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The 116th Congress has been considering a variety of housing-related issues. TheseHousing Issues in the 116th Congress
October 16, 2020
Since the outbreak of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic in early 2020 and the resulting economic recession, pandemic relief and response has dominated the housing policy
Katie Jones, Coordinator
considerations of the second session of the 116th Congress. The CARES Act (P.L. 116-136),
Analyst in Housing Policy
enacted in March 2020, contained several housing-related provisions. These included nearly $15
billion in supplemental funding for housing-related COVID-19 relief and response as well as policies such as a temporary eviction moratorium for some properties and forbearance for some
Darryl E. Getter
mortgages. Since then, the Administration issued an order implementing a nationwide eviction
Specialist in Financial Economics
moratorium, and additional relief legislation has been introduced and considered in Congress.
Pandemic relief and response are not the only housing issues that have been considered by the
Mark P. Keightley
116th Congress. Others include topics related to housing finance, federal housing assistance
Specialist in Economics
include topics related to housing finance, federal housing assistance programs, and housing-related tax provisions, among other things. Particular issues that have
been of interest during theto Congress include the following:
Housing and mortgage market conditions provide context for these and other issues that Congress may consider, although housing markets are local in nature and national housing market indicators do not necessarily accurately reflect conditions in specific communities. On a national basis, some key characteristics of owner-occupied housing markets and the mortgage market in recent years include increasing housing prices, low mortgage interest rates, and home sales that have been increasing but constrained by a limited inventory of homes on the market. Key characteristics of rental housing markets include an increasing number of renters, low rental vacancy rates, and increasing rents. Rising home prices and rents that have outpaced income growth in recent years have led to policymakers and others increasingly raising concerns about the affordability of both owner-occupied and rental housing. Affordability challenges are most prominent among the lowest-income renter households, reflecting a shortage of rental housing units that are both affordable and available to this population. The housing-related implications of the COVID-19 pandemic and its resulting recession on U.S. markets and households are still unfolding.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 Housing and Mortgage Market Conditions .......................................................................... 1
Owner-Occupied Housing Markets and the Mortgage Market ........................................... 2
House Prices........................................................................................................ 2 Interest Rates ....................................................................................................... 3 Homeownership Affordability ................................................................................ 4 Home Sales ......................................................................................................... 5
Housing Inventory and Housing Starts..................................................................... 6 Mortgage Market Composition ............................................................................... 8
Rental Housing Markets ............................................................................................. 9
Share of Renters................................................................................................... 9 Rental Vacancy Rates.......................................................................................... 10
Rental Housing Affordability ............................................................................... 11
The COVID-19 Pandemic and Housing ............................................................................ 12
COVID-19 and Effects on Housing ............................................................................ 12
Federal Housing Responses to COVID-19 ................................................................... 14
Federal Interventions Related to Rental Housing ..................................................... 14 Federal Interventions Related to Mortgages ............................................................ 16 Increased Funding for Housing Programs............................................................... 19
Proposals for Additional Action ................................................................................. 20
Other Housing Issues in the 116th Congress ....................................................................... 21
Housing Finance ..................................................................................................... 21
Status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac .................................................................. 21 CFPB’s Proposed Changes to the Qualified Mortgage Rule and the GSE Patch............ 26
Department of Veterans Affairs Loan Guaranty and Maximum Loan Amounts ............. 28
Housing Assistance .................................................................................................. 28
Appropriations for Housing Programs ................................................................... 28 Housing Vouchers for Foster Youth ....................................................................... 30 Implementation of Housing Assistance Legislation .................................................. 31
Quality of Federal y Assisted Housing ................................................................... 33 Native American Housing Programs...................................................................... 34 Proposed New Investments in Affordable Housing .................................................. 35
Selected Administrative Actions Related to Affordable Housing ..................................... 37
HUD Noncitizen Eligibility and Documentation Proposed Rule................................. 37
Equal Access to Housing ..................................................................................... 38 Regulatory Barriers Council................................................................................. 39 Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing................................................................... 39
Housing and Disaster Response and Recovery ............................................................. 40
Emergency Sheltering Options During the COVID-19 Pandemic ............................... 41 Implementation of Housing-Related Provisions of the Disaster Recovery Reform
Act (DRRA) ................................................................................................... 42
FEMA Short-term, Emergency Housing Program Change......................................... 44 Community Development Block Grants-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR).................... 46
Housing-Related Tax Extenders ................................................................................. 47
Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt.................................................................. 47
Deductibility of Mortgage Insurance Premiums....................................................... 48
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Figures Figure 1. Year-over-Year House Price Changes (Nominal) ..................................................... 2 Figure 2. Mortgage Interest Rates ...................................................................................... 3 Figure 3. New and Existing Home Sales ............................................................................. 5 Figure 4. Housing Starts ................................................................................................... 7 Figure 5. Share of Mortgage Originations by Type ............................................................... 8 Figure 6. Rental and Homeownership Rates ........................................................................ 9 Figure 7. Rental Vacancy Rates ....................................................................................... 10 Figure 8. Renters and Owners Having Difficulty Making Housing Payments.......................... 13
Contacts Author Information ....................................................................................................... 49
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Introduction In March 2020, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic began having wide-ranging public health and economic effects in the United States. The impacts of the pandemic have
implications for housing, including the ability of households experiencing income disruptions to make housing payments. In response, Congress and the Administration have taken a variety of actions related to COVID-19 and housing. However, the pandemic is continuing and the economy is in a recession. Some initial assistance measures have ended, and there have been cal s for additional action. The longer-term consequences of the pandemic and associated economic
turmoil on housing markets remain unclear.
Outside of pandemic-related housing issues, several other housing-related issues have been active during the 116th Congress. These include issues related topopulation.
The 116th Congress has been considering a variety of housing-related issues. These involve assisted housing programs, such as
those administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and issues related to housing finance, among other things. Specific topics of interest include ongoing issues such as interest in reforming the nation's housing finance system,issues such as the status of two government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; how to prioritize appropriations for federal housing programs in a limited funding environment, ; oversight of the implementation of changes to certain housing programs that were enacted in prior Congresses, and the possibility of extending Congresses; administrative changes to certain affordable housing policies and programs; and the
extension of certain temporary housing-related tax provisions. Additional issues may emerge as the Congress progresses.
This report provides a high-level overview of the most prominent housing-related issues that have
been of interest during the 116th Congress. It116th Congress. It begins with an overview of housing and mortgage market conditions during the Congress to date. While this overview includes some national-level statistics from the months after the pandemic began, it is stil too early to know how the pandemic wil ultimately affect housing markets in the medium or longer term. The following section discusses housing-related concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic and federal housing responses. Final y, the report discusses other housing issues that have been active during the 116th
Congress.
The discussion in this report provides a broad overview of major issues and is not intended to
provides a broad overview of major issues and is not intended to provide detailed information or analysis. It includes references to more in-depth CRS reports on
these issues where possible.
This section provides background on housing and mortgage market conditions at the beginning of the 116th during the 116th Congress to provide context for the housing policy issues discussed in the remainder of the report. This discussion of market conditions is at the national level. Yet, localLocal housing market conditions can vary dramatically
vary dramatical y, and national housing market trends may not reflect the conditions in a specific area. Nevertheless, national housing market indicators can provide an overall overal sense of general
trends in housing.
In general, rising home prices, relatively low interest rates, and rising rental costs have been prominent features of housing and mortgage markets in recent years. Although interest rates have remained low, rising house prices and rental costs that in many cases have outpaced income growth have led to increased concerns about housing affordability for both prospective homebuyers and
renters.
Most homebuyers take out a mortgage to purchase a home. Therefore, owner-occupied housing markets and the mortgage market are closely linked, although they are not the same. The ability of prospective homebuyers to obtain mortgages, and the costs of those mortgages, impact housing demand and affordability. The following subsections show current trends in selected owner-
occupied housing and mortgage market indicators.
As shown inin Figure 1, nationally, nominal house prices have been increasingincreased national y on a year-over-year basis in each quarter since the beginning of 2012, with year-over-year increases exceeding 5% for much of that time period and exceeding 6% for most quarters since mid-2016at times. These increases followfollowed almost five years of house price declines in the years during and surrounding the economic recession of 2007-2009
and associated housing market turmoil. House
Year-over-year house price increases have slowed somewhat but continued to exceed 5% through
the second quarter of 2020, despite the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.1
slowed somewhat during 2018, but year-over-year house prices still increased by nearly 6% during the fourth quarter of 2018.
1 See Federal Housing Finance Agency, House Price Index (HPI) Quarterly Report, 2020Q2 and June 2020, August 25, 2020, https://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/Reports/ReportDocuments/2020Q2_HPI.pdf.
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House prices, and changes in house prices, vary greatly across local housing markets. Some areas of the country are experiencingcan experience rapid increases in house prices, while other areas are experiencingexperience slower or stagnating house price growth. Similarly, prices have fully regained or even exceeded their pre-recession levels in nominal terms in many parts of the country, but in other areas prices remain below those levels.1
HouseFurthermore, house price increases affect participants in the housing market differently. Rising prices reduce affordability for prospective homebuyers, but they are generallygeneral y beneficial for current homeowners due to the increased home equity that accompanies them (although rising house prices also have the potential to negatively impact
affordability for current homeowners through increased property taxes).
For several years, mortgage interest rates have been low by historical standards. Lower interest rates increase mortgage affordability and make it easier for some households to purchase homes or refinance their existing mortgages.
As shown inin Figure 2, average mortgage interest rates have been consistently below 5% since May 2010 and have been below 4% for several stretches during that time. After starting to
increase somewhat in late 2017 and much of 2018, mortgage interest rates showed declines at the end of 2018 into early 2019. The average mortgage interest rate for February 2019 was 4.37%, compared to 4.46% in the previous month and 4.33% a year earlier.
have been general y
declining since late 2018.
Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, interest rates have fal en even further, in part due to
federal monetary policy responses to the pandemic. At times, interest rates have been below 3%, their lowest levels since at least 1971.2 The average mortgage interest rate for August 2020 was
2.94%, compared to 3.02% in the previous month and 3.62% a year earlier.
Figure 2. Mortgage Interest Rates
January 1995–August 2020
January 1995–February 2019 |
![]() |
Source: Figure created by CRS based on data from Freddie pmms/. Notes: Freddie |
House prices have been rising for several years on a national basis, and mortgage interest rates, while low currentlywhile still low by historical standards, have also risen for certain stretches. While incomes have also been rising in recent years, helping to mitigate some affordability pressures, on the whole house price increases have outpaced income increases.23 Home price-to-income ratios have been generally trending upwards since around 2012, with the national median sales price for an existing home more than 4.1 times the median household income in 2018.4 These trends have led to increased concerns
about the affordability of owner-occupied housing.
Despite rising house prices, many metrics of housing affordability suggest that owner-occupied housing is currently relatively affordable.35 These metrics generallygeneral y measure the share of income that a median-income family would need to qualify for a mortgage to purchase a median-priced home, subject to certain assumptions. Therefore, rising incomes and, especiallyespecial y, interest rates that are stil are still low by historical standards contribute to monthly mortgage payments being considered
affordable under these measures despite recent house price increases.
Some factors that affect housing affordability may not be captured by these metrics. For example, several of the metrics are based on certain assumptions (such as a borrower making a 20% down
payment) that may not apply to many households. Furthermore, because they typicallytypical y measure the affordability of monthly mortgage payments, they often do not take into account other affordability challengeschal enges that homebuyers may face, such as affording a down payment and other upfront costs of purchasing a home (costs that generallygeneral y increase as home prices rise). Other factors—such as the ability to qualify for a mortgage, the availability of homes on the market, and
regional differences in house prices and income—may also make homeownership less attainable for some households.4 6 Some of these factors may have a bigger impact on affordability for specific demographic groups, as income trends and housing preferences are not uniform across all al
segments of the population.7
It is unclear how the COVID-19 pandemic may ultimately impact the affordability of homeownership. The pandemic could have implications for a variety of interrelated factors that affect affordability, including factors related to both the supply of homes on the market and the
demand for homes.
3 See Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, State of the Nation’s Housing 2018, p. 22, http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2018.pdf , showing changes in median house prices and median household incomes (in real terms). 4 Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, State of the Nation’s Housing 2019, p.12, https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/state-nations-housing-2019.
5 For example, see U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Housing Market Indicators Monthly Update, August 2020, p.3, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Housing-Market -Indicators-Report -August-2020.pdf, showing the National Association of Realtors Housing Affordability Index (HAI) compared to its historical norm. (For more information on the HAI, see the National Association of Realtors website at https://www.nar.realtor/research-and-statistics/housing-statistics/housing-affordability-index/methodology.) See also
the Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center’s Housing Finance at a Glance: A Monthly Chartbook, August 2020, p. 21,
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102776/august-chartbook-2020.pdf.
6 Freddie Mac Insight, If Housing Is So Affordable, Why Doesn't It Feel That Way?, July 19, 2017, http://www.freddiemac.com/research/insight/20170719_affordability.html. 7 For example, see the discussion of affordability challenges for younger households in Freddie Mac Insight , Locked Out? Are Rising Housing Costs Barring Young Adults from Buying Their First Hom es?, June 2018, http://www.freddiemac.com/research/pdf/201806-Insight -05.pdf.
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Home Sales
Annual home sales increased between 2014 and 2017, improvingsegments of the population.5
Given that house price increases are showing some signs of slowing and interest rates have remained low, the affordability of owner-occupied homes may hold steady or improve. Such trends could potentially impact housing market activity, including home sales.
In general, annual home sales have been increasing since 2014 and have improved from their levels during the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, although in 2018 the overall . The overal number of home sales declined from the previous year in 2018 and remained steady in 2019. While home sales have been improving somewhat in recent years (prior to fallingfal ing in 2018), the supply of homes on the market has generally
general y not been keeping pace with the demand for homes, thereby limiting home sales activity
and contributing to house price increases.
Home sales include sales of both existing and newly built homes. Existing home sales generally general y
number in the millionsmil ions each year, while new home sales are usuallyusual y in the hundreds of thousands. thousands. Figure 3 shows the annual number of existing and new home sales for each year from 1995 through 20182019. Existing home sales numbered about 5.3 million in 2018, mil ion in 2019, steady from the previous year and a decline from 5.5 millionmil ion in 2017 (existing home sales in 2017 were the highest level since 2006). New home sales numbered about 622683,000 in 20182019, an increase from 614
617,000 in 20172018 and the highest level since 2007. However, the number of new home sales remains appreciably lower than in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when they tended to be
between 800,000 and 1 millionmil ion per year.
per year.
Figure 3. New and Existing Home Sales
Annual, 1995–2019
|
![]() |
Source: Figure created by CRS using data from HUD |
The number and types of homes on the market affect home sales and home prices. On a national basis, the supply of homes on the market has been relatively low in recent years,69 and in general new construction has not been creating enough new homes to meet demand.710 However, as noted previously, national housing market indicators are not necessarily indicative of local conditions.
While many areas of the country are experiencing low levels of housing inventory that contribute to higher home prices, other areas, particularly those experiencing population declines, face a different set of housing challengeschal enges, including surplus housing inventory and higher levels of
vacant homes.8
11
On a national basis, the inventory of homes on the market has been below historical averages in recent years, though the inventory, of new homes, in particular, has begun to increase somewhat of late.912 Homes come onto the market through the construction of new homes and when current homeowners decide to sell sel their existing homes. Existing homeowners'’ decisions to sell their sel their
homes can be influenced by expectations about housing inventory and affordability. For example, current homeowners may choose not to sell sel if they are uncertain about finding new homes that meet their needs, or if their interest rates on new mortgages would be substantiallysubstantial y higher than the interest rates on their current mortgages. New construction activity is influenced by a variety of
factors including labor, materials, and other costs as well wel as the expected demand for new homes.
One measure of the amount of new construction is housing starts. Housing starts are the number of new housing units on which construction is started in a given period and are typicallytypical y reported monthly as a "seasonally“seasonal y adjusted annual rate."” This means that the number of housing starts
reported for a given month (1) has been adjusted to account for seasonal factors and (2) has been multiplied multiplied by 12 to reflect what the annual number of housing starts would be if the current month'
month’s pace continued for an entire year.10
13
Figure 4 shows the seasonallyseasonal y adjusted annual rate of starts on one-unit homes for each month from January 1995 through December 2018.11 Housing starts for single-family homes fell during the housing market turmoil, reflecting decreased home purchase demand. In recent July 2020.14 Housing starts for single-family homes fel during the
9 For example, see HUD’s U.S. Housing Market Conditions National Housing Market Summary, 1st Quarter 2020, June 2020, p. 3, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/NationalSummary_1Q20.pdf.
10 For example, see Freddie Mac, The Major Challenge of Inadequate U.S. Housing Supply, Economic & Housing Research Insight, December 2018, http://www.freddiemac.com/fmac-resources/research/pdf/201811-Insight-06.pdf and The Housing Supply Shortage: State of the States, Economic & Housing Research Insight, February 2020, http://www.freddiemac.com/fmac-resources/research/pdf/202002-Insight -12.pdf.
