Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

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Hypersonic Weapons:
~~October 19, 2021~~March 17, 2022
Background and Issues for Congress
Kelley M. Sayler
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons— The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—
Analyst in Advanced Analyst in Advanced
maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional
Technology and Global Technology and Global
prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States
Security Security
has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched

from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are

powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As former Vice Chairman of the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these
weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical
threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics,
on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S.
military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.
Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and
Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic
systems. This is due, in part, to the advances in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a systems. This is due, in part, to the advances in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a
number of hypersonic weapons programs and have likely fielded operational hypersonic glide vehicles—number of hypersonic weapons programs and have likely fielded operational hypersonic glide vehicles—
~~potential y~~potentially armed with nuclear warheads. Most U.S. hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in Russia and armed with nuclear warheads. Most U.S. hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in Russia and
China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons ~~wil~~ will likely likely
require greater accuracy and require greater accuracy and ~~wil be more technical y chal enging~~will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and
Russian systems. Russian systems.
The Pentagon’s FY2022 budget request for hypersonic research is $3.8 The Pentagon’s FY2022 budget request for hypersonic research is $3.8 ~~bil ion~~billion—up from $3.2 —up from $3.2 ~~bil ion~~billion in the in the
FY2021 request. The Missile Defense Agency FY2021 request. The Missile Defense Agency ~~additional y~~ additionally requested $247.9 requested $247.9 ~~mil ion~~million for hypersonic defense. At for hypersonic defense. At
present, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons, present, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons,
suggesting that it may not have approved either mission requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans. suggesting that it may not have approved either mission requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans.
Indeed, as Principal Director for Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Indeed, as Principal Director for Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is
instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets. instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets.
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions
about the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and about the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and
arms control. Potential questions include the following: arms control. Potential questions include the following:
 What mission(s)  What mission(s) ~~wil~~ will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-
effective means of executing these potential missions? How effective means of executing these potential missions? How ~~wil~~ will they be incorporated into joint they be incorporated into joint
operational doctrine and concepts? operational doctrine and concepts?
 Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress  Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress
evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests
for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an
acceleration of research on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile acceleration of research on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile
defense options both necessary and defense options both necessary and ~~technological y~~technologically feasible? feasible?
 How, if at  How, if at ~~al , wil~~ all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability? the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?
 Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new  Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new
multilateral multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building
activities? activities?

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as a part of its The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as a part of its
conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) program since the early 2000s.1 In recent years, it has conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) program since the early 2000s.1 In recent years, it has
focused such efforts on hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles with shorter and focused such efforts on hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles with shorter and
intermediate ranges for use in regional conflicts. Although funding for these programs has been intermediate ranges for use in regional conflicts. Although funding for these programs has been
relatively restrained in the past, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in relatively restrained in the past, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in
pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part, pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part,
to advances in these technologies in Russia and China, leading to a heightened focus in the to advances in these technologies in Russia and China, leading to a heightened focus in the
United States on the strategic threat posed by hypersonic flight. Open-source reporting indicates United States on the strategic threat posed by hypersonic flight. Open-source reporting indicates
that both China and Russia have conducted numerous successful tests of hypersonic glide that both China and Russia have conducted numerous successful tests of hypersonic glide
vehicles and likelyvehicles and likely fielded an operational capability. fielded an operational capability.
Experts disagree on the potential impact of competitor hypersonic weapons on both strategic Experts disagree on the potential impact of competitor hypersonic weapons on both strategic
stability and the U.S. military’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, former Under Secretary of stability and the U.S. military’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, former Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) Michael Griffin has testified to Congress Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) Michael Griffin has testified to Congress
that the United States does not “have systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in a that the United States does not “have systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in a
corresponding manner, and we don’t have defenses against [their] systems.”2 Although the John corresponding manner, and we don’t have defenses against [their] systems.”2 Although the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019 NDAA,S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019 NDAA, P.L. 115-P.L. 115-
232) accelerated the development of hypersonic weapons, which USD(R&E) identifies as a 232) accelerated the development of hypersonic weapons, which USD(R&E) identifies as a
priority research and development area, the United States is unlikely to field an operational priority research and development area, the United States is unlikely to field an operational
system before 2023. However, most U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, in contrast to those in system before 2023. However, most U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, in contrast to those in
Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead.3 As a result, U.S. Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead.3 As a result, U.S.
hypersonic weapons hypersonic weapons ~~wil likely~~ will likely require greater accuracy and require greater accuracy and ~~wil be more technical y chal enging~~
will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.
In addition to accelerating development of hypersonic weapons, Section 247 of the FY2019 In addition to accelerating development of hypersonic weapons, Section 247 of the FY2019
NDAA required that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense NDAA required that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense
~~Intel igence~~Intelligence Agency, produce a classified assessment of U.S. and adversary hypersonic weapons Agency, produce a classified assessment of U.S. and adversary hypersonic weapons
programs, to include the following elements: programs, to include the following elements:
(1) An evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries on such technology. (1) An evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries on such technology.
(2) An evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology. (2) An evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology.
(3) An evaluation of the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology. (3) An evaluation of the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology.
(4) (4) An assessment of the technological progress of the United States and adversaries on An assessment of the technological progress of the United States and adversaries on
such technology. such technology.
(5) Descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such technology. (5) Descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such technology.

1 For details, see CRS1 For details, see CRS Report R41464, Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. , by Amy F. Woolf.
2 U.S.2 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services,Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, ~~“T estimony~~ “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New
~~T echnologies~~Technologies to Meet Emerging to Meet Emerging ~~T hreats~~Threats, April 18, 2018, , April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-
40_04-18-18.pdf. 40_04-18-18.pdf.
3 Until recently, the United States was 3 Until recently, the United States was not believed to be considering the development of nuclear-armed hypersonic not believed to be considering the development of nuclear-armed hypersonic
weapons; however, a since-revoked Air Force solicitation sought ideas for a “weapons; however, a since-revoked Air Force solicitation sought ideas for a “ thermal protection system that can thermal protection system that can
support [a] hypersonic glide to ICBM ranges.” Seniorsupport [a] hypersonic glide to ICBM ranges.” Senior defense officials respondeddefense officials responded to news reports of the revocation, to news reports of the revocation,
stating that DOD “remains stating that DOD “remains ~~committ ed~~committed to non-nuclear role for hypersonics.” See Steve to non-nuclear role for hypersonics.” See Steve ~~T rimble~~Trimble, “USAF Errantly , “USAF Errantly
Reveals Research on ICBM-RangeReveals Research on ICBM-Range Hypersonic GlideHypersonic Glide Vehicle,”Vehicle,” Aviation Week, August 18, 2020, Aviation Week, August 18, 2020,
at https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/usaf-errantly-reveals-research-icbm-range-https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/usaf-errantly-reveals-research-icbm-range-
hypersonic-glide. hypersonic-glide.
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(6) An assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.4 (6) An assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.4
This report was delivered to Congress in July 2019. Similarly, Section 1689 of the FY2019 This report was delivered to Congress in July 2019. Similarly, Section 1689 of the FY2019
NDAA requires the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to produce a report on “how NDAA requires the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to produce a report on “how
hypersonic missile defense can be accelerated to meet emerging hypersonic threats.”5 The hypersonic missile defense can be accelerated to meet emerging hypersonic threats.”5 The
findings of these reports could hold implications for congressional authorizations, appropriations, findings of these reports could hold implications for congressional authorizations, appropriations,
and oversight. and oversight.
The following report reviews the hypersonic weapons programs in the United States, Russia, and The following report reviews the hypersonic weapons programs in the United States, Russia, and
China, providing information on the programs and infrastructure in each nation, based on China, providing information on the programs and infrastructure in each nation, based on
unclassified sources. It also provides a brief summary of the state of global hypersonic weapons unclassified sources. It also provides a brief summary of the state of global hypersonic weapons
research development. It concludes with a discussion of the issues that Congress might address as research development. It concludes with a discussion of the issues that Congress might address as
it considers DOD’s funding requests for U.S. hypersonic technology programs. it considers DOD’s funding requests for U.S. hypersonic technology programs.
Background
Several countries are developing hypersonic weapons, which fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 (five Several countries are developing hypersonic weapons, which fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 (five
times the speed of sound).6 There are two primary categories of hypersonic weapons: times the speed of sound).6 There are two primary categories of hypersonic weapons:
  Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) are launched from a rocket before gliding to a are launched from a rocket before gliding to a
target.7 target.7
  Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines, or are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines, or
“scramjets,” after acquiring their target. “scramjets,” after acquiring their target.
Unlike Unlike ~~bal istic~~ ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons do not follow a missiles, hypersonic weapons do not follow a ~~bal istic~~ballistic trajectory and can trajectory and can
maneuver en route to their destination. As maneuver en route to their destination. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, hypersonic weapons Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, hypersonic weapons
could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical
threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not
preferred.”8 Conventional hypersonic weapons use only kinetic energy—energy derived from preferred.”8 Conventional hypersonic weapons use only kinetic energy—energy derived from
motion—to destroy unhardened targets or, motion—to destroy unhardened targets or, ~~potential y~~potentially, underground facilities.9, underground facilities.9
Hypersonic weapons could Hypersonic weapons could ~~chal enge~~challenge detection and defense due to their speed, maneuverability, detection and defense due to their speed, maneuverability,
and low altitude of flight.10 For example, terrestrial-based radar cannot detect hypersonic and low altitude of flight.10 For example, terrestrial-based radar cannot detect hypersonic
weapons until late in the weapon’s flight.weapons until late in the weapon’s flight.1111 Figure 1 depicts the differences in terrestrial-based depicts the differences in terrestrial-based
radar detection timelines for radar detection timelines for ~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles versus hypersonic glide vehicles. missiles versus hypersonic glide vehicles.

4 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, 4 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, ~~T itle~~Title II, §247. II, §247.
5 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, 5 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, ~~T itle~~Title XVI, §1689. XVI, §1689.
6 At a minimum, the United States, Russia,6 At a minimum, the United States, Russia, China, Australia, India, France, Germany, and Japan are developing China, Australia, India, France, Germany, and Japan are developing
hypersonic weapons technology. See Richard H. Speierhypersonic weapons technology. See Richard H. Speier et al., et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread
of a New ~~Class~~ Class of Weapons, RAND, RAND Corporation, 2017, Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html; and https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html; and
Mike Yeo, “Japan unveils its hypersonic weapons plans,” Mike Yeo, “Japan unveils its hypersonic weapons plans,” Defense News, March 14, 2020. March 14, 2020.
7 When HGVs7 When HGVs are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to as a hypersonic are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to as a hypersonic
boostboost -glide weapon. -glide weapon.
8 U.S.8 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services,Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, ~~“T estimony~~ “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States
Strategic Command andStrategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf. imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
9 Richard H. Speier 9 Richard H. Speier et al., et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons, p. 13. , p. 13.
10 See10 See Department of Defense, Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, , at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-
2019-Missile-Defense-Review/2019-Missile-Defense-Review/~~T he~~The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf. %202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
11 Richard H. Speier11 Richard H. Speier et al., et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons. .
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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Figure 1. Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs.
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles

Source: CRS image based on an image in “Gliding missiles CRS image based on an image in “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,”that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The
Economist,, April 6, 2019, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-April 6, 2019, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-
faster-than-mach-5-are-coming. faster-than-mach-5-are-coming.
This delayed detection compresses the timeline for decisionmakers assessing their response This delayed detection compresses the timeline for decisionmakers assessing their response
options and for a defensive system to intercept the attacking weapon—options and for a defensive system to intercept the attacking weapon—~~potential y~~potentially permitting only permitting only
a single intercept attempt.12a single intercept attempt.12
Furthermore, U.S. defense officials have stated that both terrestrial- and current space-based Furthermore, U.S. defense officials have stated that both terrestrial- and current space-based
sensor architectures are insufficient to detect and track hypersonic weapons, sensor architectures are insufficient to detect and track hypersonic weapons, ~~w ith~~with former former
USD(R&E) Griffin noting that “hypersonic targets are 10 to 20 times dimmer than what the U.S. USD(R&E) Griffin noting that “hypersonic targets are 10 to 20 times dimmer than what the U.S.
~~normal y~~normally tracks by tracks by ~~satel ites~~satellites in geostationary orbit.”13 Some analysts have suggested that space- in geostationary orbit.”13 Some analysts have suggested that space-
based sensor layers—integrated with tracking and fire-control systems to direct high-performance based sensor layers—integrated with tracking and fire-control systems to direct high-performance
interceptors or directed energy interceptors or directed energy ~~weapons—could theoretical y~~weapons14—could theoretically present viable options for defending present viable options for defending
against hypersonic weapons in the future.against hypersonic weapons in the future.1415 Indeed, the Indeed, the 2019 Missile Defense Review notes that notes that
“such sensors take advantage of the large area viewable from space for improved tracking and “such sensors take advantage of the large area viewable from space for improved tracking and
~~potential y~~potentially targeting of advanced threats, including HGVs and hypersonic cruise targeting of advanced threats, including HGVs and hypersonic cruise missiles.”16 12 Bradley Perrett et al., “U.S. Navy sees Chinese HGV as part of Wider Threat,” Aviation Week, January 27, 2014. 13 David Vergun, “DOD Scaling Up Effort to Develop Hypersonics,” DoD News, December 13, 2018, at ~~missiles.”15~~
~~Other analysts have questioned the affordability, technological feasibility, and/or utility of wide-~~
~~area hypersonic weapons defense.16 As physicist and nuclear expert James Acton explains, “point-~~
~~defense systems, and particularly [Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)], could very~~
~~plausibly be adapted to deal with hypersonic missiles. The disadvantage of those systems is that~~
~~they can only defend smal areas. To defend the whole of the continental United States, you~~

~~12 Bradley Perrett et al., “U.S. Navy sees Chinese HGV as part of Wider T hreat,” Aviation Week, January 27, 2014.~~
~~13 David Vergun, “DOD Scaling Up Effort to Develop Hypersonics,” DoD News, December 13, 2018,~~
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1712954/dod-scaling-up-effort-to-develop-hypersonics/; see also https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1712954/dod-scaling-up-effort-to-develop-hypersonics/; see also
~~“T estimony of Michael Griffin”; and “T estimony of John E. Hyten.”~~
~~14 “T estimony of Michael Griffin”; and “T estimony of John E. Hyten.”~~
~~15 Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, p. XVI, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/~~
~~11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/T he%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.~~
~~16 See James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2, 2018,~~
~~https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/02/hypersonic-weapons-explainer-pub-75957; and Margot van Loon,~~
~~“Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer.”~~
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~~would need an unaffordable number of THAAD batteries.”17~~U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New Technologies to Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-40_04-18-18.pdf, and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf. 14 Section 1664 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) granted the “Director of the Missile Defense Agency the authority to budget for, direct, and manage directed energy programs applicable for ballistic and hypersonic missile defense missions, in coordination with other directed energy efforts of the Department of Defense.” 15 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New Technologies to Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-40_04-18-18.pdf; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf. 16 Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, p. XVI, at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/ Congressional Research Service 3 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Other analysts have questioned the affordability, technological feasibility, and/or utility of wide-area hypersonic weapons defense.17 As physicist and nuclear expert James Acton explains, “point-defense systems, and particularly [Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)], could very plausibly be adapted to deal with hypersonic missiles. The disadvantage of those systems is that they can only defend small areas. To defend the whole of the continental United States, you would need an unaffordable number of THAAD batteries.”18 In addition, some analysts have In addition, some analysts have
argued that the United States’ current command and control architecture would be incapable of argued that the United States’ current command and control architecture would be incapable of
“processing data quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an incoming hypersonic threat.”“processing data quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an incoming hypersonic threat.”1819
(For additional information on hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, (For additional information on hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623,
Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress, by , by ~~Kel ey~~ Kelley M. Sayler and Stephen M. M. Sayler and Stephen M. ~~McCal~~ McCall.) .)
United States
The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s
Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the
abilityability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as ~~wel~~ well as through as through
several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.1920 Those who support these development efforts Those who support these development efforts
argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as ~~wel~~ well as provide the U.S. military as provide the U.S. military
with an abilitywith an ability to defeat capabilities such as advanced air and missile defense systems that form to defeat capabilities such as advanced air and missile defense systems that form
the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-access/area denial strategies.the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-access/area denial strategies.2021 In recognition of this, the In recognition of this, the
2018 National Defense Strategy identifies hypersonic weapons as one of the key technologies identifies hypersonic weapons as one of the key technologies
“[ensuring the United States] “[ensuring the United States] ~~wil~~ will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.”be able to fight and win the wars of the future.”2122 Similarly, the Similarly, the
House Armed Services Committee’s bipartisan House Armed Services Committee’s bipartisan Future of Defense Task Force Report notes that notes that
hypersonic weapons could present hypersonic weapons could present ~~chal enges~~challenges to the United States in the years to come. to the United States in the years to come.2223
Programs
Unlike Unlike programs in China and Russia, U.S. hypersonic weapons are to be programs in China and Russia, U.S. hypersonic weapons are to be ~~conventional y~~conventionally armed. armed.
As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons ~~wil~~ will likely require greater accuracy and likely require greater accuracy and ~~wil be more~~
~~technical y chal enging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. Indeed,~~
~~according to one expert, “a nuclear-armed glider would be effective if it were 10 or even 100~~
~~times less accurate [than a conventional y-armed glider]” due to nuclear blast effects.23~~
~~According to open-source reporting, the United States is conducting research, development, test,~~
~~and evaluation (RDT&E) on a number of offensive hypersonic weapons and hypersonic~~
~~technology programs, including the following (see Table 1):~~

