes $1.8 trillion for DOD, $154 billion for the Department of State and USAID, and $3 billion for DHS and the Coast Guard (see Table 1). These figures do not include emergency-designated funding appropriated in this period for domestic programs, such as disaster response. Table 1. Emergency and OCO/GWOT Appropriations by Agency, FY2001-FY2019(in billions of dollars)
Fiscal Year
DOD
State/USAID
Homeland
Total
2001
22 | .9 |
0 | .3 |
0 | .0 |
23 | .2 |
2002
16 | .9 |
2 | .1 |
0 | .0 |
19 | .0 |
2003
72 | .5 |
7 | .8 |
0 | .4 |
80 | .7 |
2004
90 | .8 |
21 | .8 |
0 | .1 |
112 | .7 |
2005
75 | .6 |
5 | .5 |
0 | .1 |
81 | .2 |
2006
115 | .8 |
4 | .0 |
0 | .2 |
119 | .9 |
2007
166 | .3 |
5 | .8 |
0 | .1 |
172 | .1 |
2008
186 | .9 |
7 | .5 |
0 | .2 |
194 | .6 |
2009
145 | .7 |
8 | .8 |
0 | .2 |
154 | .7 |
2010
162 | .4 |
5 | .0 |
0 | .2 |
167 | .6 |
2011
158 | .8 |
0 | .0 |
0 | .3 |
159 | .0 |
2012
115 | .1 |
11 | .2 |
0 | .3 |
126 | .5 |
2013
82 | .0 |
10 | .8 |
0 | .3 |
93 | .0 |
2014
84 | .9 |
6 | .5 |
0 | .2 |
91 | .7 |
2015
63 | .0 |
9 | .3 |
0 | .2 |
72 | .5 |
2016
58 | .9 |
14 | .9 |
0 | .2 |
74 | .0 |
2017
82 | .5 |
20 | .8 |
0 | .2 |
103 | .4 |
2018
65 | .9 |
12 | .0 |
0 | .2 |
78 | .1 |
2019
68 | .8 |
n/a |
n/a |
68 | .8 |
Total
1,835 | .7 |
154
3
1,993 | .1 |
Agency % of Total
92.1%
7 | .7% |
0 | .2% |
100% |
From FY2001 through FY2009, DOD received $1.8 trillion in appropriations for OCO/GWOT, or approximately 17% of the department's total discretionary budget authority of $10.8 trillion during the period.39
The department's OCO/GWOT funding peaked in FY2008 both in terms of nominal dollars, at $186.9 billion, and as a share of its discretionary budget, at 28.1% (see Figure 3), after the Bush Administration surged additional U.S. military personnel to Iraq. The department's OCO funding also increased as a share of its discretionary spending from FY2009 to FY2010 following the Obama Administration's deployment of more U.S. military personnel to Afghanistan, and again in FY2017 following enactment of legislation in response to the Trump Administration's request for additional appropriations.40In FY2019, the department's OCO/GWOT funding totaled $68.8 billion, or 10% of its discretionary spending.41
Figure 3. OCO/GWOT Funding as a Share of DOD Discretionary Budget Authority, FY2001-FY2019
(in billions of dollars and as a percentage of the total)
Source: Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, Table 2-1: Base Budget, War Funding and Supplementals by Military Department, by P.L. Title (FY2001-FY2019), April 2019.
Notes: Figures in nominal dollars (not adjusted for inflation). DOD OCO/GWOT figures do not include appropriations for hurricane relief, avian flu and Ebola assistance, Iron Dome, missile defeat, and other purposes.
Figure 4. Share of Base and OCO/GWOT Funding by SelectedAppropriation Title, FY2001-FY2019
(in percentages of discretionary budget authority)
Source: DOD, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, Table 2-1: Base Budget, War Funding and Supplementals by Military Department, by Public Law Title.
Notes: Figures include DOD estimates for FY2018 and FY2019.
Figure 5. Share of Base and OCO/GWOT Funding by Military Service, FY2001-FY2019
(in percentages of discretionary budget authority)
Source: DOD, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, Table 2-1: Base Budget, War Funding and Supplementals by Military Department, by Public Law Title.
Notes: Figures include DOD estimates for FY2018 and FY2019.
OCO funding for DOD has not decreased at the same rate as the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has decreased.43 For example, the number of U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria decreased from a peak of 187,000 personnel in FY2008 (including 148,000 in Iraq and 39,000 in Afghanistan) to an assumed level of nearly 18,000 personnel in FY2019 (including 11,958 personnel in Afghanistan and 5,765 personnel in Iraq and Syria)—a decline of approximately 169,000 personnel (90%).44 Meanwhile, OCO funding decreased from a peak of $187 billion in FY2008 to $69 billion in FY2019—a decline of approximately $118 billion (63%).
While the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has decreased since FY2009, the number of U.S. troops deployed or stationed elsewhere to support those personnel has fallen by a lesser degree and, in recent years, remained relatively steady. For example, the number of support forces—that is, personnel from units and forces operating outside of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries (including those stationed in the continental United States or otherwise mobilized) decreased from 112,000 personnel in FY2009 to an assumed level of 76,073 personnel in FY2019—a decline of 35,927 personnel (32%). In addition, when these support forces are combined with in-country force levels, the total force level decreases by a percentage more similar to the OCO budget, from 297,000 personnel in FY2009 to an assumed level of 93,796 personnel in FY2019—a decline of 203,204 personnel (68%) (see Figure 6).Figure 6. Number of Operational and Support Forces for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, and DOD OCO Appropriations, FY2009-FY2019
(left scale: average annual troop strength; right scale: billions of dollars)
Source: Department of Defense, Defense Budget Overview documents, FY2011-FY2019.
Notes: Support forces include personnel from units and forces operating outside of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries (including those stationed in the continental United States or otherwise mobilized). DOD began detailing the number of in-theater support forces in the FY2009 budget request.
According to DOD, the reason OCO funding has not fallen in proportion to the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria is "due to the fixed, and often inelastic, costs of infrastructure, support requirements, and in-theater presence to support contingency operations."46 For example, in FY2019, the department requested $20 billion in OCO funding for "in-theater support"—nearly 30% of the OCO request and more than any other functional category.47
However, some analysts have noted the U.S. military's fixed costs in Afghanistan remained relatively stable at roughly $7 billion a year from FY2005 through FY2013 until after the BCA went into effect—and have since increased to roughly $32 billion a year, suggesting "that roughly $25 billion in 'enduring' or base budget costs migrated into the Afghanistan budget, effectively circumventing the budget caps. The actual funding needed for operations in Afghanistan is roughly $20 billion in FY2019."48
DOD Criteria for Contingency OperationsTitle 10, Section 101, of the United States Code, defines a contingency operation as any Secretary of Defense-designated military operation "in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force." Since the 1990s NATO intervention in the Balkans, DOD Financial Management Regulations (FMR) have defined contingency operations costs as those expenses necessary to cover incremental costs "that would not have been incurred had the contingency operation not been supported."49 Such incremental costs would not include, for example, base pay for troops or planned equipment modernization, as those expenditures are normal peacetime needs of the DOD.50
In September 2010, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in collaboration with DOD, issued criteria for the department to use in making war/overseas contingency operations funding requests (see Appendix A).In January 2017, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded the criteria for deciding whether items belong in the base budget or OCO funding "are outdated and do not address the full scope of activities" in the budget request.51 "For example, they do not address geographic areas such as Syria and Libya, where DOD has begun military operations; DOD's deterrence and counterterrorism initiatives; or requests for OCO funding to support requirements not related to ongoing contingency operations" it states.52
Section 1524 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (P.L. 115-91), directed the Secretary of Defense to "update the guidelines regarding the budget items that may be covered by overseas contingency operations accounts."
Costs of Major DOD Contingency OperationsCongress has enacted legislation directing DOD to compile reports on the costs of certain contingency operations.
Section 1266 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (P.L. 115-91) directs the Secretary of Defense to submit the Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution report, known as the Cost of War report, on a quarterly basis to the congressional defense committees and the GAO: "Not later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal year quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees and the Comptroller General of the United States the Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution report for such fiscal year quarter."53
The conference report accompanying the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 115-245) requires DOD to report incremental costs for operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility and directs:
the Secretary of Defense to continue to report incremental costs for all named operations in the Central Command Area of Responsibility on a quarterly basis and to submit, also on a quarterly basis, commitment, obligation, and expenditure data for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund, and for all security cooperation programs funded under the Defense Security Cooperation Agency in the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide Account.54
DOD's June 2018 Cost of War report to Congress details $1.5 trillion in obligations associated with certain contingency operations from FY2001 through FY2018.55 That figure includes $757.1 billion for those conducted primarily in Iraq—Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation New Dawn (OND), and Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR); $727.7 billion for those conducted primarily in Afghanistan—Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS); and $27.8 billion for those conducted primarily in the United States (see Table 2 and Figure 7).56 Table 2. OCO/GWOT Obligations of Major DOD Contingency Operations Since FY2001(in billions of dollars)
Primary Country
Major Operations
Date(s)
Cost ($)
Description
Related Missions
Afghanistan
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
2001-December 2014
581 | .1 |
U.S. operation in response to 9/11 terrorist attacks; targeted Al Qaeda and Taliban; included operations in Afghanistan and other countries; succeeded by OFS.
OEF-Caribbean and Central America;
Operation Spartan Shield (continues under OFS);dOther classified worldwide counterterrorism missions.
Afghanistan
Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS)
January 2015-Current
146 | .6 |
U.S. contribution to NATO Resolute Support mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan Security Forces; successor to OEF.
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa;
Operation Spartan Shield
Subtotal, Afghanistan
727 | .7 |
Iraq
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
March 2003-September 2010-
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein; buildup of forces began in September 2002 for invasion in March 2003
Iraq
Operation New Dawn (OND)
September 2010-December 2011
n/a |
Focus on stability operations and training, advising, and assisting Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
Successor to OIF.
Iraq/Syria
Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)
August 7, 2014-Current
26 | .2 |
U.S. operation targeting the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) in Iraq and Syria; began with airstrikes and expanded to include ground forces.
Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq;
Other OND-related activities;
Operation Yukon Journey in the Middle Eastg; Northwest Africa Counterterrorismh; East Africa Counterterrorismi; and Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines (OPE-P)j.Subtotal, Iraq
757 | .1 |
Libya
Operation Odyssey Lightning
2016
n/a |
U.S. warplanes struck Islamic State training camp in western Libya near the border with Tunisia.
United States
2001-Current
27 | .8 |
Response to defend the U.S. homeland in the wake of the attacks of 9/11.
Provides for enhanced security for military bases and other homeland defense activities.
Total
Source: Cost figures from Department of Defense, Cost of War report, June 2018; names and descriptions of operations from CRS research, DOD sources.