11 For example, see Freddie Mac, The Housing Supply Shortage: State of the States, Economic & Housing Research Insight, February 2020, p. 3, http://www.freddiemac.com/fmac-resources/research/pdf/202002-Insight -12.pdf; Jenny Schuetz, The Goldilocks problem of housing supply: Too little, too m uch, or just right? , Brookings Institution, December 14, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-goldilocks-problem-of-housing-supply-too-little-too-much-or-just-right/; and Alan Mallach, The Em pty House Next Door: Understanding and Reducing Vacancy and Hypervacancy in the United States, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2018, pp. 22 -26, https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/empty-house-next -door-full.pdf. 12 HUD, U.S. Housing Market Conditions National Housing Market Summary, 1st Quarter 2020, June 2020, pp. 1-3, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/NationalSummary_1Q20.pdf.
13 T he Census Bureau defines the seasonally adjusted annual rate as “the seasonally adjusted monthly value multiplied by 12” and notes that it “is neither a forecast nor a projection; rather it is a description of the rate of building permits, housing starts, housing completions, or new home sales in the particular month for which they are calculated.” See U.S. Census Bureau, “New Residential Construction,” at https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/definitions/index.html#s. 14 T he number of housing starts is consistently higher than the number of new home sales. T his is prima rily because housing starts include homes that are not intended to be put on the for -sale market, such as homes built by the owner of the land or homes built for rental. See the U.S. Census Bureau, “Comparing New Home Sales and New Residential
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housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, reflecting decreased home purchase demand. In recent years, levels of new construction have remained relatively low by historical standards, reflecting a variety of considerations including labor shortages and the cost of building.1215 Housing starts have general yhave generally been increasing since about 2012, but remain well wel below their levels from the late 1990s through the mid-2000s. For 2018, the seasonally2019, the seasonal y adjusted annual rate of housing starts averaged about 868893,000. In comparison, the seasonallyseasonal y adjusted annual rate of housing starts
exceeded 1 million mil ion from the late 1990s through the mid-2000s.
Single-family housing starts showed a significant drop as the pandemic began, though they have
begun to recover somewhat in the months since then.16 Single-family housing starts in July were
higher than in the previous July, though not as high as the months in late 2019 and early 2020.17
Figure 4. Housing Starts
By month; seasonal y By month; seasonally adjusted annual rate |
![]() |
adjusted annual rate
Source: Figure created by CRS using data from the U.S. Census Bureau, New Residential Construction July 2020. Notes: Figure reflects |
High housing construction costs have led to a greater share of new housing being built at the more expensive end of the market over the last several years. To the extent that new homes are
Construction,” https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/salesvsstarts.html.
15 For example, see Freddie Mac, “What is Causing the Lean Inventory of Houses?,” Outlook Report, July 27, 2017, http://www.freddiemac.com/research/forecast/20170726_lean_inventory_of_houses.page. 16 T he Census Bureau notes that its data collection methods for this survey were impacted by the pandemic, though it says that “ ... processing and data quality were monitored throughout the month [of July] and quality metrics, including response rates, fell within normal ranges for these surveys.” For more information on how data collection was impacted, see U.S. Census Bureau, “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) COVID-19’s Effect on the July 2020 New Residential Construction Indicator,” https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/pdf/newresconst_202007_notes.pdf. 17 For data on housing starts and other measures of residential construction (both single-family and multifamily), see U.S. Census Bureau, New Residential Construction, https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/index.html.
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concentrated at higher price points, supply and price pressures may be exacerbated for lower-
priced homes.18
Mortgage Market Composition
After a mortgage is originated, it might be held in a financial institution’s asset
Figure 5. Share of Mortgage Originations
portfolio, or it might be securitized through
by Type
one of several channels.19 Two government-
2019
sponsored enterprises (GSEs),. To the extent that new homes are concentrated at higher price points, supply and price pressures may be exacerbated for lower-priced homes.13
When a lender originates a mortgage, it can choose to hold that mortgage in its own portfolio, sell it to a private company, or sell it to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, two congressionally chartered government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bundle mortgages into , issue mortgage-backed securities and guarantee investors' ’ payments on those securities. Furthermore, a mortgage might be insured by a federal government Mortgages
that are insured or guaranteed by a federal agency, such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), are eligible to be included in mortgage-backed securities
guaranteed by Ginnie Mae, part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Private companies can also issue mortgage-backed securities
without a government or GSE guarantee,
known as private label securities. The
Source: Figure created by CRS based on Inside Mortgage Finance data as reported in Urban Institute,
shares of mortgages that are provided
Housing Finance Policy Center, Housing Finance at a
through each of these channels may be
Glance: A Monthly Chartbook, February 2020, p. 8.
relevant to policymakers because of their
Notes: Figure shows share of first-lien mortgage
implications for mortgage access and
originations by dol ar volume.
affordability as wel as the federal
government’s exposure to risk.
As shown in Figure 5, a little underVeterans Affairs (VA). Most FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed mortgages are included in mortgage-backed securities that are guaranteed by Ginnie Mae, another government agency.14 The shares of mortgages that are provided through each of these channels may be relevant to policymakers because of their implications for mortgage access and affordability as well as the federal government's exposure to risk.
As shown in Figure 5, over two-thirds of the total dollar volume of mortgages originated
was either backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (4643%) or guaranteed by a federal agency such as FHA or VA (2319%) in 2018. Nearly2019. Over one-third of the dollar volume of mortgages originated was held in bank portfolios, while close to 2% was included in a private-label security without
government backing.
The shares of mortgage originations backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and held in bank portfolios are roughly similar to their respective shares in the early 2000s. The share of private-label securitization has been, and continues to be, small smal since the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, while the FHA/VA share is higher than it was in the early and mid-2000s.1520 The share
of mortgages insured by FHA or guaranteed by VA was low by historical standards during that
18 For example, see Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, State of the Nation’s Housing, 2019, p. 8, https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_ State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2019.pdf ; and Jung Hyun Choi, Laurie Goodman, and Bing Bai, “Four ways today’s high home prices affect the larger economy,” Urban Institute, Urban Wire blog, October 11, 2018, https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/four-ways-todays-high-home-prices-affect -larger-economy.
19 For more information on different types of mortgages and mortgage securitization channels, see CRS Report R42995, An Overview of the Housing Finance System in the United States. 20 See Urban Institute, Housing Finance Policy Center, Housing Finance at a Glance: A Monthly Chartbook, July 2020, p. 8, for a graph showing mortgage market composition since 2001 .
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of mortgages insured by FHA or guaranteed by VA was low by historical standards during that time period as many households opted for other types of mortgages, including subprime mortgages.
As has been the case in owner-occupied housing markets, affordability has been a prominent concern in rental markets in recent years. In the years since the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, the number and share of renter households has increased, leading to lower rental vacancy rates and higher rents in many markets.
The housing and mortgage market turmoil of the late 2000s led to a substantial decrease in the homeownership rate and a corresponding increase in the share of households who rent their homesrenter households. As shown in
Figure 6, the share of renters increased from about 31% in 2005 and 2006 to a high of about 36.6% in 2016, before decreasing slightly to 36.1% in 2017 and continuing to decline to 35.6% in 2018beginning to decrease and reaching 35.4% in 2019. The homeownership rate correspondingly fell fel from a high of 69% in the mid-2000s to 63.4% in 2016, before rising to 63.9% in 2017 and continuing to rise to 64.4% in 2018.16
The overall number of occupied housing units also increased over this time period, from nearly 110 mil ion 110 million in 2006 to 121 million in 2018123 mil ion in 2019; most of this increase has been in renter-occupied units.1722 The number of renter-occupied units increased from about 34 millionmil ion in 2006 to about 43 million in 2018. The number of owner-occupied housing units fell from about 75 million units in 2006 to about 74 million in 2014, but has since increased to about 78 million units in 2018.
The higher number and share of renter households has had implications for rental vacancy rates and rental housing costs. More renter households increases competition for rental housing, which
may in turn drive up rents if there is not enough new rental housing created (whether through new
construction or conversion of owner-occupied units to rental units) to meet the increased demand.
As shown inin Figure 7, the rental vacancy rate has generallygeneral y declined in recent years and was under 7
6.4% at the end of 2018.
2019. The potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on rental vacancy rates
is unclear, in part because the pandemic has affected more recent data collection for this survey.24
Figure 7. Rental Vacancy Rates
Q1 1995–Q4 2019
Q1 1995–Q4 2018 |
![]() |
Source: Figure created by CRS based on data from U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and |
Rental housing affordability is impacted by a variety of factors, including the supply of rental housing units available, the characteristics of those units (e.g., age and amenities), and the demand for available unitsavailable units, and renter incomes. New housing units have been added to the rental stock in recent years through both construction of new rental units and conversions of existing owner-
occupied units to rental housing. However, the supply of rental housing has not necessarily kept pace with the demand, particularly among lower-cost rental units, and low vacancy rates have been especially
been especial y pronounced in less-expensive units.18
25
The increased demand for rental housing, as well wel as the concentration of new rental construction in higher-cost units, has led to increases in rents in recent years. Median renter incomes have also been increasing for the last several years, at times outpacing increases in rents. However, over the longer term, median rentsRents have increased faster than renter incomes, reducing rental affordability.19
26 Rising rental costs and renter incomes that are not keeping up with rent increases over the long term can contribute to housing affordability problems
chal enges, particularly for households with lower incomes. Under one common
Under the most commonly used definition, housing is considered to be affordable if a household is paying no more than 30% of its income in housing costs. Under this definition, householdsHouseholds that pay more than 30% are considered to be cost-burdened, and those that pay more than 50% are considered to be
severely cost-burdened.
The overall The overal number of cost-burdened renter households has increased from 14.8 mil ion 14.8 million in 2001 to 20.5 million in 2017, although the 20.5 million in 2017 represented a decrease from 20.8 million in 2016 and over 21 million in 2014 and 2015.208 mil ion in 2018, or about 47% of al renters.27 (Over this time period, the overal the overall number of renter households has increased as wellwel .) While housing cost burdens can affect households of all al income levels, and have been growing among middle-income households,28 income levels, they are most prevalent among the lowest-income households. In 20172018, 83% of
renter households with incomes below $15,000 experienced housing cost burdens, and 72% experienced severe cost burdens.2129 A shortage of lower-cost rental units that are both available and affordable to extremely low-income renter households (households that earn no more than
30% of area median income), in particular, contributes to these cost burdens.30
25 For example, see Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, America’s Rental Housing 2020, pp. 3, https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_Americas_Rental_Housing_2020.pdf. 26 See HUD, Office of Policy Development and Research, U.S. Housing Market Conditions National Housing Market Sum m ary 1st Quarter 2020, June 2020, pp. 5-6, and underlying data available at https://www.huduser.gov/portal/ushmc/quarterly_commentary.html. Data on median rents reflect median rents for recent movers less the cost of utilities. For more information on data sources used, see HUD Office of Policy Development and Research, HUD’s New Rental Affordability Index, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr-edge-trending-110716.html.
27 Joint Center for Housing Studies, America’s Rental Housing 2020, Appendix T ables, https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/americas-rental-housing-2020, showing Joint Center for Housing Studies tabulations of American Community Survey data. 28 See, for example, Whitney Airgood-Obrycki, “America’s Rental Affordability Crisis is Climbing the Income Ladder,” Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, blog post, January 31, 2020, https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/americas-rental-affordability-crisis-is-climbing-the-income-ladder/.
29 Joint Center for Housing Studies, America’s Rental Housing 2020, Appendix T ables, https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/americas-rental-housing-2020, showing Joint Center for Housing Studies tabulations of American Community Survey data. 30 See Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, America’s Rental Housing 2020, p. 31, https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_Americas_Rental_Housing_2020.pdf; and National Low Income Housing Coalition, The Gap: A Shortage of Affordable Hom es, March 2020, available at https://reports.nlihc.org/gap.
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The COVID-19 Pandemic and Housing The COVID-19 pandemic that began in early 2020 is having wide-ranging effects on public health and the economy. The pandemic has led to a number of housing-related concerns, including, among other things, concerns about housing insecurity among both renters and
homeowners.
Congress and federal agencies have responded to these concerns by taking a variety of actions. In general, these actions have included providing additional federal funding for several housing programs, establishing temporary protections for certain renters and homeowners, and taking
actions intended to support the housing finance system more broadly.
As the economy has entered recession and some temporary assistance measures have begun to expire, many policymakers and others have cal ed for additional federal action. Numerous bil s
that would further address COVID-19-related housing issues have been introduced and some
have been considered.
This section of the report discusses the effects of COVID-19 on housing and federal responses to
date.
COVID-19 and Effects on Housing The pandemic has led to increased housing insecurity as many households experience income disruptions. Such disruptions can lead to difficulties making rent or mortgage payments. According to data from the Census Bureau’s Pulse Survey, and as shown in Figure 8, 21% of renters and 13% of owners reported having not made the current month’s housing payment as of the week that ended on July 21. (These figures include those with deferred payments.) Larger
shares (35% and 17%, respectively) expected that they would not be able to pay the following
month.31
31 T hese figures reflect CRS calculations based on data in the Week 12 Household Pulse Survey, available at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/household-pulse-survey/data.html. T hey include those who missed last month’s payment or whose last month payment was deferred, and those who have slight or no confidence that they will make next month’s payment or anticipate that next month’s payment will be deferred.
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Figure 8. Renters and Owners Having Difficulty Making Housing Payments
For the week ending July 21, 2020
Source: Figure created by CRS based on data from the Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey for Week 12 (July 16-July 21).
Thus far, many households have been protected by federal and state or local eviction or foreclosure moratoriums. It is not yet clear to what extent renters and homeowners wil be able to make their rent or mortgage payments or make up missed payments when protections expire.
(The end dates for eviction and foreclosure protections depend on a variety of factors, including
the specific protection in question and whether any extensions are issued.)
As described in the “Housing and Mortgage Market Conditions” section, data are beginning to
emerge about the trajectory of national housing market indicators during the first few months of the pandemic. However, the full effects of COVID-19 on housing markets wil not be known for some time. Such effects wil depend on a variety of factors, including the duration of the public health threat and the timing and pattern of economic recovery, and involve a high degree of uncertainty. Impacts may vary across the country based on differences in local housing markets as
wel as geographic variation in the prevalence of COVID-19 and local responses. The impacts are likely to vary across demographic groups, due in part to existing differences in housing conditions as wel as the uneven distribution of the health and economic consequences of the
pandemic.32
32 For example, see Sharon Cornelissen and Alexander Hermann, A Triple Pandemic? The Economic Impacts of COVID-19 Disproportionately Affect Black and Hispanic Households, Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, July 7, 2020, https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/a-triple-pandemic-the-economic-impacts-of-covid-19-disproportionately-affect-black-and-hispanic-households/; and Michael Neal and Alanna McCargo, How Econom ic Crises and Sudden Disasters Increase Racial Disparities in Hom eownership, T he Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center, June 1, 2020, https://www.urban.org/research/publication/how-economic-crises-and-sudden-disasters-increase-racial-disparities-homeownership.
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Federal Housing Responses to COVID-19 On March 27, 2020, President Trump signed into law the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136), a COVID-19 response package that included, among many other things, several provisions related to housing. These included certain temporary protections for renters in properties with federal assistance or federal bac king and homeowners
with federally backed mortgages, as wel as increased funding for several housing programs.
Both prior to and since the passage of the CARES Act, federal agencies have taken various administrative actions to address housing concerns related to COVID-19. In addition, on August 8, 2020, President Trump signed an Executive Order related to COVID-19 and housing.33 The Executive Order directed several federal agencies to examine authorities or resources that they
may be able to use to further assist tenants or homeowners affected by COVID-19 to help them avoid eviction or foreclosure. It did not itself provide any new resources or implement any additional actions related to evictions and foreclosures. (For more information on this Executive Order, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10532, President Trump’s Executive Actions on Student Loans, Wage Assistance, Payroll Taxes, and Evictions: Initial Takeaways.) The Executive Order,
among other things, directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to consider whether measures to temporarily pause evictions were necessary to prevent the spread of COVID-19 between states. On September 4,
2020, the CDC announced a national eviction moratorium to last until the end of the year.
Lawmakers have also introduced a variety of additional bil s to further address housing issues
related to COVID-19, though as of the date of this report none has been enacted.
Federal Interventions Related to Rental Housing
While al types of households may be at risk of housing instability due to COVID-19, renters may
be particularly vulnerable. This is both because more financial y vulnerable populations are more likely to be renters, and because the process for evicting a household from a rental unit is general y faster than the process of foreclosing on a mortgage. As such, there have been several
policy interventions aimed specifical y at aiding renters.
CARES Act Rental Housing Provisions
To protect renters experiencing COVID-19-related financial hardships, the CARES Act included a 120-day moratorium on eviction filings for tenants in rental properties with federal assistance or federal y related financing, as wel as a prohibition on charging late fees for nonpayment of rent for the same time period. These protections were designed to al eviate the economic and public health consequences of tenant displacement during the pandemic. They supplemented temporary
eviction moratoria and rent freezes implemented in states and cities by governors and local officials using emergency powers. The CARES Act eviction moratorium expired on July 24, though the law also required that landlords provide tenants with at least 30 days’ notice before requiring tenants to vacate a covered property after the moratorium expired. Therefore, tenants
should not have been required to leave covered rental units until at least August 23.
33 Executive Order on Fighting the Spread of COVID-19 by Providing Assistance to Renters and Homeowners, issued on August 8, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-fighting-spread-covid-19-providing-assistance-renters-homeowners/.
