Order Code RL34003
Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests
and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa
May 16, 2007
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and
the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa
Summary

On February 6, 2007, the Bush Administration announced its intention to create
a new unified combatant command, Africa Command or AFRICOM, to promote U.S.
national security objectives in Africa and in its surrounding waters. U.S. military
involvement on the continent is currently divided among three commands: European
Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and Pacific Command
(PACOM). As envisioned by the Administration, the new command’s area of
responsibility (AOR) would include all African countries except Egypt.
In recent years, analysts and U.S. policymakers have noted Africa’s growing
strategic importance to U.S. interests. Among those interests are Africa’s role in the
Global War on Terror and the potential threats posed by ungoverned spaces; the
growing importance of Africa’s natural resources, particularly energy resources; and
ongoing concern for the continent’s many humanitarian crises, armed conflicts, and
more general challenges, such as the devastating effect of HIV/AIDS. In 2006,
Congress authorized a feasibility study on the creation of a new command for Africa.
As defined by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM’s mission will be
to promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional
organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the region through improved
security capability, military professionalization, and accountable governance. The
command’s military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises.
A transition team has begun establishment of the new command, which is
expected to begin as a sub-unified command under EUCOM by October 2007 and
achieve full capability as a stand-alone command by October 2008. DOD has
signaled its intention to eventually locate AFRICOM on the continent, and U.S
officials are consulting with strategic partners in the region to identify a suitable
location for the command’s headquarters. The transition team and the new command
will operate from Stuttgart, Germany until a location on the continent is secured. The
Pentagon has stressed that there are no plans to have a significant troop presence on
the continent.
The 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa highlighted the threat of
terrorism to U.S. interests on the continent. Political instability and civil wars have
created vast ungoverned spaces, area in which some experts allege that terrorist
groups may train and operate. Instability also heightens human suffering and retards
economic development, which may in turn threaten U.S. economic interests. Africa
recently surpassed the Middle East as the United States’ largest supplier of crude oil,
further emphasizing the continent’s strategic importance. This report provides a
broad overview of U.S. strategic interests in Africa and the role of U.S. military
efforts on the continent as they pertain to the creation of a new Africa Command.
Although the command is still in the planning phase, a discussion of AFRICOM’s
potential mission, its coordination with other government agencies, and its basing
and manpower requirements is included. This report will be updated as events
warrant.

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Contents
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The DOD Proposal for a New Africa Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Changes to the Unified Command Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Current U.S. National Security Strategy Toward Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Oil and Global Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
HIV/AIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) . . . . . . . . 16
Security Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Operation Enduring Freedom: Trans Sahara/Trans Sahara
Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
International Military Education and Training (IMET) . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
The Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program
(ACOTA)/ Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) . . . . . . . . 18
Regional Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Related CRS Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix 1. History of U.S. Military Involvement in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix 2. Instances of the Use of U.S. Armed Forces in Africa, 1900-2006 . 26
Appendix 3. Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Proposed AFRICOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) . . . . . . . 23

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Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests
and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa
Issues for Congress
President George W. Bush formally announced the creation of a new Unified
Combatant Command (COCOM)1 for the African continent on February 6, 2007,
reflecting Africa’s increasing strategic importance to the United States.2 Defense
Secretary Robert Gates announced the command’s creation to Congress during a
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the same day.3 The Department of
Defense (DOD) organizes its command structure by dividing its activities among
joint military commands based either on a geographic or functional area of
responsibility.4 DOD currently has five geographic commands and four functional
commands. U.S. military involvement in Africa is currently divided among three
geographic commands: European Command (EUCOM), Central Command
(CENTCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM). As contemplated by the
Administration, the new command’s area of responsibility (AOR) would include all
African countries except Egypt, which is expected to remain under the AOR of
CENTCOM. A transition team has begun to establish AFRICOM, which is expected
to have initial operating capability (IOC) as a sub-unified command under EUCOM
by October 2007 and full operating capability (FOC) as a stand-alone command by
October 2008.
As proposed by DOD, AFRICOM’s mission will be to promote U.S. strategic
objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help
1 Combatant commands are also referred to as unified commands because they are composed
of forces from two or more services, and they can be led by either regional/geographic or
functional combatant commanders.
2 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Creates a Department of
Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa,” February 6, 2007.
3 See Testimony of Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on February 6, 2007. Formal efforts to establish an Africa Command, or
AFRICOM, began in mid-2006, under former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
The Pentagon announced that it was considering AFRICOM in August 2006, and President
Bush reportedly approved the proposal on December 15, 2006. “Africa Command Plans
Approved by Bush, DOD Officials Confirm,” Stars and Stripes, December 30, 2006.
4 A unified combatant command is defined by the Department of Defense as “a command
with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant
assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so
designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance
of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,”according to DOD’s Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms.

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CRS-2
strengthen stability and security in the region through improved security capability,
military professionalization, and accountable governance. The command’s military
operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises.
The Administration’s motivation for the creation of a new combatant command
for Africa evolved out of concerns about the current DOD division of responsibility
for Africa among the geographic commands. The current division has reportedly
created problems in coordinating activities, and allegedly has increasingly become
too great a burden on EUCOM and CENTCOM staff. Although some military
officials have advocated the creation of an Africa Command for over a decade, recent
crises such as that in the Darfur region of Sudan have highlighted the challenges
created by “seams” between the COCOMs’ boundaries.
One such seam lies between Sudan (within CENTCOM’s AOR), Chad and the
Central African Republic (within EUCOM’s AOR), an area of increasing instability.
The United States, acting first alone and later as a member of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), has provided airlift and training for African Union
(AU) peacekeeping troops in Darfur, and although CENTCOM has responsibility for
Sudan, much of the airlift and training has been done by EUCOM forces. Some
observers argue that EUCOM and CENTCOM have become overstretched
particularly given the demands created by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
Commander of EUCOM, whose current AOR includes 91 countries, testified before
Congress that
the increasing strategic significance of Africa will continue to pose the greatest
security stability challenge in the EUCOM AOR. The large ungoverned area in
Africa, HIV/AIDS epidemic, corruption, weak governance, and poverty that exist
throughout the continent are challenges that are key factors in the security
stability issues that affect every country in Africa.5
His predecessor, General James Jones, pointed out in 2006 that EUCOM’s staff were
spending more than half their time on Africa issues, up from almost none three years
prior.6
AFRICOM faces myriad challenges, both in its establishment and its operation.
Some of these challenges may become issues for Congress. Members of Congress
have expressed interest in the creation of an Africa Command, and in 2006, Senator
Russ Feingold introduced legislation requiring a feasibility study on the
establishment of a new command for Africa. Key oversight questions for Congress
relating to the command include the following.
5 Testimony of General Craddock to the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19,
2006.
6 Greg Mills, “World’s Biggest Military Comes to Town,” Business Day, February 9, 2007.

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CRS-3
! Is an Africa Command necessary or desirable? Is its mission well-
defined?
! How are U.S. strategic interests influencing the size and scope of the
U.S. military footprint on the continent, and what effect will the
creation of a new Africa Command have on future U.S. military
operations in Africa?
! How are AFRICOM and U.S. military efforts in Africa perceived by
Africans and by other foreign countries, including China?
! What are the costs associated with both the creation and eventual
operation of AFRICOM?
! What role, if any, will contractors play in AFRICOM’s operations?
! What are the Administration’s plans for the development of
AFRICOM’s interagency process and, in particular, how closely are
the State Department and DOD coordinating on plans for the
command and on U.S. military efforts in Africa in general? How
will AFRICOM address the intelligence community’s need to realign
its resources directed toward the continent?
! How will the Administration ensure that U.S. military efforts in
Africa do not overshadow or contradict U.S. diplomatic and
development objectives? Should conflict prevention activities be an
essential part of DOD’s mandate, and are they sustainable?
! How prominent will counter-terrorism operations and programs be,
particularly vis-a-vis peacekeeping training and support components
in AFRICOM’s mandate? Would some DOD-implemented counter-
terrorism programs be more appropriately implemented by other
U.S. agencies?
! Are the legal authorities guiding DOD’s implementation of security
cooperation reform programs sufficient? Do any of these authorities
hinder the U.S. military’s ability to conduct these programs?
! What efforts does DOD take to ensure that the training and
equipment provided to African security forces is not used to
suppress internal dissent or to threaten other nations?
This report provides information on AFRICOM’s mission, structure,
interagency coordination, and its basing and manpower requirements. Because the
command is still in the planning phase, many of the details regarding these issues are
still being determined by the Administration. The report also gives a broad overview
of U.S. strategic interests in Africa and the role of U.S. military efforts on the
continent as they pertain to the creation of a new Africa Command.

