Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy
September 18, 2023February 1, 2024
Haiti, located on the Haiti, located on the western third of the island of Hispaniola island of Hispaniola and bordering the Dominican bordering the Dominican
Republic, remains mired in interrelated political, security, and humanitarian crises. Haiti lacks an Republic, remains mired in interrelated political, security, and humanitarian crises. Haiti lacks an
Clare Ribando Seelke
elected president, legislature, and mayorselected president and Karla I. Rios legislature following the July 2021 assassination of President following the July 2021 assassination of President
Specialist in Latin
Jovenel Moïse. Moïse had named Jovenel Moïse. Moïse had named Analyst in Latin American Ariel Henry to be prime minister prior to his death, but Henry Ariel Henry to be prime minister prior to his death, but Henry
American Affairs
had not been sworn in as required had not been sworn in as required Affairs under Haitian law. Since the assassination, a political stalemate under Haitian law. Since the assassination, a political stalemate

has persisted over whether Henry has persisted over whether Henry or a transitional government should govern until elections or a transitional government should govern until elections can
Karla I. Rios
be convened and an elected government is in place.
Analystare convened. A December 2022 Clare Ribando Seelke Henry-backed accord aimed to create a path to elect a president by February 7, 2024. As that date Specialist in Latin has approached, protests against the de facto Henry government have escalated. in Latin American American
Affairs Affairs
The The ongoing political impasse political impasse also has hindered Haiti’s ability to respond to worsening security has hindered Haiti’s ability to respond to worsening security

and and humanitarian criseshumanitarian crises caused by rampant gang violence, food and fuel shortages, and a
resurgence of cholera. In October 2022, Henry asked for a foreign security force to help . In October 2022, Henry asked for a foreign security force to help
reestablish control amid rampant gang violence. Although
reestablish control and enable humanitarian aid deliveries. While many Haitian civil society many Haitian civil society
groups initially opposed this request due to concerns regarding abuses committed during past interventions and Henry’s groups initially opposed this request due to concerns regarding abuses committed during past interventions and Henry’s
unelected status, increased insecurity has led more Haitians to express support for international assistance. Kenya hasunelected status, some have since expressed support for a foreign security force presence. After Kenya offered offered
to lead a “multinational security to lead a “multinational security support (MSS) mission,”support mission” if authorized by the U.N. Security Council. The compound the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution in October 2023 to authorize a non-U.N. mission funded by voluntary contributions. The status of the MSS is uncertain, however, as Kenya’s High Court has ruled the deployment unconstitutional. The crises in Haiti crises in Haiti
continue to fuel instability and U.S.-bound migration. continue to fuel instability and U.S.-bound migration.
U.S. Policy
U.S. policy in Haiti has aimed to support Haitian efforts to restore security, the rule of law, democratic institutions leading to U.S. policy in Haiti has aimed to support Haitian efforts to restore security, the rule of law, democratic institutions leading to
free and fair elections, and economic and social stability. free and fair elections, and economic and social stability. In FY2022, theThe Biden Administration allocated $237.4 million in Biden Administration allocated $237.4 million in
bilateral assistance for Haitibilateral assistance for Haiti in FY2022 and $204.5 million in FY2023, including increased support for the Haitian National Police. , including increased support for the Haitian National Police. In FY2023, an estimated $204.5
million has been allocated to Haiti; theThe Administration requested $291.5 million for Haiti in FY2024. Separately, the Administration requested $291.5 million for Haiti in FY2024. Separately, the
Administration has continued to provide humanitarian assistance to Haiti, including more than $112 millionAdministration provided more than $126.5 million in humanitarian assistance to Haiti in FY2023. In in FY2023. In
March 2023, the Administration released a 10-year plan for promoting peace and stability in Haiti, a priority country under March 2023, the Administration released a 10-year plan for promoting peace and stability in Haiti, a priority country under
the Global Fragility Act (P.L. 116-94), supported by the Global Fragility Act (P.L. 116-94), supported by additional funds. The Administration pledged $100 million in foreign assistance and $100 million in Defense Department operational support to the proposed MSS. Theadditional funds.
The Biden Administration has encouraged negotiations between Henry and other key stakeholders regarding a pathway to
future elections, and has placed increased pressure on Henry in recent months to reach an inclusive political accord. Since
October 2022, the U.S. Treasury and State Departments have publicly sanctioned U.S. Treasury and State Departments have publicly sanctioned seveneight current or former Haitian officials, current or former Haitian officials,
including including Laurent Lamothe, former prime minister for President Michel Martelly (2011-2016). The Administration also has
sought to facilitate a broader international response to the situation in Haititwo former prime ministers, and several gang leaders. The United States . The United States and Mexico co-drafted a U.N. drafted a U.N.
Security Council resolution to sanction gang leaders in Haiti and their financial backers Security Council resolution to sanction gang leaders in Haiti and their financial backers that was (adopted in October 2022)adopted in October 2022.
The United States and Ecuador are finalizing a U.N. Security Council resolution to support a Kenyan-led mission to Haiti. .
Congressional Action
Congress set objectives for U.S. policy toward Haiti through 2025 in the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Congress set objectives for U.S. policy toward Haiti through 2025 in the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional
Transparency Initiative Act (P.L. 117-103, Division V)Transparency Initiative Act (P.L. 117-103, Division V) and directed the Secretary of State to prioritize the protection of
human rights and anticorruption efforts. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328), did not designate a total . The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328), did not designate a total
funding level for Haiti but placed democracy-related conditions on some funding level for Haiti but placed democracy-related conditions on some foreign assistance. Neither of the versions of a
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024, reported by assistance. Neither the House-passedthe House (H.R. (H.R.
4665/H.Rept. 118-146) 4665/H.Rept. 118-146) andnor the Senate Appropriations Senate Appropriations CommitteesCommittee-reported (S. 2438/S.Rept. 118-71) (S. 2438/S.Rept. 118-71) versions of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024, would designate a specific aid would designate a specific aid
amount for Haiti. However, both measures would place restrictions on assistance to the central government. In addition to amount for Haiti. However, both measures would place restrictions on assistance to the central government. In addition to
foreign assistance, the House passed, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported, bills (H.R. 1684/S. 396) that foreign assistance, the House passed, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported, bills (H.R. 1684/S. 396) that
would require an annual State Department report on ties between gangs and politicians in Haiti and would require an annual State Department report on ties between gangs and politicians in Haiti and would direct the President to direct the President to
impose visa- and property-blocking impose sanctions on sanctions on certain individuals identified in the report. Bills to renew trade preferences individuals identified in the report. Bills to renew trade preferences
for Haiti (H.R. 5035/S. 552) also have been introduced in both houses. Congressional oversight efforts in the 118th Congress for Haiti (H.R. 5035/S. 552) also have been introduced in both houses. Congressional oversight efforts in the 118th Congress
have focused on the Administration’s plans to improve security and democracy in Haiti, have focused on the Administration’s plans to improve security and democracy in Haiti, and could expand to monitor funding
and anyits relationship with the Henry government, and its pledged support for a multinational force deployment to Haiti. multinational force deployment to Haiti.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Political Situation ............................................................................................................................ 2
Background ............................................................................................................................... 2
The Aftermath of President Moïse’s Assassination Post-Assassination Political Impasse ........................................................................................ 4
Security Crisis ................................................................................................................................. 5
Humanitarian Situation .................................................................................................................... 87
U.N. Presence in Haiti and Recent Action ...................................................................................... 98
Sanctions Resolution ............................................................................................................... 10
Multinational Force Consideration.................... 9 Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission ........................................................................ 10
U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress ............................................................................................... 11
Foreign Assistance .................................................................................................................. 12
Bilateral Assistance ........................................................................................................... 12
Humanitarian Assistance ................................................................................................... 14
Funds to Support the Multinational Security Support Mission ......................................... 14 Global Fragility Act Implementation ................................................................................ 15
Donor Coordination .......................................................................................................... 15
Trade Preferences .................................................................................................................... 16
Sanctions: U.S. and Multilateral ............................................................................................. 16
U.S. Department of Justice Cooperation ................................................................................. 1817
Weapons and Drug Trafficking ............................................................................................... 18
Migration Issues ...................................................................................................................... 18
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 20

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Haiti ..................................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Criminal Dynamics in Haiti ............................................................................................. 6

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Haiti by Account: FY2018-FY2024 ..................................... 1413

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 20


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Introduction
Haiti, a Caribbean country that shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic (see Haiti, a Caribbean country that shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic (see
Figure 1), , has been of ongoing interest to Congress and successive U.S. presidential has been of ongoing interest to Congress and successive U.S. presidential
administrations because of its proximity to the United States, chronic instability, and vulnerability administrations because of its proximity to the United States, chronic instability, and vulnerability
to natural disasters.1 Although Haiti has endured corrupt, authoritarian leaders for much of its to natural disasters.1 Although Haiti has endured corrupt, authoritarian leaders for much of its
history, governance arguably had improved in the years prior to a 2010 earthquake.2 That disaster history, governance arguably had improved in the years prior to a 2010 earthquake.2 That disaster
killed more than 200,000 people and set development back significantly. Despite extensive killed more than 200,000 people and set development back significantly. Despite extensive
international support for Haiti’s recovery, democratic institutions remain weak and the country international support for Haiti’s recovery, democratic institutions remain weak and the country
continues to contend with extreme poverty; wide economic disparities; and both human-made and continues to contend with extreme poverty; wide economic disparities; and both human-made and
natural disastersnatural disasters, including an. An August 2021 earthquake August 2021 earthquake that killed 2,000 people. killed 2,000 people.
The situation in Haiti further deteriorated after The situation in Haiti further deteriorated after
Haiti at a Glance
Capital: Port-au-Prince Port-au-Prince
the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in
July 2021 led to uncertainty over who would July 2021 led to uncertainty over who would
Population: 12. 12.2 million3 mil ion (2023, IMF est.) (2023, IMF est.)
succeed him. Two days before the succeed him. Two days before the
Languages: French (official), Creole (official) French (official), Creole (official)
assassination, Moïse named Ariel Henry to be assassination, Moïse named Ariel Henry to be
Area: 10,710 sq. miles, slightly larger than 10,710 sq. miles, slightly larger than
Massachusetts Massachusetts
prime minister, but Henry was not sworn in. prime minister, but Henry was not sworn in.
Since most legislators’ terms had expired at the
GDP: $26.58 billionHenry has served as de facto prime minister GDP: $25.9 bil ion (2023, current prices, IMF est.) (2023, current prices, IMF est.)
time of the assassination, the Haitian legislaturesince mid-July 2021, although protests calling
Real GDP Growth: -1.8% (2021); -1.7% (2022); -1.8% (2021); -1.7% (2022);
0.3% (2023, forecast-1.5% (2023) (% change, constant prices, IMF) ) (% change, constant prices, IMF)
lacked the quorum needed to select a president
for his resignation have resurged in 2024. Per Capita GDP: $2, $2,170130 (2023, current prices, IMF (2023, current prices, IMF) Haiti lacks an elected president, legislature, and Life Expectancy at Birth: 60.8/66.7 years local government; the terms of the last 10 (male/female) (PAHO, 2022) elected senators ended in January 2023. A
to serve out the remainder of Moïse’s term, as
est.)
outlined in the Haitian Constitution.
Life Expectancy: 60.4/66.1 years (male/female)
Haiti still lacks an elected president, legislature,
(UNDP, 2021)
and local government; the terms of the last 10
Maternal Mortality Ratio: 480/100,000 live births 480/100,000 live births
elected senators ended in January 2023. A
(UNDP, 2022)
political standoff between de facto Primepolitical standoff between Henry’s de facto (UNDP, 2022) government and opposition political and civil
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF); International Monetary Fund (IMF); United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
Minister Henry’s government and opposition
political and civil society leaders regarding
how to form a Pan society leaders regarding how to form a American Health Organization (PAHO); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). transitional government to stabilize the country and convene elections persists transitional government to stabilize the country and convene elections persists
amid a amid a worsening security and humanitarian crisis.worsening security and humanitarian crisis. In October 2022, Henry requested In October 2022, Henry requested
international support to help the Haitian National Police restore order. In international support to help the Haitian National Police restore order. In AugustOctober 2023, the 2023, the United
Nations (U.N.) Security-General outlined options for U.N. support forU.N. Security Council adopted a resolution to authorize the the deployment of a non-U.N. multinational security support (MSS) mission to Haiti led by Kenya and supported by voluntary contributions. Kenya had aimed to deploy its police to lead the MSS early this year, but a January 2024 ruling by Kenya’s high court ruled the deployment unconstitutionaldeployment of a
multinational force to Haiti; the United States and Ecuador are preparing to introduce a U.N.
Security Council resolution to authorize such a deployment.3 .3
The 118th Congress may consider options for responding to the interrelated political, security, and The 118th Congress may consider options for responding to the interrelated political, security, and
humanitarian crises in Haitihumanitarian crises in Haiti and the Henry government’s request for international intervention.
, including what, if any, U.S. support should be provided to a potential MSS. This report provides This report provides a briefan overview of the situation in Haiti and U.S. policy responses to date. overview of the situation in Haiti and U.S. policy responses to date.

1 For background, see Laurent DuBois, 1 For background, see Laurent DuBois, Haiti: the Aftershocks of History (New York, NY: Picador, 2013); Philippe (New York, NY: Picador, 2013); Philippe
Girard, Girard, Haiti: : The Tumultuous History: From Pearl of the Caribbean to Broken Nation (New York, NY: Palgrave (New York, NY: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2005, 2010). MacMillan, 2005, 2010).
2 International Crisis Group, 2 International Crisis Group, Consolidating Stability in Haiti, Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 21, July 18, 2007. Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 21, July 18, 2007.
3 3 Jacqueline Charles, “U.N. Leader Calls for Range of Options to Combat Haiti Gangs,” Miami Herald, August 15,
2023; Michael Wilner, “U.S. Official says U.N. Resolution on Haiti is Urgent: ‘We are Moving as Fast as we can,’”
Miami Herald, September 13, 2023.