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Separate from the eviction moratorium, the CARES Act also included provisions related to forbearance for federally backed multifamily mortgages (discussed further below). The CARES Act provided that multifamily mortgage borrowers receiving forbearance must provide certain tenant protections during the forbearance period. Namely, owners cannot evict tenants for nonpayment of rent or charge late fees for the duration of the forbearance. Therefore, some tenants may benefit from federal protection from eviction because they live in a property with a
federal y backed multifamily mortgage subject to a forbearance agreement.
In addition, other assistance provided in the CARES Act, such as federal unemployment
insurance supplemental payments (which have now expired), likely helped renters make housing payments and therefore avoid eviction. While this assistance was not specific to housing,
households could use it to help maintain housing in light of income disruptions.
For more information on CARES Act protections for renters, see the following:
CRS Insight IN11320, CARES Act Eviction Moratorium.
CDC’s National Eviction Moratorium
On September 4, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention published an order in the Federal Register implementing a national eviction moratorium through December 31, 2020.34 The moratorium protects certain tenants from eviction for non-payment of rent. The CDC relied on broad authority that it has to take actions to prevent the spread of communicable diseases between states to implement this moratorium.35 In the Federal Register notice announcing it, the CDC
described the public health risks posed by evictions and their effects during a pandemic.
Unlike the CARES Act eviction moratorium, the CDC’s eviction moratorium potential y applies
to renters in any rental property, not just those with federal financing or federal assistance. While the CARES Act moratorium applied automatical y to renters in covered properties, the CDC moratorium requires eligible renters to provide landlords a document that attests to their
eligibility. Eligible renters must attest that they
meet income eligibility criteria; namely, that they either 1) expect to have
incomes no higher than $99,000 ($198,000 if filing a joint tax return) in 2020, 2) were not required to report income to the Internal Revenue Service in 2019, or 3) received an Economic Impact Payment under Section 2201 of the CARES Act;
have made “best efforts to obtain al available government assistance” to pay
rent;
are unable to pay full rent due to certain specified hardships; are making “best efforts” to make partial payments as close as possible to the full
payment as circumstances permit; and
would likely become homeless, move to a homeless shelter, or move into housing
with others in close quarters if evicted due to a lack of available housing options.
Renters must also attest that they understand that the order does not relieve them of the obligation
to pay rent, and does not prohibit landlords from charging fees, penalties, or interest in 34 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Health and Human Services, “T emporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19,” 85 Federal Register 55292-55297, September 4, 2020. 35 T he CDC’s order cites its authority under Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §264) and regulations at 42 CFR 70.2. See the Federal Register notice for the CDC’s discussion of the risk s that evictions pose to public health.
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accordance with applicable contracts. (In contrast, the CARES Act prohibited landlords from charging fees, penalties, or interest during the eviction moratorium.) The CDC moratorium does
not supersede state or local eviction moratoria that provide greater protections.
While the CARES Act did not explicitly include any penalties for noncompliance, the CDC’s order specifies potential penalties (fines and/or jail time) for landlords who do not comply. Renters who are not truthful in their attestations could be found guilty of perjury and be subject to
associated penalties.
The CDC’s national eviction moratorium order raises a variety of questions and is the subject of legal chal enges.36 In addition to questions surrounding the CDC’s authority to issue such a moratorium, there are questions around issues such as how enforcement is being carried out and how many renters may seek protection. Industry groups representing property owners have raised
concerns about the impact of the eviction moratorium on owners, who may have difficulty covering the costs of the property if tenants are unable to pay rent.37 Tenant advocates, while general y welcoming the moratorium, have also noted that it does not help tenants pay rent and have raised concerns about what happens to renters when the moratorium ends.38 Both owner and
tenant advocates have cal ed for federal rental assistance to help tenants make rent payments.39
For more information on the CDC’s eviction moratorium, see CRS Insight IN11516, Federal
Eviction Moratoriums in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic.
Federal Interventions Related to Mortgages
The CARES Act requires mortgage servicers to grant forbearance requests for borrowers with federal y backed mortgages who are experiencing a financial hardship related to COVID-19.40 Mortgage forbearance al ows a household to reduce or suspend mortgage payments for an agreed-upon period of time, but it does not forgive the amounts owed; borrowers and mortgage servicers
must negotiate an agreement for the repayment of the missed amounts.
Under the CARES Act, forbearance for federal y backed single-family mortgages can be for up to 360 days (an initial period of up to 180 days, with an extension of up to an additional 180 days). For federally backed multifamily mortgages, the forbearance can be for up to 90 days (an initial
period of up to 30 days, with two possible 30-day extensions).41 Federal y backed mortgages 36 See, for example, Brown v. Azar et al., 1:20-CV-03702, N.D. Ga. 37 See, for example, National Multifamily Housing Council, “Statement by NMHC President Doug Bibby on Administration’s Enactment of Federal Eviction Moratorium,” September 1, 2020, https://www.nmhc.org/news/press-release/2020/statement-by-nmhc-president -doug-bibby-on-administrations-enactment -of-federal-eviction-moratorium/.
38 See, for example, National Low Income Housing Coalition, “Statement from National Low Income Housing Coalition President and CEO Diane Yentel on the White House Morato rium on Evictions for Nonpayment of Rent,” September 1, 2020, https://nlihc.org/news/statement-national-low-income-housing-coalition-president -and-ceo-diane-yentel-white-house. 39 Letter from California Housing Consortium et al., August 21, 2020, https://www.irem.org/File%20Library/GlobalNavigation/Advocacy/CoalitionLetters/2020/08212020RentalAssistanceCoalitionLetter.pdf.
40 Prior to passage of the CARES Act, the federal agencies that back mortgages and the government -sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had each released guidance reminding mortgage servicers of existing options to help borrowers having difficulties making mortgage payments, including forbearance, and encouraging or requiring temporary suspensions on foreclosures. While much of this guidance was similar to the provisions included in the CARES Act, the specifics varied by agency.
41 FHFA has since announced the availability of forbearance for multifamily mortgages backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac for up to an additional three months; tenant protections must apply for the duration of the forbearance. See FHFA, “FHFA Provides T enant Protections,” press release, June 29, 2020, https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Provides-T enant -Protections.aspx. HUD has also stated that FHA-insured multifamily mortgages in
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include those insured, guaranteed, or originated by a federal agency, such as HUD, USDA, or VA, or purchased or securitized by two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. They are estimated to constitute approximately 70% of outstanding single-family
mortgages.42
The CARES Act also temporarily suspended foreclosures on federally backed single-family mortgages. The CARES Act foreclosure moratorium was in effect for 60 days from March 18, 2020; however, the federal agencies that back mortgages and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have al since announced extensions. As of the date of this report, these entities had extended the
foreclosure moratorium for mortgages they back through December 31, 2020.43
Federal agencies that back mortgages, such as the Federal Housing Administration, and GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (along with their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance
Agency, or FHFA44) have also taken additional steps to assist borrowers and other mortgage
market participants.45 These steps have included the following:
The CARES Act was silent on this question. Several of the federal entities involved in
mortgages have stated that borrowers with mortgages they back who are not able to repay the missed amounts in a lump sum at the end of the forbearance wil be offered other repayment options,46 and have announced specific options for deferring the missed
amounts to the end of the loan term.47
forbearance may be able to have forbearance periods extended, and that tenant protections will apply during any extended forbearance. See HUD Housing Notice H 20 -07, “ Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act Eviction Moratorium,” issued July 1, 2020, p. 3, https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/OCHCO/documents/20-07hsgn.pdf.pdf. 42 See, for example, Karan Kaul and Laurie Goodman, “T he Price T ag for Keeping 29 Million Families in T heir Homes: $162 Billion,” T he Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center, March 27, 2020, https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/price-tag-keeping-29-million-families-their-homes-162-billion.
43 FHA Mortgagee Letter 2020-27, https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/OCHCO/documents/2020-27hsgml.pdf; FHFA, “FHFA Extends Foreclosure and REO Eviction Moratoriums,” https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Extends-Foreclosure-and-REO-Eviction-Moratoriums.aspx; VA Circular 26-20-30, https://www.benefits.va.gov/HOMELOANS/documents/circulars/26-20-30.pdf; USDA, “ USDA Implements Immediate Measures to Help Rural Residents, Businesses and Communities Affected by COVID -19,” updated August 28, 2020, https://www.rd.usda.gov/sites/default/files/COVID19_CUMULAT IVE_StakeholderNotification_WEEKLY_Aug28.pdf ; and HUD Office of Public and Indian Housing Dear Lender Letter 2020-10, https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PIH/documents/DLL_2020-10_Eviction_Moratorium_and_Loan_Processing_Flexibilities_Extension.pdf .
44 T he Federal Housing Finance Agency is the regulator and conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as the regulator of a third housing GSE, the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system. T he FHLBs have also taken steps to address COVID-19-related issues; see the FHLB website at https://fhlbanks.com/covid-19/. For more information on the FHLBs in general, see CRS Report R46499, The Federal Hom e Loan Bank (FHLB) System and Selected Policy Issues. 45 Administrative actions and guidance related to the pandemic continue to evolve. Many federal agencies involved in housing post pandemic-related guidance in a centralized location. For example, see HUD’s webpage on coronavirus resources at https://www.hud.gov/coronavirus, the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s webpage on coronavirus assistance information at https://www.fhfa.gov/Homeownersbuyer/MortgageAssistance/Pages/Coronavirus-Assistance-Information.aspx, and USDA’s Rural Development COVID-19 response page at https://www.rd.usda.gov/coronavirus.
46 See “CARES Act Forbearance Fact Sheet for Borrowers with FHA, VA, or USDA Loans,” https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/SFH/documents/IACOVID19FBFactSheetConsumer.pdf; and FHFA, “ ‘No Lump Sum Required at the End of Forbearance’ says FHFA’s Calabria,” press release, April 27, 2020, https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/No-Lump-Sum-Required-at-the-End-of-Forbearance-says-FHFAs-Calabria.aspx. 47 See FHA Mortgagee Letter 2020-06, “FHA’s Loss Mitigation Options for Single Family Borrowers Affected by the Presidentially-Declared COVID-19 National Emergency in Accordance with the CARES Act,” April 1, 2020,
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Temporary Mortgage Origination Flexibilities: Certain aspects of the mortgage
origination process present chal enges during the pandemic. In response, federal entities have made temporary changes to certain requirements for mortgages that they back in order to minimize the effects on mortgage origination and home buying. These changes include al owing for alternatives to interior home appraisals in some circumstances and providing flexibilities related to the process for re-verifying a borrower’s employment
before closing.48 FHA and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have each also announced temporary policies that al ow them to insure or purchase, respectively, mortgages that otherwise meet their requirements but are in forbearance.49 (Usual y, mortgages that are already in forbearance are not eligible for FHA insurance or purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.) To help balance the increased risk that these mortgages pose to these
entities, their acceptance of these mortgages is subject to certain conditions.50 Some lawmakers have raised concerns about these conditions, however, and their potential
impact on mortgage credit access.51
Support for Mortgage Servicers: Mortgage servicers are often required to advance
payments to investors in mortgage-backed securities even if the borrower has not made their payments on time, including in the case of forbearance. Large volumes of delinquent payments or mortgage forbearances can therefore cause liquidity issues for some servicers.52 In response, Ginnie Mae and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have each taken
certain steps to address potential servicer liquidity issues for mortgages that they back.53
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/OCHCO/ documents/20-06hsngml.pdf; FHA Mortgagee Letter 2020-22, “ FHA’s COVID-19 Loss Mitigation Options,” https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/OCHCO/documents/20-22hsgml.pdf; and FHFA, “FHFA Announces Payment Deferral as New Repayment Option for Homeowners in COVID-19 Forbearance Plans,” press release, May 13, 2020, https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Announces-Payment-Deferral-as-New-Repayment -Option-for-Homeowners-in-COVID-19-Forbearance-Plans.aspx. 48 See, for example, FHFA, “FHFA Directs Enterprises to Grant Flexibilities for Appraisal and Employment Verifications,” press release, March 23, 2020, https://www.fhfa.gov/media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Directs-Enterprises-to-Grant-Flexibilities-for-Appraisal-and-Employment-Verifications.aspx; and HUD, “ Re-verification of Employment and Exterior-Only and Desktop-Only Appraisal Scope of Work Options for FHA Single Family Programs Impacted By COVID-19,” FHA Mortgagee Letter 2020-05, March 27, 2020, https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/OCHCO/documents/20-05hsgml.pdf. T he flexibilities provided in each of these documents were subsequently extended. 49 FHFA, “FHFA Announces that Enterprises will Purchase Qualified Loans in Forbearance to Keep Lending Flowing,” press release, April 22, 2020, https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Announces-that-Enterprises-will-Purchase-Qualified-Loans.aspx; and FHA Mortgagee Letter 2020-16, “ Endorsement of Mortgages under Forbearance for Borrowers Affected by the Presidentially -Declared COVID-19 National Emergency consistent with the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act,” https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/OCHCO/documents/2020-16hsngml.pdf. As of the date of this report, FHA’s policy is in effect through November 30, 2020, and FHFA’s policy had been ext ended through October 31, 2020. 50 Ibid. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac charge additional fees for purchasing mortgages in forbearance, while FHA requires a lender to continue to bear some of the risk of such mortgages by signing a partial indemnification agree ment. 51 Letter from House Financial Services Committee Chairwoman Maxine Waters et al. to HUD Secretary Benjamin S. Carson and FHFA Director Mark Calabria, June 25, 2020, https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ltr_to_hud_and_fhfa_re_ef_6-25-20.pdf. Bills introduced in the House (H.R. 6794) and Senate (S. 4260) would prohibit FHA and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from imposing additional costs or other terms on such mortgages solely based on their forbearance status.
52 For more information on mortgage servicing considerations, see CRS Insight IN11377, Mortgage Servicing Rights and Selected Market Developm ents. 53 Ginnie Mae expanded access to the Pass T hrough Assistance Program (PT AP), through which Ginnie Mae lends money to servicers to make required advances if they cannot obtain funding through other sources. FHFA announced that Fannie Mae servicers would only be required to advance four months of principal and interest payments (this was
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In addition, the Federal Reserve has agreed to purchase mortgage-backed securities to help provide liquidity and stability in the mortgage market.54 These purchases can facilitate the funding of mortgages, even if investors’ demand for mortgage-backed securities declines during
the pandemic. For more information, see the following:
CRS Insight IN11334, Mortgage Provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security (CARES) Act.
CRS Insight IN11316, COVID-19: Support for Mortgage Lenders and Servicers. CRS Insight IN11385, The Impact of COVID-19-Related Forbearances on the
Federal Mortgage Finance System.
Increased Funding for Housing Programs
The CARES Act appropriated an additional $12.4 bil ion for HUD housing programs in FY2020. These funds were directed to several HUD programs to provide additional resources to address
emerging housing needs caused by COVID-19, to help cover increased costs in rental assistance programs, and for administrative capacity and oversight. The CARES Act also provides the HUD Secretary broad waiver authority in most accounts to expedite or facilitate the use of these funds
to respond to the coronavirus.
The majority of the funds—about $9.4 bil ion—were for several HUD grant programs, many of which provide relatively flexible funding to state and local governments or other entities for eligible affordable housing, community development, or related activities. Because these programs general y fund a range of al owable activities, they can be used to address a variety of
emerging needs related to the pandemic. The largest amounts were for the Community Development Fund, the account that funds Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) ($5 bil ion), and Emergency Solutions Grants (ESG) ($4 bil ion). States and local governments can use CDBG funds for a range of housing and community development activities, while ESG, one of the Homeless Assistance Grants, can be used for a range of services for those who are
homeless or at risk of homelessness. The law also provided funds to grant programs that assist tribes, fair housing programs, and the Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA)
program.
The CARES Act also provided about $3 bil ion to maintain existing rental assistance in several HUD programs. HUD rental assistance programs subsidize the difference between tenant contributions toward rent and a unit’s rent (or operating expenses). When tenants’ incomes are reduced—such as by rising unemployment triggered by the pandemic—their rent contributions decrease, which increases federal subsidy costs. The CARES Act provided supplemental funding
to help cover those anticipated increased costs in several HUD programs, inc luding the public
housing, Housing Choice Voucher, and project-based Section 8 programs.
already t he policy for Freddie Mac servicers). See Ginnie Mae, “ Ginnie Mae Announces Changes to its Pass-T hrough Assistance Program in Response to COVID-19 National Emergency,” press release, April 10, 2020, https://ginniemae.gov/newsroom/Pages/PressReleaseDispPage.aspx?ParamID=196; and FHFA, “ FHFA Addresses Servicer Liquidity Concerns, Announces Four Month Advance Obligation Limit for Loans in Forbearance,” press release, April 21, 2020, https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Addresses- Servicer-Liquidity-Concerns-Announces-Four-Month-Advance-Obligation-Limit-for-Loans-in-Forbearance.aspx. 54 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement,” March 23, 2020, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200323a.htm.
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The CARES Act also provided $50 mil ion for HUD administrative offices and $5 mil ion for the
HUD Office of the Inspector General for oversight of activities funded under the CARES Act.
For more information, see the following:
CRS Insight IN11319, Funding for HUD in the CARES Act. CRS Insight IN11315, Community Development Block Grants and the CARES
Act.
CRS Insight IN11277, Responding to the COVID-19 Pandemic with Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) Authorities
Proposals for Additional Action As the pandemic continues, there have been cal s for additional federal policy interventions.