~~17 Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer.”~~
18will be more 2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf. 17 See James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2, 2018, at https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/02/hypersonic-weapons-explainer-pub-75957; and Margot van Loon, “Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer.” 18 Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer.” 19 Margot van Loon, “Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer” in Margot van Loon, “Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer” in Defense Technology Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons, ,
American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019. Some analysts have suggestedAmerican Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019. Some analysts have suggested that future command and control that future command and control
systems may require autonomous functionality to manage the speed and unpredictabilitysystems may require autonomous functionality to manage the speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons. See of hypersonic weapons. See
John L. Dolan, Richard K. Gallagher,John L. Dolan, Richard K. Gallagher, and David L. Mann, “Hypersonic Weapons Are Literally Unstoppable (As in and David L. Mann, “Hypersonic Weapons Are Literally Unstoppable (As in
America Can’t Stop America Can’t Stop ~~T hem~~Them),” ),” Real Clear Defense, April 23, 2019, , April 23, 2019, at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/04/https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/04/
23/hypersonic_weapons__a_threat_to_national_security_114358.html. 23/hypersonic_weapons__a_threat_to_national_security_114358.html.
19 20 For a full history of U.S. For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRShypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464, Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global
Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. , by Amy F. Woolf.
2021 Roger Zakheim and Roger Zakheim and ~~T om~~Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” Remarks at Defense Responses,” Remarks at
the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army
Justification Book of Research, Development, Justification Book of Research, Development, ~~T est~~Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580.Activity 4, p. 580.
21 22 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of ~~T he~~The United States of America,” p. 3, United States of America,” p. 3,
at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
2223 House Armed Services House Armed Services Committee, Committee, Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020, September 2020, , September 2020,
at https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2/6/26129500https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2/6/26129500 -d208-47ba-a9f7--d208-47ba-a9f7-
25a8f82828b0/424EB2008281A3C79BA8C7EA71890AE9.future-of-defense-task-force-report.pdf. 25a8f82828b0/424EB2008281A3C79BA8C7EA71890AE9.future-of-defense-task-force-report.pdf.
~~23 James M. Acton, “China’s Advanced Weapons,” T estimony to the U.S. China Economic and Security Review~~
~~Commission, February 23, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/23/china-s-advanced-weapons-pub-68095.~~
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~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~
Congressional Research Service 4 link to page 12 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. Indeed, according to one expert, “a nuclear-armed glider would be effective if it were 10 or even 100 times less accurate [than a conventionally-armed glider]” due to nuclear blast effects.24 According to open-source reporting, the United States is conducting research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) on a number of offensive hypersonic weapons and hypersonic technology programs, including the following (see Table 1):
 U.S. Navy—Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS);  U.S. Navy—Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS);
 U.S. Army—Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW);  U.S. Army—Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW);
 U.S. Air Force—AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW,  U.S. Air Force—AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW,
pronounced “arrow”); pronounced “arrow”);
 U.S. Air Force—Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM);  U.S. Air Force—Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM);
 DARPA—Tactical Boost Glide (TBG);  DARPA—Tactical Boost Glide (TBG);
 DARPA—Operational Fires (OpFires); and  DARPA—Operational Fires (OpFires); and
 DARPA—Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC, pronounced  DARPA—Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC, pronounced
“hawk”). “hawk”).
These programs are intended to produce operational prototypes, as there are currently no These programs are intended to produce operational prototypes, as there are currently no
programs of record for hypersonic weapons.programs of record for hypersonic weapons.24
25 U.S. Navy
In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a
common glide vehicle for use across the services.common glide vehicle for use across the services.2526 The common glide vehicle is being adapted The common glide vehicle is being adapted
from a Mach 6 Army prototype warhead, the Alternate Re-Entry System, which was successfully from a Mach 6 Army prototype warhead, the Alternate Re-Entry System, which was successfully
tested in 2011 and 2017.tested in 2011 and 2017.2627 Once development is complete, “Sandia National Laboratories, the Once development is complete, “Sandia National Laboratories, the
designer of the original concept, then designer of the original concept, then ~~wil~~ will build the common glide vehicles. ... Booster systems build the common glide vehicles. ... Booster systems
are being developed separately.”are being developed separately.”27
28 The Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) is expected to pair the common glide vehicle with The Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) is expected to pair the common glide vehicle with
a booster system to create a common a booster system to create a common Al All Up Round (AUR) for use by both the Navy and Army. Up Round (AUR) for use by both the Navy and Army.
According to the Navy’s FY2022 budget documents, the Navy intends to conduct testing in According to the Navy’s FY2022 budget documents, the Navy intends to conduct testing in
support of CPS’s deployment on Zumwalt-class destroyers by FY2025 and Virginia-class support of CPS’s deployment on Zumwalt-class destroyers by FY2025 and Virginia-class
submarines by FY2028.submarines by FY2028.2829 Although Navy officials have previously noted plans to achieve Although Navy officials have previously noted plans to achieve
~~“limited operating capability” on Ohio-class submarines as early as 202529 and to eventual y field~~
~~hypersonic weapons on Burke-class destroyers, such plans are not reflected in FY2022 budget~~

~~24 Steve T rimble, “New Long-T erm~~ 24 James M. Acton, “China’s Advanced Weapons,” Testimony to the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 23, 2017, at https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/23/china-s-advanced-weapons-pub-68095. 25 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics, But Only Prototypes,” Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics, But Only Prototypes,” Aviation Week, March , March
15, 2019, 15, 2019, at https://aviationweek.com/defense/new-long-term-pentagon-plan-boosts-hypersonics-only-prototypes. https://aviationweek.com/defense/new-long-term-pentagon-plan-boosts-hypersonics-only-prototypes.
~~25 T he~~26 The services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors with rotating chairmanship. Body Board of Directors with rotating chairmanship.
SydneySydney J. Freedberg,J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Ramps Jr., “Army Ramps Upup Funding Funding ~~For~~ for Laser Shield, Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,”Hypersonic Sword,” Breaking Defense, ,
February 28, 2020, February 28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-shield-hypersonic-sword/. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-shield-hypersonic-sword/.
26 27 Steve Steve ~~T rimble~~Trimble and Guy and Guy Norris, “Sandia’sNorris, “Sandia’s ~~Swerve Could~~ Swerve Could Lead to FirstLead to First -gen Hypersonic Production Line,” -gen Hypersonic Production Line,” Aviation
Week,, October 11, 2018, October 11, 2018, at http://aviationweek.com/air-dominance/sandia-s-swerve-could-lead-first-gen-hypersonic-http://aviationweek.com/air-dominance/sandia-s-swerve-could-lead-first-gen-hypersonic-
production-line; and Sydneyproduction-line; and Sydney J. FreedbergJ. Freedberg Jr., “Jr., “ Army Warhead Is Key Army Warhead Is Key ~~T o~~To Joint Hypersonics,” Joint Hypersonics,” Breaking Defense, ,
AugustAugust 22, 2018, 22, 2018, at https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/army-warhead-is-key-to-joint-hypersonics/. https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/army-warhead-is-key-to-joint-hypersonics/.
2728 Steve Steve ~~T rimble~~Trimble and Guy and Guy Norris, “Sandia’sNorris, “Sandia’s ~~Swerve Could~~ Swerve Could Lead to FirstLead to First -gen Hypersonic Production Line,” -gen Hypersonic Production Line,” Aviation
Week,, October 11, 2018, October 11, 2018, at http://aviationweek.com/air-dominance/sandia-s-swerve-could-lead-first-gen-hypersonic-http://aviationweek.com/air-dominance/sandia-s-swerve-could-lead-first-gen-hypersonic-
production-line. production-line.
28 29 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
~~Development, T est and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1466,~~
~~https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/RDT EN_BA4_Book.pdf .~~
~~29 Department of the Navy, “Highlights of the Depart ment of the Navy FY 2021 Budget,” February 10, 2020,~~
~~https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/21pres/Highlights_book.pdf; and Megan Eckstein, “ Navy Says~~
~~Hypersonic Weapons Coming to Subs in 5 Years,” USNI News, November 17, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/11/17/~~
~~navy-says-hypersonic-weapons-coming-to-subs-in-5-years.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

5

~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~documents.30 The Navy is requesting $1.4 bil ion for CPS RDT&E in FY2022—an increase of~~
~~$366 mil ion over the FY2021 request and $607 mil ion over the FY2021 appropriation.31~~
~~U.S. Army~~
Congressional Research Service 5 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress “limited operating capability” on Ohio-class submarines as early as 202530 and to eventually field hypersonic weapons on Burke-class destroyers, such plans are not reflected in FY2022 budget documents.31 The Navy is requesting $1.4 billion for CPS RDT&E in FY2022—an increase of $366 million over the FY2021 request and $607 million over the FY2021 appropriation.32 U.S. Army The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon program is expected to pair the common glide The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon program is expected to pair the common glide
vehicle with the Navy’s booster system. The system is intended to have a range of over 1,725 vehicle with the Navy’s booster system. The system is intended to have a range of over 1,725
miles and “provide the Army with a prototype strategic attack weapon system to defeat A2/AD miles and “provide the Army with a prototype strategic attack weapon system to defeat A2/AD
capabilities, suppress adversary Long Range Fires, and engage other high payoff/time sensitive capabilities, suppress adversary Long Range Fires, and engage other high payoff/time sensitive
targets.”targets.”3233 The Army is requesting $301 The Army is requesting $301 ~~mil ion~~million in RDT&E for the program in FY2022—$500 in RDT&E for the program in FY2022—$500
~~mil ion~~ million under the FY2021 request and $531 under the FY2021 request and $531 ~~mil ion~~ million under the FY2021 appropriation.under the FY2021 appropriation.3334 It plans to It plans to
conduct flight tests for LRHW in FY2022 and FY2023, field an experimental prototype in conduct flight tests for LRHW in FY2022 and FY2023, field an experimental prototype in
FY2023, and transition to a program of record in the fourth quarter of FY2024.FY2023, and transition to a program of record in the fourth quarter of FY2024.34
35 U.S. Air Force
The AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon is expected to leverage DARPA’s Tactical The AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon is expected to leverage DARPA’s Tactical
Boost Glide technology to develop an air-launched hypersonic glide vehicle prototype capable of Boost Glide technology to develop an air-launched hypersonic glide vehicle prototype capable of
~~travel ing~~travelling at average speeds of between Mach 6.5 and Mach 8 at a range of approximately 1,000 at average speeds of between Mach 6.5 and Mach 8 at a range of approximately 1,000
miles.miles.~~35 Despite testing delays due to technical chal enges, ARRW~~ 36 Although ARRW successfully completed a successfully completed a
“captive carry” test flight in June 2019“captive carry” test flight in June 2019~~; its first free-flight test failed in April 2021.36 The Air~~
~~Force has requested $238 mil ion for ARRW RDT&E in FY2022—$144 mil ion under the~~

~~30 David B. Larter, “All US Navy destroyers will get hypersonic missiles, says T rump’s national security adviser,”~~
~~Defense News, October 21, 2020,~~ , it has Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1466, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. 30 Department of the Navy, “Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2021 Budget,” February 10, 2020, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/21pres/Highlights_book.pdf; and Megan Eckstein, “Navy Says Hypersonic Weapons Coming to Subs in 5 Years,” USNI News, November 17, 2020, at https://news.usni.org/2020/11/17/navy-says-hypersonic-weapons-coming-to-subs-in-5-years. 31 David B. Larter, “All US Navy destroyers will get hypersonic missiles, says Trump’s national security adviser,” Defense News, October 21, 2020, at https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/10/21/all-us-navy-destroyers-will-get-https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/10/21/all-us-navy-destroyers-will-get-
hypersonic-missiles-trumps-national-security-advisor-says/. hypersonic-missiles-trumps-national-security-advisor-says/.
31 32 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Development, ~~T est~~Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1466, Activity 4, p. 1466,
at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/~~RDT EN_BA4_Book.pdf .~~
32RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. 33 Sydney J. Freedberg Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Discloses Hypersonic LRHW Range Of 1,725 Miles; Watch Out China,” Breaking Jr., “Army Discloses Hypersonic LRHW Range Of 1,725 Miles; Watch Out China,” Breaking
Defense, May, 12 2021, Defense, May, 12 2021, at https://breakingdefense.com/2021/05/army-discloses-hypersonic-lrhw-range-of-1725-miles-https://breakingdefense.com/2021/05/army-discloses-hypersonic-lrhw-range-of-1725-miles-
watch-out-china/; and watch-out-china/; and at https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/army-sets-2023-hypersonic-flight-test-strategic-cannon-https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/army-sets-2023-hypersonic-flight-test-strategic-cannon-
advances/ Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budgetadvances/ Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book ofEstimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Research,
Development, Development, ~~T est~~Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 639, Activity 4, p. 639,
at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/~~Documen ts~~Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte//BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/~~RDT E_BA_4_FY_202~~
RDTE_BA_4_FY_2022_PB.pdf. 2_PB.pdf.
33 34 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research,
Development, Development, ~~T est~~Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 639, Activity 4, p. 639,
at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/~~RDT E_BA_4_FY_202~~
RDTE_BA_4_FY_2022_PB.pdf. 2_PB.pdf.
3435 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research,
Development, Development, ~~T est~~Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, Activity 4,
at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/~~RDT E_BA_4_FY_202~~
RDTE_BA_4_FY_2022_PB.pdf. 2_PB.pdf.
35 36 ARRW is ARRW is expected to be launchedexpected to be launched initially from the B-52H strategic bomber. initially from the B-52H strategic bomber. ~~T homas~~Thomas Newdick, Newdick, “Air Force Says “Air Force Says
NewNew Hypersonic MissileHypersonic Missile Will Hit Will Hit ~~T argets~~Targets 1,000 Miles Away In Under 12 Minutes,” 1,000 Miles Away In Under 12 Minutes,” The Drive, October 13, 2020, , October 13, 2020,
at https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37045/air-force-says-new-hypersonic-missile-will-hit-targets-1000-miles-https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37045/air-force-says-new-hypersonic-missile-will-hit-targets-1000-miles-
~~away-in-under-12-minutes.~~
~~36 Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force’s Hypersonic ARRW Missile Fails First Flight T est,” Military.com , April 6, 2021,~~
~~https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/04/06/air-forces-hypersonic-arrw-missile-fails-first-flight -test.html#:~:text=~~
~~In%20June%202019%2C%20the%20service,early%202020s%2C%20the%20release%20states.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

