Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

January 23, 2023 – February 1, 2024 R47394

Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy
February 1, 2024
Haiti, located on the island of Hispaniola bordering the Dominican Republic, remains mired in
interrelated political, security, and humanitarian crises. Haiti lacks an elected president and
Karla I. Rios
legislature following the July 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. Moïse had named
Analyst in Latin American
Ariel Henry to be prime minister prior to his death, but Henry had not been sworn in as required
Affairs
under Haitian law. Since the assassination, a political stalemate has persisted over whether Henry

or a transitional government should govern until elections are convened. A December 2022
Clare Ribando Seelke
Henry-backed accord aimed to create a path to elect a president by February 7, 2024. As that date
Specialist in Latin
has approached, protests against the de facto Henry government have escalated.
American Affairs

The political impasse has hindered Haiti’s ability to respond to worsening security and
humanitarian crises. In October 2022, Henry asked for a foreign security force to help reestablish

control amid rampant gang violence. Although many Haitian civil society groups initially
opposed this request due to concerns regarding abuses committed during past interventions and Henry’s unelected status,
some have since expressed support for a foreign security force presence. After Kenya offered to lead a “multinational security
support (MSS) mission,” the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution in October 2023 to authorize a non-U.N. mission
funded by voluntary contributions. The status of the MSS is uncertain, however, as Kenya’s High Court has ruled the
deployment unconstitutional. The crises in Haiti continue to fuel instability and U.S.-bound migration.
U.S. Policy
U.S. policy in Haiti has aimed to support Haitian efforts to restore security, the rule of law, democratic institutions leading to
free and fair elections, and economic and social stability. The Biden Administration allocated $237.4 million in bilateral
assistance for Haiti in FY2022 and $204.5 million in FY2023, including increased support for the Haitian National Police.
The Administration requested $291.5 million for Haiti in FY2024. Separately, the Administration provided more than $126.5
million in humanitarian assistance to Haiti in FY2023. In March 2023, the Administration released a 10-year plan for
promoting peace and stability in Haiti, a priority country under the Global Fragility Act (P.L. 116-94), supported by
additional funds. The Administration pledged $100 million in foreign assistance and $100 million in Defense Department
operational support to the proposed MSS. The U.S. Treasury and State Departments have publicly sanctioned eight current or
former Haitian officials, including two former prime ministers, and several gang leaders. The United States co-drafted a U.N.
Security Council resolution to sanction gang leaders in Haiti and their financial backers (adopted in October 2022).
Congressional Action
Congress set objectives for U.S. policy toward Haiti through 2025 in the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional
Transparency Initiative Act (P.L. 117-103, Division V). The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328), did not
designate a total funding level for Haiti but placed democracy-related conditions on some assistance. Neither the House-
passed (H.R. 4665/H.Rept. 118-146) nor the Senate Appropriations Committee-reported (S. 2438/S.Rept. 118-71) versions of
the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024, would designate a specific aid
amount for Haiti. However, both measures would place restrictions on assistance to the central government. In addition to
foreign assistance, the House passed, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported, bills (H.R. 1684/S. 396) that
would require an annual State Department report on ties between gangs and politicians in Haiti and would direct the
President to impose sanctions on individuals identified in the report. Bills to renew trade preferences for Haiti (H.R. 5035/S.
552) also have been introduced in both houses. Congressional oversight efforts in the 118th Congress have focused on the
Administration’s plans to improve security and democracy in Haiti, its relationship with the Henry government, and its
pledged support for a multinational force deployment to Haiti.
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Introduction
Haiti, a Caribbean country that shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic (see
Figure 1), has been of ongoing interest to Congress and successive U.S. presidential
administrations because of its proximity to the United States, chronic instability, and vulnerability
to natural disasters.1 Although Haiti has endured corrupt, authoritarian leaders for much of its
history, governance arguably had improved in the years prior to a 2010 earthquake.2 That disaster
killed more than 200,000 people and set development back significantly. Despite extensive
international support for Haiti’s recovery, democratic institutions remain weak and the country
continues to contend with extreme poverty; wide economic disparities; and both human-made and
natural disasters. An August 2021 earthquake killed 2,000 people.
The situation in Haiti further deteriorated after
Haiti at a Glance
Capital: Port-au-Prince
the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in
July 2021 led to uncertainty over who would
Population: 12.3 mil ion (2023, IMF est.)
succeed him. Two days before the
Languages: French (official), Creole (official)
assassination, Moïse named Ariel Henry to be
Area: 10,710 sq. miles, slightly larger than
Massachusetts
prime minister, but Henry was not sworn in.
Henry has served as de facto prime minister
GDP: $25.9 bil ion (2023, current prices, IMF est.)
since mid-July 2021, although protests calling
Real GDP Growth: -1.8% (2021); -1.7% (2022); -
1.5% (2023) (% change, constant prices, IMF)
for his resignation have resurged in 2024.
Per Capita GDP: $2,130 (2023, current prices, IMF)
Haiti lacks an elected president, legislature, and
Life Expectancy at Birth: 60.8/66.7 years
local government; the terms of the last 10
(male/female) (PAHO, 2022)
elected senators ended in January 2023. A
Maternal Mortality Ratio: 480/100,000 live births
political standoff between Henry’s de facto
(UNDP, 2022)
government and opposition political and civil
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF); Pan
society leaders regarding how to form a
American Health Organization (PAHO); United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
transitional government to stabilize the country
and convene elections persists amid a
worsening security and humanitarian crisis.
In October 2022, Henry requested international support to help the Haitian National Police restore
order. In October 2023, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution to authorize the
deployment of a non-U.N. multinational security support (MSS) mission to Haiti led by Kenya
and supported by voluntary contributions. Kenya had aimed to deploy its police to lead the MSS
early this year, but a January 2024 ruling by Kenya’s high court ruled the deployment
unconstitutional.3
The 118th Congress may consider options for responding to the interrelated political, security, and
humanitarian crises in Haiti, including what, if any, U.S. support should be provided to a potential
MSS. This report provides an overview of the situation in Haiti and U.S. policy responses to date.

1 For background, see Laurent DuBois, Haiti: the Aftershocks of History (New York, NY: Picador, 2013); Philippe
Girard, Haiti: The Tumultuous History: From Pearl of the Caribbean to Broken Nation (New York, NY: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2005, 2010).
2 International Crisis Group, Consolidating Stability in Haiti, Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 21, July 18, 2007.
3 Tom Odula, “Kenya’s High Court Rules That Deploying the Nation’s Police Officers to Haiti Is Unconstitutional,”
Associated Press (AP), January 26, 2024.
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Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

Figure 1. Map of Haiti

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS).
Political Situation
Background
Haiti won independence from France in 1804, making it the second independent republic in the
Western Hemisphere (after the United States). Since then, the country has experienced long
periods of authoritarianism and political fragility, punctuated by foreign interventions and natural
disasters.4 Since the fall of the brutal Duvalier dictatorship (1957-1986), attempts to consolidate
democratic rule have had limited success.5 In 1991, a military coup interrupted the term of Haiti’s
first president elected in free and fair elections, Jean-Bertrand Aristide of the center-left Fanmi
Lavalas party (1991; 1994-1996; 2000-2004). The threat of a U.S. military intervention allowed
Aristide to return three years later to complete his term. In 2000, Aristide began a second term
after the opposition boycotted the presidential election due to flawed parliamentary elections

