Order Code RL34003
Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests
and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa
Updated July 6, 2007
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and
the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa
Summary

On February 6, 2007, the Bush Administration announced its intention to create
a new unified combatant command, U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM, to promote
U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters. U.S. military
involvement on the continent is currently divided among three commands: U.S.
European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S.
Pacific Command (PACOM). As envisioned by the Administration, the command’s
area of responsibility (AOR) would include all African countries except Egypt.
In recent years, analysts and U.S. policymakers have noted Africa’s growing
strategic importance to U.S. interests. Among those interests are Africa’s role in the
Global War on Terror and the potential threats posed by ungoverned spaces; the
growing importance of Africa’s natural resources, particularly energy resources; and
ongoing concern for the continent’s many humanitarian crises, armed conflicts, and
more general challenges, such as the devastating effect of HIV/AIDS. In 2006,
Congress authorized a feasibility study on the creation of a new command for Africa.
As defined by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM’s mission will be
to promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional
organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the region through improved
security capability, military professionalization, and accountable governance. The
command’s military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises.
A transition team has begun establishment of the new command, which is
expected to begin as a sub-unified command under EUCOM by October 2007 and
achieve full capability as a stand-alone command by October 2008. DOD has
signaled its intention to eventually locate AFRICOM on the continent, and U.S
officials are consulting with strategic partners in the region to identify a suitable
location for the command’s headquarters. The transition team and the new command
will operate from Stuttgart, Germany until facilities in Africa are secured. The
Department of Defense has stressed that there are no plans to have a significant troop
presence on the continent.
The 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa highlighted the threat of
terrorism to U.S. interests on the continent. Political instability and civil wars have
created vast ungoverned spaces, areas in which some experts allege that terrorist
groups may train and operate. Instability also heightens human suffering and retards
economic development, which may in turn threaten U.S. economic interests. Africa
recently surpassed the Middle East as the United States’ largest supplier of crude oil,
further emphasizing the continent’s strategic importance. This report provides a
broad overview of U.S. strategic interests in Africa and the role of U.S. military
efforts on the continent as they pertain to the creation of a new Africa Command.
Although the command is still in the planning phase, a discussion of AFRICOM’s
potential mission, its coordination with other government agencies, and its basing
and manpower requirements is included. This report will be updated as events
warrant.

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Contents
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The DOD Proposal for a New Africa Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Changes to the Unified Command Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Combatant Command “Plus”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Interagency Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Structure and Footprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Headquarters Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Manpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Current U.S. National Security Strategy Toward Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Oil and Global Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Maritime Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Armed Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Terror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
HIV/AIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
U.S. Military Assistance and Security Cooperation in Africa: An Expanding
Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) . . . . . . . . 18
Security Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Operation Enduring Freedom: Trans Sahara/Trans Sahara
Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
International Military Education and Training (IMET) . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
Program (ACOTA)/ Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) 20
Regional Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Congressional Interest and Oversight Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Related CRS Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix 1. History of U.S. Military Involvement in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix 2. Instances of the Use of U.S. Armed Forces in Africa, 1950-2006 . 29
Appendix 3. Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
List of Figures
Figure 1. Proposed Area of Responsibility for Africa Command . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

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Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests
and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa
Issues for Congress
President George W. Bush formally announced the creation of a new Unified
Combatant Command (COCOM) for the African continent on February 6, 2007,
reflecting Africa’s increasing strategic importance to the United States.1 Defense
Secretary Robert Gates announced the command’s creation to Congress during a
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the same day.2 The Department of
Defense (DOD) organizes its command structure by dividing its activities among
joint military commands based either on a geographic or functional area of
responsibility.3 DOD currently has five geographic commands and four functional
commands. U.S. military involvement in Africa is currently divided among three
geographic commands: European Command (EUCOM), Central Command
(CENTCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM). As contemplated by the
Administration, the new command’s area of responsibility (AOR) would include all
African countries except Egypt, which is expected to remain under the AOR of
CENTCOM. A transition team has begun to establish Africa Command
(AFRICOM), which is expected to have initial operating capability (IOC) as a
sub-unified command under EUCOM by October 2007 and full operating capability
(FOC) as a stand-alone command by October 2008. President Bush has nominated
Army General William E. "Kip" Ward, currently Deputy Commander of EUCOM,
to serve as commander of the new command.
As proposed by DOD, AFRICOM’s mission will be to promote U.S. strategic
objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help
strengthen stability and security in the region through improved security capability,
1 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Creates a Department of
Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa,” February 6, 2007.
2 See Testimony of Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on February 6, 2007. Formal efforts to establish an Africa Command, or
AFRICOM, began in mid-2006, under former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
DOD announced that it was considering AFRICOM in August 2006, and President Bush
reportedly approved the proposal on December 15, 2006. “Africa Command Plans
Approved by Bush, DOD Officials Confirm,” Stars and Stripes, December 30, 2006.
3 A unified combatant command is defined as “a command with a broad continuing mission
under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more
Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the
Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff,” according to DOD’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

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military professionalization, and accountable governance. The command’s military
operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises.4
The Administration’s motivation for the creation of a new combatant command
for Africa evolved in part out of concerns about the current DOD division of
responsibility for Africa among the geographic commands. The current division
reportedly has created problems in coordinating activities among the regional
commands. Although some military officials have advocated the creation of an
Africa Command for over a decade, recent crises have highlighted the challenges
created by “seams” between the COCOMs’ boundaries. One such seam lies between
Sudan (within CENTCOM’s AOR), Chad and the Central African Republic (within
EUCOM’s AOR), an area of increasing instability. The United States, acting first
alone and later as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has
provided airlift and training for African Union (AU) peacekeeping troops in the
Darfur region of Sudan, and although CENTCOM has responsibility for Sudan, much
of the airlift and training has been done by EUCOM forces.
In addition, close observers say that EUCOM and CENTCOM have become
overstretched particularly given the demands created by the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The Commander of EUCOM, whose current AOR includes 92
countries, testified before Congress that
the increasing strategic significance of Africa will continue to pose the greatest
security stability challenge in the EUCOM AOR. The large ungoverned area in
Africa, HIV/AIDS epidemic, corruption, weak governance, and poverty that exist
throughout the continent are challenges that are key factors in the security
stability issues that affect every country in Africa.5
His predecessor, General James Jones, pointed out in 2006 that EUCOM’s staff were
spending more than half their time on Africa issues, up from almost none three years
prior.6
AFRICOM faces myriad challenges, both in its establishment and its operation.
Some of these challenges may become issues for Congress. Members of Congress
have expressed interest in the creation of an Africa Command, and in 2006, Senator
Russ Feingold introduced legislation requiring a feasibility study on the
establishment of a new command for Africa. Key oversight questions for Congress
relating to the command include the following.
! Is an Africa Command necessary or desirable? Is its mission well-
defined?
! How are U.S. strategic interests influencing the size and scope of the
U.S. military footprint on the continent, and what effect will the
4 The official website for Africa Command can be found at [http://www.eucom.mil/africom].
5 Testimony of General Craddock to the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19,
2006.
6 Greg Mills, “World’s Biggest Military Comes to Town,” Business Day, February 9, 2007.

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creation of a new Africa Command have on future U.S. military
operations in Africa?
! How are AFRICOM and U.S. military efforts in Africa perceived by
Africans and by other foreign countries, including China?
! What are the costs associated with both the creation and eventual
operation of AFRICOM?
! What role, if any, will contractors play in AFRICOM’s operations?
! What are the Administration’s plans for the development of
AFRICOM’s interagency process and, in particular, how closely are
the State Department and DOD coordinating on plans for the
command and on U.S. military efforts in Africa in general? How
will AFRICOM address the intelligence community’s need to realign
its resources directed toward the continent?
! How will the Administration ensure that U.S. military efforts in
Africa do not overshadow or contradict U.S. diplomatic and
development objectives? Should conflict prevention activities be an
essential part of DOD’s mandate, and are they sustainable?
! How prominent will counter-terrorism operations and programs be,
particularly vis-a-vis peacekeeping training and support components
in AFRICOM’s mandate? Would some DOD-implemented counter-
terrorism programs be more appropriately implemented by other
U.S. agencies?
! Are the legal authorities guiding DOD’s implementation of security
cooperation reform programs sufficient? Do any of these authorities
hinder the U.S. military’s ability to conduct these programs?
! What efforts does DOD take to ensure that the training and
equipment provided to African security forces is not used to
suppress internal dissent or to threaten other nations?
This report provides information on AFRICOM’s mission, structure,
interagency coordination, and its basing and manpower requirements. Because the
command is still in the planning phase, many of the details regarding these issues are
still being determined by the Administration. The report also gives a broad overview
of U.S. strategic interests in Africa and the role of U.S. military efforts on the
continent as they pertain to the creation of a new Africa Command.

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The DOD Proposal for a New Africa Command
Changes to the Unified Command Plan
The mission of geographic commands is defined by a general geographic area
of responsibility (AOR), while the mission of functional commands is the worldwide
performance of a warfighting function. There are currently five geographic
combatant commands: European (EUCOM), Pacific (PACOM), North
(NORTHCOM), Southern (SOUTHCOM), and Central (CENTCOM) Commands.
There are four functional COCOMs, including Transportation (TRANSCOM),
Special Operations (SOCOM), Joint Forces (JFCOM) and Strategic (STRATCOM)
Commands. As mentioned above, DOD responsibilities for Africa are currently
divided among three geographic commands. EUCOM, based in Germany, has 42
African countries in its AOR;7 CENTCOM, based in Florida, covers eight countries
in East Africa, including those that make up the Horn of Africa; and PACOM, based
in Hawaii, is responsible for the islands of Comoros, Madagascar, and Mauritius.8
The creation of a new combatant command requires changes by the President
to a classified executive document, the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which
establishes the basic organization of the U.S. armed forces. The UCP also identifies
the mission and responsibility of each command, and provides the basis for DOD
security assistance coordination with the chiefs of diplomatic missions overseas.
Changes to the UCP are usually initiated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS), who presents a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. After the
Secretary’s review, a proposal is presented to the President for approval. The most
recent Unified Command to be established is NORTHCOM, which was created in
2002, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, to protect the U.S. homeland. The
UCP is reviewed at least every two years, as required by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD
Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433). The review in 2006 recommended the
establishment of an Africa Command as a unified combatant command. A new
functional command, a unified Medical Command, is reportedly also being
considered. Congress has, on occasion, taken legislative action that has led to
changes in the UCP.9
Combatant Command “Plus”?
Some DOD officials have referred to the proposed Africa Command as a
combatant command “plus.”10 This implies that the command would have all the
roles and responsibilities of a traditional combatant command, including the ability
7 Western Sahara is considered an “Area of Interest.” For more information see CRS
Report RS20962, Western Sahara: Status of Settlement Efforts, by Carol Migdalovitz.
8 For more information see [http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand].
9 For more information on changes to the UCP see CRS Report RL30245, Military Changes
to the Unified Command Plan: Background and Issues for Congress, by William C. Story.
10 “Pentagon: AFRICOM Won’t Boost U.S. Troop Presence on the Continent,” Inside the
Army, February 12, 2007.

