Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

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Hypersonic Weapons:
~~January 10~~February 13, 2023 , 2023
Background and Issues for Congress
Kelley M. Sayler
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—maneuvering The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—maneuvering
Analyst in Advanced Analyst in Advanced
weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike
Technology and Global Technology and Global
program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on
Security Security
developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a

target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines
during flight. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of during flight. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of

U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable
“responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles]
when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic
weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence. weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.
Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Congress have Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Congress have
shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part, shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part,
to the advances in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a number of hypersonic weapons programs to the advances in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a number of hypersonic weapons programs
and have likely fielded operational hypersonic glide vehicles—potentially armed with nuclear warheads. Most U.S. and have likely fielded operational hypersonic glide vehicles—potentially armed with nuclear warheads. Most U.S.
hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As a hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As a
result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than
nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.
The Pentagon’s FY2023 budget request for hypersonic research is $4.7 billion—up from $3.8 billion in the FY2022 request. The Pentagon’s FY2023 budget request for hypersonic research is $4.7 billion—up from $3.8 billion in the FY2022 request.
The Missile Defense Agency additionally requested $225.5 million for hypersonic defense. At present, the Department of The Missile Defense Agency additionally requested $225.5 million for hypersonic defense. At present, the Department of
Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may not have Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may not have
approved either mission requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans. Indeed, as Principal Director for approved either mission requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans. Indeed, as Principal Director for
Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not
yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of
potential weapon system concepts and mission sets. potential weapon system concepts and mission sets.
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions about the As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions about the
rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and arms control. rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and arms control.
Potential questions include the following: Potential questions include the following:
 What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-effective  What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-effective
means of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint operational doctrine means of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint operational doctrine
and concepts? and concepts?
 Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress evaluate  Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress evaluate
funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests for hypersonic funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests for hypersonic
weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an acceleration of research weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an acceleration of research
on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile defense options both necessary and on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile defense options both necessary and
technologically feasible? technologically feasible?
 How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?  How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?
 Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new multilateral  Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new multilateral
arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building activities? arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building activities?

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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as a part of its The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as a part of its
conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) program since the early 2000s.1 In recent years, it has conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) program since the early 2000s.1 In recent years, it has
focused such efforts on hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles with shorter and focused such efforts on hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles with shorter and
intermediate ranges for use in regional conflicts. Although funding for these programs has been intermediate ranges for use in regional conflicts. Although funding for these programs has been
relatively restrained in the past, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in relatively restrained in the past, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in
pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part, pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part,
to advances in these technologies in Russia and China, leading to a heightened focus in the to advances in these technologies in Russia and China, leading to a heightened focus in the
United States on the strategic threat posed by hypersonic flight. Open-source reporting indicates United States on the strategic threat posed by hypersonic flight. Open-source reporting indicates
that both China and Russia have conducted numerous successful tests of hypersonic glide that both China and Russia have conducted numerous successful tests of hypersonic glide
vehicles and likely fielded an operational capability. vehicles and likely fielded an operational capability.
Experts disagree on the potential impact of competitor hypersonic weapons on both strategic Experts disagree on the potential impact of competitor hypersonic weapons on both strategic
stability and the U.S. military’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, former Under Secretary of stability and the U.S. military’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, former Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) Michael Griffin has testified to Congress Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) Michael Griffin has testified to Congress
that the United States does not “have systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in a that the United States does not “have systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in a
corresponding manner, and we don’t have defenses against [their] systems.”2 Although the John corresponding manner, and we don’t have defenses against [their] systems.”2 Although the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019 NDAA, P.L. 115-S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019 NDAA, P.L. 115-
232) accelerated the development of hypersonic weapons, which USD(R&E) identifies as a 232) accelerated the development of hypersonic weapons, which USD(R&E) identifies as a
priority research and development area, the United States is unlikely to field an operational priority research and development area, the United States is unlikely to field an operational
system before 2023. However, most U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, in contrast to those in system before 2023. However, most U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, in contrast to those in
Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead.3 As a result, U.S. Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead.3 As a result, U.S.
hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging
to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.
In addition to accelerating development of hypersonic weapons, Section 247 of the FY2019 In addition to accelerating development of hypersonic weapons, Section 247 of the FY2019
NDAA required that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense NDAA required that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, produce a classified assessment of U.S. and adversary hypersonic weapons Intelligence Agency, produce a classified assessment of U.S. and adversary hypersonic weapons
programs, to include the following elements: programs, to include the following elements:
(1) An evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries on such technology. (1) An evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries on such technology.
(2) An evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology. (2) An evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology.
(3) An evaluation of the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology. (3) An evaluation of the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology.
(4) An assessment of the technological progress of the United States and adversaries on (4) An assessment of the technological progress of the United States and adversaries on
such technology. such technology.
(5) Descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such technology. (5) Descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such technology.

1 For details, see CRS Report R41464, 1 For details, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. , by Amy F. Woolf.
2 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New 2 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New
Technologies to Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-Technologies to Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-
40_04-18-18.pdf. 40_04-18-18.pdf.
3 Until recently, the United States was not believed to be considering the development of nuclear-armed hypersonic 3 Until recently, the United States was not believed to be considering the development of nuclear-armed hypersonic
weapons; however, a since-revoked Air Force solicitation sought ideas for a “thermal protection system that can weapons; however, a since-revoked Air Force solicitation sought ideas for a “thermal protection system that can
support [a] hypersonic glide to ICBM ranges.” Senior defense officials responded to news reports of the revocation, support [a] hypersonic glide to ICBM ranges.” Senior defense officials responded to news reports of the revocation,
stating that DOD “remains committed to non-nuclear role for hypersonics.” See Steve Trimble, “USAF Errantly stating that DOD “remains committed to non-nuclear role for hypersonics.” See Steve Trimble, “USAF Errantly
Reveals Research on ICBM-Range Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,” Aviation Week, August 18, 2020, at Reveals Research on ICBM-Range Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,” Aviation Week, August 18, 2020, at
https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/usaf-errantly-reveals-research-icbm-range-https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/usaf-errantly-reveals-research-icbm-range-
hypersonic-glide. hypersonic-glide.
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(6) An assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.4 (6) An assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.4
This report was delivered to Congress in July 2019. Similarly, Section 1689 of the FY2019 This report was delivered to Congress in July 2019. Similarly, Section 1689 of the FY2019
NDAA requires the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to produce a report on “how NDAA requires the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to produce a report on “how
hypersonic missile defense can be accelerated to meet emerging hypersonic threats.”5 The hypersonic missile defense can be accelerated to meet emerging hypersonic threats.”5 The
findings of these reports could hold implications for congressional authorizations, appropriations, findings of these reports could hold implications for congressional authorizations, appropriations,
and oversight. and oversight.
The following report reviews the hypersonic weapons programs in the United States, Russia, and The following report reviews the hypersonic weapons programs in the United States, Russia, and
China, providing information on the programs and infrastructure in each nation, based on China, providing information on the programs and infrastructure in each nation, based on
unclassified sources. It also provides a brief summary of the state of global hypersonic weapons unclassified sources. It also provides a brief summary of the state of global hypersonic weapons
research development. It concludes with a discussion of the issues that Congress might address as research development. It concludes with a discussion of the issues that Congress might address as
it considers DOD’s funding requests for U.S. hypersonic technology programs. it considers DOD’s funding requests for U.S. hypersonic technology programs.
Background
Several countries are developing hypersonic weapons, which fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 (five Several countries are developing hypersonic weapons, which fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 (five
times the speed of sound).6 There are two primary categories of hypersonic weapons: times the speed of sound).6 There are two primary categories of hypersonic weapons:
  Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) are launched from a rocket before gliding to a are launched from a rocket before gliding to a
target.7 target.7
  Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines, or are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines, or
“scramjets,” after acquiring their target. “scramjets,” after acquiring their target.
Unlike ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons do not follow a ballistic trajectory and can Unlike ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons do not follow a ballistic trajectory and can
maneuver en route to their destination. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and maneuver en route to their destination. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, hypersonic former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, hypersonic
weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or
time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied
access, or not preferred.”8 Conventional hypersonic weapons use only kinetic energy—energy access, or not preferred.”8 Conventional hypersonic weapons use only kinetic energy—energy
derived from motion—to destroy unhardened targets or, potentially, underground facilities.9 derived from motion—to destroy unhardened targets or, potentially, underground facilities.9
Hypersonic weapons could challenge detection and defense due to their speed, maneuverability, Hypersonic weapons could challenge detection and defense due to their speed, maneuverability,
and low altitude of flight.10 For example, terrestrial-based radar cannot detect hypersonic and low altitude of flight.10 For example, terrestrial-based radar cannot detect hypersonic
weapons until late in the weapon’s flight.11weapons until late in the weapon’s flight.11 Figure 1 depicts the differences in terrestrial-based depicts the differences in terrestrial-based
radar detection timelines for ballistic missiles versus hypersonic glide vehicles. radar detection timelines for ballistic missiles versus hypersonic glide vehicles.

4 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §247. 4 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §247.
5 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title XVI, §1689. 5 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title XVI, §1689.
6 At a minimum, the United States, Russia, China, Australia, India, France, Germany, and Japan are developing 6 At a minimum, the United States, Russia, China, Australia, India, France, Germany, and Japan are developing
hypersonic weapons technology. See Richard H. Speier et al., hypersonic weapons technology. See Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread
of a New Class of Weapons, RAND Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html; , RAND Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html;
and Mike Yeo, “Japan unveils its hypersonic weapons plans,” and Mike Yeo, “Japan unveils its hypersonic weapons plans,” Defense News, March 14, 2020. March 14, 2020.
7 When HGVs are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to as a hypersonic 7 When HGVs are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to as a hypersonic
boost-glide weapon. boost-glide weapon.
8 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States 8 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States
Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armed-Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf. services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
9 Richard H. Speier et al., 9 Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons, p. 13. , p. 13.
10 See Department of Defense, 10 See Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-, at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-
2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf. 2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
11 Richard H. Speier et al., 11 Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons. .
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Figure 1. Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs.
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles

Source: CRS image based on an image in “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” CRS image based on an image in “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The
Economist, April 6, 2019, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-, April 6, 2019, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-
faster-than-mach-5-are-coming. faster-than-mach-5-are-coming.
This delayed detection compresses the timeline for decisionmakers assessing their response This delayed detection compresses the timeline for decisionmakers assessing their response
options and for a defensive system to intercept the attacking weapon—potentially permitting only options and for a defensive system to intercept the attacking weapon—potentially permitting only
a single intercept attempt.12 a single intercept attempt.12
Furthermore, U.S. defense officials have stated that both terrestrial- and current space-based Furthermore, U.S. defense officials have stated that both terrestrial- and current space-based
sensor architectures are insufficient to detect and track hypersonic weapons, with former sensor architectures are insufficient to detect and track hypersonic weapons, with former
USD(R&E) Griffin noting that “hypersonic targets are 10 to 20 times dimmer than what the U.S. USD(R&E) Griffin noting that “hypersonic targets are 10 to 20 times dimmer than what the U.S.
normally tracks by satellites in geostationary orbit.”13 Some analysts have suggested that space-normally tracks by satellites in geostationary orbit.”13 Some analysts have suggested that space-
based sensor layers—integrated with tracking and fire-control systems to direct high-performance based sensor layers—integrated with tracking and fire-control systems to direct high-performance
interceptors or directed energy weapons14—could theoretically present viable options for interceptors or directed energy weapons14—could theoretically present viable options for
defending against hypersonic weapons in the future.15 Indeed, the defending against hypersonic weapons in the future.15 Indeed, the 2019 Missile Defense Review
notes that “such sensors take advantage of the large area viewable from space for improved notes that “such sensors take advantage of the large area viewable from space for improved
tracking and potentially targeting of advanced threats, including HGVs and hypersonic cruise tracking and potentially targeting of advanced threats, including HGVs and hypersonic cruise
missiles.”16 missiles.”16

12 Bradley Perrett et al., “U.S. Navy sees Chinese HGV as part of Wider Threat,” 12 Bradley Perrett et al., “U.S. Navy sees Chinese HGV as part of Wider Threat,” Aviation Week, January 27, 2014. , January 27, 2014.
13 David Vergun, “DOD Scaling Up Effort to Develop Hypersonics,” 13 David Vergun, “DOD Scaling Up Effort to Develop Hypersonics,” DoD News, December 13, 2018, at , December 13, 2018, at
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1712954/dod-scaling-up-effort-to-develop-hypersonics/; see also U.S. https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1712954/dod-scaling-up-effort-to-develop-hypersonics/; see also U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New Technologies to Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New Technologies to
Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-40_04-18-18.pdf, Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-40_04-18-18.pdf,
and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States
Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armed-Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf. services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
14 Section 1664 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) granted the “Director of the Missile Defense Agency the authority 14 Section 1664 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) granted the “Director of the Missile Defense Agency the authority
to budget for, direct, and manage directed energy programs applicable for ballistic and hypersonic missile defense to budget for, direct, and manage directed energy programs applicable for ballistic and hypersonic missile defense
missions, in coordination with other directed energy efforts of the Department of Defense.” missions, in coordination with other directed energy efforts of the Department of Defense.”
15 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New 15 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New
Technologies to Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-Technologies to Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-
40_04-18-18.pdf; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing 40_04-18-18.pdf; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing
on United States Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armed-on United States Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf. services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
16 Department of Defense, 16 Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, p. XVI, at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/, p. XVI, at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/
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Other analysts have questioned the affordability, technological feasibility, and/or utility of wide- Other analysts have questioned the affordability, technological feasibility, and/or utility of wide-
area hypersonic weapons defense.17 As physicist and nuclear expert James Acton explains, “point-area hypersonic weapons defense.17 As physicist and nuclear expert James Acton explains, “point-
defense systems, and particularly [Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)], could very defense systems, and particularly [Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)], could very
plausibly be adapted to deal with hypersonic missiles. The disadvantage of those systems is that plausibly be adapted to deal with hypersonic missiles. The disadvantage of those systems is that
they can only defend small areas. To defend the whole of the continental United States, you they can only defend small areas. To defend the whole of the continental United States, you
would need an unaffordable number of THAAD batteries.”18 In addition, some analysts have would need an unaffordable number of THAAD batteries.”18 In addition, some analysts have
argued that the United States’ current command and control architecture would be incapable of argued that the United States’ current command and control architecture would be incapable of
“processing data quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an incoming hypersonic threat.”19 “processing data quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an incoming hypersonic threat.”19
(For additional information on hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, (For additional information on hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623,
Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.) , by Kelley M. Sayler.)
United States
The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s
Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the
ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as well as through ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as well as through
several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.20 Those who support these development efforts several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.20 Those who support these development efforts
argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as well as provide the U.S. military argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as well as provide the U.S. military
with an ability to defeat capabilities such as advanced air and missile defense systems that form with an ability to defeat capabilities such as advanced air and missile defense systems that form
the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-access/area denial strategies.21 In recognition of this, the the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-access/area denial strategies.21 In recognition of this, the
2018 National Defense Strategy identifies hypersonic weapons as one of the key technologies identifies hypersonic weapons as one of the key technologies
“[ensuring the United States] will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.”22 Similarly, the “[ensuring the United States] will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.”22 Similarly, the
House Armed Services Committee’s bipartisan House Armed Services Committee’s bipartisan Future of Defense Task Force Report notes that notes that
hypersonic weapons could present challenges to the United States in the years to come.23 hypersonic weapons could present challenges to the United States in the years to come.23
Programs
Unlike programs in China and Russia, U.S. hypersonic weapons are to be conventionally armed. Unlike programs in China and Russia, U.S. hypersonic weapons are to be conventionally armed.
As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more

2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf. 2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
17 See James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2, 2018, 17 See James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2, 2018,
at https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/02/hypersonic-weapons-explainer-pub-75957; and Margot van Loon, at https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/02/hypersonic-weapons-explainer-pub-75957; and Margot van Loon,
“Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer.” “Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer.”
18 Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer.” 18 Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer.”
19 Margot van Loon, “Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer” in 19 Margot van Loon, “Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer” in Defense Technology Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons, ,
American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019. Some analysts have suggested that future command and control American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019. Some analysts have suggested that future command and control
systems may require autonomous functionality to manage the speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons. See systems may require autonomous functionality to manage the speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons. See
John L. Dolan, Richard K. Gallagher, and David L. Mann, “Hypersonic Weapons Are Literally Unstoppable (As in John L. Dolan, Richard K. Gallagher, and David L. Mann, “Hypersonic Weapons Are Literally Unstoppable (As in
America Can’t Stop Them),” America Can’t Stop Them),” Real Clear Defense, April 23, 2019, at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/, April 23, 2019, at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/
04/23/hypersonic_weapons__a_threat_to_national_security_114358.html. 04/23/hypersonic_weapons__a_threat_to_national_security_114358.html.
20 For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464, 20 For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global
Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. , by Amy F. Woolf.
21 Roger Zakheim and Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” Remarks at 21 Roger Zakheim and Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” Remarks at
the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army
Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580. Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580.
22 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” p. 3, at 22 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” p. 3, at
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
23 House Armed Services Committee, 23 House Armed Services Committee, Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020, September 2020, at , September 2020, at
https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2/6/26129500-d208-47ba-a9f7-25a8f82828b0/https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2/6/26129500-d208-47ba-a9f7-25a8f82828b0/
424EB2008281A3C79BA8C7EA71890AE9.future-of-defense-task-force-report.pdf. 424EB2008281A3C79BA8C7EA71890AE9.future-of-defense-task-force-report.pdf.
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technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. Indeed, technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. Indeed,
according to one expert, “a nuclear-armed glider would be effective if it were 10 or even 100 according to one expert, “a nuclear-armed glider would be effective if it were 10 or even 100
times less accurate [than a conventionally-armed glider]” due to nuclear blast effects.24 times less accurate [than a conventionally-armed glider]” due to nuclear blast effects.24
According to open-source reporting, the United States is conducting research, development, test, According to open-source reporting, the United States is conducting research, development, test,
and evaluation (RDT&E) on a number of offensive hypersonic weapons and hypersonic and evaluation (RDT&E) on a number of offensive hypersonic weapons and hypersonic
technology programs, including the following (seetechnology programs, including the following (see Table 1): :
 U.S. Navy—Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS);  U.S. Navy—Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS);
 U.S. Navy—Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment 2 (OASuW Inc 2), also  U.S. Navy—Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment 2 (OASuW Inc 2), also
known as Hypersonic Air-Launched OASuW (HALO); known as Hypersonic Air-Launched OASuW (HALO);
 U.S. Army—Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW);  U.S. Army—Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW);
 U.S. Air Force—AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW,  U.S. Air Force—AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW,
pronounced “arrow”); pronounced “arrow”);
 U.S. Air Force—Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM);  U.S. Air Force—Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM);
 DARPA—Tactical Boost Glide (TBG);  DARPA—Tactical Boost Glide (TBG);
 DARPA—Operational Fires (OpFires); and  DARPA—Operational Fires (OpFires); and
 DARPA— DARPA—More Opportunities with Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept ~~follow-on (MoHAWC,~~
(MOHAWC, pronounced “mohawk”). pronounced “mohawk”).
These programs are intended to produce operational prototypes, as there are currently no These programs are intended to produce operational prototypes, as there are currently no
programs of record for hypersonic weapons.25 programs of record for hypersonic weapons.25
U.S. Navy
In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a
Common Hypersonic Glide Body for use across the services.26 The glide body is being adapted Common Hypersonic Glide Body for use across the services.26 The glide body is being adapted
from a Mach 6 Army prototype warhead, the Alternate Re-Entry System. The Navy’s from a Mach 6 Army prototype warhead, the Alternate Re-Entry System. The Navy’s
Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) is expected to pair the glide body with a booster system to Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) is expected to pair the glide body with a booster system to
create a common All Up Round (AUR) for use by both the Navy and Army. The first test of the create a common All Up Round (AUR) for use by both the Navy and Army. The first test of the
AUR, conducted in June 2022, resulted in failure.27 AUR, conducted in June 2022, resulted in failure.27
According to the Navy’s FY2023 budget documents, the Navy intends to conduct testing in According to the Navy’s FY2023 budget documents, the Navy intends to conduct testing in
support of CPS’s deployment on Zumwalt-class destroyers by FY2025.28 Although Navy officials support of CPS’s deployment on Zumwalt-class destroyers by FY2025.28 Although Navy officials

