Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

Changes from August 21, 2023 to September 18, 2023

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy
~~August 21~~September 18, 2023 , 2023
Haiti, located on the western third of the island of Hispaniola and bordering the Dominican Haiti, located on the western third of the island of Hispaniola and bordering the Dominican
Republic, remains mired in interrelated political, security, and humanitarian crises. Haiti lacks an Republic, remains mired in interrelated political, security, and humanitarian crises. Haiti lacks an
Clare Ribando Seelke
elected president, legislature, and mayors following the July 2021 assassination of President elected president, legislature, and mayors following the July 2021 assassination of President
Specialist in Latin Specialist in Latin
Jovenel Moïse. Moïse had named Ariel Henry to be prime minister prior to his death, but Henry Jovenel Moïse. Moïse had named Ariel Henry to be prime minister prior to his death, but Henry
American Affairs American Affairs
had not been sworn in as required under Haitian law. Since the assassination, a political stalemate had not been sworn in as required under Haitian law. Since the assassination, a political stalemate

has persisted over whether Henry or a transitional government should govern until elections can has persisted over whether Henry or a transitional government should govern until elections can
Karla I. Rios
be convened and an elected government is in place. be convened and an elected government is in place.
Analyst in Latin American Analyst in Latin American
Affairs Affairs
The ongoing political impasse also has hindered Haiti’s ability to respond to worsening security The ongoing political impasse also has hindered Haiti’s ability to respond to worsening security

and humanitarian crises caused by rampant gang violence, food and fuel shortages, and a and humanitarian crises caused by rampant gang violence, food and fuel shortages, and a
resurgence of cholera. In October 2022, Henry asked for a foreign security force to help resurgence of cholera. In October 2022, Henry asked for a foreign security force to help

reestablish control and enable humanitarian aid deliveries. While many Haitian civil society reestablish control and enable humanitarian aid deliveries. While many Haitian civil society
groups initially opposed this request due to concerns regarding abuses committed during past interventions and Henry’s groups initially opposed this request due to concerns regarding abuses committed during past interventions and Henry’s
unelected status, increased insecurity has led more Haitians to express support for international assistance. Kenya unelected status, increased insecurity has led more Haitians to express support for international assistance. Kenya is
~~considering leading such a force~~has offered to lead a “multinational security support mission” if authorized by the U.N. Security Council. The compound crises in Haiti continue to fuel if authorized by the U.N. Security Council. The compound crises in Haiti continue to fuel
instability and U.S.-bound migration. instability and U.S.-bound migration.
U.S. Policy
U.S. policy in Haiti has aimed to support Haitian efforts to restore security, the rule of law, democratic institutions leading to U.S. policy in Haiti has aimed to support Haitian efforts to restore security, the rule of law, democratic institutions leading to
free and fair elections, and economic and social stability. In FY2022, the Biden Administration allocated $237.4 million in free and fair elections, and economic and social stability. In FY2022, the Biden Administration allocated $237.4 million in
bilateral assistance for Haiti, including increased support for the Haitian National Police. In FY2023, an estimated $204.5 bilateral assistance for Haiti, including increased support for the Haitian National Police. In FY2023, an estimated $204.5
million has been allocated to Haiti; the Administration requested $291.5 million for Haiti in FY2024. Separately, the million has been allocated to Haiti; the Administration requested $291.5 million for Haiti in FY2024. Separately, the
Administration has continued to provide humanitarian assistance to Haiti, including more than $112 million in FY2023. In Administration has continued to provide humanitarian assistance to Haiti, including more than $112 million in FY2023. In
March 2023, the Administration released a 10-year plan for promoting peace and stability in Haiti, a priority country under March 2023, the Administration released a 10-year plan for promoting peace and stability in Haiti, a priority country under
the Global Fragility Act (P.L. 116-94), supported by additional funds. the Global Fragility Act (P.L. 116-94), supported by additional funds.
The Biden Administration has encouraged negotiations between Henry and other key stakeholders regarding a pathway to The Biden Administration has encouraged negotiations between Henry and other key stakeholders regarding a pathway to
future elections, and has placed increased pressure on Henry in recent months to reach an inclusive political accord. Since future elections, and has placed increased pressure on Henry in recent months to reach an inclusive political accord. Since
October 2022, the U.S. Treasury and State Departments have publicly sanctioned seven current or former Haitian officials, October 2022, the U.S. Treasury and State Departments have publicly sanctioned seven current or former Haitian officials,
including Laurent Lamothe, former prime minister for President Michel Martelly (2011-2016). The Administration also has including Laurent Lamothe, former prime minister for President Michel Martelly (2011-2016). The Administration also has
sought to facilitate a broader international response to the situation in Haiti. The United States and Mexico drafted a U.N. sought to facilitate a broader international response to the situation in Haiti. The United States and Mexico drafted a U.N.
Security Council resolution to sanction gang leaders in Haiti and their financial backers that was adopted in October 2022. Security Council resolution to sanction gang leaders in Haiti and their financial backers that was adopted in October 2022.
The United States and Ecuador The United States and Ecuador ~~plan to present~~are finalizing a U.N. Security Council resolution to support a Kenyan-led a U.N. Security Council resolution to support a Kenyan-led ~~multinational~~
~~force in~~mission to Haiti. Haiti.
Congressional Action
Congress set objectives for U.S. policy toward Haiti through 2025 in the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Congress set objectives for U.S. policy toward Haiti through 2025 in the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional
Transparency Initiative Act (P.L. 117-103, Division V) and directed the Secretary of State to prioritize the protection of Transparency Initiative Act (P.L. 117-103, Division V) and directed the Secretary of State to prioritize the protection of
human rights and anticorruption efforts. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328), did not designate a total human rights and anticorruption efforts. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328), did not designate a total
funding level for Haiti but placed democracy-related conditions on some foreign assistance. Neither of the versions of a funding level for Haiti but placed democracy-related conditions on some foreign assistance. Neither of the versions of a
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024, reported by the House (H.R. Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024, reported by the House (H.R.
4665/H.Rept. 118-146) and Senate Appropriations Committees (S. 2438/S.Rept. 118-71) would designate a specific aid 4665/H.Rept. 118-146) and Senate Appropriations Committees (S. 2438/S.Rept. 118-71) would designate a specific aid
amount for Haiti. However, both measures would place restrictions on assistance to the central government. In addition to amount for Haiti. However, both measures would place restrictions on assistance to the central government. In addition to
foreign assistance, the House passed, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported, bills (H.R. 1684/S. 396) that foreign assistance, the House passed, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported, bills (H.R. 1684/S. 396) that
would require an annual State Department report on ties between gangs and politicians in Haiti and direct the President to would require an annual State Department report on ties between gangs and politicians in Haiti and direct the President to
impose visa- and property-blocking sanctions on certain individuals identified in the report. Bills to renew trade preferences impose visa- and property-blocking sanctions on certain individuals identified in the report. Bills to renew trade preferences
for Haiti (H.R. 5035/S. 552) also have been introduced in both houses. Congressional oversight efforts in the 118th Congress for Haiti (H.R. 5035/S. 552) also have been introduced in both houses. Congressional oversight efforts in the 118th Congress
have focused on the Administration’s plans to improve security and democracy in Haiti, and could expand to monitor funding have focused on the Administration’s plans to improve security and democracy in Haiti, and could expand to monitor funding
and any multinational force deployment to Haiti. and any multinational force deployment to Haiti.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

link to page 5 link to page 5 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

Introduction
Haiti, a Caribbean country that shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic (see Haiti, a Caribbean country that shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic (see
Figure 1), , has been of ongoing interest to Congress and successive U.S. presidential has been of ongoing interest to Congress and successive U.S. presidential
administrations because of its proximity to the United States, chronic instability, and vulnerability administrations because of its proximity to the United States, chronic instability, and vulnerability
to natural disasters.1 Although Haiti has endured corrupt, authoritarian leaders for much of its to natural disasters.1 Although Haiti has endured corrupt, authoritarian leaders for much of its
history, governance arguably had improved in the years prior to a 2010 earthquake.2 That disaster history, governance arguably had improved in the years prior to a 2010 earthquake.2 That disaster
killed more than 200,000 people and set development back significantly. Despite extensive killed more than 200,000 people and set development back significantly. Despite extensive
international support for Haiti’s recovery, democratic institutions remain weak and the country international support for Haiti’s recovery, democratic institutions remain weak and the country
continues to contend with extreme poverty; wide economic disparities; and both human-made and continues to contend with extreme poverty; wide economic disparities; and both human-made and
natural disasters, including an August 2021 earthquake that killed 2,000 people. natural disasters, including an August 2021 earthquake that killed 2,000 people.
The situation in Haiti further deteriorated after The situation in Haiti further deteriorated after
Haiti at a Glance
Capital: Port-au-Prince Port-au-Prince
the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in
July 2021 led to uncertainty over who would July 2021 led to uncertainty over who would
Population: 12.2 12.2 ~~mil ion~~million (2023, IMF est.) (2023, IMF est.)
succeed him. Two days before the succeed him. Two days before the
Languages: French (official), Creole (official) French (official), Creole (official)
assassination, Moïse named Ariel Henry to be assassination, Moïse named Ariel Henry to be
Area: 10,710 sq. miles, slightly larger than 10,710 sq. miles, slightly larger than
Massachusetts Massachusetts
prime minister, but Henry was not sworn in. prime minister, but Henry was not sworn in.
Since most legislators’ terms had expired at the Since most legislators’ terms had expired at the
GDP: $26.58 $26.58 ~~bil ion~~billion (2023, current prices, IMF est.) (2023, current prices, IMF est.)
time of the assassination, the Haitian legislature time of the assassination, the Haitian legislature
Real GDP Growth: -1.8% (2021); -1.7% (2022); -1.8% (2021); -1.7% (2022);
0.3% (2023, forecast) (% change, constant prices, IMF) 0.3% (2023, forecast) (% change, constant prices, IMF)
lacked the quorum needed to select a president lacked the quorum needed to select a president
Per Capita GDP: $2,170 (2023, current prices, IMF $2,170 (2023, current prices, IMF
to serve out the remainder of Moïse’s term, as to serve out the remainder of Moïse’s term, as
est.) est.)
outlined in the Haitian Constitution. outlined in the Haitian Constitution.
Life Expectancy: 60.4/66.1 years (male/female) 60.4/66.1 years (male/female)
Haiti still lacks an elected president, legislature, Haiti still lacks an elected president, legislature,
(UNDP, 2021) (UNDP, 2021)
and local government; the terms of the last 10 and local government; the terms of the last 10
Maternal Mortality Ratio: 480/100,000 live births 480/100,000 live births
elected senators ended in January 2023. A elected senators ended in January 2023. A
(UNDP, 2022) (UNDP, 2022)
political standoff between de facto Prime political standoff between de facto Prime
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF); United International Monetary Fund (IMF); United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
Minister Henry’s government and opposition Minister Henry’s government and opposition
political and civil society leaders regarding political and civil society leaders regarding
how to form a transitional government to stabilize the country and convene elections persists how to form a transitional government to stabilize the country and convene elections persists
amid a worsening security and humanitarian crisis. In October 2022, Henry requested amid a worsening security and humanitarian crisis. In October 2022, Henry requested
international support to help the Haitian National Police restore order. In international support to help the Haitian National Police restore order. In ~~mid-~~August 2023, the August 2023, the
United Nations (U.N.) Security-General outlined options for U.N. support for the deployment of a United Nations (U.N.) Security-General outlined options for U.N. support for the deployment of a
multinational force to Haiti; the United States multinational force to Haiti; the United States isand Ecuador are preparing to introduce a U.N. Security Council preparing to introduce a U.N. Security Council
resolution to authorize such a deployment.3 resolution to authorize such a deployment.3
The 118th Congress may consider options for responding to the interrelated political, security, and The 118th Congress may consider options for responding to the interrelated political, security, and
humanitarian crises in Haiti and the Henry government’s request for international intervention. humanitarian crises in Haiti and the Henry government’s request for international intervention.
This report provides a brief overview of the situation in Haiti and U.S. policy responses to date. This report provides a brief overview of the situation in Haiti and U.S. policy responses to date.

1 For background, see Laurent DuBois, 1 For background, see Laurent DuBois, Haiti: the Aftershocks of History (New York, NY: Picador, 2013); Philippe (New York, NY: Picador, 2013); Philippe
Girard, Girard, Haiti: : The Tumultuous History: From Pearl of the Caribbean to Broken Nation (New York, NY: Palgrave (New York, NY: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2005, 2010). MacMillan, 2005, 2010).
2 International Crisis Group, 2 International Crisis Group, Consolidating Stability in Haiti, Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 21, July 18, 2007. Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 21, July 18, 2007.
3 Jacqueline Charles, “U.N. Leader Calls for Range of Options to Combat Haiti Gangs,” 3 Jacqueline Charles, “U.N. Leader Calls for Range of Options to Combat Haiti Gangs,” Miami Herald,, August 15, August 15,
2023;2023; ~~U.S. Department of State, “Special Online Briefing: Barbara A. Feinstein Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for~~
~~Caribbean Affairs and Haiti,” August 4, 2023.~~
Michael Wilner, “U.S. Official says U.N. Resolution on Haiti is Urgent: ‘We are Moving as Fast as we can,’” Miami Herald, September 13, 2023. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1 1

Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

Figure 1. Map of Haiti

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS). Congressional Research Service (CRS).
Political Situation
Background
Haiti won independence from France in 1804, making it the second independent republic in the Haiti won independence from France in 1804, making it the second independent republic in the
Western Hemisphere (after the United States). Since then, the country has experienced long Western Hemisphere (after the United States). Since then, the country has experienced long
periods of authoritarianism and political fragility, punctuated by foreign interventions and natural periods of authoritarianism and political fragility, punctuated by foreign interventions and natural
disasters.4 After the fall of the brutal Duvalier dictatorship (1957-1986), attempts to consolidate disasters.4 After the fall of the brutal Duvalier dictatorship (1957-1986), attempts to consolidate
democratic rule have had limited success.5 In 1991, a military coup interrupted the term of Haiti’s democratic rule have had limited success.5 In 1991, a military coup interrupted the term of Haiti’s
first president elected in free and fair elections, Jean-Bertrand Aristide of the center-left first president elected in free and fair elections, Jean-Bertrand Aristide of the center-left Fanmi
Lavalas party (1991; 1994-1996; 2000-2004). The threat of a U.S. military intervention allowed party (1991; 1994-1996; 2000-2004). The threat of a U.S. military intervention allowed
Aristide to return three years later to complete his term. In 2000, Aristide began a second term Aristide to return three years later to complete his term. In 2000, Aristide began a second term
after the opposition boycotted the presidential election due to flawed parliamentary elections after the opposition boycotted the presidential election due to flawed parliamentary elections

