Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues
~~August 27~~November 6, 2020 , 2020
for Congress
Kelley M. Sayler
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons— The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—
Analyst in Advanced Analyst in Advanced
maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional
Technology and Global Technology and Global
prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States
Security Security
has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched

from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are

powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As Vice Chairman of the powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these
weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical
threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics,
on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S.
militarymilitary capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence. capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.
Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and
Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic
systems. This is due, in part, to the growing interest in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have systems. This is due, in part, to the growing interest in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have
a number of hypersonic weapons programs and are expected to field an operational hypersonic glide vehicle—a number of hypersonic weapons programs and are expected to field an operational hypersonic glide vehicle—
~~potential y~~potentially armed with nuclear warheads—as early as 2020. Most U.S. hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in armed with nuclear warheads—as early as 2020. Most U.S. hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in
Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons
~~wil likely~~ will likely require greater accuracy and require greater accuracy and ~~wil be more technical y chal enging~~will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed to develop than nuclear-armed
Chinese and Russian systems. Chinese and Russian systems.
The Pentagon’s FY2021 budget request for The Pentagon’s FY2021 budget request for al all hypersonic-related research is $3.2 hypersonic-related research is $3.2 ~~bil ion~~billion—up from $2.6 —up from $2.6 ~~bil ion~~billion in in
the FY2020 request—including $206.8 the FY2020 request—including $206.8 ~~mil ion~~million for hypersonic defense programs. At present, the Department of for hypersonic defense programs. At present, the Department of
Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may not Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may not
have approved either requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans. Indeed, as Assistant Director for have approved either requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans. Indeed, as Assistant Director for
Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) Mike White has stated, Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) Mike White has stated,
DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in
the evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets. the evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets.
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions
about the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and about the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and
arms control. Potential questions include the following: arms control. Potential questions include the following:
 What mission(s)  What mission(s) ~~wil~~ will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-
effective means of executing these potential missions? How effective means of executing these potential missions? How ~~wil~~ will they be incorporated into joint they be incorporated into joint
operational doctrine and concepts? operational doctrine and concepts?
 Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress  Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress
evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests
for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an
acceleration of research on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile acceleration of research on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile
defense options both necessary and defense options both necessary and ~~technological y~~technologically feasible? feasible?
 How, if at  How, if at ~~al , wil~~ all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability? the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?
 Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new  Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new
multilateral multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building
activities? activities?

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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as a part of its The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as a part of its
conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) program since the early 2000s.1 In recent years, it has conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) program since the early 2000s.1 In recent years, it has
focused such efforts on hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles with shorter and focused such efforts on hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles with shorter and
intermediate ranges for use in regional conflicts. Although funding for these programs has been intermediate ranges for use in regional conflicts. Although funding for these programs has been
relatively restrained in the past, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in relatively restrained in the past, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in
pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part, pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part,
to the growing interest in these technologies in Russia and China, leading to a heightened focus in to the growing interest in these technologies in Russia and China, leading to a heightened focus in
the United States on the strategic threat posed by hypersonic flight. Open-source reporting the United States on the strategic threat posed by hypersonic flight. Open-source reporting
indicates that both China and Russia have conducted numerous successful tests of hypersonic indicates that both China and Russia have conducted numerous successful tests of hypersonic
glide vehicles, and both are expected to field an operational capability as early as 2020.glide vehicles, and both are expected to field an operational capability as early as 2020.
Experts disagree on the potential impact of competitor hypersonic weapons on both strategic Experts disagree on the potential impact of competitor hypersonic weapons on both strategic
stability and the U.S. military’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, former Under Secretary of stability and the U.S. military’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, former Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) Michael Griffin has testified to Congress Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) Michael Griffin has testified to Congress
that the United States does not “have systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in a that the United States does not “have systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in a
corresponding manner, and we don’t have defenses against [their] systems.”2 Although the John corresponding manner, and we don’t have defenses against [their] systems.”2 Although the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019 NDAA,S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019 NDAA, P.L. 115-P.L. 115-
232) accelerated the development of hypersonic weapons, which USD(R&E) identifies as a 232) accelerated the development of hypersonic weapons, which USD(R&E) identifies as a
priority research and development area, the United States is unlikely to field an operational priority research and development area, the United States is unlikely to field an operational
system before 2023. However, most U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, in contrast to those in system before 2023. However, most U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, in contrast to those in
Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead.3 As a result, U.S. Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead.3 As a result, U.S.
hypersonic weapons hypersonic weapons ~~wil likely~~ will likely require greater accuracy and require greater accuracy and ~~wil be more technical y chal enging~~
will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.
In addition to accelerating development of hypersonic weapons, Section 247 of the FY2019 In addition to accelerating development of hypersonic weapons, Section 247 of the FY2019
NDAA required that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense NDAA required that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense
~~Intel igence~~Intelligence Agency, produce a classified assessment of U.S. and adversary hypersonic weapons Agency, produce a classified assessment of U.S. and adversary hypersonic weapons
programs, to include the following elements: programs, to include the following elements:
(1) An evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries on such technology. (1) An evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries on such technology.
(2) An evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology. (2) An evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology.
(3) An evaluation of the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology. (3) An evaluation of the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology.
(4) (4) An assessment of the technological progress of the United States and adversaries on An assessment of the technological progress of the United States and adversaries on
such technology. such technology.
(5) Descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such technology. (5) Descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such technology.

1 For details, see CRS1 For details, see CRS Report R41464, Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. , by Amy F. Woolf.
2 U.S.2 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services,Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, ~~“T estimony~~ “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New
~~T echnologies~~Technologies to Meet Emerging to Meet Emerging ~~T hreats~~Threats, April 18, 2018, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-, April 18, 2018, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-
40_04-18-18.pdf. 40_04-18-18.pdf.
3 Until recently, the United States was 3 Until recently, the United States was not believed to be considering the development of nuclear-armed hypersonic not believed to be considering the development of nuclear-armed hypersonic
weapons; however, a since-revoked Air Force weapons; however, a since-revoked Air Force ~~solicit ation~~solicitation sought ideas for a “ sought ideas for a “ thermal protection system that can thermal protection system that can
support [a] hypersonic glide to ICBM ranges.” Seniorsupport [a] hypersonic glide to ICBM ranges.” Senior defense officials respondeddefense officials responded to news reports of the revocation, to news reports of the revocation,
stating that DOD “remains committed to non-nuclear role for hypersonics.” See Steve stating that DOD “remains committed to non-nuclear role for hypersonics.” See Steve ~~T rimble~~Trimble, “USAF Errantly , “USAF Errantly
Reveals Research on ICBM-RangeReveals Research on ICBM-Range Hypersonic GlideHypersonic Glide Vehicle,”Vehicle,” Aviation Week, August 18, 2020, Aviation Week, August 18, 2020,
https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/usaf-errantly-reveals-research-icbm-range-https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/usaf-errantly-reveals-research-icbm-range-
hypersonic-glide. hypersonic-glide.
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(6) An assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.4 (6) An assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.4
This report was delivered to Congress in July 2019. Similarly, Section 1689 of the FY2019 This report was delivered to Congress in July 2019. Similarly, Section 1689 of the FY2019
NDAA requires the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to produce a report on “how NDAA requires the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to produce a report on “how
hypersonic missile defense can be accelerated to meet emerging hypersonic threats.”5 The hypersonic missile defense can be accelerated to meet emerging hypersonic threats.”5 The
findings of these reports could hold implications for congressional authorizations, appropriations, findings of these reports could hold implications for congressional authorizations, appropriations,
and oversight. and oversight.
The following report reviews the hypersonic weapons programs in the United States, Russia, and The following report reviews the hypersonic weapons programs in the United States, Russia, and
China, providing information on the programs and infrastructure in each nation, based on China, providing information on the programs and infrastructure in each nation, based on
unclassified sources. It also provides a brief summary of the state of global hypersonic weapons unclassified sources. It also provides a brief summary of the state of global hypersonic weapons
research development. It concludes with a discussion of the issues that Congress might address as research development. It concludes with a discussion of the issues that Congress might address as
it considers DOD’s funding requests for U.S. hypersonic technology programs. it considers DOD’s funding requests for U.S. hypersonic technology programs.
Background
Several countries are developing hypersonic weapons, which fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 (five Several countries are developing hypersonic weapons, which fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 (five
times the speed of sound), but none have yet introduced them into their operational military times the speed of sound), but none have yet introduced them into their operational military
forces.6 There are two primary categories of hypersonic weapons forces.6 There are two primary categories of hypersonic weapons
  Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) are launched from a rocket before gliding to a are launched from a rocket before gliding to a
target.7 target.7
  Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines, or are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines, or
“scramjets,” after acquiring their target. “scramjets,” after acquiring their target.
Unlike Unlike ~~bal istic~~ ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons do not follow a missiles, hypersonic weapons do not follow a ~~bal istic~~ballistic trajectory and can trajectory and can
maneuver en route to their destination. As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former maneuver en route to their destination. As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, hypersonic weapons Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, hypersonic weapons
could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical
threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not
preferred.”8 Conventional hypersonic weapons use only kinetic energy—energy derived from preferred.”8 Conventional hypersonic weapons use only kinetic energy—energy derived from
motion—to destroy unhardened targets or, motion—to destroy unhardened targets or, ~~potential y~~potentially, underground facilities.9, underground facilities.9
Hypersonic weapons could Hypersonic weapons could ~~chal enge~~challenge detection and defense due to their speed, maneuverability, detection and defense due to their speed, maneuverability,
and low altitude of flight.10 For example, terrestrial-based radar cannot detect hypersonic and low altitude of flight.10 For example, terrestrial-based radar cannot detect hypersonic
weapons until late in the weapon’s flight.weapons until late in the weapon’s flight.1111 Figure 1 depicts the differences in terrestrial-based depicts the differences in terrestrial-based
radar detection timelines for radar detection timelines for ~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles versus hypersonic glide vehicles. missiles versus hypersonic glide vehicles.

4 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, 4 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, ~~T itle~~Title II, §247. II, §247.
5 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, 5 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, ~~T itle~~Title XVI, §1689. XVI, §1689.
6 6 ~~T he~~The United States, Russia, United States, Russia, China, Australia, India, France, and Germany are developing hypersonic weapons China, Australia, India, France, and Germany are developing hypersonic weapons
technology. See Richard H. Speier et al., technology. See Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New ~~Class~~ Class of
Weapons, RAND, RAND Corporation, 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html. Corporation, 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html.
7 When HGVs 7 When HGVs are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to as a hypersonic are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to as a hypersonic
boostboost -glide weapon. -glide weapon.
8 U.S.8 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services,Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, ~~“T estimony~~ “Testimony of John E. Hyten of John E. Hyten ,” Hearing on United States ,” Hearing on United States
Strategic Command andStrategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf. imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
9 Richard H. Speier 9 Richard H. Speier et al., et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons, p. 13. , p. 13.
10 See10 See Department of Defense, Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-
2019-Missile-Defense-Review/2019-Missile-Defense-Review/~~T he~~The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf. %202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
11 Richard H. Speier11 Richard H. Speier et al., et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons. .
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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Figure 1. Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs.
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles

Source: CRS image based on an image in “Gliding missiles CRS image based on an image in “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,”that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The
Economist,, April 6, 2019, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-April 6, 2019, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-
faster-than-mach-5-are-coming.faster-than-mach-5-are-coming.
This delayed detection compresses the timeline for decision-makers assessing their response This delayed detection compresses the timeline for decision-makers assessing their response
options and for a defensive system to intercept the attacking weapon—options and for a defensive system to intercept the attacking weapon—~~potential y~~potentially permitting only permitting only
a single intercept attempt.12a single intercept attempt.12
Furthermore, U.S. defense officials have stated that both terrestrial- and current space-based Furthermore, U.S. defense officials have stated that both terrestrial- and current space-based
sensor architectures are insufficient to detect and track hypersonic weapons, with former sensor architectures are insufficient to detect and track hypersonic weapons, with former
USD(R&E) Griffin noting that “hypersonic targets are 10 to 20 times dimmer than what the U.S. USD(R&E) Griffin noting that “hypersonic targets are 10 to 20 times dimmer than what the U.S.
~~normal y~~normally tracks by tracks by ~~satel ites~~satellites in geostationary orbit.”13 Some analysts have suggested that space- in geostationary orbit.”13 Some analysts have suggested that space-
based sensor layers—integrated with tracking and fire-control systems to direct high-performance based sensor layers—integrated with tracking and fire-control systems to direct high-performance
interceptors or directed energy weapons—could interceptors or directed energy weapons—could ~~theoretical y~~theoretically present viable options for defending present viable options for defending
against hypersonic weapons in the future.14 Indeed, the against hypersonic weapons in the future.14 Indeed, the 2019 Missile Defense Review notes that notes that
“such sensors take advantage of the large area viewable from space for improved tracking and “such sensors take advantage of the large area viewable from space for improved tracking and
~~potential y~~potentially targeting of advanced threats, including HGVs and hypersonic cruise missiles.”15 targeting of advanced threats, including HGVs and hypersonic cruise missiles.”15
Other analysts have questioned the affordability, technological feasibility, and/or utility of wide- Other analysts have questioned the affordability, technological feasibility, and/or utility of wide-
area hypersonic weapons defense.16 As physicist and nuclear expert James Acton explains, “point-area hypersonic weapons defense.16 As physicist and nuclear expert James Acton explains, “point-
defense systems, and particularly [Terminal High-Altitudedefense systems, and particularly [Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)], could very Area Defense (THAAD)], could very
plausibly be adapted to deal with hypersonic missiles. The disadvantage of those systems is that plausibly be adapted to deal with hypersonic missiles. The disadvantage of those systems is that
they can only defend they can only defend ~~smal~~ small areas. To defend the whole of the continental United States, you areas. To defend the whole of the continental United States, you