Dozens of bil s have been introduced in Congress that would address various housing-related
issues caused by the pandemic.
Some cal s have been for additional assistance to renters and homeowners so they do not fal behind on their payments and risk eviction or foreclosure, and possibly homelessness, when moratoria or forbearance periods end. Such assistance could take various forms. Some have proposed expansions or extensions of existing eviction or foreclosure moratoria or additional protections related to CARES Act mortgage forbearance requirements. Others have proposed other types of assistance, such as direct payments to help households make their rental or
mortgage payments for a period of time. For example, even before the national eviction moratorium was announced, a broad coalition of low-income housing advocates, real estate
interests, and other stakeholders had come together to cal for emergency rental assistance.55
Some have also cal ed for additional assistance for other housing market participants that are affected when renters or mortgage borrowers miss payments; namely, landlords and mortgage servicers. (Proposals to assist households by providing direct financial assistance to help with rent or mortgage payments would also benefit landlords and servicers, respectively, by reducing the amount of missed payments.) In addition to experiencing a loss of income, which could be
particularly significant for landlords whose rental properties represent their primary source of income, some landlords may have difficulty sustaining mortgage payments, operating costs, or other expenses related to maintaining rental housing if tenants are unable to pay rent. Tenants who work in industries at higher risk of job loss may be more likely to rent units in single-family homes or smal multifamily properties, and many of the smal er landlords of these properties, in
particular, may struggle to withstand months without rental income.56 Some owners of rental properties were eligible for Smal Business Administration Economic Injury Disaster Loans as authorized under the CARES Act,57 but there have been cal s for additional or more targeted assistance. Similarly, while Ginnie Mae and FHFA have taken some administrative actions to
55 Letter from Aeon et al. to Congressional Leadership, May 4, 2020, https://nhc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/FinalHousingCoalitionERALetter2020-05-04.pdf. 56 For example, see Whitney Airgood-Obrycki and Alexander Hermann, “COVID-19 Rent Shortfalls in Small Buildings,” Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, May 26, 2020, https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/covid-19-rent-shortfalls-in-small-buildings/; and Jung Hyun Choi and Caitlin Young, “ Owners and Renters of 6.2 Million Units in Small Buildings Are Particularly Vulnerable during the Pandemic,” Urban Institute Housing Finance Policy Center, August 10, 2020, https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/owners-and-renters-62-million-units-small-buildings-are-particularly-vulnerable-during-pandemic.
57 For more information on these loans, see https://www.sba.gov/funding-programs/loans/coronavirus-relief-options.
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address concerns about mortgage servicer liquidity, some have cal ed for additional actions to
provide additional financial support for mortgage servicers.58
A variety of bil s introduced in Congress would address these or other pandemic-related housing
issues, and some have been considered. The Heroes Act (H.R. 6800), which the House passed in May, includes several housing-related provisions in Division K. These include additional funding for some existing housing programs as wel as for certain new programs to respond to pandemic -related housing needs; extensions, expansions, and changes to the CARES Act eviction moratorium, foreclosure moratorium, and mortgage forbearance provisions; and access to
financial support for landlords and mortgage servicers.59 These provisions were also included in a standalone bil , the Emergency Housing Protections and Relief Act of 2020 (H.R. 7301), which has also passed the House. The House passed a revised version of the Heroes Act (H.R. 925) on October 1; the broad contours of the housing-related provisions in H.R. 925 are largely similar to those in H.R. 6800, though there are some differences in the details and in the specific provisions
that are included. For more information, see the following:
CRS Report R46434, HEROES Act, Division K—COVID-19 Housing, Economic
Relief, and Oversight Act.
Other Housing Issues in the 116th Congress Outside of the pandemic, a variety of other housing-related issues have been of interest during the
116th Congress, including issues related to housing finance, housing assistance programs, administrative actions related to affordable housing, housing and disaster relief, and housing-
related tax provisions.
Housing Finance
Status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) chartered by Congress to provide liquidity to the secondary markets for single-family and multifamily residential mortgages. The GSEs purchase mortgages from loan originators, retain the credit (default) risk from the mortgages they purchase, and subsequently issue mortgage-backed
securities (MBS). Investors who purchase the MBS are guaranteed to get their initial principal investment returned, but they assume the risk that borrowers may choose to repay their mortgages ahead of schedule (e.g., by refinancing or sel ing the home), known as prepayment risk.60 In short,
58 For example, see Karen Kaul and T ed T ozer, The Need for a Federal Liquidity Facility for Government Loan Servicing, Urban Institute Housing Finance Policy Center, July 2020, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102580/the-need-for-a-federal-liquidity-facility-for-government-loan-servicing_0.pdf.
59 T he Heroes Act, as passed by the House, would also continue the UI expansion and provide a second $1,200 relief payment for most households. While not specific housing provisions, such assistance could potentially be used to address housing-related needs.
60 Prepayment risk is one type of the broader category of risks linked to changes in interest rates. Following interest rates changes, the market value of a loan (or bond) asset can change; for assets that give borrowers the option to prepay their loans ahead of schedule, the prepayment risk may offset market value changes. On the liability side, interest rate changes affect the lenders’ costs to borrow funds used to finance assets held in their portfolios. Hence, lenders can take advantage of the GSEs’ securitization process to reduce the various interest rate risks associated with holding highly
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the GSEs’ securitization process detaches two mortgage risks into separate components.61 The GSEs retain the default risk component for a fee and transfer the prepayment risk component to
MBS investors.
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent federal government agency created by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA; P.L. 110-289), regulates the GSEs for prudential safety and soundness and ensures they meet their affordable housing mission goals. In September 2008, the GSEs experienced losses that exceeded their statutory minimum capital requirement levels due to the high rate of mortgage defaults. The GSEs also experienced
losses following spikes in short-term borrowing rates that occurred while they were funding long-term assets held in their portfolios. The GSEs subsequently agreed to be placed under
conservatorship by FHFA, which now has the powers of management, boards, and shareholders.62
Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac entered conservatorship in 2008, policymakers have expressed interest in comprehensive housing finance reform legislation that would resolve the conservatorships of these GSEs and address the underlying issues that are perceived to have led to their financial trouble and conservatorships. Previous Congresses have considered housing finance reform legislation to varying degrees, but none has been enacted. Early in the 116th
Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Chairman Mike Crapo released an outline for potential housing finance reform legislation.63 The committee held
hearings on it shortly thereafter.64
In March 2019, President Trump issued a Memorandum on Federal Housing Finance Reform directing the Treasury and HUD secretaries to develop plans to achieve certain housing finance reform goals, including both legislative and administrative reforms.65 Treasury and HUD released these plans on September 5, 2019.66 Both plans include a variety of legislative recommendations, as wel as recommendations for steps that the agencies could take administratively in the absence
of legislation. The Senate Banking Committee and the House Financial Services Committee each
held a hearing on the plans.67
interest -sensitive assets such as 30-year fixed rate mortgages.
61 For more on default and prepayment risk, see CRS In Focus IF10993, Consumer Credit Markets and Loan Pricing: The Basics.
62 For more background on the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, see CRS Report R44525, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship: Frequently Asked Questions; and FHFA, “ Conservatorship,” at https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship. 63 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, “Chairman Crapo Releases Outline for Housing Finance Reform,” press release, February 1, 2019, https://www.banking.senate.gov/newsroom/majority/chairman-crapo-releases-outline-for-housing-finance-reform.
64 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Chairman’s Housing Reform Outline: Part 1, 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 26, 2019; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Chairm an’s Housing Reform Outline: Part 2 , 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 2019. 65 Presidential Memorandum, Memorandum on Federal Housing Finance Reform , March 27, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-federal-housing-finance-reform/.
66 Department of the Treasury, Housing Reform Plan Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum Issued March 27, 2019, September 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Treasury-Housing-Finance-Reform-Plan.pdf; and Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Finance Reform Plan Pursuant to the Presidential Mem orandum Issued March 27, 2019, September 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/HUD-Housing-Finance-Reform-Plan-September-2019.pdf. 67 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Housing Finance Reform: Next Steps, 116th Cong., 1st sess., September 10, 2019; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Financial Services, The End of Affordable Housing? A Review of the Trump Administration’s Plans to Change Housing Finance in America , 116th
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Outside of any legislative efforts related to housing finance reform, FHFA has taken a variety of administrative and regulatory actions related to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in its dual roles as
their regulator and conservator.
Status of FHFA Administrative Requirements for GSEs While Under Conservatorship
Since conservatorship, the FHFA has focused on initiatives to standardize many aspects of the GSEs’ operations, which include their mortgage data collection processes, securitization processes, mortgage servicing policies (e.g., resolving delinquencies), and MBS issuances. Such
standardization arguably increases transparency, reduces the length of the single-family mortgage origination and securitization processes, and ultimately increases the liquidity and uniform pricing of the GSEs’ issued securities.68 These efforts have resulted in the GSEs issuing two types of securities to facilitate lending in the single-family mortgage market. The GSEs continue to transfer prepayment risks but via a new financial instrument (the uniform mortgage-backed
security); and they now transfer default risks (credit risk transfers, CRT) to private investors. Uniform Mortgage-Backed Security
The FHFA, under the single security initiative, directed the GSEs to align their key contractual and business practices by acquiring mortgages with similar prepayment speeds along with other features.69 Each GSE continues to separately purchase conforming mortgages and guarantee the
credit risks linked to the MBS trusts it creates. The prepayment speeds, however, are now required to align such that they do not diverge by more than 2% over a three-month interval.70 With similar prepayment characteristics, Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s MBS trusts would generate similar cash-flow predictability and prepayment speeds and, therefore, facilitate the creation of uniform securities. Rather than separate MBS issuances, the FHFA directed the GSEs to issue one common security—the uniform mortgage-backed security (UMBS). However, the
GSEs would continue to separately issue and guarantee MBS that do not meet the standardization
requirements for UMBS.
The issuance of UMBS began on June 3, 2019.71 The combined market for the GSEs’ MBS issuances is expected to be more liquid because the UMBSs trade at a single price (rather than at two different prices).72 FHFA monitors the GSEs to ensure that their underwriting policies remain Cong., 1st sess., October 22, 2019. 68 For more information on the mortgage servicing and loss mitigation initiatives, see FHFA, “Mortgage Servicing,” at https://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Policy/Pages/Mortgage-Servicing.aspx; and Karan Kaul et al., The Case for Uniform Mortgage Servicing Data Standards, Urban Institute, November 2018, at https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99317/uniform_mortgage_servicing_data_standards_0.pdf. T he standardization of servicing may enhance the attractiveness of CRT investments by clarifying the procedures for handling nonp erforming mortgages, thus clarifying how losses will be distributed among the various tranche classes. For more information, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: T he Joint Forum, Report on Asset Securitisation Incentives, July 2011, at https://www.bis.org/publ/joint26.pdf; and Patricia A. McCoy, Barriers to Federal Hom e Mortgage Modification Efforts During the Financial Crisis, Joint Center for Housing Studies: Harvard University, August 2010, at https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/mf10-6.pdf.
69 See FHFA, “Uniform Mortgage-Backed Security,” 84 Federal Register 7793-7801, March 5, 2019. 70 See FHFA, “Uniform Mortgage-Backed Security,” 84 Federal Register 7793-7801, March 5, 2019. 71 See FHFA, “Statement of FHFA Deputy Director Robert Fishman on the Launch of the New Uniform Mortgage -Backed Security (UMBS),” press release, June 3, 2019, at https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/Statement-of-FHFA-Deputy-Director-Robert-Fishman-on-the-launch-of-the-new-Uniform-Mortgage-Backed-Security.aspx. 72 FHFA, An Update on the Structure of the Single Security, May 15, 2015, p. 4, at https://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/Reports/ReportDocuments/Single%20Security%20Update%20final.pdf. For a discussion of the pricing differential that
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intact to avoid material misalignment that compromises interchangeability of the underlying
mortgages used to create UMBS.73
Credit Risk Transfer
In July 2013, the GSEs initiated new CRT programs to share with the private sector a portion of the default risk linked to their guaranteed single-family mortgages held in the MBS trusts.74 Investors preferring exposure only to mortgage prepayment risk may continue to purchase MBSs;
however, the private sector may now purchase CRT issuances, which function similarly to MBSs, to earn revenue in exchange for assuming exposure to the credit risk.75 The GSEs typical y transfer to CRT investors some of the credit risk linked to mortgages with loan-to-values (LTVs) greater than 60% (or borrowers with 40% or less in accumulated home equity, meaning that they are more vulnerable to the possibility of owing more than the value of their homes if housing
prices were to fal ).76 When defaults occur, the GSEs reduce the returns paid to CRT investors (similar to reducing the returns to MBSs investors after prepayments occur). Conversely, the GSEs retain the credit risk for mortgages with lower LTVs (or borrowers with 41% or more in accumulated home equity such that their outstanding balances are significantly below the value of their residential properties), which are less likely to default.77 From 2013 to 2019, the GSEs have
transferred a total of $3.479 tril ion of credit risk to private investors.78
Proposed Capital Rule
Although the exact definition of capital for financial firms is determined by law and regulation, it general y refers to common or preferred equity (as a percentage of assets), which can absorb financial losses. The FHFA suspended the GSEs’ capital requirements during conservatorship,
and they must pay dividends only to Treasury (as opposed to private shareholders) while they are under conservatorship. As a prerequisite for exiting conservatorship, the GSEs must increase their holdings of capital reserves.79 Given that pre-conservatorship capital levels for the GSEs were not
existed between Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s MBSs, see CRS Report R45828, Overview of Recent Administrative Reform s of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; and Laurie Goodman, The $400 Million Case for a Single GSE Security, Urban Institute, September 5, 2014, at http://www.urban.org/urban-wire/400-million-case-single-gse-security. For a discussion on the effects of standardization in the mortgage and MBS markets, see Adam J. Levit in and Susan M. Wachter, “Explaining the Housing Bubble,” The Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 100, no. 4 (April 12, 2012), pp. 1177-1258.
73 For more information, see CRS Report R45828, Overview of Recent Administrative Reforms of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
74 T he GSEs had existing programs to redistribute more than 90% of the credit risk on their multi-family programs. Fannie Mae issues instruments linked to credit risk stemming from its multi-family mortgages through its Delegated Underwriting and Servicing Program (DUS); the corresponding Freddie Mac instruments are known as K -Deals. See U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Financial Audit: Federal Housing Finance Agency’s Fiscal Years 2018 and 2017 Financial Statements, GAO-19-183R, November 15, 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695479.pdf; and FHFA, Overview of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Credit Risk Transfer Transactions, August 2015, at https://www.fhfa.gov/aboutus/reports/reportdocuments/crt-overview-8-21-2015.pdf.
75 Fannie Mae’s CRT instruments are known as Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS); Freddie Mac’s CRT instruments are known as Structural Agency Credit Risk (ST ACR). 76 See FHFA, Performance and Accountability Report, FY2018, at https://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/Reports/ReportDocuments/FHFA-2018-PAR.pdf.
77 T he GSEs may also transfer the credit risk of mortgages retained in their portfolios (typically because they lack the standardized features that would make them eligible for placement into an MBS trust for securitization).
78 For more information, see FHFA, “Credit Risk T ransfer Progress Report,” Fourth Quarter 2019, at https://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/Reports/ReportDocuments/CRT -Progress-Report -4Q2019.pdf. 79 P.L. 102-550, the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, establishes the statutory
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sufficient to avoid conservatorship, HERA gave FHFA the authority to increase capital standards
above the statutory minimum as necessary.80
On May 20, 2020, FHFA released a proposed rule that would establish a new regulatory capital
framework for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to be in place once they are returned to stockholder control.81 The proposed framework borrows concepts from the capital regulatory framework for large banks such as the definition of capital, various capital buffers, and a risk weight capital floor that would be applied for any CRT exposures retained in portfolio.82 Comments on the proposal
were due by August 31, 2020.
Multifamily Housing Financing Activities
Multifamily properties are general y defined as properties that include five or more housing units. FHFA has placed various directives on the GSEs’ multifamily programs since conservatorship.83 Namely, in 2014, it placed annual caps on the overal dollar volume of multifamily mortgages that each GSE can purchase to shrink their multifamily operations and resulting risks to
taxpayers.84 It excluded mission-driven purchases from counting toward the cap to encourage GSE support in the affordable housing and underserved market segments.85 Beginning in 2016, FHFA also excluded loans that would finance certain energy and water efficiency improvements
(i.e., green loans) from the multifamily purchase caps to retain focus on mission goals.
On September 13, 2019, FHFA revised its directive regarding the multifamily purchase caps, increasing them from the previous caps of $35 bil ion each to $100 bil ion each for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Al multifamily mortgage purchases wil now count toward the cap—no exemptions or exclusions for mission-driven or green loans. 86 However, 37.5% of the GSEs’ loan
purchases must be mission driven. The FHFA Director stated that this revision narrows the scope of the GSEs’ multifamily programs to maintain the focus on affordable rental units for low- and
moderate-income households and other historical y underserved renters.87
minimum leverage (unweighted) capital requirement; P.L. 110-289, the Housing Economic and Recovery Act of 2008, gave FHFA the authority to increase capital standards above the statutory minimum as necessary. 80 T he statutory minimum leverage (unweighted) capital requirement, specified in P.L. 102-550, the Federal Housing Enterprises Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, is equal to 2.5% of on -balance sheet (portfolio) assets and 0.45% of off-balance sheet (MBS trust) obligations.