Notes: Figures may not include funding for certain overseas contingency operations, including three recently classified missions targeting militants affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State—Operation Yukon Journey in the Middle East, and Northwest Africa Counterterrorism and East Africa Counterterrorism in Africa. See the Limitations to Cost of War Data section below—as well as Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines (OPE-P).
a. OEF-Horn of Africa is headquartered at the U.S. Navy's Combat Command Support Activity at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. It supports special operations forces conducting counterterrorism operations, civil affairs, and military information support operations in the Horn of Africa. b. OEF-Trans Sahara, now known as Operation Juniper Shield, constitutes DOD's support to State Department-led Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Program (TSCTP); program also supports the Commander of U.S. Africa Command in carrying out the National Military Strategy for U.S. military operations in ten partner nations (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia); the operation is currently funded in the DOD base budget. c. The mission of OEF-Philippines was to advise and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines in combatting terrorism, and specifically the activities of the terrorist group Abu Sayaf, in the Philippines. See table note below for later mission Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines (OPE-P). d. Operation Spartan Shield contributes to U.S. Central Command missions. e. Figure includes amounts for Operation New Dawn. f. Initially funded with supplemental appropriations, ONE was transferred to the base budget in 2005. ONE obligations have totaled less than $1 billion since FY2008, according to DOD. g. According to the Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, Operation Inherent Resolve and Other Overseas Contingency Operations, through September 30, 2018, "On February 9, 2018, the Secretary of Defense designated three new named contingency operations: Operation Yukon Journey, and operations in Northwest Africa and East Africa. These operations, which are classified, seek to degrade al Qaeda and ISIS-affiliated terrorists in the Middle East and specific regions of Africa." h. Ibid. i. Ibid. j. According to the Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, Operation Inherent Resolve Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, through September 30, 2018, "The Secretary of Defense designated OPE-P as a contingency operation in 2017 to support the Philippine government and military in their efforts to isolate, degrade, and defeat Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) affiliates and other terrorist organizations in the Philippines." The report references "$100.2 million in DoD obligations for OPE-P reported in FY2018." k. The Administration's November 2016 amendment to the OCO budget included $20 million in funding to support U.S. counter-ISIL efforts and to finance the incremental Navy and Air Force cost of operations, flying hours, and deployments in Libya. See DOD Overview: Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Amendment FY2017, Figure 1 footnote. l. Note this total reflects DOD obligations for selected overseas contingency operations and is different than the total OCO/GWOT figure cited earlier in this report, which reflects OCO/GWOT budget authority. Budget authority is provided by law to incur financial obligations; obligations are binding agreements that will result in outlays.Figure 7. DOD OCO/GWOT Obligations, FY2001-FY2018
(in billions of dollars)
Source: DOD, Cost of War report, June 2018.
Notes: ONE obligations have totaled less than $1 billion since FY2008.
DOD's quarterly Cost of War reports are intended to provide Congress, GAO, and other stakeholders insight into the how the department obligates war-related appropriations. The reports include base and OCO obligations related to war activities, as well as obligation data broken down by certain major operations, service, component, agency, and appropriation.
However, as GAO has noted, "the proportion of OCO appropriations not associated with specific operations identified in the statutory Cost of War reporting requirement has trended upward" in part because the criteria DOD uses for making OCO funding requests is outdated and not always used.57
More recently, the June 2018 Cost of War report does not appear to reference three recently classified overseas contingency operations targeting militants affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS): Operation Yukon Journey in the Middle East, Northwest Africa Counterterrorism, and East Africa Counterterrorism.58
Some observers have noted other limitations to Cost of War reports, such as incomplete accounting of costs, limited distribution of the documents and underlying data, and formatting that makes it difficult to reconcile the data with information contained in budget justification documents.
State/USAIDBetween FY2001 and FY2018, Congress appropriated a total of $154 billion in OCO funds for State Department and USAID. For FY2018 (the most recent full-year appropriations for foreign affairs agencies), OCO funding amounted to 22% of the total appropriations for State Department, Foreign Operations and Related Programs appropriation.
The Obama Administration's FY2012 International Affairs budget request was the first to include a request for OCO funds for "extraordinary and temporary costs of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan."59 At the time, the Administration indicated that the use of this designation was intended to provide a transparent, whole-of-government approach to the exceptional war-related costs incurred in those three countries, thus better aligning the associated military and civilian costs. This first foreign affairs OCO request identified the significant resource demands placed on the State Department as a result of the transitions from military-led to civilian-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the importance of a stable Pakistan for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan.
The FY2012 foreign affairs OCO request included:
In subsequent years, the Administration designated certain State Department activities in Syria and other peacekeeping activities as OCO, and Congress accepted and broadened this expanded use of OCO in annual appropriations. In the FY2017 budget request, the Administration further broadened its use of State OCO funds, applying the designation to funds for countering Russian aggression, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and aid to Africa. In addition to OCO funds requested through the normal appropriations process, the Administration in recent years requested emergency supplemental funding (designated as OCO) to support State/USAID efforts in countering the Islamic State and to respond to global health threats such as the Ebola and Zika viruses.
For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested no OCO/GWOT funding for the Department of State and USAID, although the FY2019 House and Senate SFOPS bills (H.R. 6385 and S. 3108, 115th Congress) would have appropriated approximately $8 billion in OCO-designated funding for various priorities.
The estimated $154.1 billion in emergency and OCO/GWOT appropriations enacted to date for State/USAID includes major non-war-related programs, such as aid for the 2004 tsunami along Indian Ocean coasts, 2010 earthquake in Haiti, 2013 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, and 2015 worldwide outbreak of the Zika virus; as well as diplomatic operations (e.g., paying staff, providing security, and building and maintaining embassies). OCO/GWOT has also funded a variety of foreign aid programs, ranging from the Economic Support Fund to counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, among other activities in other countries. Figure 8 depicts the emergency or OCO appropriations for foreign affairs activities. Since 2012, when the OCO designation was first used for foreign affairs, more OCO funds have been appropriated than were requested each year, and those have also been authorized to be used in additional countries.Figure 8. State/USAID OCO Funding, FY2012-FY2019
(in billions of dollars)
Source: Department of State Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2014, FY2015, FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018, P.L. 114-254 and P.L. 115-31, P.L. 115-141.
Note: Totals include net rescissions. FY2019 appropriations have not been enacted.
The Trump Administration initially requested a total of $89 billion in OCO funding for FY2019. All the funding was requested by DOD.64
In an amendment to the budget after Congress raised the BCA spending caps as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123), the Administration removed the OCO designation from $20 billion of the funding, in effect, shifting that amount into the DOD base budget request.65
In a statement on the budget amendment, Mulvaney said the request fixes "long-time budget gimmicks" in which OCO funding has been used for base budget requirements.66 Beginning in FY2020, "the Administration proposes returning to OCO's original purpose by shifting certain costs funded in OCO to the base budget where they belong," he wrote.67
OCO Funding by OperationOf the revised amount of $69 billion requested for DOD OCO funding in FY2019:
Figure 9. OCO Funding by Operation/Activity in FY2019 DOD Budget Request
(in billions of dollars and percentages of the total)
Source: Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Defense Budget Overview, FY2019 budget request, revised February 13, 2018.
Notes: OFS: Operation Freedom's Sentinel; OIR: Operation Inherent Resolve.
The FY2019 OCO budget assumes a total force level (average annual troop strength) of 93,796 personnel. That figure includes:
The number of personnel actually in-country or in-theater at any given time may exceed or fall below those assumed levels. The FY2019 force level assumes an increase of 3,153 personnel (3.5%) from the FY2018 assumed level, all of which is assumed for in-theater support.69 (For analysis of troop level and budget trends, see the section, "Trends in OCO Funding and Troop Levels," earlier in this report.)
Figure 10. U.S. Force Level Assumptions in FY2019 DOD OCO Budget Request
(average annual troop strength in thousands and percentages of the total)
Source: Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Defense Budget Overview, FY2019 budget request, revised February 13, 2018.
Notes: The department makes a distinction between the average annual troop strength figure used for budgeting purposes and "current force level," which it cites as 14,000 U.S. personnel in Afghanistan following an increase of 3,500 personnel and a change in accounting methodology.
As previously discussed, DOD acknowledges "OCO funding has not declined at the same rate as the in-country troop strength … due to the fixed, and often inelastic, costs of infrastructure, support requirements, and in-theater presence to support contingency operations." The departments lists the following as OCO cost drivers:
(in billions of dollars)
Functional/Mission Category |
FY2019 Budget Request |
% of Total |
In-Theater Support |
20.0 |
29% |
Operations/Force Protection |
14.7 |
21% |
Classified Programs |
9.9 |
14% |
Equipment Reset and Readiness |
8.7 |
13% |
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) |
6.5 |
9% |
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) |
5.2 |
8% |
Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) |
1.4 |
2% |
Support for Coalition Forces |
1.1 |
2% |
Security Cooperation |
0.9 |
1% |
Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat |
0.6 |
1% |
Total |
69 |
100% |
Sources: Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Defense Budget Overview, FY2019 budget request, Figure 4.4: OCO Functional/Mission Category, p. 4-4; Congressional Budget Office, Funding for Overseas Contingency Operations and Its Impact on Defense Spending, October 23, 2018.
According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), approximately $47 billion (68%) of the FY2019 OCO budget request consists of enduring activities—that is, "those that would probably continue in the absence of overseas conflicts"—that could be funded in the DOD base budget.71 CBO associates enduring activities with the following DOD functional categories: in-theater support, classified programs, equipment reset and readiness, European Deterrence Initiative, security cooperation, and joint improvised-threat defeat.
Differing OCO ProjectionsExecutive Branch budget documents for FY2019 show differing projections for how much OCO would be apportioned over the Future Years Defense Program (also known as the FYDP, pronounced "fiddip," the five-year period from FY2019 through FY2023).72 For example, Table 1-11 in DOD's National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, citing OMB data, projects five-year OCO funding at $359 billion. However, Table 1-9 of the same document puts the figure at $149 billion after assuming a higher amount of OCO funding shifting into the base budget.73
According to OMB, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected increasing caps on defense discretionary base budget authority by $84 billion (15%) to $660 billion in FY2020 and by $87 billion (15%) to $677 billion in FY2021.74 It also projected defense funding for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) totaling $73 billion in FY2020 and $66 billion in FY2021.75 Thus, projected defense discretionary funding would total $733 billion in FY2020 and $743 billion in FY2021.
FY2019 DOD budget documents show the same defense discretionary topline for FY2020 and FY2021.76 But they list an "Outyears Placeholder for OCO" of $20 billion in fiscal years FY2020-FY2023, and an "OCO to Base" amount of $53 billion in FY2020 and $45.8 billion in each year from FY2021-FY2023. The documents do not break down what accounts or activities are included in these amounts.
The emergence of any new contingencies or conflicts would likely change DOD assumptions about OCO needs.