12 Bradley Perrett et al., “U.S. Navy sees Chinese HGV12 Bradley Perrett et al., “U.S. Navy sees Chinese HGV as part of Wider as part of Wider ~~T hreat~~Threat,” ,” Aviation Week, January 27, 2014. , January 27, 2014.
13 David Vergun,13 David Vergun, “ “DOD ScalingDOD Scaling Up Effort to Develop Hypersonics,” Up Effort to Develop Hypersonics,” DoD News, December, December 13, 2018, 13, 2018,
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1712954/dod-scaling-up-effort-to-develop-hypersonics/; see also https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1712954/dod-scaling-up-effort-to-develop-hypersonics/; see also
““~~T estimony~~Testimony of Michael Griffin”; and “ of Michael Griffin”; and “~~T estimony~~Testimony of John E. Hyten.” of John E. Hyten.”
14 “14 “~~T estimony~~Testimony of Michael Griffin”; and “ of Michael Griffin”; and “~~T estimony~~Testimony of John E. Hyten.” of John E. Hyten.”
15 Department of Defense, 15 Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, p. XVI,, p. XVI, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/
11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/~~T he~~The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf. %202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
16 See 16 See James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer,” Carnegie James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer,” Carnegie ~~Endowm ent~~Endowment for International Peace, April 2, 2018, for International Peace, April 2, 2018,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/02/hypersonic-weapons-explainer-pub-75957; and Margot van Loon, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/02/hypersonic-weapons-explainer-pub-75957; and Margot van Loon,
“Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer.”“Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer.”
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would need an unaffordable number of THAAD batteries.”17 In addition, some analysts have would need an unaffordable number of THAAD batteries.”17 In addition, some analysts have
argued that the United States’ current command and control architecture would be incapable of argued that the United States’ current command and control architecture would be incapable of
“processing data quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an incoming hypersonic threat.”18 “processing data quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an incoming hypersonic threat.”18
(A broader discussion of hypersonic weapons defense is outside the scope of this report.) (A broader discussion of hypersonic weapons defense is outside the scope of this report.)
United States
The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s
Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the
~~ability~~ ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as ~~wel~~ well as through as through
several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.19 Those who support these development efforts several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.19 Those who support these development efforts
argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as ~~wel~~ well as provide the U.S. military as provide the U.S. military
with an abilitywith an ability to defeat capabilities such as advanced air and missile defense systems that form to defeat capabilities such as advanced air and missile defense systems that form
the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-access/area denial strategies.20 In recognition of this, the the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-access/area denial strategies.20 In recognition of this, the
2018 National Defense Strategy identifies hypersonic weapons as one of the key technologies identifies hypersonic weapons as one of the key technologies
“[ensuring the United States] “[ensuring the United States] ~~wil~~ will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.”21 be able to fight and win the wars of the future.”21
Programs
Unlike Unlike programs in China and Russia, most U.S. hypersonic weapons are to be programs in China and Russia, most U.S. hypersonic weapons are to be ~~conventional y~~conventionally
armed. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons armed. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons ~~wil likely~~ will likely require greater accuracy and require greater accuracy and ~~wil be more~~
~~technical y chal enging~~will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. Indeed, to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. Indeed,
according to one expert, “a nuclear-armed glider would be effective if it were 10 or even 100 according to one expert, “a nuclear-armed glider would be effective if it were 10 or even 100
times less accurate [than a times less accurate [than a ~~conventional y~~conventionally-armed glider]” due to nuclear blast effects.22-armed glider]” due to nuclear blast effects.22
According to open-source reporting, the United States has a number of major offensive According to open-source reporting, the United States has a number of major offensive
hypersonic weapons and hypersonic technology programs in development, including the hypersonic weapons and hypersonic technology programs in development, including the
following (following (seesee Table 1): :
 U.S. Navy—Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS);  U.S. Navy—Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS);
 U.S. Army—Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW);  U.S. Army—Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW);
 U.S. Air Force—AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW,  U.S. Air Force—AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW,
pronounced “arrow”); pronounced “arrow”);
 DARPA—Tactical Boost Glide (TBG);  DARPA—Tactical Boost Glide (TBG);

17 Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer.” 17 Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer.”
18 Margot van Loon, “Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer” in 18 Margot van Loon, “Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer” in Defense Technology Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons, ,
American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019. Some analysts have suggestedAmerican Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019. Some analysts have suggested that future command and control that future command and control
systems may require autonomous functionality to manage the speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons. See systems may require autonomous functionality to manage the speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons. See
John L. Dolan, Richard K. Gallagher,John L. Dolan, Richard K. Gallagher, and David L. Mann, “Hypersonic Weapons Are Literally Unstoppable (As in and David L. Mann, “Hypersonic Weapons Are Literally Unstoppable (As in
America Can’t Stop America Can’t Stop ~~T hem~~Them),” ),” Real Clear Defense, April 23, 2019, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/04/, April 23, 2019, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/04/
23/hypersonic_weapons__a_threat_to_national_security_114358.html. 23/hypersonic_weapons__a_threat_to_national_security_114358.html.
19 For a full history of U.S. 19 For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRShypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464, Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global
Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. , by Amy F. Woolf.
20 Roger Zakheim and 20 Roger Zakheim and ~~T om~~Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” Remarks at Defense Responses,” Remarks at
the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Armythe Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army
Justification Book of Research, Development, Justification Book of Research, Development, ~~T est~~Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580. Activity 4, p. 580.
21 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of 21 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of ~~T he~~The United States of America,” p. 3, United States of America,” p. 3,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
22 James M. Acton, “China’s Advanced Weapons,” 22 James M. Acton, “China’s Advanced Weapons,” ~~T estimony~~Testimony to the U.S. China Economic and to the U.S. China Economic and ~~Se curity~~Security Review Review
Commission, February 23, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/23/china-s-advanced-weapons-pub-68095. Commission, February 23, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/23/china-s-advanced-weapons-pub-68095.
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 DARPA—Operational Fires (OpFires); and  DARPA—Operational Fires (OpFires); and
 DARPA—Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC, pronounced  DARPA—Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC, pronounced
“hawk”). “hawk”).
These programs are intended to produce operational prototypes, as there are currently no These programs are intended to produce operational prototypes, as there are currently no
programs of record for hypersonic weapons.23 Accordingly, funding for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs of record for hypersonic weapons.23 Accordingly, funding for U.S. hypersonic weapons
programs is found in the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation accounts, rather than in programs is found in the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation accounts, rather than in
Procurement. Procurement.
U.S. Navy
In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a
common glide vehicle for use across the services.24 The common glide vehicle is being adapted common glide vehicle for use across the services.24 The common glide vehicle is being adapted
from a Mach 6 Army prototype warhead, the Alternate Re-Entry System, which was successfully from a Mach 6 Army prototype warhead, the Alternate Re-Entry System, which was successfully
tested in 2011 and 2017.25 Once development is complete, “Sandia National Laboratories, the tested in 2011 and 2017.25 Once development is complete, “Sandia National Laboratories, the
designer of the original concept, then designer of the original concept, then ~~wil~~ will build the common glide vehicles…. Booster systems build the common glide vehicles…. Booster systems
are being developed separately.”26are being developed separately.”26
The Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) is expected to pair the common glide vehicle with The Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) is expected to pair the common glide vehicle with
a submarine-launched booster system, achieving initial operational capabilitya submarine-launched booster system, achieving initial operational capability (IOC) on a (IOC) on a
Virginia-class submarine with VirginiaVirginia-class submarine with Virginia Payload Module in FY2028.27 The Navy is requesting $1 Payload Module in FY2028.27 The Navy is requesting $1
~~bil ion~~ billion for CPS in FY2021—an increase of $415 for CPS in FY2021—an increase of $415 ~~mil ion~~ million over the FY2020 request and $496 over the FY2020 request and $496
~~mil ion~~ million over the FY2020 appropriation—and $5.3 over the FY2020 appropriation—and $5.3 ~~bil ion~~ billion across the five-year Future Years across the five-year Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP).28Defense Program (FYDP).28
U.S. Army
The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon program is expected to pair the common glide The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon program is expected to pair the common glide
vehicle with the Navy’s booster system. The system is intended to have a range of 1,400 miles vehicle with the Navy’s booster system. The system is intended to have a range of 1,400 miles

~~23 Steve T rimble, “ New Long-T erm~~ 23 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics, But Only Prototypes,” Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics, But Only Prototypes,” Aviation Week, March , March
15, 2019, https://aviationweek.com/defense/new-long-term-pentagon-plan-boosts-hypersonics-only-prototypes. 15, 2019, https://aviationweek.com/defense/new-long-term-pentagon-plan-boosts-hypersonics-only-prototypes.
24 24 ~~T he~~The services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors with rotating chairmanship. Body Board of Directors with rotating chairmanship.
SydneySydney J. Freedberg,J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Ramps Up FundingJr., “Army Ramps Up Funding For Laser Shield,For Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,”Hypersonic Sword,” Breaking Defense, ,
February 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-shield-hypersonic-sword/. February 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-shield-hypersonic-sword/.
25 Steve 25 Steve ~~T rimble~~Trimble and Guy and Guy Norris, “Sandia’sNorris, “Sandia’s ~~Swerve Could~~ Swerve Could Lead to FirstLead to First -gen Hypersonic Production Line,” -gen Hypersonic Production Line,” Aviation
Week,, October 11, 2018, http://aviationweek.com/air-dominance/sandia-s-swerve-could-lead-first-gen-hypersonic-October 11, 2018, http://aviationweek.com/air-dominance/sandia-s-swerve-could-lead-first-gen-hypersonic-
production-line; and Sydneyproduction-line; and Sydney J. FreedbergJ. Freedberg Jr., “Jr., “ Army Warhead Is Key Army Warhead Is Key ~~T o~~To Joint Hypersonics,” Joint Hypersonics,” Breaking Defense, ,
AugustAugust 22, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/army-warhead-is-key-to-joint-hypersonics/. 22, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/army-warhead-is-key-to-joint-hypersonics/.
26 26 ~~T rimble~~Trimble and Norris, “ and Norris, “ Sandia’sSandia’s Swerve.” Swerve.”
27 Department of the Navy, “Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2021 Budget,” February 10, 2020, 27 Department of the Navy, “Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2021 Budget,” February 10, 2020,
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/21pres/Highlights_book.pdf. Vice Admiral https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/21pres/Highlights_book.pdf. Vice Admiral ~~T erry~~Terry Benedict, former Benedict, former
director of the Navy Strategic Systems Program, has stated that CPS willdirector of the Navy Strategic Systems Program, has stated that CPS will eventually be deployed on both Ohioeventually be deployed on both Ohio - and - and
Virginia-classVirginia-class submarines.submarines. Navy leadership has also discussedNavy leadership has also discussed the possibility of deployingthe possibility of deploying ~~CPS~~ CPS on Arleigh Burke- and on Arleigh Burke- and
ZumwaltZumwalt -class-class destroyers. Seedestroyers. See Jason Sherman and Lee Hudson,Jason Sherman and Lee Hudson, “ “Navy reveals plans to put hypersonic strike weapons Navy reveals plans to put hypersonic strike weapons
on submarines,”on submarines,” Inside Defense, November 8, 2017, https://insidedefense.com/inside-missile-defense/navy-reveals-, November 8, 2017, https://insidedefense.com/inside-missile-defense/navy-reveals-
plans-put-hypersonic-strike-weapons-submarines; and Paul McLeary, “plans-put-hypersonic-strike-weapons-submarines; and Paul McLeary, “ SecNav SecNav ~~T ells~~Tells Fleet Hypersonic Competition Fleet Hypersonic Competition
Demands ‘Sputnik Moment;’ Glide BodyDemands ‘Sputnik Moment;’ Glide Body ~~T est~~ Test Set,” Set,” Breaking Defense, January 31, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/, January 31, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/
2020/01/secnav-tells-fleet-hypersonic-competition-demands-sputnik-moment-glide-body-test-set/. 2020/01/secnav-tells-fleet-hypersonic-competition-demands-sputnik-moment-glide-body-test-set/.
28 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research, 28 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Development, ~~T est~~Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1419, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Activity 4, p. 1419, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/21pres/Documents/21pres/~~RDT EN_BA4_Book~~RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf; see also CRS.pdf; see also CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10831, IF10831, Defense ~~Prim er~~Primer: Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP), by Brendan W. McGarry and Heidi, by Brendan W. McGarry and Heidi M. Peters. M. Peters.
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and “provide the Army with a prototype strategic attack weapon system to defeat A2/AD and “provide the Army with a prototype strategic attack weapon system to defeat A2/AD
capabilities, suppress adversary Long Range Fires, and engage other high payoff/time sensitive capabilities, suppress adversary Long Range Fires, and engage other high payoff/time sensitive
targets.”29 The Army is requesting $801 targets.”29 The Army is requesting $801 ~~mil ion~~million for the program in FY2021—$573 for the program in FY2021—$573 ~~mil ion~~ million over over
the FY2020 request and $397 the FY2020 request and $397 ~~mil ion~~ million over the FY2020 appropriation—and $3.3 over the FY2020 appropriation—and $3.3 ~~bil ion~~ billion across the across the
FYDP.30 It plans to conduct flight tests for LRHW from FY2021 to FY2023, field combat rounds FYDP.30 It plans to conduct flight tests for LRHW from FY2021 to FY2023, field combat rounds
in FY2023, and transition to a program of record in the fourth quarter of FY2024.31in FY2023, and transition to a program of record in the fourth quarter of FY2024.31
U.S. Air Force
The AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon is expected to leverage DARPA’s Tactical The AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon is expected to leverage DARPA’s Tactical
Boost Glide technology to develop an air-launched hypersonic glide vehicle prototype capable of Boost Glide technology to develop an air-launched hypersonic glide vehicle prototype capable of
~~travel ing at speeds up to Mach 20~~travelling at average speeds of between Mach 6.5 and Mach 8 at a range of approximately at a range of approximately ~~575~~ 1,000 miles.32 Despite testing delays miles.32 Despite testing delays
due to technical due to technical ~~chal enges~~challenges, ARRW completed a successful flight test in June 2019 and is , ARRW completed a successful flight test in June 2019 and is
expected to complete flight tests in FY2022.33 The Air Force has requested $382 expected to complete flight tests in FY2022.33 The Air Force has requested $382 ~~mil ion~~million for for
ARRW in FY2021—up from $286 ARRW in FY2021—up from $286 ~~mil ion~~million in the FY2020 request and appropriation—and $581 in the FY2020 request and appropriation—and $581
~~mil ion~~ million across the FYDP, with no funds requested beyond FY2022.34 ARRW is a project under the across the FYDP, with no funds requested beyond FY2022.34 ARRW is a project under the
Air Force’s Hypersonics Prototyping Program Element, which is intended to demonstrate Air Force’s Hypersonics Prototyping Program Element, which is intended to demonstrate
concepts “to [enable] leadership to make informed strategy and resource decisions … for future concepts “to [enable] leadership to make informed strategy and resource decisions … for future
programs.”35programs.”35
In February 2020, the Air Force announced that it had In February 2020, the Air Force announced that it had ~~cancel ed~~cancelled its second hypersonic weapon its second hypersonic weapon
program, the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW), which had been expected to use program, the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW), which had been expected to use
the common glide vehicle, due to budget pressures that forced it to choose between ARRW and the common glide vehicle, due to budget pressures that forced it to choose between ARRW and
HCSW.36 Air Force acquisition chief HCSW.36 Air Force acquisition chief ~~Wil~~ Will Roper explained that ARRW was selected because it Roper explained that ARRW was selected because it
~~was more advanced and gave the Air Force additional options. “[ARRW] is smal er; we can carry~~