81 See FHFA, “FHFA Releases Re-Proposed Capital Rule for the Enterprises,” May 20, 2020, at https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Releases-Re-Proposed-Capital-Rule-for-the-Enterprises.aspx.
82 See FHFA, “Enterprise Regulatory Capital Framework,” 85 Federal Register 39274-39406, June 30, 2020. 83 For more information, see CRS Report R46480, Multifamily Housing Finance and Selected Policy Issues. 84 See FHFA, “FHFA Seeks Public Input on Reducing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Multifamily Businesses,” press release, August 9, 2013, at https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/PublicAffairsDocuments/MultifamilyInput080913Final.pdf; and FHFA, Conservatorship Strategic Plan: Perform ance Goals for 2013 , at https://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/Reports/ReportDocuments/2013EnterpriseScorecard_508.pdf.
85 See FHFA, “Fact Sheet: New Multifamily Caps for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,” press release, at https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/PublicAffairsDocuments/newmultifamilycaps-9132019.pdf. 86 See FHFA, “FHFA Revises Multifamily Loan Purchase Caps for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,” press release, September 13, 2019, at https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Revises-Multifamily-Loan-Purchase-Caps-for-Fannie-Mae-and-Freddie-Mac.aspx.
87 See FHFA, “FHFA Revises Multifamily Loan Purchase Caps for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,” press release, September 13, 2019, at https://www.fhfa.gov/mobile/Pages/public-affairs-detail.aspx?PageName=FHFA-Revises-Multifamily-Loan-Purchase-Caps-for-Fannie-Mae-and-Freddie-Mac.aspx.
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CFPB’s Proposed Changes to the Qualified Mortgage Rule and the GSE Patch
The Dodd-Frank Wal Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) requires lenders to make a good faith effort to ensure that certain mortgage borrowers have the ability to repay the loans they offer. Lenders that are found to violate the requirement can be required to pay monetary damages.88 On January 10, 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) released a final rule implementing these ability-to-repay (ATR) requirements; the
rule took effect on January 10, 2014.89
The final rule provides multiple ways for a loan originator to comply with the ATR
requirements,90 one of which is by originating a qualified mortgage (QM). QMs are mortgages that meet certain underwriting standards and lack various risky product-features. When a lender issues a QM, it creates a presumption that the lender has complied with its ATR responsibilities, reducing the lender’s legal exposure. The level of protection afforded a lender varies according to the loan’s pricing.91 QMs with annual percentage rates (APRs) not exceeding the Average Prime
Offer Rate (APOR) by more than 1.5 percentage points qualify for safe harbor status. QMs with APRs exceeding the APOR by more than that amount are considered higher-priced QMs and benefit from a rebuttable presumption of compliance. The CFPB has explained these legal
protections in this way:
Under a safe harbor, if a court finds that a mortgage you originated was a QM, then that finding conclusively establishes that you complied with the ATR requirements when you originated the mortgage. ... Under a rebuttable presumption, if a court finds that a mortgage you originated was a higher-priced QM, a consumer can argue that you violated the ATR rule. However, to prevail on that argument, the consumer must show that based on the information available to you at the time the mortgage was made, the consumer did not have enough residual income left to meet living expenses after paying their mortgage and other debts.92
Lenders may be less likely to originate non-QM loans due to the increased legal exposure.
Limiting the borrower’s debt-to-income (DTI) ratio to 43% is one of the current underwriting requirements for a loan to receive general QM status. Mortgages with DTIs exceeding 43% may stil qualify as QMs if (1) they are eligible to be insured or guaranteed by FHA, USDA, or VA and meet permanent QM standards established by each of those agencies,93 or (2) they are eligible for
88 15 U.S.C. §1640 89 See Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB), “Ability -to-repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the T ruth in Lending Act (Regulation Z),” 78 Federal Register 6408-6620, January 30, 2013. 90 For a comparison of the different ways the lenders can comply with the AT R requirements, see https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201603_cfpb_atr-and-qm-comparison-chart.pdf.
91 All QM loans must meet certain underwriting and product feature requirements. 92 CFPB, Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Rule Small Entity Compliance Guide, March 2016, pp. 33-34, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/bcfp__atr-qm_small-entity_compliance-guide.pdf. 93 T he Dodd-Frank Act allowed federal agencies that guarantee mortgages to issue their own definitions of a QM. T he Federal Housing Administration, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, and United States Department of Agriculture did not adopt a 43% DT I requirement for the mortgages they guarantee. Instead, these agencies adopted their own QM definitions, which included the exclusion of product features they considered would impede repayment from borrowers they predominantly serve—but they did not limit DT Is to 43%. See Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Qualified Mortgage Definition for HUD Insured and Guaranteed Single Family Mortgages,” 78 Federal Register 75215-75238, December 13, 2013; Department of Veterans Affairs, “ Loan Guaranty: Ability -T o-Repay Standards and Qualified Mortgage Definition Under the T ruth in Lending Act,” 79 Federal Register 26620-26628, May 9, 2014; and Department of Agriculture, Rural Housing Service, “Single Family Housing Guaranteed Loan Program,” 81 Federal Register 26461-26465, May 3, 2016.
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purchase by two government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.94 The GSE QM option, which is referred to as the QM patch, al ows the GSEs to operate under their own QM rules for seven years (until January 10, 2021) or until they exit conservatorship,
whichever is sooner.95
On June 22, 2020, the CFPB proposed revisions to the current QM definition.96 Some of the
proposed revisions include the following:97
For the QM definition, the proposal would remove the 43% DTI ratio requirement and
replace it with requirements that are based on the mortgage pricing, which reflects the credit quality of borrowers. The rule would continue to grant safe harbor QM status to a first-lien (primary) mortgage in which the difference between its APR and the APOR is less than 1.5 percentage points.98 To qualify as a QM with rebuttable presumption,
however, the proposal would limit the difference between the APR and APOR for first-
lien mortgages to no more than 2 percentage points.99
The CFPB also seeks comments on removing Appendix Q, which creditors are currently
required to use to verify borrower debt and income for QMs, and granting safe harbor to creditors that use specified income and debt verification standards such as one or more of the following: Fannie Mae’s Single Family Sel ing Guide, Freddie Mac’s Single-Family Sel er/Servicer Guide, FHA’s Single Family Housing Policy Handbook, the Veteran Administrations Lenders Handbook, and the Field Office Handbook for the Direct Single
Family Housing Program and Handbook for the Single Family Guaranteed Loan Program
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
The CFPB is also seeking comments on an alternative proposal to consider a DTI range
between 45% and 48% rather than removing the DTI requirement entirely. Higher credit-quality applicants likely to qualify for lower mortgage rates could be approved with DTIs near or at the upper end of the range. In this case, a better credit score may act as a compensating factor, a positive risk attribute that may be given additional weight when
underwriting applicants with higher DTIs.
94 See CFPB, Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Rule Assessment Report, January 2019, at https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ability-to-repay-qualified-mortgage_assessment -report.pdf.
95 See CFPB, “Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the T ruth in Lending Act (Regulation Z),” 78 Federal Register 6049, January 30, 2013; Bing Bai, Laurie Goodman, and Ellen Seidman, Has the QM Rule Made It Harder to Get a Mortgage?, Urban Institute, March 2016, at https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/78266/2000640-Has-the-QM-Rule-Made-It-Harder-to-Get-a-Mortgage.pdf; and Karan Kaul and Laurie Goodman, What, If Anything, Should Replace the QM GSE Patch? , Urban Institute, August 2018, at https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98949/2018_10_30_qualified_mortgage_rule_finalizedv2_0.pdf.
96 See CFPB, “Qualified Mortgage Definition Under the T ruth in Lending Act (Regulation Z): General QM Loan Definition,” 85 Federal Register 41716-41778, July 10, 2020. 97 For a summary of the proposal, see CFPB, Summary of Proposed Rule-Makings: June 2020 Proposals to Amend the ATR-QM Rule, June 22, 2020, at https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_atr-qm_summary-of-proposals_2020-06.pdf. 98 Consistent with the current rule, the CFPB proposes higher thresholds for loans with smaller loan amounts and for subordinate-lien transactions, which typically have higher APRs. For more information on how the CFPB defines the benchmark APOR, see, CFPB, “ What is a ‘Higher-Priced Mortgage Loan?’”, September 17, 2013, at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what -is-a-higher-priced-mortgage-loan-en-1797/.
99 Under the current rule, there is no limit on the amount by which the APR exceeds the APOR for the purposes of the QM definition, though only QMs where the difference is no more than 1.5 percentage points (for most first -lien mortgages) qualify for a safe harbor.
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On June 22, 2020, in a separate proposed rule, the CFPB also proposed revisions to the current GSE/QM patch.100 Specifical y, the CFPB proposes to extend the sunset date for the GSE Patch such that it corresponds to the earlier of either (1) the effective date of the final amendments to the QM rule revisions or (2) the date that the GSEs exit conservatorship. (The CFPB notes that
the QM rule revisions are not expected to become effective prior to April 1, 2021.)
30% of area median income), in particular, contributes to these cost burdens.22
A variety of housing-related issues have been of interest to the 116th Congress, including housing finance, housing assistance programs, and housing-related tax provisions, among other things.
Two major players in the U.S. housing finance system are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that were created by Congress to provide liquidity to the mortgage market. By law, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac cannot make mortgages; rather, they are restricted to purchasing mortgages that meet certain requirements from lenders. Once the GSEs purchase a mortgage, they package it with others into a mortgage-backed security (MBS), which they guarantee and sell to institutional investors (which can be the mortgage originator).23 They retain a relatively small amount of MBS as a portfolio investment. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are involved in both single-family and multifamily housing, though their single-family businesses are much larger.
In 2008, in the midst of housing and mortgage market turmoil, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac experienced financial trouble and entered voluntary conservatorship overseen by their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). As part of the legal arrangements of this conservatorship, the Department of the Treasury contracted to purchase a maximum of $200 billion of new senior preferred stock from each of the GSEs; in return for this support, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pay dividends on this stock to Treasury.24 These funds become general revenues.
Several issues related to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could be of interest to the 116th Congress. These include the potential for legislative housing finance reform, new leadership at FHFA and the potential for administrative changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and certain issues that could affect Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's finances and mortgage standards, respectively.
For more information on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, see CRS Report R44525, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship: Frequently Asked Questions.
Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac entered conservatorship in 2008, policymakers have largely agreed on the need for comprehensive housing finance reform legislation that would resolve the conservatorships of these GSEs and address the underlying issues that are perceived to have led to their financial trouble and conservatorships. Such legislation could eliminate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, possibly replacing them with other entities; retain the companies but transform their role in the housing finance system; or return them to their previous status with certain changes. In addition to addressing the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, housing finance reform legislation could potentially involve changes to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)25 or other federal programs that support the mortgage market.
While there is generally broad agreement on certain principles of housing finance reform—such as increasing the private sector's role in the mortgage market, reducing government risk, and maintaining access to affordable mortgages for creditworthy households—there is disagreement over how best to achieve these objectives and over the technical details of how a restructured housing finance system should operate. Since 2008, a variety of housing finance reform proposals have been put forward by Members of Congress, the Trump and Obama Administrations, think tanks, and industry groups.26 Proposals differ on structural questions as well as on specific implementation issues, such as whether, and how, certain affordable housing requirements that currently apply to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be included in a new system.
In the 116th Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Chairman Mike Crapo has released an outline for potential housing finance reform legislation.27 The committee held hearings on March 26 and March 27, 2019, on the outline.28
Previous Congresses have also considered housing finance reform legislation in varying degrees. In the 113th Congress, the House Committee on Financial Services and Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs considered different versions of comprehensive housing finance reform legislation, but none were ultimately enacted.29 The 114th Congress considered a number of more-targeted reforms to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but did not actively consider comprehensive housing finance reform legislation.30 At the end of the 115th Congress, the House Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on a draft housing finance reform bill released by then-Chairman Jeb Hensarling and then-Representative John Delaney, but no further action was taken on it.31
FHFA, an independent agency, is the regulator for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System and is the conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The director of FHFA is appointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, for a five-year term. The term of FHFA Director Mel Watt expired in January 2019. President Trump nominated Mark Calabria to be the next FHFA director. The Senate confirmed the nomination on April 4, 2019, and Dr. Calabria was sworn in on April 15, 2019.
FHFA has relatively wide latitude to make many changes to Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's operations without congressional approval, though it is subject to certain statutory constraints. In recent years, for example, FHFA has directed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to engage in risk-sharing transactions, develop a common securitization platform for issuing mortgage-backed securities, and undertake certain pilot programs.32 The prospect of new leadership at FHFA led many to speculate about possible administrative changes that FHFA could make to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac going forward.33 Any such changes could potentially lead to congressional interest and oversight.
FHFA could make many changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, including changes to the pricing of mortgages they purchase, to their underwriting standards, or to certain product offerings. It could also make changes to pilot programs, start laying the groundwork for a post-conservatorship housing finance system, or take a different implementation approach to certain affordable housing initiatives required by statute, such as Duty to Serve requirements.34 Because the new FHFA director has been critical of certain aspects of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the past, some believe that the new leadership could result in the agency taking steps to reduce Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's role in the mortgage market.35 In March 2019, nearly 30 industry groups sent a letter to Acting Director Otting urging that FHFA proceed cautiously with any administrative changes to ensure that they do not disrupt the mortgage market.36
Also in March 2019, President Trump issued a Memorandum on Federal Housing Finance Reform directing the Treasury and HUD secretaries to develop plans to achieve certain housing finance reform goals, including both legislative and administrative reforms.37 Treasury and HUD released these plans on September 5, 2019.38 Both plans include a variety of legislative recommendations, as well as recommendations for steps that the agencies could take administratively in the absence of legislation. The Senate Banking Committee and the House Financial Services Committee each held a hearing on the plans.39
Certain other issues related to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may be of interest during the 116th Congress. A new accounting standard (current expected credit loss, or CECL) that could require the GSEs to increase their loan loss reserves goes into effect in 2020.40 CECL could result in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac needing to draw on their support agreements with Treasury.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) requires mortgage lenders to document and verify a borrower's ability to repay (ATR). If a mortgage lacks certain risky features and a lender complies with the ATR regulations, the mortgage is considered to be a qualified mortgage (QM), which provides the lender certain protections against lawsuits claiming that the ATR requirements were not met. Mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac currently have an exemption (known as the QM Patch) from the debt-to-income ratio requirement in the ATR rule. This exemption expires in early 2021 (or earlier if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac exit conservatorship before that date).41
For several years, concern in Congress about federal budget deficits has led to increased interest in reducing the amount of discretionary funding provided each year through the annual appropriations process. This interest manifested most prominently in the enactment of the Budget Control Act of 2011(P.L. 112-25), which set enforceable limits for both mandatory and discretionary spending.42 The limits on discretionary spending, which have been amended and adjusted since they were first enacted,43 have implications for HUD's budget, the largest source of funding for direct housing assistance, because it is made up almost entirely of discretionary appropriations.44 In FY2020, the discretionary spending limits were slated to decrease, after having been increased in FY2018 and FY2019 by the Bipartisan Budget Act of FY2018 (BBA; P.L. 115-123), but they were raised again by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-37).45
More than three-quarters of HUD's appropriations are devoted to three rental assistance programs serving more than 4 million families: the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program, Section 8 project-based rental assistance, and the public housing program. Funding for the HCV program and project-based rental assistance has been increasing in recent years, largely because of the increased costs of maintaining assistance for households that are currently served by the programs.46 Public housing has, arguably, been underfunded (based on studies undertaken by HUD of what it should cost to operate and maintain it) for many years.47 Despite the large share of total HUD funding these rental assistance programs command, their combined funding levels only permit them to serve an estimated one in four eligible families, which creates long waiting lists for assistance in most communities.48 A similar dynamic plays out in the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing Service budget. Demand for housing assistance exceeds the supply of subsidies, yet the vast majority of the RHS budget is devoted to maintaining assistance for current residents.49
In a budget environment with limits on discretionary spending, pressure to provide increased funding to maintain current services for existing rental assistance programs competes with pressure from states, localities, and advocates to maintain or increase funding for other popular programs, such as HUD's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, grants for homelessness assistance, and funding for Native American housing.
The Trump Administration's budget request for FY2020 proposed an 18% decrease in funding for HUD's programs and activities as compared to the prior year.50 It proposed to eliminate funding for several programs, including multiple HUD grant programs (CDBG, the HOME Investment Partnerships Program, and the Self-Help and Assisted Homeownership Opportunity Program (SHOP)), and to decrease funding for most other HUD programs. In proposing to eliminate the grant programs, the Administration cited budget constraints and proposed that state and local governments take on more of a role in the housing and community development activities funded by these programs. Additionally, the budget referenced policy changes designed to reduce the cost of federal rental assistance programs, including the Making Affordable Housing Work Act of 2018 (MAHWA) legislative proposal, released by HUD in April 2018.51 If enacted, the proposal would make a number of changes to the way tenant rents are calculated in HUD rental assistance programs, resulting in rent increases for assisted housing recipients, and corresponding decreases in the cost of federal subsidies. Further, it would permit local program administrators or property owners to institute work requirements for recipients. In announcing the proposal, HUD described it as setting the programs on "a more fiscally sustainable path," creating administrative efficiency, and promoting self-sufficiency.52 Low-income housing advocates have been critical of it, particularly the effect increased rent payments may have on families.53 Thus far, it has not been considered in Congress.