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to facilitate or lead military operations, but would also include a broader “soft
power” mandate aimed at preemptively reducing conflict and would incorporate a
larger civilian component from other U.S. government agencies to address those
challenges. According to the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, “America is now
threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” The Department
of Defense, identifying instability in foreign countries as a threat to U.S. interests,
issued DOD Directive 3000.05 in 2005, defining stability operations11 as a “core
U.S. military mission” that “shall be given priority comparable to combat
operations.”12 Although U.S. armed forces have traditionally focused on “fighting
and winning wars,” defense strategy is now evolving to look at conflict prevention,
or “Phase Zero,” addressing threats at their inception through theater security
cooperation (TSC) and capacity building of allies.13
As General Bantz Craddock, Commander of EUCOM, noted in his confirmation
hearing, Africa in recent years has posed “the greatest security stability challenge”
to EUCOM, and “a separate command for Africa would provide better focus and
increased synergy in support of U.S. policy and engagement.”14 In the view of
AFRICOM's architects and proponents, if U.S. agencies, both military and civilian,
are able to coordinate more efficiently and effectively both among themselves as well
as with their African partners and other international actors, they might be more
successful at averting more complex emergencies on the continent.
This preemptive approach reflects an evolution in DOD strategy that has been
outlined extensively in government documents, but operationalizing that broad
mandate may be prove difficult. As one foreign policy expert points out, “the
mission of AFRICOM will necessarily require a major break with conventional
doctrinal mentalities both within the armed services themselves and between
government agencies.”15 As one DOD official explained, “We want to help develop
a stable environment in which civil society can be built and that the quality of life for
the citizenry can be improved.”16 The prospect that the Department of Defense will
focus less on fighting wars and more on preventing them engenders mixed feelings
11 DOD defines stability operations as “military and civilian activities conducted across the
spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.”
12 DOD, Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, November 28, 2005.
13 Some analysts view four traditional phases for a military campaign: deter/engage, seize
initiative, decisive operations, and transition. DOD officials have recently begun using a
phrase, “Phase Zero” to encompass efforts prior to the first phase aimed at preventing the
conflict. For more information on the Phase Zero strategy and TSC, also known as
peacetime engagement, see General Charles Wald, “The Phase Zero Campaign,” Joint Force
Quarterly, Issue 43, 4th Quarter 2006, available at [http://www.ndu.edu/inss].
14 Advance Questions for General Bantz J. Craddock, USA, Nominee for United States
European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in his confirmation hearing
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 19, 2006.
15 J. Peter Pham, “Getting AFRICOM Right,” World Defense Review, February 15, 2007.
16 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry From the Pentagon,”
February 7, 2007.

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elsewhere in the government. While many at the State Department and the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) welcome the ability of DOD
to leverage resources and to organize complex operations, there also is concern that
the military may overestimate its capabilities as well as its diplomatic role in Africa,
or pursue activities that are not a core part of its mandate.
The mission of the proposed Africa Command might be most closely compared
to that of Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which is responsible for U.S. military
efforts in Central and South America. SOUTHCOM’s mission, as defined by DOD,
is to ensure the forward defense of the United States through security cooperation,
counter-narcotics operations, humanitarian assistance, and monitoring and support
for human rights initiatives in the region. Like SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM is
expected to supervise an array of missions that relate to U.S. strategic interests but
are not combat-related, unlike EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM, which have
traditionally been more focused on preparing for potential warfighting operations.
One DOD official has suggested that the U.S. government could consider the new
command successful "if it keeps American troops out of Africa for the next 50
years."17
Interagency Coordination
The Bush Administration has noted that the proposal for the new command
reflects an evolution in the involvement of other U.S. government agencies in the
DOD planning process. The State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
(PM) serves as the primary liaison for the Department with DOD in Washington. Its
counterpart at DOD is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (ISA). USAID recently created the Office of Military
Affairs (OMA) within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian
Assistance (DCHA) to coordinate agency policy with DOD and the State Department
for humanitarian relief and post conflict reconstruction efforts. USAID's Office of
U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Operations Liaison Unit (OLU) and the
geographic bureaus' missions manage the operational coordination with DOD for
those activities.
At the regional level, State's PM Bureau appoints senior officials known as
Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADs) to serve as advisors to combatant commanders
and other military leaders to “provide policy support regarding the diplomatic and
political aspects of the commanders’ military responsibilities.”18 Like the State
Department, USAID places OFDA military liaison officers with COCOMs that
routinely provide humanitarian and disaster relief coordination; OMA also currently
has policy advisors with EUCOM and SOCCOM.19 The State Department,
17 Comments by Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Ryan Henry at a Public
Meeting of USAID's Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA) on May 23,
2007.
18 For more information on POLADs, see [http://www.state.gov/t/pm/polad/].
19 According to USAID officials, OMA aims to eventually place advisors with all of the
(continued...)

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intelligence and other government agencies also designate representatives to Joint
Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) within several of DOD’s COCOMs to
facilitate the interagency process. The JIACG is a relatively new concept, created out
of a request by CENTCOM’s former commander, General Tommy Franks, in 2001,
to “execute and influence policy, but not to make it, and to establish new interagency
links, but not to replace habitual relationships or traditional chains of command.”20
At the country level, DOD assigns defense attachés to serve as military liaisons
at embassies around the world. These attachés serve on interagency embassy
Country Teams, which are led by the U.S. ambassador in each country. Many
embassies also have an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), led by a military
officer who reports to the ambassador, to coordinate security assistance activities
with the host country's defense forces.21 USAID OFDA deploys military liaison
officers as part of a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to affected
countries during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations when there is
a civil-military component involved.
According to DOD officials, the new command will seek greater interagency
coordination with the State Department, USAID, and other government agencies and
will have a larger civilian staff (possibly between one quarter to one third of the total
staff) than has been traditional with other combatant commands. The State
Department’s Senior Advisor for Security Negotiations and Agreements in the PM
Bureau, Ambassador Robert Loftis, serves as the Deputy Executive Director of the
AFRICOM transition team, and has reportedly played an integral role in planning for
the new command. DOD has announced it will place a State Department official in
the command structure of AFRICOM, possibly as the equivalent of a deputy
commander. To maintain the military chain of command, one deputy commander
position would always be held by a military officer, but DOD statements suggest a
second equivalent position, that of a Deputy Senior Director, would be held by a
Senior Foreign Service Officer.22
Those involved in the creation of AFRICOM aim to build upon initiatives in
NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM to improve the interagency process, but EUCOM
Commander General Bantz Craddock suggests this command will be “the pioneer”
for a new approach that the other commands may later adopt. As part of this
"pioneering" approach, DOD officials have announced that AFRICOM will have a
major new command element known as the Directorate of Civil/Military Affairs, in
addition to a traditional operational element. The Directorate's mission will be to
19 (...continued)
combatant commands.
20 For more information on JIACGs, see Col. Matthew F. Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency
Cooperation: The First Step,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 37, 2005.
21 According to interviews with DOD officials, the United States currently has 13 ODCs in
Africa (not including Egypt) and over 20 defense attaches in U.S. embassies on the
continent.
22 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry From the Pentagon,”
April 27, 2007.

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oversee the command's capacity building efforts. It will be led by AFRICOM's senior
State Department official (the Deputy Senior Director) and will be the primary
conduit for the command's interaction with the African Union and its African
Standby Force (see Security Assistance below), to allow for more efficient
coordination between the Force's development goals and U.S.-supported training
exercises. The Directorate will also manage AFRICOM's disaster relief,
humanitarian assistance, and civic action projects; medical skills and health
programs; security sector reform/restructuring activities; security capabilities; and
command, control, and communications.
Structure and Footprint
DOD officials emphasize that the new command is still in the early planning
phase; many details regarding the command’s structure and footprint have yet to be
determined. As mentioned above, AFRICOM’s final headquarters location has not
been identified, and a move to the continent is not expected for several years. The
AFRICOM transition team also has yet to determine the number of supporting units
or sub-regional offices that the command might require. DOD suggests there are no
plans to establish any new military bases in Africa.23 Principal Under Secretary of
Defense Ryan Henry has asserted that the creation of the new command reflects an
“organizational change,” rather than a change in “basing structure or troop positions
on the continent.”24
At present, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has a
semi-permanent troop presence at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti with more than 1,500
U.S. military and civilian personnel in residence. The U.S. military recently signed
a five year lease with the Djiboutian government for Lemonier, with the option to
extend the lease for two more five-year terms. The command authority for CJTF-
HOA, currently under CENTCOM, will be transferred to AFRICOM in 2008. The
United States military has access to a number of foreign air bases and ports in Africa
and has established “bare-bones” facilities maintained by local troops in several
locations. The U.S. military used facilities in Kenya in the 1990s to support its
intervention in Somalia and continues to use them today to support counter-terrorism
activities. DOD refers to these facilities as “lily pads,” or cooperative security
locations, and currently has access to locations in Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.
Headquarters Location. There is ongoing debate over where to base
AFRICOM. EUCOM is currently the only geographic combatant command whose
headquarters are located outside of the United States. Given that the majority of
countries that will be transferred to AFRICOM’s new AOR are currently under the
responsibility of EUCOM, and that consequently a majority of the personnel working
on Africa issues were already based in EUCOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart,
23 U.S. military facilities on the island of Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, will remain
under the AOR of PACOM.
24 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry From the Pentagon,”
April 23, 2007.