29 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, 29 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research,
Development, Development, ~~T est~~Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, pp. 579Activity 4, pp. 579 -584, https://www.asafm.army.mil/-584, https://www.asafm.army.mil/
documents/BudgetMaterial/fy2020/rdte_ba4.pdf; and Sydney J. Freedbergdocuments/BudgetMaterial/fy2020/rdte_ba4.pdf; and Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Jr., “ Army Sets 2023 Hypersonic Flight Army Sets 2023 Hypersonic Flight
~~T est~~Test; Strategic Cannon Advances,” ; Strategic Cannon Advances,” Breaking Defense, March 19, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/army-, March 19, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/army-
sets-2023-hypersonic-flight-test-strategic-cannon-advances/. sets-2023-hypersonic-flight-test-strategic-cannon-advances/.
30 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, 30 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research,
Development, Development, ~~T est~~Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 613, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Activity 4, p. 613, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/
Documents/BudgetMaterial/2021/Base%20Budget/rdte/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2021/Base%20Budget/rdte/
~~RDT E_BA_4_FY_2021_PB_RDT E_Vol~~RDTE_BA_4_FY_2021_PB_RDTE_Vol%202_Budget_Activity_4.pdf. %202_Budget_Activity_4.pdf.
31 Department of the Army, “FY 2021: President’s Budget Highlights,” February 31 Department of the Army, “FY 2021: President’s Budget Highlights,” February 2020, p. 18, 2020, p. 18,
https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2021/pbr/Overview%20and%20Highlights/https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2021/pbr/Overview%20and%20Highlights/
Army_FY_2021_Budget_Highlights.pdf. Army_FY_2021_Budget_Highlights.pdf.
32 ARRW is expected to be launched initially from the B-52H strategic bomber. Thomas Newdick, “Air Force Says New Hypersonic Missile Will Hit Targets 1,000 Miles Away In Under 12 Minutes,” The Drive, October 13, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37045/air-force-says-new-hypersonic-missile-will-hit-targets-1000-miles-away-in-under-12-minutes. 33 The Air Force’s budget ~~32 Stephen T rimble, “ Lockheed Martin claims both USAF hypersonic programmes,” Flight Global, August 7, 2018,~~
~~https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/lockheed-martin-claims-both-usaf-hypersonic-programm-450968/.~~
~~33 T he Air Force’s budget~~ request notes that “further schedule details can be provided in the appropriate forum.” request notes that “further schedule details can be provided in the appropriate forum.”
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Development, ~~T est~~Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 128. See and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 128. See also Lee Hudsonalso Lee Hudson and Steve and Steve ~~T rimble, “ T op~~Trimble, “Top U.S. Hypersonic U.S. Hypersonic
Weapon Program Facing NewWeapon Program Facing New ~~Schedule~~ Schedule Pressure,” Pressure,” Aviation Week,, January 11, 2019, http://aviationweek.com/defense/January 11, 2019, http://aviationweek.com/defense/
top-us-hypersonic-weapon-program-facing-new-schedule-pressure. top-us-hypersonic-weapon-program-facing-new-schedule-pressure.
34 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research, 34 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Development, ~~T est~~Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 121, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY21/ and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 121, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY21/
~~RDT E_~~RDTE_/FY21%20Air%20Force%20Research%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation%20Vol%20II.pdf?/FY21%20Air%20Force%20Research%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation%20Vol%20II.pdf?
ver=2020-02-12-145218-377. ver=2020-02-12-145218-377.
35 Ibid., p. 121. 35 Ibid., p. 121.
36 Valerie36 Valerie Insinna, “Insinna, “ US Air Force kills one of its hypersonic weapons programs,” US Air Force kills one of its hypersonic weapons programs,” Defense News,, ~~February~~ February 10, 2020, 10, 2020,
https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2020/02/10/the-air-force-just-canceled-one-of-its-hypersonic-https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2020/02/10/the-air-force-just-canceled-one-of-its-hypersonic-
~~weapons-programs/.~~
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was more advanced and gave the Air Force additional options. “[ARRW] is smaller; we can carry twice as many on the B-52, and it’s possible it could be on the F-15,” he explained.37 The Air twice as many on the B-52, and it’s possible it could be on the F-15,” he explained.37 The Air
Force Force ~~wil~~ was to continue its technical review of HCSW through March 2020.38 continue its technical review of HCSW through March 2020.38
Finally, the Air Force is reportedly seeking information from industry on the Expendable Hypersonic Air-Breathing Multi-Mission Demonstrator Program, also known as “Mayhem.” Mayhem is reported to be larger than ARRW and capable of carrying multiple payloads for different mission sets.39 DARPA ~~DARPA~~
DARPA, in partnership with the Air Force, continues to test Tactical Boost Glide, a wedge-shaped DARPA, in partnership with the Air Force, continues to test Tactical Boost Glide, a wedge-shaped
hypersonic glide vehicle capable of Mach 7+ flight that “aims to develop and demonstrate hypersonic glide vehicle capable of Mach 7+ flight that “aims to develop and demonstrate
technologies to enable future air-launched, tactical-range hypersonic boost glide systems.”technologies to enable future air-launched, tactical-range hypersonic boost glide systems.”3940 TBG TBG
~~wil~~ will “also consider traceability, compatibility, and integration with the Navy Vertical Launch “also consider traceability, compatibility, and integration with the Navy Vertical Launch
System” and is planned to transition to both the Air Force and the Navy. DARPA has requested System” and is planned to transition to both the Air Force and the Navy. DARPA has requested
$117 $117 ~~mil ion~~million—down from the $162 —down from the $162 ~~mil ion~~ million FY2020 request and the $152 FY2020 request and the $152 ~~mil ion~~ million FY2020 FY2020
appropriation—for TBG in FY2021.appropriation—for TBG in FY2021.40
41 DARPA’s Operational Fires reportedly seeks to leverage TBG technologies to develop a ground- DARPA’s Operational Fires reportedly seeks to leverage TBG technologies to develop a ground-
launched system that launched system that ~~wil~~ will enable “advanced tactical weapons to penetrate modern enemy air enable “advanced tactical weapons to penetrate modern enemy air
defenses and rapidly and precisely engage critical time sensitive targets.” DARPA has requested defenses and rapidly and precisely engage critical time sensitive targets.” DARPA has requested
~~$40 mil ion~~ $40 million for OpFires in FY2021—down from the $50 for OpFires in FY2021—down from the $50 ~~mil ion~~million FY2020 request and FY2020 request and
appropriation—and intends to transition the program to the Army.appropriation—and intends to transition the program to the Army.41
42 In the longer term, DARPA, with Air Force support, is continuing work on the Hypersonic Air- In the longer term, DARPA, with Air Force support, is continuing work on the Hypersonic Air-
breathing Weapon Concept, which “seeks to develop and demonstrate critical technologies to breathing Weapon Concept, which “seeks to develop and demonstrate critical technologies to
enable an effective and affordable air-launched hypersonic cruise missile.”enable an effective and affordable air-launched hypersonic cruise missile.”4243 Assistance Director Assistance Director
for Hypersonics Mike White has stated that such a missile would be for Hypersonics Mike White has stated that such a missile would be ~~smal er~~smaller than DOD’s than DOD’s
hypersonic glide vehicles and could therefore launch from a wider range of platforms. Director hypersonic glide vehicles and could therefore launch from a wider range of platforms. Director
~~White has additional y noted that HAWC and other hypersonic cruise missiles could integrate~~
~~seekers more easily than hypersonic glide vehicles.43 DARPA requested $7 mil ion to develop~~
~~HAWC in FY2021—down from the $10 mil ion FY2020 request and $20 mil ion FY2020~~
~~appropriation.44~~

~~37 John A. T irpak, “Roper: T he~~ weapons-programs/. 37 John A. Tirpak, “Roper: The ARRW Hypersonic Missile Better Option for USAF,” March 2, 2020, ARRW Hypersonic Missile Better Option for USAF,” March 2, 2020,
https://www.airforcemag.com/arrw-beat-hcsw-because-its-smaller-better-for-usaf/. https://www.airforcemag.com/arrw-beat-hcsw-because-its-smaller-better-for-usaf/. ~~T irpak~~Tirpak additionally notes that “ additionally notes that “ the the
F-15 couldF-15 could accelerate the ARRW to Mach 3 before launch, potentially reducing the size of the booster neededaccelerate the ARRW to Mach 3 before launch, potentially reducing the size of the booster needed to get the to get the
weapon to hypersonic speed.” weapon to hypersonic speed.”
38 Ibid. 38 Ibid.
39 39 ~~“T actical Boost Glide (T BG~~See, for example, Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile Becomes High-Priority USAF Project,” Air Force Magazine, October 13, 2020, https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-attack-cruise-missile-becomes-high-priority-usaf-project/. 40 “Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/program/tactical-boost-glide; ) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/program/tactical-boost-glide;
and Guyand Guy Norris, “U.S. Air Force Plans Road Map to Operational Hypersonics,” Norris, “U.S. Air Force Plans Road Map to Operational Hypersonics,” Aviation Week, July, July 27, 2017, 27, 2017,
https://aviationweek.com/defense/us-air-force-plans-road-map-operational-hypersonics. https://aviationweek.com/defense/us-air-force-plans-road-map-operational-hypersonics.
40 41 DARPA states that the decline in the budget DARPA states that the decline in the budget request “reflects completion of full-scale testing and final program request “reflects completion of full-scale testing and final program
reporting.” Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Defense Advancedreporting.” Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Research Projects
Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, pp. 162-164, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, pp. 162-164, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/
defbudget/fy2021/defbudget/fy2021/~~budget_just ification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/~~
~~RDT E_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2021.pdf .~~
41budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2021.pdf. 42 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 165, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 165, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2021/budget_justification/pdfs/fy2021/budget_justification/pdfs/~~03_RDT _and_E/RDT E_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2021.pdf .~~
4203_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2021.pdf. 43 “Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/ “Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/
program/hypersonic-air-breathing-weapon-concept. program/hypersonic-air-breathing-weapon-concept.
~~43 “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/~~
~~T ranscripts/T ranscript/Article/2101062/department -of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/.~~
~~44 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,~~
~~Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 165, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/~~
~~fy2021/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/RDT E_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2021.pdf .~~
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Congressional Research Service 7 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress White has additionally noted that HAWC and other hypersonic cruise missiles could integrate seekers more easily than hypersonic glide vehicles.44 DARPA requested $7 million to develop HAWC in FY2021—down from the $10 million FY2020 request and $20 million FY2020 appropriation.45 Table 1. Summary of U.S. Hypersonic Weapons Programs
FY2020
PB2021
Title
($ in millions)
($ in millions)
Schedule
Conventional Prompt Conventional Prompt
512 512
1,008 1,008
IOC in FY2028 IOC in FY2028
Strike Strike (CPS) (CPS)
Long-Range Hypersonic Long-Range Hypersonic
404 404
801 801
Flight tests through 2023 Flight tests through 2023
Weapon (LRHW) Weapon (LRHW)
AGM-183 Air-Launched AGM-183 Air-Launched
286 286
382 382
Flight tests through 2022 Flight tests through 2022
Rapid Response Weapon Rapid Response Weapon
(ARRW) (ARRW)
Hypersonic Conventional Hypersonic Conventional
290 290
0 0
~~Cancel ed~~Cancelled in 2020 in 2020
Strike Strike Weapon (HCSW) Weapon (HCSW)
Tactical Boost Glide Tactical Boost Glide
152 152
117 117
Testing through at least Testing through at least
(TBG) (TBG)
2021 2021
Operational Fires Operational Fires
50 50
40 40
Testing through at least Testing through at least
(OpFires) (OpFires)
2021; transitions to 2021; transitions to
weapon system weapon system
integration planning and integration planning and
design in 2021 design in 2021
Hypersonic Air-breathing Hypersonic Air-breathing
20 20
7 7
Complete Complete flight tests in flight tests in
Weapon Concept Weapon Concept
2020; final program 2020; final program
(HAWC) (HAWC)
reviews reviews in 2021 in 2021
Source: Program information Program information taken from U.S. Navy, Army,taken from U.S. Navy, Army, ~~Air~~ Air Force,Force, and DARPA FY2021 Justification Books, and DARPA FY2021 Justification Books,
available at https://comptrol er.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/. available at https://comptrol er.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
Hypersonic Missile ~~Defenses45~~Defenses46
DOD is also investing in counter-hypersonic weapons capabilities, although former USD(R&E) DOD is also investing in counter-hypersonic weapons capabilities, although former USD(R&E)
Michael Griffin has stated that the United States Michael Griffin has stated that the United States ~~wil~~ will not have a defensive capability against not have a defensive capability against
hypersonic weapons until the mid-2020s, at the earliest.hypersonic weapons until the mid-2020s, at the earliest.4647 In September 2018, the Missile Defense In September 2018, the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA)—which in 2017 established a Hypersonic Defense Program pursuant to Section Agency (MDA)—which in 2017 established a Hypersonic Defense Program pursuant to Section
1687 of the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-840)—commissioned 21 white papers to explore 1687 of the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-840)—commissioned 21 white papers to explore
hypersonic missile defense options, including interceptor missiles, hypervelocity projectiles, laser hypersonic missile defense options, including interceptor missiles, hypervelocity projectiles, laser
~~guns, and electronic attack systems.47 In January 2020, MDA issued a draft request for prototype~~
~~proposals for a Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapons System interceptor. This~~
~~effort is intended to “reduce interceptor key technology and integration risks, anchor modeling~~
~~and simulation in areas of large uncertainty, and to increase the interceptor technology readiness~~
~~levels (TRL) to level 5” (validating components in a relevant environment).48 MDA has also~~

