Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and
the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
March 22, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34003
CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa
Summary
In recent years, analysts and U.S. policymakers have noted Africa’s growing strategic importance
to U.S. interests. Among those interests are the increasing importance of Africa’s natural
resources, particularly energy resources, and mounting concern over violent extremist activities
and other potential threats posed by under-governed spaces, such as maritime piracy and illicit
trafficking. In addition, there is ongoing concern for Africa’s many humanitarian crises, armed
conflicts, and more general challenges, such as the devastating effect of HIV/AIDS. In 2006,
Congress authorized a feasibility study on the creation of a new command for Africa to
consolidate current operations and activities on the continent under one commander. Congress has
closely monitored the command since its establishment.
On February 6, 2007, the Bush Administration announced the creation of a new unified
combatant command, U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM, to promote U.S. national security
objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters. Prior to AFRICOM’s establishment, U.S. military
involvement on the continent was divided among three commands: U.S. European Command
(EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). The
command’s area of responsibility (AOR) includes all African countries except Egypt. AFRICOM
was officially launched as a sub-unified command under EUCOM on October 1, 2007, and
became a stand-alone command on October 1, 2008.
DOD signaled its intention to locate AFRICOM’s headquarters on the continent early in the
planning process, but such a move is unlikely to take place for several years, if at all. The
command will operate from Stuttgart, Germany, for the foreseeable future. DOD has stressed that
there are no plans to have a significant troop presence on the continent. The East African country
of Djibouti, home to the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) at Camp
Lemonnier, provides the U.S. military’s only enduring infrastructure in Africa.
As envisioned by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM aims to promote U.S. strategic
objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen regional
stability and security through improved security capability and military professionalization. If
directed by national command authorities, its military operations would aim to deter aggression
and respond to crises. In March 2011, AFRICOM commenced Operation Odyssey Dawn to
protect civilians in Libya as part of multinational military operations authorized by the U.N.
Security Council under Resolution 1973.
The 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa and more recent attacks have highlighted the
threat of terrorism to U.S. interests on the continent. Political instability and civil wars have
created vast under-governed spaces, areas in which some experts allege that terrorist groups may
train and operate. The upsurge in piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa has been directly
attributed to ongoing instability in Somalia. Instability also heightens human suffering and retards
economic development, which may in turn threaten U.S. economic interests. Africa’s exports of
crude oil to the United States are now roughly equal to those of the Middle East, further
emphasizing the continent’s strategic importance. This report provides a broad overview of U.S.
strategic interests in Africa and the role of U.S. military efforts on the continent as they pertain to
the creation of AFRICOM. A discussion of AFRICOM’s mission, its coordination with other
government agencies, and its basing and manpower requirements is included.
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Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa
Contents
Issues for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 1
The DOD Proposal for an Africa Command ................................................................................ 4
Changes to the Unified Command Plan ................................................................................. 4
Combatant Command “Plus”? ............................................................................................... 4
An Imbalance Between Military and Civilian Capacities?...................................................... 6
Interagency Coordination ...................................................................................................... 7
Structure and Footprint.......................................................................................................... 9
Headquarters Location .................................................................................................. 10
Manpower..................................................................................................................... 11
Cost .............................................................................................................................. 12
U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa................................................................................................ 14
Current U.S. National Security Strategy Toward Africa ....................................................... 14
Oil and Global Trade..................................................................................................... 16
Maritime Security ......................................................................................................... 16
Armed Conflicts............................................................................................................ 17
Violent Extremism ........................................................................................................ 18
HIV/AIDS .................................................................................................................... 19
U.S. Military Assistance and Security Cooperation in Africa: An Expanding Role ..................... 19
Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) ................................................... 21
Security Assistance ............................................................................................................. 22
African Partnership Station (APS) ................................................................................. 23
Operation Enduring Freedom: Trans Sahara (OEF-TS)/Trans Sahara Counter-
Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP).................................................................................. 23
International Military Education and Training (IMET)................................................... 24
The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA)/
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) ................................................................. 24
Regional Perspectives ............................................................................................................... 25
Congressional Interest and Oversight Issues .............................................................................. 27
Figures
Figure 1. Area of Responsibility for Africa Command ............................................................... 30
Tables
Table 1. AFRICOM Funding from the Operations and Maintenance Budget .............................. 13
Appendixes
Appendix A. History of U.S. Military Involvement in Africa ..................................................... 31
Appendix B. Instances of the Use of U.S. Armed Forces in Africa, 1950-2009........................... 33
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Appendix C. Acronyms ............................................................................................................. 38
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 39
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Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa
Issues for Congress
On February 6, 2007, President George W. Bush formally announced the creation of a new
Unified Combatant Command (COCOM) for the African continent, reflecting Africa’s increasing
strategic importance to the United States.1 The Department of Defense (DOD) organizes its
command structure by dividing its activities among joint military commands based either on a
geographic or functional area of responsibility (AOR).2 With the creation of the new command,
DOD now has six geographic commands and four functional commands. Previously, U.S.
military involvement in Africa was divided among three geographic commands: European
Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM). The
command’s area of responsibility (AOR) includes all African countries except Egypt, which
remains in the AOR of CENTCOM. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was launched with initial
operating capability (IOC) as a sub-unified command under EUCOM on October 1, 2007, and
reached full operating capability (FOC) as a stand-alone unified command on October 1, 2008.
AFRICOM’s first commander, Army General William E. “Kip” Ward, former Deputy
Commander of EUCOM, retired in 2011, transferring command authority to General Carter F.
Ham, formerly Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe, on March 9.
Although the precise wording of AFRICOM’s mission statement has evolved since the command
was first announced, DOD officials have broadly suggested that the command’s mission is to
promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African partners to help strengthen stability
and security in the region through improved security capability and military professionalization.3
A key aspect of the command’s mission is its supporting role to other agencies’ and departments’
efforts on the continent. But like other combatant commands, AFRICOM is expected to oversee
military operations, when directed, to deter aggression and respond to crises.
Among AFRICOM’s current responsibilities is Operation Odyssey Dawn, the U.S. contribution to
a multilateral military effort to enforce a no-fly zone and protect civilians in Libya, in support of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973.4 Initial military operations, launched on March 19, 2011,
1 Formal efforts to establish the command began in mid-2006, under former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
DOD announced that it was considering AFRICOM in August 2006, and President Bush reportedly approved the
proposal on December 15, 2006. “Africa Command Plans Approved by Bush, DOD Officials Confirm,” Stars and
Stripes, December 30, 2006.
2 A unified combatant command is defined as “a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander
and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so
designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff,” according to DOD’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
3 When first announced, the draft mission statement was: “U.S. Africa Command promotes U.S. National Security
objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the
AOR. U.S. Africa Command leads the in-theater DOD response to support other USG agencies in implementing USG
security policies and strategies. In concert with other U.S. government agencies and other international partners, U.S.
Africa Command conducts theater security cooperation activities to assist in building security capacity and improve
accountable governance. As directed, U.S. Africa Command conducts military operations to deter aggression and
respond to crises.” Its current mission statement, approved by Secretary Gates, is “United States Africa Command, in
concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement
through military-to-military programs, military sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to
promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.”
4 For more information on U.S. policy toward Libya and related military operations, see CRS Report RL33142, Libya:
Unrest and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard and CRS Report R41701, No-Fly Zones: Strategic, Operational,
and Legal Considerations for Congress, coordinated by Jeremiah Gertler.
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included Tomahawk cruise missile attacks targeting Libyan command and control and air defense
facilities. General Ham currently serves as theater commander for the operation, whose tactical
operations are coordinated by a Joint Task Force under Admiral Sam Locklear. Locklear serves
jointly as Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa, and as Commander of Allied
Joint Force Command, Naples, which has operational responsibility for NATO missions in the
Mediterranean. The Commander of U.S. Air Forces Africa serves as Joint Force Air Component
Commander for the operation. AFRICOM, through Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn, has
supported the U.S. response to the evolving humanitarian emergency in Libya since March 4
through the delivery of relief supplies and evacuation of foreign nationals fleeing the violence.
Congress is closely monitoring developments related to the military operation in Libya.
The Bush Administration’s motivation for the creation of a new unified command for Africa
evolved in part out of concerns about DOD’s division of responsibility for Africa among three
geographic commands, which reportedly posed coordination challenges. Although some military
officials had advocated the creation of an Africa Command for over a decade, recent crises
highlighted the challenges created by “seams” between the COCOMs’ boundaries. One such
seam was located between Sudan (then within CENTCOM’s AOR), Chad and the Central African
Republic (then within EUCOM’s AOR), an area of increased instability. The United States, acting
both alone and a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has provided airlift
and training for African peacekeeping troops in the Darfur region of Sudan, and although
CENTCOM had responsibility for Sudan, much of the airlift and training was done by EUCOM.
In addition, close observers say that EUCOM and CENTCOM had become overstretched
particularly given the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Commander of EUCOM, whose AOR
included 92 countries prior to AFRICOM’s creation, testified before Congress that
the increasing strategic significance of Africa will continue to pose the greatest security
stability challenge in the EUCOM AOR. The large ungoverned area in Africa, HIV/AIDS
epidemic, corruption, weak governance, and poverty that exist throughout the continent are
challenges that are key factors in the security stability issues that affect every country in
Africa.5
His predecessor, General James L. Jones, who later served as President Barack Obama’s National
Security Advisor, pointed out in 2006 that EUCOM’s staff were spending more than half their
time on Africa issues, up from almost none three years prior.
AFRICOM has faced myriad challenges in its establishment, and outstanding issues remain as the
command moves forward. Some of these issues have been or may be addressed by Congress. Key
oversight questions relating to the command may include the following:
• What are the United States’ strategic interests in Africa?
• How are U.S. strategic interests influencing the size and scope of the U.S.
military footprint on the continent, and what effect will AFRICOM have on
future U.S. military operations in Africa?
• Is AFRICOM’s mission well defined?
5 Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2006.
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• The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) addresses steps the U.S. military
will take in order to improve potential “contingency response.” How has
AFRICOM prepared to meet potential contingencies on the continent?
• How are AFRICOM and U.S. military efforts in Africa perceived by Africans and
by other foreign countries, including China? Have those perceptions evolved
since the command was first announced?
• What are the costs associated with AFRICOM? How are these costs affected by
AFRICOM’s chosen headquarters location?
• What role, if any, do contractors play in AFRICOM’s operations?
• How closely do the State Department and DOD coordinate on plans for the
command and on U.S. military efforts in Africa in general? What are the Obama
Administration’s views on the development of AFRICOM’s interagency process?
Has AFRICOM’s enhanced integration of non-DOD USG agency personnel
proven effective in supporting the command’s mission?
• How is AFRICOM addressing the intelligence community’s need to realign its
resources directed toward the continent? What are AFRICOM’s current
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) needs?
• How is the Obama Administration ensuring that U.S. military efforts in Africa do
not overshadow or contradict U.S. diplomatic and development objectives?
Should conflict prevention activities be an essential part of DOD’s mandate, and
are they sustainable?
• What are the authorities granted to U.S. Chiefs of Mission regarding combatant
command activities in the countries to which they are posted, and are these
authorities sufficient?
• How prominent are counter-terrorism operations and programs, particularly
relative to the peacekeeping training and support components, in AFRICOM’s
mandate? Would some DOD-implemented counter-terrorism programs be more
appropriately implemented by other U.S. agencies?
• How do AFRICOM’s civil affairs teams contribute to the command’s mission?
• Are the legal authorities guiding DOD’s implementation of security cooperation
programs sufficient for AFRICOM to fulfill its mandate? Do any of these
authorities hinder the U.S. military’s ability to conduct these programs?
• Are there procedural challenges that hinder AFRICOM’s ability to conduct its
capacity building mandate in a timely manner?
• Does the lack of assigned forces affect AFRICOM’s ability to implement its
mandate?
• How can AFRICOM ensure that improvements in partner capacity are sustained?
• How does DOD ensure that the training and equipment provided to African
forces are not used to suppress internal dissent or threaten other nations?
This report provides information on AFRICOM’s mission, structure, interagency coordination,
and its basing and manpower requirements. It also gives a broad overview of U.S. strategic
interests in Africa and the role of U.S. military efforts on the continent.
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The DOD Proposal for an Africa Command
Changes to the Unified Command Plan
The mission of geographic commands is defined by a general geographic area of responsibility
(AOR), while the mission of functional commands is the worldwide performance of trans-
regional responsibilities. There are currently six geographic combatant commands: Africa
(AFRICOM), European (EUCOM), Pacific (PACOM), North (NORTHCOM), Southern
(SOUTHCOM), and Central (CENTCOM) Commands. There are four functional COCOMs,
including Transportation (TRANSCOM), Special Operations (SOCOM), Joint Forces (JFCOM)
and Strategic (STRATCOM) Commands. As mentioned above, DOD responsibilities for Africa
were divided among three geographic commands prior to October 2008. EUCOM, based in
Germany, had 42 African countries in its AOR;6 CENTCOM, based in Florida, covered eight
countries in East Africa, including those that make up the Horn of Africa; and PACOM, based in
Hawaii, was responsible for the islands of Comoros, Madagascar, and Mauritius.7
The creation of a new combatant command requires changes by the President to a classified
executive document, the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which establishes responsibilities and
areas of responsibilities for the commanders of combatant commands. Changes to the UCP are
usually initiated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who presents a
recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. After the Secretary’s review, a proposal is presented
to the President for approval. Prior to the advent of AFRICOM, the most recent Unified
Command to be established was NORTHCOM, which was created in 2002, after the September
11 terrorist attacks, to protect the U.S. homeland. The UCP is reviewed at least every two years,
as required by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433). The 2006
review recommended the establishment of an Africa Command, and the 2008 review, released in
December 2008, codified the command. Congress has, on occasion, taken legislative action that
has led to changes in the UCP.
Combatant Command “Plus”?
