Contents

• Introduction
• Origins
• The First World War and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)
• The Expansion of TWEA
• The Efforts of Congress to Limit Executive Emergency Authorities
• The Enactment of the National Emergencies Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
• IEEPA's Statute, its Use, and Judicial Interpretation
• IEEPA's Statute
• Requirements for an IEEPA Declaration
• Consultation and Reporting
• Amendments to IEEPA
• The Informational Materials Amendments to IEEPA
• USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA
• IEEPA Trends
• Presidential Emergency Use
• Congressional Nonemergency Use and Retroactive Approval
• Current Uses of IEEPA
• Use of Assets Frozen under IEEPA
• Presidential Use of Foreign Assets Frozen under IEEPA
• Congressionally Mandated Use of Frozen Foreign Assets and Proceeds of Sanctions
• International Law Implications of Seizing and Repurposing Frozen Assets
• Judicial Interpretation of IEEPA
• Dames & Moore v. Regan
• Separation of Powers—Non-Delegation Doctrine
• Separation of Powers—Legislative Veto
• Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
• Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
• First Amendment Challenges
• First Amendment—Informational Materials and Communications Exception under IEEPA
• Use of IEEPA to Continue Enforcing the Export Administration Act (EAA)
• Use of IEEPA to Regulate Cryptocurrency
• Issues and Options for Congress
• The Use of IEEPA to Impose Tariffs
• Delegation of Authority under IEEPA
• Definition of "National Emergency" and "Unusual and Extraordinary Threat"
• Scope of the Authority
• Amending the NEA to Require Joint Resolutions of Approval
• The NEA, IEEPA, and "Never Ending Emergencies"
• The Status Quo
• Implications of Terminating National Emergencies Invoking IEEPA
• The Export Control Reform Act of 2018

Summary

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) provides the President broad authority to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a declaration of national emergency. IEEPA, like the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) from which it branched, sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanctions regime. Changes in the use of IEEPA powers since the act's enactment in 1977, including its use to impose tariffs on imports from almost all countries in 2025, have caused some Members of Congress and policy analysts to question whether the statute's oversight provisions are robust enough given the sweeping economic powers it confers upon the President during a declared emergency.

Over the course of the twentieth century, Congress delegated increasing amounts of emergency power to the President by statute. TWEA was one such statute. Congress passed TWEA in 1917 to regulate international transactions with enemy powers following the entry of the United States into the First World War. Congress expanded the act during the 1930s to allow the President to declare a national emergency in times of peace and assume sweeping powers over both domestic and international transactions. Between 1945 and the early 1970s, TWEA became the central means to impose sanctions as part of U.S. Cold War strategy. Presidents used TWEA to block international financial transactions, seize U.S.-based assets held by foreign nationals, restrict exports, modify regulations to deter the hoarding of gold, and limit foreign direct investment in U.S. companies. In addition, when a temporary tariff the President had imposed on all imports into the United States was challenged in federal court, the government argued that TWEA provided legal authority for the President's action.

Following committee investigations that discovered that the United States had been in a state of emergency for more than 40 years, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976 and IEEPA in 1977. The pair of statutes placed new limits on presidential emergency powers. Both included reporting requirements to increase transparency and track costs, and the NEA required the President to assess annually and extend, if appropriate, an emergency. Some experts argue that renewal process has become pro forma. The NEA also afforded Congress the means to terminate a national emergency by adopting a concurrent resolution in each chamber. A decision by the Supreme Court, in a landmark case, however, found the use of concurrent resolutions to terminate an executive action unconstitutional. Concerned about the termination provisions in the NEA, Congress amended the statute to require a joint resolution, significantly increasing the difficulty of terminating an emergency.

Like TWEA, IEEPA has become an important means to impose economic-based sanctions since its enactment; like TWEA, Presidents have frequently used IEEPA to restrict a variety of international transactions; and like TWEA, the subjects of the restrictions, the frequency of use, and the duration of emergencies have expanded over time. Initially, Presidents used IEEPA to target foreign states or their governments. Over the years, presidential administrations have increasingly used IEEPA to target non-state individuals and groups, such as terrorists, persons who engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities, and certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court.

As of September 1, 2025, Presidents had declared 77 national emergencies invoking IEEPA, 46 of which are ongoing. National emergencies invoking IEEPA often last nearly a decade, although some have lasted significantly longer—the first state of emergency declared under the NEA and IEEPA, which was declared in response to the taking of U.S. embassy staff as hostages by Iran in 1979, is in its fifth decade.

IEEPA grants sweeping powers to the President to control economic transactions. Despite these broad powers, until 2023, Congress had never attempted to terminate a national emergency invoking IEEPA. Instead, Congress has directed the President on numerous occasions to use IEEPA authorities to impose sanctions. Congress may want to consider whether IEEPA appropriately balances the need for swift action in a time of crisis with Congress's duty to oversee executive action. Congress may also want to consider IEEPA's role in implementing congressional influence in U.S. foreign policy and national security decision making.

---

Introduction

The issue of executive discretion has been at the center of constitutional debates in liberal democracies throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Specifically, the question of how to balance a commitment to the rule of law with the exigencies of modern political and economic crises has been a consistent concern of legislators and scholars in the United States and around the world.¹

The U.S. Constitution is silent on the question of how to handle emergencies. As such, over the past two centuries, Congress and the President have answered that question in varied and often ad hoc ways. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the answer was often for the President to act without congressional approval in a time of crisis, knowingly risking impeachment and personal civil liability.² Congress claimed primacy over emergency action and would decide subsequently either to ratify the President's actions through legislation or indemnify the President for any civil liability.³

By the twentieth century, a new pattern began to emerge. Instead of retroactively judging an executive's extraordinary actions in a time of emergency, Congress enacted statutes authorizing the President to declare a state of emergency and make use of extraordinary delegated powers.⁴ The expanding delegation of emergency powers to executives, and the increase in governing via emergency power by executives, was a common trajectory among twentieth-century liberal democracies.⁵ As innovation quickened the pace of social change and global crises, some legislatures felt compelled to delegate to their executives, who traditional political theorists assumed could operate with greater "dispatch" than the more deliberate and future-oriented legislatures.⁶ Whether such actions subvert the rule of law or are a standard feature of healthy modern constitutional orders has been a subject of debate.⁷

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is one example of a twentieth-century delegation of emergency authority.⁸ One of more than a hundred emergency statutes under the umbrella of the National Emergencies Act (NEA),⁹ IEEPA grants the President extensive power to regulate a variety of economic transactions during a state of national emergency. Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977 to limit the emergency economic powers that it had delegated to the President under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). Nevertheless, some scholars argue that judicial and legislative actions subsequent to IEEPA's enactment have made it, like TWEA, a source of expansive and unchecked executive authority in the economic realm.¹⁰ Other scholars argue that IEEPA is a useful tool for Presidents to quickly implement the will of Congress either as directed by law or as encouraged by congressional activity.¹¹

Until the late 2010s, there had been little congressional discussion of modifying either IEEPA or its umbrella statute, the NEA. Presidential actions in the late 2010s and 2020s, have drawn renewed attention to presidential emergency powers under the NEA, of which IEEPA is the most frequently used.

Origins

The First World War and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)

The First World War (1914-1919) saw an unprecedented degree of economic mobilization.¹² The executive departments of European governments began to regulate their economies with or without the support of their legislatures. The United States, in contrast, was in a privileged position relative to its allies in Europe. Separated by an ocean from Germany and Austria-Hungary, the United States was never under substantial threat of invasion. Rather than relying on the inherent powers of the presidency, or acting unconstitutionally and hoping for a subsequent congressional ratification, President Wilson sought explicit pre-authorization for expansive new powers to meet the global crisis.¹³ By the end of 1917, Congress had passed 22 statutes empowering the President to take control of private property for public use during the war.¹⁴ These statutes gave the President broad authority to control railroads, shipyards, cars, telegraph and telephone systems, water systems, and many other sectors of the American economy.¹⁵

TWEA was one of those 22 statutes.¹⁶ It granted to the executive an extraordinary degree of control over international trade, investment, migration, and communications between the United States and its enemies.¹⁷ TWEA defined "enemy" broadly and included "any individual, partnership, or other body of individuals [including corporations], of any nationality, resident within the territory ... of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside of the United States and doing business within such a territory.... "¹⁸ The first four sections of the act granted the President extensive powers to limit trading with, communicating with, or transporting enemies (or their allies) of the United States.¹⁹ These sections also empowered the President to censor foreign communications and place extensive restrictions on enemy insurance or reinsurance companies.²⁰

Section 5(b) of TWEA would form one of the central bases of presidential emergency economic power in the twentieth century. Section 5(b), as originally enacted, states:

That the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign exchange, export or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers of credit in any form (other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly within the United States), and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or of the ownership of property between the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy, ally of enemy or otherwise, or between residents of one or more foreign countries, by any person within the United States; and he may require any such person engaged in any such transaction to furnish, under oath, complete information relative thereto, including the production of any books of account, contracts, letters or other papers, in connection therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is completed.²¹

The statute gave the President expansive control over private international economic transactions in times of war.²² While Congress terminated many of the war powers in 1921, TWEA was specifically exempted because the U.S. government had yet to dispose of a large amount of alien property in its custody.²³ The disposition of property seized under emergency powers would become a central tension in the structure of emergency authority over the next century.

The Expansion of TWEA

The Great Depression, a massive global economic downturn that began in 1929, presented a challenge to liberal democracies in Europe and the Americas. To address the complexities presented by the crisis, nearly all such democracies began delegating discretionary authority to their executives to a degree that had previously been done only in times of war.²⁴ Congress responded, in part, by dramatically expanding the scope of TWEA, delegating to the President the power to declare states of emergency in peacetime and assume expansive domestic economic powers.

Such a delegation was made politically possible by analogizing economic crises to war. In public speeches, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asserted that the Depression was to be "attacked," "fought against," "mobilized for," and "combatted" by "great arm[ies] of people."²⁵ The economic mobilization of the First World War had blurred the lines between the executive's military and economic powers. As the Depression was likened to "armed strife"²⁶ and declared to be "an emergency more serious than war"²⁷ by a Justice of the Supreme Court, it became routine to use emergency economic legislation enacted in wartime as the basis for extraordinary economic authority in peacetime.²⁸

As the Depression entered its third year, the newly-elected President Roosevelt asked Congress for "broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe."²⁹ In his first act as President, Roosevelt proclaimed a bank holiday, suspending all transactions at all banking institutions located in the United States and its territories for four days.³⁰ In his proclamation, Roosevelt claimed to have authority to declare the holiday under Section 5(b) of TWEA.³¹ However, because the United States was not in a state of war and the suspended transactions were primarily domestic, the President's authority to issue such an order was dubious.³²

Despite the tenuous legality, Congress ratified Roosevelt's actions by passing the Emergency Banking Relief Act three days after his proclamation.³³ The act amended Section 5(b) of TWEA to read

During time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, investigate, regulate, or prohibit.... ³⁴

This amendment gave the President the authority to declare that a national emergency existed and assume extensive controls over the national economy previously only available in times of war. By 1934, Roosevelt had used these extensive new powers to regulate "[e]very transaction in foreign exchange, transfer of credit between any banking institution within the United States and any banking institution outside of the United States."³⁵

With America's entry into the Second World War in 1941, Congress again amended TWEA to grant the President extensive powers over the disposition of private property, adding the so-called "vesting" power, which authorized the permanent seizure of property.³⁶ Now in its most expansive form, TWEA authorized the President to declare a national emergency and, in so doing, to regulate foreign exchange, domestic banking, possession of precious metals, and property in which any foreign country or foreign national had an interest.³⁷

The Second World War ended in 1945. Following the conflict, the allied powers constructed institutions and signed agreements designed to keep the peace and to liberalize world trade. However, the United States did not immediately resume a peacetime posture with respect to emergency powers. Instead, the onset of the Cold War rationalized the continued use of TWEA and other emergency powers outside the context of a declared war.³⁸ Over the next several decades, Presidents declared four national emergencies and assumed expansive authority over economic transactions in the postwar period.³⁹

During the Cold War, economic sanctions became an increasingly popular foreign policy and national security tool, and TWEA was a prominent source of presidential authority to use the tool. In 1950, President Harry S. Truman declared a national emergency, citing TWEA, to impose economic sanctions on North Korea and China.⁴⁰ Subsequent Presidents referenced that national emergency as authority for imposing sanctions on Vietnam, Cuba, and Cambodia.⁴¹ Truman likewise used Section 5(b) of TWEA to maintain regulations on foreign exchange, transfers of credit, and the export of coin and currency that had been in place since the early 1930s.⁴² Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford invoked TWEA to continue export controls established under the Export Administration Act when the act expired.⁴³

TWEA was also a prominent instrument of postwar presidential monetary policy. Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy used TWEA and the national emergency declared by President Roosevelt in 1933 to maintain and modify regulations controlling the hoarding and export of gold.⁴⁴ In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson explicitly used Truman's 1950 declaration of emergency under Section 5(b) of TWEA to limit direct foreign investment by U.S. companies in an effort to strengthen the balance of payments position of the United States after the devaluation of the pound sterling by the United Kingdom.⁴⁵ In 1971, after President Nixon suspended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold, he made use of Section 5(b) of TWEA to declare a state of emergency and place a 10% ad valorem supplemental duty on all dutiable goods entering the United States.⁴⁶

The reliance by the executive on the powers granted by Section 5(b) of TWEA meant that postwar sanctions regimes and significant parts of U.S. international monetary policy relied on continued states of emergency for their operation.

The Efforts of Congress to Limit Executive Emergency Authorities

By the mid-1970s, following U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, revelations of domestic spying, assassinations of foreign political leaders, the Watergate break-in, and other related abuses of power, Congress increasingly focused on checking the executive branch. The Senate formed a bipartisan special committee chaired by Senators Frank Church and Charles Mathias to reevaluate delegations of emergency authority to the President.⁴⁷ The special committee issued a report surveying the President's emergency powers in which it asserted that the United States had technically "been in a state of national emergency since March 9, 1933" and that there were four distinct declarations of national emergency in effect.⁴⁸ The report also noted that the United States had "on the books at least 470 significant emergency statutes without time limitations delegating to the Executive extensive discretionary powers, ordinarily exercised by the Legislature, which affect the lives of American citizens in a host of all-encompassing ways."⁴⁹

In the course of the Committee's investigations, Senator Mathias, a committee co-chair, noted, "A majority of the people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency government."⁵⁰ Senator Church, the other co-chair, said the central question before the committee was "whether it [was] possible for a democratic government such as ours to exist under its present Constitution and system of three separate branches equal in power under a continued state of emergency."⁵¹

Among the more controversial statutes highlighted by the committee was TWEA. In 1977, during the House markup of a bill revising TWEA, Representative Jonathan Bingham, Chairperson of the House International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Economic Policy, described TWEA as conferring "on the President what could have been dictatorial powers that he could have used without any restraint by Congress."⁵² According to the Department of Justice, TWEA granted the President four major groups of powers in a time of war or other national emergency:

(a) Regulatory powers with respect to foreign exchange, banking transfers, coin, bullion, currency, and securities;

(b) Regulatory powers with respect to "any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest";

(c) The power to vest "any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof"; and

(d) The powers to hold, use, administer, liquidate, sell, or otherwise deal with "such interest or property" in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States.⁵³

The House report on the reform legislation called TWEA "essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and international economic arena, without congressional review."⁵⁴ The criticisms of TWEA centered on the following:

(a) It required no consultation or reports to Congress with regard to the use of powers or the declaration of a national emergency.

(b) It set no time limits on a state of emergency, no mechanism for congressional review, and no way for Congress to terminate it.

(c) It stated no limits on the scope of TWEA's economic powers and the circumstances under which such authority could be used.