6

~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~FY2021 request and $148 mil ion under the FY2021 appropriation.37 In addition, the Air Force~~
~~has requested $161 mil ion in FY2022 for the procurement of an estimated 12 ARRW missiles.38~~
~~In February 2020, the Air Force announced that it had cancel ed its second hypersonic weapon~~
Congressional Research Service 6 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress experienced failures in all three of its subsequent flight tests.37 The Air Force continues to assert that, despite these failures, “it is still possible to provide [early operational capability] in late calendar year 2022, provided future flight testing [of ARRW] concludes as per the current plan.”38 This schedule could leave little to no room for test delays or additional flight failures. The Air Force has requested $238 million for ARRW RDT&E in FY2022—$144 million under the FY2021 request and $148 million under the FY2021 appropriation.39 In addition, the Air Force requested $161 million in FY2022 for the procurement of an estimated 12 ARRW missiles;40 Congress authorized $116 million for ARRW procurement in the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81), noting that the additional funds were “early to need.” In February 2020, the Air Force announced that it had cancelled its second hypersonic weapon program, the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW), which had been expected to use program, the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW), which had been expected to use
the common glide vehicle and booster system, due to budget pressures that forced it to choose the common glide vehicle and booster system, due to budget pressures that forced it to choose
between ARRW and HCSW.between ARRW and HCSW.3941 Then-Air Force acquisition chief Then-Air Force acquisition chief ~~Wil~~ Will Roper explained that ARRW Roper explained that ARRW
was selected because it was more advanced and gave the Air Force additional options. “[ARRW] was selected because it was more advanced and gave the Air Force additional options. “[ARRW]
is is ~~smal er~~smaller; we can carry twice as many on the B-52, and it’s possible it could be on the F-15,” he ; we can carry twice as many on the B-52, and it’s possible it could be on the F-15,” he
explained.explained.4042 A senior Air Force official has since noted that a B-52 could A senior Air Force official has since noted that a B-52 could ~~potential y~~potentially carry four carry four
ARRWs.ARRWs.41
~~Final y~~43 Finally, in FY2022, the Air Force launched the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) , in FY2022, the Air Force launched the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM)
program to develop a hypersonic cruise missile that integrates Air Force and DARPA program to develop a hypersonic cruise missile that integrates Air Force and DARPA
technologies. Some reports indicate that HACM is intended to be launched from both bombers technologies. Some reports indicate that HACM is intended to be launched from both bombers
and fighter aircraft, with a senior Air Force official noting that a B-52 could and fighter aircraft, with a senior Air Force official noting that a B-52 could ~~potential y~~potentially carry 20 carry 20
HACMs or more.HACMs or more.4244 According to the Air Force, “the ability to execute HACM development is away-in-under-12-minutes. 37 Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force’s Hypersonic ARRW Missile Fails First Flight Test,” Military.com, April 6, 2021, at https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/04/06/air-forces-hypersonic-arrw-missile-fails-first-flight-test.html#:~:text=In%20June%202019%2C%20the%20service,early%202020s%2C%20the%20release%20states; and Anthony Capaccio, “Hypersonic-Missile Failures Risk U.S. Chase of China, Russia,” Bloomberg, March 7, 2022, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-07/hypersonic-missile-failures-imperil-u-s-chase-of-china-russia. 38 Anthony Capaccio, “Hypersonic-Missile Failures Risk U.S. Chase of China, Russia,” Bloomberg, March 7, 2022, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-07/hypersonic-missile-failures-imperil-u-s-chase-of-china-russia. 39 ~~According to the Air Force, “the ability to execute HACM development is~~
~~contingent upon fully funded and successful predecessor capability development efforts.”43 The~~
~~Air Force requested $200 mil ion for HACM in FY2022.44~~
~~The Air Force is also seeking information from industry on the Expendable Hypersonic Air-~~
~~Breathing Multi-Mission Demonstrator Program, alternatively known as Project Mayhem.~~
~~According to Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White, “Project Mayhem is to look at the~~
~~next step in what the opportunity space al ows relative to hypersonic cruise missile systems” and~~
~~is intended to be capable of flying “significantly longer ranges than what we’re doing today.”45~~

37 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Development, ~~T est~~Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 139, and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 139,
at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/~~RDT E_~~RDTE_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20-/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20-
%20AF%20RDT%20AF%20RDT %20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d.%20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d.
38 40 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Missile Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Missile
Procurement, Volume I, p. 19, Procurement, Volume I, p. 19,
at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/~~PROCUREMENT _~~PROCUREMENT_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-
%203020%20-%20Missile%20Proc.pdf?ver=GIEj1YH2GS-elMys1wLm1A%3d%3d.%203020%20-%20Missile%20Proc.pdf?ver=GIEj1YH2GS-elMys1wLm1A%3d%3d.
39 41 Valerie Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force kills one of its hypersonic weapons programs,” Insinna, “US Air Force kills one of its hypersonic weapons programs,” Defense News,, ~~February~~ February 10, 2020, 10, 2020,
at https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2020/02/10/the-air-force-just-canceled-one-of-its-hypersonic-https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2020/02/10/the-air-force-just-canceled-one-of-its-hypersonic-
weapons-programs/. weapons-programs/.
4042 John A. John A. ~~T irpak~~Tirpak, “Roper: , “Roper: ~~T he~~The ARRW Hypersonic Missile Better Option for USAF,” ARRW Hypersonic Missile Better Option for USAF,” Air Force Magazine, March 2, , March 2,
2020, 2020, at https://www.airforcemag.com/arrw-beat-hcsw-because-its-smaller-better-for-usaf/. https://www.airforcemag.com/arrw-beat-hcsw-because-its-smaller-better-for-usaf/. ~~T irpak~~Tirpak additionally notes that additionally notes that
“the F-15 could accelerate the ARRW to Mach 3 before launch, potentially reducing the size of the booster needed to “the F-15 could accelerate the ARRW to Mach 3 before launch, potentially reducing the size of the booster needed to
get the weapon to hypersonic speed.” get the weapon to hypersonic speed.”
4143 John A. John A. ~~T irpak~~Tirpak, “Air Force Will , “Air Force Will ~~T ry~~Try Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile in July,”in July,” Air Force Magazine, ,
June 3, 2021, June 3, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/. https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/.
4244 John A. John A. ~~T irpak~~Tirpak, “Air Force Will , “Air Force Will ~~T ry~~Try Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile in July,”in July,” Air Force Magazine, ,
June 3, 2021, June 3, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/. Congressional Research Service 7 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress contingent upon fully funded and successful predecessor capability development efforts.”45 The Air Force requested $200 million for HACM in FY2022.46 The Air Force is also seeking information from industry on the Expendable Hypersonic Air-Breathing Multi-Mission Demonstrator Program, alternatively known as Project Mayhem. According to Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White, “Project Mayhem is to look at the next step in what the opportunity space allows relative to hypersonic cruise missile systems” and is intended to be capable of flying “significantly longer ranges than what we’re doing today.”47 Mayhem is reported to be larger than ARRW and capable of carrying multiple payloads for different mission sets.48 DARPA ~~https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/.~~
~~43 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,~~
~~Development, T est and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 148,~~
~~https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/RDT E_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20-~~
~~%20AF%20RDT %20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d.~~
~~44 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,~~
~~Development, T est and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 139,~~
~~https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/RDT E_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20-~~
~~%20AF%20RDT %20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d.~~
~~45 Mike White, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Hypersonic Strike and Defense: A~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~Mayhem is reported to be larger than ARRW and capable of carrying multiple payloads for~~
~~different mission sets.46~~
~~DARPA~~
DARPA, in partnership with the Air Force, continues to test Tactical Boost Glide, a wedge-shaped DARPA, in partnership with the Air Force, continues to test Tactical Boost Glide, a wedge-shaped
hypersonic glide vehicle capable of Mach 7+ flight that “aims to develop and demonstrate hypersonic glide vehicle capable of Mach 7+ flight that “aims to develop and demonstrate
technologies to enable future air-launched, tactical-range hypersonic boost glide systems.”technologies to enable future air-launched, tactical-range hypersonic boost glide systems.”4749 TBG TBG
~~wil~~ will “also consider traceability, compatibility, and integration with the Navy Vertical Launch “also consider traceability, compatibility, and integration with the Navy Vertical Launch
System” and is planned to transition to both the Air Force and the Navy. DARPA has requested System” and is planned to transition to both the Air Force and the Navy. DARPA has requested
$50 $50 ~~mil ion~~ million for TBG in FY2022—$67 for TBG in FY2022—$67 ~~mil ion~~ million under the FY2021 request and $32 under the FY2021 request and $32 ~~mil ion~~ million under under
the FY2021 appropriation.the FY2021 appropriation.48
50 DARPA’s Operational Fires reportedly seeks to leverage TBG technologies to develop a ground- DARPA’s Operational Fires reportedly seeks to leverage TBG technologies to develop a ground-
launched system that launched system that ~~wil~~ will enable “advanced tactical weapons to penetrate modern enemy air enable “advanced tactical weapons to penetrate modern enemy air
defenses and rapidly and precisely engage critical time sensitive targets.” DARPA has requested defenses and rapidly and precisely engage critical time sensitive targets.” DARPA has requested
~~$45 mil ion~~ $45 million for OpFires in FY2022—$5 for OpFires in FY2022—$5 ~~mil ion~~ million over the FY2021 request and $3 over the FY2021 request and $3 ~~mil ion~~ million under under
the FY2022 appropriation.the FY2022 appropriation.49
~~In the longer term, DARPA, with Air Force support, is continuing work on the Hypersonic Air-~~
~~breathing Weapon Concept, which “seeks to develop and demonstrate critical technologies to~~
~~enable an effective and affordable air-launched hypersonic cruise missile.”50 Principal Director~~
~~for Hypersonics Mike White has stated that such a missile would be smal er than DOD’s~~
~~hypersonic glide vehicles and could therefore launch from a wider range of platforms. Principal~~
~~Director White has additional y noted that HAWC and other hypersonic cruise missiles could~~
~~integrate seekers more easily than hypersonic glide vehicles.51 DARPA requested $10 mil ion to~~
~~develop HAWC in FY2022—$10 mil ion under the FY2021 request and $21 mil ion under the~~
~~FY2021 appropriation.52~~

~~Conversation with Mike White,” June 10, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/hypersonic-strike-and-defense-~~
~~conversation-mike-white.~~
~~46 See, for example, Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile Becomes High -Priority USAF Project,” Air~~
~~Force Magazine, October 13, 2020, https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-attack-cruise-missile-becomes-~~
~~highpriority-usaf-project/.~~
~~47 “T actical Boost Glide (T BG) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/program/tactical-boost-glide;~~
~~and Guy Norris, “U.S. Air Force Plans Road Map to Operational Hypersonics,” Aviation Week, July 27, 2017,~~
~~https://aviationweek.com/defense/us-air-force-plans-road-map-operational-hypersonics.~~
~~48 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,~~
~~Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 158,~~
~~https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/RD~~
~~T E_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf .~~
~~49 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,~~
~~Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 159,~~
~~https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/RD~~
~~T E_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf .~~
~~50 “~~51 45 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 148, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/RDTE_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20-%20AF%20RDT%20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d. 46 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 139, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/RDTE_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20-%20AF%20RDT%20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d. 47 Mike White, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Hypersonic Strike and Defense: A Conversation with Mike White,” June 10, 2021, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/hypersonic-strike-and-defense-conversation-mike-white. 48 See, for example, Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile Becomes High-Priority USAF Project,” Air Force Magazine, October 13, 2020, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-attack-cruise-missile-becomes-highpriority-usaf-project/. 49 “Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/program/tactical-boost-glide; and Guy Norris, “U.S. Air Force Plans Road Map to Operational Hypersonics,” Aviation Week, July 27, 2017, at https://aviationweek.com/defense/us-air-force-plans-road-map-operational-hypersonics. 50 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 158, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf. 51 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 159, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf. Congressional Research Service 8 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress In the longer term, DARPA, with Air Force support, is continuing work on the Hypersonic Air-Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept, which “seeks to develop and demonstrate critical technologies to enable an effective and affordable air-launched hypersonic cruise missile.”52 Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has stated that such a missile would be smaller than DOD’s hypersonic glide vehicles and could therefore launch from a wider range of platforms. Principal Director White has additionally noted that HAWC and other hypersonic cruise missiles could integrate seekers more easily than hypersonic glide vehicles.53 DARPA requested $10 million to develop HAWC in FY2022—$10 million under the FY2021 request and $21 million under the FY2021 appropriation.54 ~~breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/~~
~~program/hypersonic-air-breathing-weapon-concept.~~
~~51 “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/~~
~~T ranscripts/T ranscript/Article/2101062/department -of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/.~~
~~52 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,~~
~~Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 161,~~
~~https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/RD~~
~~T E_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf .~~
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Table 1. Summary of U.S. Hypersonic Weapons RDT&E Funding
FY2021 Request
FY2021 Enacted
PB2022
Title
($ in millions)
($ in millions)
($ in millions)
Schedule
Conventional Conventional
1,008 1,008
767 767
1,374 1,374
Platform Platform
Prompt Strike (CPS) Prompt Strike (CPS)
deployment in deployment in
FY2025 and FY2028 FY2025 and FY2028
Long-Range Long-Range
801 801
832 832
301 301
Prototype Prototype
Hypersonic Hypersonic
deployment in deployment in
Weapon (LRHW) Weapon (LRHW)
FY2023 FY2023
AGM-183 Air- AGM-183 Air-
382 382
386 386
238 238
Early operational Early operational
Launched Rapid Launched Rapid
capability in capability in ~~FY2022~~
Response Weapon Response Weapon
CY2022 (ARRW) (ARRW)
Hypersonic Attack Hypersonic Attack
0 0
0 0
200 200
Complete Complete critical critical
Cruise Missile Cruise Missile
design review design review in in
(HACM) (HACM)
FY2023 FY2023
Tactical Boost Glide Tactical Boost Glide
117 117
82 82
50 50
Continue tests in Continue tests in
(TBG) (TBG)
FY2022 FY2022
Operational Fires Operational Fires
40 40
48 48
45 45
Complete Complete critical critical
(OpFires) (OpFires)
design review design review in in
FY2022 FY2022
Hypersonic Air- Hypersonic Air-
20 20
31 31
10 10
Complete Complete final final
breathing Weapon breathing Weapon
program review program review in in
Concept (HAWC) Concept (HAWC)
FY2022 FY2022
Source: Program information Program information taken from U.S. Navy, Army,taken from U.S. Navy, Army, ~~Air~~ Air Force,Force, and DARPA and DARPA ~~FY202 2~~FY2022 Justification Books, available at https://comptrol er.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/. For the Air Force’s update to ARRW’s schedule (from FY2022 to CY2022), see Anthony Capaccio, “Hypersonic-Missile Failures Risk U.S. Chase of China, Russia,” Bloomberg, March 7, 2022, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-07/hypersonic-missile-failures-imperil-u-s-chase-of-china-russia. 52 “Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) Program Information,” DARPA, at https://www.darpa.mil/program/hypersonic-air-breathing-weapon-concept. 53 “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/. 54 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 161, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf. Congressional Research Service 9 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Hypersonic Missile Defenses55 ~~Justification Books,~~
~~available at https://comptrol er.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.~~
~~Hypersonic Missile Defenses53~~
DOD is also investing in counter-hypersonic weapons capabilities, although former USD(R&E) DOD is also investing in counter-hypersonic weapons capabilities, although former USD(R&E)
Michael Griffin has stated that the United States Michael Griffin has stated that the United States ~~wil~~ will not have a defensive capability against not have a defensive capability against
hypersonic weapons until the mid-2020s, at the earliest.hypersonic weapons until the mid-2020s, at the earliest.5456 In September 2018, the Missile Defense In September 2018, the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA)—which in 2017 established a Hypersonic Defense Program pursuant to Section Agency (MDA)—which in 2017 established a Hypersonic Defense Program pursuant to Section
1687 of the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-840)—commissioned 21 white papers to explore 1687 of the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-840)—commissioned 21 white papers to explore
hypersonic missile defense options, including interceptor missiles, hypervelocity projectiles, laser hypersonic missile defense options, including interceptor missiles, hypervelocity projectiles, laser
guns, and electronic attack systems.guns, and electronic attack systems.5557 In January 2020, MDA issued a draft request for prototype In January 2020, MDA issued a draft request for prototype
proposals for a Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapons System interceptor. This proposals for a Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapons System interceptor. This
effort is intended to “reduce interceptor key technology and integration risks, anchor modeling effort is intended to “reduce interceptor key technology and integration risks, anchor modeling
and simulation in areas of large uncertainty, and to increase the interceptor technology readiness and simulation in areas of large uncertainty, and to increase the interceptor technology readiness
levels (TRL) to level 5” (validating components in a relevant environment).levels (TRL) to level 5” (validating components in a relevant environment).5658 MDA has also awarded four companies—Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Leidos, and L3Harris—with $20 million contracts to design prototype space-based (low-Earth orbit) sensors by October 31, 2020.59 Such sensors could theoretically ~~MDA has also~~