Some DOD officials have referred to Africa Command as a combatant command “plus.”8 This
implies that the command has all the roles and responsibilities of a traditional geographic
combatant command, including the ability to facilitate or lead military operations, but also
includes a broader “soft power” mandate aimed at building a stable security environment and
incorporates a larger civilian component from other U.S. government agencies to address those
challenges. According to the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, “America is now threatened
less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” The Department of Defense, identifying
instability in foreign countries as a threat to U.S. interests, issued DOD Directive 3000.05 in
2005, defining stability operations9 as a “core U.S. military mission” that “shall be given priority
6 Western Sahara is considered an “Area of Interest.”
7 For more information see http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand.
8 “Pentagon: AFRICOM Won’t Boost U.S. Troop Presence on the Continent,” Inside the Army, February 12, 2007.
9 DOD defines stability operations as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to
conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.”
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comparable to combat operations.”10 The 2008 National Defense Strategy further argues that “the
inability of many states to police themselves effectively or to work with their neighbors to ensure
regional security represents a challenge to the international system” and that “if left unchecked,
such instability can spread and threaten regions of interest to the United States, our allies, and
friends.” The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reiterates these points, noting,
“preventing conflict, stabilizing crises, and building security sector capacity are essential
elements of America’s national security approach.”
Although U.S. forces have traditionally focused on “fighting and winning wars,” defense strategy
is now evolving to look at conflict prevention, or “Phase Zero,” addressing threats at their
inception through increased emphasis on theater security cooperation (TSC) and capacity
building of allies.11 The 2010 QDR emphasized the strategic importance the Administration
places on security assistance, and was reiterated in the FY2011 DOD budget request:
U.S. security is inextricably tied to the effectiveness of our efforts to help partners and allies
build their own security capacity…. Although security assistance is not new, what has
fundamentally changed is the role that such assistance can play in providing security in
today’s environment. Threats to our security in the decades to come are more likely to
emanate from state weakness than from state strength. The future strategic landscape will
increasingly feature challenges in the ambiguous gray area that is neither fully war nor fully
peace. In such an environment, enabling our partners to respond to security challenges may
reduce risk to U.S. forces and extend security to areas we cannot reach alone.12
Based on the 2010 QDR, DOD has defined three strategic goals that represent the Department’s
“primary warfighting missions”: prevail in today’s wars; prevent and deter conflict; and prepare
for a wide range of contingencies.13
As General Bantz Craddock noted in 2006 when he was Commander of EUCOM, Africa in recent
years had posed “the greatest security stability challenge” to EUCOM, and “a separate command
for Africa would provide better focus and increased synergy in support of U.S. policy and
engagement.”14 In the view of AFRICOM’s architects and proponents, if U.S. agencies, both
military and civilian, are able to coordinate more efficiently and effectively both among
themselves as well as with their African partners and other international actors, they might be
more successful at averting more complex emergencies on the continent. The 2008 National
Defense Strategy stresses the military’s commitment to the concept of a new “Jointness,” with
10 DOD, Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,
November 28, 2005. The directive also clarifies that DOD sees its role in U.S. government plans for SSTR as a
supporting one: “Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian
professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain
order when civilians cannot do so.”
11 Some analysts view four traditional phases for a military campaign: deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive
operations, and transition. DOD officials have begun using a phrase, “Phase Zero” to encompass efforts prior to the
first phase aimed at preventing the conflict. For more information on the Phase Zero strategy and TSC, also known as
peacetime engagement, see General Charles Wald, “The Phase Zero Campaign,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 43, 4th
Quarter 2006, available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss.
12 DOD, The Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 73. The FY2011 Defense Budget Request is
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/budget.html.
13 DOD, FY2012 Defense Budget Request.
14 Advance Questions for General Bantz J. Craddock, USA, Nominee for United States European Command and
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2006.
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emphasis on developing a “whole-of-government” approach toward meeting national security
objectives, including greater civilian participation in military operations and greater
harmonization of best practices among interagency partners. The 2010 QDR repeats the need to
strengthen interagency partnerships. AFRICOM’s first commander, General Kip Ward, viewed
the U.S. military’s role in Africa as part of a “three-pronged” U.S. government approach, with
DOD, through AFRICOM, taking the lead on security issues, but playing a supporting role to the
Department of State, which conducts diplomacy, and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), which implements development programs.
Ward viewed AFRICOM as playing a greater role in development activities than other
commands, but emphasized that its role would remain one of supporting USAID’s development
and humanitarian objectives. Command guidance for AFRICOM’s humanitarian and civic
assistance activities stresses that such activities should complement, not duplicate, other U.S.
government activities, and should be used to strengthen security sector relationships. AFRICOM
policies also require such activities to meet both US foreign policy objectives and AFRICOM
theater strategic interests, and they must be approved by the Ambassador and USAID Mission
Director in the host country.15
The mission of Africa Command has been most closely compared to that of Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM), which is responsible for U.S. military efforts in Central and South America.
SOUTHCOM’s mission, as defined by DOD, is to ensure the forward defense of the United
States through security cooperation, counter-narcotics operations, humanitarian assistance, and
monitoring and support for human rights initiatives in the region. Like SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM
supervises an array of operations that relate to U.S. strategic interests but are not combat-related,
unlike EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM, which have traditionally been more focused on
preparing for potential warfighting operations. One DOD official suggested that the U.S.
government could consider the command a success “if it keeps American troops out of Africa for
the next 50 years.”16
An Imbalance Between Military and Civilian Capacities?
AFRICOM’s proactive approach to deterring or averting conflict reflects an evolution in DOD
strategy that has been outlined extensively in government documents, but operationalizing that
broad mandate may prove difficult.17 As one foreign policy expert points out, “the mission of
AFRICOM will necessarily require a major break with conventional doctrinal mentalities both
within the armed services themselves and between government agencies.”18 One former DOD
official described the mandate in the following words, “We want to help develop a stable
environment in which civil society can be built and that the quality of life for the citizenry can be
improved.”19 The prospect that the Department of Defense will focus less on fighting wars and
more on preventing them engenders mixed feelings elsewhere in the government. While many at
15 Interviews by author with AFRICOM officials in Germany in February 2009.
16 Comments by then-Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Ryan Henry at a Meeting of USAID’s Advisory
Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA) on May 23, 2007.
17 While the Phase Zero approach to ensuring national security has been accepted by much of the DOD leadership,
discussion is ongoing within the Department about how best to use the U.S. military in a pre-conflict role.
18 J. Peter Pham, “Getting AFRICOM Right,” World Defense Review, February 15, 2007.
19 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry From the Pentagon,” February 7, 2007.
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the State Department and USAID welcome the ability of DOD to leverage resources and to
organize complex operations, there also is concern that the military may overestimate its
capabilities as well as its diplomatic role, or pursue activities that are not a core part of its
mandate. Some argue that the highly unequal allocation of resources between the Departments of
Defense, State, and USAID, hinder their ability to act as “equal partners” and could lead to the
militarization of development and diplomacy.20
In August 2009, the State Department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) published a report
assessing the capacity of the Department’s Bureau of African Affairs (AF). In that report, the OIG
found that cuts in State Department resources and personnel after the end of the Cold War led to a
decline in management and experienced staffing at U.S. missions on the African continent. The
subsequent dramatic increase in funding for HIV/AIDS programs and new development
initiatives, like the Millennium Challenge Corporation, combined with an increase in funding for
military programs in many African countries, left U.S. embassy personnel overwhelmed and
acutely understaffed. Among the OIG’s many findings, the report determined that the U.S.
military “is stepping into a void created by a lack of resources for traditional development and
public diplomacy.”21 The report also suggested that the creation and role of AFRICOM was
“misunderstood at best, if not resented and challenged by AF.” Inadequate communication
between the Bureau and embassies led to confusion about AFRICOM’s role and the parameters of
ambassadors’ authority in the beginning, although the OIG found that “there is every indication
that the new Assistant Secretary and the AFRICOM Commander are working cooperatively.”
Other reports produced recently by non-governmental organizations like Refugees International
reiterate the OIG report’s findings, and, like the OIG, provide an array of recommendations for
resolving what they determine to be an imbalance between civilian and military capacity in U.S.
foreign affairs.22 DOD references the current disparity in capacities in the 2010 QDR, noting that
the lack of adequate civilian capacity has made prevailing in current conflicts significantly
more challenging. Unfortunately, despite a growing awareness of the need and real efforts
throughout the government to address it, adequate civilian capacity will take time and
resources to develop and is unlikely to materialize in the near term.
Interagency Coordination
The Bush Administration suggested that its proposal for AFRICOM represented an evolution in
the involvement of other U.S. government agencies in the DOD planning process. Interagency
coordination of U.S. security policy involves a variety of offices and actors in Washington, DC,
and in the field. In Washington, the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)
serves as the primary liaison for the Department with DOD. Its counterpart at DOD is the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA). USAID created the
Office of Military Affairs (OMA) within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian
Assistance (DCHA) in 2005 to coordinate agency policy with DOD and the State Department for
humanitarian relief and post conflict reconstruction efforts. USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign
20 See, for example, Lisa Schirch and Aaron Kishbaugh, “Leveraging ‘3D’ Security: From Rhetoric to Reality,”
Foreign Policy in Focus, Policy Brief Vol. 11, No. 2, November 15, 2006.
21 U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, Report of
Inspection: The Bureau of African Affairs, Report No. ISP-I-09-63, August 2009.
22 Ron Capps, Drawing on the Full Strength of America: Seeking Greater Civilian Capacity on U.S. Foreign Affairs,
Refugees International, September 2009.
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Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Operations Liaison Unit (OLU), and the geographic bureaus’
missions manage the operational coordination with DOD for those activities.
At the regional level, State’s PM Bureau appoints senior officials known as Foreign Policy
Advisors (POLADs) to serve as advisors to combatant commanders and other military leaders to
“provide policy support regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of the commanders’
military responsibilities.”23 Like the State Department, USAID places OFDA military liaison
officers with COCOMs that routinely provide humanitarian and disaster relief coordination;
OMA also currently has policy advisors known as Senior Development Advisors (SDAs) in
several commands, including AFRICOM.
At the country level, DOD assigns senior defense officials/defense attachés (SDO/DATT) to serve
as military liaisons at embassies around the world. These officials serve on interagency embassy
Country Teams, which are led by the U.S. ambassador in each country. Many embassies also have
an Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), which reports to the ambassador and the COCOM, to
coordinate security assistance activities with the host country’s defense forces.24 USAID OFDA
deploys military liaison officers as part of a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to
affected countries during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations when there is a
civil-military component involved.
AFRICOM has sought greater interagency coordination with the State Department, USAID, and
other government agencies, including a larger non-DOD civilian staff (initially proposed at as
much as one quarter of the total staff), than has been traditional with other combatant commands.
Those involved in the creation of AFRICOM aimed to build upon initiatives in NORTHCOM and
SOUTHCOM to improve the interagency process, but a former EUCOM Commander suggested
that this command could be “the pioneer” for a new approach that the other commands might
later adopt. In the development of AFRICOM’s first theater strategy and supporting campaign
plan, for example, the leadership sought to involve other U.S. government agencies at the earliest
stages of the planning process, an effort that DOD hopes to employ more broadly as its new
planning approach.25 Non-DOD civilian staff positions within AFRICOM include senior
leadership positions, senior advisors or liaisons (including the Foreign Policy Advisor, a Senior
Development Advisor, an OFDA liaison, and a senior Treasury Department representative), and
subject-matter experts embedded with the headquarters staff. During his confirmation hearing,
General Ward testified that he did not believe any statutory changes were necessary to incorporate
“detailed” non-DOD personnel into the command.26 Officials report that filling those interagency
positions has been more challenging than first anticipated. Although lawyers from several
departments have worked to facilitate the assignment of non-DOD civilians to AFRICOM, fewer
than 40 have been permanently assigned.
23 For more information on Foreign Policy Advisors, see http://www.state.gov/t/pm/polad/.
24 These offices are also sometimes referred to as Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC) or Security Assistance
Organizations (SAOs). There are currently 18 OSCs in Africa (not including Egypt) and 34 defense attachés in U.S.
embassies on the continent. AFRICOM has proposed to open 3 new OSCs in FY2011 and 7 in FY2012. Changes to the
titles and responsibilities of defense attachés and security assistance officers were made in DOD Directive 5105.75 in
December 2007.
25 A theater campaign plan translates national or theater strategy into operational concepts.
26 As in the case of POLADs, DOD and the respective department or agency will establish an agreement regarding the
relationship between the staff member and the command.
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A senior U.S. diplomat, Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates, served as AFRICOM’s first Deputy to
the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA), a new post equivalent to that of a deputy
commander. Yates, who had previously served as U.S. ambassador to Burundi and Ghana and
more recently as the Foreign Policy Advisor to EUCOM, was the first non-DOD civilian to be
integrated into the command structure of a unified command. The DCMA directs many of
AFRICOM’s civil-military plans and programs, as well as its various security cooperation
initiatives, and is responsible for ensuring that policy development and implementation are
consistent with U.S. foreign policy. Ambassador Yates left AFRICOM to become the Senior
Director for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform at the National Security Council in 2009
(she now serves as Senior Director for Africa); J. Anthony Holmes, a senior U.S. diplomat,
replaced Yates as DCMA. Navy Vice Admiral Robert Moeller, who led AFRICOM’s transition
team, served as the DCMA’s military equivalent, Deputy to the Commander for Military
Operations (DCMO). Vice Admiral Charles J. Leidig, Jr. assumed DCMO duties in August 2010.
The DCMO is responsible for the implementation and execution of AFRICOM’s programs and
operations. To maintain the military chain of command, one deputy commander position is to be
held by a military officer, but AFRICOM’s architects envisaged that the DCMA role would
continue to be held by a Senior Foreign Service Officer. Both Deputies have supervisory
authority for the civilian and military personnel in their respective offices.