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Germany, DOD determined that the AFRICOM transition team, and eventually its
headquarters, would be initially located at the American base in Germany as well.
Prior to Secretary Gates’ announcement of the command’s establishment, there
was speculation that an Africa Command might be permanently located in Europe,
or in the United States, like the other commands. Some observers suggest that an
Africa Command located in Europe would perpetuate African perceptions that the
West views Africa through a colonial lens. Locating the command on the continent,
on the other hand, might be perceived positively as a recognition of Africa’s strategic
importance in the world and to the United States. Locating the headquarters within
the AOR would have several benefits in terms of proximity. Flight time from
Germany to Nairobi, Kenya, for example, is approximately 8 hours, and flight time
from Germany to Johannesburg, South Africa is approximately 11 hours. Deploying
AFRICOM’s staff in close geographic proximity to their African counterparts and to
U.S. diplomatic missions on the continent would enable more efficient interaction.
On the other hand, some initial reaction to locating the Africa Command on the
continent has been negative. There are concerns, both domestically and
internationally, that moving the command to Africa might be the first step in an
alleged U.S. military agenda to establish a larger footprint on the continent. DOD
officials have stressed that the location in question would be a staff headquarters
rather than a troop headquarters, and have suggested that they are planning a
dispersed headquarters model, with several small locations spread across the
continent to lessen the U.S. presence and burden in any one country.25 Some
speculate that DOD might consider co-locating those facilities with the headquarters
of the continent's regional and sub-regional organizations to link AFRICOM with the
AU's nascent regional security architecture (see Security Assistance below).
EUCOM currently has a military liaison officer (LNO) at the African Union
headquarters in Ethiopia and one with ECOWAS in Nigeria. Those presences are
likely to be expanded under the new command, and additional liaison offices may be
attached to other sub-regional organizations, regardless of whether DOD adopts the
dispersed headquarters concept.
The transition team is reportedly still developing its criteria for determining the
ultimate location(s) for AFRICOM. Administration officials are currently in
consultations with African countries that have a security relationship with the United
States, and have reportedly already received offers to host the command from several
of them, including Botswana and Liberia. Reports also suggest that other strategic
partners, such as South Africa and Algeria, have expressed reluctance to host the new
command, possibly out of concern over a permanent foreign military presence within
their borders. At the forefront of DOD considerations in determining the host
country (or counties) will be providing for the safety and security of several hundred
American personnel who will staff the command and their families. Living standards
in Africa are among the lowest in the world, and DOD would prefer a politically
stable location with good access to health care and schools and relatively low levels
25 Comments by Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Ryan Henry at a Public
Meeting of USAID's Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA) on May 23,
2007.

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of corruption. Locating U.S. soldiers permanently in a foreign country will be
predicated on the host country’s approval of a Status-of- Forces Agreement (SOFA),
a legal document negotiated by the State Department to define the legal status of U.S.
personnel and property while in that country, and a bilateral non-surrender
agreement, commonly known as an Article 98 Agreement, to protect American
servicemen from prosecution by the International Criminal Court.26 Some advocacy
groups hope that DOD will consider potential host countries’ human rights record
among other criteria.
Although AFRICOM’s move to Africa may take several years, DOD announced
in late April 2007 that the COCOM’s commander would “be stationed” on the
continent possibly as early as 2008, suggesting that, at the very least, some of the
command’s senior staff may operate out of a yet-to-be-determined temporary location
in Africa while the remainder of the command’s staff provide support from
Stuttgart.27
Manpower. Manning a new command is a challenging task, particularly in a
time when defense resources and personnel are stretched thin by engagements in Iraq
and Afghanistan. While the number of personnel needed to staff a combatant
command varies, DOD officials estimate that the average command includes between
400 and 1,000 personnel. The size of the new Africa Command is still under
consideration, but early reports suggest the command will be relatively small,
perhaps between 400 and 700, with an estimated ten General Officer (GO) billets.
Like other COCOMs, AFRICOM’s commander will be a four-star general or
admiral. On July 10, 2007, DOD announced that the President had nominated Army
General William E. "Kip" Ward to be the first commander of Africa Command.
General Ward, who currently serves as Deputy Commander of EUCOM, will require
Senate confirmation for the position. As of mid-2007, the transition team, which will
form the core of the new command, included an estimated 60 staff, led by Executive
Director Navy Rear Admiral Robert Moeller. Many of the personnel for the new
command will be transferred from EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM, although
staffing a new operations center may be more challenging, given that “ops center”
personnel cover operations for their COCOM’s entire AOR. The latest estimates
suggest that all of PACOM’s Africa responsibilities may be transferred to AFRICOM
by IOC, but the transfer of EUCOM and CENTCOM Africa responsibilities will be
a slower process, partly due to the complexity of transferring their larger “ops center”
duties. The armed services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) also must
determine what restructuring they will need to meet the needs of the new command.
Cost. Admiral Moeller, who has served as head of the AFRICOM planning
team, has announced that the command will cost an estimated $50 million in
FY2007. Costs for FY2008 are still being determined. The financial burden of
AFRICOM will increase substantially when the command begins its move to the
26 For more information on Article 98 agreements, see CRS Report RL31495, U.S. Policy
Regarding the International Criminal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
27 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry From the Pentagon,”
April 23, 2007.

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continent, given the construction and/or acquisition of physical infrastructure and
other start-up costs.
U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa
Africa and the Unified Command Plan
Africa was not included in the U.S. military command structure until 1952, when
several North African countries, including Libya, were added to the responsibilities
of U.S. European Command because of their historic relationship with Europe. The
rest of the continent remained outside the responsibility of any command until 1960,
when Cold War concerns over Soviet influence in newly independent African
countries led the Department of Defense to include Sub-Saharan Africa in the Atlantic
Command (LANTCOM), leaving North Africa in EUCOM. The Unified Command
Plan was revised again in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy, and responsibility for
Sub-Saharan Africa was transferred to a newly-created Strike Command (STRICOM),
which was responsible for operations in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and
South Asia. STRICOM was redesignated as Readiness Command (REDCOM) in
1971, and its responsibility for Africa was dissolved, leaving Sub-Saharan Africa out
of the combatant command structure until 1983. Under the Reagan Administration,
U.S. military involvement in Africa was largely dominated by Cold War priorities, and
the Administration’s “containment” policy led DOD to divide responsibility for Africa
into its current configuration among three geographic commands.
Issues on the African continent have not historically been identified as strategic
priorities for the U.S. military, and U.S. military engagement in Africa has been
sporadic.28 According to one defense analyst, “during the Cold War, United States
foreign policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa had little to do with Africa.”29 After the
fall of the Soviet Union, many U.S. policymakers considered the U.S. military’s role
and responsibilities on the continent to be minimal. In 1995, the Department of
Defense outlined its view of Africa in its U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan
Africa, asserting that “ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in
Africa.”30 In 1998, following terrorist attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa,
the United States conducted a retaliatory attack against a pharmaceutical factory in
Khartoum, Sudan that Clinton Administration officials initially contended was
producing precursors for chemical weapons for al Qaeda. The embassy bombings,
28 For an overview of the history of U.S. military involvement in Africa, see Appendix 1.
Appendix 2 provides a list of instances in which U.S. military forces have deployed in
conflict situations in Africa since World War II.
29 Letitia Lawson, “U.S. Africa Policy Since the Cold War,” Strategic Insights, Vol. VI,
Issue 1, January 2007.
30 The report did, however, note significant U.S. political and humanitarian interests. DOD
Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan
Africa, August 1995.

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CRS-12
and the retaliatory strike against Sudan, are considered by many analysts to be a
turning point in U.S. strategic policy toward the region.
Current U.S. National Security Strategy Toward Africa
The Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy of 2002 reflected a need
for a more focused strategic approach toward the African continent: “In Africa,
promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty.
This threatens both a core value of the United States — preserving human dignity —
and our strategic priority — combating global terror.” To address these challenges,
the document asserted that U.S. security strategy must focus on building indigenous
security and intelligence capabilities through bilateral engagement and “coalitions of
the willing.”31 The White House’s most recent National Security Strategy, issued in
2006, goes further, identifying Africa as “a high priority of this Administration,” and
“recogniz(ing) that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen
fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective
democracies.”32
The establishment of the new Africa Command reflects an evolution in
policymakers' perceptions of U.S. strategic interests in Africa. In 2004 an advisory
panel of Africa experts authorized by Congress to propose new policy initiatives
identified five factors that have shaped increased U.S. interest in Africa in the past
decade: HIV/AIDS, oil, global trade, armed conflicts, and terror.33 They suggested
that these factors had led to a “conceptual shift to a strategic view of Africa.”34
Oil and Global Trade. The United States has sought to increase its economic
relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, and trade between the United States and Africa
tripled between 1990 and 2005.35 In 2000, the Clinton Administration introduced a
comprehensive U.S. trade and investment policy for the continent in the African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA; Title I, P.L. 106-200). AGOA has been
amended by Congress on several occasions, most recently in 2006. Natural
31 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002.
32 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, March 2006.
33 Some U.S. officials have recently argued that environmental security should be added as
a national security issue, particularly as it relates to Africa. One DOD official testified
before Congress that climate change served as a “threat multiplier” in Africa, using Nigeria,
Sudan, and Somalia as examples and asserting, “beyond the more conventional threats we
traditionally address, I believe we must now also prepare to respond to the consequences of
dramatic population migrations, pandemic health issues and significant food and water
shortages due to the possibility of significant climate change.” Testimony of General
Charles Wald, Member, Military Advisory Board, at a hearing on Climate Change and
National Security Threats by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 9, 2007.
34 Walter H. Kansteiner III and J. Stephen Morrison, Rising U.S. Stakes in Africa: Seven
Proposals to Strengthen U.S.-Africa Policy, May 2004.
35 For more information, see CRS Report RL31772, U.S. Trade and Investment Relationship
with Sub-Saharan Africa: The African Growth and Opportunity Act and Beyond, by Danielle
Langton.