~~45 For additional information about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus~~ 44 “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/. 45 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 165, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2021.pdf. 46 For additional information about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, IF11623, Hypersonic Missile
Defense: Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler, Stephen M. McCall, and Quintin A. Reed., by Kelley M. Sayler, Stephen M. McCall, and Quintin A. Reed.
46 47 “Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin at “Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin at NDIA Hypersonics NDIA Hypersonics
Senior Executive Series,”Senior Executive Series,” U.S.U.S. Department of Defense, December 13, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Department of Defense, December 13, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/News/~~T ranscripts/~~
~~T ranscript~~ Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1713396/media-availability-with-deputy-secretary-shanahan-and-under-secretary-of-defens/. -View/Article/1713396/media-availability-with-deputy-secretary-shanahan-and-under-secretary-of-defens/.
~~47 P.L. 114-840, Section 2, Division A, T itle XVI, §1687; and Hudson and T rimble, “T op U.S. Hypersonic Weapon~~
~~Program”; Steve T rimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” p. 21.~~
~~48 Missile Defense Agency, “Draft Request for Prototype Proposal: Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapon~~
~~System,” January 30, 2020, p. 8. T RL measures a technology’s level of maturity; T RL 5 requires validation in a~~
~~relevant environment. For information about specific T RLs, see T roy Carter, “The 9 T echnology Readiness Levels of~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

8

~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Congressional Research Service 8 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress guns, and electronic attack systems.48 In January 2020, MDA issued a draft request for prototype proposals for a Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapons System interceptor. This effort is intended to “reduce interceptor key technology and integration risks, anchor modeling and simulation in areas of large uncertainty, and to increase the interceptor technology readiness levels (TRL) to level 5” (validating components in a relevant environment).49 MDA has also awarded four companies—Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Leidos, and L3Harris—with $20 awarded four companies—Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Leidos, and L3Harris—with $20
~~mil ion~~ million contracts to design prototype space-based (low-Earth orbit) sensors by October 31, contracts to design prototype space-based (low-Earth orbit) sensors by October 31,
2020.2020.4950 Such sensors could Such sensors could ~~theoretical y~~theoretically extend the range at which incoming missiles could be extend the range at which incoming missiles could be
detected and tracked—a critical requirement for hypersonic missile defense, according to then-detected and tracked—a critical requirement for hypersonic missile defense, according to then-
USD(R&E) Griffin.USD(R&E) Griffin.5051 MDA requested $206.8 MDA requested $206.8 ~~mil ion~~million for hypersonic defense in FY2021—up for hypersonic defense in FY2021—up
from its $157.4 from its $157.4 ~~mil ion~~million FY2020 request—and $659 FY2020 request—and $659 ~~mil ion~~million across the FYDP. across the FYDP.5152 In addition, In addition,
DARPA is working on a program DARPA is working on a program ~~cal ed~~called Glide Breaker, which “ Glide Breaker, which “~~wil~~ will develop critical component develop critical component
technology to support a lightweight vehicle designed for precise engagement of hypersonic technology to support a lightweight vehicle designed for precise engagement of hypersonic
threats at very long range.”threats at very long range.”5253 DARPA requested $3 DARPA requested $3 ~~mil ion~~million for Glide Breaker in FY2021—down for Glide Breaker in FY2021—down
from $10 from $10 ~~mil ion~~million in FY2020. in FY2020.53
54 Infrastructure
According to a study mandated by the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112- According to a study mandated by the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-
239) and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA),239) and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA),5455 the United States had 48 the United States had 48
critical hypersonic test facilities and mobile assets in 2014 needed for the maturation of critical hypersonic test facilities and mobile assets in 2014 needed for the maturation of
hypersonic technologies for defense systems development through 2030. These specialized hypersonic technologies for defense systems development through 2030. These specialized
facilities, which simulate the unique conditions experienced in hypersonic flight (e.g., speed, facilities, which simulate the unique conditions experienced in hypersonic flight (e.g., speed,
pressure, heating),pressure, heating),5556 included 10 DOD hypersonic ground test facilities, 11 DOD open-air ranges, included 10 DOD hypersonic ground test facilities, 11 DOD open-air ranges,
11 DOD mobile assets, 9 NASA facilities, 2 Department of Energy facilities, and 5 industry or 11 DOD mobile assets, 9 NASA facilities, 2 Department of Energy facilities, and 5 industry or
academic facilities.academic facilities.5657 In its 2014 evaluation of U.S. hypersonic test and evaluation infrastructure, In its 2014 evaluation of U.S. hypersonic test and evaluation infrastructure,
IDA noted that “no current U.S. facility can provide full-scale, time-dependent, coupled IDA noted that “no current U.S. facility can provide full-scale, time-dependent, coupled
aerodynamic and thermal-loading environments for flight durations necessary to evaluate aerodynamic and thermal-loading environments for flight durations necessary to evaluate
~~these characteristics above Mach 8.” Since the 2014 study report was published, the University of~~
~~Notre Dame has opened a Mach 6 hypersonic wind tunnel and at least one hypersonic testing~~
~~facility has been inactivated. Development of Mach 8 and Mach 10 wind tunnels at Purdue~~
~~University and the University of Notre Dame, respectively, is ongoing.57 In addition, the~~
~~University of Arizona plans to modify one of its wind tunnels to enable Mach 5 testing by early~~
~~2021, while Texas A&M University—in partnership with Army Futures Command—plans to~~

~~the DOD,” T echLink, https://techlinkcenter.org/technology-readiness-level-dod/.~~
~~49 Sandra Erwin, “~~ 48 P.L. 114-840, Section 2, Division A, Title XVI, §1687; and Hudson and Trimble, “Top U.S. Hypersonic Weapon Program”; Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” p. 21. 49 Missile Defense Agency, “Draft Request for Prototype Proposal: Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapon System,” January 30, 2020, p. 8. TRL measures a technology’s level of maturity; TRL 5 requires validation in a relevant environment. For information about specific TRLs, see Troy Carter, “The 9 Technology Readiness Levels of the DOD,” TechLink, https://techlinkcenter.org/technology-readiness-level-dod/. 50 Sandra Erwin, “Missile Defense Agency selects four companies to develop space sensors,” Missile Defense Agency selects four companies to develop space sensors,” Space News,, October 30, October 30,
2019, https://spacenews.com/missile-defense-agency-selects-four-companies-to-develop-space-sensors/. Experts 2019, https://spacenews.com/missile-defense-agency-selects-four-companies-to-develop-space-sensors/. Experts
disagreedisagree on the cost and technological feasibility of space-basedon the cost and technological feasibility of space-based ~~missile~~ missile defense. defense.
50 51 Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin .” .”
5152 Missile Missile Defense Agency, BudgetDefense Agency, Budget Estimates Overview: FiscalEstimates Overview: Fiscal Year 2021, p. 12, https://www.mda.mil/global/Year 2021, p. 12, https://www.mda.mil/global/
documents/pdf/budgetfy21.pdf. documents/pdf/budgetfy21.pdf.
5253 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 164. Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 164.
53 54 Ibid. Ibid.
5455 P.L. 112-239, Section 2, Division A, P.L. 112-239, Section 2, Division A, ~~T itle~~Title X, §1071. X, §1071.
~~55 T hese~~56 These conditions additionally require the development of specialized materials such as metals and ceramics. conditions additionally require the development of specialized materials such as metals and ceramics.
~~56 T his~~ 57 This list is list is taken directly from a 2014 Institute for Defense Analysis report and, therefore, may not be current. See taken directly from a 2014 Institute for Defense Analysis report and, therefore, may not be current. See
(U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure to Effectively
and Efficiently Mature Hypersonic Technologies for Defense ~~System s Developm ent: Sum mary~~Systems Development: Summary Analysis and
~~Assessm ent~~Assessment, Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2014. Permission to use this material has been granted by the , Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2014. Permission to use this material has been granted by the
Office of ScienceOffice of Science ~~and T echnology Policy.~~
~~57 Oriana Pawlyk, “ Air Force Expanding Hypersonic T echnology T esting at T wo Indiana Universities,” Military.com,~~
~~April 23, 2019, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/04/23/air-force-expanding-hypersonic-technology-testing-~~
~~two-indiana-universities.html.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

9

~~link to page 23~~ ~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~complete construction of a kilometer-long Mach 10 wind tunnel by 2021.58~~ and Technology Policy. Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 23 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress these characteristics above Mach 8.” Since the 2014 study report was published, the University of Notre Dame has opened a Mach 6 hypersonic wind tunnel and at least one hypersonic testing facility has been inactivated. Development of Mach 8 and Mach 10 wind tunnels at Purdue University and the University of Notre Dame, respectively, is ongoing.58 In addition, the University of Arizona plans to modify one of its wind tunnels to enable Mach 5 testing by early 2021, while Texas A&M University—in partnership with Army Futures Command—plans to complete construction of a kilometer-long Mach 10 wind tunnel by 2021.59 (For a list of U.S. (For a list of U.S.
hypersonic test assets and their capabilities, see thypersonic test assets and their capabilities, see the Appendix.) The United States also uses the ) The United States also uses the
Royal Australian Air Force Woomera Test Range in Australia and the Andøya Rocket Range in Royal Australian Air Force Woomera Test Range in Australia and the Andøya Rocket Range in
Norway for flight testing.Norway for flight testing.5960 In January 2019, the Navy announced plans to reactivate its Launch In January 2019, the Navy announced plans to reactivate its Launch
Test Complex at China Lake, CA, to improve air launch and underwater testing capabilities for Test Complex at China Lake, CA, to improve air launch and underwater testing capabilities for
the conventional prompt strike program.the conventional prompt strike program.60
61 In April In April 2020, DOD’s Office of Inspector General announced that it would be evaluating current 2020, DOD’s Office of Inspector General announced that it would be evaluating current
ground test and evaluation facilities to determine if the capability and capacity would be ground test and evaluation facilities to determine if the capability and capacity would be
sufficient to execute DOD’s planned test schedule.sufficient to execute DOD’s planned test schedule.6162 In addition, in March 2020, DOD announced In addition, in March 2020, DOD announced
that it had established a “hypersonic war room” to assess the U.S. industrial base for hypersonic that it had established a “hypersonic war room” to assess the U.S. industrial base for hypersonic
weapons and identify “critical nodes” in the supply chain.weapons and identify “critical nodes” in the supply chain.~~62 Initial findings are to be released in~~
~~mid-2020.63~~
63 DOD has also amended its “5000 series” acquisition policy in order to enhance supply chain resiliency and reduce sustainment costs.64 Russia
Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it
accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States
and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-~~Bal istic~~Ballistic Missile Treaty in Missile Treaty in
2001.2001.6465 Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated that “the US is permitting constant, Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated that “the US is permitting constant,
~~uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-bal istic missiles, improving their quality, and creating~~
~~new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventual y this wil result in the~~
~~complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that al of our missiles could simply~~
~~be intercepted.”65 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they approach~~
~~their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its sense of~~
~~strategic stability.66~~

~~58 University of Arizona, “Mach 5 Quiet Ludwieg T ube~~ 58 Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Expanding Hypersonic Technology Testing at Two Indiana Universities,” Military.com, April 23, 2019, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/04/23/air-force-expanding-hypersonic-technology-testing-two-indiana-universities.html. 59 University of Arizona, “Mach 5 Quiet Ludwieg Tube,” https://transition.arizona.edu/facilities/qlt5?_ga=,” https://transition.arizona.edu/facilities/qlt5?_ga=
2.62515882.768526379.15828431922.62515882.768526379.1582843192 -983632914.1582843192; and Ashley -983632914.1582843192; and Ashley ~~T ressel, “~~ Tressel, “Army to open hypersonic testing Army to open hypersonic testing
facility at facility at ~~T exas~~Texas A&M,” Inside Defense, October 13, 2019, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/army-open- A&M,” Inside Defense, October 13, 2019, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/army-open-
hypersonic-testing-facility-texas-am. Additional universities such as the University of Maryland, hypersonic-testing-facility-texas-am. Additional universities such as the University of Maryland, ~~th e~~the California California
Institute of Institute of ~~T echnology~~Technology, the Georgia Institute of , the Georgia Institute of ~~T echnology~~Technology, the Air Force Academy, the University of , the Air Force Academy, the University of ~~T ennessee~~Tennessee, and , and
VirginiaVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State University also maintain experimental hypersonic facilities or conduct Polytechnic Institute and State University also maintain experimental hypersonic facilities or conduct
hypersonic research. hypersonic research.
59 60 (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure.
6061 “Update: US Navy to develop China Lake to support CPS weapon testing,” “Update: US Navy to develop China Lake to support CPS weapon testing,” Jane’s (subscription required),(subscription required), February February
12, 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1644858-JMR. 12, 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1644858-JMR.
61 62 See See Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Memorandum for Distribution: Evaluation of the Ground Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Memorandum for Distribution: Evaluation of the Ground
~~T est~~Test and Evaluation Infrastructure Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (Project No. D2020 and Evaluation Infrastructure Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (Project No. D2020 -DEV0SN-0106.000),” -DEV0SN-0106.000),”
April 13, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/14/2002280826/-1/-1/1/D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000.PDF. April 13, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/14/2002280826/-1/-1/1/D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000.PDF.
6263 Aaron Mehta, “Pentagon launches hypersonic industrial base study,” Aaron Mehta, “Pentagon launches hypersonic industrial base study,” Defense News,, March 3, 2020, March 3, 2020,
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/03/02/pentagon-launches-hypersonic-industrial-base-study/. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/03/02/pentagon-launches-hypersonic-industrial-base-study/.
~~63 Ibid.~~
6464 C. Todd Lopez, “Rewrite of Acquisition Regulation Helps U.S. Build Hypersonic Arsenal More Quickly,” DOD News, October 30, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2400205/rewrite-of-acquisition-regulation-helps-us-build-hypersonic-arsenal-more-quickly/. 65 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic
~~Arm s~~Arms Control, February, February 2019, https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-2019, https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-
and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/. and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.
~~65 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/~~
~~president/news/56957.~~
~~66 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See T ong~~
~~Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic T echnology and the Security~~
~~Dilemma,” Carnegie-T singhua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/~~
~~conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