Structure and Footprint
DOD officials emphasize that AFRICOM remains under development; some details regarding the
command’s structure and footprint are still being reviewed. A decision on AFRICOM’s final
headquarters location has been postponed to 2012, and a move to the continent may not occur for
several years, if at all. DOD officials initially considered the establishment of sub-regional offices
in Africa but reportedly received resistance from the State Department, based on concerns related
to chief-of-mission authority. Officials stress that there are no plans to establish any new military
bases in Africa.27 As a Bush Administration defense official once asserted, the creation of
AFRICOM reflected an “organizational change,” rather than a change in “basing structure or
troop positions on the continent.”28
At present, DOD’s Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has a semi-
permanent troop presence at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti with more than 2,000 U.S. military and
civilian personnel in residence. The facility provides support for U.S. military operations in the
Gulf of Aden and supports DOD objectives in Yemen.29 The U.S. military is currently in a five-
year lease with the Djiboutian government for Lemonnier, with the option to extend the lease
through 2020. The command authority for CJTF-HOA, formerly under CENTCOM, has been
transferred to AFRICOM, and Camp Lemonnier continues to be used as an enduring Forward
Operating Site.30 AFRICOM’s other Forward Operating Site is on the United Kingdom’s
Ascension Island in the south Atlantic. U.S. military facilities in Rota, Spain; Sigonella, Italy;
Aruba, Lesser Antilles; Souda Bay, Greece; and Ramstein, Germany, serve as logistic support
facilities. The U.S. military also has access to a number of foreign air bases and ports in Africa
27 U.S. military facilities on the island of Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, will remain under the AOR of PACOM.
28 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry From the Pentagon,” April 23, 2007.
29 “U.S. Africa Command 2010 Posture Statement,” Statement of General Ward before the House Armed Services
Committee on March 10, 2010.
30 The mission transfer process from CENTCOM to AFRICOM for CJTF-HOA responsibilities continued into 2009.
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and has established “bare-bones” facilities maintained by local troops in several locations. The
U.S. military used facilities in Kenya in the 1990s to support its intervention in Somalia and
continues to use them today to support counter-terrorism activities. DOD refers to these facilities
as “lily pads,” or Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs), and has access to locations in Algeria,
Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Tunisia,
Uganda, and Zambia.
Headquarters Location
There has been considerable debate over where to ultimately base AFRICOM. Prior to
AFRICOM’s establishment, EUCOM was the only geographic combatant command with
headquarters located outside of the United States. Given that the majority of countries in
AFRICOM’s AOR were previously under the responsibility of EUCOM, and that consequently a
majority of the personnel working on Africa issues were already based in EUCOM’s headquarters
in Stuttgart, Germany, DOD determined that AFRICOM’s headquarters would be initially located
at the American base in Germany as well.31 In November 2008, the Secretary of Defense
announced that the decision on whether to move the command out of Germany would be
postponed until 2012 to allow the command to gain greater understanding of its long-term
operational requirements.
Prior to Secretary Gates’ announcement of the command’s establishment, there was speculation
that an Africa Command might be permanently located in Europe, or in the United States, like the
other commands. Some DOD officials have argued that AFRICOM’s headquarters should be
located in Africa. Locating the headquarters within the AOR would have several benefits in terms
of proximity. Flight time from Germany to Nairobi, Kenya, for example, is approximately eight
hours, and flight time from Germany to Johannesburg, South Africa, is approximately 11 hours.
Flight time from Washington, DC, to the African Union (AU) headquarters in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, is approximately 16-20 hours. Deploying AFRICOM’s staff in close geographic
proximity to their African counterparts and to U.S. diplomatic missions on the continent could
enable more efficient interaction.
Those who have advocated locating Africa Command on the continent faced some initial negative
reactions from Africans. There are concerns, both domestically and internationally, that moving
the command to Africa might be the first step in an alleged U.S. military agenda to establish a
larger footprint on the continent. DOD officials stressed early in the headquarters discussion that
the location in question would be a staff headquarters rather than a troop headquarters, and
suggested that they might consider a dispersed regional headquarters model, with several small
locations spread across the continent to lessen the U.S. presence and burden in any one country.32
Some have suggested that AFRICOM try to co-locate such dispersed facilities with the
headquarters of the continent’s regional and sub-regional organizations to link AFRICOM with
the AU’s nascent regional security architecture (see “Security Assistance” below). General Ward
reportedly found AFRICOM’s dispersed presence among its Offices of Security Cooperation
(OSCs) in countries across the continent to be sufficient in terms of an on-continent presence.
31 DOD spent approximately $140 million between FY2007 and FY2009 to renovate the Stuttgart facilities.
32 Comments by then-Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Ryan Henry at a Public Meeting of USAID’s
Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA) on May 23, 2007. DOD’s FY2009 budget request sought
funding for a “limited presence on the African continent with the establishment of two of five regional offices,” but
plans for those two offices were postponed and funding for the offices was cut by Congress.
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Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa
AFRICOM already has military liaison officers (LNOs) at the African Union headquarters in
Ethiopia, with ECOWAS in Nigeria, at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training
Center in Ghana, and the International Peace Support Training Center in Kenya. Those posts are
likely to expand, and additional liaison offices may be attached to other regional organizations.
The Department of Defense has developed criteria for determining the ultimate location(s) for
AFRICOM in coordination with the Department of State, should a decision be made to move
from Stuttgart. Several U.S. states have offered to host the command, and DOD has conducted
preliminary assessments of some sites. Through regular consultations with African countries that
have a security relationship with the United States, U.S. officials reportedly received offers to
host the command from several governments, including, most publicly, Liberia. Other strategic
partners, such as South Africa and Algeria, expressed reluctance to host the command, possibly
out of concern over a permanent foreign military presence within their borders. In some countries,
there are concerns that an American military presence might embolden domestic terrorist groups.
Some African governments that consider themselves to be regional hegemons may perceive a
permanent American military presence, whether staffed by civilians or troops, to be a rival for
political or military power in their sphere of influence.
At the forefront of DOD considerations in determining a host country (or countries), should a
decision to move to the continent be made, would be providing for the safety and security of over
1,000 American personnel (and their families) who staff the command. Living standards in Africa
are among the lowest in the world, and DOD would be expected to choose a politically stable
location on the continent with good access to health care and schools and relatively low levels of
corruption. Ease of access to regional and international transportation, along with proximity to the
African Union, African regional organizations, and U.S. government hubs on the continent would
also be considered. Locating U.S. soldiers permanently in a foreign country would be predicated
on the host country’s approval of a Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA), a legal document
negotiated by the State Department to define the legal status of U.S. personnel and property while
in that country, and a bilateral non-surrender agreement, commonly known as an Article 98
Agreement, to protect American servicemen from prosecution by the International Criminal
Court. Some advocacy groups hope that DOD would consider potential host countries’ human
rights record among other criteria. In March 2009 testimony, General Ward indicated that while
there was still a potential for the headquarters to be located in Africa, such a move was neither
necessary nor sought after at this time.33 General Ham, in his confirmation hearing, testified that
he plans to commence an assessment of the options for a permanent headquarters location.
Manpower
Manning a new command is a challenging task, particularly in a time when defense resources and
personnel have been stretched thin by engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the number of
personnel needed to staff a combatant command headquarters varies, DOD officials estimate that
the average command ranges from 500 to more than 1,000 personnel (exclusive of supporting
intelligence architecture).34 AFRICOM was authorized to have just over 1,300 headquarters staff
by October 2008, including intelligence and other support requirements.35 Sourcing manpower to
33 Testimony before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee at a hearing on the U.S. Africa
Command, March 19, 2009.
34 These figures do not necessarily include contractors working at command headquarters.
35 AFRICOM had 628 military positions, 318 DOD civilian positions, and 13 interagency positions (not including
(continued...)
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Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa
facilitate the aggressive timeline to meet full operational capacity proved difficult, according to
AFRICOM officials, and less than 75% of these positions were filled by the FOC date. An
estimated 270 personnel for the command were transferred from EUCOM, CENTCOM, and
PACOM. As of November 2010, AFRICOM had 1,170 staff at its headquarters, and several
hundred additional staff providing intelligence support. The armed services (Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marines) component headquarters each also have between 100-200 staff that support
AFRICOM.36 In essence, the services must pay two manpower bills—they must fill AFRICOM
headquarters requirements and also staff the service component headquarters.37 The service
components currently have no assigned forces for activities in Africa and instead must rely on
forces provided through the Global Force Management and Request for Forces system.
AFRICOM estimates that the average U.S. military footprint on the continent (exclusive of
Egypt) is approximately 3,500 troops. This includes an estimated 2,000 troops at CJTF-HOA and
the rotational presence of forces participating in various exercises, such as the annual
communications interoperability exercise African Endeavor; operations, such as the
counterterrorism effort Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans-Sahara; theater security cooperation
activities, such as the Navy’s Africa Partnership Station; and various conferences and meetings.38
Cost
Start-up costs for Africa Command in FY2007 were approximately $51 million, and the nascent
command’s budget for FY2008 (October 1, 2007, to September 30, 2008) was estimated at
$154.6 million. The Bush Administration’s FY2009 budget request included $389 million for the
command to cover (1) operation of the headquarters in Stuttgart, (2) an AFRICOM intelligence
capability, (3) a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) for AFRICOM, (4) operational
support aircraft, (5) the establishment of two regional offices on the continent (see above), and (6)
training, exercises and theater security cooperation activities. On September 30, 2008, President
Bush signed into law H.R. 2638, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329). Under this legislation, which included defense
appropriations, AFRICOM received $53 million less than requested. DOD officials suggest some
items trimmed from the budget were restored following negotiations with the relevant
committees, although the command lost some requested funding due to across-the-board cuts to
the operations and maintenance account.39 While the AFRICOM reduction was not as steep as
was proposed in the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee version of the bill, and the
joint explanatory statement accompanying the final legislation expressed support for AFRICOM,
(...continued)
liaison positions) assigned on October 1, 2008 (FOC). These figures were short of the approved FY2009 targets: 639
military positions, 665 DOD civilian positions, and 52 interagency positions. For more information, see Government
Accountability Office, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and Challenges Associated with
Establishing the U.S. Africa Command, GAO-08-947T, July 15, 2008.
36 AFRICOM’s four service component commands are: U.S. Army Africa (USARAF); U.S. Naval Forces, Africa
(NAVAF); U.S. Marine Forces, Africa (MARFORAF); and U.S. Air Forces Africa/ the 17th Air Force (AFAFRICA).
Its joint theater special operations command is called Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA). They are
located, respectively, in Vicenza, Italy; Naples, Italy; Stuttgart, Germany; Ramstein, Germany; and Stuttgart, Germany.
37 These estimates were provided to the author by AFRICOM officials in November 2010.
38 Information provided to the author by AFRICOM in November 2010.
39 For more information, see CRS Report RL34473, Defense: FY2009 Authorization and Appropriations, by Pat
Towell, Stephen Daggett, and Amy Belasco. The identified cuts in FY2009 targeted the proposed regional offices, the
TSOC, and DOD salaries for interagency personnel. In interviews with the author in December 2008, DOD officials
reported that a compromise had been reached on the cut to salaries for interagency personnel.
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the statement also insisted that the State Department and USAID should “play a more important
role in this new organization supported with the appropriate manpower and funding required.”
AFRICOM’s budget for FY2010 was estimated at $295 million, slightly higher than the $278
million originally requested.40 Among the items identified for directed funding in the FY2010
request were (1) a new program of record, Air and Maritime Sector Development (AMSD); (2) an
expansion of Operation Objective Voice (OOV; see below); (3) a Standing Joint Forces
Headquarters (SJFHQ); (4) strategic communications; (5) satellite communications; (6) additional
manpower (16 billets) for AFRICOM’s Special Operations Command and another 125 billets (55
military and 70 civilian billets for the SJFHQ, OSCs, and the command’s Joint Operations
Center).41 The request also included funding for four new Offices of Security Cooperation in
Cameroon, Chad, Libya, and Rwanda, and expansion of existing offices in Kenya, Liberia, and
Morocco. The Department’s FY2010 military construction request included $41.8 million for
Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti.42 CJTF-HOA operations, estimated at $80 million in FY2010, have
been classified as Overseas Contingency Operations and have been funded separately from other
AFRICOM activities, primarily by the Navy.43 To date they have been funded through emergency
supplemental appropriations, rather than in DOD’s base budget. DOD’s budget request for
AFRICOM for FY2011, $296.2 million, was similar to that of FY2010. The FY2011 DOD base
budget does not include funding for CJTF-HOA or base operations at Camp Lemonnier.
Table 1. AFRICOM Funding from the Operations and Maintenance Budget
($ in millions)
Operation
Theater
Enduring
Security
Freedom
Operation
Standing
Cooperation/
HQ
Trans-
Objective
Joint
Office of
Operational
Mission
Sahara
Voice
Forces
Security
Support
Support
(OEF-TS)
(OOV)
HQ
Cooperation
Total
FY2010
74 87 47 8 25 38 278
request
FY2010
73.7 106.9 46.3 4.8 25.4 38 295.2
estimate
FY2011
71.8 116 49.5 5.6 14.6 38.7 296.2
request
Source: U.S. Africa Command.
40 The command’s FY2010 budget estimate of $274.8 million was understated by $20.4 million due to an erroneous
budget reduction that has been restored by the Army in FY2010.
41 S.Rept. 111-74 accompanying H.R. 3326, the FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act, recommended significant cuts to
the COCOMs’ Information Operations budgets, including cuts to AFRICOM’s Operation Objective Voice. The Senate
Report also recommended a $5 million cut in the command’s counternarcotics operations; H.Rept. 111-230
accompanying H.R. 3326 recommended a $2 million cut in CN operations. The House Report advocated in increase in
AFRICOM’s budget for maritime security capacity building, recommending an additional $20.5 million for the Africa
Partnership Station.
42 Camp Lemonnier received $68.6 million in military construction projects in FY2008, $31.4 million in FY2009, and
an estimated $41.8 million in FY2010. DOD requested $51.6 million for FY2011, part of which would fund
construction of a Horn of Africa Joint Operations Center. The FY2012 request includes $89.5 million for Lemonnier.
43 Requested funding for CJTF-HOA operations in FY2010 was $60 million; requested funding for base operating costs
and facilities modification at Lemonnier was $249 million. The camp’s FY2010 budget is estimated at $238 million.
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AFRICOM received approximately $30 million in FY2009 for operational airlift support,
including $17.5 million for the 17th Air Force for military airlift and $12.5 million for
TRANSCOM to contract staff travel. AFRICOM leadership and staff have reported challenges
posed by the routing and scheduling of commercial airlines traveling on the continent. DOD’s
FY2010 budget request included $75 million for airlift, in addition to a C-37 that would be
dedicated to AFRICOM in FY2011 and $100 million for a C-40, to be delivered in FY2012. The
Air Force’s FY2011 budget included a $5 million increase for AFRICOM airlift support.
