Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy
June 5, 2023
Haiti, located on the western third of the island of Hispaniola and bordering the Dominican
Republic, remains mired in interrelated political, security, and humanitarian crises. As of June
Clare Ribando Seelke
2023, Haiti lacks an elected president, legislature, and mayors following the July 2021
Specialist in Latin
assassination of President Jovenel Moïse; the terms of the last 10 elected senators expired in
American Affairs
January 2023. A political standoff between de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s government

and rival political and civil society leaders, some of whom have backed a proposal (the Montana
Karla I. Rios
Accord) to form a transitional government, has prevented the country from scheduling elections
Analyst in Latin American
to replace officials whose terms have expired. It is yet unclear whether an agreement announced
Affairs
by Henry on December 21, 2022, will lead to elections in February 2024 as originally envisioned.

The ongoing political impasse also has hindered Haiti’s ability to respond to worsening security

and humanitarian crises caused by rampant gang violence, food and fuel shortages, a resurgence
of cholera, and an August 2021 earthquake. In October 2022, Henry asked for a foreign security force to help reestablish
control and enable humanitarian aid deliveries; many Haitian civil society groups oppose this request, and no country has
offered to lead such a force. The compound crises in Haiti continue to fuel instability and U.S.-bound migration.
U.S. Policy
U.S. policy in Haiti has aimed to support Haitian efforts to restore security, the rule of law, democratic institutions leading to
free and fair elections, and economic and social stability. In FY2022, the Biden Administration allocated $237.4 million in
foreign assistance for Haiti, including increased support for the Haitian National Police. The FY2023 budget request included
$274.8 million for Haiti, and the FY2024 request included $291.5 million for Haiti. The Administration also has continued to
provide humanitarian assistance to Haiti, including $79.2 million in FY2022 and $56.5 million to date in FY2023. In March
2023, the Administration released a 10-year strategic plan for preventing conflict and promoting stability in Haiti, 1 of 10
countries prioritized by the Global Fragility Act (P.L. 116-94).
The Biden Administration’s approach toward Haiti has evolved from supporting the Henry government to working with the
United Nations and other international actors to push Henry, his rivals, and other stakeholders to reach an inclusive political
accord. Since October 2022, the U.S. Treasury and State Departments have publicly sanctioned seven current or former
Haitian officials, including Laurent Lamothe, former prime minister for President Michel Martelly (2011-2016). The State
Department has denied visas to dozens of additional individuals and their families. The Administration also has sought to
facilitate a broader international response to the deteriorating situation in Haiti. The United States and Mexico drafted a U.N.
Security Council resolution to sanction gang leaders in Haiti and their financial backers that was adopted in October 2022.
Separately, the United States and Mexico proposed, but did not make public, a resolution to send a non-U.N.-led security
assistance mission to Haiti.
Congressional Action
Congress has set objectives for U.S. policy, appropriated foreign assistance, and engaged in oversight aimed at ameliorating
the crises in Haiti. The Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative Act (P.L. 117-103,
Division V), enacted during the 117th Congress, set goals for U.S. development policy in Haiti through 2025 and directed the
Secretary of State to prioritize the protection of human rights and anti-corruption efforts. The act also required U.S. agencies
to assess the progress of post-disaster recovery in Haiti and develop a strategy for achieving the act’s policy objectives. The
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328), did not designate a total funding level for Haiti but placed
democracy-related conditions on some foreign assistance. The explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-328 urged the
Secretary of State to use “every appropriate diplomatic tool to press for dialogue” and to take “strong legal action” against
those engaged in human rights abuses, corruption, and other illicit activities.
The 118th Congress is now considering the Biden Administration’s FY2024 budget request for Haiti, as well as other
legislative measures. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee have reported bills
(H.R. 1684/S. 396) that would require an annual State Department report on ties between gangs and politicians in Haiti and
call for the imposition of sanctions on individuals engaged in such activities. Proposed legislation to renew trade preferences
for Haiti (S. 552) also has been introduced in the Senate. Congressional oversight efforts have focused on the
Administration’s policies to manage migration from Haiti, among other issues.
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Introduction
Haiti, a Caribbean country that shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic (see
Figure 1), has been of ongoing interest to Congress and successive U.S. presidential
administrations because of its proximity to the United States, chronic instability, and vulnerability
to natural disasters.1 Although Haiti has endured corrupt, authoritarian leaders for much of its
history, governance arguably had improved in the years prior to a 2010 earthquake.2 That disaster
killed more than 200,000 people and set development back decades. Despite extensive
international support for Haiti’s recovery, democratic institutions remain weak and the country
continues to contend with extreme poverty; wide economic disparities; and both human-made and
natural disasters, including an August 2021 earthquake that killed 2,000.
The situation in Haiti further deteriorated after
Haiti at a Glance
Capital: Port-au-Prince
the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in
July 2021 led to uncertainty over who would
Population: 12.2 mil ion (2023, IMF est.)
succeed him. Two days before the
Languages: French (official), Creole (official)
assassination, Moïse named Ariel Henry to be
Area: 10,710 sq. miles, slightly larger than
Massachusetts
prime minister, but Henry was not sworn in.
Since most legislators’ terms had expired at the
GDP: $26.58 bil ion (2023, current prices, IMF est.)
time of the assassination, the Haitian legislature
Real GDP Growth: -1.8% (2021); -1.7% (2022);
0.3% (2023, forecast) (% change, constant prices, IMF)
lacked the quorum needed to select a president
Per Capita GDP: $2,170 (2023, current prices, IMF
to serve out the remainder of Moïse’s term, as
est.)
outlined in the Haitian Constitution.
Life Expectancy: 60.4/66.1 years (male/female)
As of June 2023, Haiti still lacks an elected
(UNDP, 2021)
president, legislature, and local government. A
Maternal Mortality Ratio: 480/100,000 live births
political standoff between de facto Prime
(UNDP, 2022)
Minister Henry’s government and opposition
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF); United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
political and civil society leaders regarding
how to form a transitional government to
stabilize the country and convene elections persists. The standoff continues amid a worsening
security crisis. Following a September 2022 announcement by Prime Minister Henry that fuel
subsidies would end, protests and gang-led violence erupted.3 After gangs took over the ports,
highways, and main fuel terminal, the economy ground to a halt and humanitarian agencies lost
access to some areas. In October, cholera resurfaced after a three-year hiatus. Henry requested
international intervention in Haiti in October 2022, but the United Nations (U.N.) Security
Council has not yet voted on a resolution responding to that request.4
The 118th Congress may consider options for responding to the interrelated political, security, and
humanitarian crises in Haiti and the Henry government’s request for international intervention.
This report provides a brief overview of the situation in Haiti and U.S. policy responses to date.