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The DOD Proposal for a New Africa Command
Changes to the Unified Command Plan
The mission of geographic commands is defined by a general geographic area
of responsibility (AOR), while the mission of functional commands is the worldwide
performance of a warfighting function. There are currently five geographic
combatant commands: European (EUCOM), Pacific (PACOM), North
(NORTHCOM), Southern (SOUTHCOM), and Central (CENTCOM) Commands.
There are four functional COCOMs, which include Transportation (TRANSCOM),
Special Operations (SOCOM), Joint Forces (JFCOM) and Strategic (STRATCOM)
Commands. As mentioned above, DOD responsibilities for Africa are currently
divided among three geographic commands. EUCOM, based in Germany, has 42
African countries in its AOR7; CENTCOM, based in Florida, covers eight countries
in East Africa, including those that make up the Horn of Africa, and PACOM, based
in Hawaii, is responsible for the islands of Comoros, Madagascar, and Mauritius.8
The creation of a new combatant command requires changes by the President
to a classified executive document, the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which
establishes the basic organization of the U.S. armed forces. The UCP also identifies
the mission and responsibility of each command, and provides the basis for DOD
security assistance coordination with the Chiefs of Diplomatic missions overseas.
Changes to the UCP are usually initiated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS), who presents a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. After the
Secretary’s review, a proposal is presented to the President for approval. The most
recent Unified Command to be established is NORTHCOM, which was created in
2002 after the September 11 terrorist attacks to protect the U.S. homeland. The UCP
is reviewed at least every two years, as required by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD
Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-422). The review in 2006 recommended the
establishment of an Africa Command as a unified combatant command. A new
functional command, a unified Medical Command, is reportedly also being
considered. Congress has, on occasion, taken legislative action that has led to
changes in the UCP.9
Combatant Command “Plus”?
Some DOD officials have referred to the proposed Africa Command as a
combatant command “plus.”10 This implies that the command would have all the
roles and responsibilities of a traditional combatant command, including the ability
7 Western Sahara is considered an “Area of Interest.” For more information see CRS
Report RS20962, Western Sahara: Status of Settlement Efforts, by Carol Migdalovitz.
8 For more information see [http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand].
9 For more information on changes to the UCP see CRS Report RL30254, Military Changes
to the Unified Command Plan: Background and Issues for Congress, by William C. Story.
10 “Pentagon: AFRICOM Won’t Boost U.S. Troop Presence on the Continent,” Inside the
Army, February 12, 2007.

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CRS-5
to facilitate or lead military operations, but would also include a broader “soft
power” mandate aimed at preemptively reducing conflict and would incorporate a
larger civilian component to address those challenges. According to the 2002 U.S.
National Security Strategy, “America is now threatened less by conquering states
than we are by failing ones.” The Department of Defense, identifying instability in
foreign countries as a threat to U.S. interests, issued DOD Directive 3000.05 in 2005,
defining stability operations11 as a “core U.S. military mission” that “shall be given
priority comparable to combat operations.”12 Although U.S. armed forces have
traditionally focused on “fighting and winning wars,” defense strategy is now
evolving to look at conflict prevention, or “Phase Zero,” addressing threats at their
inception through theater security cooperation (TSC) and capacity building of allies.13
As General Bantz Craddock, Commander of EUCOM noted in his confirmation
hearing, Africa in recent years has posed “the greatest security stability challenge”
to EUCOM, and “a separate command for Africa would provide better focus and
increased synergy in support of U.S. policy and engagement.”14 If U.S. agencies, both
military and civilian, are able to coordinate more efficiently and effectively both
among themselves as well as with their African partners and other international
actors, they might be more successful at averting more complex emergencies on the
continent.
This preemptive approach reflects an evolution in DOD strategy and has been
outlined extensively in government documents, but operationalizing that broad
mandate may be prove difficult. As one foreign policy expert points out, “the
mission of AFRICOM will necessarily require a major break with conventional
doctrinal mentalities both within the armed services themselves and between
government agencies.”15 As one DOD official explained, “We want to help develop
a stable environment in which civil society can be built and that the quality of life for
the citizenry can be improved.”16 While many at the State Department and USAID
welcome the ability of DOD to leverage resources and to organize complex
operations, there also is concern that the military may overestimate its capabilities as
11 DOD defines stability operations as “military and civilian activities conducted across the
spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.”
12 DOD, Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, November 28, 2005.
13 Some analysts view four traditional phases for a military campaign: deter/engage, seize
initiative, decisive operations, and transition. DOD officials have recently begun using a
phrase, “Phase Zero” to encompass efforts prior to the first phase aimed at preventing the
conflict. For more information on the Phase Zero strategy and TSC, also known as
peacetime engagement, see General Charles Wald, “The Phase Zero Campaign,” Joint Force
Quarterly, Issue 43, 4th Quarter 2006, available at [http://www.ndu.edu/inss].
14 Advance Questions for General Bantz J. Craddock, USA, Nominee for United States
European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in his confirmation hearing
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 19, 2006.
15 J. Peter Pham, “Getting AFRICOM Right,”World Defense Review, Feb 15, 2007.
16 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry From the Pentagon,”
February 7, 2007.

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CRS-6
well as its diplomatic role in Africa, or pursue activities that are not a core part of its
mandate.
The mission of the proposed Africa Command might be most closely compared
to that of Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which is responsible for U.S. military
efforts in Central and South America. SOUTHCOM’s mission, as defined by DOD,
is to ensure the forward defense of the United States through security cooperation,
counter-narcotics operations, humanitarian assistance, and monitoring and support
for human rights initiatives in the region. Like SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM is
expected to supervise an array of missions that relate to U.S. strategic interests but
are not combat-related, unlike EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM, which have
traditionally been more focused on preparing for potential warfighting operations.
Interagency Coordination
The Bush Administration has noted that the proposal for the new command
reflects an evolution in the involvement of other U.S. government agencies in the
DOD planning process. The State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
(PM) serves as the primary liaison for the Department with DOD. Its counterpart at
DOD is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs (ISA). DOD assigns defense attachés to serve as military liaisons at
embassies around the world. Likewise, PM appoints senior State Department
officials known as Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADs) to serve as advisors to
combatant commanders and other military leaders to “provide policy support
regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of the commanders’ military
responsibilities.”17 The State Department, intelligence and other government
agencies also designate representatives to Joint Interagency Coordination Groups
(JIACGs) within several of DOD’s COCOMs to facilitate the interagency process.
The JIACG is a relatively new concept, created out of a request by CENTCOM’s
former commander, General Tommy Franks, in 2001, to “execute and influence
policy, but not to make it, and to establish new interagency links, but not to replace
habitual relationships or traditional chains of command.”18
According to DOD officials, the new command will seek greater interagency
coordination with the State Department, USAID, and other government agencies and
will have a larger civilian staff (possibly by as much as one third of the total staff)
than has been traditional with other combatant commands. The State Department’s
Senior Advisor for Security Negotiations and Agreements in the Bureau of Political
and Military Affairs, Ambassador Robert Loftis, has reportedly played an integral
role in planning for the new command, and DOD is considering placing a State
Department official in the command structure of AFRICOM, possibly as one of two
deputy commanders. To maintain the military chain of command, one of the deputies
would always be a military officer, but DOD statements suggest a second deputy
17 For more information on POLADs, see [http://www.state.gov/t/pm/polad/].
18 For more information on JIACGs, see Col. Matthew F. Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency
Cooperation: The First Step,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 37, 2005 and

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CRS-7
commander position would rotate among civilian agencies, with a State Department
official filling the role first.19
Those involved in the creation of AFRICOM aim to build upon initiatives in
NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM to improve the interagency process, but EUCOM
Commander General Bantz Craddock suggests this command will be “the pioneer”
for a new approach that the other commands may later adopt.
Structure and Footprint
DOD officials emphasize that the new command is still in the early planning
phase; many of the details regarding the command’s structure and footprint have yet
to be determined. As mentioned above, AFRICOM’s final headquarters location has
not been identified, and a move to the continent is not expected for several years.
Debate is also ongoing about the number of supporting units or sub-regional offices
the command might require. DOD suggests there are no plans to establish any new
military bases in Africa.20 Principal Under Secretary of Defense Ryan Henry, has
asserted that the creation of the new command reflects an “organizational change,”
rather than a change in “basing structure or troop positions on the continent.”21
Nevertheless, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has a
semi-permanent troop presence at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti with more than 1,500
U.S. military and civilian personnel in residence. The U.S. military recently signed
a five year lease with the Djiboutian government for Lemonier, with the option to
extend the lease for two more five-year terms. The command authority for CJTF-
HOA, currently under CENTCOM, will be transferred to AFRICOM by 2008. The
United States military has access to a number of foreign air bases and ports in Africa
and has established “bare-bones” facilities maintained by local troops in several
locations. The U.S. military used facilities in Kenya in the 1990s to support its
intervention in Somalia and continues to use them today to support counter-terrorism
activities. DOD refers to these facilities as “lily pads,” or cooperative security
locations and currently has access to locations in Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco,
Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.
Headquarters Location. There is ongoing debate over where to base
AFRICOM. EUCOM is currently the only geographic combatant command whose
headquarters are located outside of the United States. Given that the majority of
countries that will be transferred to AFRICOM’s new AOR are currently under the
responsibility of EUCOM, and that consequently a majority of the personnel working
on Africa issues were already based in EUCOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart,
Germany, DOD determined that the AFRICOM transition team, and eventually its
headquarters, would be initially located at the American base in Germany as well.
19 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry From the Pentagon,”
April 27, 2007.
20 U.S. military facilities on the island of Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, will remain
under the AOR of PACOM.
21 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry From the Pentagon,”
April 23, 2007.