Tom Odula, “Kenya’s High Court Rules That Deploying the Nation’s Police Officers to Haiti Is Unconstitutional,” Associated Press (AP), January 26, 2024. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

Figure 1. Map of Haiti

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS). Congressional Research Service (CRS).
Political Situation
Background
Haiti won independence from France in 1804, making it the second independent republic in the Haiti won independence from France in 1804, making it the second independent republic in the
Western Hemisphere (after the United States). Since then, the country has experienced long Western Hemisphere (after the United States). Since then, the country has experienced long
periods of authoritarianism and political fragility, punctuated by foreign interventions and natural periods of authoritarianism and political fragility, punctuated by foreign interventions and natural
disasters.4 disasters.4 AfterSince the fall of the brutal Duvalier dictatorship (1957-1986), attempts to consolidate the fall of the brutal Duvalier dictatorship (1957-1986), attempts to consolidate
democratic rule have had limited success.5 In 1991, a military coup interrupted the term of Haiti’s democratic rule have had limited success.5 In 1991, a military coup interrupted the term of Haiti’s
first president elected in free and fair elections, Jean-Bertrand Aristide of the center-left first president elected in free and fair elections, Jean-Bertrand Aristide of the center-left Fanmi
Lavalas party (1991; 1994-1996; 2000-2004). The threat of a U.S. military intervention allowed party (1991; 1994-1996; 2000-2004). The threat of a U.S. military intervention allowed
Aristide to return three years later to complete his term. In 2000, Aristide began a second term Aristide to return three years later to complete his term. In 2000, Aristide began a second term
after the opposition boycotted the presidential election due to flawed parliamentary elections after the opposition boycotted the presidential election due to flawed parliamentary elections

4 Rocio Cara Labrador and Diana Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development,” Council on Foreign Relations, 4 Rocio Cara Labrador and Diana Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development,” Council on Foreign Relations,
September 2022 (hereinafter Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path”). Haiti reportedly paid an indemnity to France September 2022 (hereinafter Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path”). Haiti reportedly paid an indemnity to France
of some $560 million, which caused a significant drain on Haiti’s finances well into the 20th century. Concerns about of some $560 million, which caused a significant drain on Haiti’s finances well into the 20th century. Concerns about
the indebted country’s ability to pay its creditors prompted a U.S. intervention from 1915 to 1934. Lazaro Gamio et al., the indebted country’s ability to pay its creditors prompted a U.S. intervention from 1915 to 1934. Lazaro Gamio et al.,
“Haiti’s Lost Billions,” “Haiti’s Lost Billions,” New York Times, May 20, 2022; Hans Schmidt, , May 20, 2022; Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti: 1915-
1934 (Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971). (Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971).
5 Fearing communist rule and/or instability on the island, successive U.S. presidential administrations recognized the 5 Fearing communist rule and/or instability on the island, successive U.S. presidential administrations recognized the
regimes of François Duvalier (1957-1971) and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-1987), despite concerns about the regimes of François Duvalier (1957-1971) and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-1987), despite concerns about the
leaders’ authoritarian tendencies. See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “U.S. Relations with Haiti” in leaders’ authoritarian tendencies. See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “U.S. Relations with Haiti” in
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, American Republics, vol. V, document 309, at , vol. V, document 309, at
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d309; and U.S. Department of State, Office of the https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d309; and U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Historian, “Telegram from the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State” in Historian, “Telegram from the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State” in Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Mexico,
Cuba, and the Caribbean, vol. XXIII, document 253, August 14, 1978, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/vol. XXIII, document 253, August 14, 1978, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1977-80v23/d253. frus1977-80v23/d253.
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Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

favoring favoring Fanmi Lavalas. In 2004, Aristide—facing an armed uprising against his rule . In 2004, Aristide—facing an armed uprising against his rule led by Guy Philiipe, a drug trafficker subsequently imprisoned on money laundering charges in the United States, as well as as well as
U.S. and international pressure—resigned and went into exile.6 U.S. and international pressure—resigned and went into exile.6
From 2004 to 2017, the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a peacekeeping force From 2004 to 2017, the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a peacekeeping force
that grew to 13,000 at its peak, sought to restore order in the country; build the Haitian National that grew to 13,000 at its peak, sought to restore order in the country; build the Haitian National
Police (HNP); and, later, help with recovery after a 2010 earthquake. The legacy of MINUSTAH Police (HNP); and, later, help with recovery after a 2010 earthquake. The legacy of MINUSTAH
is complicated, as troops helped restore some stability to Haiti but reintroduced cholera into the is complicated, as troops helped restore some stability to Haiti but reintroduced cholera into the
country and committed human rights and sexual abuses. This experience initially led many country and committed human rights and sexual abuses. This experience initially led many
Haitians to oppose the type of foreign military involvement requested by the Henry government.7 Haitians to oppose the type of foreign military involvement requested by the Henry government.7
Haiti’s most recent presidents,President Michel Martelly (2011-2016) and his chosen successor, Jovenel Michel Martelly (2011-2016) and his chosen successor, Jovenel
Moïse (2017-July 2021), who represented the center-right Moïse (2017-July 2021), who represented the center-right Tèt Kale Party (PHTK), Party (PHTK), both took office took office
after disputed elections and administered governments allegedly rife with corruption.8 Under after disputed elections and administered governments allegedly rife with corruption.8 Under
Moïse, Haiti experienced political and social unrest, high inflation, antigovernment protests, and Moïse, Haiti experienced political and social unrest, high inflation, antigovernment protests, and
gang violence. Like other Haitian politicians, Moïse allegedly provided money and arms to gangs gang violence. Like other Haitian politicians, Moïse allegedly provided money and arms to gangs
in exchange for favors, including suppressing antigovernment protests such as those that erupted in exchange for favors, including suppressing antigovernment protests such as those that erupted
in 2018 after the government announced fuel price hikes.9 A 2021 report by Harvard Law in 2018 after the government announced fuel price hikes.9 A 2021 report by Harvard Law
School’s International Human Rights Clinic documented state (primarily police) involvement in School’s International Human Rights Clinic documented state (primarily police) involvement in
attacks on neighborhoods in which some 240 civilians died from 2018 to 2020.10 Instability attacks on neighborhoods in which some 240 civilians died from 2018 to 2020.10 Instability
increased in 2019 after Haitian auditors issued two reports to the country’s chief prosecutor increased in 2019 after Haitian auditors issued two reports to the country’s chief prosecutor
alleging Moïse and other officials had misappropriated and embezzled millions of dollars in alleging Moïse and other officials had misappropriated and embezzled millions of dollars in
public funds.11 public funds.11
Political gridlock between the executive and legislative branches led to the government not Political gridlock between the executive and legislative branches led to the government not
organizing scheduled October 2019 parliamentary elections. The terms of the entire lower organizing scheduled October 2019 parliamentary elections. The terms of the entire lower
Chamber of Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate expired in January 2020, as did the terms of all Chamber of Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate expired in January 2020, as did the terms of all
local government posts, without newly elected officials to take these positions.12 Thereafter, local government posts, without newly elected officials to take these positions.12 Thereafter,
Moïse ruled by decree, with some controversy over whether his term was to end in February 2021 Moïse ruled by decree, with some controversy over whether his term was to end in February 2021
or February 2022 (the or February 2022 (the U.S. State Department did not take a position on that dispute).13 State Department did not take a position on that dispute).13

6 6 AP, “Supporters of Former Haitian Rebel Leader Guy Philippe Launch Widespread Protests,” January 16, 2024. Daniel P. Erikson, “Haiti After Aristide: Still on the Brink,” Daniel P. Erikson, “Haiti After Aristide: Still on the Brink,” Current History, vol. 104, no. 679 (February 2005), vol. 104, no. 679 (February 2005), pp.
83-90.
. 7 Carla King et al., “‘MINUSTAH Is Doing Positive Things Just as They Do Negative Things’: Nuanced Perceptions of 7 Carla King et al., “‘MINUSTAH Is Doing Positive Things Just as They Do Negative Things’: Nuanced Perceptions of
a UN Peacekeeping Operation Amidst Peacekeeper-Perpetrated Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Haiti,” a UN Peacekeeping Operation Amidst Peacekeeper-Perpetrated Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Haiti,” Conflict,
Security & Development, vol. 21, no. 6 (November 17, 2021), pp. 749-779. For how past interventions have influenced , vol. 21, no. 6 (November 17, 2021), pp. 749-779. For how past interventions have influenced
recent popular opinion in Haiti, see Rafael Bernal, “Human Rights Coalition to Biden: No Military Intervention in recent popular opinion in Haiti, see Rafael Bernal, “Human Rights Coalition to Biden: No Military Intervention in
Haiti,” Haiti,” The Hill, November 1, 2022. , November 1, 2022.
8 On Martelly and Moïse’s elections, see Georges Fauriol, “Haiti’s Problematic Electoral Dynamics,” 8 On Martelly and Moïse’s elections, see Georges Fauriol, “Haiti’s Problematic Electoral Dynamics,” Global
Americans, December 21, 2021. On Martelly and drug trafficking, see Jacqueline Charles and Michael Wilner, , December 21, 2021. On Martelly and drug trafficking, see Jacqueline Charles and Michael Wilner,
“Canada Sanctions Former Haiti President Michel Martelly, Two Former Prime Ministers,” “Canada Sanctions Former Haiti President Michel Martelly, Two Former Prime Ministers,” Miami Herald, November , November
21, 2022. On corruption in the Moïse government, see Maria Abi-Habib, “Haiti’s Leader Kept a List of Drug 21, 2022. On corruption in the Moïse government, see Maria Abi-Habib, “Haiti’s Leader Kept a List of Drug
Traffickers. His Assassins Came for It,” Traffickers. His Assassins Came for It,” New York Times, December 12, 2021. , December 12, 2021.
9 Chris Dalby, “International Sanctions Seek to Weaken Haiti’s Patronage System Between Politicians, Gangs,” 9 Chris Dalby, “International Sanctions Seek to Weaken Haiti’s Patronage System Between Politicians, Gangs,” InSight
Crime, November 24, 2022. For Moïse officials’ involvement in attacks on neighborhoods where protests occurred, see , November 24, 2022. For Moïse officials’ involvement in attacks on neighborhoods where protests occurred, see
U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human Rights U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human Rights
Day,” December 10, 2020. Day,” December 10, 2020.
10 Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, 10 Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, Killing with Impunity: State-Sanctioned Massacres in Haiti, ,
April 2021. April 2021.
11 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix C: Major Corruption Cases in Haiti and Government of Haiti Efforts to 11 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix C: Major Corruption Cases in Haiti and Government of Haiti Efforts to
Address Corruption,” November 10, 2022. Address Corruption,” November 10, 2022.
12 The 10 remaining senators’ terms expired on January 9, 2023. 12 The 10 remaining senators’ terms expired on January 9, 2023.
13 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix F: Alleged February 2021 Coup Against President Jovenel Moïse and U.S. and 13 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix F: Alleged February 2021 Coup Against President Jovenel Moïse and U.S. and
(continued...) (continued...)
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On July 7, 2021, armed assailants assassinated President Moïse in his private home in Port-au- On July 7, 2021, armed assailants assassinated President Moïse in his private home in Port-au-
Prince. Details of the attack remain under investigation; however, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prince. Details of the attack remain under investigation; however, the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) has arrested 11 individuals for their role in a plot to kill Moïse, Investigation (FBI) has arrested 11 individuals for their role in a plot to kill Moïse, and one of
those individuals wasthree of whom have been sentenced to life in prison sentenced to life in prison in June 2023.14 The FBI also has supported .14 The FBI also has supported
Haitian authorities’ investigation of the crime, although threats to the safety of those authorities Haitian authorities’ investigation of the crime, although threats to the safety of those authorities
and turnover among the judges leading the investigation have hindered and turnover among the judges leading the investigation have hindered their efforts. Haitian
police have arrested at least 23 people accused of planning the plot, including former Colombian
soldiers, members of Moïse’s security team, a former rebel leader, a former police inspector, and
a Haitian-American pastor with ties to Florida.15
The Aftermath of President Moïse’s AssassinationHaitian efforts. Post-Assassination Political Impasse
Moïse’s assassination gave rise to uncertainty about who would succeed him as president and Moïse’s assassination gave rise to uncertainty about who would succeed him as president and
who would serve as prime minister. Under the Haitian Constitution (Article 149), if a president who would serve as prime minister. Under the Haitian Constitution (Article 149), if a president
dies in the last two years of his term, the legislature should elect a provisional president to serve dies in the last two years of his term, the legislature should elect a provisional president to serve
out the term.out the term.1615 As Haiti lacked a functioning legislature at the time of the assassination, the choice As Haiti lacked a functioning legislature at the time of the assassination, the choice
of who would succeed Moïse could not follow the prescribed constitutional order. of who would succeed Moïse could not follow the prescribed constitutional order.
Three individuals laid claims to serve as prime minister: interim Prime Minister Claude Joseph; Three individuals laid claims to serve as prime minister: interim Prime Minister Claude Joseph;
Ariel Henry, a neurosurgeon nominated to be prime minister two days before Moïse’s death but Ariel Henry, a neurosurgeon nominated to be prime minister two days before Moïse’s death but
not sworn in; and Joseph Lambert, then-president of the Haitian Senate. On July not sworn in; and Joseph Lambert, then-president of the Haitian Senate. On July 8, the Haitian
government requested security and investigative assistance from the United States. In response to
that request, an inter-agency delegation traveled to Haiti on July 1111, an inter-agency U.S. delegation traveled to Haiti in response to a request for security and investigative assistance from the Haitian government. U.S. officials met with all . U.S. officials met with all
three claimants to prime minister. After days of jockeying among the claimants over who would three claimants to prime minister. After days of jockeying among the claimants over who would
become prime minister, Joseph agreed that Henry would be prime minister and he foreign become prime minister, Joseph agreed that Henry would be prime minister and he foreign
minister on July 12.17minister.16 Lambert separately gave up his quest to be prime minister; the U.S. Lambert separately gave up his quest to be prime minister; the U.S.
government later sanctioned him for drug trafficking. On July 17, the United States, United government later sanctioned him for drug trafficking. On July 17, the United States, United
Nations, and other donors issued a statement calling for the formation of an “inclusive Nations, and other donors issued a statement calling for the formation of an “inclusive
government” and encouraging Prime Minister-designate Ariel Henry to form a government.government” and encouraging Prime Minister-designate Ariel Henry to form a government.18
17 Henry’s irregular path to his position, Henry’s irregular path to his position, lackluster effortsstruggles to address Haitian challenges while in office, and allegations of his while in office, and allegations of his
possible involvement in Moïse’s assassination, have eroded his credibility.possible involvement in Moïse’s assassination, have eroded his credibility.1918
Since the assassination, a political stalemate has persisted over how to convene elections and who Since the assassination, a political stalemate has persisted over how to convene elections and who
should govern until an elected government is in place. In September 2021, de facto Prime should govern until an elected government is in place. In September 2021, de facto Prime
Minister Henry and his supporters proposed that Henry name a provisional electoral council to Minister Henry and his supporters proposed that Henry name a provisional electoral council to
convene elections, and that Henry remain the single head of government until a new elected convene elections, and that Henry remain the single head of government until a new elected
government takes officegovernment takes office, but Henry did not appoint that council. Rival political and civil society . Rival political and civil society
leaders, some of whom backed the Montana Accord, a 2021 proposal to form an interim leaders, some of whom backed the Montana Accord, a 2021 proposal to form an interim
government led by a president and prime minister, argued for a transitional government not led by Henry.19
International Partner Efforts to Support Free and Fair Elections in Haiti,” November 2022, at https://www.state.gov/ International Partner Efforts to Support Free and Fair Elections in Haiti,” November 2022, at https://www.state.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Appendix-F-Developments-in-Haiti-004977.pdf. wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Appendix-F-Developments-in-Haiti-004977.pdf.
14 14 Chris Cameron, “Man Gets Life in Prison in Killing of Haiti Leader,” New York Times, June 4, 2023; Sarah Morland,
“Colombian ex-soldier Pleads Guilty in Plot to Kill Haitian President,” Reuters, September 7, 2023.
15 Jacqueline Charles, “Made in Miami: How a South Florida Plot to Oust Haiti’s Jovenel Moïse Led to His Murder,”
Miami Herald, December 8, 2022; “Ex-Rebel Leader Known as ‘the Torturer’ Is ArrestedSarah Morland and Kylie Madry, “Ex-Colombian Soldier Pleads Guilty in Haiti President’s in Haiti President’s
Assassination,” Assassination,” Miami Herald, Reuters, December December 21, 2022.
1622, 2023. 15 Haiti’s Constitution of 1987 with Amendments Through 2012 is available in English at Haiti’s Constitution of 1987 with Amendments Through 2012 is available in English at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012.pdf?lang=en. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012.pdf?lang=en.
1716 CRS interview with State Department officials, January 9, 2023. CRS interview with State Department officials, January 9, 2023.
1817 U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), “Core Group Press Release,” July 17, 2021. U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), “Core Group Press Release,” July 17, 2021.
1918 Monique Beals, “Judge, Investigators say Haitian Prime Minister Involved in President’s Assassination,” Monique Beals, “Judge, Investigators say Haitian Prime Minister Involved in President’s Assassination,” The Hill, ,
February 8, 2022.February 8, 2022. 19 The Montana Accord proposed a two-year interim government led by a president and prime minister, with oversight committees, to restore order, administer elections, and create a truth and justice commission to address past human rights violations. Georges Fauriol, “Haiti: Betting on the Montana Accord,” Global Americans, February 9, 2022.
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government led by a president and prime minister, argued for a transitional government not led by
Henry. 20
On December 21, 2022, Henry put forth a new transition proposal—the National Consensus for On December 21, 2022, Henry put forth a new transition proposal—the National Consensus for
an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections (or the December 21st agreement)—that was an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections (or the December 21st agreement)—that was
signed by a range of stakeholders, including some former signatories of the Montana Accord.signed by a range of stakeholders, including some former signatories of the Montana Accord.2120
His government established a three-member High Transition Council (HTC) to implement that His government established a three-member High Transition Council (HTC) to implement that
transition plan in January 2023 and appointed eight judges to the country’s highest court in March transition plan in January 2023 and appointed eight judges to the country’s highest court in March
2023. 2023. An independent facilitation committee is carrying out consultations between the HTC, civil
society, and donors on implementing the agreement. Since May, a three-person eminent persons
group from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has sought to facilitate intra-Haitian
dialogue. High-level talks among Henry and other key stakeholders took place in Jamaica in mid-
June 2023, with a focus on increasing the size of the transition council and possibly expanding its
powers, as well as selecting an electoral council. The stakeholders did not reach an agreement
then nor in follow-up talks held earlier in September 2023, but negotiations continue.Since May 2023, a group of eminent persons from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has facilitated several rounds of talks among Henry and other stakeholders focused on increasing the size of the HTC and possibly expanding its powers, as well as selecting an electoral council. Those talks have yielded limited progress. Some Haitians are calling for Henry to step down by February 7, 2024, the date by which the December 21st agreement aimed to have an elected government assume office.21 In recent months, protests calling for Henry’s resignation have increased. Some of those protests have been led by former rebel leader Guy Philippe (repatriated from the United States in December) and members of an armed government environmental protection brigade that have clashed with police.22
Security Crisis
Relations between Haitian gangs and the country’s political and economic elite are well Relations between Haitian gangs and the country’s political and economic elite are well
establishedestablished (see Figure 2). Many of. Haiti’s past presidents and prominent politicians have used Haiti’s past presidents and prominent politicians have used
and received support from gangs. Generally, gangs provide political elites with services such as and received support from gangs. Generally, gangs provide political elites with services such as
campaign support, voter intimidation, bribery, fundraising, vandalism, and protest disruption.campaign support, voter intimidation, bribery, fundraising, vandalism, and protest disruption.22
Former President Aristide reportedly relied on support from gangs that engaged in political Former President Aristide reportedly relied on support from gangs that engaged in political
repression, and the Canadian government sanctioned former President Martelly for his role in repression, and the Canadian government sanctioned former President Martelly for his role in
financing gangs.23 Business elites have formed relationships with gangs in order to protect their financing gangs.23 Business elites have formed relationships with gangs in order to protect their
businesses and enable them to move merchandise throughout the country and abroad.businesses and enable them to move merchandise throughout the country and abroad.24 In In
December 2022, the Canadian government imposed sanctions on December 2022, the Canadian government imposed sanctions on three prominent businessmenprominent businessmen—
Gilbert Bigio, Reynold Deeb, and Sherif Abdallah— for reportedly providing “illicit financial and for reportedly providing “illicit financial and
operational support to gangs.”operational support to gangs.”25