4 Rocio Cara Labrador and Diana Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development,” Council on Foreign Relations,
September 2022 (hereinafter Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path”). Haiti reportedly paid an indemnity to France
of some $560 million, which caused a significant drain on Haiti’s finances well into the 20th century. Concerns about
the indebted country’s ability to pay its creditors prompted a U.S. intervention from 1915 to 1934. Lazaro Gamio et al.,
“Haiti’s Lost Billions,” New York Times, May 20, 2022; Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti: 1915-
1934 (Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971).
5 Fearing communist rule and/or instability on the island, successive U.S. presidential administrations recognized the
regimes of François Duvalier (1957-1971) and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-1987), despite concerns about the
leaders’ authoritarian tendencies. See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “U.S. Relations with Haiti” in
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, American Republics, vol. V, document 309, at
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d309; and U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Historian, “Telegram from the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State” in Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Mexico,
Cuba, and the Caribbean, vol. XXIII, document 253, August 14, 1978, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1977-80v23/d253.
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favoring Fanmi Lavalas. In 2004, Aristide—facing an armed uprising against his rule led by Guy
Philiipe, a drug trafficker subsequently imprisoned on money laundering charges in the United
States, as well as U.S. and international pressure—resigned and went into exile.6
From 2004 to 2017, the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a peacekeeping force
that grew to 13,000 at its peak, sought to restore order in the country; build the Haitian National
Police (HNP); and, later, help with recovery after a 2010 earthquake. The legacy of MINUSTAH
is complicated, as troops helped restore some stability to Haiti but reintroduced cholera into the
country and committed human rights and sexual abuses. This experience initially led many
Haitians to oppose the type of foreign military involvement requested by the Henry government.7
President Michel Martelly (2011-2016) and his chosen successor, Jovenel Moïse (2017-July
2021), who represented the center-right Tèt Kale Party (PHTK), both took office after disputed
elections and administered governments allegedly rife with corruption.8 Under Moïse, Haiti
experienced political and social unrest, high inflation, antigovernment protests, and gang
violence. Like other Haitian politicians, Moïse allegedly provided money and arms to gangs in
exchange for favors, including suppressing antigovernment protests such as those that erupted in
2018 after the government announced fuel price hikes.9 A 2021 report by Harvard Law School’s
International Human Rights Clinic documented state (primarily police) involvement in attacks on
neighborhoods in which some 240 civilians died from 2018 to 2020.10 Instability increased in
2019 after Haitian auditors issued two reports to the country’s chief prosecutor alleging Moïse
and other officials had misappropriated and embezzled millions of dollars in public funds.11
Political gridlock between the executive and legislative branches led to the government not
organizing scheduled October 2019 parliamentary elections. The terms of the entire lower
Chamber of Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate expired in January 2020, as did the terms of all
local government posts, without newly elected officials to take these positions.12 Thereafter,
Moïse ruled by decree, with some controversy over whether his term was to end in February 2021
or February 2022 (the U.S. State Department did not take a position on that dispute).13

6 AP, “Supporters of Former Haitian Rebel Leader Guy Philippe Launch Widespread Protests,” January 16, 2024.
Daniel P. Erikson, “Haiti After Aristide: Still on the Brink,” Current History, vol. 104, no. 679 (February 2005).
7 Carla King et al., “‘MINUSTAH Is Doing Positive Things Just as They Do Negative Things’: Nuanced Perceptions of
a UN Peacekeeping Operation Amidst Peacekeeper-Perpetrated Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Haiti,” Conflict,
Security & Development, vol. 21, no. 6 (November 17, 2021), pp. 749-779. For how past interventions have influenced
recent popular opinion in Haiti, see Rafael Bernal, “Human Rights Coalition to Biden: No Military Intervention in
Haiti,” The Hill, November 1, 2022.
8 On Martelly and Moïse’s elections, see Georges Fauriol, “Haiti’s Problematic Electoral Dynamics,” Global
Americans, December 21, 2021. On Martelly and drug trafficking, see Jacqueline Charles and Michael Wilner,
“Canada Sanctions Former Haiti President Michel Martelly, Two Former Prime Ministers,” Miami Herald, November
21, 2022. On corruption in the Moïse government, see Maria Abi-Habib, “Haiti’s Leader Kept a List of Drug
Traffickers. His Assassins Came for It,” New York Times, December 12, 2021.
9 Chris Dalby, “International Sanctions Seek to Weaken Haiti’s Patronage System Between Politicians, Gangs,” InSight
Crime, November 24, 2022. For Moïse officials’ involvement in attacks on neighborhoods where protests occurred, see
U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human Rights
Day,” December 10, 2020.
10 Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, Killing with Impunity: State-Sanctioned Massacres in Haiti,
April 2021.
11 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix C: Major Corruption Cases in Haiti and Government of Haiti Efforts to
Address Corruption,” November 10, 2022.
12 The 10 remaining senators’ terms expired on January 9, 2023.
13 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix F: Alleged February 2021 Coup Against President Jovenel Moïse and U.S. and
(continued...)
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On July 7, 2021, armed assailants assassinated President Moïse in his private home in Port-au-
Prince. Details of the attack remain under investigation; however, the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) has arrested 11 individuals for their role in a plot to kill Moïse, three of whom
have been sentenced to life in prison.14 The FBI also has supported Haitian authorities’
investigation of the crime, although threats to the safety of those authorities and turnover among
the judges leading the investigation have hindered Haitian efforts.
Post-Assassination Political Impasse
Moïse’s assassination gave rise to uncertainty about who would succeed him as president and
who would serve as prime minister. Under the Haitian Constitution (Article 149), if a president
dies in the last two years of his term, the legislature should elect a provisional president to serve
out the term.15 As Haiti lacked a functioning legislature at the time of the assassination, the choice
of who would succeed Moïse could not follow the prescribed constitutional order.
Three individuals laid claims to serve as prime minister: interim Prime Minister Claude Joseph;
Ariel Henry, a neurosurgeon nominated to be prime minister two days before Moïse’s death but
not sworn in; and Joseph Lambert, then-president of the Haitian Senate. On July 11, an inter-
agency U.S. delegation traveled to Haiti in response to a request for security and investigative
assistance from the Haitian government. U.S. officials met with all three claimants to prime
minister. After days of jockeying among the claimants over who would become prime minister,
Joseph agreed that Henry would be prime minister and he foreign minister.16 Lambert separately
gave up his quest to be prime minister; the U.S. government later sanctioned him for drug
trafficking. On July 17, the United States, United Nations, and other donors issued a statement
calling for the formation of an “inclusive government” and encouraging Prime Minister-designate
Ariel Henry to form a government.17 Henry’s irregular path to his position, struggles to address
Haitian challenges while in office, and allegations of his possible involvement in Moïse’s
assassination, have eroded his credibility.18
Since the assassination, a political stalemate has persisted over how to convene elections and who
should govern until an elected government is in place. In September 2021, de facto Prime
Minister Henry and his supporters proposed that Henry name a provisional electoral council to
convene elections, and that Henry remain the single head of government until a new elected
government takes office. Rival political and civil society leaders, some of whom backed the
Montana Accord, a 2021 proposal to form an interim government led by a president and prime
minister, argued for a transitional government not led by Henry.19