(d) The actions taken under the authority of TWEA were rarely related to the circumstances in which the national emergency was declared.⁵⁵

In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Professor Harold G. Maier, a noted legal scholar, summed up the development and the main criticisms of TWEA:

Section 5(b)'s effect is no longer confined to "emergency situations" in the sense of existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit, by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President."⁵⁶

The Enactment of the National Emergencies Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act

Congress's reforms to emergency powers under TWEA came in two acts. First, Congress enacted the National Emergencies Act in 1976.⁵⁷ The NEA provided for the termination of all existing declared emergencies in 1978, except those making use of Section 5(b) of TWEA, and placed new restrictions on the manner of declaring and the duration of new states of emergency, including

• Requiring the President to transmit immediately to Congress a notification of the declaration of national emergency.
• Requiring a biannual review whereby "each House of Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a concurrent [now joint, see below] resolution to determine whether that emergency shall be terminated."
• Authorizing Congress to terminate the national emergency through a privileged concurrent [now joint] resolution.⁵⁸

Second, Congress tackled the more complicated question of TWEA. Because the authorities granted by TWEA were heavily entwined with postwar international monetary policy and the use of sanctions in U.S. foreign policy, unwinding it was a difficult undertaking.⁵⁹ The exclusion of Section 5(b) reflected congressional interest in preserving existing regulations regarding foreign assets, foreign funds, and exports of strategic goods.⁶⁰ Similarly, establishing a means to continue existing uses of TWEA reflected congressional interest in "improving future use rather than remedying past abuses."⁶¹

The subcommittee charged with reforming TWEA spent more than a year preparing reports, including the first complete legislative history of TWEA, a tome that ran nearly 700 pages.⁶² In the resulting legislation, Congress did three things. First, Congress amended TWEA so that TWEA was, as originally intended, only applicable "during a time of war."⁶³ Second, Congress expanded the Export Administration Act to include powers that previously were authorized by reference to Section 5(b) of TWEA.⁶⁴ Finally, Congress wrote the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to confer "upon the President a new set of authorities for use in time of national emergency which are both more limited in scope than those of section 5(b) and subject to procedural limitations, including those of the [NEA]."⁶⁵

The Report of the House Committee on International Relations summarized the nature of an "emergency" in its "new approach" to international emergency economic powers:

[G]iven the breadth of the authorities, and their availability at the President's discretion upon a declaration of a national emergency, their exercise should be subject to various substantive restrictions. The main one stems from a recognition that emergencies are by their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal ongoing problems. A national emergency should be declared and emergency authorities employed only with respect to a specific set of circumstances which constitute a real emergency, and for no other purpose. The emergency should be terminated in a timely manner when the factual state of emergency is over and not continued in effect for use in other circumstances. A state of national emergency should not be a normal state of affairs.⁶⁶

IEEPA's Statute, its Use, and Judicial Interpretation

IEEPA empowers the President to exercise an array of economic powers "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat."⁶⁷ The statute provides that the authorities granted by IEEPA to the President "may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared for purposes of this chapter [i.e., IEEPA] and may not be exercised for any other purpose."⁶⁸ Each "new threat" for which IEEPA is invoked requires a new declaration.⁶⁹

IEEPA's Statute

IEEPA, as currently amended, empowers the president to

(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit:

(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,

(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or national thereof,

(iii) the importing or exporting of currencies or securities; and

(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

(C) when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.⁷⁰

Presidents may invoke IEEPA under the procedures set forth in the NEA, subject to the requirements described above. When declaring a national emergency, the NEA requires that the President "immediately" transmit the proclamation declaring the emergency to Congress and publish it in the Federal Register.⁷¹ The President must also specify the provisions of law that he or she intends to use to address the emergency.⁷² The NEA authorizes the President to exercise additional statutory emergency authorities to address a previously declared national emergency, as long as the intent to exercise them is published,⁷³

Requirements for an IEEPA Declaration

In addition to the requirements of the NEA, IEEPA provides several further restrictions. As noted above, IEEPA imposes different requirements if the President seeks to exercise powers with respect to a national emergency that has not expressly been declared by invoking IEEPA. The President may exercise IEEPA authorities only to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared for purposes of IEEPA. and "not ... for any other purpose."⁷⁴ Accordingly, IEEPA authorities are available only with respect to a national emergency declared for the purpose of using IEEPA authorities, and that emergency must be declared "with respect to" addressing an unusual and extraordinary threat from abroad. Consequently, the statutory text does not seem to support a President's invocation of IEEPA authorities (by executive order or otherwise) by referring to a preexisting national emergency that had not been declared under IEEPA.⁷⁵

Presidents have developed a practice of issuing executive orders to either expand or modify the scope of previously declared national emergencies to account for changed circumstances regarding a particular threat.⁷⁶ In keeping with the limitations IEEPA imposes restricting the use of its authorities to national emergencies declared for that purpose, and requiring a new declaration to address a "new threat,"⁷⁷ past Presidents appear to have avoided adding IEEPA authorities as an expansion of non-IEEPA emergencies⁷⁸ or expanding declared IEEPA emergencies to cover distinct new threats.⁷⁹

President Donald Trump appears to have departed from this trend by issuing three executive orders on February 1, 2025,⁸⁰ that stated they expanded an earlier national emergency proclaimed with respect to the southern border he declared on January 20, 2025 (January Proclamation) to invoke IEEPA.⁸¹ The January Proclamation, which invoked his authority under the NEA, did not invoke IEEPA authorities or describe the threat (i.e., an "invasion") as unusual and extraordinary.⁸² In each of the February Executive Orders, President Trump noted he had "previously declared a national emergency with respect to the grave threat to the United States posed by the influx of illegal aliens and illicit drugs into the United States in Proclamation 10886."⁸³ He then announced: "Pursuant to the NEA, I hereby expand the scope of the national emergency declared in that proclamation to cover," among other things, the respective "failure" of Canada, Mexico, and China to take actions to address criminal activities, such as illicit drugs and human trafficking into the United States, including by using IEEPA to impose tariffs.⁸⁴ The February Executive Orders appear to be contrary to past presidential practice of exercising IEEPA's powers only with respect to a national emergency declared for that purpose, and that new threats (if understood to mean involving distinct geographical areas) require separate declarations of new national emergencies.⁸⁵

The February Executive Orders also declared, respectively, that the "failure" of Canada, Mexico, and China to act constitutes "an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in substantial part outside the United States, to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."⁸⁶ Based on those findings, the President announced that he "declare[d] and reiterate[d] a national emergency under the NEA and IEEPA to deal with that threat,"⁸⁷ leaving some ambiguity with regard to the intent to declare new national emergencies or expand the existing emergency.

The House of Representatives and Senate have treated the February Executive Orders as declaring new national emergencies. On March 6, 2025, the Ranking Member of House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Gregory M. Meeks, introduced two joint resolutions to terminate national emergencies:⁸⁸ the national emergency declared on February 1, 2025, with respect to Canada;⁸⁹ and the national emergency declared on February 1, 2025, with respect to Mexico.⁹⁰ Neither joint resolution claims to terminate the emergency declared on January 20, 2025.⁹¹ Additionally, on March 11, 2025, the House of Representatives agreed to a resolution providing, "Each day for the remainder of the first session of the 119^th Congress shall not constitute a calendar day for purposes of section 202 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. §1622) with respect to a joint resolution terminating a national emergency declared by the President on February 1, 2025."⁹² Accordingly, sufficient calendar days will not elapse prior to the end of the session to force the automatic discharge of any relevant resolution of termination from the committee of jurisdiction.⁹³ On March 11, 2025, Senator Tim Kaine introduced "a joint resolution to terminate the national emergency declared to impose duties on articles imported from Canada" by the February 1, 2025 Executive Order.⁹⁴ The Senate approved that resolution on April 2, 2025, and it is pending before the House.⁹⁵

Consultation and Reporting

Another IEEPA requirement that differs from the NEA is that the IEEPA provides that the President shall consult with Congress "in every possible instance" before exercising any of the authorities granted under IEEPA.⁹⁶ Once the President declares a national emergency invoking IEEPA, he or she must immediately transmit a report to Congress specifying

(1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority;

(2) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States;

(3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those authorities to deal with those circumstances;

(4) why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those circumstances; and

(5) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such actions are to be taken with respect to those countries.⁹⁷

The President subsequently is to report on the actions taken under the IEEPA at least once in every succeeding six-month interval that the authorities are exercised.⁹⁸ As per the NEA, the emergency may be terminated by the President, by a privileged joint resolution of Congress, or automatically if the President does not publish in the Federal Register and transmit to Congress a notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such anniversary.⁹⁹

Amendments to IEEPA

Congress has amended IEEPA eight times (Table 1). Five of the eight amendments altered civil and criminal penalties for violations of orders issued under the statute. Other amendments protected the exchange of certain informational materials from regulation under IEEPA and expanded IEEPA's scope following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Congress also amended the NEA in response to a ruling by the Supreme Court to require a joint rather than a concurrent resolution to terminate a national emergency.

The Informational Materials Amendments to IEEPA

As originally enacted, IEEPA protected the rights of U.S. persons to participate in the exchange of "any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of value" with a foreign person otherwise subject to sanctions. Amendments in 1988 and 1994 updated this list of protected rights to include the exchange of published information in a variety of formats.¹⁰⁰ As amended, the act currently protects the exchange of "information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds," provided such exchange is not otherwise controlled for national security or foreign policy reasons related to weapons proliferation or international terrorism.¹⁰¹

USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA

Unlike the Trading with the Enemy Act, IEEPA did not allow the President to vest assets as originally enacted.¹⁰² In 2001, at the request of the George W. Bush Administration, Congress amended IEEPA as part of the USA PATRIOT Act¹⁰³ to return to the President the authority to vest frozen assets, but only under certain circumstances:

[T]he President may ... when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that [the President] determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.¹⁰⁴

Speaking about the efforts of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify and disrupt the flow of terrorist finances, Attorney General John Ashcroft told Congress

At present the President's powers are limited to freezing assets and blocking transactions with terrorist organizations. We need the capacity for more than a freeze. We must be able to seize. Doing business with terrorist organization must be a losing proposition. Terrorist financiers must pay a price for their support of terrorism, which kills innocent Americans.

Consistent with the President's [issuance of E.O. 13224¹⁰⁵] and his statements [of September 24, 2001], our proposal gives law enforcement the ability to seize the terrorists' assets. Further, criminal liability is imposed on those who knowingly engage in financial transactions, money-laundering involving the proceeds of terrorist acts.¹⁰⁶

The House Judiciary Committee report explaining the amendments described its purpose as follows:

Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. §1702) grants to the President the power to exercise certain authorities relating to commerce with foreign nations upon his determination that there exists an unusual and extraordinary threat to the United States. Under this authority, the President may, among other things, freeze certain foreign assets within the jurisdiction of the United States. A separate law, the Trading With the Enemy Act, authorizes the President to take title to enemy assets when Congress has declared war.

Section 159 of this bill amends section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to provide the President with authority similar to what he currently has under the Trading With the Enemy Act in circumstances where there has been an armed attack on the United States, or where Congress has enacted a law authorizing the President to use armed force against a foreign country, foreign organization, or foreign national. The proceeds of any foreign assets to which the President takes title under this authority must be placed in a segregated account can only be used in accordance with a statute authorizing the expenditure of such proceeds.

Section 159 also makes a number of clarifying and technical changes to section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, most of which will not change the way that provision currently is implemented.¹⁰⁷

The government has apparently never employed the vesting power to seize Al Qaeda assets within the United States. Instead, the government has sought to confiscate them through forfeiture procedures.¹⁰⁸

The first, and to date, apparently only, use of this power under IEEPA occurred on March 20, 2003.¹⁰⁹ On that date, in Executive Order 13290, President George W. Bush ordered the blocked "property of the Government of Iraq and its agencies, instrumentalities, or controlled entities" to be vested "in the Department of the Treasury ... [to] be used to assist the Iraqi people and to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq."¹¹⁰ The President's order excluded from confiscation Iraq's diplomatic and consular property, as well as assets that had, prior to March 20, 2003, been ordered attached in satisfaction of judgments against Iraq rendered pursuant to the terrorist suit provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)¹¹¹ and Section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA)¹¹² (which reportedly totaled about $300 million).¹¹³

A subsequent executive order blocked the property of former Iraqi officials and their families, vesting title of such blocked funds in the Department of the Treasury for transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) to be "used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq's infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, for the cost of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefitting of the Iraqi people."¹¹⁴ The DFI was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1483, which required member states to freeze all assets of the former Iraqi government and of Saddam Hussein, senior officials of his regime and their family members, and transfer such assets to the DFI, which was then administered by the United States. Most of the vested assets were used by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) for reconstruction projects and ministry operations.¹¹⁵

The USA PATRIOT Act made three other amendments to Section 203 of IEEPA.¹¹⁶ After the power to investigate, it added the power to block assets during the pendency of an investigation.¹¹⁷ It clarified that the type of interest in property subject to IEEPA is an "interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."¹¹⁸ It also added subsection (c), which provides

In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was based on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review.¹¹⁹

As described in the House Judiciary Committee report, these provisions were meant to clarify and codify existing practices.¹²⁰

IEEPA Trends

Like TWEA prior to its amendment in 1977, the President and Congress together have often turned to IEEPA to impose economic sanctions in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic objectives. While initially enacted to circumscribe presidential emergency authority,¹²¹ presidential emergency use of IEEPA has expanded in scale, scope, and frequency since the statute's enactment. The House report on IEEPA stated, "emergencies are by their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal, ongoing problems."¹²² National emergencies invoking IEEPA, however, have increased in frequency and length since its enactment.

Between 1977 and September 1, 2025, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in 77 declarations of national emergency under the NEA.¹²³ On average, these emergencies last more than nine years. Most emergencies have been geographically specific, targeting a specific country or government. However, since 1990, Presidents have declared non-geographically-specific emergencies in response to issues like weapons proliferation, global terrorism, malicious cyber-enabled activities, and trade practices.¹²⁴ The erosion of geographic limitations has been accompanied by an expansion in the nature of the targets of sanctions issued under IEEPA authority. Originally, IEEPA was used to target foreign governments; however, Presidents have increasingly targeted groups and individuals.¹²⁵ Usually Presidents use IEEPA as an emergency power; however, Congress has directed the President to use IEEPA or expressed its approval of presidential emergency use in several statutes.¹²⁶ Between 1976, when the NEA was enacted, and 2019, one joint resolution to terminate a national emergency was introduced.¹²⁷ In the late-2010s, some Members of Congress began to express concern with the NEA. Between 2019 and September 1, 2025, Members of Congress introduced 23 joint resolutions to terminate a national emergency; 11 of those resolutions involved IEEPA (Table A-2). Despite this interest in terminating national emergencies, no emergency declared under the NEA has been terminated without presidential assent.

Presidential Emergency Use¹²⁸

IEEPA is the most frequently cited emergency authority when the President declares a national emergency under the NEA.¹²⁹ Rather than referencing the same set of emergencies, as had been the case with TWEA, IEEPA requires the President to declare a national emergency for each independent use,¹³⁰ and permits the exercise of IEEPA powers only in connection with a national emergency declared for the purpose of invoking IEEPA.¹³¹ As a result, the number of national emergencies declared under the terms of the NEA has proliferated over the past four decades. Presidents declared four national emergencies under the auspices of TWEA in the four decades prior to IEEPA's enactment. In contrast, as of September 1, 2025 Presidents have declared 88 national emergencies under the NEA, 77 of which invoked IEEPA.¹³² As of September 1, 2025, there were 51 ongoing national emergencies; all but five involve IEEPA.

Figure 1. Declarations and Executive Orders Citing IEEPA

Source: CRS. 2020s current as of September 1, 2025. Note: Executive orders include declarations of national emergency that cite IEEPA that were made by executive order and any subsequent modifications or amendments to an emergency or such an order.

Each year since 1990, Presidents have issued roughly 4.5 executive orders citing IEEPA and declared 1.5 new national emergencies citing IEEPA.¹³³ (Figure 1).

On average, emergencies invoking IEEPA last more than nine years.¹³⁴ The longest emergency was also the first. President Jimmy Carter, in response to the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, declared the first national emergency under the provisions of the NEA and invoked IEEPA.¹³⁵ Eight successive Presidents have renewed that emergency annually for more than 40 years. As of September 1, 2025, that emergency is still in effect, largely to provide a legal basis for resolving matters of ownership of the Shah's disputed assets.¹³⁶ That initial emergency aside, the length of emergencies invoking IEEPA has increased each decade. The average length of an emergency invoking IEEPA declared in the 1980s was four years. That average extended to 12 years for emergencies declared in the 1990s and 16 years for emergencies declared in the 2000s and continues to grow (Figure 3).¹³⁷

Presidents have terminated emergencies or allowed them to expire. On average Presidents have proclaimed seven emergencies under the NEA per four-year term (six of which invoke IEEPA), and terminated or did not renew an average of three emergencies per four-year term (two of which invoke IEEPA) (Figure 2).¹³⁸ As a result, Presidents declare an average of four more emergencies under the NEA per term than they terminate or allow to lapse (slightly less than four of which invoke IEEPA). As such, the number of ongoing national emergencies has grown nearly continuously since the enactment of IEEPA and the NEA (Figure 4). Between January 1, 1979, and September 1, 2025, there were on average 16 ongoing national emergencies each year, 14 of which invoked IEEPA.