~~53 For additional information about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623,~~ ~~Hypersonic Missile~~
~~Defense: Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler, Stephen M. McCall, and Quintin A. Reed.~~
~~54 “Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin at NDIA Hypersonics~~
~~Senior Executive Series,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 13, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/News/T ranscripts/~~
~~T ranscript -View/Article/1713396/media-availability-with-deputy-secretary-shanahan-and-under-secretary-of-defens/.~~
~~55 P.L. 114-840, Section 2, Division A, T itle XVI, §1687; and Hudson and T rimble, “T op U.S. Hypersonic Weapon~~
~~Program”; Steve T rimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” p. 21.~~
~~56 Missile Defense Agency, “Draft Request for Prototype Proposal: Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapon~~
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~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~awarded four companies—Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Leidos, and L3Harris—with $20~~
~~mil ion contracts to design prototype space-based (low-Earth orbit) sensors by October 31,~~
~~2020.57 Such sensors could theoretical y~~ extend the range at which incoming missiles could be extend the range at which incoming missiles could be
detected and tracked—a critical requirement for hypersonic missile defense, according to then-detected and tracked—a critical requirement for hypersonic missile defense, according to then-
USD(R&E) Griffin.USD(R&E) Griffin.5860 MDA requested $248 MDA requested $248 ~~mil ion~~million for hypersonic defense in FY2022—up from for hypersonic defense in FY2022—up from
its $207 its $207 ~~mil ion~~ million FY2021 request and down from the $273 FY2021 request and down from the $273 ~~mil ion~~million FY2021 appropriation. FY2021 appropriation.5961 In In
addition, DARPA is working on a program addition, DARPA is working on a program ~~cal ed~~called Glide Breaker, which “ Glide Breaker, which “~~wil~~ will develop critical develop critical
component technology to support a lightweight vehicle designed for precise engagement of component technology to support a lightweight vehicle designed for precise engagement of
hypersonic threats at very long range.”hypersonic threats at very long range.”6062 DARPA requested $7 DARPA requested $7 ~~mil ion~~million for Glide Breaker in for Glide Breaker in
FY2022, matching the $7 FY2022, matching the $7 ~~mil ion~~ million appropriation in FY2021.63 55 For additional information about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler, Stephen M. McCall, and Quintin A. Reed. 56 “Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin at NDIA Hypersonics Senior Executive Series,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 13, 2018, at https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1713396/media-availability-with-deputy-secretary-shanahan-and-under-secretary-of-defens/. 57 P.L. 114-840, Section 2, Division A, Title XVI, §1687; and Hudson and Trimble, “Top U.S. Hypersonic Weapon Program”; Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” p. 21. 58 Missile Defense Agency, “Draft Request for Prototype Proposal: Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapon System,” January 30, 2020, p. 8. TRL measures a technology’s level of maturity; TRL 5 requires validation in a relevant environment. For information about specific TRLs, see Troy Carter, “The 9 Technology Readiness Levels of the DOD,” TechLink, at https://techlinkcenter.org/technology-readiness-level-dod/. 59 Sandra Erwin, “Missile Defense Agency selects four companies to develop space sensors,” Space News, October 30, 2019, at https://spacenews.com/missile-defense-agency-selects-four-companies-to-develop-space-sensors/. Experts disagree on the cost and technological feasibility of space-based missile defense. 60 Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin.” 61 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 2a of 5, p. 569, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf. 62 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 164. 63 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 160, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf. Congressional Research Service 10 link to page 28 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Infrastructure According to a study mandated by the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239) and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA),64 the United States had 48 critical hypersonic test facilities and mobile assets in 2014 needed for the maturation of hypersonic technologies for defense systems development through 2030.65 These specialized facilities, which simulate the unique conditions experienced in hypersonic flight (e.g., speed, pressure, heating),66 included 10 DOD hypersonic ground test facilities, 11 DOD open-air ranges, 11 DOD mobile assets, 9 NASA facilities, 2 Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, and 5 industry or academic facilities.67 In its 2014 evaluation of U.S. hypersonic test and evaluation infrastructure, IDA noted that “no current U.S. facility can provide full-scale, time-dependent, coupled aerodynamic and thermal-loading environments for flight durations necessary to evaluate these characteristics above Mach 8.” Since the 2014 study report was published, there have been a number of changes in U.S. ~~appropriation in FY2021.61~~
~~Infrastructure~~
~~According to a study mandated by the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-~~
~~239) and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA),62 the United States had 48~~
~~critical hypersonic test facilities and mobile assets in 2014 needed for the maturation of~~
~~hypersonic technologies for defense systems development through 2030.63 These specialized~~
~~facilities, which simulate the unique conditions experienced in hypersonic flight (e.g., speed,~~
~~pressure, heating),64 included 10 DOD hypersonic ground test facilities, 11 DOD open-air ranges,~~
~~11 DOD mobile assets, 9 NASA facilities, 2 Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, and 5~~
~~industry or academic facilities.65 In its 2014 evaluation of U.S. hypersonic test and evaluation~~
~~infrastructure, IDA noted that “no current U.S. facility can provide full-scale, time-dependent,~~

~~System,” January 30, 2020, p. 8. T RL measures a technology’s level of maturity; T RL 5 requires validation in a~~
~~relevant environment. For information about specific T RLs, see T roy Carter, “ The 9 T echnology Readiness Levels of~~
~~the DOD,” T echLink, https://techlinkcenter.org/technology-readiness-level-dod/.~~
~~57 Sandra Erwin, “Missile Defense Agency selects four companies to develop space sensors,” Space News, October 30,~~
~~2019, https://spacenews.com/missile-defense-agency-selects-four-companies-to-develop-space-sensors/. Experts~~
~~disagree on the cost and technological feasibility of space-based missile defense.~~
~~58 Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin.”~~
~~59 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense -Wide~~
~~Justification Book 2a of 5, p. 569,~~
~~https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/RD~~
~~T E_Vol2_MDA_RDT E_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf.~~
~~60 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,~~
~~Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 164.~~
~~61 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,~~
~~Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 160,~~
~~https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy202 2/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/RD~~
~~T E_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf .~~
~~62 P.L. 112-239, Section 2, Division A, T itle X, §1071.~~
~~63 A more recent report by the Government Accountability Office states that there are “26 DOD, DOE, NASA, and~~
~~private U.S. wind tunnel facilities capable of supporting hypersonic research.” Government Accountability Office,~~
~~Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Respon sibilities to Ensure Coordination across Developm ent~~
~~Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 15, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378.~~
~~64 T hese conditions additionally require the development of specialized materials such as metals and ceramics.~~
~~65 T his list is taken directly from a 2014 Institute for Defense Analysis report and, therefore, may not be current. See~~
~~(U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.,~~ ~~(U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evalua tion Infrastructure to Effectively~~
~~and Efficiently Mature Hypersonic Technologies for Defense System s Developm ent: Sum mary Analysis and~~
~~Assessm ent, Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2014. Permission to use this material has been granted by the~~
~~Office of Science and T echnology Policy.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~link to page 26~~ ~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~coupled aerodynamic and thermal-loading environments for flight durations necessary to evaluate~~
~~these characteristics above Mach 8.”~~
~~Since the 2014 study report was published, there have been a number of changes in U.S.~~
hypersonic test infrastructure. For example, the University of Notre Dame has opened a Mach 6 hypersonic test infrastructure. For example, the University of Notre Dame has opened a Mach 6
hypersonic wind tunnel and at least one hypersonic testing facility has been inactivated. hypersonic wind tunnel and at least one hypersonic testing facility has been inactivated.
Development of Mach 8 and Mach 10 wind tunnels at Purdue University and the University of Development of Mach 8 and Mach 10 wind tunnels at Purdue University and the University of
Notre Dame, respectively, is ongoing.Notre Dame, respectively, is ongoing.6668 In addition, the University of Arizona modified one of its In addition, the University of Arizona modified one of its
wind tunnels to enable Mach 5 testing, while Texas A&M University—in partnership with Army wind tunnels to enable Mach 5 testing, while Texas A&M University—in partnership with Army
Futures Command—is constructing a kilometer-long Mach 10 wind tunnel.Futures Command—is constructing a kilometer-long Mach 10 wind tunnel.6769 (For a partial list of (For a partial list of
U.S. hypersonic test assets and their capabilities, see U.S. hypersonic test assets and their capabilities, see thethe Appendix.) The United States also uses ) The United States also uses
the Royal Australian Air Force Woomera Test Range in Australia and the Andøya Rocket Range the Royal Australian Air Force Woomera Test Range in Australia and the Andøya Rocket Range
in Norway for flight testing.in Norway for flight testing.6870 In January 2019, the Navy announced plans to reactivate its Launch In January 2019, the Navy announced plans to reactivate its Launch
Test Complex at China Lake, CA to improve air launch and underwater testing capabilities for the Test Complex at China Lake, CA to improve air launch and underwater testing capabilities for the
conventional prompt strike program.conventional prompt strike program.6971 According to an assessment conducted by the Government 64 P.L. 112-239, Section 2, Division A, Title X, §1071. 65 A more recent report by the Government Accountability Office states that there are “26 DOD, DOE, NASA, and private U.S. wind tunnel facilities capable of supporting hypersonic research.” Government Accountability Office, Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination across Development Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 15, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378. 66 These conditions additionally require the development of specialized materials such as metals and ceramics. 67 This list is taken directly from a 2014 Institute for Defense Analysis report and, therefore, may not be current. See (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure to Effectively and Efficiently Mature Hypersonic Technologies for Defense Systems Development: Summary Analysis and Assessment, Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2014. Permission to use this material has been granted by the Office of Science and Technology Policy. 68 Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Expanding Hypersonic Technology Testing at Two Indiana Universities,” Military.com, April 23, 2019, at ~~According to an assessment conducted by the Government~~
~~Accountability Office, DOD has dedicated approximately $1 bil ion to hypersonic facility~~
~~modernization from FY2015 to FY2024.70~~
~~In April 2020, DOD’s Office of Inspector General announced that it would be evaluating current~~
~~ground test and evaluation facilities to determine if the capability and capacity would be~~
~~sufficient to execute DOD’s planned test schedule.71 Similarly, Section 222 of the FY2021 NDAA~~
~~(P.L. 116-283) requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in~~
~~consultation with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, to submit to the congressional~~
~~defense committees “an assessment of the sufficiency of the testing capabilities and infrastructure~~
~~used for fielding hypersonic weapons, and a description of any investments in testing capabilities~~
~~and infrastructure that may be required to support in-flight and ground-based testing for such~~
~~weapons.”~~
~~In addition, in March 2020, DOD announced that it had established a “hypersonic war room” to~~
~~assess the U.S. industrial base for hypersonic weapons and identify “critical nodes” in the supply~~

~~66 Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Expanding Hypersonic T echnology T esting at T wo Indiana Universities,” Military.com,~~
~~April 23, 2019,~~ https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/04/23/air-force-expanding-hypersonic-technology-testing-https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/04/23/air-force-expanding-hypersonic-technology-testing-
two-indiana-universities.html. two-indiana-universities.html.
6769 University of Arizona, “Mach 5 Quiet Ludwieg University of Arizona, “Mach 5 Quiet Ludwieg ~~T ube,”~~ Tube,” at https://transition.arizona.edu/facilities/qlt5?_ga=https://transition.arizona.edu/facilities/qlt5?_ga=
2.62515882.768526379.15828431922.62515882.768526379.1582843192 -983632914.1582843192; and Ashley -983632914.1582843192; and Ashley ~~T ressel, “~~ Tressel, “Army to open hypersonic testing Army to open hypersonic testing
facility at facility at ~~T exas~~Texas A&M,” Inside Defense, October 13, 2019, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/army-open- A&M,” Inside Defense, October 13, 2019, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/army-open-
hypersonic-testing-facility-texas-am. Additional universities such as the University of Maryland, the California hypersonic-testing-facility-texas-am. Additional universities such as the University of Maryland, the California
Institute of Institute of ~~T echnology~~Technology, the Georgia Institute of , the Georgia Institute of ~~T echnology~~Technology, the Air Force Academy, the University of , the Air Force Academy, the University of ~~T ennessee~~Tennessee, and , and
VirginiaVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State University also maintainPolytechnic Institute and State University also maintain experimental hypersonic facilities or conduct experimental hypersonic facilities or conduct
hypersonic research. hypersonic research.
6870 (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure.
6971 “Update: US Navy to develop China Lake to support CPS weapon testing,” “Update: US Navy to develop China Lake to support CPS weapon testing,” Jane’s (subscription required),(subscription required), February February
12, 2019, 12, 2019, at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1644858-JMR. Congressional Research Service 11 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Accountability Office, DOD has dedicated approximately $1 billion to hypersonic facility modernization from FY2015 to FY2024.72 In February 2022, DOD’s Office of Inspector General announced that it had concluded its two-year-long evaluation of current ground test and evaluation facilities to determine if the capability and capacity would be sufficient to execute DOD’s planned test schedule; however, DOD did not release the evaluation to the public.73 Similarly, an annual report by DOD’s Director of Test and Evaluation evaluated the sufficiency of U.S. hypersonic weapons test infrastructure; this report was not released publicly.74 Congress has also continued to express interest in hypersonic weapons infrastructure. Section 222 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in consultation with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, to submit to the congressional defense committees “an assessment of the sufficiency of the testing capabilities and infrastructure used for fielding hypersonic weapons, and a description of any investments in testing capabilities and infrastructure that may be required to support in-flight and ground-based testing for such weapons.” Section 225 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) requires the Secretary of Defense to identify the hypersonic facilities and capabilities of the Major Range and Test Facility Base and brief the congressional defense committees on a plan for improvement. Finally, in March 2020, DOD announced that it had established a “hypersonic war room” to assess the U.S. industrial base for hypersonic weapons and identify “critical nodes” in the supply chain.75~~https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1644858-JMR.~~
~~70 Government Accountability Office,~~ ~~Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure~~
~~Coordination across Developm ent Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 27, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-~~
~~378.~~
~~71 See Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Memorandum for Distribution: Evaluation of the Ground~~
~~T est and Evaluation Infrastructure Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (Project No. D2020 -DEV0SN-0106.000),”~~
~~April 13, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/14/2002280826/-1/-1/1/D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000.PDF.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

11

~~link to page 16~~ ~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~chain.72~~ DOD has also amended its “5000 series” acquisition policy in order to enhance supply DOD has also amended its “5000 series” acquisition policy in order to enhance supply
chain resiliency and reduce sustainment costs.chain resiliency and reduce sustainment costs.73
76 Russia
Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it
accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States
and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-~~Bal istic~~Ballistic Missile Treaty in Missile Treaty in
2001.2001.7477 Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated that “the US is permitting constant, Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated that “the US is permitting constant,
uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating 72 Government Accountability Office, Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination across Development Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 27, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378. 73 See Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Memorandum for Distribution: Evaluation of the Ground Test and Evaluation Infrastructure Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (Project No. D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000),” April 13, 2020, at https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/14/2002280826/-1/-1/1/D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000.PDF; and Department of Defense Office of Inspector General,” Evaluation of the Ground Test and Evaluation Infrastructure Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (DODIG-2022-056),” February 3, 2022, at https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/2921419/evaluation-of-the-ground-test-and-evaluation-infrastructure-supporting-hyperson/. 74 Anthony Capaccio, “Pentagon Hypersonic Weapons Tests Need More Wide-Open Spaces,” Bloomberg, February 3, 2020. 75 Aaron Mehta, “Pentagon launches hypersonic industrial base study,” Defense News, March 3, 2020, at https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/03/02/pentagon-launches-hypersonic-industrial-base-study/. 76 C. Todd Lopez, “Rewrite of Acquisition Regulation Helps U.S. Build Hypersonic Arsenal More Quickly,” DOD News, October 30, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2400205/rewrite-of-acquisition-regulation-helps-us-build-hypersonic-arsenal-more-quickly/. 77 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic Arms Control, February 2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/. Congressional Research Service 12 link to page 17 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress ~~missiles, improving their quality, and creating~~
new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, ~~eventual y this wil~~ eventually this will result in the result in the
complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that al all of our missiles could simply of our missiles could simply
be intercepted.”be intercepted.”7578 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they approach Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they approach
their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its sense of their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its sense of
strategic stability.strategic stability.76
79 Programs
Russia is pursuing two hypersonic weapons programs—the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon (or Russia is pursuing two hypersonic weapons programs—the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon (or
Zircon)—and has reportedly fielded the KinzhalZircon)—and has reportedly fielded the Kinzhal (“Dagger”), a maneuvering air-launched (“Dagger”), a maneuvering air-launched ~~bal istic~~
ballistic missile.missile.7780
Avangard Avangard (Figure 2) is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an intercontinental is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an intercontinental ~~bal istic~~ballistic
missile (ICBM), giving it “effectively ‘unlimited’ range.”missile (ICBM), giving it “effectively ‘unlimited’ range.”7881 Reports indicate that Avangard is Reports indicate that Avangard is
currently deployed on the SS-19 Stiletto ICBM, though Russia plans to currently deployed on the SS-19 Stiletto ICBM, though Russia plans to ~~eventual y~~eventually launch the launch the
vehicle from the Sarmat ICBM. Sarmat is vehicle from the Sarmat ICBM. Sarmat is ~~stil~~ still in development, although it is scheduled to be in development, although it is scheduled to be
deployed by the end of 2022.deployed by the end of 2022.7982 Avangard features onboard countermeasures and Avangard features onboard countermeasures and ~~wil reportedly~~

