Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

July 11, 2019 – February 9, 2024 R45811

Hypersonic Weapons:
February 9, 2024
Background and Issues for Congress
Kelley M. Sayler
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—maneuvering
Specialist in Advanced
weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike
Technology and Global
program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on
Security
developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a

target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines
during flight. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of

U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable
“responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles]
when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic
weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.
Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Congress have
shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part,
to the advances in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a number of hypersonic weapons programs
and have likely fielded operational hypersonic glide vehicles—potentially armed with nuclear warheads. Most U.S.
hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As a
result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than
nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.
The Pentagon’s FY2023 budget request for hypersonic research was $4.7 billion—up from $3.8 billion in the FY2022
request. The Pentagon declined to provide a breakout of funding for hypersonic-related research in FY2024, but requested
$11 billion for long-range fires—a category that includes hypersonic weapons. The Missile Defense Agency additionally
requested $190.6 million for hypersonic defense in FY2024, down from its $225.5 million request in FY2023. At present, the
Department of Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may
not have approved either mission requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans. Indeed, as former Principal
Director for Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) Mike White has stated,
DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in the
evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets.
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions about the
rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and arms control.
Potential questions include the following:
• What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-effective
means of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint operational doctrine
and concepts?
• Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress evaluate
funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests for hypersonic
weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an acceleration of research
on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile defense options both necessary and
technologically feasible?
• How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?
• Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new multilateral
arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building activities?

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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as a part of its
conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) program since the early 2000s.1 In recent years, it has
focused such efforts on hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles with shorter and
intermediate ranges for use in regional conflicts. Although funding for these programs has been
relatively restrained in the past, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in
pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part,
to advances in these technologies in Russia and China, leading to a heightened focus in the
United States on the strategic threat posed by hypersonic flight. Open-source reporting indicates
that both China and Russia have conducted numerous successful tests of hypersonic glide
vehicles and likely fielded an operational capability.
Experts disagree on the potential impact of competitor hypersonic weapons on both strategic
stability and the U.S. military’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, former Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) Michael Griffin has testified to Congress
that the United States does not “have systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in a
corresponding manner, and we don’t have defenses against [their] systems.”2 Although the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019 NDAA, P.L. 115-
232) accelerated the development of hypersonic weapons, which USD(R&E) identifies as a
priority research and development area, the United States is unlikely to field an operational
system before FY2025. However, most U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, in contrast to those in
Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead.3 As a result, U.S.
hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging
to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.
In addition to accelerating development of hypersonic weapons, Section 247 of the FY2019
NDAA required that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, produce a classified assessment of U.S. and adversary hypersonic weapons
programs, to include the following elements:
(1) An evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries on such technology.
(2) An evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology.
(3) An evaluation of the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology.
(4) An assessment of the technological progress of the United States and adversaries on
such technology.
(5) Descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such technology.

1 For details, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
2 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New
Technologies to Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-
40_04-18-18.pdf.
3 Until recently, the United States was not believed to be considering the development of nuclear-armed hypersonic
weapons; however, a since-revoked Air Force solicitation sought ideas for a “thermal protection system that can
support [a] hypersonic glide to ICBM ranges.” Senior defense officials responded to news reports of the revocation,
stating that DOD “remains committed to non-nuclear role for hypersonics.” See Steve Trimble, “USAF Errantly
Reveals Research on ICBM-Range Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,” Aviation Week, August 18, 2020, at
https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/usaf-errantly-reveals-research-icbm-range-
hypersonic-glide.
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(6) An assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.4
This report was delivered to Congress in July 2019. Similarly, Section 1689 of the FY2019
NDAA requires the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to produce a report on “how
hypersonic missile defense can be accelerated to meet emerging hypersonic threats.”5 The
findings of these reports could hold implications for congressional authorizations, appropriations,
and oversight.
The following report reviews the hypersonic weapons programs in the United States, Russia, and
China, providing information on the programs and infrastructure in each nation, based on
unclassified sources. It also provides a brief summary of the state of global hypersonic weapons
research development. It concludes with a discussion of the issues that Congress might address as
it considers DOD’s funding requests for U.S. hypersonic technology programs.
Background
Several countries are developing hypersonic weapons, which fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 (five
times the speed of sound).6 There are two primary categories of hypersonic weapons:
• Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) are launched from a rocket before gliding to a
target.7
• Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines, or
“scramjets,” after acquiring their target.
Unlike ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons do not follow a ballistic trajectory and can
maneuver en route to their destination. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, hypersonic
weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or
time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied
access, or not preferred.”8 Conventional hypersonic weapons use only kinetic energy—energy
derived from motion—to destroy unhardened targets or, potentially, underground facilities.9
Hypersonic weapons could challenge detection and defense due to their speed, maneuverability,
and low altitude of flight.10 For example, terrestrial-based radar cannot detect hypersonic
weapons until late in the weapon’s flight.11 Figure 1 depicts the differences in terrestrial-based
radar detection timelines for ballistic missiles versus hypersonic glide vehicles.

4 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §247.
5 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title XVI, §1689.
6 At a minimum, the United States, Russia, China, Australia, India, France, Germany, and Japan are developing
hypersonic weapons technology. See Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread
of a New Class of Weapons, RAND Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html;
and Mike Yeo, “Japan unveils its hypersonic weapons plans,” Defense News, March 14, 2020.
7 When HGVs are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to as a hypersonic
boost-glide weapon.
8 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States
Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
9 Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons, p. 13.
10 See Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-
2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
11 Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons.
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Figure 1. Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs.
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles

Source: CRS image based on an image in “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The
Economist, April 6, 2019, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-
faster-than-mach-5-are-coming.
This delayed detection compresses the timeline for decisionmakers assessing their response
options and for a defensive system to intercept the attacking weapon—potentially permitting only
a single intercept attempt.12
Furthermore, U.S. defense officials have stated that both terrestrial- and current space-based
sensor architectures are insufficient to detect and track hypersonic weapons, with former
USD(R&E) Griffin noting that “hypersonic targets are 10 to 20 times dimmer than what the U.S.
normally tracks by satellites in geostationary orbit.”13 Some analysts have suggested that space-
based sensor layers—integrated with tracking and fire-control systems to direct high-performance
interceptors or directed energy weapons14—could theoretically present viable options for
defending against hypersonic weapons in the future.15 Indeed, the 2019 Missile Defense Review
notes that “such sensors take advantage of the large area viewable from space for improved
tracking and potentially targeting of advanced threats, including HGVs and hypersonic cruise
missiles.”16

12 Bradley Perrett et al., “U.S. Navy sees Chinese HGV as part of Wider Threat,” Aviation Week, January 27, 2014.
13 David Vergun, “DOD Scaling Up Effort to Develop Hypersonics,” DoD News, December 13, 2018, at
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1712954/dod-scaling-up-effort-to-develop-hypersonics/; see also U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New Technologies to
Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-40_04-18-18.pdf,
and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States
Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
14 Section 1664 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) granted the “Director of the Missile Defense Agency the authority
to budget for, direct, and manage directed energy programs applicable for ballistic and hypersonic missile defense
missions, in coordination with other directed energy efforts of the Department of Defense.”
15 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New
Technologies to Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-
40_04-18-18.pdf; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing
on United States Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
16 Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, p. XVI, at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/
2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
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Other analysts have questioned the affordability, technological feasibility, and/or utility of wide-
area hypersonic weapons defense.17 As physicist and nuclear expert James Acton explains, “point-
defense systems, and particularly [Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)], could very
plausibly be adapted to deal with hypersonic missiles. The disadvantage of those systems is that
they can only defend small areas. To defend the whole of the continental United States, you
would need an unaffordable number of THAAD batteries.”18 In addition, some analysts have
argued that the United States’ current command and control architecture would be incapable of
“processing data quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an incoming hypersonic threat.”19
(For additional information on hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623,
Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.)
United States
The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s
Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the
ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as well as through
several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.20 Those who support these development efforts
argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as well as provide the U.S. military
with an ability to defeat capabilities such as advanced air and missile defense systems that form
the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-access/area denial strategies.21 In recognition of this, the
2018 National Defense Strategy identifies hypersonic weapons as one of the key technologies
“[ensuring the United States] will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.”22 Similarly, the
House Armed Services Committee’s bipartisan Future of Defense Task Force Report notes that
hypersonic weapons could present challenges to the United States in the years to come.23
Programs
Unlike programs in China and Russia, U.S. hypersonic weapons are to be conventionally armed.
As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more
technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. Indeed,

17 See James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2, 2018,
at https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/02/hypersonic-weapons-explainer-pub-75957; and Margot van Loon,
“Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer.”
18 Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer.”
19 Margot van Loon, “Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer” in Defense Technology Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons,
American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019. Some analysts have suggested that future command and control
systems may require autonomous functionality to manage the speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons. See
John L. Dolan, Richard K. Gallagher, and David L. Mann, “Hypersonic Weapons Are Literally Unstoppable (As in
America Can’t Stop Them),” Real Clear Defense, April 23, 2019, at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/
04/23/hypersonic_weapons__a_threat_to_national_security_114358.html.
20 For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global
Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
21 Roger Zakheim and Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” Remarks at
the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army
Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580.
22 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” p. 3, at
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
23 House Armed Services Committee, Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020, September 2020, at
https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2/6/26129500-d208-47ba-a9f7-25a8f82828b0/
424EB2008281A3C79BA8C7EA71890AE9.future-of-defense-task-force-report.pdf.
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according to one expert, “a nuclear-armed glider would be effective if it were 10 or even 100
times less accurate [than a conventionally-armed glider]” due to nuclear blast effects.24
According to open-source reporting, the United States is conducting research, development, test,
and evaluation (RDT&E) on a number of offensive hypersonic weapons and hypersonic
technology programs, including the following (see Table 1):
• U.S. Navy—Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS);
• U.S. Navy—Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment 2 (OASuW Inc 2), also
known as Hypersonic Air-Launched OASuW (HALO);
• U.S. Army—Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW);
• U.S. Air Force—AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW,
pronounced “arrow”);
• U.S. Air Force—Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM);
• DARPA—Tactical Boost Glide (TBG); and
• DARPA—More Opportunities with Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept
(MOHAWC, pronounced “mohawk”).
These programs are intended to produce operational prototypes, as there are currently no
programs of record for hypersonic weapons.25
U.S. Navy
In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a
Common Hypersonic Glide Body for use across the services.26 The glide body is being adapted
from a Mach 6 Army prototype warhead, the Alternate Re-Entry System. The Navy’s
Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) is expected to pair the glide body with a booster system to
create a common All Up Round (AUR) for use by both the Navy and Army. The first test of the
AUR, conducted in June 2022, resulted in failure.27 Two subsequent flight tests, planned for
March and October 2023, did not occur due to failed preflight checks.28
According to the Navy’s FY2024 budget documents, the service intends to deploy CPS on
Zumwalt-class destroyers by the end of FY2025.29 Although Navy officials have previously noted