24 James M. Acton, “China’s Advanced Weapons,” Testimony to the U.S. China Economic and Security Review 24 James M. Acton, “China’s Advanced Weapons,” Testimony to the U.S. China Economic and Security Review
Commission, February 23, 2017, at https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/23/china-s-advanced-weapons-pub-68095. Commission, February 23, 2017, at https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/23/china-s-advanced-weapons-pub-68095.
25 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics, But Only Prototypes,” 25 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics, But Only Prototypes,” Aviation Week, March , March
15, 2019, at https://aviationweek.com/defense/new-long-term-pentagon-plan-boosts-hypersonics-only-prototypes. 15, 2019, at https://aviationweek.com/defense/new-long-term-pentagon-plan-boosts-hypersonics-only-prototypes.
26 The services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors with rotating chairmanship. 26 The services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors with rotating chairmanship.
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Ramps up Funding for Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,” Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Ramps up Funding for Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,” Breaking Defense, February , February
28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-shield-hypersonic-sword/. 28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-shield-hypersonic-sword/.
27 Jon Herskovitz and Anthony Capaccio, “US Hypersonic Missile Fails in Test in Fresh Setback for Program,” 27 Jon Herskovitz and Anthony Capaccio, “US Hypersonic Missile Fails in Test in Fresh Setback for Program,”
Bloomberg, June 29, 2022, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-30/us-hypersonic-missile-fails-in-, June 29, 2022, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-30/us-hypersonic-missile-fails-in-
test-in-fresh-setback-for-program.test-in-fresh-setback-for-program.
28 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research, 28 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1458, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1458, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. Reports indicate that Zumwalt-class destroyers could carry up to 12 Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. Reports indicate that Zumwalt-class destroyers could carry up to 12
missiles each. See Sam LaGrone, “Navy Awards HII Planning Contract for Zumwalt Hypersonic Upgrades,” missiles each. See Sam LaGrone, “Navy Awards HII Planning Contract for Zumwalt Hypersonic Upgrades,” USNI
News, January 9, 2023, at https://news.usni.org/2023/01/09/navy-awards-hii-planning-contract-for-zumwalt-, January 9, 2023, at https://news.usni.org/2023/01/09/navy-awards-hii-planning-contract-for-zumwalt-
hypersonic-upgrades?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-hypersonic-upgrades?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-
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have previously noted plans to achieve “limited operating capability” on Ohio-class submarines have previously noted plans to achieve “limited operating capability” on Ohio-class submarines
as early as 202529 and on Virginia-class submarines by FY2028, as well as to eventually field as early as 202529 and on Virginia-class submarines by FY2028, as well as to eventually field
hypersonic weapons on Burke-class destroyers, such plans are not reflected in FY2023 budget hypersonic weapons on Burke-class destroyers, such plans are not reflected in FY2023 budget
documents.30 The Navy is requesting $1.2 billion for CPS RDT&E in FY2023—a decrease of documents.30 The Navy is requesting $1.2 billion for CPS RDT&E in FY2023—a decrease of
$169 million from the FY2022 request and $120 million from the FY2022 appropriation.31 $169 million from the FY2022 request and $120 million from the FY2022 appropriation.31
The Navy is also developing the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment 2 (OASuW Inc 2), The Navy is also developing the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment 2 (OASuW Inc 2),
also known as Hypersonic Air-Launched OASuW (HALO)—a new start in FY2023.32 Although also known as Hypersonic Air-Launched OASuW (HALO)—a new start in FY2023.32 Although
few details about the program have been released publicly, HALO is likely to be compatible with few details about the program have been released publicly, HALO is likely to be compatible with
the Navy’s F/A-18 fighter jet.33 The Navy is requesting $92 million for HALO RDT&E in the Navy’s F/A-18 fighter jet.33 The Navy is requesting $92 million for HALO RDT&E in
FY2023.34 FY2023.34
U.S. Army
The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) program is expected to pair the common The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) program is expected to pair the common
glide vehicle with the Navy’s booster system. The system is intended to have a range of over glide vehicle with the Navy’s booster system. The system is intended to have a range of over
1,725 miles and “provide the Army with a prototype strategic attack weapon system to defeat 1,725 miles and “provide the Army with a prototype strategic attack weapon system to defeat
A2/AD capabilities, suppress adversary Long Range Fires, and engage other high payoff/time A2/AD capabilities, suppress adversary Long Range Fires, and engage other high payoff/time
sensitive targets.”35 The Army is requesting $806 million in RDT&E for the program in sensitive targets.”35 The Army is requesting $806 million in RDT&E for the program in
FY2023—$394 million over the FY2022 request and $380 million over the FY2022 FY2023—$394 million over the FY2022 request and $380 million over the FY2022
appropriation.36 It plans to field an experimental prototype in FY2023 and transition to a program appropriation.36 It plans to field an experimental prototype in FY2023 and transition to a program

c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d. c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d.
29 See Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research, 29 See Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1466, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1466, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/22pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf; Department of the Navy, “Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY Documents/22pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf; Department of the Navy, “Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY
2021 Budget,” February 10, 2020, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/21pres/Highlights_book.pdf; 2021 Budget,” February 10, 2020, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/21pres/Highlights_book.pdf;
and Megan Eckstein, “Navy Says Hypersonic Weapons Coming to Subs in 5 Years,” and Megan Eckstein, “Navy Says Hypersonic Weapons Coming to Subs in 5 Years,” USNI News, November 17, 2020, , November 17, 2020,
at https://news.usni.org/2020/11/17/navy-says-hypersonic-weapons-coming-to-subs-in-5-years. at https://news.usni.org/2020/11/17/navy-says-hypersonic-weapons-coming-to-subs-in-5-years.
30 David B. Larter, “All US Navy destroyers will get hypersonic missiles, says Trump’s national security adviser,” 30 David B. Larter, “All US Navy destroyers will get hypersonic missiles, says Trump’s national security adviser,”
Defense News, October 21, 2020, at https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/10/21/all-us-navy-destroyers-will-get-, October 21, 2020, at https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/10/21/all-us-navy-destroyers-will-get-
hypersonic-missiles-trumps-national-security-advisor-says/. hypersonic-missiles-trumps-national-security-advisor-says/.
31 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research, 31 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1458, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1458, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
32 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research, 32 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1373, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1373, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
33 Joesph Trevithick, “Hypersonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Has To Be Ready By 2028 Navy Says,” 33 Joesph Trevithick, “Hypersonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Has To Be Ready By 2028 Navy Says,” The Drive, April , April
23, 2022, at https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/hypersonic-anti-ship-cruise-missile-has-to-be-ready-by-2028-23, 2022, at https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/hypersonic-anti-ship-cruise-missile-has-to-be-ready-by-2028-
navy-says. navy-says.
34 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research, 34 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1373, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1373, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
35 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Discloses Hypersonic LRHW Range Of 1,725 Miles; Watch Out China,” 35 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Discloses Hypersonic LRHW Range Of 1,725 Miles; Watch Out China,” Breaking
Defense, May 12, 2021, at https://breakingdefense.com/2021/05/army-discloses-hypersonic-lrhw-range-of-1725-miles-, May 12, 2021, at https://breakingdefense.com/2021/05/army-discloses-hypersonic-lrhw-range-of-1725-miles-
watch-out-china/; https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/army-sets-2023-hypersonic-flight-test-strategic-cannon-watch-out-china/; https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/army-sets-2023-hypersonic-flight-test-strategic-cannon-
advances/; and Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, advances/; and Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 639, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 639, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/
Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/RDTE_BA_4_FY_2022_PB.pdf. Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/RDTE_BA_4_FY_2022_PB.pdf.
36 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, 36 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, pp. 711-726, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, pp. 711-726, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/
72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf; and Department of Defense 72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf; and Department of Defense
Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation,
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of record in the fourth quarter of FY2024—a timeline that Army officials have termed “very, very of record in the fourth quarter of FY2024—a timeline that Army officials have termed “very, very
aggressive” and that will require the program to take on “a lot of risk.”37 The Army additionally aggressive” and that will require the program to take on “a lot of risk.”37 The Army additionally
requested $249 million for the procurement of LRHW ground support equipment in FY2023.38 requested $249 million for the procurement of LRHW ground support equipment in FY2023.38
U.S. Air Force
The AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon is The AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon is ~~expected~~ to leverage DARPA’s Tactical to leverage DARPA’s Tactical
Boost Glide technology to develop an air-launched hypersonic glide vehicle prototype capable of Boost Glide technology to develop an air-launched hypersonic glide vehicle prototype capable of
travelling at average speeds of between Mach 6.5 and Mach 8 at a range of approximately 1,000 travelling at average speeds of between Mach 6.5 and Mach 8 at a range of approximately 1,000
miles.39 ARRW successfully completed a “captive carry” test flight in June 2019. It then miles.39 ARRW successfully completed a “captive carry” test flight in June 2019. It then
experienced three successive failures before completing three successful flight tests in 2022.40 experienced three successive failures before completing three successful flight tests in 2022.40
The most recent flight test, conducted in December 2022, was the first test of the full prototype The most recent flight test, conducted in December 2022, was the first test of the full prototype
operational ARRW.41 The Air Force has repeatedly pushed the timeline for ARRW and now states operational ARRW.41 The Air Force has repeatedly pushed the timeline for ARRW and now states
that ARRW could be operational “as early as fall 2023.”42 The Air Force requested $115 million that ARRW could be operational “as early as fall 2023.”42 The Air Force requested $115 million
for ARRW RDT&E in FY2023—$123 million under the FY2022 request and $204 million under for ARRW RDT&E in FY2023—$123 million under the FY2022 request and $204 million under
the FY2022 appropriation.43 In addition, the Air Force requested $47 million for ARRW the FY2022 appropriation.43 In addition, the Air Force requested $47 million for ARRW

Volume II, Budget Activity 5D, p. 185, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Volume II, Budget Activity 5D, p. 185, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/
Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_5D.pdf. Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_5D.pdf.
37 Jon Harper, 37 Jon Harper, DefenseScoop, October 10, 2022, at https://defensescoop.com/2022/10/10/army-assuming-a-lot-of-risk-, October 10, 2022, at https://defensescoop.com/2022/10/10/army-assuming-a-lot-of-risk-
as-it-moves-to-field-hypersonic-weapons-by-end-of-fiscal-year/. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) as-it-moves-to-field-hypersonic-weapons-by-end-of-fiscal-year/. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY)
2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget
Activity 4, pp. 705-709, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/Activity 4, pp. 705-709, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/
rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf. rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf.
38 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Missile Procurement, 38 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Missile Procurement,
p. 66, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/Procurement/p. 66, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/Procurement/
MSLS_ARMY.pdf. MSLS_ARMY.pdf.
39 ARRW is expected to be launched initially from the B-52H strategic bomber. Thomas Newdick, “Air Force Says 39 ARRW is expected to be launched initially from the B-52H strategic bomber. Thomas Newdick, “Air Force Says
New Hypersonic Missile Will Hit Targets 1,000 Miles Away In Under 12 Minutes,” New Hypersonic Missile Will Hit Targets 1,000 Miles Away In Under 12 Minutes,” The Drive, October 13, 2020, at , October 13, 2020, at
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37045/air-force-says-new-hypersonic-missile-will-hit-targets-1000-miles-https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37045/air-force-says-new-hypersonic-missile-will-hit-targets-1000-miles-
away-in-under-12-minutes. away-in-under-12-minutes.
40 Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force’s Hypersonic ARRW Missile Fails First Flight Test,” 40 Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force’s Hypersonic ARRW Missile Fails First Flight Test,” Military.com, April 6, 2021, at , April 6, 2021, at
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/04/06/air-forces-hypersonic-arrw-missile-fails-first-flight-test.html#:~:text=https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/04/06/air-forces-hypersonic-arrw-missile-fails-first-flight-test.html#:~:text=
In%20June%202019%2C%20the%20service,early%202020s%2C%20the%20release%20states; John A. Tirpak, In%20June%202019%2C%20the%20service,early%202020s%2C%20the%20release%20states; John A. Tirpak,
“Hypersonic ARRW Flies Successfully for Second Time, Completing Booster Tests,” “Hypersonic ARRW Flies Successfully for Second Time, Completing Booster Tests,” Air Force Magazine, July 13, , July 13,
2022, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-arrw-flies-successfully-for-second-time-completing-booster-tests/. 2022, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-arrw-flies-successfully-for-second-time-completing-booster-tests/.
41 Ilka Cole, “Air Force conducts first ARRW operational prototype missile test,” U.S. Air Force, December 12, 2022, 41 Ilka Cole, “Air Force conducts first ARRW operational prototype missile test,” U.S. Air Force, December 12, 2022,
at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3243194/air-force-conducts-first-arrw-operational-prototype-at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3243194/air-force-conducts-first-arrw-operational-prototype-
missile-test/.missile-test/.
The FY2022 Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) Annual Report notes that the ARRW program office does not, however, “have a DOT&E-approved Integrated Master Test Plan nor has the Office submitted an Operational Demonstration Plan.” See DOT&E, FY2022 DOT&E Annual Report, January 2023, p. 246, at https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2022/FY22DOTEAnnualReport.pdf?ver=UBO7t2O1FkRuvrB-nJDZ-g%3d%3d. 42 Nicole Ledbetter, “AFGSC takes next steps in making Air Force’s first hypersonic weapon,” U.S. Air Force 2nd 42 Nicole Ledbetter, “AFGSC takes next steps in making Air Force’s first hypersonic weapon,” U.S. Air Force 2nd
Bomb Wing Public Affairs, December 4, 2022, at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3234145/afgsc-Bomb Wing Public Affairs, December 4, 2022, at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3234145/afgsc-
takes-next-steps-in-making-air-forces-first-hypersonic-weapon/. As recently as March 2022, the Air Force asserted that takes-next-steps-in-making-air-forces-first-hypersonic-weapon/. As recently as March 2022, the Air Force asserted that
ARRW could reach early operational capability in late 2022. See Anthony Capaccio, “Hypersonic-Missile Failures ARRW could reach early operational capability in late 2022. See Anthony Capaccio, “Hypersonic-Missile Failures
Risk U.S. Chase of China, Russia,” Risk U.S. Chase of China, Russia,” Bloomberg, March 7, 2022, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-, March 7, 2022, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-
07/hypersonic-missile-failures-imperil-u-s-chase-of-china-russia. 07/hypersonic-missile-failures-imperil-u-s-chase-of-china-russia.
43 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research, 43 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 145, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY23/Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 145, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY23/
RDTE_/FY23%20Air%20Force%20Research%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation%20Vol%20II.pdf?RDTE_/FY23%20Air%20Force%20Research%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation%20Vol%20II.pdf?
ver=LK67U_ThMsX7AwahfurKGw%3d%3d. ver=LK67U_ThMsX7AwahfurKGw%3d%3d.
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procurement in FY2023;44 however, Air Force officials have stated that they will submit a procurement in FY2023;44 however, Air Force officials have stated that they will submit a
reprogramming request to shift these funds to ARRW RDT&E.45 reprogramming request to shift these funds to ARRW RDT&E.45
In February 2020, the Air Force announced that it had cancelled its second hypersonic weapon In February 2020, the Air Force announced that it had cancelled its second hypersonic weapon
program, the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW), which had been expected to use program, the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW), which had been expected to use
the common glide vehicle and booster system, due to budget pressures that forced it to choose the common glide vehicle and booster system, due to budget pressures that forced it to choose
between ARRW and HCSW.46 Then-Air Force acquisition chief Will Roper explained that ARRW between ARRW and HCSW.46 Then-Air Force acquisition chief Will Roper explained that ARRW
was selected because it was more advanced and gave the Air Force additional options. “[ARRW] was selected because it was more advanced and gave the Air Force additional options. “[ARRW]
is smaller; we can carry twice as many on the B-52, and it’s possible it could be on the F-15,” he is smaller; we can carry twice as many on the B-52, and it’s possible it could be on the F-15,” he
explained.47 A senior Air Force official has since noted that a B-52 could potentially carry four explained.47 A senior Air Force official has since noted that a B-52 could potentially carry four
ARRWs.48 ARRWs.48
Finally, in FY2022, the Air Force launched the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) Finally, in FY2022, the Air Force launched the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM)
program to develop a hypersonic cruise missile that integrates Air Force and DARPA program to develop a hypersonic cruise missile that integrates Air Force and DARPA
technologies. Some reports indicate that HACM is intended to be launched from both bombers technologies. Some reports indicate that HACM is intended to be launched from both bombers
and fighter aircraft,49 with a senior Air Force official noting that a B-52 could potentially carry 20 and fighter aircraft,49 with a senior Air Force official noting that a B-52 could potentially carry 20
HACMs or more.50 According to the Air Force, “the ability to execute HACM development is HACMs or more.50 According to the Air Force, “the ability to execute HACM development is
contingent upon fully funded and successful predecessor capability development efforts.”51 The contingent upon fully funded and successful predecessor capability development efforts.”51 The
Air Force requested $317 million for HACM in FY2023, up from $200 million in the FY2022 Air Force requested $317 million for HACM in FY2023, up from $200 million in the FY2022
request and $190 million in the FY2022 appropriation.52 request and $190 million in the FY2022 appropriation.52

