Contents

• Issues for Congress
• The DOD Proposal for an Africa Command
• Changes to the Unified Command Plan
• Combatant Command "Plus"?
• An Imbalance Between Military and Civilian Capacities?
• Interagency Coordination
• Structure and Footprint
• Headquarters Location
• Manpower
• Cost
• U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa
• Current U.S. National Security Strategy Toward Africa
• Oil and Global Trade
• Maritime Security
• Armed Conflicts
• Violent Extremism
• HIV/AIDS
• U.S. Military Assistance and Security Cooperation in Africa: An Expanding Role
• Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)
• Security Assistance
• African Partnership Station (APS)
• Operation Enduring Freedom: Trans Sahara (OEF-TS)/Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
• International Military Education and Training (IMET)
• The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA)/ Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)
• Regional Perspectives
• Congressional Interest and Oversight Issues

Summary

In recent years, analysts and U.S. policymakers have noted Africa's growing strategic importance to U.S. interests. Among those interests are the increasing importance of Africa's natural resources, particularly energy resources, and mounting concern over violent extremist activities and other potential threats posed by under-governed spaces, such as maritime piracy and illicit trafficking. In addition, there is ongoing concern for Africa's many humanitarian crises, armed conflicts, and more general challenges, such as the devastating effect of HIV/AIDS. In 2006, Congress authorized a feasibility study on the creation of a new command for Africa to consolidate current operations and activities on the continent under one commander. Congress has closely monitored the command since its establishment.

On February 6, 2007, the Bush Administration announced the creation of a new unified combatant command, U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM, to promote U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters. Prior to AFRICOM's establishment, U.S. military involvement on the continent was divided among three commands: U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). The command's area of responsibility (AOR) includes all African countries except Egypt. AFRICOM was officially launched as a sub-unified command under EUCOM on October 1, 2007, and became a stand-alone command on October 1, 2008.

DOD signaled its intention to locate AFRICOM's headquarters on the continent early in the planning process, but such a move is unlikely to take place for several years, if at all. The command will operate from Stuttgart, Germany, for the foreseeable future. DOD has stressed that there are no plans to have a significant troop presence on the continent. The East African country of Djibouti, home to the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) at Camp Lemonnier, provides the U.S. military's only enduring infrastructure in Africa.

As envisioned by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM aims to promote U.S. strategic objectives and protect U.S. interests in the region by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen their defense capabilities so that they are better able to contribute to regional stability and security. AFRICOM also has a mandate to conduct military operations, if so directed by national command authorities. In March 2011, for example, AFRICOM commenced Operation Odyssey Dawn to protect civilians in Libya as part of multinational military operations authorized by the U.N. Security Council under Resolution 1973.

The 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa and more recent attacks have highlighted the threat of terrorism to U.S. interests on the continent. Political instability and civil wars have created vast under-governed spaces, areas in which some experts allege that terrorist groups may train and operate. The upsurge in piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa has been directly attributed to ongoing instability in Somalia. Instability also heightens human suffering and retards economic development, which may in turn threaten U.S. economic interests. Africa's exports of crude oil to the United States are now roughly equal to those of the Middle East, further emphasizing the continent's strategic importance. This report provides a broad overview of U.S. strategic interests in Africa and the role of U.S. military efforts on the continent as they pertain to the creation of AFRICOM. A discussion of AFRICOM's mission, its coordination with other government agencies, and its basing and manpower requirements is included.

Issues for Congress

On February 6, 2007, President George W. Bush formally announced the creation of a new Unified Combatant Command for the African continent, reflecting Africa's increasing strategic importance to the United States.¹ The Department of Defense (DOD) organizes its command structure by dividing its activities among joint military commands based either on a geographic or functional area of responsibility (AOR).² With the creation of the new command, DOD now has six geographic commands and four functional commands. Previously, U.S. military involvement in Africa was divided among three geographic commands: European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM). The command's area of responsibility (AOR) includes all African countries except Egypt, which remains in the AOR of CENTCOM. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was launched with initial operating capability (IOC) as a sub-unified command under EUCOM on October 1, 2007, and reached full operating capability (FOC) as a stand-alone unified command on October 1, 2008. AFRICOM's first commander, Army General William E. "Kip" Ward, former Deputy Commander of EUCOM, retired in 2011, transferring command authority to General Carter F. Ham, formerly Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe, on March 9.

Although the precise wording of AFRICOM's mission statement has evolved since the command was first announced, DOD officials have broadly suggested that the command's mission is to promote U.S. strategic objectives and protect U.S. interests in the region by working with African partners to strengthen their defense capabilities so that they are better able to contribute to regional stability and security.³ A key aspect of this mission is its supporting role to other agencies' and departments' efforts on the continent. But like other combatant commands, AFRICOM is expected to oversee military operations, when directed, to deter aggression and respond to crises.

AFRICOM's first major military operation was Operation Odyssey Dawn, the U.S. contribution to a multilateral military effort to enforce a no-fly zone and protect civilians in Libya, in support of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973.⁴ Initial U.S. military operations, launched on March 19, 2011, included Tomahawk cruise missile attacks targeting Libyan command and control and air defense facilities. General Ham served as theater commander for the operation, with tactical operations coordinated by a Joint Task Force under Admiral Sam Locklear. Locklear serves jointly as Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa, and as Commander of Allied Joint Force Command, Naples, which has operational responsibility for NATO missions in the Mediterranean. The Commander of U.S. Air Forces Africa served as Joint Force Air Component Commander for Operation Odyssey Dawn. AFRICOM also supported the U.S. humanitarian response that commenced on March 4, through the delivery of relief supplies and the evacuation of foreign nationals fleeing the violence. NATO assumed the lead for military operations in Libya on April 1 under Operation Unified Protector. Congress continues to closely monitor developments related to the ongoing conflict in Libya.

The Bush Administration's motivation for the creation of a new unified command for Africa evolved in part out of concerns about DOD's division of responsibility for Africa among three geographic commands, which reportedly posed coordination challenges. Although some military officials had advocated the creation of an Africa Command for over a decade, more recent crises highlighted the challenges created by "seams" between the commands' boundaries. One such seam was located between Sudan (then within CENTCOM's AOR), Chad and the Central African Republic (then within EUCOM's AOR), an area of periodic instability. The United States, acting both alone and a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has provided airlift and training for African peacekeeping troops in the Darfur region of Sudan, and although CENTCOM had responsibility for Sudan, much of the airlift and training was done by EUCOM.

Additionally, close observers say that EUCOM and CENTCOM had become overstretched by the mid 2000s, particularly given the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Commander of EUCOM, whose AOR included 92 countries prior to AFRICOM's creation, testified before Congress that

the increasing strategic significance of Africa will continue to pose the greatest security stability challenge in the EUCOM AOR. The large ungoverned area in Africa, HIV/AIDS epidemic, corruption, weak governance, and poverty that exist throughout the continent are challenges that are key factors in the security stability issues that affect every country in Africa.⁵

His predecessor, General James L. Jones, who later served as President Barack Obama's National Security Advisor, pointed out in 2006 that EUCOM's staff were spending more than half their time on Africa issues, up from almost none three years prior.

AFRICOM has faced myriad challenges in its establishment, and outstanding issues remain as the command moves forward. Some of these issues have been or may be addressed by Congress. Key oversight questions relating to the command may include the following:

• What are the United States' strategic interests in Africa?
• How are U.S. strategic interests influencing the size and scope of the U.S. military footprint on the continent, and what effect might AFRICOM's creation have on future U.S. military operations in Africa?
• Is AFRICOM's mission well defined?
• The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) addresses steps the U.S. military will take in order to improve potential "contingency response." How has AFRICOM prepared to meet potential contingencies on the continent?
• How are AFRICOM and U.S. military efforts in Africa perceived by Africans and by other foreign countries, including China? Have those perceptions evolved since the command was first announced?
• What are the costs associated with AFRICOM? How are these costs affected by AFRICOM's chosen headquarters location?
• How closely do the State Department and DOD coordinate on plans for the command and on U.S. military efforts in Africa in general? What are the Obama Administration's views on the development of AFRICOM's interagency process? Has AFRICOM's enhanced integration of non-DOD USG agency personnel proven effective in supporting the command's mission?
• How is AFRICOM addressing the intelligence community's need to realign its resources directed toward the continent? What are AFRICOM's current intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) needs?
• How is the Obama Administration ensuring that U.S. military efforts in Africa do not overshadow or contradict U.S. diplomatic and development objectives? Should conflict prevention activities be an essential part of DOD's mandate, and are they sustainable?
• What are the authorities granted to U.S. Chiefs of Mission regarding combatant command activities in the countries to which they are posted, and are these authorities sufficient?
• How prominent are counterterrorism operations and programs, particularly relative to the peacekeeping training and support components, in AFRICOM's mandate? Would some DOD-implemented counterterrorism programs be more appropriately implemented by other U.S. agencies?
• How do AFRICOM's civil affairs teams contribute to the command's mission?
• Are the legal authorities guiding DOD's implementation of security cooperation programs sufficient for AFRICOM to fulfill its mandate? Do any of these authorities hinder the U.S. military's ability to conduct these programs?
• Are there procedural challenges that hinder AFRICOM's ability to conduct its capacity building mandate in a timely manner?
• Does the lack of assigned forces affect AFRICOM's ability to implement its mandate?
• How can AFRICOM ensure that improvements in partner capacity are sustained?
• How does DOD ensure that the training and equipment provided to African forces are not used to suppress internal dissent or threaten other nations?