Figure 2. Balance of Emergencies Citing IEEPA by Presidential Term

Source: CRS. Current as of September 1, 2025.

Figure 3. Average Length of Emergencies Citing IEEPA

Source: CRS. Current as of September 1, 2025. Notes: A single emergency was declared in the 1970s (Iran) and that has lasted 40 years. 2010s do not have sufficient data to create an average length that would be meaningful for the purposes of analysis.

In most cases, the declared emergencies citing IEEPA have been geographically specific. For example, in the first use of IEEPA, President Jimmy Carter issued an executive order that both declared a national emergency with respect to the "situation in Iran" and "blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran."¹³⁹ Five months later, President Carter issued a second order dramatically expanding the scope of the first EO and effectively blocked the transfer of all goods, money, or credit destined for Iran by anyone subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.¹⁴⁰ A further order expanded the coverage to block imports to the United States from Iran.¹⁴¹ Together, these orders touched upon virtually all economic contacts between any place or legal person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and the territory and government of Iran.¹⁴²

Many of the executive orders invoking IEEPA have followed this pattern of limiting the scope to a specific territory, government, or its nationals. Executive Order 12513, for example, prohibited "imports into the United States of goods and services of Nicaraguan origin" and "exports from the United States of goods to or destined for Nicaragua." The order likewise prohibited Nicaraguan air carriers and vessels of Nicaraguan registry from entering U.S. ports.¹⁴³ Executive Order 12532 prohibited various transactions with the "Government of South Africa or to entities owned or controlled by that Government."¹⁴⁴

Figure 4. Cumulative Number of Ongoing National Emergencies by Year

Source: CRS. Current as of September 1, 2025. Notes: Orange dashed line indicates national emergencies citing IEEPA. Hashed space indicates all national emergencies.

While the majority of national emergencies invoking IEEPA have been geographically specific, many emergencies have lacked explicit geographic limitations.¹⁴⁵ President George H.W. Bush declared the first geographically nonspecific emergency in response to the threat posed by the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.¹⁴⁶ Similarly, President George W. Bush declared a national emergency in response to the threat posed by "persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism."¹⁴⁷ President Barack Obama declared emergencies to respond to the threats of "transnational criminal organizations" and "persons engaging in malicious cyber-enabled activities."¹⁴⁸ President Donald Trump declared an emergency to respond to "foreign adversaries" who were "creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and communications technologies and services" during his first administration,¹⁴⁹ and declared an emergency during his second administration to respond to "trading partners" whose "economic policies" he determined were "suppress[ing] domestic wages and consumption."¹⁵⁰

Without explicit geographic limitations, these orders have included provisions that are global in scope. These geographically nonspecific emergencies invoking IEEPA have increased in frequency over the past 40 years.¹⁵¹

Figure 5. National Emergency Act Declarations

Source: Federal Register; CRS.

In addition to the erosion of geographic limitations, the stated motivations for declaring national emergencies have expanded in scope as well. Initially, stated rationales for declarations of national emergency citing IEEPA were short and often referenced either a specific geography or the specific actions of a government. Presidents found that circumstances like "the situation in Iran,"¹⁵² or the "policies and actions of the Government of Nicaragua,"¹⁵³ constituted "unusual and extraordinary threat[s] to the national security and foreign policy of the United States" and would therefore declare a national emergency.¹⁵⁴

The stated rationales have expanded over time in both the length and subject matter. Presidents have increasingly declared national emergencies, in part, to respond to human and civil rights abuses,¹⁵⁵ slavery,¹⁵⁶ denial of religious freedom,¹⁵⁷ political repression,¹⁵⁸ public corruption,¹⁵⁹ and the undermining of democratic processes.¹⁶⁰ While the first reference to human rights violations as a rationale for a declaration of national emergency came in 1985,¹⁶¹ most such references have come in the past 20 years (Table A-3).

Presidents have also expanded the nature of the targets of IEEPA sanctions. Originally, the targets of sanctions issued under IEEPA were foreign governments. The first use of IEEPA targeted "Iranian Government Property."¹⁶² Use of IEEPA quickly expanded to target geographically defined regions.¹⁶³ Presidents have also increasingly targeted groups, such as political parties, corporations, or terrorist organizations, and individuals, such as supporters of terrorism, suspected narcotics traffickers, or associates of the International Criminal Court.¹⁶⁴

The first instances of orders directed at groups or persons were limited to foreign groups or persons. For example, in Executive Order 12978, President Bill Clinton targeted specific "foreign persons" and "persons determined ... to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of" such foreign persons.¹⁶⁵ An excerpt is included below:

Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, I hereby order blocked all property and interests in property that are or hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons, of:

(a) the foreign persons listed in the Annex to this order;

(b) foreign persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State:

(i) to play a significant role in international narcotics trafficking centered in Colombia; or

(ii) materially to assist in, or provide financial or technological support for or goods or services in support of, the narcotics trafficking activities of persons designated in or pursuant to this order; and

(c) persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of, persons designated in or pursuant to this order.¹⁶⁶

In 2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13219 to target "persons who threaten international stabilization efforts in the Western Balkans."¹⁶⁷ While the order was similar to that of Executive Order 12978, it removed the qualifier "foreign." As such, persons in the United States, including U.S. citizens, could be targets of the order.¹⁶⁸ The following is an excerpt of the order:

Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)(1), (3), and (4) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(1), (3), and (4)), the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (title IX, P.L. 106-387), and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, all property and interests in property of:

(i) the persons listed in the Annex to this order; and

(ii) persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, because they are found:

(A) to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of violence ... ¹⁶⁹

Several subsequent invocations of IEEPA have similarly not been limited to foreign targets.¹⁷⁰

In sum, presidential emergency use of IEEPA initially was directed at foreign states, with targets that were delimited by geography or nationality. Since the 1990s, Presidents have expanded the scope of their declarations to include groups and individual persons, regardless of nationality or geographic location, who are engaged in specific activities.

Congressional Nonemergency Use and Retroactive Approval

While IEEPA is often categorized as an emergency statute, Congress has used IEEPA outside of the context of national emergencies. When Congress legislates sanctions, it often authorizes or directs the President to use IEEPA authorities to impose those sanctions.

In the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018, for example, Congress directed the President to exercise "all powers granted to the President [by IEEPA] to the extent necessary to block and prohibit [certain transactions]."¹⁷¹ Penalties for violations by a person of a measure imposed by the President under the act would be, likewise, determined by reference to IEEPA.¹⁷²

This trend has been long-term. Congress first directed the President to make use of IEEPA authorities in 1986 as part of an effort to assist Haiti in the recovery of assets illegally diverted by its former government. That statute provided

The President shall exercise the authorities granted by section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act [50 USC 1702] to assist the Government of Haiti in its efforts to recover, through legal proceedings, assets which the Government of Haiti alleges were stolen by former president-for-life Jean Claude Duvalier and other individuals associated with the Duvalier regime. This subsection shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of section 202 of that Act. [50 USC 1701]¹⁷³

In directing the President to use IEEPA, Congress waived the requirement that he declare a national emergency (and none was declared).¹⁷⁴

Subsequent legislation has followed this general pattern, with slight variations in language and specificity.¹⁷⁵ The following is an example of current legislative language that has appeared in several recent statutes:

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to—

...

(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

(A) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

...

(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of paragraph (1)(A) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out paragraph (1)(A) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.¹⁷⁶

Congress has also expressed, retroactively, its approval of unilateral presidential invocations of IEEPA in the context of a national emergency. In the Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, for example, Congress declared, "It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State should continue to implement Executive Order No. 13382."¹⁷⁷

Presidents have also used IEEPA in an effort to preempt or influence parallel congressional activity. On September 9, 1985, President Reagan, finding "that the policies and actions of the Government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy and economy of the United States," declared a national emergency and limited transactions with South Africa.¹⁷⁸ The President declared the emergency despite the fact that legislation limiting transactions with South Africa was quickly making its way through Congress.¹⁷⁹ In remarks about the declaration, President Reagan stated that he had been opposed to the bill contemplated by Congress because unspecified provisions "would have harmed the very people [the U.S. was] trying to help."¹⁸⁰ Nevertheless, members of the press at the time¹⁸¹ (and at least one scholar since)¹⁸² noted that the limitations imposed by the executive order and the provisions in legislation then winding its way through Congress were "substantially similar."¹⁸³

Current Uses of IEEPA

In general, IEEPA has served as an integral part of the international sanctions regime.¹⁸⁴ The President, either through a declaration of emergency or via statutory direction, has used IEEPA to limit economic transactions in support of administrative and congressional national security and foreign policy goals. Much of the action taken pursuant to IEEPA has involved blocking transactions and freezing assets.

Once the President declares that a national emergency exists, he may use the authority in Section 203 of IEEPA (Grants of Authorities; 50 U.S.C. §1702) to investigate, regulate, or prohibit imports, exports, foreign exchange transactions, transfers of credit, transfers of securities, or payments, and may take other specified actions relating to property in which a foreign country or person has interest—freezing assets, blocking property and interests in property, prohibiting U.S. persons from entering into transactions related to frozen assets and blocked property.

Pursuant to Section 203, Presidents have, among other things,

• prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as engaging in malicious cyber-enabled activities, including "interfering with or undermining election processes or institutions;"¹⁸⁵
• prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as illicit narcotics traffickers, including foreign drug kingpins;¹⁸⁶
• prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as engaging in human rights abuses or significant corruption;¹⁸⁷
• prohibited transactions related to illicit trade in rough diamonds;¹⁸⁸
• prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as Transnational Criminal Organizations;¹⁸⁹
• prohibited transactions with "those who disrupt the Middle East peace process";¹⁹⁰
• prohibited transactions related to offensive military overflights of certain regions;¹⁹¹
• prohibited transactions related to weapons of mass destruction, in coordination with export controls authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act of 1979, and in furtherance of efforts to deter the weapons programs of specific countries (i.e., Iran, North Korea);¹⁹²
• prohibited transactions with those designated as "persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism";¹⁹³
• maintained the dual-use export control system at times when its then-underlying authority, the Export Administration Act authority, had lapsed;¹⁹⁴
• blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as engaged in cyber activities that compromise critical infrastructures, including election processes or the private sector's trade secrets;¹⁹⁵
• blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as responsible for serious human rights abuse or engaged in corruption;¹⁹⁶
• prohibited transactions with those who pose "an undue risk of sabotage to or subversion of the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of information and communications technology or services in the United States";¹⁹⁷ and
• imposed tariffs on imported goods.¹⁹⁸

No President has used IEEPA to enact a policy that was primarily domestic in effect. Some scholars argue that the interconnectedness of the global economy means a President might be able to use IEEPA to take an action that was primarily domestic in effect.¹⁹⁹

Use of Assets Frozen under IEEPA

The ultimate disposition of assets frozen under IEEPA may serve as an important part of the leverage economic sanctions provide to influence the behavior of foreign actors.²⁰⁰ The President and Congress have each at times determined the fate of blocked assets to further foreign policy goals.

Presidential Use of Foreign Assets Frozen under IEEPA

Presidents have used frozen assets as a bargaining tool during foreign policy crises and to bring a resolution to such crises, at times by unfreezing the assets, returning them to the sanctioned entity, or channeling them to a follow-on government. The following are some examples of how Presidents have used blocked assets to resolve foreign policy issues.

President Carter invoked authority under IEEPA to impose trade sanctions against Iran, freezing Iranian assets in the United States, in response to the hostage crisis in 1979.²⁰¹ On January 19, 1981, the United States and Iran entered into a series of executive agreements brokered by Algeria under which the hostages were freed and the frozen assets were distributed to various entities.²⁰² Of the blocked assets, the agreements directed $5.1 billion to repay outstanding U.S. bank loans to Iran, $2.8 billion returned to Iran, $1 billion transferred into a security account in the Hague to pay other U.S. claims against Iran as arbitrated by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT), and $2 billion remained blocked pending further agreement with Iran or decision of the Tribunal. The United States also froze the assets of the former Shah's estate along with those of the Shah's close relatives pending litigation in U.S. courts to ascertain Iran's right to their return. Iran's litigation was unsuccessful, and none of the contested assets were returned to Iran.²⁰³

Presidents have also channeled frozen assets to opposition governments in cases where the United States continued to recognize a previous government that had been removed by coup d'état or otherwise replaced as the legitimate government of a country. For example, after Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle tried to dismiss de facto military ruler General Manuel Noriega from his post as head of the Panamanian Defense Forces, which resulted in Delvalle's own dismissal by the Panamanian Legislative Assembly, President Reagan recognized Delvalle as the legitimate head of government and instituted economic sanctions against the Noriega regime.²⁰⁴ As part of these sanctions, the Department of State, in February 1988, advised U.S. banks not to disburse funds to the Noriega regime, and Delvalle obtained court orders permitting him access to those funds.²⁰⁵ In April 1988, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12635, which "blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Panama that are in the United States ... or that come within the possession or control of persons located within the United States."²⁰⁶ In June 1988, the Department of the Treasury issued regulations directing most payments from the U.S. government owed to Panama and all payments owed "to Panama from the operation of the Panama Canal Commission" to an escrow account established at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.²⁰⁷ One escrow account contained funds for the payment of operating expenses of the Delvalle government.²⁰⁸ After the U.S. invasion of Panama ended in early 1990, President George H.W. Bush lifted economic sanctions against the country²⁰⁹ and used some of the frozen funds to repay debts owed by Panama to foreign creditors, with remaining funds turned over to the successor government.²¹⁰

The Obama and Trump Administrations took similar actions in response to the increasing repression of Nicolás Maduro (2013-present) in Venezuela. President Barack Obama initially froze Venezuelan government assets in 2015 under IEEPA and the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014.²¹¹ In January 2019, the Trump Administration recognized Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela's interim president²¹² and permitted Guaidó access to the frozen Venezuelan government assets that were "held at the United States Federal Reserve and other insured United States financial institutions."²¹³ The Trump Administration also imposed additional sanctions under IEEPA to freeze the assets of the main Venezuelan state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa),²¹⁴ which significantly reduced funds available to the government of Nicolas Maduro.²¹⁵ The Biden Administration continued to recognize Guaidó's interim government²¹⁶ until its dissolution in December 2022, and then recognized the National Assembly elected in 2014 as the "last remaining democratic institution in Venezuela" even though most of its members are in exile.²¹⁷

The Biden and Trump Administrations recognize Edmundo González Urrutia, winner of the July 2024 presidential elections, as the "rightful" President of Venezuela.²¹⁸ Nevertheless, Nicolás Maduro has remained in office and was inaugurated for a third term as president in January 2025.²¹⁹ González Urrutía, in exile since September 2024, does not have direct access to Venezuela assets in the United States.²²⁰ The National Assembly leaders elected in 2015 technically has access to the assets frozen in the United States, but any transactions involving those assets require a license from OFAC.²²¹ The opposition-controlled 2015 National Assembly has sought to prevent the sale of one of Venezuela's most valuable assets, CITGO, the U.S. refining arm of PdVSA, for the payment of debts owed and appropriations carried out by the Maduro government; no sale can occur unless OFAC grants a license for it to go forward.²²²

There is also precedent for using frozen foreign assets for purposes authorized by the U.N. Security Council. After the first war with Iraq, President George H.W. Bush ordered the transfer of frozen Iraqi assets derived from the sale of Iraqi petroleum held by U.S. banks to a holding account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to fulfill "the rights and obligations of the United States under U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 778."²²³ The President cited a section of the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA),²²⁴ as well as IEEPA, as authority to take the action.²²⁵ The President ordered the transferred funds to be used to provide humanitarian relief and to finance the United Nations Compensation Commission,²²⁶ which was established to adjudicate claims against Iraq arising from the invasion.²²⁷ Other Iraqi assets remained frozen and accumulated interest until the United States vested them in 2003 pursuant to IEEPA.²²⁸

In some cases, the United States has ended sanctions and returned frozen assets to successor governments. For example, as a condition of releasing sanctions, the United States released $237.6 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Central Bank of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the central banks of the successor states in 2003.²²⁹ In 2002, the United States released $217 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Taliban to the Afghan Interim Authority.²³⁰

As of the date of this report, the fate of the Afghan Central Bank (DaB) assets held in the United States at the time of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 remains undecided. Some victims—including survivors and family members—of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks with judgments against the Taliban have obtained a writ of attachment with respect to the assets.²³¹ The Biden Administration subsequently blocked the funds pursuant to IEEPA²³² and filed a statement of interest²³³ asking the district court for permission to make half ($3.5 billion) of the assets available for transfer under the OFAC license²³⁴ issued on behalf of the people of Afghanistan to "to address significant humanitarian and economic concerns and to avoid further regional instability and other conditions contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States."²³⁵ The other half of the assets would remain blocked to avail the judgment plaintiffs of the opportunity to make their case for entitlement to attach them in satisfaction of their judgments. In the statement of interest, the Biden Administration did not take a position with respect to the plaintiffs' right to the assets, but set forth some legal considerations that seem to militate against the judgment plaintiffs.²³⁶ In February 2023, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for post-judgment attachment of the DaB assets, holding that, "[p]ursuant to the FSIA, TRIA, and the U.S. Constitution, the Taliban—not the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan or the Afghan people—must pay for the Taliban's liability in the 9/11 Attacks."²³⁷ The court found that recognizing the DaB as an "agency or instrumentality" of the Taliban would require the court to recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, and that such authority to recognize governments is entrusted solely to the President.²³⁸ Plaintiffs have appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the case remains pending.²³⁹ The court heard oral arguments in October 2024.