44 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Missile 44 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Missile
Procurement, Volume I, p. 23, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY23/PROCUREMENT_/Procurement, Volume I, p. 23, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY23/PROCUREMENT_/
FY23%20Air%20Force%20Missile%20Procurement.pdf?ver=QeRLpOSY7vcLmsKbr3C-Qw%3d%3d. The Air Force FY23%20Air%20Force%20Missile%20Procurement.pdf?ver=QeRLpOSY7vcLmsKbr3C-Qw%3d%3d. The Air Force
requested $161 million in FY2022 for the procurement of an estimated 12 ARRW missiles. Congress authorized $116 requested $161 million in FY2022 for the procurement of an estimated 12 ARRW missiles. Congress authorized $116
million for ARRW procurement in the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81), noting that additional funds were “early to need.” million for ARRW procurement in the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81), noting that additional funds were “early to need.”
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Missile Procurement, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Missile Procurement,
Volume I, p. 19, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/PROCUREMENT_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Volume I, p. 19, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/PROCUREMENT_/FY22%20DAF%20J-
Book%20-%203020%20-%20Missile%20Proc.pdf?ver=GIEj1YH2GS-elMys1wLm1A%3d%3d. Book%20-%203020%20-%20Missile%20Proc.pdf?ver=GIEj1YH2GS-elMys1wLm1A%3d%3d.
https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/PROCUREMENT_/FY22 DAF J-Book - 3020 - Missile https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/PROCUREMENT_/FY22 DAF J-Book - 3020 - Missile
Proc.pdf?ver=GIEj1YH2GS-elMys1wLm1A%3d%3d. Proc.pdf?ver=GIEj1YH2GS-elMys1wLm1A%3d%3d.
45 Valerie Insinna, “Air Force ditches plans to buy first hypersonic ARRW missile in FY23,” 45 Valerie Insinna, “Air Force ditches plans to buy first hypersonic ARRW missile in FY23,” Breaking Defense, March , March
29, 2022, at https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/air-force-ditches-plans-to-buy-first-hypersonic-arrw-missile-in-fy23/. 29, 2022, at https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/air-force-ditches-plans-to-buy-first-hypersonic-arrw-missile-in-fy23/.
46 Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force kills one of its hypersonic weapons programs,” 46 Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force kills one of its hypersonic weapons programs,” Defense News, February 10, 2020, at , February 10, 2020, at
https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2020/02/10/the-air-force-just-canceled-one-of-its-hypersonic-https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2020/02/10/the-air-force-just-canceled-one-of-its-hypersonic-
weapons-programs/. weapons-programs/.
47 John A. Tirpak, “Roper: The ARRW Hypersonic Missile Better Option for USAF,” 47 John A. Tirpak, “Roper: The ARRW Hypersonic Missile Better Option for USAF,” Air Force Magazine, March 2, , March 2,
2020, at https://www.airforcemag.com/arrw-beat-hcsw-because-its-smaller-better-for-usaf/. Tirpak additionally notes 2020, at https://www.airforcemag.com/arrw-beat-hcsw-because-its-smaller-better-for-usaf/. Tirpak additionally notes
that “the F-15 could accelerate the ARRW to Mach 3 before launch, potentially reducing the size of the booster needed that “the F-15 could accelerate the ARRW to Mach 3 before launch, potentially reducing the size of the booster needed
to get the weapon to hypersonic speed.” to get the weapon to hypersonic speed.”
48 John A. Tirpak, “Air Force Will Try Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile in July,” 48 John A. Tirpak, “Air Force Will Try Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile in July,” Air Force Magazine, ,
June 3, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/. June 3, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/.
49 FY2023 Air Force budget documents note that “the HACM program will prioritize integration on the F-15E platform 49 FY2023 Air Force budget documents note that “the HACM program will prioritize integration on the F-15E platform
to enable quick entry into flight test.” to enable quick entry into flight test.”
50 John A. Tirpak, “Air Force Will Try Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile in July,” 50 John A. Tirpak, “Air Force Will Try Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile in July,” Air Force Magazine, ,
June 3, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/. June 3, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/.
51 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research, 51 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 148, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 148, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/
RDTE_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20-%20AF%20RDT%20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=RDTE_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20-%20AF%20RDT%20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=
KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d. KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d.
52 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research, 52 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 145 and 161, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 145 and 161, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/
FY23/RDTE_/FY23/RDTE_/
FY23%20Air%20Force%20Research%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=FY23%20Air%20Force%20Research%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=
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The Air Force is also seeking information from industry on the Expendable Hypersonic Air- The Air Force is also seeking information from industry on the Expendable Hypersonic Air-
Breathing Multi-Mission Demonstrator Program, alternatively known as Project Mayhem. Breathing Multi-Mission Demonstrator Program, alternatively known as Project Mayhem.
According to Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White, “Project Mayhem is to look at the According to Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White, “Project Mayhem is to look at the
next step in what the opportunity space allows relative to hypersonic cruise missile systems” and next step in what the opportunity space allows relative to hypersonic cruise missile systems” and
is intended to be capable of flying “significantly longer ranges than what we’re doing today.”53 is intended to be capable of flying “significantly longer ranges than what we’re doing today.”53
Mayhem is reported to be larger than ARRW and capable of carrying multiple payloads for Mayhem is reported to be larger than ARRW and capable of carrying multiple payloads for
different mission sets.54 different mission sets.54
DARPA
DARPA, in partnership with the Air Force, continues to test Tactical Boost Glide, a wedge-shaped DARPA, in partnership with the Air Force, continues to test Tactical Boost Glide, a wedge-shaped
hypersonic glide vehicle capable of Mach 7+ flight that “aims to develop and demonstrate hypersonic glide vehicle capable of Mach 7+ flight that “aims to develop and demonstrate
technologies to enable future air-launched, tactical-range hypersonic boost glide systems.”55 TBG technologies to enable future air-launched, tactical-range hypersonic boost glide systems.”55 TBG
will “also consider traceability, compatibility, and integration with the Navy Vertical Launch will “also consider traceability, compatibility, and integration with the Navy Vertical Launch
System” and is planned to transition to both the Air Force and the Navy. DARPA has requested System” and is planned to transition to both the Air Force and the Navy. DARPA has requested
$30 million for TBG in FY2023—$20 million under the FY2022 request and appropriation.56 $30 million for TBG in FY2023—$20 million under the FY2022 request and appropriation.56
DARPA’s Operational Fires reportedly seeks to leverage TBG technologies to develop a ground- DARPA’s Operational Fires reportedly seeks to leverage TBG technologies to develop a ground-
launched system that will enable “advanced tactical weapons to penetrate modern enemy air launched system that will enable “advanced tactical weapons to penetrate modern enemy air
defenses and rapidly and precisely engage critical time sensitive targets.” OpFires completed its defenses and rapidly and precisely engage critical time sensitive targets.” OpFires completed its
first flight test in July 2022.57 DARPA requested and received $45 million for OpFires in FY2022, first flight test in July 2022.57 DARPA requested and received $45 million for OpFires in FY2022,
but did not request funds in FY2023, following the program’s completion.58 but did not request funds in FY2023, following the program’s completion.58
DARPA has similarly concluded work on the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept DARPA has similarly concluded work on the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept
(HAWC), which, with Air Force support, sought “to develop and demonstrate critical (HAWC), which, with Air Force support, sought “to develop and demonstrate critical

LK67U_ThMsX7AwahfurKGw%3d%3d; and Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air LK67U_ThMsX7AwahfurKGw%3d%3d; and Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air
Force Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 139, at Force Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 139, at
https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/RDTE_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20-https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/RDTE_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20-
%20AF%20RDT%20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d.%20AF%20RDT%20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d.
53 Mike White, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Hypersonic Strike and Defense: A 53 Mike White, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Hypersonic Strike and Defense: A
Conversation with Mike White,” June 10, 2021, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/hypersonic-strike-and-defense-Conversation with Mike White,” June 10, 2021, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/hypersonic-strike-and-defense-
conversation-mike-white. conversation-mike-white.
54 See, for example, Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile Becomes High-Priority USAF Project,” Air 54 See, for example, Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile Becomes High-Priority USAF Project,” Air
Force Magazine, October 13, 2020, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-attack-cruise-missile-becomes-Force Magazine, October 13, 2020, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-attack-cruise-missile-becomes-
highpriority-usaf-project/. highpriority-usaf-project/.
55 “Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/program/tactical-boost-glide; 55 “Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/program/tactical-boost-glide;
and Guy Norris, “U.S. Air Force Plans Road Map to Operational Hypersonics,” and Guy Norris, “U.S. Air Force Plans Road Map to Operational Hypersonics,” Aviation Week, July 27, 2017, at , July 27, 2017, at
https://aviationweek.com/defense/us-air-force-plans-road-map-operational-hypersonics. https://aviationweek.com/defense/us-air-force-plans-road-map-operational-hypersonics.
56 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 56 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 171, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 171, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf; and fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf; and
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 158, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 158, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf. fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf.
57 DARPA, “Operational Fires Program Successfully Completes First Flight Test,” July 13, 2022, at 57 DARPA, “Operational Fires Program Successfully Completes First Flight Test,” July 13, 2022, at
https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2022-07-13a. https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2022-07-13a.
58 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 58 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 172, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 172, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf; and fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf; and
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 159, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 159, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf. fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf.
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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

technologies to enable an effective and affordable air-launched hypersonic cruise missile.”59 technologies to enable an effective and affordable air-launched hypersonic cruise missile.”59
DARPA successfully tested HAWC in March and July 2022DARPA successfully tested HAWC in March and July 2022 and in January 2023, launching the missile from a B-52 , launching the missile from a B-52
bomber.60 Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has stated that hypersonic cruise bomber.60 Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has stated that hypersonic cruise
missiles like HAWC would be smaller than hypersonic glide vehicles and could therefore launch missiles like HAWC would be smaller than hypersonic glide vehicles and could therefore launch
from a wider range of platforms. Principal Director White has additionally noted that HAWC and from a wider range of platforms. Principal Director White has additionally noted that HAWC and
other hypersonic cruise missiles could integrate seekers more easily than hypersonic glide other hypersonic cruise missiles could integrate seekers more easily than hypersonic glide
vehicles.61 DARPA requested and received $10 million to develop HAWC in FY2022.62 DARPA vehicles.61 DARPA requested and received $10 million to develop HAWC in FY2022.62 DARPA
requested $60 million for requested $60 million for ~~MoHAWC~~More Opportunities with HAWC (MOHAWC), the successor program to HAWC, in FY2023.63 Like , the successor program to HAWC, in FY2023.63 Like
HAWC, HAWC, ~~MoHAWC~~MOHAWC seeks to develop technologies for use in future air-launched hypersonic cruise seeks to develop technologies for use in future air-launched hypersonic cruise
missiles.64 missiles.64
Table 1. Summary of U.S. Hypersonic Weapons RDT&E Funding
FY2022 Request
FY2022 Enacted
PB2023
Title
($ in millions)
($ in millions)
($ in millions)
Schedule
Conventional Conventional
1,374 1,374
1,325 1,325
1,205 1,205
Platform Platform
Prompt Strike (CPS) Prompt Strike (CPS)
deployment in deployment in
FY2025 and FY2025 and ~~FY2028~~FY2029
Hypersonic Air- Hypersonic Air-
0 0
0 0
92 92
Field in FY2028 Field in FY2028
Launched OASuW Launched OASuW
(HALO) (HALO)
Long-Range Long-Range
412 412
426 426
806 806
Prototype Prototype
Hypersonic Hypersonic
deployment in deployment in
Weapon (LRHW) Weapon (LRHW)
FY2023 FY2023
AGM-183 Air- AGM-183 Air-
238 238
319 319
115 115
Flight tests through Flight tests through
Launched Rapid Launched Rapid
FY2023 FY2023
Response Weapon Response Weapon
(ARRW) (ARRW)
Hypersonic Attack Hypersonic Attack
200 200
190 190
462 462
Complete test and Complete test and
Cruise Missile Cruise Missile
development in development in
(HACM) (HACM)
FY2027 FY2027
~~Tactical Boost Glide~~
50
50
30
~~Complete third test~~
~~(TBG)~~
~~flight in FY2023~~

59 “Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) Program Information,” DARPA, at https://www.darpa.mil/59 “Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) Program Information,” DARPA, at https://www.darpa.mil/
program/hypersonic-air-breathing-weapon-concept. program/hypersonic-air-breathing-weapon-concept.
60 Oren Liebermann, “US tested hypersonic missile in mid-March but kept it quiet to avoid escalating tensions with 60 Oren Liebermann, “US tested hypersonic missile in mid-March but kept it quiet to avoid escalating tensions with
Russia,” Russia,” CNN, April 5, 2022, at https://us.cnn.com/2022/04/04/politics/us-hypersonic-missile-test/index.html; , April 5, 2022, at https://us.cnn.com/2022/04/04/politics/us-hypersonic-missile-test/index.html; ~~and~~
Courtney Albon, “Raytheon hypersonic scramjet missile has another successful flight test,” Courtney Albon, “Raytheon hypersonic scramjet missile has another successful flight test,” Defense News, July 19, , July 19,
2022, at https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/2022/07/19/darpas-hypersonic-scramjet-missile-logs-another-2022, at https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/2022/07/19/darpas-hypersonic-scramjet-missile-logs-another-
flight-test-success/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-flight-test-success/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-
4bbb-8610-4bbb-8610-~~e5794efcfa7d.~~
e5794efcfa7d; and DARPA, “Final Flight of HAWC Program Screams Through the Sky,” January 30, 2023, at https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2023-01-30. 61 “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/ 61 “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/
Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/. Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/.
62 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 62 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 161, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 161, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf. fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf.
63 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 63 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 173, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 173, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf. fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf.
64 Ibid. 64 Ibid.
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FY2022 Request
FY2022 Enacted
PB2023
Title
($ in millions)
($ in millions)
($ in millions)
Schedule
Tactical Boost Glide 50 50 30 Complete third test (TBG) flight in FY2023 Hypersonic Air-Hypersonic Air-
10 10
10 10
60 60
Begin integration Begin integration
breathing Weapon breathing Weapon
and ground testing and ground testing
Concept (HAWC)/ Concept (HAWC)/
in FY2023 in FY2023
~~MoHAWC~~More Opportunities for HAWC (MOHAWC)
Source: Program information taken from U.S. Navy, Army, Air Force, and DARPA FY2022 and FY2023 Program information taken from U.S. Navy, Army, Air Force, and DARPA FY2022 and FY2023
Justification Books, available at https://comptrol er.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/. Justification Books, available at https://comptrol er.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
Note: ~~MoHAWC~~MOHAWC, a new start in FY2023, is the successor program to HAWC, which concluded in , a new start in FY2023, is the successor program to HAWC, which concluded in ~~FY2022~~2023. .
Hypersonic Missile Defenses65
DOD is also investing in counter-hypersonic weapons capabilities, although former USD(R&E) DOD is also investing in counter-hypersonic weapons capabilities, although former USD(R&E)
Michael Griffin has stated that the United States will not have a defensive capability against Michael Griffin has stated that the United States will not have a defensive capability against
hypersonic weapons until the mid-2020s, at the earliest.66 In September 2018, the Missile Defense hypersonic weapons until the mid-2020s, at the earliest.66 In September 2018, the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA)—which in 2017 established a Hypersonic Defense Program pursuant to Section Agency (MDA)—which in 2017 established a Hypersonic Defense Program pursuant to Section
1687 of the FY2017 NDAA (H.Rept. 114-840)—commissioned 21 white papers to explore 1687 of the FY2017 NDAA (H.Rept. 114-840)—commissioned 21 white papers to explore
hypersonic missile defense options, including interceptor missiles, hypervelocity projectiles, laser hypersonic missile defense options, including interceptor missiles, hypervelocity projectiles, laser
guns, and electronic attack systems.67 In January 2020, MDA issued a draft request for prototype guns, and electronic attack systems.67 In January 2020, MDA issued a draft request for prototype
proposals for a Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapons System interceptor intended proposals for a Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapons System interceptor intended
to be fielded in the mid-2030s; however, the program was later cancelled in favor of a nearer-term to be fielded in the mid-2030s; however, the program was later cancelled in favor of a nearer-term
solution, the Glide Phase Intercept (GPI).68 MDA seeks to field a regional, sea-based GPI solution, the Glide Phase Intercept (GPI).68 MDA seeks to field a regional, sea-based GPI
capability in the mid- to late 2020s.69 In addition, MDA is developing the Hypersonic and capability in the mid- to late 2020s.69 In addition, MDA is developing the Hypersonic and
Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)—which it hopes to launch in March 2023—in an effort Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)—which it hopes to launch in March 2023—in an effort
to improve the agency’s ability to detect and track incoming missiles.70 MDA requested $89.2 to improve the agency’s ability to detect and track incoming missiles.70 MDA requested $89.2
million for HBTSS in FY2023; the agency requested $225.5 million for hypersonic defense in million for HBTSS in FY2023; the agency requested $225.5 million for hypersonic defense in
~~FY2023—down from its $247.9 million FY2022 request and $287.8 million FY2022~~
~~appropriation.71 Finally, DARPA is working on a program called Glide Breaker, which “will~~