This report provides information on AFRICOM's mission, structure, interagency coordination, and its basing and manpower requirements. It also gives a broad overview of U.S. strategic interests in Africa and the role of U.S. military efforts on the continent.

The DOD Proposal for an Africa Command

Changes to the Unified Command Plan

The mission of geographic commands is defined by a general geographic area of responsibility (AOR), while the mission of functional commands is the worldwide performance of trans-regional responsibilities. There are currently six geographic combatant commands: Africa (AFRICOM), European (EUCOM), Pacific (PACOM), North (NORTHCOM), Southern (SOUTHCOM), and Central (CENTCOM) Commands. There are four functional commands, including Transportation (TRANSCOM), Special Operations (SOCOM), Joint Forces (JFCOM) and Strategic (STRATCOM) Commands. As mentioned above, DOD responsibilities for Africa were divided among three geographic commands prior to October 2008. EUCOM, based in Germany, had 42 African countries in its AOR;⁶ CENTCOM, based in Florida, covered eight countries in East Africa, including those that make up the Horn of Africa; and PACOM, based in Hawaii, was responsible for the islands of Comoros, Madagascar, and Mauritius.⁷

The creation of a new combatant command requires changes by the President to a classified executive document, the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which establishes responsibilities and areas of responsibilities for the commanders of combatant commands. Changes to the UCP are usually initiated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who presents a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. After the Secretary's review, a proposal is presented to the President for approval. Prior to the advent of AFRICOM, the most recent geographic command to be established was NORTHCOM, which was created in 2002, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, to protect the U.S. homeland. The UCP is reviewed at least every two years, as required by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433). The 2006 review recommended the establishment of an Africa Command, and the 2008 review codified the command. Congress has, on occasion, taken legislative action that has led to changes in the UCP.

Combatant Command "Plus"?

Some DOD officials have referred to Africa Command as a combatant command "plus."⁸ This implies that the command has all the roles and responsibilities of a traditional geographic combatant command, including the ability to facilitate or lead military operations, but also includes a broader "soft power" mandate aimed at building a stable security environment and incorporates a larger civilian component from other U.S. government agencies to address those challenges. According to the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones." The Department of Defense, identifying instability in foreign countries as a threat to U.S. interests, issued DOD Directive 3000.05 in 2005, defining stability operations⁹ as a "core U.S. military mission" that "shall be given priority comparable to combat operations."¹⁰ The 2008 National Defense Strategy further argues that "the inability of many states to police themselves effectively or to work with their neighbors to ensure regional security represents a challenge to the international system" and that "if left unchecked, such instability can spread and threaten regions of interest to the United States, our allies, and friends." The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reiterates these points, noting, "preventing conflict, stabilizing crises, and building security sector capacity are essential elements of America's national security approach."

Although U.S. forces have traditionally focused on "fighting and winning wars," defense strategy is now evolving to look at conflict prevention, or "Phase Zero," addressing threats at their inception through increased emphasis on theater security cooperation (TSC) and capacity building of allies.¹¹ The 2010 QDR placed strategic importance on security assistance, an emphasis that was reiterated in the FY2011 DOD budget request:

U.S. security is inextricably tied to the effectiveness of our efforts to help partners and allies build their own security capacity…. Although security assistance is not new, what has fundamentally changed is the role that such assistance can play in providing security in today's environment. Threats to our security in the decades to come are more likely to emanate from state weakness than from state strength. The future strategic landscape will increasingly feature challenges in the ambiguous gray area that is neither fully war nor fully peace. In such an environment, enabling our partners to respond to security challenges may reduce risk to U.S. forces and extend security to areas we cannot reach alone.¹²

Based on the 2010 QDR, DOD has defined three strategic goals that represent the Department's "primary warfighting missions": prevail in today's wars; prevent and deter conflict; and prepare for a wide range of contingencies.¹³

As General Bantz Craddock noted in 2006 when he was Commander of EUCOM, Africa in recent years had posed "the greatest security stability challenge" to EUCOM, and "a separate command for Africa would provide better focus and increased synergy in support of U.S. policy and engagement."¹⁴ In the view of AFRICOM's architects and proponents, if U.S. agencies, both military and civilian, are able to coordinate more efficiently and effectively both among themselves as well as with their African partners and other international actors, they might be more successful at averting more complex emergencies on the continent. The 2008 National Defense Strategy stresses the military's commitment to the concept of a new "Jointness," with emphasis on developing a "whole-of-government" approach toward meeting national security objectives, including greater civilian participation in military operations and greater harmonization of best practices among interagency partners. The 2010 QDR repeats the need to strengthen interagency partnerships. AFRICOM's first commander, General Kip Ward, viewed the U.S. military's role in Africa as part of a "three-pronged" U.S. government approach, with DOD, through AFRICOM, taking the lead on security issues, but playing a supporting role to the Department of State, which conducts diplomacy, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which implements development programs.

AFRICOM have stressed that despite playing a greater role in development activities has been traditional among most other commands, its role remains, in relation to USAID's development and humanitarian objectives, a supporting one. Command guidance for AFRICOM's humanitarian and civic assistance activities stresses that such activities should complement, not duplicate, other U.S. government activities, and should be used to strengthen security sector relationships. AFRICOM policies also require such activities to meet both U.S. foreign policy objectives and AFRICOM theater strategic interests, and they must be approved by the Ambassador and USAID Mission Director in the host country.¹⁵

The mission of Africa Command has been most closely compared to that of Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which is responsible for U.S. military efforts in Central and South America. SOUTHCOM's mission, as defined by DOD, is to ensure the forward defense of the United States through security cooperation, counter-narcotics operations, humanitarian assistance, and monitoring and support for human rights initiatives in the region. Like SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM supervises an array of operations that relate to U.S. strategic interests but are not combat-related, unlike EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM, which have traditionally been more focused on preparing for potential warfighting operations. One DOD official suggested that the U.S. government could consider the command a success "if it keeps American troops out of Africa for the next 50 years."¹⁶

An Imbalance Between Military and Civilian Capacities?

AFRICOM's proactive approach to deterring or averting conflict reflects an evolution in DOD strategy that has been outlined extensively in government documents, but operationalizing that broad mandate may prove difficult.¹⁷ As one foreign policy expert points out, "the mission of AFRICOM will necessarily require a major break with conventional doctrinal mentalities both within the armed services themselves and between government agencies."¹⁸ One former DOD official described the mandate in the following words, "We want to help develop a stable environment in which civil society can be built and that the quality of life for the citizenry can be improved."¹⁹ The prospect that the Department of Defense will focus less on fighting wars and more on preventing them engenders mixed feelings elsewhere in the government. While many at the State Department and USAID welcome the ability of DOD to leverage resources and to organize complex operations, there also is concern among some in those agencies that the military may overestimate its capabilities as well as its diplomatic role, or pursue activities that are not a core part of its mandate. Some argue that the highly unequal allocation of resources between the Departments of Defense, State, and USAID, hinder their ability to act as "equal partners" and could lead to the militarization of development and diplomacy.²⁰

In August 2009, the State Department's Office of Inspector General (OIG) published a report assessing the capacity of the Department's Bureau of African Affairs (AF). In that report, the OIG found that cuts in State Department resources and personnel after the end of the Cold War led to a decline in management and experienced staffing at U.S. missions on the African continent. The subsequent dramatic increase in funding for HIV/AIDS programs and new development initiatives, like the Millennium Challenge Corporation, combined with an increase in funding for military programs in many African countries, left U.S. embassy personnel overwhelmed and acutely understaffed. Among the OIG's many findings, the report determined that the U.S. military "is stepping into a void created by a lack of resources for traditional development and public diplomacy."²¹ The report also suggested that the creation and role of AFRICOM was "misunderstood at best, if not resented and challenged by AF." Inadequate communication between the Bureau and embassies led to confusion about AFRICOM's role and the parameters of U.S. ambassadors' authority in the beginning, although the OIG found that "there is every indication that the new Assistant Secretary and the AFRICOM Commander are working cooperatively."²² Other reports produced recently by non-governmental organizations like Refugees International mirror the OIG's findings, and, like the OIG, provide an array of recommendations for resolving what they view as an imbalance between civilian and military capacity in U.S. foreign affairs.²³ DOD references the current disparity in capacities in the 2010 QDR, noting that:

the lack of adequate civilian capacity has made prevailing in current conflicts significantly more challenging. Unfortunately, despite a growing awareness of the need and real efforts throughout the government to address it, adequate civilian capacity will take time and resources to develop and is unlikely to materialize in the near term.