~~72 Aaron Mehta, “Pentagon launches hypersonic industrial base study,” Defense News, March 3, 2020,~~
~~https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/03/02/pentagon-launches-hypersonic-industrial-base-study/.~~
~~73 C. T odd Lopez, “Rewrite of Acquisition Regulation Helps U.S. Build Hyp ersonic Arsenal More Quickly,”~~ ~~DOD~~
~~News, October 30, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2400205/rewrite-of-acquisition-~~
~~regulation-helps-us-build-hypersonic-arsenal-more-quickly/.~~
~~74 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs,~~ ~~Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic~~
~~Arm s Control, February 2019, https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-~~
~~and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.~~
~~75 Vladimir~~ will reportedly carry a nuclear warhead. It was successfully tested twice in 2016 and once in December 2018, reportedly reaching speeds of Mach 20; however, an October 2017 test resulted in failure. Russian news sources claim that Avangard entered into combat duty in December 2019.83 78 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,”Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/56957. president/news/56957.
76 79 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See ~~T ong~~ Tong
Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic ~~T echnology~~Technology and the Security and the Security
Dilemma,” Carnegie-Dilemma,” Carnegie-~~T singhua~~ Tsinghua Center for GlobalCenter for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/
conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-
pub-76894. pub-76894.
7780 Although the Kinzhal is a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile Although the Kinzhal is a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile rather than a hypersonic glide vehicle or rather than a hypersonic glide vehicle or
hypersonic cruise missile, it ishypersonic cruise missile, it is often included in reporting of Russia’soften included in reporting of Russia’s hypersonic weapons program. For this reasonhypersonic weapons program. For this reason ——
and becauseand because it poses defensive challengesit poses defensive challenges that are similar to other hypersonic weapons—it is includedthat are similar to other hypersonic weapons—it is included here for here for
reference. reference.
7881 Steve Steve ~~T rimble~~Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” , “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week,, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20. January 14-27, 2019, p. 20.
7982 Nicholas Fiorenza, “Putin outlines development of Russia’s nuclear triad,” Nicholas Fiorenza, “Putin outlines development of Russia’s nuclear triad,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (subscription (subscription
required),required), April 22, 2021, April 22, 2021, at https://customer.janes.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/FG_3953700-JDW. Sarmat could https://customer.janes.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/FG_3953700-JDW. Sarmat could
reportedly accommodate at least three Avangard vehicles. Seereportedly accommodate at least three Avangard vehicles. See Malcolm Claus,Malcolm Claus, “Russia“Russia unveils newunveils new strategic delivery strategic delivery
systems,” systems,” Jane’s (subscription required),(subscription required), at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR. 83 “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” TASS, December 27, 2019, at https://tass.com/defense/1104297. Congressional Research Service 13 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress ~~https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

12

~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~carry a nuclear warhead. It was successfully tested twice in 2016 and once in December 2018,~~
~~reportedly reaching speeds of Mach 20; however, an October 2017 test resulted in failure.~~
~~Russian news sources claim that Avangard entered into combat duty in December 2019.80~~
Figure 2. Artist Rendering of Avangard

Source: https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR. https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.
In addition to Avangard, Russia is developing Tsirkon, a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile In addition to Avangard, Russia is developing Tsirkon, a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile
capable of traveling at speeds of between Mach 6 and Mach 8. Tsirkon is reportedly capable of capable of traveling at speeds of between Mach 6 and Mach 8. Tsirkon is reportedly capable of
striking both ground and naval targets. According to Russian news sources, Tsirkon has a range of striking both ground and naval targets. According to Russian news sources, Tsirkon has a range of
between approximately 250 and 600 miles and can be fired from the vertical launch systems between approximately 250 and 600 miles and can be fired from the vertical launch systems
mounted on cruisers mounted on cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and and Pyotr Veliky, Project 20380 corvettes, Project 22350 , Project 20380 corvettes, Project 22350
frigates, and Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other platforms.frigates, and Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other platforms.8184 These sources assert These sources assert
that Tsirkon was successfully launched from a Project 22350 frigate in Januarythat Tsirkon was successfully launched from a Project 22350 frigate in January ~~and October~~
~~2020.82 U.S. intel igence~~, October, and December 2020 and from a Project 885 Yasen-class submarine in October 2021.85 U.S. intelligence reports indicate that the missile reports indicate that the missile ~~wil~~ will become operational in 2023.become operational in 2023.8386
In addition, Russia has reportedly fielded Kinzhal, In addition, Russia has reportedly fielded Kinzhal, a maneuvering air-launched a maneuvering air-launched ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile missile
modified from the Iskander missile. According to U.S. modified from the Iskander missile. According to U.S. ~~intel igence~~intelligence reports, Kinzhal was reports, Kinzhal was
successfully test fired from a modified MiG-31 fighter (NATO code name: Foxhound) in July successfully test fired from a modified MiG-31 fighter (NATO code name: Foxhound) in July
2018—striking a target at a distance of approximately 500 miles—and may now be ready for 2018—striking a target at a distance of approximately 500 miles—and may now be ready for
combat.combat.8487 Russia plans to deploy the missile on both the MiG-31 and the Su-34 long-range strike Russia plans to deploy the missile on both the MiG-31 and the Su-34 long-range strike

~~80 “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” TASS, December 27, 2019,~~
~~https://tass.com/defense/1104297.~~
~~81 “Russia~~ fighter.88 Russia is working to mount the missile on the Tu-22M3 strategic bomber (NATO code 84 “Russia makes over 10 test launches of makes over 10 test launches of ~~T sirkon~~Tsirkon seaborne hypersonic missile,” seaborne hypersonic missile,” TASS, December 21, 2018, , December 21, 2018,
at http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
Aspirations, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, , Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, at https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/
military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf. military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf.
~~82 “T ASS~~85 “TASS: Russia: Russia Conducts First Ship-BasedConducts First Ship-Based Hypersonic Missile Hypersonic Missile ~~T est~~Test,” ,” Reuters, February, February 27, 2020, 27, 2020,
at https://www.voanews.com/europe/tass-russia-conducts-first-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test; and https://www.voanews.com/europe/tass-russia-conducts-first-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test; and ~~Associated Press,~~
~~“Russia reports successful test launch of hypersonic missile,” October 7, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/vladimir-~~
~~putin-archive-russia-20688205e30f19a8d76fcd77cb9d45a4.~~
~~83 Amanda Macias, “Russia again successfully~~ Samuel Cranny-Evans, “Russia conducts first submarine test launches of Tsirkon hypersonic missile,” Jane’s (subscription required), October 4, 2021. 86 Amanda Macias, “Russia again successfully tests ship-based hypersonic missile—whichtests ship-based hypersonic missile—which ~~will~~ will likely be ready for likely be ready for
combat by 2022,”combat by 2022,” CNBC, December 20, 2018, , December 20, 2018, at https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/20/russia-tests-hypersonic-missile-that-https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/20/russia-tests-hypersonic-missile-that-
could-be-ready-for-war-by-2022.html; and “could-be-ready-for-war-by-2022.html; and “ Russian Navy to accept latest Russian Navy to accept latest ~~T sirkon~~Tsirkon hypersonic missile for service in hypersonic missile for service in
2023—source,” 2023—source,” TASS, March 20, 2019, , March 20, 2019, at http://tass.com/defense/1049572. http://tass.com/defense/1049572.
8487 Amanda Macias, “Russia’s Amanda Macias, “Russia’s new hypersonic missile, which can be launchednew hypersonic missile, which can be launched from warplanes, willfrom warplanes, will likely belikely be ready for ready for
combat by 2020,”combat by 2020,” CNBC, July, July 13, 2018, 13, 2018, at https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/13/russia-new-hypersonic-missile-likely-https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/13/russia-new-hypersonic-missile-likely-
ready-for-war-by-2020.html. ready-for-war-by-2020.html.
88 Mark B. Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles … and What It Means” in Defense Technology Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons, American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

~~fighter.85 Russia is working to mount the missile on the Tu-22M3 strategic bomber (NATO code~~
name: Backfire), although the slower-moving bomber may face name: Backfire), although the slower-moving bomber may face ~~chal enges~~challenges in “accelerating the in “accelerating the
weapon into the correct launch parameters.”weapon into the correct launch parameters.”86
89 Russian media has reported Kinzhal’s top speed as Mach 10, with a range of up to 1,200 miles Russian media has reported Kinzhal’s top speed as Mach 10, with a range of up to 1,200 miles
when launched from the MiG-31. The Kinzhal is reportedly capable of maneuverable flight, as when launched from the MiG-31. The Kinzhal is reportedly capable of maneuverable flight, as
~~wel~~ well as of striking both ground and naval targets, and could as of striking both ground and naval targets, and could ~~eventual y~~eventually be fitted with a nuclear be fitted with a nuclear
warhead. However, such claims regarding Kinzhal’s performance characteristics have not been warhead. However, such claims regarding Kinzhal’s performance characteristics have not been
publicly verified by U.S. publicly verified by U.S. ~~intel igence~~intelligence agencies, and have been met with skepticism by a number agencies, and have been met with skepticism by a number
of analysts.of analysts.8790
Infrastructure
Russia reportedly conducts hypersonic wind tunnel testing at the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic Russia reportedly conducts hypersonic wind tunnel testing at the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic
Institute in Zhukovsky and the Khristianovich Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics in Institute in Zhukovsky and the Khristianovich Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics in
Novosibirsk, and has tested hypersonic weapons at Dombarovskiy Air Base, the Baykonur Novosibirsk, and has tested hypersonic weapons at Dombarovskiy Air Base, the Baykonur
Cosmodrome, and the Kura Range.Cosmodrome, and the Kura Range.8891
China
According to Tong Zhao, a According to Tong Zhao, a ~~fel ow~~fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most
experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in
China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S. China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S.
military technology,” such as U.S. missile defenses.military technology,” such as U.S. missile defenses.8992 In particular, China’s pursuit of hypersonic In particular, China’s pursuit of hypersonic
weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United
States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting
infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s abilityinfrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a to conduct a
retaliatory strike against the United States.retaliatory strike against the United States.90
93 As General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of United States Northern Command As General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of United States Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), testified in a (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), testified in a
February 2020 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, China is “testing a February 2020 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, China is “testing a
[nuclear-capable] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle” that could evade U.S. missile [nuclear-capable] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle” that could evade U.S. missile

~~85 Mark B. Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles … and What It Means” in~~ ~~Defense Technology~~
~~Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons, American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019.~~
~~86 Dave Majumdar, “Russia: New Kinzhal Aero-Ballistic Missile~~ defense and warning systems.94 Reports additionally indicate that China may have tested a 89 Dave Majumdar, “Russia: New Kinzhal Aero-Ballistic Missile Has 3,000 km Range if Fired from Supersonic Has 3,000 km Range if Fired from Supersonic
Bomber,” Bomber,” The National Interest, July 18, 2018, , July 18, 2018, at https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-new-kinzhal-aero-ballistic-https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-new-kinzhal-aero-ballistic-
missile-has-3000-km-range-if-fired-supersonic-bomber. missile-has-3000-km-range-if-fired-supersonic-bomber.
8790 David Axe, “Is Kinzhal, Russia’s David Axe, “Is Kinzhal, Russia’s ~~New~~ New Hypersonic Missile, a GameHypersonic Missile, a Game Changer?,” Changer?,” The Daily Beast, March 15, 2018, , March 15, 2018,
at https://www.thedailybeast.com/is-kinzhal-russias-new-hypersonic-missile-a-game-changer. https://www.thedailybeast.com/is-kinzhal-russias-new-hypersonic-missile-a-game-changer.
8891 “Aerodynamics,” Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, http://tsagi.com/research/aerodynamics/; “Russia announces “Aerodynamics,” Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, http://tsagi.com/research/aerodynamics/; “Russia announces
successfulsuccessful flight test of Avangard hypersonic glideflight test of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle,” vehicle,” Jane’s (subscription required),(subscription required), January 3, 2019, January 3, 2019,
at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1451630-JMR; and “https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1451630-JMR; and “ Avangard system isAvangard system is tested, saidtested, said to be fully ready for to be fully ready for
deployment,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 26, 2018, deployment,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 26, 2018, at http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/
avangard_system_is_tested_said.shtml. avangard_system_is_tested_said.shtml.
~~89 T ong~~92 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic ~~T echnology~~Technology and the and the
Security Dilemma.” Security Dilemma.”
~~90 T ong~~ 93 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability”; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability”; and Lora Saalman, “China’s ~~Calc ulus~~ Calculus on Hypersonic on Hypersonic
Glide,”Glide,” ~~August~~ August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-
backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide. backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.
94 General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February 13, 2020, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/20-02-13-united-states-northern-command-and-united-states-strategic-command. Congressional Research Service 15~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~defense and warning systems.91 Reports additional y indicate that China may have tested a~~
~~nuclear-capable HGV92~~nuclear-capable HGV95—launched by a Long March rocket—in August 2021.—launched by a Long March rocket—in August 2021.9396 In contrast to the In contrast to the
~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles that China has previously used to launch HGVs, the Long March, a fractional missiles that China has previously used to launch HGVs, the Long March, a fractional
orbital bombardment system (FOBS), launches the HGV into orbit before the HGVorbital bombardment system (FOBS), launches the HGV into orbit before the HGV de-orbits to de-orbits to
its target. This could provide China with a space-based global strike capability and further reduce its target. This could provide China with a space-based global strike capability and further reduce
the amount of target warning time prior to a strike.the amount of target warning time prior to a strike.9497
China has also demonstrated a growing interest in Russian advances in hypersonic weapons China has also demonstrated a growing interest in Russian advances in hypersonic weapons
technology, conducting flight tests of a hypersonic-glide vehicle (HGV) only days after Russia technology, conducting flight tests of a hypersonic-glide vehicle (HGV) only days after Russia
tested its own system.tested its own system.9598 Furthermore, a January 2017 report found that over half of open-source Furthermore, a January 2017 report found that over half of open-source
Chinese papers on hypersonic weapons include references to Russian weapons programs.Chinese papers on hypersonic weapons include references to Russian weapons programs.9699 This This
could indicate that China is increasingly considering hypersonic weapons within a regional could indicate that China is increasingly considering hypersonic weapons within a regional
context. Indeed, some analysts believe that China may be planning to mate context. Indeed, some analysts believe that China may be planning to mate ~~conventional y~~conventionally armed armed
HGVs with the DF-21 and DF-26 HGVs with the DF-21 and DF-26 ~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles in support of an anti-access/area denial missiles in support of an anti-access/area denial
strategy.strategy.97
100 Programs
China has conducted a number of successful tests of the DF-17, a medium-range China has conducted a number of successful tests of the DF-17, a medium-range ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile missile
~~specifical y~~specifically designed to launch HGVs. U.S. designed to launch HGVs. U.S. ~~intel igence~~ intelligence analysts assess that the missile has a analysts assess that the missile has a
range of approximately 1,000 to 1,500 miles and may now be deployed.range of approximately 1,000 to 1,500 miles and may now be deployed.98101 China has also tested China has also tested
the DF-41 intercontinental the DF-41 intercontinental ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile, which could be modified to carry a conventional or missile, which could be modified to carry a conventional or
nuclear HGV, according to a report by a U.S. Congressional commission. The development of the nuclear HGV, according to a report by a U.S. Congressional commission. The development of the
DF-41 thus “significantly increases the [Chinese] rocket force’s nuclear threat to the U.S. DF-41 thus “significantly increases the [Chinese] rocket force’s nuclear threat to the U.S.
~~mainland,” the report states.99~~

~~91 General T errence J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February 13, 2020,~~
~~https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/20-02-13-united-states-northern-command-and-united-states-strategic-~~
~~command.~~
~~92 It is not clear if this nuclear-capable HGV is the same model as that referenced by General O’Shaughnessy.~~
93mainland,” the report states.102 China has tested the DF-ZF HGV (previously referred to as the WU-14) at least nine times since 2014. U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately 95 It is not clear if this nuclear-capable HGV is the same model as that referenced by General O’Shaughnessy. 96 Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile,” October 16, Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile,” October 16,
2021, 2021, at https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Zhao Lijian has stated that “Zhao Lijian has stated that “ this was a routine test of [a] space vehicle,” rather than a test of a nuclear-capable HGV. this was a routine test of [a] space vehicle,” rather than a test of a nuclear-capable HGV.
Zhao Lijian, “Zhao Lijian, “ Remarks at RegularRemarks at Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s RepublicPress Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, of China,
October 18, 2021, October 18, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1915130.shtml. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1915130.shtml.
9497 Greg Greg Hadley, “Hadley, “ Kendall: China HasKendall: China Has Potential to Strike Earth Potential to Strike Earth ~~From~~from Space,” Space,” Air Force Magazine, September 20, 2021, , September 20, 2021,
at https://www.airforcemag.com/global-strikes-space-china-frank-kendall/. https://www.airforcemag.com/global-strikes-space-china-frank-kendall/.
95 98 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide.” on Hypersonic Glide.”
9699 Lora Saalman, “Factoring Russia Lora Saalman, “Factoring Russia into the US-China Equation on Hypersonic Glideinto the US-China Equation on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles,”Vehicles,” SIPRI, January 2017, SIPRI, January 2017,
at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Factoring-Russia-into-US-Chinese-equation-hypersonic-glide-vehicles.pdf. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Factoring-Russia-into-US-Chinese-equation-hypersonic-glide-vehicles.pdf.
97100 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide”;on Hypersonic Glide”; and Malcolm Clausand Malcolm Claus and Andrewand Andrew ~~T ate~~ Tate, “Chinese hypersonic , “Chinese hypersonic
programme reflects regional priorities,” programme reflects regional priorities,” Jane’s (subscription required), (subscription required), March 12, 2019, March 12, 2019, at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/
Display/FG_1731069-JIR. Display/FG_1731069-JIR.
98 101 Ankit Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Ankit Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly ~~T ested~~ Tested Ballistic Missile Ballistic Missile Armed with a Hypersonic Glide Armed with a Hypersonic Glide
Vehicle,”Vehicle,” The National Interest, December, December 28, 2017, 28, 2017, at https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinas-https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinas-
newly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/; and Bill Gertz, “newly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/; and Bill Gertz, “ China’s new hypersonic China’s new hypersonic
missile,” missile,” Washington ~~Tim es~~Times, October 2, 2019, , October 2, 2019, at https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/oct/2/china-shows-df-17-https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/oct/2/china-shows-df-17-
hypersonic-missile/. hypersonic-missile/.
99102 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2018 Annual Report, p. 235, , p. 235, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf. default/files/annual_reports/2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.
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link to page link to page 2021 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress 1,200 miles and have stated that the vehicle may be capable of performing “extreme maneuvers” during flight.103 China reportedly fielded the DF-ZF in 2020.104 ~~and Issues for Congress~~