10

~~link to page 14~~

~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Congressional Research Service 10 link to page 15 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply be intercepted.”66 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they approach their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its sense of strategic stability.67 Programs
Russia is pursuing two hypersonic weapons programs—the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon (or Russia is pursuing two hypersonic weapons programs—the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon (or
Zircon)—and has reportedly fielded the KinzhalZircon)—and has reportedly fielded the Kinzhal (“Dagger”), a maneuvering air-launched (“Dagger”), a maneuvering air-launched ~~bal istic~~
ballistic missile.missile.6768
Avangard Avangard (Figure 2) is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an intercontinental is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an intercontinental ~~bal istic~~ballistic
missile (ICBM), giving it “effectively ‘unlimited’ range.”missile (ICBM), giving it “effectively ‘unlimited’ range.”6869 Reports indicate that Avangard is Reports indicate that Avangard is
currently deployed on the SS-19 Stiletto ICBM, though Russia plans to currently deployed on the SS-19 Stiletto ICBM, though Russia plans to ~~eventual y~~eventually launch the launch the
vehicle from the Sarmat ICBM. Sarmat is vehicle from the Sarmat ICBM. Sarmat is ~~stil~~ still in development, although it may be deployed by in development, although it may be deployed by
2021.2021.6970 Avangard features onboard countermeasures and Avangard features onboard countermeasures and ~~wil~~ will reportedly carry a nuclear warhead. reportedly carry a nuclear warhead.
It was successfully tested twice in 2016 and once in December 2018, reportedly reaching speeds It was successfully tested twice in 2016 and once in December 2018, reportedly reaching speeds
of Mach 20; however, an October 2017 test resulted in failure. Russian news sources claim that of Mach 20; however, an October 2017 test resulted in failure. Russian news sources claim that
Avangard entered into combat duty in December 2019.Avangard entered into combat duty in December 2019.70
~~Figure 2. Artist Rendering of Avangard~~

Source: https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.
~~In addition to Avangard, Russia is developing Tsirkon, a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile~~
~~capable of traveling at speeds of between Mach 6 and Mach 8. Tsirkon is reportedly capable of~~
~~striking both ground and naval targets. According to Russian news sources, Tsirkon has a range of~~
~~between approximately 250 and 600 miles and can be fired from the vertical launch systems~~
~~mounted on cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Pyotr Veliky, Project 20380 corvettes, Project 22350~~
~~frigates, and Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other platforms.71 These sources assert~~

~~pub-76894.~~
~~67 Although the Kinzhal is a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile rather than a hypersonic glide vehicle or~~
~~hypersonic cruise missile, it is often included in reporting of Russia’s hypersonic weapons program. For this reason —~~
~~and because it poses defensive challenges that are similar to other hypersonic weapons—it is included here for~~
~~reference.~~
~~68 Steve T rimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20.~~
~~69 Ibid. Sarmat could reportedly accommodate at least three Avangard vehicles. See Malcolm Claus, “Russia unveils~~
~~new strategic delivery systems,” Jane’s (subscription required), https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.~~
~~70 “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” TASS, December 27, 2019,~~
~~https://tass.com/defense/1104297.~~
~~71 “Russia makes over 10 test launches of T sirkon seaborne hypersonic missile,” TASS, December 21, 2018,~~
~~http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also~~ ~~Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power~~
~~Aspirations, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/~~
~~military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

11

~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~that Tsirkon was successfully launched from a Project 22350 frigate in January 2020.72 U.S.~~
~~intel igence reports indicate that the missile wil become operational in 2023.73~~
~~In addition, Russia has reportedly fielded Kinzhal, a maneuvering air-launched bal istic missile~~
~~modified from the Iskander missile. According to U.S. intel igence~~71 66 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957. 67 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-pub-76894. 68 Although the Kinzhal is a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile rather than a hypersonic glide vehicle or hypersonic cruise missile, it is often included in reporting of Russia’s hypersonic weapons program. For this reason—and because it poses defensive challenges that are similar to other hypersonic weapons—it is included here for reference. 69 Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20. 70 Ibid. Sarmat could reportedly accommodate at least three Avangard vehicles. See Malcolm Claus, “Russia unveils new strategic delivery systems,” Jane’s (subscription required), https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR. 71 “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” TASS, December 27, 2019, https://tass.com/defense/1104297. Congressional Research Service 11 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Figure 2. Artist Rendering of Avangard Source: https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR. In addition to Avangard, Russia is developing Tsirkon, a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile capable of traveling at speeds of between Mach 6 and Mach 8. Tsirkon is reportedly capable of striking both ground and naval targets. According to Russian news sources, Tsirkon has a range of between approximately 250 and 600 miles and can be fired from the vertical launch systems mounted on cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Pyotr Veliky, Project 20380 corvettes, Project 22350 frigates, and Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other platforms.72 These sources assert that Tsirkon was successfully launched from a Project 22350 frigate in January and October 2020.73 U.S. intelligence reports indicate that the missile will become operational in 2023.74 In addition, Russia has reportedly fielded Kinzhal, a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile modified from the Iskander missile. According to U.S. intelligence reports, Kinzhal was reports, Kinzhal was
successfully test fired from a modified MiG-31 fighter (NATO code name: Foxhound) as recently successfully test fired from a modified MiG-31 fighter (NATO code name: Foxhound) as recently
as July 2018—striking a target at a distance of approximately 500 miles—and is expected by U.S. as July 2018—striking a target at a distance of approximately 500 miles—and is expected by U.S.
~~intel igence~~ intelligence sources to become ready for combat by 2020.sources to become ready for combat by 2020.7475 Russia plans to deploy the missile on Russia plans to deploy the missile on
both the MiG-31 and the Su-34 long-range strike fighter.both the MiG-31 and the Su-34 long-range strike fighter.7576 Russia is working to mount the missile Russia is working to mount the missile
on the Tu-22M3 strategic bomber (NATO code name: Backfire), although the slower-moving on the Tu-22M3 strategic bomber (NATO code name: Backfire), although the slower-moving
bomber may face bomber may face ~~chal enges~~challenges in “accelerating the weapon into the correct launch parameters.”77 72 “Russia makes over 10 test launches of Tsirkon seaborne hypersonic missile,” TASS, December 21, 2018, http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf. 73 “TASS: Russia Conducts First Ship-Based Hypersonic Missile Test,” Reuters, February 27, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/europe/tass-russia-conducts-first-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test; and Associated Press, “Russia reports successful test launch of hypersonic missile,” October 7, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/vladimir-putin-archive-russia-20688205e30f19a8d76fcd77cb9d45a4. 74 Amanda Macias, “Russia again successfully tests ship-based hypersonic missile—which will ~~in “accelerating the weapon into the correct launch parameters.”76~~
~~Russian media has reported Kinzhal’s top speed as Mach 10, with a range of up to 1,200 miles~~
~~when launched from the MiG-31. The Kinzhal is reportedly capable of maneuverable flight, as~~
~~wel as of striking both ground and naval targets, and could eventual y be fitted with a nuclear~~
~~warhead. However, such claims regarding Kinzhal’s performance characteristics have not been~~
~~publicly verified by U.S. intel igence agencies, and have been met with skepticism by a number~~
~~of analysts.77~~
~~Infrastructure~~
~~Russia reportedly conducts hypersonic wind tunnel testing at the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic~~
~~Institute in Zhukovsky and the Khristianovich Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics in~~
~~Novosibirsk, and has tested hypersonic weapons at Dombarovskiy Air Base, the Baykonur~~
~~Cosmodrome, and the Kura Range.78~~
~~China~~
~~According to Tong Zhao, a fel ow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most~~
~~experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in~~

~~72 “T ASS: Russia Conducts First Ship-Based Hypersonic Missile T est ,” Reuters, February 27, 2020,~~
~~https://www.voanews.com/europe/tass-russia-conducts-first-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test.~~
~~73 Amanda Macias, “ Russia again successfully tests ship-based hypersonic missile—which will~~ likely be ready for likely be ready for
combat by 2022,”combat by 2022,” CNBC, December 20, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/20/russia-tests-hypersonic-missile-that-, December 20, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/20/russia-tests-hypersonic-missile-that-
could-be-ready-for-war-by-2022.html; and “could-be-ready-for-war-by-2022.html; and “ Russian Navy to accept latest Russian Navy to accept latest ~~T sirkon~~Tsirkon hypersonic missile for service in hypersonic missile for service in
2023—source,” 2023—source,” TASS, March 20, 2019, http://tass.com/defense/1049572. , March 20, 2019, http://tass.com/defense/1049572.
74 75 Amanda Macias, “Russia’s Amanda Macias, “Russia’s new hypersonic missile, which can be launchednew hypersonic missile, which can be launched from warplanes, willfrom warplanes, will likely belikely be ready for ready for
combat by 2020,”combat by 2020,” CNBC, July, July 13, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/13/russia-new-hypersonic-missile-likely-13, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/13/russia-new-hypersonic-missile-likely-
ready-for-war-by-2020.html. ready-for-war-by-2020.html.
7576 Mark B. Schneider, Mark B. Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles …“Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles … and What It Means” in and What It Means” in Defense Technology
Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons, American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019. , American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019.
7677 Dave Majumdar, Dave Majumdar, ~~“ Russia: New~~ “Russia: New Kinzhal Aero-Ballistic MissileKinzhal Aero-Ballistic Missile Has 3,000 km Range if Fired from Supersonic Congressional Research Service 12 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Russian media has reported Kinzhal’s top speed as Mach 10, with a range of up to 1,200 miles when launched from the MiG-31. The Kinzhal is reportedly capable of maneuverable flight, as well as of striking both ground and naval targets, and could eventually be fitted with a nuclear warhead. However, such claims regarding Kinzhal’s performance characteristics have not been publicly verified by U.S. intelligence agencies, and have been met with skepticism by a number of analysts.78 Infrastructure Russia reportedly conducts hypersonic wind tunnel testing at the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic Institute in Zhukovsky and the Khristianovich Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics in Novosibirsk, and has tested hypersonic weapons at Dombarovskiy Air Base, the Baykonur Cosmodrome, and the Kura Range.79 China According to Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in ~~Has 3,000 km Range if Fired from Supersonic~~
~~Bomber,” The National Interest, July 18, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-new-kinzhal-aero-ballistic-~~
~~missile-has-3000-km-range-if-fired-supersonic-bomber.~~
~~77 David Axe, “ Is Kinzhal, Russia’s New Hypersonic Missile, a Game Changer?,” The Daily Beast, March 15, 2018,~~
~~https://www.thedailybeast.com/is-kinzhal-russias-new-hypersonic-missile-a-game-changer.~~
~~78 “Aerodynamics,” Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, http://tsagi.com/research/aerodynamics/; “Russia announces~~
~~successful flight test of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle,” Jane’s (subscription required), January 3, 2019,~~
~~https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1451630-JMR; and “ Avangard system is tested, said to be fully ready for~~
~~deployment ,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 26, 2018, http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/~~
~~avangard_system_is_tested_said.shtml.~~
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~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S. China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S.
military technology,” such as U.S. regional missile defenses.military technology,” such as U.S. regional missile defenses.7980 In particular, China’s pursuit of In particular, China’s pursuit of
hypersonic weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable hypersonic weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable
the United States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and the United States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and
supporting infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s abilitysupporting infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to to
conduct a retaliatory strike against the United States.conduct a retaliatory strike against the United States.80
81 China has demonstrated a growing interest in Russian advances in hypersonic weapons China has demonstrated a growing interest in Russian advances in hypersonic weapons
technology, conducting flight tests of a hypersonic-glide vehicle (HGV) only days after Russia technology, conducting flight tests of a hypersonic-glide vehicle (HGV) only days after Russia
tested its own system.tested its own system.8182 Furthermore, a January 2017 report found that over half of open-source Furthermore, a January 2017 report found that over half of open-source
Chinese papers on hypersonic weapons include references to Russian weapons programs.Chinese papers on hypersonic weapons include references to Russian weapons programs.8283 This This
could indicate that China is increasingly considering hypersonic weapons within a regional could indicate that China is increasingly considering hypersonic weapons within a regional
context. Indeed, some analysts believe that China may be planning to mate context. Indeed, some analysts believe that China may be planning to mate ~~conventional y~~conventionally armed armed
HGVs with the DF-21 and DF-26 HGVs with the DF-21 and DF-26 ~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles in support of an anti-access/area denial Bomber,” The National Interest, July 18, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-new-kinzhal-aero-ballistic-missile-has-3000-km-range-if-fired-supersonic-bomber. 78 David Axe, “Is Kinzhal, Russia’s New Hypersonic Missile, a Game Changer?,” The Daily Beast, March 15, 2018, https://www.thedailybeast.com/is-kinzhal-russias-new-hypersonic-missile-a-game-changer. 79 “Aerodynamics,” Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, http://tsagi.com/research/aerodynamics/; “Russia announces successful flight test of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle,” Jane’s (subscription required), January 3, 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1451630-JMR; and “Avangard system is tested, said to be fully ready for deployment,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 26, 2018, http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/avangard_system_is_tested_said.shtml. 80 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security Dilemma.” 81 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability”; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide,” August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide. 82 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide.” 83 Lora Saalman, “Factoring Russia into the US-China Equation on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles,” SIPRI, January 2017, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Factoring-Russia-into-US-Chinese-equation-hypersonic-glide-vehicles.pdf. Congressional Research Service 13 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress strategy.84 ~~missiles in support of an anti-access/area denial~~
~~strategy.83~~ China has reportedly not made a final determination as to whether its hypersonic China has reportedly not made a final determination as to whether its hypersonic
weapons weapons ~~wil~~ will be nuclear- or be nuclear- or ~~conventional y~~conventionally-armed—or dual-capable.-armed—or dual-capable.
Programs
China has conducted a number of successful tests of the DF-17, a medium-range China has conducted a number of successful tests of the DF-17, a medium-range ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile missile
~~specifical y~~specifically designed to launch HGVs. U.S. designed to launch HGVs. U.S. ~~intel igence~~ intelligence analysts assess that the missile has a analysts assess that the missile has a
range of approximately 1,000 to 1,500 miles and could be deployed in 2020.range of approximately 1,000 to 1,500 miles and could be deployed in 2020.8485 China has also China has also
tested the DF-41 intercontinental tested the DF-41 intercontinental ~~bal istic~~ ballistic missile, which could be modified to carry a missile, which could be modified to carry a
conventional or nuclear HGV, according to a report by a U.S. Congressional commission. The conventional or nuclear HGV, according to a report by a U.S. Congressional commission. The
development of the DF-41 thus “significantly increases the [Chinese] rocket force’s nuclear threat development of the DF-41 thus “significantly increases the [Chinese] rocket force’s nuclear threat
to the U.S. mainland,” the report states.to the U.S. mainland,” the report states.85
86 China has tested the DF-ZF HGV (previously referred to as the WU-14) at least nine times since China has tested the DF-ZF HGV (previously referred to as the WU-14) at least nine times since
2014. U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately 2014. U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately
1,200 miles and have stated that the missile may be capable of performing “extreme maneuvers” 1,200 miles and have stated that the missile may be capable of performing “extreme maneuvers”