Interagency Coordination

The Bush Administration suggested that its proposal for AFRICOM represented an evolution in the involvement of other U.S. government agencies in the DOD planning process. Interagency coordination of U.S. security policy involves a variety of offices and actors in Washington, DC, and in the field. In Washington, the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) serves as the primary liaison for the Department with DOD. Its counterpart at DOD is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA). USAID created the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) in 2005 to coordinate agency policy with DOD and the State Department for humanitarian relief and post conflict reconstruction efforts. USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Operations Liaison Unit (OLU), and the geographic bureaus' missions manage the operational coordination with DOD for those activities.

At the regional level, State's PM Bureau appoints senior officials known as Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADs) to serve as advisors to combatant commanders and other military leaders to "provide policy support regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of the commanders' military responsibilities."²⁴ Like the State Department, USAID places OFDA military liaison officers with combatant commands that routinely provide humanitarian and disaster relief coordination; OMA also currently has policy advisors known as Senior Development Advisors (SDAs) in several commands, including AFRICOM.

At the country level, DOD assigns senior defense officials/defense attachés (SDO/DATT) to serve as military liaisons at embassies around the world. These officials serve on interagency embassy Country Teams, which are led by the U.S. ambassador in each country. Many embassies also have an Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), which reports to the ambassador and the combatant commander, to coordinate security assistance activities with the host country's defense forces.²⁵ USAID OFDA deploys military liaison officers as part of a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to affected countries during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations when there is a civil-military component involved.

AFRICOM has sought greater interagency coordination with the State Department, USAID, and other government agencies, including a larger non-DOD civilian staff (initially proposed at as much as one quarter of the total staff), than has been traditional with other combatant commands. Those involved in the creation of AFRICOM aimed to build upon initiatives in NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM to improve the interagency process, but a former EUCOM Commander suggested that this command could be "the pioneer" for a new approach that the other commands might later adopt. In the development of AFRICOM's first theater strategy and supporting campaign plan, for example, the leadership sought to involve other U.S. government agencies at the earliest stages of the planning process, an effort that DOD hopes to employ more broadly as its new planning approach.²⁶ Non-DOD civilian staff positions within AFRICOM include senior leadership positions, senior advisors or liaisons (including the Foreign Policy Advisor, a Senior Development Advisor, an OFDA liaison, and a senior Treasury Department representative), and subject-matter experts embedded with the headquarters staff. AFRICOM officials report that filling interagency positions has been more challenging than first anticipated. Although lawyers from several departments have worked to facilitate the assignment of non-DOD civilians to AFRICOM, only roughly 40 have been permanently assigned.

A senior U.S. diplomat, Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates, served as AFRICOM's first Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA), a new post equivalent to that of a deputy commander. Yates, who had previously served as U.S. ambassador to Burundi and Ghana and more recently as the Foreign Policy Advisor to EUCOM, was the first non-DOD civilian to be integrated into the command structure of a unified command. The DCMA directs many of AFRICOM's civil-military plans and programs, as well as its various security cooperation initiatives, and is responsible for ensuring that policy development and implementation are consistent with U.S. foreign policy. Ambassador Yates left AFRICOM to become the Senior Director for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform at the National Security Council in 2009 (she now serves as Senior Director for Africa); J. Anthony Holmes, a senior U.S. diplomat, replaced Yates as DCMA. In August 2010, Vice Admiral Charles J. Leidig, Jr. assumed the post of the DCMA's military equivalent, Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO). The DCMO is responsible for the implementation and execution of AFRICOM's programs and operations. To maintain the military chain of command, the DCMO position will always be held by a military officer, but AFRICOM's architects envisaged that the DCMA role would continue to be held by a Senior Foreign Service Officer. Both Deputies have supervisory authority for the civilian and military personnel in their respective offices.

Structure and Footprint

DOD officials emphasize that AFRICOM remains under development; some details regarding the command's structure and footprint are still under review. A decision on AFRICOM's final headquarters location has been postponed to 2012 to allow the command to gain greater understanding of its long-term operational requirements.²⁷ Moving the headquarters to Africa, as initially envisioned by DOD, may not occur for several years, if at all. DOD officials initially considered the establishment of sub-regional offices in Africa but reportedly received resistance from the State Department, based on concerns related to chief-of-mission authority. Officials stress that there are no plans to establish new military bases in Africa.²⁸ As a Bush Administration defense official once asserted, the creation of AFRICOM reflected an "organizational change," rather than a change in "basing structure or troop positions on the continent."²⁹

At present, DOD's Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has a semi-permanent troop presence at an enduring Forward Operating Site, Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti with more than 2,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel in residence. The facility provides support for U.S. military operations in the Gulf of Aden area and supports DOD objectives in Yemen.³⁰ The U.S. military is currently in a five-year lease with the Djiboutian government for Lemonnier, with the option to extend the lease through 2020. AFRICOM's other Forward Operating Site is on the United Kingdom's Ascension Island in the south Atlantic. U.S. military facilities in Rota, Spain; Sigonella, Italy; Aruba, Lesser Antilles; Souda Bay, Greece; and Ramstein, Germany, serve as logistic support facilities. The U.S. military also has access to a number of foreign air bases and ports in Africa and has established "bare-bones" facilities maintained by local troops in several locations. The U.S. military used facilities in Kenya in the 1990s to support its intervention in Somalia and continues to use them today to support counter-terrorism activities. DOD refers to these facilities as "lily pads," or Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs), and has access to locations in Algeria, Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.

Headquarters Location

There has been considerable debate over where to ultimately base AFRICOM. Prior to AFRICOM's establishment, EUCOM was the only geographic combatant command with headquarters located outside of the United States. Given that the majority of countries in AFRICOM's AOR were previously under the responsibility of EUCOM, and that consequently a majority of the personnel working on Africa issues were already based in EUCOM's headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, DOD determined that AFRICOM's headquarters would be initially located at the American base in Germany as well.³¹ In November 2008, the Secretary of Defense announced that the decision on whether to move the command would be postponed until 2012.

Prior to Secretary Gates' announcement of the command's establishment, there was speculation that an Africa Command might be permanently located in Europe, or in the United States, like the other commands. Some DOD officials argued that AFRICOM's headquarters should be located in Africa. Locating the headquarters within the AOR would have several benefits in terms of proximity. Flight time from Germany to Nairobi, Kenya, for example, is approximately eight hours, and flight time from Germany to Johannesburg, South Africa, is approximately 11 hours. Flight time from Washington, DC, to the African Union (AU) headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, is approximately 16-20 hours. Deploying AFRICOM's staff in close geographic proximity to their African counterparts and to U.S. diplomatic missions on the continent could enable more efficient interaction.

Those in DOD who initially advocated locating Africa Command on the continent faced some negative reactions from Africans. There were concerns, both domestically and internationally, that moving the command to Africa might be the first step in an alleged U.S. military agenda to establish a larger footprint on the continent. DOD officials stressed early in the headquarters discussion that the location in question would be a staff headquarters rather than a troop headquarters, and suggested that they might consider a dispersed regional headquarters model, with several small locations spread across the continent to lessen the U.S. presence and burden in any one country.³² Some suggested that AFRICOM try to co-locate such dispersed facilities with the headquarters of the continent's regional and sub-regional organizations to link AFRICOM with the AU's nascent regional security architecture. General Ward reportedly found AFRICOM's dispersed presence among its Offices of Security Cooperation (OSCs) across the continent to be sufficient in terms of an on-continent presence. AFRICOM already has military liaison officers (LNOs) at the African Union headquarters in Ethiopia, at ECOWAS headquarters in Nigeria, at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana, and at the International Peace Support Training Center in Kenya. Those posts may expand, and additional liaison offices may be attached to other regional organizations.

The Department of Defense has developed criteria for determining the ultimate location(s) for AFRICOM in coordination with the Department of State, should a decision be made to move from Stuttgart. Several U.S. states have offered to host the command, and DOD has conducted preliminary assessments of some sites. Through regular consultations with African countries that have a security relationship with the United States, U.S. officials reportedly received offers to host the command from several governments, including, most publicly, Liberia, in 2007. Other strategic partners, such as South Africa and Algeria, expressed strong opposition to a command headquarters in Africa, possibly out of concern over a permanent foreign military presence within their borders. In some countries, there are concerns that an American military presence might embolden domestic terrorist groups. Some African governments that consider themselves to be regional hegemons may perceive a permanent American military presence, whether staffed by civilians or troops, to be a rival for political or military power in their sphere of influence.