~~China has tested the DF-ZF HGV (previously referred to as the WU-14) at least nine times since~~
~~2014. U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately~~
~~1,200 miles and have stated that the vehicle may be capable of performing “extreme maneuvers”~~
~~during flight.100 Although unconfirmed by intel igence agencies, some analysts believe the DF-ZF~~
~~could have become operational as early as 2020.101~~
According to U.S. defense officials, China also successfully tested Starry Sky-2 (or Xing Kong- According to U.S. defense officials, China also successfully tested Starry Sky-2 (or Xing Kong-
2), a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype, in August 2018.2), a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype, in August 2018.~~102~~105 China claims the vehicle China claims the vehicle
reached top speeds of Mach 6 and executed a series of in-flight maneuvers before landing.reached top speeds of Mach 6 and executed a series of in-flight maneuvers before landing.~~103~~
~~Unlike~~ 106 Unlike the DF-ZF, Starry Sky-2 is a “waverider” that uses powered flight after launch and derives the DF-ZF, Starry Sky-2 is a “waverider” that uses powered flight after launch and derives
lift from its own shockwaves. Some reports indicate that the Starry Sky-2 could be operational by lift from its own shockwaves. Some reports indicate that the Starry Sky-2 could be operational by
2025.2025.~~104~~107 U.S. officials have declined to comment on the program. U.S. officials have declined to comment on the program.~~105~~108
Infrastructure
China has a robust research and development infrastructure devoted to hypersonic weapons. China has a robust research and development infrastructure devoted to hypersonic weapons.
Then-USD(R&E) Michael Griffin stated in March 2018 that China has conducted 20 times as Then-USD(R&E) Michael Griffin stated in March 2018 that China has conducted 20 times as
many hypersonic tests as the United States.many hypersonic tests as the United States.~~106~~109 China tested three hypersonic vehicle models China tested three hypersonic vehicle models
(D18-1S, D18-2S, and D18-3S)—each with different aerodynamic properties—in September (D18-1S, D18-2S, and D18-3S)—each with different aerodynamic properties—in September
2018.2018.~~107~~110 Analysts believe that these tests could be designed to help China develop weapons that Analysts believe that these tests could be designed to help China develop weapons that
fly at variable speeds, including hypersonic speeds. Similarly, China has used the Lingyun Mach fly at variable speeds, including hypersonic speeds. Similarly, China has used the Lingyun Mach
6+ high-speed engine, or “scramjet,” test bed6+ high-speed engine, or “scramjet,” test bed (Figure 3) to research thermal resistant components ) to research thermal resistant components
and hypersonic cruise missile technologies.and hypersonic cruise missile technologies.~~108~~

~~100 “Gliding missiles~~ 111 103 “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The Economist, April 6, 2019, , April 6, 2019,
at https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-thathttps://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that -fly-faster-than-mach-5-are--fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-
coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady,coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, ~~“ China T ests~~ “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US New Weapon Capable of Breaching US ~~Missile~~ Missile Defense Systems,”Defense Systems,” The
~~Diplom at~~Diplomat, April 28, 2016, , April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-missile-https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-missile-
~~defense-systems/.~~
~~101 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2015 Annual Report, p. 20, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/~~
~~default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF.~~
~~102~~defense-systems/. 104 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021, p. 60, at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF. 105 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 44, May 2, 2019, p. 44, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/
~~2019_CHINA_MILIT ARY_POW ER_REPORT.pdf.~~
~~103 Jessie~~ 2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. 106 Jessie Yeung, “China claims to have successfullyYeung, “China claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircraft, tested its first hypersonic aircraft, CNN, August, August 7, 2018, 7, 2018,
at https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircrafthttps://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft -intl/index.html. -intl/index.html.
~~104~~107 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20. p. 20.
~~105~~108 Bill Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Gertz, “China Reveals ~~T est~~Test of New of New Hypersonic Missile,” Hypersonic Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon, August, August 10, 2018, 10, 2018,
at https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/. https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/.
~~106~~ 109 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015 , p. 20. , p. 20.
~~107~~110 Malcolm Claus Malcolm Claus and Andrewand Andrew ~~T ate~~ Tate, “Chinese hypersonic programme reflects regional priorities,” , “Chinese hypersonic programme reflects regional priorities,” Jane’s (subscription (subscription
required),required), March 12, 2019, March 12, 2019, at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1731069-JIR. https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1731069-JIR.
~~108~~111 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “China’s hypersonic military projects include spaceplanes and rail guns,”“China’s hypersonic military projects include spaceplanes and rail guns,” Popular
Mechanics, June, June 26, 2018, 26, 2018, at https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-work-speeds-up. https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-work-speeds-up.
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Figure 3. Lingyun-1 Hypersonic Cruise Missile Prototype

Source: Photo accompanying Drake Photo accompanying Drake Long, “China revealsLong, “China reveals Lingyun-1 hypersonic missileLingyun-1 hypersonic missile at National Science and at National Science and
Technology expo,” Technology expo,” The Defense Post, May 21, 2018. , May 21, 2018.
According to According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, “China is also investing heavily in hypersonic ground , “China is also investing heavily in hypersonic ground
testing facilities.”testing facilities.”~~109~~112 For example, the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center For example, the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center
claims to have 18 wind tunnels, while the China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics is known claims to have 18 wind tunnels, while the China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics is known
to operate at least three hypersonic wind tunnels—the FD-02, FD-03, and FD-07—capable of to operate at least three hypersonic wind tunnels—the FD-02, FD-03, and FD-07—capable of
reaching speeds of Mach 8, Mach 10, and Mach 12, respectively.reaching speeds of Mach 8, Mach 10, and Mach 12, respectively.~~110~~113 China also operates the JF-12 China also operates the JF-12
hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 5 and Mach 9 and the FD-21 hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 5 and Mach 9 and the FD-21
hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 10 and Mach 15.hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 10 and Mach 15.~~111 It wil~~
114 It will reportedly complete construction of the JF-22 wind tunnel, capable of reaching speeds of Mach reportedly complete construction of the JF-22 wind tunnel, capable of reaching speeds of Mach
30, in 2022.30, in 2022.~~112~~115 In addition, China is known to have tested hypersonic weapons at the Jiuquan In addition, China is known to have tested hypersonic weapons at the Jiuquan
~~Satel ite~~Satellite Launch Center and the Taiyuan Launch Center and the Taiyuan ~~Satel ite Launch Center.~~

~~109 Andrew T ate~~Satellite Launch Center. 112 Andrew Tate, “China conducts further tests with hypersonic vehicles,” , “China conducts further tests with hypersonic vehicles,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (subscription (subscription
required),required), October 2, 2018, October 2, 2018, at https://customer.janes.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/FG_1120806-JDW. https://customer.janes.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/FG_1120806-JDW.
~~110~~ 113 Kelvin Wong, “China claims successful Kelvin Wong, “China claims successful test of hypersonic waverider,” test of hypersonic waverider,” Jane’s (subscription required),(subscription required), ~~August 10,~~
August 10, at 2018, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1002295-JDW; and Ellen Nakashima and Gerry Shih, “2018, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1002295-JDW; and Ellen Nakashima and Gerry Shih, “ China builds China builds
advanced weapons systems usingadvanced weapons systems using American chip technology,” American chip technology,” Washington Post, April 9, 2021. , April 9, 2021.
~~111~~114 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “A look at China’s most exciting hypersonic aerospace programs,” “A look at China’s most exciting hypersonic aerospace programs,” Popular Science, ,
April 18, 2017, April 18, 2017, at https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-technology. https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-technology.
~~112 Andrew T ate, “~~ 115 Andrew Tate, “China’s new hypersonic wind tunnel expected to be ready next year,” China’s new hypersonic wind tunnel expected to be ready next year,” Janes Defence Weekly
(subscription required), August(subscription required), August 24, 2021, 24, 2021, at https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/chinas-new-hypersonic-https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/chinas-new-hypersonic-
wind-tunnel-expected-to-be-ready-next-year. wind-tunnel-expected-to-be-ready-next-year.
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Global Hypersonic Weapons Programs
Although the United States, Russia, and China possess Although the United States, Russia, and China possess the most advanced hypersonic weapons programs,the most advanced hypersonic weapons programs, a a
number of other countries—including Australia,number of other countries—including Australia, India, France, Germany,India, France, Germany, and Japan—are also developing and Japan—are also developing
hypersonic weapons technology. Since 2007, the United States has col aborated with Australiahypersonic weapons technology. Since 2007, the United States has col aborated with Australia on the Hypersonic on the Hypersonic
International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) programInternational Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) program to develop hypersonic technologies.to develop hypersonic technologies. The most The most
recent HIFiRE test, successful y conducted in July 2017, explored the flight dynamics of a Mach 8 hypersonic glide recent HIFiRE test, successful y conducted in July 2017, explored the flight dynamics of a Mach 8 hypersonic glide
vehicle,vehicle, while previous tests explored scramjetwhile previous tests explored scramjet engine technologies.engine technologies. HIFiRE’s successor,HIFiRE’s successor, the Southern Cross the Southern Cross
Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE) program,Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE) program, is to further develop hypersonic air-breathing is to further develop hypersonic air-breathing
technologies.technologies. SCIFiRE demonstration tests are expected by the mid-2020s. In addition to the WoomeraSCIFiRE demonstration tests are expected by the mid-2020s. In addition to the Woomera Test Test
Range facilities—oneRange facilities—one of the largest weapons test facilitiesof the largest weapons test facilities in the world—Australiain the world—Australia ~~reportedly~~ reportedly operates seven operates seven
hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 30. hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 30.
India has similarlyIndia has similarly col aborated with Russia on the development of BrahMos II, a Mach 7 hypersonic cruise missile. col aborated with Russia on the development of BrahMos II, a Mach 7 hypersonic cruise missile.
Although BrahMos II was Although BrahMos II was ~~initial y~~ initially intended to be fielded in 2017, news reports indicate that the program faces intended to be fielded in 2017, news reports indicate that the program faces
significant delays and is now scheduled to achieve initial operational capability between 2025 and 2028. Reportedly, significant delays and is now scheduled to achieve initial operational capability between 2025 and 2028. Reportedly,
India is also developing an indigenous, dual-capable hypersonic cruiseIndia is also developing an indigenous, dual-capable hypersonic cruise ~~missile~~ missile as part of its Hypersonic Technology as part of its Hypersonic Technology
DemonstratorDemonstrator Vehicle programVehicle program and successful y tested a Mach 6 scramjetand successful y tested a Mach 6 scramjet in June 2019in June 2019 and Septemberand September 2020. India 2020. India
operates approximately 12 hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 13. operates approximately 12 hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 13.
France also has col aborated and contracted with Russia on the development of hypersonic technology. Although France also has col aborated and contracted with Russia on the development of hypersonic technology. Although
France has been investing in hypersonic technology researchFrance has been investing in hypersonic technology research since the 1990s, it has only recently announced its since the 1990s, it has only recently announced its
intent to weaponize the technology. Under the V-max (Experimental Maneuvering Vehicle) program,intent to weaponize the technology. Under the V-max (Experimental Maneuvering Vehicle) program, France plans France plans
to modify its air-to-surface ASN4G supersonic missileto modify its air-to-surface ASN4G supersonic missile for hypersonic flight by 2022. Somefor hypersonic flight by 2022. Some analysts believeanalysts believe that the that the
V-max program is intended to provide France with a strategic nuclear weapon. France operates five hypersonic V-max program is intended to provide France with a strategic nuclear weapon. France operates five hypersonic
wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 21. wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 21.
Germany successful yGermany successful y tested an experimental hypersonic glide vehicle (SHEFEX II) in 2012; however, reports tested an experimental hypersonic glide vehicle (SHEFEX II) in 2012; however, reports
indicate that Germanyindicate that Germany may have pul ed funding for the program. Germanmay have pul ed funding for the program. German defense contractor DLR continues to defense contractor DLR continues to
research and test hypersonic vehicles as part of the European Union’sresearch and test hypersonic vehicles as part of the European Union’s ~~ATLLAS~~ ATLLAS II project, which seeksII project, which seeks to design a to design a
Mach 5-6 vehicle.Mach 5-6 vehicle. Germany operates three hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Germany operates three hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to
Mach 11. Mach 11.
~~Final y,~~ Finally, Japan is developing the Hypersonic CruiseJapan is developing the Hypersonic Cruise ~~Missile~~ Missile (HCM) and the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HCM) and the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile
(HVGP). According to(HVGP). According to Jane’s, Japan invested $122 mil ion, Japan invested $122 mil ion in HVGP in FY2019. It reportedlyin HVGP in FY2019. It reportedly plans to field HVGPs plans to field HVGPs
for area suppression and neutralizing aircraft carriers.for area suppression and neutralizing aircraft carriers. HVGP is expected to enter serviceHVGP is expected to enter service in 2026, with a more in 2026, with a more
advanced versionadvanced version available by 2030, while HCM is expected to enter serviceavailable by 2030, while HCM is expected to enter service in 2030. The Japan Aerospace in 2030. The Japan Aerospace
Exploration Agency operates three hypersonic wind tunnels, with two additional facilitiesExploration Agency operates three hypersonic wind tunnels, with two additional facilities at Mitsubishi Heavy at Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries and the University of Tokyo. Industries and the University of Tokyo.
Other countries—including Iran, Israel,Other countries—including Iran, Israel, ~~and~~ South Korea South Korea, and Brazil—have ~~—have~~ conducted foundational researchconducted foundational research on hypersonic on hypersonic
~~airflows~~ airflows and propulsion systems,and propulsion systems, but may not be pursuing a hypersonic weapons capability at this timebut may not be pursuing a hypersonic weapons capability at this time. In addition, a number of countries—including North Korea—are testing increasingly maneuverable systems that travel at hypersonic speeds but that do not qualify as “hypersonic weapons” as defined in this report. Note: For additional information .
~~Note:~~ ~~For additional information~~ about global hypersonic weapons programs, see Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic
Missile Proliferation. For information about Japan’s hypersonic weapons research and development plans, see Mike Yeo,
“Japan unveils its hypersonic weapons plans,” Defense News, March 14, 2020.