U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa
Issues on the African continent have not historically been identified as strategic priorities for the
U.S. military, and U.S. military engagement in Africa has been sporadic.44 According to one
defense analyst, “during the Cold War, United States foreign policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa
had little to do with Africa.”45 After the fall of the Soviet Union, many U.S. policymakers
considered the U.S. military’s role and responsibilities on the continent to be minimal. In 1995,
the Department of Defense outlined its view of Africa in its U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-
Saharan Africa, asserting that “ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in
Africa.”46 In 1998, following terrorist attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa, the United
States conducted a retaliatory attack against a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan, that
Clinton Administration officials initially contended was producing precursors for chemical
weapons for al Qaeda. The embassy bombings, and the retaliatory strike against Sudan, are
considered by many analysts to be a turning point in U.S. strategic policy toward the region.
Africa and the Unified Command Plan
Africa was not included in the U.S. military command structure until 1952, when several North African countries,
including Libya, were added to the responsibilities of U.S. European Command because of their historic relationship
with Europe. The rest of the continent remained outside the responsibility of any command until 1960, when Cold
War concerns over Soviet influence in newly independent African countries led the Department of Defense to
include Sub-Saharan Africa in the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), leaving North Africa in EUCOM. The Unified
Command Plan was revised again in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy, and responsibility for Sub-Saharan Africa was
transferred to a newly-created Strike Command (STRICOM), which was responsible for operations in the Middle
East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. STRICOM was redesignated as Readiness Command (REDCOM) in 1971,
and its responsibility for Africa was dissolved, leaving Sub-Saharan Africa out of the combatant command structure
until 1983. Under the Reagan Administration, U.S. military involvement in Africa was largely dominated by Cold War
priorities, and the Administration’s “containment” policy led DOD to divide responsibility for Africa into its
configuration among three geographic commands.
Current U.S. National Security Strategy Toward Africa
The Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy of 2002 reflected a need for a more
focused strategic approach toward the African continent: “In Africa, promise and opportunity sit
side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the
United States—preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror.”
44 For an overview of the history of U.S. military involvement in Africa, see Appendix A. Appendix B provides a list
of instances in which U.S. military forces have deployed in conflict situations in Africa since World War II.
45 Letitia Lawson, “U.S. Africa Policy Since the Cold War,” Strategic Insights, Vol. VI, Issue 1, January 2007.
46 The report did, however, note significant U.S. political and humanitarian interests. DOD Office of International
Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, August 1995.
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To address these challenges, the document asserted that U.S. security strategy must focus on
building indigenous security and intelligence capabilities through bilateral engagement and
“coalitions of the willing.” The 2006 National Security Strategy went further, identifying Africa
as “a high priority” and “recogniz(ing) that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to
strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective
democracies.”
President Obama has affirmed his view of Africa’s strategic importance in numerous policy
documents and public statements. In a speech in Ghana in July 2009, he said,
When there is genocide in Darfur or terrorists in Somalia, these are not simply African
problems, they are global security challenges, and they demand a global response.... And let
me be clear: our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold on the continent,
but on confronting these common challenges to advance the security of America, Africa, and
the world.47
The Obama Administration’s first National Security Strategy, issued in 2010, stresses the need to
“embrace effective partnerships” on the continent, highlighting a number of priorities, including
“access to open markets, conflict prevention, global peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and the
protection of vital carbon sinks.” The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review asserts that the
United States’ efforts to address transnational challenges in the region “will hinge on partnering
with African states… to conduct capacity building and peacekeeping operations, prevent
extremism, and address humanitarian crises.” The 2011 National Military Strategy also stresses
the importance of partnerships:
The United Nations and African Union play a critical role in humanitarian, peacekeeping and
capacity-building efforts, which help preserve stability, facilitate resolutions to political
tensions that underlie conflicts, and foster broader development. To support this, the Joint
Force will continue to build partner capacity in Africa, focusing on critical states where the
threat of terrorism could pose a threat to our homeland and interests. We will continue to
counter violent extremism in the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia and the Trans-Sahel.
We will work in other areas to help reduce the security threat to innocent civilians. We must
identify and encourage states and regional organizations that have demonstrated a leadership
role to continue to contribute to Africa's security. We will help facilitate the African Union’s
and the Regional Economic Communities’ development of their military capacity, including
the African Stand-by Force, to address the continent’s many security challenges.
The establishment of AFRICOM reflects an evolution in policymakers’ perceptions of the
continent’s security challenges and U.S. strategic interests there. In 2004 an advisory panel of
Africa experts authorized by Congress to propose new policy initiatives identified five factors
that have shaped increased U.S. interest in Africa in the past decade: oil, global trade, armed
conflicts, terror, and HIV/AIDS.48 They suggested that these factors had led to a “conceptual shift
to a strategic view of Africa.”49
47 Speech by President Barack Obama to the Ghanaian Parliament, July 11, 2009.
48 Some U.S. officials have argued that environmental security should be added as a national security issue, particularly
as it relates to Africa. One DOD official testified before Congress that climate change served as a “threat multiplier” in
Africa, using Nigeria, Sudan, and Somalia as examples and asserting, “beyond the more conventional threats we
traditionally address, I believe we must now also prepare to respond to the consequences of dramatic population
migrations, pandemic health issues and significant food and water shortages due to the possibility of significant climate
change.” Testimony of General Charles Wald, Member, Military Advisory Board, at a hearing on Climate Change and
(continued...)
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Oil and Global Trade
The United States has sought to increase its economic relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, and
trade between the United States and Africa has tripled since 1990. In 2000, the Clinton
Administration introduced a comprehensive U.S. trade and investment policy for the continent in
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA; Title I, P.L. 106-200). AGOA has been
amended by Congress on several occasions. Natural resources, particularly energy resources,
dominate the products imported from Africa under AGOA. Africa now supplies the United States
with roughly the same amount of crude oil as the Middle East.50
Nigeria is Africa’s largest supplier of oil, and is regularly the fifth-largest global supplier of oil to
the United States. Instability in the country’s Niger Delta region has reduced output periodically
by over 25%. World oil prices have been affected by Nigerian political developments and by
periodic attacks on pipelines and other oil facilities in the Delta. Oil prices have likewise been
affected by recent instability in Libya. Former President Bush announced in his 2006 State of the
Union Address his intention to “to replace more than 75 percent of our oil imports from the
Middle East by 2025,”51 echoing a commitment made in 2002 “to strengthen [U.S.] energy
security and the shared prosperity of the global economy by working with our allies, trading
partners, and energy producers to expand the sources and types of global energy supplied,
especially in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region.”52 A senior
DOD official reportedly commented in 2003 that “a key mission for U.S. forces (in Africa) would
be to ensure that Nigeria’s oil fields ... are secure.”53 In spite of conflict in the Niger Delta and
other oil producing areas, the potential for deep water drilling in the Gulf of Guinea is high,
although not without challenges.54
Maritime Security
Africa’s coastlines, particularly along the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden, and the west Indian
Ocean, have been highly susceptible to illegal fishing, illegal trafficking, and piracy in recent
years.55 The inability of African governments to adequately police the region’s waters has allowed
criminal elements to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons and dump hazardous waste, and has
opened maritime commerce and off-shore oil production facilities to the threat of piracy and
sabotage.56 The growing problem of narcotics trafficking in West Africa, estimated by the U.N.
(...continued)
National Security Threats by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 9, 2007.
49 Walter H. Kansteiner III and J. Stephen Morrison, Rising U.S. Stakes in Africa: Seven Proposals to Strengthen U.S.-
Africa Policy, CSIS, May 2004.
50 Data on U.S. crude oil imports is compiled by the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration, and
is available at http://www.eia.doe.gov.
51 The White House, “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” January 31, 2006.
52 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002.
53 “In Massive Shift, U.S. Is Planning To Cut Size of Military in Germany,” Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2003.
54 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Is Offshore West Africa the World’s Next Frontier for Oil?” International
Energy Outlook 2010, July 27, 2010.
55 According to the International Maritime Bureau, the waters off the coast of Nigeria had the highest number of pirate
attacks worldwide in 2007, but attacks by Somali pirates have been the most numerous since 2008.
56 See, for example, The Atlantic Council, Advancing U.S., African and Global Interests: Security and STability in the
Maritime Domain,” November 30, 2010, and Michael Baker and Mthuli Ncube, “Beyond Pirates and Drugs: Unlocking
(continued...)
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Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to be a transit point for almost one-third of all cocaine
annually consumed in Europe, has become an area of increasing concern to policymakers. In
2005, the Bush Administration introduced its National Strategy for Maritime Security, identifying
the freedom of the seas and the facilitation and defense of commerce as top national priorities and
indicating plans to fund border and coastal security initiatives with African countries.57
The United States government, represented by members of AFRICOM (and previously EUCOM),
the U.S. Navy, the State Department, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), has
engaged its West African partners in a number of ministerial conferences on maritime security,
and is currently conducting several activities to increase the capability of African navies to
monitor and enforce maritime laws. AFRICOM coordinates with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to implement the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP), a
cooperative effort in which African Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET) embark on U.S.
and host nation vessels to conduct boardings, search, seizure and arrests in African waters. The
U.S. Navy has increased its operations in the Gulf of Guinea to enhance security in the region,
although those operations have been sporadic.58 Through its Global Fleet Stations (GFS) concept,
the Navy has committed itself to more persistent, longer-term engagement (see information on the
African Partnership Station in “Security Assistance” below). In the waters off the coast of East
Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is working with the Navy
and with coalition partners in CENTCOM’s Coalition Task Force 151 (CTF-151), which conducts
maritime security operations to protect shipping routes in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the
Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean.59 Coalition and U.S. naval forces have had
numerous engagements with pirates in these waters.
Armed Conflicts
Political conflict and instability in parts of Africa have caused human suffering on a massive scale
and undermined economic, social, and political development.60 Although the number of conflicts
in Africa has decreased in recent years, the continent is home to a majority of the United Nations’
peace operations, with six missions currently underway (the African Union implements another
peace operation, AMISOM, in Somalia).61 Four African countries—Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and
South Africa—have consistently ranked in the top 10 troop contributing countries to U.N.
peacekeeping operations. African militaries also contribute troops to peace operations conducted
by the African Union and regional organizations like ECOWAS. Despite a willingness to
participate in these operations, many African militaries lack the command and control, training,
equipment, and logistics capability to effectively participate in such efforts. Instability in Africa
has demanded substantial humanitarian and defense resources from the international community,
and the United States and other donor countries have acknowledged the utility and potential cost-
effectiveness of assisting African forces to enhance their capabilities to participate in these
(...continued)
Africa’s Maritime Potential and Economic Development,“ African Security Review, 2011.
57 The White House, The National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 20, 2005.
58 ”U.S. Increasing Operations in Gulf of Guinea,” American Forces Press Service, September 5, 2006.
59 For more information see CRS Report R40528, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, by Lauren Ploch et al.
60 For discussion on the indirect costs of instability, see CRS Report 97-454, Peacekeeping Options: Considerations for
U.S. Policymakers and the Congress, by Marjorie Ann Browne, Ellen Collier, and Nina M. Serafino.
61 Current operations in Africa include UNAMID (Darfur region of Sudan), UNMIS (Sudan), UNOCI (Cote d’Ivoire),
UNMIL (Liberia), MONUSCO (Dem. Rep. Of Congo), and MINURSO (Western Sahara).
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operations. In 2004, the G8 introduced the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a five-year
multilateral program to train 75,000 troops, a majority of them African, by 2010.62
Violent Extremism
U.S. security policy has been driven largely in recent years by counter-terrorism efforts, which
the Bush and Obama Administrations have both identified as a top national security priority.
Terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, in 1998,
on targets in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002, and more recently in Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco,
Somalia, and Uganda have highlighted the threat of violent extremism in the region. The Director
of National Intelligence (DNI) has repeatedly expressed concern to Congress over Al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the increasing capabilities of Al Shabaab in East Africa.63 In
February 2011 hearings on national security threats by the House and Senate, the DNI testified
that while the U.S. intelligence community considered most of these groups’ members to be
focused on regional objectives in the short-term, some of those now training and fighting in
Somalia also aspire to attack the United States.64 DOD has emphasized the need to work with
partner nations to counteract the threat, claiming, “Terrorists’ abilities to remotely plan and
coordinate attacks is growing, sometimes facilitated by global illicit trafficking routes, extending
their operational reach while rendering targeting of their sanctuaries more difficult.... We must
continue to support and facilitate whole-of-nation approaches to countering extremism that seek
and sustain regional partnerships with responsible states to erode terrorists’ support and sources
of legitimacy.”65
In testimony before Congress, AFRICOM’s Commander, General Ward, linked the threat posed
by terror groups to regional conflicts, stating, “violent extremism by transnational terrorist
organizations is a major source of regional instability.”66 Of primary concern to policy makers is
the possible challenge posed by “ungoverned spaces,” defined as “physical or non-physical
area(s) where there is an absence of state capacity or political will to exercise control.”67 The
Bush Administration linked these areas indirectly to terrorist threats, asserting
Regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor governance,
external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal rivalries, and ethnic or religious
hatreds. If left unaddressed, however, these different causes lead to the same ends: failed
states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for
terrorists.68
62 For more information see CRS Report RL32773, The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
63 For more information on these groups, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective,
Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins. See also CRS Report R41473,
Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response, by Lauren Ploch.
64 Testimony of DNI Director James Clapper before the House Select Intelligence Committee, “Worldwide Threats,”
February 10, 2010.
65 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, February 8, 2011.
66 Statement of General William E. Ward before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 9, 2010.
67 Jessica Piombo, “Terrorism and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview,” Strategic Insights, Vol.
VI, Issue 1, January 2007.