Congressionally Mandated Use of Frozen Foreign Assets and Proceeds of Sanctions

Congress appears to have intended that frozen assets may be used to settle a foreign country's debts and claims of U.S. nationals after the national emergency has terminated.²⁴⁰ As described below, Congress has directed frozen assets be used, even during an ongoing national emergency, to pay certain court judgments against foreign states, and has recently enacted a framework for using Russian sovereign assets for reparations to Ukraine.

Compensation for U.S. Victims of Terrorism

The executive branch has historically resisted congressional efforts to vest foreign assets to pay U.S. claimants without first obtaining a settlement agreement with the country in question.²⁴¹ Congress has overcome such resistance in the case of foreign governments that have been designated as "State Supporters of Terrorism."²⁴² U.S. nationals who are victims of state-supported terrorism involving designated states have been able to sue those countries for damages under an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) since 1996.²⁴³

To facilitate the payment of judgments under the exception, Congress passed Section 117 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999,²⁴⁴ which further amended the FSIA by allowing attachment and execution against state property with respect to which financial transactions are prohibited or regulated under Section 5(b) TWEA, Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act (authorizing the trade embargo against Cuba), Sections 202 and 203 of IEEPA, or any orders, licenses or other authority issued under these statutes. Because of the Clinton Administration's continuing objections, however, Section 117 also gave the President authority to "waive the requirements of this section in the interest of national security," an authority President Clinton promptly exercised in signing the statute into law.²⁴⁵

The Section 117 waiver authority protecting blocked foreign government assets from attachment to satisfy terrorism judgments has continued in effect ever since, prompting Congress to take other actions to make frozen assets available to judgment holders. Congress enacted Section 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA)²⁴⁶ to mandate the payment from frozen Cuban assets of compensatory damages awarded against Cuba under the FSIA terrorism exception on or prior to July 20, 2000.

The Department of the Treasury subsequently vested $96.7 million in funds generated from long-distance telephone services between the United States and Cuba in order to compensate claimants in Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, the lawsuit based on the 1996 downing of two unarmed U.S. civilian airplanes by the Cuban air force.²⁴⁷ Another payment of more than $7 million was made using vested Cuban assets to a Florida woman who had won a lawsuit against Cuba based on her marriage to a Cuban spy.²⁴⁸

As unpaid judgments against designated state sponsors of terrorism continued to mount, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA).²⁴⁹ Section 201 of TRIA overrode long-standing objections by the executive branch to make the frozen assets of terrorist states available to satisfy judgments for compensatory damages against such states (and organizations and persons) as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in subsection (b), in every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune under section 1605A or 1605(a)(7) (as such section was in effect on January 27, 2008) of title 28, United States Code, the blocked assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable.²⁵⁰

Subsection (b) of Section 201 provided waiver authority "in the national security interest," but only with respect to frozen foreign government "property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations." When Congress amended the FSIA in 2008²⁵¹ to revamp the terrorism exception, it provided that judgments entered under the new exception could be satisfied out of the property of a foreign state notwithstanding the fact that the property in question is regulated by the United States government pursuant to TWEA or IEEPA.²⁵² Congress has also crafted legislation on occasion that makes specific assets available to satisfy specific judgments.²⁵³

Congress has also directed that the proceeds from certain sanctions violations be paid into a fund for providing compensation to the former hostages of Iran and terrorist state judgment creditors.²⁵⁴ To fund the program, Congress designated that certain real property and bank accounts owned by Iran and forfeited to the United States could go into the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund (Fund), along with the sum of $1,025,000,000, representing the amount paid to the United States pursuant to the June 27, 2014, plea agreement and settlement between the United States and BNP Paribas for sanctions violations.²⁵⁵ The Fund is replenished through criminal penalties and forfeitures for violations of IEEPA or TWEA-based regulations, or any related civil or criminal conspiracy, scheme, or other federal offense related to doing business or acting on behalf of a state sponsor of terrorism.²⁵⁶ Three-quarters of all civil penalties and forfeitures relating to the same offenses are also deposited into the Fund.²⁵⁷ Unless renewed, the Fund sunsets in 2039.²⁵⁸ One bill in the 119^th Congress, the American Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act (S. 706 and H.R. 1530), would direct approximately $1.912 billion corresponding to revenue from the Binance Holdings Limited plea agreement²⁵⁹ into the Fund.²⁶⁰ The bill would also amend the funding scheme to increase the portion of proceeds from qualifying civil forfeitures to be deposited into the Fund to 100 percent.²⁶¹

Russian Central Bank Assets and Oligarch Assets

Russia's 2022 large-scale invasion of Ukraine has led the executive branch to levy new sanctions against Russia, in addition to sanctions imposed for other reasons.²⁶² On April 24, 2024, President Biden signed into law the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity (REPO) for Ukrainians Act.²⁶³ The REPO for Ukrainians Act describes Russia as an aggressor state²⁶⁴ and provides authority for the U.S. government to confiscate previously frozen Russian sovereign assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction.²⁶⁵

The REPO for Ukrainians Act also establishes a framework for the transfer of such assets to Ukraine for reconstruction assistance and compensation for damages caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.²⁶⁶ The act further states that it is the sense of Congress that "any effort by the United States to confiscate and repurpose Russian sovereign assets should be undertaken alongside international allies and partners as part of a coordinated, multilateral effort."²⁶⁷ In effect, the act offers the President (and encourages international allies that support Ukraine to embrace) an alternative source of funds to help Ukraine. As of the date of this report, the U.S. government has not seized, transferred, or confiscated any Russian sovereign assets.²⁶⁸

The REPO for Ukrainians Act authorizes the President to seize, confiscate, transfer, liquidate or vest "any Russian aggressor state sovereign assets" subject to U.S. jurisdiction for the purpose of transferring such funds to a Ukraine Support Fund.²⁶⁹ The act describes three permissible uses of the Ukraine Support Fund by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID): (1) making contributions to an international body, fund, or mechanism established to administer compensation or provide assistance to Ukraine; (2) supporting Ukraine's "reconstruction, rebuilding, and recovery"; and (3) providing the people of Ukraine with "economic and humanitarian assistance."²⁷⁰ Funds in the Ukraine Support Fund may not be transferred or spent until the President certifies and transmits in writing to appropriate congressional committees a plan "to ensure transparency and accountability" for the use of such funds.²⁷¹ Authority to use the Ukraine Support Fund expires in five years or 120 days after the President certifies that certain conditions related to the cessation of hostilities and the provision of damages compensation to Ukraine are met, whichever is earlier.²⁷²

Separately, Congress in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, authorized the Attorney General to "transfer to the Secretary of State the proceeds of any covered forfeited property for use by the Secretary of State to provide assistance to Ukraine to remediate the harms of Russian aggression towards Ukraine."²⁷³ The provision appears to authorize forfeiture of property involved in certain sanctions violations as well as blocked property owned or controlled by a person designated under the specified executive orders pertaining to Russia, which is forfeitable under the identified statutes.²⁷⁴ The provision applies to forfeitures that occurred prior to May 1, 2025.²⁷⁵

International Law Implications of Seizing and Repurposing Frozen Assets

Some observers have debated whether confiscating Russian assets and transferring them to Ukraine as reparations for the invasion would violate international law.²⁷⁶ Proponents of the measure characterize it as a valid countermeasure supported by precedent,²⁷⁷ while others cautioned that confiscation of assets under these circumstances may pose risks to the financial system,²⁷⁸ may not fulfill criteria for a valid countermeasure under international law,²⁷⁹ and is not supported by relevant precedent.²⁸⁰ Historically, reparations have occurred pursuant to an international agreement such as a peace treaty,²⁸¹ the award of an international court,²⁸² or a UN Security Council resolution.²⁸³

In the REPO for Ukrainians Act, a sense of Congress provision expresses that the confiscation and repurposing of Russian sovereign assets, including the assets of agencies and instrumentalities of the Russian Federation,²⁸⁴ is consistent with international law.²⁸⁵ The act also includes a sense of Congress that, because Russia breached the prohibition on aggression under international law, the United States is legally entitled to take countermeasures to induce Russia to comply with its international obligations to cease its military invasion of Ukraine.²⁸⁶

Although not cited in the act, an argument in support of the sense of Congress may be found in the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).²⁸⁷ These articles, which are nonbinding, articulate principles that "seek to formulate ... the basic rules of international law concerning the responsibility of States for their internationally wrongful acts."²⁸⁸ Although the articles are not legally binding and do not themselves provide legal authority for taking any action, they are authoritative within the international legal community and may be cited by courts as evidence of international legal principles.²⁸⁹

The articles further describe countermeasures as otherwise internationally wrongful acts (not amounting to the use of armed force or violations of certain other international law norms) taken by an injured state in order to cause the responsible state to cease its wrongful conduct.²⁹⁰ The injured state is entitled to demand cessation of the breach of an international legal obligation, assurances of non-repetition, and reparations.²⁹¹ Countermeasures are limited to the temporary non-performance of an obligation toward the responsible state and must be reversible insofar as possible.²⁹² ARSIWA contemplate that third states (e.g., the United States) who are not themselves injured may take countermeasures to enforce a breached obligation that is owed to the international community as a whole, in order to "ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State."²⁹³ A comment accompanying the articles explains that the status of such an entitlement remains uncertain under international law.²⁹⁴ In addition, a state other than an injured state is entitled to demand cessation of the breach of international law, as well as demand performance of the obligation of reparation in the interest of the injured state.²⁹⁵

Judicial Interpretation of IEEPA

A number of lawsuits seeking to overturn actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have made their way through the judicial system, including challenges to the breadth of presidential authority and congressionally delegated authority, and challenges asserting violations of constitutional rights. Most of these challenges have failed, and the few challenges that succeeded did not seriously undermine the overarching statutory scheme for sanctions.

Dames & Moore v. Regan

The breadth of presidential power under IEEPA is illustrated by the Supreme Court's 1981 opinion in Dames & Moore v. Regan.²⁹⁶ In Dames & Moore, petitioners had challenged President Reagan's executive order ratifying previous executive orders that established regulations to further compliance with the terms of the Algiers Accords, which President Carter had entered into to end the hostage crisis with Iran,²⁹⁷ and suspending litigation against Iran.²⁹⁸ Under the Algiers Accords, the United States was obligated (1) to terminate all legal proceedings in U.S. courts involving claims of U.S. nationals against Iran, (2) to nullify all attachments and judgments, and (3) to resolve outstanding claims exclusively through binding arbitration in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT).²⁹⁹ President Carter, through executive orders, revoked all licenses that permitted the exercise of "any right, power, or privilege" with regard to Iranian funds, nullified all non-Iranian interests in assets acquired after a previous blocking order, and required banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be held or transferred as directed by the Secretary of the Treasury.³⁰⁰

Dames & Moore had sued Iran for breach of contract to recover compensation for work performed.³⁰¹ The district court had entered summary judgment in favor of Dames & Moore and issued an order attaching certain Iranian assets for satisfaction of any judgment that might result,³⁰² but stayed the case pending appeal.³⁰³ The executive orders and regulations implementing the Algiers Accords resulted in the nullification of this prejudgment attachment and the dismissal of the case against Iran, directing that it be filed at the IUSCT.

In response, Dames & Moore sued the government. The plaintiff claimed that the President and the Secretary of the Treasury exceeded their statutory and constitutional powers to the extent they adversely affected Dames & Moore's judgment against Iran, the execution of that judgment, the prejudgment attachments, and the plaintiff's ability to continue litigation against the Iranian banks.³⁰⁴

The government defended its actions, relying largely on IEEPA, which provided explicit support for most of the measures taken—nullification of the prejudgment attachment and transfer of the property to Iran—but could not be read to authorize actions affecting the suspension of claims in U.S. courts. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority:

Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA … directly authorizes the President's suspension of claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor of Congress' legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the President is acting alone or at least with the acceptance of Congress. As we have noted, Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might act. Such failure of Congress specifically to delegate authority does not, "especially ... in the areas of foreign policy and national security," imply "congressional disapproval" of action taken by the Executive. On the contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the President's authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion may be considered to "invite" "measures on independent presidential responsibility." At least this is so where there is no contrary indication of legislative intent and when, as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President.³⁰⁵

The Court remarked that Congress's implicit approval of the long-standing presidential practice of settling international claims by executive agreement was critical to its holding that the challenged actions were not in conflict with acts of Congress.³⁰⁶ For support, the Court cited Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,³⁰⁷ which stated that "a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned … may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power' vested in the President by §1 of Art. II."³⁰⁸ Consequently, it may be argued that Congress's exclusion of certain express powers in IEEPA do not necessarily preclude the President from exercising them, at least where a court finds sufficient precedent exists.

Lower courts have examined IEEPA under a number of other constitutional doctrines.

Separation of Powers—Non-Delegation Doctrine

Courts have reviewed whether IEEPA violated the non-delegation principle of separation of powers by delegating too much power to the President to legislate, in particular by creating new crimes.³⁰⁹ These challenges have generally failed.³¹⁰ As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained while evaluating IEEPA, delegations of congressional authority are constitutional so long as Congress provides through a legislative act an "intelligible principle" governing the exercise of the delegated authority.³¹¹ Even if the standards are higher for delegations of authority to define criminal offenses, the court held, IEEPA provides sufficient guidance.³¹² The court stated

The IEEPA "meaningfully constrains the [President's] discretion," by requiring that "[t]he authorities granted to the President ... may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared." And the authorities delegated are defined and limited.³¹³

The Second Circuit found it significant that "IEEPA relates to foreign affairs—an area in which the President has greater discretion,"³¹⁴ bolstering its view that IEEPA does not violate the non-delegation doctrine.