Issues for Congress
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs during the As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs during the
annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider a number of questions about annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider a number of questions about
the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected coststhe rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, budget and management, and their implications for strategic , and their implications for strategic
stability and arms control. This section provides an overview of some of stability and arms control. This section provides an overview of some of these questions. Congressional Research Service 19 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress ~~these questions.~~
Mission Requirements
Although the Department of Defense is funding a number of hypersonic weapons programs, it has Although the Department of Defense is funding a number of hypersonic weapons programs, it has
not established any programs of record, suggesting that it may not have approved requirements not established any programs of record, suggesting that it may not have approved requirements
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for hypersonic weapons or long-term funding plans.for hypersonic weapons or long-term funding plans.~~113~~116 Indeed, as Principal Director for Indeed, as Principal Director for
Hypersonics (USD[R&E]) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire Hypersonics (USD[R&E]) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire
hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to “[identify] the most viable hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to “[identify] the most viable
overarching weapon system concepts to choose from and then make a decision based on success overarching weapon system concepts to choose from and then make a decision based on success
~~and chal enges.”114~~and challenges.”117 Given the lack of mission requirements, DOD officials have expressed a number of competing perspectives about the potential costs and intended quantities of U.S. hypersonic weapons. For example, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall has stated that “hypersonics are not going to be cheap anytime soon ... [and thus] we’re more likely to have relatively small inventories of [hypersonic missiles] than large ones.”118 Conversely, a number of other senior defense officials have stated that DOD intends to buy large quantities of hypersonic weapons. Then-DOD Director of Defense Research & Engineering Mark Lewis has noted that DOD wants “to deliver hypersonics at scale.... That means hundreds of weapons in a short period of time in the hands of the warfighter.”119 Similarly, Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has stated that DOD seeks to “[produce] hypersonics in mass, because you have to be able to deliver capability in meaningful numbers, even to defeat the high-end targets.”120 These perspectives appear to be grounded in differing assumptions about the affordability of hypersonic weapons. Likewise, they are likely to hold different implications for the unit cost of the weapons.
As Congress conducts oversight of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it may seek to obtain As Congress conducts oversight of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it may seek to obtain
information about DOD’s evaluation of potential mission sets for hypersonic weapons, a cost information about DOD’s evaluation of potential mission sets for hypersonic weapons, a cost
analysis of analysis of hypersonic weapons and alternative means of executing alternative means of executing ~~these~~potential mission sets, and an assessment of the enabling mission sets, and an assessment of the enabling
technologies—such as space-based sensors or autonomous command and control systems—that technologies—such as space-based sensors or autonomous command and control systems—that
may be required to employ or defend against hypersonic weapons. For example, Section 1671 of may be required to employ or defend against hypersonic weapons. For example, Section 1671 of
the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in
coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to submit to the congressional coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to submit to the congressional
defense committees a report on strategic hypersonic weapons, including “a description of how the defense committees a report on strategic hypersonic weapons, including “a description of how the
requirements for land and sea-based hypersonic weapons requirements for land and sea-based hypersonic weapons ~~wil~~ will be addressed with the Joint be addressed with the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, and how such requirements Requirements Oversight Council, and how such requirements ~~wil be formal y~~ will be formally provided to the provided to the
military departments procuring such weapons.” This report is to military departments procuring such weapons.” This report is to ~~additional y~~ additionally include “the include “the
potential target sets for hypersonic weapons ... and the required mission planning to support potential target sets for hypersonic weapons ... and the required mission planning to support
~~targeting by the United States Strategic Command and other combatant commands.”~~
~~Funding and Management Considerations~~
~~Principal Director for Hypersonics (USD[R&E])~~ targeting by the United States Strategic Command and other combatant commands.” 116 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.” 117 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.” 118 John A. Tirpak, “Only Small Inventories of Hypersonic Missiles in USAF’s Future, Due to Cost,” Air Force Magazine, February 15, 2022, at https://www.airforcemag.com/only-small-inventories-of-hypersonic-missiles-in-usafs-future-due-to-cost/. 119 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Hypersonics: DoD Wants ‘Hundreds of Weapons’ ASAP,” Breaking Defense, April 24, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/hypersonics-dod-wants-hundreds-of-weapons-asap/. 120 “Hypersonic Strike and Defense: A Conversation with Mike White,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 10, 2021, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/hypersonic-strike-and-defense-conversation-mike-white. See also Jon Harper, “Just In: Pentagon to Spend Billions Mass-Producing Hypersonic Weapons,” National Defense Magazine, March 4, 2020, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/4/pentagon-to-spend-billions-mass-producing-hypersonic-weapons. Congressional Research Service 20 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Funding and Management Considerations Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has noted that DOD is prioritizing Mike White has noted that DOD is prioritizing
offensive programs while it determines “the path forward to get a robust defensive strategy.”offensive programs while it determines “the path forward to get a robust defensive strategy.”~~115~~
121 This approach is reflected in DOD’s recent budget requests. For example, DOD requested $247.9 This approach is reflected in DOD’s recent budget requests. For example, DOD requested $247.9
~~mil ion~~ million for hypersonic defense programs and $3.8 for hypersonic defense programs and $3.8 ~~bil ion~~billion for hypersonic weapons programs in for hypersonic weapons programs in
FY2022.FY2022.~~116~~122 Similarly, in FY2021, DOD requested $206.8 Similarly, in FY2021, DOD requested $206.8 ~~mil ion~~million for hypersonic defense for hypersonic defense
programs and $3.2 programs and $3.2 ~~bil ion~~billion for hypersonic weapons programs. for hypersonic weapons programs.~~117~~
123 Although the Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees increased FY2020 Although the Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees increased FY2020
appropriations for both hypersonic offense and defense above the FY2020 request, they expressed appropriations for both hypersonic offense and defense above the FY2020 request, they expressed
concerns, noting in their joint explanatory statement of H.R. 1158 “that the rapid growth in concerns, noting in their joint explanatory statement of H.R. 1158 “that the rapid growth in
hypersonic research has the potential to result in stove-piped, proprietary systems that duplicate hypersonic research has the potential to result in stove-piped, proprietary systems that duplicate
capabilities and increase costs.”capabilities and increase costs.”~~118~~124 To mitigate this concern, they appropriated $100 To mitigate this concern, they appropriated $100 ~~mil ion~~million for for
DOD to establish a Joint Hypersonics Transition Office (JHTO) to “develop and implement an DOD to establish a Joint Hypersonics Transition Office (JHTO) to “develop and implement an

~~113 Steve T rimble, “New Long-T erm Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.”~~
~~114 Steve T rimble, “New Long-T erm Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.”~~
~~115 Aaron Mehta, “Is the Pentagon Moving Quickly Enough on Hypersonic Defense?” Defense News, March 21, 2019,~~
integrated science and technology roadmap for hypersonics” and “establish a university consortium for hypersonic research and workforce development” in support of DOD efforts.125 DOD established the JHTO in April 2020 and announced on October 26, 2020, that it awarded Texas A&M University with a $20 million contract—renewable for up to $100 million—to manage a University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics (UCAH).126 UCAH is to be overseen by a group of academic researchers from Texas A&M University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Minnesota, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the University of Arizona, the University of Tennessee Space Institute, Morgan State University, the California Institute of Technology, Purdue University, the University of California-Los Angeles, and the Georgia Institute of Technology.127 The consortium is to “facilitate transitioning academic 121 Aaron Mehta, “Is the Pentagon Moving Quickly Enough on Hypersonic Defense?” Defense News, March 21, 2019, at https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/03/21/is-the-pentagon-moving-quickly-enough-on-hypersonic-defense/. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/03/21/is-the-pentagon-moving-quickly-enough-on-hypersonic-defense/.
~~116~~122 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Missile Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency DefenseDefense Agency Defense -Wide -Wide
Justification Book VolumeJustification Book Volume 2a of 5, p. 569, 2a of 5, p. 569,
at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/~~03_RDT _and_E/RD~~
~~T E_Vol2_MDA_RDT E_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf.~~
~~117~~03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf. 123 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Missile Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency DefenseDefense Agency Defense -Wide -Wide
Justification Book VolumeJustification Book Volume 2a of 5, p. 10, 2a of 5, p. 10, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/
budget_justification/pdfs/budget_justification/pdfs/~~03_RDT _and_E/RDT E_Vol2_MDA_RDT E_PB21_Justification_Book.pdf .~~
~~118~~03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB21_Justification_Book.pdf. 124 “Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020: Joint Explanatory Statement,” Defense Subcommittees of the “Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020: Joint Explanatory Statement,” Defense Subcommittees of the
Appropriations Committees, December 16, 2019, Appropriations Committees, December 16, 2019, at https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/
democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/HR%201158%20-%20Division%20A%20-democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/HR%201158%20-%20Division%20A%20-
%20Defense%20SOM%20FY20.pdf. %20Defense%20SOM%20FY20.pdf.
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~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~integrated science and technology roadmap for hypersonics” and “establish a university~~
~~consortium for hypersonic research and workforce development” in support of DOD efforts.119~~
~~DOD established the JHTO in April 2020 and announced on October 26, 2020, that it awarded~~
~~Texas A&M University with a $20 mil ion contract—renewable for up to $100 mil ion—to~~
~~manage a University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics (UCAH).120 UCAH is to be overseen~~
~~by a group of academic researchers from Texas A&M University, the Massachusetts Institute of~~
~~Technology, the University of Minnesota, the University of Il inois at Urbana-Champaign, the~~
~~University of Arizona, the University of Tennessee Space Institute, Morgan State University, the~~
~~California Institute of Technology, Purdue University, the University of California-Los Angeles,~~
~~and the Georgia Institute of Technology.121 The consortium is to “facilitate transitioning academic~~
~~research into developing systems [as wel as] work with the department to reduce system~~
~~development timelines while maintaining quality control standards.”122~~
125 Ibid. The Joint Hypersonic Transition Office, then called the Joint Technology Office on Hypersonics, was originally mandated by Section 218 of the FY2007 NDAA (P.L. 109-364). The office was redesignated as the Joint Hypersonics Transition Office and given additional authorities in Section 214 of the FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-91). Section 216 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) further amended the office’s authorities to include the ability to enter into agreements with institutions of higher learning. The office went unfunded until FY2020 and was not established until April 2020. 126 David Vergun, “DOD Awards Applied Hypersonics Contract to Texas A&M University,” DOD News, October 26, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2394438/dod-awards-applied-hypersonics-contract-to-texas-am-university/. 127 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 21 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress research into developing systems [as well as] work with the department to reduce system development timelines while maintaining quality control standards.”128 In addition, Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Secretary of the Army In addition, Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Secretary of the Army
and the Secretary of the Navy to jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a report and the Secretary of the Navy to jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a report
on LRHW and CPS, including total costs of the programs, “the strategy for such programs with on LRHW and CPS, including total costs of the programs, “the strategy for such programs with
respect to manning, training, and equipping, including cost estimates, [and] a testing strategy and respect to manning, training, and equipping, including cost estimates, [and] a testing strategy and
schedule for such programs.” It directs the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation schedule for such programs.” It directs the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
to submit to the congressional defense committees an independent cost estimate of these to submit to the congressional defense committees an independent cost estimate of these
programs.programs.~~123~~129
Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, however, it may be Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, however, it may be
~~chal enging~~challenging for Congress to evaluate the balance of funding for hypersonic weapons programs, for Congress to evaluate the balance of funding for hypersonic weapons programs,
enabling technologies, supporting test infrastructure, and hypersonic missile defense.enabling technologies, supporting test infrastructure, and hypersonic missile defense.
Strategic Stability
Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified
two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: the weapon’s short two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: the weapon’s short
time-of-flight—which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response—and its unpredictable flight time-of-flight—which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response—and its unpredictable flight
path—which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore path—which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore
heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict. This risk heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict. This risk
could be further compounded in countries that co-locate nuclear and conventional capabilities or could be further compounded in countries that co-locate nuclear and conventional capabilities or
~~facilities.~~

~~119 Ibid. T he Joint Hypersonic T ransition Office, then called the Joint T echnology Office on Hypersonics, was~~
~~originally mandated by Section 218 of the FY2007 NDAA ( P.L. 109-364). The office was redesignated as the Joint~~
~~Hypersonics T ransition Office and given additional authorities in Section 214 of the FY2018 NDAA ( P.L. 115-91).~~
~~Section 216 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) further amended the office’s authorities to include the ability to enter~~
~~into agreements with institutions of higher learning. T he office went unfunded until FY2020 and was not established~~
~~until April 2020.~~
~~120 David Vergun, “DOD Awards Applied Hypersonics Contract to T exas A&M University,” DOD News, October 26,~~
~~2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2394438/dod-awards-applied-hypersonics-contract-to-~~
~~texas-am-university/.~~
~~121 Ibid.~~
~~122 Ibid.~~
~~123 T he Government Accountability Office notes DOD’s difficulty in developing accurate cost estimates f or hypersonic~~
~~weapons programs. For example, between FY2019 and FY2020, estimates for CPS “almost doubled.” Government~~
~~Accountability Office,~~ ~~Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination~~
~~across Developm ent Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 21, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378.~~
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facilities. Some analysts argue that unintended escalation could occur as a result of warhead ambiguity, or Some analysts argue that unintended escalation could occur as a result of warhead ambiguity, or
from the inabilityfrom the inability to distinguish between a to distinguish between a ~~conventional y~~conventionally armed hypersonic weapon and a armed hypersonic weapon and a
nuclear-armed one. However, as a United Nations report notes, “even if a State did know that an nuclear-armed one. However, as a United Nations report notes, “even if a State did know that an
HGV launched toward it was HGV launched toward it was ~~conventional y~~conventionally armed, it may armed, it may ~~stil~~ still view such a weapon as strategic view such a weapon as strategic
in nature, regardless of how it was perceived by the State firing the weapon, and decide that a in nature, regardless of how it was perceived by the State firing the weapon, and decide that a
strategic response was warranted.”strategic response was warranted.”~~124~~130 Differences in threat perception and escalation ladders Differences in threat perception and escalation ladders
could thus result in unintended escalation. Such concerns have previously led Congress to restrict could thus result in unintended escalation. Such concerns have previously led Congress to restrict
funding for conventional prompt strike programs.funding for conventional prompt strike programs.~~125~~131
Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal. Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal.
Pavel Podvig, a senior research Pavel Podvig, a senior research ~~fel ow~~fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,
has noted that the weapons “don’t … change much in terms of strategic balance and military has noted that the weapons “don’t … change much in terms of strategic balance and military
capability.”capability.”~~126~~132 This, some analysts argue, is because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia This, some analysts argue, is because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia
already possess the ability to strike the United States with intercontinental already possess the ability to strike the United States with intercontinental ~~bal istic missiles,~~
~~which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm U.S. missile defenses.127 Furthermore, these~~
~~analysts note that in the case of hypersonic weapons, traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it~~
~~is real y~~ballistic missiles, 128 Ibid. 129 The Government Accountability Office notes DOD’s difficulty in developing accurate cost estimates for hypersonic weapons programs. For example, between FY2019 and FY2020, estimates for CPS “almost doubled.” Government Accountability Office, Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination across Development Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 21, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378. 130 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons. 131 For a history of legislative activity on conventional prompt global strike, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. 132 Amy Mackinnon, “Russia’s New Missiles Are Aimed at the U.S.,” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2019, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/05/russias-new-missiles-are-aimed-at-you-weapons-hypersonic-putin-united-states-inf/. Congressional Research Service 22 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm U.S. missile defenses.133 Furthermore, these analysts note that in the case of hypersonic weapons, traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it is really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the world that would be so suicidal that it would a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the world that would be so suicidal that it would
even think threating to use—not to mention to even think threating to use—not to mention to ~~actual y~~actually use—hypersonic weapons against the use—hypersonic weapons against the
United States ... would end United States ... would end ~~wel .”128~~well.”134
Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of (P.L. 116-283) directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to submit to the Staff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to submit to the
congressional defense committees a report that examines congressional defense committees a report that examines
How How ~~escalation risks will be addressed with regards to the use of strategic hypersonic~~
~~weapons, including whether any risk escalation exercises have been conduct ed or~~ escalation risks will be addressed with regards to the use of strategic hypersonic weapons, including whether any risk escalation exercises have been conducted or are are
planned for the potential use of hypersonic weapons, and an analysis of the escalation risks planned for the potential use of hypersonic weapons, and an analysis of the escalation risks
posed by foreign hypersonicposed by foreign hypersonic systems that are potentially nuclear and conventional dual-systems that are potentially nuclear and conventional dual-
use capable weapons. use capable weapons.
Arms Control
Some analysts who believe that hypersonic weapons could present a threat to strategic stability or Some analysts who believe that hypersonic weapons could present a threat to strategic stability or
inspire an arms race have argued that the United States should take measures to mitigate risks or inspire an arms race have argued that the United States should take measures to mitigate risks or
limit the weapons’ proliferation. Proposed measures include expanding New START, negotiating limit the weapons’ proliferation. Proposed measures include expanding New START, negotiating
new multilateral arms control agreements, and undertaking transparency and confidence-building new multilateral arms control agreements, and undertaking transparency and confidence-building
~~measures.129~~

124 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons.
~~125 For a history of legislative activity on convent ional prompt global strike, see CRS Report R41464,~~ ~~Conventional~~
~~Prom pt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.~~
~~126 Amy Mackinnon, “Russia’s New Missiles Are Aimed at the U.S.,” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2019,~~
~~https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/05/russias-new-missiles-are-aimed-at-you-weapons-hypersonic-putin-united-states-~~
~~inf/.~~
~~127 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019,~~
~~https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. Schneider,~~
~~“Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14.~~
~~128 Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019,~~
~~https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632.~~
~~129 See United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapon; and Richard H. Speier et al.,~~ ~~Hypersonic~~
~~Missile Proliferation.~~
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measures.135
The New START Treaty, a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United States and Russia, The New START Treaty, a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United States and Russia,
does not currently cover weapons that fly on a does not currently cover weapons that fly on a ~~bal istic~~ballistic trajectory for less than 50% of their flight, trajectory for less than 50% of their flight,
as do hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles.as do hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles.~~130~~136 However, Article V of the treaty However, Article V of the treaty
states that “when a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that states that “when a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that
Party Party ~~shal~~ shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration
in the Bilateralin the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that the Consultative Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that the
United States could raise the issue in the BCC of negotiating to include hypersonic weapons in United States could raise the issue in the BCC of negotiating to include hypersonic weapons in
the New START limits.the New START limits.~~131~~137 However, because New START is due to expire in 2026, this may be a However, because New START is due to expire in 2026, this may be a
short-term solution.short-term solution.~~132~~
138 As an alternative, some analysts have proposed negotiating a new international As an alternative, some analysts have proposed negotiating a new international arms control arms control
agreement that would institute a moratorium or ban on hypersonic weapon testing. These analysts agreement that would institute a moratorium or ban on hypersonic weapon testing. These analysts
~~argue that a test ban would be a “highly verifiable” and “highly effective” means of preventing a~~
~~potential arms race and preserving strategic stability.133 Other analysts have countered that a test~~
~~ban would be infeasible, as “no clear technical distinction can be made between hypersonic~~
~~missiles and other conventional capabilities that are less prompt, have shorter ranges, and also~~
~~have the potential to undermine nuclear deterrence.”134 These analysts have instead proposed~~
~~international transparency and confidence-building measures, such as exchanging weapons data;~~
~~conducting joint technical studies; “providing advance notices of tests; choosing separate,~~
~~distinctive launch locations for tests of hypersonic missiles; and placing restraints on sea-based~~
~~tests.”135~~