68 The White House, The National Security Strategy of The United States, September 2002.
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State Department officials have identified failed states as an “acute risk” to U.S. national
security.69 In addition to failed states providing a potential “safe haven” for terrorists, there is
evidence to suggest terrorist groups may profit from the limited capacity of state administrative
and security institutions, particularly when in the midst of conflict. During Sierra Leone’s civil
war in the 1990s, for example, reports suggest that al Qaeda may have used the proceeds from the
“conflict diamond” trade as a funding source for its operations.70 General Ward has testified that
“terrorist activities, kidnapping, illicit trafficking of all types (humans, weapons, drugs), and the
existence of under-governed spaces in the Sahel contribute to the region’s vulnerability and make
it susceptible to extremist influences.”71
HIV/AIDS
According to the United Nations, there were over 22 million HIV-positive Africans in 2009,
representing 67% of infected persons worldwide.72 HIV/AIDS is the leading cause of death on the
continent and was identified by former Secretary of State Colin Powell as “the greatest threat of
mankind today.”73 The rate of infection in some African security forces is believed to be high,
raising concerns that those forces may be unable to deploy when needed.74 The Bush
Administration and Congress placed priority on efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, committing over
$48 billion through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR); President Obama
has pledged to sustain that commitment. Twelve of PEPFAR’s 15 focus countries are in Africa.75
As part of these efforts, DOD has established the DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP)
with African armed forces, which is administered by the Naval Health Research Center in San
Diego. DHAPP supports programs in approximately 40 countries.
U.S. Military Assistance and Security Cooperation
in Africa: An Expanding Role
The Department of Defense conducts a wide variety of activities in Africa in support of U.S.
national interests. Operational activities may include, but are not limited to, humanitarian relief,76
69 Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005.
70 See Douglas Farah, “Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade Sale of Gems From Sierra Leone Rebels Raised
Millions, Sources Say,” The Washington Post, November 2, 2001; U.N. Security Council, Report of the Panel of
Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), Paragraph 19, Concerning Liberia, in S/2001/1015,
October 26, 2001; and CRS Report RL30751, Diamonds and Conflict: Background, Policy, and Legislation.
71 Statement of General William E. Ward before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 9, 2010.
72 UNAIDS, UN Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, November 2010.
73 Speech by Secretary Powell at the Gheskio Clinic, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, April 5, 2004.
74 Kevin A. O’Brien, “Headlines Over the Horizon: AIDS and African Armies,” Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 292, No. 1,
July/August 2003.
75 For more information, see CRS Report RL33584, AIDS in Africa, by Nicolas Cook.
76 General Ward, in his confirmation hearing, has testified that “The U.S. military is not an instrument of first resort in
providing humanitarian assistance but supports civilian relief agencies ... The U.S. military may be involved when it
provides a unique service; when the civilian response is overwhelmed; and civilian authorities request assistance. The
USAID Office of Disaster Assistance validates all such requests for U.S. military assistance. Our role in this context
will not change.”
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peacekeeping, counter-narcotics, sanctions enforcement, demining, non-combatant evacuations
(NEOs), and maritime interdiction operations (MIOs).
In addition to traditional contingency operations,77 the U.S. military implements a number of
efforts aimed at increasing African militaries’ capacity to provide security and stability for their
own countries and the region as a whole. Several of these DOD-implemented initiatives are part
of foreign military assistance programs funded by the State Department that “help to promote the
principles of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.”78 In addition to providing
funding, the State Department gives overall guidance and direction for the programs. The United
States military also occasionally provides advisors to peacekeeping missions on the continent;
U.S. military advisors from CJTF-HOA have assisted peacekeepers deployed to Sudan and
Somalia. U.S. forces routinely conduct a variety of bilateral and multilateral joint exercises with
African militaries through such programs as Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). U.S.
forces also conduct joint exercises as part of disaster assistance and maritime security training.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) was created in 1999 as one of DOD’s five
regional centers for strategic studies. It conducts a variety of academic activities for African,
American, and European military and civilian officials aimed promoting good governance and
democratic values, countering ideological support of terrorism, and fostering regional
collaboration and cooperation in the African defense and security sectors. ACSS, which is based
in Washington, DC, has offices on the continent in Dakar, Senegal and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
DOD initiated another multi-nation forum, the Africa Clearinghouse, in 2004 under EUCOM.
The Africa Clearinghouse, modeled after EUCOM Clearinghouses for Southeast Europe and the
South Caucasus, provides a venue for the United States to coordinate its actions with other
nations involved in security cooperation in Africa to maximize limited resources, synchronize
security assistance, and avoid duplication of efforts.
The United States sells military equipment to African governments through the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) program, implemented by the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).79
The U.S. government also provides loans (the United States waives repayment of these loans for
African countries) to foreign governments to finance the purchase of such equipment through the
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Equipment is also provided to select African
countries through the African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBSP) and the Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) program, and through special DOD authorities.
U.S. counter-terrorism strategy on the continent is addressed through a number of these
initiatives, but U.S. counter-terrorism efforts may also include, at one end of the spectrum,
programs to address the root causes of terrorism, and, at the other end, military operations to
destroy terrorist targets through military strikes. The United States is placing increasing emphasis
on Information Operations (IO) in Africa, which use information to improve the security
environment and counter extremist ideology through military information support teams deployed
to U.S. embassies. IO activities in Africa have included website initiatives such as
77 DOD defines a “contingency operation” as a military operation in which members of the Armed Forces are or may
become involved, either by designation of the Secretary of Defense or by law, in military actions, operations, or
hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing force.
78 For more information on U.S. Foreign Military Training programs, see the Department of State’s website at
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt.
79 For more information, see http://www.dsca.osd.mil/ or CRS Report R41539, U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and
Deliveries to Major Clients, 2002-2009, by Richard F. Grimmett.
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Maghrebia.com and AFRICOM’s Operation Objective Voice (OOV), an interagency effort to
counter extremist messaging.80 Some question whether activities such as these should be a part of
DOD’s mandate, or whether they might be more appropriately managed by other U.S. agencies.
DOD officials argue that AFRICOM not only allows the U.S. military to better coordinate these
operations and programs, but that it also allows DOD to better coordinate with other U.S.
agencies, like the State Department, USAID, the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and others, as well as with other governments, like
those of Britain and France, which are also providing training and assistance for African security
forces. DOD suggests that Africa Command builds on the experiences of the U.S. military’s only
forward presence in the region, the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa.
Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)
In October 2002, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) developed a joint task force
to focus on “detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating
in the region,” and to provide a forward presence in the region.81 Under AFRICOM, the task
force’s mission has evolved to more broadly reflect a strategy of “cooperative conflict
prevention.” Between 2,000 and 2,500 short-term rotational U.S. military and civilian personnel
make up CJTF-HOA, which covers the land and airspace in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya,
Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan, as well as the coastal waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden,
and the Indian Ocean. CJTF-HOA has named Burundi, Chad, Comoros, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and
Yemen as “areas of interest.”
CJTF personnel, approximately half of whom are reservists, train the region’s security forces in
counter-terrorism and other areas of military professionalization, serve as advisors to peace
operations, and oversee and support humanitarian assistance efforts. Although U.S. Central
Command maintains primary responsibility for naval operations against pirates in the waters off
the Horn of Africa, CJTF-HOA personnel provide security assistance to several regional maritime
security forces, few of which have “blue water capacity." The Task Force has provided military
assistance and training to Burundian, Djiboutian, and Ugandan military forces deployed in
support of the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). As part of this effort,
CJTF-HOA worked with non-governmental organizations to provide medical supplies to the
AMISOM forces for assistance to the people of Mogadishu. CJTF-HOA has supported several
humanitarian missions, including the airlift of humanitarian assistance supplies to Ethiopia and
Northern Kenya. CJTF-HOA also conducts civilian-military operations throughout East Africa as
part of an effort to “win hearts and minds”82 and enhance the long-term stability of the region.
These civil-military operations include digging wells and building and repairing schools,
hospitals, and roads, and were part of a broader CENTCOM mission to “counter the re-
emergence of transnational terrorism.”83 Some observers question whether these activities might
be more appropriately coordinated by a civilian agency or non-governmental organization than by
80 The website can be found at http://www.magharebia.com.
81 For more information see http://www.hoa.africom.mil. See also CRS Report R41473, Countering Terrorism in East
Africa: The U.S. Response, by Lauren Ploch.
82 U.S. Central Command, “CJTF HOA donates supplies to Djiboutian Well Drillers,” March 12, 2007.
83 For more information on CJTF-HOA activities, see http://www.hoa.africom.mil.
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the U.S. military. AFRICOM officials have suggested that the scope of these activities is being
reexamined. The future role and structure of the task force itself are also under review.
Security Assistance
Building partnership capacity is a key goal of U.S. military strategy in Africa and is consequently
a key mandate for AFRICOM. At present, military experts believe that no African nation poses a
direct threat to the United States or is expected to; consequently Africa Command is expected to
focus less on preparing U.S. forces for major combat in the AOR. Instead, the command
concentrates much of its energies and resources on training and assistance to professionalize local
militaries so that they can better ensure stability and security on the continent. As one DOD
official asserted during AFRICOM’s establishment, “its principal mission will be in the area of
security cooperation and building partnership capability. It will not be in warfighting.”84
AFRICOM officials have stressed the need for persistent engagement, in line with the 2011
National Military Strategy, which states that “military-to-military relationships must be reliable to
be effective, and persevere through political upheavals or even disruption.” Officials stress that
U.S. training programs aim to encourage respect for human rights and for civilian authority, key
shortcomings for some African security forces.
The U.S. government provides security assistance to African militaries through both bilateral and
multilateral initiatives. During the 1990s, the United States provided military training through
several programs, including the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), the Enhanced
International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program, the African Regional Peacekeeping
Program (ARP), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). Some of this training
has been provided by the U.S. Army 3rd and 10th Special Forces Groups, which have worked with
African militaries since 1990. Training has also been provided by contractors. Under the National
Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), U.S. states’ and territories’ National Guard units have
paired with several African countries to conduct a variety of security cooperation activities.85 The
U.S. military has worked with the continent’s regional security organizations, including the
African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). U.S.
military efforts also aim to support the development of the African Union’s African Standby
Force (ASF), a multinational peacekeeping force composed of regional brigades organized by the
continent’s Regional Economic Communities.86 The AU aims for the force to have a standby
capacity of 15,000 to 20,000 peacekeepers. The ASF and its regional brigades are not intended to
be standing forces, but will instead draw from pre-identified forces of member states. AFRICOM
continues to conduct annual training exercises begun under EUCOM, such African Endeavor, a
communications and interoperability exercise with 25 African nations conducted annually. U.S.
military assistance also includes efforts to improve information sharing networks between African
countries through programs such as the Multinational Information Sharing Initiative, which donor
and aid organizations can in turn use to warn of and be warned of possible crises. AFRICOM also
84 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry From the Pentagon,” April 23, 2007.
85 As of November 2010, SPP included eight U.S-African partnerships: Utah and Morocco, North Dakota and Ghana,
California and Nigeria, Wyoming and Tunisia, New York and California, North Carolina and Botswana, Vermont and
Senegal, and Michigan and Liberia.
86 The ASF is divided into North, West, Central, East, and South Regional Brigades, which are organized by the
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS/CEMAC), the East African states, and the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), respectively.
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supports U.S. security sector reform initiatives in post-conflict countries like the DRC, Liberia,
and Sudan. Several of the other major current bilateral and multilateral security assistance
programs implemented by DOD in Africa are listed below (the list is not inclusive).87 These
programs fall under the mission of Africa Command.
African Partnership Station (APS)
In October 2007, U.S. Naval Forces Europe launched a new initiative, the African Partnership
Station (APS). Under the initiative, a navy ship, the USS Fort McHenry, was deployed to the Gulf
of Guinea from fall 2007 to spring 2008 to serve as a continuing sea base of operations and a
“floating schoolhouse” from which to provide assistance and training to the Gulf nations.
Training focused on maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, port facilities
management and security, seamanship/navigation, search and rescue, leadership, logistics, civil
engineering, humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Other Navy and Coast Guard vessels
have subsequently deployed to the region under the APS banner, and APS began conducting
similar activities in East Africa in 2009. European partners, NGOs, and U.S. government
agencies, including the Coast Guard and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), have partnered with the Navy to use the station, which is considered by the Navy to be
a “delivery vehicle for interagency, international, and NGO assistance” to West, Central, and East
Africa, for their own training and development initiatives.88 Humanitarian outreach activities have
included Project Handclasp and Project Hope. The APS vessels have had a minimal footprint
onshore, and have conducted repeat visits to ports along the African coast. The cost for APS in
FY2010 was initially estimated at $10.5 million for deployments in West and Central Africa and
$9.96 million for East Africa.89
Operation Enduring Freedom: Trans Sahara (OEF-TS)/Trans Sahara Counter-
Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
In 2002, the Department of State launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) program to increase
border security and counter-terrorism capacities of four West African nations: Mali, Chad, Niger,
and Mauritania. In 2005, the Bush Administration announced a “follow-on” interagency program
to PSI. According to the State Department, the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership
(formerly Initiative) aims to “improve individual country and regional capabilities to defeat
terrorist organizations, disrupt efforts to recruit and train new terrorist fighters, particularly from
the young and rural poor, and counter efforts to establish safe havens for domestic and outside
extremist groups.”90 Under the American military component, Operation Enduring Freedom-
Trans Sahara, which AFRICOM took responsibility for in fall 2008, U.S. forces work with their
African counterparts from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger,
87 Other authorities used for DOD training include the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (Title 10, USC, Sec.
166(a)), the DOD Regional Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program (Title 10, USC, Sec. 2249(c)), the Air Force’s
Aviation Leadership Program (Title 10, USC, Sec. 9381-9383), training with U.S. Special Forces (Title 10, USC, Sec.
2011), and disaster response training under Title 10, USC, Sec. 2561.
88 Presentation by Admiral Harry Ulrich, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies on October 16, 2007.
89 House Rpt. 111-230, accompanying H.R. 3326, the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010, expressed
support for more robust deployment of APS and recommended an additional $20.5 million in support of maritime
security capacity building in AFRICOM’s AOR.
90 U.S. State Department, FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification.
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Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia to improve intelligence, command and control, logistics, and border
control, and to execute joint operations against terrorist groups. U.S. and African forces have
conducted joint exercises such as Exercise Flintlock to improve security partnerships initiated
under PSI and TSCTP.