24 James M. Acton, “China’s Advanced Weapons,” Testimony to the U.S. China Economic and Security Review
Commission, February 23, 2017, at https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/23/china-s-advanced-weapons-pub-68095.
25 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics, But Only Prototypes,” Aviation Week, March
15, 2019, at https://aviationweek.com/defense/new-long-term-pentagon-plan-boosts-hypersonics-only-prototypes.
26 The services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors with rotating chairmanship.
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Ramps up Funding for Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,” Breaking Defense, February
28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-shield-hypersonic-sword/.
27 Jon Herskovitz and Anthony Capaccio, “US Hypersonic Missile Fails in Test in Fresh Setback for Program,”
Bloomberg, June 29, 2022, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-30/us-hypersonic-missile-fails-in-
test-in-fresh-setback-for-program.
28 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2023 Annual Report, January 2024, p. 168, at
https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2023/other/2023annual-report.pdf?ver=
d7gusiIrcbYmxM0oDkPSFg%3d%3d.
29 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1456, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/24pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. Reports indicate that Zumwalt-class destroyers could carry up to 12
missiles each. See Sam LaGrone, “Navy Awards HII Planning Contract for Zumwalt Hypersonic Upgrades,” USNI
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plans to achieve “limited operating capability” on Ohio-class submarines as early as 202530 and
on Virginia-class submarines by FY2028, as well as to eventually field hypersonic weapons on
Burke-class destroyers, such plans are not reflected in FY2024 budget documents.31 The Navy is
requesting $901 million for CPS RDT&E in FY2024—a decrease from the FY2023 request of
$1.2 billion—and $341 million for CPS procurement.32
The Navy is also developing the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment 2 (OASuW Inc 2),
also known as Hypersonic Air-Launched OASuW (HALO)—a new start in FY2023.33 Although
few details about the program have been released publicly, HALO is likely to be compatible with
the Navy’s F/A-18 fighter jet.34 The Navy is requesting $95.8 million for HALO RDT&E in
FY2024.35
U.S. Army
The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) program, also known as Dark Eagle, is
expected to pair the common glide vehicle with the Navy’s booster system.36 The system is
intended to have a range of over 1,725 miles and “provide the Army with a prototype strategic
attack weapon system to defeat A2/AD capabilities, suppress adversary Long Range Fires, and
engage other high payoff/time sensitive targets.”37 The Army is requesting $943 million for

News, January 9, 2023, at https://news.usni.org/2023/01/09/navy-awards-hii-planning-contract-for-zumwalt-
hypersonic-upgrades?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-
c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d.
30 See Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1466, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/22pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf; Department of the Navy, “Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY
2021 Budget,” February 10, 2020, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/21pres/Highlights_book.pdf;
and Megan Eckstein, “Navy Says Hypersonic Weapons Coming to Subs in 5 Years,” USNI News, November 17, 2020,
at https://news.usni.org/2020/11/17/navy-says-hypersonic-weapons-coming-to-subs-in-5-years.
31 David B. Larter, “All US Navy destroyers will get hypersonic missiles, says Trump’s national security adviser,”
Defense News, October 21, 2020, at https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/10/21/all-us-navy-destroyers-will-get-
hypersonic-missiles-trumps-national-security-advisor-says/.
32 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1499, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/24pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf; and Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates,
Navy Justification Book of Weapons Procurement, p. 39, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/24pres/
WPN_Book.pdf. The Navy’s FY2024 request would support the procurement of eight CPS weapons.
33 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1373, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. Some reports indicate that, despite its name, HALO may not travel at
hypersonic speeds, and thus may not qualify as a hypersonic weapon. See, for example, Jon Harper, “Navy’s future
HALO ‘hypersonic’ missile might not actually be hypersonic,” Defense Scoop, April 3, 2023, at
https://defensescoop.com/2023/04/03/navys-future-halo-hypersonic-missile-might-not-actually-be-hypersonic/.
34 Joesph Trevithick, “Hypersonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Has To Be Ready By 2028 Navy Says,” The Drive, April
23, 2022, at https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/hypersonic-anti-ship-cruise-missile-has-to-be-ready-by-2028-
navy-says.
35 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1353, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/24pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
36 For additional information about LRHW, see CRS In Focus IF11991, The U.S. Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic
Weapon (LRHW), by Andrew Feickert.
37 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Discloses Hypersonic LRHW Range Of 1,725 Miles; Watch Out China,” Breaking
Defense, May 12, 2021, at https://breakingdefense.com/2021/05/army-discloses-hypersonic-lrhw-range-of-1725-miles-
watch-out-china/; https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/army-sets-2023-hypersonic-flight-test-strategic-cannon-
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LRHW RDT&E in FY202438 and $156.8 million for the procurement of LRHW ground support
equipment.39 The Army has fielded prototype LRHW equipment and “intends to field two
additional batteries of LRHW” by FY2027.40 Army officials have previously expressed plans to
transition LRHW to a program of record in the fourth quarter of FY2024—a timeline that
officials have termed “very, very aggressive” and that will require the program to take on “a lot of
risk.”41
U.S. Air Force
The AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon is to leverage DARPA’s Tactical Boost
Glide technology to develop an air-launched hypersonic glide vehicle prototype capable of
travelling at average speeds of between Mach 6.5 and Mach 8 at a range of approximately 1,000
miles.42 ARRW successfully completed a “captive carry” test flight in June 2019. It then
experienced three successive failures before completing three successful flight tests in 2022.43
Although the first test of the full operational ARRW prototype in December 2022 was successful,
ARRW’s flight testing record since then appears to have been mixed, with at least one 2023 test
flight failure.44 The Air Force declined to comment on the outcome of a second 2023 test, noting
only that it “gained valuable new insights into [ARRW’s] capabilities.”45 Following the March

advances/; and Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 639, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/
Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/RDTE_BA_4_FY_2022_PB.pdf.
38 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 5D, p. 181, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/
Documents/BudgetMaterial/2024/Base%20Budget/rdte/RDTE-Vol%202-Budget%20Activity%205D.pdf; and
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4B, p. 257, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/
BudgetMaterial/2024/Base%20Budget/rdte/RDTE-Vol%202-Budget%20Activity%204B.pdf.
39 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Missile Procurement,
pp. 80-81, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2024/Base%20Budget/Procurement/
Missile%20Procurement%20Army.pdf.
40 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2023 Annual Report, January 2024, p. 123, at
https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2023/other/2023annual-report.pdf?ver=
d7gusiIrcbYmxM0oDkPSFg%3d%3d.
41 Jon Harper, DefenseScoop, October 10, 2022, at https://defensescoop.com/2022/10/10/army-assuming-a-lot-of-risk-
as-it-moves-to-field-hypersonic-weapons-by-end-of-fiscal-year/. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY)
2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget
Activity 4, pp. 705-709, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/
rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf.
42 ARRW is expected to be launched initially from the B-52H strategic bomber. Thomas Newdick, “Air Force Says
New Hypersonic Missile Will Hit Targets 1,000 Miles Away In Under 12 Minutes,” The Drive, October 13, 2020, at
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37045/air-force-says-new-hypersonic-missile-will-hit-targets-1000-miles-
away-in-under-12-minutes.
43 Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force’s Hypersonic ARRW Missile Fails First Flight Test,” Military.com, April 6, 2021, at
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/04/06/air-forces-hypersonic-arrw-missile-fails-first-flight-test.html#:~:text=
In%20June%202019%2C%20the%20service,early%202020s%2C%20the%20release%20states; John A. Tirpak,
“Hypersonic ARRW Flies Successfully for Second Time, Completing Booster Tests,” Air Force Magazine, July 13,
2022, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-arrw-flies-successfully-for-second-time-completing-booster-tests/.
44 Ilka Cole, “Air Force conducts first ARRW operational prototype missile test,” U.S. Air Force, December 12, 2022,
at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3243194/air-force-conducts-first-arrw-operational-prototype-
missile-test/; and Stephen Losey, “US Air Force fires hypersonic ARRW in first test since March failure,” C4ISRNet,
August 21, 2023, at https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/08/21/us-air-force-fires-arrw-hypersonic-in-
first-test-since-march-failure/.
45 Stephen Losey, “US Air Force fires hypersonic ARRW in first test since March failure,” C4ISRNet, August 21, 2023,
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2023 failure, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall stated that the Air Force is “more
committed to HACM at this point in time than [it is] to ARRW.”46 The Air Force requested $150
million for ARRW RDT&E in FY2024; however, the FY2024 NDAA did not authorize any
funding for the program.47
In February 2020, the Air Force announced that it had cancelled its second hypersonic weapon
program, the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW), which had been expected to use
the common glide vehicle and booster system, due to budget pressures that forced it to choose
between ARRW and HCSW.48 Then-Air Force acquisition chief Will Roper explained that ARRW
was selected because it was more advanced and gave the Air Force additional options. “[ARRW]
is smaller; we can carry twice as many on the B-52, and it’s possible it could be on the F-15,” he
explained.49 A senior Air Force official has since noted that a B-52 could potentially carry four
ARRWs.50
Finally, in FY2022, the Air Force launched the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM)
program to develop a hypersonic cruise missile that integrates Air Force and DARPA
technologies. Some reports indicate that HACM is intended to be launched from both bombers
and fighter aircraft,51 with a senior Air Force official noting that a B-52 could potentially carry 20
HACMs or more.52 According to the Air Force, “the ability to execute HACM development is
contingent upon fully funded and successful predecessor capability development efforts.”53 The
Air Force requested $381.5 million for HACM in FY2024, up from $317 million in the FY2023
request and down from the $423.4 million FY2023 appropriation.54