20 The Montana Accord proposed a two-year interim government led by a president and prime minister, with oversight
committees, to restore order, administer elections, and create a truth and justice commission to address past human
rights violations. Georges Fauriol, “Haiti: Betting on the Montana Accord,” Global Americans, February 9, 2022.
2124 Since Moïse’s assassination, state authority has collapsed in parts of Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas. As of late 2023, armed gangs reportedly controlled 80% of the capital and other urban areas, as well as major highways and the agricultural region of Artibonite (see Figure 1).25 These gangs are often better armed than the national police.26 A wave of protests and gang-led violence erupted in September 2022 after de facto Prime Minister Henry announced the end of fuel subsidies. Gangs took over a major port and the country’s main fuel terminal, temporarily grinding the economy to a halt and blocking humanitarian agencies’ access to some areas. As 20 U.N. Security Council, U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), U.N. Security Council, U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), Report of the Secretary General, , S/2023/274, April April 14, 2023. 21 BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, S/2024/62, January 15, 2024. Hereinafter: S/2024/62. 22 AP, “Haiti Cracks Down on Heavily Armed Environmental Agents After Clashes with Police,” January 29, 2024. 14, 2023.
22 Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, Gangs of Haiti: Expansion, Power, and an Escalating Crisis, October
2022. Hereinafter: Global Initiative, Gangs of Haiti.
23 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 23 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Haiti: The Chimères, Their Activities and Their Geographic Presence;
the Treatment of the Chimères by the Authorities and the Presence of Group Members Within the Government and the
Police (2006-May 2008), June 3, 2008; Harold Isaac and Brian Ellsworth, “Canada Sanctions Haiti Ex-President , June 3, 2008; Harold Isaac and Brian Ellsworth, “Canada Sanctions Haiti Ex-President
Martelly for Financing Gangs,” Reuters, November 20, 2022. Martelly for Financing Gangs,” Reuters, November 20, 2022.
24 24 Alberto Arce and Rodrigo Abd, “In Haiti, the Difficult Relationship of Gangs and Business,” Associated Press,
October 21, 2021.
25 Government of Canada, “Canada Imposes Sanctions Against Haitian Economic Elites,” December 5, 2022Government of Canada, Global Affairs Canada, “Canada Imposes Sanctions Against Haitian Economic Elites,” December 5, 2022. 25 AP, “UN Human Rights Official is Alarmed by Sprawling Gang Violence in Haiti,” October 31, 2023. BINUH, Criminal Violence Extends Beyond Port-au-Prince: the Situation in Lower Artibonite from January 2022 to October 2023, November 2023. Hereinafter: BINUH, November 2023. 26 Jon Lee Anderson, “A Land Held Hostage,” The New Yorker, July 24, 2023. .
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link to page 13 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

Figure 2. Criminal Dynamics in Haiti

Source: CRS, based on a graphic from InSight Crime used in U.S. Agency for International Development, Mapping
Haiti’s Criminal Dynamics: Conclusions and Recommendations Brief, November 2021, at https://pdf.usaid.gov/
pdf_docs/PA00ZF3H.pdf.
Since Moïse’s assassination, state authority has collapsed in parts of Port-au-Prince and
surrounding areas. Armed gangs control parts of the city and other urban areas, as well as major
highways. These gangs are often better armed than the national police.26 Protests and gang-led
violence erupted following a September 2022 announcement by de facto Prime Minister Henry
that fuel subsidies would end. After gangs took over a major port and the country’s main fuel
terminal, the economy temporarily ground to a halt and humanitarian agencies lost access to some
areas. In early October 2022, Henry and his advisors requested an international force to help quell
the security situation and allow humanitarian aid to flow as an outbreak of cholera surged;
responses to that request remain pending (see “Multinational Force Consideration,” below).27
The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that there are at
least 300 criminal groups operating in Haiti.28 In 2022, homicides increased by 35.2% compared
with 2021 as gangs, such as G9 and Family (G9) and G-PEP, vied for control of territory.29 More
than 2,094 reported homicides occurred between January 2023 and June 2023, 68% more than the
last half of 2022.30 In 2022, kidnappings increased by 104.7% compared with 2021. Kidnappings
escalated further during the first half of 2023, as gangs sought to find new revenue amid
diminished support from elites fearful of being designated for U.S. and Canadian sanctions.31
Gang attacks on government personnel and critical infrastructure have increased as they have
grown more autonomous.

26 Jon Lee Anderson, “A Land Held Hostage,” The New Yorker, July 24, 2023.
27 Catherine Osborn, “Haiti’s Crisis Escalates,” Foreign Policy, October 14, 2022.
28 noted previously, Henry requested an international force to help quell the security situation in October 2022; however, such a force has yet to be established (see “Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission” below).27 The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimates that there are at least 300 criminal groups operating in Haiti.28 However, some local sources suggest the number of criminal groups is closer to 750, including self-defense groups.29 Many of these groups have developed alliances to amplify their operational capabilities. According to the U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the number of reported homicides increased by 119% last year, rising from 2,183 in 2022 to 4,789 in 2023.30 Kidnappings escalated from 1,359 in 2022 to 2,490 in 2023, an 83% increase.31 Gangs have sought to find new revenue through kidnapping for ransom and other crimes amid diminished support from elites fearful of being designated for U.S. and Canadian sanctions.32 Gang attacks on government personnel and critical infrastructure have increased as they have grown more autonomous. According to U.N. reports, gangs have used “collective rape” and other gender-based violence (GBV) against women, children as young as 10, and the elderly to intimidate people 33 . Gender- based and sexual violence, though gravely underreported, is more prevalent in zones contested by gangs in which many inhabitants lack access to basic health, education, and social services. Doctors Without Borders estimates that its staff treated 42% more survivors of GBV in 2023 than in 2022 (some 3,700 victims), a majority of those were victims of armed actors rather than intimate partner violence.34 The U.N. Secretary-General described the Haitian National Police (HNP) in 2022 as “spread thin” and lacking weapons, equipment, and capacity.35 Some 1,663 officers resigned over the course of 2023, leaving the HNP with 13,196 officers as of December.36 Low pay and poor working conditions have increased attrition among HNP officers available to perform police duties.37 At any given time, only 4,000 officers are available for policing.38 In 2023, 45 out of 412 police buildings were non-operational, were under the direct control of armed gangs, or had been subjected to repeated attacks.39 27 Catherine Osborn, “Haiti’s Crisis Escalates,” Foreign Policy, October 14, 2022. 28 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Haiti: Humanitarian Response Plan 2023 at Haiti: Humanitarian Response Plan 2023 at a Glance,” Relief Web, April 13, 2023. 29 BINUH, November 2023. 30 S/2024/62. 31 Ibid. 32a Glance,” Relief Web, April 13, 2023.
29 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary-General, January 17, 2023; and Scott Mistler-Ferguson, “G9
vs. G-PEP – The Two Gang Alliances Tearing Haiti Apart,” InSight Crime, July 21, 2022.
30 Ibid; “Haiti: International Support Needed Now to Stop Spiraling Gang Violence,” UN News, May 9, 2023.
31 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, , S/2023/41, January 17, 2023; January 17, 2023; U.N. Security Council, BINUH, BINUH,
Report of the Secretary General, , S/2023/492, July 3, 2023; Reuters, “Haiti Rights Group Records Three-Fold Rise in Kidnappings July 3, 2023; Reuters, “Haiti Rights Group Records Three-Fold Rise in Kidnappings
for Early 2023,” April 4, 2023.
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According to U.N. reports, gangs have used “collective rape” and other gender-based violence
against women, children as young as 10, and the elderly to intimidate people 32
. From January
2023 to March 2023, at least 652 women and girls were victims of collective rape. Gender-based
and sexual violence is more prevalent in zones contested by warring gangs in which many
inhabitants lack access to basic health, education, and social services.
The U.N. Secretary-General described the police in 2022 as “spread thin” and lacking weapons,
equipment, and capacity.33 Some studies also indicate the HNP has struggled with widespread
criminal cooptation. for Early 2023,” April 4, 2023. 33 This draws from BINUH and Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Sexual Violence in Port-au-Prince: A Weapon Used by Gangs to Instill Fear, October 14, 2022; OHCHR and BINUH, Human Rights Situation, Quarterly Report: January-March 2023; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Gang Control and Security Vacuums: Assessing Gender-Based Violence in Cité Soleil, May 2023. 34 Widlore Mérancourt and Amanda Coletta, “’Collective Rapes’ Surge as Weapon in Haiti’s Gang War,” Washington Post, January 29, 2024. 35 BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, S/2022/747, October 10, 2022. Hereinafter: S/2022/747. 36 Security Council, S/2024/62. 37 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, S/2023/492, July 3, 2023. 38 Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH), Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments June Through November 2023, December 2023. 39 U.N. Security Council, S/2024/62 and S/2023/769. Congressional Research Service 6 link to page 21 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy A July 2022 International Crisis Group study estimated that 40% of HNP A July 2022 International Crisis Group study estimated that 40% of HNP
officers officers havehad ties to gangs. ties to gangs.3440 Corruption, combined with the HNP and Haitian Coast Guard’s lack Corruption, combined with the HNP and Haitian Coast Guard’s lack
of control over the country’s ports and borders, have made Haiti a hub for drug and arms of control over the country’s ports and borders, have made Haiti a hub for drug and arms
trafficking and worsened gang violence (trafficking and worsened gang violence (seesee “Weapons and Drug Trafficking”).). Low pay and
poor working conditions have increased attrition among the 10,000 or so HNP officers available
to perform police duties.35 When police have sought to confront gangs, confrontations have often When police have sought to confront gangs, confrontations have often
proven deadly. In November 2022, criminals assassinated the director of the HNP’s training proven deadly. In November 2022, criminals assassinated the director of the HNP’s training
center at the center. In May 2023, a police officer died as gangs set two Canadian-provided
armored vehicles on fire.
center at the center. Impunity prevails in Haiti’s weak justice system. In addition to failing to resolve Moïse’s Impunity prevails in Haiti’s weak justice system. In addition to failing to resolve Moïse’s
assassination, Haitian authorities have yet to arrest Jimmy Chérizier, a former HNP officer turned assassination, Haitian authorities have yet to arrest Jimmy Chérizier, a former HNP officer turned
gang leader who was linked to Moïse, or other Haitian officials implicated in the 2018 La Saline gang leader who was linked to Moïse, or other Haitian officials implicated in the 2018 La Saline
massacre of 71 people.massacre of 71 people.3641 Gangs overtook several of Haiti’s main courthouses in summer 2022, Gangs overtook several of Haiti’s main courthouses in summer 2022,
and many of the courthouses remain inoperable. Without functioning courts, Haitian prisons and many of the courthouses remain inoperable. Without functioning courts, Haitian prisons
continue to hold inmates, 85% of whom were in pretrial detention in June 2023; prisons have a continue to hold inmates, 85% of whom were in pretrial detention in June 2023; prisons have a
332331% cell occupancy rate.% cell occupancy rate.3742 Many inmates lack access to food, water, and medical care. Many inmates lack access to food, water, and medical care.
Haitian authorities have increased the prison budget by 87% for 2023/2024, including a 41% increase for food.43 The rampant violence in Haiti has left many Haitians hopeless and frustrated. Since April 2023, The rampant violence in Haiti has left many Haitians hopeless and frustrated. Since April 2023,
Haiti has experienced a rise in antigang vigilantism—the Haiti has experienced a rise in antigang vigilantism—the Bwa Kale movement. movement.3844 On April 24, On April 24,
Port-au-Prince residents Port-au-Prince residents confronted, lynchedlynched, and burned 10 alleged gang members. The and burned 10 alleged gang members. The
movement is now in movement is now in all 10 administrative departments (states) of Haiti; hundreds have been killed.45 Humanitarian Situation Haiti is a fragile country that is highly vulnerable to natural disasters due to its location and topography (exacerbated by deforestation and climate change), and the Haitian government’s limited capacity to respond to such disasters. A decade after the devastating 2010 earthquake, inadequate recovery efforts, combined with subsequent natural disasters (e.g., Hurricane Matthew, a 2021 earthquake) and disease outbreaks (e.g., cholera, Coronavirus Disease 2019 [COVID-19]), have further weakened the state’s ability to protect and provide for its citizens.46 Flooding in June 2023 resulted in more than 40 deaths and left some 13,000 Haitians homeless.47 The Fund for Peace’s 2023 Fragile States Index ranked Haiti as the 10th most fragile state in the world due to various factors, including the state’s lack of legitimacy and inability to deliver services, uneven economic development, and relatively low levels of social cohesion.48 40all 10 administrative departments (states) of Haiti, with at least 224 people
killed from April-June 2023.39