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CRS-8
Prior to Secretary Gates’ announcement of the command’s establishment, there
was speculation that an Africa Command might be permanently located in Europe,
or in the United States, like the other commands. Some observers suggest that an
Africa Command located in Europe would perpetuate African perceptions that the
West views Africa through a colonial lens. Locating the command on the continent,
on the other hand, might be perceived positively as a recognition of Africa’s strategic
importance in the world and to the United States. Locating the HQ within the AOR
would have several benefits in terms of proximity. Flight time from Germany to
Nairobi, Kenya, for example, is approximately 8 hours, and flight time from
Germany to Johannesburg, South Africa is approximately 11 hours. Deploying
AFRICOM’s staff in close geographic proximity to their African counterparts and to
U.S. diplomatic missions on the continent would enable more efficient interaction.
On the other hand, some initial reaction to locating the Africa Command on the
continent has been negative. There are concerns, both domestically and
internationally, that moving the Command to Africa might be the first step in an
alleged U.S. military agenda to establish a larger footprint on the continent.
The transition team is reportedly still developing its criteria for determining the
ultimate location for the headquarters. DOD officials are currently in consultations
with African countries that have a security relationship with the United States, and
have allegedly already received offers to host the command from several of them,
including Botswana and Morocco. Reports also suggest that other strategic partners,
such as South Africa, have expressed reluctance to host the new command, possibly
out of concern over a permanent foreign military presence within their borders. At
the forefront of DOD considerations in determining the host country will be
providing for the safety and security of an estimated 500 American personnel and
their families who will staff the command. Living standards in Africa are among the
lowest in the world, and DOD would prefer a politically stable location with good
access to health care and schools and relatively low levels of corruption. Locating
U.S. soldiers permanently in a foreign country will be predicated on the host
country’s approval of a Status-of- Forces Agreement (SOFA), a legal document
negotiated by the State Department to define the legal status of U.S. personnel and
property while in that country, and a bilateral non-surrender agreement, commonly
known as an Article 98 Agreement, to protect American servicemen from
prosecution by the International Criminal Court.22 Some advocacy groups hope that
DOD will consider potential host countries’ human rights record among other
criteria.
Although AFRICOM’s move to Africa may take several years, DOD announced
in late April 2007 that the COCOM’s commander would “be stationed” on the
continent possibly as early as 2008, suggesting that, at the very least, some of the
command’s senior staff may operate out of a yet-to-be-determined temporary location
in Africa while the remainder of the command’s staff provide support from
Stuttgart.23 In addition to its headquarters, DOD is also considering opening several
22 For more information on Article 98 agreements, see CRS Report RL31495, U.S. Policy
Regarding the International Criminal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
23 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry From the Pentagon,”
(continued...)

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CRS-9
small sub-regional offices under AFRICOM to better coordinate with Africa’s
regional and sub-regional organizations. EUCOM currently has a military liaison
officer at the African Union headquarters in Ethiopia. That presence may be
expanded under the new command, and additional liaison offices may be attached to
sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS.
Manpower. Manning a new command is a challenging task, particularly in a
time when defense resources and personnel are stretched thin by engagements in Iraq
and Afghanistan. While the number of personnel needed to staff a combatant
command varies, DOD officials estimate that the average command includes between
400 and 1,000 personnel. The size of the new Africa Command is still under
consideration, but early reports suggest the command will be relatively small,
perhaps between 400 and 700, with an estimated ten General Officer (GO) billets.
Like other COCOMs, AFRICOM’s commander will be a four-star general or
admiral. DOD is expected to announce its nomination for that position before the
IOC date (October 1, 2007), and the nominee will require Senate confirmation. As
of March 2007, the transition team, which will form the core of the new command,
included an estimated 60 staff, led by team leader Navy Rear Admiral Robert
Moeller. Many of the personnel for the new command will be transferred from
EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM, although staffing a new operations center may
be more challenging, given that “ops center” personnel cover operations for their
COCOM’s entire AOR. The latest estimates suggest that all of PACOM’s Africa
responsibilities may be transferred to AFRICOM by IOC, but the transfer of EUCOM
and CENTCOM Africa responsibilities will be a slower process, partly due to the
complexity of transferring their larger “ops center” duties. The armed services
(Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) also must determine what restructuring they
will need to meet the needs of the new command.
Cost. Admiral Moeller, head of the AFRICOM planning team, has announced
that the command will cost an estimated $50 million in FY2007. Costs for FY2008
are still being determined. The financial burden of AFRICOM will increase
substantially when the command begins its move to the continent, given the
construction and/or acquisition of physical infrastructure and other start-up costs.
23 (...continued)
April 23, 2007.

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U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa
Issues on the African continent have not historically been identified as strategic
priorities for the U.S. military, and U.S. military engagement in Africa has been
sporadic.24 According to one defense analyst, “during the Cold War, United States
foreign policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa had little to do with Africa.”25 After the
fall of the Soviet Union, many U.S. policymakers considered the U.S. military’s role
and responsibilities on the continent to be minimal. In 1995, DOD outlined its view
of Africa in its U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, asserting that
“ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.”26 In 1998,
following terrorist attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa, the United States
conducted a retaliatory attack against a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan
that Clinton Administration officials initially contended was producing precursors
for chemical weapons for al Qaeda. The embassy bombings, and the retaliatory strike
against Sudan, are considered by many analysts to be a turning point in U.S. strategic
policy toward the region.
Africa and the Unified Command Plan
Africa was not included in the U.S. military command structure until 1952, when
several North African countries, including Libya, were added to the responsibilities
of U.S. European Command because of their historic relationship with Europe. The
rest of the continent remained outside the responsibility of any command until 1960,
when Cold War concerns over Soviet influence in newly independent African
countries led DOD to include Sub-Saharan Africa in the Atlantic Command
(LANTCOM), leaving North Africa in EUCOM. The Unified Command Plan was
revised again in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy, and responsibility for Sub-
Saharan Africa was transferred to a newly-created Strike Command (STRICOM),
which was responsible for operations in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and
South Asia. STRICOM was redesignated as Readiness Command (REDCOM) in
1971, and its responsibility for Africa was dissolved, leaving Sub-Saharan Africa out
of the combatant command structure until 1983. Under the Reagan Administration,
U.S. military involvement in Africa was largely dominated by Cold War priorities, and
the Administration’s “containment” policy led DOD to divide responsibility for Africa
into its current configuration among three geographic commands.
24 For an overview of the history of U.S. military involvement, see Appendix 1. Appendix
2 provides a list of instances in which U.S. military forces have deployed in conflict
situations in Africa since World War II.
25 Letitia Lawson, “U.S. Africa Policy Since the Cold War,” Strategic Insights, Vol. VI,
Issue 1, January 2007.
26 DOD Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for Sub-
Saharan Africa, August 1995.

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Current U.S. National Security Strategy Toward Africa
The establishment of the new Africa Command reflects an evolution in the
United States’ strategic approach toward Africa. In 2004 an advisory panel of Africa
experts authorized by Congress to propose new policy initiatives identified five
factors that have shaped increased U.S. interest in Africa in the past decade:
HIV/AIDS, oil, global trade, armed conflicts, and terror.27 They suggested that these
factors had led to a “conceptual shift to a strategic view of Africa.”28
The Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy of 2002 reflected a need
for a more focused strategic approach toward the continent: “In Africa, promise and
opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens
both a core value of the United States — preserving human dignity — and our
strategic priority — combating global terror.” To address these challenges, the
document asserted that U.S. security strategy must focus on building indigenous
security and intelligence capabilities through bilateral engagement and “coalitions of
the willing.”29 The White House’s most recent National Security Strategy, issued in
2006, goes further, identifying Africa as “a high priority of this Administration,” and
“recogniz(ing) that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen
fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective
democracies.”30
Oil and Global Trade. The United States has sought to increase its economic
relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, and trade between the United States and Africa
tripled between 1990 and 2005.31 In 2000, the Clinton Administration introduced a
comprehensive U.S. trade and investment policy for the continent in the African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA; Title I, P.L. 106-200). AGOA has been
amended by Congress on several occasions, most recently in 2006. Natural
resources, particularly energy resources, dominate the products imported from Africa
27 Some U.S. officials have recently argued that environmental security should be added as
a national security issue, particularly as it relates to Africa. One former Pentagon official
testified before Congress that climate change served as a “threat multiplier” in Africa, using
Nigeria, Sudan, and Somalia as examples and asserting, “beyond the more conventional
threats we traditionally address, I believe we must now also prepare to respond to the
consequences of dramatic population migrations, pandemic health issues and significant
food and water shortages due to the possibility of significant climate change.” Testimony
of General Charles Wald, Member, Military Advisory Board, at a hearing on Climate
Change and National Security Threats by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May
9, 2007.
28 Walter H. Kansteiner III and J. Stephen Morrison, Rising U.S. Stakes in Africa: Seven
Proposals to Strengthen U.S.-Africa Policy, May 2004.
29 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002.
30 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, March 2006.
31 For more information, see CRS Report RL31772, U.S. Trade and Investment Relationship
with Sub-Saharan Africa: The African Growth and Opportunity Act and Beyond, by Danielle
Langton.