65 For additional information about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, 65 For additional information about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, Hypersonic Missile
Defense: Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler. , by Kelley M. Sayler.
66 “Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin at NDIA Hypersonics 66 “Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin at NDIA Hypersonics
Senior Executive Series,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 13, 2018, at https://dod.defense.gov/News/Senior Executive Series,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 13, 2018, at https://dod.defense.gov/News/
Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1713396/media-availability-with-deputy-secretary-shanahan-and-under-secretary-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1713396/media-availability-with-deputy-secretary-shanahan-and-under-secretary-
of-defens/. of-defens/.
67 H.Rept. 114-840, Section 2, Division A, Title XVI, §1687; Hudson and Trimble, “Top U.S. Hypersonic Weapon 67 H.Rept. 114-840, Section 2, Division A, Title XVI, §1687; Hudson and Trimble, “Top U.S. Hypersonic Weapon
Program”; and Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” p. 21. Program”; and Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” p. 21.
68 Missile Defense Agency, “Draft Request for Prototype Proposal: Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapon 68 Missile Defense Agency, “Draft Request for Prototype Proposal: Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapon
System,” January 30, 2020, p. 8; and Steve Trimble, “MDA Unveils GPI In Retooled Counter-Hypersonic Plan,” System,” January 30, 2020, p. 8; and Steve Trimble, “MDA Unveils GPI In Retooled Counter-Hypersonic Plan,”
Aviation Week, February 4, 2021, at https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/mda-unveils-, February 4, 2021, at https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/mda-unveils-
gpi-retooled-counter-hypersonic-plan. gpi-retooled-counter-hypersonic-plan.
69 Steve Trimble, “MDA Unveils GPI In Retooled Counter-Hypersonic Plan,” 69 Steve Trimble, “MDA Unveils GPI In Retooled Counter-Hypersonic Plan,” Aviation Week, February 4, 2021, at , February 4, 2021, at
https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/mda-unveils-gpi-retooled-counter-hypersonic-plan. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/mda-unveils-gpi-retooled-counter-hypersonic-plan.
70 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide 70 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide
Justification Book 2a of 5, p. 841, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/Justification Book 2a of 5, p. 841, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/
budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf; and budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf; and Defense
Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, Office of the Under , Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, April 2022, p. 2-15, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, April 2022, p. 2-15, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
~~71 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide~~
~~Justification Book 2a of 5, pp. 631 and 853, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/~~
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~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Congressional Research Service 11 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress FY2023—down from its $247.9 million FY2022 request and $287.8 million FY2022 appropriation.71 Finally, DARPA is working on a program called Glide Breaker, which “will develop critical component technology to support a lightweight vehicle designed for precise develop critical component technology to support a lightweight vehicle designed for precise
engagement of hypersonic threats at very long range.”72 DARPA requested $18 million for Glide engagement of hypersonic threats at very long range.”72 DARPA requested $18 million for Glide
Breaker in FY2023, up from its $7 million request and appropriation in FY2022.73 Breaker in FY2023, up from its $7 million request and appropriation in FY2022.73
Infrastructure
According to a study mandated by the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112- According to a study mandated by the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-
239) and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA),74 the United States had 48 239) and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA),74 the United States had 48
critical hypersonic test facilities and mobile assets in 2014 needed for the maturation of critical hypersonic test facilities and mobile assets in 2014 needed for the maturation of
hypersonic technologies for defense systems development through 2030.75 These specialized hypersonic technologies for defense systems development through 2030.75 These specialized
facilities, which simulate the unique conditions experienced in hypersonic flight (e.g., speed, facilities, which simulate the unique conditions experienced in hypersonic flight (e.g., speed,
pressure, heating),76 included 10 DOD hypersonic ground test facilities, 11 DOD open-air ranges, pressure, heating),76 included 10 DOD hypersonic ground test facilities, 11 DOD open-air ranges,
11 DOD mobile assets, 9 NASA facilities, 2 Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, and 5 11 DOD mobile assets, 9 NASA facilities, 2 Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, and 5
industry or academic facilities.77 In its 2014 evaluation of U.S. hypersonic test and evaluation industry or academic facilities.77 In its 2014 evaluation of U.S. hypersonic test and evaluation
infrastructure, IDA noted that “no current U.S. facility can provide full-scale, time-dependent, infrastructure, IDA noted that “no current U.S. facility can provide full-scale, time-dependent,
coupled aerodynamic and thermal-loading environments for flight durations necessary to evaluate coupled aerodynamic and thermal-loading environments for flight durations necessary to evaluate
these characteristics above Mach 8.” these characteristics above Mach 8.”
Since the 2014 study report was published, there have been a number of changes in U.S. Since the 2014 study report was published, there have been a number of changes in U.S.
hypersonic test infrastructure. For example, the University of Notre Dame has opened a Mach 6 hypersonic test infrastructure. For example, the University of Notre Dame has opened a Mach 6
hypersonic wind tunnel and at least one hypersonic testing facility has been inactivated. hypersonic wind tunnel and at least one hypersonic testing facility has been inactivated.
Development of Mach 8 and Mach 10 wind tunnels at Purdue University and the University of Development of Mach 8 and Mach 10 wind tunnels at Purdue University and the University of
Notre Dame, respectively, is ongoing.78 In addition, the University of Arizona modified one of its Notre Dame, respectively, is ongoing.78 In addition, the University of Arizona modified one of its
~~wind tunnels to enable Mach 5 testing, while Texas A&M University—in partnership with Army~~
~~Futures Command—is constructing a kilometer-long Mach 10 wind tunnel.79 The United States~~

71 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 2a of 5, pp. 631 and 853, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf; and fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf; and
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide Justification
Book 2a of 5, p. 569, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/Book 2a of 5, p. 569, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/
pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf. pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf.
72 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 72 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 164. Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 164.
73 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 73 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 169, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 169, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf; and fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf; and
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 160, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 160, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf. fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf.
74 P.L. 112-239, Section 2, Division A, Title X, §1071. 74 P.L. 112-239, Section 2, Division A, Title X, §1071.
75 A more recent report by the Government Accountability Office states that there are “26 DOD, DOE, NASA, and 75 A more recent report by the Government Accountability Office states that there are “26 DOD, DOE, NASA, and
private U.S. wind tunnel facilities capable of supporting hypersonic research.” Government Accountability Office, private U.S. wind tunnel facilities capable of supporting hypersonic research.” Government Accountability Office,
Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination across Development
Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 15, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378. , GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 15, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378.
76 These conditions additionally require the development of specialized materials such as metals and ceramics. 76 These conditions additionally require the development of specialized materials such as metals and ceramics.
77 This list is taken directly from a 2014 Institute for Defense Analysis report and, therefore, may not be current. See 77 This list is taken directly from a 2014 Institute for Defense Analysis report and, therefore, may not be current. See
(U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure to Effectively
and Efficiently Mature Hypersonic Technologies for Defense Systems Development: Summary Analysis and
Assessment, Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2014. Permission to use this material has been granted by the , Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2014. Permission to use this material has been granted by the
Office of Science and Technology Policy. Office of Science and Technology Policy.
78 Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Expanding Hypersonic Technology Testing at Two Indiana Universities,” Military.com, 78 Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Expanding Hypersonic Technology Testing at Two Indiana Universities,” Military.com,
April 23, 2019, at https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/04/23/air-force-expanding-hypersonic-technology-April 23, 2019, at https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/04/23/air-force-expanding-hypersonic-technology-
~~testing-two-indiana-universities.html.~~
~~79 University of Arizona, “Mach 5 Quiet Ludwieg Tube,” at https://transition.arizona.edu/facilities/qlt5?_ga=~~
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link to page link to page 3132 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

wind tunnels to enable Mach 5 testing, while Texas A&M University—in partnership with Army Futures Command—is constructing a kilometer-long Mach 10 wind tunnel.79 The United States also uses the Royal Australian Air Force Woomera Test Range in Australia and the Andøya also uses the Royal Australian Air Force Woomera Test Range in Australia and the Andøya
Rocket Range in Norway for flight testing.80 (For a partial list of U.S. hypersonic test assets and Rocket Range in Norway for flight testing.80 (For a partial list of U.S. hypersonic test assets and
their capabilities, see ttheir capabilities, see the Appendix.) )
In February 2022, DOD’s Office of Inspector General announced that it had concluded its two- In February 2022, DOD’s Office of Inspector General announced that it had concluded its two-
year-long evaluation of current ground test and evaluation facilities to determine if the capability year-long evaluation of current ground test and evaluation facilities to determine if the capability
and capacity would be sufficient to execute DOD’s planned test schedule; however, DOD did not and capacity would be sufficient to execute DOD’s planned test schedule; however, DOD did not
release the evaluation to the public.81 Similarly, release the evaluation to the public.81 Similarly, ~~an annual report by DOD’s Director of Test and~~
~~Evaluation~~ the FY2022 Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) Annual Report evaluated the sufficiency of U.S. hypersonic weapons test evaluated the sufficiency of U.S. hypersonic weapons test ~~infrastructure; this report~~
~~was not released publicly.82~~infrastructure.82 The DOT&E report concluded that “additional missile test range modernization efforts are needed to support an increase in the tempo of testing and the development of new capabilities to measure hypersonic missile flight performance in increasingly complex threat environments.”83 Congress appropriated $47.5 million to USD(R&E) and DOT&E in FY2022 for hypersonic test infrastructure; Congress may consider whether additional funds would be required to address DOT&E’s recommendations.84
DOD reportedly plans to expand hypersonic test infrastructure in the coming years. In January DOD reportedly plans to expand hypersonic test infrastructure in the coming years. In January
2019, the Navy announced plans to reactivate its Launch Test Complex at China Lake, CA, to 2019, the Navy announced plans to reactivate its Launch Test Complex at China Lake, CA, to
improve air launch and underwater testing capabilities for the conventional prompt strike improve air launch and underwater testing capabilities for the conventional prompt strike
program.program.8385 DOD has also announced the planned construction of the Multi-Service Advanced DOD has also announced the planned construction of the Multi-Service Advanced
Capability Hypersonics Test Bed (MACH-TB), which is to “increase domestic capacity for Capability Hypersonics Test Bed (MACH-TB), which is to “increase domestic capacity for
hypersonic flight testing and leverage multiple commercially-available launch vehicles for ride-hypersonic flight testing and leverage multiple commercially-available launch vehicles for ride-
along hypersonic payloads.”along hypersonic payloads.”~~84According~~86According to an assessment conducted by the Government testing-two-indiana-universities.html. 79 University of Arizona, “Mach 5 Quiet Ludwieg Tube,” at https://transition.arizona.edu/facilities/qlt5?_ga= ~~to an assessment conducted by the Government~~
~~Accountability Office, DOD has dedicated approximately $1 billion to hypersonic facility~~
~~modernization from FY2015 to FY2024.85~~
~~Congress has also continued to express interest in hypersonic weapons infrastructure. Section 222~~
~~of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) required the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and~~
~~Engineering, in consultation with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, to submit to~~

2.62515882.768526379.1582843192-983632914.1582843192; and Ashley Tressel, “Army to open hypersonic testing 2.62515882.768526379.1582843192-983632914.1582843192; and Ashley Tressel, “Army to open hypersonic testing
facility at Texas A&M,” Inside Defense, October 13, 2019, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/army-open-facility at Texas A&M,” Inside Defense, October 13, 2019, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/army-open-
hypersonic-testing-facility-texas-am. Additional universities such as the University of Maryland, the California hypersonic-testing-facility-texas-am. Additional universities such as the University of Maryland, the California
Institute of Technology, the Georgia Institute of Technology, the Air Force Academy, the University of Tennessee, and Institute of Technology, the Georgia Institute of Technology, the Air Force Academy, the University of Tennessee, and
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University also maintain experimental hypersonic facilities or conduct Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University also maintain experimental hypersonic facilities or conduct
hypersonic research. hypersonic research.
80 (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., 80 (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure.
81 See Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Memorandum for Distribution: Evaluation of the Ground 81 See Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Memorandum for Distribution: Evaluation of the Ground
Test and Evaluation Infrastructure Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (Project No. D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000),” Test and Evaluation Infrastructure Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (Project No. D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000),”
April 13, 2020, at https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/14/2002280826/-1/-1/1/D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000.PDF; and April 13, 2020, at https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/14/2002280826/-1/-1/1/D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000.PDF; and
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General,” Evaluation of the Ground Test and Evaluation Infrastructure Department of Defense Office of Inspector General,” Evaluation of the Ground Test and Evaluation Infrastructure
Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (DODIG-2022-056),” February 3, 2022, at https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (DODIG-2022-056),” February 3, 2022, at https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/
Article/2921419/evaluation-of-the-ground-test-and-evaluation-infrastructure-supporting-hyperson/. Article/2921419/evaluation-of-the-ground-test-and-evaluation-infrastructure-supporting-hyperson/.
82 82 ~~Anthony Capaccio, “Pentagon Hypersonic Weapons Tests Need More Wide-Open Spaces,” Bloomberg, February 3,~~
~~2020.~~
83DOT&E, FY2022 DOT&E Annual Report, January 2023, pp. 18-19, at https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2022/FY22DOTEAnnualReport.pdf?ver=UBO7t2O1FkRuvrB-nJDZ-g%3d%3d. 83 Ibid., p. 18. 84 Ibid., p. 19. 85 “Update: US Navy to develop China Lake to support CPS weapon testing,” “Update: US Navy to develop China Lake to support CPS weapon testing,” Jane’s (subscription required), February (subscription required), February
12, 2019, at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1644858-JMR. 12, 2019, at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1644858-JMR.
8486 U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD Announces New Contract to Increase Hypersonic Flight Testing Tempo,” U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD Announces New Contract to Increase Hypersonic Flight Testing Tempo,”
October 6, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3182305/dod-announces-new-contract-to-October 6, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3182305/dod-announces-new-contract-to-
increase-hypersonic-flight-testing-tempo/. According to a Dynetics press release, Dynetics is to lead a MACH-TB team increase-hypersonic-flight-testing-tempo/. According to a Dynetics press release, Dynetics is to lead a MACH-TB team
composed of over 20 partners, including Peraton, Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Stratolaunch, JRC Integrated composed of over 20 partners, including Peraton, Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Stratolaunch, JRC Integrated
Systems, NineTwelve Institute, Corvid, SpinLaunch, Varda, Kitty Hawk Technologies, Systima Division of Karman Systems, NineTwelve Institute, Corvid, SpinLaunch, Varda, Kitty Hawk Technologies, Systima Division of Karman
~~Space and Defense, Sandia National Laboratories, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, X-Bow Systems, RLNS and other~~
~~hypersonic experts. See PRNewswire, “Dynetics Awarded New Contract to Increase Hypersonic Flight Testing~~
~~Tempo,” October 20, 2022, at https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/dynetics-awarded-new-contract-to-increase-~~
~~hypersonic-flight-testing-tempo-301654753.html.~~
~~85 Government Accountability Office,~~ ~~Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure~~
~~Coordination across Development Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 27, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-~~
~~21-378.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

13

~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Congressional Research Service 13 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Accountability Office, DOD has dedicated approximately $1 billion to hypersonic facility modernization from FY2015 to FY2024.87 Congress has also continued to express interest in hypersonic weapons infrastructure. Section 222 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) required the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in consultation with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, to submit to the congressional defense committees “an assessment of the sufficiency of the testing capabilities the congressional defense committees “an assessment of the sufficiency of the testing capabilities
and infrastructure used for fielding hypersonic weapons, and a description of any investments in and infrastructure used for fielding hypersonic weapons, and a description of any investments in
testing capabilities and infrastructure that may be required to support in-flight and ground-based testing capabilities and infrastructure that may be required to support in-flight and ground-based
testing for such weapons.”testing for such weapons.”8688 Section 225 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) requires the Section 225 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) requires the
Secretary of Defense to identify the hypersonic facilities and capabilities of the Major Range and Secretary of Defense to identify the hypersonic facilities and capabilities of the Major Range and
Test Facility Base and brief the congressional defense committees on a plan for improvement. Test Facility Base and brief the congressional defense committees on a plan for improvement.
Similarly, Section 237 of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) directs the Secretary of Defense to Similarly, Section 237 of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) directs the Secretary of Defense to
both assess DOD’s capacity to test and evaluate hypersonic capabilities and “[identify] test both assess DOD’s capacity to test and evaluate hypersonic capabilities and “[identify] test
facilities outside the Department of Defense that have potential to be used to expand [DOD] facilities outside the Department of Defense that have potential to be used to expand [DOD]
capacity ... including test facilities of other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, capacity ... including test facilities of other departments and agencies of the Federal Government,
academia, and commercial test facilities.” academia, and commercial test facilities.”
Finally, in March 2020, DOD announced that it had established a “hypersonic war room” to Finally, in March 2020, DOD announced that it had established a “hypersonic war room” to
assess the U.S. industrial base for hypersonic weapons and identify “critical nodes” in the supply assess the U.S. industrial base for hypersonic weapons and identify “critical nodes” in the supply
chain.chain.8789 DOD has also amended its “5000 series” acquisition policy in order to enhance supply DOD has also amended its “5000 series” acquisition policy in order to enhance supply
chain resiliency and reduce sustainment costs.chain resiliency and reduce sustainment costs.8890
Russia
Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it
accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States
and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in
2001.2001.8991 Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated that “the US is permitting constant, Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated that “the US is permitting constant,
uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating
new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in the new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in the
complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply
be intercepted.”be intercepted.”9092 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they approach Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they approach
~~their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its sense of~~
~~strategic stability.91~~

~~86 This report was delivered to the committees on December 16, 2021.~~
87 Space and Defense, Sandia National Laboratories, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, X-Bow Systems, RLNS and other hypersonic experts. See PRNewswire, “Dynetics Awarded New Contract to Increase Hypersonic Flight Testing Tempo,” October 20, 2022, at https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/dynetics-awarded-new-contract-to-increase-hypersonic-flight-testing-tempo-301654753.html. 87 Government Accountability Office, Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination across Development Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 27, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378. 88 This report was delivered to the committees on December 16, 2021. 89 Aaron Mehta, “Pentagon launches hypersonic industrial base study,” Aaron Mehta, “Pentagon launches hypersonic industrial base study,” Defense News, March 3, 2020, at , March 3, 2020, at
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/03/02/pentagon-launches-hypersonic-industrial-base-study/. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/03/02/pentagon-launches-hypersonic-industrial-base-study/.
8890 C. Todd Lopez, “Rewrite of Acquisition Regulation Helps U.S. Build Hypersonic Arsenal More Quickly,” C. Todd Lopez, “Rewrite of Acquisition Regulation Helps U.S. Build Hypersonic Arsenal More Quickly,” DOD
News, October 30, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2400205/rewrite-of-acquisition-, October 30, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2400205/rewrite-of-acquisition-
regulation-helps-us-build-hypersonic-arsenal-more-quickly/. regulation-helps-us-build-hypersonic-arsenal-more-quickly/.
8991 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic
Arms Control, February 2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-, February 2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-
and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/. and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.
9092 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/56957president/news/56957.
~~91 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See Tong~~
~~Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security~~
~~Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/~~
~~conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-~~
~~pub-76894~~. .
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20 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its sense of strategic stability.93 Programs
Russia is pursuing two hypersonic weapons programs—the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon (or Russia is pursuing two hypersonic weapons programs—the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon (or
Zircon)—and has reportedly fielded the Kinzhal (“Dagger”), a maneuvering air-launched ballistic Zircon)—and has reportedly fielded the Kinzhal (“Dagger”), a maneuvering air-launched ballistic
missile.missile.9294
Avangard Avangard (Figure 2) is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an intercontinental ballistic is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM), giving it “effectively ‘unlimited’ range.”missile (ICBM), giving it “effectively ‘unlimited’ range.”9395 Reports indicate that Avangard is Reports indicate that Avangard is
currently deployed on the SS-19 Stiletto ICBM, though Russia plans to eventually launch the currently deployed on the SS-19 Stiletto ICBM, though Russia plans to eventually launch the
vehicle from the Sarmat ICBM. Sarmat is still in development, although it was successfully tested vehicle from the Sarmat ICBM. Sarmat is still in development, although it was successfully tested
in April 2022 and is scheduled to be deployed by the end of 2022.in April 2022 and is scheduled to be deployed by the end of 2022.9496 Avangard features onboard Avangard features onboard
countermeasures and will reportedly carry a nuclear warhead. It was successfully tested twice in countermeasures and will reportedly carry a nuclear warhead. It was successfully tested twice in
2016 and once in December 2018, reportedly reaching speeds of Mach 20; however, an October 2016 and once in December 2018, reportedly reaching speeds of Mach 20; however, an October
2017 test resulted in failure. Russian news sources claim that Avangard entered into combat duty 2017 test resulted in failure. Russian news sources claim that Avangard entered into combat duty
in December 2019.in December 2019.95
~~Figure 2. Artist Rendering of Avangard~~