International Partner Efforts to Support Free and Fair Elections in Haiti,” November 2022, at https://www.state.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Appendix-F-Developments-in-Haiti-004977.pdf.
14 Sarah Morland and Kylie Madry, “Ex-Colombian Soldier Pleads Guilty in Haiti President’s Assassination,” Reuters,
December 22, 2023.
15 Haiti’s Constitution of 1987 with Amendments Through 2012 is available in English at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012.pdf?lang=en.
16 CRS interview with State Department officials, January 9, 2023.
17 U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), “Core Group Press Release,” July 17, 2021.
18 Monique Beals, “Judge, Investigators say Haitian Prime Minister Involved in President’s Assassination,” The Hill,
February 8, 2022.
19 The Montana Accord proposed a two-year interim government led by a president and prime minister, with oversight
committees, to restore order, administer elections, and create a truth and justice commission to address past human
rights violations. Georges Fauriol, “Haiti: Betting on the Montana Accord,” Global Americans, February 9, 2022.
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On December 21, 2022, Henry put forth a new transition proposal—the National Consensus for
an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections (or the December 21st agreement)—that was
signed by a range of stakeholders, including some former signatories of the Montana Accord.20
His government established a three-member High Transition Council (HTC) to implement that
transition plan in January 2023 and appointed eight judges to the country’s highest court in March
2023. Since May 2023, a group of eminent persons from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
has facilitated several rounds of talks among Henry and other stakeholders focused on increasing
the size of the HTC and possibly expanding its powers, as well as selecting an electoral council.
Those talks have yielded limited progress.
Some Haitians are calling for Henry to step down by February 7, 2024, the date by which the
December 21st agreement aimed to have an elected government assume office.21 In recent months,
protests calling for Henry’s resignation have increased. Some of those protests have been led by
former rebel leader Guy Philippe (repatriated from the United States in December) and members
of an armed government environmental protection brigade that have clashed with police.22
Security Crisis
Relations between Haitian gangs and the country’s political and economic elite are well
established. Haiti’s past presidents and prominent politicians have used and received support from
gangs. Generally, gangs provide political elites with services such as campaign support, voter
intimidation, bribery, fundraising, vandalism, and protest disruption. Former President Aristide
reportedly relied on support from gangs that engaged in political repression, and the Canadian
government sanctioned former President Martelly for his role in financing gangs.23 Business elites
have formed relationships with gangs in order to protect their businesses and enable them to
move merchandise throughout the country and abroad. In December 2022, the Canadian
government imposed sanctions on three prominent businessmen for reportedly providing “illicit
financial and operational support to gangs.”24
Since Moïse’s assassination, state authority has collapsed in parts of Port-au-Prince and
surrounding areas. As of late 2023, armed gangs reportedly controlled 80% of the capital and
other urban areas, as well as major highways and the agricultural region of Artibonite (see Figure
1).25 These gangs are often better armed than the national police.26 A wave of protests and gang-
led violence erupted in September 2022 after de facto Prime Minister Henry announced the end
of fuel subsidies. Gangs took over a major port and the country’s main fuel terminal, temporarily
grinding the economy to a halt and blocking humanitarian agencies’ access to some areas. As

20 U.N. Security Council, U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), Report of the Secretary General, S/2023/274, April
14, 2023.
21 BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, S/2024/62, January 15, 2024. Hereinafter: S/2024/62.
22 AP, “Haiti Cracks Down on Heavily Armed Environmental Agents After Clashes with Police,” January 29, 2024.
23 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Haiti: The Chimères, Their Activities and Their Geographic Presence;
the Treatment of the Chimères by the Authorities and the Presence of Group Members Within the Government and the
Police (2006-May 2008), June 3, 2008; Harold Isaac and Brian Ellsworth, “Canada Sanctions Haiti Ex-President
Martelly for Financing Gangs,” Reuters, November 20, 2022.
24 Government of Canada, Global Affairs Canada, “Canada Imposes Sanctions Against Haitian Economic Elites,”
December 5, 2022.
25 AP, “UN Human Rights Official is Alarmed by Sprawling Gang Violence in Haiti,” October 31, 2023. BINUH,
Criminal Violence Extends Beyond Port-au-Prince: the Situation in Lower Artibonite from January 2022 to October
2023, November 2023. Hereinafter: BINUH, November 2023.
26 Jon Lee Anderson, “A Land Held Hostage,” The New Yorker, July 24, 2023.
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noted previously, Henry requested an international force to help quell the security situation in
October 2022; however, such a force has yet to be established (see “Multinational Security
Support (MSS) Mission” below).27
The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimates that there
are at least 300 criminal groups operating in Haiti.28 However, some local sources suggest the
number of criminal groups is closer to 750, including self-defense groups.29 Many of these groups
have developed alliances to amplify their operational capabilities. According to the U.N.
Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the number of reported homicides increased by 119% last
year, rising from 2,183 in 2022 to 4,789 in 2023.30 Kidnappings escalated from 1,359 in 2022 to
2,490 in 2023, an 83% increase.31 Gangs have sought to find new revenue through kidnapping for
ransom and other crimes amid diminished support from elites fearful of being designated for U.S.
and Canadian sanctions.32 Gang attacks on government personnel and critical infrastructure have
increased as they have grown more autonomous.
According to U.N. reports, gangs have used “collective rape” and other gender-based violence
(GBV) against women, children as young as 10, and the elderly to intimidate people 33
. Gender-
based and sexual violence, though gravely underreported, is more prevalent in zones contested by
gangs in which many inhabitants lack access to basic health, education, and social services.
Doctors Without Borders estimates that its staff treated 42% more survivors of GBV in 2023 than
in 2022 (some 3,700 victims), a majority of those were victims of armed actors rather than
intimate partner violence.34
The U.N. Secretary-General described the Haitian National Police (HNP) in 2022 as “spread
thin” and lacking weapons, equipment, and capacity.35 Some 1,663 officers resigned over the
course of 2023, leaving the HNP with 13,196 officers as of December.36 Low pay and poor
working conditions have increased attrition among HNP officers available to perform police
duties.37 At any given time, only 4,000 officers are available for policing.38 In 2023, 45 out of 412
police buildings were non-operational, were under the direct control of armed gangs, or had been
subjected to repeated attacks.39

27 Catherine Osborn, “Haiti’s Crisis Escalates,” Foreign Policy, October 14, 2022.
28 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Haiti: Humanitarian Response Plan 2023 at
a Glance,” Relief Web, April 13, 2023.
29 BINUH, November 2023.
30 S/2024/62.
31 Ibid.
32 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, S/2023/41, January 17, 2023; BINUH, Report of
the Secretary General, S/2023/492, July 3, 2023; Reuters, “Haiti Rights Group Records Three-Fold Rise in
Kidnappings for Early 2023,” April 4, 2023.
33 This draws from BINUH and Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Sexual Violence
in Port-au-Prince: A Weapon Used by Gangs to Instill Fear, October 14, 2022; OHCHR and BINUH, Human Rights
Situation, Quarterly Report: January-March 2023; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Gang
Control and Security Vacuums: Assessing Gender-Based Violence in Cité Soleil, May 2023.
34 Widlore Mérancourt and Amanda Coletta, “’Collective Rapes’ Surge as Weapon in Haiti’s Gang War,” Washington
Post, January 29, 2024.
35 BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, S/2022/747, October 10, 2022. Hereinafter: S/2022/747.
36 Security Council, S/2024/62.
37 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, S/2023/492, July 3, 2023.
38 Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH), Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent
Developments June Through November 2023, December 2023.
39 U.N. Security Council, S/2024/62 and S/2023/769.
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A July 2022 International Crisis Group study estimated that 40% of HNP officers had ties to
gangs.40 Corruption, combined with the HNP and Haitian Coast Guard’s lack of control over the
country’s ports and borders, have made Haiti a hub for drug and arms trafficking and worsened
gang violence (see “Weapons and Drug Trafficking”). When police have sought to confront
gangs, confrontations have often proven deadly. In November 2022, criminals assassinated the
director of the HNP’s training center at the center.
Impunity prevails in Haiti’s weak justice system. In addition to failing to resolve Moïse’s
assassination, Haitian authorities have yet to arrest Jimmy Chérizier, a former HNP officer turned
gang leader who was linked to Moïse, or other Haitian officials implicated in the 2018 La Saline
massacre of 71 people.41 Gangs overtook several of Haiti’s main courthouses in summer 2022,
and many of the courthouses remain inoperable. Without functioning courts, Haitian prisons
continue to hold inmates, 85% of whom were in pretrial detention in June 2023; prisons have a
331% cell occupancy rate.42 Many inmates lack access to food, water, and medical care. Haitian
authorities have increased the prison budget by 87% for 2023/2024, including a 41% increase for
food.43
The rampant violence in Haiti has left many Haitians hopeless and frustrated. Since April 2023,
Haiti has experienced a rise in antigang vigilantism—the Bwa Kale movement.44 On April 24,
Port-au-Prince residents lynched and burned 10 alleged gang members. The movement is now in
all 10 administrative departments (states) of Haiti; hundreds have been killed.45
Humanitarian Situation
Haiti is a fragile country that is highly vulnerable to natural disasters due to its location and
topography (exacerbated by deforestation and climate change), and the Haitian government’s
limited capacity to respond to such disasters. A decade after the devastating 2010 earthquake,
inadequate recovery efforts, combined with subsequent natural disasters (e.g., Hurricane
Matthew, a 2021 earthquake) and disease outbreaks (e.g., cholera, Coronavirus Disease 2019
[COVID-19]), have further weakened the state’s ability to protect and provide for its citizens.46
Flooding in June 2023 resulted in more than 40 deaths and left some 13,000 Haitians homeless.47
The Fund for Peace’s 2023 Fragile States Index ranked Haiti as the 10th most fragile state in the
world due to various factors, including the state’s lack of legitimacy and inability to deliver
services, uneven economic development, and relatively low levels of social cohesion.48