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under AGOA. According to reports, Africa has surpassed the Middle East as the
United States’ largest supplier of crude.32
Nigeria is Africa’s largest supplier of oil, and is the fifth largest global supplier
of oil to the United States. Instability in the country’s Niger Delta region has reduced
output periodically by as much as 25%. World oil prices rose above $60 per barrel
in April 2007 after the country held disputed national elections and again in May
2007 after attacks on pipelines in the Delta. President Bush announced in his 2006
State of the Union Address his intention to “to replace more than 75 percent of our
oil imports from the Middle East by 2025,”33 echoing a commitment made in 2002
“to strengthen [U.S.] energy security and the shared prosperity of the global economy
by working with our allies, trading partners, and energy producers to expand the
sources and types of global energy supplied, especially in the Western Hemisphere,
Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region.”34 A senior Pentagon official
reportedly commented in 2003 that “a key mission for U.S. forces (in Africa) would
be to ensure that Nigeria’s oil fields... are secure.”35 In spite of conflict in the Niger
Delta and other areas, the potential for deep water drilling in the Gulf of Guinea is
high, and analysts estimate that Africa may supply as much as 25% of all U.S. oil
imports by 2015.36
Maritime Security. Africa’s coastlines, particularly along the Gulf of Guinea,
the Gulf of Aden, and the waters of Somalia, have been highly susceptible to illegal
fishing, illegal trafficking, and piracy in recent years.37 The inability of African
governments to adequately police the region’s waters has allowed criminal elements
to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons and dump hazardous waste, and has opened
maritime commerce and off-shore oil production facilities to the threat of piracy and
sabotage. In 2005, the Bush Administration introduced its National Strategy for
Maritime Security, identifying the freedom of the seas and the facilitation and
32 See John Authers, “The Short View: African Oil,” Financial Times, April 24, 2007. Data
on U.S. crude oil imports is compiled by the Department of Energy’s Energy Information
Administration, and is available at [http://www.eia.doe.gov].
33 The White House, “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” January 31, 2006.
34 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002.
35 Greg Jaffe, “In Massive Shift, U.S. Is Planning To Cut Size of Military in Germany,” Wall
Street Journal, June 10, 2003.
36 Central Intelligence Agency, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With
Non-government Experts, December 2000, online at [http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/global
trends2015/]. This prediction implies that previously higher sub-Saharan African shares of
U.S. oil imports will be eclipsed and then surpassed. Previously, when absolute levels of
U.S. oil imports were lower, Africa provided a higher percentage of annual U.S. imports
(e.g., about 19.53% in 1990 and about 18.47% in 1995) than it has during the past five years.
For more information, see also African Oil Policy Initiative Group, African Oil: A Priority
for U.S. National Security and African Development, January 2002.
37 According to the International Maritime Bureau, the waters off the coast of Nigeria had
the third highest number of attacks worldwide in 2006, after Indonesia and Bangladesh. ICC
International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report
2006, January 2007.

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CRS-13
defense of commerce as top national priorities and indicating plans to fund border
and coastal security initiatives with African countries.38 The United States
government, represented by members of EUCOM, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, the
State Department, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), has engaged
its African partners in a number of ministerial conferences on maritime security, and
is currently conducting several activities to increase the capability of African navies
to monitor and enforce maritime laws. The U.S. Navy has also reportedly increased
its operations in the Gulf of Guinea to enhance security in the region.39
Armed Conflicts. Africa has been beset by political conflict and instability
over the last fifty years, causing human suffering on a massive scale and retarding
economic, social, and political development.40 Although the number of conflicts in
Africa has decreased in recent years, the continent is home to a majority of the United
Nations’ peace operations, with six missions currently underway.41 Four African
countries, Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa have consistently ranked in the
top 10 troop contributing countries to U.N. peacekeeping operations in recent years.
African militaries also contribute troops to peace operations conducted by the African
Union and regional organizations like ECOWAS. Despite a willingness to
participate in these operations, many African militaries lack the command, training,
equipment, and logistics capability to effectively participate in such efforts.
Instability in Africa has demanded substantial humanitarian and defense resources
from the international community, and the United States and other donor countries
have acknowledged the utility and potential cost-effectiveness of assisting African
forces to enhance their capabilities to participate in these operations. In 2004 the G-8
introduced the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multilateral, five-year
program that aims to train 75,000 troops, a majority of them African, by 2010.42
Terror. Current U.S. security policy is driven in large part by the Global War
on Terror (GWOT), which the Bush Administration has identified as a top national
security priority.43 Terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya in 1998, on targets in Mombasa, Kenya in 2002 and
most recently in Algiers in 2007 have highlighted the threat of terrorism in the
region. Pentagon officials have emphasized the need to work with African
governments to counteract the threat, claiming “Africa has been, is now, and will be
38 The White House, The National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 20, 2005.
39 “U.S. Increasing Operations in Gulf of Guinea,” American Forces Press Service,
September 5, 2006.
40 For further discussion on the indirect costs of instability, see CRS Report 97-454,
Peacekeeping Options: Considerations for U.S. Policymakers and the Congress, by
Marjorie Ann Browne, Ellen Collier, and Nina M. Serafino, p. 5.
41 Current operations in Africa include UNMIS (Sudan), UNOCI (Cote d’Ivoire), UNMIL
(Liberia), MONUC (Dem. Rep. Of Congo), UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea), and MINURSO
(Western Sahara).
42 For more information see CRS Report RL32773, The Global Peace Operations Initiative:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
43 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002.

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CRS-14
into the foreseeable future ripe for terrorists and acts of terrorism.”44 Of primary
concern to policy makers is the possible challenge posed by “ungoverned spaces,”
defined as “physical or non-physical area(s) where there is an absence of state
capacity or political will to exercise control.”45 The Administration has linked these
areas indirectly to terrorist threats, asserting:
Regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor
governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal
rivalries, and ethnic or religious hatreds. If left unaddressed, however, these
different causes lead to the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and
ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists.46
In addition to failed states providing a potential “safe haven” for terrorists, there is
evidence to suggest terrorist groups may have profited from the collapse of state
administrative and security institutions in Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s by
trafficking gemstones during Sierra Leone’s civil war. Reports contend that al Qaeda
used the proceeds from its “conflict diamond” trade as a funding source for its
operations.47 State Department officials have identified failed states such as these as
an “acute risk” to U.S. national security.48
HIV/AIDS. According to the United Nations, there were almost 25 million
HIV-positive Africans in 2006, representing 63% of infected persons worldwide.49
HIV/AIDS is the leading cause of death on the continent and was identified in 2004
by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell as “the greatest threat of mankind today.”50
The rate of infection in some African security forces is believed to be high, between
40-60% in the case of Angola, for example, raising concerns that those forces may
be unable to deploy when needed.51 The Bush Administration has placed priority on
efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, committing over $15 billion through the President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Twelve of PEPFAR’s 15 focus
44 Speech by DOD official Vincent Kern referenced in “Africa Is Still Ripe for Terrorism,
Top Pentagon Official Asserts,”The Washington File, February 10, 2004.
45 Jessica Piombo, “Terrorism and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An
Overview,” Strategic Insights, Vol. VI, Issue 1, January 2007.
46 The White House, The National Security Strategy of The United States, September 2002.
47 See Douglas Farah, “Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade Sale of Gems From Sierra
Leone Rebels Raised Millions, Sources Say,” Washington Post, November 2, 2001; U.N.
Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1343 (2001), Paragraph 19, Concerning Liberia, in S/2001/1015, October 26, 2001; and
CRS Report RL30751, Diamonds and Conflict: Background, Policy, and Legislation, by
Nicolas Cook.
48 Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.
84, No. 4, July/August 2005.
49 UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update, December 2006.
50 Speech by “Secretary of State Colin L. Powell at the Gheskio Clinic Port-au-Prince, Haiti,
April 5, 2004.
51 Kevin A. O’Brien, “Headlines Over the Horizon: AIDS and African Armies,” Atlantic
Monthly, Vol. 292, No. 1, July/August 2003.

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CRS-15
countries are in Africa.52 As part of the Administration’s efforts, DOD has
undertaken its own HIV/AIDS Prevention Program with African armed forces, which
is administered by the Naval Health Research Center in San Diego.
U.S. Military Assistance and Security Cooperation
in Africa: An Expanding Role
The Department of Defense conducts a wide variety of activities in Africa in
support of U.S. national interests. Operational activities may include, but are not
limited to, humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, counter-narcotics, sanctions
enforcement, demining, non-combatant evacuations (NEOs), and maritime
interception operations (MIOs).
In addition to traditional contingency operations, the U.S. military is
implementing a number of efforts aimed at increasing the capabilities of African
militaries to provide security and stability for their own countries and the region as
a whole. Several of these DOD-implemented initiatives are part of foreign military
assistance programs funded by the State Department that “help to promote the
principles of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.”53 In addition
to providing funding, the State Department gives overall guidance and direction for
the programs. The United States military also occasionally provides advisors to
peacekeeping missions on the continent; U.S. military advisors from CJTF-HOA are
currently assisting the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). U.S. forces
routinely conduct a variety of bilateral and multilateral joint exercises with African
militaries through such programs as Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET).
U.S. forces also conduct joint exercises as part of disaster assistance and maritime
security training.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) was created in 1999 as one of
DOD’s five regional centers for strategic studies. It conducts a variety of academic
activities for African, American, and European military and civilian officials aimed
promoting good governance and democratic values, countering ideological support
of terrorism, and fostering regional collaboration and cooperation in the African
defense and security sectors. ACSS, which is based in Washington, DC, opened an
annex at the U.S. embassy in Ethiopia in 2006 and is planning future annexes
elsewhere on the continent.54 DOD initiated another multi-nation forum, the Africa
Clearinghouse, in 2004 under EUCOM. The Africa Clearinghouse, modeled after
EUCOM Clearinghouses for Southeast Europe and the South Caucasus, provides a
venue for the United States to coordinate its actions with other nations involved in
security cooperation in Africa to maximize limited resources, synchronize security
assistance, and avoid duplication of efforts.
52 For more information, see CRS Report RL33584, AIDS in Africa, by Nicolas Cook.
53 For more information on U.S. Foreign Military Training programs, see the Department
of State’s website at [http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/].
54 U.S. State Department, “Africa Center for Strategic Studies Opens Annex in Ethiopia,”
August 1, 2006, available at [http://usinfo.state.gov].