In ongoing litigation regarding tariffs imposed under IEEPA, the Court of International Trade has described the nondelegation doctrine as a "useful tool[] for the court to interpret [IEEPA] so as to avoid constitutional problems."³¹⁵ The court did not strike down any part of IEEPA but ruled that the statute did not authorize certain "worldwide" tariffs, reasoning that IEEPA cannot allow the President "to impose whatever tariff rates he deems desirable" without "creat[ing] an unconstitutional delegation of power."³¹⁶ The court's order is currently stayed (paused) pending appeal.³¹⁷

Conversely, plaintiffs have had little success challenging IEEPA sanctions where Congress has imposed limitations on the President's authority. The Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to the then-existing Iraq travel ban based on the claim that the ban imposed an indirect restriction on the provision of medical supplies in violation of IEEPA.³¹⁸ In a case where plaintiffs sought injunctive relief from the imposition of sanctions by arguing that the President's authority did not extend to imposing sanctions involving medical supplies and humanitarian aid for Iran, the district court dismissed the claim in part because the statutory restrictions on such sanctions do not create a private right of action.³¹⁹

Separation of Powers—Legislative Veto

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Section 207(b) of IEEPA is an unconstitutional legislative veto. That provision states

The authorities described in subsection (a)(1) may not continue to be exercised under this section if the national emergency is terminated by the Congress by concurrent resolution pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act [50 U.S.C. §1622] and if the Congress specifies in such concurrent resolution that such authorities may not continue to be exercised under this section.³²⁰

In United States v. Romero-Fernandez, two defendants convicted of violating the terms of an executive order issued under IEEPA argued on appeal that IEEPA was unconstitutional, in part, because of the above provision. The Eleventh Circuit accepted that the provision was an unconstitutional legislative veto (as conceded by the government) based on INS v. Chadha,³²¹ in which the Supreme Court held that Congress cannot void the exercise of power by the executive branch through concurrent resolution, but can act only through bicameral passage followed by presentment of the law to the President.³²² The Eleventh Circuit nevertheless upheld the defendants' convictions for violations of IEEPA regulations,³²³ holding that the legislative veto provision was severable from the rest of the statute.³²⁴

Fifth Amendment Takings Clause

Courts have also addressed whether certain actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have effected an uncompensated taking of property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause prohibits "private property [from being] taken for public use, without just compensation."³²⁵ The Fifth Amendment's prohibitions apply as well to regulatory takings, in which the government does not physically take property but instead imposes restrictions on the right of enjoyment that decreases the value of the property or right therein.³²⁶

The Supreme Court has held that the nullification of prejudgment attachments pursuant to regulations issued under IEEPA was not an uncompensated taking, suggesting that the reason for this position was the contingent nature of the licenses that had authorized the attachments.³²⁷ The Court also suggested that the broader purpose of the statute supported the view that there was no uncompensated taking:

This Court has previously recognized that the congressional purpose in authorizing blocking orders is "to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President.... " Such orders permit the President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency. The frozen assets serve as a "bargaining chip" to be used by the President when dealing with a hostile country. Accordingly, it is difficult to accept petitioner's argument because the practical effect of it is to allow individual claimants throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate this "bargaining chip" through attachments, garnishments, or similar encumbrances on property. Neither the purpose the statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language supports such a result.³²⁸

Similarly, a lower court held that the extinguishment of contractual rights due to sanctions enacted pursuant to IEEPA does not amount to a regulatory taking requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment.³²⁹ Even though the plaintiff suffered "obvious economic loss" due to the sanctions regulations, the court found that that factor alone was not enough to sustain plaintiff's claim of a compensable taking.³³⁰ The court quoted long-standing Supreme Court precedent to support its finding:

A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring upon individuals great losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless. They may destroy the worth of contracts. But whoever supposed that, because of this, a tariff could not be changed, or a non-intercourse act, or an embargo be enacted, or a war be declared? ... [W]as it ever imagined this was taking private property without compensation or without due process of law?³³¹

Accordingly, it seems unlikely that entities whose business interests are harmed by the imposition of sanctions pursuant to IEEPA will be entitled to compensation from the government for their losses.

Persons whose assets have been directly blocked by the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) pursuant to IEEPA have likewise found little success challenging the loss of the use of their assets as uncompensated takings.³³² Many courts have recognized that a temporary blocking of assets does not constitute a taking because it is a temporary action that does not vest title in the United States.³³³ This conclusion is apparently so even if the blocking of assets necessitates the closing altogether of a business enterprise.³³⁴ In some circumstances, however, a court may analyze at least the initial blocking of assets under a Fourth Amendment standard for seizure.³³⁵ One court found a blocking to be unreasonable under a Fourth Amendment standard where there was no reason that OFAC could not have first obtained a judicial warrant.³³⁶

Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause

Some persons whose assets have been blocked have asserted that their right to due process has been violated. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.³³⁷ Where one company protested that the blocking of its assets without a pre-deprivation hearing violated its right to due process, a district court found that a temporary deprivation of property does not necessarily give rise to a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.³³⁸ A second district court stated that the exigencies of national security and foreign policy considerations that are implicated in IEEPA cases have meant that OFAC historically has not provided pre-deprivation notice in sanctions programs.³³⁹ A third district court stated that OFAC's failure to provide a charitable foundation with notice or a hearing prior to its designation as a terrorist organization and blocking of its assets did not violate its right to procedural due process, because the OFAC designation and blocking order serve the important governmental interest of combating terrorism by curtailing the flow of terrorist financing.³⁴⁰ That same court also held that prompt action by the government was necessary to protect against the transfer of assets subject to the blocking order.³⁴¹

In Al Haramain Islamic Foundation v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether OFAC's use of classified information without any disclosure of its content in its decision to freeze the assets of a charitable organization, and its failure to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, violated the organization's right to procedural due process.³⁴² The court applied the balancing test set forth by the Supreme Court in its landmark case Mathews v. Eldridge³⁴³ to resolve these questions.³⁴⁴ Under the Eldridge test, to determine if an individual has received constitutional due process, courts must weigh

(1) [the person's or entity's] private property interest,

(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, as well as the value of additional safeguards, and

(3) the Government's interest in maintaining its procedures, including the burdens of additional procedural requirements.³⁴⁵

While weighing the interests and risks at issue in Al Haramain, the Ninth Circuit found the organization's property interest to be significant:

By design, a designation by OFAC completely shutters all domestic operations of an entity. All assets are frozen. No person or organization may conduct any business whatsoever with the entity, other than a very narrow category of actions such as legal defense. Civil penalties attach even for unwitting violations. Criminal penalties, including up to 20 years' imprisonment, attach for willful violations. For domestic organizations such as AHIF–Oregon, a designation means that it conducts no business at all. The designation is indefinite. Although an entity can seek administrative reconsideration and limited judicial relief, those remedies take considerable time, as evidenced by OFAC's long administrative delay in this case and the ordinary delays inherent in our judicial system. In sum, designation is not a mere inconvenience or burden on certain property interests; designation indefinitely renders a domestic organization financially defunct.³⁴⁶

Nevertheless, the court found "the government's interest in national security [could not] be understated."³⁴⁷ In evaluating the government's interest in maintaining its procedures, the Ninth Circuit explained that the Constitution requires that the government "take reasonable measures to ensure basic fairness to the private party and that the government follow procedures reasonably designed to protect against erroneous deprivation of the private party's interests."³⁴⁸ While the Ninth Circuit had previously held that the use of undisclosed information in a case involving the exclusion of certain longtime resident aliens should be considered presumptively unconstitutional,³⁴⁹ the court found that the presumption had been overcome in this case.³⁵⁰ The Ninth Circuit noted that all federal courts that have considered the argument that OFAC may not use undisclosed classified information in making its determinations have rejected it.³⁵¹ Although the court found that OFAC's failure to provide even an unclassified summary of the information at issue was a violation of the organization's due process rights,³⁵² the court deemed the error harmless because it would not likely have affected the outcome of the case.³⁵³

In the same case, the Ninth Circuit also considered the organization's argument that it had been denied adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.³⁵⁴ Specifically, the organization asserted that OFAC had refused to disclose its reasons for investigating and designating the organization, leaving it unable to respond adequately to OFAC's unknown suspicions.³⁵⁵ Because OFAC had provided the organization with only one document to support its designation over the four-year period between the freezing of its assets and its redesignation as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT), the court agreed that OFAC had deprived the organization's procedural due process rights.³⁵⁶ However, the court found that this error too was harmless.³⁵⁷

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that a foreign individual could not challenge his designation as a specially designated national under IEEPA on due process grounds because he had not established a sufficient connection with the United States to warrant constitutional protections.³⁵⁸ The court acknowledged that the D.C. Circuit has not articulated a specific test for determining whether a foreign national residing outside the United States maintains the requisite "substantial connections" to avail himself of due process rights.³⁵⁹ The court held that, irrespective of the proper test, the individual had failed to meet the requisite constitutional standard because he "ha[d] not established any connection to the United States, let alone a substantial one."³⁶⁰ The court held that the foreign national retained the right to procedural review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).³⁶¹

First Amendment Challenges

Some courts have considered whether asset blocking or penalties imposed pursuant to regulations promulgated under IEEPA have violated the subjects' First Amendment rights to free association, free speech, or religion. Challenges on these grounds have typically failed.³⁶² Courts have held that there is no First Amendment right to support terrorists.³⁶³ The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit distinguished advocacy from financial support and held that the blocking of assets affected only the ability to provide financial support, but did not implicate the organization's freedom of association.³⁶⁴ Similarly, a district court interpreted relevant case law to hold that government actions prohibiting charitable contributions are subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, a higher standard that typically applies to regulations implicating political contributions.³⁶⁵

With respect to a free speech challenge brought by a charitable organization whose assets were temporarily blocked during the pendency of an investigation, a district court explained that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important government interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."³⁶⁶ Accordingly, the district court applied the following test to determine whether the designations and blocking actions were lawful. Citing the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. O'Brien, the court stated that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if

(1) it is within the constitutional power of the government;

(2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;

(3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and

(4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.³⁶⁷

The court found the government's actions fell within the bounds of this test:

First, the President clearly had the power to issue the Executive Order. Second, the Executive Order promotes an important and substantial government interest—that of preventing terrorist attacks. Third, the government's action is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; it prohibits the provision of financial and other support to terrorists. Fourth, the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are no greater than necessary.³⁶⁸

With respect to an organization that was not itself designated as an SDGT but wished to conduct coordinated advocacy with another organization that was so designated, one appellate court found that an OFAC regulation barring such coordinated advocacy based on its content was subject to strict scrutiny.³⁶⁹ The court rejected the government's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project³⁷⁰ to find that the regulation impermissibly implicated the organization's right to free speech.³⁷¹ Accordingly, there may be some circumstances where the First Amendment protects speech coordinated with (but not on behalf of) an organization designated as an SDGT.

First Amendment—Informational Materials and Communications Exception under IEEPA

Although caselaw is sparse, it appears that criminal defendants have had little success asserting a defense that their conduct amounted to conduct under the provision of informational materials or protected communications exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected a claim that OFAC's regulation, which exempts informational materials that were "not fully created and in existence at the date of the transactions" from the scope of the statutory exception for informational materials, was ultra vires.³⁷² The Third Circuit upheld the defendant's conviction for violating Iran sanctions regulations by marketing a dynamic chemical engineering software program to various Iranian entities.³⁷³ A district court validated an indictment for IEEPA violations against a defendant who spoke at a conference in the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK) involving cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies.³⁷⁴ The court held that the jury could decide if the speech was part of a long-term conspiracy to persuade and assist the DPRK in using cryptocurrency services in an effort to avoid U.S. sanctions and launder money.³⁷⁵ Another court upheld regulations that provided that software does not qualify as excepted "information and informational materials" if it is subject to export controls.³⁷⁶ Likewise, source code was held not entitled to protection insofar as it was used to conduct cryptocurrency transactions.³⁷⁷

Civil litigants have had some success challenging IEEPA regulations that effectively shut down communications platforms altogether. On May 15, 2019, President Donald J. Trump, finding "that the unrestricted acquisition or use in the United States of information and communications technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries" constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, declared a national emergency under the authority of the NEA and invoked authorities granted by IEEPA.³⁷⁸

A little more than a year later, on August 6, 2020, President Trump issued two executive orders under that same national emergency to address "the spread in the United States of mobile applications developed and owned by companies in [China]."³⁷⁹ The executive orders applied to the video sharing platform TikTok³⁸⁰ and the communications platform WeChat, among others,³⁸¹ and prohibited certain transactions, as identified by the Secretary of Commerce, with ByteDance Ltd., TikTok's owner, and Tencent Holdings Ltd., WeChat's owner.³⁸²

After the Trump Administration issued regulations barring transactions involving the TikTok and WeChat communications applications (apps) in the United States, users of TikTok and WeChat challenged the executive orders and the Commerce Department memorandums implementing them on constitutional and statutory grounds. Specifically, in two separate cases, litigants argued that the orders and memorandums violated their First Amendment right to free speech and violated the IEEPA restriction on regulating transactions of informational materials.³⁸³ TikTok also brought a separate suit to enjoin the restrictions.³⁸⁴

In the first case, Marland v. Trump, plaintiffs, users of the video-sharing application TikTok, challenged the Commerce Department's memorandum that identified six prohibited transactions under E.O. 13942.³⁸⁵ The Commerce TikTok Identification specified that it bans only business-to-business transactions and does not apply to exchanges of business or personal information among TikTok users.³⁸⁶ An earlier Commerce Department memorandum noted that the effect of the prohibitions, most of which were scheduled to apply on November 12, 2020, would be to "significantly reduce the functionality and usability of the app in the United States," and that "these prohibitions may ultimately make the application less effective and may be challenging for U.S.-based TikTok users."³⁸⁷

The plaintiffs contended that the Commerce Identification violated the First and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the APA.³⁸⁸ The district court declined to address the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenges and certain other claims, and considered instead their claim that the Commerce TikTok Identification was an ultra vires exercise of agency authority under the APA because it violates IEEPA's "informational material" exception as well as the exception for "personal communication[s] ... not involv[ing] a transfer of anything of value."³⁸⁹ The court employed a textual interpretation of IEEPA's informational material bar to find that the short-format videos exchanged via TikTok clearly fell into IEEPA's nonexhaustive exemplary list of informational materials protected from regulation or prohibition because they are "analogous to the 'films,' 'artworks,' 'photographs,' and 'news wire feeds' expressly protected under §1702(b)(3)."³⁹⁰

The court next determined that the Commerce TikTok Identification, even though it did not directly ban TikTok users from communicating via TikTok, amounted, at minimum, to an indirect regulation of such communications by making them impossible to carry out.³⁹¹ The government sought to characterize the burden on TikTok users as merely incidental to the Commerce Identification's intended objective of prohibiting TikTok's commercial transactions, and that any incidental burden cannot violated IEEPA.³⁹² The court, pointing to legislative history of the Berman Amendments, rejected the government's contention that the object of the regulation must itself involve transactions of informational material to be in violation of IEEPA's informational material exception.³⁹³ The court observed, "[t]he Government's suggested reading ignores Congress's deliberate insertion of the word 'indirectly' into IEEPA."³⁹⁴ While the court accepted the notion that some burdens on transactions involving informational materials might be so tangential as to survive review, it declared that this case "does not present a line-drawing problem" between indirect regulation and tangential effects.³⁹⁵

In the next case, TikTok and its Beijing-based parent company ByteDance sued to enjoin the Commerce TikTok Identification prohibitions and were initially granted a nationwide preliminary injunction on the first of the prohibitions, which involved availability of the video-sharing app in app stores.³⁹⁶ The district court determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the prohibition contravened the informational material exception.³⁹⁷ The court explained that the content users share through TikTok falls into the category of informational materials because it "appears to be (or to be analogous to) 'publications, films, ... photographs, ... artworks, ... and news wire feeds.'"³⁹⁸ Like the court in Marland, the district court in TikTok Inc. rejected the government's contention that the prohibition involved only business-to-business transactions based on the finding that the "purpose and effect" of the prohibition on U.S. users was "to limit, and ultimately reduce to zero, the number of U.S. users who can comment on the platform and have their personal data on TikTok."³⁹⁹ The court also found it implausible that information exchanged on TikTok would fall within a carve-out to the informational materials exception under the Espionage Act for "shar[ing] U.S. defense secrets ... with foreign adversaries."⁴⁰⁰

The IEEPA exception also covers "personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of value."⁴⁰¹ The government in TikTok argued that, even if personal communications shared over TikTok have no economic value to the creators and recipients, such communications nevertheless have an economic value to the platform as a whole.⁴⁰² The district court rejected this argument, stating "such an expansive reading of the phrase 'anything of value' would write the personal-communications limitation out of the statute."⁴⁰³ The court reasoned that, "[a]ll communication service providers—from televisions stations and publishers to cellular phone carriers—get some value from a user's 'presence on' their platform."⁴⁰⁴