40 International Crisis Group, New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists, July 27, 2022.
41 Chérizier, then-Minister of the Interior Fednel Monchery, and President Moïse’s Departmental Delegate Joseph
Pierre Richard Duplan allegedly planned an attack carried out by gangs on protesters who had criticized the
government. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International
Human Rights Day,” December 10, 2020.
42 BINUH, Human Rights Situation Main Trends, Quarterly Report: July-September 2023, October 27, 2023.
43 S/2024/62.
44 Reuters, “Haitian Residents Lynch and Set Fire to Suspected Gang Members,” April 26, 2023.
45 BINUH, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2023/768, October 16, 2023. Hereinafter: S/2023/768.
46 On recovery and reconstruction, see Jonathan Katz, The Big Truck That Went by: How the World Came to Save Haiti
and Left Behind a Disaster (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2014); Government Accountability Office (GAO),
Haiti: USAID and State Should Improve Management and Assessment of Reconstruction Activities, GAO-23-105211,
March 2023. Hereinafter: GAO, March 2023. On subsequent disasters, see Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path.”
47 Jacqueline Charles, “At Least 42 Dead, Thousands Homeless in Haiti After a Weekend of Heavy Rains, Flooding,”
Miami Herald, June 5, 2023.
48 The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, at https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/.
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In contrast to some previous humanitarian crises Haiti has endured, the political and security
situation is the primary driver of the current humanitarian emergency.49 According to U.N.
officials, as of October 2023, gang violence had displaced at least 195,000 people.50 Gang
blockades of highways have limited humanitarian access, particularly to the southern peninsula
but also to communities to the east and north of the capital. The G9 gang’s blockade of the
Varreux fuel terminal from September to November 2022, combined with broad unrest, caused
businesses and hospitals to close. During that period, Haitians, fearful of encountering gang
violence, sheltered in place amid a lack of water and sanitation services, fuel, electricity, and
food. UNOCHA estimates that 5.5 million Haitians are in need of humanitarian aid.51 Since mid-
September 2023, the Dominican Republic has closed its shared land border with Haiti in response
to a water dispute. The continued closure could exacerbate humanitarian conditions in Haiti’s
border departments.52
In 2023, UNOCHA requested $719.9 million for the Humanitarian Response Plan in Haiti. As of
December 2023, donors had provided 33% of the funds requested, or $242.2 million.53
Ongoing humanitarian concerns include food insecurity and inadequate access to health care,
protection, and education. In September 2023, the World Food Program and its partners estimated
that 4.4 million Haitians, roughly 44% of the population, faced acute levels of hunger.54 In
October 2022, cholera resurfaced in Haiti; as of December 2023, it had claimed 1,156 lives.55
While cholera is preventable through vaccination and treatable with rehydration, gangs have
reportedly prevented patient access to health facilities and denied medical staff entry to affected
communities. In March 2023, BINUH reported that 21 health facilities had temporarily shut down
or reduced their activities due to violence.56 Children in Haiti are extremely vulnerable to
protection concerns, particularly gender-based violence. They have also lost years of schooling
due to COVID-19, insecurity and cholera-related school closures, and armed attacks on schools.57
U.N. Presence in Haiti and Recent Action
The U.N. has had a continuous presence in Haiti for almost 20 years, with diplomatic and
financial support provided by successive U.S. presidential administrations. Following the collapse
of the Aristide government in 2004, the U.N. Security Council established MINUSTAH to help
restore order and train the HNP.58 After the 2010 earthquake, the Security Council expanded
MINUSTAH’s size and mission.

49 UNOCHA, “Seven Things to Know About the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti,” October 26, 2022.
50 International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Haiti Emergency Response: Situation Report,” October 2023.
51 UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2024, December 2023.
52 World Food Program (WFP), “Haiti: Overview of DR Border Closure Impacts,” November 3, 2023.
53 United Nations, “Support to Haiti’s Police, Deployment of Multinational Mission Fundamental Towards Restoring
Stability in Country, Senior Official Tells Security Council,” January 25, 2024.
54 WFP, “Severe Hunger Persists in Haiti as Violence Intensifies in the Capital,” September 19, 2023.
55 Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), “Cholera Epidemic in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,” December
27, 2023.
56 OHCHR and BINUH, Human Rights Situation, Main Trends, Quarterly Report: January-March 2023, March 8,
2023; Reuters, “Medecins Sans Frontieres Shuts Haiti Hospital amid Gang Violence,” March 8, 2023.
57 U.N. Children’s Fund, “Haiti: Armed Violence Against Schools Increases Nine-Fold in One Year,” February 9,
2023.
58 U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 1542 (2004)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 4961st Meeting, on 30 April
2004,” S/RES/1542 (2004), June 1, 2004. MINUSTAH’s original mission aimed to restore security and stability,
(continued...)
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A Security Council resolution ended MINUSTAH in 2017, citing Haiti’s peaceful completion of a
long-delayed electoral process in February 2017 as a milestone.59 The Security Council also
praised MINUSTAH for supporting the political process, professionalizing the police, and
improving security and stability in Haiti, achievements that proved short-lived. Haitian and
international human rights and health experts criticized MINUSTAH for its role in introducing
cholera to Haiti (a disease that had not been present in the country for more than a century) and
for allegations of sexual abuse by some of its forces.60 In 2016, then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-
Moon apologized for the U.N.’s role in a cholera outbreak that ultimately caused nearly 10,000
deaths; the U.N. also launched a $400 million fund to confront the epidemic.61
In 2017, the U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) succeeded MINUSTAH,
focusing on strengthening judicial institutions, protecting human rights, increasing the
professionalism of the HNP, and reinforcing the rule of law. The mission also supported violence-
reduction projects and income-generating activities for youth. During MINJUSTH’s mandate, the
number of HNP officers increased by 10% to 15,400 and courts reported a 300% increase in files
processed on the day of their reception.62
In October 2019, the U.N. transitioned to a political office, the U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti
(BINUH), for an initial one-year period that the U.N. Security Council twice extended. BINUH’s
mandate, which currently runs through July 2024,63 is to advise the Haitian government on how to
establish an inclusive national dialogue on reestablishing stability, security, and the rule of law so
elections can be held, among other aims. The mission also emphasizes protecting and promoting
human rights, including by documenting recent gender-based violence by gangs and producing
reports from Haiti for the U.N. Secretary-General and Security Council.64 BINUH coordinates
with other U.N. agencies, funds, and programs, ranging from humanitarian agencies such as the
World Food Program to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime.
Sanctions Resolution
On October 17, 2022, the Security Council discussed a resolution sponsored by the United States
and Mexico to establish a U.N. sanctions regime against gang leaders in Haiti and those who
finance them. The Security Council unanimously approved the sanctions resolution (Resolution