At the forefront of DOD considerations in determining a host country (or countries), were a decision made to move to Africa, would be providing for the safety and security of over 1,000 American personnel (and their families) who staff the command. Living standards in Africa are among the lowest in the world, and DOD would be expected to choose a politically stable location on the continent with good access to health care and schools and relatively low levels of corruption. Ease of access to regional and international transportation, along with proximity to the African Union, African regional organizations, and U.S. government hubs on the continent would also be considered. Locating U.S. soldiers permanently in a foreign country would be predicated on the host country's approval of a Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA), a legal document negotiated by the State Department to define the legal status of U.S. personnel and property while in that country, and a bilateral non-surrender agreement, commonly known as an Article 98 Agreement, to protect American servicemen from prosecution by the International Criminal Court. While AFRICOM officials have not entirely ruled out a move to the continent, they have stated that such a move is neither necessary nor sought after at this time.³³

Manpower

Manning the new command has been a challenge in a time when defense resources and personnel have been stretched thin by engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the number of personnel needed to staff a combatant command headquarters varies, DOD officials estimate that the average command ranges from 500 to more than 1,000 personnel (exclusive of supporting intelligence architecture).³⁴ AFRICOM was authorized to have just over 1,300 headquarters staff by October 2008, including intelligence and other support requirements.³⁵ Sourcing manpower to facilitate the aggressive timeline to meet full operational capacity proved difficult, according to AFRICOM officials, and less than 75% of these positions were filled by the FOC date. An estimated 270 personnel for the command were transferred from EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM. AFRICOM now has roughly 1,200 staff at its headquarters, and several hundred additional staff providing intelligence support. The armed services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) component headquarters each also have between 100-300 staff that support AFRICOM.³⁶ In essence, the services must pay two manpower bills—they must fill AFRICOM headquarters requirements and also staff the service component headquarters. With the exception of a small Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), the service components currently have no assigned forces for activities in Africa and instead must rely on forces provided through the Global Force Management and Request for Forces system. AFRICOM estimates that the U.S. military footprint on the continent (exclusive of Egypt) averaged approximately 3,500 troops in 2010. This includes an estimated 2,000 troops at CJTF-HOA and the rotational presence of forces participating in various exercises, such as the annual communications interoperability exercise African Endeavor; operations, such as the counterterrorism effort Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans-Sahara; theater security cooperation activities, such as the Navy's Africa Partnership Station; and various conferences and meetings.³⁷

Cost

Start-up costs for Africa Command in FY2007 were approximately $51 million, and the nascent command's budget for FY2008 was estimated at $154.6 million. DOD's FY2009 budget request included $389 million for the command. The command faced some opposition to certain items in its FY2009 budget and lost some requested funding to across-the-board cuts from the operations and maintenance account.³⁸ Appropriators expressed support for AFRICOM in an explanatory statement accompanying the final legislation, but insisted that the State Department and USAID should "play a more important role in this new organization supported with the appropriate manpower and funding required." AFRICOM's budget for FY2010 was estimated at $295 million, slightly higher than the $278 million originally requested.³⁹ Military construction at Camp Lemonnier is budgeted separately.⁴⁰ The funding for CJTF-HOA operations, estimated at $80 million in FY2010, and for base operations at Camp Lemonnier, estimated at $238 million in FY2010, have been classified as Overseas Contingency Operations and have been funded separately from other AFRICOM activities, primarily by the Navy.⁴¹ To date, they have been funded through emergency supplemental appropriations, rather than in DOD's base budget. DOD's budget request for AFRICOM for FY2011, $296.2 million, was similar to that of FY2010.⁴² The FY2012 request is slightly more modest, at just under $290 million.

U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa

Issues on the African continent have not historically been identified as strategic priorities for the U.S. military, and U.S. military engagement in Africa has been sporadic.⁴³ According to one defense analyst, "during the Cold War, United States foreign policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa had little to do with Africa."⁴⁴ After the fall of the Soviet Union, many U.S. policymakers considered the U.S. military's role and responsibilities on the continent to be minimal. In 1995, the Department of Defense outlined its view of Africa in its U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, asserting that "ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa."⁴⁵ In 1998, following terrorist attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa, the United States conducted a retaliatory attack against a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan, that Clinton Administration officials initially contended was producing precursors for chemical weapons for al Qaeda. The embassy bombings, and the retaliatory strike against Sudan, are considered by many analysts to be a turning point in U.S. strategic policy toward the region.

Current U.S. National Security Strategy Toward Africa

The Bush Administration's National Security Strategy of 2002 reflected a need for a more focused strategic approach toward the continent: "In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States—preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror." To address these challenges, the document asserted that U.S. security strategy must focus on building indigenous security and intelligence capabilities through bilateral engagement and "coalitions of the willing." The 2006 National Security Strategy went further, identifying Africa as "a high priority" and "recogniz(ing) that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies."

President Obama has affirmed his view of Africa's strategic importance in numerous policy documents and public statements. In a speech in Ghana in July 2009, he said:

When there is genocide in Darfur or terrorists in Somalia, these are not simply African problems, they are global security challenges, and they demand a global response.... And let me be clear: our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold on the continent, but on confronting these common challenges to advance the security of America, Africa, and the world.⁴⁶

The Obama Administration's first National Security Strategy, issued in 2010, stresses the need to "embrace effective partnerships" on the continent, highlighting a number of priorities, including "access to open markets, conflict prevention, global peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and the protection of vital carbon sinks." The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review asserts that the United States' efforts to address transnational challenges in the region "will hinge on partnering with African states… to conduct capacity building and peacekeeping operations, prevent extremism, and address humanitarian crises." The 2011 National Military Strategy also stresses the importance of partnerships:

The United Nations and African Union play a critical role in humanitarian, peacekeeping and capacity-building efforts, which help preserve stability, facilitate resolutions to political tensions that underlie conflicts, and foster broader development. To support this, the Joint Force will continue to build partner capacity in Africa, focusing on critical states where the threat of terrorism could pose a threat to our homeland and interests. We will continue to counter violent extremism in the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia and the Trans-Sahel. We will work in other areas to help reduce the security threat to innocent civilians. We must identify and encourage states and regional organizations that have demonstrated a leadership role to continue to contribute to Africa's security. We will help facilitate the African Union's and the Regional Economic Communities' development of their military capacity, including the African Stand-by Force, to address the continent's many security challenges.

The establishment of AFRICOM reflects an evolution in policymakers' perceptions of the continent's security challenges and U.S. strategic interests there. In 2004 an advisory panel of Africa experts authorized by Congress to propose new policy initiatives identified five factors that have shaped increased U.S. interest in Africa in the past decade: oil, global trade, armed conflicts, terror, and HIV/AIDS.⁴⁷ They suggested that these factors had led to a "conceptual shift to a strategic view of Africa."⁴⁸ 

Oil and Global Trade

The United States has sought to increase its economic relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, and trade between the United States and Africa has tripled since 1990. In 2000, the Clinton Administration introduced a comprehensive U.S. trade and investment policy for the continent in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA; Title I, P.L. 106-200). AGOA has been amended by Congress on several occasions. Natural resources, particularly energy resources, dominate the products imported from Africa under AGOA. Africa now supplies the United States with roughly the same amount of crude oil as the Middle East.⁴⁹

Nigeria is Africa's largest supplier of oil, and is regularly the fifth-largest global supplier of oil to the United States. Instability in the country's Niger Delta region has reduced output periodically by over 25%. World oil prices have been affected by Nigerian political developments and by periodic attacks on pipelines and other oil facilities in the Delta. Oil prices have likewise been affected by recent instability in Libya. Former President Bush announced in his 2006 State of the Union Address his intention to "to replace more than 75 percent of our oil imports from the Middle East by 2025,"⁵⁰ echoing a commitment made in 2002 "to strengthen [U.S.] energy security and the shared prosperity of the global economy by working with our allies, trading partners, and energy producers to expand the sources and types of global energy supplied, especially in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region."⁵¹ A senior DOD official reportedly commented in 2003 that "a key mission for U.S. forces (in Africa) would be to ensure that Nigeria's oil fields ... are secure."⁵² In spite of conflict in the Niger Delta and other oil producing areas, the potential for deep water drilling in the Gulf of Guinea is high, although not without challenges.⁵³