Source: https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.
~~In addition to Avangard, Russia is developing Tsirkon, a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile~~
~~capable of traveling at speeds of between Mach 6 and Mach 8. Tsirkon is reportedly capable of~~
~~striking both ground and naval targets. According to Russian news sources, Tsirkon has a~~
~~maximum range of approximately 625 miles and can be fired from the vertical launch systems~~
~~mounted on cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Pyotr Veliky, Project 20380 corvettes, Project 22350~~
~~frigates, and Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other platforms.96 These sources assert~~

9297 93 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-pub-76894. 94 Although the Kinzhal is a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile rather than a hypersonic glide vehicle or Although the Kinzhal is a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile rather than a hypersonic glide vehicle or
hypersonic cruise missile, it is often included in reporting of Russia’s hypersonic weapons program. For this reason—hypersonic cruise missile, it is often included in reporting of Russia’s hypersonic weapons program. For this reason—
and because it poses defensive challenges that are similar to other hypersonic weapons—it is included here for and because it poses defensive challenges that are similar to other hypersonic weapons—it is included here for
reference. reference.
9395 Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20. , January 14-27, 2019, p. 20.
9496 Lateshia Beachum, Mary Ilyushina and Karoun Demirjian, “Russia’s ‘Satan 2’ missile changes little for U.S., Lateshia Beachum, Mary Ilyushina and Karoun Demirjian, “Russia’s ‘Satan 2’ missile changes little for U.S.,
scholars say,” scholars say,” Washington Post, April 20, 2022, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/20/satan-2-icbm/; , April 20, 2022, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/20/satan-2-icbm/;
and Nicholas Fiorenza, “Putin outlines development of Russia’s nuclear triad,” and Nicholas Fiorenza, “Putin outlines development of Russia’s nuclear triad,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (subscription (subscription
required), April 22, 2021, at https://customer.janes.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/FG_3953700-JDW. Sarmat could required), April 22, 2021, at https://customer.janes.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/FG_3953700-JDW. Sarmat could
reportedly accommodate at least three Avangard vehicles. See Malcolm Claus, “Russia unveils new strategic delivery reportedly accommodate at least three Avangard vehicles. See Malcolm Claus, “Russia unveils new strategic delivery
systems,” systems,” Jane’s (subscription required), at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR. (subscription required), at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.
9597 “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” TASS, December 27, 2019, , December 27, 2019,
at https://tass.com/defense/1104297. at https://tass.com/defense/1104297.
~~96 “Russia makes over 10 test launches of Tsirkon seaborne hypersonic missile,” TASS, December 21, 2018, at~~
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Congressional Research Service 15 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Figure 2. Artist Rendering of Avangard Source: https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR. In addition to Avangard, Russia is developing Tsirkon, a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile capable of traveling at speeds of between Mach 6 and Mach 8. Tsirkon is reportedly capable of striking both ground and naval targets. According to Russian news sources, Tsirkon has a maximum range of approximately 625 miles and can be fired from the vertical launch systems mounted on cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Pyotr Veliky, Project 20380 corvettes, Project 22350 frigates, and Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other platforms.98 These sources assert that Tsirkon was successfully launched from a Project 22350 frigate in January, October, and that Tsirkon was successfully launched from a Project 22350 frigate in January, October, and
December 2020 and May 2022 and from a Project 885 Yasen-class submarine in October 2021.December 2020 and May 2022 and from a Project 885 Yasen-class submarine in October 2021.9799
Russia reportedly deployed Tsirkon on the Project 22350 frigate Russia reportedly deployed Tsirkon on the Project 22350 frigate Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet
Union Gorshkov in January in January ~~2022.98~~2023.100
In addition, Russia has fielded Kinzhal, a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile modified In addition, Russia has fielded Kinzhal, a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile modified
from the Iskander missile. Russia reportedly fired Kinzhal from a MiG-31 interceptor aircraft in from the Iskander missile. Russia reportedly fired Kinzhal from a MiG-31 interceptor aircraft in
~~Ukraine99~~Ukraine101 and additionally plans to deploy the missile on the Su-34 long-range strike and additionally plans to deploy the missile on the Su-34 long-range strike ~~fighter100~~fighter102
and the Tu-22M3 strategic bomber, although the slower-moving bomber may face challenges in and the Tu-22M3 strategic bomber, although the slower-moving bomber may face challenges in
“accelerating the weapon into the correct launch parameters.”“accelerating the weapon into the correct launch parameters.”~~101~~103 Russian media has reported Russian media has reported
Kinzhal’s top speed as Mach 10, with a range of up to 1,200 miles when launched from the MiG-Kinzhal’s top speed as Mach 10, with a range of up to 1,200 miles when launched from the MiG-
~~31. The Kinzhal is reportedly capable of maneuverable flight, as well as of striking both ground~~
~~and naval targets, and could eventually be fitted with a nuclear warhead. However, such claims~~
~~regarding Kinzhal’s performance characteristics have not been publicly verified by U.S.~~
~~intelligence agencies, and have been met with skepticism by a number of analysts.102~~
~~Infrastructure~~
~~Russia reportedly conducts hypersonic wind tunnel testing at the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic~~
~~Institute in Zhukovsky and the Khristianovich Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics in~~
~~Novosibirsk, and has tested hypersonic weapons at Dombarovskiy Air Base, the Baykonur~~
~~Cosmodrome, and the Kura Range.103~~

98 “Russia makes over 10 test launches of Tsirkon seaborne hypersonic missile,” TASS, December 21, 2018, at http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
Aspirations, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, at https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, at https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/
military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf. military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf.
9799 “TASS: Russia Conducts First Ship-Based Hypersonic Missile Test,” “TASS: Russia Conducts First Ship-Based Hypersonic Missile Test,” Reuters, February 27, 2020, at , February 27, 2020, at
https://www.voanews.com/europe/tass-russia-conducts-first-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test; Samuel Cranny-Evans, https://www.voanews.com/europe/tass-russia-conducts-first-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test; Samuel Cranny-Evans,
“Russia conducts first submarine test launches of Tsirkon hypersonic missile,” “Russia conducts first submarine test launches of Tsirkon hypersonic missile,” Jane’s (subscription required), October (subscription required), October
4, 2021; and Isabel van Brugen, “Putin to Give Navy Hypersonic Missiles as Russia Beats U.S. in Arms Race,” 4, 2021; and Isabel van Brugen, “Putin to Give Navy Hypersonic Missiles as Russia Beats U.S. in Arms Race,”
Newsweek, July 18, 2022, at https://www.newsweek.com/putin-russian-navy-hypersonic-missiles-zircon-1725426. , July 18, 2022, at https://www.newsweek.com/putin-russian-navy-hypersonic-missiles-zircon-1725426.
98100 Guy Faulconbridge, “Putin deploys new Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles to Atlantic,” Guy Faulconbridge, “Putin deploys new Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles to Atlantic,” Reuters, January 4, 2023, at , January 4, 2023, at
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-sends-off-frigate-armed-with-new-hypersonic-cruise-missile-2023-01-04/.https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-sends-off-frigate-armed-with-new-hypersonic-cruise-missile-2023-01-04/.
99 101 Roxana Tiron, “Hypersonic Weapons: Who Has Them and Why It Matters,” Roxana Tiron, “Hypersonic Weapons: Who Has Them and Why It Matters,” Washington Post, April 6, 2022, at , April 6, 2022, at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/hypersonic-weapons-who-has-them-and-why-it-matters/2022/04/05/https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/hypersonic-weapons-who-has-them-and-why-it-matters/2022/04/05/
1f6d0280-b557-11ec-8358-20aa16355fb4_story.html. 1f6d0280-b557-11ec-8358-20aa16355fb4_story.html.
~~100~~102 Mark B. Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles … and What It Means” in Mark B. Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles … and What It Means” in Defense
Technology Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons, American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019. , American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019.
~~101~~103 Dave Majumdar, “Russia: New Kinzhal Aero-Ballistic Missile Has 3,000 km Range if Fired from Supersonic Dave Majumdar, “Russia: New Kinzhal Aero-Ballistic Missile Has 3,000 km Range if Fired from Supersonic
Bomber,” Bomber,” The National Interest, July 18, 2018, at https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-new-kinzhal-aero-, July 18, 2018, at https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-new-kinzhal-aero-
ballistic-missile-has-3000-km-range-if-fired-supersonic-bomber. ballistic-missile-has-3000-km-range-if-fired-supersonic-bomber.
~~102 David Axe, “Is Kinzhal, Russia’s New Hypersonic Missile, a Game Changer?,” The Daily Beast, March 15, 2018, at~~
~~https://www.thedailybeast.com/is-kinzhal-russias-new-hypersonic-missile-a-game-changer.~~
~~103 “Aerodynamics,” Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, http://tsagi.com/research/aerodynamics/; “Russia announces~~
~~successful flight test of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle,” Jane’s (subscription required), January 3, 2019, at~~
~~https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1451630-JMR; and “Avangard system is tested, said to be fully ready for~~
~~deployment,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 26, 2018, at http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/~~
~~avangard_system_is_tested_said.shtml.~~
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Congressional Research Service 16 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress 31. The Kinzhal is reportedly capable of maneuverable flight, as well as of striking both ground and naval targets, and could eventually be fitted with a nuclear warhead. However, such claims regarding Kinzhal’s performance characteristics have not been publicly verified by U.S. intelligence agencies, and have been met with skepticism by a number of analysts.104 Infrastructure Russia reportedly conducts hypersonic wind tunnel testing at the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic Institute in Zhukovsky and the Khristianovich Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics in Novosibirsk, and has tested hypersonic weapons at Dombarovskiy Air Base, the Baykonur Cosmodrome, and the Kura Range.105
China
According to Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most According to Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most
experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in
China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S. China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S.
military technology,” such as U.S. missile defenses.military technology,” such as U.S. missile defenses.~~104~~106 In particular, China’s pursuit of hypersonic In particular, China’s pursuit of hypersonic
weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United
States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting
infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a
retaliatory strike against the United States.retaliatory strike against the United States.~~105~~107
As General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of United States Northern Command As General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of United States Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), testified in a (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), testified in a
February 2020 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, China is “testing a February 2020 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, China is “testing a
[nuclear-capable] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle” that could evade U.S. missile [nuclear-capable] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle” that could evade U.S. missile
defense and warning systems.defense and warning systems.~~106~~108 Reports additionally indicate that China may have tested a Reports additionally indicate that China may have tested a
nuclear-capable nuclear-capable ~~HGV107~~HGV109—launched by a Long March rocket—in August 2021.—launched by a Long March rocket—in August 2021.~~108~~110 In contrast to In contrast to
the ballistic missiles that China has previously used to launch HGVs, the Long March, a the ballistic missiles that China has previously used to launch HGVs, the Long March, a
~~fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), launches the HGV into orbit before the HGV de-~~
~~orbits to its target. This could provide China with a space-based global strike capability and~~
~~further reduce the amount of target warning time prior to a strike.109~~
~~China has also demonstrated a growing interest in Russian advances in hypersonic weapons~~
~~technology, conducting flight tests of a hypersonic-glide vehicle (HGV) only days after Russia~~
~~tested its own system.110 Furthermore, a January 2017 report found that over half of open-source~~
~~Chinese papers on hypersonic weapons include references to Russian weapons programs.111 This~~
~~could indicate that China is increasingly considering hypersonic weapons within a regional~~
~~context. Indeed, some analysts believe that China may be planning to mate conventionally armed~~
~~HGVs with the DF-21 and DF-26 ballistic missiles in support of an anti-access/area denial~~
~~strategy.112~~

~~104~~ 104 David Axe, “Is Kinzhal, Russia’s New Hypersonic Missile, a Game Changer?,” The Daily Beast, March 15, 2018, at https://www.thedailybeast.com/is-kinzhal-russias-new-hypersonic-missile-a-game-changer. 105 “Aerodynamics,” Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, http://tsagi.com/research/aerodynamics/; “Russia announces successful flight test of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle,” Jane’s (subscription required), January 3, 2019, at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1451630-JMR; and “Avangard system is tested, said to be fully ready for deployment,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 26, 2018, at http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/avangard_system_is_tested_said.shtml. 106 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the
Security Dilemma.” Security Dilemma.”
~~105~~107 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability”; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability”; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic
Glide,” August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/Glide,” August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/
topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide. topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.
~~106~~108 General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February 13, 2020, General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February 13, 2020,
at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/20-02-13-united-states-northern-command-and-united-states-at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/20-02-13-united-states-northern-command-and-united-states-
strategic-command. strategic-command.
~~107~~109 It is not clear if this nuclear-capable HGV is the same model as that referenced by General O’Shaughnessy. It is not clear if this nuclear-capable HGV is the same model as that referenced by General O’Shaughnessy.
~~108~~110 Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile,” October 16, Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile,” October 16,
2021, at https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson 2021, at https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Zhao Lijian has stated that “this was a routine test of [a] space vehicle,” rather than a test of a nuclear-capable HGV. Zhao Lijian has stated that “this was a routine test of [a] space vehicle,” rather than a test of a nuclear-capable HGV.
Zhao Lijian, “Remarks at Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Zhao Lijian, “Remarks at Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
October 18, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1915130.shtml. October 18, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1915130.shtml.
~~109 Greg Hadley, “Kendall: China Has Potential to Strike Earth from Space,” Air Force Magazine, September 20, 2021,~~
~~at https://www.airforcemag.com/global-strikes-space-china-frank-kendall/.~~
~~110 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide.”~~
~~111 Lora Saalman, “Factoring Russia into the US-China Equation on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles,” SIPRI, January 2017,~~
~~at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Factoring-Russia-into-US-Chinese-equation-hypersonic-glide-vehicles.pdf.~~
~~112 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide”; and Malcolm Claus and Andrew Tate, “Chinese~~
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Congressional Research Service 17 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), launches the HGV into orbit before the HGV de-orbits to its target. This could provide China with a space-based global strike capability and further reduce the amount of target warning time prior to a strike.111 China has also demonstrated a growing interest in Russian advances in hypersonic weapons technology, conducting flight tests of a hypersonic-glide vehicle (HGV) only days after Russia tested its own system.112 Furthermore, a January 2017 report found that over half of open-source Chinese papers on hypersonic weapons include references to Russian weapons programs.113 This could indicate that China is increasingly considering hypersonic weapons within a regional context. Indeed, some analysts believe that China may be planning to mate conventionally armed HGVs with the DF-21 and DF-26 ballistic missiles in support of an anti-access/area denial strategy.114 Programs
China has conducted a number of successful tests of the DF-17, a medium-range ballistic missile China has conducted a number of successful tests of the DF-17, a medium-range ballistic missile
specifically designed to launch HGVs. U.S. intelligence analysts assess that the missile has a specifically designed to launch HGVs. U.S. intelligence analysts assess that the missile has a
range of approximately 1,000 to 1,500 miles and may now be deployed.range of approximately 1,000 to 1,500 miles and may now be deployed.~~113~~115 China has also tested China has also tested
the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile, which could be modified to carry a conventional or the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile, which could be modified to carry a conventional or
nuclear HGV, according to a report by a U.S. Congressional commission. The development of the nuclear HGV, according to a report by a U.S. Congressional commission. The development of the
DF-41 thus “significantly increases the [Chinese] rocket force’s nuclear threat to the U.S. DF-41 thus “significantly increases the [Chinese] rocket force’s nuclear threat to the U.S.
mainland,” the report states.mainland,” the report states.~~114~~116
China has tested the DF-ZF HGV (previously referred to as the WU-14) at least nine times since China has tested the DF-ZF HGV (previously referred to as the WU-14) at least nine times since
2014. U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately 2014. U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately
1,200 miles and have stated that the vehicle may be capable of performing “extreme maneuvers” 1,200 miles and have stated that the vehicle may be capable of performing “extreme maneuvers”
during flight.during flight.~~115~~117 China reportedly fielded the DF-ZF in 2020. China reportedly fielded the DF-ZF in 2020.~~116~~
~~According to U.S. defense officials, China also successfully tested Starry Sky-2 (or Xing Kong-~~
~~2), a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype, in August 2018.117 China claims the vehicle~~
~~reached top speeds of Mach 6 and executed a series of in-flight maneuvers before landing.118~~
~~Unlike the DF-ZF, Starry Sky-2 is a “waverider” that uses powered flight after launch and derives~~
~~lift from its own shockwaves. Some reports indicate that the Starry Sky-2 could be operational by~~
~~2025.119 U.S. officials have declined to comment on the program.120~~
~~Infrastructure~~
~~China has a robust research and development infrastructure devoted to hypersonic weapons.~~
~~Then-USD(R&E) Michael Griffin stated in March 2018 that China has conducted 20 times as~~
~~many hypersonic tests as the United States.121 China tested three hypersonic vehicle models~~

118 111 Greg Hadley, “Kendall: China Has Potential to Strike Earth from Space,” Air Force Magazine, September 20, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/global-strikes-space-china-frank-kendall/. 112 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide.” 113 Lora Saalman, “Factoring Russia into the US-China Equation on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles,” SIPRI, January 2017, at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Factoring-Russia-into-US-Chinese-equation-hypersonic-glide-vehicles.pdf. 114 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide”; and Malcolm Claus and Andrew Tate, “Chinese hypersonic programme reflects regional priorities,” hypersonic programme reflects regional priorities,” Jane’s (subscription required), March 12, 2019, at (subscription required), March 12, 2019, at
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1731069-JIR. https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1731069-JIR.
~~113~~115 Ankit Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile Armed with a Hypersonic Glide Ankit Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile Armed with a Hypersonic Glide
Vehicle,” Vehicle,” The National Interest, December 28, 2017, at https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinas-, December 28, 2017, at https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinas-
newly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/; and Bill Gertz, “China’s new hypersonic newly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/; and Bill Gertz, “China’s new hypersonic
missile,” missile,” Washington Times, October 2, 2019, at https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/oct/2/china-shows-df-, October 2, 2019, at https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/oct/2/china-shows-df-
17-hypersonic-missile/. 17-hypersonic-missile/.
~~114~~116 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2018 Annual Report, p. 235, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/, p. 235, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf. default/files/annual_reports/2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.
~~115~~117 “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The Economist, April 6, 2019, at , April 6, 2019, at
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-
coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” The
Diplomat, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-
missile-defense-systems/. missile-defense-systems/.
~~116~~118 Department of Defense, Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021, p. 60, , p. 60,
at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF. at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.
~~117~~Congressional Research Service 18 link to page 24 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress According to U.S. defense officials, China also successfully tested Starry Sky-2 (or Xing Kong-2), a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype, in August 2018.119 China claims the vehicle reached top speeds of Mach 6 and executed a series of in-flight maneuvers before landing.120 Unlike the DF-ZF, Starry Sky-2 is a “waverider” that uses powered flight after launch and derives lift from its own shockwaves. Some reports indicate that the Starry Sky-2 could be operational by 2025.121 U.S. officials have declined to comment on the program.122 Infrastructure China has a robust research and development infrastructure devoted to hypersonic weapons. Then-USD(R&E) Michael Griffin stated in March 2018 that China has conducted 20 times as many hypersonic tests as the United States.123 China tested three hypersonic vehicle models (D18-1S, D18-2S, and D18-3S)—each with different aerodynamic properties—in September 2018.124 Analysts believe that these tests could be designed to help China develop weapons that fly at variable speeds, including hypersonic speeds. Similarly, China has used the Lingyun Mach 6+ high-speed engine, or “scramjet,” test bed (Figure 3) to research thermal resistant components and hypersonic cruise missile technologies.125 119 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 44, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/May 2, 2019, p. 44, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/
2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. 2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.
~~118~~120 Jessie Yeung, “China claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircraft,” Jessie Yeung, “China claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircraft,” CNN, August 7, 2018, at , August 7, 2018, at
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft-intl/index.html. https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft-intl/index.html.
~~119~~121 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20. , p. 20.
~~120~~122 Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Test of New Hypersonic Missile,” Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Test of New Hypersonic Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon, August 10, 2018, at , August 10, 2018, at
https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/. https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/.
~~121~~123 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20. , p. 20.
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~~link to page 23~~