Beyond HUD, the Administration's FY2020 budget request for USDA's Rural Housing Service proposed to eliminate funding for most rural housing programs, except for several loan guarantee programs. It would continue to provide funding to renew existing rental assistance, but also proposes a new minimum rent policy for tenants designed to help reduce federal subsidy costs.
For more on HUD appropriations trends in general, see CRS Report R42542, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): Funding Trends Since FY2002. For more on the FY2020 process, see CRS Report R45774, Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations for FY2020: In Brief.
Policymakers have raised concerns that youth aging out of foster care lack adequate and affordable housing as they transition to adulthood. A recent national study of young people experiencing homelessness found that one-quarter to one-third had a history of having been in foster care.54 In light of this, both the Administration and Congress have either made or proposed changes to increase access to housing assistance for foster youth.
Under current law, HUD's Family Unification Program (FUP) offers vouchers plus services to (1) child welfare involved families for whom lack of stable housing is a risk for family separation or a primary barrier to reunification and (2) youth aging out of foster care and at risk of homelessness. FUP vouchers for youth are unique, in that they are limited to up to 36 months, unlike other vouchers that are not subject to a time limit. Although foster youth are one of the target populations for FUP, according to HUD, only 5% of FUP vouchers are used for youth.55
In July 2019, HUD announced a new Administration initiative called Foster Youth to Independence (FYI). Under FYI, HUD will make additional vouchers, through the tenant protection set-aside in the Housing Choice Voucher Program, available to serve youth in a program modeled after FUP.
In Congress, the House passed via voice vote the Fostering Stable Housing Opportunities Act (FSHO; H.R. 4300). The bill would provide explicit statutory authority to use tenant protection vouchers for foster youth consistent with the FUP program, and would allow for those vouchers to be extended beyond the typical 36-month time limit for youth when a youth is engaged in employment, education, or training activities (or is otherwise exempt from compliance), among other provisions. A companion bill has been introduced in the Senate (S. 2803).56
Several pieces of assisted housing legislation that were enacted in prior Congresses are to be implemented during the 116th Congress.
In the FY2016 HUD appropriations law, Congress mandated that HUD expand the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration by 100 public housing authorities (PHAs).57 MTW is a waiver program that allows a limited number of participating PHAs to receive exceptions from HUD for most of the rules and regulations governing the public housing and voucher programs. MTW has been controversial for many years, with PHAs supporting the flexibility it provides (e.g., allowing PHAs to move funding between programs), and low-income housing advocates criticizing some of the policies being adopted by PHAs (e.g., work requirements and time limits). Most recently, GAO issued a report raising concerns about HUD's oversight of MTW, including the lack of monitoring of the effects of policy changes under MTW on tenants.58
HUD was required to phase in the FY2016 expansion and evaluate any new policies adopted by participating PHAs. Following a series of listening sessions and advisory committee meetings, and several solicitations for comment, HUD issued a solicitation of interest for the first two expansion cohorts in December 2018. As of the date of this report, no selections had yet been made for those cohorts.59
The Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) was an Obama Administration initiative initially designed to test the feasibility of addressing the estimated $25.6 billion backlog in unmet capital needs in the public housing program60 by allowing local PHAs to convert their public housing properties to either Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers or Section 8 project-based rental assistance.61 PHAs are limited in their ability to mortgage, and thus raise private capital for, their public housing properties because of a federal deed restriction placed on the properties as a condition of federal assistance. When public housing properties are converted under RAD, that deed restriction is removed.62 As currently authorized, RAD conversions must be cost-neutral, meaning that the Section 8 rents the converted properties may receive must not result in higher subsidies than would have been received under the public housing program. Given this restriction, and without additional subsidy, not all public housing properties can use a conversion to raise private capital, potentially limiting the usefulness of a conversion for some properties.63 While RAD conversions have been popular with PHAs,64 and HUD's initial evaluations of the program have been favorable,65 a recent GAO study has raised questions about HUD's oversight of RAD, and about how much private funding is actually being raised for public housing through the conversions.66
RAD, as first authorized by Congress in the FY2012 HUD appropriations law, was originally limited to 60,000 units of public housing (out of roughly 1 million units).67 However, Congress has since expanded the demonstration. Most recently, in FY2018, Congress raised the cap so that up to 455,000 units of public housing will be permitted to convert to Section 8 under RAD, and it further expanded the program so that Section 202 Housing for the Elderly units can also convert. Not only is HUD currently implementing the FY2018 expansion, but the President's FY2020 budget request to Congress requests that the cap on public housing RAD conversions be eliminated completely.68
The Housing Act of 1949 set as U.S. policy the promotion of "safe" and "decent" housing. In light of this, federally assisted housing is generally subject to minimum physical quality standards as a condition of receiving assistance, and to periodic inspection to ensure that quality is maintained. Those inspection protocols, including the exact standards the property must meet, the frequency of inspection, and the entity that conducts the inspections, can all vary by program. In recent years, news articles highlighting poor conditions at federally assisted properties and concerns raised by tenants and other stakeholders have focused policymakers' attention on the physical condition of the federally assisted housing stock generally, and of HUD-assisted properties in particular. This has led to calls for changes to various elements of the existing protocols. For example, see the following:
On May 10, 2019, HUD released a proposed rule to end eligibility for "mixed status" families in its major rental assistance programs (public housing, Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers, Section 8 project-based rental assistance).72 Mixed status families comprise both citizens (or eligible noncitizens) and ineligible noncitizens. Under current HUD regulations, mixed status families are eligible to receive prorated assistance, meaning that the household can receive federal housing assistance but their benefit must be reduced proportionally to avoid assisting ineligible noncitizens (generally, nonimmigrants such as those in the country illegally as well as those with temporary status, such as tourists and students). Additionally, the proposed rule would establish new requirements that citizens provide documentation of their citizenship status.73 (For more information, see CRS Insight IN11121, HUD's Proposal to End Assistance to Mixed Status Families.)
Low-income housing advocates74 and stakeholder groups representing program administrators75 have publicly opposed the proposed rule change, citing its potential disruptive effect on the roughly 25,000 currently assisted mixed status families, as well as the increases in both subsidy costs (estimated at $200 million per year by HUD) and administrative costs it would cause. Legislative language to block implementation of the rule was included in the House-passed FY2020 HUD appropriations bill (Section 234 of Division E of H.R. 3055); H.R. 2763, as ordered reported by the House Financial Services Committee; and S. 1904, as introduced in the Senate. (The language from H.R. 3055 was not included in the final FY2020 HUD appropriations law, P.L. 116-94.)
In spring 2019, as part of the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions published by OMB, HUD announced that it would release a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in fall 2019 that would make changes to its Equal Access to Housing rule.76 HUD initially published an Equal Access to Housing rule in 2012, stating that housing provided through HUD programs must be made available regardless of a person's sexual orientation, gender identity, or marital status.77 Another Equal Access to Housing rule—specifically targeted to HUD Community Planning and Development (CPD) programs, where funding can be used to fund shelters for people experiencing homelessness—was published in 2016.78 The 2016 Equal Access to Housing rule requires that placement in facilities with shared sleeping and/or bath accommodations occur in conformance with a person's gender identity.
HUD states that the forthcoming NPRM would allow CPD program grant recipients and shelter operators to determine how people experiencing homelessness are admitted to sex-segregated shelters. Among the factors that could be considered are "privacy, safety, practical concerns, religious beliefs, any relevant considerations under civil rights and nondiscrimination authorities, the individual's sex as reflected in official government documents, as well as the gender which a person identifies with."
Legislation to prohibit HUD from implementing a rule based on the proposal published in the Unified Agenda passed the House Financial Services Committee on June 11, 2019. (See the Ensuring Equal Access to Shelter Act of 2019, H.R. 3018.) In addition, the FY2020 House-passed HUD appropriations bill (Section 236 of Division E of H.R. 3055) would have prevented HUD from making changes to either the 2012 or 2016 Equal Access to Housing rules. (The language from H.R. 3055 was not included in the final FY2020 HUD appropriations law, P.L. 116-94.)
For more information about the Equal Access to Housing rules, see CRS Report R44557, The Fair Housing Act: HUD Oversight, Programs, and Activities.
On June 25, 2019, President Trump signed an Executive Order establishing a White House Council on Eliminating Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing.79 The council is to be chaired by the HUD Secretary, but will include members from eight federal agencies. The council is charged with assessing federal, state, and local regulations and the effect they are having on developing new affordable housing; taking action to reduce federal regulatory barriers; and supporting state and local efforts to reduce regulatory barriers.
On November 22, 2019, HUD published a Request for Information in the Federal Register seeking input from the public on "Federal, State, local and Tribal laws, regulations, land use requirements, and administrative practices that artificially raise the costs of affordable housing development and contribute to shortages in housing supply."80
The Fair Housing Act requires HUD to administer its programs in a way that affirmatively furthers fair housing.81 In addition, statutes or regulations governing specific HUD programs require that funding recipients affirmatively further fair housing (AFFH). On July 16, 2015, HUD published a final rule (AFFH rule) that more specifically defined what it means to affirmatively further fair housing, and required that local communities and Public Housing Authorities receiving HUD funding assess the needs of their communities and ways in which they could improve access to housing.
After the AFFH rule began to be implemented, on May 23, 2018, HUD effectively suspended its implementation. Several months later, on August 13, 2018, HUD announced an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking stating that it "has determined that a new approach towards AFFH is required" and requesting public comments on potential changes to the AFFH regulations.82 HUD has not yet released a proposed rule.
For more information about the AFFH rule, see CRS Report R44557, The Fair Housing Act: HUD Oversight, Programs, and Activities.
When major disasters occur, the President may authorize an emergency or major disaster declaration83 under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act; P.L. 93-288, as amended).84 The presidential declaration makes various housing assistance programs, including programs provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), available to disaster survivors. FEMA-provided housing assistance may include short-term, emergency sheltering accommodations85 (e.g., the Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program, which is intended to provide short-term hotel/motel accommodations).86 Interim housing needs may be met through the Individuals and Households Program (IHP).87 IHP housing assistance may include financial assistance (e.g., assistance to rent alternate housing accommodations) and/or direct assistance (e.g., Transportable Temporary Housing Units (TTHUs)88) to eligible individuals and households who, as a result of an emergency or disaster, have uninsured or under-insured necessary expenses and serious needs that cannot be met through other means or forms of assistance.89 IHP assistance is intended to be temporary and is generally limited to a period of 18 months following the date of the declaration, but it may be extended by FEMA.90
Additionally, following a disaster, Congress may appropriate funds through HUD's Community Development Block Grant for disaster recovery (CDBG-DR) to assist communities in long-term rebuilding (see the "Community Development Block Grants-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR)"section for more information).
Most recently, to assist certain areas of California that were impacted by natural disasters in 2017 and 2018, the Further Consolidation Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94) increases California's 2020 Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) allocation by the lesser of the state's combined 2017 and 2018 LIHTC allocations associated with qualified disaster areas, or 50% of the state's combined 2017 and 2018 total LIHTC allocations
The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA, Division D of P.L. 115-254), which was enacted on October 5, 2018, is the most comprehensive reform of FEMA's disaster assistance programs since the passage of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA, Division B of P.L. 113-2) and the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA, P.L. 109-295). The DRRA legislation focuses on improving pre-disaster planning and mitigation, response, and recovery, and increasing FEMA accountability. As such, it amends many sections of the Stafford Act and includes new standalone authorities. In addition, DRRA requires reports to Congress,91 rulemaking, and other actions.
The 116th Congress has expressed interest in the oversight of DRRA's implementation, including sections that amend FEMA's temporary housing assistance programs under Stafford Act Section 408, the Individuals and Households Program. These sections include the following:
DRRA Section 1211—State Administration of Assistance for Direct Temporary Housing and Permanent Housing Construction—amends Stafford Act Section 408(f)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, State Role—to allow state, territorial, or tribal governments to administer Direct Temporary Housing Assistance and Permanent Housing Construction, in addition to Other Needs Assistance (ONA).92 It also provides a mechanism for state and local units of government to be reimbursed for locally implemented housing solutions.93 This provision may allow states to customize disaster housing solutions and expedite disaster recovery. FEMA is developing a State-Administered Direct Housing Grant Guide, which will serve as interim guidance for state, territorial, or tribal governments seeking to administer these programs as part of a two-year pilot program.94
DRRA Section 1212—Assistance to Individuals and Households—amends Stafford Act Section 408(h)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, Maximum Amount of Assistance—to separate the cap on the maximum amount of financial assistance eligible individuals and households may receive for housing assistance and ONA.95 Prior to DRRA, an individual or household could receive financial assistance for housing (including assistance to rent alternate housing accommodations) and ONA—combined—up to the maximum amount of financial assistance. Post-DRRA, financial assistance for housing-related needs may not exceed $35,500 (FY2020; adjusted annually), and separate from that, financial assistance for ONA may not exceed $35,500 (FY2020; adjusted annually). DRRA Section 1212 also removes financial assistance to rent alternate housing accommodations from the cap, and creates an exception for accessibility-related costs.96 This may better enable FEMA's disaster assistance programs to meet the recovery-related needs of individuals, including those with disabilities and others with access and functional needs, and households who experience significant damage to their primary residence and personal property as a result of an emergency or major disaster. However, there is also the potential that this change may disincentivize sufficient insurance coverage because of the new ability for eligible individuals and households to receive separate and increased housing and ONA awards that more comprehensively cover disaster-related real and personal property losses. In March 2019, FEMA began processing retroactive payments to applicants who either reached or exceeded the financial cap for disasters declared on or after August 1, 2017,97 and FEMA stated that, in April 2019, it would begin evaluating applications to assess whether some survivors may be eligible for additional rental assistance, which may enable eligible applicants to receive additional funds.98
DRRA Section 1213—Multifamily Lease and Repair Assistance—amends Stafford Act Section 408(c)(1)(B)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, Direct Assistance—to expand the eligible areas for multifamily lease and repair, and remove the requirement that the value of the improvements or repairs not exceed the value of the lease agreement.99 This may increase housing options for disaster survivors. The Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security must assess the use of FEMA's direct assistance authority to justify this alternative to other temporary housing options, and submit a report to Congress.100
Congress may wish to track the implementation of DRRA to review the effectiveness and impacts of FEMA's DRRA-related regulations and policy guidance, including assessing the effects of DRRA-related changes to federal disaster housing assistance for past and future disasters. For more information on DRRA, including a more detailed analysis of the changes to the Individuals and Households Program and tables of deadlines associated with the implementation actions and requirements of DRRA, see CRS Report R45819, The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA): A Summary of Selected Statutory Provisions.
FEMA has also made a change to the available assistance options that may be provided under Stafford Act Section 403—Essential Assistance—to meet short-term, emergency sheltering needs. In October 2019, FEMA publicly announced that it was ending the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power (STEP) pilot program.101 The STEP pilot program provided an alternative emergency sheltering option that allowed disaster survivors to shelter at home. STEP-funded work allowed FEMA to fund "minimal, temporary protective repairs ... to private homes," the intent being to "quickly make damaged homes habitable in the short term until homeowners could complete more permanent repairs independently through other FEMA programs or using private insurance payments."102
The justification provided by FEMA for ending the STEP program was that it "was not meeting its established objectives" based on FEMA's analysis of the program, which was used following several disasters.103 Specifically, "FEMA found that repairs under the STEP pilot program generally could not be made quickly enough to effectively serve as shelter under section 403 of the Stafford Act."104 For example, in the U.S. Virgin Islands, although the program was authorized in October 2017, initial repairs did not begin until March 2018, and eligible work was not completed until April 2019. So although the program was intended to run for the three to four months following the disaster, the STEP pilot program operated for 18 months.105 An additional challenge identified related to limiting the scope of the program to performing minimal, emergency repairs.106 As an example of how the program's scope shifted, FEMA expanded the STEP pilot program it conducted in the U.S. Virgin Islands to also allow for permanent repair or replacement of damaged roofs.107
Despite the challenges FEMA faced with implementing the STEP pilot program, there may still be a need for a short-term disaster housing program that can serve as an alternative to existing emergency sheltering solutions such as congregate care shelters or the TSA program. In November 2019, GAO published a report noting that "FEMA used the STEP pilot program to supplement other FEMA sheltering programs and provide necessary additional capacity to help address the emergency sheltering needs of disaster-affected communities."108 The report also noted that "conducting a broad evaluation of FEMA's emergency sheltering programs and the agency's options for addressing emergency sheltering needs ... would help FEMA understand its ability to provide sheltering options and to properly plan for the provision of effective emergency sheltering assistance to disaster-affected communities."109 The Department of Homeland Security concurred with GAO's recommendation that the FEMA Administrator evaluate FEMA's options for providing future emergency sheltering assistance.110
Depending on the results of FEMA's evaluation of its emergency sheltering programs, Congress may wish to explore disaster housing solutions that provide the flexibility needed to support disaster survivors when the existing solutions are infeasible or impractical (e.g., there are not enough hotels/motels to shelter people through the TSA program, or there is not space available to deploy TTHUs).111 To accomplish this, Congress may consider requiring FEMA to collaborate with disaster housing partners to identify and outline emergency, short-, interim, and long-term disaster housing solutions. Additionally, this may require an update to the National Disaster Housing Strategy112 to reflect the findings of FEMA's evaluation. An update to the National Disaster Housing Strategy may also present the opportunity to update the roles and responsibilities of housing partners, disaster housing practices, and solutions for meeting the housing needs of disaster survivors across all phases of disaster recovery. Congress may also consider pursuing legislative solutions, including by consolidating, eliminating, or revising existing authorities and programs; or creating new programs that address congressionally identified unmet needs.