4 Rocio Cara Labrador and Diana Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development,” Council on Foreign Relations, 4 Rocio Cara Labrador and Diana Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development,” Council on Foreign Relations,
September 2022 (hereinafter Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path”). Haiti reportedly paid an indemnity to France September 2022 (hereinafter Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path”). Haiti reportedly paid an indemnity to France
of some $560 million, which caused a significant drain on Haiti’s finances well into the 20th century. Concerns about of some $560 million, which caused a significant drain on Haiti’s finances well into the 20th century. Concerns about
the indebted country’s ability to pay its creditors prompted a U.S. intervention from 1915 to 1934. Lazaro Gamio et al., the indebted country’s ability to pay its creditors prompted a U.S. intervention from 1915 to 1934. Lazaro Gamio et al.,
“Haiti’s Lost Billions,” “Haiti’s Lost Billions,” New York Times, May 20, 2022; Hans Schmidt, , May 20, 2022; Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti: 1915-
1934 (Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971). (Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971).
5 Fearing communist rule and/or instability on the island, successive U.S. presidential administrations recognized the 5 Fearing communist rule and/or instability on the island, successive U.S. presidential administrations recognized the
regimes of François Duvalier (1957-1971) and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-1987), despite concerns about the regimes of François Duvalier (1957-1971) and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-1987), despite concerns about the
leaders’ authoritarian tendencies. See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “U.S. Relations with Haiti” in leaders’ authoritarian tendencies. See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “U.S. Relations with Haiti” in
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, American Republics, vol. V, document 309, at , vol. V, document 309, at
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d309; and U.S. Department of State, Office of the https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d309; and U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Historian, “Telegram from the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State” in Historian, “Telegram from the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State” in Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Mexico,
Cuba, and the Caribbean, vol. XXIII, document 253, August 14, 1978, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/vol. XXIII, document 253, August 14, 1978, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1977-80v23/d253. frus1977-80v23/d253.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2 2

Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

favoring favoring Fanmi Lavalas. In 2004, Aristide—facing an armed uprising against his rule as well as . In 2004, Aristide—facing an armed uprising against his rule as well as
U.S. and international pressure—resigned and went into exile.6 U.S. and international pressure—resigned and went into exile.6
From 2004 to 2017, the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a peacekeeping force From 2004 to 2017, the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a peacekeeping force
that grew to 13,000 at its peak, sought to restore order in the country; build the Haitian National that grew to 13,000 at its peak, sought to restore order in the country; build the Haitian National
Police (HNP); and, later, help with recovery after a 2010 earthquake. The legacy of MINUSTAH Police (HNP); and, later, help with recovery after a 2010 earthquake. The legacy of MINUSTAH
is complicated, as troops helped restore some stability to Haiti but reintroduced cholera into the is complicated, as troops helped restore some stability to Haiti but reintroduced cholera into the
country and committed human rights and sexual abuses. This experience initially led many country and committed human rights and sexual abuses. This experience initially led many
Haitians to oppose the type of foreign military involvement requested by the Henry government.7 Haitians to oppose the type of foreign military involvement requested by the Henry government.7
Haiti’s most recent presidents, Michel Martelly (2011-2016) and his chosen successor, Jovenel Haiti’s most recent presidents, Michel Martelly (2011-2016) and his chosen successor, Jovenel
Moïse (2017-July 2021), who represented the center-right Moïse (2017-July 2021), who represented the center-right Tèt Kale Party (PHTK), took office Party (PHTK), took office
after disputed elections and administered governments allegedly rife with corruption.8 Under after disputed elections and administered governments allegedly rife with corruption.8 Under
Moïse, Haiti experienced political and social unrest, high inflation, antigovernment protests, and Moïse, Haiti experienced political and social unrest, high inflation, antigovernment protests, and
gang violence. Like other Haitian politicians, Moïse allegedly provided money and arms to gangs gang violence. Like other Haitian politicians, Moïse allegedly provided money and arms to gangs
in exchange for favors, including suppressing antigovernment protests such as those that erupted in exchange for favors, including suppressing antigovernment protests such as those that erupted
in 2018 after the government announced fuel price hikes.9 A 2021 report by Harvard Law in 2018 after the government announced fuel price hikes.9 A 2021 report by Harvard Law
School’s International Human Rights Clinic documented state (primarily police) involvement in School’s International Human Rights Clinic documented state (primarily police) involvement in
attacks on neighborhoods in which some 240 civilians died from 2018 to 2020.10 Instability attacks on neighborhoods in which some 240 civilians died from 2018 to 2020.10 Instability
increased in 2019 after Haitian auditors issued two reports to the country’s chief prosecutor increased in 2019 after Haitian auditors issued two reports to the country’s chief prosecutor
alleging Moïse and other officials had misappropriated and embezzled millions of dollars in alleging Moïse and other officials had misappropriated and embezzled millions of dollars in
public funds.11 public funds.11
Political gridlock between the executive and legislative branches led to the government not Political gridlock between the executive and legislative branches led to the government not
organizing scheduled October 2019 parliamentary elections. The terms of the entire lower organizing scheduled October 2019 parliamentary elections. The terms of the entire lower
Chamber of Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate expired in January 2020, as did the terms of all Chamber of Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate expired in January 2020, as did the terms of all
local government posts, without newly elected officials to take these positions.12 Thereafter, local government posts, without newly elected officials to take these positions.12 Thereafter,
Moïse ruled by decree, with some controversy over whether his term was to end in February 2021 Moïse ruled by decree, with some controversy over whether his term was to end in February 2021
or February 2022 (the State Department did not take a position on that dispute).13 or February 2022 (the State Department did not take a position on that dispute).13

6 Daniel P. Erikson, “Haiti After Aristide: Still on the Brink,” 6 Daniel P. Erikson, “Haiti After Aristide: Still on the Brink,” Current History, vol. 104, no. 679 (February 2005), pp. , vol. 104, no. 679 (February 2005), pp.
83-90. 83-90.
7 Carla King et al., “‘MINUSTAH Is Doing Positive Things Just as They Do Negative Things’: Nuanced Perceptions of 7 Carla King et al., “‘MINUSTAH Is Doing Positive Things Just as They Do Negative Things’: Nuanced Perceptions of
a UN Peacekeeping Operation Amidst Peacekeeper-Perpetrated Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Haiti,” a UN Peacekeeping Operation Amidst Peacekeeper-Perpetrated Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Haiti,” Conflict,
Security & Development, vol. 21, no. 6 (November 17, 2021), pp. 749-779. For how past interventions have influenced , vol. 21, no. 6 (November 17, 2021), pp. 749-779. For how past interventions have influenced
recent popular opinion in Haiti, see Rafael Bernal, “Human Rights Coalition to Biden: No Military Intervention in recent popular opinion in Haiti, see Rafael Bernal, “Human Rights Coalition to Biden: No Military Intervention in
Haiti,” Haiti,” The Hill, November 1, 2022. , November 1, 2022.
8 On Martelly and Moïse’s elections, see Georges Fauriol, “Haiti’s Problematic Electoral Dynamics,” 8 On Martelly and Moïse’s elections, see Georges Fauriol, “Haiti’s Problematic Electoral Dynamics,” Global
Americans, December 21, 2021. On Martelly and drug trafficking, see Jacqueline Charles and Michael Wilner, , December 21, 2021. On Martelly and drug trafficking, see Jacqueline Charles and Michael Wilner,
“Canada Sanctions Former Haiti President Michel Martelly, Two Former Prime Ministers,” “Canada Sanctions Former Haiti President Michel Martelly, Two Former Prime Ministers,” Miami Herald, November , November
21, 2022. On corruption in the Moïse government, see Maria Abi-Habib, “Haiti’s Leader Kept a List of Drug 21, 2022. On corruption in the Moïse government, see Maria Abi-Habib, “Haiti’s Leader Kept a List of Drug
Traffickers. His Assassins Came for It,” Traffickers. His Assassins Came for It,” New York Times, December 12, 2021. , December 12, 2021.
9 Chris Dalby, “International Sanctions Seek to Weaken Haiti’s Patronage System Between Politicians, Gangs,” 9 Chris Dalby, “International Sanctions Seek to Weaken Haiti’s Patronage System Between Politicians, Gangs,” InSight
Crime, November 24, 2022. For Moïse officials’ involvement in attacks on neighborhoods where protests occurred, see , November 24, 2022. For Moïse officials’ involvement in attacks on neighborhoods where protests occurred, see
U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human Rights U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human Rights
Day,” December 10, 2020. Day,” December 10, 2020.
10 Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, 10 Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, Killing with Impunity: State-Sanctioned Massacres in Haiti, ,
April 2021. April 2021.
11 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix C: Major Corruption Cases in Haiti and Government of Haiti Efforts to 11 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix C: Major Corruption Cases in Haiti and Government of Haiti Efforts to
Address Corruption,” November 10, 2022. Address Corruption,” November 10, 2022.
12 The 10 remaining senators’ terms expired on January 9, 2023. 12 The 10 remaining senators’ terms expired on January 9, 2023.
13 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix F: Alleged February 2021 Coup Against President Jovenel Moïse and U.S. and 13 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix F: Alleged February 2021 Coup Against President Jovenel Moïse and U.S. and
(continued...) (continued...)
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

3 3

Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

On July 7, 2021, armed assailants assassinated President Moïse in his private home in Port-au- On July 7, 2021, armed assailants assassinated President Moïse in his private home in Port-au-
Prince. Details of the attack remain under investigation; however, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prince. Details of the attack remain under investigation; however, the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) has arrested 11 individuals for their role in a plot to kill Moïse, and one of Investigation (FBI) has arrested 11 individuals for their role in a plot to kill Moïse, and one of
those individuals was sentenced to life in prison in June 2023.14 The FBI also has supported those individuals was sentenced to life in prison in June 2023.14 The FBI also has supported
Haitian authorities’ investigation of the crime, although threats to the safety of those authorities Haitian authorities’ investigation of the crime, although threats to the safety of those authorities
and turnover among the judges leading the investigation have hindered their efforts. Haitian and turnover among the judges leading the investigation have hindered their efforts. Haitian
police have arrested at least 23 people accused of planning the plot, including former Colombian police have arrested at least 23 people accused of planning the plot, including former Colombian
soldiers, members of Moïse’s security team, a former rebel leader, a former police inspector, and soldiers, members of Moïse’s security team, a former rebel leader, a former police inspector, and
a Haitian-American pastor with ties to Florida.15 a Haitian-American pastor with ties to Florida.15
The Aftermath of President Moïse’s Assassination
Moïse’s assassination gave rise to uncertainty about who would succeed him as president and Moïse’s assassination gave rise to uncertainty about who would succeed him as president and
who would serve as prime minister. Under the Haitian Constitution (Article 149), if a president who would serve as prime minister. Under the Haitian Constitution (Article 149), if a president
dies in the last two years of his term, the legislature should elect a provisional president to serve dies in the last two years of his term, the legislature should elect a provisional president to serve
out the term.16 As Haiti lacked a functioning legislature at the time of the assassination, the choice out the term.16 As Haiti lacked a functioning legislature at the time of the assassination, the choice
of who would succeed Moïse could not follow the prescribed constitutional order. of who would succeed Moïse could not follow the prescribed constitutional order.
Three individuals laid claims to serve as prime minister: interim Prime Minister Claude Joseph; Three individuals laid claims to serve as prime minister: interim Prime Minister Claude Joseph;
Ariel Henry, a neurosurgeon nominated to be prime minister two days before Moïse’s death but Ariel Henry, a neurosurgeon nominated to be prime minister two days before Moïse’s death but
not sworn in; and Joseph Lambert, then-president of the Haitian Senate. On July 8, the Haitian not sworn in; and Joseph Lambert, then-president of the Haitian Senate. On July 8, the Haitian
government requested security and investigative assistance from the United States. In response to government requested security and investigative assistance from the United States. In response to
that request, an inter-agency delegation traveled to Haiti on July 11. U.S. officials met with all that request, an inter-agency delegation traveled to Haiti on July 11. U.S. officials met with all
three claimants to prime minister. After days of jockeying among the claimants over who would three claimants to prime minister. After days of jockeying among the claimants over who would
become prime minister, Joseph agreed that Henry would be prime minister and he foreign become prime minister, Joseph agreed that Henry would be prime minister and he foreign
minister on July 12.17 Lambert separately gave up his quest to be prime minister; the U.S. minister on July 12.17 Lambert separately gave up his quest to be prime minister; the U.S.
government later sanctioned him for drug trafficking. On July 17, the United States, United government later sanctioned him for drug trafficking. On July 17, the United States, United
Nations, and other donors issued a statement calling for the formation of an “inclusive Nations, and other donors issued a statement calling for the formation of an “inclusive
government” and encouraging Prime Minister-designate Ariel Henry to form a government.18 government” and encouraging Prime Minister-designate Ariel Henry to form a government.18
Henry’s irregular path to his position, lackluster efforts while in office, and allegations of his Henry’s irregular path to his position, lackluster efforts while in office, and allegations of his
possible involvement in Moïse’s assassination, have eroded his credibility.19 possible involvement in Moïse’s assassination, have eroded his credibility.19
Since the assassination, a political stalemate has persisted over how to convene elections and who Since the assassination, a political stalemate has persisted over how to convene elections and who
should govern until an elected government is in place. In September 2021, de facto Prime should govern until an elected government is in place. In September 2021, de facto Prime
Minister Henry and his supporters proposed that Henry name a provisional electoral council to Minister Henry and his supporters proposed that Henry name a provisional electoral council to
convene elections, and that Henry remain the single head of government until a new elected convene elections, and that Henry remain the single head of government until a new elected
government takes office, but Henry did not appoint that council. Rival political and civil society leaders, some of whom backed the Montana Accord, a 2021 proposal to form an interim
International Partner Efforts to Support Free and Fair Elections in Haiti,” November 2022, at https://www.state.gov/ International Partner Efforts to Support Free and Fair Elections in Haiti,” November 2022, at https://www.state.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Appendix-F-Developments-in-Haiti-004977.pdf. wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Appendix-F-Developments-in-Haiti-004977.pdf.
14 14 ~~U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on the Assassination of Former President of Haiti Jovenel Moïse, (Div.~~
~~V, P.L. 117-103), November 10, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/haiti-reports/. U.S. Department of Justice, “Four~~
~~Florida Men Arrested in Plot to Kill Haitian President, Grand Jury Returns Indictment Against 11,” February 14, 2023;~~
Chris Cameron, “Man Gets Life in Prison in Killing of Haiti Leader,” New York Times~~, June 4~~Chris Cameron, “Man Gets Life in Prison in Killing of Haiti Leader,” New York Times, June 4, 2023; Sarah Morland, “Colombian ex-soldier Pleads Guilty in Plot to Kill Haitian President,” Reuters, September 7, 2023. , 2023.
15 Jacqueline Charles, “Made in Miami: How a South Florida Plot to Oust Haiti’s Jovenel Moïse Led to His Murder,” 15 Jacqueline Charles, “Made in Miami: How a South Florida Plot to Oust Haiti’s Jovenel Moïse Led to His Murder,”
Miami Herald, December 8, 2022; “Ex-Rebel Leader Known as ‘the Torturer’ Is Arrested in Haiti President’s , December 8, 2022; “Ex-Rebel Leader Known as ‘the Torturer’ Is Arrested in Haiti President’s
Assassination,” Assassination,” Miami Herald, December 21, 2022. , December 21, 2022.
16 Haiti’s Constitution of 1987 with Amendments Through 2012 is available in English at 16 Haiti’s Constitution of 1987 with Amendments Through 2012 is available in English at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012.pdf?lang=en. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012.pdf?lang=en.
17 CRS interview with State Department officials, January 9, 2023. 17 CRS interview with State Department officials, January 9, 2023.
18 U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), “Core Group Press Release,” July 17, 2021. 18 U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), “Core Group Press Release,” July 17, 2021.
19 Monique Beals, “Judge, Investigators say Haitian Prime Minister Involved in President’s Assassination,” 19 Monique Beals, “Judge, Investigators say Haitian Prime Minister Involved in President’s Assassination,” The Hill, ,
February 8, 2022. February 8, 2022.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