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CRS-13
resources, particularly energy resources, dominate the products imported from Africa
under AGOA. Africa recently surpassed the Middle East as the United States’ largest
supplier of crude.36
Nigeria is Africa’s largest supplier of oil, and is the fifth largest global supplier
of oil to the United States. Instability in the country’s Niger Delta region has reduced
output periodically by as much as 25%. World oil prices rose above $60 per barrel
in April 2007 after the country held disputed national elections and above $70 per
barrel in May 2007 after attacks on pipelines in the Delta. President Bush announced
in his 2006 State of the Union Address his intention to “to replace more than 75
percent of our oil imports from the Middle East by 2025,”37 echoing a commitment
made in 2002 “to strengthen [U.S.] energy security and the shared prosperity of the
global economy by working with our allies, trading partners, and energy producers
to expand the sources and types of global energy supplied, especially in the Western
Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region.”38 A senior DOD official
reportedly commented in 2003 that “a key mission for U.S. forces (in Africa) would
be to ensure that Nigeria’s oil fields... are secure.”39 In spite of conflict in the Niger
Delta and other oil producing areas, the potential for deep water drilling in the Gulf
of Guinea is high, and analysts estimate that Africa may supply as much as 25% of
all U.S. oil imports by 2015.40
Maritime Security. Africa’s coastlines, particularly along the Gulf of Guinea,
the Gulf of Aden, and the west Indian Ocean, have been highly susceptible to illegal
fishing, illegal trafficking, and piracy in recent years.41 The inability of African
governments to adequately police the region’s waters has allowed criminal elements
to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons and dump hazardous waste, and has opened
maritime commerce and off-shore oil production facilities to the threat of piracy and
sabotage. In 2005, the Bush Administration introduced its National Strategy for
36 See John Authers, “The Short View: African Oil,” Financial Times, April 24, 2007. Data
on U.S. crude oil imports is compiled by the Department of Energy’s Energy Information
Administration, and is available at [http://www.eia.doe.gov].
37 The White House, “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” January 31, 2006.
38 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002.
39 Greg Jaffe, “In Massive Shift, U.S. Is Planning To Cut Size of Military in Germany,” Wall
Street Journal, June 10, 2003.
40 Central Intelligence Agency, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With
Non-government Experts, December 2000. This prediction implies that previously higher
sub-Saharan African shares of U.S. oil imports will be eclipsed and then surpassed.
Previously, when absolute levels of U.S. oil imports were lower, Africa provided a higher
percentage of annual U.S. imports (e.g., about 19.53% in 1990 and about 18.47% in 1995)
than it has during the past five years. For more information, see also African Oil Policy
Initiative Group, African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African
Development, January 2002.
41 According to the International Maritime Bureau, the waters off the coast of Nigeria had
the third highest number of attacks worldwide in 2006, after Indonesia and Bangladesh. ICC
International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report
2006, January 2007.

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CRS-14
Maritime Security, identifying the freedom of the seas and the facilitation and
defense of commerce as top national priorities and indicating plans to fund border
and coastal security initiatives with African countries.42
The United States government, represented by members of EUCOM, U.S. Naval
Forces Europe, the State Department, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies
(ACSS), has engaged its African partners in a number of ministerial conferences on
maritime security, and is currently conducting several activities to increase the
capability of African navies to monitor and enforce maritime laws. The U.S. Navy
has increased its operations in the Gulf of Guinea to enhance security in the region,
although those operations have been sporadic.43 Through its Global Fleet Stations
(GFS) concept, the Navy has announced plans for more persistent, longer-term
engagement. U.S. Naval Forces Europe will deploy a navy ship from fall 2007 to
spring 2008 to serve as a continuing sea base of operations and a "floating
schoolhouse" from which to provide assistance and training to the Gulf of Guinea
nations. 44
Armed Conflicts. Africa has been beset by political conflict and instability
over the last fifty years, causing human suffering on a massive scale and retarding
economic, social, and political development.45 Although the number of conflicts in
Africa has decreased in recent years, the continent is home to a majority of the United
Nations’ peace operations, with six missions currently underway.46 Four African
countries, Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa have consistently ranked in the
top 10 troop contributing countries to U.N. peacekeeping operations in recent years.
African militaries also contribute troops to peace operations conducted by the African
Union and regional organizations like ECOWAS. Despite a willingness to
participate in these operations, many African militaries lack the command and
control, training, equipment, and logistics capability to effectively participate in such
efforts. Instability in Africa has demanded substantial humanitarian and defense
resources from the international community, and the United States and other donor
countries have acknowledged the utility and potential cost-effectiveness of assisting
African forces to enhance their capabilities to participate in these operations. In 2004
the G8 introduced the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multilateral,
42 The White House, The National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 20, 2005.
43 “U.S. Increasing Operations in Gulf of Guinea,” American Forces Press Service,
September 5, 2006.
44 For more information on Global Fleet Stations, see U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval
Operations Concept 2006, Washington, 2006. See also "U.S. Navy Seeks to Expand
Presence in W. Africa," DefenseNews, June 4, 2007;"U.S. Naval Forces Europe Prepares
For AFRICOM Stand Up," American Forces Press Service, June 1, 2007; and "U.S. Navy
Plans Six-Month West African Training Mission," USINFO, June 7, 2007.
45 For further discussion on the indirect costs of instability, see CRS Report 97-454,
Peacekeeping Options: Considerations for U.S. Policymakers and the Congress, by
Marjorie Ann Browne, Ellen Collier, and Nina M. Serafino, p. 5.
46 Current operations in Africa include UNMIS (Sudan), UNOCI (Cote d’Ivoire), UNMIL
(Liberia), MONUC (Dem. Rep. Of Congo), UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea), and MINURSO
(Western Sahara).

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CRS-15
five-year program that aims to train 75,000 troops, a majority of them African, by
2010.47
Terror. Current U.S. security policy is driven in large part by the Global War
on Terror (GWOT), which the Bush Administration has identified as a top national
security priority.48 Terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya in 1998, on targets in Mombasa, Kenya in 2002 and
most recently in Algiers in 2007 have highlighted the threat of terrorism in the
region. DOD officials have emphasized the need to work with African governments
to counteract the threat, claiming “Africa has been, is now, and will be into the
foreseeable future ripe for terrorists and acts of terrorism.”49 Of primary concern to
policy makers is the possible challenge posed by “ungoverned spaces,” defined as
“physical or non-physical area(s) where there is an absence of state capacity or
political will to exercise control.”50 The Administration has linked these areas
indirectly to terrorist threats, asserting:
Regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor
governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal
rivalries, and ethnic or religious hatreds. If left unaddressed, however, these
different causes lead to the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and
ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists.51
In addition to failed states providing a potential “safe haven” for terrorists, there
is evidence to suggest terrorist groups may have profited from the collapse of state
administrative and security institutions in Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s by
trafficking gemstones during Sierra Leone’s civil war. Reports suggest that al Qaeda
used the proceeds from its “conflict diamond” trade as a funding source for its
operations.52 State Department officials have identified failed states such as these as
an “acute risk” to U.S. national security.53
47 For more information see CRS Report RL32773, The Global Peace Operations Initiative:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
48 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002.
49 Speech by DOD official Vincent Kern referenced in “Africa Is Still Ripe for Terrorism,
Top Pentagon Official Asserts,” The Washington File, February 10, 2004.
50 Jessica Piombo, “Terrorism and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An
Overview,” Strategic Insights, Vol. VI, Issue 1, January 2007.
51 The White House, The National Security Strategy of The United States, September 2002.
52 See Douglas Farah, “Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade Sale of Gems From Sierra
Leone Rebels Raised Millions, Sources Say,” The Washington Post, November 2, 2001;
U.N. Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1343 (2001), Paragraph 19, Concerning Liberia, in S/2001/1015, October 26,
2001; and CRS Report RL30751, Diamonds and Conflict: Background, Policy, and
Legislation, by Nicolas Cook.
53 Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.
84, No. 4, July/August 2005.

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HIV/AIDS. According to the United Nations, there were almost 25 million
HIV-positive Africans in 2006, representing 63% of infected persons worldwide.54
HIV/AIDS is the leading cause of death on the continent and was identified in 2004
by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell as “the greatest threat of mankind today.”55
The rate of infection in some African security forces is believed to be high, reportedly
between 40-60% in the case of Angola, for example, raising concerns that those
forces may be unable to deploy when needed.56 The Bush Administration has placed
priority on efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, committing over $15 billion through the
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Twelve of PEPFAR’s 15
focus countries are in Africa.57 As part of the Administration’s efforts, DOD has
undertaken its own HIV/AIDS Prevention Program with African armed forces, which
is administered by the Naval Health Research Center in San Diego.
U.S. Military Assistance and Security Cooperation
in Africa: An Expanding Role
The Department of Defense conducts a wide variety of activities in Africa in
support of U.S. national interests. Operational activities may include, but are not
limited to, humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, counter-narcotics, sanctions
enforcement, demining, non-combatant evacuations (NEOs), and maritime
interdiction operations (MIOs).
In addition to traditional contingency operations58, the U.S. military implements
a number of efforts aimed at increasing the capabilities of African militaries to
provide security and stability for their own countries and the region as a whole.
Several of these DOD-implemented initiatives are part of foreign military assistance
programs funded by the State Department that “help to promote the principles of
democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.”59 In addition to providing
funding, the State Department gives overall guidance and direction for the programs.
The United States military also occasionally provides advisors to peacekeeping
missions on the continent; U.S. military advisors from CJTF-HOA are currently
assisting the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). U.S. forces routinely conduct
a variety of bilateral and multilateral joint exercises with African militaries through
54 UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update, December 2006.
55 Speech by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell at the Gheskio Clinic, Port-au-Prince, Haiti,
April 5, 2004.
56 Kevin A. O’Brien, “Headlines Over the Horizon: AIDS and African Armies,” Atlantic
Monthly, Vol. 292, No. 1, July/August 2003.
57 For more information, see CRS Report RL33584, AIDS in Africa, by Nicolas Cook.
58 DOD defines a "contingency operation" as a military operation in which members of the
Armed Forces are or may become involved, either by designation of the Secretary of
Defense or by law, in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the
United States or against an opposing force.
59 For more information on U.S. Foreign Military Training programs, see the Department
of State’s website at [http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/].