HUD's CDBG-DR program provides grants to states and localities to assist their recovery efforts following a presidentially declared disaster. Generally, grantees must use at least half of these funds for activities that principally benefit low- and moderate-income persons or areas. The program is designed to help communities and neighborhoods that otherwise might not recover due to limited resources.113 CDBG-DR is not available for all major disasters because it is generally subject to Congress passing CDBG supplemental appropriations.
In the 116th Congress, CDBG-DR has been provided $2.4 billion to aid disaster-affected communities with long-term recovery, including the restoration of housing, infrastructure, and economic activity.114 This follows the provision of $37 billion for CDBG-DR in the 115th Congress.115
While CDBG-DR has had a significant role in funding recovery efforts from past disasters, and continues to play a major role in the recovery from the 2017 hurricanes, the program is not formally authorized, meaning the rules that govern the funding use and oversight vary with HUD guidance accompanying each allocation. Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in formally authorizing the CDBG-DR program, in part in response to concerns about HUD's oversight of CDBG-DR funding. In July 2019, the House Financial Services Committee ordered to be reported H.R. 3702, the Reforming Disaster Recovery Act of 2019, which would authorize the CDBG-DR program and includes a number of provisions to codify financial controls over program funds. The House passed the bill in November 2019 and it has been received in the Senate.
Native Americans living in tribal areas experience a variety of housing challenges. Housing conditions in tribal areas are generally worse than those for the United States as a whole, and factors such as the legal status of trust lands present additional complications for housing.116 In light of these challenges, and the federal government's long-standing trust relationship with tribes, certain federal housing programs provide funding specifically for housing in tribal areas.
The Tribal HUD-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (Tribal HUD-VASH) program provides rental assistance and supportive services to Native American veterans who are homeless or at risk of homelessness. Tribal HUD-VASH is modeled on the broader HUD-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) program, which provides rental assistance and supportive services for homeless veterans. Tribal HUD-VASH was initially created and funded through the FY2015 HUD appropriations act (P.L. 113-235), and funds to renew rental assistance have been provided in subsequent appropriations acts. However, no separate authorizing legislation for Tribal HUD-VASH currently exists.
In the 116th Congress, a bill to codify the Tribal HUD-VASH program (S. 257) was ordered to be reported favorably by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in February 2019 and passed the full Senate in June 2019. An identical bill (H.R. 2999) has been introduced in the House and referred to the Committee on Financial Services. A substantively identical bill also passed the Senate during the 115th Congress (S. 1333), but the House ultimately did not consider it.
For more information on HUD-VASH and Tribal HUD-VASH, see CRS Report RL34024, Veterans and Homelessness.
The main federal program that provides housing assistance to Native American tribes and Alaska Native villages is the Native American Housing Block Grant (NAHBG), which was authorized by the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA, P.L. 104-330). NAHASDA reorganized the federal system of housing assistance for tribes while recognizing the rights of tribal self-governance and self-determination. The NAHBG provides formula funding to tribes that can be used for a range of affordable housing activities that benefit primarily low-income Native Americans or Alaska Natives living in tribal areas. A separate block grant program authorized by NAHASDA, the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant (NHHBG), provides funding for affordable housing activities that benefit Native Hawaiians eligible to reside on the Hawaiian Home Lands.117 NAHASDA also authorizes a loan guarantee program, the Title VI Loan Guarantee, for tribes to carry out eligible affordable housing activities.
The most recent authorization for most NAHASDA programs expired at the end of FY2013, although NAHASDA programs have generally continued to be funded in annual appropriations laws. (The NHHBG has not been reauthorized since its original authorization expired in FY2005, though it has continued to receive funding in most years.118) NAHASDA reauthorization legislation has been considered in varying degrees in the 113th, 114th, and 115th Congresses but none was ultimately enacted.119 In general, tribes and Congress have been supportive of NAHASDA, though there has been some disagreement over specific provisions or policy proposals that have been included in reauthorization bills. Some of these disagreements involve debates over specific program changes that have been proposed. Others involve debate over broader issues, such as the appropriateness of providing federal funding for programs specifically for Native Hawaiians and whether such funding could be construed to provide benefits based on race.120
In the 116th Congress, a NAHASDA reauthorization bill (H.R. 5319) was introduced in the House in December 2019.
For more information on NAHASDA, see CRS Report R43307, The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA): Background and Funding.
Department of Veterans Affairs Loan Guaranty and Maximum Loan Amounts
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) insures home loans to veterans as part of the VA Loan Guaranty program. To date, the maximum amount a veteran can borrow has been limited by the Freddie Mac conforming loan limit.121101 While veterans can enter into loans that exceed the conforming loan limit, they cannot do so without making a down payment. The fact that VA loans do not ordinarily require a down payment is a popular feature of the program—in FY2018, nearly
80% of loans did not have a down payment.122
102
Congress removed the conforming loan limit for VA loans entered into on or after January 1,
2020, as part of the Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-23). After the change takes effect, most veterans will wil be able to enter into loans of any amount, subject to eligibility, without the need for a down payment. An exception exists for veterans who have
outstanding VA loans; they will still stil be subject to Freddie Mac conforming loan limits.
Housing Assistance
Appropriations for Housing Programs
For several years, concern in Congress about federal budget deficits led to increased interest in reducing the amount of discretionary funding provided each year through the annual appropriations process. This interest manifested most prominently in the enactment of the Budget
Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), which set enforceable limits for both mandatory and discretionary spending.103 The limits on discretionary spending, which have been amended and adjusted since they were first enacted,104 have implications for HUD’s budget, the largest source of funding for direct housing assistance, because it is made up almost entirely of discretionary appropriations.105 In FY2020, the discretionary spending limits were slated to decrease, after having been increased in FY2018 and FY2019 by the Bipartisan Budget Act of FY2018 (BBA;
100 See CFPB, “Qualified Mortgage Definition Under the T ruth in Lending Act (Regulation Z): Extension of Sunset
Date,” 85 Federal Register 41448-41463, July 10, 2020.
101 In 2019, the conforming loan limit for most areas of the country was $484,350. Ho wever, in certain high-cost areas the conforming loan limit may be as high as 115% of the area median home price, but not to exceed 150% of the conforming loan limit. As a result, in some high-cost areas the 2019 limit is as high as $726,525. (For more inf ormation on the conforming loan limit, see CRS Report R44826, The Loan Lim its for Governm ent-Backed Mortgages.)
102 U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, FY2018 Annual Benefits Report, Home Loan Guaranty section, p. 8, https://www.benefits.va.gov/REPORT S/abr/docs/2018-loan-guaranty.pdf. 103 For more information, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions. 104 Ibid. 105 Funding levels for HUD are determined by the T ransportation, HUD, and Related Agencies (T HUD) Appropriations Subcommittee, generally in a bill by the same name. While HUD’s budget is generally smaller than the Department of T ransportation’s, it makes up the largest share of the discretionary funding in the T HUD appropriations bill each year because the majority of DOT ’s budget is made up of mandatory funding.
Congressional Research Service
28
Housing Issues in the 116th Congress
P.L. 115-123), but they were raised again for FY2020 and FY2021 by the Bipartisan Budget Act
of 2019 (P.L. 116-37).106
More than three-quarters of HUD’s appropriations are devoted to three rental assistance programs
serving more than 4 mil ion families: the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program, Section 8 project-based rental assistance, and the public housing program. Funding for the HCV program and project-based rental assistance has been increasing in recent years, largely because of the increased costs of maintaining assistance for households that are currently served by the programs.107 Public housing has, arguably, been underfunded (based on studies undertaken by
HUD of what it should cost to operate and maintain it) for many years.108 Despite the large share of total HUD funding these rental assistance programs command, their combined funding levels only permit them to serve an estimated one in four eligible families, which creates long waiting lists for assistance in most communities.109 A similar dynamic plays out in the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Rural Housing Service budget. Demand for housing assistance exceeds the supply of subsidies, yet the vast majority of the RHS budget is devoted to maintaining assistance for
current residents.110
In a budget environment with limits on discretionary spending, pressure to provide increased
funding to maintain current services for existing rental assistance programs competes with pressure from states, localities, and advocates to maintain or increase funding for other popular programs, such as HUD’s Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, grants for
homelessness assistance, and funding for Native American housing.
FY2021 Budget
The Trump Administration’s budget request for FY2021 proposed a 15% decrease in new appropriations for HUD’s programs and activities as compared to the prior year.111 As in prior budget requests, it proposed to eliminate funding for several programs, including multiple HUD grant programs (CDBG, the HOME Investment Partnerships Program, the Self-Help and Assisted Homeownership Opportunity Program (SHOP), and the public housing Capital Fund), and to decrease funding for most other HUD programs. In proposing to eliminate the grant programs, the
Administration cited budget constraints and proposed that state and local governments take on more of a role in the housing and community development activities funded by these programs.
106 For more information, see CRS Insight IN11148, The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019: Changes to the BCA and Debt Lim it.
107 For the Section 8 HCV program, funding has been increasing in p art because Congress has created more vouchers each year over the past several years (largely to replace units lost to the affordable housing stock in other assisted housing programs or to provide targeted assistance for homeless veterans), and in part bec ause the cost of renewing individual vouchers has been rising as gaps between low-income tenants’ incomes and rents in the market have been growing. For the Section 8 project -based program, the increased funding is due to more long-term rental assistance contracts on older properties expiring and being renewed, requiring new appropriations, as well as rent inflation.
108 For example, see Meryl Finkel et al., “Capital Needs in the Public Housing Program: Revised Final Report,” prepared for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, November 24, 2010, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=PH_Capital_Needs.pdf. 109 See Figure 6 of Joint Center for Housing Studies be subject to Freddie Mac conforming loan limits.
In the past, Congress has regularly extended a number of temporary tax provisions that address a variety of policy issues, including certain provisions related to housing. This set of temporary provisions is commonly referred to as "tax extenders." Two housing-related provisions that have been included in tax extenders packages recently are (1) the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, and (2) the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums, each of which is discussed further below.
The most recently enacted tax extenders legislation was the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123) in the 115th Congress. That law extended the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and the ability to deduct mortgage insurance premiums through the end of 2017 (each had previously expired at the end of 2016). As of the date of this report, these provisions had not been extended beyond 2017.
The most recently enacted tax extenders legislation was included in the Further Consolidation Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94) in the 116th Congress. That law extended the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and the ability to deduct mortgage insurance premiums through the end of 2020 (each had previously expired at the end of 2017).
For more information on tax extenders in general, see CRS Report R45347, Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders").
Historically, when all or part of a taxpayer's mortgage debt has been forgiven, the forgiven amount has been included in the taxpayer's gross income for tax purposes.123 This income is typically referred to as canceled mortgage debt income.
During the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, some efforts to help troubled borrowers avoid foreclosure resulted in canceled mortgage debt.124 The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-142), signed into law in December 2007, temporarily excluded qualified canceled mortgage debt income associated with a primary residence from taxation. The provision was originally effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010, and was subsequently extended several times.
Rationales put forth when the provision was originally enacted included minimizing hardship for distressed households, lessening the risk that nontax homeownership retention efforts would be thwarted by tax policy, and assisting in the recoveries of the housing market and overall economy. Arguments against the exclusion at the time included concerns that it makes debt forgiveness more attractive for homeowners, which could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations, and concerns about fairness given that the ability to realize the benefits depends on a variety of factors.125 More recently, because the economy, housing market, and foreclosure rates have improved significantly since the height of the housing and mortgage market turmoil, the exclusion may no longer be warranted.
For more information on the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, see CRS Report RL34212, Analysis of the Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt Income.
Traditionally, homeowners have been able to deduct the interest paid on their mortgage, as well as property taxes they pay, as long as they itemize their tax deductions.126 Beginning in 2007, homeowners could also deduct qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as a result of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-432).127 Specifically, homeowners could effectively treat qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as mortgage interest, thus making the premiums deductible if homeowners itemized and their adjusted gross incomes were below a specified threshold ($55,000 for single, $110,000 for married filing jointly). Originally, the deduction was to be available only for 2007, but it was subsequently extended several times.
Two possible rationales for allowing the deduction of mortgage insurance premiums are that it assisted in the recovery of the housing market, and that it promotes homeownership. The housing market, however, has largely recovered from the market turmoil of the late 2000s, and it is not clear that the deduction has an effect on the homeownership rate. To the degree that owner-occupied housing is over subsidized, extending the deduction could lead to a greater misallocation of the resources that are directed toward the housing industry.