These military efforts are designed to support complementary development activities led by the
State Department and USAID. To counter the recruitment efforts of terrorist groups, for example,
USAID supports job creation initiatives for disadvantaged youth. Young people are a key
demographic in Africa, where high unemployment rates and scarce education opportunities
compound the challenges posed by a growing “youth bulge.” Such programs are coordinated with
the efforts of U.S. military personnel working in the region. The United States has allocated over
$500 million for TSCTP since FY2005. The State Department’s Partnership for Regional East
Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), formerly known as the East Africa Regional Security
Initiative (EARSI), has been designed to build upon the best practices of TSCTP.
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
In 1949 the U.S. government began providing training to foreign militaries under the Military
Assistance Training Program (MAP) and through Foreign Military Sales (FMS), which allows
countries to pay for their own training. MAP was succeeded in 1976 by IMET, which provides
training at U.S. military schools and other training assistance for foreign military personnel on a
grant basis through funding from the Department of State. A subset of IMET training, Expanded
IMET (E-IMET), provides courses on defense management, civil-military relations, law
enforcement cooperation, and military justice for military as well as civilian personnel. The State
Department also provides training through its Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Sub-
Saharan African countries received approximately $13.8 million in IMET assistance and $6.8
million in FMF in FY2008, $15.3 million in IMET and $8.3 million in FMF in FY2009, and
$15.1 million in IMET and $18 million in FMF in FY2010. The FY2012 request includes $15.5
million in IMET and $18.8 million in FMF for Sub-Saharan Africa.
The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program
(ACOTA)/ Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)
In 1996, the Clinton Administration proposed the creation of an African Crisis Response Force
(ACRF), an African standby force that would be trained and equipped by the United States and
other donor nations. The initiative was not well received on the continent, and was later
reintroduced as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a bilateral training program
designed to improve the capabilities of individual African countries’ militaries to participate in
multilateral peacekeeping operations. ACOTA, which replaced ACRI in 2002, aims to upgrade
the peace-enforcement capabilities of African militaries. ACOTA provides Peace Support
Operations training, including light infantry and small unit tactics, and focuses on training
African troops who can in turn train other African units. In 2004, ACOTA became a part of GPOI.
GPOI attempts to address some of the factors limiting African militaries’ ability to contribute to
peace operations by conducting a variety of programs, events, and activities oriented on
peacekeeping capacity building. Among these programs is an effort to foster an international
transport and logistics support system for African and other region’s forces. The United States
coordinates its peacekeeping training and assistance programs with other G8 countries through a
G8 Africa Clearinghouse. While the State Department is the executive agent of GPOI and
ACOTA, DOD provides small military teams for special mentoring assistance to ACOTA training
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events. According to the State Department, over 154,500 peacekeepers from over 20 African
countries have received training under ACOTA and its predecessor, ACRI.91 The Obama
Administration has requested $92 million for GPOI for FY2011.92
Regional Perspectives
U.S. reaction to the creation of a new command for Africa has been largely positive, although
concerns have been raised.93 In Africa, on the other hand, perceptions of the command are more
mixed. There has been considerable apprehension over U.S. motivations for creating AFRICOM,
and some Africans worry that the move represents a neocolonial effort to dominate the region
militarily. U.S. military efforts on the continent have been seen as episodic, leading some to
question a more sustained focus from DOD now. Reports of U.S. air strikes in Somalia in recent
years and U.S. support for Ethiopia’s military intervention there have added to those concerns.
Many view U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in Africa with skepticism, and there appears to be a
widespread belief that the new command’s primary goals will be to hunt terrorists and to secure
U.S. access to African oil.94 U.S. foreign policy analysts have focused increased attention on
China’s role in Africa in recent years, and such attention has led some to question whether an
Africa Command might be part of a new contest for influence on the continent.95
Among several African governments and militaries, on the other hand, AFRICOM has been
received with cautious optimism.96 They view increased American attention to the continent’s
problems as a positive move, potentially bringing increased resources, training, and assistance.
U.S. foreign military assistance has increased in recent years, and military training programs in
Africa have steadily been on the rise.
In the first years of the command, DOD and State Department officials consulted regularly with
African nations on AFRICOM, seeking to solicit African views and explain the rationale behind
the command’s creation and its programs. In April 2007, senior officials visited Nigeria, South
Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Senegal. Following their visit, one DOD official noted that
despite some initial “misconceptions,” they had not encountered “any specific resistance to the
idea.”97 In June 2007, they visited Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, and Djibouti, and held
discussions with African Union officials. The delegation also held meetings with 40 foreign
defense attachés serving in Paris. African officials reportedly gave “positive feedback about the
91 U.S. Department of State, ACOTA Factsheet, April 1, 2009, available at http://www.usau.usmission.gov/media/pdfs/
acota_factsheet_april2009.pdf.
92 For more information, see CRS Report RL32773, The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
93 For U.S. reactions, see, for example, Michael Moran, “The New ‘Africa Command,’” Council on Foreign Relations,
February 9, 2007; Brett D. Schaefer, “Creating an Africa Command: Bush Administration Makes the Right Call,”
Heritage Foundation, February 7, 2007; “Analysts Concerned New US Military Command to Hamper African
Development,” VOA, October 23, 2007; Mark Malan, U.S. Civil-Military Imbalance for Global Engagement: Lessons
From the Operational Level in Africa, Refugees International, July 2008; and Daniel Volman and William Minter,
“AFRICOM – Making Peace or Fueling War,” Foreign Policy in Focus, March 13, 2009.
94 See, for example, “The U.S., Oil, and Africa,” Egyptian Mail, February 20, 2007.
95 Dulue Mbachu, “Skepticism Over U.S. Africa Command,” ISN Security Watch, February 19, 2007.
96 “Morocco Lobbying to Become Home for New U.S. Military Command,” Middle East Newsline, February 9, 2007,
and “Algerian Foreign Minister “Satisfied” With Plans for US-Africa Command,” El-Khabar, March 24, 2007.
97 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry from the Pentagon,” April 23, 2007.
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design and mission of AFRICOM” and advised the delegation that DOD should consider how
AFRICOM could complement the AU’s regional security structure.98 In September 2007, DOD
hosted representatives from the African Union, African regional security organizations, and over
35 African governments to further explain its plans for the command and to solicit input from
attendees; a similar event was held in April 2008. Analysts suggest U.S. officials should continue
to closely consult with these governments to ensure that AFRICOM reflects a mutual exchange of
interests and is seen to foster a closer alliance rather than serving as an avenue for the U.S. to
dictate policy to African governments.
In October 2007, members of the Pan-African Parliament, the legislative body of the African
Union, voted in favor of a motion to “prevail upon all African Governments through the African
Union (AU) not to accede to the United States of America’s Government’s request to host
AFRICOM anywhere in the African continent.”99 West African military chiefs, following a
conference the following month in Liberia, issued a cautious response to U.S. government plans,
saying that AFRICOM “had not been fully understood” by African countries and requesting
“further sensitization by the United States authorities at the highest political level.” ECOWAS’s
Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security did suggest that “everybody welcomes
and supports the idea, but we want that direction to come from the heads of state.”100
Several African heads of state have publicly expressed preliminary their views on the command.
Some have advised DOD to consider how AFRICOM could complement the AU’s regional
security structure. Nigerian former President Umaru Yar’Adua, during his December 2007 visit to
Washington, DC, commented, “We shall partner with AFRICOM to assist not only Nigeria, but
also the African continent to actualize its peace and security initiative, which is an initiative to
help standby forces of brigade-size in each of the regional economic groupings within the African
continent.”101 Yar’Adua’s statements were criticized by several Nigerian opposition parties and
civil society organizations. In response, Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs remarked,
“Nigeria’s position on AFRICOM remains that African governments have the sovereign
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security on the continent.... President Yar’Adua’s
statement on the proposed AFRICOM is consistent with Nigeria’s well-known position on the
necessity for Africa to avail itself of opportunities for enhanced capacity for the promotion of
peace and security in Africa.”102 During President Bush’s second official visit to Africa in
February 2008, Ghana’s President John Kufour announced, “I am happy, one, for the President
dispelling any notion that the United States of America is intending to build military bases on the
continent of Africa. I believe the explanation the President has given should put fade to the
speculation, so that the relationship between us and the United States will grow stronger and with
mutual respect.”103 Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has been vocal in her support from
AFRICOM, and has offered to host its headquarters.
98 DOD, “DOD Special Briefing on Africa Command with Mr. Ryan Henry from the Pentagon,” June 21, 2007.
99 Some details of the debate are included in “Gaborone Succeeds At PAP As Sebetela is Booed,” All Africa, October
29, 2007.
100 ”West African Military Heads Want to Hear More from the United States on Africa Command,” Associated Press,
November 7, 2007.
101 White House Press Release, “President Bush Meets with President Umaru Yar’Adua of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria,” December 13, 2007.
102 “AFRICOM Ship Heads for the Gulf of Guinea,” This Day (Lagos), January 8, 2008.
103 Press availability with Presidents Bush and Kufour in Accra, Ghana on February 20, 2008.
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As AFRICOM has assumed ongoing security engagement operations from EUCOM and
CENTCOM and initiated new programs, its officials have stressed the need for improved
strategic communications efforts to increase understanding of the command among African
governments and their people. In October 2008, the South African government, initially one of
the most vocal on the continent in expressing concerns about the new command, welcomed the
USS Theodore Roosevelt, the first U.S. carrier to visit the country since the end of apartheid. The
President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, has yet to publicly express his views on AFRICOM.
Congressional Interest and Oversight Issues
As noted above, AFRICOM continues to face challenges, some of which may be issues for
Congress. Several Members of Congress expressed interest in the creation of an Africa Command
prior to the Bush Administration decision. In 2006, Senator Russ Feingold introduced S.Amdt.
4527 to the FY2007 National Defense Authorization bill (S. 2766) requiring a feasibility study for
the establishment of a new command for Africa. S. 2766 passed the Senate in June 2006. In
December 2007, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.Res. 897, recognizing the
strategic importance of the African continent and welcoming the establishment of AFRICOM.
Senator James Inhofe introduced similar legislation, S.Res. 480, in March 2008. These
resolutions also urge the Departments of Defense and State, as well as USAID, to consult with
African partners to address concerns regarding the command’s mandate. The Africa
Subcommittees of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, as well as the House Armed Services Committee, held hearings on AFRICOM in 2007.
General Ward delivered the command’s most recent posture statement to the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees in March 2010. General Carter Ham will present AFRICOM’s 2011
posture statement to Congress in April.
Congress has addressed issues associated with the command’s development in report language
accompanying several authorization and appropriations bills. The Senate Armed Services
Committee expressed its support for AFRICOM in S.Rept. 110-77, which accompanied S. 1547,
the National Defense Authorization Act, 2008. The report did, however, raise questions regarding
authorities needed to stand up and staff the command; authorities and funding mechanisms for
interagency staff; location; planned staffing levels; and anticipated costs. The committee repeated
its support in S.Rept. 110-335, which accompanied S. 3001, the National Defense Authorization
Act, 2009, but expressed concern that other U.S. government agencies may not have the resources
to support the command’s “whole of government” approach. In S.Rept. 111-35 accompanying S.
1390, the National Defense Authorization Act, 2010, the committee expressed support for the
persistent regional engagement activities conducted by AFRICOM’s Combined Joint Task Force–
Horn of Africa, but requested clarification from DOD on the future role of the Task Force on the
continent. The House Armed Services Committee raised questions regarding AFRICOM’s
mission in H.Rept. 110-652, which accompanied H.R. 5658, the Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act, 2009. The Senate Appropriations Committee also noted its concern regarding
unanswered questions surrounding the command’s mission in S.Rept. 110-85 accompanying H.R.
2642, the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
2008, and in the conference report to H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act, 2008 (
H.Rept. 110-477). Such concerns were repeated in S.Rept. 110-428, which accompanied S. 3301,
the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2009.
H.Rept. 110-775, accompanying the House version of that legislation, H.R. 6599, raised specific
concern with unanswered questions related to the permanent location of AFRICOM’s
headquarters. Reference to AFRICOM in the joint explanatory statement accompanying H.R.
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2638, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009
(P.L. 110-329), has been discussed above (see “Cost”).
AFRICOM’s mandate has also been considered by Congress within the broader context of DOD’s
role in U.S. foreign affairs. AFRICOM has been the focus of a series of hearings by the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs. The command has also been discussed in hearings on foreign assistance and
national security reform, on interagency cooperation, and on the concept of “smart power.” The
House Armed Services Committee, which commissioned a Panel on Roles and Missions (of not
only the various military branches, but also of the various civilian agencies involved in protecting
U.S. security), found that shortcomings in the interagency process have led the military to take on
missions that are not part of its core responsibilities. The FY2008 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) required the military to examine its core competencies, which may ultimately have
implications for AFRICOM, as may a requirement in H.Rept. 111-288 accompanying the FY2010
NDAA for DOD to evaluate the relationship between DOD’s authorities to conduct security
cooperation and the Department of State’s authorities for security assistance. Some observers
have cautioned that AFRICOM could develop independent institutional imperatives that demand
resources regardless of need, rather than reflecting genuine strategic interests.
Given that a large part of AFRICOM’s mandate is to build the indigenous capacity of African
defense forces, the ease with which the command can conduct security cooperation programs will
be key to its success. DOD officials suggest that inefficiencies exist in the authorities through
which funding is provided for the military’s TSC activities.104 Some military officials have argued
that the applicable laws need simplification to allow the combatant commands greater flexibility
to respond to emerging threats and opportunities. Others have raised concerns, though, that
modifying the administrative authorities could interfere with the Department of State’s diplomatic
decisions or bilateral relationships. The National Security Council is currently conducting a
Security Sector Assistance Review that may address some of these issues. The U.S. military has
faced other policy restrictions in its operations with some African governments and militaries.