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The United States sells military equipment to African governments through the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, implemented by the U.S. Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA).55 The U.S. government also provides loans (the
United States waives repayment of these loans for African countries) to foreign
governments to finance the purchase of such equipment through the Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) program. Equipment is also provided to select African countries
through the African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBSP) and the Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) program.
U.S. counter-terrorism strategy on the continent is addressed through a number
of these initiatives, but U.S. counter-terrorism efforts also may also include, at one
end of the spectrum, programs to address the root causes of terrorism, and, at the
other end, military operations to destroy terrorist targets through military strikes. The
United States is placing increasing emphasis on Information Operations (IO) in
Africa, which use information to improve the security environment and counter
extremist ideology through military information support teams deployed to U.S.
embassies. IO activities in Africa have included website initiatives such as
Maghrebia.56 Some question whether these activities should be a part of DOD’s
mandate, or whether they might be more appropriately managed by other U.S.
agencies.
Administration officials argue that AFRICOM would not only allow the U.S.
military to better coordinate these operations and programs, but that it would also
allow DOD to better coordinate with other U.S. agencies, like the State Department,
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of
Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations and
others, as well as with other governments, like those of Britain and France, which are
also providing training and assistance for African security forces. DOD suggests
that the new Africa Command will build on the experiences of the U.S. military’s
only forward presence in the region, Combined Joint Task Force — Horn of Africa
(CJTF-HOA), located in the East African nation of Djibouti.
Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). In October
2002, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) developed a joint task force
to focus on “detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist
groups operating in the region,” and to provide a forward presence in the region.57
Approximately 1,500 U.S. military and civilian personnel make up CJTF-HOA,
which covers the land and airspace in Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Seychelles, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Djibouti, and Yemen, as well as the coastal waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf
of Aden, and the Indian Ocean. CJTF personnel train the region’s security forces on
counter-terrorism, collect intelligence, serve as advisors to peace operations, conduct
activities to maintain critical maritime access to Red Sea routes, and oversee and
55 For more information, see [http://www.dsca.osd.mil/] or CRS Report RL33758, U.S. Arms
Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients, 1998-2005, by Richard F.
Grimmett.
56 The website can be found at [http://www.magharebia.com].
57 For more information, see [http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/resources/english/facts.asp].

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support humanitarian assistance efforts. CJTF-HOA has supported at least 11
humanitarian missions, including the airlift of humanitarian assistance supplies to
Ethiopia and Northern Kenya. CJTF-HOA also conducts civilian-military operations
throughout East Africa as part of an effort to “win hearts and minds”58 and enhance
the “long-term stability of the region.”59 These civil-military operations include
digging wells and building and repairing schools, hospitals, and roads, and are also
part of a broader CENTCOM mission to “counter the re-emergence of transnational
terrorism.”60 Some observers question whether these activities are an appropriate
role for the U.S. military.
Security Assistance
Building partnership capacity is a key goal of U.S. military strategy in Africa
and will consequently be a key mandate for AFRICOM. At present, military experts
believe that no African nation poses a direct threat to the United States or is expected
to; consequently an Africa Command would focus less on preparing U.S. forces for
major combat in the AOR. Instead, the command would concentrate much of its
energies and resources on training and assistance to professionalize local militaries
so that they can better ensure stability and security on the continent. As one DOD
official has asserted, “its principle mission will be in the area of security cooperation
and building partnership capability. It will not be in warfighting.”61 Officials stress
that U.S. training programs aim to provide these soldiers with respect for human
rights and for civilian authority, key shortcomings for many African security forces.
U.S. military assistance also includes efforts to improve information sharing
networks between African countries through programs such as EUCOM’s
Multinational Information Sharing Initiative, which donor and aid organizations can
in turn utilize to warn of and be warned of possible crises.
The U.S. government provides security assistance to African militaries through
both bilateral and multilateral initiatives. During the 1990s, the United States
provided military training through several programs, including the African Crisis
Response Initiative (ACRI), the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities
(EIPC), the African Regional Peacekeeping Program (ARP), and International
Military Education and Training (IMET). Some of this training has been provided by
the U.S. Army 3rd and 10th Special Forces Groups, which have worked with African
militaries since 1990. EUCOM has worked with the continent’s regional security
organizations, including the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS). Several of the major current security assistance
programs implemented by DOD are listed below (the list is not inclusive).62
58 U.S. Central Command, “CJTF HOA donates supplies to Djiboutian Well Drillers,”
March 12, 2007.
59 For more information, see [http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/resources/english/facts.asp].
60 For more information on CJTF-HOA activities, see [http://www.hoa.centcom.mil].
61 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry From the Pentagon,”
April 23, 2007.
62 Other authorities used for DOD training include the Combatant Commander Initiative
(continued...)

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CRS-18
Operation Enduring Freedom: Trans Sahara/Trans Sahara Counter-
Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). In 2002, the Department of State launched the Pan-
Sahel Initiative (PSI) program to increase border security and counter-terrorism
capacities of four West African nations: Mali, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania. In 2005,
the Bush Administration announced a “follow-on” program to PSI. According to the
State Department, TSCTI “would look beyond the provision of training and
equipment for counter-terrorism units, but also would consider development
assistance, expanded public diplomacy campaigns and other elements as part of an
overall CT strategy.” Under the American military component, Operation Enduring
Freedom - Trans Sahara, implemented by EUCOM, U.S. forces work with their
African counterparts to improve intelligence, command and control, logistics, and
border control, and to execute joint operations against terrorist groups. U.S. and
African forces have conducted joint exercises such as Exercise Flintlock to improve
security partnerships initiated under PSI and TSCTI.
International Military Education and Training (IMET).63 In 1949 the
U.S. government began providing training to foreign militaries under the Military
Assistance Training Program (MAP) and through Foreign Military Sales (FMS),
which allows countries to pay for their own training. MAP was succeeded in 1976
by IMET, which provides training at U.S. military schools and other training
assistance on a grant basis through funding from the Department of State. In FY2007
IMET is expected to train 1,400 African military officers. The Department of State
also provides training through its Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program.
The Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
Program (ACOTA)/ Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).64 In 1996,
the Clinton Administration proposed an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), an
African standby force that would be trained and equipped by the United States and
other donor nations. The initiative was not well received on the continent, and was
later reintroduced as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a bilateral
training program designed to improve the capabilities of individual African
countries’ militaries to participate in multilateral peacekeeping operations. ACOTA,
which replaced ACRI in 2002, aims to upgrade the peace-enforcement capabilities
of African militaries. ACOTA provides military operations training, including light
infantry and small unit tactics, and focuses on training African troops who can in turn
train other African units.65 Under ACOTA, African forces are provided with military
62 (...continued)
Fund (Title 10, USC, Sec. 166(a), the DOD Regional Counter-Terrorism Fellowship
Program (Title 10, USC, Sec. 2249(c)), the Air Force’s Aviation Leadership Program (Title
10, USC, Sec. 9381-9383), training with U.S. Special Forces (Title 10, USC, Sec. 2011), and
disaster response training under Title 10, USC, Sec. 2561.
63 For more information on IMET, see CRS Report RS20506, The International Military
Training and Education Program, by Richard F. Grimmett.
64 For more information on ACOTA/GPOI, see CRS Report RL32773, The Global Peace
Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
65 “Kenyan military unite with CJTF-HOA for peacekeeping operations,” Marine Corps
(continued...)

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CRS-19
weaponry, including rifles, machine guns, and mortars when they train and deploy.66
In 2004, ACOTA became a part of GPOI. GPOI addresses some of the critical
limitations of African militaries’ ability to contribute to peace operations by
supporting a transport and logistics support system for those forces. Benin,
Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique,
Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia have received ACOTA training.
Regional Perspectives
U.S. reaction to the proposed creation of a new command for Africa has been
largely positive, although some initial concerns have been raised.67 In Africa, on the
other hand, perceptions of the new command are more mixed. There is considerable
apprehension over U.S. motivations for creating AFRICOM, and some Africans
worry that the move represents a neo-colonial effort to dominate the region militarily.
U.S. military efforts on the continent have been seen as episodic, leading some to
question a more sustained focus from DOD now. Recent reports of U.S. air strikes
in Somalia and alleged U.S. support for Ethiopia’s military intervention there have
added to those concerns. Many have viewed U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in Africa
with skepticism, and there appears to be a widespread belief that the new command’s
primary goals will be to hunt terrorists and to secure U.S. access to African oil.68 U.S.
foreign policy analysts have focused increased attention on China’s role in Africa in
recent years, and such attention has led some to question whether an Africa
Command might be part of a new contest for influence on the continent.69
Among several African governments and militaries, on the other hand,
AFRICOM has been received with cautious optimism.70 They view increased
American attention to the continent’s problems as a positive move, potentially
bringing increased resources, training, and assistance. U.S. foreign military assistance
65 (...continued)
News, August 13, 2003.
66 According to Benedikt Franke, “Enabling a Continent to Help Itself: U.S. Military
Capacity Building and Africa’s Emerging Security Architecture,” Strategic Insights,
Volume VI, Issue 1, January 2007, the only lethal equipment provided through ACRI was
small arms ammunition for marksmanship training.
67 See, for example, Michael Moran, “The New ‘Africa Command,’”Council on Foreign
Relations, February 9, 2007, Brett D. Schaefer, “Creating an Africa Command: Bush
Administration Makes the Right Call,” Heritage Foundation, February 7, 2007. Some of
the concerns expressed by American observers are reflected in a statement by Nicole Lee
of the Trans Africa Forum on February 7, 2007, available at
[http://www.transafricaforum.org].
68 See, for example, “The U.S., Oil, and Africa,” Egyptian Mail, February 20, 2007.
69 Dulue Mbachu, “Skepticism Over U.S. Africa Command,” ISN Security Watch, February
19, 2007.
70 See, for example, “Morocco Lobbying to Become Home for New U.S. Military
Command,” Middle East Newsline, February 9, 2007, and “Algerian Foreign Minister
“Satisfied” With Plans for US-Africa Command,” El-Khabar, March 24, 2007.