Author Contact Information
1. |
Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, State of the Nation's Housing 2018, pp. 10-11, http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/state-nations-housing-2018. |
2. |
|
3. |
For example, see HUD's Housing Market Indicators Monthly Update, February 2019, p.3, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Housing-Market-Indicators-Report-February-2019.pdf, showing the National Association of Realtors Housing Affordability Index (HAI) compared to its historical norm. (For more information on the HAI, see the National Association of Realtors website at https://www.nar.realtor/research-and-statistics/housing-statistics/housing-affordability-index/methodology.) See also the Urban Institute's Housing Finance Policy Center's Housing Finance at a Glance: A Monthly Chartbook, February 2019, p. 21, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99840/february_chartbook_2019.pdf. |
4. |
Freddie Mac Insight, If Housing Is So Affordable, Why Doesn't It Feel That Way?, July 19, 2017, http://www.freddiemac.com/research/insight/20170719_affordability.html. |
5. |
For example, see the discussion of affordability challenges for younger households in Freddie Mac Insight, Locked Out? Are Rising Housing Costs Barring Young Adults from Buying Their First Homes?, June 2018, http://www.freddiemac.com/research/pdf/201806-Insight-05.pdf. |
6. |
For example, see HUD's U.S. Housing Market Conditions National Housing Market Summary, 4th Quarter 2018, March 2019, pp. 2-3, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/NationalSummary_4Q18.pdf. |
7. |
For example, see Freddie Mac, The Major Challenge of Inadequate U.S. Housing Supply, Economic & Housing Research Insight, December 2018, http://www.freddiemac.com/fmac-resources/research/pdf/201811-Insight-06.pdf. |
8. |
|
9. |
HUD, U.S. Housing Market Conditions National Housing Market Summary, 4th Quarter 2019, March 2019, pp. 1-3, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/NationalSummary_4Q18.pdf. |
10. |
The Census Bureau defines the seasonally adjusted annual rate as "the seasonally adjusted monthly value multiplied by 12" and notes that it "is neither a forecast nor a projection; rather it is a description of the rate of building permits, housing starts, housing completions, or new home sales in the particular month for which they are calculated." See https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/definitions/index.html#s. |
11. |
The number of housing starts is consistently higher than the number of new home sales. This is primarily because housing starts include homes that are not intended to be put on the for-sale market, such as homes built by the owner of the land or homes built for rental. See the U.S. Census Bureau, "Comparing New Home Sales and New Residential Construction," https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/salesvsstarts.html. |
12. |
For example, see Freddie Mac, "What is Causing the Lean Inventory of Houses?," Outlook Report, July 27, 2017, http://www.freddiemac.com/research/outlook/20170726_lean_inventory_of_houses.html. |
13. |
For example, see Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, State of the Nation's Housing, 2018, pp. 8 and 10, https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2018.pdf; and Jung Hyun Choi, Laurie Goodman, and Bing Bai, "Four ways today's high home prices affect the larger economy," Urban Institute, Urban Wire blog, October 11, 2018, https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/four-ways-todays-high-home-prices-affect-larger-economy. |
14. |
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase eligible mortgages, package them into mortgage-backed securities that they either sell to investors or hold in their own portfolios, and guarantee payments to investors on those mortgage-backed securities. Ginnie Mae, which is part of HUD, guarantees mortgage-backed securities that are made up solely of government-insured mortgages (mostly mortgages insured by FHA or guaranteed by VA). Unlike Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae does not issue the mortgage-backed securities itself, but rather guarantees securities issued by private companies that have been approved to be Ginnie Mae issuers. Private companies can also issue mortgage-backed securities without a Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae guarantee, but there has been little private-label securitization in the years since the housing market turmoil. |
15. |
See Urban Institute, Housing Finance Policy Center, Housing Finance at a Glance: A Monthly Chartbook, April 2019, p. 8, for a graph showing mortgage market composition since 2001. |
16. |
U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, Annual Statistics, http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/prevann.html. |
17. |
U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, Historical Tables, Table 7, "Annual Estimates of the Housing Inventory: 1965 to Present," http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/histtabs.html. |
18. |
For example, see Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, State of the Nation's Housing 2018, pp. 26-28, https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2018.pdf. |
19. |
See HUD, Office of Policy Development and Research, U.S. Housing Market Conditions National Housing Market Summary 4th Quarter 2018, March 2019, pp. 4-5, and underlying data available at https://www.huduser.gov/portal/ushmc/quarterly_commentary.html. Data on median rents reflect median rents for recent movers less the cost of utilities. For more information on data sources used, see HUD Office of Policy Development and Research, HUD's New Rental Affordability Index, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr-edge-trending-110716.html. |
20. |
|
21. |
Ibid. |
22. |
See Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, State of the Nation's Housing 2018, p. 28, https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2018.pdf; and National Low Income Housing Coalition, The Gap: A Shortage of Affordable Homes, March 2019, https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2019.pdf. |
23. |
The advantage of holding MBS instead of the underlying mortgages is the MBS have Fannie Mae's or Freddie Mac's guarantee of timely payment of principal and interest. Banks are required to hold less capital against these MBS than they would be against the underlying mortgages. |
24. |
To conserve cash, FHFA ordered Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to stop paying dividends on all other stock. As of December 31, 2018, Treasury had purchased a total of over $191 billion of senior preferred stock from the two GSEs and received a total of over $292 billion in dividends. See FHFA, Treasury and Federal Reserve Purchase Programs for GSE and Mortgage-Related Securities, https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/Treasury-and-Federal-Reserve-Purchase-Programs-for-GSE-and-Mortgage-Related-Securities.aspx. Since the first quarter of 2012, the only time Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have drawn on their lines of credit with Treasury was in the fourth quarter of 2017; this draw was attributed to changes in the value of deferred tax assets as a result of the tax revision law that was enacted in late 2017 (P.L. 115-97). |
25. |
FHA is a part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and insures certain mortgages made by private lenders against the possibility of borrower default. By insuring these mortgages, FHA helps to make affordable mortgages more available to borrowers who might otherwise not be well-served by the private mortgage market, such as borrowers with low down payments. |
26. |
For example, a 2019 GAO report examines 14 housing finance reform proposals and categorizes them according to certain models. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Housing Finance: Prolonged Conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Prompt Need for Reform, GAO-19-239, January 2019, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-239. |
27. |
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, "Chairman Crapo Releases Outline for Housing Finance Reform," press release, February 1, 2019, https://www.banking.senate.gov/newsroom/majority/chairman-crapo-releases-outline-for-housing-finance-reform. |
28. |
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Chairman's Housing Reform Outline: Part 1, 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 26, 2019; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Chairman's Housing Reform Outline: Part 2, 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 2019. |
29. |
In the 113th Congress, H.R. 2767, the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 2013, was ordered to be reported out of the House Committee on Financial Services, while S. 1217, the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, was reported out of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. For more information on these bills from the 113th Congress, see archived CRS Report R43219, Selected Legislative Proposals to Reform the Housing Finance System. |
30. |
For a discussion of congressional action related to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the 114th Congress, see archived CRS Report R44304, Housing Issues in the 114th Congress. |
31. |
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Financial Services, A Legislative Proposal to Provide for a Sustainable Housing Finance System: The Bipartisan Housing Finance Reform Act of 2018, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., December 21, 2018. See also U.S. Congress, House Committee on Financial Services, "Chairman Hensarling Delivers Opening Statement, Unveils Bipartisan GSE Reform Bill," press release, September 6, 2018, https://republicans-financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=403883. |
32. |
For a discussion of the risk-sharing transactions and common securitization platform, see CRS Report R44506, FHFA's Administrative Reform of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Housing Finance System. |
33. |
For example, see Jim Parrott, "What to expect from Calabria's leadership of the Federal Housing Finance Agency," Urban Institute blog post, December 20, 2018, https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/what-expect-calabrias-leadership-federal-housing-finance-agency. |
34. |
Duty to Serve is a statutory requirement that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac develop plans to expand access to the secondary market for mortgages for low- and moderate-income borrowers in specific underserved markets (rural housing, manufactured housing, and affordable housing preservation). For more information, see FHFA's website at https://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Programs/Pages/Duty-to-Serve.aspx. |
35. |
For example, at the nomination hearing, several Senators asked Mark Calabria about his past statements related to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and possible actions that he could take as FHFA director. See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Nomination Hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 14, 2019. |
36. |
See "Administrative Reforms to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Priorities for Preserving Access and Affordability," at https://narfocus.com/billdatabase/clientfiles/172/3/3325.pdf. |
37. |
|
38. |
Department of the Treasury, Housing Reform Plan Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum Issued March 27, 2019, September 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Treasury-Housing-Finance-Reform-Plan.pdf; and Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Finance Reform Plan Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum Issued March 27, 2019, September 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/HUD-Housing-Finance-Reform-Plan-September-2019.pdf. |
39. |
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Housing Finance Reform: Next Steps, 116th Cong., 1st sess., September 10, 2019; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Financial Services, The End of Affordable Housing? A Review of the Trump Administration's Plans to Change Housing Finance in America, 116th Cong., 1st sess., October 22, 2019. |
40. |
For details about CECL, see CRS Report R45339, Banking: Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL). |
41. |
See CRS Report R43081, The Ability-to-Repay Rule: Possible Effects of the Qualified Mortgage Definition on Credit Availability and Other Selected Issues. |
42. |
For more information, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions. |
43. |
Ibid. |
44. |
Funding levels for HUD are determined by the Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations Subcommittee, generally in a bill by the same name. While HUD 's budget is generally smaller than the Department of Transportation's, it makes up the largest share of the discretionary funding in the THUD appropriations bill each year because the majority of DOT's budget is made up of mandatory funding. |
45. |
For more information, see CRS Insight IN11148, The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019: Changes to the BCA and Debt Limit. |
46. |
For the Section 8 HCV program, funding has been increasing in part because Congress has created more vouchers each year over the past several years (largely to replace units lost to the affordable housing stock in other assisted housing programs or to provide targeted assistance for homeless veterans), and in part because the cost of renewing individual vouchers has been rising as gaps between low-income tenants' incomes and rents in the market have been growing. For the Section 8 project-based program, the increased funding is due to more long-term rental assistance contracts on older properties expiring and being renewed, requiring new appropriations, as well as rent inflation. |
47. |
For example, see Meryl Finkel et al., "Capital Needs in the Public Housing Program: Revised Final Report," prepared for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, November 24, 2010, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=PH_Capital_Needs.pdf. |
48. |
See Figure 6 of Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, America's Rental Housing, 2017, p. 6, http://www.jchs.harvard.edu//research-areas/reports/americas-rental-housing-2017. |
49. |
The bulk of the RHS budget for rental housing is devoted to renewing existing Section 521 rental assistance contracts in Section 515 and Section 514/516 rental housing properties. For more information about USDA's rural housing programs, see CRS Report RL31837, An Overview of USDA Rural Development Programs. |
50. |
For more information, see CRS Report R45660, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): FY2020 Budget Request Fact Sheet. |
51. |
HUD, "Secretary Carson Proposes Rent Reform: Reforms to make current rent policies simpler, more transparent and predictable," press release, April 25, 2018 https://www.hud.gov/press/press_releases_media_advisories/HUD_No_18_033. |
52. |
HUD, "Secretary Carson Proposes Rent Reform: Reforms to make current rent policies simpler, more transparent and predictable," press release, April 25, 2018 https://www.hud.gov/press/press_releases_media_advisories/HUD_No_18_033. |
53. |
For example, see National Low Income Housing Coalition, "Affordable Housing Advocates Tell HUD and Congress – Keep Housing Affordable for Low Income Families," press release, April 25, 2018, http://nlihc.org/press/releases/10642. |
54. |
University of Chicago, Chapin Hall, Voices of Youth Count, Missed Opportunities: Pathways from Foster Care to Youth Homelessness in America, July 2019, https://voicesofyouthcount.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Chapin-Hall_VoYC_Child-Welfare-Brief_2019-1.pdf |
55. |
See HUD Notice PIH 2019-20(HA), Tenant Protection Vouchers for Foster Youth to Independence Initiative, July 26, 2019, https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PIH/documents/PIH-2019-20.pdf |
56. |
The bill was discussed during a Senate Banking Committee hearing on November 7, 2019, entitled "Examining Bipartisan Bills to Promote Affordable Housing Access and Safety." |
57. |
See Section 239, Title II, Division L of P.L. 114-113. |
58. |
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rental Housing: Improvements Needed to Better Monitor the Moving to Work Demonstration, Including Effects on Tenants, GAO-18-150, January 25, 2018, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-150. |
59. |
For more information, see HUD's website for Cohort #1: https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/mtw/expansion/cohort1; and Cohort #2: https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/mtw/expansion/cohort2. The Notice for Cohort #1 is PIH Notice 2018-17, as extended by PIH Notice 2019-03. The Notice for Cohort #2 is PIH 2019-04. |
60. |
The backlog estimate comes from Meryl Finkel, Ken Lam, et al., Capital Needs in the Public Housing Program (Cambridge, MA: November 24, 2011). |
61. |
While most of the focus of RAD has been on public housing conversions, the 2012 law also authorized a separate component of RAD that allows for the conversion of older forms of rental assistance contracts (Rental Assistance Payment and Rent Supplement contracts, which predate the Section 8 program) to Section 8. Absent this conversion, HUD has no authority to renew those old contracts when they expire. |
62. |
New affordability restrictions are placed on the property as a condition of a RAD conversion, but they do not require the same deep affordability as is required under the public housing deed restriction (called a Declaration of Trust). |
63. |
While the raising of private capital is the most common incentive for conversion, not all conversions feature it. For more information, see Econometrica, Inc. Evaluation of HUD's Rental Assistance Demonstration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, interim report, September 2016, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/RAD-InterimRpt.pdf. |
64. |
For example, see Letter from Sunia Zaterman, Executive Director, CLPHA, Saul Ramirez, Executive Director, NAHRO, and Timothy G. Kaiser, Executive Director, PHADA, to House and Senate Appropriations Committee Chairs and Ranking Members, April 16, 2017, http://www.clpha.org/uploads/Public_Housing/5-16-14IndustryGroupLetteronRADCap.pdf. |
65. |
For example, see Econometrica, Inc., Evaluation of HUD's Rental Assistance Demonstration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, interim report, September 2016, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/RAD-InterimRpt.pdf. |
66. |
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rental Assistance Demonstration: HUD Needs to Take Action to Improve Metrics and Ongoing Oversight, GAO-18-123, February 2018, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-123. |
67. |
P.L. 112-55; 125 Stat. 673. |
68. |
See Section 219 of the General Provisions portion of the FY2020 President's budget request for HUD. |
69. |
For a summary, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rental Housing Assistance: HUD Should Strengthen Physical Inspection of Properties and Oversight of Lead Paint Hazards, GAO-20-277T, November 20, 2019, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-277T. |
70. |
For more information about NSPIRE, see https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/reac/nspire/concept. |
71. |
For example, the Carbon Monoxide Alarms Leading Every Resident To Safety Act of 2019 (H.R. 1690), which was passed by the House; the Safe Housing for Families Act (S. 755); the Get the Lead Out of Assisted Housing Act of 2019 (H.R. 3721/S. 2087); and the Lead-Free Future Act of 2019 (H.R. 4416). |
72. |
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Amendments to Further Implement Provisions of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1980," 84 Federal Register 20589, May 10, 2019. |
73. | 84 Federal Register 20589, May 10, 2019.
144 For more information, see CRS |
74. | 145 For example, see |
75. | |
76. |
See Revised Requirements Under Community Planning and Development Housing Programs (FR-6152), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201904&RIN=2506-AC53. |
77. |
|
78. | . 149 U.S. |
79. |
|
80. |
156 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), |
81. |
157 42 U.S.C. |
82. |
|
83. |
For more information about the disaster declaration process, see CRS Report R43784, FEMA's Disaster Declaration Process: A Primer. |
84. |
42 U.S.C. §§5121 et seq. |
85. |
|
86. |
|
87. |
Interim housing assistance may be authorized under Stafford Act Section 408—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households. |
88. |
Examples of Transportable Temporary Housing Units (TTHUs) include Recreational Vehicles (RVs) or Manufactured Housing Units (MHUs), which is defined in 24 C.F.R. §3280.2 as "a structure, transportable in one or more sections ... and which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities." FEMA, IAPPG, p. 113. |
89. |
42 U.S.C. §5174. For more information, see CRS Report R46014, FEMA Individual Assistance Programs: An Overview. |
90. |
44 C.F.R. §206.110(e). |
91. |
|
92. |
Congressional Research Service
42
Housing Issues in the 116th Congress
The 116th Congress has expressed interest in the oversight of DRRA’s implementation, including sections that amend FEMA’s temporary housing assistance programs under Stafford Act Section
408, the Individuals and Households Program. These sections include the following:
DRRA Section 1211—State Administration of Assistance for Direct Temporary
Housing and Permanent Housing Construction—amended Stafford Act Section 408(f)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, State Role—to al ow state, territorial, or tribal governments to administer Direct Temporary Housing Assistance and Permanent Housing Construction, in addition to Other Needs
Assistance (ONA).183 It also provides a mechanism for state and local units of government to be reimbursed for local y implemented housing solutions.184 This provision may al ow states to customize disaster housing solutions and expedite disaster recovery. On July 28, 2020, FEMA announced the publication of the State-Administered Direct Housing Grant Guide, making “[s]tate, local, tribal and territorial governments ... eligible to receive grants in order to provide
disaster housing missions to disaster survivors [for a limited period of time].”185 FEMA wil offer the grant, which al ows states, territories, and Indian tribal governments to administer Direct Temporary Housing Assistance and Permanent Housing Construction, under a pilot program that runs until October 5, 2020, and FEMA wil then work to develop and issue final regulations to implement this authority.186
DRRA Section 1212—Assistance to Individuals and Households—amended
Stafford Act Section 408(h)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, Maximum Amount of Assistance—to separate the cap on the maximum amount
of financial assistance eligible individuals and households may receive for housing assistance and ONA.187 Prior to the enactment of DRRA, there was a cap
183 §1211(a) of DRRA, P.L. 115-254. Other Needs Assistance (ONA) provides a grant of financial assistance for other disaster-related necessary expenses and |
93. |
§1211(b) of DRRA, P.L. 115-254. |
94. | P.L. 115-254. 185 FEMA, “FEMA Bulletin Week of July 27, 2020.” https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSFEMA/bulletins/297b876. T he State-Adm inistered Direct Housing Grant Guide provides guidance to allow states, territories, and Indian tribal governments to receive grant funds under a cooperative agreement.
186 FEMA stated that it is developing a State-Administered Direct Housing Grant Guide that will serve as interim |
95. |
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96. |
§1212 of DRRA, P.L. 115-254. |
97. |
§1202 of DRRA, P.L. 115-254. Amendments to the Stafford Act apply to major disasters and emergencies declared on or after August 1, 2017. See also FEMA, DRRA Annual Report, p. 17. |
98. |
FEMA, "FEMA Bulletin Week of March 18, 2019: FEMA Announces Retroactive Payments to Disaster Survivors," press release, March 19, 2019, https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSFEMA/bulletins/237ddd7. FEMA's website that tracks its implementation of DRRA includes an implementation update for Section 1212, which states that "[r]etroactive payments began in March 2019" and that it "[a]utomatically applied to new disasters as of April 2019" (FEMA, "Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018," last updated June 11, 2019, https://www.fema.gov/disaster-recovery-reform-act-2018). |
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100. | 190 §1213(c) of DRRA, P.L. 115-254 |
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103. |
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104. |
194 FEMA, |
105. |
GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery, p. 32. |
106. |
GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery, p. 31. |
107. |
GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery, p. 28. |
108. |
GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery, p. 33. |
109. |
GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery, p. 36. |
110. |
GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery, p. 44. |
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112. |
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113. | .
205 U.S. |
114. | |
115. |
For the allocation of these funds, see https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/cdbg-dr/cdbg-dr-grantee-contact-information/#all-disasters. |
116. |
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Assessment of American Indian, Alaska Native, and Native Hawaiian Housing Needs, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/native_american_assessment/home.html. |
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118. |
In FY2016, no funding was appropriated for the NHHBG. However, HUD's budget justification for FY2016 (as well as other years) indicated that HUD would have sufficient carryover balances from prior-year appropriations to continue to carry out activities under the program without a new appropriation. |
119. |
In the 113th Congress, a NAHASDA reauthorization bill (H.R. 4329) was passed by the House, while a different bill (S. 1352) was favorably reported out of committee in the Senate. In the 114th Congress, a bill (H.R. 360) was again passed by the House, while a different bill (S. 710) was favorably reported out of committee in the Senate. In the 115th Congress, similar, but not identical, bills were introduced in the House and the Senate (H.R. 3864 and S. 1895, respectively). H.R. 3864 was favorably reported out of committee in the House. |
120. |
For more information on some of the issues that have been debated in the context of NAHASDA reauthorization in the past, see archived CRS Report R44261, The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act (NAHASDA): Issues and Reauthorization Legislation in the 114th Congress. |
121. |
In 2019, the conforming loan limit for most areas of the country was $484,350. However, in certain high-cost areas the conforming loan limit may be as high as 115% of the area median home price, but not to exceed 150% of the conforming loan limit. As a result, in some high-cost areas the 2019 limit is as high as $726,525. (For more information on the conforming loan limit, see CRS Report R44826, The Loan Limits for Government-Backed Mortgages.) |
122. |
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, FY2018 Annual Benefits Report, Home Loan Guaranty section, p. 8, https://www.benefits.va.gov/REPORTS/abr/docs/2018-loan-guaranty.pdf. |
123. |
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124. | Incom e.
209 For example, canceled mortgage debt |
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127. | 212 In general, lenders require |