Maritime Security

Africa's coastlines, particularly along the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden, and the west Indian Ocean, have been highly susceptible to illegal fishing, illegal trafficking, and piracy in recent years.⁵⁴ The inability of African governments to adequately police the region's waters has allowed criminal elements to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons and dump hazardous waste, and has opened maritime commerce and off-shore oil production facilities to the threat of piracy and sabotage.⁵⁵ The growing problem of narcotics trafficking in West Africa, estimated by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to be a transit point for almost one-third of all cocaine annually consumed in Europe, has become an area of increasing concern to policymakers. In 2005, the Bush Administration introduced its National Strategy for Maritime Security, identifying the freedom of the seas and the facilitation and defense of commerce as top national priorities and indicating plans to fund border and coastal security initiatives with African countries.⁵⁶

The United States government, represented by members of AFRICOM (and previously EUCOM), the U.S. Navy, the State Department, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), has engaged its West African partners in a number of ministerial conferences on maritime security, and is currently conducting several activities to increase the capability of African navies to monitor and enforce maritime laws. AFRICOM coordinates with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to implement the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP), a cooperative effort in which African Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET) embark on U.S. and host nation vessels to conduct boardings, search, seizure and arrests in African waters. The U.S. Navy has increased its operations in the Gulf of Guinea to enhance security in the region, although those operations have been sporadic.⁵⁷ Through its Global Fleet Stations (GFS) concept, the Navy has committed itself to more persistent, longer-term engagement (see information on the African Partnership Station in "Security Assistance" below). In the waters off the coast of East Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is working with the Navy and with coalition partners in CENTCOM's Coalition Task Force 151 (CTF-151), which conducts maritime security operations to protect shipping routes in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean.⁵⁸ Coalition and U.S. naval forces have had numerous engagements with pirates in these waters. AFRICOM also implements a number of train and equip programs to build the capacity of African navies to secure their waters.

Armed Conflicts

Political conflict and instability in parts of Africa have caused human suffering on a massive scale and have undermined economic, social, and political development.⁵⁹ Although the number of conflicts in Africa has decreased in recent years, the continent is home to a majority of the United Nations' peacekeeping operations, with six missions currently underway (the African Union implements another peace operation, AMISOM, in Somalia).⁶⁰ Four African countries—Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa—have consistently ranked in the top 10 troop contributing countries to U.N. peacekeeping operations. African militaries also contribute troops to peace operations conducted by the African Union and regional organizations like ECOWAS. Despite a willingness to participate in these operations, many African militaries lack the command and control, training, equipment, and logistics capability to effectively participate in such efforts. Instability in Africa has demanded substantial humanitarian and defense resources from the international community, and the United States and other donor countries have acknowledged the utility and potential cost-effectiveness of assisting African forces to enhance their capabilities to participate in these operations. In 2004, the G8 introduced the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multilateral program to train peacekeeping troops around the world.⁶¹

Violent Extremism

U.S. security policy has been driven largely in recent years by counterterrorism efforts, which the Bush and Obama Administrations have both identified as a top national security priority. Terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, in 1998, on targets in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002, and more recently in Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, and Uganda have highlighted the threat of violent extremism in the region. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has repeatedly expressed concern to Congress over Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the increasing capabilities of Al Shabaab in East Africa.⁶² Al Shabaab is believed to have ties to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), although the extent of that relationship remains subject to speculation.⁶³ In February 2011 hearings on national security threats by the House and Senate, the DNI testified that while the U.S. intelligence community considered most of these groups' members to be focused on regional objectives in the short-term, some of those now training and fighting in Somalia also aspire to attack the United States.⁶⁴ DOD has emphasized the need to work with partner nations to counteract these threats, claiming, "Terrorists' abilities to remotely plan and coordinate attacks is growing, sometimes facilitated by global illicit trafficking routes, extending their operational reach while rendering targeting of their sanctuaries more difficult.... We must continue to support and facilitate whole-of-nation approaches to countering extremism that seek and sustain regional partnerships with responsible states to erode terrorists' support and sources of legitimacy."⁶⁵

In testimony before Congress, AFRICOM officials have linked the threat posed by terror groups to regional conflicts, stating, "violent extremism by transnational terrorist organizations is a major source of regional instability."⁶⁶ Of primary concern to policy makers is the possible challenge posed by "ungoverned spaces," defined as "physical or non-physical area(s) where there is an absence of state capacity or political will to exercise control."⁶⁷ State Department officials have identified failed states as an "acute risk" to U.S. national security.⁶⁸ In addition to failed states providing a potential "safe haven" for terrorists, there is evidence to suggest terrorist groups may profit from the limited capacity of state administrative and security institutions, particularly when in the midst of conflict. During Sierra Leone's civil war in the 1990s, for example, reports suggest that al Qaeda may have used the proceeds from the "conflict diamond" trade as a funding source for its operations.⁶⁹ General Ward has testified that "terrorist activities, kidnapping, illicit trafficking of all types (humans, weapons, drugs), and the existence of under-governed spaces in the Sahel contribute to the region's vulnerability and make it susceptible to extremist influences."⁷⁰

The Obama Administration's strategy for countering terrorism in Africa, as outlined in June 2011, focuses on dismantling Al Qaeda elements in the region and on empowering countries and local administrations "to serve as countervailing forces to the supporters of al-Qa'ida and the purveyors of instability that enable the transnational terrorist threat to persist."⁷¹ Under this overarching strategy, U.S. programs seek to build regional intelligence, military, law enforcement, and judicial capacities; strengthen aviation, port, and border security; stem the flow of terrorist financing; and counter the spread of extremist ideologies.

HIV/AIDS

According to the United Nations, there were over 22 million HIV-positive Africans in 2009, representing 67% of infected persons worldwide.⁷² HIV/AIDS is the leading cause of death on the continent and was identified by former Secretary of State Colin Powell as "the greatest threat of mankind today."⁷³ The rate of infection in some African security forces is believed to be high, raising concerns that those forces may be unable to deploy when needed.⁷⁴ The Bush Administration and Congress placed priority on efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, committing over $48 billion through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR); President Obama has pledged to sustain that commitment. Twelve of PEPFAR's 15 focus countries are in Africa.⁷⁵ As part of these efforts, DOD has established the DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) with African armed forces, which is administered by the Naval Health Research Center in San Diego. DHAPP supports programs in approximately 40 countries.

U.S. Military Assistance and Security Cooperation in Africa: An Expanding Role

The Department of Defense conducts a wide variety of activities in Africa in support of U.S. national interests. Operational activities may include, but are not limited to, humanitarian relief,⁷⁶ peacekeeping, counterterrorism efforts, sanctions enforcement, non-combatant evacuations (NEOs), and maritime interdiction operations (MIOs).

In addition to traditional contingency operations,⁷⁷ the U.S. military implements a number of efforts aimed at increasing African militaries' capacities to provide security and stability for their own countries and the region as a whole. Several of these DOD-implemented initiatives are part of foreign military assistance programs funded by the State Department that "help to promote the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law."⁷⁸ In addition to providing funding, the State Department gives overall guidance and direction for the programs. The United States military also occasionally provides advisors to peacekeeping missions on the continent; U.S. military advisors from CJTF-HOA have assisted peacekeepers deployed to Sudan and Somalia. U.S. forces routinely conduct a variety of bilateral and multilateral joint exercises with African militaries through such programs as Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). U.S. forces also conduct joint exercises as part of disaster assistance and maritime security training.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) was created in 1999 as one of DOD's five regional centers for strategic studies. It conducts a variety of academic activities for African, American, and European military and civilian officials aimed promoting good governance and democratic values, countering ideological support of terrorism, and fostering regional collaboration and cooperation in the African defense and security sectors. ACSS, which is based in Washington, DC, has offices on the continent in Dakar, Senegal and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The United States sells military equipment to African governments through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, implemented by the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).⁷⁹ The U.S. government also provides loans (the United States waives repayment of these loans for African countries) to foreign governments to finance the purchase of such equipment through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Equipment is also provided to select African countries through the African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBSP) and the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, and through special DOD authorities.

U.S. counterterrorism strategy on the continent is addressed through a number of these initiatives, but U.S. counterterrorism efforts may also include, at one end of the spectrum, programs to address the root causes of terrorism, and, at the other end, military operations to destroy terrorist targets through military strikes. The United States is placing increasing emphasis on Information Operations (IO) in Africa, which use information to improve the security environment and counter extremist ideology through military information support teams deployed to U.S. embassies. IO activities in Africa have included website initiatives such as Maghrebia.com and AFRICOM's Operation Objective Voice (OOV), an interagency effort to counter extremist messaging.⁸⁰ Some question whether activities such as these should be a part of DOD's mandate, or whether they might be more appropriately managed by other U.S. agencies.