The establishment of a new unified command requires both financial and human resources,
although some of those have been redirected from the other commands. Military resources have
been stretched by major theater operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, making troop readiness and
costs associated with developing AFRICOM a critical issue for Congress.105 Adequately staffing
the command at the interagency level may also require additional resources from Congress—
some officials at the State Department and USAID have expressed concern about their
departments’ inability to provide the number of civilian staff requested by the command, and that
104 Funds provided to DOD under Title 10, USC, cannot be generally used for training or equipment programs, whereas
Title 22 funds, which are controlled by the State Department but include some DOD-implemented programs like FMF
and IMET, cannot be used to fund military operations. The FY2006 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163) gave
DOD a temporary expanded funding and authority under Title 10, USC, Section 1206 to address lengthy administrative
and procurement delays. Section 1206 authority allows DOD to directly fund some security cooperation activities. In
FY2006, DOD obligated $13 million in Section 1206 funding to African countries; an estimated $39 million was
obligated in FY2007. Approximately $62 million was obligated to African countries in FY2008, $49 million in
FY2009, and $25 million in FY2010.
105 Congress has, in the past, prohibited funding for combatant commands. For example, under the FY1982 DOD
Authorization Act (P.L. 97-252), Congress prohibited the use of funds for the integration of the Army’s Military Traffic
Management Command and the Navy’s Military Sealift Command into a new unified transportation command, at the
request of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff.
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concern that has been echoed by DOD.106 The Secretary of Defense has advocated on behalf of
the civilian agencies, emphasizing that the State Department is critically understaffed.107
The development of AFRICOM’s interagency staffing has been of particular interest to Congress.
In the House Report to accompany H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act of FY2008, the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence expressed concern with interagency coordination on
Africa, calling it “flawed” and suggesting that the intelligence community needed to realign its
resources to “better understand the threats emanating from this region.” DOD officials point out
that there are no legally binding requirements for agencies to coordinate their activities, which
could make AFRICOM’s “pioneering” interagency process more challenging, should other
agencies not have the resources to participate adequately.108 Because AFRICOM’s role is to
support U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa, close coordination with the State Department
will be critical to its success.
As U.S. military activity on the continent has expanded in recent years, some observers have
expressed concern with the idea that U.S. military efforts on the continent could overshadow U.S.
diplomatic objectives. A 2006 Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Report found that
As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs ... U.S. defense agencies are
increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of
civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the
Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries
and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on war fighting.109
Senator Feingold, in several speeches before the Senate, expressed his support for the Africa
Command, but cautioned that it must “contribute to, not define, the U.S. Government’s overall
strategy and objectives for the continent.”110 Likewise, Senator Richard Lugar has suggested that
AFRICOM could help the U.S. military develop a “more sophisticated understanding of a region
that is ever-changing and highly complex,” but has also cautioned, “with greater expertise created
within a new regional command, the hope is that there would be few disagreements between the
two Departments on the appropriateness of security assistance to specific African nations. But
undoubtedly, some differences of opinion will occur.”111 As AFRICOM continues to develop,
Congress may exert its oversight authority to monitor the command’s operations to ensure that
they support, rather than guide, U.S. political, economic, and social objectives for the continent.
106 Then-EUCOM Commander Bantz Craddock told a Defense Writers Group forum on May 18, 2007, “It will be
difficult to get subscription and participation by the interagency.” Other concerns have been expressed to the author in
interviews with Administration officials.
107 See, for example, the speech delivered by Secretary Gates to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign in Washington,
DC, on July 15, 2008.
108 Some of the challenges in coordinating a more effective interagency process were outlined by John Hamre,
President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in a hearing, “Organizing Department of Defense
Roles and Mission Requirements,” held by the House Armed Services Committee on June 20, 2007.
109 Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign, December 15,
2006.
110 Statements of Senator Russ Feingold, “Creation of a U.S. Africa Command,” before the Senate on January 10, 2007,
and on January 27, 2009.
111 Opening Statement at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing “Exploring The U.S. Africa Command and
A New Strategic Relationship With Africa,” August 1, 2007.
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Figure 1. Area of Responsibility for Africa Command
Source: Department of Defense, adapted by CRS.
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Appendix A. History of U.S. Military Involvement
in Africa
The United States maintained Wheelus Air Base in Libya from the 1940s until 1971 with some
4,000 American personnel.112 Wheelus served primarily as a bomber base for missions to Europe
and as an Air Force training location, although U.S. forces from the base did provide emergency
humanitarian assistance to earthquake and flood victims in Libya and Tunisia in the 1960s.
Africa was not included in the U.S. military command structure until 1952, when several North
African countries, including Libya, were added to the responsibilities of U.S. European
Command because of their historic relationship with Europe. The rest of the continent remained
outside the responsibility of any command until 1960, when Cold War concerns over Soviet
influence in newly independent African countries led DOD to include Sub-Saharan Africa in the
Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), leaving North Africa in EUCOM. The Unified Command Plan
was revised again in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy, and responsibility for Sub-Saharan
Africa was transferred to a newly-created Strike Command (STRICOM), which was responsible
for operations in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia and located at McDill Air
Force Base in Tampa, FL. STRICOM was redesignated as Readiness Command (REDCOM) in
1971, and its responsibility for Africa was dissolved, leaving Sub-Saharan Africa out of the
combatant command structure until 1983. Under the Reagan Administration, U.S. military
involvement in Africa was largely dominated by Cold War priorities, and the Administration’s
“containment” policy led DOD to divide responsibility for Africa into its current configuration.
In the 1980s, the U.S. military was involved in repeated skirmishes with Libyan jets in territorial
disputes over the Gulf of Sidra, and those engagements later escalated as Libya was implicated
for supporting international terrorism. On April 15, 1986, the United States initiated air strikes
against multiple military targets in Libya under the code name Operation El Dorado Canyon to
“inflict damage to Qadhafi’s capability to direct and control the export of international terrorism;”
several civilian targets including the French Embassy in Tripoli were also inadvertently hit.113
After the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Africa was driven by President George H. W.
Bush’s vision of a “New World Order”114 and later by President Bill Clinton’s policy of “assertive
multilateralism.”115 U.S. military involvement in Africa was dominated by the deployment of U.S.
forces to Somalia to secure humanitarian operations, first in 1992 under the U.S.-led Unified Task
Force (UNITAF), also known as Operation Restore Hope, and later under the United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II.116 U.S. military efforts in Somalia were unprecedented on
112 Other former U.S. military installations in North Africa included Kenitra Naval Air Station, also known as Port
Lyautey, and several Naval Communication Relay Stations in Morocco, as well as three airbases: Nouassur, Sidi
Slimane, and Ben Guerir.
113 The White House, “Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speaks on the United States Air Strike Against
Libya,” April 15, 1986.
114 See the speech of President George H.W. Bush before a Joint Session of Congress, “Toward a New World Order,”
September 11, 1990.
115 See the statement of then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, “Myths of Peacekeeping,” June 24, 1993.
116 For more information, see CRS Report RL30065, Somalia: Background and U.S. Involvement Through the 1990s,
by Ted Dagne and CRS Report RL30184, Military Interventions by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background,
Outcomes, and "Lessons Learned" for Kosovo, by Nina M. Serafino.
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the continent—over 25,000 U.S. soldiers were deployed by President George H.W. Bush under
UNITAF, which was led by CENTCOM and included forces from 24 other countries.
The number of U.S. troops was significantly reduced under President Clinton as operational
responsibility was shifted from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. In October 1993, U.S. Special
Operations soldiers in the U.S.-led Task Force Ranger engaged Somali militia forces in the battle
of Mogadishu, which ultimately resulted in the deaths of 18 American soldiers and hundreds of
Somalis.117 President Clinton ultimately ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia in
March 1994, the same month that a limited U.S. deployment of 3,600 soldiers was dispatched to
Central Africa to assist in humanitarian efforts for Rwandan refugees and to provide protection
for humanitarian supplies in Rwanda.118
In 1995, DOD outlined its view of Africa in its U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa,
asserting that “ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.”119 While the
U.S. military was deployed almost annually during the 1990s to conduct Non-Combatant
Evacuation and Repatriation Operations (NEO) in African countries that had become politically
unstable, other contingency operations120 involving U.S. forces in Africa in latter half of the
1990s were limited. In 1998, following the attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa, the
United States conducted retaliatory cruise missile attacks against a pharmaceutical factory in
Khartoum, Sudan, that Clinton Administration officials initially contended was producing
precursors for chemical weapons for al Qaeda.
In 2003, the United States responded to calls to intervene in Liberia’s civil war by deploying a
U.S. Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) off the coast of Liberia to provide assistance to the
ECOWAS mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) through Joint Task Force Liberia, under the command of
EUCOM.121 Out of an estimated 5,000 U.S. forces deployed to the area under Operation
Sheltering Sky, only approximately 200 U.S. soldiers came ashore.
More recently, U.S. military personnel have provided training and logistical support for African
peacekeepers in both Sudan and Somalia and counterterrorism training to select African military
units in the Sahel and East Africa. As discussed above, the U.S. Navy continues to conduct anti-
piracy patrols off the coast of East Africa. According to media reports, the U.S. military also has,
in recent years, engaged in air strikes against suspected terrorist targets in Somalia. AFRICOM
officials have acknowledged that the command provided logistical and advisory support for a
joint military operation between the armies of Uganda, the DRC, and Southern Sudan in
December 2008 against the Ugandan insurgent group known as the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA).122 The U.S. government is currently reviewing its strategy to address the LRA threat.
117 Twenty-nine American soldiers ultimately lost their lives as a result of the conflict in Somalia.
118 Although the mission was deemed successful in alleviating the starvation and disease that threatened the refugees,
many have been highly critical of the United States, the United Nations, and others for not doing more to attempt to
avert the genocide that occurred in Rwanda that year. See, for example, Col. Scott R. Feil, “Could 5,000 Peacekeepers
Have Saved 500,000 Rwandans?: Early Intervention Reconsidered,” ISD Reports, Vol. III, No. 2, April 1997.
119 DOD Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, August 1995.
120 According to DOD, a military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of Defense as a contingency
operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter of law: title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 101
(a)(13).
121 For more information, see CRS Report RL32243, Liberia: Transition to Peace, by Nicolas Cook.
122 John Vandiver, “AFRICOM Official Defends U.S. Role in Ugandan Mission,” Stars and Stripes, February 14, 2009;
Jeffrey Gettleman and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Aided a Failed Plan to Rout Ugandan Rebels,” New York Times, February 6,
(continued...)
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Appendix B. Instances of the Use of U.S. Armed
Forces in Africa, 1950-2009123
1956
Egypt. A marine battalion evacuated U.S. nationals and other persons from Alexandria during the Suez crisis.
1964
Congo. The United States sent four transport planes to provide airlift for Congolese troops during a rebellion
and to transport Belgian paratroopers to rescue foreigners.
1967
Congo. The United States sent three military transport aircraft with crews to provide the Congo central
government with logistical support during a revolt.
1978
Zaire. From May 19 through June 1978, the United States used military transport aircraft to provide logistical
support to Belgian and French rescue operations in Zaire.
1981
Libya. On August 19, 1981, U.S. planes based on the carrier U.S.S. Nimitz shot down two Libyan jets over the
Gulf of Sidra after one of the Libyan jets had fired a heat-seeking missile. The United States periodically held
freedom of navigation exercises in the Gulf of Sidra, claimed by Libya as territorial waters but considered
international waters by the United States.
1983
Egypt. After a Libyan plane bombed a city in Sudan on March 18, 1983, and Sudan and Egypt appealed for
assistance, the United States dispatched an AWACS electronic surveillance plane to Egypt.
1983
Chad. On August 8, 1983, President Reagan reported the deployment of two AWACS electronic surveillance
planes and eight F-15 fighter planes and ground logistical support forces to assist Chad against Libyan and
rebel forces.
1986
Libya. On March 26, 1986, President Reagan reported to Congress that, on March 24 and 25, U.S. forces,
while engaged in freedom of navigation exercises around the Gulf of Sidra, had been attacked by Libyan
missiles and the United States had responded with missiles.
1986
Libya. On April 16, 1986, President Reagan reported that U.S. air and naval forces had conducted bombing
strikes on terrorist facilities and military installations in Libya.
1989
Libya. On January 4, 1989, two U.S. Navy F-14 aircraft based on the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy shot down two
Libyan jet fighters over the Mediterranean Sea about 70 miles north of Libya. The U.S. pilots said the Libyan
planes had demonstrated hostile intentions.
1990
Liberia. On August 6, 1990, President Bush reported that a reinforced rifle company had been sent to provide
additional security to the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, and that helicopter teams had evacuated U.S. citizens
from Liberia.
1991
Zaire. On September 25-27, 1991, after widespread looting and rioting broke out in Kinshasa, U.S. Air Force
C-141s transported 100 Belgian troops and equipment into Kinshasa. U.S. planes also carried 300 French
troops into the Central African Republic and hauled back American citizens and third country nationals from
locations outside Zaire.
1992
Sierra Leone. On May 3, 1992, U.S. military planes evacuated Americans from Sierra Leone, where military
leaders had overthrown the government.
1992
Somalia. On December 10, 1992, President Bush reported that he had deployed U.S. armed forces to Somalia
in response to a humanitarian crisis and a U.N. Security Council Resolution determining that the situation
constituted a threat to international peace. This operation, called Operation Restore Hope, was part of a
U.S.-led United Nations Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and came to an end on May 4, 1993. U.S. forces
continued to participate in the successor United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), which the U.N.
Security Council authorized to assist Somalia in political reconciliation and restoration of peace.
(...continued)
2009.
123 Covert actions, disaster relief, and routine alliance stationing and training exercises are not included in this list. Most
instances listed since 1980 are summaries of U.S. military deployments reported to Congress by the President as a
result of the War Powers Resolution.
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1993
Somalia. On June 10, 1993, President Clinton reported that in response to attacks against U.N. forces in
Somalia by a factional leader, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force in the area had participated in military action to
quell the violence. On July 1 President Clinton reported further air and ground military operations on June 12
and June 17 aimed at neutralizing military capabilities that had impeded U.N. efforts to deliver humanitarian
relief and promote national reconstruction, and additional instances occurred in the following months.