The third case stems from the Commerce Secretary's issuance of "Identification of Prohibited Transactions to Implement Executive Order 13943 and Address the Threat Posed by WeChat and the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," identifying the prohibited transactions (Commerce WeChat Identification).⁴⁰⁵ The Commerce WeChat Identification further clarified that these prohibitions "only apply to the parties to business-to-business transactions" and did not apply to "[t]he exchange between or among WeChat mobile application users of personal or business information using the WeChat mobile application, to include the transferring and receiving of funds," among other things.⁴⁰⁶ The U.S. users of the messaging, social-media, and mobile-payment app WeChat sued to challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order 13943 on First Amendment and Fifth Amendment grounds, as well its compliance with the IEEPA exception precluding regulation of personal communications.⁴⁰⁷ The government did not contest that the prohibitions would result in shutting down WeChat for users as a platform for the exchange of information.⁴⁰⁸

Addressing the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge, the district court agreed that the plaintiffs established a strong showing that the WeChat ban unlawfully foreclosed "an entire medium of public expression" or amounted to an unlawful prior restraint of their communications.⁴⁰⁹ The court concluded that Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking WeChat users in the United States do not have any other viable means of communicating electronically, "not only because China bans other apps, but also because Chinese speakers with limited English proficiency have no options other than WeChat."⁴¹⁰ The court suggested, without deciding, that the WeChat ban could receive heightened First Amendment strict scrutiny if decided on the merits.⁴¹¹ With regard to intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their First Amendment challenge. An intermediate form of scrutiny is normally reserved for restrictions on the "time, place, or manner," and a time, place, or manner restriction survives such scrutiny if it "(1) is narrowly tailored, (2) serves a significant governmental interest unrelated to the content of the speech, and (3) leaves open adequate channels for communication."⁴¹² The court agreed that the government's national security interest in preventing WeChat (and China) collection of data from U.S. users is significant, but that the "effective ban" did not advance that interest in a narrowly tailored way given the "obvious alternatives to a complete ban, such as barring WeChat from government devices" or enhancing data security.⁴¹³ The court concluded that "[o]n this limited record, the prohibited transactions burden substantially more speech than is necessary to serve the government's significant interest in national security, especially given the lack of substitute channels for communication."⁴¹⁴

The court further determined that the immediate shutdown of WeChat would cause irreparable harm to the plaintiffs by eliminating their platform for communication.⁴¹⁵ In assessing the balance of equities and the public interest (elements that merge where the government is a party),⁴¹⁶ the court found that the balance of equities tipped in plaintiffs' favor and the public interest favored protecting the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.⁴¹⁷ The court framed the government's contention that an injunction would "frustrate and displace the President's determination of how best to address threats to national security"⁴¹⁸ as important, but deemed the evidence of the threat posed specifically by WeChat to be only modest, noting that the wholesale shutdown of WeChat burdens more speech than necessary to serve the government's national security and foreign policy interests.⁴¹⁹ Accordingly, the court entered a preliminary nationwide injunction of the Commerce WeChat Identification.⁴²⁰

All three courts adjudicating these disputes issued preliminary injunctions, and the government appealed each decision.⁴²¹ The Biden Administration initially sought to pause the litigation while it reviewed U.S.-China policy and the effective social media platform bans.⁴²² President Biden subsequently issued an executive order rescinding the relevant executive orders and the Commerce Department's implementing memorandums,⁴²³ making the litigation moot.⁴²⁴ The original underlying executive order related to the information and communications technology and services supply chain,⁴²⁵ however, remains intact with elaborations set forth in Executive Order 14034. In April 2024, Congress enacted the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACAA).⁴²⁶ The PAFACAA makes it unlawful for certain entities to "distribute, maintain, or update ... a foreign adversary controlled application" in the United States unless the covered application's owners execute a "qualified divestiture" within a specified timeframe.⁴²⁷

Use of IEEPA to Continue Enforcing the Export Administration Act (EAA)

Until the enactment of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018,⁴²⁸ export of dual use goods and services was regulated pursuant to the authority of the Export Administration Act,⁴²⁹ which was subject to periodic expiry and reauthorization. President Reagan was the first President to use IEEPA as a vehicle for continuing the enforcement of the EAA's export controls.⁴³⁰

After Congress did not extend the expired EAA, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12444 in 1983, finding that "unrestricted access of foreign parties to United States commercial goods, technology, and technical data and the existence of certain boycott practices of foreign nations constitute, in light of the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security."⁴³¹ Although the EAA had been reauthorized for short periods since its initial expiration in 1983, every subsequent President utilized the authorities granted under IEEPA to maintain the existing system of export controls during periods of lapse.

In the latest iteration, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13222 in 2001, finding the existence of a national emergency with respect to the expiration of the EAA and directing—pursuant to the authorities allocated under IEEPA—that "the provisions for administration of the [EAA] shall be carried out under this order so as to continue in full force and effect … the export control system heretofore maintained."⁴³² Presidents Obama and Trump annually extended the 2001 executive order.⁴³³

Courts have generally treated this arrangement as authorized by Congress,⁴³⁴ although certain provisions of the EAA in effect under IEEPA have led to challenges. The determining factor appears to be whether IEEPA itself provides the President the authority to carry out the challenged action. In one case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a conviction for an attempt to violate the regulations even though the EAA had expired and did not expressly criminalize such attempts.⁴³⁵ The circuit court rejected the defendants' argument that the President had exceeded his delegated authority under the EEA by "enlarging" the crimes punishable under the regulations.⁴³⁶

Nevertheless, a district court held that the conspiracy provisions of the EAA regulations were rendered inoperative by the lapse of the EAA and "could not be repromulgated by executive order under the general powers that IEEPA vests in the President."⁴³⁷ The district court found that, even if Congress intended to preserve the operation of the EAA through IEEPA, that intent was limited by the scope of the statutes' substantive coverage at the time of IEEPA's enactment, when no conspiracy provision existed in either statute.⁴³⁸

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the application of the EAA as a statute permitting the government to withhold information under exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),⁴³⁹ which exempts from disclosure information exempted from disclosure by statute, even though the EAA had expired.⁴⁴⁰ Referring to legislative history it interpreted as congressional approval of the use of IEEPA to continue the EAA provisions during periods of lapse, the court stated

Although the legislative history does not refer to the EAA's confidentiality provision, it does evince Congress's intent to authorize the President to preserve the operation of the export regulations promulgated under the EAA. Moreover, it is significant for purposes of determining legislative intent that Congress acted with the knowledge that the EAA's export regulations had long provided for confidentiality and that the President's ongoing practice of extending the EAA by executive order had always included these confidentiality protections.⁴⁴¹

The D.C. Circuit distinguished this holding in a later case involving appellate jurisdiction over a decision by the Department of Commerce to apply sanctions for a company's violation of the EAA regulations.⁴⁴² Pursuant to the regulations and under the direction of the Commerce Department, the company sought judicial review directly in the D.C. Circuit.⁴⁴³ The D.C. Circuit, however, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction:

This court would have jurisdiction pursuant to the President's order only if the President has the authority to confer jurisdiction—an authority that, if it exists, must derive from either the Executive's inherent power under the Constitution or a permissible delegation of power from Congress. The former is unavailing, as the Constitution vests the power to confer jurisdiction in Congress alone. Whether the executive order can provide the basis of our jurisdiction, then, turns on whether the President can confer jurisdiction on this court under the auspices of IEEPA…. We conclude that the President lacks that power. Nothing in the text of IEEPA delegates to the President the authority to grant jurisdiction to any federal court.⁴⁴⁴

Consequently, the appeal of the agency decision was determined to belong in the district court according to the default rule under the APA.⁴⁴⁵

Use of IEEPA to Regulate Cryptocurrency

The utility of cryptocurrency for terrorist fundraising and sanctions evasions makes it a prime concern with respect to sanctions enforcement.⁴⁴⁶ The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held in Van Loon v. Department of the Treasury⁴⁴⁷ that "smart contracts"—applications that self-execute when participants meet some predetermined set of criteria⁴⁴⁸—are not "property" subject to regulation under IEEPA because they are incapable of being owned,⁴⁴⁹ even considering the expansive definition of property in the relevant regulations.⁴⁵⁰ OFAC had designated the automatic crypto-mixer Tornado Cash pursuant to E.O. 13964,⁴⁵¹ placing it onto the Specially Designated Nationals List and prohibiting transactions in all property and interests in property belonging to Tornado Cash.⁴⁵² OFAC designated Tornado Cash due to the mixing protocol's assisting malicious cyber actors, such as a North Korea-linked hacking group, to launder the proceeds of cybercrimes.⁴⁵³

Six users of Tornado Cash brought a lawsuit against OFAC, arguing the designation exceeded its statutory authority by imposing sanctions on self-executing software that does not constitute an interest in property held by a foreign person.⁴⁵⁴ The district judge issued a summary judgment in favor of OFAC, finding that Tornado Cash is an entity with a property interest in the smart contracts, which it found to be contracts under the regulation.⁴⁵⁵ The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the immutable nature of the contracts require "[a]n agreement between two or more parties," while immutable smart contracts have only one party.⁴⁵⁶ Tornado Cash, the court observed, does not have control over or own the smart contracts.⁴⁵⁷ Likewise, the court found, the smart contracts are "less like a 'service' and more like a tool that is used in performing a service."⁴⁵⁸

The Fifth Circuit suggested Congress consider updating IEEPA to target modern technologies like crypto-mixing software, but stated that until that happens, Tornado Cash's immutable smart contracts will not be deemed the "property" of a foreign national or entity, leaving them exempt from blocking under IEEPA.⁴⁵⁹

Issues and Options for Congress

Congress may address a number of issues with respect to IEEPA; four are addressed here. The first pertains to the use of IEEPA to impose tariffs. The second pertains to how Congress has delegated its authority under IEEPA and its umbrella statute, the NEA. The third pertains to the termination of national emergencies invoking IEEPA. The fourth pertains to choices made in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018.

The Use of IEEPA to Impose Tariffs

Prior to 2025, no President had used IEEPA to impose tariffs.⁴⁶⁰ Beginning in February 2025, President Trump cited IEEPA as his authority to impose tariffs on a variety of trading partners to deal with six distinct national emergencies.⁴⁶¹ These emergency measures included tariffs on Canada,⁴⁶² Mexico,⁴⁶³ and China⁴⁶⁴ to deal with fentanyl trafficking, potential tariffs on countries importing Venezuelan oil,⁴⁶⁵ tariffs on the imports from most other countries to deal with the "persistent annual United States goods trade deficits,"⁴⁶⁶ and tariffs on Brazil to deal with "violat[ions of] the free expression rights of United States persons."⁴⁶⁷

Several Members of Congress have expressed concern with using IEEPA to impose tariffs. Between February 1, 2025, and September 1, 2025, Members of Congress introduced six joint resolutions to terminate national emergencies that had been declared to impose tariffs (Table A-2) and have introduced bills that would restrict the President's authority to impose tariffs using IEEPA.⁴⁶⁸

Several parties have also filed lawsuits challenging these tariffs.⁴⁶⁹ In May 2025, the U.S. Court of International Trade found that several of the tariff actions were not authorized under IEEPA, while the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose any tariffs.⁴⁷⁰ The government has appealed these decisions, respectively, to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.⁴⁷¹ In August, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the U.S. Court of International Trade's opinion, holding that the tariffs imposed on Mexico, Canada, and China with respect to trafficking and on many other trading partners with respect to the U.S. trade balance "exceed the authority delegated to the President by IEEPA's text."⁴⁷² The Trump Administration appealed the decision and the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari with respect to both cases.⁴⁷³

Delegation of Authority under IEEPA

Although the stated aim of the drafters of the NEA and IEEPA was to restrain the use of emergency powers, the use of such powers has expanded by several measures. Presidents declare national emergencies and renew them for years or even decades. The limitation of IEEPA to transactions involving some foreign interest was intended to limit IEEPA's domestic application. However, globalization has eroded that limit, as few transactions today do not involve some foreign interest. Many of the other criticisms of TWEA that IEEPA was supposed to address—consultation, time limits, congressional review, scope of power, and logical relationship to the emergency declared—are criticisms that scholars levy against IEEPA today.⁴⁷⁴ TWEA came under criticism because the first national emergency declared pursuant to its authority had been ongoing for 41 years.⁴⁷⁵ In 2025, the first emergency declared pursuant to authority under IEEPA, the emergency with Iran declared in November 1979, is logging its forty-sixth year.

In general, four criticisms are levied by scholars with respect to the structure of the NEA and IEEPA that may be of interest to Congress. First, the NEA and IEEPA do not define the phrases "national emergency" and "unusual and extraordinary threat," and Presidents have interpreted these terms broadly. Second, the scope of presidential authority under IEEPA has become less constrained in a highly globalized era. Third, owing to rulings by the Supreme Court and amendments to the NEA, Congress must have a two-thirds majority rather than a simple majority to terminate a national emergency without presidential consent. Fourth, the structure of the U.S. sanctions regime and its reliance on IEEPA has created emergencies that do not end. Despite these criticisms, Congress has never terminated an emergency declaration invoking IEEPA.⁴⁷⁶ This absence of any explicit statement of disapproval, coupled with explicit statements of approval in some instances, may indicate congressional approval of presidential use of IEEPA thus far. Arguably, then, IEEPA could be seen as an effective tool for carrying out the will of Congress.

Definition of "National Emergency" and "Unusual and Extraordinary Threat"

Neither the NEA nor IEEPA define what constitutes a "national emergency."⁴⁷⁷ IEEPA conditions its invocation in a declaration on its necessity for dealing with an "unusual and extraordinary threat … to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States."⁴⁷⁸ In the markup of IEEPA in the House, Fred Bergsten, then-Assistant Secretary for International Affairs in the Department of the Treasury, praised the requirement that a national emergency for the purposes of IEEPA be "based on an unusual and extraordinary threat" because such language "emphasizes that such powers should be available only in true emergencies."⁴⁷⁹ Because "unusual" and "extraordinary" are also undefined, the usual and ordinary invocation of the statute seems to conflict with those statutory conditions.

If Congress wanted to refine the meaning of "national emergency" or "unusual and extraordinary threat," it could do so through statute. Additionally, Congress could consider requiring some sort of factual finding by a court prior to, or shortly after, the exercise of any authority, such as under the First Militia Act of 1792⁴⁸⁰ or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.⁴⁸¹ Congress could also require some sort of congressional action to make use of IEEPA authority beyond a certain period (See "Amending the NEA to Require Joint Resolutions of Approval" below). Alternatively, Congress may consider that the ambiguity in the existing statute provides the executive with the flexibility necessary to address national emergencies with the requisite dispatch.

Scope of the Authority

While IEEPA nominally applies only to foreign transactions, the breadth of the phrase, "any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof" leaves a great deal of room for executive discretion. The interconnectedness of the modern global economy has left few major transactions in which a foreign interest is not involved.⁴⁸² As a result, at least one scholar has concluded, "the exemption of purely domestic transactions from the President's transaction controls seems to be a limitation without substance."⁴⁸³

Presidents have used IEEPA since the 1980s to control exports by maintaining the dual-use export control system, enshrined in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) in times when its underlying authorization, the Export Administration Act, periodically expired. During those times when Congress did not reauthorize the EAA, Presidents have declared emergencies to maintain the dual-use export control system.⁴⁸⁴ The current emergency has been ongoing since 2001.⁴⁸⁵

While Presidents have used IEEPA to implement trade restrictions against adversaries, until 2025 it was not used to impose tariffs.⁴⁸⁶ As noted above, the U.S. government cited TWEA after the fact as legal authority for a 10% ad valorem tariff that President Nixon had imposed on goods entering the United States to avoid a balance of payments crisis after he ended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold. Although some legal scholars criticized this use of TWEA,⁴⁸⁷ the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals upheld President Nixon's actions⁴⁸⁸ and Congress maintained the language that the U.S. government relied upon in nearly identical form in the subsequent reforms resulting in the enactment of IEEPA.⁴⁸⁹ In the 116^th, 117^th, 118^th, and 119^th Congresses, bills were introduced that would limit the President's authority to use IEEPA to impose tariffs.⁴⁹⁰

The scope of powers over individual targets is also extensive. Under IEEPA, the President has the power to prohibit all financial transactions with individuals designated by executive order. Such power allows the President to block all the assets of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident.⁴⁹¹

Such uses of IEEPA may reflect the will of Congress or they may represent a grant of authority that may have gone beyond what Congress originally intended.