1 For background, see Laurent DuBois, Haiti: the Aftershocks of History (New York, NY: Picador, 2013); Philippe
Girard, Haiti: The Tumultuous History: From Pearl of the Caribbean to Broken Nation (New York, NY: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2005, 2010).
2 International Crisis Group, Consolidating Stability in Haiti, Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 21, July 18, 2007.
3 U.N. Security Council, “Letter Dated 8 October 2022 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council,” S/2022/747, October 10, 2022. Hereinafter, Security Council, S/2022/747.
4 For a description of the type of resolution the United States and Mexico had envisioned in response to Henry’s
request, see United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a
U.N. Security Council Briefing on Haiti,” October 17, 2022.
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Figure 1. Map of Haiti

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS).
Political Situation
Background
Haiti won independence from France in 1804, making it the second independent republic in the
Western Hemisphere (after the United States). Since then, the country has experienced long
periods of authoritarianism and political fragility, punctuated by foreign interventions and natural
disasters.5 After the fall of the brutal Duvalier dictatorship (1957-1986), attempts to consolidate
democratic rule have had limited success.6 In 1991, a military coup interrupted the term of Haiti’s
first president elected in free and fair elections, Jean-Bertrand Aristide of the center-left Fanmi
Lavalas party (1991; 1994-1996; 2000-2004). The threat of a U.S. military intervention allowed
Aristide to return three years later to complete his term. In 2000, Aristide began a second term
after the opposition boycotted the presidential election due to flawed parliamentary elections

5 Rocio Cara Labrador and Diana Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development,” Council on Foreign Relations,
September 2022 (hereinafter Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path”). Haiti reportedly paid an indemnity to France
of some $560 million, which caused a significant drain on Haiti’s finances well into the 20th century. Concerns about
the indebted country’s ability to pay its creditors prompted a U.S. intervention from 1915 to 1934. Lazaro Gamio et al.,
“Haiti’s Lost Billions,” New York Times, May 20, 2022; Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti: 1915-
1934 (Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971).
6 Fearing communist rule and/or instability on the island, successive U.S. presidential administrations recognized the
regimes of François Duvalier (1957-1971) and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-1987), despite concerns about the
leaders’ authoritarian tendencies. See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “U.S. Relations with Haiti” in
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, American Republics, vol. V, document 309, at
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d309; and U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Historian, “Telegram from the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State” in Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Mexico,
Cuba, and the Caribbean, vol. XXIII, document 253, August 14, 1978, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1977-80v23/d253.
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favoring Fanmi Lavalas in May 2000. In 2004, Aristide—facing an armed uprising against his
rule as well as U.S. and international pressure—resigned and went into exile.7
From 2004 to 2017, the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a peacekeeping force
that grew to 13,000 at its peak, sought to restore order in the country; build the Haitian National
Police (HNP); and, later, help with recovery after the 2010 earthquake. The legacy of
MINUSTAH is complicated, as troops introduced cholera into the country and committed human
rights and sexual abuses. This experience has led many Haitians to oppose the type of foreign
military involvement requested by the Henry government.8
Haiti’s most recent presidents, Michel Martelly (2011-2016) and his chosen successor, Jovenel
Moïse (2017-July 2021), who represented the center-right Tèt Kale Party (PHTK), took office
after disputed elections and administered governments allegedly rife with corruption.9 Under
Moïse, Haiti experienced political and social unrest, high inflation, anti-government protests, and
gang violence. Like other Haitian politicians, Moïse allegedly provided money and arms to gangs
in exchange for favors, including suppressing anti-government protests such as those that erupted
in 2018 after announced fuel price hikes.10 A 2021 report by Harvard Law School’s International
Human Rights Clinic documented state (primarily police) involvement in attacks on
neighborhoods in which some 240 civilians died from 2018 to 2020.11 Instability increased in
2019 after Haitian auditors issued two reports to the country’s chief prosecutor alleging Moïse
and other officials had misappropriated and embezzled millions of dollars in public funds.12
Political gridlock between the executive and legislative branches led to the government not
organizing scheduled October 2019 parliamentary elections. The terms of the entire lower
Chamber of Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate expired in January 2020, as did the terms of all
local government posts, without newly elected officials to take these positions.13 Thereafter,
Moïse ruled by decree, with some controversy over whether his term was to end in February 2021
or February 2022 (the State Department did not take a position on that dispute).14

7 Daniel P. Erikson, “Haiti After Aristide: Still on the Brink,” Current History, vol. 104, no. 679 (February 2005), pp.
83-90.
8 Carla King et al., “‘MINUSTAH Is Doing Positive Things Just as They Do Negative Things’: Nuanced Perceptions of
a UN Peacekeeping Operation Amidst Peacekeeper-Perpetrated Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Haiti,” Conflict,
Security & Development, vol. 21, no. 6 (November 17, 2021), pp. 749-779. For how past interventions have influenced
recent popular opinion in Haiti, see Rafael Bernal, “Human Rights Coalition to Biden: No Military Intervention in
Haiti,” The Hill, November 1, 2022.
9 On Martelly and Moïse’s elections, see Georges Fauriol, “Haiti’s Problematic Electoral Dynamics,” Global
Americans, December 21, 2021. On Martelly and drug trafficking, see Jacqueline Charles and Michael Wilner,
“Canada Sanctions Former Haiti President Michel Martelly, Two Former Prime Ministers,” Miami Herald, November
21, 2022. On corruption in the Moïse government, see Maria Abi-Habib, “Haiti’s Leader Kept a List of Drug
Traffickers. His Assassins Came for It,” New York Times, December 12, 2021.
10 Chris Dalby, “International Sanctions Seek to Weaken Haiti’s Patronage System Between Politicians, Gangs,”
InSight Crime, November 24, 2022. For Moïse officials’ involvement in attacks on neighborhoods where protests
occurred, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International
Human Rights Day,” December 10, 2020.
11 Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, Killing with Impunity: State-Sanctioned Massacres in Haiti,
April 2021.
12 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix C: Major Corruption Cases in Haiti and Government of Haiti Efforts to
Address Corruption,” November 10, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Appendix-C-
Developments-in-Haiti-004977.pdf.
13 The 10 remaining senators’ terms expired on January 9, 2023.
14 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix F: Alleged February 2021 Coup Against President Jovenel Moïse and U.S. and
International Partner Efforts to Support Free and Fair Elections in Haiti,” November 2022, at https://www.state.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Appendix-F-Developments-in-Haiti-004977.pdf.
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On July 7, 2021, armed assailants assassinated President Moïse in his private home in Port-au-
Prince. Details of the attack remain under investigation; however, the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) has arrested 11 individuals for their role in a plot to kill Moïse. A federal
judge sentenced one of those individuals to life in prison in early June 2023.15 The FBI also has
supported Haitian authorities’ investigation of the crime, although threats to the safety of those
authorities and turnover among the judges leading the investigation have hindered their efforts.
Haitian police have arrested at least 23 people accused of planning the plot, including 18 former
Colombian soldiers, members of Moïse’s security team, a former rebel leader, a former police
inspector, and a Haitian-American pastor with ties to Florida.16
The Aftermath of President Moïse’s Assassination
Moïse’s assassination gave rise to uncertainty about who would succeed him as president and
who would serve as prime minister. Under the Haitian Constitution (Article 149), if a president
dies in the last two years of his term, the legislature should elect a provisional president to serve
out the term.17 As Haiti lacked a functioning legislature at the time of the assassination, the choice
of who would succeed Moïse could not follow the prescribed constitutional order.
Three individuals laid claims to serve as prime minister: interim Prime Minister Claude Joseph;
Ariel Henry, a neurosurgeon nominated to be prime minister two days before Moïse’s death but
not sworn in; and Joseph Lambert, then-president of the Haitian Senate. On July 8, the Haitian
government requested security and investigative assistance from the United States. In response to
that request, an inter-agency delegation traveled to Haiti on July 11. U.S. officials met with all
three claimants to prime minister. After days of jockeying among the claimants over who would
become prime minister, Joseph agreed that Henry would be prime minister and he foreign
minister on July 12.18 Lambert separately gave up his quest to be prime minister; the U.S.
government later sanctioned him for drug trafficking. On July 17, the United States, United
Nations, and other donors issued a statement calling for the formation of an “inclusive
government” and encouraging Prime Minister-designate Ariel Henry to form a government.19
In September 2021, Henry dismissed Haiti’s electoral council. He and his supporters then
proposed that Henry name a provisional electoral council to convene elections. They also
proposed that Henry remain the single head of government until a new elected government takes
office. As of June 2023, Henry has yet to appoint that council, and many civil society and
political actors within Haiti have opposed this proposal. Henry’s irregular path to his position and