DOD officials argue that AFRICOM not only allows the U.S. military to better coordinate these operations and programs, but that it also allows DOD to better coordinate with other U.S. agencies, like the State Department, USAID, the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and others, as well as with other governments, like those of Britain and France, which are also providing training and assistance for African security forces. DOD suggests that Africa Command builds on the experiences of the U.S. military's only forward presence in the region, the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa.

Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)

In October 2002, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) developed a joint task force to focus on "detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region," and to provide a forward presence in the region.⁸¹ Under AFRICOM, the task force's mission has evolved to more broadly reflect a strategy of "cooperative conflict prevention." Between 2,000 and 2,500 short-term rotational U.S. military and civilian personnel make up CJTF-HOA, which covers the land and airspace in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan, as well as the coastal waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean. CJTF-HOA has named Burundi, Chad, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen as "areas of interest."

CJTF personnel, approximately half of whom are reservists, train the region's security forces in counterterrorism and other areas of military professionalization, serve as advisors to peace operations, and oversee and support humanitarian assistance efforts. Although U.S. Central Command maintains primary responsibility for naval operations against pirates in the waters off the Horn of Africa, CJTF-HOA personnel provide security assistance to several regional maritime security forces, few of which have "blue water capacity." The Task Force has provided military assistance and training to Burundian and Ugandan military forces deployed in support of the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). As part of this effort, CJTF-HOA worked with non-governmental organizations to provide medical supplies to the AMISOM forces for assistance to the people of Mogadishu. CJTF-HOA has supported several humanitarian missions, including the airlift of humanitarian assistance supplies. CJTF-HOA also conducts civilian-military operations throughout East Africa as part of an effort to "win hearts and minds"⁸² and enhance the long-term stability of the region. These civil-military operations include digging wells and building and repairing schools, hospitals, and roads, and were initially part of a broader CENTCOM mission to "counter the re-emergence of transnational terrorism."⁸³ Some observers question whether these activities might be more appropriately coordinated by a civilian agency or non-governmental organization than by the U.S. military. AFRICOM officials have suggested that the scope of these activities is being reexamined. The future role and structure of the task force itself are also under review.

Security Assistance

Building the defense capacities of partner nations is a key goal of U.S. military strategy in Africa and is consequently a key mandate for AFRICOM. At present, military experts believe that no African nation poses a direct threat to the United States or is expected to; consequently Africa Command is expected to focus less on preparing U.S. forces for major combat in the AOR. Instead, the command concentrates much of its energies and resources on training and assistance to professionalize local militaries so that they can better ensure stability and security on the continent. As one DOD official asserted during AFRICOM's establishment, "its principal mission will be in the area of security cooperation and building partnership capability. It will not be in warfighting."⁸⁴ AFRICOM officials have stressed the need for persistent engagement, in line with the 2011 National Military Strategy, which states that "military-to-military relationships must be reliable to be effective, and persevere through political upheavals or even disruption." Officials stress that U.S. training programs aim to encourage respect for human rights and for civilian authority, key shortcomings for some African security forces.

The U.S. government provides security assistance to African militaries through both bilateral and multilateral initiatives. During the 1990s, the United States provided military training through several programs, including the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program, the African Regional Peacekeeping Program (ARP), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). Some of this training has been provided by U.S. Special Forces. Training has also been provided by contractors. Under the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), U.S. states' and territories' National Guard units have paired with several African countries to conduct a variety of security cooperation activities.⁸⁵ The U.S. military has worked with the continent's regional security organizations, including the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). U.S. military efforts also aim to support the development of the African Union's African Standby Force (ASF), a multinational peacekeeping force composed of regional brigades organized by the continent's Regional Economic Communities.⁸⁶ The AU aims for the force to have a standby capacity of 15,000 to 20,000 peacekeepers. The ASF and its regional brigades are not intended to be standing forces, but will instead draw from pre-identified forces of member states. AFRICOM continues to conduct annual training exercises begun under EUCOM, such as African Endeavor, a communications and interoperability exercise with more than 30 African nations conducted annually. U.S. military assistance also includes efforts to improve information sharing networks between African countries through programs such as the Multinational Information Sharing Initiative, which donor and aid organizations can in turn use to warn of and be warned of possible crises. AFRICOM also supports U.S. security sector reform initiatives in post-conflict countries like the DRC, Liberia, and Sudan. Several of the other major current bilateral and multilateral security assistance programs implemented by DOD in Africa are listed below (the list is not inclusive).⁸⁷ These programs fall under the mission of Africa Command.

African Partnership Station (APS)

In October 2007, U.S. Naval Forces Europe launched a new initiative, the African Partnership Station (APS). Under the initiative, a navy ship, the USS Fort McHenry, was deployed to the Gulf of Guinea from fall 2007 to spring 2008 to serve as a continuing sea base of operations and a "floating schoolhouse" from which to provide assistance and training to the Gulf nations. Training focused on maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, port facilities management and security, seamanship/navigation, search and rescue, leadership, logistics, civil engineering, humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Other Navy and Coast Guard vessels have subsequently deployed to the region under the APS banner, and APS began conducting similar activities in East Africa in 2009. European partners, NGOs, and U.S. government agencies, including the Coast Guard and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), have partnered with the Navy to use the station, which is considered by the Navy to be a "delivery vehicle for interagency, international, and NGO assistance" to West, Central, and East Africa, for their own training and development initiatives.⁸⁸ Humanitarian outreach activities have included Project Handclasp and Project Hope. The APS vessels have had a minimal footprint onshore and have conducted repeat visits to ports along the African coast. The cost for APS in FY2010 was initially estimated at $10.5 million for deployments in West and Central Africa and $9.96 million for East Africa.⁸⁹

Operation Enduring Freedom: Trans Sahara (OEF-TS)/Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)

In 2002, the Department of State launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) program to increase border security and counterterrorism capacities of four West African nations: Mali, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania. In 2005, the Bush Administration announced a "follow-on" interagency program to PSI. According to the State Department, the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (formerly Initiative) aims combat violent extremism and defeat terrorist organizations operating in the Maghreb and Sahel by strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities and coordination and by discrediting terrorist ideology. Under the American military component, Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara, for which AFRICOM took responsibility in late 2008, U.S. forces work with their African counterparts from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia to improve intelligence, command and control, logistics, and border control, and to execute joint operations against terrorist groups. U.S. and African forces have conducted joint exercises, such as Exercise Flintlock, to improve security partnerships initiated under PSI and TSCTP.

These military efforts are designed to support complementary development activities led by the State Department and USAID. To counter the recruitment efforts of terrorist groups, for example, USAID supports job creation initiatives for disadvantaged youth. Young people are a key demographic in Africa, where high unemployment rates and scarce education opportunities compound the challenges posed by a growing "youth bulge." Such programs are coordinated with the efforts of U.S. military personnel working in the region. The United States has allocated over $500 million for TSCTP since FY2005. The State Department's Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), formerly known as the East Africa Regional Security Initiative (EARSI), has been designed to build upon the best practices of TSCTP.

International Military Education and Training (IMET)

In 1949 the U.S. government began providing training to foreign militaries under the Military Assistance Training Program (MAP) and through Foreign Military Sales (FMS), which allows countries to pay for their own training. MAP was succeeded in 1976 by IMET, which provides training at U.S. military schools and other training assistance for foreign military personnel on a grant basis through funding from the Department of State. A subset of IMET training, Expanded IMET (E-IMET), provides courses on defense management, civil-military relations, law enforcement cooperation, and military justice for military as well as civilian personnel. The State Department also provides training through its Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Sub-Saharan African countries received approximately $13.8 million in IMET assistance and $6.8 million in FMF in FY2008, $15.3 million in IMET and $8.3 million in FMF in FY2009, and $15.1 million in IMET and $18 million in FMF in FY2010. The FY2012 request includes $15.5 million in IMET and $18.8 million in FMF for Sub-Saharan Africa.