32 This draws from BINUH and Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Sexual Violence
in Port-au-Prince: A Weapon Used by Gangs to Instill Fear, October 14, 2022; OHCHR and BINUH, Human Rights
Situation, Quarterly Report: January-March 2023; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Gang
Control and Security Vacuums: Assessing Gender-Based Violence in Cité Soleil, May 2023 Human Rights Watch,
“Living a Nightmare,” August 14, 2023.
33 Security Council, S/2022/747.
34 International Crisis Group, International Crisis Group, New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists, July 27, 2022. , July 27, 2022.
35 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, July 3, 2023.
3641 Chérizier, then-Minister of the Interior Fednel Monchery, and President Moïse’s Departmental Delegate Joseph Chérizier, then-Minister of the Interior Fednel Monchery, and President Moïse’s Departmental Delegate Joseph
Pierre Richard Duplan allegedly planned an attack carried out by gangs on protesters who had criticized the Pierre Richard Duplan allegedly planned an attack carried out by gangs on protesters who had criticized the
government. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International government. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International
Human Rights Day,” December 10, 2020. Human Rights Day,” December 10, 2020.
37 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary-General, July 3, 2023; Widlore Mérancourt and Amanda
Coletta, “He Was Sentenced to a Year in Prison. He Had Been Held More Than Nine,” Washington Post, August 11,
2023.
3842 BINUH, Human Rights Situation Main Trends, Quarterly Report: July-September 2023, October 27, 2023. 43 S/2024/62. 44 Reuters, “Haitian Residents Lynch and Set Fire to Suspected Gang Members,” April 26, 2023. Reuters, “Haitian Residents Lynch and Set Fire to Suspected Gang Members,” April 26, 2023.
39 U.N. Security Council,45 BINUH, BINUH, Report of the Secretary -General, S/2023/768, October 16, 2023. Hereinafter: S/2023/768. 46 On recovery and reconstruction, see Jonathan Katz, The Big Truck That Went by: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left Behind a Disaster (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2014); Government Accountability Office (GAO), Haiti: USAID and State Should Improve Management and Assessment of Reconstruction Activities, GAO-23-105211, March 2023. Hereinafter: GAO, March 2023. On subsequent disasters, see Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path.” 47 Jacqueline Charles, “At Least 42 Dead, Thousands Homeless in Haiti After a Weekend of Heavy Rains, Flooding,” Miami Herald, June 5, 2023. 48 The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, at https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/. Congressional Research Service 7 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy General, July 3, 2023.
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Humanitarian Situation
Haiti is a fragile country that is highly vulnerable to natural disasters due to its location and
topography (exacerbated by deforestation and climate change), and the Haitian government’s
capacity to respond to such disasters is limited. A decade after the devastating 2010 earthquake,
inadequate recovery efforts, combined with subsequent natural disasters (e.g., Hurricane
Matthew, a 2021 earthquake) and disease outbreaks (e.g., cholera, Coronavirus Disease 2019
[COVID-19]), have further weakened the state’s ability to protect and provide for its citizens.40
Flooding in June 2023 resulted in more than 40 deaths and left some 13,000 Haitians homeless.41
The Fund for Peace’s 2022 Fragile States Index ranked Haiti as the 11th most fragile state in the
world due to various factors, including the state’s lack of legitimacy and inability to deliver
services, uneven economic development, and relatively low levels of social cohesion.42
In contrast to some previous humanitarian crises Haiti has endured, the political and security In contrast to some previous humanitarian crises Haiti has endured, the political and security
situation is the primary driver of the current humanitarian emergency.situation is the primary driver of the current humanitarian emergency.4349 According to U.N. According to U.N.
officials, as of officials, as of JuneOctober 2023, gang violence had displaced at least 195,000 people. 2023, gang violence had displaced at least 195,000 people.4450 Gang blockades Gang blockades
of highways have limited humanitarian access, particularly to the southern peninsula but also to of highways have limited humanitarian access, particularly to the southern peninsula but also to
communities to the east and north of the capital. The G9 gang’s blockade of the Varreux fuel communities to the east and north of the capital. The G9 gang’s blockade of the Varreux fuel
terminal from terminal from mid-September to September to early November 2022, combined with broad unrest, caused November 2022, combined with broad unrest, caused
businesses and hospitals to close. During that period, Haitians, fearful of encountering gang businesses and hospitals to close. During that period, Haitians, fearful of encountering gang
violence, sheltered in place amid a lack of water and sanitation services, fuel, electricity, and violence, sheltered in place amid a lack of water and sanitation services, fuel, electricity, and
food. food. The U.N. OCHAUNOCHA estimates that 5. estimates that 5.25 million Haitians are in need of humanitarian aid. million Haitians are in need of humanitarian aid.45
Conditions in Haiti could deteriorate further if the Dominican Republic keeps its borders51 Since mid-September 2023, the Dominican Republic has closed its shared land border with with
Haiti closed.46 The closures began in mid-September 2023 in response to a border water dispute.Haiti in response to a water dispute. The continued closure could exacerbate humanitarian conditions in Haiti’s border departments.52 In 2023, UNOCHA requested $719.9 million for the Humanitarian Response Plan in Haiti. As of December 2023, donors had provided 33% of the funds requested, or $242.2 million.53
Ongoing humanitarian concerns include food insecurity and inadequate access to health care, Ongoing humanitarian concerns include food insecurity and inadequate access to health care,
protection, and education. In protection, and education. In October 2022, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization
estimated that a record 4.7September 2023, the World Food Program and its partners estimated that 4.4 million Haitians, roughly million Haitians, roughly 5044% of the population, faced acute levels of % of the population, faced acute levels of
hunger.hunger.4754 In October 2022, cholera resurfaced in Haiti In October 2022, cholera resurfaced in Haiti, and; as of as of mid-April 2023December 2023, it had claimed it had claimed
686 lives.48 1,156 lives.55 While cholera is preventable through vaccination and treatable with rehydration, While cholera is preventable through vaccination and treatable with rehydration,
gangs have reportedly prevented patient access to health facilities and denied medical staff entry gangs have reportedly prevented patient access to health facilities and denied medical staff entry
to affected to affected communities. In March 2023, BINUH reported that 21 health facilities had temporarily shut down or reduced their activities due to violence.56 Children in Haiti are extremely vulnerable to protection concerns, particularly gender-based violence. They have also lost years of schooling due to COVID-19, insecurity and cholera-related school closures, and armed attacks on schools.57 U.N. Presence in Haiti and Recent Action The U.N. has had a continuous presence in Haiti for almost 20 years, with diplomatic and financial support provided by successive U.S. presidential administrations. Following the collapse of the Aristide government in 2004, the U.N. Security Council established MINUSTAH to help restore order and train the HNP.58 After the 2010 earthquake, the Security Council expanded MINUSTAH’s size and mission. 49 UNOCHAcommunities. In March 2023, the U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) reported

40 On recovery and reconstruction, see Jonathan Katz, The Big Truck That Went by: How the World Came to Save Haiti
and Left Behind a Disaster (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2014); Government Accountability Office (GAO),
Haiti: USAID and State Should Improve Management and Assessment of Reconstruction Activities, GAO-23-105211,
March 2023. Hereinafter: GAO, March 2023. On subsequent disasters, see Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path.”
41 Jacqueline Charles, “At Least 42 Dead, Thousands Homeless in Haiti After a Weekend of Heavy Rains, Flooding,”
Miami Herald, June 5, 2023.
42 The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, at https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/.
43 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Seven Things to Know About the , “Seven Things to Know About the
Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti,” October 26, 2022. Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti,” October 26, 2022.
4450 International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Haiti Emergency Response: Situation Report,” International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Haiti Emergency Response: Situation Report,” JuneOctober 2023. 2023.
4551 UNOCHA, UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 20232024, December , December 2022.
46 “Dominican Republic Closes all Borders with Haiti in Escalation of Diplomatic Crisis,” PBS, September 15, 2023.
47 U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “Catastrophic Hunger Levels Recorded for
the First Time in Haiti,” October 14, 2022.
482023. 52 World Food Program (WFP), “Haiti: Overview of DR Border Closure Impacts,” November 3, 2023. 53 United Nations, “Support to Haiti’s Police, Deployment of Multinational Mission Fundamental Towards Restoring Stability in Country, Senior Official Tells Security Council,” January 25, 2024. 54 WFP, “Severe Hunger Persists in Haiti as Violence Intensifies in the Capital,” September 19, 2023. 55 Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), “Cholera Epidemic in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,” Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), “Cholera Epidemic in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,” May 19,
2023.
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that 21 health facilities had temporarily shut down or reduced their activities due to violence.49
Children in Haiti are extremely vulnerable to protection concerns, particularly gender-based
violence. They have also lost years of schooling due to COVID-19; insecurity and cholera-related
school closures; and, most recently, armed attacks on schools.50
U.N. Presence in Haiti and Recent Action
The U.N. has had a continuous presence in Haiti for almost 19 years, with diplomatic and
financial support provided by successive U.S. presidential administrations. Following the collapse
of the Aristide government in 2004, the U.N. Security Council established MINUSTAH to help
restore order and train the HNP.51 After the 2010 earthquake, the Security Council expanded
MINUSTAH’s size and mission.December 27, 2023. 56 OHCHR and BINUH, Human Rights Situation, Main Trends, Quarterly Report: January-March 2023, March 8, 2023; Reuters, “Medecins Sans Frontieres Shuts Haiti Hospital amid Gang Violence,” March 8, 2023. 57 U.N. Children’s Fund, “Haiti: Armed Violence Against Schools Increases Nine-Fold in One Year,” February 9, 2023. 58 U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 1542 (2004)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 4961st Meeting, on 30 April 2004,” S/RES/1542 (2004), June 1, 2004. MINUSTAH’s original mission aimed to restore security and stability, (continued...) Congressional Research Service 8 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy
A Security Council resolution ended MINUSTAH in 2017, citing Haiti’s peaceful completion of a A Security Council resolution ended MINUSTAH in 2017, citing Haiti’s peaceful completion of a
long-delayed electoral process in February 2017 as a milestone.long-delayed electoral process in February 2017 as a milestone.5259 The Security Council also The Security Council also
praised MINUSTAH for supporting the political process, professionalizing the police, and praised MINUSTAH for supporting the political process, professionalizing the police, and
improving security and stability in Haiti, achievements that proved short-lived. Haitian and improving security and stability in Haiti, achievements that proved short-lived. Haitian and
international human rights and health experts criticized MINUSTAH for its role in introducing international human rights and health experts criticized MINUSTAH for its role in introducing
cholera to Haiti (a disease that had not been present in the country for more than a century) and cholera to Haiti (a disease that had not been present in the country for more than a century) and
for allegations of sexual abuse by some of its forces.for allegations of sexual abuse by some of its forces.5360 In 2016, then-Secretary-General Ban Ki- In 2016, then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-
Moon apologized for the U.N.’s role in a cholera outbreak that ultimately caused nearly 10,000 Moon apologized for the U.N.’s role in a cholera outbreak that ultimately caused nearly 10,000
deaths; the U.N. also launched a $400 million fund to confront the epidemic.deaths; the U.N. also launched a $400 million fund to confront the epidemic.5461
In 2017, the U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) succeeded MINUSTAH, In 2017, the U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) succeeded MINUSTAH,
focusing on strengthening judicial institutions, protecting human rights, increasing the focusing on strengthening judicial institutions, protecting human rights, increasing the
professionalism of the HNP, and reinforcing the rule of law. The mission also supported violence-professionalism of the HNP, and reinforcing the rule of law. The mission also supported violence-
reduction projects and income-generating activities for youth. During MINJUSTH’s mandate, the reduction projects and income-generating activities for youth. During MINJUSTH’s mandate, the
number of HNP officers increased by 10% to 15,400 and courts reported a 300% increase in files number of HNP officers increased by 10% to 15,400 and courts reported a 300% increase in files