at https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/08/21/us-air-force-fires-arrw-hypersonic-in-first-test-since-
march-failure/.
46 John A. Tirpak, “Kendall: Air Force ‘More Committed’ to HACM After Latest Unsuccessful ARRW Test,” Air and
Space Forces Magazine, March 28, 2023, at https://www.airandspaceforces.com/kendall-air-force-hacm-unsuccessful-
arrw-test/.
47 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 185, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY24/
Research%20and%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation/
FY24%20Air%20Force%20Research%20and%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation%20Vol%20II.pdf?
ver=pYOQLrjX71gVe8w6FCJOwg%3d%3d.
48 Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force kills one of its hypersonic weapons programs,” Defense News, February 10, 2020, at
https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2020/02/10/the-air-force-just-canceled-one-of-its-hypersonic-
weapons-programs/.
49 John A. Tirpak, “Roper: The ARRW Hypersonic Missile Better Option for USAF,” Air Force Magazine, March 2,
2020, at https://www.airforcemag.com/arrw-beat-hcsw-because-its-smaller-better-for-usaf/. Tirpak additionally notes
that “the F-15 could accelerate the ARRW to Mach 3 before launch, potentially reducing the size of the booster needed
to get the weapon to hypersonic speed.”
50 John A. Tirpak, “Air Force Will Try Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile in July,” Air Force Magazine,
June 3, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/.
51 FY2023 Air Force budget documents note that “the HACM program will prioritize integration on the F-15E platform
to enable quick entry into flight test.”
52 John A. Tirpak, “Air Force Will Try Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile in July,” Air Force Magazine,
June 3, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/.
53 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 148, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/
RDTE_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20-%20AF%20RDT%20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=
KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d.
54 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 193, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY24/
Research%20and%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation/
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The Air Force is also seeking information from industry on the Expendable Hypersonic Air-
Breathing Multi-Mission Demonstrator Program, alternatively known as Project Mayhem.
According to then-Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White, “Project Mayhem is to look at
the next step in what the opportunity space allows relative to hypersonic cruise missile systems”
and is intended to be capable of flying “significantly longer ranges than what we’re doing
today.”55 Mayhem is reported to be larger than ARRW and capable of carrying multiple payloads
for different mission sets.56
DARPA
DARPA, in partnership with the Air Force, continues to test Tactical Boost Glide, a wedge-shaped
hypersonic glide vehicle capable of Mach 7+ flight that “aims to develop and demonstrate
technologies to enable future air-launched, tactical-range hypersonic boost glide systems.”57 TBG
will “also consider traceability, compatibility, and integration with the Navy Vertical Launch
System” and is planned to transition to both the Air Force and the Navy. DARPA has requested
$81.5 million for TBG in FY2024—up from $30 million in the FY2023 request and
appropriation.58
DARPA’s Operational Fires reportedly sought to leverage TBG technologies to develop a ground-
launched system that will enable “advanced tactical weapons to penetrate modern enemy air
defenses and rapidly and precisely engage critical time sensitive targets.” OpFires completed its
first flight test in July 2022.59 DARPA requested and received $45 million for OpFires in FY2022,
but did not request funds in FY2023, following the program’s completion.60

FY24%20Air%20Force%20Research%20and%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation%20Vol%20II.pdf?
ver=pYOQLrjX71gVe8w6FCJOwg%3d%3d; and Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Air
Force Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 145, at
https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY23/RDTE_/
FY23%20Air%20Force%20Research%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=
LK67U_ThMsX7AwahfurKGw%3d%3d.
55 Mike White, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Hypersonic Strike and Defense: A
Conversation with Mike White,” June 10, 2021, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/hypersonic-strike-and-defense-
conversation-mike-white.
56 See, for example, Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile Becomes High-Priority USAF Project,” Air
Force Magazine, October 13, 2020, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-attack-cruise-missile-becomes-
highpriority-usaf-project/.
57 “Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/program/tactical-boost-glide;
and Guy Norris, “U.S. Air Force Plans Road Map to Operational Hypersonics,” Aviation Week, July 27, 2017, at
https://aviationweek.com/defense/us-air-force-plans-road-map-operational-hypersonics.
58 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 171, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf; and
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 169, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2024/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2024.pdf.
59 DARPA, “Operational Fires Program Successfully Completes First Flight Test,” July 13, 2022, at
https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2022-07-13a.
60 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 172, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf; and
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 159, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf.
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DARPA has similarly concluded work on the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept
(HAWC), which, with Air Force support, sought “to develop and demonstrate critical
technologies to enable an effective and affordable air-launched hypersonic cruise missile.”61
DARPA successfully tested HAWC in March and July 2022 and in January 2023, launching the
missile from a B-52 bomber.62 Former Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has stated
that hypersonic cruise missiles like HAWC would be smaller than hypersonic glide vehicles and
could therefore launch from a wider range of platforms. Former Principal Director White has
additionally noted that HAWC and other hypersonic cruise missiles could integrate seekers more
easily than hypersonic glide vehicles.63 DARPA requested and received $10 million to develop
HAWC in FY2022.64 DARPA requested and received $60 million for More Opportunities with
HAWC (MOHAWC), the successor program to HAWC, in FY2023 and requested $30 million for
the program in FY2024.65 Like HAWC, MOHAWC seeks to develop technologies for use in
future air-launched hypersonic cruise missiles.66
Table 1. Summary of Selected U.S. Hypersonic Weapons RDT&E Funding
FY2023 Request
FY2023 Enacted
PB2024
Title
($ in millions)
($ in millions)
($ in millions)
Schedule
Conventional
1,205
1,230
901
Platform
Prompt Strike (CPS)
deployment in
FY2025
Hypersonic Air-
92
152
96
Field by FY2029
Launched OASuW
(HALO)
Long-Range
806
872
943
Field two additional
Hypersonic
batteries by FY2027
Weapon (LRHW)
AGM-183 Air-
115
115
150
Complete
Launched Rapid
prototyping and
Response Weapon
flight testing in
(ARRW)
FY2024

61 “Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) Program Information,” DARPA, at https://www.darpa.mil/
program/hypersonic-air-breathing-weapon-concept.
62 Oren Liebermann, “US tested hypersonic missile in mid-March but kept it quiet to avoid escalating tensions with
Russia,” CNN, April 5, 2022, at https://us.cnn.com/2022/04/04/politics/us-hypersonic-missile-test/index.html; Courtney
Albon, “Raytheon hypersonic scramjet missile has another successful flight test,” Defense News, July 19, 2022, at
https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/2022/07/19/darpas-hypersonic-scramjet-missile-logs-another-flight-test-
success/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-
e5794efcfa7d; and DARPA, “Final Flight of HAWC Program Screams Through the Sky,” January 30, 2023, at
https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2023-01-30.
63 “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/
Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/.
64 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 161, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf.
65 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 173, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf; and
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 175, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2024/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2024.pdf.
66 Ibid.
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FY2023 Request
FY2023 Enacted
PB2024
Title
($ in millions)
($ in millions)
($ in millions)
Schedule
Hypersonic Attack
317
423
382
Complete test and
Cruise Missile
development in
(HACM)
FY2027
Tactical Boost Glide
30
30
82
Complete phase 2
(TBG)
analysis and initiate
design updates in
FY2024
Hypersonic Air-
60
60
30
Complete flight test
breathing Weapon
data analysis and
Concept (HAWC)/
final program
More Opportunities
review in FY2024
for HAWC
(MOHAWC)
Source: Program information taken from U.S. Navy, Army, Air Force, and DARPA FY2023 and FY2024
Justification Books, available at https://comptrol er.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
Note: MOHAWC, a new start in FY2023, is the successor program to HAWC, which concluded in 2023.
Table 2. Summary of U.S. Hypersonic Weapons Procurement Funding
FY2023 Request
FY2023 Enacted
PB2024
Title
($ in millions)
($ in millions)
($ in millions)
Status
CPS
0
0
341
Request would
procure 8 CPS All
Up Rounds
LRHW
249
249
157
Request would
procure LRHW
ground support
equipment
Source: Program information taken from U.S. Navy and Army FY2023 and FY2024 Justification Books, available
at https://comptrol er.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
Hypersonic Missile Defenses67
DOD is also investing in counter-hypersonic weapons capabilities, although former USD(R&E)
Michael Griffin has stated that the United States will not have a defensive capability against
hypersonic weapons until the mid-2020s, at the earliest.68 In September 2018, the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA)—which in 2017 established a Hypersonic Defense Program pursuant to Section
1687 of the FY2017 NDAA (H.Rept. 114-840)—commissioned 21 white papers to explore
hypersonic missile defense options, including interceptor missiles, hypervelocity projectiles, laser
guns, and electronic attack systems.69 In January 2020, MDA issued a draft request for prototype

67 For additional information about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, Hypersonic Missile
Defense: Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.
68 “Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin at NDIA Hypersonics
Senior Executive Series,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 13, 2018, at https://dod.defense.gov/News/
Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1713396/media-availability-with-deputy-secretary-shanahan-and-under-secretary-
of-defens/.
69 H.Rept. 114-840, Section 2, Division A, Title XVI, §1687; Hudson and Trimble, “Top U.S. Hypersonic Weapon
Program”; and Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” p. 21.
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proposals for a Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapons System interceptor intended
to be fielded in the mid-2030s; however, the program was later cancelled in favor of an
alternative solution, the Glide Phase Intercept (GPI).70 According to MDA FY2024 budget
documents, the agency seeks to field a regional, sea-based GPI capability in FY2034.71 Section
1666 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31) directs MDA to accelerate this timeline to achieve
initial operational capability by December 31, 2029, and full operational capability by December
31, 2032.
In addition, MDA is developing the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)—
which it hopes to launch in the second quarter of FY2024—in an effort to improve the agency’s
ability to detect and track incoming missiles.72 MDA requested $69 million for HBTSS in
FY2024; the agency requested $209 million for hypersonic defense in FY2024—down from its
$225.5 million FY2023 request and $518 million appropriation.73 Finally, DARPA is working on
a program called Glide Breaker, which “will develop critical component technology to support a
lightweight vehicle designed for precise engagement of hypersonic threats at very long range.”74
DARPA requested $29.1 million for Glide Breaker in FY2024.75
Infrastructure
According to a study mandated by the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-
239) and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA),76 the United States had 48
critical hypersonic test facilities and mobile assets in 2014 needed for the maturation of
hypersonic technologies for defense systems development through 2030.77 These specialized