Congressional Action on the FY2019 OCO Request and AppropriationsCongress has appropriated a total of $68.8 billion for DOD OCO funding in FY2019, including the following amounts:
For the Department of State and USAID, as well as the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Coast Guard, FY2019 OCO levels have not yet been determined. They remain at prorated FY2018 levels because of continuing resolutions (CR) to fund certain agencies through December 21, 2018.77
The FY2019 House and Senate SFOPS bills (H.R. 6385 and S. 3108, 115th Congress) would have appropriated approximately $8 billion in OCO-designated funding for various priorities. The House committee-reported version of the Homeland Security appropriations bill (H.R. 6776, 115th Congress) would not have appropriated any OCO/GWOT funding for the Coast Guard, while the Senate committee-reported version of the bill (S. 3109, 115th Congress) would have appropriated $165 million for OCO/GWOT funding for the Coast Guard.78
Issues for Congress How Could the BCA Affect Future OCO Levels?Any decision by the 116th Congress to change discretionary defense and nondefense spending limits that remain in effect for FY2020 and FY2021 under the Budget Control Act (BCA; P.L. 112-25) could impact future OCO funding levels.
Lawmakers may consider the following questions:
In a November 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission, a bipartisan panel created by Congress, issued recommendations related to OCO and the BCA.79 Recommendation No. 24 states, "Congress should eliminate the final two years of caps under the BCA." Recommendation 29 states, "To better prepare for major-power competition, Congress should gradually integrate OCO spending back into the base Pentagon budget. This also requires a dollar-for-dollar increase in the BCA spending caps, should they remain in force, so that this transfer does not result in an overall spending cut."80
Will Congress Continue to Use OCO for State/USAID?Both House and Senate FY2019 committee-reported appropriations bills from the 115th Congress included about $8 billion in OCO funding for State/USAID. It remains to be seen if the 116th Congress will pass this OCO level as requested or extend the continuing resolution.
How Much Would Defense Spending Caps Increase under the Administration's Budget Plans?Congress could enact legislation to authorize and appropriate a level of base and OCO spending to meet current or revised discretionary defense spending caps in any number of ways.
In FY2019 budget documents from OMB and DOD, the Trump Administration projected increasing defense spending in FY2020 and FY2021 beyond the statutory limits of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), but by differing amounts based on differing OCO projections. These figures serve as possible scenarios or options for Congress to consider.
FY2020 Projections According to OMB budget documents, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected $733 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2020, including a base budget of $660 billion (which assumes an $84 billion, or 15%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO defense budget of $73 billion (see Figure 11).81According to DOD budget documents, the President's revised FY2019 budget request projected $733 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2020, including a base budget of $713 billion (which assumes a $137 billion, or 24%, increase in the BCA defense cap—what would be the largest increase to the BCA defense caps yet—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $20 billion.82
Alternatively, assuming no change in the cap and congressional support for the Administration's projected $733 billion topline in FY2020, Congress could keep the BCA defense cap unchanged at $576 billion and designate an additional $157 billion for OCO.
FY2021 Projections According to OMB budget documents, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected $743 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2021, including a base budget of $677 billion (which assumes an $87 billion, or 15%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $66 billion (see Figure 11).83According to DOD budget documents, the President's revised FY2019 budget request projected $743 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2021, including a base budget of $723 billion (which assumes a $133 billion, or 23%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $20 billion.84
Alternatively, assuming no change in the cap and congressional support for the Administration's projected $743 billion topline in FY2020, Congress could keep the BCA defense cap unchanged at $590 billion and designate an additional $153 billion for OCO.
Figure 11. Possible Adjustments to BCA Defense Caps and OCO Funding in FY2020 and FY2021
(in billions of dollars of discretionary budget authority)
Sources: CRS analysis of Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government for Fiscal Year 2019, Table S-7: Proposed Discretionary Caps for 2019 Budget; Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, Table 1-9: National Defense Budget Authority – Discretionary and Mandatory; Congressional Budget Office, Sequestration Update Report: August 2018.
Notes: For each set of toplines, the left-most bars assume no change to the BCA defense cap and the difference would be made up entirely by OCO funding; the middle bars assume OCO funding as projected by OMB in Table S-7; the right-most bars assume $20 billion in OCO funding as projected by DOD in Table 1-9. These figures assume "OCO to Base" amounts are treated as base budget funding and a defense cap of $576 billion in FY2020 and $590 billion in FY2021, as estimated in CBO's Sequestration Update Report.
As previously discussed, these figures would change with different toplines for the national defense budget function (050).85
Former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and the National Defense Strategy Commission have recommended that Congress increase the defense budget between 3% and 5% a year above inflation ("real growth") to meet U.S. strategic goals.86
President Donald Trump has said the discretionary defense spending request would total $700 billion in FY2020, a decrease of 2% in nominal terms from FY2019. Trump said, "We know what the budget—the new budget is for the Defense Department. It will probably be $700 billion."87 However, some media outlets have since reported that the President intends to request a discretionary defense budget of $750 billion in FY2020.88
Senator James Inhofe, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Representative Mac Thornberry, ranking member of the House Armed Services Committees in the 116th Congress, have argued, "Any cut in the defense budget would be a senseless step backward."89 Thornberry has also said transferring recurring OCO costs into the regular budget "makes sense … it makes for more predictable budgeting, but it's all about what happens on the topline."90 Representative Adam Smith, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in the 116th Congress, has said of the defense budget: "I think the number is too high, and it's certainly not going to be there in the future … We've got a debt, we've got a deficit, we've got infrastructure problems, we've got healthcare, education—there's a whole lot that is necessary to make our country safe, secure, and prosperous."91
Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan has talked about a flat topline for national defense: "When you look at the $700 billion, it's not just for one year drop down, [or] a phase, it's a drop and then held constant" over the FYDP.92 Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer David Norquist, who is also performing the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, at one time was reportedly preparing two budgets for FY2020—one assuming $733 billion for national defense and another assuming $700 billion.93
An analyst has noted "returning enduring OCO costs to the base budget, particularly a vast majority of those enduring costs over a short period as DOD has outlined, could significantly complicate an agreement between congressional Democrats and Republicans to increase both the defense and nondefense BCA budget caps for FY2020 and FY2021."94
How Much OCO Funding Could Shift to the DOD Base Budget? As analyst noted, "OCO has become an even less-defined pot of money … Congress needs to properly question the DOD budget planners on the future of OCO."95In a January 2017 report, GAO concluded, "Without a reliable estimate of DOD's enduring OCO costs, decision makers will not have a complete picture of the department's future funding needs or be able to make informed choices and trade-offs in budget formulation and decision making."96
The department states it has not fully estimated those costs in part because of the BCA.97 In a response to GAO, DOD wrote, "Developing reliable estimates of enduring OCO costs is an important first step to any future effort to transition enduring OCO costs to the base budget. In the context of such an effort, the Department would consider developing and reporting formal estimates of those costs. However, until there is sufficient relief from the budgetary caps established in the Budget Control Act of 2011, the Department will need OCO to finance counterterrorism operations, in particular [OFS] and [OIR]."98
In an October 2018 report, the Congressional Budget Office estimated OCO funding for DOD enduring activities—that is, those that would probably continue in the absence of overseas conflicts—totaled more than $50 billion a year (in 2019 dollars) from 2006 to 2018—and are projected to total about $47 billion a year starting in FY2020.99
This figure appears to be consistent with projections published by DOD. According to the department's FY2019 budget documents, DOD projected $53 billion for "OCO to Base" in FY2020 and $45.8 billion for "OCO to Base" for FY2021 through FY2023.
How Does OCO Funding Affect Defense Planning?Some analysts have concluded:
Uncertainty created by current reliance on OCO, particularly to fund base budget needs, could be detrimental to national security on three levels: (a) by undermining budget controls and contributing thereby to larger deficits, (b) by generating insecurity in the defense workforce and in defense suppliers, and (c) by creating long-term uncertainty in defense planning. The alternative, transitioning longer-term OCO expenses to the base budget, could be achieved through a combination of increased budget caps, targeted cuts in inefficient Defense programs, and increased revenues.100
For example, a potential enduring activity in the OCO budget is the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). It was previously known as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), an effort that began in June 2014 to increase the number of U.S. military personnel and prepositioned equipment in Central and Eastern Europe intended in part to reassure NATO allies after Russia's military seized Crimea.101 As some analysts have noted, "Because it is in the OCO part of the budget request, EDI funding does not include a projection for how much funding will be allocated in future years, which can create uncertainty in the minds of allies and adversaries alike about the U.S. military's commitment to the program."102 On the other hand, some contend that it is precisely EDI's flexibility that allows the commander of European Command to quickly respond to changing security and posture needs in Europe, and ensure that monies intended for European deterrence will not be redirected to other DOD priorities.103
In its November 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission quoted the late military strategist Bernard Brodie, who wrote "strategy wears a dollar sign."104 The panel concluded that relying on OCO funding to increase the defense budget "is not the way to provide adequate and stable resources" for the type of great power competition outlined in the Secretary of Defense's 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which calls for the United States to bolster its competitive military advantage relative to threats posed by China and Russia:
Because of budgetary constraints imposed by the BCA, lawmakers and the Department of Defense have increasingly relied upon the overseas contingency operations (OCO) fund to pay for warfighting operations in the greater Middle East, as well as other activities and initiatives. Yet this approach to resourcing has produced problems and distortions of its own. For one thing, the amount of money devoted to OCO since the BCA was enacted no longer corresponds to warfighting operations in the greater Middle East. Furthermore, such operations are no longer a top priority as articulated in the NDS. Finally, reorienting the military toward high-end competition and conflict will require new capabilities beyond the current program of record. OCO is not the way to provide adequate and stable resources for such a long-term endeavor, given its lack of predictability and the limitations on what OCO funds can be used to buy."105
Appendix A. Statutes, Guidance, and RegulationsThe designation of funding as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT) is governed by several statues as well as Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and the Department of Defense (DOD) Financial Management Regulation (FMR).
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA) of 1985
BBEDCA, as amended, includes the statutory definitions of emergency and unanticipated as they relate to budget enforcement through sequestration. The act also allows for appropriations to be designated by Congress and the President as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism. Such appropriations are effectively exempt from the statutory discretionary spending limits.106
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (2 U.S.C. §900) Definitions The term "emergency" means a situation that- requires new budget authority and outlays (or new budget authority and the outlays flowing therefrom) for the prevention or mitigation of, or response to, loss of life or property, or a threat to national security; and (B) is unanticipated. The term "unanticipated" means that the underlying situation is- sudden, which means quickly coming into being or not building up over time; urgent, which means a pressing and compelling need requiring immediate action; unforeseen, which means not predicted or anticipated as an emerging need; and (D) temporary, which means not of a permanent duration. Notes: As amended by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25). |
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (2 U.S.C. §901) Enforcing Discretionary Spending Limits Enforcement Sequestration Within 15 calendar days after Congress adjourns to end a session there shall be a sequestration to eliminate a budget-year breach, if any, within any category. Eliminating a breach Each non-exempt account within a category shall be reduced by a dollar amount calculated by multiplying the enacted level of sequestrable budgetary resources in that account at that time by the uniform percentage necessary to eliminate a breach within that category. Adjustments to discretionary spending limits Concepts and definitions When the President submits the budget under section 1105 of title 31, OMB shall calculate and the budget shall include adjustments to discretionary spending limits (and those limits as cumulatively adjusted) for the budget year and each outyear to reflect changes in concepts and definitions. Such changes shall equal the baseline levels of new budget authority and outlays using up-to-date concepts and definitions, minus those levels using the concepts and definitions in effect before such changes. Such changes may only be made after consultation with the Committees on Appropriations and the Budget of the House of Representatives and the Senate, and that consultation shall include written communication to such committees that affords such committees the opportunity to comment before official action is taken with respect to such changes. Sequestration reports When OMB submits a sequestration report under section 904(e), (f), or (g) of this title for a fiscal year, OMB shall calculate, and the sequestration report and subsequent budgets submitted by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31 shall include adjustments to discretionary spending limits (and those limits as adjusted) for the fiscal year and each succeeding year, as follows: (A) Emergency appropriations; overseas contingency operations/global war on terrorism If, for any fiscal year, appropriations for discretionary accounts are enacted that - the Congress designates as emergency requirements in statute on an account by account basis and the President subsequently so designates, or the Congress designates for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism in statute on an account by account basis and the President subsequently so designates, the adjustment shall be the total of such appropriations in discretionary accounts designated as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism, as applicable. Notes: As amended by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25). |
Title 10, United States Code—Armed Forces
10 U.S.C. 101—Definitions
Section 101 provides definitions of terms applicable to Title 10. While it does not define overseas contingency operations, it does include a definition of a contingency operations.