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such programs as Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). U.S. forces also
conduct joint exercises as part of disaster assistance and maritime security training.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) was created in 1999 as one of
DOD’s five regional centers for strategic studies. It conducts a variety of academic
activities for African, American, and European military and civilian officials aimed
promoting good governance and democratic values, countering ideological support
of terrorism, and fostering regional collaboration and cooperation in the African
defense and security sectors. ACSS, which is based in Washington, DC, opened an
annex at the U.S. embassy in Ethiopia in 2006 and is planning future annexes
elsewhere on the continent.60 DOD initiated another multi-nation forum, the Africa
Clearinghouse, in 2004 under EUCOM. The Africa Clearinghouse, modeled after
EUCOM Clearinghouses for Southeast Europe and the South Caucasus, provides a
venue for the United States to coordinate its actions with other nations involved in
security cooperation in Africa to maximize limited resources, synchronize security
assistance, and avoid duplication of efforts.
The United States sells military equipment to African governments through the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, implemented by the U.S. Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA).61 The U.S. government also provides loans (the
United States waives repayment of these loans for African countries) to foreign
governments to finance the purchase of such equipment through the Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) program. Equipment is also provided to select African countries
through the African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBSP) and the Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) program.
U.S. counter-terrorism strategy on the continent is addressed through a number
of these initiatives, but U.S. counter-terrorism efforts may also include, at one end
of the spectrum, programs to address the root causes of terrorism, and, at the other
end, military operations to destroy terrorist targets through military strikes. The
United States is placing increasing emphasis on Information Operations (IO) in
Africa, which use information to improve the security environment and counter
extremist ideology through military information support teams deployed to U.S.
embassies. IO activities in Africa have included website initiatives such as
Maghrebia.62 Some question whether activities such as these should be a part of
DOD’s mandate, or whether they might be more appropriately managed by other U.S.
agencies.
Administration officials argue that AFRICOM would not only allow the U.S.
military to better coordinate these operations and programs, but that it would also
allow DOD to better coordinate with other U.S. agencies, like the State Department,
USAID, the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal
60 U.S. State Department, “Africa Center for Strategic Studies Opens Annex in Ethiopia,”
August 1, 2006, available at [http://usinfo.state.gov].
61 For more information, see [http://www.dsca.osd.mil/] or CRS Report RL33758, U.S. Arms
Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients, 1998-2005, by Richard F.
Grimmett.
62 The website can be found at [http://www.magharebia.com].

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Bureau of Investigations and others, as well as with other governments, like those of
Britain and France, which are also providing training and assistance for African
security forces. DOD suggests that the new Africa Command will build on the
experiences of the U.S. military’s only forward presence in the region, Combined
Joint Task Force — Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), located in the East African nation
of Djibouti.
Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). In October
2002, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) developed a joint task force
to focus on “detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist
groups operating in the region,” and to provide a forward presence in the region.63
Approximately 1,500 U.S. military and civilian personnel make up CJTF-HOA,
which covers the land and airspace in Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Seychelles, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Djibouti, and Yemen, as well as the coastal waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf
of Aden, and the Indian Ocean. CJTF personnel train the region’s security forces on
counter-terrorism, collect intelligence, serve as advisors to peace operations, conduct
activities to maintain critical maritime access to Red Sea routes, and oversee and
support humanitarian assistance efforts. CJTF-HOA has supported at least 11
humanitarian missions, including the airlift of humanitarian assistance supplies to
Ethiopia and Northern Kenya. CJTF-HOA also conducts civilian-military operations
throughout East Africa as part of an effort to “win hearts and minds”64 and enhance
the “long-term stability of the region.”65 These civil-military operations include
digging wells and building and repairing schools, hospitals, and roads, and are also
part of a broader CENTCOM mission to “counter the re-emergence of transnational
terrorism.”66 Some observers question whether some of these activities might be
more appropriately coordinated by a civilian agency or non-governmental
organization than by the U.S. military.
Security Assistance
Building partnership capacity is a key goal of U.S. military strategy in Africa
and will consequently be a key mandate for AFRICOM. At present, military experts
believe that no African nation poses a direct threat to the United States or is expected
to; consequently an Africa Command would focus less on preparing U.S. forces for
major combat in the AOR. Instead, the command would concentrate much of its
energies and resources on training and assistance to professionalize local militaries
so that they can better ensure stability and security on the continent. As one DOD
official has asserted, “its principle mission will be in the area of security cooperation
and building partnership capability. It will not be in warfighting.”67 Officials stress
63 For more information, see [http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/resources/english/facts.asp].
64 U.S. Central Command, “CJTF HOA donates supplies to Djiboutian Well Drillers,”
March 12, 2007.
65 For more information, see [http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/resources/english/facts.asp].
66 For more information on CJTF-HOA activities, see [http://www.hoa.centcom.mil].
67 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry From the Pentagon,”
April 23, 2007.

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that U.S. training programs aim to encourage respect for human rights and for
civilian authority, key shortcomings for many African security forces.
The U.S. government provides security assistance to African militaries through
both bilateral and multilateral initiatives. During the 1990s, the United States
provided military training through several programs, including the African Crisis
Response Initiative (ACRI), the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities
(EIPC) program, the African Regional Peacekeeping Program (ARP), and
International Military Education and Training (IMET). Some of this training has been
provided by the U.S. Army 3rd and 10th Special Forces Groups, which have worked
with African militaries since 1990. Training has also been provided by contractors.
Under the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), U.S. states' and
territories' National Guard units have paired with several African countries to
conduct a variety of security cooperation activities.68 EUCOM has worked with the
continent’s regional security organizations, including the African Union (AU) and
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). U.S. military efforts
also aim to support the development of the African Union's African Standby Force
(ASF), a multinational peacekeeping force composed of regional brigades organized
by the continent's Regional Economic Communities.69 The AU anticipates the Force
being operational by 2010 with a standby capacity of 15,000 to 20,000 peacekeepers.
The ASF and its regional brigades are not intended to be standing forces, but will
instead draw from pre-identified forces of member states. U.S. military assistance
also includes efforts to improve information sharing networks between African
countries through programs such as EUCOM’s Multinational Information Sharing
Initiative, which donor and aid organizations can in turn utilize to warn of and be
warned of possible crises.
Several of the major current bilateral and multilateral security assistance
programs implemented by DOD in Africa are listed below (the list is not inclusive).70
These programs will fall under the mission of the new Africa Command.
Operation Enduring Freedom: Trans Sahara/Trans Sahara Counter-
Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). In 2002, the Department of State launched the Pan-
Sahel Initiative (PSI) program to increase border security and counter-terrorism
capacities of four West African nations: Mali, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania. In 2005,
68 As of June 2007, SPP included five U.S-African partnerships: Utah and Morocco, North
Dakota and Ghana, California and Nigeria, Wyoming and Tunisia, and New York and
California.
69 The ASF is divided into North, West, Central, East, and South Regional Brigades, which
are organized by the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central
African States (ECCAS/CEMAC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
(IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), respectively.
70 Other authorities used for DOD training include the Combatant Commander Initiative
Fund (Title 10, USC, Sec. 166(a)), the DOD Regional Counter-Terrorism Fellowship
Program (Title 10, USC, Sec. 2249(c)), the Air Force’s Aviation Leadership Program (Title
10, USC, Sec. 9381-9383), training with U.S. Special Forces (Title 10, USC, Sec. 2011), and
disaster response training under Title 10, USC, Sec. 2561.

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the Bush Administration announced a “follow-on” program to PSI. According to the
State Department, TSCTI “would look beyond the provision of training and
equipment for counter-terrorism units, but also would consider development
assistance, expanded public diplomacy campaigns and other elements as part of an
overall CT strategy.” Under the American military component, Operation Enduring
Freedom - Trans Sahara, implemented by EUCOM, U.S. forces work with their
African counterparts from Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria,
Senegal, and Tunisia to improve intelligence, command and control, logistics, and
border control, and to execute joint operations against terrorist groups. U.S. and
African forces have conducted joint exercises such as Exercise Flintlock to improve
security partnerships initiated under PSI and TSCTI.
International Military Education and Training (IMET).71 In 1949 the
U.S. government began providing training to foreign militaries under the Military
Assistance Training Program (MAP) and through Foreign Military Sales (FMS),
which allows countries to pay for their own training. MAP was succeeded in 1976
by IMET, which provides training at U.S. military schools and other training
assistance for foreign military personnel on a grant basis through funding from the
Department of State. A subset of IMET training, Expanded IMET (E-IMET),
provides courses on defense management, civil-military relations, law enforcement
cooperation, and military justice for military as well as civilian personnel. In
FY2007 IMET is expected to train 1,400 African military officers. The Department
of State also provides training through its Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
program. The President's FY2008 Budget Request includes $18.3 million in IMET
funds for African countries and $14.5 million in FMF (these figures include IMET
and FMF funding for Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia, but not Egypt).
The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
Program (ACOTA)/ Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).72 In 1996,
the Clinton Administration proposed the creation of an African Crisis Response
Force (ACRF), an African standby force that would be trained and equipped by the
United States and other donor nations. The initiative was not well received on the
continent, and was later reintroduced as the African Crisis Response Initiative
(ACRI), a bilateral training program designed to improve the capabilities of
individual African countries’ militaries to participate in multilateral peacekeeping
operations. ACOTA, which replaced ACRI in 2002, aims to upgrade the peace-
enforcement capabilities of African militaries. ACOTA provides Peace Support
Operations training, including light infantry and small unit tactics, and focuses on
training African troops who can in turn train other African units.73 In 2004, ACOTA
became a part of GPOI. GPOI attempts to address some of the factors limiting
African militaries’ ability to contribute to peace operations by conducting a variety
of programs, events, and activities oriented on peacekeeping capacity building.
71 For more information on IMET, see CRS Report RS20506, The International Military
Training and Education Program, by Richard F. Grimmett.
72 For more information on ACOTA/GPOI, see CRS Report RL32773, The Global Peace
Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
73 “Kenyan military unite with CJTF-HOA for peacekeeping operations,” Marine Corps
News, August 13, 2003.