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has increased in recent years, and military training programs under the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Regional Defense Counter-terrorism
Fellowship Program (CTFP) in Africa have steadily been on the rise.
DOD and State Department officials involved in the creation of Africa
Command have begun a series of consultations with African nations to discuss their
plans for the command. In April 2007, senior officials visited Nigeria, South Africa,
Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal. Following their visit, one DOD official noted
that despite some initial “misconceptions,” they had not encountered “any specific
resistance to the idea.”71 Analysts suggest U.S. officials should closely consult with
these governments to ensure that AFRICOM reflects a mutual exchange of interests
and is seen to foster a closer alliance rather than serving as an avenue for the U.S. to
dictate policy to African governments.
Congressional Interest and Oversight Issues
As noted above, AFRICOM faces myriad challenges, both in its establishment
and its operation. Some of these challenges may become issues for Congress. Some
Members of Congress have expressed interest in the creation of an Africa Command,
and in 2006, Senator Russ Feingold introduced S.Amdt. 4527 to the FY2007
National Defense Authorization bill (S. 2766) requiring a feasibility study for the
establishment of a new command for Africa. The amendment was included in the
legislation, which passed the Senate in June 2006.
The establishment of a new unified command will require both financial and
human resources, although the Pentagon anticipates that much of those will be
redirected from the existing commands. Regardless, military resources have been
stretched by major theater operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, making troop readiness
and costs associated with standing up a new command a critical issue for Congress.
Staffing the command at the interagency level may also require additional resources
from Congress — some officials at the State Department have already expressed
concern with the Department’s ability to provide the number of civilian staff to the
command envisioned by DOD. Some observers have expressed concern that
AFRICOM could develop independent institutional imperatives that demand
resources regardless of need, rather than reflecting genuine strategic interests.
Congress has, in the past, prohibited funding for combatant commands. For example,
under the FY1982 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 97-252), Congress prohibited the
use of funds for the integration of the Army’s Military Traffic Management
Command and the Navy’s Military Sealift Command into a new unified
transportation command, at the request of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff.
Given that a large part of AFRICOM’s mandate will be to build the indigenous
capacity of African defense forces, the ease with which the command can conduct
security cooperation reform programs will be key to its success. DOD officials
suggest that inefficiencies exist in the authorities that provide funding for the
71 DOD, “News Briefing with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Henry From the Pentagon,”
April 23, 2007.

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CRS-21
military’s TSC activities.72 Military officials have argued that the applicable laws
need simplification. The U.S. military faces other policy restrictions, including
Article 98 restrictions, in its operations with some African governments and
militaries. At the same time, DOD is concerned about the lack of servicemen
protections for U.S. troops operating on the continent.
The development of AFRICOM’s interagency process may be of particular
interest to Congress. In the House Report to accompany H.R. 2082, the Intelligence
Authorization Act of FY2008, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
expressed concern with interagency coordination on Africa, calling it “flawed” and
suggesting that the intelligence community needed to realign its resources to “better
understand the threats emanating from this region.” The Pentagon points out that
there are no legally binding requirements for agencies to coordinate their activities,
which could make AFRICOM’s “pioneering” interagency process more challenging,
should other agencies not have the resources to adequately participate. Because the
command’s role will be to support U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa, close
coordination with the State Department will be critical to the success of AFRICOM.
Some have suggested that because the State Department organizes its efforts
bilaterally while DOD organizes regionally, that coordination may be challenging
and may require some “internal bureaucratic changes” within the State Department.73
Observers have expressed concern that U.S. military efforts on the continent
must not be allowed to overshadow U.S. diplomatic objectives. Senator Feingold,
in a speech before the Senate, expressed his support for the Africa Command, but
cautioned that it must “contribute to, not define, the U.S. Government’s overall
strategy and objectives for the continent.”74 As DOD stands up the new command and
as AFRICOM becomes operational, Congress may exert its oversight authority to
monitor the command’s operations to ensure they support, rather than guide, the
United States’ political, economic, and social objectives for the continent.
72 Authorities provided to DOD under Title 10, USC, cannot be generally used for training
or equipment programs, whereas Title 22 funds, which are controlled by the State
Department, but which include some DOD-implemented programs like FMF and IMET,
cannot be used to fund military operations. In the FY2006 Defense Appropriations Act,
Congress gave DOD expanded funding and authorities under Title 10, USC, Section 1206
and 1207 to address lengthy administrative and procurement delays. Section 1206
authorities allow DOD to directly fund some security cooperation activities.
73 Statement of Senator Russ Feingold, “Creation of a U.S. Africa Command,” before the
Senate on January 10, 2007.
74 Statement of Senator Russ Feingold, “Creation of a U.S. Africa Command,” before the
Senate on January 10, 2007.

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CRS-22
Related CRS Reports
CRS Report RL33557, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of
U.S. Military Involvement, by Nina M. Serafino.
CRS Report RL32773, The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
CRS Report RL32238, Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues
for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS Report RL33769, International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian
Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress, by Rhoda Margesson.
CRS Report RL33600, International Terrorism: Threat, Policy, and Response, by
Raphael F. Perl.
CRS Report FL33584, AIDS in Africa, by Nicolas Cook.
CRS Report RL33771, Trends in U.S. Global AIDS Spending: FY2000-FY2007, by
Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.

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CRS-23
Figure 1. Map of Proposed AFRICOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)
Source: Department of Defense.

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CRS-24
Appendix 1. History of U.S. Military
Involvement in Africa
The United States maintained Wheelus Air Base near Tripoli, Libya from the
1940s until 1971 with an estimated 4,000 American personnel.75 Wheelus served
primarily as a bomber base for missions to Europe and as an Air Force training
location, although U.S. forces from the base did provide emergency humanitarian
assistance to earthquake and flood victims in Libya and Tunisia in the 1960s.
Africa was not included in the U.S. military command structure until 1952,
when several North African countries, including Libya, were added to the
responsibilities of U.S. European Command because of their historic relationship
with Europe. The rest of the continent remained outside the responsibility of any
command until 1960, when Cold War concerns over Soviet influence in newly
independent African countries led DOD to include Sub-Saharan Africa in the
Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), leaving North Africa in EUCOM. The Unified
Command Plan was revised again in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy, and
responsibility for Sub-Saharan Africa was transferred to a newly-created Strike
Command (STRICOM), which was responsible for operations in the Middle East,
Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia and located at McDill Air Force Base in Tampa,
Florida. STRICOM was redesignated as Readiness Command (REDCOM) in 1971,
and its responsibility for Africa was dissolved, leaving Sub-Saharan Africa out of the
combatant command structure until 1983. Under the Reagan Administration, U.S.
military involvement in Africa was largely dominated by Cold War priorities, and the
Administration’s “containment” policy led DOD to divide responsibility for Africa
into its current configuration among three geographic commands.
In the 1980s, the U.S. military was involved in repeated skirmishes with Libyan
jets in territorial disputes over the Gulf of Sidra, and those engagements later
escalated as Libya was implicated for supporting international terrorism. On April
15, 1986, the United States initiated air strikes against multiple military targets in
Libya under the code name Operation El Dorado Canyon to “inflict damage to
Qadhafi’s capability to direct and control the export of international terrorism;”
several civilian targets including the French Embassy in Tripoli were also
inadvertently hit.76
After the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Africa was driven by
President George H. W. Bush’s vision of a “New World Order”77 and later by
75 Other former U.S. military installations in North Africa included Kenitra Naval Air
Station, also known as Port Lyautey, and several Naval Communication Relay Stations in
Morocco, as well as three airbases: Nouassur, Sidi Slimane, and Ben Guerir.
76 The White House, “Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the United
States Air Strike Against Libya,” April 15, 1986.
77 See the speech of President George H.W. Bush before a Joint Session of Congress,
“Toward a New World Order,” September 11, 1990.