The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA)/ Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)

In 1996, the Clinton Administration proposed the creation of an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), an African standby force that would be trained and equipped by the United States and other donor nations. The initiative was not well received on the continent, and was later reintroduced as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a bilateral training program designed to improve the capabilities of individual African countries' militaries to participate in multilateral peacekeeping operations. ACOTA, which replaced ACRI in 2002, aims to upgrade the peace-enforcement capabilities of African militaries. ACOTA provides Peace Support Operations training, including light infantry and small unit tactics, and focuses on training African troops who can in turn train other African units. In 2004, ACOTA became a part of GPOI.⁹⁰ GPOI attempts to address some of the factors limiting African militaries' ability to contribute to peace operations by conducting a variety of programs, events, and activities oriented on peacekeeping capacity building. Among these programs is an effort to foster an international transport and logistics support system for African and other region's forces. The United States coordinates its peacekeeping training and assistance programs with other G8 countries through a G8 Africa Clearinghouse. While the State Department is the executive agent of GPOI and ACOTA, DOD provides small military teams for special mentoring assistance to ACOTA training events. According to the State Department, over 154,500 peacekeepers from over 20 African countries have received training under ACOTA and its predecessor, ACRI.⁹¹

Regional Perspectives

U.S. reaction to the creation of a new command for Africa has been largely positive, although concerns have been raised.⁹² In Africa, on the other hand, perceptions of the command are more mixed. There has been considerable apprehension over U.S. motivations for creating AFRICOM, and some Africans worry that the move represents a neocolonial effort to dominate the region militarily. U.S. military efforts on the continent have been seen as episodic, leading some to question the motivation for a more sustained focus from DOD now. Reports of U.S. air strikes in Somalia in recent years and U.S. support for Ethiopia's military intervention there have added to those concerns. Many view U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Africa with skepticism, and there appears to be a widespread belief that the command's primary goals are to hunt terrorists and to secure U.S. access to African oil.⁹³ U.S. foreign policy analysts have focused increased attention on China's role in Africa in recent years, and such attention has led some to question whether AFRICOM might be part of a new contest for influence on the continent.⁹⁴

AFRICOM has been received with cautious optimism among several African governments and militaries.⁹⁵ They view increased American attention to the continent's problems as a positive development, potentially bringing increased resources, training, and assistance. U.S. foreign military assistance has increased in recent years, and military training programs in Africa have steadily been on the rise.

In the first years of the command, DOD and State Department officials consulted regularly with African nations on AFRICOM, seeking to solicit African views and explain the rationale behind the command's creation and its programs. In April 2007, senior officials visited Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Senegal. Following their visit, one DOD official noted that despite some initial "misconceptions," they had not encountered "any specific resistance to the idea."⁹⁶ In June 2007, they visited Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, and Djibouti, and held discussions with African Union officials. The delegation also held meetings with 40 foreign defense attachés serving in Paris. African officials reportedly gave "positive feedback about the design and mission of AFRICOM" and advised the delegation that DOD should consider how AFRICOM could complement the AU's regional security structure.⁹⁷ In September 2007, DOD hosted representatives from the African Union, African regional security organizations, and over 35 African governments to further explain its plans for the command and to solicit input from attendees; a similar event was held in April 2008. Analysts suggest U.S. officials should continue to closely consult with these governments to ensure that AFRICOM reflects a mutual exchange of interests and is seen to foster a closer alliance rather than serving as an avenue for the U.S. to dictate policy to African governments.

In October 2007, members of the Pan-African Parliament, the legislative body of the African Union, voted in favor of a motion to "prevail upon all African Governments through the African Union (AU) not to accede to the United States of America's Government's request to host AFRICOM anywhere in the African continent."⁹⁸ West African military chiefs, following a conference the following month in Liberia, issued a cautious response to U.S. government plans, saying that AFRICOM "had not been fully understood" by African countries and requesting "further sensitization by the United States authorities at the highest political level." ECOWAS's Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security did suggest that "everybody welcomes and supports the idea, but we want that direction to come from the heads of state."⁹⁹

Several African heads of state publicly expressed preliminary views on the command. Some advised DOD to consider how AFRICOM could complement the AU's regional security structure. Former Nigerian President Umaru Yar'Adua, during his December 2007 visit to Washington, DC, commented, "We shall partner with AFRICOM to assist not only Nigeria, but also the African continent to actualize its peace and security initiative, which is an initiative to help standby forces of brigade-size in each of the regional economic groupings within the African continent."¹⁰⁰ Yar'Adua's statements were criticized by several Nigerian opposition parties and civil society organizations. In response, Nigeria's Minister of Foreign Affairs remarked, "Nigeria's position on AFRICOM remains that African governments have the sovereign responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security on the continent.... President Yar'Adua's statement on the proposed AFRICOM is consistent with Nigeria's well-known position on the necessity for Africa to avail itself of opportunities for enhanced capacity for the promotion of peace and security in Africa."¹⁰¹ During President Bush's second official visit to Africa in February 2008, Ghana's President John Kufour announced, "I am happy, one, for the President dispelling any notion that the United States of America is intending to build military bases on the continent of Africa. I believe the explanation the President has given should put fade to the speculation, so that the relationship between us and the United States will grow stronger and with mutual respect."¹⁰² Liberia's President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has been vocal in her support from AFRICOM, and has offered to host its headquarters. As AFRICOM has assumed ongoing security engagement operations from EUCOM and CENTCOM and initiated new programs, its officials have stressed the need to continue strategic communications efforts to increase understanding of the command among African governments and their people.

Congressional Interest and Oversight Issues

Congress has followed the evolution of U.S. military engagement on the African continent with interest and continues to engage the Executive Branch on issues related to AFRICOM's development. Several Members of Congress expressed interest in the creation of a combatant command for Africa prior to the Bush Administration decision to establish AFRICOM. In 2006, Senator Russ Feingold introduced S.Amdt. 4527 to S. 2766, the Senate version of the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act (hereafter these authorization bills are referred to as NDAAs) requiring a feasibility study on establishing a new command for Africa. In December 2007, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.Res. 897, recognizing the strategic importance of the African continent and welcoming AFRICOM's establishment. Senator James Inhofe introduced similar legislation, S.Res. 480, in March 2008. These resolutions also urged the Departments of Defense and State, as well as USAID, to consult with African partners to address concerns regarding the command's mandate. Multiple committees held hearings on the command during its first year. General Carter Ham delivered AFRICOM's most recent posture statement to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in April 2011.

Congress has addressed issues associated with the command's development in report language accompanying several authorization and appropriations bills. In the command's first year, the Senate Armed Services Committee expressed its support for AFRICOM in S.Rept. 110-77 (accompanying S. 1547, the Senate version of the FY2008 NDAA), but raised questions regarding authorities needed to stand up and staff the command; authorities and funding mechanisms for interagency staff; location; planned staffing levels; and anticipated costs. The committee repeated its support in S.Rept. 110-335 ( accompanying the FY2009 NDAA; P.L. 110-417), but expressed concern that other U.S. government agencies may not have the resources to support the command's "whole of government" approach.

Congress has focused some of its attention on AFRICOM on the command's headquarters location. In 2008, the House Appropriations Committee raised concern with unanswered questions related to the headquarters location in H.Rept. 110-775 (accompanying H.R. 6599, the House version of the FY2009 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act). The House Armed Services Committee, in H.Rept. 112-78 (accompanying H.R. 1540, the FY2012 NDAA), has directed the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on the conclusions of an alternative basing review for AFRICOM by April 2012, noting the committee's view that AFRICOM's location should "provide the maximum military value to the realigned command and at the minimum cost required to implement the relocation." In July 2011, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison introduced S.Amdt. 562 to H.R. 2055, the FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations bill, which would restrict the use of funds for a permanent AFRICOM headquarters outside the United States until the Secretary of Defense provides the congressional defense committees with an analysis of the military construction costs associated with establishing a permanent location overseas versus in the United States. DOD has used military construction funds in previous years to update the headquarters facilities currently used by AFRICOM in Stuttgart and is not currently requesting funds for further headquarters construction.

Several committee reports have raised questions associated with military construction in Djibouti associated with AFRICOM's Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa. In S.Rept. 111-35 (accompanying S. 1390, the Senate version of the FY2010 NDAA), the Senate Armed Services Committee expressed support for the persistent regional engagement activities conducted by CJTF-HOA, but requested clarification from DOD on the future role of the Task Force on the continent. In the final version of the FY2011 NDAA (H.R. 6523, P.L. 111-383), the House Armed Services Committee required DOD to submit a report evaluating CJTF-HOA's activities to counter violent extremism on the continent and the extent to which the Task Force's activities are aligned with AFRICOM's mission. Most recently, in S.Rept. 112-29 (accompanying the Senate version of the FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations bill), the Senate Appropriations Committee reiterated support for maintaining a military presence in the Horn of Africa at Camp Lemonnier, given the region's strategic importance in the war against terrorism, but repeated concerns about "the long range mission of AFRICOM at Camp Lemonnier and the planned development and security of the installation," as well as about the long-term funding options for CJTF-HOA.