70 Missile Defense Agency, “Draft Request for Prototype Proposal: Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapon
System,” January 30, 2020, p. 8; and Steve Trimble, “MDA Unveils GPI In Retooled Counter-Hypersonic Plan,”
Aviation Week, February 4, 2021, at https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/mda-unveils-
gpi-retooled-counter-hypersonic-plan.
71 Steve Trimble, “MDA Unveils GPI In Retooled Counter-Hypersonic Plan,” Aviation Week, February 4, 2021, at
https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/mda-unveils-gpi-retooled-counter-hypersonic-plan.
72 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide
Justification Book 2a of 5, p. 841, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/
budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf; and Defense
Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, April 2022, p. 2-15, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf; and Sandra Erwin,
“Pentagon agencies team up in upcoming launch of hypersonic tracking satellites,” Space News, December 28, 2023, at
https://spacenews.com/pentagon-agencies-team-up-in-upcoming-launch-of-hypersonic-tracking-satellites/.
73 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide
Justification Book 2a of 5, pp. 631 and 853, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf; and
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide Justification
Book 2a of 5, pp. 613 and 833, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2024/
budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB24_Justification_Book.pdf.
74 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 164.
75 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 168, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2024/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2024.pdf.
76 P.L. 112-239, Section 2, Division A, Title X, §1071.
77 A more recent report by the Government Accountability Office states that there are “26 DOD, DOE, NASA, and
private U.S. wind tunnel facilities capable of supporting hypersonic research.” Government Accountability Office,
Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination across Development
Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 15, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378.
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facilities, which simulate the unique conditions experienced in hypersonic flight (e.g., speed,
pressure, heating),78 included 10 DOD hypersonic ground test facilities, 11 DOD open-air ranges,
11 DOD mobile assets, 9 NASA facilities, 2 Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, and 5
industry or academic facilities.79 In its 2014 evaluation of U.S. hypersonic test and evaluation
infrastructure, IDA noted that “no current U.S. facility can provide full-scale, time-dependent,
coupled aerodynamic and thermal-loading environments for flight durations necessary to evaluate
these characteristics above Mach 8.”
Since the 2014 study report was published, there have been a number of changes in U.S.
hypersonic test infrastructure. For example, the University of Notre Dame has opened Mach 6
and Mach 10 quiet wind tunnels, Purdue University has opened a Mach 8 quiet wind tunnel, and
at least one hypersonic testing facility has been inactivated.80 In addition, the University of
Arizona modified one of its wind tunnels to enable Mach 5 testing, while Texas A&M
University—in partnership with Army Futures Command—is constructing a kilometer-long Mach
10 wind tunnel.81 The United States also uses the Royal Australian Air Force Woomera Test
Range in Australia and the Andøya Rocket Range in Norway for flight testing.82 (For an
illustrative list of U.S. hypersonic test assets and their capabilities, see the Appendix.)
In February 2022, DOD’s Office of Inspector General announced that it had concluded its two-
year-long evaluation of current ground test and evaluation facilities to determine if the capability
and capacity would be sufficient to execute DOD’s planned test schedule; however, DOD did not
release the evaluation to the public.83 Similarly, the FY2022 Director, Operational Test &
Evaluation (DOT&E) Annual Report evaluated the sufficiency of U.S. hypersonic weapons test
infrastructure.84 The DOT&E report concluded that “additional missile test range modernization
efforts are needed to support an increase in the tempo of testing and the development of new
capabilities to measure hypersonic missile flight performance in increasingly complex threat

78 These conditions additionally require the development of specialized materials such as metals and ceramics.
79 This list is taken directly from a 2014 Institute for Defense Analysis report and, therefore, may not be current. See
(U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure to Effectively
and Efficiently Mature Hypersonic Technologies for Defense Systems Development: Summary Analysis and
Assessment, Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2014. Permission to use this material has been granted by the
Office of Science and Technology Policy.
80 Jessica Sieff, “University of Notre Dame adds two new hypersonics research facilities,” Notre Dame News, June 6,
2022, at https://news.nd.edu/news/university-of-notre-dame-adds-two-new-hypersonics-research-facilities/; and
Evamarie Socha, “Purdue Applied Research Institute opens $41M Hypersonics and Applied Research Facility,” Purdue
University News, June 7, 2023, at https://www.purdue.edu/newsroom/releases/2023/Q2/purdue-applied-research-
institute-opens-41m-hypersonics-and-applied-research-facility.html.
81 University of Arizona, “Mach 5 Quiet Ludwieg Tube,” at https://transition.arizona.edu/facilities/qlt5?_ga=
2.62515882.768526379.1582843192-983632914.1582843192; and Ashley Tressel, “Army to open hypersonic testing
facility at Texas A&M,” Inside Defense, October 13, 2019, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/army-open-
hypersonic-testing-facility-texas-am. Additional universities such as the University of Maryland, the California
Institute of Technology, the Georgia Institute of Technology, the Air Force Academy, the University of Tennessee, and
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University also maintain experimental hypersonic facilities or conduct
hypersonic research.
82 (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure.
83 See Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Memorandum for Distribution: Evaluation of the Ground
Test and Evaluation Infrastructure Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (Project No. D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000),”
April 13, 2020, at https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/14/2002280826/-1/-1/1/D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000.PDF; and
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General,” Evaluation of the Ground Test and Evaluation Infrastructure
Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (DODIG-2022-056),” February 3, 2022, at https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/
Article/2921419/evaluation-of-the-ground-test-and-evaluation-infrastructure-supporting-hyperson/.
84 DOT&E, FY2022 DOT&E Annual Report, January 2023, pp. 18-19, at https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/
reports/FY2022/FY22DOTEAnnualReport.pdf?ver=UBO7t2O1FkRuvrB-nJDZ-g%3d%3d.
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environments.”85 Congress appropriated $47.5 million to USD(R&E) and DOT&E in FY2022 for
hypersonic test infrastructure; however, the FY2023 DOT&E Annual Report notes that at least
one hypersonic weapon program’s “flight test schedule [was still] continually challenged due to
the limited availability and numbers of hypersonic flight corridors, target areas, and test support
assets.”86 Congress may consider whether additional funds would be required to address
DOT&E’s FY2022 recommendation.
DOD reportedly plans to expand hypersonic test infrastructure in the coming years. In January
2019, the Navy announced plans to reactivate its Launch Test Complex at China Lake, CA, to
improve air launch and underwater testing capabilities for the conventional prompt strike
program.87 DOD has also announced the development of the Multi-Service Advanced Capability
Hypersonics Test Bed (MACH-TB), which is to “increase domestic capacity for hypersonic flight
testing and leverage multiple commercially-available launch vehicles for ride-along hypersonic
payloads.”88 DOD successfully tested components of MACH-TB in November 2023.89 According
to an assessment conducted by the Government Accountability Office, DOD has dedicated
approximately $1 billion to hypersonic facility modernization from FY2015 to FY2024.90
Congress has also continued to express interest in hypersonic weapons infrastructure. Section 222
of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) required the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering, in consultation with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, to submit to
the congressional defense committees “an assessment of the sufficiency of the testing capabilities
and infrastructure used for fielding hypersonic weapons, and a description of any investments in
testing capabilities and infrastructure that may be required to support in-flight and ground-based
testing for such weapons.”91 Section 225 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) requires the
Secretary of Defense to identify the hypersonic facilities and capabilities of the Major Range and
Test Facility Base and brief the congressional defense committees on a plan for improvement.
Similarly, Section 237 of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) directs the Secretary of Defense to
both assess DOD’s capacity to test and evaluate hypersonic capabilities and “[identify] test
facilities outside the Department of Defense that have potential to be used to expand [DOD]
capacity ... including test facilities of other departments and agencies of the Federal Government,
academia, and commercial test facilities.” Section 218 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31)

85 Ibid., p. 18.
86 Ibid., p. 19; and DOT&E, FY2022 DOT&E Annual Report, January 2024, pp. 18-19, at https://www.dote.osd.mil/
Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2023/other/2023annual-report.pdf?ver=d7gusiIrcbYmxM0oDkPSFg%3d%3d.
87 “Update: US Navy to develop China Lake to support CPS weapon testing,” Jane’s (subscription required), February
12, 2019, at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1644858-JMR.
88 U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD Announces New Contract to Increase Hypersonic Flight Testing Tempo,”
October 6, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3182305/dod-announces-new-contract-to-
increase-hypersonic-flight-testing-tempo/. According to a Dynetics press release, Dynetics is to lead a MACH-TB team
composed of over 20 partners, including Peraton, Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Stratolaunch, JRC Integrated
Systems, NineTwelve Institute, Corvid, SpinLaunch, Varda, Kitty Hawk Technologies, Systima Division of Karman
Space and Defense, Sandia National Laboratories, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, X-Bow Systems, RLNS and other
hypersonic experts. See PRNewswire, “Dynetics Awarded New Contract to Increase Hypersonic Flight Testing
Tempo,” October 20, 2022, at https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/dynetics-awarded-new-contract-to-increase-
hypersonic-flight-testing-tempo-301654753.html.
89 U.S. Navy, “Department of Defense Demonstrates Advanced Hypersonic Technologies,” November 16, 2023, at
https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3591504/department-of-defense-demonstrates-advanced-
hypersonic-technologies/.
90 Government Accountability Office, Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure
Coordination across Development Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 27, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-
21-378.
91 This report was delivered to the committees on December 16, 2021.
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directs the Secretary to update this assessment at least once every two years. It additionally
directs the Secretary to conduct a study to evaluate at least two possible locations in the United
States that “have potential to be used as additional corridors for long-distance hypersonic system
testing” and to submit to the congressional defense committees an annual report on DOD funding
and investments in hypersonic capabilities.
Finally, in March 2020, DOD announced that it had established a “hypersonic war room” to
assess the U.S. industrial base for hypersonic weapons and identify “critical nodes” in the supply
chain.92 DOD has also amended its “5000 series” acquisition policy in order to enhance supply
chain resiliency and reduce sustainment costs.93
Russia
Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it
accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States
and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in
2001.94 Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated that “the US is permitting constant,
uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating
new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in the
complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply
be intercepted.”95 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they approach
their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its sense of
strategic stability.96
Programs
Russia is pursuing two hypersonic weapons programs—the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon (or
Zircon)—and has reportedly fielded the Kinzhal (“Dagger”), a maneuvering air-launched ballistic
missile.97
Avangard (Figure 2) is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM), giving it “effectively ‘unlimited’ range.”98 Reports indicate that Avangard is