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President William J. Clinton’s policy of “assertive multilateralism.”78 U.S. military
involvement in Africa was dominated by the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia
to secure humanitarian operations, first in 1992 under the U.S.-led Unified Task
Force (UNITAF), also known as Operation Restore Hope, and later under the United
Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II.79 U.S. military efforts in Somalia were
unprecedented on the continent — over 25,000 U.S. soldiers were deployed by
President George H.W. Bush under UNITAF, which was led by CENTCOM and
included forces from 24 other countries.
The number of U.S. troops was significantly reduced under President Clinton
as operational responsibility was shifted from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. In October
1993, U.S. Special Operations soldiers in the U.S.-led Task Force Ranger engaged
Somali militia forces in the battle of Mogadishu, which ultimately resulted in the
deaths of 18 American soldiers and hundreds of Somalis.80 President Clinton
ultimately ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia in March 1994, the
same month that a limited U.S. deployment of 3,600 soldiers was dispatched to
Central Africa to assist in humanitarian efforts for Rwandan refugees and to provide
protection for humanitarian supplies in Rwanda.81
In 1995, DOD outlined its view of Africa in its U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-
Saharan Africa, asserting that “ultimately we see very little traditional strategic
interest in Africa.”82 While the U.S. military was deployed almost annually during
the 1990s to conduct Non-Combatant Evacuation and Repatriation Operations (NEO)
in African countries that had become politically unstable, other contingency
operations83 involving U.S. forces in Africa in latter half of the 1990s were limited.
In 1998, following the attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa, the United
States conducted retaliatory cruise missile attacks against a pharmaceutical factory
78 See the statement of then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, “Myths of Peacekeeping,” June 24, 1993.
79 For more information, see CRS Report RL30065, Somalia: Background and U.S.
Involvement Through the 1990s, by Theodros Dagne and CRS Report RL30184, Military
Interventions by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background, Outcomes, and “Lessons
Learned” for Kosovo, by Nina M.Serafino.
80 Twenty nine American soldiers ultimately lost their lives as a result of the conflict in
Somalia.
81 Although the mission was deemed successful in alleviating the starvation and disease that
threatened the refugees, many have been highly critical of the United States, the United
Nations, and others for not doing more to attempt to avert the genocide that occurred in
Rwanda that year. See, for example, Col. Scott R. Feil, “Could 5,000 Peacekeepers Have
Saved 500,000 Rwandans?: Early Intervention Reconsidered,” ISD Reports, Vol. III, No. 2,
April 1997.
82 DOD Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for Sub-
Saharan Africa, August 1995.
83 According to DOD, a military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of
Defense as a contingency operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter of law:
title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 101 (a)(13).

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CRS-26
in Khartoum, Sudan that Clinton Administration officials initially contended was
producing precursors for chemical weapons for al Qaeda.
In 2003, the United States responded to calls to intervene in Liberia’s civil war
by deploying a U.S. Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) off the coast of Liberia to
provide assistance to the ECOWAS mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) through Joint Task
Force Liberia, under the command of EUCOM.84 Out of an estimated 5,000 U.S.
forces deployed to the area under Operation Sheltering Sky, only approximately 200
U.S. soldiers entered Monrovia. According to EUCOM, U.S. forces “oversaw the
separation of warring factions, the opening of air and seaports so the U.N. and other
humanitarian organizations could resume operations, and the arrival of U.N.
peacekeeping forces.”85
Appendix 2. Instances of the Use of U.S. Armed
Forces in Africa, 1900-2006
1903-1904 Abyssinia. Twenty-five marines were sent to Abyssinia to protect the U.S. Consul
General while he negotiated a treaty.
1904
Tangier, Morocco. “We want either Perdicaris alive or Raisula dead.” A squadron
demonstrated to force release of a kidnapped American. Marines were landed to protect
the consul general.
1956
Egypt. A marine battalion evacuated U.S. nationals and other persons from Alexandria
during the Suez crisis.
1964
Congo. The United States sent four transport planes to provide airlift for Congolese
troops during a rebellion and to transport Belgian paratroopers to rescue foreigners.
1967
Congo. The United States sent three military transport aircraft with crews to provide the
Congo central government with logistical support during a revolt.
1978
Zaire. From May 19 through June 1978, the United States utilized military transport
aircraft to provide logistical support to Belgian and French rescue operations in Zaire.
1981
Libya. On August 19, 1981, U.S. planes based on the carrier U.S.S. Nimitz shot down
two Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sidra after one of the Libyan jets had fired a
heat-seeking missile. The United States periodically held freedom of navigation
exercises in the Gulf of Sidra, claimed by Libya as territorial waters but considered
international waters by the United States.
1983
Egypt. After a Libyan plane bombed a city in Sudan on March 18, 1983, and Sudan and
Egypt appealed for assistance, the United States dispatched an AWACS electronic
surveillance plane to Egypt.
1983
Chad. On August 8, 1983, President Reagan reported the deployment of two AWACS
electronic surveillance planes and eight F-15 fighter planes and ground logistical support
forces to assist Chad against Libyan and rebel forces.
1986
Libya. On March 26, 1986, President Reagan reported to Congress that, on March 24
84 For more information, see CRS Report RL32243, Liberia: Transition to Peace, by Nicolas
Cook.
85 U.S. EUCOM, “History of European Command Military Operations,” available at
[http://www.eucom.mil/english/Operations/history.asp}.

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CRS-27
and 25, U.S. forces, while engaged in freedom of navigation exercises around the Gulf
of Sidra, had been attacked by Libyan missiles and the United States had responded with
missiles.
1986
Libya. On April 16, 1986, President Reagan reported that U.S. air and naval forces had
conducted bombing strikes on terrorist facilities and military installations in Libya.
1989
Libya. On January 4, 1989, two U.S. Navy F-14 aircraft based on the U.S.S. John F.
Kennedy shot down two Libyan jet fighters over the Mediterranean Sea about 70 miles
north of Libya. The U.S. pilots said the Libyan planes had demonstrated hostile
intentions.
1990
Liberia. On August 6, 1990, President Bush reported that a reinforced rifle company
had been sent to provide additional security to the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, and that
helicopter teams had evacuated U.S. citizens from Liberia.
1991
Zaire. On September 25-27, 1991, after widespread looting and rioting broke out in
Kinshasa, U.S. Air Force C-141s transported 100 Belgian troops and equipment into
Kinshasa. U.S. planes also carried 300 French troops into the Central African Republic
and hauled back American citizens and third country nationals from locations outside
Zaire.
1992
Sierra Leone. On May 3, 1992, U.S. military planes evacuated Americans from Sierra
Leone, where military leaders had overthrown the government.
1992
Somalia. On December 10, 1992, President Bush reported that he had deployed U.S.
armed forces to Somalia in response to a humanitarian crisis and a U.N. Security
Council Resolution determining that the situation constituted a threat to international
peace. This operation, called Operation Restore Hope, was part of a U.S.-led United
Nations Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and came to an end on May 4, 1993. U.S. forces
continued to participate in the successor United Nations Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM II), which the U.N. Security Council authorized to assist Somalia in political
reconciliation and restoration of peace.
1993
Somalia. On June 10, 1993, President Clinton reported that in response to attacks
against U.N. forces in Somalia by a factional leader, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force in
the area had participated in military action to quell the violence. On July 1 President
Clinton reported further air and ground military operations on June 12 and June 17
aimed at neutralizing military capabilities that had impeded U.N. efforts to deliver
humanitarian relief and promote national reconstruction, and additional instances
occurred in the following months.
1994
Rwanda. On April 12, 1994, President Clinton reported that combat-equipped U.S.
military forces had been deployed to Burundi to conduct possible non-combatant
evacuation operations of U.S. citizens and other third-country nationals from Rwanda,
where widespread fighting had broken out. By September 30, 1994, all U.S. troops had
departed from Rwanda and surrounding nations. In the Defense Appropriations Act for
FY1995 (P.L. 103-335, signed September 30, 1994), Congress barred use of funds for
U.S. military participation in or around Rwanda after October 7, 1994, except for any
action necessary to protect U.S. citizens.
1995
Somalia. On March 1, 1995, President Clinton reported that on February 27, 1995,
1,800 combat-equipped U.S. armed forces personnel began deployment into Mogadishu,
Somalia, to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. forces assigned there to the United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). This mission was completed on March 3, 1995.
1996
Liberia. On April 11, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress that on April 9,
1996 due to the “deterioration of the security situation and the resulting threat to
American citizens” in Liberia he had ordered U.S. military forces to evacuate from that
country “private U.S. citizens and certain third-country nationals who had taken refuge
in the U.S. Embassy compound....”
1996
Liberia. On May 20, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress the continued

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deployment of U.S. military forces in Liberia to evacuate both American citizens and
other foreign personnel, and to respond to various isolated “attacks on the American
Embassy complex” in Liberia. The President noted that the deployment of U.S. forces
would continue until there was no longer any need for enhanced security at the Embassy
and a requirement to maintain an evacuation capability in the country.
1996
Central African Republic. On May 23, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress
the deployment of U.S. military personnel to Bangui, Central African Republic, to
conduct the evacuation from that country of “private U.S. citizens and certain U.S.
Government employees,” and to provide “enhanced security for the American Embassy
in Bangui.”
1996
Rwanda and Zaire. On December 2, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress that
to support the humanitarian efforts of the United Nations regarding refugees in Rwanda
and the Great Lakes Region of Eastern Zaire, he had authorized the use of U.S.
personnel and aircraft, including AC-130U planes to help in surveying the region in
support of humanitarian operations, although fighting still was occurring in the area, and
U.S. aircraft had been subject to fire when on flight duty.
1997
Congo and Gabon. On March 27, 1997, President Clinton reported to Congress that,
on March 25, 1997, a standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel had been
deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide enhanced security for American private
citizens, government employees, and selected third country nationals in Zaire, and to be
available for any necessary evacuation operation.
1997
Sierra Leone. On May 30, 1997, President Clinton reported to Congress that on May
29 and May 30, 1997, U.S. military personnel were deployed to Freetown, Sierra Leone,
to prepare for and undertake the evacuation of certain U.S. government employees and
private U.S. citizens.
1998
Guinea-Bissau. On June 12, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress that, on June
10, 1998, in response to an army mutiny in Guinea-Bissau endangering the U.S.
Embassy, U.S. government employees and citizens in that country, he had deployed a
standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel to Dakar, Senegal, to remove such
individuals, as well as selected third country nationals, from the city of Bissau. The
deployment continued until the necessary evacuations were completed.
1998
Kenya and Tanzania. On August 10, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress that
he had deployed, on August 7, 1998, a Joint Task Force of U.S. military personnel to
Nairobi, Kenya, to coordinate the medical and disaster assistance related to the
bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He also reported that teams
of 50-100 security personnel had arrived in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania, to enhance the security of the U.S. Embassies and citizens there.
1998
Afghanistan and Sudan. On August 21, 1998, by letter, President Clinton reported to
Congress that he had authorized airstrikes on August 20th against camps and installations
in Afghanistan and Sudan used by the Osama bin Laden terrorist organization. The
President did so based on what he viewed as convincing information that the bin Laden
organization was responsible for the bombings, on August 7, 1998, of the U.S.
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
1998
Liberia. On September 29, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress that on
September 27, 1998 he had, due to political instability and civil disorder in Liberia,
deployed a stand-by response and evacuation force of 30 U.S. military personnel to
augment the security force at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, and to provide for a rapid
evacuation capability, as needed, to remove U.S. citizens and government personnel
from the country.
1999
Kenya. On February 25, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress that he was
continuing to deploy U.S. military personnel in that country to assist in providing
security for the U.S. embassy and American citizens in Nairobi, pending completion of
renovations of the American embassy facility in Nairobi, subject of a terrorist bombing
in August 1998.