promote political processes (including elections), strengthen institutions and rule-of-law-structures, and promote and
protect human rights.
59 U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 2350 (2017)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 7924th Meeting, on 13 April
2017,” S/RES/2350 (2017), April 13, 2017. Critics argue, however, that a transitional government, not the U.N.-backed
PHTK government, accomplished that goal. Even with MINUSTAH present, Haiti experienced a constitutional crisis
after Michel Martelly failed to convene elections to choose his successor. Georges Fauriol, ‘A Cycle of Instability’:
Haiti’s Constitutional Crisis,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 8, 2021.
60 For background, see CRS In Focus IF10502, Haiti: Cholera, the United Nations, and Hurricane Matthew, by
Maureen Taft-Morales and Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.
61 U.N. News, “U.N.’s Ban Apologizes to People of Haiti, Outlines New Plan to Fight Cholera Epidemic and Help
Communities,” December 1, 2016. By the end of 2021, donors had contributed only $21.8 million to support the
pledged $400 million fund. See U.N. Haiti Cholera Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund, 2021 Annual Report.
62 U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, “MINUJUSTH Completes Its Mandate, Putting an End to 15 Consecutive
Years of Peacekeeping in Haiti,” October 16, 2019.
63 For background, see BINUH, “Mandate,” at https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/mandate.
64 BINUH and OHCHR, Sexual Violence.
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2653) on October 21, 2022; an expert committee has recommended, and the Security Council has
added, four gang leaders to its sanctions list (See “Sanctions: U.S. and Multilateral”).65
Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission
On October 6, 2022, de facto Prime Minister Henry and his ministers requested the deployment
of an international force to help Haitian forces quell the security situation and allow humanitarian
aid to flow. On October 8, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres sent a letter to the Security
Council recommending various approaches to respond to that request.66 On October 17, 2022, the
Security Council discussed a proposed resolution by the United States and Mexico, which
reportedly would have authorized the deployment of a non-U.N. multinational force to Haiti.67
From October 2022 through mid-2023, few countries publicly offered to send their forces to Haiti
and many countries, including Canada, declined U.S. requests to lead such a force.
In July 2023, Kenya announced its willingness to “positively consider” leading a multinational
force in Haiti and sending 1,000 police to support the HNP if authorized by the Security
Council.68 The State Department and CARICOM praised Kenya’s disposition even as some
questioned the human rights record of the Kenyan police.69 In August 2023, Kenya deployed an
assessment mission accompanied by U.S. officials to Haiti. In an August 15 letter to the Security
Council, the Secretary-General said the mission should focus on disarming gangs, securing key
installations and highways, and reasserting state presence to enable basic services to reach the
population.70 He also asserted that “the robust use of force by a specialized multinational police
force,” likely supported by military assets, is needed to help the HNP reestablish law and order.
He outlined how the U.N. could provide logistical support to the multinational force, while also
expanding BINUH to facilitate a political accord and train the police, among other tasks.
On October 2, 2023, the Security Council approved Resolution 2699 to support a Kenyan-led
multinational force financed by voluntary contributions to provide security for critical
infrastructure, training, and operational support to the HNP.71 Russia and China abstained from
the vote. The resolution called on member states to contribute personnel, equipment, financial,
and logistical support for the MSS.
In late January 2024, Kenya’s High Court blocked the Kenyan government from deploying police
officers to Haiti, ruling that police officers cannot be deployed on foreign operations missions.72

65 Security Council, “Resolution 2692 (2023),” July 14, 2023. U.N. Security Council, “Security Council 2653 Sanctions
Committee Adds 4 Entries to its Sanctions List,” SC/15520, December 8, 2023.
66 Such approaches included deploying a non-U.N. rapid action force (probably composed of some military forces) to
support the HNP, forming a multinational police task force, creating a multinational antigang force, expanding
BINUH’s budget and mandate, bolstering the HNP and the justice sector, and combating arms trafficking. Security
Council, S/2022/747.
67 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a U.N. Security
Council Briefing on Haiti,” October 17, 2022.
68 Reuters, “Kenya Ready to Lead Multinational Force to Haiti,” July 29, 2023.
69 U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Kenya Considering Leading a
Multinational Force in Haiti,” August 1, 2023; CARICOM, “Statement on Multi-national Force to Support Haiti,”
August 4, 2023; Luke Taylor, “Kenya’s Offer to Send Police to Haiti Sparks Human Rights Concerns,” The Guardian,
August 5, 2023..
70 Security Council, “Letter Dated 14 August 2023 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council,” S/2023/596, August 15, 2023.
71 Security Council, “Resolution 2699 (2023),” October 2, 2023.
72 Jacqueline Charles, “No Cops for Haiti: Kenya Court Blocks Sending Police to Help Fight Kidnapping Gangs,”
Miami Herald, January 26, 2024.
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The Kenyan government reportedly plans to challenge the ruling. While the U.S. State
Department has reaffirmed its support for an MSS mission to Haiti, the composition, budget, and
timing of a potential deployment remain unclear.73
Any units or participants in a mission to Haiti (whether police or military troops) would be
subject to U.N. vetting, while those receiving U.S. support would be subject to U.S. human rights
vetting (22 U.S.C. §2378d and 10 USC §362). Human rights experts have suggested additional
training that should be provided to MSS members as well as mechanisms to prevent, investigate,
and punish any potential human rights violations.74
U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress
Biden Administration policy goals in Haiti include supporting Haitian-led efforts to confront
gangs and insecurity, resolve the political and constitutional crisis, revive the economy, and
address the root causes of emigration from the country.75 Since Moïse’s assassination, U.S.,
Canadian, and U.N. officials—among others criticized for past interventions in the country—have
emphasized their support for “Haitian-led solutions” to the country’s challenges. In March 2023,
the Biden Administration issued a 10-year plan for Haiti, as mandated by the Global Fragility Act
(GFA; P.L. 116-94), with a long-term, interagency goal of helping the government and citizenry
of Haiti work together to develop a shared vision and plan to achieve long-term stability.76 (See
“Global Fragility Act Implementation.”)
U.S. officials have pursued several courses of action to advance those goals. Secretary of State
Antony Blinken and other top U.S. officials have stressed the urgency of reaching a political
consensus on how to reestablish constitutional order to de facto Prime Minister Henry and other
key stakeholders.77 The U.S. government has sanctioned corrupt officials and encouraged other
countries to do so, supported efforts to facilitate dialogue by CARICOM and others, expanded
support for the HNP, and sought a partner country to lead a non-U.N. multinational force to help
stabilize the country.78 U.S. officials have pledged to provide significant funding, equipment, and
logistical support to any multinational force deployed to Haiti that would expand on U.S.
assistance to the HNP.79 Despite the current uncertainty surrounding the MSS, U.S. officials have
asked countries to donate funding and troops to support the mission.80 While some analysts have
urged U.S. policymakers not to support a multinational mission, others have recommended

73 U.S. State Department, “United States Reiterates Support for Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti,”
January 27, 2024; and International Crisis Group, Haiti’s Gangs: Can a Foreign Mission Break Their Stranglehold,
January 5, 2024.
74 See, for example, Tirana Hassan, “Remarks Delivered at a U.N. Security Council Meeting on Haiti,” Human Rights
Watch, January 25, 2024.
75 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Haiti, revised and updated March 27, 2023.
76 U.S. Department of State, The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for
Haiti, March 24, 2023.
77 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Haitian Prime Minister Henry,” July 5, 2023.
78 David C. Adams, “U.S. and Canada Turn to Sanctions against Haitian Politicians and Businessmen Accused of Ties
to Gangs,” Univision, December 19, 2022; International Crisis Group, Haiti’s Last Resort: Gangs and the Prospect for
Foreign Intervention, Briefing No. 48, December 14, 2022.
79 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” August 14, 2023.
80 U.S. State Department, “United States Reiterates Support for Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti,”
January 27, 2024.
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greater, more multifaceted U.S. support for the MSS and redoubled efforts to broker a political
consensus in Haiti.81
Congress has had a direct role in shaping U.S. policy toward Haiti and conducting oversight of
U.S. policy development and implementation. Among other policy areas, Congress has influenced
decisions regarding foreign assistance, trade preferences, sanctions policy, and migration.
Individual Members have differed, however, on policy approaches and priorities. In December
2023, for example, six Members of Congress wrote a letter asking the Administration to withdraw
its support for the MSS, while five Senators wrote a letter asking the Administration for
clarification on issues ranging from dialogue in Haiti to sanctions to arms trafficking policy.82
Should a multinational force be deployed to Haiti, Congress could determine what, if any, support
the United States would provide for such a force and/or use its legislative and oversight tools to
ensure that such a force respects human rights and that those who receive U.S. training or
equipment are rigorously vetted, as required by U.S. law.83
Foreign Assistance
Bilateral Assistance
Congress has appropriated foreign assistance to support Haiti’s recovery from recurrent natural
disasters and foster long-term stability. In addition to significantly expanding such assistance in
the aftermath of a massive 2010 earthquake, Congress has closely monitored the implementation
and impact of U.S. assistance activities.84 Congress also shapes U.S. policy toward Haiti through
appropriations, conditions on appropriations, and reporting requirements linked to the obligation
of U.S. assistance.
Congress enacted the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative
Act (HAITI Act) as part of the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103,
Division V). The HAITI Act stated that U.S. policy should support sustainable rebuilding and
development efforts in Haiti that recognize Haitian independence, are led by the people and
government of Haiti, and contribute to international efforts to support broad and inclusive
dialogue to restore democratic institutions and legitimacy in the country.85 The HAITI Act also
required U.S. agencies to measure the progress of post disaster recovery and efforts to address
corruption, governance, rule of law, and media freedoms in Haiti. The State Department
submitted the reports required by the act and made them public on November 10, 2022.86