49 OHCHR and BINUH, Human Rights Situation, Main Trends, Quarterly Report: January-March 2023, March 8,
2023; Reuters, “Medecins Sans Frontieres Shuts Haiti Hospital amid Gang Violence,” March 8, 2023.
50 U.N. Children’s Fund, “Haiti: Armed Violence Against Schools Increases Nine-Fold in One Year,” February 9,
2023.
51 U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 1542 (2004)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 4961st Meeting, on 30 April
2004,” S/RES/1542 (2004), June 1, 2004. MINUSTAH’s original mission aimed to restore security and stability,
processed on the day of their reception.62 In October 2019, the U.N. transitioned to a political office, the U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), for an initial one-year period that the U.N. Security Council twice extended. BINUH’s mandate, which currently runs through July 2024,63 is to advise the Haitian government on how to establish an inclusive national dialogue on reestablishing stability, security, and the rule of law so elections can be held, among other aims. The mission also emphasizes protecting and promoting human rights, including by documenting recent gender-based violence by gangs and producing reports from Haiti for the U.N. Secretary-General and Security Council.64 BINUH coordinates with other U.N. agencies, funds, and programs, ranging from humanitarian agencies such as the World Food Program to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime. Sanctions Resolution On October 17, 2022, the Security Council discussed a resolution sponsored by the United States and Mexico to establish a U.N. sanctions regime against gang leaders in Haiti and those who finance them. The Security Council unanimously approved the sanctions resolution (Resolution promote political processes (including elections), strengthen institutions and rule-of-law-structures, and promote and promote political processes (including elections), strengthen institutions and rule-of-law-structures, and promote and
protect human rights. protect human rights.
5259 U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 2350 (2017)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 7924th Meeting, on 13 April U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 2350 (2017)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 7924th Meeting, on 13 April
2017,” S/RES/2350 (2017), April 13, 2017. Critics argue, however, that a transitional government, not the U.N.-backed 2017,” S/RES/2350 (2017), April 13, 2017. Critics argue, however, that a transitional government, not the U.N.-backed
PHTK government, accomplished that goal. Even with MINUSTAH present, Haiti experienced a constitutional crisis PHTK government, accomplished that goal. Even with MINUSTAH present, Haiti experienced a constitutional crisis
after Michel Martelly failed to convene elections to choose his successor. Georges Fauriol, ‘A Cycle of Instability’: after Michel Martelly failed to convene elections to choose his successor. Georges Fauriol, ‘A Cycle of Instability’:
Haiti’s Constitutional Crisis,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 8, 2021. Haiti’s Constitutional Crisis,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 8, 2021.
5360 For background, see CRS In Focus IF10502, For background, see CRS In Focus IF10502, Haiti: Cholera, the United Nations, and Hurricane Matthew, by , by
Maureen Taft-Morales and Tiaji Salaam-Blyther. Maureen Taft-Morales and Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.
5461 U.N. News, “U.N.’s Ban Apologizes to People of Haiti, Outlines New Plan to Fight Cholera Epidemic and Help U.N. News, “U.N.’s Ban Apologizes to People of Haiti, Outlines New Plan to Fight Cholera Epidemic and Help
Communities,” December 1, 2016. By the end of 2021, donors had contributed only $21.8 million to support the Communities,” December 1, 2016. By the end of 2021, donors had contributed only $21.8 million to support the
pledged $400 million fund. See U.N. Haiti Cholera Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund, pledged $400 million fund. See U.N. Haiti Cholera Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund, 2021 Annual Report. .
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processed on the day of their reception.55 However, Haitians continued to report increased sexual
violence.56
In October 2019, the U.N. transitioned to a political office, the U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti
(BINUH), for an initial one-year period that the U.N. Security Council twice extended. BINUH’s
mandate, which currently runs through July 2024,57 is to advise the Haitian government on how to
establish an inclusive national dialogue on reestablishing stability, security, and the rule of law so
elections can be held, among other aims. The mission also emphasizes protecting and promoting
human rights, including by documenting recent gender-based violence by gangs and producing
reports from Haiti for the U.N. Secretary-General and Security Council.58 BINUH coordinates
with other U.N. agencies, funds, and programs, ranging from humanitarian agencies such as the
World Food Program to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime.
Sanctions Resolution
On October 17, 2022, the Security Council discussed a resolution sponsored by the United States
and Mexico to establish a U.N. sanctions regime against gang leaders in Haiti and those who
finance them. The Security Council unanimously approved the sanctions resolution (Resolution
2653) on October 21, 2022; an expert committee is guiding its implementation.59
Multinational Force Consideration
62 U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, “MINUJUSTH Completes Its Mandate, Putting an End to 15 Consecutive Years of Peacekeeping in Haiti,” October 16, 2019. 63 For background, see BINUH, “Mandate,” at https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/mandate. 64 BINUH and OHCHR, Sexual Violence. Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 19 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy 2653) on October 21, 2022; an expert committee has recommended, and the Security Council has added, four gang leaders to its sanctions list (See “Sanctions: U.S. and Multilateral”).65 Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission On October 6, 2022, de facto Prime Minister Henry and his ministers requested the deployment On October 6, 2022, de facto Prime Minister Henry and his ministers requested the deployment
of an international force to help Haitian forces quell the security situation and allow humanitarian of an international force to help Haitian forces quell the security situation and allow humanitarian
aid to flow. On October 8, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres sent a letter to the Security aid to flow. On October 8, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres sent a letter to the Security
Council recommending various approaches to respond to that request.Council recommending various approaches to respond to that request. Such approaches included
deploying a non-U.N. rapid action force (probably composed of some military forces) to support
the HNP, forming a multinational police task force, creating a multinational antigang force,
expanding BINUH’s budget and mandate, bolstering the HNP and the justice sector, and
combating arms trafficking.6066 On October 17, 2022, the Security Council discussed a proposed On October 17, 2022, the Security Council discussed a proposed
resolution by the United States and Mexico, which reportedly would have authorized the resolution by the United States and Mexico, which reportedly would have authorized the
deployment of a non-U.N. multinational force to Haiti.deployment of a non-U.N. multinational force to Haiti.61 67 From October 2022 through mid-2023, From October 2022 through mid-2023,
few countries publicly offered to send their forces to Haiti and many countries, including Canada, few countries publicly offered to send their forces to Haiti and many countries, including Canada,
declined U.S. requests to lead such a force. declined U.S. requests to lead such a force.
In July 2023, Kenya announced its willingness to “positively consider” leading a multinational In July 2023, Kenya announced its willingness to “positively consider” leading a multinational
force in Haiti and sending 1,000 police to support the HNP if authorized by the Security force in Haiti and sending 1,000 police to support the HNP if authorized by the Security
Council.Council.62 Once announced, the68 The State Department and CARICOM praised Kenya’s disposition even as some questioned the human rights record of the Kenyan police.69 In August 2023, Kenya deployed an assessment mission accompanied by U.S. officials to Haiti. In an August 15 letter to the Security Council, the Secretary-General said the mission should focus on disarming gangs, securing key installations and highways, and reasserting state presence to enable basic services to reach the population.70 He also asserted that “the robust use of force by a specialized multinational police force,” likely supported by military assets, is needed to help the HNP reestablish law and order. He outlined how the U.N. could provide logistical support to the multinational force, while also expanding BINUH to facilitate a political accord and train the police, among other tasks. On October 2, 2023, the Security Council approved Resolution 2699 to support a Kenyan-led multinational force financed by voluntary contributions to provide security for critical infrastructure, training, and operational support to the HNP.71 Russia and China abstained from the vote. The resolution called on member states to contribute personnel, equipment, financial, and logistical support for the MSS. In late January 2024, Kenya’s High Court blocked the Kenyan government from deploying police officers to Haiti, ruling that police officers cannot be deployed on foreign operations missions.72 65 Security Council, “Resolution 2692 (2023),” July 14, 2023. U.N. Security Council, “Security Council 2653 Sanctions Committee Adds 4 Entries to its Sanctions List,” SC/15520, December 8, 2023. 66 Such approaches included deploying a non-U.N. rapid action force (probably composed of some military forces) to support the HNP, forming a multinational police task force, creating a multinational antigang force, expanding BINUH’s budget and mandate, bolstering the HNP and the justice sector, and combating arms trafficking. Security Council, S/2022/747. 67 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at State Department and CARICOM praised Kenya’s disposition

55 U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, “MINUJUSTH Completes Its Mandate, Putting an End to 15 Consecutive
Years of Peacekeeping in Haiti,” October 16, 2019.
56 International Justice Resource Center, “U.N. Transitions from Peacekeeping to Governance, Amid Crisis in Haiti,”
October 17, 2019.
57 For background, see BINUH, “Mandate,” at https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/mandate.
58 BINUH and OHCHR, Sexual Violence.
59 Security Council, “Resolution 2692 (2023),” July 14, 2023.
60 Security Council, S/2022/747.
61 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a U.N. Security
Council Briefing on Haiti,” October 17, 2022. Security Council Report, “Haiti: Briefing,” in What’s in Blue (blog),
December 21, 2022 (hereinafter Security Council Report, “Haiti”).
62 Reuters, “Kenya Ready to Lead Multinational Force to Haiti,” July 29, 2023.
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even as some questioned the human rights record of the Kenyan police.63 Other countries that
have considered contributing troops to a mission to Haiti include the Bahamas, Antigua and
Barbuda, and Jamaica.64 Kenya deployed an assessment mission accompanied by U.S. officials to
Haiti in August and is discussing the scope and mission of a “multinational security support
mission” with the Security Council, donors, Haitian officials, and other stakeholders.65 The
United States and Ecuador plan to present a U.N. Security a U.N. Security Council Briefing on Haiti,” October 17, 2022. 68 Reuters, “Kenya Ready to Lead Multinational Force to Haiti,” July 29, 2023. 69 U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Kenya Considering Leading a Multinational Force in Haiti,” August 1, 2023; CARICOM, “Statement on Multi-national Force to Support Haiti,” August 4, 2023; Luke Taylor, “Kenya’s Offer to Send Police to Haiti Sparks Human Rights Concerns,” The Guardian, August 5, 2023.. 70 Security Council, “Letter Dated 14 August 2023 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2023/596, August 15, 2023. 71 Security Council, “Resolution 2699 (2023),” October 2, 2023. 72 Jacqueline Charles, “No Cops for Haiti: Kenya Court Blocks Sending Police to Help Fight Kidnapping Gangs,” Miami Herald, January 26, 2024. Congressional Research Service 10 link to page 18 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy The Kenyan government reportedly plans to challenge the ruling. While the U.S. State Department has reaffirmed its support for an MSS mission to Haiti, the composition, budget, and timing of a potential deployment remain unclear.73 Any Council resolution to support a
Kenyan-led multinational force in Haiti financed by voluntary contributions as soon as possible.66
Such a mission would likely require many more troop contributing countries, which U.S. officials
have predicted will come forward after a favorable Security Council vote, as well as significant
training, equipment, and logistical support from the United States, Canada, and others.67 In his
August 15 letter to the Security Council, the Secretary-General reportedly said that the mission
should focus on disarming the gangs, securing key installations and highways, and reasserting
state presence to enable basic services to reach the population.68 He also asserted that “the robust
use of force by a specialized multinational police force,” likely supported by military assets, is
needed to help the HNP reestablish law and order. He reportedly outlined how the U.N. could
provide logistical support to the multinational force and the HNP, while also expanding and
strengthening BINUH to facilitate a political accord and train the police, among other tasks. Any
units or participants in a mission to Haiti (whether police or military troops) would be subject to units or participants in a mission to Haiti (whether police or military troops) would be subject to
U.N. vetting, while those receiving U.S. support would be subject to U.S. U.N. vetting, while those receiving U.S. support would be subject to U.S. Leahy human rights vetting (22 vetting (22
U.S.C. §2378d and 10 USC §362). U.S.C. §2378d and 10 USC §362). Kenyan officials have said that the soonest they could arrive
in Haiti would likely be three months after a Security Council vote.69Human rights experts have suggested additional training that should be provided to MSS members as well as mechanisms to prevent, investigate, and punish any potential human rights violations.74
U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress
Biden Administration policy goals in Haiti include supporting Haitian-led efforts to confront Biden Administration policy goals in Haiti include supporting Haitian-led efforts to confront
gangs and insecuritygangs and insecurity;, resolve the political and constitutional crisis resolve the political and constitutional crisis;, revive the economy revive the economy; and
address poverty and a lack of access to health care, education, and other basic services.70, and address the root causes of emigration from the country.75 Since Since
Moïse’s assassination, U.S., Canadian, and U.N. officials—among others criticized for past Moïse’s assassination, U.S., Canadian, and U.N. officials—among others criticized for past
interventions in the country—have emphasized their support for “Haitian-led solutions” to the interventions in the country—have emphasized their support for “Haitian-led solutions” to the
country’s challenges. In March 2023, the Biden Administration issued a 10-year plan for Haiti, as country’s challenges. In March 2023, the Biden Administration issued a 10-year plan for Haiti, as
mandated by the Global Fragility Act mandated by the Global Fragility Act (GFA; P.L. 116-94), with a long-term, interagency goal of helping the government and citizenry of Haiti work together to develop a shared vision and plan to achieve long-term stability.76 (See “Global Fragility Act Implementation.”) U.S. officials have pursued several courses of action to advance those goals. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other top U.S. officials have stressed the urgency of reaching a political consensus on how to reestablish constitutional order to de facto Prime Minister Henry and other key stakeholders.77 The U.S. government has sanctioned corrupt officials and encouraged other countries to do so, supported efforts to facilitate dialogue by CARICOM and others, expanded support for the HNP, and sought a partner country to lead a non-U.N. multinational force to help stabilize the country.78 U.S. officials have pledged to provide significant funding, equipment, and logistical support to any multinational force deployed to Haiti that would expand on U.S. assistance to the HNP.79 Despite the current uncertainty surrounding the MSS, U.S. officials have asked countries to donate funding and troops to support the mission.80 While some analysts have urged U.S. policymakers not to support a multinational mission, others have recommended 73 U.S. State Department, “United States Reiterates Support for Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti,” January 27, 2024; and International Crisis Group, Haiti’s Gangs: Can a Foreign Mission Break Their Stranglehold, January 5, 2024. 74 See, for example, Tirana Hassan, “Remarks Delivered at a U.N. Security Council Meeting on Haiti,” Human Rights Watch, January 25, 2024. 75 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Haiti, revised and updated March 27, 2023. 76 U.S. Department of State, The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti, March 24, 2023. 77 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Haitian Prime Minister Henry,” July 5, 2023. 78 David C. Adams, “U.S. and Canada Turn to Sanctions against Haitian Politicians and Businessmen Accused of Ties to Gangs,” Univision, December 19, 2022; International Crisis Group, Haiti’s Last Resort: Gangs and the Prospect for Foreign Intervention, Briefing No. 48, December 14, 2022. 79 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” August 14, 2023. 80 U.S. State Department, “United States Reiterates Support for Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti,” January 27, 2024. Congressional Research Service 11 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy greater, more multifaceted U.S. support for the MSS and redoubled efforts to broker a political consensus in Haiti.81 Congress has had a direct role in shaping U.S. policy toward Haiti and conducting oversight of U.S. policy development and implementation. Among other policy areas, Congress has influenced decisions regarding foreign assistance, trade preferences, sanctions policy, and migration. Individual Members have differed, however, on policy approaches and priorities. In December 2023, for example, six Members of Congress wrote a letter asking the Administration to withdraw its support for the MSS, while five Senators wrote a letter asking the Administration for clarification on issues ranging from dialogue in Haiti to sanctions to arms trafficking policy.82 Should a multinational force be deployed to Haiti, Congress could determine what, if any, support the United States would provide for such a force and/or use its legislative and oversight tools to (GFA; P.L. 116-94), with a long-term, interagency goal of