92 Aaron Mehta, “Pentagon launches hypersonic industrial base study,” Defense News, March 3, 2020, at
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/03/02/pentagon-launches-hypersonic-industrial-base-study/.
93 C. Todd Lopez, “Rewrite of Acquisition Regulation Helps U.S. Build Hypersonic Arsenal More Quickly,” DOD
News, October 30, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2400205/rewrite-of-acquisition-
regulation-helps-us-build-hypersonic-arsenal-more-quickly/.
94 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic
Arms Control, February 2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-
and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.
95 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/56957.
96 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See Tong
Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security
Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/
conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-
pub-76894.
97 Although the Kinzhal is a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile rather than a hypersonic glide vehicle or
hypersonic cruise missile, it is often included in reporting of Russia’s hypersonic weapons program. For this reason—
and because it poses defensive challenges that are similar to other hypersonic weapons—it is included here for
reference.
98 Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20.
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currently deployed on the SS-19 Stiletto ICBM, though Russia plans to eventually launch the
vehicle from the Sarmat ICBM. Sarmat reportedly entered combat duty in September 2023.99
Avangard features onboard countermeasures and will reportedly carry a nuclear warhead. It was
successfully tested twice in 2016 and once in December 2018, reportedly reaching speeds of
Mach 20; however, an October 2017 test resulted in failure. Russian news sources claim that
Avangard entered into combat duty in December 2019.100
Figure 2. Artist Rendering of Avangard

Source: https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.
In addition to Avangard, Russia is developing Tsirkon, a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile
capable of traveling at speeds of between Mach 6 and Mach 8. Tsirkon is reportedly capable of
striking both ground and naval targets. According to Russian news sources, Tsirkon has a
maximum range of approximately 625 miles and can be fired from the vertical launch systems
mounted on cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Pyotr Veliky, Project 20380 corvettes, Project 22350
frigates, and Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other platforms.101 These sources assert
that Tsirkon was successfully launched from a Project 22350 frigate in January, October, and
December 2020 and May 2022 and from a Project 885 Yasen-class submarine in October 2021.102
Russia reportedly deployed Tsirkon on the Project 22350 frigate Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet
Union Gorshkov in January 2023.103

99 Al Jazeera, “Russia puts advanced Sarmat nuclear missile system on ‘combat duty,’” September 2, 2023, at
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/2/russia-puts-advanced-sarmat-nuclear-missile-system-on-combat-
duty#:~:text=Russia%20test%2Dfired%20the%20Sarmat,in%20Russia's%20far%20east%20region. Sarmat could
reportedly accommodate at least three Avangard vehicles. See Malcolm Claus, “Russia unveils new strategic delivery
systems,” Jane’s (subscription required), at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.
100 “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” TASS, December 27, 2019,
at https://tass.com/defense/1104297.
101 “Russia makes over 10 test launches of Tsirkon seaborne hypersonic missile,” TASS, December 21, 2018, at
http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
Aspirations, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, at https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/
military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf.
102 “TASS: Russia Conducts First Ship-Based Hypersonic Missile Test,” Reuters, February 27, 2020, at
https://www.voanews.com/europe/tass-russia-conducts-first-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test; Samuel Cranny-Evans,
“Russia conducts first submarine test launches of Tsirkon hypersonic missile,” Jane’s (subscription required), October
4, 2021; and Isabel van Brugen, “Putin to Give Navy Hypersonic Missiles as Russia Beats U.S. in Arms Race,”
Newsweek, July 18, 2022, at https://www.newsweek.com/putin-russian-navy-hypersonic-missiles-zircon-1725426.
103 Guy Faulconbridge, “Putin deploys new Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles to Atlantic,” Reuters, January 4, 2023, at
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-sends-off-frigate-armed-with-new-hypersonic-cruise-missile-2023-01-04/.
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In addition, Russia has fielded Kinzhal, a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile modified
from the Iskander missile. Russia reportedly fired Kinzhal from a MiG-31 interceptor aircraft in
Ukraine104 and additionally plans to deploy the missile on the Su-34 long-range strike fighter105
and the Tu-22M3 strategic bomber, although the slower-moving bomber may face challenges in
“accelerating the weapon into the correct launch parameters.”106 Russian media has reported
Kinzhal’s top speed as Mach 10, with a range of up to 1,200 miles when launched from the MiG-
31. The Kinzhal is reportedly capable of maneuverable flight, as well as of striking both ground
and naval targets, and could eventually be fitted with a nuclear warhead. However, such claims
regarding Kinzhal’s performance characteristics have not been publicly verified by U.S.
intelligence agencies, and have been met with skepticism by a number of analysts.107
Infrastructure
Russia reportedly conducts hypersonic wind tunnel testing at the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic
Institute in Zhukovsky and the Khristianovich Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics in
Novosibirsk, and has tested hypersonic weapons at Dombarovskiy Air Base, the Baykonur
Cosmodrome, and the Kura Range.108
China
According to Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most
experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in
China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S.
military technology,” such as U.S. missile defenses.109 In particular, China’s pursuit of hypersonic
weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United
States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting
infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a
retaliatory strike against the United States.110
As General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of United States Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), testified in a
February 2020 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, China is “testing a

104 Roxana Tiron, “Hypersonic Weapons: Who Has Them and Why It Matters,” Washington Post, April 6, 2022, at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/hypersonic-weapons-who-has-them-and-why-it-matters/2022/04/05/
1f6d0280-b557-11ec-8358-20aa16355fb4_story.html.
105 Mark B. Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles … and What It Means” in Defense
Technology Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons, American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019.
106 Dave Majumdar, “Russia: New Kinzhal Aero-Ballistic Missile Has 3,000 km Range if Fired from Supersonic
Bomber,” The National Interest, July 18, 2018, at https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-new-kinzhal-aero-
ballistic-missile-has-3000-km-range-if-fired-supersonic-bomber.
107 David Axe, “Is Kinzhal, Russia’s New Hypersonic Missile, a Game Changer?,” The Daily Beast, March 15, 2018, at
https://www.thedailybeast.com/is-kinzhal-russias-new-hypersonic-missile-a-game-changer.
108 “Aerodynamics,” Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, http://tsagi.com/research/aerodynamics/; “Russia announces
successful flight test of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle,” Jane’s (subscription required), January 3, 2019, at
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1451630-JMR; and “Avangard system is tested, said to be fully ready for
deployment,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 26, 2018, at http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/
avangard_system_is_tested_said.shtml.
109 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the
Security Dilemma.”
110 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability”; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic
Glide,” August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/
topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.
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[nuclear-capable] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle” that could evade U.S. missile
defense and warning systems.111 Reports additionally indicate that China may have tested a
nuclear-capable HGV112—launched by a Long March rocket—in August 2021.113 In contrast to
the ballistic missiles that China has previously used to launch HGVs, the Long March, a
fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), launches the HGV into orbit before the HGV de-
orbits to its target. This could provide China with a space-based global strike capability and
further reduce the amount of target warning time prior to a strike.114
China has also demonstrated a growing interest in Russian advances in hypersonic weapons
technology, conducting flight tests of a hypersonic-glide vehicle (HGV) only days after Russia
tested its own system.115 Furthermore, a January 2017 report found that over half of open-source
Chinese papers on hypersonic weapons include references to Russian weapons programs.116 This
could indicate that China is increasingly considering hypersonic weapons within a regional
context. Indeed, some analysts believe that China may be planning to mate conventionally armed
HGVs with the DF-21 and DF-26 ballistic missiles in support of an anti-access/area denial
strategy.117
Programs
China has conducted a number of successful tests of the DF-17, a medium-range ballistic missile
specifically designed to launch HGVs. U.S. intelligence analysts assess that the missile has a
range of approximately 1,000 to 1,500 miles and may now be deployed.118 China has also tested
the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile, which could be modified to carry a conventional or
nuclear HGV, according to a report by a U.S. Congressional commission. The development of the
DF-41 thus “significantly increases the [Chinese] rocket force’s nuclear threat to the U.S.
mainland,” the report states.119