81 Daniel Larison, “No Matter how Well-Intentioned, Armed Mission in Haiti is a Mistake,” Responsible Statecraft,
October 4, 2023; Georges Fauriol, Wanted: A Reset of Haiti Policy, United States Institute of Peace, January 25, 2024.
82 Rafael Bernal, “House Democrats ask Biden Administration to Reverse Course in Haiti,” The Hill, December 8,
2023; Senator Ed Markey, “Senators Markey and Warnock, Colleagues Urge Biden Administration to Address
Humanitarian Crisis and Insecurity in Haiti,” December 19, 2023.
83 CRS In Focus IF10575, Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”), by Michael A. Weber.
84 See, as an example, GAO-23-105211, March 2023.
85 Other elements of U.S. policy cited in the act include building the long-term capacity of the government, civil
society, and private sector to foster economic development in Haiti; fostering collaboration with the Haitian diaspora
and the business community in Haiti; supporting anticorruption, press freedom, and human rights protection, including
through the imposition of sanctions; restoring the natural resources of Haiti; promoting political stability and free and
fair elections; providing comprehensive reporting on the goals and progress of the Haitian government and the U.S.
government; and promoting the participation of Haitian women and youth in U.S. assistance programs.
86 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Haiti: Reports,” November 10, 2022, at
https://www.state.gov/haiti-reports/.
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In addition to the HAITI Act, current and future U.S. programming and budget requests are likely
to reflect the priorities of the State Department and USAID’s two-year Integrated Country
Strategy for Haiti, adopted in March 2022 and updated in March 2023, and the GFA-mandated
U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti, released
in March 2023 (see “Global Fragility Act Implementation”).87
The FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328), did not specify a comprehensive
appropriations level for Haiti. The act required the State Department to withhold any aid to
support the Haitian government until the Secretary of State certifies that a new president and
parliament have taken office following free and fair elections or that a broadly representative
transitional government is in place and it is in the U.S. interest to provide such assistance. The
withholding requirement does not apply to aid intended to support free and fair elections;
antigang police and justice administration; disaster relief and recovery; and education, public
health, food security, and other basic human needs. As in prior years, the act prohibited assistance
for the armed forces of Haiti. The explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-328 urged the
Secretary of State to use “every appropriate diplomatic tool to press for dialogue” among key
stakeholders and to take “strong legal action” against those engaged in human rights abuses,
corruption, and other illicit activities.88 The State Department has allocated an estimated $204.9
million in foreign assistance to Haiti for FY2023 (see Table 1).
The Administration has requested $291.5 million for Haiti in FY2024, with the largest increase in
funding requested under the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
foreign assistance account to support the HNP and other justice sector actors. This prioritization
of restoring security and justice coincides with the phase one activities outlined by the GFA
strategic plan for Haiti. Congress has not yet concluded action on FY2024 appropriations but it
has enacted continuing resolutions (P.L. 118-15, P.L. 118-22, and P.L. 118-35) that fund most
foreign aid programs at the same level and under the same conditions as FY2023 until March 8,
2024. The FY2024 foreign assistance appropriations measures approved by the House (H.R.
4665/H.Rept. 118-146) and reported in the Senate (S. 2438/S.Rept. 118-71) do not specify
funding levels for Haiti. However, both measures would place restrictions on assistance to the
central government.
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Haiti by Account: FY2018-FY2024
(appropriations in thousands of current U.S. dollars)
FY2023
FY2024
Account
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
(Estimate)
(Request)
DA
32,000
51,000
51,000
52,000
59,000
46,400
113,200
ESF
8,500
—
—
14,800a
20,500b
7,000
—
FFP
3,244
11,719
7,996
3,110
—
—
—
GHP (State)
99,386
103,011
78,765
99,822
103,081
102,505
100,000
GHP
24,200
24,500
24,500
24,500
24,500
30,000
33,000
(USAID)
INCLE
12,000
22.,800c
33,000d
57,600e
33,300f
33,300
45,000

87 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy, updated March 2023; and State Department, The U.S. Strategy to
Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti.
88 “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Leahy, Chair of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Regarding H.R.
2617, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023,” Congressional Record, vol. 168, no. 198—book II (December 20,
2022), p. S9299.
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IMET
233
241
96
255
47
—
255
FMF
5,000
—
—
—
—
—
—
Total
184,563
213,471
195,357
252,087a
240,434b
204,905
291,455
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Supplementary Tables-Foreign
Operations, FY2020-FY2024 and U.S. Department of State, FY2023 estimate data, August 2023; and Email from
State Department official, September 13, 2023.
Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; FFP = Food for Peace; GHP = Global
Health Programs; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; IMET = International Military
Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing.
a. This sum includes $14.8 mil ion of ESF appropriated through the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L.
117-2).
b. This sum includes $15.0 mil ion of ESF appropriated through the Additional Ukraine Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128).
c. This includes $8 mil ion reprogrammed in FY2021.
d. This includes $15 mil ion reprogrammed in FY2021 and FY2022.
e. This includes $44.6 mil ion reprogrammed in FY2022.
f.
This includes $3 mil ion provided through the Global Fragility Act.
Humanitarian Assistance
The United States is the largest humanitarian donor to Haiti. In response to the worsening
humanitarian situation in Haiti, USAID sent a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to the
country in October 2022 that has been coordinating the delivery of relief supplies and other
assistance to a portion of the estimated 5.5 million Haitians in need of humanitarian assistance.89
In FY2022 and FY2023, USAID provided a total of more than $206 million in humanitarian
assistance, including $179.8 million in emergency assistance.90 FY2023 programs focused on
providing in-kind food aid and emergency cash for people to purchase food; medical,
psychosocial, and other assistance to victims of GBV; and, water, sanitation, and hygiene
programs to prevent the spread of cholera and other diseases. In addition to responding to these
immediate needs, USAID helped fund programs to reduce the country’s risk of disasters and
improve Haiti’s capacity to respond to emergencies.
U.S. agencies also helped Haiti respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and related health needs. The
United States has donated nearly 1.1 million COVID-19 vaccines to Haiti.91 As of January 5,
2024, 3.2% of Haiti’s population had completed the COVID-19 vaccination schedule, one of the
lowest vaccination rates in the world.92 USAID is working with the Haitian government to
implement media campaigns encouraging vaccination, provide COVD-19 immunization services,
and strengthen health care facilities’ access to oxygen.
Funds to Support the Multinational Security Support Mission
The Biden Administration has committed to providing support to the MSS mission to Haiti,
although fulfilling that pledge is likely to require congressional support. The United States has
pledged $100 million in foreign assistance, likely to consist of International Narcotics Control