15 U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on the Assassination of Former President of Haiti Jovenel Moïse, (Div.
V, P.L. 117-103), November 10, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/haiti-reports/ U.S. Department of Justice, “Four Florida
Men Arrested in Plot to Kill Haitian President, Grand Jury Returns Indictment Against 11,” February 14, 2023; Chris
Cameron, “Man Gets Life in Prison in Killing of Haiti Leader,” New York Times, June 4, 2023.
16 Jacqueline Charles, “Made in Miami: How a South Florida Plot to Oust Haiti’s Jovenel Moïse Led to His Murder,”
Miami Herald, December 8, 2022; “Ex-Rebel Leader Known as ‘the Torturer’ Is Arrested in Haiti President’s
Assassination,” Miami Herald, December 21, 2022.
17 Haiti’s Constitution of 1987 with Amendments Through 2012 is available in English at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012.pdf?lang=en.
18 CRS interview with State Department officials, January 9, 2023.
19 U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), “Core Group Press Release,” July 17, 2021.
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allegations of his possible involvement in Moïse’s assassination, have eroded his credibility.20
Henry has fired officials who have sought to question him about the Moïse case.21
As an alternative to Henry’s proposal, numerous civil society organizations and political parties
have sought to form an interim government. After months of broad consultations, the Citizen
Conference for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis (widely known as the Montana Group) came to an
agreement in August 2021.22 The Montana Accord proposed a two-year interim government led
by a president and prime minister, with oversight committees, to restore order, administer
elections, and create a truth and justice commission to address past human rights violations.
Although many civic leaders and political parties signed the accord, some did not (including
some business groups, churches, and the PHTK and allied parties).
In October 2022, Henry and his advisers requested foreign intervention to address the worsening
security and humanitarian crises.23 Many Haitian political and civil society groups opposed the
request, and critics maintain that Henry wants an intervention to help him remain in power and
protect his and allied interests, as past Haitian leaders did.24 U.S. and Canadian sanctions targeting
Haitian politicians and business leaders, some of whom have opposed negotiations or reportedly
have benefitted from the unrest, have sought to break the political impasse.25
Henry put forth a transition proposal on December 21, 2022, named the National Consensus for
an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections.26 His government established a three-member
High Transition Council (HTC) to implement that transition plan in January 2023 and appointed
judges to the country’s highest court in March 2023. An independent facilitation committee is
carrying out consultations between the HTC, civil society, and donors on implementing the
agreement. Discussions are also ongoing over how to improve security conditions and to select a
new provisional electoral council. It is yet unclear whether the plan will receive broad enough
support to enable Haiti to convene elections in February 2024 as originally envisioned.
Security Crisis
Since Moïse’s assassination, violent gangs have threatened to overwhelm the Haitian government
and businesses, many of which have long been the gangs’ primary benefactors. The symbiotic
relationship between the gangs in Haiti and the country’s political and economic elite is well
established. Many of Haiti’s past presidents and other prominent politicians have used and
received support from gangs. Generally, gangs provide political elites with services such as
campaign support, voter intimidation, bribery, fundraising, vandalism, and disruption (see
depiction in Figure 2).27 Former President Aristide relied on support from gangs known as

20 Monique Beals, “Judge, Investigators say Haitian Prime Minister Involved in President’s Assassination,” The Hill,
February 8, 2022.
21 As an example, see “Haiti’s PM Replaces The Prosecutor Who Wanted Him Charged In The President’s Slaying,”
Associated Press (AP), September 14, 2021.
22 Georges Fauriol, “Haiti: Betting on the Montana Accord,” Global Americans, February 9, 2022.
23 Catherine Osborn, “Haiti’s Crisis Escalates,” Foreign Policy, October 14, 2022.
24 Jonathan M. Katz, “Haiti’s Elites Keep Calling for the U.S. Marines,” Foreign Policy, October 31, 2022.
25 David C. Adams, “U.S. and Canada Turn to Sanctions Against Haitian Politicians and Businessmen Accused of Ties
to Gangs,” UnivisionNews, December 19, 2022 (hereinafter Adams, “U.S. and Canada Turn to Sanctions”).
26 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, April 13, 2023.
27 Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, Gangs of Haiti: Expansion, Power, and an Escalating Crisis, October
2022. Hereinafter: Global Initiative, Gangs of Haiti.
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chimères, and the Canadian government sanctioned former President Martelly for his role in
financing gangs.28
The relationship between Haiti’s economic elite and gangs is less apparent but no less significant
than the ties between politicians and gangs. Business owners assert they have to support certain
gangs as a defensive measure to protect their businesses and enable them to move merchandise
throughout the country and abroad.29 In December 2022, the Canadian government imposed
sanctions on Gilbert Bigio, Reynold Deeb, and Sherif Abdallah, three elites who reportedly
provided “illicit financial and operational support to armed gangs.”30
Figure 2. Criminal Dynamics in Haiti

Source: CRS, based on a graphic from InSight Crime for the U.S. Agency for International Development,
November 2021, at https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00ZF3H.pdf.
Gangs have expanded their power in the wake of Moïse’s assassination. They have exerted
control over territory, highways, ports, and the delivery of humanitarian aid, challenging the
authority of the HNP and other state institutions. Gangs were responsible for an October 2021
kidnapping of U.S. missionaries and a blockade of the country’s primary fuel terminal from
September to early November 2022.
In 2021, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) estimated there were 200
gangs in Haiti, which reportedly controlled some 60% of Port-au-Prince.31 The G9 and Family
(G9) and the G-PEP are two of Haiti’s most powerful gang federations. In 2022, homicides
increased by 35.2% compared with 2021 as gangs vied for control of territory.32 More than 1,400