4 4

link to page 9 link to page 9 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

government government ~~takes office, but Henry did not appoint that council. Rival political and civil society~~
~~leaders, some of whom backed the Montana Accord, a 2021 proposal to form an interim~~
~~government~~ led by a president and prime minister, argued for a transitional government not led by led by a president and prime minister, argued for a transitional government not led by
Henry. 20 Henry. 20
On December 21, 2022, Henry put forth a new transition proposal—the National Consensus for On December 21, 2022, Henry put forth a new transition proposal—the National Consensus for
an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections (or the December 21st agreement)—that was an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections (or the December 21st agreement)—that was
signed by a range of stakeholders, including some former signatories of the Montana Accord.21 signed by a range of stakeholders, including some former signatories of the Montana Accord.21
His government established a three-member High Transition Council (HTC) to implement that His government established a three-member High Transition Council (HTC) to implement that
transition plan in January 2023 and appointed eight judges to the country’s highest court in March transition plan in January 2023 and appointed eight judges to the country’s highest court in March
2023. An independent facilitation committee is carrying out consultations between the HTC, civil 2023. An independent facilitation committee is carrying out consultations between the HTC, civil
society, and donors on implementing the agreement. Since May, a three-person eminent persons society, and donors on implementing the agreement. Since May, a three-person eminent persons
group from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has group from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has ~~facilitated~~sought to facilitate intra-Haitian dialogue. High- intra-Haitian dialogue. High-
level talks among Henry and other key stakeholders took place in Jamaica in mid-June 2023, with level talks among Henry and other key stakeholders took place in Jamaica in mid-June 2023, with
a focus on increasing the size of the transition council and possibly expanding its powers, as well a focus on increasing the size of the transition council and possibly expanding its powers, as well
as selecting an electoral council. The stakeholders did not reach as selecting an electoral council. The stakeholders did not reach ~~a final agreement~~an agreement then nor in follow-up talks held earlier in September 2023, but , but
negotiations negotiations ~~are continuing.22~~continue.
Security Crisis
Relations between Haitian gangs and the country’s political and economic elite are well Relations between Haitian gangs and the country’s political and economic elite are well
established (sestablished (see Figure 2). Many of Haiti’s past presidents and prominent politicians have used . Many of Haiti’s past presidents and prominent politicians have used
and received support from gangs. Generally, gangs provide political elites with services such as and received support from gangs. Generally, gangs provide political elites with services such as
campaign support, voter intimidation, bribery, fundraising, vandalism, and protest disruption.campaign support, voter intimidation, bribery, fundraising, vandalism, and protest disruption.2322
Former President Aristide reportedly relied on support from gangs that engaged in political Former President Aristide reportedly relied on support from gangs that engaged in political
repression, and the Canadian government sanctioned former President Martelly for his role in repression, and the Canadian government sanctioned former President Martelly for his role in
financing gangs.financing gangs.2423 Business elites have formed relationships with gangs in order to protect their Business elites have formed relationships with gangs in order to protect their
businesses and enable them to move merchandise throughout the country and abroad.businesses and enable them to move merchandise throughout the country and abroad.2524 In In
December 2022, the Canadian government imposed sanctions on prominent businessmen—December 2022, the Canadian government imposed sanctions on prominent businessmen—
Gilbert Bigio, Reynold Deeb, and Sherif Abdallah—for reportedly providing “illicit financial and Gilbert Bigio, Reynold Deeb, and Sherif Abdallah—for reportedly providing “illicit financial and
operational support to gangs.”operational support to gangs.”2625

20 The Montana Accord proposed a two-year interim government led by a president and prime minister, with oversight 20 The Montana Accord proposed a two-year interim government led by a president and prime minister, with oversight
committees, to restore order, administer elections, and create a truth and justice commission to address past human committees, to restore order, administer elections, and create a truth and justice commission to address past human
rights violations. Georges Fauriol, “Haiti: Betting on the Montana Accord,” rights violations. Georges Fauriol, “Haiti: Betting on the Montana Accord,” Global Americans, February 9, 2022. , February 9, 2022.
21 U.N. Security Council, U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), 21 U.N. Security Council, U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), Report of the Secretary General, April 14, 2023. , April 14, 2023.
2222 ~~Jacqueline Charles, “They Don’t Have a Deal, but Haitian Leaders Leave Jamaica with Promise to Keep Talking,”~~
Miami Herald, June 14, 2023.
23 Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, Gangs of Haiti: Expansion, Power, and an Escalating Crisis, October , October
2022. Hereinafter: Global Initiative, 2022. Hereinafter: Global Initiative, Gangs of Haiti. .
2423 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Haiti: The Chimères, Their Activities and Their Geographic Presence;
the Treatment of the Chimères by the Authorities and the Presence of Group Members Within the Government and the
Police (2006-May 2008), June 3, 2008; Harold Isaac and Brian Ellsworth, “Canada Sanctions Haiti Ex-President , June 3, 2008; Harold Isaac and Brian Ellsworth, “Canada Sanctions Haiti Ex-President
Martelly for Financing Gangs,” Reuters, November 20, 2022. Martelly for Financing Gangs,” Reuters, November 20, 2022.
2524 Alberto Arce and Rodrigo Abd, “In Haiti, the Difficult Relationship of Gangs and Business,” Associated Press, Alberto Arce and Rodrigo Abd, “In Haiti, the Difficult Relationship of Gangs and Business,” Associated Press,
October 21, 2021. October 21, 2021.
2625 Government of Canada, “Canada Imposes Sanctions Against Haitian Economic Elites,” December 5, 2022. Government of Canada, “Canada Imposes Sanctions Against Haitian Economic Elites,” December 5, 2022.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

5 5

link to page 13 link to page 13

Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

Figure 2. Criminal Dynamics in Haiti

Source: CRS, based on a graphic from CRS, based on a graphic from InSight Crime used in U.S. Agency for International Development, used in U.S. Agency for International Development, Mapping
Haiti’s Criminal Dynamics: Conclusions and Recommendations Brief, November 2021, at https://pdf.usaid.gov/, November 2021, at https://pdf.usaid.gov/
pdf_docs/PA00ZF3H.pdf. pdf_docs/PA00ZF3H.pdf.
Since Moïse’s assassination, state authority has collapsed in parts of Port-au-Prince and Since Moïse’s assassination, state authority has collapsed in parts of Port-au-Prince and
surrounding areas. Armed gangs control parts of the city and other urban areas, as well as major surrounding areas. Armed gangs control parts of the city and other urban areas, as well as major
highways. These gangs are often better armed than the national police.highways. These gangs are often better armed than the national police.2726 Protests and gang-led Protests and gang-led
violence erupted following a September 2022 announcement by de facto Prime Minister Henry violence erupted following a September 2022 announcement by de facto Prime Minister Henry
that fuel subsidies would end. After gangs took over a major port and the country’s main fuel that fuel subsidies would end. After gangs took over a major port and the country’s main fuel
terminal, the economy temporarily ground to a halt and humanitarian agencies lost access to some terminal, the economy temporarily ground to a halt and humanitarian agencies lost access to some
areas. In early October 2022, Henry and his advisors requested an international force to help quell areas. In early October 2022, Henry and his advisors requested an international force to help quell
the security situation and allow humanitarian aid to flow as an outbreak of cholera surged; the security situation and allow humanitarian aid to flow as an outbreak of cholera surged;
~~possible~~ responses to that request remain pending (see responses to that request remain pending (see “Multinational Force Consideration,”
~~below).28~~below).27
The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that there are at The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that there are at
least 300 criminal groups operating in Haiti.least 300 criminal groups operating in Haiti.2928 In 2022, homicides increased by 35.2% compared In 2022, homicides increased by 35.2% compared
with 2021 as gangs, such as G9 and Family (G9) and G-PEP, vied for control of territory.with 2021 as gangs, such as G9 and Family (G9) and G-PEP, vied for control of territory.3029 More More
than 2,094 reported homicides occurred between January 2023 and June 2023, 68% more than the than 2,094 reported homicides occurred between January 2023 and June 2023, 68% more than the
last half of 2022.last half of 2022.3130 In 2022, kidnappings increased by 104.7% compared with 2021. Kidnappings In 2022, kidnappings increased by 104.7% compared with 2021. Kidnappings
escalated further during the first half of 2023, as gangs sought to find new revenue amid escalated further during the first half of 2023, as gangs sought to find new revenue amid
diminished support from elites fearful of being designated for U.S. and Canadian sanctions.diminished support from elites fearful of being designated for U.S. and Canadian sanctions.32

2731 Gang attacks on government personnel and critical infrastructure have increased as they have grown more autonomous. 26 Jon Lee Anderson, “A Land Held Hostage,” Jon Lee Anderson, “A Land Held Hostage,” The New Yorker, July 24, 2023. , July 24, 2023.
2827 Catherine Osborn, “Haiti’s Crisis Escalates,” Catherine Osborn, “Haiti’s Crisis Escalates,” Foreign Policy, October 14, 2022. , October 14, 2022.
2928 Haiti: Humanitarian Response Plan 2023 at a Glance,” Relief Web, April 13, 2023. Haiti: Humanitarian Response Plan 2023 at a Glance,” Relief Web, April 13, 2023.
3029 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary-General, January 17, 2023; and Scott Mistler-Ferguson, “G9 , January 17, 2023; and Scott Mistler-Ferguson, “G9
vs. G-PEP – The Two Gang Alliances Tearing Haiti Apart,” vs. G-PEP – The Two Gang Alliances Tearing Haiti Apart,” InSight Crime, July 21, 2022. , July 21, 2022.
3130 Ibid; “Haiti: International Support Needed Now to Stop Spiraling Gang Violence,” Ibid; “Haiti: International Support Needed Now to Stop Spiraling Gang Violence,” UN News, May 9, 2023. , May 9, 2023.
3231 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, January 17, 2023; U.N. Security Council, BINUH, , January 17, 2023; U.N. Security Council, BINUH,
Report of the Secretary General, July 3, 2023; Reuters, “Haiti Rights Group Records Three-Fold Rise in Kidnappings , July 3, 2023; Reuters, “Haiti Rights Group Records Three-Fold Rise in Kidnappings
for Early 2023,” April 4, 2023. for Early 2023,” April 4, 2023.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

6 6

link to page link to page 2021 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

~~Gang attacks on government personnel and critical infrastructure have increased as they have~~
~~grown more autonomous.~~
According to U.N. reports, gangs have used “collective rape” and other gender-based violence According to U.N. reports, gangs have used “collective rape” and other gender-based violence
against women, children as young as 10, and the elderly to intimidate people against women, children as young as 10, and the elderly to intimidate people 33
32 . From January . From January
2023 to March 2023, at least 652 women and girls were victims of collective rape. Gender-based 2023 to March 2023, at least 652 women and girls were victims of collective rape. Gender-based
and sexual violence is more prevalent in zones contested by warring gangs in which many and sexual violence is more prevalent in zones contested by warring gangs in which many
inhabitants lack access to basic health, education, and social services. inhabitants lack access to basic health, education, and social services.
The U.N. Secretary-General described the police in 2022 as “spread thin” and lacking weapons, The U.N. Secretary-General described the police in 2022 as “spread thin” and lacking weapons,
equipment, and capacity.equipment, and capacity.3433 Some studies also indicate the HNP has struggled with widespread Some studies also indicate the HNP has struggled with widespread
criminal cooptation. A July 2022 International Crisis Group study estimated that 40% of HNP criminal cooptation. A July 2022 International Crisis Group study estimated that 40% of HNP
officers have ties to gangs.officers have ties to gangs.3534 Corruption, combined with the HNP and Haitian Coast Guard’s lack Corruption, combined with the HNP and Haitian Coast Guard’s lack
of control over the country’s ports and borders, have made Haiti a hub for drug and arms of control over the country’s ports and borders, have made Haiti a hub for drug and arms
trafficking and worsened gang violence (trafficking and worsened gang violence (~~See~~ see “Weapons and Drug Trafficking”). Low pay and ). Low pay and
poor working conditions have increased attrition among the 10,000 or so HNP officers available poor working conditions have increased attrition among the 10,000 or so HNP officers available
to perform police duties.to perform police duties.3635 When police have sought to confront gangs, confrontations have often When police have sought to confront gangs, confrontations have often
proven deadly. In November 2022, criminals assassinated the director of the HNP’s training proven deadly. In November 2022, criminals assassinated the director of the HNP’s training
center at the center. In May 2023, a police officer died as gangs set two Canadian-provided center at the center. In May 2023, a police officer died as gangs set two Canadian-provided
armored vehicles on fire. armored vehicles on fire.
Impunity prevails in Haiti’s weak justice system. In addition to failing to resolve Moïse’s Impunity prevails in Haiti’s weak justice system. In addition to failing to resolve Moïse’s
assassination, Haitian authorities have yet to arrest Jimmy Chérizier, a former HNP officer turned assassination, Haitian authorities have yet to arrest Jimmy Chérizier, a former HNP officer turned
gang leader who was linked to Moïse, or other Haitian officials implicated in the 2018 La Saline gang leader who was linked to Moïse, or other Haitian officials implicated in the 2018 La Saline
massacre of 71 people.massacre of 71 people.3736 Gangs overtook several of Haiti’s main courthouses in summer 2022, Gangs overtook several of Haiti’s main courthouses in summer 2022,
and many of the courthouses remain inoperable. Without functioning courts, Haitian prisons and many of the courthouses remain inoperable. Without functioning courts, Haitian prisons
continue to hold inmates, 85% of whom were in pretrial detention in June 2023; prisons have a continue to hold inmates, 85% of whom were in pretrial detention in June 2023; prisons have a
332% cell occupancy rate.332% cell occupancy rate.3837 Many inmates lack access to food, water, and medical care. Many inmates lack access to food, water, and medical care.
The rampant violence in Haiti has left many Haitians hopeless and frustrated. Since April 2023, The rampant violence in Haiti has left many Haitians hopeless and frustrated. Since April 2023,
Haiti has experienced a rise in antigang vigilantism—the Haiti has experienced a rise in antigang vigilantism—the Bwa Kale movement. movement.3938 On April 24, On April 24,
Port-au-Prince residents confronted, lynched, and burned 10 alleged gang members. The Port-au-Prince residents confronted, lynched, and burned 10 alleged gang members. The
movement is now in all 10 administrative departments (states) of Haiti, with at least 224 people movement is now in all 10 administrative departments (states) of Haiti, with at least 224 people
killed from April-June 2023.killed from April-June 2023.4039