~~79 T ong Zhao, “ Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic T echnology and the~~
~~Security Dilemma.”~~
~~80 T ong Zhao, “ Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability”; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic~~
~~Glide,” August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-~~
~~backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.~~
~~81 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide.”~~
~~82 Lora Saalman, “Factoring Russia into the US-China Equation on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles,” SIPRI, January 2017,~~
~~https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Factoring-Russia-into-US-Chinese-equation-hypersonic-glide-vehicles.pdf.~~
~~83 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide”; and Malcolm Claus and Andrew T ate~~during flight.87 Although unconfirmed by intelligence agencies, some analysts believe the DF-ZF will be operational as early as 2020.88 According to U.S. defense officials, China also successfully tested Starry Sky-2 (or Xing Kong-2), a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype, in August 2018.89 China claims the vehicle reached top speeds of Mach 6 and executed a series of in-flight maneuvers before landing.90 Unlike the DF-ZF, Starry Sky-2 is a “waverider” that uses powered flight after launch and derives lift from its own shockwaves. Some reports indicate that the Starry Sky-2 could be operational by 2025.91 U.S. officials have declined to comment on the program.92 84 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide”; and Malcolm Claus and Andrew Tate, “Chinese hypersonic , “Chinese hypersonic
programme reflects regional priorities,” programme reflects regional priorities,” Jane’s (subscription required), (subscription required), March 12, 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/March 12, 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/
Display/FG_1731069-JIR. Display/FG_1731069-JIR.
84 85 Ankit Panda, “ Ankit Panda, “ Introducing the DF-17: China’s NewlyIntroducing the DF-17: China’s Newly ~~T ested~~ Tested Ballistic Missile Ballistic Missile Armed with a Hypersonic Glide Armed with a Hypersonic Glide
Vehicle,”Vehicle,” The National Interest, December, December 28, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinas-28, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinas-
newly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/; and Bill Gertz, “newly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/; and Bill Gertz, “ China’s new hypersonic China’s new hypersonic
missile,” missile,” Washington ~~Tim es~~Times, October 2, 2019, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/oct/2/china-shows-df-17-, October 2, 2019, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/oct/2/china-shows-df-17-
hypersonic-missile/. hypersonic-missile/.
8586 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2018 Annual Report, p. 235, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/, p. 235, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf. default/files/annual_reports/2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.
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~~link to page 18~~ ~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~during flight.86 Although unconfirmed by intel igence agencies, some analysts believe the DF-ZF~~
~~wil be operational as early as 2020.87~~
~~According to U.S. defense officials, China also successfully tested Starry Sky-2 (or Xing Kong-~~
~~2), a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype, in August 2018.88 China claims the vehicle~~
~~reached top speeds of Mach 6 and executed a series of in-flight maneuvers before landing.89~~
~~Unlike the DF-ZF, Starry Sky-2 is a “waverider” that uses powered flight after launch and derives~~
~~lift from its own shockwaves. Some reports indicate that the Starry Sky-2 could be operational by~~
~~2025.90 U.S. officials have declined to comment on the program.91~~
~~Infrastructure~~
~~China has a robust research and development infrastructure devoted to hypersonic weapons.~~
~~Then-USD(R&E) Michael Griffin stated in March 2018 that China has conducted 20 times as~~
~~many hypersonic tests as the United States.92 China tested three hypersonic vehicle models (D18-~~
~~1S, D18-2S, and D18-3S)—each with different aerodynamic properties—in September 2018.93~~
~~Analysts believe that these tests could be designed to help China develop weapons that fly at~~
~~variable speeds, including hypersonic speeds. Similarly, China has used the Lingyun Mach 6+~~
~~high-speed engine, or “scramjet,” test bed (Figure 3) to research thermal resistant components~~
~~and hypersonic cruise missile technologies.94~~

~~86 “Gliding missiles~~ 87 “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The Economist, April 6, 2019, , April 6, 2019,
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-thathttps://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that -fly-faster-than-mach-5-are--fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-
coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady,coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, ~~“ China T ests~~ “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US New Weapon Capable of Breaching US ~~Missile~~ Missile Defense Systems,” Defense Systems,” The
~~Diplom at~~Diplomat, April 28, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-missile-, April 28, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-missile-
defense-systems/. defense-systems/.
87 88 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2015 Annual Report, p. 20, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/, p. 20, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF. default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF.
8889 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 44, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/May 2, 2019, p. 44, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/
~~2019_CHINA_MILIT ARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf .~~
~~89 Jessie Yeung, “~~ 2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. 90 Jessie Yeung, “China claims to have successfullyChina claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircrafttested its first hypersonic aircraft . .
CNN,, ~~August~~ August 7, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft-intl/index.html. 7, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft-intl/index.html.
9091 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20. p. 20.
9192 Bill Bill Gertz, “Gertz, “ China Reveals China Reveals ~~T est~~Test of New of New Hypersonic Missile,” Hypersonic Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon, August, August 10, 2018, 10, 2018,
https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/. https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/.
~~92 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20.~~
~~93 Malcolm Claus and Andrew T ate, “ Chinese hypersonic programme reflects regional priorities,” Jane’s (subscription~~
~~required), March 12, 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1731069-JIR.~~
~~94 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “ China’s hypersonic military projects include spaceplanes and rail guns,”~~ ~~Popular~~
~~Mechanics, June 26, 2018, https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-work-speeds-up.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

14

~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~Figure 3. Lingyun-1 Hypersonic Cruise Missile Prototype~~

~~Source:~~ ~~Photo accompanying Drake Long, “China reveals Lingyun-1 hypersonic missile~~ Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 18 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Infrastructure China has a robust research and development infrastructure devoted to hypersonic weapons. Then-USD(R&E) Michael Griffin stated in March 2018 that China has conducted 20 times as many hypersonic tests as the United States.93 China tested three hypersonic vehicle models (D18-1S, D18-2S, and D18-3S)—each with different aerodynamic properties—in September 2018.94 Analysts believe that these tests could be designed to help China develop weapons that fly at variable speeds, including hypersonic speeds. Similarly, China has used the Lingyun Mach 6+ high-speed engine, or “scramjet,” test bed (Figure 3) to research thermal resistant components and hypersonic cruise missile technologies.95 Figure 3. Lingyun-1 Hypersonic Cruise Missile Prototype Source: Photo accompanying Drake Long, “China reveals Lingyun-1 hypersonic missile at National Science and at National Science and
Technology expo,” Technology expo,” The Defense Post, May 21, 2018. , May 21, 2018.
According to According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, “China is also investing heavily in hypersonic ground , “China is also investing heavily in hypersonic ground
testing facilities.”testing facilities.”9596 CAAA CAAA operates the FD-02, FD-03, and FD-07 hypersonic wind tunnels, operates the FD-02, FD-03, and FD-07 hypersonic wind tunnels,
which are capable of reaching speeds of Mach 8, Mach 10, and Mach 12, respectively.which are capable of reaching speeds of Mach 8, Mach 10, and Mach 12, respectively.9697 China China
also operates the JF-12 hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 5 and also operates the JF-12 hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 5 and
Mach 9, and the FD-21 hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 10 and Mach 9, and the FD-21 hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 10 and
Mach 15.Mach 15.9798 China is expected to have an operational wind tunnel capable of reaching speeds of China is expected to have an operational wind tunnel capable of reaching speeds of
Mach 25 by 2020.Mach 25 by 2020.9899 China is known to have tested hypersonic weapons at the Jiuquan China is known to have tested hypersonic weapons at the Jiuquan ~~Satel ite~~
Satellite Launch Center and the Taiyuan Launch Center and the Taiyuan ~~Satel ite~~Satellite Launch Center. 93 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20. 94 Malcolm Claus and Andrew Tate, “Chinese hypersonic programme reflects regional priorities,” Jane’s (subscription required), March 12, 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1731069-JIR. 95 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “China’s hypersonic military projects include spaceplanes and rail guns,” Popular Mechanics, June 26, 2018, https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-work-speeds-up. 96 Tate ~~Launch Center.~~

~~95 T ate~~, “China conducts further tests.” , “China conducts further tests.”
9697 Kelvin Wong, “ Kelvin Wong, “ China claims successfulChina claims successful test of hypersonic waverider,” test of hypersonic waverider,” Jane’s (subscription required),(subscription required), ~~August~~ August 10, 10,
2018, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1002295-JDW. 2018, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1002295-JDW.
9798 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “A look at China’s most exciting hypersonic aerospace programs,” Popular Science, “A look at China’s most exciting hypersonic aerospace programs,” Popular Science,
April 18, 2017, https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-technology. April 18, 2017, https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-technology.
~~98 T ate~~ 99 Tate, “China conducts further tests.” , “China conducts further tests.”
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Global Hypersonic Weapons Programs
Although the United States, Russia, and China possess Although the United States, Russia, and China possess the most advanced hypersonic weapons programs,the most advanced hypersonic weapons programs, a a
number of other countries—including Australia,number of other countries—including Australia, India, France, and Germany—areIndia, France, and Germany—are also developing hypersonic also developing hypersonic
weapons technology. Since 2007, the United States has col aborated with Australia on the weapons technology. Since 2007, the United States has col aborated with Australia on the ~~Hyperson ic~~Hypersonic
International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) programInternational Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) program to develop hypersonic technologies.to develop hypersonic technologies. The most The most
recent HIFiRE test, successful y conducted in July 2017, explored the flight dynamics of a Mach 8 hypersonic glide recent HIFiRE test, successful y conducted in July 2017, explored the flight dynamics of a Mach 8 hypersonic glide
vehicle,vehicle, while previous tests explored scramjetwhile previous tests explored scramjet engine technologies.engine technologies. In addition to the WoomeraIn addition to the Woomera Test Range Test Range
facilities—onefacilities—one of the largestof the largest weapons test facilitiesweapons test facilities in the world—Australiain the world—Australia operates seven hypersonic wind operates seven hypersonic wind
tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 30. tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 30.
India has similarlyIndia has similarly col aborated with Russia on the development of BrahMos II, a Mach 7 hypersonic cruise missile. col aborated with Russia on the development of BrahMos II, a Mach 7 hypersonic cruise missile.
Although BrahMos II was Although BrahMos II was ~~initial y~~ initially intended to be fielded in 2017, news reports indicate that the program faces intended to be fielded in 2017, news reports indicate that the program faces
significant delays and is now scheduled to achieve initial operational capability between 2025 and 2028. Reportedly, significant delays and is now scheduled to achieve initial operational capability between 2025 and 2028. Reportedly,
India is also developing an indigenous hypersonic cruise missileIndia is also developing an indigenous hypersonic cruise missile as part of its Hypersonic Technology as part of its Hypersonic Technology
DemonstratorDemonstrator Vehicle programVehicle program and successful y tested a Mach 6 scramjetand successful y tested a Mach 6 scramjet in June 2019. India operates in June 2019. India operates
approximately 12 hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 13. approximately 12 hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 13.
France also has col aborated and contracted with Russia on the development of hypersonic technology. Although France also has col aborated and contracted with Russia on the development of hypersonic technology. Although
France has been investing in hypersonic technology researchFrance has been investing in hypersonic technology research since the 1990s, it has only recently announced its since the 1990s, it has only recently announced its
intent to weaponize the technology. Under the V-max (Experimental Maneuvering Vehicle) program,intent to weaponize the technology. Under the V-max (Experimental Maneuvering Vehicle) program, France plans France plans
to modify its air-to-surface ASN4G supersonic missileto modify its air-to-surface ASN4G supersonic missile for hypersonic flight by 2022. Somefor hypersonic flight by 2022. Some analysts believeanalysts believe that the that the
V-max program is intended to provide France with a strategic nuclear weapon. France operates five hypersonic V-max program is intended to provide France with a strategic nuclear weapon. France operates five hypersonic
wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 21. wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 21.
Germany successful yGermany successful y tested an experimental hypersonic glide vehicle (SHEFEX II) in 2012; however, reports tested an experimental hypersonic glide vehicle (SHEFEX II) in 2012; however, reports
indicate that Germanyindicate that Germany may have pul ed funding for the program. Germanmay have pul ed funding for the program. German defense contractor DLR continues to defense contractor DLR continues to
research and test hypersonic vehicles as part of the European Union’s ATLAS II project,research and test hypersonic vehicles as part of the European Union’s ATLAS II project, which seekswhich seeks to design a to design a
Mach 5-6 vehicle.Mach 5-6 vehicle. Germany operates three hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Germany operates three hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to
Mach 11. Mach 11.
~~Final y,~~ Finally, Japan is developing the Hypersonic CruiseJapan is developing the Hypersonic Cruise ~~Missile~~ Missile (HCM) and the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HCM) and the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile
(HVGP). According to(HVGP). According to Jane’s, Japan invested $122 mil ion, Japan invested $122 mil ion in HVGP in FY2019. It reportedlyin HVGP in FY2019. It reportedly plans to field one plans to field one
HVGP warhead for neutralizing aircraft carriersHVGP warhead for neutralizing aircraft carriers and one for area suppression—both in the 2024 to 2028 and one for area suppression—both in the 2024 to 2028
timeframe.timeframe. The warheads are expected to enter serviceThe warheads are expected to enter service in 2030. The Japan Aerospacein 2030. The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency Exploration Agency
operates three hypersonic wind tunnels, with two additional facilitiesoperates three hypersonic wind tunnels, with two additional facilities at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the
University of Tokyo. University of Tokyo.
Other countries—including Iran, Israel,Other countries—including Iran, Israel, and South Korea—haveand South Korea—have conducted foundational researchconducted foundational research on hypersonic on hypersonic
airflowsairflows and propulsion systems,and propulsion systems, but may not be pursuing a hypersonic weapons capability at this time. but may not be pursuing a hypersonic weapons capability at this time.
Note: For additional ~~information~~ information about global hypersonic weapons programs, see Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic
Missile Proliferation. For information about Japan’s hypersonic weapons research and development plans, see Mike Yeo,
“Japan unveils its hypersonic weapons plans,” Defense News, March 14, 2020.
Issues for Congress
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs during the As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs during the
annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider a number of questions about annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider a number of questions about
the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic
stability and arms control. This section provides an overview of some of these questions. stability and arms control. This section provides an overview of some of these questions.
Mission Requirements
Although the Department of Defense is funding a number of hypersonic weapons programs, it has Although the Department of Defense is funding a number of hypersonic weapons programs, it has
not established any programs of record, suggesting that it may not have approved requirements not established any programs of record, suggesting that it may not have approved requirements
for hypersonic weapons or long-term funding plans.for hypersonic weapons or long-term funding plans.99100 Indeed, as Assistant Director for Indeed, as Assistant Director for
Hypersonics (USD[R&E]) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire Hypersonics (USD[R&E]) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire

~~99 Steve T rimble, “New Long-T erm~~ 100 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.” Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.”
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hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to “[identify] the most viable hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to “[identify] the most viable
overarching weapon system concepts to choose from and then make a decision based on success overarching weapon system concepts to choose from and then make a decision based on success
and and ~~chal enges.”100~~challenges.”101 As Congress conducts oversight of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it may As Congress conducts oversight of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it may
seek to obtain information about DOD’s evaluation of potential mission sets for hypersonic seek to obtain information about DOD’s evaluation of potential mission sets for hypersonic
weapons, a cost analysis of alternative means of executing these mission sets, and an assessment weapons, a cost analysis of alternative means of executing these mission sets, and an assessment
of the enabling technologies—such as space-based sensors or autonomous command and control of the enabling technologies—such as space-based sensors or autonomous command and control
systems—that may be required to employ or defend against hypersonic weapons. systems—that may be required to employ or defend against hypersonic weapons.
Funding and Management Considerations
Assistant Director for Hypersonics (USD[R&E]) Mike White has noted that DOD is prioritizing Assistant Director for Hypersonics (USD[R&E]) Mike White has noted that DOD is prioritizing
offensive programs while it determines “the path forward to get a robust defensive strategy.”offensive programs while it determines “the path forward to get a robust defensive strategy.”~~101~~102
This approach is reflected in DOD’s FY2021 request, which This approach is reflected in DOD’s FY2021 request, which ~~al ocates~~allocates $206.8 $206.8 ~~mil ion~~million for for
hypersonic defense programs—of a total $3.2 hypersonic defense programs—of a total $3.2 ~~bil ion~~billion request for request for al all hypersonic-related hypersonic-related
research.research.~~102~~103 Similarly, in FY2020, DOD requested $157.4 Similarly, in FY2020, DOD requested $157.4 ~~mil ion~~million for hypersonic defense for hypersonic defense
programs—of a total $2.6 programs—of a total $2.6 ~~bil ion for al~~ billion for all hypersonic-related research.hypersonic-related research.
Although the Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees increased FY2020 Although the Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees increased FY2020
appropriations for both hypersonic offense and defense above the FY2020 request, they expressed appropriations for both hypersonic offense and defense above the FY2020 request, they expressed
concerns, noting in their joint explanatory statement of H.R. 1158 “that the rapid growth in concerns, noting in their joint explanatory statement of H.R. 1158 “that the rapid growth in
hypersonic research has the potential to result in stove-piped, proprietary systems that duplicate hypersonic research has the potential to result in stove-piped, proprietary systems that duplicate
capabilities and increase costs.”capabilities and increase costs.”~~103~~104 To mitigate this concern, they appropriated $100 To mitigate this concern, they appropriated $100 ~~mil ion~~million for for
DOD to establish a Joint DOD to establish a Joint ~~Hypersonic~~Hypersonics Transition Office Transition Office (JHTO) to “develop and implement an integrated to “develop and implement an integrated
science and technology roadmap for hypersonics” and “establish a university consortium for science and technology roadmap for hypersonics” and “establish a university consortium for
~~hypersonic research and workforce development” in support of DOD efforts.104 Given the lack of~~
~~defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, it may be chal enging for Congress to~~
~~evaluate the balance of funding for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies,~~
~~supporting test infrastructure, and hypersonic missile defense.~~
~~Strategic Stability~~
~~Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified~~
~~two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: the weapon’s short~~
~~time-of-flight—which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response—and its unpredictable flight~~

~~100 Ibid.~~
~~101~~hypersonic research and workforce development” in support of DOD efforts.105 DOD established the JHTO in April 2020 and announced on October 26, 2020, that it awarded Texas A&M University with a $20 million contract—renewable for up to $100 million—to manage a University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics (UCAH).106 UCAH is to be overseen by a group of academic researchers from Texas A&M University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Minnesota, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the University of Arizona, the University of Tennessee Space Institute, Morgan State University, the 101 Ibid. 102 Aaron Mehta, “Is the Pentagon Moving Quickly Enough on Hypersonic Defense?” Aaron Mehta, “Is the Pentagon Moving Quickly Enough on Hypersonic Defense?” Defense News,, March 21, 2019, March 21, 2019,
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/03/21/is-the-pentagon-moving-quickly-enough-on-hypersonic-defense/. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/03/21/is-the-pentagon-moving-quickly-enough-on-hypersonic-defense/.
~~102Department~~103Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Missile of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency DefenseDefense Agency Defense -Wide -Wide
Justification Book VolumeJustification Book Volume 2a of 5, p. 10, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/2a of 5, p. 10, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/
budget_justification/pdfs/budget_justification/pdfs/~~03_RDT _and_E/RDT E_Vol2_MDA_RDT E_PB21_Justification_Book.pdf .~~
~~103~~03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB21_Justification_Book.pdf. 104 “Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020: Joint Explanatory Statement,” Defense Subcommittees of the “Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020: Joint Explanatory Statement,” Defense Subcommittees of the
Appropriations Committees, December 16, 2019, https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/Appropriations Committees, December 16, 2019, https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/
democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/HR%201158%20-%20Division%20A%20-democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/HR%201158%20-%20Division%20A%20-
%20Defense%20SOM%20FY20.pdf. %20Defense%20SOM%20FY20.pdf.
~~104~~105 Ibid. Ibid. ~~T he~~ The Joint Hypersonic Joint Hypersonic ~~T ransition~~Transition Office, then called the Joint Office, then called the Joint ~~T echnology~~Technology Office on Hypersonics, was Office on Hypersonics, was
originally mandated by Section 218 of the FY2007 NDAA (originally mandated by Section 218 of the FY2007 NDAA ( P.L. 109-364). The office was redesignatedP.L. 109-364). The office was redesignated as the Joint as the Joint
Hypersonics Hypersonics ~~T ransition~~Transition Office and given additional authorities in Section 214 of the FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-91). Office and given additional authorities in Section 214 of the FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-91).
Section 216 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) further amended the office’s authorities to include the ability to enter Section 216 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) further amended the office’s authorities to include the ability to enter
into agreements with institutions of higher learning. into agreements with institutions of higher learning. ~~T he~~The office went unfunded office went unfunded until FY2020 and wasuntil FY2020 and was not established until April 2020. 106 David Vergun, “DOD Awards Applied Hypersonics Contract to Texas A&M University,” DOD News, October 26, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2394438/dod-awards-applied-hypersonics-contract-to-texas-am-university/. ~~not established~~
~~until April 2020.~~
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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress California Institute of Technology, Purdue University, the University of California-Los Angeles, and the Georgia Institute of Technology.107 The consortium is to “facilitate transitioning academic research into developing systems [as well as] work with the department to reduce system development timelines while maintaining quality control standards.”108 Finally, given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, it may be challenging for Congress to evaluate the balance of funding for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, supporting test infrastructure, and hypersonic missile defense. Strategic Stability Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: the weapon’s short time-of-flight—which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response—and its unpredictable flight ~~and Issues for Congress~~

path—which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore path—which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore
heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict. This risk heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict. This risk
could be further compounded in countries that co-locate nuclear and conventional capabilities or could be further compounded in countries that co-locate nuclear and conventional capabilities or
facilities. facilities.
Some analysts argue that unintended escalation could occur as a result of warhead ambiguity, or Some analysts argue that unintended escalation could occur as a result of warhead ambiguity, or
from the inabilityfrom the inability to distinguish between a to distinguish between a ~~conventional y~~conventionally armed hypersonic weapon and a armed hypersonic weapon and a
nuclear-armed one. However, as a United Nations report notes, “even if a State did know that an nuclear-armed one. However, as a United Nations report notes, “even if a State did know that an
HGV launched toward it was HGV launched toward it was ~~conventional y~~conventionally armed, it may armed, it may ~~stil~~ still view such a weapon as strategic view such a weapon as strategic
in nature, regardless of how it was perceived by the State firing the weapon, and decide that a in nature, regardless of how it was perceived by the State firing the weapon, and decide that a
strategic response was warranted.”strategic response was warranted.”~~105~~109 Differences in threat perception and escalation ladders Differences in threat perception and escalation ladders
could thus result in unintended escalation. Such concerns have previously led Congress to restrict could thus result in unintended escalation. Such concerns have previously led Congress to restrict
funding for conventional prompt strike programs.funding for conventional prompt strike programs.~~106~~110
Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal. Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal.
Pavel Podvig, a senior research Pavel Podvig, a senior research ~~fel ow~~fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,
has noted that the weapons “don’t … change much in terms of strategic balance and military has noted that the weapons “don’t … change much in terms of strategic balance and military
capability.”capability.”~~107~~111 This, some analysts argue, is because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia This, some analysts argue, is because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia
already possess the ability to strike the United States with intercontinental already possess the ability to strike the United States with intercontinental ~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles, missiles,
which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm U.S. missile defenses.which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm U.S. missile defenses.~~108~~112 Furthermore, these Furthermore, these
analysts note that in the case of hypersonic weapons, traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it analysts note that in the case of hypersonic weapons, traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it
is is ~~real y~~really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the world that would be so suicidal that it would a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the world that would be so suicidal that it would
even think threating to use—not to mention to even think threating to use—not to mention to ~~actual y~~actually use—hypersonic weapons against the use—hypersonic weapons against the
United States ... would end United States ... would end ~~wel .”109~~
~~Arms Control~~
~~Some analysts who believe that hypersonic weapons could present a threat to strategic stability or~~
~~inspire an arms race have argued that the United States should take measures to mitigate risks or~~
~~limit the weapons’ proliferation. Proposed measures include expanding New START, negotiating~~
~~new multilateral arms control agreements, and undertaking transparency and confidence-building~~
~~measures.110~~
~~The New START Treaty, a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United States and Russia,~~
~~does not currently cover weapons that fly on a bal istic trajectory for less than 50% of their flight,~~
~~as do hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles.111 However, Article V of the treaty~~

~~105~~well.”113 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 109 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons.
~~106~~110 For a history of legislative activity on conventional prompt global strike, see CRS For a history of legislative activity on conventional prompt global strike, see CRS Report R41464, Report R41464, Conventional
~~Prom pt~~Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. , by Amy F. Woolf.
~~107~~111 Amy Mackinnon, “ Amy Mackinnon, “ Russia’s NewRussia’s New ~~Missiles~~ Missiles Are Aimed at the U.S.,”Are Aimed at the U.S.,” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2019, , March 5, 2019,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/05/russias-new-missiles-are-aimed-at-you-weapons-hypersonic-putin-united-states-https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/05/russias-new-missiles-are-aimed-at-you-weapons-hypersonic-putin-united-states-
inf/. inf/.
~~108~~112 David Axe, “ David Axe, “ How the U.S.How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019, , January 16, 2019,
https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. Schneider, https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. Schneider,
“Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14. “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14.
~~109~~113 Jyri Raitasalo, “ Jyri Raitasalo, “ Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019, , January 5, 2019,
~~https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632.~~
~~110 See United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapon; and Richard H. Speier et al.,~~ ~~Hypersonic~~
~~Missile Proliferation.~~
~~111 In some cases, hypersonic glide vehicles may be launched from intercontinental ballistic missiles that are already~~
~~covered by New ST ART , as is reported to be the case with Russia’s Avangard HGV. See Rachel S. Cohen,~~
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Congressional Research Service 18 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Arms Control Some analysts who believe that hypersonic weapons could present a threat to strategic stability or inspire an arms race have argued that the United States should take measures to mitigate risks or limit the weapons’ proliferation. Proposed measures include expanding New START, negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, and undertaking transparency and confidence-building measures.114 The New START Treaty, a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United States and Russia, does not currently cover weapons that fly on a ballistic trajectory for less than 50% of their flight, as do hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles.115 However, Article V of the treaty states that “when a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that states that “when a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that
Party Party ~~shal~~ shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration
in the Bilateralin the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that the Consultative Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that the
United States could raise the issue in the BCC of negotiating to include hypersonic weapons in United States could raise the issue in the BCC of negotiating to include hypersonic weapons in
the New START limits.the New START limits.~~112~~116 However, because New START is due to expire in 2021, unless However, because New START is due to expire in 2021, unless
extended through 2026, this solution is likelyextended through 2026, this solution is likely to be temporary.to be temporary.~~113~~
117 As an alternative, some analysts have proposed negotiating a new international As an alternative, some analysts have proposed negotiating a new international arms control arms control
agreement that would institute a moratorium or ban on hypersonic weapon testing. These analysts agreement that would institute a moratorium or ban on hypersonic weapon testing. These analysts
argue that a test ban would be a “highly verifiable” and “highly effective” means of preventing a argue that a test ban would be a “highly verifiable” and “highly effective” means of preventing a
potential arms race and preserving strategic stability.potential arms race and preserving strategic stability.~~114~~118 Other analysts have countered that a test Other analysts have countered that a test
ban would be infeasible, as “no clear technical distinction can be made between hypersonic ban would be infeasible, as “no clear technical distinction can be made between hypersonic
missiles and other conventional capabilities that are less prompt, have shorter ranges, and also missiles and other conventional capabilities that are less prompt, have shorter ranges, and also
have the potential to undermine nuclear deterrence.”have the potential to undermine nuclear deterrence.”~~115~~119 These analysts have instead proposed These analysts have instead proposed
international transparency and confidence-building measures, such as exchanging weapons data; international transparency and confidence-building measures, such as exchanging weapons data;
conducting joint technical studies; “providing advance notices of tests; choosing separate, conducting joint technical studies; “providing advance notices of tests; choosing separate,
distinctive launch locations for tests of hypersonic missiles; and placing restraints on sea-based distinctive launch locations for tests of hypersonic missiles; and placing restraints on sea-based
~~tests.”116~~