~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~(D18-1S, D18-2S, and D18-3S)—each with different aerodynamic properties—in September~~
~~2018.122 Analysts believe that these tests could be designed to help China develop weapons that~~
~~fly at variable speeds, including hypersonic speeds. Similarly, China has used the Lingyun Mach~~
~~6+ high-speed engine, or “scramjet,” test bed (Figure 3) to research thermal resistant components~~
~~and hypersonic cruise missile technologies.123~~
124 Malcolm Claus and Andrew Tate, “Chinese hypersonic programme reflects regional priorities,” Jane’s (subscription required), March 12, 2019, at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1731069-JIR. 125 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “China’s hypersonic military projects include spaceplanes and rail guns,” Popular Mechanics, June 26, 2018, at https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-work-speeds-up. Congressional Research Service 19 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Figure 3. Lingyun-1 Hypersonic Cruise Missile Prototype

Source: Photo accompanying Drake Long, “China reveals Lingyun-1 hypersonic missile at National Science and Photo accompanying Drake Long, “China reveals Lingyun-1 hypersonic missile at National Science and
Technology expo,” Technology expo,” The Defense Post, May 21, 2018. , May 21, 2018.
According to According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, “China is also investing heavily in hypersonic ground , “China is also investing heavily in hypersonic ground
testing facilities.”testing facilities.”~~124~~126 For example, the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center For example, the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center
claims to have 18 wind tunnels, while the China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics is known claims to have 18 wind tunnels, while the China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics is known
to operate at least three hypersonic wind tunnels—the FD-02, FD-03, and FD-07—capable of to operate at least three hypersonic wind tunnels—the FD-02, FD-03, and FD-07—capable of
reaching speeds of Mach 8, Mach 10, and Mach 12, respectively.reaching speeds of Mach 8, Mach 10, and Mach 12, respectively.~~125~~127 China also operates the JF-12 China also operates the JF-12
hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 5 and Mach 9 and the FD-21 hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 5 and Mach 9 and the FD-21
hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 10 and Mach 15.hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 10 and Mach 15.~~126~~128 It will It will
reportedly complete construction of the JF-22 wind tunnel, capable of reaching speeds of Mach reportedly complete construction of the JF-22 wind tunnel, capable of reaching speeds of Mach
30, in 2022.30, in 2022.~~127~~129 In addition, China is known to have tested hypersonic weapons at the Jiuquan In addition, China is known to have tested hypersonic weapons at the Jiuquan
Satellite Launch Center and the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center. Satellite Launch Center and the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center.

~~122 Malcolm Claus and Andrew Tate, “Chinese hypersonic programme reflects regional priorities,” Jane’s (subscription~~
~~required), March 12, 2019, at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1731069-JIR.~~
~~123 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “China’s hypersonic military projects include spaceplanes and rail guns,”~~ ~~Popular~~
~~Mechanics, June 26, 2018, at https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-work-speeds-up.~~
~~124~~126 Andrew Tate, “China conducts further tests with hypersonic vehicles,” Andrew Tate, “China conducts further tests with hypersonic vehicles,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (subscription (subscription
required), October 2, 2018, at https://customer.janes.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/FG_1120806-JDW. required), October 2, 2018, at https://customer.janes.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/FG_1120806-JDW.
~~125~~127 Kelvin Wong, “China claims successful test of hypersonic waverider,” Kelvin Wong, “China claims successful test of hypersonic waverider,” Jane’s (subscription required), August 10, at (subscription required), August 10, at
2018, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1002295-JDW; and Ellen Nakashima and Gerry Shih, “China builds 2018, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1002295-JDW; and Ellen Nakashima and Gerry Shih, “China builds
advanced weapons systems using American chip technology,” advanced weapons systems using American chip technology,” Washington Post, April 9, 2021. , April 9, 2021.
~~126~~128 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “A look at China’s most exciting hypersonic aerospace programs,” Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “A look at China’s most exciting hypersonic aerospace programs,” Popular Science, ,
April 18, 2017, at https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-technology. April 18, 2017, at https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-technology.
~~127~~129 Andrew Tate, “China’s new hypersonic wind tunnel expected to be ready next year,” Andrew Tate, “China’s new hypersonic wind tunnel expected to be ready next year,” Janes Defence Weekly
(subscription required), August 24, 2021, at https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/chinas-new-hypersonic-(subscription required), August 24, 2021, at https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/chinas-new-hypersonic-
wind-tunnel-expected-to-be-ready-next-year. wind-tunnel-expected-to-be-ready-next-year.
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Global Hypersonic Weapons Programs
Although the United States, Russia, and China possess the most advanced hypersonic weapons programs, a Although the United States, Russia, and China possess the most advanced hypersonic weapons programs, a
number of other countries—including Australia, India, France, Germany, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan—number of other countries—including Australia, India, France, Germany, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan—
are also developing hypersonic weapons technology. Since 2007, the United States has col aborated with Australia are also developing hypersonic weapons technology. Since 2007, the United States has col aborated with Australia
on the Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) program to develop hypersonic on the Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) program to develop hypersonic
technologies. The most recent HIFiRE test, successful y conducted in July 2017, explored the flight dynamics of a technologies. The most recent HIFiRE test, successful y conducted in July 2017, explored the flight dynamics of a
Mach 8 hypersonic glide vehicle, while previous tests explored scramjet engine technologies. HIFiRE’s successor, Mach 8 hypersonic glide vehicle, while previous tests explored scramjet engine technologies. HIFiRE’s successor,
the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE) program, is to further develop hypersonic the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE) program, is to further develop hypersonic
air-breathing technologies. SCIFiRE demonstration tests are expected by the mid-2020s. In addition to the air-breathing technologies. SCIFiRE demonstration tests are expected by the mid-2020s. In addition to the
Woomera Test Range facilities—one of the largest weapons test facilities in the world—Australia reportedly Woomera Test Range facilities—one of the largest weapons test facilities in the world—Australia reportedly
operates seven hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 30. operates seven hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 30.
India has similarly col aborated with Russia on the development of BrahMos II, a Mach 7 hypersonic cruise missile. India has similarly col aborated with Russia on the development of BrahMos II, a Mach 7 hypersonic cruise missile.
Although BrahMos II was initially intended to be fielded in 2017, news reports indicate that the program faces Although BrahMos II was initially intended to be fielded in 2017, news reports indicate that the program faces
significant delays and is now scheduled to achieve initial operational capability between 2025 and 2028. Reportedly, significant delays and is now scheduled to achieve initial operational capability between 2025 and 2028. Reportedly,
India is also developing an indigenous, dual-capable hypersonic cruise missile as part of its Hypersonic Technology India is also developing an indigenous, dual-capable hypersonic cruise missile as part of its Hypersonic Technology
Demonstrator Vehicle program and successful y tested a Mach 6 scramjet in June 2019 and September 2020. India Demonstrator Vehicle program and successful y tested a Mach 6 scramjet in June 2019 and September 2020. India
operates approximately 12 hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 13. operates approximately 12 hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 13.
France also has col aborated and contracted with Russia on the development of hypersonic technology. Although France also has col aborated and contracted with Russia on the development of hypersonic technology. Although
France has been investing in hypersonic technology research since the 1990s, it has only recently announced its France has been investing in hypersonic technology research since the 1990s, it has only recently announced its
intent to weaponize the technology. Under the V-max (Experimental Maneuvering Vehicle) program, France plans intent to weaponize the technology. Under the V-max (Experimental Maneuvering Vehicle) program, France plans
to modify its air-to-surface ASN4G supersonic missile for hypersonic flight by 2022. Some analysts believe that the to modify its air-to-surface ASN4G supersonic missile for hypersonic flight by 2022. Some analysts believe that the
V-max program is intended to provide France with a strategic nuclear weapon. France operates five hypersonic V-max program is intended to provide France with a strategic nuclear weapon. France operates five hypersonic
wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 21. wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 21.
Germany successful y tested an experimental hypersonic glide vehicle (SHEFEX II) in 2012; however, reports Germany successful y tested an experimental hypersonic glide vehicle (SHEFEX II) in 2012; however, reports
indicate that Germany may have pul ed funding for the program. German defense contractor DLR continues to indicate that Germany may have pul ed funding for the program. German defense contractor DLR continues to
research and test hypersonic vehicles as part of the European Union’s ATLLAS II project, which seeks to design a research and test hypersonic vehicles as part of the European Union’s ATLLAS II project, which seeks to design a
Mach 5-6 vehicle. Germany operates three hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 5-6 vehicle. Germany operates three hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to
Mach 11. Mach 11.
In addition, South Korea reportedly has been developing a ground-launched Mach 6+ hypersonic cruise missile, In addition, South Korea reportedly has been developing a ground-launched Mach 6+ hypersonic cruise missile,
Hycore, since 2018 and plans to test the missile in 2022. According to Hycore, since 2018 and plans to test the missile in 2022. According to Janes, South Korea is developing the missile , South Korea is developing the missile
“in response to growing concern about North Korea military modernization” and plans to eventually develop sea- “in response to growing concern about North Korea military modernization” and plans to eventually develop sea-
and air-launched variants. and air-launched variants.
Although North Korea tested the Hwasong-8—which it identifies as a hypersonic glide vehicle—in September Although North Korea tested the Hwasong-8—which it identifies as a hypersonic glide vehicle—in September
2021, reports indicate that the vehicle may have reached speeds of only Mach 3. Similarly, North Korea claims to 2021, reports indicate that the vehicle may have reached speeds of only Mach 3. Similarly, North Korea claims to
have tested a second hypersonic weapon in January 2022; however, experts believe that that weapon may instead have tested a second hypersonic weapon in January 2022; however, experts believe that that weapon may instead
be a maneuvering reentry vehicle. be a maneuvering reentry vehicle.
Finally, Japan is developing the Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM) and the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile Finally, Japan is developing the Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM) and the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile
(HVGP). According to(HVGP). According to Jane’s, Japan invested $122 mil ion in HVGP in FY2019. It reportedly plans to field HVGPs , Japan invested $122 mil ion in HVGP in FY2019. It reportedly plans to field HVGPs
for area suppression and neutralizing aircraft carriers. HVGP is expected to enter service in 2026, with a more for area suppression and neutralizing aircraft carriers. HVGP is expected to enter service in 2026, with a more
advanced version available by 2030, while HCM is expected to enter service in 2030. The Japan Aerospace advanced version available by 2030, while HCM is expected to enter service in 2030. The Japan Aerospace
Exploration Agency operates three hypersonic wind tunnels, with two additional facilities at Mitsubishi Heavy Exploration Agency operates three hypersonic wind tunnels, with two additional facilities at Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries and the University of Tokyo. According to DOD, Japan and the United States have agreed to conduct Industries and the University of Tokyo. According to DOD, Japan and the United States have agreed to conduct
“a joint analysis focused on future cooperation in counter-hypersonic technology.” “a joint analysis focused on future cooperation in counter-hypersonic technology.”
Other countries—including Iran, Israel, and Brazil—have conducted foundational research on hypersonic airflows Other countries—including Iran, Israel, and Brazil—have conducted foundational research on hypersonic airflows
and propulsion systems, but may not be pursuing a hypersonic weapons capability at this time. In addition, a and propulsion systems, but may not be pursuing a hypersonic weapons capability at this time. In addition, a
number of countries are testing increasingly maneuverable systems that travel at hypersonic speeds but that do number of countries are testing increasingly maneuverable systems that travel at hypersonic speeds but that do
not qualify as “hypersonic weapons” as defined in this report. not qualify as “hypersonic weapons” as defined in this report.
Note: For information about South Korea’s hypersonic weapons programs, see Jon Grevatt and Rahul Udoshi, For information about South Korea’s hypersonic weapons programs, see Jon Grevatt and Rahul Udoshi,
“South Korea develops Hycore hypersonic cruise missile,” “South Korea develops Hycore hypersonic cruise missile,” Janes (subscription required), January 25, 2022. For (subscription required), January 25, 2022. For
information about North Korea’s hypersonic weapons programs, see Choi Soo-hyang, “N. Korea's ‘hypersonic information about North Korea’s hypersonic weapons programs, see Choi Soo-hyang, “N. Korea's ‘hypersonic
missile’ appears to be at early stage of development: JCS,” Yonhap News Agency, September 29, 2021; and Ankit missile’ appears to be at early stage of development: JCS,” Yonhap News Agency, September 29, 2021; and Ankit
Panda, “The real danger of North Korea’s new hypersonic missile is not its speed,” NK News, January 10, 2022. Panda, “The real danger of North Korea’s new hypersonic missile is not its speed,” NK News, January 10, 2022.
For information about Japan’s hypersonic weapons programs, see Mike Yeo, “Japan unveils its hypersonic weapons For information about Japan’s hypersonic weapons programs, see Mike Yeo, “Japan unveils its hypersonic weapons
plans,” plans,” Defense News, March 14, 2020. For additional information about global hypersonic weapons programs, see , March 14, 2020. For additional information about global hypersonic weapons programs, see
Richard H. Speier et al., Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation..

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Issues for Congress
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs during the As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs during the
annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider a number of questions about annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider a number of questions about
the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, budget and management, and their the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, budget and management, and their
implications for strategic stability and arms control. This section provides an overview of some of implications for strategic stability and arms control. This section provides an overview of some of
these questions. these questions.
Mission Requirements
Although the Department of Defense is funding a number of hypersonic weapons programs, it has Although the Department of Defense is funding a number of hypersonic weapons programs, it has
not established any programs of record, suggesting that it may not have approved requirements not established any programs of record, suggesting that it may not have approved requirements
for hypersonic weapons or long-term funding plans.for hypersonic weapons or long-term funding plans.~~128~~130 Indeed, as Principal Director for Indeed, as Principal Director for
Hypersonics (USD[R&E]) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire Hypersonics (USD[R&E]) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire
hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to “[identify] the most viable hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to “[identify] the most viable
overarching weapon system concepts to choose from and then make a decision based on success overarching weapon system concepts to choose from and then make a decision based on success
and challenges.”and challenges.”~~129~~131
Given the lack of mission requirements, DOD officials have expressed a number of competing Given the lack of mission requirements, DOD officials have expressed a number of competing
perspectives about the potential costs and intended quantities of U.S. hypersonic weapons. For perspectives about the potential costs and intended quantities of U.S. hypersonic weapons. For
example, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall has stated that “hypersonics are not going to example, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall has stated that “hypersonics are not going to
be cheap anytime soon ... [and thus] we’re more likely to have relatively small inventories of be cheap anytime soon ... [and thus] we’re more likely to have relatively small inventories of
[hypersonic missiles] than large ones.”[hypersonic missiles] than large ones.”~~130~~132 Conversely, a number of other senior defense officials Conversely, a number of other senior defense officials
have stated that DOD intends to buy large quantities of hypersonic weapons. Then-DOD Director have stated that DOD intends to buy large quantities of hypersonic weapons. Then-DOD Director
of Defense Research & Engineering Mark Lewis has noted that DOD wants “to deliver of Defense Research & Engineering Mark Lewis has noted that DOD wants “to deliver
hypersonics at scale.... That means hundreds of weapons in a short period of time in the hands of hypersonics at scale.... That means hundreds of weapons in a short period of time in the hands of
the warfighter.”the warfighter.”~~131~~133 Similarly, Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has stated that DOD Similarly, Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has stated that DOD
seeks to “[produce] hypersonics in mass, because you have to be able to deliver capability in seeks to “[produce] hypersonics in mass, because you have to be able to deliver capability in
meaningful numbers, even to defeat the high-end targets.”meaningful numbers, even to defeat the high-end targets.”~~132~~134 These perspectives appear to be These perspectives appear to be
grounded in differing assumptions about the affordability of hypersonic weapons. Likewise, they grounded in differing assumptions about the affordability of hypersonic weapons. Likewise, they
are likely to hold different implications for the unit cost of the weapons. are likely to hold different implications for the unit cost of the weapons.
As Congress conducts oversight of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it may seek to obtain As Congress conducts oversight of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it may seek to obtain
information about DOD’s evaluation of potential mission sets for hypersonic weapons, a cost information about DOD’s evaluation of potential mission sets for hypersonic weapons, a cost
analysis of hypersonic weapons and alternative means of executing potential mission sets, and an analysis of hypersonic weapons and alternative means of executing potential mission sets, and an
assessment of the enabling technologies—such as space-based sensors or autonomous command assessment of the enabling technologies—such as space-based sensors or autonomous command
and control systems—that may be required to employ or defend against hypersonic weapons. For and control systems—that may be required to employ or defend against hypersonic weapons. For
example, Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Chairman of the Joint example, Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Chairman of the Joint