28 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Haiti: The Chimères, Their Activities and Their Geographic Presence;
the Treatment of the Chimères by the Authorities and the Presence of Group Members Within the Government and the
Police (2006-May 2008), June 3, 2008; Harold Isaac and Brian Ellsworth, “Canada Sanctions Haiti Ex-President
Martelly for Financing Gangs,” Reuters, November 20, 2022.
29 Alberto Arce and Rodrigo Abd, “In Haiti, the Difficult Relationship of Gangs and Business,” Associated Press,
October 21, 2021.
30 Government of Canada, “Canada Imposes Sanctions Against Haitian Economic Elites,” December 5, 2022.
31 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Mapping Haiti’s Criminal Dynamics, November 2021; Global
Initiative, Gangs of Haiti.
32 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary-General, January 17, 2023.
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reported homicides occurred between January 2023 and April 2023.33 In 2022, kidnappings
increased by 104.7% compared with 2021. Kidnappings escalated further during the first quarter
of 2023, as gangs sought to find new revenue amid diminished support from elites who reportedly
feared being subject to U.S. or Canadian sanctions.34
According to U.N. reports, gangs have used “collective rape” and other gender-based violence
against women, children as young as 10, and the elderly to intimidate people 35
. From January
2023 to March 2023, at least 652 women and girls were victims of collective rape. Gender-based
and sexual violence is more prevalent in zones contested by warring gangs in which many
inhabitants lack access to basic health, education, and social services.
Although the State Department asserted that the HNP ranked among the “most trusted and
effective institutions in Haiti” after MINUSTAH left the country, the U.N. Secretary-General
described the police force in 2022 as “spread thin” and lacking weapons, equipment, and
capacity.36 Some studies also indicate the HNP has struggled with widespread criminal cooptation
and infiltration. A July 2022 International Crisis Group study estimated that 40% of the HNP has
ties to gangs.37 Even when police have sought to confront gangs and broader violence, the
challenges have been daunting. In November 2022, criminals assassinated the director of the
HNP’s training center at the center. In May 2023, a police officer died as gangs set two Canadian-
provided armored vehicles on fire.38
Furthermore, impunity prevails in Haiti’s weak justice system. In addition to failing to resolve
Moïse’s assassination, Haitian authorities have yet to arrest Jimmy Chérizier, a former HNP
officer turned gang leader, or other Haitian officials implicated in the 2018 La Saline massacre of
71 people.39 Gangs overtook several of Haiti’s main courthouses in summer 2022, and many of
the courthouses remain inoperable. Without functioning courts, Haitian prisons continue to hold
inmates, 83% of whom were in pretrial detention in March 2023; prisons have a 286% cell
occupancy rate.40 Many inmates lack access to food, water, and medical care. In April 2023,
Haitian officials estimated that gangs control 80% of the capital and other major cities.41
In addition, corruption and a lack of control over the country’s ports and borders have made Haiti
a hub for drug and arms trafficking. In August 2022, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

33 Ibid; “Haiti: International Support Needed now to Stop Spiraling Gang Violence,” UN News, May 9, 2023.
34 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, January 17, 2023; U.N. Security Council, BINUH,
Report of the Secretary General, April 13, 2023; Reuters, “Haiti Rights Group Records Three-Fold Rise in
Kidnappings for Early 2023,” April 4, 2023.
35 This draws from BINUH and Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Sexual Violence
in Port-au-Prince: A Weapon Used by Gangs to Instill Fear, October 14, 2022; OHCHR and BINUH, Human Rights
Situation, Quarterly Report: January-March 2023; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Gang
Control and Security Vacuums: Assessing Gender-Based Violence in Cité Soleil, May 2023.
36 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “Haiti Summary,” at
https://2017-2021.state.gov/bureau-of-international-narcotics-and-law-enforcement-affairs-work-by-country/haiti-
summary/index.html; Security Council, S/2022/747.
37 International Crisis Group, New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists, July 27, 2022.
38 Jacqueline Charles, “Police Officer Is Killed in Haiti After Gang Sets Armored Vehicles Ablaze,” Miami Herald,
May 18, 2023.
39 Chérizier, then-Minister of the Interior Fednel Monchery, and President Moïse’s Departmental Delegate Joseph
Pierre Richard Duplan planned an attack carried out by gangs on protesters who had criticized the government. U.S.
Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human Rights Day,”
December 10, 2020.
40 OHCHR and BINUH, Human Rights Situation, Main Trends, Quarterly Report: January-March 2023.
41 U.N. Security Council Meetings Coverage, “As Haiti Slides into Violence, Its People ‘Cannot Wait Any Longer’ for
Assistance, Foreign Minister Tells Security Council,” April 26, 2023.
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(DHS) Homeland Security Investigations office in Miami, FL, announced new initiatives to
counter reported spikes in arms trafficking to Haiti.42 In December 2022, the State Department
sanctioned Rommel Bell, former customs director in Haiti, for corruption after Haiti’s anti-
corruption unit launched an investigation into Bell’s alleged participation in arms trafficking.43
The rampant violence in Haiti has left many Haitians hopeless and frustrated. Since April 2023,
Haiti has experienced a rise in anti-gang vigilantism—the Bwa Kale movement.44 On April 24,
Port-au-Prince residents confronted, lynched, and burned 10 alleged gang members. Anti-gang
vigilantism has spiraled, with the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights citing
164 “mob killings and lynchings of alleged gang members” in April 2023.45
Humanitarian Situation
Haiti is a fragile country that is highly vulnerable to natural disasters due to its location and
topography (exacerbated by deforestation and climate change), and the Haitian government’s
capacity to respond to such disasters is limited. A decade after the devastating 2010 earthquake,
inadequate recovery efforts, combined with subsequent natural disasters (e.g., Hurricane
Matthew, the 2021 earthquake) and disease outbreaks (e.g., cholera, Coronavirus Disease 2019
[COVID-19]) have further weakened the state’s ability to protect and provide for its citizens.46
Recent flooding has resulted in more than 40 deaths and left some 13,000 homeless.47 The Fund
for Peace’s 2022 Fragile States Index ranked Haiti as the 11th most fragile state in the world due
to various factors, including the state’s lack of legitimacy and inability to deliver services, uneven
economic development, and relatively low levels of social cohesion.48
In contrast to some previous humanitarian crises Haiti has endured, a political and security crisis
is the primary driver of the current humanitarian emergency.49 According to U.N. officials, as of
March 2023, gang violence had displaced at least 160,000 people.50 Gang blockades of highways
have limited humanitarian access, particularly to the southern peninsula but also to communities
to the east and north of the capital. The G9 gang’s blockade of the Varreux fuel terminal from
mid-September to early November 2022 combined with broad unrest, caused businesses and
hospitals to close. During that period, Haitians, fearful of encountering gang violence, sheltered
in place amid a lack of water and sanitation services, fuel, electricity, and food. The U.N. Office