3332 This draws from BINUH and Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), This draws from BINUH and Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Sexual Violence
in Port-au-Prince: A Weapon Used by Gangs to Instill Fear, October 14, 2022; OHCHR and BINUH, , October 14, 2022; OHCHR and BINUH, Human Rights
Situation, Quarterly Report: January-March 2023; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, ; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Gang
Control and Security Vacuums: Assessing Gender-Based Violence in Cité Soleil, May 2023 Human Rights Watch, , May 2023 Human Rights Watch,
“Living a Nightmare,” August 14, 2023. “Living a Nightmare,” August 14, 2023.
3433 Security Council, S/2022/747. Security Council, S/2022/747.
3534 International Crisis Group, International Crisis Group, New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists, July 27, 2022. , July 27, 2022.
3635 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, July 3, 2023. , July 3, 2023.
3736 Chérizier, then-Minister of the Interior Fednel Monchery, and President Moïse’s Departmental Delegate Joseph Chérizier, then-Minister of the Interior Fednel Monchery, and President Moïse’s Departmental Delegate Joseph
Pierre Richard Duplan allegedly planned an attack carried out by gangs on protesters who had criticized the Pierre Richard Duplan allegedly planned an attack carried out by gangs on protesters who had criticized the
government. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International government. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International
Human Rights Day,” December 10, 2020. Human Rights Day,” December 10, 2020.
3837 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary-General, July 3, 2023; Widlore Mérancourt and Amanda , July 3, 2023; Widlore Mérancourt and Amanda
Coletta, “He Was Sentenced to a Year in Prison. He Had Been Held More Than Nine,” Coletta, “He Was Sentenced to a Year in Prison. He Had Been Held More Than Nine,” Washington Post, August 11, , August 11,
2023. 2023.
3938 Reuters, “Haitian Residents Lynch and Set Fire to Suspected Gang Members,” April 26, 2023. Reuters, “Haitian Residents Lynch and Set Fire to Suspected Gang Members,” April 26, 2023.
4039 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, July 3, 2023. , July 3, 2023.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

7 7

Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

Humanitarian Situation
Haiti is a fragile country that is highly vulnerable to natural disasters due to its location and Haiti is a fragile country that is highly vulnerable to natural disasters due to its location and
topography (exacerbated by deforestation and climate change), and the Haitian government’s topography (exacerbated by deforestation and climate change), and the Haitian government’s
capacity to respond to such disasters is limited. A decade after the devastating 2010 earthquake, capacity to respond to such disasters is limited. A decade after the devastating 2010 earthquake,
inadequate recovery efforts, combined with subsequent natural disasters (e.g., Hurricane inadequate recovery efforts, combined with subsequent natural disasters (e.g., Hurricane
Matthew, a 2021 earthquake) and disease outbreaks (e.g., cholera, Coronavirus Disease 2019 Matthew, a 2021 earthquake) and disease outbreaks (e.g., cholera, Coronavirus Disease 2019
[COVID-19]), have further weakened the state’s ability to protect and provide for its citizens.[COVID-19]), have further weakened the state’s ability to protect and provide for its citizens.4140
Flooding in June 2023 resulted in more than 40 deaths and left some 13,000 Haitians homeless.Flooding in June 2023 resulted in more than 40 deaths and left some 13,000 Haitians homeless.4241
The Fund for Peace’s 2022 Fragile States Index ranked Haiti as the 11th most fragile state in the The Fund for Peace’s 2022 Fragile States Index ranked Haiti as the 11th most fragile state in the
world due to various factors, including the state’s lack of legitimacy and inability to deliver world due to various factors, including the state’s lack of legitimacy and inability to deliver
services, uneven economic development, and relatively low levels of social cohesion.services, uneven economic development, and relatively low levels of social cohesion.4342
In contrast to some previous humanitarian crises Haiti has endured, the political and security In contrast to some previous humanitarian crises Haiti has endured, the political and security
situation is the primary driver of the current humanitarian emergency.situation is the primary driver of the current humanitarian emergency.4443 According to U.N. According to U.N.
officials, as of June 2023, gang violence had displaced at least 195,000 people.officials, as of June 2023, gang violence had displaced at least 195,000 people.4544 Gang blockades Gang blockades
of highways have limited humanitarian access, particularly to the southern peninsula but also to of highways have limited humanitarian access, particularly to the southern peninsula but also to
communities to the east and north of the capital. The G9 gang’s blockade of the Varreux fuel communities to the east and north of the capital. The G9 gang’s blockade of the Varreux fuel
terminal from mid-September to early November 2022, combined with broad unrest, caused terminal from mid-September to early November 2022, combined with broad unrest, caused
businesses and hospitals to close. During that period, Haitians, fearful of encountering gang businesses and hospitals to close. During that period, Haitians, fearful of encountering gang
violence, sheltered in place amid a lack of water and sanitation services, fuel, electricity, and violence, sheltered in place amid a lack of water and sanitation services, fuel, electricity, and
food. The U.N. OCHA estimates that 5.2 million Haitians are in need of humanitarian aid.food. The U.N. OCHA estimates that 5.2 million Haitians are in need of humanitarian aid.46
45 Conditions in Haiti could deteriorate further if the Dominican Republic keeps its borders with Haiti closed.46 The closures began in mid-September 2023 in response to a border water dispute. Ongoing humanitarian concerns include food insecurity and inadequate access to health care, Ongoing humanitarian concerns include food insecurity and inadequate access to health care,
protection, and education. In October 2022, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization protection, and education. In October 2022, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization
estimated that a record 4.7 million Haitians, roughly 50% of the population, faced acute levels of estimated that a record 4.7 million Haitians, roughly 50% of the population, faced acute levels of
hunger.47 In October 2022, cholera resurfaced in Haiti, and as of mid-April 2023 it had claimed hunger.47 In October 2022, cholera resurfaced in Haiti, and as of mid-April 2023 it had claimed
686 lives.48 While cholera is preventable through vaccination and treatable with rehydration, 686 lives.48 While cholera is preventable through vaccination and treatable with rehydration,
gangs have reportedly prevented patient access to health facilities and denied medical staff entry gangs have reportedly prevented patient access to health facilities and denied medical staff entry
to affected communities. In March 2023, the U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) reported to affected communities. In March 2023, the U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) reported
~~that 21 health facilities had temporarily shut down or reduced their activities due to violence.49~~
~~Children in Haiti are extremely vulnerable to protection concerns, particularly gender-based~~

41 40 On recovery and reconstruction, see Jonathan Katz, On recovery and reconstruction, see Jonathan Katz, The Big Truck That Went by: How the World Came to Save Haiti
and Left Behind a Disaster (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2014); Government Accountability Office (GAO), (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2014); Government Accountability Office (GAO),
Haiti: USAID and State Should Improve Management and Assessment of Reconstruction Activities, GAO-23-105211, GAO-23-105211,
March 2023. Hereinafter: GAO, March 2023. On subsequent disasters, see Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path.” March 2023. Hereinafter: GAO, March 2023. On subsequent disasters, see Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path.”
4241 Jacqueline Charles, “At Least 42 Dead, Thousands Homeless in Haiti After a Weekend of Heavy Rains, Flooding,” Jacqueline Charles, “At Least 42 Dead, Thousands Homeless in Haiti After a Weekend of Heavy Rains, Flooding,”
Miami Herald, June 5, 2023. , June 5, 2023.
4342 The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, at https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/. The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, at https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/.
4443 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Seven Things to Know About the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Seven Things to Know About the
Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti,” October 26, 2022. Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti,” October 26, 2022.
4544 International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Haiti Emergency Response: Situation Report,” June 2023. International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Haiti Emergency Response: Situation Report,” June 2023.
4645 UNOCHA, UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2023, December 2022. , December 2022.
46 “Dominican Republic Closes all Borders with Haiti in Escalation of Diplomatic Crisis,” PBS, September 15, 2023. 47 U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “Catastrophic Hunger Levels Recorded for 47 U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “Catastrophic Hunger Levels Recorded for
the First Time in Haiti,” October 14, 2022. the First Time in Haiti,” October 14, 2022.
48 Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), “Cholera Epidemic in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,” May 19, 48 Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), “Cholera Epidemic in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,” May 19,
2023. 2023.
~~49 OHCHR and BINUH, Human Rights Situation, Main Trends, Quarterly Report: January-March 2023, March 8,~~
~~2023; Reuters, “Medecins Sans Frontieres Shuts Haiti Hospital amid Gang Violence,” March 8, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

8

~~Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy~~

Congressional Research Service 8 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy that 21 health facilities had temporarily shut down or reduced their activities due to violence.49 Children in Haiti are extremely vulnerable to protection concerns, particularly gender-based violence. They have also lost years of schooling due to COVID-19; insecurity and cholera-related violence. They have also lost years of schooling due to COVID-19; insecurity and cholera-related
school closures; and, most recently, armed attacks on schools.50 school closures; and, most recently, armed attacks on schools.50
U.N. Presence in Haiti and Recent Action
The U.N. has had a continuous presence in Haiti for almost 19 years, with diplomatic and The U.N. has had a continuous presence in Haiti for almost 19 years, with diplomatic and
financial support provided by successive U.S. presidential administrations. Following the collapse financial support provided by successive U.S. presidential administrations. Following the collapse
of the Aristide government in 2004, the U.N. Security Council established MINUSTAH to help of the Aristide government in 2004, the U.N. Security Council established MINUSTAH to help
restore order and train the HNP.51 After the 2010 earthquake, the Security Council expanded restore order and train the HNP.51 After the 2010 earthquake, the Security Council expanded
MINUSTAH’s size and mission. MINUSTAH’s size and mission.
A Security Council resolution ended MINUSTAH in 2017, citing Haiti’s peaceful completion of a A Security Council resolution ended MINUSTAH in 2017, citing Haiti’s peaceful completion of a
long-delayed electoral process in February 2017 as a milestone.52 The Security Council also long-delayed electoral process in February 2017 as a milestone.52 The Security Council also
praised MINUSTAH for supporting the political process, professionalizing the police, and praised MINUSTAH for supporting the political process, professionalizing the police, and
improving security and stability in Haiti, achievements that proved short-lived. Haitian and improving security and stability in Haiti, achievements that proved short-lived. Haitian and
international human rights and health experts criticized MINUSTAH for its role in introducing international human rights and health experts criticized MINUSTAH for its role in introducing
cholera to Haiti (a disease that had not been present in the country for more than a century) and cholera to Haiti (a disease that had not been present in the country for more than a century) and
for allegations of sexual abuse by some of its forces.53 In 2016, then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-for allegations of sexual abuse by some of its forces.53 In 2016, then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-
Moon apologized for the U.N.’s role in a cholera outbreak that ultimately caused nearly 10,000 Moon apologized for the U.N.’s role in a cholera outbreak that ultimately caused nearly 10,000
deaths; the U.N. also launched a $400 million fund to confront the epidemic.54 deaths; the U.N. also launched a $400 million fund to confront the epidemic.54
In 2017, the U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) succeeded MINUSTAH, In 2017, the U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) succeeded MINUSTAH,
focusing on strengthening judicial institutions, protecting human rights, increasing the focusing on strengthening judicial institutions, protecting human rights, increasing the
professionalism of the HNP, and reinforcing the rule of law. The mission also supported violence-professionalism of the HNP, and reinforcing the rule of law. The mission also supported violence-
reduction projects and income-generating activities for youth. During MINJUSTH’s mandate, the reduction projects and income-generating activities for youth. During MINJUSTH’s mandate, the
number of HNP officers increased by 10% to 15,400 and courts reported a 300% increase in files number of HNP officers increased by 10% to 15,400 and courts reported a 300% increase in files
~~processed on the day of their reception.55 However, Haitians continued to report increased sexual~~
~~violence.56~~
~~In October 2019, the U.N. transitioned to a political office, the U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti~~
~~(BINUH), for an initial one-year period that the U.N. Security Council twice extended. BINUH’s~~

49 OHCHR and BINUH, Human Rights Situation, Main Trends, Quarterly Report: January-March 2023, March 8, 2023; Reuters, “Medecins Sans Frontieres Shuts Haiti Hospital amid Gang Violence,” March 8, 2023. 50 U.N. Children’s Fund, “Haiti: Armed Violence Against Schools Increases Nine-Fold in One Year,” February 9, 50 U.N. Children’s Fund, “Haiti: Armed Violence Against Schools Increases Nine-Fold in One Year,” February 9,
2023. 2023.
51 U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 1542 (2004)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 4961st Meeting, on 30 April 51 U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 1542 (2004)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 4961st Meeting, on 30 April
2004,” S/RES/1542 (2004), June 1, 2004. MINUSTAH’s original mission aimed to restore security and stability, 2004,” S/RES/1542 (2004), June 1, 2004. MINUSTAH’s original mission aimed to restore security and stability,
promote political processes (including elections), strengthen institutions and rule-of-law-structures, and promote and promote political processes (including elections), strengthen institutions and rule-of-law-structures, and promote and
protect human rights. protect human rights.
52 U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 2350 (2017)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 7924th Meeting, on 13 April 52 U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 2350 (2017)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 7924th Meeting, on 13 April
2017,” S/RES/2350 (2017), April 13, 2017. Critics argue, however, that a transitional government, not the U.N.-backed 2017,” S/RES/2350 (2017), April 13, 2017. Critics argue, however, that a transitional government, not the U.N.-backed
PHTK government, accomplished that goal. Even with MINUSTAH present, Haiti experienced a constitutional crisis PHTK government, accomplished that goal. Even with MINUSTAH present, Haiti experienced a constitutional crisis
after Michel Martelly failed to convene elections to choose his successor. Georges Fauriol, ‘A Cycle of Instability’: after Michel Martelly failed to convene elections to choose his successor. Georges Fauriol, ‘A Cycle of Instability’:
Haiti’s Constitutional Crisis,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 8, 2021. Haiti’s Constitutional Crisis,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 8, 2021.
53 For background, see CRS In Focus IF10502, 53 For background, see CRS In Focus IF10502, Haiti: Cholera, the United Nations, and Hurricane Matthew, by , by
Maureen Taft-Morales and Tiaji Salaam-Blyther. Maureen Taft-Morales and Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.
54 U.N. News, “U.N.’s Ban Apologizes to People of Haiti, Outlines New Plan to Fight Cholera Epidemic and Help 54 U.N. News, “U.N.’s Ban Apologizes to People of Haiti, Outlines New Plan to Fight Cholera Epidemic and Help
Communities,” December 1, 2016. By the end of 2021, donors had contributed only $21.8 million to support the Communities,” December 1, 2016. By the end of 2021, donors had contributed only $21.8 million to support the
pledged $400 million fund. See U.N. Haiti Cholera Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund, pledged $400 million fund. See U.N. Haiti Cholera Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund, 2021 Annual Report. .
~~55 U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, “MINUJUSTH Completes Its Mandate, Putting an End to 15 Consecutive~~
~~Years of Peacekeeping in Haiti,” October 16, 2019.~~
~~56 International Justice Resource Center, “U.N. Transitions from Peacekeeping to Governance, Amid Crisis in Haiti,”~~
~~October 17, 2019.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