63 U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Kenya Considering Leading a
Multinational Force in Haiti,” August 1, 2023; CARICOM, “Statement on Multi-national Force to Support Haiti,”
August 4, 2023; Luke Taylor, “Kenya’s Offer to Send Police to Haiti Sparks Human Rights Concerns,” The Guardian,
August 5, 2023; Human Rights Watch, Kenya: End Abusive Policing of Protests, May 31, 2023.
64 “Antigua Considers Role as Ja Confirms Plan to Send Troops to Haiti,” The Gleaner, August 4, 2023.
65 CRS phone interview with State Department officials, September 13, 2023.
66 Michael Wilner, “U.S. Official says U.N. Resolution on Haiti is Urgent: ‘We are Moving as Fast as we can,’” Miami
Herald, September 13, 2023.
67 Woodrow Wilson Center, “Two Years After Moïse Assassination: The Impact of Gang Violence in Haiti,”
September 13, 2023, available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/two-years-after-moise-assassination-impact-
gang-violence-haiti.
68 Jacqueline Charles, “U.N. Leader Calls for Range of Options to Combat Haiti Gangs,” Miami Herald, August 15,
2023; Edith M. Lederer, “UN Chief Urges Deployment of Police Special Forces and Military Support to Combat Gangs
in Haiti,” Associated Press, August 15, 2023.
69 CRS phone interview with State Department officials, September 13, 2023.
70 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Haiti, approved March 18, 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/04/ICS_WHA_Haiti_Public.pdf.
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helping the government and citizenry of Haiti work together to develop a shared vision and plan
to achieve long-term stability.71
U.S. officials have pursued several courses of action to advance those goals. Secretary of State
Antony Blinken and other top U.S. officials have stressed the increasing urgency of reaching a
political consensus on how to reestablish constitutional order to de facto Prime Minister Henry
and other key stakeholders.72 The U.S. government has sanctioned corrupt officials and
encouraged other countries to do so, supported efforts to facilitate dialogue by CARICOM and
others, expanded support for the HNP, and sought a partner country to lead a non-U.N.
“multinational force” to help stabilize the country.73 U.S. officials have pledged to provide
significant funding, equipment, and logistical support to any multinational force deployed to Haiti
that would expand on U.S. assistance to the HNP.74
On many U.S. policy issues regarding Haiti, Congress has had a direct role in shaping policy or
conducting oversight of policy development and implementation. Those policy issues include, but
are not limited to, foreign assistance, trade preferences, sanctions policy, and migration. Should a
multinational force be deployed to Haiti, Congress could engage in oversight or consider
legislative options related to the mission. For example, Congress could provide or withhold
funding for such a force and/or seek to ensure that such a force respects human rights and that ensure that such a force respects human rights and that
those who receive U.S. training or equipment are rigorously vetted, as required by U.S. law.those who receive U.S. training or equipment are rigorously vetted, as required by U.S. law.7583
Foreign Assistance
Bilateral Assistance
Congress has appropriated foreign assistance to support Haiti’s recovery from recurrent natural Congress has appropriated foreign assistance to support Haiti’s recovery from recurrent natural
disasters and foster long-term stability. In addition to significantly expanding such assistance in disasters and foster long-term stability. In addition to significantly expanding such assistance in
the aftermath of a massive 2010 earthquake, Congress has closely monitored the implementation the aftermath of a massive 2010 earthquake, Congress has closely monitored the implementation
and impact of U.S. assistance activities.and impact of U.S. assistance activities.7684 Congress also shapes U.S. policy toward Haiti through Congress also shapes U.S. policy toward Haiti through
appropriations, conditions on appropriations, and reporting requirements linked to the obligation appropriations, conditions on appropriations, and reporting requirements linked to the obligation
of U.S. assistance. of U.S. assistance.
Congress enacted the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative Congress enacted the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative
Act (HAITI Act) as part of the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Act (HAITI Act) as part of the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103,
Division V). The HAITI Act stated that U.S. policy should support sustainable rebuilding and Division V). The HAITI Act stated that U.S. policy should support sustainable rebuilding and
development efforts in Haiti that recognize Haitian independence, are led by the people and development efforts in Haiti that recognize Haitian independence, are led by the people and
government of Haiti, and contribute to international efforts to support broad and inclusive government of Haiti, and contribute to international efforts to support broad and inclusive
dialogue to restore democratic institutions and legitimacy in the country.dialogue to restore democratic institutions and legitimacy in the country.7785 The HAITI Act also The HAITI Act also

71 U.S. Department of State, The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for
Haiti, March 24, 2023.
72 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Haitian Prime Minister Henry,” July 5, 2023.
73 Adams, “U.S. and Canada Turn to Sanctions”; International Crisis Group, Haiti’s Last Resort: Gangs and the
Prospect for Foreign Intervention, Briefing No. 48, December 14, 2022.
74 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” August 14, 2023.
75required U.S. agencies to measure the progress of post disaster recovery and efforts to address corruption, governance, rule of law, and media freedoms in Haiti. The State Department submitted the reports required by the act and made them public on November 10, 2022.86 81 Daniel Larison, “No Matter how Well-Intentioned, Armed Mission in Haiti is a Mistake,” Responsible Statecraft, October 4, 2023; Georges Fauriol, Wanted: A Reset of Haiti Policy, United States Institute of Peace, January 25, 2024. 82 Rafael Bernal, “House Democrats ask Biden Administration to Reverse Course in Haiti,” The Hill, December 8, 2023; Senator Ed Markey, “Senators Markey and Warnock, Colleagues Urge Biden Administration to Address Humanitarian Crisis and Insecurity in Haiti,” December 19, 2023. 83 CRS In Focus IF10575, CRS In Focus IF10575, Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”), by Michael A. Weber. , by Michael A. Weber.
7684 See, as an example, GAO-23-105211, March 2023. See, as an example, GAO-23-105211, March 2023.
7785 Other elements of U.S. policy cited in the act include building the long-term capacity of the government, civil Other elements of U.S. policy cited in the act include building the long-term capacity of the government, civil
society, and private sector to foster economic development in Haiti; fostering collaboration with the Haitian diaspora society, and private sector to foster economic development in Haiti; fostering collaboration with the Haitian diaspora
and the business community in Haiti; supporting anticorruption, press freedom, and human rights protection, including and the business community in Haiti; supporting anticorruption, press freedom, and human rights protection, including
through the imposition of sanctions; restoring the natural resources of Haiti; promoting political stability and free and through the imposition of sanctions; restoring the natural resources of Haiti; promoting political stability and free and
(continued...)
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required U.S. agencies to measure the progress of postdisaster recovery and efforts to address
corruption, governance, rule of law, and media freedoms in Haiti. The State Department
submitted the reports required by the act and made them public on November 10, 2022.78
fair elections; providing comprehensive reporting on the goals and progress of the Haitian government and the U.S. government; and promoting the participation of Haitian women and youth in U.S. assistance programs. 86 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Haiti: Reports,” November 10, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/haiti-reports/. Congressional Research Service 12 link to page 18 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 17 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy In addition to the HAITI Act, current and future U.S. programming and budget requests are likely In addition to the HAITI Act, current and future U.S. programming and budget requests are likely
to reflect the priorities of the State Department and USAID’s two-year Integrated Country to reflect the priorities of the State Department and USAID’s two-year Integrated Country
Strategy for Strategy for FY2022-FY2024Haiti, adopted in March 2022, adopted in March 2022 and updated in March 2023, and the GFA-mandated , and the GFA-mandated U.S. Strategy to
Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti, released in March 2023, released in March 2023
((seesee “Global Fragility Act Implementation”)..7987
The FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328), The FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328), enacted in December 2022, did not did not
specify a comprehensive specify a comprehensive appropriations level for Haitiappropriations level for Haiti. The accompanying explanatory statement
designated $8.5 million for reforestation efforts and “not less than” $5.0 million to help meet the
sanitary, medical, and nutritional needs of Haitian prisoners. The act required the State . The act required the State
Department to withhold any aid to support the Haitian government until the Secretary of State Department to withhold any aid to support the Haitian government until the Secretary of State
certifies that a new president and parliament have taken office following free and fair elections or certifies that a new president and parliament have taken office following free and fair elections or
that a broadly representative transitional government is in place and it is in the U.S. interest to that a broadly representative transitional government is in place and it is in the U.S. interest to
provide such assistance. The withholding requirement does not apply to aid intended to support provide such assistance. The withholding requirement does not apply to aid intended to support
free and fair elections; antigang police and justice administration; disaster relief and recovery; free and fair elections; antigang police and justice administration; disaster relief and recovery;
and education, public health, food security, and other basic human needs. As in prior years, the and education, public health, food security, and other basic human needs. As in prior years, the
act prohibited assistance for the armed forces of Haiti. The explanatory statement accompanying act prohibited assistance for the armed forces of Haiti. The explanatory statement accompanying
P.L. 117-328 urged the Secretary of State to use “every appropriate diplomatic tool to press for P.L. 117-328 urged the Secretary of State to use “every appropriate diplomatic tool to press for
dialogue” among key stakeholders and to take “strong legal action” against those engaged in dialogue” among key stakeholders and to take “strong legal action” against those engaged in
human rights abuses, corruption, and other illicit activities.human rights abuses, corruption, and other illicit activities.8088 The State Department has allocated The State Department has allocated
an estimated $204.9 million in foreign assistance to Haiti for FY2023 (seean estimated $204.9 million in foreign assistance to Haiti for FY2023 (see Table 1).
U.S. foreign assistance to Haiti has ranged from a low of $184.6 million in FY2020 to
$252.1 million in FY2021 (see Table 1). The Administration has requested $291.5 million for The Administration has requested $291.5 million for
Haiti in FY2024, with the largest increase in funding requested under the International Narcotics Haiti in FY2024, with the largest increase in funding requested under the International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) foreign assistance account to support the HNP and other Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) foreign assistance account to support the HNP and other
justice sector actors. This prioritization of restoring security and justice coincides with the phase justice sector actors. This prioritization of restoring security and justice coincides with the phase
one activities outlined by the one activities outlined by the P.L. 116-94 GFA GFA strategic plan for Haiti. Congress has not yet concluded action on FY2024 appropriations but it has enacted continuing resolutions (P.L. 118-15, P.L. 118-22, and P.L. 118-35) that fund most foreign aid programs at the same level and under the same conditions as FY2023 until March 8, 2024. The FY2024 foreign assistance appropriations measures approved by the House (H.R. 4665/H.Rept. 118-146) and reported in the Senate (S. 2438/S.Rept. 118-71) do not specify funding levels for Haiti. However, both measures would place restrictions on assistance to the central government. strategic plan for Haiti.




fair elections; providing comprehensive reporting on the goals and progress of the Haitian government and the U.S.
government; and promoting the participation of Haitian women and youth in U.S. assistance programs.
78 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Haiti: Reports,” November 10, 2022, at
https://www.state.gov/haiti-reports/.
79 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy; and State Department, The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and
Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti.
80 “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Leahy, Chair of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Regarding H.R.
2617, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023,” Congressional Record, vol. 168, no. 198—book II (December 20,
2022), p. S9299.
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Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Haiti by Account: FY2018-FY2024
(appropriations in thousands of current U.S. dollars) (appropriations in thousands of current U.S. dollars)
FY2023
FY2024
Account
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
(Estimate)
(Request)
DA DA
32,000 32,000
51,000 51,000
51,000 51,000
52,000 52,000
59,000 59,000
46,400 46,400
113,200 113,200
ESF ESF
8,500 8,500
— —
— —
14,800a14,800a 20,500b
20,500b
7,000 7,000
— —
FFP FFP
3,244 3,244
11,719 11,719
7,996 7,996
3,110 3,110
— —
— —
— —
GHP (State) GHP (State)
99,386 99,386
103,011 103,011
78,765 78,765
99,822 99,822
103,081 103,081
102,505 102,505
100,000 100,000
GHP GHP
24,200 24,200
24,500 24,500
24,500 24,500
24,500 24,500
24,500 24,500
30,000 30,000
33,000 33,000
(USAID) (USAID)
INCLE INCLE
12,000 12,000
22.,8 22.,800c
33,00 33,000d
57,6 57,600e
33,3 33,300f
33,300 33,300
45,000 45,000 87 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy, updated March 2023; and State Department, The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti. 88 “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Leahy, Chair of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Regarding H.R. 2617, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023,” Congressional Record, vol. 168, no. 198—book II (December 20, 2022), p. S9299. Congressional Research Service 13 link to page 17 link to page 17 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy
IMET IMET
233 233
241 241
96 96
255 255
47 47
— —
255 255
FMF FMF
5,000 5,000
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
Total
184,563
213,471
195,357
252,087a87a
240,434b34b
204,905
291,455
Sources: U.S. Department of StateU.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification,Congressional Budget Justification, Supplementary Tables-Foreign Supplementary Tables-Foreign
Operations, FY2020-FY2024 and U.S. Department of State, FY2023 estimate data, August 2023; and Email from Operations, FY2020-FY2024 and U.S. Department of State, FY2023 estimate data, August 2023; and Email from
State Department official, September 13, 2023.State Department official, September 13, 2023.
Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; FFP = Food for Peace; GHP = Global DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; FFP = Food for Peace; GHP = Global
Health Programs; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; IMET = International Military Health Programs; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; IMET = International Military
Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing. Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing.
a. This sum includes $14.8 a. This sum includes $14.8 millionmil ion of ESF appropriated through the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. of ESF appropriated through the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L.
117-2). 117-2).
b. This sum includes $15.0 b. This sum includes $15.0 millionmil ion of ESF appropriated through the Additional Ukraine Supplemental of ESF appropriated through the Additional Ukraine Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128). Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128).
c. This includes $8 c. This includes $8 millionmil ion reprogrammed in FY2021. reprogrammed in FY2021.
d. This includes $15 d. This includes $15 millionmil ion reprogrammed in FY2021 and FY2022. reprogrammed in FY2021 and FY2022.
e. This includes $44.6 e. This includes $44.6 millionmil ion reprogrammed in FY2022. reprogrammed in FY2022.
f. f.
This includes $3 This includes $3 millionmil ion provided through the Global Fragility Act. provided through the Global Fragility Act.
Humanitarian Assistance
The United States is the largest humanitarian donor to Haiti. The United States is the largest humanitarian donor to Haiti. USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian
Assistance (BHA) provided more than $92.1 million in humanitarian assistance to Haiti in
FY2021 and $79.2 million in FY2022. Of the total amount of humanitarian assistance provided
over those two fiscal years, $152.8 million represented emergency funding, much of which
responded to humanitarian needs (i.e., concerns about food; health; water, sanitation, and
hygiene; and protection) exacerbated by an August 2021 earthquake that killed some 2,250 people
and damaged 115,000 homes and other structures.
As the In response to the worsening humanitarian situation in Haitihumanitarian situation in Haiti worsened, USAID sent a Disaster Assistance Response , USAID sent a Disaster Assistance Response
Team (DART) to the country in October 2022Team (DART) to the country in October 2022. The DART is that has been coordinating the delivery of relief coordinating the delivery of relief
supplies supplies and other assistance to a portion of the estimated 5.to a portion of the estimated 5.25 million Haitians in need of humanitarian assistance. million Haitians in need of humanitarian assistance.89 In FY2022 and FY2023, USAID provided a total of more than $206 million in humanitarian assistance, including $179.8 million in emergency assistance.90 FY2023 programs focused on providing in-kind food aid and emergency cash for people to purchase food; medical, psychosocial, and other assistance to victims of GBV; and, water, sanitation, and hygiene programs to prevent the spread of cholera and other diseases. In addition to responding to these immediate needs, USAID helped fund programs to reduce the country’s risk of disasters and improve Haiti’s capacity to respond to emergencies.
Since October, USAID/BHA has helped transport 450 metric tons of relief supplies to help Haiti
respond to the cholera outbreak and redoubled efforts to help communities access clean water and
prevent the spread of communicable diseases. BHA and other partners have scaled up programs
to address food insecurity and the protection needs of the estimated 1.9 million Haitians most
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vulnerable to GBV and gang violence. Total USAID humanitarian funding for Haiti in FY2023
stood at $112.6 million as of August 2023.81
U.S. agencies also helped Haiti respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and related health needs. The U.S. agencies also helped Haiti respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and related health needs. The
United States has donated nearly 1.1 million COVID-19 vaccines to Haiti.United States has donated nearly 1.1 million COVID-19 vaccines to Haiti.8291 As of As of August 11,
2023, 3.1January 5, 2024, 3.2% of Haiti’s population had completed the COVID-19 vaccination schedule% of Haiti’s population had completed the COVID-19 vaccination schedule.83 In
FY2022, USAID provided $51.3 million to help Haiti address the health and humanitarian
impacts of COVID-19.84 In December 2022, DOD deployed the U.S. Naval Ship Comfort to
deliver medical care to Haitians as part of a multicountry deployment, one of the lowest vaccination rates in the world.92 USAID is working with the Haitian government to implement media campaigns encouraging vaccination, provide COVD-19 immunization services, and strengthen health care facilities’ access to oxygen. Funds to Support the Multinational Security Support Mission The Biden Administration has committed to providing support to the MSS mission to Haiti, although fulfilling that pledge is likely to require congressional support. The United States has pledged $100 million in foreign assistance, likely to consist of International Narcotics Control 89 USAID, Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, “Haiti Assistance Overview,” November 2023. 90 Ibid. 91 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution,” at https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/haiti/#covid_map_link. 92 Pan American Health Organization, “COVID-19 Vaccination in the Americas,” https://ais.paho.org/imm/IM_DosisAdmin-Vacunacion.asp, accessed January 24, 2024. Congressional Research Service 14 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds, to support the MSS.93 Additionally, the U.S. Department of Defense is prepared to provided up to $100 million in training, equipment, technical assistance, and other logistical support to the mission. .
Global Fragility Act Implementation
The 116th Congress enacted the GFA, which directed the executive branch to develop a 10-year The 116th Congress enacted the GFA, which directed the executive branch to develop a 10-year
strategy to prevent conflict globally and stabilize conflict-affected areas. It also directed the strategy to prevent conflict globally and stabilize conflict-affected areas. It also directed the
executive branch to select priority countries or regions to execute such efforts through 10-year executive branch to select priority countries or regions to execute such efforts through 10-year
plans. In April 2022, the Biden Administration announced one region and four priority countries plans. In April 2022, the Biden Administration announced one region and four priority countries
for GFA implementation; Haiti was among them. The GFA also authorized three distinct funds: for GFA implementation; Haiti was among them. The GFA also authorized three distinct funds:
the Prevention and Stabilization Fund (PSF), the Complex Crisis Fund (CCF), and the Multi-the Prevention and Stabilization Fund (PSF), the Complex Crisis Fund (CCF), and the Multi-
Donor Global Fragility Fund. In March 2023, the Biden Administration released a 10-year plan Donor Global Fragility Fund. In March 2023, the Biden Administration released a 10-year plan
for Haiti, as mandated by the GFA. According to a summary of the plan, the U.S.-interagency for Haiti, as mandated by the GFA. According to a summary of the plan, the U.S.-interagency
seeks to help “Haiti’s citizens and government advance a shared vision and a permissive seeks to help “Haiti’s citizens and government advance a shared vision and a permissive
environment for long-term stability.” It prioritizes security and justice sector sectors first, then environment for long-term stability.” It prioritizes security and justice sector sectors first, then
broadens to focus on economic and development goals, as well as civil society strengthening.broadens to focus on economic and development goals, as well as civil society strengthening.8594
The Administration has allocated at least $15.0 million of FY2021 PSF assistance, $13.0 million The Administration has allocated at least $15.0 million of FY2021 PSF assistance, $13.0 million
of FY2022 PSF assistance, and $3.3 million of FY2023 CCF assistance to Haiti.of FY2022 PSF assistance, and $3.3 million of FY2023 CCF assistance to Haiti.95
Donor Coordination
The United States is the leading bilateral donor in Haiti, and Congress has encouraged U.S. The United States is the leading bilateral donor in Haiti, and Congress has encouraged U.S.
executive agencies to coordinate foreign assistance priorities with key countries and international executive agencies to coordinate foreign assistance priorities with key countries and international
organizations represented in Haiti. Active since 2004, the “Core Group” has shaped international organizations represented in Haiti. Active since 2004, the “Core Group” has shaped international
responses to key events in Haiti, as when it called on Henry to form a “consensual and inclusive responses to key events in Haiti, as when it called on Henry to form a “consensual and inclusive
government” in July 2021.government” in July 2021.8696 In addition to the U.S. Ambassador, the Core Group comprises the In addition to the U.S. Ambassador, the Core Group comprises the
Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General; the Ambassadors of Brazil, Canada, Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General; the Ambassadors of Brazil, Canada,
France, Germany, Spain, and the European Union (EU); and the Special Representative of the France, Germany, Spain, and the European Union (EU); and the Special Representative of the
Organization of American States. Organization of American States.
Many members of the Core Group (including the EU, Spain, and France) have expressed interest Many members of the Core Group (including the EU, Spain, and France) have expressed interest
in contributing to a multidonor basket fund on security that aims to support the long-term in contributing to a multidonor basket fund on security that aims to support the long-term
development of the HNP; Canada and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) administer the development of the HNP; Canada and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) administer the