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CRS-21
Among these programs is an effort to foster an international transport and logistics
support system for African and other region's forces. The United States coordinates
its peacekeeping training and assistance programs with other G8 countries through
a G8 Africa Clearinghouse. According to the State Department, over 60,000
peacekeepers from Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia have received ACOTA
training since the program's inception.74 The President's FY2008 Budget Request
includes $40.26 million for ACOTA and $7.26 million in GPOI funds for Africa
Regional Headquarters Support to the AU and ECOWAS.
Regional Perspectives
U.S. reaction to the proposed creation of a new command for Africa has been
largely positive, although some initial concerns have been raised.75 In Africa, on the
other hand, perceptions of the new command are more mixed. There is considerable
apprehension over U.S. motivations for creating AFRICOM, and some Africans
worry that the move represents a neo-colonial effort to dominate the region militarily.
U.S. military efforts on the continent have been seen as episodic, leading some to
question a more sustained focus from DOD now. Reports of U.S. air strikes in
Somalia in early 2007 and U.S. support for Ethiopia’s military intervention there
have added to those concerns. Many have viewed U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in
Africa with skepticism, and there appears to be a widespread belief that the new
command’s primary goals will be to hunt terrorists and to secure U.S. access to
African oil.76 U.S. foreign policy analysts have focused increased attention on
China’s role in Africa in recent years, and such attention has led some to question
whether an Africa Command might be part of a new contest for influence on the
continent.77
Among several African governments and militaries, on the other hand,
AFRICOM has been received with cautious optimism.78 They view increased
American attention to the continent’s problems as a positive move, potentially
bringing increased resources, training, and assistance. U.S. foreign military assistance
74 U.S. Department of State, FY 2008 Performance Summary, February 2008.
75 See, for example, Michael Moran, “The New ‘Africa Command,’” Council on Foreign
Relations, February 9, 2007, Brett D. Schaefer, “Creating an Africa Command: Bush
Administration Makes the Right Call,” Heritage Foundation, February 7, 2007. Some of
the concerns expressed by American observers are reflected in a statement by Nicole Lee
of the Trans Africa Forum on February 7, 2007, available at
[http://www.transafricaforum.org].
76 See, for example, “The U.S., Oil, and Africa,” Egyptian Mail, February 20, 2007.
77 Dulue Mbachu, “Skepticism Over U.S. Africa Command,” ISN Security Watch, February
19, 2007.
78 See, for example, “Morocco Lobbying to Become Home for New U.S. Military
Command,” Middle East Newsline, February 9, 2007, and “Algerian Foreign Minister
“Satisfied” With Plans for US-Africa Command,” El-Khabar, March 24, 2007.

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CRS-22
has increased in recent years, and military training programs under the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Regional Defense Counter-terrorism
Fellowship Program (CTFP) in Africa have steadily been on the rise.
DOD and State Department officials involved in the creation of Africa
Command are conducting a series of consultations with African nations to discuss
their plans for the command. Those involved in the consultations have stressed that
the goal of the visits has been to solicit African views and explain the rationale
behind AFRICOM's creation, rather than to find a suitable location for its
headquarters. In April 2007, senior officials visited Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya,
Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal. Following their visit, one DOD official noted that
despite some initial “misconceptions,” they had not encountered “any specific
resistance to the idea.”79 In June 2007, they visited Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt,
and Djibouti, and held discussions with African Union officials. The delegation also
held meetings with 40 foreign defense attachés serving in Paris. African officials
reportedly gave "positive feedback about the design and mission of AFRICOM" and
advised the delegation that DOD should consider how AFRICOM could complement
the AU's regional security structure.80 Analysts suggest U.S. officials should closely
consult with these governments to ensure that AFRICOM reflects a mutual exchange
of interests and is seen to foster a closer alliance rather than serving as an avenue for
the U.S. to dictate policy to African governments.
Congressional Interest and Oversight Issues
As noted above, AFRICOM faces myriad challenges, both in its establishment
and its operation. Some of these challenges may become issues for Congress. Some
Members of Congress have expressed interest in the creation of an Africa Command,
and in 2006, Senator Russ Feingold introduced S.Amdt. 4527 to the FY2007
National Defense Authorization bill (S. 2766) requiring a feasibility study for the
establishment of a new command for Africa. The amendment was included in the
legislation, which passed the Senate in June 2006. The Senate expressed its support
for AFRICOM in S.Rept. 110-77, which accompanied S. 1547, the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2008. The report did, however, raise questions regarding
authorities needed to stand up and staff the command; authorities and funding
mechanisms for interagency staff; location; planned staffing levels; and anticipated
costs.
Given that a large part of AFRICOM’s mandate will be to build the indigenous
capacity of African defense forces, the ease with which the command can conduct
security cooperation programs will be key to its success. DOD officials suggest that
inefficiencies exist in the authorities through which funding is provided for the
79 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry from the Pentagon,”
April 23, 2007.
80 DOD, "DOD Special Briefing on Africa Command with Mr. Ryan Henry from the
Pentagon," June 21, 2007.

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CRS-23
military’s TSC activities.81 Military officials have argued that the applicable laws
need simplification to allow the combatant commands greater flexibility to respond
to emerging threats and opportunities. Some have raised concerns, though, that
modifying the administrative authorities could interfere with the Department of
State's diplomatic decisions or bilateral relationships. The U.S. military faces other
policy restrictions, including Article 98 restrictions, in its operations with some
African governments and militaries.82 At the same time, DOD is also concerned
about possible gaps in servicemen protections for U.S. troops operating on the
continent (see Headquarters Location above).
The establishment of a new unified command will require both financial and
human resources, although the Department of Defense anticipates that much of those
will be redirected from the existing commands. Military resources have been
stretched by major theater operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, making troop readiness
and costs associated with standing up a new command a critical issue for Congress.83
Staffing the command at the interagency level may also require additional resources
from Congress — some officials at the State Department and USAID have already
expressed concern about their departments' inability to provide the number of civilian
staff to the command envisioned by the Department of Defense, and that concern that
has been echoed by some within DOD.84 Some observers have cautioned that
AFRICOM could develop independent institutional imperatives that demand
resources regardless of need, rather than reflecting genuine strategic interests.
81 Authorities provided to DOD under Title 10, USC, cannot be generally used for training
or equipment programs, whereas Title 22 funds, which are controlled by the State
Department, but which include some DOD-implemented programs like FMF and IMET,
cannot be used to fund military operations. In the FY2006 Defense Appropriations Act (P.L.
109-163), Congress gave DOD expanded funding and authorities under Title 10, USC,
Section 1206 and 1207 to address lengthy administrative and procurement delays. Section
1206 authorities allow DOD to directly fund some security cooperation activities. In
FY2006, DOD obligated $6 million for a Regional Maritime Awareness Capability
initiative in the Gulf of Guinea and $6 million for activities in conjunction with TSCTI
through 1206 assistance. At the request of Senator Richard Lugar, the Government
Accountability Office compiled a report, Section 1206 Security Assistance Program —
Findings on Criteria, Coordination, and Implementation, in February 2007.
82 In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 17, 2007, EUCOM
Commander Bantz Craddock expressed concern that Article 98 restrictions could affect
long-term U.S.-African security relationships and hinder the logistical capability of
countries that do not sign Article 98 agreements to participate in regional peacekeeping
efforts.
83 Congress has, in the past, prohibited funding for combatant commands. For example,
under the FY1982 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 97-252), Congress prohibited the use of
funds for the integration of the Army's Military Traffic Management Command and the
Navy's Military Sealift Command into a new unified transportation command, at the request
of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff.
84 EUCOM Commander Bantz Craddock told a Defense Writers Group forum on May 18,
2007, "It will be difficult to get subscription and participation by the interagency." Other
concerns have been expressed to the author in interviews with Administration officials.

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CRS-24
The development of AFRICOM’s interagency process may be of particular
interest to Congress. In the House Report to accompany H.R. 2082, the Intelligence
Authorization Act of FY2008, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
expressed concern with interagency coordination on Africa, calling it “flawed” and
suggesting that the intelligence community needed to realign its resources to “better
understand the threats emanating from this region.” DOD officials point out that
there are no legally binding requirements for agencies to coordinate their activities,
which could make AFRICOM’s “pioneering” interagency process more challenging,
should other agencies not have the resources to participate adequately.85 Because the
command’s role will be to support U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa, close
coordination with the State Department will be critical to the success of AFRICOM.
Some have suggested that because the State Department organizes its efforts
bilaterally while DOD organizes regionally, that coordination may be challenging
and may require some “internal bureaucratic changes” within the State Department.86
Observers have expressed concern that U.S. military efforts on the continent
must not be allowed to overshadow U.S. diplomatic objectives. A 2006 Senate
Foreign Affairs Committee Report found that
As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs... U.S. defense agencies are
increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such
bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks
weakening the Secretary of State's primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations
with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense's focus on war fighting.87
Senator Feingold, in a speech before the Senate, expressed his support for the Africa
Command, but cautioned that it must “contribute to, not define, the U.S.
Government’s overall strategy and objectives for the continent.”88 As DOD stands up
the new command and as AFRICOM becomes operational, Congress may exert its
oversight authority to monitor the command’s operations to ensure they support,
rather than guide, the United States’ political, economic, and social objectives for the
continent.
85 Some of the challenges in coordinating a more effective interagency process were outlined
by John Hamre, President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in
a hearing, "Organizing Department of Defense Roles and Mission Requirements," held by
the House Armed Services Committee on June 20, 2007.
86 Statement of Senator Russ Feingold, “Creation of a U.S. Africa Command,” before the
Senate on January 10, 2007.
87 Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror
Campaign, December 15, 2006.
88 Statement of Senator Russ Feingold, “Creation of a U.S. Africa Command,” before the
Senate on January 10, 2007.

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CRS-25
Related CRS Reports
CRS Report RL33557, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of
U.S. Military Involvement, by Nina M. Serafino.
CRS Report RL32773, The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
CRS Report RL32238, Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues
for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS Report RL33769, International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian
Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress, by Rhoda Margesson.
CRS Report RL33600, International Terrorism: Threat, Policy, and Response, by
Raphael F. Perl.
CRS Report RL33584, AIDS in Africa, by Nicolas Cook.
CRS Report RL33771, Trends in U.S. Global AIDS Spending: FY2000-FY2007, by
Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.

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CRS-26
Figure 1. Proposed Area of Responsibility for Africa Command
Source: Department of Defense, adapted by CRS.

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CRS-27
Appendix 1. History of U.S. Military
Involvement in Africa
The United States maintained Wheelus Air Base near Tripoli, Libya from the
1940s until 1971 with an estimated 4,000 American personnel.89 Wheelus served
primarily as a bomber base for missions to Europe and as an Air Force training
location, although U.S. forces from the base did provide emergency humanitarian
assistance to earthquake and flood victims in Libya and Tunisia in the 1960s.
Africa was not included in the U.S. military command structure until 1952,
when several North African countries, including Libya, were added to the
responsibilities of U.S. European Command because of their historic relationship
with Europe. The rest of the continent remained outside the responsibility of any
command until 1960, when Cold War concerns over Soviet influence in newly
independent African countries led DOD to include Sub-Saharan Africa in the
Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), leaving North Africa in EUCOM. The Unified
Command Plan was revised again in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy, and
responsibility for Sub-Saharan Africa was transferred to a newly-created Strike
Command (STRICOM), which was responsible for operations in the Middle East,
Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia and located at McDill Air Force Base in Tampa,
Florida. STRICOM was redesignated as Readiness Command (REDCOM) in 1971,
and its responsibility for Africa was dissolved, leaving Sub-Saharan Africa out of the
combatant command structure until 1983. Under the Reagan Administration, U.S.
military involvement in Africa was largely dominated by Cold War priorities, and the
Administration’s “containment” policy led DOD to divide responsibility for Africa
into its current configuration among three geographic commands.
In the 1980s, the U.S. military was involved in repeated skirmishes with Libyan
jets in territorial disputes over the Gulf of Sidra, and those engagements later
escalated as Libya was implicated for supporting international terrorism. On April
15, 1986, the United States initiated air strikes against multiple military targets in
Libya under the code name Operation El Dorado Canyon to “inflict damage to
Qadhafi’s capability to direct and control the export of international terrorism;”
several civilian targets including the French Embassy in Tripoli were also
inadvertently hit.90
After the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Africa was driven by
President George H. W. Bush’s vision of a “New World Order”91 and later by
89 Other former U.S. military installations in North Africa included Kenitra Naval Air
Station, also known as Port Lyautey, and several Naval Communication Relay Stations in
Morocco, as well as three airbases: Nouassur, Sidi Slimane, and Ben Guerir.
90 The White House, “Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the United
States Air Strike Against Libya,” April 15, 1986.
91 See the speech of President George H.W. Bush before a Joint Session of Congress,
“Toward a New World Order,” September 11, 1990.