10 U.S.C. §101- Definitions (13) The term "contingency operation" means a military operation that- is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; or results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12304a, 12305, or 12406 of this title, chapter 15 of this title, section 712 of title 14, or any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress. |
Administration and Internal Guidance
In addition to statutory requirements, the DOD and the Department of State are subject to guidance on OCO spending from the Administration. In October 2006, under the Bush Administration, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England directed the services to break with long-standing DOD regulatory policies and expand their request for supplemental funding to reflect incremental costs related to the "longer war on terror." There was no specific definition for the "longer war on terror," now one of the core missions of the DOD.
In February 2009, at the beginning of the Obama Administration, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued updated budget guidance that required DOD to move some OCO costs back into the base budget. However, within six months of issuing the new criteria, officials waived restrictions related to pay and that would have prohibited end-strength growth.107 In a letter from OMB to the then-Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Robert Hale, the agency characterized its 2009 criteria as "very successful" for delineating base and OCO spending but stated, "This update clarifies language, eliminates areas of confusion and provides guidance for areas previously unanticipated."108 GAO subsequently reported that the revised guidance significantly changed the criteria used to build the fiscal year 2010 OCO funding request by:
OMB again revised its guidance in September 2010 following a number of GAO reports that had concluded DOD reporting on OCO costs was of "questionable reliability," due in part to imprecisely defined financial management regulations related to OCO spending.110
(as of September 9, 2010)
Item
Definition of Criteria
Geographic area covered/"Theater of operations"(for non-classified war/overseas contingency operations funding)
Geographic areas in which combat or direct combat support operations occur: Iraq , Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, the Horn of Africa, Persian Gulf and Gulf nations, Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Philippines, and other countries on a case-by-case basis. Note:
Item |
Definition of Criteria |
Geographic area covered/"Theater of operations"(for non-classified war/overseas contingency operations funding) |
|
Inclusions | |
Major Equipment (General) |
Replacement of losses that have occurred but only for items not already programmed for replacement in the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP)— no accelerations. Accelerations can be made in the base budget. Replacement or repair to original capability (to upgraded capability if that is currently available) of equipment returning from theater. The replacement may be a similar end item if the original item is no longer in production. Incremental cost of non-war related upgrades, if made, should be included in the base. Purchase of specialized, theater-specific equipment. Funding must be obligated within 12 months. |
Ground Equipment Replacement |
Combat losses and washouts (returning equipment that is not economical to repair); replacement of equipment given to coalition partners, if consistent with approved policy; in-theater stocks above customary equipping levels on a case-by-case basis. |
Equipment Modifications (Enhancements) |
Operationally required modifications to equipment used in theater or in direct support of combat operations, for which funding can be obligated in 12 months, and that is not already programmed in FYDP. |
Munitions |
Replenishment of munitions expended in combat operations in theater. Training ammunition for theater-unique training events is allowed. Forecasted expenditures are not allowed. Case-by-case assessment for munitions where existing stocks are insufficient to sustain theater combat operations. |
Aircraft Replacement |
Combat losses, defined as losses by accident or by enemy action that occur in the theater of operations. |
Military Construction |
Facilities and infrastructure in the theater of operations in direct support of combat operations. The level of construction should be the minimum to meet operational requirements. At non-enduring locations, facilities and infrastructure for temporary use are covered. At enduring locations, construction requirements must be tied to surge operations or major changes in operational requirements and will be considered on a case-by-case basis. |
Research and Development |
Projects required for combat operations in these specific theaters that can be delivered in 12 months. |
Operations |
Direct War costs:
Within the theater, the incremental costs above the funding programmed in the base budget:
Indirect War Costs: Indirect war costs incurred outside the theater of operations will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. |
Health |
Short-term care directly related to combat. Infrastructure that is only to be used during the current conflict. |
Personnel (Incremental Pay) |
Incremental special pays and allowances for Service members and civilians deployed to a combat zone; incremental pay. Special pays and allowances for Reserve Component personnel mobilized to support war missions. |
Special Operations Command |
Operations and equipment that meet the criteria in this guidance. |
Prepositioned Supplies and Equipment |
Resetting in-theater stocks of supplies and equipment to pre-war levels. Excludes costs for reconfiguring prepositioned sets or for maintaining them. |
Security Force Funding |
Training, equipping, and sustaining Iraqi and Afghan military and police forces. |
Fuel |
War fuel costs and funding to ensure that logistical support to combat operations is not degraded due to cash losses in DoD's baseline fuel program. Would fund enough of any base fuel shortfall attributable to fuel price increases to maintain sufficient on-hand cash for the Defense Working Capital Funds to cover seven days' disbursements. (This would enable the Fund to partially cover losses attributable to fuel cost increases.) |
Exclusions from war/overseas contingency funding - Appropriately funded in the base budget |
|
Training equipment |
Training vehicles, aircraft, ammunition, and simulators. Exception: training base stocks of specialized, theater-specific equipment that is required to support combat operations in the theater of operations, and support to deployment-specific training described above. |
Equipment Service Life Extension Programs (SLEPs) |
Acceleration of SLEPs already in the FYDP. |
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) |
BRAC projects. |
Family Support Initiatives |
Family support initiatives to include the construction of childcare facilities; funding private-public partnerships to expand military families' access to childcare; and support for service members' spouses professional development. |
Industrial Base Capacity |
Programs to maintain industrial base capacity (e.g. "war-stoppers"). |
Personnel |
Recruiting and retention bonuses to maintain end-strength. Basic Pay and the Basic allowances for Housing and Subsistence for permanently authorized end strength. Individual augmentees will be decided on a case-by-case basis. |
Office of Security Cooperation |
Support for the personnel, operations, or the construction or maintenance of facilities, at U.S. Offices of Security Cooperation in-theater. |
Special Situations |
|
Reprogrammings and paybacks |
Items proposed for increases in reprogrammings or as payback for prior reprogrammings must meet the criteria above. |
Source: Letter from Steven M. Kosiak, Associate Director for Defense and Foreign Affairs, OMB, to Robert Hale, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, "Revised War Funding Criteria," September 9, 2010.
DOD Financial Management Regulations
DOD incorporated the September 2010 OMB criteria for war costs into the Financial Management Regulation. Table A-2depicts1 includes the general breakdown of cost categories DOD uses in its budget processes.
Table A-2. DOD General Cost Categories for Contingency Operations
DOD Financial Management Regulation
Category |
Description |
Personnel |
Incremental pay and allowances of DOD military and civilians participating in or supporting a contingency operation. |
Personnel Support |
|
Operating Support |
|
Transportation |
|
Working Capital Fund Support Costs |
|
Investment Costs |
|
Other Support Costs |
Includes various departmental programs designed to reimburse coalition countries for logistical and military support; to provide lift to and to sustain coalition partners during military operations; |
Source: DOD, "Financial Management Regulation," Contingency Operations, Table 23-1 (September 2007); http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/fmr/current/12/12_23.pdf.
Appendix B.
DOD Contingency Operations Funded in the Base Budget
In FY2017, contingency operations funded wholly or in part through the DOD's base budget funding request, and therefore subject to the BCA caps, include the following:
Note: The current FMR also includes training and equipping the "Afghan National Army and the Armed Forces of Iraq" in the Other Support Costs category.
Appendix B. Transfer Authorities, Special Purpose AccountsIn addition to the supplemental appropriations and emergency or OCO/GWOT designation, the Department of Defense and the Department of State also have the authority to shift funds from one budget account to another in response to operational needs.
For DOD, these transfers (sometimes called reprogramings) are statutorily authorized by 10 U.S.C. 2214—Transfer of funds: procedures and limitations. This authority allows the Secretary of Defense to reallocate funds for higher priority items, based on unforeseen military requirements, after receiving written approval from the four congressional defense committees. DOD may also reprogram funds within an account from one activity to another, as long as the general purpose for the use of those funds remains unchanged.111 Specific limits to transfer or reprogramming authorities have also been added to these general authorities through provisions in annual defense authorization and appropriation acts.112 The FY2019 defense appropriations bill sets the base budget transfer cap at $4 billion and the OCO transfer cap at $2 billion.113
The Department of State's OCO transfer authority has been provided in appropriations acts and has specifically authorized the Administration to transfer OCO funds only to other OCO funds within Title VIII SFOPS appropriations, not between OCO and base accounts. The transfer authority is capped, specified by account, and requires regular congressional notification procedures.
Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF)
The OCOTF was established for DOD in FY1997 as a no year transfer account (meaning amounts are available until expended) in order to provide additional flexibility to meet operational requirements.114 Transfers from the OCOTF are processed using existing reprogramming procedures. A quarterly report is submitted to the congressional oversight committees, documenting all transfers from the OCOTF to DOD components base budget accounts. Beginning in FY2002, funds to support Southwest Asia, Kosovo, and Bosnia contingency requirements were appropriated directly to DOD components' Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel accounts rather than to the OCOTF for later disbursement. FY2014 was the last year the Administration requested a direct appropriation to the OCOTF.115
Contingency Operations Funded in the DOD Base Budget116As first mandated by section 8091 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-116), Congress has required DOD to provide separate annual budget justification documents detailing the costs of U.S. armed forces' participation in all named contingency operations where the total cost of the operation exceeds $100 million or is staffed by more than 1,000 U.S. military personnel.117
Funding for certain DOD contingency operations has been moved to the base budget request, and is no longer designated as emergency or OCO/GWOT requirements.118 This movement of funding from the OCO request to the base budget request typically occurs as the operational activities of an enduring contingency operation evolve over time and DOD determines that certain elements of the associated military operations have become stable enough to be planned, financed, and executed within the base budget. For example, funding for Operation Noble Eagle, which provides fighter aircraft on 24/7 alert at several U.S. military bases, was moved from the GWOT request to the base budget request in 2005.