~~130 In some cases, hypersonic glide vehicles may be launched from intercontinental ballistic missiles that are already~~
~~covered by New ST ART , as is reported to be the case with Russia’s Avangard HGV. See Rachel S. Cohen,~~
~~“Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or T actical T ool?”~~
~~131 James Acton notes: “during [New ST ART ] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a~~
~~new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how~~
~~they would be~~ 133 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019, at https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14. 134 Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019, at https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632. 135 See United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapon; and Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation. 136 In some cases, hypersonic glide vehicles may be launched from intercontinental ballistic missiles that are already covered by New START, as is reported to be the case with Russia’s Avangard HGV. See Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Tactical Tool?” 137 James Acton notes: “during [New START] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how they would be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?:
Asking the Right Questions about Conventional ~~Prom pt~~Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2013, p. 139, 2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf.
~~132 CRS~~ 138 CRS Report R41219, Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf. , by Amy F. Woolf.
~~133 Mark Gubrud, “T est Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 6 , 2015,~~
~~https://thebulletin.org/roundtable/test-ban-for-hypersonic-missiles/.~~
~~134 T ong Zhao, “T est Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”~~
~~135 Rajaram Nagappa, “T est Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”; see also James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?, pp. 134-138.~~
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~~Appendix. U.S. Hypersonic Testing Infrastructure136~~
~~Table A-1. DOD Hypersonic Ground Test Facilities~~
~~Facility~~
~~Capability~~
~~Location~~
~~Air Force Arnold Engineering and~~
~~Tunnel A: 40-inch Mach 1.5-5.5; up~~
~~Arnold AFB, TN~~
~~Development Complex (AEDC) von~~
~~to 290 °F~~
~~Karman Gas Dynamics Facility~~
~~Tunnel B: 50-inch Mach 6 and 8; up~~
~~Tunnels A/B/C~~
~~to 900 °F~~
~~Tunnel C: 50-inch Mach 10; up to~~
~~1700 °F~~
~~Air Force AEDC High-Enthalpy~~
~~Simulate thermal and pressure~~
~~Arnold AFB, TN~~
~~Aerothermal Test Arc-Heated~~
~~environments at speeds of up to~~
~~Facilities H1, H2, H3~~
~~Mach 8~~
~~Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9~~
~~59-inch Mach 7, 8,10, 14, and18; up White Oak, MD~~
~~to 2900 °F~~
~~Air Force AEDC Aerodynamic and~~
~~Mach 3.1-7.2; up to 1300 °F~~
~~Arnold AFB, TN~~
~~Propulsion Test Unit~~
~~Air Force AEDC Aerobal istic Range~~
~~Launches projectiles of up to 8~~
~~Arnold AFB, TN~~
G
~~inches in diameter at speeds of up~~
~~to Mach 20~~
~~Hol oman High Speed Test Track~~
~~59,971 ft. track; launches~~
~~Hol oman AFB, NM~~
~~projectiles at speeds of up to Mach~~
8
~~Air Force Research Laboratory~~
~~Mach 3-7~~
~~Wright-Patterson AFB, OH~~
~~(AFRL) Cel s 18, 22~~
~~AFRL Laser Hardened Materials~~
~~High-temperature materials testing~~
~~Wright-Patterson AFB, OH~~
~~Evaluation Laboratory (LHMEL)~~
~~AFRL Mach 6 High Reynolds~~
~~10-inch Mach 6~~
~~Wright-Patterson AFB, OH~~
~~Number (Re) Facility~~
~~Test Resource Management Center~~
~~Up to Mach 8; up to 4040 °F~~
~~Arnold AFB, TN~~
~~Hypersonic Aeropropulsion Clean~~
~~Air Test-bed Facility~~
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9 was upgraded in 2019 to enable Mach 18
~~testing. See “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/~~
~~Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/.~~

~~136 T he following information is derived from the 2014 report (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.,~~ ~~(U) Study on the~~
~~Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure, and therefore, may not be current. Permission to use this material~~
~~has been granted by the Office of Science and T echnology Policy.~~
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~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~Table A-2. DOD Open-Air Ranges~~
~~Range~~
~~Location~~
~~Ronald Reagan Bal istic Missile~~
~~Kwajalein Atol , Republic of the~~
~~Defense Test Site~~
~~Marshal Islands~~
~~Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF)~~
~~Kauai, HI~~
~~Western Range, 30th Space Wing~~
~~Vandenberg AFB, CA~~
~~Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons~~
~~Point Mugu and China Lake, CA~~
~~(NAWC) Division~~
~~White Sands Missile Range (WSMR)~~
~~New Mexico~~
~~Eastern Range, 45th Space Wing~~
~~Cape Canaveral Air Force~~
~~Station/Patrick AFB/Kennedy~~
~~Space Center, FL~~
~~NASA Wal ops Flight Facility~~
~~Wal ops Island, VA~~
~~Pacific Spaceport Complex (formerly~~
~~Kodiak Island, AK~~
~~Kodiak Launch Complex)~~
~~NAWC Weapons Division R-2508~~
~~Edwards AFB, CA~~
~~Complex~~
~~Utah Test and Training Range~~
~~Utah~~
~~Nevada Test and Training Range~~
~~Nevada~~
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
~~Table A-3. DOD Mobile Assets~~
~~Asset~~
~~Navy Mobile Instrumentation~~
~~System~~
~~PMRF Mobile At-sea Sensor System~~
~~MDA Mobile Instrumentation~~
System Pacific Col ector
~~MDA Mobile Instrumentation~~
System Pacific Tracker
~~Kwajalein Mobile Range Safety~~
~~System 2~~
~~United States Navy Ship~~ ~~Lorenzen~~
~~missile range instrumentation ship~~
~~Sea-based X-band Radar~~
~~Aircraft Mobile Instrumentation~~
~~Systems~~
~~Transportable Range Augmentation~~
~~and Control System~~
~~Re-locatable MPS-36 Radar~~
~~Transportable Telemetry System~~
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
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~~Table A-4. NASA Research-Related Facilities~~
~~Facility~~
~~Capability~~
~~Location~~
~~Ames Research Center (ARC) High-temperature~~
~~Mountain View, CA~~
~~Arc Jet Complex~~
~~materials testing~~
~~ARC Hypervelocity Free~~
~~Launches projectiles~~ Congressional Research Service 23 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress argue that a test ban would be a “highly verifiable” and “highly effective” means of preventing a potential arms race and preserving strategic stability.139 Other analysts have countered that a test ban would be infeasible, as “no clear technical distinction can be made between hypersonic missiles and other conventional capabilities that are less prompt, have shorter ranges, and also have the potential to undermine nuclear deterrence.”140 These analysts have instead proposed international transparency and confidence-building measures, such as exchanging weapons data; conducting joint technical studies; “providing advance notices of tests; choosing separate, distinctive launch locations for tests of hypersonic missiles; and placing restraints on sea-based tests.”141 139 Mark Gubrud, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 6, 2015, at https://thebulletin.org/roundtable/test-ban-for-hypersonic-missiles/. 140 Tong Zhao, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?” 141 Rajaram Nagappa, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”; see also James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?, pp. 134-138. Congressional Research Service 24 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Appendix. U.S. Hypersonic Testing Infrastructure142 Table A-1. DOD Hypersonic Ground Test Facilities Facility Capability Location Air Force Arnold Engineering and Tunnel A: 40-inch Mach 1.5-5.5; up Arnold AFB, TN Development Complex (AEDC) von to 290 °F Karman Gas Dynamics Facility Tunnel B: 50-inch Mach 6 and 8; up Tunnels A/B/C to 900 °F Tunnel C: 50-inch Mach 10; up to 1700 °F Air Force AEDC High-Enthalpy Simulate thermal and pressure Arnold AFB, TN Aerothermal Test Arc-Heated environments at speeds of up to Facilities H1, H2, H3 Mach 8 Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9 59-inch Mach 7, 8,10, 14, and18; up White Oak, MD to 2900 °F Air Force AEDC Aerodynamic and Mach 3.1-7.2; up to 1300 °F Arnold AFB, TN Propulsion Test Unit Air Force AEDC Aeroballistic Range Launches projectiles of up to 8 Arnold AFB, TN G inches in diameter at speeds of up to Mach 20 Hol oman High Speed Test Track 59,971 ft. track; launches Hol oman AFB, NM projectiles at speeds of up to Mach 8 Air Force Research Laboratory Mach 3-7 Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (AFRL) Cells 18, 22 AFRL Laser Hardened Materials High-temperature materials testing Wright-Patterson AFB, OH Evaluation Laboratory (LHMEL) AFRL Mach 6 High Reynolds 10-inch Mach 6 Wright-Patterson AFB, OH Number (Re) Facility Test Resource Management Center Up to Mach 8; up to 4040 °F Arnold AFB, TN Hypersonic Aeropropulsion Clean Air Test-bed Facility Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9 was upgraded in 2019 to enable Mach 18 testing. See “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/. 142 The following information is derived from the 2014 report (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure, and therefore, may not be current. Permission to use this material has been granted by the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Congressional Research Service 25 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Table A-2. DOD Open-Air Ranges Range Location Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Kwajalein Atol , Republic of the Defense Test Site Marshall Islands Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) Kauai, HI Western Range, 30th Space Wing Vandenberg AFB, CA Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Point Mugu and China Lake, CA (NAWC) Division White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) New Mexico Eastern Range, 45th Space Wing Cape Canaveral Air Force Station/Patrick AFB/Kennedy Space Center, FL NASA Wallops Flight Facility Wallops Island, VA Pacific Spaceport Complex (formerly Kodiak Island, AK Kodiak Launch Complex) NAWC Weapons Division R-2508 Edwards AFB, CA Complex Utah Test and Training Range Utah Nevada Test and Training Range Nevada Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. Table A-3. DOD Mobile Assets Asset Navy Mobile Instrumentation System PMRF Mobile At-sea Sensor System MDA Mobile Instrumentation System Pacific Collector MDA Mobile Instrumentation System Pacific Tracker Kwajalein Mobile Range Safety System 2 United States Navy Ship Lorenzen missile range instrumentation ship Sea-based X-band Radar Aircraft Mobile Instrumentation Systems Transportable Range Augmentation and Control System Re-locatable MPS-36 Radar Transportable Telemetry System Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. Congressional Research Service 26 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Table A-4. NASA Research-Related Facilities Facility Capability Location Ames Research Center (ARC) High-temperature Mountain View, CA Arc Jet Complex materials testing ARC Hypervelocity Free Launches projectiles at at
Mountain View, CA Mountain View, CA
Flight Facilities Flight Facilities
speeds of up to Mach 23 speeds of up to Mach 23
Langley Research Center Langley Research Center
31-inch Mach 10, 20-inch 31-inch Mach 10, 20-inch
Hampton, VA Hampton, VA
(LaRC) Aerothermodynamics (LaRC) Aerothermodynamics
Mach 6, and 15-inch Mach Mach 6, and 15-inch Mach
Laboratory Laboratory
6 6
LaRC 8-foot High LaRC 8-foot High
96-inch Mach 5 and Mach 96-inch Mach 5 and Mach
Hampton, VA Hampton, VA
Temperature Tunnel Temperature Tunnel
6.5 6.5
LaRC Scramjet LaRC Scramjet Test Complex Test Complex
Up to Mach 8 and up to Up to Mach 8 and up to
Hampton, VA Hampton, VA
4740 °F 4740 °F
LaRC HyPulse Facility LaRC HyPulse Facility
Currently inactive Currently inactive
Long Island, NY Long Island, NY
Glenn Research Center Glenn Research Center
Mach 5, 6, and 7 and up to Mach 5, 6, and 7 and up to
Sandusky, OH Sandusky, OH
(GRC) Plumbrook (GRC) Plumbrook ~~Hypersonic~~
Hypersonic 3830 °F 3830 °F
Tunnel Facility Arc Jet Facility Tunnel Facility Arc Jet Facility
GRC Propulsion Systems GRC Propulsion Systems
Mach 6 Mach 6
Cleveland, OH Cleveland, OH
Laboratory 4 Laboratory 4
GRC 1’ x 1’ Supersonic Wind GRC 1’ x 1’ Supersonic Wind
12-inch Mach 1.3-6 (10 12-inch Mach 1.3-6 (10
Cleveland, OH Cleveland, OH
Tunnel Tunnel
discrete discrete airspeeds) and up airspeeds) and up
to 640 °F to 640 °F
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
Table A-5. Department of Energy Research-Related Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories Solar Solar
High-temperature materials High-temperature materials testing testing
Albuquerque, NM Albuquerque, NM
Thermal Test Facility Thermal Test Facility
and aerodynamic heating simulation and aerodynamic heating simulation
Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories
18-inch Mach 5, 8, and 14 18-inch Mach 5, 8, and 14
Albuquerque, NM Albuquerque, NM
Hypersonic Wind Tunnel Hypersonic Wind Tunnel
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
Table A-6. Industry/Academic Research-Related Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
CUBRC Large Energy National CUBRC Large Energy National
LENS 1: Mach 6-22 LENS 1: Mach 6-22
Buffalo, NY Buffalo, NY
Shock (LENS)-1/-II/-XX Tunnels Shock (LENS)-1/-II/-XX Tunnels
LENS II: Mach 2-12 LENS II: Mach 2-12
LENS XX: AtmosphericLENS XX: Atmospheric reentry reentry
simulation simulation
Boeing Polysonic Wind Tunnel Boeing Polysonic Wind Tunnel
48-inch up to Mach 5 48-inch up to Mach 5
St. Louis, St. Louis, MO MO
Lockheed Martin High Speed Wind Lockheed Martin High Speed Wind
48-inch Mach .3-5 48-inch Mach .3-5
~~Dal as,~~ Dallas, TX TX
Tunnel Tunnel
Boeing/Air Boeing/Air Force Office of ScientificForce Office of Scientific
9.5-inch Mach 6 9.5-inch Mach 6
West Lafayette, IN West Lafayette, IN
Research (AFOSR) Quiet Tunnel at Research (AFOSR) Quiet Tunnel at
Purdue University Purdue University
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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

AFOSR-University AFOSR-University of Notre Dame of Notre Dame
24-inch Mach 6 24-inch Mach 6
Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN IN
Quiet Tunnel Quiet Tunnel
Stratolaunch Carrier Stratolaunch Carrier Aircraft Aircraft
Reusable Mach 6 test bed Reusable Mach 6 test bed
N/A N/A
Sources: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.; Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.; Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Expanding Hypersonic Technology Expanding Hypersonic Technology
Testing”; University of Arizona,Testing”; University of Arizona, “Mach 5 Quiet Ludwieg Tube”; and Ashley Tressel,“Mach 5 Quiet Ludwieg Tube”; and Ashley Tressel, “Army“Army to open hypersonic to open hypersonic
testing facility.” testing facility.”
Notes: Hypersonic wind tunnels are under construction at the fol owing Hypersonic wind tunnels are under construction at the fol owing universities:universities: Texas A&M University Texas A&M University
(Mach 10 quiet tunnel(Mach 10 quiet tunnel ~~expected to be complete in 2021~~), the University), the University of Arizona (Mach 5 quiet tunnelof Arizona (Mach 5 quiet tunnel
~~expected to be complete in 2021~~), Purdue University), Purdue University (Mach 8 quiet tunnel(Mach 8 quiet tunnel ~~expected to be complete in 2022~~), ),
and the Universityand the University of Notre Dameof Notre Dame (Mach 10 quiet tunnel(Mach 10 quiet tunnel ~~expected to be complete in 2023~~). Additional ). Additional
universities,universities, such as the University of Maryland, the California Institute of Technology, the Georgia Institute of such as the University of Maryland, the California Institute of Technology, the Georgia Institute of
Technology, the AirTechnology, the Air Force Academy,Force Academy, the University of Tennesseethe University of Tennessee Space Institute, and Virginia Polytechnic Space Institute, and Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University,Institute and State University, also maintain also maintain ~~experimental~~ experimental hypersonic facilitieshypersonic facilities or conduct hypersonic research. or conduct hypersonic research.

Author Information

Kelley M. Sayler Kelley M. Sayler

Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global
Security Security

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