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President William J. Clinton’s policy of “assertive multilateralism.”92 U.S. military
involvement in Africa was dominated by the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia
to secure humanitarian operations, first in 1992 under the U.S.-led Unified Task
Force (UNITAF), also known as Operation Restore Hope, and later under the United
Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II.93 U.S. military efforts in Somalia were
unprecedented on the continent — over 25,000 U.S. soldiers were deployed by
President George H.W. Bush under UNITAF, which was led by CENTCOM and
included forces from 24 other countries.
The number of U.S. troops was significantly reduced under President Clinton
as operational responsibility was shifted from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. In October
1993, U.S. Special Operations soldiers in the U.S.-led Task Force Ranger engaged
Somali militia forces in the battle of Mogadishu, which ultimately resulted in the
deaths of 18 American soldiers and hundreds of Somalis.94 President Clinton
ultimately ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia in March 1994, the
same month that a limited U.S. deployment of 3,600 soldiers was dispatched to
Central Africa to assist in humanitarian efforts for Rwandan refugees and to provide
protection for humanitarian supplies in Rwanda.95
In 1995, DOD outlined its view of Africa in its U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-
Saharan Africa, asserting that “ultimately we see very little traditional strategic
interest in Africa.”96 While the U.S. military was deployed almost annually during
the 1990s to conduct Non-Combatant Evacuation and Repatriation Operations (NEO)
in African countries that had become politically unstable, other contingency
operations97 involving U.S. forces in Africa in latter half of the 1990s were limited.
In 1998, following the attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa, the United
States conducted retaliatory cruise missile attacks against a pharmaceutical factory
92 See the statement of then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, “Myths of Peacekeeping,” June 24, 1993.
93 For more information, see CRS Report RL30065, Somalia: Background and U.S.
Involvement Through the 1990s, by Theodros Dagne and CRS Report RL30184, Military
Interventions by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background, Outcomes, and “Lessons
Learned” for Kosovo, by Nina M.Serafino.
94 Twenty-nine American soldiers ultimately lost their lives as a result of the conflict in
Somalia.
95 Although the mission was deemed successful in alleviating the starvation and disease that
threatened the refugees, many have been highly critical of the United States, the United
Nations, and others for not doing more to attempt to avert the genocide that occurred in
Rwanda that year. See, for example, Col. Scott R. Feil, “Could 5,000 Peacekeepers Have
Saved 500,000 Rwandans?: Early Intervention Reconsidered,” ISD Reports, Vol. III, No. 2,
April 1997.
96 DOD Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for Sub-
Saharan Africa, August 1995.
97 According to DOD, a military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of
Defense as a contingency operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter of law:
title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 101 (a)(13).

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CRS-29
in Khartoum, Sudan that Clinton Administration officials initially contended was
producing precursors for chemical weapons for al Qaeda.
In 2003, the United States responded to calls to intervene in Liberia’s civil war
by deploying a U.S. Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) off the coast of Liberia to
provide assistance to the ECOWAS mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) through Joint Task
Force Liberia, under the command of EUCOM.98 Out of an estimated 5,000 U.S.
forces deployed to the area under Operation Sheltering Sky, only approximately 200
U.S. soldiers came ashore.
Appendix 2. Instances of the Use of U.S. Armed
Forces in Africa, 1950-200699
1956
Egypt. A marine battalion evacuated U.S. nationals and other persons from Alexandria
during the Suez crisis.
1964
Congo. The United States sent four transport planes to provide airlift for Congolese
troops during a rebellion and to transport Belgian paratroopers to rescue foreigners.
1967
Congo. The United States sent three military transport aircraft with crews to provide the
Congo central government with logistical support during a revolt.
1978
Zaire. From May 19 through June 1978, the United States utilized military transport
aircraft to provide logistical support to Belgian and French rescue operations in Zaire.
1981
Libya. On August 19, 1981, U.S. planes based on the carrier U.S.S. Nimitz shot down
two Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sidra after one of the Libyan jets had fired a
heat-seeking missile. The United States periodically held freedom of navigation
exercises in the Gulf of Sidra, claimed by Libya as territorial waters but considered
international waters by the United States.
1983
Egypt. After a Libyan plane bombed a city in Sudan on March 18, 1983, and Sudan and
Egypt appealed for assistance, the United States dispatched an AWACS electronic
surveillance plane to Egypt.
1983
Chad. On August 8, 1983, President Reagan reported the deployment of two AWACS
electronic surveillance planes and eight F-15 fighter planes and ground logistical support
forces to assist Chad against Libyan and rebel forces.
1986
Libya. On March 26, 1986, President Reagan reported to Congress that, on March 24
and 25, U.S. forces, while engaged in freedom of navigation exercises around the Gulf
of Sidra, had been attacked by Libyan missiles and the United States had responded with
missiles.
1986
Libya. On April 16, 1986, President Reagan reported that U.S. air and naval forces had
conducted bombing strikes on terrorist facilities and military installations in Libya.
1989
Libya. On January 4, 1989, two U.S. Navy F-14 aircraft based on the U.S.S. John F.
Kennedy shot down two Libyan jet fighters over the Mediterranean Sea about 70 miles
98 For more information, see CRS Report RL32243, Liberia: Transition to Peace, by Nicolas
Cook.
99 Covert actions, disaster relief, and routine alliance stationing and training exercises are
not included in this list. Most instances listed since 1980 are summaries of U.S. military
deployments reported to Congress by the President as a result of the War Powers Resolution.

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north of Libya. The U.S. pilots said the Libyan planes had demonstrated hostile
intentions.
1990
Liberia. On August 6, 1990, President Bush reported that a reinforced rifle company
had been sent to provide additional security to the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, and that
helicopter teams had evacuated U.S. citizens from Liberia.
1991
Zaire. On September 25-27, 1991, after widespread looting and rioting broke out in
Kinshasa, U.S. Air Force C-141s transported 100 Belgian troops and equipment into
Kinshasa. U.S. planes also carried 300 French troops into the Central African Republic
and hauled back American citizens and third country nationals from locations outside
Zaire.
1992
Sierra Leone. On May 3, 1992, U.S. military planes evacuated Americans from Sierra
Leone, where military leaders had overthrown the government.
1992
Somalia. On December 10, 1992, President Bush reported that he had deployed U.S.
armed forces to Somalia in response to a humanitarian crisis and a U.N. Security
Council Resolution determining that the situation constituted a threat to international
peace. This operation, called Operation Restore Hope, was part of a U.S.-led United
Nations Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and came to an end on May 4, 1993. U.S. forces
continued to participate in the successor United Nations Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM II), which the U.N. Security Council authorized to assist Somalia in political
reconciliation and restoration of peace.
1993
Somalia. On June 10, 1993, President Clinton reported that in response to attacks
against U.N. forces in Somalia by a factional leader, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force in
the area had participated in military action to quell the violence. On July 1 President
Clinton reported further air and ground military operations on June 12 and June 17
aimed at neutralizing military capabilities that had impeded U.N. efforts to deliver
humanitarian relief and promote national reconstruction, and additional instances
occurred in the following months.
1994
Rwanda. On April 12, 1994, President Clinton reported that combat-equipped U.S.
military forces had been deployed to Burundi to conduct possible non-combatant
evacuation operations of U.S. citizens and other third-country nationals from Rwanda,
where widespread fighting had broken out. By September 30, 1994, all U.S. troops had
departed from Rwanda and surrounding nations. In the Defense Appropriations Act for
FY1995 (P.L. 103-335, signed September 30, 1994), Congress barred use of funds for
U.S. military participation in or around Rwanda after October 7, 1994, except for any
action necessary to protect U.S. citizens.
1995
Somalia. On March 1, 1995, President Clinton reported that on February 27, 1995,
1,800 combat-equipped U.S. armed forces personnel began deployment into Mogadishu,
Somalia, to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. forces assigned there to the United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). This mission was completed on March 3, 1995.
1996
Liberia. On April 11, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress that on April 9,
1996 due to the “deterioration of the security situation and the resulting threat to
American citizens” in Liberia he had ordered U.S. military forces to evacuate from that
country “private U.S. citizens and certain third-country nationals who had taken refuge
in the U.S. Embassy compound....”
1996
Liberia. On May 20, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress the continued
deployment of U.S. military forces in Liberia to evacuate both American citizens and
other foreign personnel, and to respond to various isolated “attacks on the American
Embassy complex” in Liberia. The President noted that the deployment of U.S. forces
would continue until there was no longer any need for enhanced security at the Embassy
and a requirement to maintain an evacuation capability in the country.
1996
Central African Republic. On May 23, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress
the deployment of U.S. military personnel to Bangui, Central African Republic, to
conduct the evacuation from that country of “private U.S. citizens and certain U.S.