Amending the NEA to Require Joint Resolutions of Approval

The heart of the curtailment of presidential power by the NEA and IEEPA was the provision that Congress could terminate a state of emergency declared pursuant to the NEA with a concurrent resolution. When the "legislative veto" was struck down by the Supreme Court (see above), it left Congress with a steeper climb—presumably requiring passage of a veto-proof joint resolution—to terminate a national emergency declared under the NEA.⁴⁹² To date, no national emergency declared under the NEA has been terminated without presidential consent.

Since 2019, Members of Congress have introduced several bills that would amend the NEA to place new limits on the exercise of emergency authorities. The most common strategy has been to require a joint resolution of approval. In the 116^th, 117^th, and 118^th Congresses, bills were introduced to require a joint resolution of approval for an emergency to extend beyond a certain number of days.⁴⁹³ The National Security Powers Act of 2021, for example, would have required that Congress pass a joint resolution approving of a national emergency within 30 days.⁴⁹⁴

The NEA, IEEPA, and "Never Ending Emergencies"

Some Members of Congress, scholars, and civil society organizations have criticized the NEA for producing "never ending emergencies."⁴⁹⁵ The average length of an emergency declared under the NEA is more than nine years, with one emergency well into its fifth decade. However, excluding emergencies declared to impose sanctions drops that average to three years. Of the nine emergencies declared under the NEA that do not cite IEEPA, six were terminated or expired after fewer than three years. The remaining emergencies relate to Cuba, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and restrictions on Russian-affiliated vessels put in place after Russia's further invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The emergencies citing IEEPA frequently last decades. The reason for this may be structural. Should the President terminate an emergency, the authority to continue freezing assets would, in many cases, also terminate.⁴⁹⁶ Congress could provide non-emergency authority to maintain blocks on transactions and freezes on assets made during a national emergency. Absent such authority, Presidents will likely consider the continuation of national emergencies to be necessary to prevent assets frozen under IEEPA from becoming accessible.

The Status Quo

In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations in 1977, Professor Harold G. Maier summed up the main criticisms of TWEA:

Section 5(b)'s effect is no longer confined to "emergency situations" in the sense of existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit, by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President."⁴⁹⁷

Like TWEA before it, IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanction regime. Like TWEA before it, Congress has often approved explicitly of the President's use of IEEPA. In several circumstances, Congress has directed the President to impose a variety of sanctions under IEEPA and waived the requirement of an emergency declaration. Even when Congress has not given explicit approval, until 2023, no Member of Congress had ever introduced a resolution to terminate a national emergency citing IEEPA.⁴⁹⁸ The NEA requires that both houses of Congress meet every six months to consider a vote on a joint resolution on terminating an emergency.⁴⁹⁹ Neither house has ever met to do so with respect to an emergency citing IEEPA. In response to concerns over the scale and scope of the emergency economic powers granted by IEEPA, supporters of the status quo would argue that Congress has implicitly and explicitly expressed approval of the statute and its use. Several bills proposing a limit on the length of national emergencies declared under the NEA explicitly exclude IEEPA.⁵⁰⁰

Implications of Terminating National Emergencies Invoking IEEPA

Beginning in the late 2010s, some Members of Congress and civil society organizations began to express concern with the NEA and IEEPA. Whereas one resolution to terminate a national emergency declared under the NEA was introduced between 1976 and 2018, 22 were introduced between 2019 and September 1, 2025 (Table A-2). In 2019, both houses of Congress passed, for the first time, a resolution to terminate a national emergency.⁵⁰¹ President Donald J. Trump vetoed that resolution and the House did not override the veto.⁵⁰² In 2023, after several attempts, Congress voted to terminate the national emergency concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak.⁵⁰³ President Joe Biden signed the resolution, terminating the national emergency.⁵⁰⁴ In 2023, several Members of Congress introduced five bills seeking to terminate, for the first time, national emergencies invoking IEEPA; all five failed to pass the House.⁵⁰⁵

IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanction regime. Were Congress to terminate a national emergency invoking IEEPA, sanctions put into place under the authority of that emergency, including the blocking of assets, would terminate⁵⁰⁶ unless such sanctions could be kept in place under a different authority, such as the United Nations Participation Act.⁵⁰⁷

IEEPA also contains a savings provision in the event a national emergency invoking IEEPA is terminated, permitting the President to continue to block property if "the continuation of such prohibition with respect to that property is necessary on account of claims involving such country or its nationals," unless Congress provides otherwise in a resolution terminating the emergency.⁵⁰⁸ The legislative history suggests that Congress may have considered the continued blocking of assets that could be used for presidential settlements of claims by American citizens against foreign countries.⁵⁰⁹ In at least one case, however, the President invoked the savings provision to continue to block property pending claims among successor states.⁵¹⁰

The full scope of the savings provision with regard to the extent of prohibitions that may be maintained following termination is unclear. "Property in which a foreign country or national thereof has any interest" has been interpreted broadly by the courts, defining "interest" to mean "an interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect."⁵¹¹ In other words, the sanctioned entity need not own the property at issue in order to have an interest in it.⁵¹² The reference in the savings provision to "that property [deemed] necessary [for purpose of resolving] claims involving such country or its nationals"⁵¹³ arguably refers only to blocked property owned by the sanctioned entity liable for claims. Under this interpretation, the full range of prohibitions under the relevant sanctions regulations could no longer be enforced in the event the underlying national emergency is terminated, even if outstanding claims exist.

The Export Control Reform Act of 2018

In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA).⁵¹⁴ The legislation repealed the expired Export Administration Act of 1979,⁵¹⁵ the regulations of which had been continued by reference to IEEPA since 2001.⁵¹⁶ ECRA became the new statutory authority for Export Administration Regulations. Nevertheless, several export controls addressed in the Export Administration Act of 1979 were not updated in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018;⁵¹⁷ instead, Congress chose to require the President to continue to use IEEPA to continue to implement the three sections of the Export Administration Act of 1979 that were not repealed.⁵¹⁸ Going forward, Congress may revisit these provisions, which all relate to deterring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Appendix A. NEA and IEEPA Use

Amber Hope Wilhelm, CRS Visual Information Specialist, developed the graphics for this report. Ian Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, and Dianne Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy, were contributors to the original version of this report.