Contingency operations and other activities funded wholly or in part through DOD's base budget have included:
Beginning in FY2016, Operation Spartan Shield, which supports ongoing U.S. Central Command missions and the building of Middle East partner military capacity, was budgeted and requested in U.S. Army and U.S. Navy OCO budget justification documents under Operation Freedom's Sentinel. In FY2017, funding for Operation Enduring Freedom-Caribbean and Central America, was previously funded in part through the base DOD budget, was requested in the U.S. Special Operations Command OCO O&M budget justification documents.130
ABCT |
Armor Brigade Combat Team |
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AFRICOM |
Africa Command |
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ANDSF |
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces |
||||||
ASFF |
Afghan Security Forces Fund |
||||||
BBA |
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 |
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BBEDCA |
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 |
||||||
BCA |
Budget Control Act of 2011 |
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CENTCOM |
Central Command |
||||||
CTPF |
Counterterrorism Partnership Fund |
||||||
DNI |
Director of National Intelligence |
||||||
DOD |
Department of Defense |
||||||
DOS |
Department of State |
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ERI |
European Reassurance Initiative |
||||||
EUCOM |
European Command |
||||||
FMR |
Financial Management Regulation |
||||||
GAO |
Government Accountability Office |
||||||
GWOT |
Global War on Terror |
||||||
HASC |
House Armed Services Committee |
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IC |
Intelligence Community |
||||||
IED |
Improvised Explosive Device |
||||||
IS |
Islamic State |
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ISAF |
International Security Assistance Force |
||||||
ISF |
Iraqi Security Forces |
||||||
ITEF |
Iraq Train and Equip Fund |
||||||
MIP |
Military Intelligence Program |
||||||
MRAP |
Other Congressionally Authorized Funds or Programs Through the OCO authorization and appropriation process, Congress has created numerous funds and programs that are designed to finance specific overseas contingency operations-related activities that do not fit into traditional budgetary accounts. Many of these funds and programs are supplied with amounts that are available until expended—however, authorization for the specified fund or program has an expiration date, thereby requiring further congressional action for reauthorization of affected funds or programs.127 Congress has also provided increased transfer authority to provide greater flexibility for U.S. government activities in situations that are typically unpredictable.128 Examples of these types of congressionally authorized OCO programs or funds have included: This is an update to a report originally co-authored by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in Defense Readiness and Infrastructure. It references research previously compiled by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget; Christopher Mann, Analyst in Defense Policy and Trade; [author name scrubbed], Analyst in U.S. Defense Acquisition Policy; [author name scrubbed], CRS Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process; and [author name scrubbed], CRS Analyst in Public Finance. [author name scrubbed], Research Assistant, helped compile the graphics. Author Contact Information The figures in this paragraph are in nominal, or current, dollars (not adjusted for inflation). CRS analysis of Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, Table 2-1: Base Budget, War Funding and Supplementals by Military Department, by P.L. Title (FY2001-FY2019), April 2019; Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2001-FY2019; Department of Homeland Security, Budget in Brief documents, FY2001-FY2019; Congressional Budget Office, Final Fiscal Year 2018 House Current Status of Discretionary Appropriations, as of September 30, 2018; Congressional Budget Office, Fiscal Year 2019 House Current Status of Discretionary Appropriations, as of October 5, 2018. For more information on the appropriations process, see CRS Report R42388, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. | ||||||
NATO |
North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
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NDAA |
National Defense Authorization Act |
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NIP |
National Intelligence Program |
||||||
O&M |
Operation and Maintenance |
||||||
OCO |
Overseas Contingency Operations |
||||||
OOL |
Operation Odyssey Lightning |
||||||
OCOTF |
Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund |
||||||
OEF |
Operation Enduring Freedom |
||||||
OFS |
Operation Freedom's Sentinel |
||||||
OIF |
Operation Iraqi Freedom |
||||||
OIR |
Operation Inherent Resolve |
||||||
OMB |
Office of Management and Budget |
||||||
OND |
Operation New Dawn |
||||||
ONE |
Operation Noble Eagle |
||||||
OSC-I |
Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq |
||||||
RDT&E |
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation |
||||||
SFOPS |
State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs |
||||||
USAID |
United States Agency for International Development |
||||||
USD(I) |
Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) |
Author Contact Information
1. |
Department of Defense National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2017, Table 2-1. Note: the Department of Defense monthly Cost of War Report, August 2016, estimates that $1,621.0 billion has been appropriated for such purposes, however the report includes funding for hurricane relief (2005) and Base Realignment and Closure activities (2007). Accounting of recessions also varies between the two sources. |
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2. |
Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2001-FY2017. |
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3. |
P.L. 112-25. Title I, Sec. 101, amends the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 USC 900-922). A designation of spending as an emergency requirement or for OCO/GWOT would effectively protect such spending from points of order raised under sections 302 and 311 of the Budget Act, as well as sections 401 and 404 of S.Con.Res. 13 (111th Congress). The enactment of spending with either designation would also result in an adjustment of the appropriate spending cap, as provided in section 251(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, so that such spending would not cause a breach of that spending limit triggering a sequester. |
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4. |
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, hearing on Fiscal Year 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Request, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., July 16, 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014). |
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5. |
Jacob, Marx, "The Pentagon's Wartime Slush Fund", March 26, 2015, http://www.pogo.org/blog/2015/03/the-pentagons-wartime-slush-fund.html; Eric Pianin, "Pentagon's $90 Billion 'Slush Fund' Comes Under Attack," The Fiscal Times, May 8, 2015; Ryan Alexander, "A War Budget, Off-Budget," US News and World Report, February 16, 2016, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2016/02/16/overseas-contingency-operations-serves-as-off-budget-pentagon-slush-fund. |
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6. |
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7. |
Paul D. Shinkman, "Inside the Pentagon's 'Slush Fund'," US News and World Report, February 12, 2016, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-02-12/inside-the-pentagons-slush-fund-the-secret-budget-that-just-wont-go-away. |
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|
Some observers use the term supplemental as a colloquialism to describe the OCO budget request. While the OCO budget request is in addition, or supplemental, to an agency's base budget requirements, OCO funding may be provided through any of the three types of appropriations measures: regular appropriations bill, continuing resolution, or supplemental appropriations. The reader should not confuse a reference to a "supplemental appropriation measure" with a request for funds to supplement an agency's base budget requirements. 5.
|
|
CRS analysis of Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, "Table 6-8: DOD Budget Authority by Public Law Title (FY1948-FY2023)," "Table 2-1: Base Budget, War Funding and Supplementals by Military Department, by P.L. Title (FY2001-FY2019)," and "Table 1-9: National Defense Budget Authority-Discretionary and Mandatory," April 2019; Department of Defense, FAD-809 table, January 1978; Congressional Budget Office, Final Fiscal Year 2018 House Current Status of Discretionary Appropriations, as of September 30, 2018; CBO, Fiscal Year 2019 House Current Status of Discretionary Appropriations, as of October 5, 2018; Congressional Budget Office, Supplemental appropriations reports from the 1970s-2000s; Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, "Table 10.1-Gross Domestic Product and Deflators Used in the Historical Tables: 1940–2023." 6.
|
|
Ibid. 7.
|
|
For a recent example of the distinction between emergency and OCO/GWOT funding, as part of the third FY2018 Continuing Resolution (P.L. 115-96), Congress appropriated an additional $4.5 billion, designated as "emergency requirements" (and, thus, exempt from the BCA-originated cap on discretionary defense spending), to accelerate improvements in missile defenses and other activities oriented toward North Korea and to repair two Pacific Fleet destroyers damaged in collisions. 8.
|
These supplemental requests sometimes included appropriations to special accounts to meet unanticipated wartime needs. For example, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006 (P.L. 109-234) appropriated $2 billion for the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund to develop, buy, and field devices to counter improvised explosive devices. For more on these funds, see the "Other Congressionally Authorized Funds or Programs" section in Appendix B.
9.
|
|
Office of Management and Budget, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America's Promise, February 2009. 10.
|
These definitions are codified in 2 U.S.C. 900-922. See "The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA) of 1985" section in Appendix A. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
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Office of Management and Budget, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America |
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|
The Obama Administration's Department of Defense FY2009 Supplemental Request, April 2009, augmented the Bush Administration's Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2009 Global War on Terror Bridge Request, May 2008. 14.
|
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, Summary Justification. 15.
|
|
Title XV of the FY2010 NDAA (P.L. 111-84) was entitled, Authorization of Additional Appropriations for Overseas Contingency Operations. Title XV of the FY2009 NDAA (P.L. 110-417) was entitled, Authorization of Additional Appropriations for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the previous names for U.S. military operations primarily conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively. 16.
|
|
Title I, Sec. 101, of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) amended the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P.L. 99-177). 17.
|
|
In appropriations bills, the description of additional funding designated for OCO/GWOT typically states: "Provided, That such amounts in this paragraph are designated by the Congress for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985." 18.
|
|
Department of State, Executive Budget Summary, Function 150 & Other International Programs, Fiscal Year 2012; and Fact Sheet, FY2012 State and USAID - Overseas Contingency Operations, February 14, 2011. 19.
|
|
According to the State Department: the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) is intended to improve the planning and execution of shared Department of State and Department of Defense security assistance challenges in partner countries. First authorized in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the program is funded by both departments and has backed projects in 13 countries from the Lake Chad Basin to the Philippines to Eastern Europe. Congress renewed the GSCF authority in the FY2018 NDAA for two fiscal years, through FY2019. See https://www.state.gov/t/pm/gpi/gscf/index.htm. 20.
|
|
A designation of funding as emergency requirements or for OCO/GWOT effectively protects it from points of order raised under sections 302 and 311 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344). The enactment of spending with either designation would also result in an adjustment of the appropriate spending cap, as provided in section 251(b) of the BBEDCA, so that such spending would not cause a breach of that spending limit, thus triggering a sequester. For more information, see CRS Report R42388, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. 21.
|
|
For more information on the BCA, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. 22.
|
|
Congressional Budget Office, Letter from then-Director Douglas W. Elmendorf to then-Speaker of the House John Boehner and then-Majority Leader of the Senate Harry Reid, "CBO Estimate of the Impact on the Deficit of the Budget Control Act of 2011." 23.
|
|
Budget authority is authority provided by law to a federal agency to obligate money for goods and services. The defense limits apply to discretionary base budget authority for national defense (budget function 050). For more on the national defense budget function, see CRS In Focus IF10618, Defense Primer: The National Defense Budget Function (050), by [author name scrubbed]. 24.
|
|
For more information on sequestration, see CRS Report R42972, Sequestration as a Budget Enforcement Process: Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed]. 25.
|
|
Technically, the BCA allows an upward adjustment to the limits for certain types of funding. For more information on the defense budget and the BCA, see CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed]. 26.
|
|
For more information on the BBA 2018, see CRS Insight IN10861, Discretionary Spending Levels Under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. 27.
|
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Defense Budget Overview, FY2019 budget request, revised February 13, 2018, p. 4-3. 28.
|
|
Department of Defense, Cost of War report, June 2018, p. 9. 29.
|
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request Overview, February 2015, p. 7-9. 30.
|
|
Ibid. 31.
|
|
Mark Cancian, "Two Cheers for OCO: Grease for Budget Wheels," Breaking Defense, October 20, 2016. 32.
|
|
Testimony of Defense Secretary James Mattis, in U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal 2019 Defense Department Posture, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., April 26, 2018. For more on the National Defense Strategy, see CRS Report R45349, The 2018 National Defense Strategy: Fact Sheet, by [author name scrubbed]. 33.
|
|
In 2016, then a congressman from South Carolina, Mick Mulvaney proposed legislation intended to "help prevent abuse of the Overseas Contingency Operations slush fund." See "Reps. Mulvaney, Van Hollen, Lee, Sanford Amendment Helps Prevent Abuse of OCO Slush Fund," press release, Targeted News Service, May 19, 2016. 34.
|
|
Office of Management and Budget, President's Budget, "Addendum to the FY2019 Budget," February 12, 2018. 35.
|
|
Paul D. Shinkman, "Inside the Pentagon's 'Slush Fund'," US News and World Report, February 12, 2016. 36.
|
For the full list of criteria for OCO funding, see Table A-1 in Appendix A.