9

~~Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy~~

Congressional Research Service 9 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy processed on the day of their reception.55 However, Haitians continued to report increased sexual violence.56 In October 2019, the U.N. transitioned to a political office, the U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), for an initial one-year period that the U.N. Security Council twice extended. BINUH’s mandate, which currently runs through July 2024,57 is to advise the Haitian government on how to mandate, which currently runs through July 2024,57 is to advise the Haitian government on how to
establish an inclusive national dialogue on reestablishing stability, security, and the rule of law so establish an inclusive national dialogue on reestablishing stability, security, and the rule of law so
elections can be held, among other aims. The mission also emphasizes protecting and promoting elections can be held, among other aims. The mission also emphasizes protecting and promoting
human rights, including by documenting recent gender-based violence by gangs and producing human rights, including by documenting recent gender-based violence by gangs and producing
reports from Haiti for the U.N. Secretary-General and Security Council.58 BINUH coordinates reports from Haiti for the U.N. Secretary-General and Security Council.58 BINUH coordinates
with other U.N. agencies, funds, and programs, ranging from humanitarian agencies such as the with other U.N. agencies, funds, and programs, ranging from humanitarian agencies such as the
World Food Program to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime. World Food Program to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime.
Sanctions Resolution
On October 17, 2022, the Security Council discussed a resolution sponsored by the United States On October 17, 2022, the Security Council discussed a resolution sponsored by the United States
and Mexico to establish a U.N. sanctions regime against gang leaders in Haiti and those who and Mexico to establish a U.N. sanctions regime against gang leaders in Haiti and those who
finance them. The Security Council unanimously approved the sanctions resolution (Resolution finance them. The Security Council unanimously approved the sanctions resolution (Resolution
2653) on October 21, 2022; an expert committee is guiding its implementation.59 2653) on October 21, 2022; an expert committee is guiding its implementation.59
Multinational Force Consideration
On October 6, 2022, de facto Prime Minister Henry and his ministers requested the deployment On October 6, 2022, de facto Prime Minister Henry and his ministers requested the deployment
of an international force to help Haitian forces quell the security situation and allow humanitarian of an international force to help Haitian forces quell the security situation and allow humanitarian
aid to flow. On October 8, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres sent a letter to the Security aid to flow. On October 8, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres sent a letter to the Security
Council recommending various approaches to respond to that request. Such approaches included Council recommending various approaches to respond to that request. Such approaches included
deploying a non-U.N. rapid action force (probably composed of some military forces) to support deploying a non-U.N. rapid action force (probably composed of some military forces) to support
the HNP, forming a multinational police task force, creating a multinational antigang force, the HNP, forming a multinational police task force, creating a multinational antigang force,
expanding BINUH’s budget and mandate, bolstering the HNP and the justice sector, and expanding BINUH’s budget and mandate, bolstering the HNP and the justice sector, and
combating arms trafficking.60 On October 17, 2022, the Security Council discussed a proposed combating arms trafficking.60 On October 17, 2022, the Security Council discussed a proposed
resolution by the United States and Mexico, which reportedly would have authorized the resolution by the United States and Mexico, which reportedly would have authorized the
deployment of a non-U.N. multinational force to Haiti.61 From October 2022 through mid-2023, deployment of a non-U.N. multinational force to Haiti.61 From October 2022 through mid-2023,
few countries publicly offered to send their forces to Haiti and many countries, including Canada, few countries publicly offered to send their forces to Haiti and many countries, including Canada,
declined U.S. requests to lead such a force. declined U.S. requests to lead such a force.
In July 2023, Kenya announced its willingness to “positively consider” leading a multinational In July 2023, Kenya announced its willingness to “positively consider” leading a multinational
force in Haiti and sending 1,000 police to support the HNP if authorized by the Security force in Haiti and sending 1,000 police to support the HNP if authorized by the Security
Council.62 Once announced, the State Department and CARICOM praised Kenya’s disposition Council.62 Once announced, the State Department and CARICOM praised Kenya’s disposition
~~even as some questioned the human rights record of the Kenyan police.63 Other countries that~~
~~have considered contributing troops to a mission to Haiti include the Bahamas, Jamaica, and~~
~~Rwanda.64 Such a mission would likely require many more contributors as well as significant~~

55 U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, “MINUJUSTH Completes Its Mandate, Putting an End to 15 Consecutive Years of Peacekeeping in Haiti,” October 16, 2019. 56 International Justice Resource Center, “U.N. Transitions from Peacekeeping to Governance, Amid Crisis in Haiti,” October 17, 2019. 57 For background, see BINUH, “Mandate,” at https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/mandate. 57 For background, see BINUH, “Mandate,” at https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/mandate.
58 BINUH and OHCHR, 58 BINUH and OHCHR, Sexual Violence.
59 Security Council, “Resolution 2692 (2023),59 Security Council, “Resolution 2692 (2023),” July 14, 2023. July 14, 2023.
60 Security Council, S/2022/747. 60 Security Council, S/2022/747.
61 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a U.N. Security 61 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a U.N. Security
Council Briefing on Haiti,” October 17, 2022. Security Council Report, “Haiti: Briefing,” in Council Briefing on Haiti,” October 17, 2022. Security Council Report, “Haiti: Briefing,” in What’s in Blue (blog), (blog),
December 21, 2022 (hereinafter Security Council Report, “Haiti”). December 21, 2022 (hereinafter Security Council Report, “Haiti”).
62 Reuters, “Kenya Ready to Lead Multinational Force to Haiti,” July 29, 2023. 62 Reuters, “Kenya Ready to Lead Multinational Force to Haiti,” July 29, 2023.
~~63 U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Kenya Considering Leading a~~
~~Multinational Force in Haiti,” August 1, 2023; CARICOM, “Statement on Multi-national Force to Support Haiti,”~~
~~August 4, 2023; Luke Taylor, “Kenya’s Offer to Send Police to Haiti Sparks Human Rights Concerns,” The Guardian,~~
~~August 5, 2023; Human Rights Watch, Kenya: End Abusive Policing of Protests, May 31, 2023.~~
~~64 “Antigua Considers Role as Ja Confirms Plan to Send Troops to Haiti,” The Gleaner, August 4, 2023; “Rwanda~~
~~Willing to Support Multilateral Force Requested by Haiti,” Prensa Latina, July 6, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

10

~~Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy~~

~~training, equipment, and logistical support from the United States, Canada, and others.~~ Congressional Research Service 10 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy even as some questioned the human rights record of the Kenyan police.63 Other countries that have considered contributing troops to a mission to Haiti include the Bahamas, Antigua and Barbuda, and Jamaica.64 Kenya deployed an assessment mission accompanied by U.S. officials to Haiti in August and is discussing the scope and mission of a “multinational security support mission” with the Security Council, donors, Haitian officials, and other stakeholders.65 The United States and Ecuador plan to present a U.N. Security Council resolution to support a Kenyan-led multinational force in Haiti financed by voluntary contributions as soon as possible.66 Such a mission would likely require many more troop contributing countries, which U.S. officials have predicted will come forward after a favorable Security Council vote, as well as significant training, equipment, and logistical support from the United States, Canada, and others.67 In his In his
August 15 letter to the Security Council, the Secretary-General reportedly said that the mission August 15 letter to the Security Council, the Secretary-General reportedly said that the mission
should focus on disarming the gangs, securing key installations and highways, and reasserting should focus on disarming the gangs, securing key installations and highways, and reasserting
state presence to enable basic services to reach the population.state presence to enable basic services to reach the population.6568 He also asserted that “the robust He also asserted that “the robust
use of force by a specialized multinational police force,” likely supported by military assets, is use of force by a specialized multinational police force,” likely supported by military assets, is
neededneeded to help the HNP reestablish law and order. He reportedly outlined how the U.N. could help the HNP reestablish law and order. He reportedly outlined how the U.N. could
provide logistical support to the multinational force and the HNP, while also expanding and provide logistical support to the multinational force and the HNP, while also expanding and
strengthening BINUH to facilitate a political accord and train the police, among other tasks. strengthening BINUH to facilitate a political accord and train the police, among other tasks.
~~The United States and Ecuador plan to present a U.N. Security Council resolution to support a~~
~~Kenyan-led multinational force in Haiti financed by voluntary contributions.66 Kenya expects to~~
~~deploy an assessment mission accompanied by U.S. officials to Haiti in the coming weeks.67~~Any units or participants in a mission to Haiti (whether police or military troops) would be subject to U.N. vetting, while those receiving U.S. support would be subject to U.S. Leahy vetting (22 U.S.C. §2378d and 10 USC §362). Kenyan officials have said that the soonest they could arrive in Haiti would likely be three months after a Security Council vote.69
U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress
Biden Administration policy goals in Haiti include supporting Haitian-led efforts to confront Biden Administration policy goals in Haiti include supporting Haitian-led efforts to confront
gangs and insecurity; resolve the political and constitutional crisis; revive the economy; and gangs and insecurity; resolve the political and constitutional crisis; revive the economy; and
address poverty and a lack of access to health care, education, and other basic services.address poverty and a lack of access to health care, education, and other basic services.6870 Since Since
Moïse’s assassination, U.S., Canadian, and U.N. officials—among others criticized for past Moïse’s assassination, U.S., Canadian, and U.N. officials—among others criticized for past
interventions in the country—have emphasized their support for “Haitian-led solutions” to the interventions in the country—have emphasized their support for “Haitian-led solutions” to the
country’s challenges. In March 2023, the Biden Administration issued a 10-year plan for Haiti, as country’s challenges. In March 2023, the Biden Administration issued a 10-year plan for Haiti, as
mandated by the Global Fragility Act (GFA; P.L. 116-94), with a long-term, interagency goal of mandated by the Global Fragility Act (GFA; P.L. 116-94), with a long-term, interagency goal of
~~helping the government and citizenry of Haiti work together to develop a shared vision and plan~~
~~to achieve long-term stability.69~~
~~U.S. officials have pursued several courses of action to advance those goals. Secretary of State~~
~~Antony Blinken and other top U.S. officials have stressed the increasing urgency of reaching a~~
~~political consensus on how to reestablish constitutional order to de facto Prime Minister Henry~~
~~and other key stakeholders.70 The U.S. government has sanctioned corrupt officials and~~
~~encouraged other countries to do so, supported efforts to facilitate dialogue by CARICOM and~~
~~others, expanded support for the HNP, and sought a partner country to lead a non-U.N.~~
~~“multinational force” to help stabilize the country.71 U.S. officials have pledged to provide~~
~~significant funding, equipment, and logistical support to any multinational force deployed to Haiti~~
~~that would expand on U.S. assistance to the HNP.72~~
~~On many U.S. policy issues regarding Haiti, Congress has had a direct role in shaping policy or~~
~~conducting oversight of policy development and implementation. Those policy issues include, but~~

65 63 U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Kenya Considering Leading a Multinational Force in Haiti,” August 1, 2023; CARICOM, “Statement on Multi-national Force to Support Haiti,” August 4, 2023; Luke Taylor, “Kenya’s Offer to Send Police to Haiti Sparks Human Rights Concerns,” The Guardian, August 5, 2023; Human Rights Watch, Kenya: End Abusive Policing of Protests, May 31, 2023. 64 “Antigua Considers Role as Ja Confirms Plan to Send Troops to Haiti,” The Gleaner, August 4, 2023. 65 CRS phone interview with State Department officials, September 13, 2023. 66 Michael Wilner, “U.S. Official says U.N. Resolution on Haiti is Urgent: ‘We are Moving as Fast as we can,’” Miami Herald, September 13, 2023. 67 Woodrow Wilson Center, “Two Years After Moïse Assassination: The Impact of Gang Violence in Haiti,” September 13, 2023, available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/two-years-after-moise-assassination-impact-gang-violence-haiti. 68 Jacqueline Charles, “U.N. Leader Calls for Range of Options to Combat Haiti Gangs,” Jacqueline Charles, “U.N. Leader Calls for Range of Options to Combat Haiti Gangs,” Miami Herald,, August 15, August 15,
2023; Edith M. Lederer, “UN Chief Urges Deployment of Police Special Forces and Military Support to Combat Gangs 2023; Edith M. Lederer, “UN Chief Urges Deployment of Police Special Forces and Military Support to Combat Gangs
in Haiti,” Associated Press, August 15, 2023. in Haiti,” Associated Press, August 15, 2023.
~~66 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield at a Press Conference on the~~
~~August Planned Program of Work and the U.S. Presidency of the UN Security Council,” August 1, 2023.~~
~~67 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” August 14, 2023.~~
6869 CRS phone interview with State Department officials, September 13, 2023. 70 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Haiti, approved March 18, 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-, approved March 18, 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/04/ICS_WHA_Haiti_Public.pdf. content/uploads/2022/04/ICS_WHA_Haiti_Public.pdf.
~~69 U.S. Department of State,~~ ~~The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for~~
~~Haiti,~~ ~~March 24, 2023.~~
~~70 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Haitian Prime Minister Henry,” July 5, 2023.~~
~~71 Adams, “U.S. and Canada Turn to Sanctions”; International Crisis Group,~~ ~~Haiti’s Last Resort: Gangs and the~~
~~Prospect for Foreign Intervention, Briefing No. 48, December 14, 2022.~~
~~72 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” August 14, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

11

~~link to page 17~~ ~~Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy~~

Congressional Research Service 11 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy helping the government and citizenry of Haiti work together to develop a shared vision and plan to achieve long-term stability.71 U.S. officials have pursued several courses of action to advance those goals. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other top U.S. officials have stressed the increasing urgency of reaching a political consensus on how to reestablish constitutional order to de facto Prime Minister Henry and other key stakeholders.72 The U.S. government has sanctioned corrupt officials and encouraged other countries to do so, supported efforts to facilitate dialogue by CARICOM and others, expanded support for the HNP, and sought a partner country to lead a non-U.N. “multinational force” to help stabilize the country.73 U.S. officials have pledged to provide significant funding, equipment, and logistical support to any multinational force deployed to Haiti that would expand on U.S. assistance to the HNP.74 On many U.S. policy issues regarding Haiti, Congress has had a direct role in shaping policy or conducting oversight of policy development and implementation. Those policy issues include, but are not limited to, foreign assistance, trade preferences, sanctions policy, and migration. Should a are not limited to, foreign assistance, trade preferences, sanctions policy, and migration. Should a
multinational force be deployed to Haiti, Congress could engage in oversight or consider multinational force be deployed to Haiti, Congress could engage in oversight or consider
legislative options related to the mission. For example, Congress could provide or withhold legislative options related to the mission. For example, Congress could provide or withhold
funding for such a force and/or seek to ensure that such a force respects human rights and that funding for such a force and/or seek to ensure that such a force respects human rights and that
those who receive U.S. training or equipment are rigorously vetted, as required by U.S. law.those who receive U.S. training or equipment are rigorously vetted, as required by U.S. law.7375
Foreign Assistance
Bilateral Assistance
Congress has appropriated foreign assistance to support Haiti’s recovery from recurrent natural Congress has appropriated foreign assistance to support Haiti’s recovery from recurrent natural
disasters and foster long-term stability. In addition to significantly expanding such assistance in disasters and foster long-term stability. In addition to significantly expanding such assistance in
the aftermath of a massive 2010 earthquake, Congress has closely monitored the implementation the aftermath of a massive 2010 earthquake, Congress has closely monitored the implementation
and impact of U.S. assistance activities.and impact of U.S. assistance activities.7476 Congress also shapes U.S. policy toward Haiti through Congress also shapes U.S. policy toward Haiti through
appropriations, conditions on appropriations, and reporting requirements linked to the obligation appropriations, conditions on appropriations, and reporting requirements linked to the obligation
of U.S. assistance. of U.S. assistance.
Congress enacted the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative Congress enacted the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative
Act (HAITI Act) as part of the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Act (HAITI Act) as part of the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103,
Division V). The HAITI Act stated that U.S. policy should support sustainable rebuilding and Division V). The HAITI Act stated that U.S. policy should support sustainable rebuilding and
development efforts in Haiti that recognize Haitian independence, are led by the people and development efforts in Haiti that recognize Haitian independence, are led by the people and
government of Haiti, and contribute to international efforts to support broad and inclusive government of Haiti, and contribute to international efforts to support broad and inclusive
dialogue to restore democratic institutions and legitimacy in the country.dialogue to restore democratic institutions and legitimacy in the country.~~75 The HAITI Act also~~
~~required U.S. agencies to measure the progress of postdisaster recovery and efforts to address~~
~~corruption, governance, rule of law, and media freedoms in Haiti. The State Department~~
~~submitted the reports required by the act and made them public on November 10, 2022.76~~
~~In addition to the HAITI Act, current and future U.S. programming and budget requests are likely~~
~~to reflect the priorities of the State Department and USAID’s two-year Integrated Country~~
~~Strategy for FY2022-FY2024, adopted in March 2022, and the GFA-mandated~~ 77 The HAITI Act also 71 U.S. Department of State, The U.S. Strategy to
~~Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti, released in March 2023~~
~~(see “Global Fragility Act Implementation”).77~~
~~The FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328), enacted in December 2022, did not~~
~~specify a comprehensive appropriations level for Haiti. The accompanying explanatory statement~~
~~designated $8.5 million for reforestation efforts and “not less than” $5.0 million to help meet the~~
~~sanitary, medical, and nutritional needs of Haitian prisoners. The act required the State~~
~~Department to withhold any aid to support the Haitian government until the Secretary of State~~
~~certifies that a new president and parliament have taken office following free and fair elections or~~

73Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti, March 24, 2023. 72 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Haitian Prime Minister Henry,” July 5, 2023. 73 Adams, “U.S. and Canada Turn to Sanctions”; International Crisis Group, Haiti’s Last Resort: Gangs and the Prospect for Foreign Intervention, Briefing No. 48, December 14, 2022. 74 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” August 14, 2023. 75 CRS In Focus IF10575, CRS In Focus IF10575, Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”), by Michael A. Weber. , by Michael A. Weber.
7476 See, as an example, GAO-23-105211, March 2023. See, as an example, GAO-23-105211, March 2023.
7577 Other elements of U.S. policy cited in the act include building the long-term capacity of the government, civil Other elements of U.S. policy cited in the act include building the long-term capacity of the government, civil
society, and private sector to foster economic development in Haiti; fostering collaboration with the Haitian diaspora society, and private sector to foster economic development in Haiti; fostering collaboration with the Haitian diaspora
and the business community in Haiti; supporting anticorruption, press freedom, and human rights protection, including and the business community in Haiti; supporting anticorruption, press freedom, and human rights protection, including
through the imposition of sanctions; restoring the natural resources of Haiti; promoting political stability and free and through the imposition of sanctions; restoring the natural resources of Haiti; promoting political stability and free and
~~fair elections; providing comprehensive reporting on the goals and progress of the Haitian government and the U.S.~~
~~government; and promoting the participation of Haitian women and youth in U.S. assistance programs.~~
~~76 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Haiti: Reports,” November 10, 2022, at~~
~~https://www.state.gov/haiti-reports/.~~
~~77 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy; and State Department,~~ ~~The~~ (continued...) Congressional Research Service 12 link to page 18 link to page 17 link to page 17 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy required U.S. agencies to measure the progress of postdisaster recovery and efforts to address corruption, governance, rule of law, and media freedoms in Haiti. The State Department submitted the reports required by the act and made them public on November 10, 2022.78 In addition to the HAITI Act, current and future U.S. programming and budget requests are likely to reflect the priorities of the State Department and USAID’s two-year Integrated Country Strategy for FY2022-FY2024, adopted in March 2022, and the GFA-mandated U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and
Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

12

~~link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 16~~ ~~Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy~~

, released in March 2023 (see “Global Fragility Act Implementation”).79 The FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328), enacted in December 2022, did not specify a comprehensive appropriations level for Haiti. The accompanying explanatory statement designated $8.5 million for reforestation efforts and “not less than” $5.0 million to help meet the sanitary, medical, and nutritional needs of Haitian prisoners. The act required the State Department to withhold any aid to support the Haitian government until the Secretary of State certifies that a new president and parliament have taken office following free and fair elections or that a broadly representative transitional government is in place and it is in the U.S. interest to that a broadly representative transitional government is in place and it is in the U.S. interest to
provide such assistance. The withholding requirement does not apply to aid intended to support provide such assistance. The withholding requirement does not apply to aid intended to support
free and fair elections; antigang police and justice administration; disaster relief and recovery; free and fair elections; antigang police and justice administration; disaster relief and recovery;
and education, public health, food security, and other basic human needs. As in prior years, the and education, public health, food security, and other basic human needs. As in prior years, the
act prohibited assistance for the armed forces of Haiti. The explanatory statement accompanying act prohibited assistance for the armed forces of Haiti. The explanatory statement accompanying
P.L. 117-328 urged the Secretary of State to use “every appropriate diplomatic tool to press for P.L. 117-328 urged the Secretary of State to use “every appropriate diplomatic tool to press for
dialogue” among key stakeholders and to take “strong legal action” against those engaged in dialogue” among key stakeholders and to take “strong legal action” against those engaged in
human rights abuses, corruption, and other illicit activities.human rights abuses, corruption, and other illicit activities.7880 The State Department has allocated The State Department has allocated
an estimated $204.9 million in foreign assistance to Haiti for FY2023 (an estimated $204.9 million in foreign assistance to Haiti for FY2023 (seesee Table 1).
~~Over the last six years,~~ U.S. foreign assistance to Haiti has ranged from a low of $U.S. foreign assistance to Haiti has ranged from a low of $~~180.3~~184.6 million in million in
FY2020 to FY2020 to ~~$237.4~~$252.1 million in million in ~~FY2022 (se~~eFY2021 (see Table 1).. The Administration has requested $291.5 The Administration has requested $291.5
million for Haiti in FY2024, with the largest increase in funding requested under the International million for Haiti in FY2024, with the largest increase in funding requested under the International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) foreign assistance account to support the HNP Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) foreign assistance account to support the HNP
and other justice sector actors. This prioritization of restoring security and justice coincides with and other justice sector actors. This prioritization of restoring security and justice coincides with
the phase one activities outlined by the P.L. 116-the phase one activities outlined by the P.L. 116-~~94GFA~~94 GFA strategic plan for Haiti. fair elections; providing comprehensive reporting on the goals and progress of the Haitian government and the U.S. government; and promoting the participation of Haitian women and youth in U.S. assistance programs. 78 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Haiti: Reports,” November 10, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/haiti-reports/. 79 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy; and State Department, The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti. 80 “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Leahy, Chair of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Regarding H.R. 2617, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023,” Congressional Record, vol. 168, no. 198—book II (December 20, 2022), p. S9299. Congressional Research Service 13 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 17 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy ~~strategic plan for Haiti.~~
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Haiti by Account: FY2018-FY2024
(appropriations in thousands of current U.S. dollars) (appropriations in thousands of current U.S. dollars)
FY2023
FY2024
Account
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
(Estimate)
(Request)
DA DA
32,000 32,000
51,000 51,000
51,000 51,000
52,000 52,000
59,000 59,000
46,400 46,400
113,200 113,200
ESF ESF
8,500 8,500
— —
— —
14,800a 20,500b~~14,800a~~
~~20,50~~0b
7,000 7,000
— —
FFP FFP
3,244 3,244
11,719 11,719
7,996 7,996
3,110 3,110
— —
— —
— —
GHP (State) GHP (State)
99,386 99,386
103,011 103,011
78,765 78,765
99,822 99,822
103,081 103,081
102,505 102,505
100,000 100,000
GHP GHP
24,200 24,200
24,500 24,500
24,500 24,500
24,500 24,500
24,500 24,500
30,000 30,000
33,000 33,000
(USAID) (USAID)
INCLE INCLE
12,000 12,000
~~15,000~~
~~18,000~~
~~13,000~~
~~30,300~~
~~19,000~~22.,800c 33,000d 57,600e 33,300f 33,300
45,000 45,000
IMET IMET
233 233
241 241
96 96
255 255
47 47
— —
255 255
FMF FMF
5,000 5,000
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
Total
184,563
~~205~~213,471
~~180~~195,357 252,087a 240,434b~~,357~~
~~207,487a~~
~~237,428b~~
204,905
291,455
Sources: U.S. Department of StateU.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification,Congressional Budget Justification, Supplementary Tables-Foreign Supplementary Tables-Foreign
Operations, FY2020-FY2024 and U.S. Department of State, FY2023 estimate data, August 2023Operations, FY2020-FY2024 and U.S. Department of State, FY2023 estimate data, August 2023; and Email from State Department official, September 13, 2023..
Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; FFP = Food for Peace; GHP = Global DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; FFP = Food for Peace; GHP = Global
Health Programs; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; IMET = International Military Health Programs; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; IMET = International Military
Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing. Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing.
a. This sum includes $14.8 a. This sum includes $14.8 ~~mil ion~~million of ESF appropriated through the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. of ESF appropriated through the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L.
117-2). 117-2).
b. This sum includes $15.0 b. This sum includes $15.0 ~~mil ion~~million of ESF appropriated through the Additional Ukraine Supplemental of ESF appropriated through the Additional Ukraine Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128). Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128).

~~78 “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Leahy, Chair of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Regarding H.R.~~
~~2617, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023,” Congressional Record, vol. 168, no. 198—book II (December 20,~~
~~2022), p. S9299.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

13

~~Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy~~
c. This includes $8 million reprogrammed in FY2021. d. This includes $15 million reprogrammed in FY2021 and FY2022. e. This includes $44.6 million reprogrammed in FY2022. f. This includes $3 million provided through the Global Fragility Act.
Humanitarian Assistance
The United States is the largest humanitarian donor to Haiti. USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian The United States is the largest humanitarian donor to Haiti. USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian
Assistance (BHA) provided more than $92.1 million in humanitarian assistance to Haiti in Assistance (BHA) provided more than $92.1 million in humanitarian assistance to Haiti in
FY2021 and $79.2 million in FY2022. Of the total amount of humanitarian assistance provided FY2021 and $79.2 million in FY2022. Of the total amount of humanitarian assistance provided
over those two fiscal years, $152.8 million represented emergency funding, much of which over those two fiscal years, $152.8 million represented emergency funding, much of which
responded to humanitarian needs (i.e., concerns about food; health; water, sanitation, and responded to humanitarian needs (i.e., concerns about food; health; water, sanitation, and
hygiene; and protection) exacerbated by an August 2021 earthquake that killed some 2,250 people hygiene; and protection) exacerbated by an August 2021 earthquake that killed some 2,250 people
and damaged 115,000 homes and other structures. and damaged 115,000 homes and other structures.
As the humanitarian situation in Haiti worsened, USAID sent a Disaster Assistance Response As the humanitarian situation in Haiti worsened, USAID sent a Disaster Assistance Response
Team (DART) to the country in October 2022. The DART is coordinating the delivery of relief Team (DART) to the country in October 2022. The DART is coordinating the delivery of relief
supplies to a portion of the estimated 5.2 million Haitians in need of humanitarian assistance. supplies to a portion of the estimated 5.2 million Haitians in need of humanitarian assistance.
Since October, USAID/BHA has helped transport 450 metric tons of relief supplies to help Haiti Since October, USAID/BHA has helped transport 450 metric tons of relief supplies to help Haiti
respond to the cholera outbreak and redoubled efforts to help communities access clean water and respond to the cholera outbreak and redoubled efforts to help communities access clean water and
prevent the spread of communicable diseases. BHA and other partners have scaled up programs prevent the spread of communicable diseases. BHA and other partners have scaled up programs
to address food insecurity and the protection needs of the estimated 1.9 million Haitians most to address food insecurity and the protection needs of the estimated 1.9 million Haitians most
Congressional Research Service 14 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy vulnerable to GBV and gang violence. Total USAID humanitarian funding for Haiti in FY2023 vulnerable to GBV and gang violence. Total USAID humanitarian funding for Haiti in FY2023
stood at $112.6 million as of August 2023.stood at $112.6 million as of August 2023.7981
U.S. agencies also helped Haiti respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and related health needs. The U.S. agencies also helped Haiti respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and related health needs. The
United States has donated nearly 1.1 million COVID-19 vaccines to Haiti.United States has donated nearly 1.1 million COVID-19 vaccines to Haiti.8082 As of August 11, As of August 11,
2023, 3.1% of Haiti’s population had completed the COVID-19 vaccination schedule.2023, 3.1% of Haiti’s population had completed the COVID-19 vaccination schedule.8183 In In
FY2022, USAID provided $51.3 million to help Haiti address the health and humanitarian FY2022, USAID provided $51.3 million to help Haiti address the health and humanitarian
impacts of COVID-19.impacts of COVID-19.8284 In December 2022, DOD deployed the U.S. Naval Ship In December 2022, DOD deployed the U.S. Naval Ship Comfort to to
deliver medical care to Haitians as part of a multicountry deployment. deliver medical care to Haitians as part of a multicountry deployment.
Global Fragility Act Implementation
The 116th Congress enacted the GFA, which directed the executive branch to develop a 10-year The 116th Congress enacted the GFA, which directed the executive branch to develop a 10-year
strategy to prevent conflict globally and stabilize conflict-affected areas. It also directed the strategy to prevent conflict globally and stabilize conflict-affected areas. It also directed the
executive branch to select priority countries or regions to execute such efforts through 10-year executive branch to select priority countries or regions to execute such efforts through 10-year
plans. In April 2022, the Biden Administration announced one region and four priority countries plans. In April 2022, the Biden Administration announced one region and four priority countries
for GFA implementation; Haiti was among them. The GFA also authorized three distinct funds: for GFA implementation; Haiti was among them. The GFA also authorized three distinct funds:
the Prevention and Stabilization Fund (PSF), the Complex Crisis Fund (CCF), and the Multi-the Prevention and Stabilization Fund (PSF), the Complex Crisis Fund (CCF), and the Multi-
Donor Global Fragility Fund. In March 2023, the Biden Administration released a 10-year plan Donor Global Fragility Fund. In March 2023, the Biden Administration released a 10-year plan
for Haiti, as mandated by the GFA. According to a summary of the plan, the U.S.-interagency for Haiti, as mandated by the GFA. According to a summary of the plan, the U.S.-interagency
seeks to help “Haiti’s citizens and government advance a shared vision and a permissive seeks to help “Haiti’s citizens and government advance a shared vision and a permissive
environment for long-term stability.” It prioritizes security and justice sector sectors first, then environment for long-term stability.” It prioritizes security and justice sector sectors first, then
broadens to focus on economic and development goals, as well as civil society strengthening.broadens to focus on economic and development goals, as well as civil society strengthening.83

~~79 USAID, “Haiti-Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #6, FY2023, August 9, 2023.~~
~~80 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution,” at https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/haiti/~~
~~#covid_map_link.~~
~~81 Pan American Health Organization, “COVID-19 Vaccination in the Americas,” https://ais.paho.org/imm/~~
~~IM_DosisAdmin-Vacunacion.asp, accessed August 8, 2023.~~
~~82 USAID, “COVID-19: Latin America and the Caribbean,” Fact Sheet #6, FY2022, September 30, 2022.~~
~~83 U.S. Department of State,~~ ~~The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for~~
~~Haiti,~~ ~~March 24, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