~~“Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or T actical T ool?”~~
~~112 James Acton notes: “during [New ST ART ] negotiations, Russia argued that boost -glide weapons might constitute ‘a~~
~~new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how~~
~~they would be~~ tests.”120 https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632. 114 See United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapon; and Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation. 115 In some cases, hypersonic glide vehicles may be launched from intercontinental ballistic missiles that are already covered by New START, as is reported to be the case with Russia’s Avangard HGV. See Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Tactical Tool?” 116 James Acton notes: “during [New START] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how they would be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?:
Asking the Right Questions about Conventional ~~Prom pt~~Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2013, p. 139, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf. 2013, p. 139, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf.
~~113 CRS~~ 117 CRS Report R41219, Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf. , by Amy F. Woolf.
~~114~~118 Mark Gubrud, Mark Gubrud, ~~“T est~~ “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 6, 2015, 6, 2015,
https://thebulletin.org/roundtable/test-ban-for-hypersonic-missiles/. https://thebulletin.org/roundtable/test-ban-for-hypersonic-missiles/.
~~115 T ong~~119 Tong Zhao, “ Zhao, “~~T est~~Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?” Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”
~~116~~120 Rajaram Nagappa, “ Rajaram Nagappa, “~~T est~~Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”; see Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”; see also James M. Acton, also James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?, pp. 134-138. , pp. 134-138.
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Appendix. U.S. Hypersonic Testing ~~Infrastructure117~~Infrastructure121
Table A-1. DOD Hypersonic Ground Test Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
Air Air Force Arnold Engineering and Force Arnold Engineering and
Tunnel A: 40-inch Mach 1.5-5.5; up Tunnel A: 40-inch Mach 1.5-5.5; up
Arnold AFB, Arnold AFB, TN TN
Development Development Complex (AEDC) von Complex (AEDC) von
to 290 °F to 290 °F
Karman Gas Dynamics Karman Gas Dynamics Facility Facility
Tunnel B: 50-inch Mach 6 and 8; up Tunnel B: 50-inch Mach 6 and 8; up
Tunnels A/B/C Tunnels A/B/C
to 900 °F to 900 °F
Tunnel C: 50-inch Mach 10; up to Tunnel C: 50-inch Mach 10; up to
1700 °F 1700 °F
Air Air Force AEDC High-Enthalpy Force AEDC High-Enthalpy
Simulate thermal Simulate thermal and pressure and pressure
Arnold AFB, Arnold AFB, TN TN
Aerothermal Aerothermal Test Arc-Heated Test Arc-Heated
environments environments at speeds of up to at speeds of up to
Facilities Facilities H1, H2, H3 H1, H2, H3
Mach 8 Mach 8
Air Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9 Force AEDC Tunnel 9
59-inch Mach 7, 8,10, 14, and18; up 59-inch Mach 7, 8,10, 14, and18; up White Oak, MD White Oak, MD
to 2900 °F to 2900 °F
Air Air Force AEDC Aerodynamic and Force AEDC Aerodynamic and
Mach 3.1-7.2; up to 1300 °F Mach 3.1-7.2; up to 1300 °F
Arnold AFB, Arnold AFB, TN TN
Propulsion Test Unit Propulsion Test Unit
Air Air Force AEDC Force AEDC ~~Aerobal istic~~ Aeroballistic Range Range
Launches projectiles Launches projectiles of up to 8 of up to 8
Arnold AFB, Arnold AFB, TN TN
G G
inches in diameter at speeds of up inches in diameter at speeds of up
to Mach 20 to Mach 20
Hol oman Hol oman High Speed Test Track High Speed Test Track
59,971 ft. track; launches 59,971 ft. track; launches
Hol oman Hol oman AFB, NM AFB, NM
projectiles projectiles at speeds of up to Mach at speeds of up to Mach
8 8
Air Air Force Research Laboratory Force Research Laboratory
Mach 3-7 Mach 3-7
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
(AFRL) (AFRL) ~~Cel s~~ Cells 18, 22 18, 22
AFRL Laser AFRL Laser Hardened Materials Hardened Materials
High-temperature materials High-temperature materials testing testing
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
Evaluation Laboratory (LHMEL) Evaluation Laboratory (LHMEL)
AFRL Mach 6 High Reynolds AFRL Mach 6 High Reynolds
10-inch Mach 6 10-inch Mach 6
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
Number (Re) Facility Number (Re) Facility
Test Resource Test Resource Management Center Management Center
Up to Mach 8; up to 4040 °F Up to Mach 8; up to 4040 °F
Arnold AFB, Arnold AFB, TN TN
Hypersonic Aeropropulsion Hypersonic Aeropropulsion Clean Clean
AirAir Test-bed Facility Test-bed Facility
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. Air Force (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9 was upgraded in 2019 to enable Mach 18 AEDC Tunnel 9 was upgraded in 2019 to enable Mach 18
testing. See “Department of Defense Presstesting. See “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,”Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/March 2, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/
Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/. Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/.

~~117 T he~~ 121 The following information is derived from the 2014 report (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., following information is derived from the 2014 report (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the
Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure, and therefore, may not be current. Permission to use this material , and therefore, may not be current. Permission to use this material
has been granted by the Office of Sciencehas been granted by the Office of Science ~~and T echnology~~ and Technology Policy. Policy.
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Table A-2. DOD Open-Air Ranges
Range
Location
Ronald Reagan Ronald Reagan ~~Bal istic~~ Ballistic Missile Missile
Kwajalein Kwajalein Atol ,Atol , Republic of the Republic of the
Defense Test Site Defense Test Site
~~Marshal~~ Marshall Islands Islands
Pacific Missile Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) Range Facility (PMRF)
Kauai, HI Kauai, HI
Western Western Range, 30th Space Wing Range, 30th Space Wing
Vandenberg AFB, Vandenberg AFB, CA CA
Naval Air Warfare Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Center Weapons
Point Mugu and China Lake, Point Mugu and China Lake, CA CA
(NAWC) Division (NAWC) Division
White Sands Missile White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) Range (WSMR)
New Mexico New Mexico
Eastern Range, 45th Space Wing Eastern Range, 45th Space Wing
Cape Canaveral Air Cape Canaveral Air Force Force
Station/Patrick AFB/Kennedy Station/Patrick AFB/Kennedy
Space Center, FL Space Center, FL
NASA NASA ~~Wal ops~~ Wallops Flight Facility Flight Facility
~~Wal ops~~ Wallops Island, VA Island, VA
Pacific Spaceport Complex (formerly Pacific Spaceport Complex (formerly
Kodiak Island, AK Kodiak Island, AK
Kodiak Launch Complex) Kodiak Launch Complex)
NAWC Weapons Division NAWC Weapons Division R-2508 R-2508
Edwards AFB, Edwards AFB, CA CA
Complex Complex
Utah Test and Training Range Utah Test and Training Range
Utah Utah
Nevada Test and Training Range Nevada Test and Training Range
Nevada Nevada
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.

Table A-3. DOD Mobile Assets
Asset
Navy Mobile Instrumentation Navy Mobile Instrumentation
System System
PMRF Mobile At-sea Sensor PMRF Mobile At-sea Sensor System System
MDA Mobile Instrumentation MDA Mobile Instrumentation
System System Pacific ~~Col ector~~ Collector
MDA Mobile Instrumentation MDA Mobile Instrumentation
System System Pacific Tracker
Kwajalein Kwajalein Mobile Range Safety Mobile Range Safety
System 2 System 2
United States Navy Ship United States Navy Ship Lorenzen
missilemissile range instrumentation ship range instrumentation ship
Sea-based X-band Radar Sea-based X-band Radar
Aircraft Mobile Instrumentation Aircraft Mobile Instrumentation
Systems Systems
Transportable Range Augmentation Transportable Range Augmentation
and Control System and Control System
Re-locatable MPS-36 Radar Re-locatable MPS-36 Radar
Transportable Telemetry Transportable Telemetry System System
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
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Table A-4. NASA Research-Related Facilities
Facility
Capability

Location
Ames Ames Research Center (ARC) High-temperature Research Center (ARC) High-temperature

Mountain View, CA Mountain View, CA
Arc Jet Complex Arc Jet Complex
materials materials testing testing
ARC Hypervelocity ARC Hypervelocity Free Free
Launches projectiles Launches projectiles
at at
Mountain View, CA Mountain View, CA
Flight Facilities Flight Facilities
speeds of up to Mach 23 speeds of up to Mach 23
Langley Research Center Langley Research Center
31-inch Mach 10, 20-inch 31-inch Mach 10, 20-inch

Hampton, VA Hampton, VA
(LaRC) Aerothermodynamics (LaRC) Aerothermodynamics
Mach 6, and 15-inch Mach Mach 6, and 15-inch Mach
Laboratory Laboratory
6 6
LaRC 8-foot High LaRC 8-foot High
96-inch Mach 5 and Mach 96-inch Mach 5 and Mach

Hampton, VA Hampton, VA
Temperature Tunnel Temperature Tunnel
6.5 6.5
LaRC Scramjet LaRC Scramjet Test Complex Test Complex
Up to Mach 8 and up to Up to Mach 8 and up to

Hampton, VA Hampton, VA
4740 °F 4740 °F
LaRC HyPulse Facility LaRC HyPulse Facility
Currently inactive Currently inactive

Long Island, NY Long Island, NY
Glenn Research Center Glenn Research Center
Mach 5, 6, and 7 and up to Mach 5, 6, and 7 and up to

Sandusky, OH Sandusky, OH
(GRC) Plumbrook (GRC) Plumbrook ~~Hypersonic~~
Hypersonic 3830 °F 3830 °F
Tunnel Facility Arc Jet Facility Tunnel Facility Arc Jet Facility
GRC Propulsion Systems GRC Propulsion Systems
Mach 6 Mach 6

Cleveland, OH Cleveland, OH
Laboratory 4 Laboratory 4
GRC 1’ x 1’ Supersonic Wind GRC 1’ x 1’ Supersonic Wind
12-inch Mach 1.3-6 (10 12-inch Mach 1.3-6 (10

Cleveland, OH Cleveland, OH
Tunnel Tunnel
discrete discrete airspeeds) and up airspeeds) and up
to 640 °F to 640 °F
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.

Table A-5. Department of Energy Research-Related Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories Solar Solar
High-temperature materials High-temperature materials testing testing
Albuquerque, NM Albuquerque, NM
Thermal Test Facility Thermal Test Facility
and aerodynamic heating simulation and aerodynamic heating simulation
Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories
18-inch Mach 5, 8, and 14 18-inch Mach 5, 8, and 14
Albuquerque, NM Albuquerque, NM
Hypersonic Wind Tunnel Hypersonic Wind Tunnel
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.

Table A-6. Industry/Academic Research-Related Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
CUBRC Large Energy National CUBRC Large Energy National
LENS 1: Mach 6-22 LENS 1: Mach 6-22
Buffalo, NY Buffalo, NY
Shock (LENS)-1/-II/-XX Tunnels Shock (LENS)-1/-II/-XX Tunnels
LENS II: Mach 2-12 LENS II: Mach 2-12
LENS XX: AtmosphericLENS XX: Atmospheric re-entry re-entry
simulation simulation
ATK-GASL ATK-GASL Test Bay 4 Test Bay 4

Boeing Polysonic Wind Tunnel Boeing Polysonic Wind Tunnel
48-inch up to Mach 5 48-inch up to Mach 5
St. Louis, St. Louis, MO MO
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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Lockheed Martin High Speed Wind Lockheed Martin High Speed Wind
48-inch Mach .3-5 48-inch Mach .3-5
~~Dal as,~~ Dallas, TX TX
Tunnel Tunnel
Boeing/Air Boeing/Air Force Office of ScientificForce Office of Scientific
9.5-inch Mach 6 9.5-inch Mach 6
West Lafayette, IN West Lafayette, IN
Research (AFOSR) Quiet Tunnel at Research (AFOSR) Quiet Tunnel at
Purdue University Purdue University
AFOSR-University AFOSR-University of Notre Dame of Notre Dame
24-inch Mach 6 24-inch Mach 6
Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN IN
Quiet Tunnel Quiet Tunnel
Sources: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.; Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.; Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Expanding Hypersonic Technology Expanding Hypersonic Technology
Testing”; University of Arizona,Testing”; University of Arizona, “Mach 5 Quiet Ludwieg Tube”; and Ashley Tressel,“Mach 5 Quiet Ludwieg Tube”; and Ashley Tressel, “Army“Army to open hypersonic to open hypersonic
testing facility.” testing facility.”
Notes: Hypersonic wind tunnels are under construction at the fol owing Hypersonic wind tunnels are under construction at the fol owing universities:universities: Texas A&M University Texas A&M University
(Mach 10 quiet tunnel expected to be complete(Mach 10 quiet tunnel expected to be complete in 2021), the Universityin 2021), the University of Arizona (Mach 5 quiet tunnel of Arizona (Mach 5 quiet tunnel
expected to be completeexpected to be complete in 2021), Purdue Universityin 2021), Purdue University (Mach 8 quiet tunnel expected to be complete(Mach 8 quiet tunnel expected to be complete in 2022), in 2022),
and the Universityand the University of Notre Dameof Notre Dame (Mach 10 quiet tunnel expected to be complete in 2023). Additional (Mach 10 quiet tunnel expected to be complete in 2023). Additional
universities,universities, such as the University of Maryland, the California Institute of Technology, the Georgia Institute of such as the University of Maryland, the California Institute of Technology, the Georgia Institute of
Technology, the AirTechnology, the Air Force Academy,Force Academy, the University of Tennesseethe University of Tennessee Space Institute, and Virginia Polytechnic Space Institute, and Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University,Institute and State University, also maintain experimentalalso maintain experimental hypersonic facilitieshypersonic facilities or conduct hypersonic research. or conduct hypersonic research.

Author Information

Kelley M. Sayler Kelley M. Sayler

Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global
Security Security

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