89 USAID, Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, “Haiti Assistance Overview,” November 2023.
90 Ibid.
91 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution,” at https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/haiti/
#covid_map_link.
92 Pan American Health Organization, “COVID-19 Vaccination in the Americas,” https://ais.paho.org/imm/
IM_DosisAdmin-Vacunacion.asp, accessed January 24, 2024.
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and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds, to support the MSS.93 Additionally, the U.S. Department
of Defense is prepared to provided up to $100 million in training, equipment, technical assistance,
and other logistical support to the mission.
Global Fragility Act Implementation
The 116th Congress enacted the GFA, which directed the executive branch to develop a 10-year
strategy to prevent conflict globally and stabilize conflict-affected areas. It also directed the
executive branch to select priority countries or regions to execute such efforts through 10-year
plans. In April 2022, the Biden Administration announced one region and four priority countries
for GFA implementation; Haiti was among them. The GFA also authorized three distinct funds:
the Prevention and Stabilization Fund (PSF), the Complex Crisis Fund (CCF), and the Multi-
Donor Global Fragility Fund. In March 2023, the Biden Administration released a 10-year plan
for Haiti, as mandated by the GFA. According to a summary of the plan, the U.S.-interagency
seeks to help “Haiti’s citizens and government advance a shared vision and a permissive
environment for long-term stability.” It prioritizes security and justice sector sectors first, then
broadens to focus on economic and development goals, as well as civil society strengthening.94
The Administration has allocated at least $15.0 million of FY2021 PSF assistance, $13.0 million
of FY2022 PSF assistance, and $3.3 million of FY2023 CCF assistance to Haiti.95
Donor Coordination
The United States is the leading bilateral donor in Haiti, and Congress has encouraged U.S.
executive agencies to coordinate foreign assistance priorities with key countries and international
organizations represented in Haiti. Active since 2004, the “Core Group” has shaped international
responses to key events in Haiti, as when it called on Henry to form a “consensual and inclusive
government” in July 2021.96 In addition to the U.S. Ambassador, the Core Group comprises the
Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General; the Ambassadors of Brazil, Canada,
France, Germany, Spain, and the European Union (EU); and the Special Representative of the
Organization of American States.
Many members of the Core Group (including the EU, Spain, and France) have expressed interest
in contributing to a multidonor basket fund on security that aims to support the long-term
development of the HNP; Canada and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) administer the
fund. UNDP estimated the fund needs at least $28 million over two years to achieve its aims.
According to BINUH, donations stood at roughly $25.5 million in October 2023.97

93 U.S. Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “U.N. Security Council Authorizes Multinational
Security Support Mission to Haiti,” October 2, 2023.
94 U.S. Department of State, The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for
Haiti, March 24, 2023.
95 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Notification (CN) 23-300, August 14, 2023; USAID, CN 146, May 16,
2023.
96 BINUH, “Core Group Press Release,” July 17, 2021.
97 Electronic correspondence with U.N. official, January 26, 2024.
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Trade Preferences98
Congress has extended unilateral trade preferences to Haiti through several trade preference
programs enacted since 1975. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (P.L. 98-67,
subsequently amended, with no expiration), for example, provides limited duty-free entry of
selected Caribbean products as a core element of the U.S. foreign economic policy response to
uncertain economic and political conditions in the region. The current Haiti-specific preferences,
which expire in 2025, provide unilateral preferences to the country’s apparel sector.99 The value
of U.S. imports from Haiti entering under Caribbean preference programs increased from $25
million in 2000 to $253.3 million in 2022, an increase of over 900%. Those imports accounted for
about 31.9% of total U.S. merchandise imports from Haiti. Over 90% of U.S. imports from Haiti
in 2022 consisted of apparel items or clothing; knitted or crocheted apparel imports totaled
$807.0 million, while other apparel items or clothing totaled $155.0 million. 100
The Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act of 2023 (S. 552), introduced in the Senate in
February 2023, would renew U.S. trade preferences for Haiti through 2035. In the House, H.R.
5035, introduced in July 2023, would modify and extend trade preferences for Haiti under the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act.
Sanctions: U.S. and Multilateral
In 2020, as part of its policy toward Haiti, the U.S. government began to impose economic
sanctions and visa restrictions on those responsible for significant human rights abuses and/or
corruption.101 In December 2020, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, issued to implement
requirements enacted in the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (P.L. 114-328),
the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) imposed asset blocking sanctions on Jimmy
Chérizier (gang leader and former HNP officer) and two former Moïse officials for involvement
in the La Saline massacre. In April 2023, Treasury designated Gary Bodeu, former head of Haiti’s
Chamber of Deputies, for corruption (E.O. 13818). In December 2023, Treasury sanctioned the
leaders of four of Haiti’s largest gangs for involvement in sexual violence and other gross human
rights violations (E.O. 13818). These individuals are barred from entry into the United States.
Pursuant to Section 7031(c) of annual foreign operations appropriations acts (P.L. 117-103,
Division K and P.L. 117-328, Division K), the State Department has imposed visa restrictions on
eight Haitian officials who have committed human rights violations and/or corruption. In 2022,
the State Department imposed visa restrictions on then-Senator Lambert for corruption and gross
violations of human rights, as well as former Haitian Customs Director Rommel Bell and then-
Senator Celestin for corruption. In 2023, the State Department invoked section 7031 (c)
authorities to impose visa restrictions on Gary Bodeau, former senator Nenel Cassey, former
prime minister Laurent Lamothe, and former prime minister Jean-Marie Bellerive for corruption.
The State Department has reportedly privately revoked the visas of dozens of other officials and
their families.

98 For additional information, see CRS Report R47432, Caribbean Trade Preference Programs, by Liana Wong and M.
Angeles Villarreal.
99 For a description of how the Haiti-specific preference programs have evolved and have affected Haitian exports and
Haitian workers, see U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.-Haiti Trade: Impact of U.S. Preference Programs on
Haiti’s Economy and Workers, December 2022.
100 Compiled by CRS using data from U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb.
101 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), available at
https://ofac.treasury.gov/.
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In addition, Haitian officials have been designated for drug trafficking pursuant to E.O. 14059,
which implements the Fentanyl Sanctions Act (P.L. 116-92); this E.O results in visa bans and
economic sanctions. Treasury designated Joseph Lambert, then-president of the Haitian senate,
and former Senator Youri Latortue for involvement in drug trafficking in November 2022.
Treasury designated then-Senator Rony Celestin and former Senator Herve Fourcand pursuant to
E.O. 14059 in December 2022.
The United States has encouraged other international partners and the U.N. Security Council to
impose sanctions on gang leaders and on the financial backers of Haitian gangs, recognizing that
targeted sanctions imposed in a multilateral manner may have a better chance of affecting change
than unilateral sanctions.102 U.S. sanctions have been closely coordinated with those announced
by the Government of Canada, which also imposed sanctions on former President Martelly for
drug trafficking—a move U.S. officials have welcomed.103 In October 2022, the U.N. Security
Council unanimously approved Resolution 2653 to require member states to impose sanctions on
Jimmy Chérizier.104 The Security Council established a panel of experts to assess sanctions
compliance and recommend additional individuals and entities to be subject to travel bans, asset
blocking, and an arms embargo. The committee added the same four gang leaders designated by
the United States to its list in December 2023. The United Kingdom and the European Union
have also added those gang leaders to their sanctions lists.
Congress is considering legislation that would require reporting from the State Department and
potential sanctions on Haitians who back criminal gangs. In July 2023, the House passed an
amended version of the Haiti Criminal Collusion Transparency Act of 2023 (H.R. 1684), aimed at
identifying and penalizing ties between Haitian political and economic elites and criminal gangs.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported a companion bill, S. 396, in May 2023. The
bills would require the Secretary of State, in coordination with the intelligence community, to
report annually to specific congressional committees identifying Haitian political and economic
elites tied to gangs, among other topics. They also would require the President to impose visa
restrictions and economic sanctions on those individuals pursuant to Section 7031(c) of annual
foreign operations appropriations, Section 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114-328), or any other provision of law. The
President could waive those sanctions requirements if the President certifies that it is in the U.S.
national interest to do so or is necessary for the delivery of humanitarian or related assistance.
U.S. Department of Justice Cooperation
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has obtained three convictions in the Moïse assassination,
assisted Haitian officials investigating the assassination, and pursued cases involving those
complicit in arms trafficking, gang violence, kidnapping, and drug trafficking in and through
Haiti. In November 2022, DOJ indicted seven leaders of five Haitian gangs involved in
kidnappings of U.S. missionaries that took place in 2021; one of those individuals also has been
charged with participating in a kidnapping that resulted in the death of a U.S. citizen in Haiti in