37.
|
|
Steven Kosiak, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security, remarks made at American Enterprise Institute event, "The defense budget and emergency war spending: Does it help more than it hurts?" moderated by Mackenzie Eaglen, Resident Fellow, AEI, March 15, 2017. For more on the F-35 program, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by [author name scrubbed]. 38.
|
|
Roger I. Zakheim, Visiting Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, remarks made at American Enterprise Institute event, "The defense budget and emergency war spending: Does it help more than it hurts?" moderated by Mackenzie Eaglen, Resident Fellow, AEI, March 15, 2017. 39.
|
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, "Table 2-1: Base Budget, War Funding and Supplementals by Military Department, by Public Law Title," April 2018. 40.
|
|
Ibid. For more information on U.S. policy response to the Islamic State see CRS Report R43612, The Islamic State and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. 41.
|
|
Congressional Budget Office, Fiscal Year 2019 House Current Status of Discretionary Appropriations, as of October 5, 2018. This figure does not include the $165 million requested in the FY2019 DOD budget for the Navy intended for Coast Guard operations in support of OCO. 42.
|
|
DOD, Cost of War report, June 2018, p. 1. 43.
|
|
For more information about U.S. policy in these countries, see the following: CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report R45096, Iraq: Issues in the 115th Congress, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. 44.
|
|
In FY2019 budget documents, the Department of Defense includes a force level assumption of 11,958 personnel in Afghanistan for budgeting purposes (average annual troop strength), but acknowledged a "current" force level of 14,000 personnel in the country following an increase of 3,500 personnel and a change in accounting methodology. See Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Defense Budget Overview, FY2019 budget request, revised February 13, 2018, p. 4-2. FY2009 is the earliest year for which DOD reported the number of support personnel. 45.
|
|
According to the Department of Defense, U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility (AOR) includes 20 countries: Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. 46.
|
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Defense Budget Overview, FY2019 budget request, revised February 13, 2018, p. 4-2. 47.
|
|
For more information on the FY2019 OCO budget request, please see the section "FY2019 OCO Funding" section later in this report. 48.
|
|
Todd Harrison and Seamus P. Daniels, "Analysis of the FY2019 Defense Budget," Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2018, p. 6. Note the Department of Defense breaks down OCO funding by operation, such as Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS) that is primarily conducted in Afghanistan. For more information, see the "OCO Funding by Operation" section later in this report. 49.
|
|
Department of Defense, Financial Management Regulation, Contingency Operations, vol. 12, ch. 23, December 2017, p. 23-6. 50.
|
|
DOD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) states that only those costs in addition to the department's normal peacetime activities, such as those incurred because troops are deployed in support of a contingency operation are to be considered OCO. To aid in the identification of such activities, the DOD regulation requires the military services to show how additional contingency operation deployments and operations affect peacetime assumptions about troop levels and operational tempo. Long-term equipment procurement or similar investment costs are only to be included if "necessary to support a contingency operation" and are "not to be used to procure durable and expendable items in excess of what is required." 51.
|
|
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Overseas Contingency Operations: OMB and DOD Should Revise the Criteria for Determining Eligible Costs and Identify the Costs Likely to Endure Long Term, GAO-17-68, January 18, 2017. 52.
|
|
Ibid. 53.
|
|
Section 1266 of P.L. 115-91 amended Subsection (c) of Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (P.L. 109-163), which directed the Secretary of Defense to submit such reports to the Comptroller General "not later than 45 days after the end of each reporting month" and the Comptroller General to provide Congress with quarterly updates on the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. 10 USC 101 defines congressional defense committees as the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations. DOD details reporting requirements in Volume 12, Chapter 23, of 7000.14-R Financial Management Regulation (FMR). The Comptroller General of the United States is the director of the GAO. 54.
|
|
See Reporting Requirements under Title IX, Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism, in H.Rept. 115-952, Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2019, and for Other Purposes. Note this language was revised in 2017 to eliminate the monthly Cost of War reporting requirement; see the same section in the explanatory text to Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2017 (Division C of H.R. 244), which states, "The agreement eliminates the Cost of War reporting requirement for detailed monthly obligation and expenditure data by appropriation account," available at https://www.congress.gov/crec/2017/05/03/CREC-2017-05-03-bk2.pdf#page=320. 55.
|
|
Department of Defense, Cost of War report, June 2018. Note this total reflects DOD obligations for selected Overseas Contingency Operations and differs from the total OCO/GWOT figure cited earlier in this report, which reflects OCO/GWOT budget authority. Budget authority is provided by law to incur financial obligations; obligations are binding agreements that will result in outlays. 56.
|
|
Ibid. 57.
|
|
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Overseas Contingency Operations: OMB and DOD Should Revise the Criteria for Determining Eligible Costs and Identify the Costs Likely to Endure Long Term, GAO-17-68, January 18, 2017. 58.
|
|
Department of Defense, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, Operation Inherent Resolve and Other Contingency Operations, July 1, 2018-September 30, 2018. This report states, "On February 9, 2018, the Secretary of Defense designated three new named contingency operations: Operation Yukon Journey, and operations in Northwest Africa and East Africa. These operations, which are classified, seek to degrade al Qaeda and ISIS-affiliated terrorists in the Middle East and specific regions of Africa." 59.
|
|
Department of State, Executive Budget Summary, Function 150 and Other International Programs, FY2012. 60.
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[author name scrubbed], CRS Specialist in Homeland Security and Appropriations, contributed this section. 61.
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|
Department of Homeland Security email to CRS, October 17, 2018. 62.
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Letter from then-President Barack Obama to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, requesting supplemental appropriations, April 9, 2009. 63.
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|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Budget Estimates, Justification of Estimates, February 2017. 64.
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|
This figure includes the $165 million requested in the FY2019 DOD budget for the Navy intended for Coast Guard operations in support of OCO. According to DOD, Coast Guard activities assisting DOD include the operation and maintenance of six 110-foot Island-class patrol boats operating in U.S. Central Command, law enforcement detachments, and the deployment of a port security unit detachment to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in support of maritime/counterterrorism security operations. See Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Budget Estimates, Justification of Estimates, February 2018. 65.
|
|
Office of Management and Budget, Supplementals, Amendments, and Releases, "Estimate #1-FY2019 Budget Amendments," April 18, 2018; and Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Defense Budget Overview, FY2019 budget request, revised February 13, 2018. 66.
|
|
Office of Management and Budget, President's Budget, Estimate #1-FY2019 Budget Amendments, April 18, 2018; and OMB, "Addendum to the FY2019 Budget," February 12, 2018. 67.
|
|
Ibid. 68.
|
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Defense Budget Overview, FY2019 budget request, revised February 13, 2018, p. 4-1. 69.
|
|
Ibid. p. 4-2. Note this document makes a distinction between the average annual troop strength figure used for budgeting purposes and "current force level," which it cites as 14,000 U.S. personnel in Afghanistan following an increase of 3,500 personnel and a change in accounting methodology. 70.
|
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Defense Budget Overview, FY2019 budget request, revised February 13, 2018, p. 4-4. 71.