81 USAID, “Haiti-Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #6, FY2023, August 9, 2023.
82 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution,” at https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/haiti/
#covid_map_link.
83 Pan American Health Organization, “COVID-19 Vaccination in the Americas,” https://ais.paho.org/imm/
IM_DosisAdmin-Vacunacion.asp, accessed August 8, 2023.
84 USAID, “COVID-19: Latin America and the Caribbean,” Fact Sheet #6, FY2022, September 30, 2022.
85fund. UNDP estimated the fund needs at least $28 million over two years to achieve its aims. According to BINUH, donations stood at roughly $25.5 million in October 2023.97 93 U.S. Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “U.N. Security Council Authorizes Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti,” October 2, 2023. 94 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for
Haiti, March 24, 2023. March 24, 2023.
86 BINUH, “Core Group Press Release,” July 17, 2021.
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fund. UNDP estimated the fund needs at least $28 million over two years to achieve its aims.
According to BINUH, donations stood at roughly $17.7 million in June 2023.87
In October 2022, the U.S. and Canadian governments accelerated the delivery of armored
vehicles and other tactical equipment purchased by the Haitian government for the HNP.88 In
March 2023, Canada pledged to provide C$100 million (about $74 million) in additional aid for
the HNP.89
Trade Preferences9095 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Notification (CN) 23-300, August 14, 2023; USAID, CN 146, May 16, 2023. 96 BINUH, “Core Group Press Release,” July 17, 2021. 97 Electronic correspondence with U.N. official, January 26, 2024. Congressional Research Service 15 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Trade Preferences98
Congress has extended unilateral trade preferences to Haiti through several trade Congress has extended unilateral trade preferences to Haiti through several trade preferencespreference
programs enacted since 1975. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (P.L. 98-67, programs enacted since 1975. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (P.L. 98-67,
subsequently amended, with no expiration), for example, provides limited duty-free entry of subsequently amended, with no expiration), for example, provides limited duty-free entry of
selected Caribbean products as a core element of the U.S. foreign economic policy response to selected Caribbean products as a core element of the U.S. foreign economic policy response to
uncertain economic and political conditions in the region. The current Haiti-specific preferences, uncertain economic and political conditions in the region. The current Haiti-specific preferences,
which expire in 2025, provide unilateral preferences to the country’s apparel sector.which expire in 2025, provide unilateral preferences to the country’s apparel sector.9199 The value The value
of U.S. imports from Haiti entering under Caribbean preference programs increased from $25 of U.S. imports from Haiti entering under Caribbean preference programs increased from $25
million in 2000 to $253.3 million in 2022, an increase of over 900%.million in 2000 to $253.3 million in 2022, an increase of over 900%.92 Those imports accounted Those imports accounted
for about 31.9% of total U.S. merchandise imports from Haiti. Over 90% of U.S. imports from for about 31.9% of total U.S. merchandise imports from Haiti. Over 90% of U.S. imports from
Haiti in 2022 consisted of apparel items or clothing; knitted or crocheted apparel imports totaled Haiti in 2022 consisted of apparel items or clothing; knitted or crocheted apparel imports totaled
$807.0 million, while other apparel items or clothing totaled $155.0 million. $807.0 million, while other apparel items or clothing totaled $155.0 million.
100 The Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act of 2023 (S. 552), introduced in the Senate in The Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act of 2023 (S. 552), introduced in the Senate in
February 2023, would renew U.S. trade preferences for Haiti through 2035. In the House, H.R. February 2023, would renew U.S. trade preferences for Haiti through 2035. In the House, H.R.
5035, introduced in July 2023, would modify and extend trade preferences for Haiti under the 5035, introduced in July 2023, would modify and extend trade preferences for Haiti under the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act.
Sanctions: U.S. and Multilateral
In 2020, as part of its policy toward Haiti, the U.S. government began to impose In 2020, as part of its policy toward Haiti, the U.S. government began to impose sanctions against
economic sanctions and visa restrictions on those responsible for significant human rights abusesthose responsible for significant human rights abuses, corruption, and drug trafficking. and/or corruption.101 In In
December 2020, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, December 2020, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which built upon and expandedissued to implement requirements enacted in the the
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (P.L. 114-328), the U.S. Department of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (P.L. 114-328), the U.S. Department of the
TreasuryTreasury (Treasury) imposed asset blocking imposed asset blocking and visa restrictions on sanctions on Jimmy Chérizier (Chérizier (the gang leader and former gang leader and former
HNP officer) and two former Moïse officials for involvement HNP officer) and two former Moïse officials for involvement in the La Saline massacre. In April 2023, Treasury designated Gary Bodeu, former head of Haiti’s Chamber of Deputies, for corruption (E.O. 13818). In December 2023, Treasury sanctioned the leaders of four of Haiti’s largest gangs for involvement in sexual violence and other gross human rights violations (E.O. 13818). These individuals are barred from entry into the United States. Pursuant to Section 7031(c) of annual foreign operations appropriations acts (P.L. 117-103, Division K and P.L. 117-328, Division K), the State Department has imposed visa restrictions on eight Haitian officials who have committed human rights violations and/or corruption. In 2022, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on then-Senator Lambert for corruption and gross violations of human rights, as well as former Haitian Customs Director Rommel Bell and then-Senator Celestin for corruption. In 2023, the State Department invoked section 7031 (c) authorities to impose visa restrictions on Gary Bodeau, former senator Nenel Cassey, former prime minister Laurent Lamothe, and former prime minister Jean-Marie Bellerive for corruption. The State Department has reportedly privately revoked the visas of dozens of other officials and their families. 98in the La Saline massacre.93
Since fall 2022, the U.S. Treasury and State Departments have publicly imposed financial
sanctions and/or visa restrictions on seven current or former Haitian officials and their families

87 BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, July 3, 2023.
88 Reuters, “U.S., Canada Deliver Armored Vehicles to Haitian Police to Fight Gangs,” October 15, 2022.
89 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada in Joint Press Conference,”
March 24, 2023.
90 For additional information, see CRS Report R47432, For additional information, see CRS Report R47432, Caribbean Trade Preference Programs, by Liana Wong and M. , by Liana Wong and M.
Angeles Villarreal. Angeles Villarreal.
9199 For a description of how the Haiti-specific preference programs have evolved and have affected Haitian exports and For a description of how the Haiti-specific preference programs have evolved and have affected Haitian exports and
Haitian workers, see U.S. International Trade Commission, Haitian workers, see U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.-Haiti Trade: Impact of U.S. Preference Programs on
Haiti’s Economy and Workers, December 2022. , December 2022.
92100 Compiled by CRS using data from U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb. Compiled by CRS using data from U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb.
93 E.O. 13818, “Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption,” December
20, 2017; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International
Human Rights Day,” December 10, 2020.
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for corruption, drug trafficking, and/or human rights violations.94 In November 2022, the U.S.
Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions pursuant to E.O. 14059 on101 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), available at https://ofac.treasury.gov/. Congressional Research Service 16 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy In addition, Haitian officials have been designated for drug trafficking pursuant to E.O. 14059, which implements the Fentanyl Sanctions Act (P.L. 116-92); this E.O results in visa bans and economic sanctions. Treasury designated Joseph Lambert, then- Joseph Lambert, then-
president of the Haitian senate, and former Senator Youri Latortue for involvement in drug president of the Haitian senate, and former Senator Youri Latortue for involvement in drug
trafficking. The Treasury imposed the same sanctions ontrafficking in November 2022. Treasury designated then-Senator Rony Celestin and former then-Senator Rony Celestin and former
Senator Herve Fourcand in December 2022. In April 2023, the Department of the Treasury
sanctioned Gary Bodeu, former head of Haiti’s Chamber of Deputies, for corruption. Pursuant to
Section 7031(c) of P.L. 117-103, Division K, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on
then-Senator Lambert for corruption and involvement in a gross violation of human rights. The
State Department also imposed visa restrictions on former Haitian Customs Director Rommel
Bell and then-Senator Celestin for corruption. In June 2023, the State Department sanctioned
Laurent Lamothe, former prime minister under President Martelly, for corruption. Those subject
to recent public sanctions represents a range of political parties. The U.S. State Department has
privately revoked the visas of dozens of officials and their families.
Senator Herve Fourcand pursuant to E.O. 14059 in December 2022. The United States has encouraged other international partners and the U.N. The United States has encouraged other international partners and the U.N. to sanctionSecurity Council to impose sanctions on gang leaders and on the the
financial backers of Haitian gangs, recognizing that targeted sanctions imposed in a multilateral financial backers of Haitian gangs, recognizing that targeted sanctions imposed in a multilateral
manner may have a better chance of affecting change than unilateral sanctions.manner may have a better chance of affecting change than unilateral sanctions.95102 U.S. sanctions U.S. sanctions
have been closely coordinated with those announced by the Government of Canada, which also have been closely coordinated with those announced by the Government of Canada, which also
imposed sanctions on former President Martelly for drug trafficking—a move U.S. officials have imposed sanctions on former President Martelly for drug trafficking—a move U.S. officials have
“welcomed.”96welcomed.103 In October 2022, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved Resolution In October 2022, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved Resolution
2653 imposing2653 to require member states to impose sanctions on Jimmy Chérizier. sanctions on Jimmy Chérizier.97104 The Security Council The Security Council namedestablished a panel of experts to a panel of experts to
recommend furtherassess sanctions compliance and recommend additional individuals and entities to be subject to travel bans, asset individuals and entities to be subject to travel bans, asset seizuresblocking, and an , and an
arms embargo. In July 2023, the EU created a mechanism to impose such sanctions on Haitiansarms embargo. The committee added the same four gang leaders designated by the United States to its list in December 2023. The United Kingdom and the European Union have also added those gang leaders to their sanctions lists. .
Congress is considering legislation that would require reporting from the State Department and Congress is considering legislation that would require reporting from the State Department and
potential sanctions on Haitians who back criminal gangs. In July 2023, the House passed an potential sanctions on Haitians who back criminal gangs. In July 2023, the House passed an
amended version of the Haiti Criminal Collusion Transparency Act of 2023 (H.R. 1684), aimed at amended version of the Haiti Criminal Collusion Transparency Act of 2023 (H.R. 1684), aimed at
identifying and penalizing ties between Haitian political and economic elites and criminal gangs. identifying and penalizing ties between Haitian political and economic elites and criminal gangs.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported a companion bill, S. 396, in May 2023. The The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported a companion bill, S. 396, in May 2023. The
bills would require the Secretary of State, in coordination with the intelligence community, to bills would require the Secretary of State, in coordination with the intelligence community, to
produce an unclassified annual report, which may have a classified annex,report annually to specific to specific
congressional committees identifying Haitian political and economic elites tied to gangs, among congressional committees identifying Haitian political and economic elites tied to gangs, among
other topics. They also would require the President to impose visa restrictions and other topics. They also would require the President to impose visa restrictions and economic sanctions on sanctions on
those individuals pursuant to Section 7031(c) of annual Department of State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs Appropriations legislation, Section 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human