102 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review, October 2021.
103 Government of Canada, “Sanctions: Grave Breach of International Peace and Security in Haiti,” updated December
19, 2022, at https://www.international.gc.ca/campaign-campagne/haiti-sanction/index.aspx?lang=eng; Jacqueline
Charles and Michael Wilner, “Canada Sanctions Former Haiti President Michel Martelly, Two Former Prime
Ministers,” Miami Herald, November 21, 2022.
104 U.N. Security Council, “Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 2653 (2022) Concerning
Haiti,” at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653.
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October 2022.105 DHS has established a vetted Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit within
the HNP to work with U.S. prosecutors on cases affecting both countries, including the trafficking
of arms, drugs, and people.
Weapons and Drug Trafficking
In March 2023, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) issued a report that examined
how illicit drug and weapons trafficking have exacerbated gang-related violence in Haiti. The
report includes recommendations for national, regional, and international responses to address
illicit trafficking, strengthen port security, reinforce the capabilities of the HNP, and promote
stability in Haiti.106
The State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), issued in
March 2023, asserts that continuing instability, a weak justice system, corruption, and the HNP’s
inability to patrol the country’s extensive borders have kept drug seizures low and inhibited
bilateral antidrug efforts. Haiti’s porous border with the Dominican Republic and corruption in
the Haitian customs authority have enabled gangs to obtain illicit arms.
U.S. agencies have taken some steps to combat illicit trafficking to Haiti. In August 2022, the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Homeland Security Investigations office in
Miami, FL, announced new initiatives to counter reported spikes in arms trafficking to Haiti.107 In
December 2022, the State Department sanctioned Rommel Bell, former customs director in Haiti,
for corruption after Haiti’s anticorruption unit launched an investigation into Bell’s alleged
participation in arms trafficking. The U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(ATF) signed an agreement with the HNP in November 2023 to help Haitian police use ATF’s e-
Trace system to investigate crimes involving firearms. U.S. law enforcement agencies are also
supporting a new CARICOM Crime Gun Intelligence Unit in Trinidad to investigate regional
arms trafficking cases alongside national officials.
In December 2023, legislation was introduced in the House, H.R. 6618, that would, among other
provisions, transfer the regulatory control of certain arms exports from the Department of
Commerce to the Department of State. The bill also would require the State Department and other
relevant agencies to produce a report within 180 days on illegal arms trafficking to Haiti and
other countries covered by the bill (including Mexico and Central American and Caribbean
countries). It would require that report to inform a subsequent U.S. strategy on how to better
combat the trafficking of arms exported from the United States to those countries.
Migration Issues
Stemming irregular migration to the United States continues to be a high priority for U.S. policy
and Congress.108 U.S. government apprehensions of Haitian migrants have risen notably, both at
sea and on the U.S. Southwest border. In FY2023, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

105 U.S. Department of Justice, “Criminal Charges Unsealed Against Gang Leaders for Kidnappings of U.S. Citizens,”
November 7, 2020; “Haitian Gang Leader Charged with Hostage Taking Offenses That Resulted in the Death of a U.S.
Citizen in Haiti in October 2022,” October 24, 2023.
106 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Haiti’s Criminal Markets: Mapping Trends in Firearms and Drug Trafficking,
March 2023.
107 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Announces Crackdown on
Firearms, Ammunition Smuggling to Haiti, the Caribbean,” August 19, 2022.
108 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines irregular migration as “movement of persons that takes
place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin,
transit or destination.” IOM, “Key Migration Terms,” at https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms.
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encountered 163,781 Haitians nationwide, up from 56,596 Haitians encountered in FY2022.109
Some of those Haitians had resided in third countries (particularly Brazil and Chile) since the
2010 earthquake and had few ties to Haiti.110 From October 2022 to January 2023, U.S. Coast
Guard-reported interdictions and/or encounters of Haitian migrants exceeded 1,700.111 From
January-November 2023, Mexican officials encountered roughly 21,100 Haitians in an irregular
status.112 Some 44,200 Haitians requested asylum in Mexico during that period, making Haiti the
largest source country of asylum seekers in Mexico.113
On January 5, 2023, DHS announced the expansion of an immigration parole program for
Venezuelans to include Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans.114 Haitians who have a U.S. financial
sponsor can apply for up to two years of immigration parole, and, after being vetted, fly directly
into the interior of the United States. In April 2023, DHS added another requirement for
participation in the program making any Haitian interdicted at sea after April 27 ineligible for the
parole program.115 As of December 2023, some 133,000 Haitians had been vetted and approved
for travel to the United States under the program and 126,000 Haitians had been paroled into the
United States under this process.116
In contrast, Haitians apprehended crossing the U.S. Southwest border between ports of entry are
subject to removal (deportation) under immigration law and they may apply for asylum. The
Biden Administration removed 717 individuals to Haiti in FY2023, down from 1,532 in
FY2022.117 Human rights advocates have urged U.S. officials to suspend removals to Haiti amid
the country’s deteriorating security situation.118
The United States also has taken steps to provide other legal migration and protection pathways
for some Haitians. Some 155,000 Haitians may be eligible for relief from removal under the
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation announced in May 2021, and an estimated 105,100
additional Haitians are eligible under the extension announced in December 2022.119 In August
2023, the Biden Administration announced a modernized Haitian Family Reunification Parole
Program. As in the past, the program will allow certain U.S. citizens and legal permanent
residents to seek parole for family members in Haiti (or other countries); most of the process can
now be completed online.120

109 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Nationwide Encounters,” https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-
encounters.
110 Caitlyn Yates, Haitian Migration Through the Americas: A Decade in the Making, Migration Information Source,
September 30, 2021.
111 United States Coast Guard News, “Operation Vigilant Sentry: Stopping Illegal Migration at sea,” January 127, 2023.
112 Gobierno do México (GOM), Boletín Mensual de Estadísticas Migratorias, 2023, accessed January 30, 2024.
113 GOM, Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados (COMAR),”La COMAR en Números,” January 9, 2024.
114 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “DHS Implements New Processes for Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans
and Eliminates Cap for Venezuelans,” January 6, 2022.
115 DHS, “Implementation of a Change to the Parole Process for Haitians,” 88 FR 26327 Federal Register 26327-
26329, April 28, 2023.
116 DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “CBP Releases December 2023 Monthly Update,” January 26,
2024.
117 DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), FY2023 Annual Report, December 29, 2023.
118 Human Rights Watch, US/Haiti: Suspend Deportation Flights to Haiti, September 27, 2023.
119 See CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure, by Jill H. Wilson.
120 DHS, “DHS Modernizes Cuban and Haitian Family Reunification Parole Processes,” August 10, 2023.
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Outlook
The 118th Congress has maintained a keen interest in developments in Haiti, as deteriorating
security and humanitarian conditions in the country intersect with a broad range of U.S. interests
and policy responses. Among other actions, Congress has directly engaged with U.S. policy
approaches toward Haiti in relation to foreign assistance, trade preferences, sanctions policy, and
migration. Congress may fund, oversee, and assess new policy approaches to address the situation
in Haiti, including the deployment of a U.S.-backed, multinational security force to the country.

Author Information

Karla I. Rios
Clare Ribando Seelke
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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