1994
Rwanda. On April 12, 1994, President Clinton reported that combat-equipped U.S. military forces had been
deployed to Burundi to conduct possible non-combatant evacuation operations of U.S. citizens and other
third-country nationals from Rwanda, where widespread fighting had broken out. By September 30, 1994, al
U.S. troops had departed from Rwanda and surrounding nations. In the Defense Appropriations Act for
FY1995 (P.L. 103-335, signed September 30, 1994), Congress barred use of funds for U.S. military
participation in or around Rwanda after October 7, 1994, except for any action necessary to protect U.S.
citizens.
1995
Somalia. On March 1, 1995, President Clinton reported that on February 27, 1995, 1,800 combat-equipped
U.S. armed forces personnel began deployment into Mogadishu, Somalia, to assist in the withdrawal of U.N.
forces assigned there to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). This mission was completed
on March 3, 1995.
1996
Liberia. On April 11, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress that on April 9, 1996 due to the
“deterioration of the security situation and the resulting threat to American citizens” in Liberia he had
ordered U.S. military forces to evacuate from that country “private U.S. citizens and certain third-country
nationals who had taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy compound.... ”
1996
Liberia. On May 20, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress the continued deployment of U.S. military
forces in Liberia to evacuate both American citizens and other foreign personnel, and to respond to various
isolated “attacks on the American Embassy complex” in Liberia. The President noted that the deployment of
U.S. forces would continue until there was no longer any need for enhanced security at the Embassy and a
requirement to maintain an evacuation capability in the country.
1996
Central African Republic. On May 23, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress the deployment of U.S.
military personnel to Bangui, Central African Republic, to conduct the evacuation from that country of
“private U.S. citizens and certain U.S. Government employees,” and to provide “enhanced security for the
American Embassy in Bangui.”
1996
Rwanda and Zaire. On December 2, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress that to support the
humanitarian efforts of the United Nations regarding refugees in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region of
Eastern Zaire, he had authorized the use of U.S. personnel and aircraft, including AC-130U planes to help in
surveying the region in support of humanitarian operations, although fighting still was occurring in the area,
and U.S. aircraft had been subject to fire when on flight duty.
1997
Congo and Gabon. On March 27, 1997, President Clinton reported to Congress that, on March 25, 1997, a
standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel had been deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide
enhanced security for American private citizens, government employees, and selected third country nationals
in Zaire, and to be available for any necessary evacuation operation.
1997
Sierra Leone. On May 30, 1997, President Clinton reported to Congress that on May 29 and May 30, 1997,
U.S. military personnel were deployed to Freetown, Sierra Leone, to prepare for and undertake the
evacuation of certain U.S. government employees and private U.S. citizens.
1998
Guinea-Bissau. On June 12, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress that, on June 10, 1998, in response
to an army mutiny in Guinea-Bissau endangering the U.S. Embassy, U.S. government employees and citizens in
that country, he had deployed a standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel to Dakar, Senegal, to
remove such individuals, as well as selected third country nationals, from the city of Bissau. The deployment
continued until the necessary evacuations were completed.
1998
Kenya and Tanzania. On August 10, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress that he had deployed, on
August 7, 1998, a Joint Task Force of U.S. military personnel to Nairobi, Kenya, to coordinate the medical and
disaster assistance related to the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He also reported
that teams of 50-100 security personnel had arrived in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to
enhance the security of the U.S. Embassies and citizens there.
1998
Afghanistan and Sudan. On August 21, 1998, by letter, President Clinton reported to Congress that he had
authorized airstrikes on August 20th against camps and installations in Afghanistan and Sudan used by the
Osama bin Laden terrorist organization. The President did so based on what he viewed as convincing
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information that the bin Laden organization was responsible for the bombings, on August 7, 1998, of the U.S.
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
1998
Liberia. On September 29, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress that on September 27, 1998 he had,
due to political instability and civil disorder in Liberia, deployed a stand-by response and evacuation force of
30 U.S. military personnel to augment the security force at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, and to provide for a
rapid evacuation capability, as needed, to remove U.S. citizens and government personnel from the country.
1999
Kenya. On February 25, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress that he was continuing to deploy U.S.
military personnel in that country to assist in providing security for the U.S. embassy and American citizens in
Nairobi, pending completion of renovations of the American embassy facility in Nairobi, subject of a terrorist
bombing in August 1998.
2000
Sierra Leone. On May 12, 2000, President Clinton, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” reported to
Congress that he had ordered a U.S. Navy patrol craft to deploy to Sierra Leone to be ready to support
evacuation operations from that country if needed. He also authorized a U.S. C-17 aircraft to deliver
“ammunition, and other supplies and equipment” to Sierra Leone in support of United Nations peacekeeping
operations there.
2001
Terrorism threat. On September 24, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with
the War Powers Resolution,” and “Senate Joint Resolution 23” that in response to terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon he had ordered the “deployment of various combat-equipped and
combat support forces to a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of
operations.” The President noted in efforts to “prevent and deter terrorism” he might find it necessary to
order additional forces into these and other areas of the world.” He stated that he could not now predict
“the scope and duration of these deployments,” or the “actions necessary to counter the terrorist threat to
the United States.”
2002
Terrorism threat. On September 20, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,” that U.S. “combat-equipped and combat support forces” have been deployed to the
Philippines since January 2002 to train with, assist and advise the Philippines’ Armed Forces in enhancing their
“counterterrorist capabilities.” He added that U.S. forces were conducting maritime interception operations
in the Central and European Command areas to combat movement, arming or financing of “international
terrorists.” He also noted that U.S. combat personnel had been deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help
enhance the “counterterrorist capabilities” of their armed forces.
2002
Cote d’Ivoire. On September 26, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution,” that in response to a rebellion in Cote d’Ivoire that he had on September 25, 2002, sent U.S.
military personnel into Cote d’Ivoire to assist in the evacuation of American citizens and third country
nationals from the city of Bouake; and otherwise assist in other evacuations as necessary.
2003
Terrorism threat. On March 20, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution,” as wel as P.L. 107-40, and “pursuant to” his authority as Commander-in-Chief, that he had
continued a number of U.S. military operations globally in the war against terrorism. These military operations
included ongoing U.S. actions against al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan; collaborative anti-terror operations
with forces of Pakistan in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area; “maritime interception operations on the high
seas” in areas of responsibility of the Central and European Commands to prevent terrorist movement and
other activities; and military support for the armed forces of Georgia and Yemen in counter-terrorism
operations.
2003
Liberia. On June 9, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,”
that on June 8 he had sent about 35 combat-equipped U.S. military personnel into Monrovia, Liberia, to
augment U.S. Embassy security forces, to aid in the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens if necessary. The
President also noted that he had sent about 34 combat-equipped U.S. military personnel to help secure the
U.S. Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and to assist in evacuation of American citizens if required. They
were expected to arrive at the U.S. embassy by June 10, 2003. Back-up and support personnel were sent to
Dakar, Senegal, to aid in any necessary evacuation from either Liberia or Mauritania.
2003
Liberia. On August 13, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution,” that in response to conditions in Liberia, on August 11, 2003, he had authorized about 4,350 U.S.
combat-equipped military personnel to enter Liberian territorial waters in support of U.N. and West African
States efforts to restore order and provide humanitarian assistance in Liberia.
2003
Terrorism threat. On September 19, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,” that U.S. “combat-equipped and combat support forces” continue to be deployed at a
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number of locations around the world as part of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. American forces support anti-
terrorism efforts in the Philippines, and maritime interception operations continue on the high seas in the
Central, European, and Pacific Command areas of responsibility, to “prevent the movement, arming, or
financing of international terrorists.” He also noted that “U.S. combat equipped and support forces” had been
deployed to Georgia and Djibouti to help in enhancing their “counterterrorist capabilities.”
2004
Terrorism/Bosnia and Haiti. On March 20, 2004, the President reported to Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple on-going United States military
deployments and operations “in support of the global war on terrorism (including in Afghanistan),” as well as
operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Haiti. In this report, the President noted that U.S. anti-
terror related activities were underway in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea. He further
noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the
NATO-led KFOR (1,900 personnel); in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,100
personnel); and approximately 1,800 military personnel were deployed in Haiti as part of the U.N.
Multinational Interim Force.
2004
Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia/Iraq. On November 4, 2004, the President sent to Congress,
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United
States military deployments and operations “in support of the global war on terrorism.” These deployments,
support or military operations include activities in Afghanistan, Djibouti, as well as Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In this report, the President noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities
were underway in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped
military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,800 personnel);
and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,000 personnel). Meanwhile, he stated
that the United States continues to deploy more than 135,000 military personnel in Iraq.
2005
Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia. On May 20, 2005, the President sent to Congress “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States
military deployments and operations “in support of the global war on terrorism,” as well as operations in Iraq,
where about 139,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed. U.S. forces are also deployed in Kenya, Ethiopia,
Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” of these nations. The
President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as
part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,700 personnel). Approximately 235 U.S. personnel are also deployed in
Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and
perform operational tasks, such as counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the
Former Yugoslavia.
2005
Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia/Iraq. On December 7, 2005, the President sent to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United
States military deployments and operations “in support of the global war on terrorism,” and in support of the
Multinational Force in Iraq, where about 160,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed. U.S. forces were also
deployed in the Horn of Africa region—Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti—assisting in “enhancing
counter-terrorism capabilities” of these nations. The President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped
military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,700 personnel).
Approximately 220 U.S. personnel were also deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO
Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as “counter-
terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.”
2006
Terrorism threat/Kosovo/Bosnia/Iraq. On June 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military
deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” and in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
as part of the Multinational Force (M.F.) in Iraq. About 131,000 military personnel were deployed in Iraq. U.S.
forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations
against al-Qaida and other international terrorists operating in the region. U.S. military personnel continue to
support the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR was about 1,700 military
personnel. The NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was established on November 22, 2004, as a successor to its
stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to assist in implementing the peace agreement.
Approximately 250 U.S. personnel were assigned to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo to assist in defense
reform and perform operational tasks, such as “counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal
Court for the Former Yugoslavia.”
2006
Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia. On December 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United
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States military deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” in Kosova, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and as part of the Multinational Force (M.F.) in Iraq. About 134,000 military personnel were
deployed in Iraq. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support
necessary operations against al-Qaida and other international terrorists operating in the region, including
Yemen. U.S. military personnel continue to support the NATO-led Kosova Force (KFOR). The U.S.
contribution to KFOR was about 1,700 military personnel. The NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was
established on November 22, 2004, as a successor to its stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to
continue to assist in implementing the peace agreement. Approximately 100 U.S. personnel were assigned to
the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo to assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as
“counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.”
2007
Terrorism threat/Kosovo/Afghanistan. On June 15 and December 14, 2007, the President sent to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” consolidated reports giving details of ongoing United States
military deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,”and in support of the NATO-led
Kosovo Force (KFOR). The President reported that various U.S. “combat-equipped and combat-support
forces” were deployed to “a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, and Southern Command
areas of operation” and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaida terrorists and their supporters.
2008
Terrorism threat/Kosovo/Afghanistan. On June 13 and December 16, 2008, the President sent to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” consolidated reports giving details of ongoing United States
military deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” and in support of the NATO-led
Kosovo Force (KFOR). The President reported that various U.S. “combat-equipped and combat-support
forces” were deployed to “a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, Southern and Africa
Command areas of operation” and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaida terrorists and their
supporters.
2009
Terrorism threat/Afghanistan/Iraq/Kosovo. On June 15 and December 5, 2009, the President sent to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution," consolidated reports, giving details of "ongoing contingency
operations overseas." The report noted that the United states continues to deploy "U.S. combat-equipped
forces to help enhance the counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies" not only in the Horn of
Africa region, but globally through "maritime interception operations on the high seas" aimed at blocking the
"movement, arming and financing of international terrorists."
2010
Terrorism threat/Afghanistan/Iraq/Kosovo. On June 15 and December 15, 2010, the President sent to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report, giving details of “deployments of U.S.
Armed Forces equipped for combat.” The United States has deployed “combat-equipped forces to a number
of locations in the U.S. Central, Pacific, European, Southern and African Command areas of operation” in
support of anti-terrorist and anti-al-Qa’ida actions. In addition, the United States continues to “conduct
maritime interception operations on the high seas” directed at “stopping the movement, arming and financing
of international terrorist groups.”
Source: CRS Report R41677, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2010, by Richard F.
Grimmett
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Appendix C. Acronyms
ACBSP
African Coastal and Border Security Program
ACOTA
African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACSS
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
AFRICOM Africa
Command
AMIS
African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM
African Union Mission in Somalia
AMSD
Air & Maritime Sector Development
AOR Area
of
Responsibility
AU African
Union
CENTCOM Central
Command
CJTF-HOA
Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa
CTFP
Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fel owship Program
COCOM Combatant
Command
DOD
Department of Defense
DOS Department
of
State
ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States
EDA Excess
Defense
Articles
EUCOM European
Command
FMF Foreign
Military
Financing
FMS
Foreign Military Sales
FOC
Full Operating Capability
GPOI
Global Peace Operations Initiative
GWOT
Global War on Terrorism
IMET
International Military Education and Training
IO Information
Operations
IOC
Initial Operating Capability
JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFCOM
Joint Forces Command
JIACG
Joint Interagency Coordination Groups
LANTCOM Atlantic
Command
MIO
Maritime Interception Operation
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO
Non-Combatant Evacuation and Repatriation Operations
NORTHCOM Northern
Command
OEF-TS
Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans Sahara
OMA
USAID Office of Military Affairs
OOV Operation
Objective
Voice
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OSC
Office of Security Cooperation
OSD
Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACOM Pacific
Command
POLAD
Foreign Policy Advisor
PREACT
Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism
REDCOM Readiness
Command
SADC
Southern African Development Community
SDA Senior
Development
Advisor
SJFHQ
Standing Joint Force Headquarters
SOCOM Special
Operations
Command
SOUTHCOM Southern
Command
STRATCOM Strategic
Command
STRICOM Strike
Command
TRANSCOM Transportation
Command
TSC Theater
Security
Cooperation
TSCTP
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership
UCP Unified
Command
Plan
UNITAF
U.S. United Task Force
UNOSOM
U.N. Operation in Somalia
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
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