|
|
CBO defines enduring activities as those that would probably continue in the absence of overseas conflicts. See CBO, Funding for Overseas Contingency Operations and Its Impact on Defense Spending, October 23, 2018. |
For more information on the appropriations process see CRS Report R42388, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. For more information on FY2017 federal budget issues for Congress see CRS Report R44428, The Federal Budget: Overview and Issues for FY2017 and Beyond, by [author name scrubbed]. |
12. |
For example, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund was established in FY2006 with a $2.0 billion appropriation to provide funds to develop, buy, and field devices to counter improvised explosive devices. In FY2008 Congress provided $16.8 billion appropriation to establish a mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle account to purchase, train, and transport MRAPs to operations areas in order to provide increased protection for troops. |
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13. |
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 USC 900-922). |
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14. |
For more background on the changes to the definitions of war funding over time, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by [author name scrubbed]. |
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15. |
Office of Management and Budget, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America's Promise, Washington, DC, February 2009. |
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16. |
The Obama Administration' Department of Defense FY2009 Supplemental Request, April 2009, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2009/Supplemental/FY2009_Supplemental_Request/pdfs/FY_2009_Supplemental_Request_04-08-09.pdf augmented the Bush Administration's Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2009 Global War on Terror Bridge Request, May 2008. http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2009/Supplemental/FY2009_Global_War_On_Terror_Bridge_Request.pdf. |
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17. |
Executive Budget Summary Function 150 & Other International Programs, Fiscal Year 2012, p. 143, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/183755.pdf. State Department, "Fact Sheet, FY 2012 State and USAID - Overseas Contingency Operations," February 14, 2011, at http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/fs/2011/156555.htm. |
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18. |
. According to the DOS, the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) is a pilot program, currently authorized through September 30, 2017, that permits the DOS and DoD to pool money and expertise to address emergent challenges and opportunities to a partner countries' security and (in some instances) justice sectors important to U.S. national security and foreign policy. It is a bridging mechanism to provide assistance in the near- to mid-term. |
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19. |
For further information see CRS Report R42388, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. |
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20. |
For further information, see Ibid, pp. 17-20. |
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21. |
Procedures for discretionary spending sequestration are provided by the BBEDCA §251 and 256. Exempt programs and activities are listed in BBEDCA §255. |
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22. |
Ibid. |
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23. |
DOD, "Financial Management Regulation," Contingency Operations, vol. 12, ch. 23, pp. 23-6, September 2007, at http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/fmr/current/12/12_23.pdf. |
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24. |
Ibid. |
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25. |
Ibid. |
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26. |
Department of State, Executive Budget Summary, Function 150 and Other International Programs, FY2012, p. 133. |
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27. |
10 U.S.C.§2214 and Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R Volume 3: "Budget Execution-Availability and Use of Budgetary Resources," September 2015—see Chapter 6, "Reprogramming of DOD Appropriated Funds." This report will chiefly focus on the reprogramming of funds appropriated through unclassified DOD base and OCO accounts, as well as DOS/USAID appropriations—separate reprogramming authorities and processes are used for military construction and family housing appropriations; and for National Intelligence Program /Military Intelligence Program appropriations. |
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28. |
See for example Sec. 8005, Title VIII, Division C, "Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2016," in, as well as Sec.1001 under Title X and Sec. 1522 under Title XV, Division A, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016,". |
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29. |
In FY2016, the enacted DOD base budget was approximately $521.7 billion. |
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30. |
See for example Sec. 8005, Title VIII, Division C, "Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2016," in. Military construction funding is not covered by this transfer authority. |
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31. |
In FY2016, the enacted DOD OCO budget was approximately $58.6 billion. |
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32. |
See for example Sec. 9002, Title IX, Division C, "Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2016," in. These transfer authorities are also subject to any relevant provisions set forth under Title VIII, Division C, "Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2016," in. |
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33. |
Justification for Base Funded Contingency Operations and the Overseas Contingency Operation Transfer Fund, Fiscal Year 2017 President's Budget, February 2016. The term "no year appropriation" is defined in the U.S. Congress, House, Statement of Disbursements, Glossary of Terms, 114th Cong., 2nd sess. |
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34. |
FY2014 President's Budget, Department of Defense Contingency Operations (Base Budget), May 2013. |
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35. |
See Title VIII of Division K and Title IX of Division C in, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 and Title XII of, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. |
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36. |
These functions include bilateral economic assistance ("Transition Initiatives," "Complex Crises Fund," "Economic Support Fund," and "Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia") and international security assistance ("International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement," "Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs," "Peacekeeping Operations," and "Foreign Military Financing Program"). |
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37. |
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, (, Division K, Title VIII, Sec. 8003(a)(3). |
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38. |
Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request Overview, February 9, 2016. |
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39. |
Ibid. |
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40. |
Ibid. |
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41. |
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Joint Improvised Explosive Defense Defeat Fund Budget Justification Document for FY2010. |
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42. |
CRS Report RS22707, Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
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43. |
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2016: European Reassurance Initiative, February 2015, p. 1. |
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44. |
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45. |
USAID Office of Program, Policy, and Management. "Our Work: Complex Crises Fund," at https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus/bureau-democracy-conflict-and-humanitarian-assistance/office-program. |
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46. |
See Division K, Title VIII, "Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2016," in. |
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47. |
See Title VIII of Division K and Title IX of Division C in, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Title XII of, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, and Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request Overview, February 9, 2016. |
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48. |
DOD National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2017, and Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2001-FY2017. |
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49. |
Contributed by Christopher Mann, Research Assistant. |
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50. |
OEF-Horn of Africa supports the U.S. Navy's Combat Command Support Activity at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti and provides special operations forces to conduct operations, civil affairs, and military information support operations in the Horn of Africa. |
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51. |
OEF-Trans Sahara supports the Commander, U.S. Africa Command in the execution of the National Military Strategy for U.S. military operations in ten partner nations (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia). |
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52. |
The mission of OEF-Philippines was to advise and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines in combatting terrorism, and specifically the activities of the terrorist group Abu Sayaf, in the Philippines. |
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53. |
Operation Spartan Shield contributes to the U.S. Central Command mission to counter, protect, defend and prepare while simultaneously building partner capacity in the Middle East. |
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54. |
The NATO-led Resolute Support mission began January 1, 2015 and is the successor to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. Unlike the combat mission of ISAF, Resolute Support focuses on training, advising and assisting Afghan National Security Forces. For more on the Resolute Support mission and security operations in Afghanistan see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]. |
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55. |
For more information on U.S. policy response to the Islamic State see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics and Governance, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
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56. |
DOD Overview: Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Amendment FY2017, Figure 1 footnote. |
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57. |
Initially funded with supplemental appropriations, ONE was transferred to the base budget in 2005. |
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58. |
Department of Defense Cost of War Report, July 2016. Note: FY2015 and FY2016 ONE base budget funding totaled $205.8 million; see Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year FY2017: Justification for Base Funded Contingency Operations and the Overseas Contingency Operation Transfer Fund (OCOTF), February 2016. |
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59. |
Contributed by Heidi Peters, Research Librarian. |
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60. |
See CRS Report R43074, Department of Defense's Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R40764, Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R44116, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2016, coordinated by [author name scrubbed] for more information. |
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61. |
See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contingency Contracting: State and USAID Made Progress Assessing and Implementing Changes, but Further Actions Needed, GAO-14-229, February 14, 2014, p. 3, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-229. See also related GAO reports such as GAO-09-19; GAO-09-538T; GAO-10-1; GAO-10-187; and GAO-15-250. |
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62. |
Contributed by Heidi Peters, Research Librarian. |
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63. |
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2008, and for Other Purposes, Conference report to accompany H.R. 3222, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., November 6, 2007, H.Rept. 110-434 (Washington: GPO, 2007), Joint Explanatory Statement, p. 87. |
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64. |
U.S. President (Barack Obama), "The Budget Message of the President," 114th Cong., 1st sess., February 2, 2015, at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2016-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2016-BUD-1.pdf. |
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65. |
U.S. President (Barack Obama), "Veto Message—H.R. 1735," 114th Cong., 1st sess., October 22, 2015, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/22/veto-message-hr-1735. |
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66. |
|
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67. |
Some congressional defense committee members have maintained that the bipartisan negotiations from which the BBA emerged contemplated a FY2017 defense budget higher than the $551.1 billion cap, with additional funds to be provided through funding in OCO appropriations. As originally drafted in late October 2015, the BBA would have provided for "not less than" $58.8 billion for defense-related OCO funding in FY2017. However, the House Rules Committee adopted an amendment to modify the bill by eliminating the "not less than" language so that, as enacted, the BBA states, " ... Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism appropriations will be as follows ... For budget function 050 ... for fiscal year 2017, $58,798,000,000." See "House Amendment to the Senate amendment to H.R. 1314 [Text of the Bipartisan Budget Agreement of 2015]," in the record of the House Rules Committee's action on that Senate amendment, October 27, 2015. See also "Amendment to the House Amendment offered by Mr, Boehner (Amendment #2)," in the record of the House Rules Committee's action on "Senate Amendment to H.R. 1314," October 27, 2015. |
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68. |
Joe Gould, "Top Appropriator Draws A Line on DoD Spending," Defense News, April 8, 2016. |
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69. |
Defense Budget Overview of the FY2017 DOD Budget Request, Figure 7, attributes $5.2 billion of the FY2017 OCO request as "Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2015 Compliance." |
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70. |
Department of Defense and Overview: Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Amendment FY2017. |
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71. |
Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request, Overseas Contingency Operations. |
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72. |
Ibid, p. 7-2. |
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73. |
Department of Defense Overview: Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Amendment FY2017 (figure 1). |
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74. |
Department of Defense and Overview: Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Amendment FY2017. |
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75. |
White House, Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address," February 12, 2013. |
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76. |
Testimony of Christine Abizaid, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, March 16, 2016. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2016-03-16-DOD-Abizaid-Written-Testimony.pdf |
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77. |
CRS Analysis, Department of Defense Cost of War Report, July 2016. |
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78. |
Ibid. |
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79. |
Ibid. |
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80. |
DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2015, page 26. http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/1225_Report_Dec_2015_-_Final_20151210.pdf |
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81. |
CRS Analysis of DOD Cost of War data, July 2016. |
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82. |
Justification for FY2017 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, November 2016. |
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83. |
Ibid. |
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84. |
CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]. |
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85. |
Statement of General John F. Campbell, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Situation in Afghanistan, October 6, 2015. http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Campbell_10-06-15.pdf. |
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86. |
White House, Statement by the President on Afghanistan, October 15, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/15/statement-president-afghanistan. |
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87. |
CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]. |
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88. |
See summary and posted "Cost of Operations" reports at Department of Defense Operation Inherent Resolve website, http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve. |
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89. |
CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by [author name scrubbed]. |
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90. |
Department of Defense FY2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Amendment Overview, November 2014. |
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91. |
Contributed by Christopher Blanchard and [author name scrubbed], Specialists in Middle Eastern Affairs. |
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92. |
Department of Defense Justification for FY2017 Overseas Contingency Operations Iraq Train and Equip Fund. |
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|
Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, Table 1-11: Discretionary Budget Authority for Selected Programs and Table 1-9: National Defense Budget Authority – Discretionary and Mandatory, April 2018. See also Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Defense Budget Overview, FY2019 budget request, Figure 1.3. Defense Topline – a historical funding picture, revised February 13, 2018. 74.
|
|
Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government for Fiscal Year 2019, Table S-7. Proposed Discretionary Caps for 2019 Budget. 75.
|
|
Ibid. 76.
|
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, Table 1-9: National Defense Budget Authority-Discretionary and Mandatory, April 2019. 77.
|
|
The first CR through December 7, 2018, was P.L. 115-245; the second CR through December 21, 2018, was P.L. 115-298. 78.
|
|
S.Rept. 115-283, the Senate Appropriations Committee report accompanying S. 3109, states "The Committee recommends $165,000,000 for Coast Guard operations in support of OCO. While funding for these activities is requested in the Department of Defense budget for the U.S. Navy, the Committee adopted a practice, beginning in fiscal year 2009, of recommending these amounts be appropriated directly to the Coast Guard." 79.
|
|
Eric Edelman, Gary Roughead, et al., "Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission," United States Institute of Peace, November 14, 2018. 80.
|
|
Ibid, pp. 70-71. 81.
|
|
Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government for Fiscal Year 2019, Table S-7. Proposed Discretionary Caps for 2019 Budget. These figures assume a defense cap of $576 billion in FY2020, as estimated in Congressional Budget Office, Sequestration Update Report: August 2018. 82.
|
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, Table 1-9: National Defense Budget Authority-Discretionary and Mandatory, April 2018. These figures assume "OCO to Base" amounts are treated as base budget funding. For information on previous increases to the defense spending caps, see CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed]. 83.
|
|
Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government for Fiscal Year 2019, Table S-7. Proposed Discretionary Caps for 2019 Budget. These figures assume a defense cap of $590 billion in FY2021, as estimated in Congressional Budget Office, Sequestration Update Report: August 2018. 84.
|
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Table 1-9: National Defense Budget Authority-Discretionary and Mandatory, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, April 2018. These figures assume "OCO to Base" amounts are treated as base budget funding. For information on previous increases to the defense spending caps, see CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed]. 85.
|
|
National defense is one of 20 major functions used by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to organize budget data―and the largest in terms of discretionary spending. The national defense budget function (identified by the numerical notation 050) comprises three subfunctions: Department of Defense (DOD)-Military (051); atomic energy defense activities primarily of the Department of Energy (DOE) (053); and other defense-related activities (054) such as Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) counterintelligence activities. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10618, Defense Primer: The National Defense Budget Function (050), by [author name scrubbed]. 86.
|
|
Department of Defense, "Mattis, Dunford: 2018 Budget Will Continue Readiness Recovery," press release, June 14, 2017. 87.
|
|
White House, "Remarks by President Trump in a Cabinet Meeting," transcript, October 17, 2018. 88.