~~128~~130 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.” Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.”
~~129~~131 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.” Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.”
~~130~~132 John A. Tirpak, “Only Small Inventories of Hypersonic Missiles in USAF’s Future, Due to Cost,” John A. Tirpak, “Only Small Inventories of Hypersonic Missiles in USAF’s Future, Due to Cost,” Air Force
Magazine, February 15, 2022, at https://www.airforcemag.com/only-small-inventories-of-hypersonic-missiles-in-usafs-, February 15, 2022, at https://www.airforcemag.com/only-small-inventories-of-hypersonic-missiles-in-usafs-
future-due-to-cost/. future-due-to-cost/.
~~131~~133 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Hypersonics: DoD Wants ‘Hundreds of Weapons’ ASAP,” Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Hypersonics: DoD Wants ‘Hundreds of Weapons’ ASAP,” Breaking Defense, April 24, , April 24,
2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/hypersonics-dod-wants-hundreds-of-weapons-asap/. 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/hypersonics-dod-wants-hundreds-of-weapons-asap/.
~~132~~134 “Hypersonic Strike and Defense: A Conversation with Mike White,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Hypersonic Strike and Defense: A Conversation with Mike White,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
June 10, 2021, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/hypersonic-strike-and-defense-conversation-mike-white. See also Jon June 10, 2021, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/hypersonic-strike-and-defense-conversation-mike-white. See also Jon
Harper, “Just In: Pentagon to Spend Billions Mass-Producing Hypersonic Weapons,” Harper, “Just In: Pentagon to Spend Billions Mass-Producing Hypersonic Weapons,” National Defense Magazine, ,
March 4, 2020, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/4/pentagon-to-spend-billions-mass-March 4, 2020, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/4/pentagon-to-spend-billions-mass-
producing-hypersonic-weapons. producing-hypersonic-weapons.
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Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to submit to the Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to submit to the
congressional defense committees a report on strategic hypersonic weapons, including “a congressional defense committees a report on strategic hypersonic weapons, including “a
description of how the requirements for land and sea-based hypersonic weapons will be addressed description of how the requirements for land and sea-based hypersonic weapons will be addressed
with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and how such requirements will be formally with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and how such requirements will be formally
provided to the military departments procuring such weapons.” This report is to additionally provided to the military departments procuring such weapons.” This report is to additionally
include “the potential target sets for hypersonic weapons ... and the required mission planning to include “the potential target sets for hypersonic weapons ... and the required mission planning to
support targeting by the United States Strategic Command and other combatant commands.” support targeting by the United States Strategic Command and other combatant commands.”
Congress may also consider the conclusions of a Congressional Budget Office assessment of hypersonic weapons and their alternatives, including the following findings:  “Both hypersonic and ballistic missiles are well-suited to operate outside potential adversaries’ anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD), or ‘keep-out,’ zones.”135  “Hypersonic missiles would probably not be more survivable than ballistic missiles with maneuverable warheads in a conflict, unless the ballistic missiles encountered highly effective long-range defenses.”136  “Hypersonic missiles could cost one-third more to procure and field than ballistic missiles of the same range with maneuverable warheads.”137 Funding and Management Considerations
Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has noted that DOD is prioritizing offensive Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has noted that DOD is prioritizing offensive
programs while it determines “the path forward to get a robust defensive strategy.”programs while it determines “the path forward to get a robust defensive strategy.”~~133~~138 This This
approach is reflected in DOD’s recent budget requests. For example, DOD requested $225.5 approach is reflected in DOD’s recent budget requests. For example, DOD requested $225.5
million for hypersonic defense programs and $4.7 billion for hypersonic weapons programs in million for hypersonic defense programs and $4.7 billion for hypersonic weapons programs in
FY2023.FY2023.~~134~~139 Similarly, in FY2022, DOD requested $247.9 million for hypersonic defense Similarly, in FY2022, DOD requested $247.9 million for hypersonic defense
programs and $3.8 billion for hypersonic weapons programs.programs and $3.8 billion for hypersonic weapons programs.~~135~~140
Although the Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees increased FY2020 Although the Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees increased FY2020
appropriations for both hypersonic offense and defense above the FY2020 request, they expressed appropriations for both hypersonic offense and defense above the FY2020 request, they expressed
concerns, noting in their joint explanatory statement of H.R. 1158 “that the rapid growth in concerns, noting in their joint explanatory statement of H.R. 1158 “that the rapid growth in
~~hypersonic research has the potential to result in stove-piped, proprietary systems that duplicate~~
~~capabilities and increase costs.”136 To mitigate this concern, they appropriated $100 million for~~
~~DOD to establish a Joint Hypersonics Transition Office (JHTO) to “develop and implement an~~
~~integrated science and technology roadmap for hypersonics” and “establish a university~~
~~consortium for hypersonic research and workforce development” in support of DOD efforts.137~~

~~133~~ 135 Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Hypersonic Weapons and Alternatives, January 2023, at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58255. 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 Aaron Mehta, “Is the Pentagon Moving Quickly Enough on Hypersonic Defense?” Aaron Mehta, “Is the Pentagon Moving Quickly Enough on Hypersonic Defense?” Defense News, March 21, 2019, , March 21, 2019,
at https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/03/21/is-the-pentagon-moving-quickly-enough-on-hypersonic-at https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/03/21/is-the-pentagon-moving-quickly-enough-on-hypersonic-
defense/. defense/.
~~134~~139 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency Defense-Wide Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency Defense-Wide
Justification Book Volume 2a of 5, p. 631, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/Justification Book Volume 2a of 5, p. 631, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/
budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf; and budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf; and Defense
Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, Office of the Under , Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, April 2022, p. 2-16, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, April 2022, p. 2-16, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
~~135~~140 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency Defense-Wide Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency Defense-Wide
Justification Book Volume 2a of 5, p. 569, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/Justification Book Volume 2a of 5, p. 569, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/
budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf; and budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf; and Defense
Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, Office of the Under , Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, p. 3-2, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, p. 3-2, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
~~136 “Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020: Joint Explanatory Statement,” Defense Subcommittees of the~~
~~Appropriations Committees, December 16, 2019, at https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/~~
~~democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/HR%201158%20-%20Division%20A%20-~~
~~%20Defense%20SOM%20FY20.pdf.~~
~~137 Ibid. The Joint Hypersonic Transition Office, then called the Joint Technology Office on Hypersonics, was~~
~~originally mandated by Section 218 of the FY2007 NDAA (P.L. 109-364). The office was redesignated as the Joint~~
~~Hypersonics Transition Office and given additional authorities in Section 214 of the FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-91).~~
~~Section 216 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) further amended the office’s authorities to include the ability to enter~~
~~into agreements with institutions of higher learning. The office went unfunded until FY2020 and was not established~~
~~until April 2020.~~
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Congressional Research Service 23 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress hypersonic research has the potential to result in stove-piped, proprietary systems that duplicate capabilities and increase costs.”141 To mitigate this concern, they appropriated $100 million for DOD to establish a Joint Hypersonics Transition Office (JHTO) to “develop and implement an integrated science and technology roadmap for hypersonics” and “establish a university consortium for hypersonic research and workforce development” in support of DOD efforts.142 DOD established the JHTO in April 2020 and announced on October 26, 2020, that it awarded DOD established the JHTO in April 2020 and announced on October 26, 2020, that it awarded
Texas A&M University with a $20 million contract—renewable for up to $100 million—to Texas A&M University with a $20 million contract—renewable for up to $100 million—to
manage a University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics (UCAH).manage a University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics (UCAH).~~138~~143 UCAH is to be overseen UCAH is to be overseen
by a group of academic researchers from Texas A&M University, the Massachusetts Institute of by a group of academic researchers from Texas A&M University, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, the University of Minnesota, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the Technology, the University of Minnesota, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the
University of Arizona, the University of Tennessee Space Institute, Morgan State University, the University of Arizona, the University of Tennessee Space Institute, Morgan State University, the
California Institute of Technology, Purdue University, the University of California-Los Angeles, California Institute of Technology, Purdue University, the University of California-Los Angeles,
and the Georgia Institute of Technology.and the Georgia Institute of Technology.~~139~~144 The consortium is to “facilitate transitioning academic The consortium is to “facilitate transitioning academic
research into developing systems [as well as] work with the department to reduce system research into developing systems [as well as] work with the department to reduce system
development timelines while maintaining quality control standards.”development timelines while maintaining quality control standards.”~~140~~145
In addition, Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Secretary of the Army In addition, Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Secretary of the Army
and the Secretary of the Navy to jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a report and the Secretary of the Navy to jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a report
on LRHW and CPS, including total costs of the programs, “the strategy for such programs with on LRHW and CPS, including total costs of the programs, “the strategy for such programs with
respect to manning, training, and equipping, including cost estimates, [and] a testing strategy and respect to manning, training, and equipping, including cost estimates, [and] a testing strategy and
schedule for such programs.” It directs the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation schedule for such programs.” It directs the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
to submit to the congressional defense committees an independent cost estimate of these to submit to the congressional defense committees an independent cost estimate of these
programs.programs.~~141~~146
Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, however, it may be Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, however, it may be
challenging for Congress to evaluate the balance of funding for hypersonic weapons programs, challenging for Congress to evaluate the balance of funding for hypersonic weapons programs,
enabling technologies, supporting test infrastructure, and hypersonic missile defense. enabling technologies, supporting test infrastructure, and hypersonic missile defense.
Industrial Base and Supply Chain
U.S. government officials have expressed ongoing concern about the ability of the industrial base U.S. government officials have expressed ongoing concern about the ability of the industrial base
to support future demand for hypersonic weapons—particularly if multiple weapons programs go to support future demand for hypersonic weapons—particularly if multiple weapons programs go
~~into production at the same time.142 Indeed, a July 2022 DOD industry solicitation notes that “the~~
~~expansion of industrial base capacity is required” [emphasis added] if DOD is to meet its goal of~~
~~“[producing] the air-breathing engine constituent materials, subcomponents, components, and~~
~~subsystems to support an initial integrated system production capacity of no less than 48 all-up-~~
~~round (AUR) missiles (four to five units per month) and up to 72 AURs per year (six per~~
~~month).”143~~

~~138~~ 141 “Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020: Joint Explanatory Statement,” Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees, December 16, 2019, at https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/HR%201158%20-%20Division%20A%20-%20Defense%20SOM%20FY20.pdf. 142 Ibid. The Joint Hypersonic Transition Office, then called the Joint Technology Office on Hypersonics, was originally mandated by Section 218 of the FY2007 NDAA (P.L. 109-364). The office was redesignated as the Joint Hypersonics Transition Office and given additional authorities in Section 214 of the FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-91). Section 216 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) further amended the office’s authorities to include the ability to enter into agreements with institutions of higher learning. The office went unfunded until FY2020 and was not established until April 2020. 143 David Vergun, “DOD Awards Applied Hypersonics Contract to Texas A&M University,” David Vergun, “DOD Awards Applied Hypersonics Contract to Texas A&M University,” DOD News, October 26, , October 26,
2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2394438/dod-awards-applied-hypersonics-contract-to-2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2394438/dod-awards-applied-hypersonics-contract-to-
texas-am-university/. texas-am-university/.
~~139~~144 Ibid. Ibid.
~~140~~145 Ibid. Ibid.
~~141~~146 The Government Accountability Office notes DOD’s difficulty in developing accurate cost estimates for hypersonic The Government Accountability Office notes DOD’s difficulty in developing accurate cost estimates for hypersonic
weapons programs. For example, between FY2019 and FY2020, estimates for CPS “almost doubled.” Government weapons programs. For example, between FY2019 and FY2020, estimates for CPS “almost doubled.” Government
Accountability Office, Accountability Office, Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination
across Development Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 21, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378. , GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 21, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378.
~~142 See, for example, Justin Katz, “Hypersonics too expensive, industrial base too small for services to go it alone:~~
~~Admiral,” Breaking Defense, November 3, 2022, at https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/hypersonics-too-expensive-~~
~~industrial-base-too-small-for-services-to-go-it-alone-admiral/.~~
~~143 Department of the Air Force, “Request for Information (RFI) on Supplier Based Initiative for Air-Breathing Engines~~
~~for Hypersonic Systems,” at~~
~~https://www.businessdefense.gov/ai/dpat3/docs/AirBreathing%20Enginesfor%20HypersonicsRFFA8650225507.pdf.~~
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Congressional Research Service 24 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress into production at the same time.147 Indeed, a July 2022 DOD industry solicitation notes that “the expansion of industrial base capacity is required” [emphasis added] if DOD is to meet its goal of “[producing] the air-breathing engine constituent materials, subcomponents, components, and subsystems to support an initial integrated system production capacity of no less than 48 all-up-round (AUR) missiles (four to five units per month) and up to 72 AURs per year (six per month).”148
Furthermore, a DOD report issued in response to Executive Order 14017 (“America’s Supply Furthermore, a DOD report issued in response to Executive Order 14017 (“America’s Supply
Chains”) recommends investments in the hypersonic industrial base.Chains”) recommends investments in the hypersonic industrial base.~~144~~149 The report notes that The report notes that
DOD is in the process of “developing a hypersonics industrial base roadmap to inform DOD is in the process of “developing a hypersonics industrial base roadmap to inform
investments over the next five years, which will guide investment decisions over this period. The investments over the next five years, which will guide investment decisions over this period. The
roadmap will address sub-tier supplier development, and where appropriate, develop and retain roadmap will address sub-tier supplier development, and where appropriate, develop and retain
competition that enables affordable production.”competition that enables affordable production.”~~145~~150 The report additionally recommends that The report additionally recommends that
DOD “identify partners and allies with capabilities to aid in the development and expansion of DOD “identify partners and allies with capabilities to aid in the development and expansion of
[the U.S.] hypersonics supply chain, especially for materials and components where domestic [the U.S.] hypersonics supply chain, especially for materials and components where domestic
sources may not exist.”sources may not exist.”~~146~~151 Congress may wish to conduct oversight of DOD’s efforts to Congress may wish to conduct oversight of DOD’s efforts to
strengthen the industrial base and supply chain for hypersonic weapons. strengthen the industrial base and supply chain for hypersonic weapons.
Strategic Stability
Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified
two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: the weapon’s short two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: the weapon’s short
time-of-flight—which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response—and its unpredictable flight time-of-flight—which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response—and its unpredictable flight
path—which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore path—which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore
heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict. This risk heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict. This risk
could be further compounded in countries that co-locate nuclear and conventional capabilities or could be further compounded in countries that co-locate nuclear and conventional capabilities or
facilities. facilities.
Some analysts argue that unintended escalation could occur as a result of warhead ambiguity, or Some analysts argue that unintended escalation could occur as a result of warhead ambiguity, or
from the inability to distinguish between a conventionally armed hypersonic weapon and a from the inability to distinguish between a conventionally armed hypersonic weapon and a
nuclear-armed one. However, as a United Nations report notes, “even if a State did know that an nuclear-armed one. However, as a United Nations report notes, “even if a State did know that an
HGV launched toward it was conventionally armed, it may still view such a weapon as strategic HGV launched toward it was conventionally armed, it may still view such a weapon as strategic
in nature, regardless of how it was perceived by the State firing the weapon, and decide that a in nature, regardless of how it was perceived by the State firing the weapon, and decide that a
strategic response was warranted.”strategic response was warranted.”~~147~~152 Differences in threat perception and escalation ladders Differences in threat perception and escalation ladders
could thus result in unintended escalation. Such concerns have previously led Congress to restrict could thus result in unintended escalation. Such concerns have previously led Congress to restrict
funding for conventional prompt strike programs.funding for conventional prompt strike programs.~~148~~
~~Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal.~~
~~Pavel Podvig, a senior research fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,~~
~~has noted that the weapons “don’t … change much in terms of strategic balance and military~~
~~capability.”149 This, some analysts argue, is because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia~~
~~already possess the ability to strike the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles,~~
~~which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm U.S. missile defenses.150 Furthermore, these~~

~~144~~153 147 See, for example, Justin Katz, “Hypersonics too expensive, industrial base too small for services to go it alone: Admiral,” Breaking Defense, November 3, 2022, at https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/hypersonics-too-expensive-industrial-base-too-small-for-services-to-go-it-alone-admiral/. 148 Department of the Air Force, “Request for Information (RFI) on Supplier Based Initiative for Air-Breathing Engines for Hypersonic Systems,” at https://www.businessdefense.gov/ai/dpat3/docs/AirBreathing%20Enginesfor%20HypersonicsRFFA8650225507.pdf. 149 Department of Defense, Department of Defense, Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains: An action plan developed in response to
President Biden's Executive Order 14017, February 2022, at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/24/2002944158/-1/-, February 2022, at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/24/2002944158/-1/-
1/1/DOD-EO-14017-REPORT-SECURING-DEFENSE-CRITICAL-SUPPLY-CHAINS.PDF. 1/1/DOD-EO-14017-REPORT-SECURING-DEFENSE-CRITICAL-SUPPLY-CHAINS.PDF.
~~145~~150 Ibid. Ibid.
~~146~~151 Ibid. Ibid.
~~147~~152 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons.
~~148~~153 For a history of legislative activity on conventional prompt global strike, see CRS Report R41464, For a history of legislative activity on conventional prompt global strike, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional
~~Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.~~
~~149 Amy Mackinnon, “Russia’s New Missiles Are Aimed at the U.S.,” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2019, at~~
~~https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/05/russias-new-missiles-are-aimed-at-you-weapons-hypersonic-putin-united-states-~~
~~inf/.~~
~~150 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019, at~~
~~https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. Schneider,~~
~~“Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14.~~
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Congressional Research Service 25 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal. Pavel Podvig, a senior research fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, has noted that the weapons “don’t … change much in terms of strategic balance and military capability.”154 This, some analysts argue, is because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia already possess the ability to strike the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles, which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm U.S. missile defenses.155 Furthermore, these analysts note that in the case of hypersonic weapons, traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it analysts note that in the case of hypersonic weapons, traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it
is really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the world that would be so suicidal that it would is really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the world that would be so suicidal that it would
even think threating to use—not to mention to actually use—hypersonic weapons against the even think threating to use—not to mention to actually use—hypersonic weapons against the
United States ... would end well.”United States ... would end well.”~~151~~156
Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to submit to the Staff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to submit to the
congressional defense committees a report that examines congressional defense committees a report that examines
How escalation risks will be addressed with regards to the use of strategic hypersonic How escalation risks will be addressed with regards to the use of strategic hypersonic
weapons, including whether any risk escalation exercises have been conducted or are weapons, including whether any risk escalation exercises have been conducted or are
planned for the potential use of hypersonic weapons, and an analysis of the escalation risks planned for the potential use of hypersonic weapons, and an analysis of the escalation risks
posed by foreign hypersonic systems that are potentially nuclear and conventional dual-posed by foreign hypersonic systems that are potentially nuclear and conventional dual-
use capable weapons. use capable weapons.
Arms Control
Some analysts who believe that hypersonic weapons could present a threat to strategic stability or Some analysts who believe that hypersonic weapons could present a threat to strategic stability or
inspire an arms race have argued that the United States should take measures to mitigate risks or inspire an arms race have argued that the United States should take measures to mitigate risks or
limit the weapons’ proliferation. Proposed measures include expanding New START, negotiating limit the weapons’ proliferation. Proposed measures include expanding New START, negotiating
new multilateral arms control agreements, and undertaking transparency and confidence-building new multilateral arms control agreements, and undertaking transparency and confidence-building
measures.measures.~~152~~157
The New START Treaty, a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United States and Russia, The New START Treaty, a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United States and Russia,
does not currently cover weapons that fly on a ballistic trajectory for less than 50% of their flight, does not currently cover weapons that fly on a ballistic trajectory for less than 50% of their flight,
as do hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles.as do hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles.~~153~~158 However, Article V of the treaty However, Article V of the treaty
states that “when a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that states that “when a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that
Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration
in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that the in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that the
United States could raise the issue in the BCC of negotiating to include hypersonic weapons in United States could raise the issue in the BCC of negotiating to include hypersonic weapons in
~~the New START limits.154 However, because New START is due to expire in 2026, this may be a~~
~~short-term solution.155~~
~~As an alternative, some analysts have proposed negotiating a new international arms control~~
~~agreement that would institute a moratorium or ban on hypersonic weapon testing. These analysts~~
~~argue that a test ban would be a “highly verifiable” and “highly effective” means of preventing a~~
~~potential arms race and preserving strategic stability.156 Other analysts have countered that a test~~