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Government employees,” and to provide “enhanced security for the American Embassy
in Bangui.”
1996
Rwanda and Zaire. On December 2, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress that
to support the humanitarian efforts of the United Nations regarding refugees in Rwanda
and the Great Lakes Region of Eastern Zaire, he had authorized the use of U.S.
personnel and aircraft, including AC-130U planes to help in surveying the region in
support of humanitarian operations, although fighting still was occurring in the area, and
U.S. aircraft had been subject to fire when on flight duty.
1997
Congo and Gabon. On March 27, 1997, President Clinton reported to Congress that,
on March 25, 1997, a standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel had been
deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide enhanced security for American private
citizens, government employees, and selected third country nationals in Zaire, and to be
available for any necessary evacuation operation.
1997
Sierra Leone. On May 30, 1997, President Clinton reported to Congress that on May
29 and May 30, 1997, U.S. military personnel were deployed to Freetown, Sierra Leone,
to prepare for and undertake the evacuation of certain U.S. government employees and
private U.S. citizens.
1998
Guinea-Bissau. On June 12, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress that, on June
10, 1998, in response to an army mutiny in Guinea-Bissau endangering the U.S.
Embassy, U.S. government employees and citizens in that country, he had deployed a
standby
evacuation force of U.S. military personnel to Dakar, Senegal, to remove such
individuals, as well as selected third country nationals, from the city of Bissau. The
deployment continued until the necessary evacuations were completed.
1998
Kenya and Tanzania. On August 10, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress that
he had deployed, on August 7, 1998, a Joint Task Force of U.S. military personnel to
Nairobi, Kenya, to coordinate the medical and disaster assistance related to the
bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He also reported that teams
of 50-100 security personnel had arrived in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania, to enhance the security of the U.S. Embassies and citizens there.
1998
Afghanistan and Sudan. On August 21, 1998, by letter, President Clinton reported to
Congress that he had authorized airstrikes on August 20th against camps and installations
in Afghanistan and Sudan used by the Osama bin Laden terrorist organization. The
President did so based on what he viewed as convincing information that the bin Laden
organization was responsible for the bombings, on August 7, 1998, of the U.S.
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
1998
Liberia. On September 29, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress that on
September 27, 1998 he had, due to political instability and civil disorder in Liberia,
deployed a stand-by response and evacuation force of 30 U.S. military personnel to
augment the security force at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, and to provide for a rapid
evacuation capability, as needed, to remove U.S. citizens and government personnel
from the country.
1999
Kenya. On February 25, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress that he was
continuing to deploy U.S. military personnel in that country to assist in providing
security for the U.S. embassy and American citizens in Nairobi, pending completion of
renovations of the American embassy facility in Nairobi, subject of a terrorist bombing
in August 1998.
2000
Sierra Leone. On May 12, 2000, President Clinton, “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” reported to Congress that he had ordered a U.S. Navy patrol craft to deploy
to Sierra Leone to be ready to support evacuation operations from that country if needed.
He also authorized a U.S. C-17 aircraft to deliver “ammunition, and other supplies and
equipment” to Sierra Leone in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations there.
2001
Terrorism threat. On September 24, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to

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Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” and “Senate Joint Resolution
23” that in response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon he
had ordered the “deployment of various combat-equipped and combat support forces to
a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of operations.”
The President noted in efforts to “prevent and deter terrorism” he might find it necessary
to order additional forces into these and other areas of the world....” He stated that he
could not now predict “the scope and duration of these deployments,” or the “actions
necessary to counter the terrorist threat to the United States.”
2002
Terrorism threat. On September 20, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that U.S. “combat-equipped and combat
support forces” have been deployed to the Philippines since January 2002 to train with,
assist and advise the Philippines’ Armed Forces in enhancing their “counterterrorist
capabilities.” He added that U.S. forces were conducting maritime interception
operations in the Central and European Command areas to combat movement, arming
or financing of “international terrorists.” He also noted that U.S. combat personnel had
been deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help enhance the “counterterrorist capabilities”
of their armed forces.
2002
Cote d’Ivoire. On September 26, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” that in response to a rebellion in Cote d’Ivoire that
he had on September 25, 2002 sent U.S. military personnel into Cote d’Ivoire to assist
in the evacuation of American citizens and third country nationals from the city of
Bouake; and otherwise assist in other evacuations as necessary.
2003
Terrorism threat. On March 20, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” as well as P.L. 107-40, and “pursuant to” his authority
as Commander-in-Chief, that he had continued a number of U.S. military operations
globally in the war against terrorism. These military operations included ongoing U.S.
actions against al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan; collaborative anti-terror operations
with forces of Pakistan in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area; “maritime interception
operations on the high seas” in areas of responsibility of the Central and European
Commands to prevent terrorist movement and other activities; and military support for
the armed forces of Georgia and Yemen in counter-terrorism operations.
2003
Liberia. On June 9, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution,” that on June 8 he had sent about 35 combat-equipped U.S.
military personnel into Monrovia, Liberia, to augment U.S. Embassy security forces, to
aid in the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens if necessary. The President also noted that
he had sent about 34 combat-equipped U.S. military personnel to help secure the U.S.
Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and to assist in evacuation of American citizens if
required. They were expected to arrive at the U.S. embassy by June 10, 2003. Back-up
and support personnel were sent to Dakar, Senegal, to aid in any necessary evacuation
from either Liberia or Mauritania.
2003
Liberia. On August 13, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with
the War Powers Resolution,” that in response to conditions in Liberia, on August 11,
2003, he had authorized about 4,350 U.S. combat-equipped military personnel to enter
Liberian territorial waters in support of U.N. and West African States efforts to restore
order and provide humanitarian assistance in Liberia.
2003
Terrorism threat. On September 19, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that U.S. “combat-equipped and combat
support forces” continue to be deployed at a number of locations around the world as
part of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. American forces support anti-terrorism efforts in the
Philippines, and maritime interception operations continue on the high seas in the
Central, European, and Pacific Command areas of responsibility, to “prevent the
movement, arming, or financing of international terrorists.” He also noted that “U.S.
combat equipped and support forces” had been deployed to Georgia and Djibouti to help
in enhancing their “counterterrorist capabilities.”
2004
Terrorism/Bosnia and Haiti. On March 20, 2004, the President reported to Congress

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“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of
multiple on-going United States military deployments and operations “in support of the
global war on terrorism (including in Afghanistan),” as well as operations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Haiti. In this report, the President noted that U.S. anti-terror
related activities were underway in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and
Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be
deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,900 personnel); in Bosnia and
Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,100 personnel); and
approximately 1,800 military personnel were deployed in Haiti as part of the U.N.
Multinational Interim Force.
2004
Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia/Iraq. On November 4, 2004, the
President sent to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated
report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and
operations “in support of the global war on terrorism.” These deployments, support or
military operations include activities in Afghanistan, Djibouti, as well as Kenya,
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In this report, the President
noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia,
Yemen, and Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel
continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,800 personnel);
and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,000 personnel).
Meanwhile, he stated that the United States continues to deploy more than 135,000
military personnel in Iraq.
2005
Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia. On May 20, 2005, the President sent
to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving
details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in
support of the global war on terrorism,” as well as operations in Iraq, where about
139,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed. U.S. forces are also deployed in Kenya,
Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism
capabilities” of these nations. The President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped
military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR
(1,700 personnel). Approximately 235 U.S. personnel are also deployed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina as part of the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform
and perform operational tasks, such as counter-terrorism and supporting the International
Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.
2005
Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia/Iraq. On December 7, 2005, the
President sent to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated
report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and
operations “in support of the global war on terrorism,” and in support of the
Multinational Force in Iraq, where about 160,000 U.S. military personnel were
deployed. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region — Kenya,
Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti — assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities”
of these nations. The President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military
personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,700
personnel). Approximately 220 U.S. personnel were also deployed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina as part of the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform
and perform operational tasks, such as “counter-terrorism and supporting the
International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.”
2006
Terrorism threat/Kosovo/Bosnia/Iraq. On June 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of
multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the
war on terror,” and in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the Multinational
Force (M.F.) in Iraq. About 131,000 military personnel were deployed in Iraq. U.S.
forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support
necessary operations against al-Qaida and other international terrorists operating in the
region. U.S. military personnel continue to support the NATO-led Kosovo Force
(KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR was about 1,700 military personnel. The
NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was established in November 22, 2004 as a successor to

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its stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to assist in implementing
the peace agreement. Approximately 250 U.S. personnel were assigned to the NATO
Headquarters-Sarajevo to assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such
as “counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former
Yugoslavia.”
2006
Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia. On December 15, 2006, the President
sent to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report
giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in
support of the war on terror,” in Kosova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the
Multinational Force (M.F.) in Iraq. About 134,000 military personnel were deployed in
Iraq. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to
support necessary operations against al-Qaida and other international terrorists operating
in the region, including Yemen. U.S. military personnel continue to support the NATO-
led Kosova Force (KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR was about 1,700 military
personnel. The NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was established in November 22, 2004
as a successor to its stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to assist
in implementing the peace agreement. Approximately 100 U.S. personnel were assigned
to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo to assist in defense reform and perform operational
tasks, such as “counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the
Former Yugoslavia.”
Source: CRS Report RL32170, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2006, by Richard
F. Grimmett.

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Appendix 3. Acronyms
ACBSP
African Coastal and Border Security Program
ACOTA
African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACSS
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
AFRICOM
Africa Command
AMIS
African Union Mission in Sudan
AOR
Area of Responsibility
AU
African Union
CENTCOM
Central Command
CJTF-HOA
Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa
CTFP
Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program
COCOM
Combatant Command
DOD
Department of Defense
DOS
Department of State
ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States
EDA
Excess Defense Articles
EUCOM
European Command
FMF
Foreign Military Financing
FMS
Foreign Military Sales
FOC
Full Operating Capability
GPOI
Global Peace Operations Initiative
GWOT
Global War on Terrorism
IMET
International Military Education and Training
IO
Information Operations
IOC
Initial Operating Capability
JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFCOM
Joint Forces Command
JIACG
Joint Interagency Coordination Groups
LANTCOM
Atlantic Command
MIO
Maritime Interception Operation
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO
Non-Combatant Evacuation and Repatriation Operations
NORTHCOM
Northern Command
OEF-TS
Operation Enduring Freedom — Trans Sahara
OMA
USAID Office of Military Affairs
OSD
Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACOM
Pacific Command
POLAD
Foreign Policy Advisor
REDCOM
Readiness Command
SADC
Southern African Development Community
SOCOM
Special Operations Command
SOUTHCOM
Southern Command
STRATCOM
Strategic Command
STRICOM
Strike Command
TRANSCOM
Transportation Command
TSC
Theater Security Cooperation
TSCTI
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative
UCP
Unified Command Plan
UNITAF
U.S. United Task Force
UNOSOM
U.N. Operation in Somalia
USAID
United States Agency for International Development

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