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CRS-29
2000
Sierra Leone. On May 12, 2000, President Clinton, “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” reported to Congress that he had ordered a U.S. Navy patrol craft to deploy
to Sierra Leone to be ready to support evacuation operations from that country if needed.
He also authorized a U.S. C-17 aircraft to deliver “ammunition, and other supplies and
equipment” to Sierra Leone in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations there.
2001
Terrorism threat. On September 24, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to
Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” and “Senate Joint Resolution
23” that in response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon he
had ordered the “deployment of various combat-equipped and combat support forces to
a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of operations.”
The President noted in efforts to “prevent and deter terrorism” he might find it necessary
to order additional forces into these and other areas of the world....” He stated that he
could not now predict “the scope and duration of these deployments,” or the “actions
necessary to counter the terrorist threat to the United States.”
2002
Terrorism threat. On September 20, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that U.S. “combat-equipped and combat
support forces” have been deployed to the Philippines since January 2002 to train with,
assist and advise the Philippines’ Armed Forces in enhancing their “counterterrorist
capabilities.” He added that U.S. forces were conducting maritime interception
operations in the Central and European Command areas to combat movement, arming
or financing of “international terrorists.” He also noted that U.S. combat personnel had
been deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help enhance the “counterterrorist capabilities”
of their armed forces.
2002
Cote d’Ivoire. On September 26, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” that in response to a rebellion in Cote d’Ivoire that
he had on September 25, 2002 sent U.S. military personnel into Cote d’Ivoire to assist
in the evacuation of American citizens and third country nationals from the city of
Bouake; and otherwise assist in other evacuations as necessary.
2003
Terrorism threat. On March 20, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” as well as P.L. 107-40, and “pursuant to” his authority
as Commander-in-Chief, that he had continued a number of U.S. military operations
globally in the war against terrorism. These military operations included ongoing U.S.
actions against al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan; collaborative anti-terror operations
with forces of Pakistan in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area; “maritime interception
operations on the high seas” in areas of responsibility of the Central and European
Commands to prevent terrorist movement and other activities; and military support for
the armed forces of Georgia and Yemen in counter-terrorism operations.
2003
Liberia. On June 9, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution,” that on June 8 he had sent about 35 combat-equipped U.S.
military personnel into Monrovia, Liberia, to augment U.S. Embassy security forces, to
aid in the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens if necessary. The President also noted that
he had sent about 34 combat-equipped U.S. military personnel to help secure the U.S.
Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and to assist in evacuation of American citizens if
required. They were expected to arrive at the U.S. embassy by June 10, 2003. Back-up
and support personnel were sent to Dakar, Senegal, to aid in any necessary evacuation
from either Liberia or Mauritania.
2003
Liberia. On August 13, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with
the War Powers Resolution,” that in response to conditions in Liberia, on August 11,
2003, he had authorized about 4,350 U.S. combat-equipped military personnel to enter
Liberian territorial waters in support of U.N. and West African States efforts to restore
order and provide humanitarian assistance in Liberia.
2003
Terrorism threat. On September 19, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that U.S. “combat-equipped and combat
support forces” continue to be deployed at a number of locations around the world as
part of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. American forces support anti-terrorism efforts in the

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Philippines, and maritime interception operations continue on the high seas in the
Central, European, and Pacific Command areas of responsibility, to “prevent the
movement, arming, or financing of international terrorists.” He also noted that “U.S.
combat equipped and support forces” had been deployed to Georgia and Djibouti to help
in enhancing their “counterterrorist capabilities.”
2004
Terrorism/Bosnia and Haiti. On March 20, 2004, the President reported to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of
multiple on-going United States military deployments and operations “in support of the
global war on terrorism (including in Afghanistan),” as well as operations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Haiti. In this report, the President noted that U.S. anti-terror
related activities were underway in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and
Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be
deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,900 personnel); in Bosnia and
Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,100 personnel); and
approximately 1,800 military personnel were deployed in Haiti as part of the U.N.
Multinational Interim Force.
2004
Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia/Iraq. On November 4, 2004, the
President sent to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated
report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and
operations “in support of the global war on terrorism.” These deployments, support or
military operations include activities in Afghanistan, Djibouti, as well as Kenya,
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In this report, the President
noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia,
Yemen, and Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel
continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,800 personnel);
and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,000 personnel).
Meanwhile, he stated that the United States continues to deploy more than 135,000
military personnel in Iraq.
2005
Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia. On May 20, 2005, the President sent
to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving
details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in
support of the global war on terrorism,” as well as operations in Iraq, where about
139,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed. U.S. forces are also deployed in Kenya,
Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism
capabilities” of these nations. The President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped
military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR
(1,700 personnel). Approximately 235 U.S. personnel are also deployed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina as part of the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform
and perform operational tasks, such as counter-terrorism and supporting the International
Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.
2005
Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia/Iraq. On December 7, 2005, the
President sent to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated
report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and
operations “in support of the global war on terrorism,” and in support of the
Multinational Force in Iraq, where about 160,000 U.S. military personnel were
deployed. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region — Kenya,
Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti — assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities”
of these nations. The President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military
personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,700
personnel). Approximately 220 U.S. personnel were also deployed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina as part of the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform
and perform operational tasks, such as “counter-terrorism and supporting the
International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.”
2006
Terrorism threat/Kosovo/Bosnia/Iraq. On June 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of
multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the

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war on terror,” and in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the Multinational
Force (M.F.) in Iraq. About 131,000 military personnel were deployed in Iraq. U.S.
forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support
necessary operations against al-Qaida and other international terrorists operating in the
region. U.S. military personnel continue to support the NATO-led Kosovo Force
(KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR was about 1,700 military personnel. The
NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was established in November 22, 2004 as a successor to
its stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to assist in implementing
the peace agreement. Approximately 250 U.S. personnel were assigned to the NATO
Headquarters-Sarajevo to assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such
as “counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former
Yugoslavia.”
2006
Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia. On December 15, 2006, the President
sent to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report
giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in
support of the war on terror,” in Kosova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the
Multinational Force (M.F.) in Iraq. About 134,000 military personnel were deployed in
Iraq. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to
support necessary operations against al-Qaida and other international terrorists operating
in the region, including Yemen. U.S. military personnel continue to support the NATO-
led Kosova Force (KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR was about 1,700 military
personnel. The NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was established in November 22, 2004
as a successor to its stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to assist
in implementing the peace agreement. Approximately 100 U.S. personnel were assigned
to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo to assist in defense reform and perform operational
tasks, such as “counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the
Former Yugoslavia.”
Source: CRS Report RL32170, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2006, by Richard
F. Grimmett.

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CRS-32
Appendix 3. Acronyms
ACBSP
African Coastal and Border Security Program
ACOTA
African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACSS
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
AFRICOM
Africa Command
AMIS
African Union Mission in Sudan
AOR
Area of Responsibility
AU
African Union
CENTCOM
Central Command
CJTF-HOA
Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa
CTFP
Regional Defense Counter-terrorism Fellowship Program
COCOM
Combatant Command
DOD
Department of Defense
DOS
Department of State
ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States
EDA
Excess Defense Articles
EUCOM
European Command
FMF
Foreign Military Financing
FMS
Foreign Military Sales
FOC
Full Operating Capability
GO
General Officer
GPOI
Global Peace Operations Initiative
GWOT
Global War on Terrorism
IMET
International Military Education and Training
IO
Information Operations
IOC
Initial Operating Capability
JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFCOM
Joint Forces Command
JIACG
Joint Interagency Coordination Groups
LANTCOM
Atlantic Command
MIO
Maritime Interception Operation
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO
Non-Combatant Evacuation and Repatriation Operations
NORTHCOM Northern Command
OEF-TS
Operation Enduring Freedom — Trans Sahara
OSD
Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACOM
Pacific Command
POLAD
Foreign Policy Advisor
REDCOM
Readiness Command
SADC
Southern African Development Community
SOCOM
Special Operations Command
SOUTHCOM
Southern Command
STRATCOM
Strategic Command
STRICOM
Strike Command
TRANSCOM
Transportation Command
TSC
Theater Security Cooperation
TSCTI
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative
UCP
Unified Command Plan
UNITAF
U.S. United Task Force
UNOSOM
U.N. Operation in Somalia
USAID
United States Agency for International Development

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