~~151~~ Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. 154 Amy Mackinnon, “Russia’s New Missiles Are Aimed at the U.S.,” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2019, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/05/russias-new-missiles-are-aimed-at-you-weapons-hypersonic-putin-united-states-inf/. 155 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019, at https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14. 156 Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019, at , January 5, 2019, at
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632.
~~152~~157 See United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, See United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapon; and; and Richard H. Speier et al., Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic
Missile Proliferation.
~~153~~158 In some cases, hypersonic glide vehicles may be launched from intercontinental ballistic missiles that are already In some cases, hypersonic glide vehicles may be launched from intercontinental ballistic missiles that are already
covered by New START, as is reported to be the case with Russia’s Avangard HGV. See Rachel S. Cohen, covered by New START, as is reported to be the case with Russia’s Avangard HGV. See Rachel S. Cohen,
“Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Tactical Tool?” “Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Tactical Tool?”
~~154~~ Congressional Research Service 26 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress the New START limits.159 However, because New START is due to expire in 2026, this may be a short-term solution.160 As an alternative, some analysts have proposed negotiating a new international arms control agreement that would institute a moratorium or ban on hypersonic weapon testing. These analysts argue that a test ban would be a “highly verifiable” and “highly effective” means of preventing a potential arms race and preserving strategic stability.161 Other analysts have countered that a test ban would be infeasible, as “no clear technical distinction can be made between hypersonic missiles and other conventional capabilities that are less prompt, have shorter ranges, and also have the potential to undermine nuclear deterrence.”162 These analysts have instead proposed international transparency and confidence-building measures, such as exchanging weapons data; conducting joint technical studies; “providing advance notices of tests; choosing separate, distinctive launch locations for tests of hypersonic missiles; and placing restraints on sea-based tests.”163 159 James Acton notes: “during [New START] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a James Acton notes: “during [New START] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a
new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how
they would be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, they would be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?:
Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf. 2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf.
~~155~~160 CRS Report R41219, CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf. , by Amy F. Woolf.
~~156~~161 Mark Gubrud, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 6, 2015, at Mark Gubrud, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 6, 2015, at
https://thebulletin.org/roundtable/test-ban-for-hypersonic-missiles/. https://thebulletin.org/roundtable/test-ban-for-hypersonic-missiles/.
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~~ban would be infeasible, as “no clear technical distinction can be made between hypersonic~~
~~missiles and other conventional capabilities that are less prompt, have shorter ranges, and also~~
~~have the potential to undermine nuclear deterrence.”157 These analysts have instead proposed~~
~~international transparency and confidence-building measures, such as exchanging weapons data;~~
~~conducting joint technical studies; “providing advance notices of tests; choosing separate,~~
~~distinctive launch locations for tests of hypersonic missiles; and placing restraints on sea-based~~
~~tests.”158~~

~~157~~162 Tong Zhao, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?” Tong Zhao, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”
~~158~~163 Rajaram Nagappa, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”; see also James M. Acton, Rajaram Nagappa, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”; see also James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?, pp. 134-138. , pp. 134-138.
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Appendix. U.S. Hypersonic Testing ~~Infrastructure159~~Infrastructure164
Table A-1. DOD Hypersonic Ground Test Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
Air Force Arnold Engineering and Air Force Arnold Engineering and
Tunnel A: 40-inch Mach 1.5-5.5; up Tunnel A: 40-inch Mach 1.5-5.5; up
Arnold AFB, TN Arnold AFB, TN
Development Complex (AEDC) von Development Complex (AEDC) von
to 290 °F to 290 °F
Karman Gas Dynamics Facility Karman Gas Dynamics Facility
Tunnel B: 50-inch Mach 6 and 8; up Tunnel B: 50-inch Mach 6 and 8; up
Tunnels A/B/C Tunnels A/B/C
to 900 °F to 900 °F
Tunnel C: 50-inch Mach 10; up to Tunnel C: 50-inch Mach 10; up to
1700 °F 1700 °F
Air Force AEDC High-Enthalpy Air Force AEDC High-Enthalpy
Simulate thermal and pressure Simulate thermal and pressure
Arnold AFB, TN Arnold AFB, TN
Aerothermal Test Arc-Heated Aerothermal Test Arc-Heated
environments at speeds of up to environments at speeds of up to
Facilities H1, H2, H3 Facilities H1, H2, H3
Mach 8 Mach 8
Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9 Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9
59-inch Mach 7, 8,10, 14, and18; up White Oak, MD 59-inch Mach 7, 8,10, 14, and18; up White Oak, MD
to 2900 °F to 2900 °F
Air Force AEDC Aerodynamic and Air Force AEDC Aerodynamic and
Mach 3.1-7.2; up to 1300 °F Mach 3.1-7.2; up to 1300 °F
Arnold AFB, TN Arnold AFB, TN
Propulsion Test Unit Propulsion Test Unit
Air Force AEDC Aeroballistic Range Air Force AEDC Aeroballistic Range
Launches projectiles of up to 8 Launches projectiles of up to 8
Arnold AFB, TN Arnold AFB, TN
G G
inches in diameter at speeds of up inches in diameter at speeds of up
to Mach 20 to Mach 20
Hol oman High Speed Test Track Hol oman High Speed Test Track
59,971 ft. track; launches 59,971 ft. track; launches
Hol oman AFB, NM Hol oman AFB, NM
projectiles at speeds of up to Mach projectiles at speeds of up to Mach
8 8
Air Force Research Laboratory Air Force Research Laboratory
Mach 3-7 Mach 3-7
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
(AFRL) Cells 18, 22 (AFRL) Cells 18, 22
AFRL Laser Hardened Materials AFRL Laser Hardened Materials
High-temperature materials testing High-temperature materials testing
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
Evaluation Laboratory (LHMEL) Evaluation Laboratory (LHMEL)
AFRL Mach 6 High Reynolds AFRL Mach 6 High Reynolds
10-inch Mach 6 10-inch Mach 6
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
Number (Re) Facility Number (Re) Facility
Test Resource Management Center Test Resource Management Center
Up to Mach 8; up to 4040 °F Up to Mach 8; up to 4040 °F
Arnold AFB, TN Arnold AFB, TN
Hypersonic Aeropropulsion Clean Hypersonic Aeropropulsion Clean
Air Test-bed Facility Air Test-bed Facility
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9 was upgraded in 2019 to enable Mach 18 (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9 was upgraded in 2019 to enable Mach 18
testing. See “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/testing. See “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/
Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/. Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/.

~~159~~164 The following information is largely derived from the 2014 report (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., The following information is largely derived from the 2014 report (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on
the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure, and therefore, may not be current. Permission to use this , and therefore, may not be current. Permission to use this
material has been granted by the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Additional information has been provided material has been granted by the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Additional information has been provided
by Dee Howard Endowed Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher S. Combs (The University of Texas at San Antonio). by Dee Howard Endowed Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher S. Combs (The University of Texas at San Antonio).
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Table A-2. DOD Open-Air Ranges
Range
Location
Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile
Kwajalein Atol , Republic of the Kwajalein Atol , Republic of the
Defense Test Site Defense Test Site
Marshall Islands Marshall Islands
Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF)
Kauai, HI Kauai, HI
Western Range, 30th Space Wing Western Range, 30th Space Wing
Vandenberg AFB, CA Vandenberg AFB, CA
Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons
Point Mugu and China Lake, CA Point Mugu and China Lake, CA
(NAWC) Division (NAWC) Division
White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) White Sands Missile Range (WSMR)
New Mexico New Mexico
Eastern Range, 45th Space Wing Eastern Range, 45th Space Wing
Cape Canaveral Air Force Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station/Patrick AFB/Kennedy Station/Patrick AFB/Kennedy
Space Center, FL Space Center, FL
NASA Wallops Flight Facility NASA Wallops Flight Facility
Wallops Island, VA Wallops Island, VA
Pacific Spaceport Complex (formerly Pacific Spaceport Complex (formerly
Kodiak Island, AK Kodiak Island, AK
Kodiak Launch Complex) Kodiak Launch Complex)
NAWC Weapons Division R-2508 NAWC Weapons Division R-2508
Edwards AFB, CA Edwards AFB, CA
Complex Complex
Utah Test and Training Range Utah Test and Training Range
Utah Utah
Nevada Test and Training Range Nevada Test and Training Range
Nevada Nevada
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
Table A-3. DOD Mobile Assets
Asset
Navy Mobile Instrumentation Navy Mobile Instrumentation
System System
PMRF Mobile At-sea Sensor System PMRF Mobile At-sea Sensor System
MDA Mobile Instrumentation MDA Mobile Instrumentation
System System Pacific Collector
MDA Mobile Instrumentation MDA Mobile Instrumentation
System System Pacific Tracker
Kwajalein Mobile Range Safety Kwajalein Mobile Range Safety
System 2 System 2
United States Navy Ship United States Navy Ship Lorenzen
missile range instrumentation ship missile range instrumentation ship
Sea-based X-band Radar Sea-based X-band Radar
Aircraft Mobile Instrumentation Aircraft Mobile Instrumentation
Systems Systems
Transportable Range Augmentation Transportable Range Augmentation
and Control System and Control System
Re-locatable MPS-36 Radar Re-locatable MPS-36 Radar
Transportable Telemetry System Transportable Telemetry System
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
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Table A-4. NASA Research-Related Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
Ames Research Center (ARC) High-temperature Ames Research Center (ARC) High-temperature
Mountain View, CA Mountain View, CA
Arc Jet Complex Arc Jet Complex
materials testing materials testing
ARC Hypervelocity Free ARC Hypervelocity Free
Launches projectiles at Launches projectiles at
Mountain View, CA Mountain View, CA
Flight Facilities Flight Facilities
speeds of up to Mach 23 speeds of up to Mach 23
Langley Research Center Langley Research Center
31-inch Mach 10, 20-inch 31-inch Mach 10, 20-inch
Hampton, VA Hampton, VA
(LaRC) Aerothermodynamics (LaRC) Aerothermodynamics
Mach 6, and 15-inch Mach Mach 6, and 15-inch Mach
Laboratory Laboratory
6 6
LaRC 8-foot High LaRC 8-foot High
96-inch Mach 5 and Mach 96-inch Mach 5 and Mach
Hampton, VA Hampton, VA
Temperature Tunnel Temperature Tunnel
6.5 6.5
LaRC Scramjet Test Complex LaRC Scramjet Test Complex
Up to Mach 8 and up to Up to Mach 8 and up to
Hampton, VA Hampton, VA
4740 °F 4740 °F
LaRC HyPulse Facility LaRC HyPulse Facility
Currently inactive Currently inactive
Long Island, NY Long Island, NY
Glenn Research Center Glenn Research Center
Mach 5, 6, and 7 and up to Sandusky, OH Mach 5, 6, and 7 and up to Sandusky, OH
(GRC) Plumbrook Hypersonic 3830 °F (GRC) Plumbrook Hypersonic 3830 °F
Tunnel Facility Arc Jet Facility Tunnel Facility Arc Jet Facility
GRC Propulsion Systems GRC Propulsion Systems
Mach 6 Mach 6
Cleveland, OH Cleveland, OH
Laboratory 4 Laboratory 4
GRC 1’ x 1’ Supersonic Wind GRC 1’ x 1’ Supersonic Wind
12-inch Mach 1.3-6 (10 12-inch Mach 1.3-6 (10
Cleveland, OH Cleveland, OH
Tunnel Tunnel
discrete airspeeds) and up discrete airspeeds) and up
to 640 °F to 640 °F
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
Table A-5. Department of Energy Research-Related Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
Sandia National Laboratories Solar Sandia National Laboratories Solar
High-temperature materials testing High-temperature materials testing
Albuquerque, NM Albuquerque, NM
Thermal Test Facility Thermal Test Facility
and aerodynamic heating simulation and aerodynamic heating simulation
Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories
18-inch Mach 5, 8, and 14 18-inch Mach 5, 8, and 14
Albuquerque, NM Albuquerque, NM
Hypersonic Wind Tunnel Hypersonic Wind Tunnel
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
Table A-6. Industry/Academic Research-Related Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
CUBRC Large Energy National CUBRC Large Energy National
LENS 1: Mach 6-22 LENS 1: Mach 6-22
Buffalo, NY Buffalo, NY
Shock (LENS)-1/-II/-XX Tunnels Shock (LENS)-1/-II/-XX Tunnels
LENS II: Mach 2-12 LENS II: Mach 2-12
LENS XX: Atmospheric reentry LENS XX: Atmospheric reentry
simulation simulation
Boeing Polysonic Wind Tunnel Boeing Polysonic Wind Tunnel
48-inch up to Mach 5 48-inch up to Mach 5
St. Louis, MO St. Louis, MO
Lockheed Martin High Speed Wind Lockheed Martin High Speed Wind
48-inch Mach .3-5 48-inch Mach .3-5
Dallas, TX Dallas, TX
Tunnel Tunnel
Boeing/Air Force Office of Scientific 9.5-inch Mach 6 Boeing/Air Force Office of Scientific 9.5-inch Mach 6
West Lafayette, IN West Lafayette, IN
Research (AFOSR) Quiet Tunnel at Research (AFOSR) Quiet Tunnel at
Purdue University Purdue University
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Facility
Capability
Location
AFOSR-University of Notre Dame AFOSR-University of Notre Dame
24-inch Mach 6 24-inch Mach 6
Notre Dame, IN Notre Dame, IN
Quiet Tunnel Quiet Tunnel
Stratolaunch Carrier Aircraft Stratolaunch Carrier Aircraft
Reusable Mach 6 test bed Reusable Mach 6 test bed
Mojave, CA Mojave, CA
University of Texas at San Antonio University of Texas at San Antonio
8-inch x 8-inch Mach 7.2 8-inch x 8-inch Mach 7.2
San Antonio, TX San Antonio, TX
Hypersonic Ludwieg Tube Hypersonic Ludwieg Tube
University of Texas at Austin University of Texas at Austin
6-inch x 7-inch Mach 2 & Mach 5 6-inch x 7-inch Mach 2 & Mach 5
Austin, TX Austin, TX
Blowdown Wind Tunnel Blowdown Wind Tunnel
Southwest Research Light-Gas Gun Southwest Research Light-Gas Gun
Quiet, flight enthalpy ballistic range Quiet, flight enthalpy ballistic range
San Antonio, TX San Antonio, TX
up to Mach 20 up to Mach 20
University of Texas at Arlington University of Texas at Arlington
1.6 MW Mach 2-6 Arc Jet 1.6 MW Mach 2-6 Arc Jet
Arlington, TX Arlington, TX
Aerodynamics Research Center Aerodynamics Research Center
13-inch Mach 4-16 Shock Tunnel 13-inch Mach 4-16 Shock Tunnel
Texas A&M National Texas A&M National
7-inch Quiet Mach 6 7-inch Quiet Mach 6
Col ege Station, TX Col ege Station, TX
Aerothermochemistry and Aerothermochemistry and
36-inch Expansion Tunnel 36-inch Expansion Tunnel
Hypersonics Laboratory Hypersonics Laboratory
9-inch x 14-inch variable Mach 5-8 9-inch x 14-inch variable Mach 5-8
California Institute of Technology California Institute of Technology
12-inch Mach 5.2 T5 Reflected 12-inch Mach 5.2 T5 Reflected
Pasadena, CA Pasadena, CA
GALCIT GALCIT
Shock Tunnel Shock Tunnel
6-inch Hypervelocity (up to Mach 6-inch Hypervelocity (up to Mach
7.1) Expansion Tube 7.1) Expansion Tube
University of Arizona Hypersonic University of Arizona Hypersonic
15-inch Mach 5 15-inch Mach 5
Tucson, AZ Tucson, AZ
Ludwieg Tube Ludwieg Tube

Air Force Academy Ludwieg Tube Air Force Academy Ludwieg Tube
20-inch Mach 6 20-inch Mach 6
Colorado Springs, CO Colorado Springs, CO
University of Tennessee Space University of Tennessee Space
18-inch x 18-inch Mach 7 18-inch x 18-inch Mach 7
Tul ahoma, TN Tul ahoma, TN
Institute Ludwieg Tube Institute Ludwieg Tube
Maryland HyperTERP Reflected Maryland HyperTERP Reflected
12-inch x 12-inch Mach 6 12-inch x 12-inch Mach 6
Col ege Park, MD Col ege Park, MD
Shock Tunnel Shock Tunnel
Florida State Polysonic Wind Florida State Polysonic Wind
12-inch x 12-inch Mach 0.2-5 12-inch x 12-inch Mach 0.2-5
Tallahassee, FL Tallahassee, FL
Tunnel Tunnel
Princeton HyperBLaF Wind Tunnel Princeton HyperBLaF Wind Tunnel
9-inch Mach 8 9-inch Mach 8
Princeton, NJ Princeton, NJ
Sources: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.; Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Expanding Hypersonic Technology (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.; Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Expanding Hypersonic Technology
Testing”; and CRS correspondence with Dee Howard Endowed Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher S. Combs Testing”; and CRS correspondence with Dee Howard Endowed Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher S. Combs
(The University of Texas at San Antonio), October 27, 2022. (The University of Texas at San Antonio), October 27, 2022.
Notes: Hypersonic wind tunnels are under construction at the fol owing universities: Texas A&M University Hypersonic wind tunnels are under construction at the fol owing universities: Texas A&M University
(Mach 10 quiet tunnel), Purdue University (Mach 8 quiet tunnel), and the University of Notre Dame (Mach 10 (Mach 10 quiet tunnel), Purdue University (Mach 8 quiet tunnel), and the University of Notre Dame (Mach 10
quiet tunnel). Additional universities, such as the University of Maryland, the Georgia Institute of Technology, quiet tunnel). Additional universities, such as the University of Maryland, the Georgia Institute of Technology,
and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, also maintain experimental hypersonic facilities or conduct and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, also maintain experimental hypersonic facilities or conduct
hypersonic research. hypersonic research.

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Author Information

Kelley M. Sayler Kelley M. Sayler

Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global
Security Security

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