AFRICOM's mandate has also been considered by Congress within the broader context of DOD's role in U.S. foreign affairs. In 2008, AFRICOM was the focus of a series of hearings by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform's Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. The command has also been discussed in hearings on foreign assistance and national security reform, on interagency cooperation, and on the concept of "smart power." The House Armed Services Committee, which commissioned a Panel on Roles and Missions (of not only the various military branches, but also of the various civilian agencies involved in protecting U.S. security), found that shortcomings in the interagency process have led the military to take on missions that are not part of its core responsibilities. The FY2008 NDAA required the military to examine its core competencies, a review which may ultimately have implications for AFRICOM, as may a requirement in H.Rept. 111-288 accompanying the FY2010 NDAA for DOD to evaluate the relationship between DOD's authorities to conduct security cooperation and the Department of State's authorities for security assistance. Some observers have cautioned that AFRICOM could develop independent institutional imperatives that demand resources regardless of need, rather than reflecting genuine strategic interests.

Given that a large part of AFRICOM's mandate is to build the indigenous capacity of African defense forces, the ease with which the command can conduct security cooperation programs will be key to its success. DOD officials suggest that inefficiencies exist in the authorities through which funding is provided for the U.S. military's security cooperation activities.¹⁰³ Some military officials have argued that the applicable laws need simplification to allow the combatant commands greater flexibility to respond to emerging threats and opportunities. Others have raised concerns, though, that modifying the administrative authorities could interfere with the Department of State's diplomatic decisions or bilateral relationships. The National Security Council is currently conducting a Security Sector Assistance Review that may address some of these issues. The U.S. military has faced other policy restrictions in its operations with some African governments and militaries.

The establishment of a new unified command requires both financial and human resources, and although some have been redirected from other commands, military resources have been stretched by major theater operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, making troop readiness and costs associated with AFRICOM's development a key issue for Congress.¹⁰⁴ A June 2011 DOD report on the organizational structure of combatant commands noted that AFRICOM's headquarters staffing is not currently sufficient for full-time operational capacity during an extended crisis. The report states that during Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya, AFRICOM headquarters was augmented by 90 personnel, and additional personnel would have been required to maintain continuous operations if Odyssey Dawn had continued longer than it did.¹⁰⁵ The June 2011 report also notes that the command is open to increasing State Department and USAID staffing at AFRICOM above current levels "if, and when, these departments are able to provide additional manpower resources." Additional staffing of interagency personnel at AFRICOM may require additional resources from Congress. The Secretary of Defense has advocated on behalf of the civilian agencies, emphasizing that the State Department is critically understaffed.¹⁰⁶

The development of AFRICOM's interagency staffing has been of interest to Congress. In the House Report to accompany H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act of FY2008, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence expressed concern with interagency coordination on Africa, calling it "flawed" and suggesting that the intelligence community needed to realign its resources to "better understand the threats emanating from this region." DOD officials point out that there are no legally binding requirements for agencies to coordinate their activities, which could make AFRICOM's "pioneering" interagency process more challenging, should other agencies not have the resources to participate adequately.¹⁰⁷ Because AFRICOM's role is to support U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa, close coordination with the State Department will be critical to its success.

As U.S. military activity on the continent has expanded in recent years, some observers have expressed concern with the idea that U.S. military efforts on the continent could overshadow U.S. diplomatic objectives. A 2006 Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Report found that:

As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs ... U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State's primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense's focus on war fighting.¹⁰⁸

Former Senate Africa Subcommittee Chairman Russ Feingold, who was supportive of AFRICOM's creation, once cautioned that the command must "contribute to, not define, the U.S. Government's overall strategy and objectives for the continent."¹⁰⁹ Likewise, Senator Richard Lugar has suggested that AFRICOM could help the U.S. military develop a "more sophisticated understanding of a region that is ever-changing and highly complex," but has also noted that, "with greater expertise created within a new regional command, the hope is that there would be few disagreements between the two Departments on the appropriateness of security assistance to specific African nations. But undoubtedly, some differences of opinion will occur."¹¹⁰ As AFRICOM continues to develop, Congress may exert its oversight authority to monitor the command's operations to ensure that they support, rather than guide, U.S. political, economic, and social objectives for the continent.

Figure 1. Area of Responsibility for Africa Command

Source: Department of Defense, adapted by CRS.

Appendix .

Appendix A. History of U.S. Military Involvement in Africa

The United States maintained Wheelus Air Base in Libya from the 1940s until 1971 with some 4,000 American personnel.¹¹¹ Wheelus served primarily as a bomber base for missions to Europe and as an Air Force training location, although U.S. forces from the base did provide emergency humanitarian assistance to earthquake and flood victims in Libya and Tunisia in the 1960s.

Africa was not included in the U.S. military command structure until 1952, when several North African countries, including Libya, were added to the responsibilities of U.S. European Command because of their historic relationship with Europe. The rest of the continent remained outside the responsibility of any command until 1960, when Cold War concerns over Soviet influence in newly independent African countries led DOD to include Sub-Saharan Africa in the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), leaving North Africa in EUCOM. The Unified Command Plan was revised again in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy, and responsibility for Sub-Saharan Africa was transferred to a newly-created Strike Command (STRICOM), which was responsible for operations in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia and located at McDill Air Force Base in Tampa, FL. STRICOM was redesignated as Readiness Command (REDCOM) in 1971, and its responsibility for Africa was dissolved, leaving Sub-Saharan Africa out of the combatant command structure until 1983. Under the Reagan Administration, U.S. military involvement in Africa was largely dominated by Cold War priorities, and the Administration's "containment" policy led DOD to divide responsibility for Africa into its current configuration.

In the 1980s, the U.S. military was involved in repeated skirmishes with Libyan jets in territorial disputes over the Gulf of Sidra, and those engagements later escalated as Libya was implicated for supporting international terrorism. On April 15, 1986, the United States initiated air strikes against multiple military targets in Libya under the code name Operation El Dorado Canyon to "inflict damage to Qadhafi's capability to direct and control the export of international terrorism;" several civilian targets including the French Embassy in Tripoli were also inadvertently hit.¹¹²

After the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Africa was driven by President George H. W. Bush's vision of a "New World Order"¹¹³ and later by President Bill Clinton's policy of "assertive multilateralism."¹¹⁴ U.S. military involvement in Africa was dominated by the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia to secure humanitarian operations, first in 1992 under the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), also known as Operation Restore Hope, and later under the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II.¹¹⁵ U.S. military efforts in Somalia were unprecedented on the continent—over 25,000 U.S. soldiers were deployed by President George H.W. Bush under UNITAF, which was led by CENTCOM and included forces from 24 other countries.

The number of U.S. troops was significantly reduced under President Clinton as operational responsibility was shifted from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. In October 1993, U.S. Special Operations soldiers in the U.S.-led Task Force Ranger engaged Somali militia forces in the battle of Mogadishu, which ultimately resulted in the deaths of 18 American soldiers and hundreds of Somalis.¹¹⁶ President Clinton ultimately ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia in March 1994, the same month that a limited U.S. deployment of 3,600 soldiers was dispatched to Central Africa to assist in humanitarian efforts for Rwandan refugees and to provide protection for humanitarian supplies in Rwanda.¹¹⁷

In 1995, DOD outlined its view of Africa in its U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, asserting that "ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa."¹¹⁸ While the U.S. military was deployed almost annually during the 1990s to conduct Non-Combatant Evacuation and Repatriation Operations (NEO) in African countries that had become politically unstable, other contingency operations involving U.S. forces in Africa in latter half of the 1990s were limited. In 1998, following the attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa, the United States conducted retaliatory cruise missile attacks against a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan, that Clinton Administration officials initially contended was producing precursors for chemical weapons for al Qaeda.

In 2003, the United States responded to calls to intervene in Liberia's civil war by deploying a U.S. Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) off the coast of Liberia to provide assistance to the ECOWAS mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) through Joint Task Force Liberia, under the command of EUCOM. Out of an estimated 5,000 U.S. forces deployed to the area under Operation Sheltering Sky, only approximately 200 U.S. soldiers came ashore.

More recently, U.S. military personnel have provided training and logistical support for African peacekeepers in both Sudan and Somalia and counterterrorism training to select African military units in the Sahel and East Africa. As discussed above, the U.S. Navy continues to conduct anti-piracy patrols off the coast of East Africa. According to media reports, the U.S. military also has, in recent years, engaged in air strikes against suspected terrorist targets in Somalia. AFRICOM officials have acknowledged that the command provided logistical and advisory support for a joint military operation between the armies of Uganda, the DRC, and Southern Sudan in December 2008 against the Ugandan insurgent group known as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).¹¹⁹ The U.S. government is currently reviewing its strategy to address the LRA threat.

In March 2011, the United States commenced military operations in Libya under Operation Odyssey Dawn, the U.S. contribution to a multilateral military effort to enforce a no-fly zone and protect civilians in Libya, in support of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973.¹²⁰ NATO assumed the lead for military operations in Libya on April 1 under Operation Unified Protector.

Appendix B. Instances of the Use of U.S. Armed Forces in Africa, 1950-2009¹²¹

Appendix C. Acronyms

Footnotes