42 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Announces Crackdown on
Firearms, Ammunition Smuggling to Haiti, the Caribbean,” August 19, 2022.
43 U.S. Department of State, “Combating Global Corruption and Human Rights Abuses,” December 2, 2022; Jacqueline
Charles, “U.S. Sanctions More Haitians, Including the Relatives of People Accused of Corruption,” Miami Herald,
December 11, 2022.
44 Reuters, “Haitian Residents Lynch and Set Fire to Suspected Gang Members,” April 26, 2023.
45 OHCHR, “Haiti: UN Human Rights Chief Warns Against ‘Never-Ending Cycle of Violence,’” May 9, 2023.
46 On recovery and reconstruction, see Jonathan Katz, The Big Truck That Went by: How the World Came to Save Haiti
and Left Behind a Disaster (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2014); Government Accountability Office (GAO),
Haiti: USAID and State Should Improve Management and Assessment of Reconstruction Activities, GAO-23-105211,
March 2023. Hereinafter: GAO, March 2023. On subsequent disasters, see Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path.”
47 Jacqueline Charles, “At Least 42 Dead, Thousands Homeless in Haiti After a Weekend of Heavy Rains, Flooding,”
Miami Herald, June 5, 2023.
48 The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, at https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/.
49 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Seven Things to Know About the
Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti,” October 26, 2022.
50 OHCHR, Haiti- Gang Violence, March 21, 2023.
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for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that 5.2 million Haitians are in need of
humanitarian aid.51
Some of the ongoing humanitarian concerns focus on food insecurity, health, protection, and
education. In October 2022, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that a record
4.7 million Haitians, roughly 50% of the population, faced acute levels of hunger and 19,000
people were experiencing “catastrophic” (most urgent) levels of hunger.52 In October 2022,
cholera resurfaced in Haiti; as of mid-April 2023, cholera had claimed 686 lives. 53 While cholera
is preventable through vaccination and treatable with rehydration, gangs have reportedly
prevented patient access to health facilities and denied medical staff entry to affected
communities. In March 2023, BINUH reported that at least 21 health facilities had shut down or
reduced their activities due to escalating violence—including Doctors Without Borders, which
temporarily closed a hospital in Cité Soleil.54 Children in Haiti are extremely vulnerable to
protection concerns, particularly gender-based violence. They have also lost years of schooling
due to COVID-19; insecurity and cholera-related school closures; and, most recently, armed
attacks on schools.55
U.N. Presence in Haiti and Recent Action
The U.N. has had a continuous presence in Haiti for almost 19 years, with strong support and
funding provided by successive U.S. presidential administrations. Following the collapse of the
Aristide government in 2004, the U.N. Security Council established MINUSTAH to help restore
order and train the HNP.56 After the 2010 earthquake, the Security Council expanded
MINUSTAH’s size and mission.
A Security Council resolution ended MINUSTAH in 2017, citing Haiti’s peaceful completion of a
long-delayed electoral process in February 2017 as a milestone; critics argue, however, that a
transitional government, not the U.N.-backed PHTK government, accomplished that goal.57 The
Security Council also praised MINUSTAH for supporting the political process, professionalizing
the police, and improving security and stability in Haiti, achievements that proved short-lived.
Haitian and international human rights and health experts criticized MINUSTAH for its role in
introducing cholera to Haiti (a disease that had not been present in the country for more than a
century) and for allegations of sexual abuse by some of its forces.58 In 2016, then-Secretary-

51 UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2023, December 2022.
52 U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Catastrophic Hunger Levels Recorded for the First
Time in Haiti,” October 14, 2022.
53 Pan-American Health Organization, “Cholera Epidemic in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,” May 19, 2023.
54 OHCHR and BINUH, Human Rights Situation, Main Trends, Quarterly Report: January-March 2023, March 8,
2023; Reuters, “Medecins Sans Frontieres Shuts Haiti Hospital amid Gang Violence,” March 8, 2023.
55 U.N. Children’s Fund, “Haiti: Armed Violence Against Schools Increases Nine-Fold in One Year,” February 9,
2023.
56 U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 1542 (2004)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 4961st Meeting, on 30 April
2004,” S/RES/1542 (2004), June 1, 2004. MINUSTAH’s original mission aimed to restore security and stability,
promote political processes (including elections), strengthen institutions and rule-of-law-structures, and promote and
protect human rights.
57 U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 2350 (2017)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 7924th Meeting, on 13 April
2017,” S/RES/2350 (2017), April 13, 2017. Even with MINUSTAH present, Haiti experienced a constitutional crisis
after Michel Martelly failed to convene elections to choose his successor. Georges Fauriol, ‘A Cycle of Instability’:
Haiti’s Constitutional Crisis,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 8, 2021.
58 For background, see CRS In Focus IF10502, Haiti: Cholera, the United Nations, and Hurricane Matthew, by
Maureen Taft-Morales and Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.
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General Ban Ki-Moon apologized for the U.N.’s role in an outbreak that ultimately caused nearly
10,000 deaths; the U.N. also launched a $400 million fund to confront the epidemic.59
In 2017, the U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) took MINUSTAH’s place,
focusing on strengthening judicial institutions, protecting human rights, increasing the HNP’s
professionalization, and reinforcing the rule of law. The mission also supported violence-
reduction projects and income-generating activities for youth. During MINJUSTH’s mandate, the
number of HNP officers increased by 10% to 15,400 and courts reported a 300% increase in files
processed on the day of their reception.60 However, Haitians continued to report increased sexual
violence and widespread cholera cases.61
In October 2019, the U.N. transitioned to a political office, the U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti
(BINUH), for an initial one-year period that the U.N. Security Council twice extended. BINUH’s
mandate, which currently runs through July 2023,62 is to advise the Haitian government on how to
establish an inclusive national dialogue on reestablishing stability, security, and the rule of law so
elections can be held, among other aims. The mission also emphasizes protecting and promoting
human rights, including by documenting recent gender-based violence by gangs and producing
reports from Haiti for the U.N. Secretary-General and Security Council.63 BINUH coordinates
with other U.N. agencies, funds, and programs, ranging from humanitarian agencies such as the
World Food Program to a newer U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime office in Haiti.
On October 6, 2022, Acting Prime Minister Henry and his ministers requested the deployment of
an international force to help Haitian forces quell the security situation and allow humanitarian
aid to flow. On October 8, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres sent a letter to the Security
Council recommending various approaches to respond to that request. Such approaches included
deploying a non-U.N. rapid action force (probably composed of some military forces) to support
the HNP, forming a multinational police task force, creating a multinational anti-gang force,
expanding BINUH’s budget and mandate, bolstering the HNP and the justice sector, and
combating arms trafficking.64 On October 17, 2022, the Security Council discussed a proposed
resolution by the United States and Mexico, which reportedly would have authorized the
deployment of a non-U.N. multinational force to Haiti.65 Few countries have publicly offered to
send their forces to Haiti, and Canada has reportedly declined U.S. requests to lead such a
mission.66
On October 17, 2022, the Security Council also discussed a resolution sponsored by the United
States and Mexico to establish a U.N. sanctions regime against gang leaders in Haiti and those

59 U.N. News, “U.N.’s Ban Apologizes to People of Haiti, Outlines New Plan to Fight Cholera Epidemic and Help
Communities,” December 1, 2016. By the end of 2021, donors had contributed only $21.8 million to support the
pledged $400 million fund. See U.N. Haiti Cholera Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund, 2021 Annual Report.
60 U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, “MINUJUSTH Completes Its Mandate, Putting an End to 15 Consecutive
Years of Peacekeeping in Haiti,” October 16, 2019.
61 International Justice Resource Center, “U.N. Transitions from Peacekeeping to Governance, Amid Crisis in Haiti,”
October 17, 2019.
62 For background, see BINUH, “Mandate,” at https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/mandate.
63 BINUH and OHCHR, Sexual Violence.
64 Security Council, S/2022/747.
65 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a U.N. Security
Council Briefing on Haiti,” October 17, 2022. Security Council Report, “Haiti: Briefing,” in What’s in Blue (blog),
December 21, 2022 (hereinafter Security Council Report, “Haiti”).
66 International Crisis Group, Haiti’s Last Resort: Gangs and the Prospect of Foreign Intervention, December 14,
2022; Richard Sanders, Canada, The United States and Haiti- Dilemmas of Foreign Policy and Immigration, Wilson
Center, May 10, 2023.
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who finance them. The Security Council unanimously approved the sanctions resolution
(Resolution 2653) on October 21, 2022; an expert committee is guiding its implementation.67 The
Security Council has continued to receive regular briefings from BINUH and other U.N. agencies
in Haiti but has not taken additional public actions.
U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress
U.S. policy goals in Haiti under the Biden Administration include supporting Haitian-led efforts
to confront gangs and insecurity; resolving the political and constitutional crises; reviving the
economy; and addressing poverty and a lack of basic services (including health care and
education), which have fueled irregular migration.68 Since Moïse’s assassination, U.S., Canadian,
and U.N. officials—among others criticized for past interventions in the country—have
emphasized their support for Haitian-led solutions to the country’s political and security
challenges. As those solutions have yet to emerge and conditions in Haiti have deteriorated, U.S.
officials have pursued several courses of action.
The Biden Administration’s diplomatic approach to Haiti has evolved from supporting the Henry
government to encouraging Henry and other key stakeholders to implement the December 21
agreement and address insecurity in the country. The U.S. government has sanctioned corrupt
officials and encouraged other countries to do so, supported back-channel negotiations between
Henry and other key stakeholders, and sought a partner country to lead a non-U.N. “multinational
force” funded by voluntary contributions to help stabilize the country.69 In March 2023, the Biden
Administration issued a 10-year plan for Haiti, as mandated by the Global Fragility Act (P.L. 116-
94), with a long-term, interagency goal of helping “Haiti’s citizens and government advance a
shared vision and a permissive environment for long-term stability.”70
On many U.S. policy issues, Congress has had a direct role in shaping policy or conducting
oversight of policy development and implementation. Those policy issues include, but are not
limited to, foreign assistance, trade preferences, sanctions policy, and migration.
Foreign Assistance
Bilateral Assistance
Congress has appropriated foreign assistance to support Haiti’s recovery from recurrent natural
disasters and foster long-term stability. In addition to significantly expanding such assistance in
the aftermath of a massive 2010 earthquake, Congress has closely monitored the implementation
and impact of U.S. assistance activities.71 Congress also shapes U.S. policy toward Haiti through
appropriations, conditions on appropriations, and reporting requirements linked to the obligation
of U.S. assistance.