94 Sources for this paragraph include E.O. 14059, “Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Involved in the Global Illicit
Drug Trade,” December 15, 2021; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Haitian Politicians
for Narcotics Trafficking,” November 4, 2022; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Sanctions Additional Corrupt
Haitian Politicians for Drug Trafficking,” December 2, 2022; U.S. Department of State, “Treasury Sanctions Former
President of Haiti’s Chamber of Deputies,” April 5, 2023; U.S. Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of
State, “Designation of Haitian Senate President, Joseph Lambert, for Involvement in Significant Corruption and a
Gross Violation of Human Rights,” December 4, 2022; U.S. Department of State, “Combating Global Corruption and
Human Rights Abuses,” December 9, 2022; The State Department, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Designation
of Laurent Salvador Lamothe—Former Haitian Prime Minister and Minister of Planning and External Cooperation—
for Involvement in Significant Corruption,” June 2, 2023.
95 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review, October 2021.
96those individuals pursuant to Section 7031(c) of annual foreign operations appropriations, Section 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114-328), or any other provision of law. The President could waive those sanctions requirements if the President certifies that it is in the U.S. national interest to do so or is necessary for the delivery of humanitarian or related assistance. U.S. Department of Justice Cooperation The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has obtained three convictions in the Moïse assassination, assisted Haitian officials investigating the assassination, and pursued cases involving those complicit in arms trafficking, gang violence, kidnapping, and drug trafficking in and through Haiti. In November 2022, DOJ indicted seven leaders of five Haitian gangs involved in kidnappings of U.S. missionaries that took place in 2021; one of those individuals also has been charged with participating in a kidnapping that resulted in the death of a U.S. citizen in Haiti in 102 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review, October 2021. 103 Government of Canada, “Sanctions: Grave Breach of International Peace and Security in Haiti,” updated December Government of Canada, “Sanctions: Grave Breach of International Peace and Security in Haiti,” updated December
19, 2022, at https://www.international.gc.ca/campaign-campagne/haiti-sanction/index.aspx?lang=eng; Jacqueline 19, 2022, at https://www.international.gc.ca/campaign-campagne/haiti-sanction/index.aspx?lang=eng; Jacqueline
Charles and Michael Wilner, “Canada Sanctions Former Haiti President Michel Martelly, Two Former Prime Charles and Michael Wilner, “Canada Sanctions Former Haiti President Michel Martelly, Two Former Prime
Ministers,” Ministers,” Miami Herald, November 21, 2022. , November 21, 2022.
97104 U.N. Security Council, “Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 2653 (2022) Concerning U.N. Security Council, “Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 2653 (2022) Concerning
Haiti,” at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653. Haiti,” at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653.
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Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114-328), or any other legal provision. The
President could waive those sanctions requirements if the President certifies that said waiver is in
the U.S. national interest or is necessary for the delivery of humanitarian or related assistance.
U.S. Department of Justice Cooperation
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has obtained one indictment in the Moïse assassination,
assisted Haitian officials investigating the assassination, and pursued cases involving those
complicit in arms trafficking, gang violence, and drug trafficking in and through Haiti. In
November 2022, DOJ indicted seven leaders of five Haitian gangs, including additional
individuals involved in kidnappings of U.S. missionaries that took place in 2021.98October 2022.105 DHS has DHS has
established a vetted Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit within the HNP to work with U.S. established a vetted Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit within the HNP to work with U.S.
prosecutors on cases affecting both countries, including the trafficking of arms, drugs, and people. prosecutors on cases affecting both countries, including the trafficking of arms, drugs, and people.
Weapons and Drug Trafficking
In March 2023, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime In March 2023, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) issued a report issued a report on that examined how illicit drug and how illicit drug and
weapons trafficking have exacerbated gang-related violence in Haiti. The report includes weapons trafficking have exacerbated gang-related violence in Haiti. The report includes
recommendations for national, regional, and international responses to address illicit trafficking, recommendations for national, regional, and international responses to address illicit trafficking,
strengthen port security, reinforce the capabilities of the HNP, and promote stability in Haiti.strengthen port security, reinforce the capabilities of the HNP, and promote stability in Haiti.99
106 The State Department’s The State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR),, issued in issued in
March 2023, asserts that continuing instability, a weak justice system, corruption, and the HNP’s March 2023, asserts that continuing instability, a weak justice system, corruption, and the HNP’s
inability to patrol the country’s extensive borders have kept drug seizures low and inhibited inability to patrol the country’s extensive borders have kept drug seizures low and inhibited
bilateral antidrug efforts. Haiti’s porous border with the Dominican Republic and corruption in bilateral antidrug efforts. Haiti’s porous border with the Dominican Republic and corruption in
the Haitian customs authority have enabled gangs to obtain illicit arms. the Haitian customs authority have enabled gangs to obtain illicit arms.
U.S. agencies have taken some steps to combat illicit trafficking to Haiti. In August 2022, the U.S. agencies have taken some steps to combat illicit trafficking to Haiti. In August 2022, the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Homeland Security Investigations office in U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Homeland Security Investigations office in
Miami, FL, announced new initiatives to counter reported spikes in arms trafficking to Haiti.Miami, FL, announced new initiatives to counter reported spikes in arms trafficking to Haiti.100107 In In
December 2022, the State Department sanctioned Rommel Bell, former customs director in Haiti, December 2022, the State Department sanctioned Rommel Bell, former customs director in Haiti,
for corruption after Haiti’s anticorruption unit launched an investigation into Bell’s alleged for corruption after Haiti’s anticorruption unit launched an investigation into Bell’s alleged
participation in arms trafficking.participation in arms trafficking.101 The U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) signed an agreement with the HNP in November 2023 to help Haitian police use ATF’s e-Trace system to investigate crimes involving firearms. U.S. law enforcement agencies are also supporting a new U.S. law enforcement agencies are also supporting a new
CARICOM Crime Gun Intelligence Unit in TrinidadCARICOM Crime Gun Intelligence Unit in Trinidad that is to investigate regional arms to investigate regional arms
trafficking cases alongside national officials.trafficking cases alongside national officials.102
In December 2023, legislation was introduced in the House, H.R. 6618, that would, among other provisions, transfer the regulatory control of certain arms exports from the Department of Commerce to the Department of State. The bill also would require the State Department and other relevant agencies to produce a report within 180 days on illegal arms trafficking to Haiti and other countries covered by the bill (including Mexico and Central American and Caribbean countries). It would require that report to inform a subsequent U.S. strategy on how to better combat the trafficking of arms exported from the United States to those countries. Migration Issues
Stemming irregular migration to the United States continues to be a high priority for U.S. policy Stemming irregular migration to the United States continues to be a high priority for U.S. policy
and Congress.and Congress.108 U.S. government apprehensions of Haitian migrants have risen notably, both at U.S. government apprehensions of Haitian migrants have risen notably, both at sea and on the U.S. Southwest border. In FY2023, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)sea

98105 U.S. Department of Justice, “Criminal Charges Unsealed Against Gang Leaders for Kidnappings of U.S. Citizens,” U.S. Department of Justice, “Criminal Charges Unsealed Against Gang Leaders for Kidnappings of U.S. Citizens,”
November 7, 2020November 7, 2020.
99; “Haitian Gang Leader Charged with Hostage Taking Offenses That Resulted in the Death of a U.S. Citizen in Haiti in October 2022,” October 24, 2023. 106 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Haiti’s Criminal Markets: Mapping Trends in Firearms and Drug Trafficking,
March 2023. March 2023.
100107 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Announces Crackdown on U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Announces Crackdown on
Firearms, Ammunition Smuggling to Haiti, the Caribbean,” August 19, 2022. Firearms, Ammunition Smuggling to Haiti, the Caribbean,” August 19, 2022.
101 U.S. Department of State, “Combating Global Corruption and Human Rights Abuses,” December 2, 2022;
Jacqueline Charles, “U.S. Sanctions More Haitians, Including the Relatives of People Accused of Corruption,” Miami
Herald, December 11, 2022.
102 U.S. Embassy in Trinidad and Tobago, “Launch of CARICOM Crime Gun Intelligence Unit (CCGIU),” November
17, 2022, https://tt.usembassy.gov/launch-of-caricom-crime-gun-intelligence-unit-ccgiu/.
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and on the U.S. Southwest border. During the first nine months of FY2023, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) encountered 105,369 Haitians108 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines irregular migration as “movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination.” IOM, “Key Migration Terms,” at https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms. Congressional Research Service 18 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy encountered 163,781 Haitians nationwide, up from 56,596 Haitians encountered in FY2022.109 , up from 56,596 Haitians encountered in
all of FY2022.103 Some of those Haitians had resided in third countries (particularly Brazil and Some of those Haitians had resided in third countries (particularly Brazil and
Chile) since the 2010 earthquake and had few ties to Haiti.Chile) since the 2010 earthquake and had few ties to Haiti.104110 From October 2022 to From October 2022 to mid-July
January 2023, U.S. Coast Guard-reported interdictions and/or encounters of Haitian migrants 2023, U.S. Coast Guard-reported interdictions and/or encounters of Haitian migrants totaled
roughly 5,100.105exceeded 1,700.111 From January-November 2023, Mexican officials encountered roughly 21,100 Haitians in an irregular status.112 Some 44,200 Haitians requested asylum in Mexico during that period, making Haiti the largest source country of asylum seekers in Mexico.113
On January 5, 2023, DHS announced the expansion of On January 5, 2023, DHS announced the expansion of a set of new immigration policies to
an immigration parole program for Venezuelans to include Haitians, Nicaraguans, and CubansHaitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans, which started in October 2022 for Venezuelans.106.114 Haitians Haitians
who have a U.S. who have a U.S. financial sponsor can apply for sponsor can apply for up to two years of immigration paroleimmigration parole, and, after being vetted, and fly directly fly directly into the interior of the United Statesinto the United States
after U.S. vetting. In April 2023, DHS added another requirement for participation in the program . In April 2023, DHS added another requirement for participation in the program
making any Haitian interdicted at sea after April 27 ineligible for the parole program.making any Haitian interdicted at sea after April 27 ineligible for the parole program.107115 As of As of
JuneDecember 2023, some 2023, some 63133,000 Haitians had been vetted,000 Haitians had been vetted, and 50,000 had arrived in and approved for travel to the United States the United States
under the program, with demand far outpacing the program’s 30,000 aggregate monthly cap for
parolees accepted from all four countries.108
under the program and 126,000 Haitians had been paroled into the United States under this process.116 In contrast, Haitians apprehended crossing the U.S. Southwest border between ports of entry In contrast, Haitians apprehended crossing the U.S. Southwest border between ports of entry were
subject to the public health-related Title 42 policy until it ended on May 11, 2023.109 Title 42
allowed DHS to expel migrants back to Mexico (in coordination with the government of Mexico).
Following the end of Title 42, some Haitians encountered by DHS have been deemed ineligible
for asylum, deported to Mexico under Title 8 expedited removal procedures, and banned from
reentry for at least five years.110are subject to removal (deportation) under immigration law and they may apply for asylum. The Biden Administration removed 717 individuals to Haiti in FY2023, down from 1,532 in FY2022.117 Human rights advocates have urged U.S. officials to suspend removals to Haiti amid the country’s deteriorating security situation.118
The United States also has taken steps to provide other legal migration and protection pathways The United States also has taken steps to provide other legal migration and protection pathways
for some Haitians. Some 155,000 Haitians may be eligible for relief from removal under the for some Haitians. Some 155,000 Haitians may be eligible for relief from removal under the
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation announced in May 2021, and an estimated 105,100 Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation announced in May 2021, and an estimated 105,100
additional Haitians are eligible under the extension announced in December 2022.additional Haitians are eligible under the extension announced in December 2022.111119 In August In August
2023, the Biden Administration announced a modernized Haitian Family Reunification Parole 2023, the Biden Administration announced a modernized Haitian Family Reunification Parole
Program. As in the past, the program will allow certain U.S. citizens and legal permanent Program. As in the past, the program will allow certain U.S. citizens and legal permanent
residents to seek parole for family members in Haiti (or other countries); most of the process can residents to seek parole for family members in Haiti (or other countries); most of the process can
now be completed online.now be completed online.112120

103109 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Nationwide Encounters,” https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide- U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Nationwide Encounters,” https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-
encounters. encounters.
104110 Caitlyn Yates, Caitlyn Yates, Haitian Migration Through the Americas: A Decade in the Making, Migration Information Source, , Migration Information Source,
September 30, 2021. September 30, 2021.
105111 United States Coast Guard News, “ United States Coast Guard News, “Coast Guard Repatriates 143 People to Haiti, Cuba,” July 18, 2023.
106Operation Vigilant Sentry: Stopping Illegal Migration at sea,” January 127, 2023. 112 Gobierno do México (GOM), Boletín Mensual de Estadísticas Migratorias, 2023, accessed January 30, 2024. 113 GOM, Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados (COMAR),”La COMAR en Números,” January 9, 2024. 114 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “DHS Implements New Processes for Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “DHS Implements New Processes for Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans
and Eliminates Cap for Venezuelans,” January 6, 2022. and Eliminates Cap for Venezuelans,” January 6, 2022.
107115 DHS, “Implementation of a Change to the Parole Process for Haitians,” 88 FR 26327 DHS, “Implementation of a Change to the Parole Process for Haitians,” 88 FR 26327 Federal Register 26327- 26327-
26329, April 28, 2023. 26329, April 28, 2023.
108 DHS, “Fact Sheet: Data from First Six Months of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and
Venezuelans Shows That Lawful Pathways Work,” July 25, 2023; Camilo Montoya-Galvez, “1.5 Million Apply for
U.S. Migrant Sponsorship Program with 30,000 Monthly Cap,” CBS News, May 22, 2023.
109 CRS Report R47343, U.S. Border Patrol Apprehensions and Title 42 Expulsions at the Southwest Border: Fact
Sheet, by Audrey Singer and Sylvia L. Bryan.
110 CRS Insight IN12159, Post-Title 42: U.S. Foreign Policy Initiatives to Manage Regional Migration.
111116 DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “CBP Releases December 2023 Monthly Update,” January 26, 2024. 117 DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), FY2023 Annual Report, December 29, 2023. 118 Human Rights Watch, US/Haiti: Suspend Deportation Flights to Haiti, September 27, 2023. 119 See CRS Report RS20844, See CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure, by Jill H. Wilson. , by Jill H. Wilson.
112120 DHS, “DHS Modernizes Cuban and Haitian Family Reunification Parole Processes,” August 10, 2023. DHS, “DHS Modernizes Cuban and Haitian Family Reunification Parole Processes,” August 10, 2023.
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Outlook
The 118th Congress has maintained a keen interest in developments in Haiti, as deteriorating The 118th Congress has maintained a keen interest in developments in Haiti, as deteriorating
security and humanitarian conditions in security and humanitarian conditions in Haitithe country intersect with a broad range of U.S. interests and intersect with a broad range of U.S. interests and
policy responses. Among other actions, Congress has directly engaged with U.S. policy policy responses. Among other actions, Congress has directly engaged with U.S. policy
approaches toward Haiti in relation to foreign assistance, trade preferences, sanctions policy, and approaches toward Haiti in relation to foreign assistance, trade preferences, sanctions policy, and
migration. migration. Should the current crisis in Haiti continue, Congress may fund, oversee, and assess Congress may fund, oversee, and assess
new policy approaches to address the situation in Haiti, including the new policy approaches to address the situation in Haiti, including the potential deployment of a deployment of a
U.S.-backed, U.S.-backed, Kenya-led multinational security force to the country. multinational security force to the country.

Author Information

Clare Ribando Seelke
Karla I. Rios
SpecialistKarla I. Rios Clare Ribando Seelke Analyst in Latin American Affairs in Latin American Affairs
AnalystSpecialist in Latin American Affairs in Latin American Affairs



Acknowledgments
This report draws from the work of former CRS Specialist in Latin American Affairs Maureen Taft-
Morales.

Disclaimer
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