14

~~Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy~~

~~Haiti received a total of $15 million in FY2021 PSF resources to carry out activities in support of~~
~~the GFA, including the development of the country strategy.84~~85 The Administration has allocated at least $15.0 million of FY2021 PSF assistance, $13.0 million of FY2022 PSF assistance, and $3.3 million of FY2023 CCF assistance to Haiti.
Donor Coordination
The United States is the leading bilateral donor in Haiti, and Congress has encouraged U.S. The United States is the leading bilateral donor in Haiti, and Congress has encouraged U.S.
executive agencies to coordinate foreign assistance priorities with key countries and international executive agencies to coordinate foreign assistance priorities with key countries and international
organizations represented in Haiti. Active since 2004, the “Core Group” has shaped international organizations represented in Haiti. Active since 2004, the “Core Group” has shaped international
responses to key events in Haiti, as when it called on Henry to form a “consensual and inclusive responses to key events in Haiti, as when it called on Henry to form a “consensual and inclusive
government” in July 2021.government” in July 2021.8586 In addition to the U.S. Ambassador, the Core Group comprises the In addition to the U.S. Ambassador, the Core Group comprises the
Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General; the Ambassadors of Brazil, Canada, Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General; the Ambassadors of Brazil, Canada,
France, Germany, Spain, and the European Union (EU); and the Special Representative of the France, Germany, Spain, and the European Union (EU); and the Special Representative of the
Organization of American States. Organization of American States.
Many members of the Core Group (including the EU, Spain, and France) have expressed interest Many members of the Core Group (including the EU, Spain, and France) have expressed interest
in contributing to a multidonor basket fund on security that aims to support the long-term in contributing to a multidonor basket fund on security that aims to support the long-term
development of the HNP; Canada and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) administer the development of the HNP; Canada and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) administer the
81 USAID, “Haiti-Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #6, FY2023, August 9, 2023. 82 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution,” at https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/haiti/#covid_map_link. 83 Pan American Health Organization, “COVID-19 Vaccination in the Americas,” https://ais.paho.org/imm/IM_DosisAdmin-Vacunacion.asp, accessed August 8, 2023. 84 USAID, “COVID-19: Latin America and the Caribbean,” Fact Sheet #6, FY2022, September 30, 2022. 85 U.S. Department of State, The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti, March 24, 2023. 86 BINUH, “Core Group Press Release,” July 17, 2021. Congressional Research Service 15 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy fund. UNDP estimated the fund needs at least $28 million over two years to achieve its aims. fund. UNDP estimated the fund needs at least $28 million over two years to achieve its aims.
According to BINUH, donations stood at roughly $17.7 million in June 2023.According to BINUH, donations stood at roughly $17.7 million in June 2023.8687
In October 2022, the U.S. and Canadian governments accelerated the delivery of armored In October 2022, the U.S. and Canadian governments accelerated the delivery of armored
vehicles and other tactical equipment purchased by the Haitian government for the HNP.vehicles and other tactical equipment purchased by the Haitian government for the HNP.8788 In In
March 2023, Canada pledged to provide C$100 million (about $74 million) in additional aid for March 2023, Canada pledged to provide C$100 million (about $74 million) in additional aid for
the HNP.the HNP.8889
Trade ~~Preferences89~~Preferences90
Congress has extended unilateral trade preferences to Haiti through several trade preferences Congress has extended unilateral trade preferences to Haiti through several trade preferences
programs enacted since 1975. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (P.L. 98-67, programs enacted since 1975. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (P.L. 98-67,
subsequently amended, with no expiration), for example, provides limited duty-free entry of subsequently amended, with no expiration), for example, provides limited duty-free entry of
selected Caribbean products as a core element of the U.S. foreign economic policy response to selected Caribbean products as a core element of the U.S. foreign economic policy response to
uncertain economic and political conditions in the region. The current Haiti-specific preferences, uncertain economic and political conditions in the region. The current Haiti-specific preferences,
which expire in 2025, provide unilateral preferences to the country’s apparel sector.which expire in 2025, provide unilateral preferences to the country’s apparel sector.9091 The value The value
of U.S. imports from Haiti entering under Caribbean preference programs increased from $25 of U.S. imports from Haiti entering under Caribbean preference programs increased from $25
million in 2000 to $253.3 million in 2022, an increase of over 900%.million in 2000 to $253.3 million in 2022, an increase of over 900%.9192 Those imports accounted Those imports accounted
for about 31.9% of total U.S. merchandise imports from Haiti. Over 90% of U.S. imports from for about 31.9% of total U.S. merchandise imports from Haiti. Over 90% of U.S. imports from
Haiti in 2022 consisted of apparel items or clothing; knitted or crocheted apparel imports totaled Haiti in 2022 consisted of apparel items or clothing; knitted or crocheted apparel imports totaled
$807.0 million, while other apparel items or clothing totaled $155.0 million. $807.0 million, while other apparel items or clothing totaled $155.0 million.

~~84 Email from State Department official, May 30, 2023.~~
~~85 BINUH, “Core Group Press Release,” July 17, 2021.~~
~~86 BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, July 3, 2023.~~
~~87 Reuters, “U.S., Canada Deliver Armored Vehicles to Haitian Police to Fight Gangs,” October 15, 2022.~~
~~88 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada in Joint Press Conference,”~~
~~March 24, 2023.~~
~~89 For additional information, see CRS Report R47432, Caribbean Trade Preference Programs, by Liana Wong and M.~~
~~Angeles Villarreal.~~
~~90 For a description of how the Haiti-specific preference programs have evolved and have affected Haitian exports and~~
~~Haitian workers, see U.S. International Trade Commission,~~ ~~U.S.-Haiti Trade: Impact of U.S. Preference Programs on~~
~~Haiti’s Economy and Workers, December 2022.~~
~~91 Compiled by CRS using data from U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

15

~~Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy~~

The Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act of 2023 (S. 552), introduced in the Senate in The Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act of 2023 (S. 552), introduced in the Senate in
February 2023, would renew U.S. trade preferences for Haiti through 2035. In the House, H.R. February 2023, would renew U.S. trade preferences for Haiti through 2035. In the House, H.R.
5035, introduced in July 2023, would modify and extend trade preferences for Haiti under the 5035, introduced in July 2023, would modify and extend trade preferences for Haiti under the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act.
Sanctions: U.S. and Multilateral
In 2020, as part of its policy toward Haiti, the U.S. government began to impose sanctions against In 2020, as part of its policy toward Haiti, the U.S. government began to impose sanctions against
those responsible for significant human rights abuses, corruption, and drug trafficking. In those responsible for significant human rights abuses, corruption, and drug trafficking. In
December 2020, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which built upon and expanded the December 2020, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which built upon and expanded the
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (P.L. 114-328), the U.S. Department of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (P.L. 114-328), the U.S. Department of the
Treasury imposed asset blocking and visa restrictions on Chérizier (the gang leader and former Treasury imposed asset blocking and visa restrictions on Chérizier (the gang leader and former
HNP officer) and two former Moïse officials for involvement in the La Saline massacre.HNP officer) and two former Moïse officials for involvement in the La Saline massacre.9293
Since fall 2022, the U.S. Treasury and State Departments have publicly imposed financial Since fall 2022, the U.S. Treasury and State Departments have publicly imposed financial
sanctions and/or visa restrictions on seven current or former Haitian officials and their families sanctions and/or visa restrictions on seven current or former Haitian officials and their families
87 BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, July 3, 2023. 88 Reuters, “U.S., Canada Deliver Armored Vehicles to Haitian Police to Fight Gangs,” October 15, 2022. 89 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada in Joint Press Conference,” March 24, 2023. 90 For additional information, see CRS Report R47432, Caribbean Trade Preference Programs, by Liana Wong and M. Angeles Villarreal. 91 For a description of how the Haiti-specific preference programs have evolved and have affected Haitian exports and Haitian workers, see U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.-Haiti Trade: Impact of U.S. Preference Programs on Haiti’s Economy and Workers, December 2022. 92 Compiled by CRS using data from U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb. 93 E.O. 13818, “Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption,” December 20, 2017; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human Rights Day,” December 10, 2020. Congressional Research Service 16 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy for corruption, drug trafficking, and/or human rights violations.94~~for corruption, drug trafficking, and/or human rights violations.93~~ In November 2022, the U.S. In November 2022, the U.S.
Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions pursuant to E.O. 14059 on Joseph Lambert, then-Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions pursuant to E.O. 14059 on Joseph Lambert, then-
president of the Haitian senate, and former Senator Youri Latortue for involvement in drug president of the Haitian senate, and former Senator Youri Latortue for involvement in drug
trafficking. trafficking. The Treasury imposed the same sanctions on then-Senator Rony Celestin and former Treasury imposed the same sanctions on then-Senator Rony Celestin and former
Senator Herve Fourcand in December 2022. In April 2023, the Department of the Treasury Senator Herve Fourcand in December 2022. In April 2023, the Department of the Treasury
sanctioned Gary Bodeu, former head of Haiti’s Chamber of Deputies, for corruption. Pursuant to sanctioned Gary Bodeu, former head of Haiti’s Chamber of Deputies, for corruption. Pursuant to
Section 7031(c) of P.L. 117-103, Division K, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on Section 7031(c) of P.L. 117-103, Division K, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on
then-Senator Lambert for corruption and involvement in a gross violation of human rights. The then-Senator Lambert for corruption and involvement in a gross violation of human rights. The
State Department also imposed visa restrictions on former Haitian Customs Director Rommel State Department also imposed visa restrictions on former Haitian Customs Director Rommel
Bell and then-Senator Celestin for corruption. In June 2023, the State Department sanctioned Bell and then-Senator Celestin for corruption. In June 2023, the State Department sanctioned
Laurent Lamothe, former prime minister under President Martelly, for corruption. Those subject Laurent Lamothe, former prime minister under President Martelly, for corruption. Those subject
to recent public sanctions to recent public sanctions ~~represent~~represents a range of political parties. The U.S. State Department has a range of political parties. The U.S. State Department has
privately revoked the visas of dozens of officials and their families. privately revoked the visas of dozens of officials and their families.
The United States has encouraged other international partners and the U.N. to sanction the The United States has encouraged other international partners and the U.N. to sanction the
financial backers of Haitian gangs, recognizing that targeted sanctions imposed in a multilateral financial backers of Haitian gangs, recognizing that targeted sanctions imposed in a multilateral
manner may have a better chance of affecting change than unilateral sanctions.manner may have a better chance of affecting change than unilateral sanctions.9495 U.S. sanctions U.S. sanctions
have been closely coordinated with those announced by the Government of Canada, which also have been closely coordinated with those announced by the Government of Canada, which also
imposed sanctions on former President Martelly for drug trafficking—a move U.S. officials have imposed sanctions on former President Martelly for drug trafficking—a move U.S. officials have
“welcomed.”“welcomed.”9596 In October 2022, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved Resolution In October 2022, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved Resolution

~~92 E.O. 13818, “Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption,” December~~
~~20, 2017; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International~~
~~Human Rights Day,” December 10, 2020.~~
932653 imposing sanctions on Jimmy Chérizier.97 The Security Council named a panel of experts to recommend further individuals and entities to be subject to travel bans, asset seizures, and an arms embargo. In July 2023, the EU created a mechanism to impose such sanctions on Haitians. Congress is considering legislation that would require reporting from the State Department and potential sanctions on Haitians who back criminal gangs. In July 2023, the House passed an amended version of the Haiti Criminal Collusion Transparency Act of 2023 (H.R. 1684), aimed at identifying and penalizing ties between Haitian political and economic elites and criminal gangs. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported a companion bill, S. 396, in May 2023. The bills would require the Secretary of State, in coordination with the intelligence community, to produce an unclassified annual report, which may have a classified annex, to specific congressional committees identifying Haitian political and economic elites tied to gangs, among other topics. They also would require the President to impose visa restrictions and sanctions on those individuals pursuant to Section 7031(c) of annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations legislation, Section 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human 94 Sources for this paragraph include E.O. 14059, “Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Involved in the Global Illicit Sources for this paragraph include E.O. 14059, “Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Involved in the Global Illicit
Drug Trade,” December 15, 2021; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Haitian Politicians Drug Trade,” December 15, 2021; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Haitian Politicians
for Narcotics Trafficking,” November 4, 2022; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Sanctions Additional Corrupt for Narcotics Trafficking,” November 4, 2022; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Sanctions Additional Corrupt
Haitian Politicians for Drug Trafficking,” December 2, 2022; U.S. Department of State, “Treasury Sanctions Former Haitian Politicians for Drug Trafficking,” December 2, 2022; U.S. Department of State, “Treasury Sanctions Former
President of Haiti’s Chamber of Deputies,” April 5, 2023; U.S. Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of President of Haiti’s Chamber of Deputies,” April 5, 2023; U.S. Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of
State, “Designation of Haitian Senate President, Joseph Lambert, for Involvement in Significant Corruption and a State, “Designation of Haitian Senate President, Joseph Lambert, for Involvement in Significant Corruption and a
Gross Violation of Human Rights,” December 4, 2022; U.S. Department of State, “Combating Global Corruption and Gross Violation of Human Rights,” December 4, 2022; U.S. Department of State, “Combating Global Corruption and
Human Rights Abuses,” December 9, 2022; The State Department, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Designation Human Rights Abuses,” December 9, 2022; The State Department, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Designation
of Laurent Salvador Lamothe—Former Haitian Prime Minister and Minister of Planning and External Cooperation—of Laurent Salvador Lamothe—Former Haitian Prime Minister and Minister of Planning and External Cooperation—
for Involvement in Significant Corruption,” June 2, 2023. for Involvement in Significant Corruption,” June 2, 2023.
9495 U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review, October 2021. , October 2021.
9596 Government of Canada, “Sanctions: Grave Breach of International Peace and Security in Haiti,” updated December 19, 2022, at https://www.international.gc.ca/campaign-campagne/haiti-sanction/index.aspx?lang=eng; Jacqueline Charles and Michael Wilner, “Canada Sanctions Former Haiti President Michel Martelly, Two Former Prime Ministers,” Miami Herald, November 21, 2022. 97 U.N. Security Council, “Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 2653 (2022) Concerning Haiti,” at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653. Congressional Research Service 17 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy ~~Government of Canada, “Sanctions: Grave Breach of International Peace and Security in Haiti,” updated December~~
~~(continued...)~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