67 Security Council, “Resolution 2653 (2022), October 21, 2022; Security Council Report, “Haiti.”
68 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Haiti, approved March 18, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2022/04/ICS_WHA_Haiti_Public.pdf (hereinafter State Department, Integrated Country Strategy).
69 Adams, “U.S. and Canada Turn to Sanctions”; International Crisis Group, Haiti’s Last Resort: Gangs and the
Prospect for Foreign Intervention, briefing no. 48, December 14, 2022.
70 U.S. Department of State, The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for
Haiti, March 24, 2023.
71 See, as an example, GAO-23-105211, March 2023.
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Congress enacted the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative
Act (HAITI Act; H.R. 2471/S. 1104) as part of the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L.
117-103, Division V). The HAITI Act stated that U.S. policy should support sustainable
rebuilding and development efforts in Haiti that recognize Haitian independence, are led by the
people and government of Haiti, and contribute to international efforts to support broad and
inclusive dialogue to restore democratic institutions and legitimacy in the country.72 The HAITI
Act also required U.S. agencies to measure the progress of post-disaster recovery and efforts to
address corruption, governance, rule of law, and media freedoms in Haiti. The State Department
submitted the reports required by the act and made them public on November 10, 2022.73
Over the last five years, U.S. bilateral assistance to Haiti has ranged from a low of $180.3 million
in FY2020 to $237.4 million in FY2022 (see Table 1). In March 2022, the State Department and
USAID adopted a two-year Integrated Country Strategy to guide U.S. foreign assistance to Haiti
for FY2022-FY2024.74 The Administration requested $274.8 million in assistance for Haiti in
FY2023 to help Haiti recover from external shocks by investing in the HNP, combating
corruption, strengthening civil society, and providing services for marginalized people.75
The FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328), enacted in December 2022, does
not specify a comprehensive appropriations level for Haiti. The accompanying explanatory
statement designates $8.5 million for reforestation efforts and “not less than” $5.0 million to help
meet the sanitary, medical, and nutritional needs of Haitian prisoners. The act requires the State
Department to withhold any aid to support the Haitian government until the Secretary of State
certifies that a new president and parliament have taken office following free and fair elections or
that a broadly representative transitional government is in place and it is in the U.S. interest to
provide such assistance. The withholding requirement does not apply to aid intended to support
free and fair elections; anti-gang police and justice administration; disaster relief and recovery;
and education, public health, food security, and other basic human needs. As in prior years, the
act prohibits assistance for the armed forces of Haiti. The explanatory statement accompanying
P.L. 117-328 urges the Secretary of State to use “every appropriate diplomatic tool to press for
dialogue” among key stakeholders and to take “strong legal action” against those engaged in
human rights abuses, corruption, and other illicit activities.76
The Administration has requested $291.5 million for Haiti in FY2024, with the largest increase in
funding requested for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) to support
the HNP and other justice sector actors. This prioritization of restoring security and justice
coincides with the phase one activities outlined by the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (GFA; P.L.
116-94, Division J, Title V) plan for Haiti.

72 Other elements of U.S. policy cited in the act include building the long-term capacity of the government, civil
society, and private sector to foster economic development in Haiti; fostering collaboration with the Haitian diaspora
and the business community in Haiti; supporting anti-corruption, press freedom, and human rights protection, including
through the imposition of sanctions; restoring the natural resources of Haiti; promoting political stability and free and
fair elections; providing comprehensive reporting on the goals and progress of the Haitian government and the U.S.
government, and promoting the participation of Haitian women and youth in U.S. assistance programs.
73 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Haiti: Reports,” November 10, 2022, at
https://www.state.gov/haiti-reports/.
74 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy.
75 White House, Budget of the U.S. Government, FY2023, p. 91.
76 “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Leahy, Chair of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Regarding H.R.
2617, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023,” Congressional Record, vol. 168, no. 198—book II (December 20,
2022), p. S9299.
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Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Haiti by Account: FY2018-FY2024
(appropriations in thousands of current U.S. dollars)
FY2023
FY2024
Account
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
(Request)
(Request)
DA
32,000
51,000
51,000
52,000
59,000
111,000
113,200
ESF
8,500
—
—
14,800a
20,500b
—
—
FFP
3,244
11,719
7,996
3,110
—
—
—
GHP (State)
99,386
103,011
78,765
99,822
103,081
100,000
100,000
GHP
24,200
24,500
24,500
24,500
24,500
34,500
33,000
(USAID)
INCLE
12,000
15,000
18,000
13,000
30,300
29,000
45,000
IMET
233
241
96
255
47
255
255
FMF
5,000
—
—
—
—
—
—
Total
184,563
205,471
180,357
207,487a
237,428b
274,755
291,455
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Supplementary Tables-Foreign
Operations, FY2020-FY2024.
Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; FFP = Food for Peace; GHP = Global
Health Programs; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; IMET = International Military
Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing.
a. This sum includes $14.8 mil ion of ESF appropriated through the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L.
117-2).
b. This sum includes $15.0 mil ion of ESF appropriated through the Additional Ukraine Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128).
Humanitarian Assistance
The United States often provides additional humanitarian assistance to Haiti. USAID’s Bureau of
Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) provided more than $92.1 million in humanitarian assistance to
Haiti in FY2021 and $79.2 million in FY2022. Of the total amount of humanitarian assistance
provided over the past two fiscal years, $152.8 million represented emergency funding, much of
which responded to humanitarian needs (i.e., concerns about food; health; water, sanitation, and
hygiene; and protection) exacerbated by an August 2021 earthquake that killed some 2,250 people
and damaged 115,000 homes and other structures.
As the humanitarian situation in Haiti worsened, USAID sent a Disaster Assistance Response
Team (DART) team to the country in October 2022. The DART is coordinating the delivery of
relief supplies to a portion of the estimated 5.2 million Haitians in need of humanitarian
assistance.77 Since October, USAID/BHA has helped transport 450 metric tons of relief supplies
to help Haiti respond to the cholera outbreak. Total USAID humanitarian funding for Haiti in
FY2023 stood at $56.5 million as of May 2023.
U.S. agencies also helped Haiti respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and related health needs. The
United States has donated nearly 1.1 million COVID-19 vaccines to Haiti.78 In FY2022, USAID