|
|
Wesley Morgan, "Trump reverses course, tells Pentagon to boost budget request to $750 billion," Politico, December 9, 2018. 89.
|
|
James Inhofe and Mac Thornberry, "Don't Cut Military Spending, Mr. President," Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2018. 90.
|
|
Roxana Tiron and Tony Capaccio, "Trump Space Force, Pentagon Plan Set to Collide With Budget Caps," Bloomberg Government, October 10, 2018. 91.
|
|
Tony Bertuca, "Smith: U.S. should cut defense spending and not 'cling' to notions of post-WWII dominance," Inside Defense, September 5, 2018. 92.
|
|
Department of Defense, "Mattis, Dunford: 2018 Budget Will Continue Readiness Recovery," press release, June 14, 2017. 93.
|
|
Aaron Mehta, "It's official: DoD told to take cut with FY20 budget," Defense News, October 26, 2018. 94.
|
|
Seamus P. Daniels, "Bad Idea: Moving OCO Back into the Base Budget (While Negotiating a Budget Deal)," Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 30, 2018. 95.
|
|
Frederico Bartels, Thomas Spoehr, et al., "Backgrounder: How Congress Can Improve the 2019 President's Budget Request for Defense," The Heritage Foundation, March 30, 2018. 96.
|
|
Government Accountability Office, Overseas Contingency Operations: OMB and DOD Should Revise the Criteria for Determining Eligible Costs and Identify the Costs Likely to Endure Long Term, GAO-17-68, January 18, 2017. 97.
|
|
The Department of Defense has included "Base-to-OCO" amounts in annual budget documents. See Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Defense Budget Overview, FY2019 budget request, Table 4.3: OCO Funding and Troop Level Trends, revised February 13, 2018. 98.
|
|
Government Accountability Office, Overseas Contingency Operations: OMB and DOD Should Revise the Criteria for Determining Eligible Costs and Identify the Costs Likely to Endure Long Term, GAO-17-68, January 18, 2017. 99.
|
|
Congressional Budget Office, Funding for Overseas Contingency Operations and Its Impact on Defense Spending, October 23, 2018, p. 2. 100.
|
|
Laicie Heeley and Anna Wheeler, "Defense Divided: Overcoming the Challenges of Overseas Contingency Operations," Stimson Center, 2016. 101.
|
|
For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10946, The European Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary Overview, by [author name scrubbed] and Aras D. Kazlauskas. 102.
|
Todd Harrison and Seamus P. Daniels, "Analysis of the FY2019 Defense Budget," Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2018, pp. 6-7 |
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|
These arguments may also apply to other OCO-funded activities, such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF). 104.
|
|
Eric Edelman, Gary Roughead, et al., "Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission," United States Institute of Peace, November 14, 2018, p. 49. 105.
|
|
Ibid. p. 59. For more on the NDS, see CRS Report R45349, The 2018 National Defense Strategy: Fact Sheet, by [author name scrubbed]. 106.
|
|
Other related sections of United States Code include 10 U.S.C. §127a—Operations for which funds are not provided in advance: funding mechanisms; 22 U.S.C. §2421f—Sustainability requirements for certain capital projects in connection with overseas contingency operations; and 22 U.S.C. §1702—Chief Acquisition Officers and senior procurement executives. |
Division A of the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 2028/P.L. 114-254) provides funding through April 28, 2017, for programs and activities which regular appropriations bills for FY2017 have not been enacted. Overseas Contingency Operations funding for the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (DOS) are provided in Division A at a rate of operations equivalent to the FY2016 appropriated level. Division B of H.R. 2028 serves as a stand-alone security assistance appropriations bill, providing $5.8 billion for DOD and $4.3 billion for DOS available through September 30, 2018, unless otherwise specified. Of the additional amounts provided in Division B, $289.5 million is appropriated for the Iraq Train and Equip Fund, $50.2 million is appropriated for the DOS Transition Initiatives, and $1,030.5 billion is appropriated for the DOS Economic Support Fund. |
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95. |
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10 U.S.C. 2214 and Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R Volume 3: "Budget Execution-Availability and Use of Budgetary Resources," September 2015—see Chapter 6, "Reprogramming of DOD Appropriated Funds." This section focuses on the reprogramming of funds appropriated through unclassified DOD base and OCO accounts, as well as State/USAID appropriations—separate reprogramming authorities and processes are used for military construction and family housing appropriations; and for National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence Program appropriations. 112.
|
|
See sections 1001, "General transfer authority," and 1512, "Special transfer authority," of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115-232) and sections 8005 and 9002 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2019 (Division A of P.L. 115-245). 113.
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|
Section 8005 of P.L. 115-245 states the Secretary of Defense may transfer up to $4 billion of working capital funds to the Department of Defense "for military functions (except military construction)," and that military personnel appropriations do not count toward the limit; Section 9002 states the Secretary of Defense may transfer up to $2 billion between the appropriations or funds made available to DOD in the OCO title. 114.
|
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Justification for Component Contingency Operations and the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF), June 2008. The term no year appropriation is defined in the U.S. Congress, House, Statement of Disbursements, Glossary of Terms, 114th Cong., 2nd sess. 115.
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|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Justification for Component Contingency Operations and the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF), FY2014 budget request, May 2013. 116.
|
|
Contributed by Heidi Peters, Analyst in U.S. Defense Acquisition Policy. 117.
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|
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2008, and for Other Purposes, Conference report to accompany H.R. 3222, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., November 6, 2007, H.Rept. 110-434 (Washington: GPO, 2007), Joint Explanatory Statement, p. 87. 118.
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|
Funding requests in the base budget for overseas contingency operations are not designated as emergency or OCO/GWOT in accordance with the BCA exception and are therefore counted against the DOD's total discretionary spending limit. 119.
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|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Justification for Component Contingency Operations and the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF), FY2009 Budget Request, June 2008. 120.
|
|
Ibid. 121.
|
|
Ibid. |
Ibid. |
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100. |
Specifically, the FY2016 NDAA (P.L. 114-92) authorized $406.45 million in funding for the fund/program, which was less than the Obama Administration's original request for $600 million. FY2016 defense appropriations legislation approved by the appropriations committees (H.R. 2685/ S. 1558) would have provided $600 million for the program on different terms. The omnibus appropriations act for FY2016 (P.L. 114-113) did not appropriate funding for the Syria Train and Equip Fund, but it allows the Secretary of Defense to use funds from the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund for efforts to assist appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition, if the Secretary outlines a detailed and clear plan for the use of such funds and provides such justification to the congressional defense committees in a reprogramming request. Source: Explanatory statement" accompanying the enrolled version of P.L. 114-113/H.R. 2029, as published by the House Rules Committee. |
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101. |
Department of Defense, Prior Approval Reprogramming Action FY16-11PA, March 17, 2016. |
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102. |
An amendment offered to the House version of the NDAA would have removed the authorization for the program and fund was considered and rejected by committee members during the markup of the bill and was not made in order for reconsideration on the House floor. |
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103. |
Contributed by Heidi Peters, Research Librarian. |
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104. |
See White House Office of the Press Secretary, "FACT SHEET: European Reassurance Initiative and Other U.S. Efforts in Support of NATO Allies and Partners," June 3, 2014, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/03/fact-sheet-european-reassurance-initiative-and-other-us-efforts-support- |
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105. |
Ibid. Lines of effort in FY2017 include increasing U.S. military force presence in Central and Eastern Europe; conducting additional bilateral and multilateral exercises and training with regional NATO allies and partners; prepositioning of combat vehicles and supplies within the territory of regional NATO allies and partners; improving regional military installation infrastructure; and building the military capacity of regional NATO allies and partners. |
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106. |
Department of Defense FY2017 Budget Request, European Reassurance Initiative, February 9, 2016, p. 1. |
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107. |
Ibid. |
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Ibid. |
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Department of Defense |
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Ibid. |
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Ibid. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
113. |
Ibid, p.7-6. |
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114. |
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|
See Title VIII of Division K and Title IX of Division C in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-13); and Title XII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (P.L. 114-92). 128.
|
|
These functions include bilateral economic assistance ("Transition Initiatives," "Complex Crises Fund," "Economic Support Fund," and "Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia") and international security assistance ("International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement," "Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs," "Peacekeeping Operations," and "Foreign Military Financing Program"). 129.
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|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Defense Budget Overview, FY2019 budget request, revised February 13, 2018, p. 4-2. 130.
|
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Defense Budget Overview, FY2017 budget request, February 2016, p. 7-1. 131.
|
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Defense Budget Overview, FY2017 budget request, February 2016, p. 7-4. 132.
|
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Joint Improvised Explosive Defense Defeat Fund Budget Justification Document for FY2010. 133.
|
|
For more information on the MRAP program, see CRS Report RS22707, Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. 134.
|
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), European Reassurance Initiative, FY2016 budget request, February 2015, p. 1. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10946, The European Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary Overview, by [author name scrubbed] and Aras D. Kazlauskas. 135.
|
|
Department of State, "The Global Security Contingency Fund," available at https://pa-web1.state.gov/t/pm/gpi/sfcb/index.htm. 136.
|
|
USAID, Office of Program, Policy, and Management, Complex Crises Fund, at https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus/bureau-democracy-conflict-and-humanitarian-assistance/office-program. 137.
|
|
Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2019, p. 99 and p. 145. 138.
|
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Security Cooperation Consolidated Budget Display, FY2019 Budget Request, February 2018, p. 29 |
DOD response to CRS Request for Information, April 13, 2016. Available from author. |
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116. |
Contributed by Anne D. Miles, Analyst in Intelligence and National Security Policy. |
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117. |
For NIP and MIP aggregate numbers from 2007-2017, see yearly press releases available at dni.gov and defense.gov and CRS Report R44381, Intelligence Community Spending: Trends and Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. |
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118. |
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) briefing to Congressional staff, February 9, 2016. |
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119. |
Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 017: Justification for Base Funded Contingency Operations and the Overseas Contingency Operation Transfer Fund, February 2016. |
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120. |
The FY2015 request was submitted before the BBA was enacted and the FY2017 request reflects the agreed-to funding levels within the BBA in order to meet the adjusted BCA caps. |
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121. |
Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2017; http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252179.pdf |
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122. |
Ibid. |
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123. |
Ibid. |
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124. |
For more information on the FY2017 NDAA conference outcome see CRS Report R44497, Fact Sheet: Selected Highlights of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4909, S. 2943), by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
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125. |
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Overseas Contingency Operations: Funding and Cost Reporting for the Department of Defense, GAO-10-288R, December 18, 2009, http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/96506.pdf. |
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126. |
Letter from Steven M. Kosiak, Associate Director for Defense and Foreign Affairs, OMB, to Robert Hale, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, "Revised War Funding Criteria," September 9, 2010. |
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127. |
GAO-10-288R |
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128. |
GAO, Opportunities to Improve Controls over Department of Defense's Overseas Contingency Operations Cost Reporting, May 27, 2010. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10562r.pdf |
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129. |
Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 2017: Justification for Base Funded Contingency Operations and the Overseas Contingency Operation Transfer Fund, February 2016. |
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130. |
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