111 General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February 13, 2020,
at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/20-02-13-united-states-northern-command-and-united-states-
strategic-command.
112 It is not clear if this nuclear-capable HGV is the same model as that referenced by General O’Shaughnessy.
113 Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile,” October 16,
2021, at https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Zhao Lijian has stated that “this was a routine test of [a] space vehicle,” rather than a test of a nuclear-capable HGV.
Zhao Lijian, “Remarks at Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
October 18, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1915130.shtml.
114 Greg Hadley, “Kendall: China Has Potential to Strike Earth from Space,” Air Force Magazine, September 20, 2021,
at https://www.airforcemag.com/global-strikes-space-china-frank-kendall/.
115 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide.”
116 Lora Saalman, “Factoring Russia into the US-China Equation on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles,” SIPRI, January 2017,
at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Factoring-Russia-into-US-Chinese-equation-hypersonic-glide-vehicles.pdf.
117 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide”; and Malcolm Claus and Andrew Tate, “Chinese
hypersonic programme reflects regional priorities,” Jane’s (subscription required), March 12, 2019, at
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1731069-JIR.
118 Ankit Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile Armed with a Hypersonic Glide
Vehicle,” The National Interest, December 28, 2017, at https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinas-
newly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/; and Bill Gertz, “China’s new hypersonic
missile,” Washington Times, October 2, 2019, at https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/oct/2/china-shows-df-
17-hypersonic-missile/.
119 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2018 Annual Report, p. 235, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.
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China has tested the DF-ZF HGV (previously referred to as the WU-14) at least nine times since
2014. U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately
1,200 miles and have stated that the vehicle may be capable of performing “extreme maneuvers”
during flight.120 China reportedly fielded the DF-ZF in 2020.121
According to U.S. defense officials, China also successfully tested Starry Sky-2 (or Xing Kong-
2), a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype, in August 2018.122 China claims the vehicle
reached top speeds of Mach 6 and executed a series of in-flight maneuvers before landing.123
Unlike the DF-ZF, Starry Sky-2 is a “waverider” that uses powered flight after launch and derives
lift from its own shockwaves. Some reports indicate that the Starry Sky-2 could be operational by
2025.124 U.S. officials have declined to comment on the program.125
Infrastructure
China has a robust research and development infrastructure devoted to hypersonic weapons.
Then-USD(R&E) Michael Griffin stated in March 2018 that China has conducted 20 times as
many hypersonic tests as the United States.126 China tested three hypersonic vehicle models
(D18-1S, D18-2S, and D18-3S)—each with different aerodynamic properties—in September
2018.127 Analysts believe that these tests could be designed to help China develop weapons that
fly at variable speeds, including hypersonic speeds. Similarly, China has used the Lingyun Mach
6+ high-speed engine, or “scramjet,” test bed (Figure 3) to research thermal resistant components
and hypersonic cruise missile technologies.128

120 “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The Economist, April 6, 2019, at
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-
coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” The
Diplomat, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-
missile-defense-systems/.
121 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021, p. 60,
at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.
122 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 44, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/
2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.
123 Jessie Yeung, “China claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircraft,” CNN, August 7, 2018, at
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft-intl/index.html.
124 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20.
125 Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Test of New Hypersonic Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon, August 10, 2018, at
https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/.
126 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20.
127 Malcolm Claus and Andrew Tate, “Chinese hypersonic programme reflects regional priorities,” Jane’s (subscription
required), March 12, 2019, at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1731069-JIR.
128 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “China’s hypersonic military projects include spaceplanes and rail guns,” Popular
Mechanics, June 26, 2018, at https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-work-speeds-up.
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Figure 3. Lingyun-1 Hypersonic Cruise Missile Prototype

Source: Photo accompanying Drake Long, “China reveals Lingyun-1 hypersonic missile at National Science and
Technology expo,” The Defense Post, May 21, 2018.
According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, “China is also investing heavily in hypersonic ground
testing facilities.”129 For example, the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center
claims to have 18 wind tunnels, while the China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics is known
to operate at least three hypersonic wind tunnels—the FD-02, FD-03, and FD-07—capable of
reaching speeds of Mach 8, Mach 10, and Mach 12, respectively.130 China also operates the JF-12
hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 5 and Mach 9 and the FD-21
hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 10 and Mach 15.131 It reportedly
completed construction of the JF-22 wind tunnel, capable of reaching speeds of Mach 30, in
2023.132 In addition, China is known to have tested hypersonic weapons at the Jiuquan Satellite
Launch Center and the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center.

129 Andrew Tate, “China conducts further tests with hypersonic vehicles,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (subscription
required), October 2, 2018, at https://customer.janes.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/FG_1120806-JDW.
130 Kelvin Wong, “China claims successful test of hypersonic waverider,” Jane’s (subscription required), August 10, at
2018, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1002295-JDW; and Ellen Nakashima and Gerry Shih, “China builds
advanced weapons systems using American chip technology,” Washington Post, April 9, 2021.
131 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “A look at China’s most exciting hypersonic aerospace programs,” Popular Science,
April 18, 2017, at https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-technology.
132 Akhil Kadidal, “Chinese hypersonic wind tunnel passes acceptance check,” Janes Defence Weekly (subscription
required), June 8, 2023, at https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/chinese-hypersonic-wind-tunnel-passes-
acceptance-check.
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Global Hypersonic Weapons Programs
Although the United States, Russia, and China possess the most advanced hypersonic weapons programs, a
number of other countries—including Australia, India, France, Germany, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan—
are also developing hypersonic weapons technology. Since 2007, the United States has col aborated with Australia
on the Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) program to develop hypersonic
technologies. The most recent HIFiRE test, successful y conducted in July 2017, explored the flight dynamics of a
Mach 8 hypersonic glide vehicle, while previous tests explored scramjet engine technologies. HIFiRE’s successor,
the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE) program, is to further develop hypersonic
air-breathing technologies. SCIFiRE demonstration tests are expected by the mid-2020s. In addition to the
Woomera Test Range facilities—one of the largest weapons test facilities in the world—Australia reportedly
operates seven hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 30.
India has similarly col aborated with Russia on the development of BrahMos II, a Mach 7 hypersonic cruise missile.
Although BrahMos II was initially intended to be fielded in 2017, news reports indicate that the program faces
significant delays and is now scheduled to achieve initial operational capability between 2025 and 2028. Reportedly,
India is also developing an indigenous, dual-capable hypersonic cruise missile as part of its Hypersonic Technology
Demonstrator Vehicle program and successful y tested a Mach 6 scramjet in June 2019 and September 2020. India
operates approximately 12 hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 13.
France also has col aborated and contracted with Russia on the development of hypersonic technology. Although
France has been investing in hypersonic technology research since the 1990s, it has only recently announced its
intent to weaponize the technology. Under the V-max (Experimental Maneuvering Vehicle) program, France is
modifying its air-to-surface ASN4G supersonic missile for hypersonic flight, successful y testing the modified
missile in June 2023. Some analysts believe that the V-max program is intended to provide France with a strategic
nuclear weapon. France operates five hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 21.
Germany successful y tested an experimental hypersonic glide vehicle (SHEFEX II) in 2012; however, reports
indicate that Germany may have pul ed funding for the program. German defense contractor DLR continues to
research and test hypersonic vehicles as part of the European Union’s ATLLAS II project, which seeks to design a
Mach 5-6 vehicle. Germany operates three hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to
Mach 11.
In addition, South Korea reportedly has been developing a ground-launched Mach 6+ hypersonic cruise missile,
Hycore, since 2018. According to Janes, South Korea is developing the missile “in response to growing concern
about North Korea military modernization” and plans to eventually develop sea- and air-launched variants.
Although North Korea tested the Hwasong-8—which it identifies as a hypersonic glide vehicle—in September
2021, reports indicate that the vehicle may have reached speeds of only Mach 3. Similarly, North Korea claims to
have tested a second hypersonic weapon in January 2022; however, experts believe that that weapon may instead
be a maneuvering reentry vehicle.
Finally, Japan is developing the Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM) and the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile
(HVGP). According to Jane’s, Japan invested $122 mil ion in HVGP in FY2019. It reportedly plans to field HVGPs
for area suppression and neutralizing aircraft carriers. HVGP is expected to enter service in 2026, with a more
advanced version available by 2030, while HCM is expected to enter service in 2030. The Japan Aerospace
Exploration Agency operates three hypersonic wind tunnels, with two additional facilities at Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries and the University of Tokyo. According to DOD, Japan and the United States have agreed to conduct
“a joint analysis focused on future cooperation in counter-hypersonic technology.”
Other countries—including Iran, Israel, and Brazil—have conducted foundational research on hypersonic airflows
and propulsion systems, but may not be pursuing a hypersonic weapons capability at this time. In addition, a
number of countries are testing increasingly maneuverable systems that travel at hypersonic speeds but that do
not qualify as “hypersonic weapons” as defined in this report.
Note: For information about South Korea’s hypersonic weapons programs, see Jon Grevatt and Rahul Udoshi,
“South Korea develops Hycore hypersonic cruise missile,” Janes (subscription required), January 25, 2022. For
information about North Korea’s hypersonic weapons programs, see Choi Soo-hyang, “N. Korea's ‘hypersonic
missile’ appears to be at early stage of development: JCS,” Yonhap News Agency, September 29, 2021; and Ankit
Panda, “The real danger of North Korea’s new hypersonic missile is not its speed,” NK News, January 10, 2022.
For information about Japan’s hypersonic weapons programs, see Mike Yeo, “Japan unveils its hypersonic weapons
plans,” Defense News, March 14, 2020. For additional information about global hypersonic weapons programs, see
Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation.
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Issues for Congress
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs during the
annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider a number of questions about
the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, budget and management, and their
implications for strategic stability and arms control. This section provides an overview of some of
these questions.
Mission Requirements
Although the Department of Defense is funding a number of hypersonic weapons programs, it has
not established any programs of record, suggesting that it may not have approved requirements
for hypersonic weapons or long-term funding plans.133 Indeed, as Principal Director for
Hypersonics (USD[R&E]) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire
hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to “[identify] the most viable
overarching weapon system concepts to choose from and then make a decision based on success
and challenges.”134
Given the lack of mission requirements, DOD officials have expressed a number of competing
perspectives about the potential costs and intended quantities of U.S. hypersonic weapons. For
example, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall has stated that “hypersonics are not going to
be cheap anytime soon ... [and thus] we’re more likely to have relatively small inventories of
[hypersonic missiles] than large ones.”135 Conversely, a number of other senior defense officials
have stated that DOD intends to buy large quantities of hypersonic weapons. Then-DOD Director
of Defense Research & Engineering Mark Lewis has noted that DOD wants “to deliver
hypersonics at scale.... That means hundreds of weapons in a short period of time in the hands of
the warfighter.”136 Similarly, Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has stated that DOD
seeks to “[produce] hypersonics in mass, because you have to be able to deliver capability in
meaningful numbers, even to defeat the high-end targets.”137 These perspectives appear to be
grounded in differing assumptions about the affordability of hypersonic weapons. Likewise, they
are likely to hold different implications for the unit cost of the weapons.
As Congress conducts oversight of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it may seek to obtain
information about DOD’s evaluation of potential mission sets for hypersonic weapons, a cost
analysis of hypersonic weapons and alternative means of executing potential mission sets, and an
assessment of the enabling technologies—such as space-based sensors or autonomous command
and control systems—that may be required to employ or defend against hypersonic weapons. For
example, Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to submit to the