77 USAID, “Haiti-Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #4, FY2023, May 3, 2023.
78 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution,” at https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/haiti/
#covid_map_link.
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provided $51.3 million to help Haiti address the health and humanitarian impacts of COVID-19.79
In December 2022, DOD deployed the U.S. Naval Ship Comfort to deliver medical care to
Haitians as part of a multi-country deployment.
Global Fragility Act Implementation
The 116th Congress enacted the GFA, which directed the executive branch to develop a 10-year
strategy to prevent conflict globally and stabilize conflict-affected areas. It also directed the
executive branch to select priority countries or regions to execute such efforts through 10-year
plans. In April 2022, the Biden Administration announced one region and four priority countries
for GFA implementation; Haiti was among them. The GFA also authorized three distinct funds:
the Prevention and Stabilization Fund (PSF), the Complex Crisis Fund (CCF), and the Multi-
Donor Global Fragility Fund. These funds support the updated Global Fragility Strategy put forth
by the Biden Administration and country implementation plans, summaries of which the
Administration released in March 2023.80 Haiti received a total of $15 million in FY2021 PSF
resources to carry out activities in support of the GFA, including the development of the country
strategy.81
Some Members of Congress have debated whether Haiti should receive some types of GFA-
related funding. This debate may reflect, in part, the absence of viable government entities with
whom to execute the GFA country plan (§505(a)). For example, the explanatory statement
accompanying the Senate-introduced version of the FY2023 Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations measure, S. 4662, would have directed that
PSF assistance not be made available for Haiti. That provision was not included in the final
legislation or explanatory statement.
Donor Coordination
The United States is the leading bilateral donor in Haiti, and Congress has encouraged U.S.
executive agencies to coordinate foreign assistance priorities with key countries and international
organizations represented in Haiti. Active since 2004, the “Core Group” has shaped international
responses to key events in Haiti, as when it called on Henry to form a “consensual and inclusive
government” in July 2021.82 In addition to the U.S. Ambassador, the Core Group comprises the
Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General; the Ambassadors of Brazil, Canada,
France, Germany, Spain, and the European Union (EU); and the Special Representative of the
Organization of American States.
Many members of the Core Group (including the EU, Spain, and France) have expressed interest
in contributing to a multi-donor basket fund on security that aims to support the long-term
development of the HNP; Canada and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) administer the
fund. UNDP estimated the fund needs at least $28 million over two years to achieve its aims. As
of February 2023, the U.S. government had donated $3 million and Canada had donated C$10
million (about $7.4 million); total donations stood at $19 million83

79 USAID, “COVID-19: Latin America and the Caribbean,” Fact Sheet #6, FY2022, September 30, 2022.
80 U.S. Department of State, The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for
Haiti, March 24, 2023.
81 Email from State Department official, May 30, 2023.
82 BINUH, “Core Group Press Release,” July 17, 2021.
83 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Canada Joint Statement on Support for the Haiti Security Basket
Fund,” September 23, 2022; Global Affairs Canada, “Canada-Haiti Relations,” February 15, 2023.
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In October 2022, the U.S. and Canadian governments accelerated the delivery of armored
vehicles and other tactical equipment purchased by the Haitian government for the HNP.84 In
March 2023, Canada pledged to provide C$100 million (about $74 million) in additional aid for
the HNP.85
Trade Preferences86
Congress has extended unilateral trade preferences to Haiti through several trade preferences
programs enacted since 1975. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (P.L. 98-67,
subsequently amended, with no expiration), for example, provides limited duty-free entry of
selected Caribbean products as a core element of the U.S. foreign economic policy response to
uncertain economic and political conditions in the region. The current Haiti-specific preference
program, which expires in 2025, provides unilateral preferences to the country’s apparel sector.87
The value of imports entering under Caribbean preference programs increased from $25 million
in 2000 to $253.3 million in 2022, an increase of over 900%.88 Those imports accounted for about
31.9% of total U.S. merchandise imports from Haiti. Over 90% of U.S. imports from Haiti in
2022 consisted of apparel items or clothing: knitted or crocheted apparel imports totaled $807.0
million, while other apparel items or clothing totaled $155.0 million.
The Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act of 2023 (S. 552), introduced in the Senate in
February 2023, would renew U.S. trade preferences for Haiti through 2035.
Sanctions: U.S. and Multilateral
In 2020, as part of its policy toward Haiti, the U.S. government began to impose sanctions against
those responsible for significant human rights abuses, corruption, and drug trafficking. In
December 2020, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which built upon and expanded the
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (P.L. 114-328), U.S. Department of the
Treasury imposed asset blocking and visa restrictions on Chérizier (the gang leader and former
HNP officer) and two former Moïse officials for involvement in the La Saline massacre.89
The United States has expanded targeted sanctions on current and former Haitian officials since
autumn 2022. In November 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions
pursuant to E.O. 14059 on Joseph Lambert, then-president of the Haitian senate, and former
Senator Youri Latortue for involvement in drug trafficking.90 Treasury imposed the same

84 Reuters, “U.S., Canada Deliver Armored Vehicles to Haitian Police to Fight Gangs,” October 15, 2022.
85 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada in Joint Press Conference,”
March 24, 2023.
86 For additional information, see CRS Report R47432, Caribbean Trade Preference Programs, by Liana Wong and M.
Angeles Villarreal.
87 For a description of how the Haiti-specific preference programs have evolved and have affected Haitian exports and
Haitian workers, see U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.-Haiti Trade: Impact of U.S. Preference Programs on
Haiti’s Economy and Workers, December 2022.
88 Compiled by CRS using data from U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb.
89 E.O. 13818, “Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption,” December
20, 2017; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International
Human Rights Day,” December 10, 2020.
90 E.O. 14059, “Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Involved in the Global Illicit Drug Trade,” December 15, 2021;
U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Haitian Politicians for Narcotics Trafficking,”
November 4, 2022.
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sanctions on Senator Rony Celestin and former Senator Richard Lenine in December 2022.91 In
April 2023, the Treasury Department sanctioned Gary Bodeu, former head of Haiti’s Chamber of
Deputies, for corruption.92 Pursuant to Section 7031(c) of P.L. 117-103, Division K, the State
Department imposed visa restrictions on Senator Lambert for corruption and involvement in a
gross violation of human rights.93 The State Department also imposed visa restrictions on former
Haitian Customs Director Rommel Bell and Senator Celestin for corruption.94 In June 2023,
Secretary of State Blinked announced visa restrictions on Laurent Salvador Lamothe, former
prime minister and minister of planning and external cooperation for Michel Martelly, for
significant corruption.95 Those subject to recent public sanctions represent a range of political
parties. Dozens of officials and their families have privately had their visas revoked.
The United States has encouraged other international partners and the U.N. to sanction the
financial backers of Haitian gangs, recognizing that targeted sanctions imposed in a multilateral
manner may have a better chance of affecting change than unilateral sanctions.96 U.S. sanctions
have been closely coordinated with those announced by the Government of Canada, which also
imposed sanctions on former President Martelly for drug trafficking—a move U.S. officials have
“welcomed.”97 In October 2022, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved Resolution
2653 imposing sanctions on Jimmy Chérizier for “engaging in acts that threaten the peace,
security, and stability of Haiti.”98 The Security Council named a panel of experts to recommend
further individuals and entities to be subject to travel bans, asset seizures, and an arms embargo.
The House and Senate are considering the Haiti Criminal Collusion Transparency Act of 2023
(H.R. 1684/S. 396), aimed at identifying and penalizing ties between Haitian political and
economic elites and criminal gangs. The bills would require the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the intelligence community, to produce an unclassified annual report, which
may have a classified annex, to specific congressional committees identifying Haitian political
and economic elites tied to gangs. They also would require the Secretary of State to impose visa
restrictions and sanctions on those individuals pursuant to Section 7031(c) of annual Department
of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations legislation, Section 1263 of
the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114-328), or
any other legal provision. The President could waive those sanctions requirements if the Secretary
of State certifies that said waiver is in the U.S. national interest or is necessary for the delivery of
humanitarian or related assistance.