16

~~Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy~~

~~2653 imposing sanctions on Jimmy Chérizier.96 The Security Council named a panel of experts to~~
~~recommend further individuals and entities to be subject to travel bans, asset seizures, and an~~
~~arms embargo. In July 2023, the EU created a mechanism to impose such sanctions on Haitians.~~
~~Congress is considering legislation that would require reporting from the State Department and~~
~~potential sanctions on Haitians who back criminal gangs. In July 2023, the House passed an~~
~~amended version of the Haiti Criminal Collusion Transparency Act of 2023 (H.R. 1684), aimed at~~
~~identifying and penalizing ties between Haitian political and economic elites and criminal gangs.~~
~~The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported a companion bill, S. 396, in May 2023. The~~
~~bills would require the Secretary of State, in coordination with the intelligence community, to~~
~~produce an unclassified annual report, which may have a classified annex, to specific~~
~~congressional committees identifying Haitian political and economic elites tied to gangs, among~~
~~other topics. They also would require the President to impose visa restrictions and sanctions on~~
~~those individuals pursuant to Section 7031(c) of annual Department of State, Foreign Operations,~~
~~and Related Programs Appropriations legislation, Section 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human~~
Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114-328), or any other legal provision. The Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114-328), or any other legal provision. The
President could waive those sanctions requirements if the President certifies that said waiver is in President could waive those sanctions requirements if the President certifies that said waiver is in
the U.S. national interest or is necessary for the delivery of humanitarian or related assistance. the U.S. national interest or is necessary for the delivery of humanitarian or related assistance.
U.S. Department of Justice Cooperation
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has obtained one indictment in the Moïse assassination, The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has obtained one indictment in the Moïse assassination,
assisted Haitian officials investigating the assassination, and pursued cases involving those assisted Haitian officials investigating the assassination, and pursued cases involving those
complicit in arms trafficking, gang violence, and drug trafficking in and through Haiti. In complicit in arms trafficking, gang violence, and drug trafficking in and through Haiti. In
November 2022, DOJ indicted seven leaders of five Haitian gangs, including additional November 2022, DOJ indicted seven leaders of five Haitian gangs, including additional
individuals involved in kidnappings of U.S. missionaries that took place in 2021.individuals involved in kidnappings of U.S. missionaries that took place in 2021.9798 DHS has DHS has
established a vetted Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit within the HNP to work with U.S. established a vetted Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit within the HNP to work with U.S.
prosecutors on cases affecting both countries, including the trafficking of arms, drugs, and people. prosecutors on cases affecting both countries, including the trafficking of arms, drugs, and people.
Weapons and Drug Trafficking
In March 2023, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime issued a report on how illicit drug and In March 2023, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime issued a report on how illicit drug and
weapons trafficking have exacerbated gang-related violence in Haiti. The report includes weapons trafficking have exacerbated gang-related violence in Haiti. The report includes
recommendations for national, regional, and international responses to address illicit trafficking, recommendations for national, regional, and international responses to address illicit trafficking,
strengthen port security, reinforce the capabilities of the HNP, and promote stability in Haiti.strengthen port security, reinforce the capabilities of the HNP, and promote stability in Haiti.9899
The State Department’s The State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR),, issued in issued in
March 2023, asserts that continuing instability, a weak justice system, corruption, and the HNP’s March 2023, asserts that continuing instability, a weak justice system, corruption, and the HNP’s
inability to patrol the country’s extensive borders have kept drug seizures low and inhibited inability to patrol the country’s extensive borders have kept drug seizures low and inhibited
bilateral antidrug efforts. Haiti’s porous border with the Dominican Republic and corruption in bilateral antidrug efforts. Haiti’s porous border with the Dominican Republic and corruption in
the Haitian customs authority have enabled gangs to obtain illicit arms. the Haitian customs authority have enabled gangs to obtain illicit arms.

~~19, 2022, at https://www.international.gc.ca/campaign-campagne/haiti-sanction/index.aspx?lang=eng; Jacqueline~~
~~Charles and Michael Wilner, “Canada Sanctions Former Haiti President Michel Martelly, Two Former Prime~~
~~Ministers,” Miami Herald, November 21, 2022.~~
~~96 U.N. Security Council, “Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 2653 (2022) Concerning~~
~~Haiti,” at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653.~~
~~97 U.S. Department of Justice, “Criminal Charges Unsealed Against Gang Leaders for Kidnappings of U.S. Citizens,”~~
~~November 7, 2020.~~
~~98 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime,~~ ~~Haiti’s Criminal Markets: Mapping Trends in Firearms and Drug Trafficking,~~
~~March 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

17

~~Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy~~

U.S. agencies have taken some steps to combat illicit trafficking to Haiti. In August 2022, the U.S. agencies have taken some steps to combat illicit trafficking to Haiti. In August 2022, the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Homeland Security Investigations office in U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Homeland Security Investigations office in
Miami, FL, announced new initiatives to counter reported spikes in arms trafficking to Haiti.Miami, FL, announced new initiatives to counter reported spikes in arms trafficking to Haiti.99100 In In
December 2022, the State Department sanctioned Rommel Bell, former customs director in Haiti, December 2022, the State Department sanctioned Rommel Bell, former customs director in Haiti,
for corruption after Haiti’s anticorruption unit launched an investigation into Bell’s alleged for corruption after Haiti’s anticorruption unit launched an investigation into Bell’s alleged
participation in arms trafficking.participation in arms trafficking.~~100~~101 U.S. law enforcement agencies are also supporting a new U.S. law enforcement agencies are also supporting a new
CARICOM Crime Gun Intelligence Unit in Trinidad that is to investigate regional arms CARICOM Crime Gun Intelligence Unit in Trinidad that is to investigate regional arms
trafficking cases alongside national officials.trafficking cases alongside national officials.~~101~~102
Migration Issues
Stemming irregular migration to the United States continues to be a high priority for U.S. policy Stemming irregular migration to the United States continues to be a high priority for U.S. policy
and Congress. U.S. government apprehensions of Haitian migrants have risen notably, both at sea and Congress. U.S. government apprehensions of Haitian migrants have risen notably, both at sea
98 U.S. Department of Justice, “Criminal Charges Unsealed Against Gang Leaders for Kidnappings of U.S. Citizens,” November 7, 2020. 99 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Haiti’s Criminal Markets: Mapping Trends in Firearms and Drug Trafficking, March 2023. 100 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Announces Crackdown on Firearms, Ammunition Smuggling to Haiti, the Caribbean,” August 19, 2022. 101 U.S. Department of State, “Combating Global Corruption and Human Rights Abuses,” December 2, 2022; Jacqueline Charles, “U.S. Sanctions More Haitians, Including the Relatives of People Accused of Corruption,” Miami Herald, December 11, 2022. 102 U.S. Embassy in Trinidad and Tobago, “Launch of CARICOM Crime Gun Intelligence Unit (CCGIU),” November 17, 2022, https://tt.usembassy.gov/launch-of-caricom-crime-gun-intelligence-unit-ccgiu/. Congressional Research Service 18 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy and on the U.S. Southwest border. During the first nine months of FY2023, U.S. Customs and and on the U.S. Southwest border. During the first nine months of FY2023, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) encountered 105,369 Haitians, up from 56,596 Haitians encountered in Border Protection (CBP) encountered 105,369 Haitians, up from 56,596 Haitians encountered in
all of FY2022.all of FY2022.~~102~~103 Some of those Haitians had resided in third countries (particularly Brazil and Some of those Haitians had resided in third countries (particularly Brazil and
Chile) since the 2010 earthquake and had few ties to Haiti.Chile) since the 2010 earthquake and had few ties to Haiti.~~103~~104 From October 2022 to mid-July From October 2022 to mid-July
2023, U.S. Coast Guard-reported interdictions and/or encounters of Haitian migrants totaled 2023, U.S. Coast Guard-reported interdictions and/or encounters of Haitian migrants totaled
roughly 5,100.roughly 5,100.~~104~~105
On January 5, 2023, DHS announced the expansion of a set of new immigration policies to On January 5, 2023, DHS announced the expansion of a set of new immigration policies to
Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans, which started in October 2022 for Venezuelans.Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans, which started in October 2022 for Venezuelans.~~105~~106 Haitians Haitians
who have a U.S. sponsor can apply for immigration parole and fly directly into the United States who have a U.S. sponsor can apply for immigration parole and fly directly into the United States
after U.S. vetting. In April 2023, DHS added another requirement for participation in the program after U.S. vetting. In April 2023, DHS added another requirement for participation in the program
making any Haitian interdicted at sea after April 27 ineligible for the parole program.making any Haitian interdicted at sea after April 27 ineligible for the parole program.~~106~~107 As of As of
June 2023, some 63,000 Haitians had been vetted, and 50,000 had arrived in the United States June 2023, some 63,000 Haitians had been vetted, and 50,000 had arrived in the United States
under the program, with demand far outpacing the program’s 30,000 aggregate monthly cap for under the program, with demand far outpacing the program’s 30,000 aggregate monthly cap for
parolees accepted from all four countries.parolees accepted from all four countries.~~107~~

~~99 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Announces Crackdown on~~
~~Firearms, Ammunition Smuggling to Haiti, the Caribbean,” August 19, 2022.~~
~~100 U.S. Department of State, “Combating Global Corruption and Human Rights Abuses,” December 2, 2022;~~
~~Jacqueline Charles, “U.S. Sanctions More Haitians, Including the Relatives of People Accused of Corruption,”~~ ~~Miami~~
~~Herald,~~ ~~December 11, 2022.~~
~~101 U.S. Embassy in Trinidad and Tobago, “Launch of CARICOM Crime Gun Intelligence Unit (CCGIU),” November~~
~~17, 2022, https://tt.usembassy.gov/launch-of-caricom-crime-gun-intelligence-unit-ccgiu/.~~
~~102~~108 In contrast, Haitians apprehended crossing the U.S. Southwest border between ports of entry were subject to the public health-related Title 42 policy until it ended on May 11, 2023.109 Title 42 allowed DHS to expel migrants back to Mexico (in coordination with the government of Mexico). Following the end of Title 42, some Haitians encountered by DHS have been deemed ineligible for asylum, deported to Mexico under Title 8 expedited removal procedures, and banned from reentry for at least five years.110 The United States also has taken steps to provide other legal migration and protection pathways for some Haitians. Some 155,000 Haitians may be eligible for relief from removal under the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation announced in May 2021, and an estimated 105,100 additional Haitians are eligible under the extension announced in December 2022.111 In August 2023, the Biden Administration announced a modernized Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program. As in the past, the program will allow certain U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents to seek parole for family members in Haiti (or other countries); most of the process can now be completed online.112 103 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Nationwide Encounters,” https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide- U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Nationwide Encounters,” https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-
encounters. encounters.
~~103~~104 Caitlyn Yates, Caitlyn Yates, Haitian Migration Through the Americas: A Decade in the Making, Migration Information Source, , Migration Information Source,
September 30, 2021. September 30, 2021.
~~104~~105 United States Coast Guard News, “Coast Guard Repatriates 143 People to Haiti, Cuba,” July 18, 2023. United States Coast Guard News, “Coast Guard Repatriates 143 People to Haiti, Cuba,” July 18, 2023.
~~105~~106 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “DHS Implements New Processes for Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “DHS Implements New Processes for Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans
and Eliminates Cap for Venezuelans,” January 6, 2022. and Eliminates Cap for Venezuelans,” January 6, 2022.
~~106 “~~107 DHS, “Implementation of a Change to the Parole Process for Haitians,” 88 FR 26327DHS, “Implementation of a Change to the Parole Process for Haitians,” 88 FR 26327 Federal Register 26327- 26327-
26329, April 28, 2023. 26329, April 28, 2023.
~~107~~108 DHS, “Fact Sheet: Data from First Six Months of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and DHS, “Fact Sheet: Data from First Six Months of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and
Venezuelans Shows That Lawful Pathways Work,” July 25, 2023; Camilo Montoya-Galvez, “1.5 Million Apply for Venezuelans Shows That Lawful Pathways Work,” July 25, 2023; Camilo Montoya-Galvez, “1.5 Million Apply for
U.S. Migrant Sponsorship Program with 30,000 Monthly Cap,” U.S. Migrant Sponsorship Program with 30,000 Monthly Cap,” CBS News, May 22, 2023. , May 22, 2023.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

18

~~Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy~~

~~In contrast, Haitians apprehended crossing the U.S. Southwest border between ports of entry were~~
~~subject to the public health-related Title 42 policy until it ended on May 11, 2023.108 Title 42~~
~~allowed DHS to expel migrants back to Mexico (in coordination with the government of Mexico).~~
~~Following the end of Title 42, some Haitians encountered by DHS have been deemed ineligible~~
~~for asylum, deported to Mexico under Title 8 expedited removal procedures, and banned from~~
~~reentry for at least five years.109~~
~~The United States also has taken steps to provide other legal migration and protection pathways~~
~~for some Haitians. Some 155,000 Haitians may be eligible for relief from removal under the~~
~~Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation announced in May 2021, and an estimated 105,100~~
~~additional Haitians are eligible under the extension announced in December 2022.110 In August~~
~~2023, the Biden Administration announced a modernized Haitian Family Reunification Parole~~
~~Program. As in the past, the program will allow certain U.S. citizens and legal permanent~~
~~residents to seek parole for family members in Haiti (or other countries); most of the process can~~
~~now be completed online.111~~
109 CRS Report R47343, U.S. Border Patrol Apprehensions and Title 42 Expulsions at the Southwest Border: Fact Sheet, by Audrey Singer and Sylvia L. Bryan. 110 CRS Insight IN12159, Post-Title 42: U.S. Foreign Policy Initiatives to Manage Regional Migration. 111 See CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure, by Jill H. Wilson. 112 DHS, “DHS Modernizes Cuban and Haitian Family Reunification Parole Processes,” August 10, 2023. Congressional Research Service 19 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Outlook
The 118th Congress has maintained a keen interest in developments in Haiti, as deteriorating The 118th Congress has maintained a keen interest in developments in Haiti, as deteriorating
security and humanitarian conditions in Haiti intersect with a broad range of U.S. interests and security and humanitarian conditions in Haiti intersect with a broad range of U.S. interests and
policy responses. Among other actions, Congress has directly engaged with U.S. policy policy responses. Among other actions, Congress has directly engaged with U.S. policy
approaches toward Haiti in relation to foreign assistance, trade preferences, sanctions policy, and approaches toward Haiti in relation to foreign assistance, trade preferences, sanctions policy, and
migration. Should the current crisis in Haiti continue, Congress may fund, oversee, and assess migration. Should the current crisis in Haiti continue, Congress may fund, oversee, and assess
new policy approaches to address the situation in Haiti, including the potential deployment of a new policy approaches to address the situation in Haiti, including the potential deployment of a
U.S.-backed, Kenya-led multinational security force to the country. U.S.-backed, Kenya-led multinational security force to the country.

Author Information

Clare Ribando Seelke Clare Ribando Seelke
Karla I. Rios Karla I. Rios
Specialist in Latin American Affairs Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Analyst in Latin American Affairs Analyst in Latin American Affairs

Acknowledgments
This report draws from the work of former CRS Specialist in Latin American Affairs Maureen Taft- This report draws from the work of former CRS Specialist in Latin American Affairs Maureen Taft-
Morales.Morales.

~~108 CRS Report R47343,~~ ~~U.S. Border Patrol Apprehensions and Title 42 Expulsions at the Southwest Border: Fact~~
~~Sheet, by Audrey Singer and Sylvia L. Bryan.~~
~~109 CRS Insight IN12159, Post-Title 42: U.S. Foreign Policy Initiatives to Manage Regional Migration.~~
~~110 See CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure, by Jill H. Wilson.~~
~~111 DHS, “DHS Modernizes Cuban and Haitian Family Reunification Parole Processes,” August 10, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

19

~~Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy~~

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
R47394 R47394 · VERSION 510 · UPDATED
20 20