133 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.”
134 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.”
135 John A. Tirpak, “Only Small Inventories of Hypersonic Missiles in USAF’s Future, Due to Cost,” Air Force
Magazine, February 15, 2022, at https://www.airforcemag.com/only-small-inventories-of-hypersonic-missiles-in-usafs-
future-due-to-cost/.
136 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Hypersonics: DoD Wants ‘Hundreds of Weapons’ ASAP,” Breaking Defense, April 24,
2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/hypersonics-dod-wants-hundreds-of-weapons-asap/.
137 “Hypersonic Strike and Defense: A Conversation with Mike White,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
June 10, 2021, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/hypersonic-strike-and-defense-conversation-mike-white. See also Jon
Harper, “Just In: Pentagon to Spend Billions Mass-Producing Hypersonic Weapons,” National Defense Magazine,
March 4, 2020, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/4/pentagon-to-spend-billions-mass-
producing-hypersonic-weapons.
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congressional defense committees a report on strategic hypersonic weapons, including “a
description of how the requirements for land and sea-based hypersonic weapons will be addressed
with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and how such requirements will be formally
provided to the military departments procuring such weapons.” This report is to additionally
include “the potential target sets for hypersonic weapons ... and the required mission planning to
support targeting by the United States Strategic Command and other combatant commands.”
Congress may also consider the conclusions of a Congressional Budget Office assessment of
hypersonic weapons and their alternatives, including the following findings:
• “Both hypersonic and ballistic missiles are well-suited to operate outside
potential adversaries’ anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD), or ‘keep-out,’
zones.”138
• “Hypersonic missiles would probably not be more survivable than ballistic
missiles with maneuverable warheads in a conflict, unless the ballistic missiles
encountered highly effective long-range defenses.”139
• “Hypersonic missiles could cost one-third more to procure and field than ballistic
missiles of the same range with maneuverable warheads.”140
Funding and Management Considerations
Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has noted that DOD is prioritizing offensive
programs while it determines “the path forward to get a robust defensive strategy.”141 This
approach is reflected in DOD’s recent budget requests. For example, DOD requested $225.5
million for hypersonic defense programs and $4.7 billion for hypersonic weapons programs in
FY2023.142 Similarly, in FY2022, DOD requested $247.9 million for hypersonic defense
programs and $3.8 billion for hypersonic weapons programs.143 (Although DOD requested $190.6
million for hypersonic defense programs in FY2024, the department has declined to provide a
breakout of funding for hypersonic weapons programs in FY2024.)
Although the Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees increased FY2020
appropriations for both hypersonic offense and defense above the FY2020 request, they expressed
concerns, noting in their joint explanatory statement of H.R. 1158 “that the rapid growth in

138 Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Hypersonic Weapons and Alternatives, January 2023, at https://www.cbo.gov/
publication/58255.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 Aaron Mehta, “Is the Pentagon Moving Quickly Enough on Hypersonic Defense?” Defense News, March 21, 2019,
at https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/03/21/is-the-pentagon-moving-quickly-enough-on-hypersonic-
defense/.
142 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency Defense-Wide
Justification Book Volume 2a of 5, p. 631, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/
budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf; and Defense
Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, April 2022, p. 2-16, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
143 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency Defense-Wide
Justification Book Volume 2a of 5, p. 569, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/
budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf; and Defense
Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, p. 3-2, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
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hypersonic research has the potential to result in stove-piped, proprietary systems that duplicate
capabilities and increase costs.”144 To mitigate this concern, they appropriated $100 million for
DOD to establish a Joint Hypersonics Transition Office (JHTO) to “develop and implement an
integrated science and technology roadmap for hypersonics” and “establish a university
consortium for hypersonic research and workforce development” in support of DOD efforts.145
DOD established the JHTO in April 2020 and announced on October 26, 2020, that it awarded
Texas A&M University with a $20 million contract—renewable for up to $100 million—to
manage a University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics (UCAH).146 UCAH is to be overseen
by a group of academic researchers from Texas A&M University, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, the University of Minnesota, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the
University of Arizona, the University of Tennessee Space Institute, Morgan State University, the
California Institute of Technology, Purdue University, the University of California-Los Angeles,
and the Georgia Institute of Technology.147 The consortium is to “facilitate transitioning academic
research into developing systems [as well as] work with the department to reduce system
development timelines while maintaining quality control standards.”148
In addition, Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Secretary of the Army
and the Secretary of the Navy to jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a report
on LRHW and CPS, including total costs of the programs, “the strategy for such programs with
respect to manning, training, and equipping, including cost estimates, [and] a testing strategy and
schedule for such programs.” It directs the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
to submit to the congressional defense committees an independent cost estimate of these
programs.149
Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, however, it may be
challenging for Congress to evaluate the balance of funding for hypersonic weapons programs,
enabling technologies, supporting test infrastructure, and hypersonic missile defense.
Industrial Base and Supply Chain
U.S. government officials have expressed ongoing concern about the ability of the industrial base
to support future demand for hypersonic weapons—particularly if multiple weapons programs go

144 “Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020: Joint Explanatory Statement,” Defense Subcommittees of the
Appropriations Committees, December 16, 2019, at https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/
democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/HR%201158%20-%20Division%20A%20-
%20Defense%20SOM%20FY20.pdf.
145 Ibid. The Joint Hypersonic Transition Office, then called the Joint Technology Office on Hypersonics, was
originally mandated by Section 218 of the FY2007 NDAA (P.L. 109-364). The office was redesignated as the Joint
Hypersonics Transition Office and given additional authorities in Section 214 of the FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-91).
Section 216 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) further amended the office’s authorities to include the ability to enter
into agreements with institutions of higher learning. The office went unfunded until FY2020 and was not established
until April 2020.
146 David Vergun, “DOD Awards Applied Hypersonics Contract to Texas A&M University,” DOD News, October 26,
2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2394438/dod-awards-applied-hypersonics-contract-to-
texas-am-university/.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 The Government Accountability Office notes DOD’s difficulty in developing accurate cost estimates for hypersonic
weapons programs. For example, between FY2019 and FY2020, estimates for CPS “almost doubled.” Government
Accountability Office, Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination
across Development Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 21, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378.
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into production at the same time.150 Indeed, a July 2022 DOD industry solicitation notes that “the
expansion of industrial base capacity is required” [emphasis added] if DOD is to meet its goal of
“[producing] the air-breathing engine constituent materials, subcomponents, components, and
subsystems to support an initial integrated system production capacity of no less than 48 all-up-
round (AUR) missiles (four to five units per month) and up to 72 AURs per year (six per
month).”151
Furthermore, a DOD report issued in response to Executive Order 14017 (“America’s Supply
Chains”) recommends investments in the hypersonic industrial base.152 The report notes that
DOD is in the process of “developing a hypersonics industrial base roadmap to inform
investments over the next five years, which will guide investment decisions over this period. The
roadmap will address sub-tier supplier development, and where appropriate, develop and retain
competition that enables affordable production.”153 The report additionally recommends that
DOD “identify partners and allies with capabilities to aid in the development and expansion of
[the U.S.] hypersonics supply chain, especially for materials and components where domestic
sources may not exist.”154 Congress may wish to conduct oversight of DOD’s efforts to strengthen
the industrial base and supply chain for hypersonic weapons.
Strategic Stability
Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified
two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: the weapon’s short
time-of-flight—which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response—and its unpredictable flight
path—which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore
heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict. This risk
could be further compounded in countries that co-locate nuclear and conventional capabilities or
facilities.
Some analysts argue that unintended escalation could occur as a result of warhead ambiguity, or
from the inability to distinguish between a conventionally armed hypersonic weapon and a
nuclear-armed one. However, as a United Nations report notes, “even if a State did know that an
HGV launched toward it was conventionally armed, it may still view such a weapon as strategic
in nature, regardless of how it was perceived by the State firing the weapon, and decide that a
strategic response was warranted.”155 Differences in threat perception and escalation ladders
could thus result in unintended escalation. Such concerns have previously led Congress to restrict
funding for conventional prompt strike programs.156

150 See, for example, Justin Katz, “Hypersonics too expensive, industrial base too small for services to go it alone:
Admiral,” Breaking Defense, November 3, 2022, at https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/hypersonics-too-expensive-
industrial-base-too-small-for-services-to-go-it-alone-admiral/.
151 Department of the Air Force, “Request for Information (RFI) on Supplier Based Initiative for Air-Breathing Engines
for Hypersonic Systems,” at https://www.businessdefense.gov/ai/dpat3/docs/
AirBreathing%20Enginesfor%20HypersonicsRFFA8650225507.pdf.
152 Department of Defense, Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains: An action plan developed in response to
President Biden’s Executive Order 14017, February 2022, at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/24/2002944158/-1/-1/
1/DOD-EO-14017-REPORT-SECURING-DEFENSE-CRITICAL-SUPPLY-CHAINS.PDF.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons.
156 For a history of legislative activity on conventional prompt global strike, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional
Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
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Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal.
Pavel Podvig, a senior research fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,
has noted that the weapons “don’t … change much in terms of strategic balance and military
capability.”157 This, some analysts argue, is because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia
already possess the ability to strike the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles,
which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm U.S. missile defenses.158 Furthermore, these
analysts note that in the case of hypersonic weapons, traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it
is really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the world that would be so suicidal that it would
even think threating to use—not to mention to actually use—hypersonic weapons against the
United States ... would end well.”159
Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to submit to the
congressional defense committees a report that examines
How escalation risks will be addressed with regards to the use of strategic hypersonic
weapons, including whether any risk escalation exercises have been conducted or are
planned for the potential use of hypersonic weapons, and an analysis of the escalation risks
posed by foreign hypersonic systems that are potentially nuclear and conventional dual-
use capable weapons.
Arms Control
Some analysts who believe that hypersonic weapons could present a threat to strategic stability or
inspire an arms race have argued that the United States should take measures to mitigate risks or
limit the weapons’ proliferation. Proposed measures include expanding New START, negotiating
new multilateral arms control agreements, and undertaking transparency and confidence-building
measures.160
The New START Treaty, a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United States and Russia,
does not currently cover weapons that fly on a ballistic trajectory for less than 50% of their flight,
as do hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles.161 However, Article V of the treaty
states that “when a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that
Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration
in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that the
United States could raise the issue in the BCC of negotiating to include hypersonic weapons in