91 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Sanctions Additional Corrupt Haitian Politicians for Drug Trafficking,”
December 2, 2022.
92 U.S. Department of State, “Treasury Sanctions Former President of Haiti’s Chamber of Deputies,” April 5, 2023.
93 U.S. Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Designation of Haitian Senate President, Joseph
Lambert, for Involvement in Significant Corruption and a Gross Violation of Human Rights,” December 4, 2022.
94 U.S. Department of State, “Combating Global Corruption and Human Rights Abuses,” December 9, 2022.
95 The State Department asserts that LaMothe misappropriated some $60 million in PetroCaribe funds provided to Haiti
by the Venezuelan government, The State Department, Anthony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Designation of Laurent
Salvador Lamothe – Former Haitian Prime Minister and Minister of Planning and External Cooperation – for
Involvement in Significant Corruption,” June 2, 2023.
96 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review, October 2021.
97 Government of Canada, “Sanctions: Grave Breach of International Peace and Security in Haiti,” updated December
19, 2022, at https://www.international.gc.ca/campaign-campagne/haiti-sanction/index.aspx?lang=eng; Jacqueline
Charles and Michael Wilner, “Canada Sanctions Former Haiti President Michel Martelly, Two Former Prime
Ministers,” Miami Herald, November 21, 2022.
98 U.N. Security Council, “Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 2653 (2022) Concerning
Haiti,” at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653.
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Indictments
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has assisted Haitian officials investigating the Moïse
assassination and selected cases involving those complicit in arms trafficking, gang violence, and
drug trafficking in and through Haiti. DOJ has secured the extradition of two individuals
allegedly complicit in Moïse’s assassination, as well as a gang leader responsible for the 2021
kidnapping of U.S. missionaries. In November 2022, DOJ indicted seven leaders of five Haitian
gangs, including additional individuals involved in the 2021 missionary kidnappings.99
Migration Issues
Migration issues continue to be a high priority for U.S. policy and Congress. U.S. government
apprehensions of Haitian migrants have risen notably, both at sea and on the U.S. Southwest
border. In FY2022, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) encountered roughly 53,910
Haitians on the Southwest border, up from 47,255 encountered in FY2021.100 Many of those
Haitians had resided in third countries (particularly Brazil and Chile) since the 2010 earthquake
and had few ties to Haiti.101 CBP placed a majority of those individuals (77%) into Title 8
removal proceedings under immigration code, and many were released into the United States to
await their immigration court proceedings. CBP expelled the other 22% of Haitians from the
United States under Title 42 of the U.S. Code.102 In FY2022, the Coast Guard interdicted more
than 7,175 Haitian migrants, compared with 1,527 Haitian migrants in FY2021.103
On January 5, 2023, DHS announced the expansion of a set of new immigration policies to
Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans, which started in October 2022 for Venezuelans.104 Haitians
who have a U.S. sponsor can apply for immigration parole and fly directly into the United States
after U.S. vetting. As of April 2023, some 580,000 Haitians had reportedly applied for the
program (of some 1.5 million applicants from the four countries), overwhelming the program’s
pledge to accept a monthly aggregate of 30,000 parolees from the four countries.105
In contrast, Haitians apprehended crossing the U.S. Southwest border between ports of entry were
subject to the public health-related Title 42 policy until it ended on May 11, 2023. Title 42
allowed DHS to expel migrants back to Mexico (in coordination with the government of Mexico).
Following the end of Title 42, Haitians encountered by DHS are likely to be deemed ineligible for

99 U.S. Department of Justice, “Criminal Charges Unsealed Against Gang Leaders for Kidnappings of U.S. Citizens,”
November 7, 2020.
100 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Nationwide Encounters,” calculated by CRS using data available at
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters. Nearly 46% of migrants were encountered at ports of
entry and 53% between ports of entry.
101 Caitlyn Yates, Haitian Migration Through the Americas: A Decade in the Making, Migration Information Source,
September 30, 2021.
102 Title 42 was a public health measure invoked in March 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention that enabled U.S. authorities to restrict entry into the United States of foreign nationals
lacking “proper travel documents” to help prevent the spread of disease. On May 11, 2023, the federal COVID-19
public health emergency declaration expired and the Biden Administration ended the use of Title 42.
103 Skyler Shepard, “Coast Guard Repatriates 180 People to Haiti, 46 Children,” CBS12, November 25, 2022.
104 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “DHS Implements New Processes for Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans
and Eliminates Cap for Venezuelans,” January 6, 2022.
105 Camilo Montoya-Galvez, “1.5 Million Apply for U.S. Migrant Sponsorship Program with 30,000 Monthly Cap,”
CBS News, May 22, 2023.
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asylum, deported to Mexico under Title 8 expedited removal procedures, and banned from reentry
for at least five years.106
The United States also has taken steps to provide legal migration and protection pathways for
some Haitians. Some 155,000 Haitians may be eligible for relief from removal under the
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation announced in May 2021, and additional Haitians
are eligible under the extension announced in December 2022.107 In July 2022, the Biden
Administration said it would resume the Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program, allowing
certain U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents to seek parole for family members in Haiti.
Outlook
The 118th Congress has maintained a keen interest in developments in Haiti, as deteriorating
security and humanitarian conditions in Haiti intersect with a broad range of U.S. interests and
policy responses. As noted earlier, Congress has directly engaged with U.S. policy approaches
toward Haiti in relation to foreign assistance, trade preferences, sanctions policy, and migration.
Should the current crisis in Haiti continue, Congress may choose to consider and assess new
policy approaches to address the situation in Haiti, including the potential for U.S.-backed
international intervention, or other new engagements in Haiti.

Author Information

Clare Ribando Seelke
Karla I. Rios
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Analyst in Latin American Affairs

Acknowledgments
This report draws from the past work of Maureen Taft-Morales, Specialist in Latin American Affairs.

106 CRS Insight IN12159, Post-Title 42: U.S. Foreign Policy Initiatives to Manage Regional Migration, by Clare
Ribando Seelke, Peter J. Meyer, and Ramon Miro.
107 See CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure, by Jill H. Wilson.
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Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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Congressional Research Service
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