157 Amy Mackinnon, “Russia’s New Missiles Are Aimed at the U.S.,” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2019, at
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/05/russias-new-missiles-are-aimed-at-you-weapons-hypersonic-putin-united-states-
inf/.
158 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019, at
https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. Schneider,
“Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14.
159 Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019, at
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632.
160 See United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapon; and Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic
Missile Proliferation.
161 In some cases, hypersonic glide vehicles may be launched from intercontinental ballistic missiles that are already
covered by New START, as is reported to be the case with Russia’s Avangard HGV. See Rachel S. Cohen,
“Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Tactical Tool?”
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the New START limits.162 However, because New START is due to expire in 2026, this may be a
short-term solution.163
As an alternative, some analysts have proposed negotiating a new international arms control
agreement that would institute a moratorium or ban on hypersonic weapon testing. These analysts
argue that a test ban would be a “highly verifiable” and “highly effective” means of preventing a
potential arms race and preserving strategic stability.164 Other analysts have countered that a test
ban would be infeasible, as “no clear technical distinction can be made between hypersonic
missiles and other conventional capabilities that are less prompt, have shorter ranges, and also
have the potential to undermine nuclear deterrence.”165 These analysts have instead proposed
international transparency and confidence-building measures, such as exchanging weapons data;
conducting joint technical studies; “providing advance notices of tests; choosing separate,
distinctive launch locations for tests of hypersonic missiles; and placing restraints on sea-based
tests.”166

162 James Acton notes: “during [New START] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a
new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how
they would be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?:
Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf.
163 CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf.
164 Mark Gubrud, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 6, 2015, at
https://thebulletin.org/roundtable/test-ban-for-hypersonic-missiles/.
165 Tong Zhao, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”
166 Rajaram Nagappa, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”; see also James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?, pp. 134-138.
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Appendix. U.S. Hypersonic Testing Infrastructure167
Table A-1. DOD Hypersonic Ground Test Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
Air Force Arnold Engineering and
Tunnel A: 40-inch Mach 1.5-5.5; up
Arnold AFB, TN
Development Complex (AEDC) von
to 290 °F
Karman Gas Dynamics Facility
Tunnel B: 50-inch Mach 6 and 8; up
Tunnels A/B/C
to 900 °F
Tunnel C: 50-inch Mach 10; up to
1700 °F
Air Force AEDC High-Enthalpy
Simulate thermal and pressure
Arnold AFB, TN
Aerothermal Test Arc-Heated
environments at speeds of up to
Facilities H1, H2, H3
Mach 8
Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9
59-inch Mach 7, 8,10, 14, and18; up White Oak, MD
to 2900 °F
Air Force AEDC Aerodynamic and
Mach 3.1-7.2; up to 1300 °F
Arnold AFB, TN
Propulsion Test Unit
Air Force AEDC Aeroballistic Range
Launches projectiles of up to 8
Arnold AFB, TN
G
inches in diameter at speeds of up
to Mach 20
Hol oman High Speed Test Track
59,971 ft. track; launches
Hol oman AFB, NM
projectiles at speeds of up to Mach
8
Air Force Research Laboratory
Mach 3-7
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
(AFRL) Cells 18, 22
AFRL Laser Hardened Materials
High-temperature materials testing
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
Evaluation Laboratory (LHMEL)
AFRL Mach 6 High Reynolds
10-inch Mach 6
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
Number (Re) Facility
Test Resource Management Center
Up to Mach 8; up to 4040 °F
Arnold AFB, TN
Hypersonic Aeropropulsion Clean
Air Test-bed Facility
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9 was upgraded in 2019 to enable Mach 18
testing. See “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/
Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/.

167 The following information is largely derived from the 2014 report (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on
the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure, and therefore, may not be current. Permission to use this
material has been granted by the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Additional information has been provided
by Dee Howard Endowed Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher S. Combs (The University of Texas at San Antonio).
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Table A-2. DOD Open-Air Ranges
Range
Location
Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile
Kwajalein Atol , Republic of the
Defense Test Site
Marshall Islands
Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF)
Kauai, HI
Western Range, 30th Space Wing
Vandenberg AFB, CA
Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons
Point Mugu and China Lake, CA
(NAWC) Division
White Sands Missile Range (WSMR)
New Mexico
Eastern Range, 45th Space Wing
Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station/Patrick AFB/Kennedy
Space Center, FL
NASA Wallops Flight Facility
Wallops Island, VA
Pacific Spaceport Complex (formerly
Kodiak Island, AK
Kodiak Launch Complex)
NAWC Weapons Division R-2508
Edwards AFB, CA
Complex
Utah Test and Training Range
Utah
Nevada Test and Training Range
Nevada
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
Table A-3. DOD Mobile Assets
Asset
Navy Mobile Instrumentation
System
PMRF Mobile At-sea Sensor System
MDA Mobile Instrumentation
System Pacific Collector
MDA Mobile Instrumentation
System Pacific Tracker
Kwajalein Mobile Range Safety
System 2
United States Navy Ship Lorenzen
missile range instrumentation ship
Sea-based X-band Radar
Aircraft Mobile Instrumentation
Systems
Transportable Range Augmentation
and Control System
Re-locatable MPS-36 Radar
Transportable Telemetry System
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
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Table A-4. NASA Research-Related Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
Ames Research Center (ARC) High-temperature
Mountain View, CA
Arc Jet Complex
materials testing
ARC Hypervelocity Free
Launches projectiles at
Mountain View, CA
Flight Facilities
speeds of up to Mach 23
Langley Research Center
31-inch Mach 10, 20-inch
Hampton, VA
(LaRC) Aerothermodynamics
Mach 6, and 15-inch Mach
Laboratory
6
LaRC 8-foot High
96-inch Mach 5 and Mach
Hampton, VA
Temperature Tunnel
6.5
LaRC Scramjet Test Complex
Up to Mach 8 and up to
Hampton, VA
4740 °F
LaRC HyPulse Facility
Currently inactive
Long Island, NY
Glenn Research Center
Mach 5, 6, and 7 and up to Sandusky, OH
(GRC) Plumbrook Hypersonic 3830 °F
Tunnel Facility Arc Jet Facility
GRC Propulsion Systems
Mach 6
Cleveland, OH
Laboratory 4
GRC 1’ x 1’ Supersonic Wind
12-inch Mach 1.3-6 (10
Cleveland, OH
Tunnel
discrete airspeeds) and up
to 640 °F
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
Table A-5. Department of Energy Research-Related Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
Sandia National Laboratories Solar
High-temperature materials testing
Albuquerque, NM
Thermal Test Facility
and aerodynamic heating simulation
Sandia National Laboratories
18-inch Mach 5, 8, and 14
Albuquerque, NM
Hypersonic Wind Tunnel
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
Table A-6. Industry/Academic Research-Related Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
CUBRC Large Energy National
LENS 1: Mach 6-22
Buffalo, NY
Shock (LENS)-1/-II/-XX Tunnels
LENS II: Mach 2-12
LENS XX: Atmospheric reentry
simulation
Boeing Polysonic Wind Tunnel
48-inch up to Mach 5
St. Louis, MO
Lockheed Martin High Speed Wind
48-inch Mach .3-5
Dallas, TX
Tunnel
Boeing/Air Force Office of Scientific 9.5-inch Mach 6
West Lafayette, IN
Research (AFOSR) Quiet Tunnel at
Purdue University
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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Facility
Capability
Location
AFOSR-University of Notre Dame
24-inch Mach 6
Notre Dame, IN
Quiet Tunnel
Stratolaunch Carrier Aircraft
Reusable Mach 6 test bed
Mojave, CA
University of Texas at San Antonio
8-inch x 8-inch Mach 7.2
San Antonio, TX
Hypersonic Ludwieg Tube
University of Texas at Austin
6-inch x 7-inch Mach 2 & Mach 5
Austin, TX
Blowdown Wind Tunnel
Southwest Research Light-Gas Gun
Quiet, flight enthalpy ballistic range
San Antonio, TX
up to Mach 20
University of Texas at Arlington
1.6 MW Mach 2-6 Arc Jet
Arlington, TX
Aerodynamics Research Center
13-inch Mach 4-16 Shock Tunnel
Texas A&M National
7-inch Quiet Mach 6
Col ege Station, TX
Aerothermochemistry and
36-inch Expansion Tunnel
Hypersonics Laboratory
9-inch x 14-inch variable Mach 5-8
California Institute of Technology
12-inch Mach 5.2 T5 Reflected
Pasadena, CA
GALCIT
Shock Tunnel
6-inch Hypervelocity (up to Mach
7.1) Expansion Tube
University of Arizona Hypersonic
15-inch Mach 5
Tucson, AZ
Ludwieg Tube

Air Force Academy Ludwieg Tube
20-inch Mach 6
Colorado Springs, CO
University of Tennessee Space
18-inch x 18-inch Mach 7
Tul ahoma, TN
Institute Ludwieg Tube
Maryland HyperTERP Reflected
12-inch x 12-inch Mach 6
Col ege Park, MD
Shock Tunnel
Florida State Polysonic Wind
12-inch x 12-inch Mach 0.2-5
Tallahassee, FL
Tunnel
Princeton HyperBLaF Wind Tunnel
9-inch Mach 8
Princeton, NJ
Sources: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.; Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Expanding Hypersonic Technology
Testing”; and CRS correspondence with Dee Howard Endowed Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher S. Combs
(The University of Texas at San Antonio), October 27, 2022.
Notes: Hypersonic wind tunnels are under construction at the fol owing universities: Texas A&M University
(Mach 10 quiet tunnel), Purdue University (Mach 8 quiet tunnel), and the University of Notre Dame (Mach 10
quiet tunnel). Additional universities, such as the University of Maryland, the Georgia Institute of Technology,
and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, also maintain experimental hypersonic facilities or conduct
hypersonic research.

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31

Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Author Information

Kelley M. Sayler

Specialist in Advanced Technology and Global
Security

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
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Congressional Research Service
R45811 · VERSION 36 · UPDATED
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