Footnotes

1.	Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1948); Edward Corwin, Total War and the Constitution (New York: Knopf, 1963). Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
2.	See, for example, John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas Hollis (London: A. Millar et al., 1764), pp. 340-341: "This power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative […]."
3.	Jules Lobel, "Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism," Yale Law Journal 98, no. 7 (May 1989), pp. 1392-1398; John Fabian Witt, "A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism," Law and History Review 36, no. 3 (August 2018); George M. Dennison, "Martial Law: The Development of a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776-1861," The American Journal of Legal History 18, no. 1 (January 1974); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning: The Constitution of the Original Executive (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), pp. 208-210; Matthew Warshauer, Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Martial Law (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2006). As Thomas Jefferson wrote, an executive officer acting illegally for what he determines to be the good of the country "does indeed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the constitution, and his station makes it his duty to incur that risk." Thomas Jefferson, The Works of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul Leicester Ford, Federal Edition (New York: Putnam, 1905), p. 11:146, qtd. in Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning, p. 214.
4.	U.S. Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., July 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), pp. 40-41.
5.	For scholarship on this general trend, see, for example, William E. Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds, Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Peter L. Lindseth, "The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s," Yale Law Journal 113, no. 7 (May 2004); Jules Lobel, "Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism"; Mary L. Dudziak, War-Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Corwin, Total War and the Constitution; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship.
6.	Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, ch. 2; See, for example, Carl Schmitt, "The Plight of European Jurisprudence," tr. G. L. Ulmen, Telos 83 (Spring 1990); Locke, Two Treatises of Government, pp. 340-341: "[…] since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their way; therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe."
7.	For arguments that emergency government subverts the rule of law, see, for example, Sanford Levinson, "Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency," Georgia Law Review 40, no. 3 (Spring 2006); Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). For arguments that states of emergency can be a standard feature of modern constitutional orders or that they can reflect or anticipate the preferences of the legislature, see, for example, Kim Lane Scheppele, "Small Emergencies," Georgia Law Review 40, no. 3 (Spring 2006), p. 836; Carey and Shugart, Executive Decree Authority, p. 3.
8.	International Emergency Economic Powers Act, P.L. 95-223 (October 28, 1977), 91 Stat. 1626, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq. (2018) (IEEPA).
9.	National Emergencies Act, P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq. (2018) (NEA); CRS Report R46379, Emergency Authorities Under the National Emergencies Act, Stafford Act, and Public Health Service Act, coordinated by Jennifer K. Elsea (2020).
10.	See, for example, Patrick A. Thronson, "Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime," Michigan Journal of Law Reform 46, no. 2 (2013), pp. 757-759; "The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential Emergency Power," Harvard Law Review 96, no. 5 (March 1983), p. 1120.
11.	See, for example, Scheppele, "Small Emergencies," pp. 845-847: Statutes like IEEPA show "that emergencies have been brought inside the constitutional order by being normalized in the ordinary legislative process."
12.	See Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, eds., The Economics of World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
13.	Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, pp. 241-243; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, pp. 40-41.
14.	J. Reuben Clark, Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917: Dealing with the Control and Taking of Private Property for the Public Use, Benefit, or Welfare (Washington, DC: GPO, 1918), pp. 1-125.
15.	Clark, Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917, pp. 1-125; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 243; David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), ch. 2.
16.	For an overview of TWEA's development, see Benjamin A. Coates, "The Secret Life of Statutes: A Century of the Trading with the Enemy Act," Modern American History 1, no. 2 (2018).
17.	Trading with the Enemy Act, P.L. 65-91 (October 6, 1917) §2, 40 Stat. 411, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §4305 (2018) (TWEA).
18.	TWEA §2.
19.	TWEA §3.
20.	TWEA §4.
21.	TWEA §5b.
22.	TWEA §2.
23.	U.S. Congress, House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, Report of the Committee on International Relations on H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 95-459 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 4.
24.	William E. Scheuerman, "The Economic State of Emergency," Cardozo Law Review 21 (2000), p. 1872.
25.	See, for example, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Inaugural Address of 1933 (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1988); Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 256; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. 56.
26.	Franklin D. Roosevelt's Inaugural Address of 1933.
27.	New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306 (1932) (J. Brandeis, dissenting).
28.	Scheuerman, "The Economic State of Emergency," p. 1878.
29.	Franklin D. Roosevelt's Inaugural Address of 1933.
30.	Proclamation 2039 of March 6, 1933, "Bank Holiday, March 6-9, 1933, Inclusive," 48 Stat. 1689.
31.	In his proclamation, President Roosevelt did not refer to the "Trading with the Enemy Act," but instead chose to use the more-opaque "Act of October 6, 1917." Proclamation 2039.
32.	President Herbert Hoover had likewise contemplated using TWEA for such a purpose. However, Hoover's Attorney General, William D. Mitchell, had expressed serious doubts about the legality of such an action. In the last days of Hoover's presidency, Mitchell said that Hoover "should not issue [such an] executive order unless it was unanimously agreed by [the] outgoing and incoming administrations that it was necessary and assurances [were] obtained from Congressional leaders that [such an action] would be ratified promptly and that enabling legislation would be passed" as there was only a "shoe string" on which to base the legality of such an order. Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), pp. 146-147.
33.	Emergency Banking Relief Act, P.L. 73-1 (March 9, 1933), 48 Stat. 1 (EBRA). The House, despite having no copies of the bill and relying upon a draft text read aloud by the Speaker, passed the bill after 38 minutes of debate. The Senate voted to pass the measure the same evening. U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. 57.
34.	TWEA as amended by EBRA. Italics show the language added by EBRA.
35.	E.O. 6560 (January 15, 1934). These actions came in the context of greater participation by the executive in international economic transactions generally. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 gave the President the authority to negotiate bilateral trade agreements, marking the beginning of a period of increasing U.S. trade liberalization through executive action. Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2017), chap. 9.
36.	P.L. 77-354 (December 18, 1941), 55 Stat. 838.
37.	Ibid.
38.	Scheuerman, "The Economic State of Emergency," p. 1879; Robert S. Rankin and Winfried R. Dallmyr, Freedom and Emergency Powers in the Cold War (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964).
39.	Proclamation 2914 (December 16, 1950); Proclamation 3972 (March 23, 1970); Proclamation 3972 (February 23, 1971); Proclamation 4074 (August 15, 1971). See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10267, Definition of National Emergency under the National Emergencies Act, by Jennifer K. Elsea (2019); CRS Report 98-505, National Emergency Powers, by Elizabeth M. Webster (2021).
40.	Proclamation 2914 of December 16, 1950, "Proclaiming the Existence of a National Emergency, 15 Federal Register 9029, December 19, 1950. This emergency would remain in place until 1976 and would be used to justify a host of emergency powers. See the partial list of executive orders issued pursuant to Proclamation 2914 in U.S. Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, Executive Orders in Times of War and National Emergency, Report of the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., June 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), p. 15.
41.	U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Trade and Commerce, United States Embargo on Trade with South Vietnam and Cambodia, 94th Cong. 1st sess., June 4, 1975 (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1975), p. 2; 31 C.F.R. 500.101-500.808 (1975).
42.	Executive Order 10348 of April 26, 1952, "Continuing in Force Orders and Regulations Relating to Blocked Property," 17 Federal Register 3769, April 29, 1952.
43.	Executive Order 11677 of August 1, 1972, "Continuing the Regulation of Exports," 37 Federal Register 15483, August 3, 1972; Executive Order 11683 of August 29, 1972, "Revoking Executive Order No. 11677 of August 1, 1972, and Continuing in Effect Executive Order No. 11533 of June 4, 1970, Relating to the Administration of Export Controls," 37 Federal Register 17813, September 1, 1972; Executive Order 11796 of July 30, 1974, "Continuing the Regulation of Exports," 39 Federal Register 27891, August 2, 1974; Executive Order 11798 of August 14, 1974, "Revoking Executive Order No. 11796 of July 30, 1974, and Continuing in Effect Executive Order No. 11533 of June 4, 1970, Relating to the Administration of Export Controls," 39 Federal Register 29567, August 16, 11974; Executive Order 11810 of September 30, 1974, "Continuing the Regulation of Exports," 39 Federal Register 35567, October 2, 1974; Executive Order 11818 of November 5, 1974, "Revoking Executive Order No. 11810 of September 30, 1974, and Continuing in Effect Executive Order No. 11533 of June 4, 1970, Relating to the Administration of Export Control," 39 Federal Register 39429, November 7, 1974; Executive Order 11940 of September 30, 1976, "Continuing the Regulation of Exports," 41 Federal Register 43707, October 4, 1976.
44.	Executive Order 10896 of November 29, 1960, "Amendment of Executive Order No. 6260 of August 28, 1933," 25 Federal Register 12281, December 1, 1960; Executive Order 11037 of July 20, 1962, "Amendment of Section 12 of Executive Order No. 6260 of August 28, 1933, as Amended," 27 Federal Register 6967, July 24, 1962.
45.	Executive Order 11387 of January 1, 1968, "Governing Certain Capital Transfers Abroad," 33 Federal Register 47, January 3, 1968.
46.	Proclamation 4074 of August 15, 1971, "Imposition of Supplemental Duty for Balance of Payments Purposes," 36 Federal Register 15724, August 17, 1971, reprinted in 85 Stat. 926. Although the proclamation did not explicitly refer to TWEA in order to avoid the possible embarrassment of using a statute named the "Trading with the Enemy Act" to impose a tariff principally aimed at U.S. allies, the proclamation was carefully worded to not exclude TWEA as an authority under which the proclamation was issued. When a legal challenge was issued, the Government argued, and the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals agreed, that TWEA was the source of the authority for the proclamation. United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975). See also CRS Insight IN11129, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (NEA), and Tariffs: Historical Background and Key Issues, by Christopher A. Casey (2025).
47.	The bipartisan special committee was called the "Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency," and was charged with conducting "a study and investigation with respect to the matter of terminating the national emergency proclaimed by the President of the United States on December 16, 1950." U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of International Transactions in Time of Declared National Emergency, committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., November 1976 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), p. iii.
48.	U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v. The four national emergencies were those proclaimed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933, President Truman in 1950, and the two proclaimed by President Nixon in 1970 and 1971.
49.	U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v.
50.	Qtd. in U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents, p. iii.
51.	Ibid.
52.	U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Revision of the Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup before the Committee on International Relations ("House Markup"), 95th Cong., 1st sess., June 1977 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 5. House and Senate committee reports expressed the view that past Presidents had abused the authority to regulate economic transactions in a national emergency conferred by TWEA by using it in circumstances far removed from those that originally gave rise to the declaration of national emergency. H. Rept. No. 95-459 (June 23, 1977); S. Rept. No. 95-466 (October 3, 1977). Both reports noted that President Lyndon B. Johnson, citing President Truman's declaration of national emergency with respect to Korea in 1950, had imposed controls on direct investment abroad by U.S. nationals in 1968, and that President Gerald R. Ford had used President Nixon's declaration of national emergency with respect to the balance of payments in 1971 to justify extending the controls and regulations of the Export Administration Act when that act lapsed temporarily in 1976. H. Rept. No. 95-459, at 5; S. Rept. No. 95-466, at 2. More generally, the House report noted that the national emergency authority of TWEA had been used by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to regulate the banking industry in 1933 and to impose consumer credit controls in 1941 and by President Richard M. Nixon to impose a surcharge on imports into the United States in 1971. Thus, the House report concluded, TWEA "has become essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and international economic arena, without congressional review." H. Rept. No. 95-459, 7.
53.	U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2.
54.	Ibid.
55.	Ibid., 9.
56.	Ibid.
57.	P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq.
58.	Ibid. While the NEA terminated the national emergencies on September 14, 1978, it explicitly enabled the continuation of those emergencies with respect to Section 5(b) of TWEA to give the Congress more time to consider how to address the issue of sanctions and international economic regulation. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) grandfathered powers that "were being exercised [under TWEA] with respect to a country on July 1, 1977," including those with respect to Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. P.L. 95-223 (December 28, 1977) §101(b). The grandfathered powers, however, would require a declaration or renewal. See, for example, Memorandum of September 8, 1978, "Determination Extending the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act," 45 Federal Register 40449, September 12, 1978; Memorandum of September 12, 1979, "Memorandum From the President on Embargo Regulations Under the Trading With the Enemy Act," 44 Federal Register 53153, September 13, 1979; Presidential Determination of September 8, 1980, "Determination Concerning the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act," 45 Federal Register 59549, September 10, 1980.
59.	U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, pp. 6-7.
60.	U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, International Emergency Economic Powers Legislation, Report to Accompany H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., S.Rept. 95-466 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 3.
61.	U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, 10.
62.	House Markup, p. 9; U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of International Transactions in a Time of Declared Emergency, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., November 1976, committee print (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976).
63.	P.L. 95-223 (December 28, 1977) (Title I) ("Section 5(b)(1) of the Trading With the Enemy Act // 50 USC app. 5. // is amended by striking out "or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President" in the text preceding subparagraph (A)."); 91 Stat. 1625, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §4305 (2018); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2.
64.	Ibid. (Title III); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2 ("Title III of the bill makes a series of conforming amendments to the Export Administration Act, which transfer to that act the authority, heretofore exercised under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act to regulate exports of non-U.S.-origin goods and technology by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. concerns.").
65.	Ibid. (Title II); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2.
66.	House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 11.
67.	50 U.S.C. §1701.
68.	50 U.S.C. §1701(b).
69.	Ibid.
70.	50 U.S.C. §1702.
71.	50 U.S.C. §1621.
72.	50 U.S.C. §1631.
73.	50 U.S.C. §1631 (stating the President may list intended authorities "either in the declaration of a national emergency, or by one or more contemporaneous or subsequent Executive orders published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress").
74.	50 U.S.C. §1701(b).
75.	IEEPA authorities are broad, but not unlimited. See, for example, Micei Int'l v. Dep't of Com., 613 F.3d 1147, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("Nothing in the text of IEEPA delegates to the President the authority to grant jurisdiction to any federal court."); TikTok Inc. v. Trump, 507 F. Supp. 3d 92, 112 (D.D.C. 2020) (enjoining enforcement of regulation as exceeding authority conferred by IEEPA because provisions "likely constitute indirect regulations of 'personal communication[s]' or the exchange of 'information or informational materials'" in violation of §1702(b)).
76.	See, for example, Executive Order 13566 of February 25, 2011, "Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain Transactions Related to Libya," 76 Federal Register 11315, March 2, 2011 (addressing threat to the national security and U.S. policy after finding that "Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, his government, and close associates have taken extreme measures against the people of Libya, including by using weapons of war, mercenaries, and wanton violence against unarmed civilians"); expanded by Executive Order 13726 of April 19, 2016, "Blocking Property and Suspending Entry Into the United States of Persons Contributing to the Situation in Libya," 81 Federal Register 23559, April 21, 2016 (changing scope of the national emergency after Qadhafi was deposed to cover "ongoing violence in Libya, including attacks by armed groups against Libyan state facilities, foreign missions in Libya, and critical infrastructure, as well as human rights abuses, [and] violations of the [U.N.] arms embargo"); Executive Order 13338 of May 11, 2004, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Syria," 69 Federal Register 26751, May 13, 2004 (declaring national emergency to deal with threat posed by "the actions of the Government of Syria in supporting terrorism, continuing its occupation of Lebanon, pursuing weapons of mass destruction and missile programs, and undermining United States and international efforts with respect to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq"), modified in scope by Executive Order 13399 of April 25, 2006, "Blocking Property of Additional Persons in Connection With the National Emergency With Respect to Syria," 71 Federal Register 25059, April 28, 2006 (modifying scope of the national emergency to assist in the investigation of the "assassination of former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafiq Hariri, and the deaths of 22 others, and other bombings or assassination attempts in Lebanon since October 1, 2004, that are related to Hariri's assassination or that implicate the Government of Syria or its officers or agents"), expanded by Executive Order 13572 of April 29, 2011, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to Human Rights Abuses in Syria," 76 Federal Register 24787, March 3, 2011 (expanding scope of the national emergency to cover "the Government of Syria's human rights abuses, including those related to the repression of the people of Syria").
77.	50 U.S.C. §1701(b).
78.	See Table A-3. While IEEPA was not invoked in the first declaration of national emergency following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush declared a second state of emergency invoking IEEPA. Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, "Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transaction with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism," 66 Federal Register 49079, September 25, 2001.
79.	President Jimmy Carter declared a new national emergency to address a threat emanating from countries neighboring Iran in the same executive order in which he modified an existing national emergency. Executive Order 12211 of April 17, 1980, "Sanctions Against Iran," 45 Federal Register 26685, April 21, 1980 (issued "in order to take steps additional to those set forth" in Executive Order 12170, but declaring a new national emergency with respect to "added unusual and extraordinary threat … created by subsequent events in Iran and neighboring countries, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan").
80.	Executive Order 14193 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border," 90 Federal Register 9113, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border," 90 Federal Register 9117, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14195 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People's Republic of China," 90 Federal Register 9121, February 7, 2025.
81.	Proclamation 10886 of January 20, 2025, "Declaring a National Emergency at the Southern Border of the United States," 90 Federal Register 8327, January 29, 2025. The President declared in the Proclamation that "a national emergency exists at the southern border of the United States." Ibid.
82.	Ibid. (describing threat to U.S. sovereignty that is geographically specific to the southern border caused by "cartels, criminal gangs, known terrorists, human traffickers, smugglers, unvetted military-age males from foreign adversaries, and illicit narcotics" as a "grave threat to our Nation" and an "imminent threat"). The Proclamation asserted the intent to authorize military mobilization under 10 U.S.C. §12302 and to authorize the diversion of military construction funds for not- previously authorized construction projects to support use of the Armed Forces. For information about the use of this authority, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11278, Diverting Military Construction Funds During a National Emergency: Legal Framework, by Jennifer K. Elsea (2025).
83.	Executive Order 14193 [Canada]; Executive Order 14194 [Mexico]; Executive Order 14195 [China].
84.	Ibid.
85.	50 U.S.C. §1701(b). The plain language of the statute appears to preclude the President from relying on IEEPA to "expand" a previously declared national emergency to address a separate threat and appears to preclude the President invoking IEEPA authorities by referring to a preexisting national emergency that was not declared under IEEPA.
86.	Executive Order 14193 [Canada]; Executive Order 14194 [Mexico]; Executive Order 14195 [China].
87.	Ibid.
88.	H.J.Res. 72; H.J.Res. 73.
89.	H.J.Res. 72.
90.	H.J.Res. 73.
91.	H.J.Res. 72; H.J.Res. 73.
92.	H.Res. 211 §4.
93.	50 U.S.C. §1622(c).
94.	S.J.Res. 37.
95.	Ibid.
96.	50 U.S.C. §1703(a).
97.	50 U.S.C. §1703(b).
98.	50 U.S.C. §1703(c).
99.	50 U.S.C. §1622. For information regarding the expedited procedures for terminating a national emergency, see CRS Report R46567, National Emergencies Act: Expedited Procedures in the House and Senate, by Michael Greene (2025).
100.	P.L. 100-418 (August 23, 1988); P.L. 103-236 (April 30, 1994). The amendments were introduced by Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) and are occasionally referred to as the "Berman Amendments." For more background, see, "Sleeping with the Enemy? OFAC Rules and First Amendment Freedoms," Perspectives on History (May 2004).
101.	Codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(3).
102.	P.L. 95-223. House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 15 ("This grant of authorities does not include the following authorities … : (1) the power to vest … property."); Senate, International Emergency Economic Powers Legislation, p. 5 ("Authority to vest property, seize records and regulate purely domestic economic transactions would not be granted.").
103.	Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
104.	P.L. 107-56 §106, 115 Stat. 272, 277, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(C) (2018).
105.	Executive Order 13224.
106.	Administration's Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess., serial no. 39 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 7 (testimony of Attorney General Ashcroft).
107.	U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany H.R. 2975, 107th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 107-236 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 62.
108.	See United States v. All Funds on Deposit with R.J. O'Brien & Assocs., 783 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 2015) (insurance companies' attempt to intercede in civil forfeiture action involving Al Qaeda assets).
109.	Executive Order 13290 of March 20, 2003, "Confiscating and Vesting Certain Iraqi Property," 68 Federal Register 14307, March 24, 2003.
110.	Ibid.
111.	28 U.S.C. §1605A.
112.	P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).
113.	See Tom Schoenberg, "Fights Loom for Iraqi Riches," Legal Times (March 31, 2003). Judgment creditors were paid about $140 million from the vested assets to cover the unsatisfied portions of judgments and interest.
114.	E.O. 13315, 68 Federal Register 52,315 (September 3, 2003).
115.	GAO-04-579T Recovering Iraq's Assets (March 18, 2004). As of March 2004, according to GAO, the CPA had spent $1.67 billion of the $1.9 billion for "emergency needs, including salaries for civil servants and pensions, and for ministry operations." Ibid., 7. The CPA was also authorized to use the more than $900 million in assets seized by the U.S. military in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction activities. Ibid.
116.	P.L. 107-56 §106, 115 Stat. 277 (2001).
117.	P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(B) (2018).
118.	P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(a) (2018).
119.	P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(c) (2018).
120.	House, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany H.R. 2975, p. 62.
121.	House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, pp. 2-9.
122.	Ibid., 11.
123.	This tally does not include IEEPA invocations made in connection with executive orders expanding the scope of an initial declaration of national emergency. See Table A-1.
124.	For example, Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015, "Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities," 80 Federal Register 18077, April 2, 2015; Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017, "Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption," 82 Federal Register 60839, December 26, 2017; Executive Order 13848 of September 12, 2018, "Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election," 83 Federal Register 46843, September 114, 2018; Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," 84 Federal Register 22689, May 17, 2019; Executive Order 13920 of May 1, 2020, "Securing the United States Bulk-Power System," 85 Federal Register 26595, May 4, 2020; Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, "Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits," 90 Federal Register 15041, April 7, 2025.
125.	See "Presidential Emergency Use."
126.	See "Congressional Nonemergency Use and Retroactive Approval."
127.	H.J.Res 69, 109th Cong. Congress did not vote on the joint resolution because the President terminated the emergency before a vote was required to be held. Proclamation 7959 of November 3, 2005, 70 Federal Register 67899 (November 8, 2005).
128.	The numbers here define emergencies by executive orders declaring an emergency. This choice causes some anomalies in the data. For example, the national emergency with regard to controlling the whereabouts of highly enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons in Russia lapsed when the notice extending the emergency was not published in the Federal Register by the emergency's anniversary date on June 21, 2012. As such, President Barack Obama issued an executive order declaring a new national emergency to reinstate the restrictions. For consistency, such anomalies have been treated as two distinct national emergencies. Such treatment decreases the average duration of emergencies. See, for example, Executive Order 13159 of June 21, 2000, "Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons," 65 Federal Register 39279, June 26, 2000; Executive Order 13617 of June 25, 2012, "Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons," 77 Federal Register 38459, June 27, 2012.
129.	See Figure 4.
130.	50 U.S.C. §1701(b) ("Any exercise of such authorities to deal with any new threat shall be based on a new declaration of national emergency which must be with respect to such threat.").
131.	Ibid. ("The authorities granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared for purposes of this chapter and may not be exercised for any other purpose.").
132.	Declarations of emergency under the NEA that do not invoke IEEPA have all made by presidential proclamation. See, for example, Proclamation 6491 of October 14, 1992, "To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March 3, 1931, Within a Limited Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki," 57 Federal Register 47553, October 16, 1992; Proclamation 6867 of March 1, 1996, "Declaration of a National Emergency and Invocation of Emergency Authority Relating to the Regulation of the Anchorage and Movement of Vessels," 61 Federal Register 8843, March 5, 1996; Proclamation 6907 of July 1, 1996, "Declaration of a State of Emergency and Release of Feed Grain From the Disaster Reserve," 61 Federal Register 35083, July 5, 1996; Proclamation 7463 of September 14, 2001, "Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks," 66 Federal Register 48199, September 18, 2001; Proclamation 7924 of September 8, 2005, "To Suspend Subchapter IV of Chapter 31 of Title 40, United States Code, Within a Limited Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricane Katrina," 70 Federal Register 54227, September 13, 2005; Proclamation 8443 of October 23, 2009, "Declaration of a National Emergency With Respect to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic," 74 Federal Register 55439, October 28, 2009; Proclamation 9844 of February 15, 2019, "Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States," 84 Federal Register 4949, February 20, 2019; Proclamation 9994 of March 13, 2020, "Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak," 85 Federal Register 15337, March 18, 2020.
133.	The practice of issuing IEEPA-related executive orders has also changed over time. During the Iran hostage-taking in 1979, for example, President Carter issued a new and separate E.O. with each fine-tuning of the initial national emergency declaration; overall from November 1979 to his last day in office in January 1981, President Carter issued 12 executive orders relating to the hostage crisis and negotiations with Iran. Later presidents have opted, instead, to issue one executive order to declare the existence of a national emergency, and then to revisit that order to adjust or expand its reach by amending the original language.
134.	Emergencies invoking IEEPA that have been terminated lasted an average of 6.5 years. However, most emergencies citing IEEPA have not been terminated, including the first ever declared, which has been ongoing since 1979.
135.	Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979, "Blocking Iranian Government Property," 44 Federal Register 65729, November 15, 1979.
136.	Notice of November 8, 2022, "Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Iran," 87 Federal Register 68013, November 10, 2022.
137.	Not enough time has passed to understand whether the trend will continue with those national emergencies declared in the 2010s.
138.	Rounded to the nearest whole emergency. Includes the partial term for President Trump as of September 1, 2025.
139.	Executive Order 12170.
140.	Executive Order 12205 of April 7, 1980, "Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Iran," 45 Federal Register 24099, April 9, 1980. The order exempted "food, medicine and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering."
141.	Executive Order 12211 of April 17, 1980, "Further Prohibitions on Transactions With Iran," 45 Federal Register 26685, April 21, 1980.
142.	Exceptions were made for family remittances.
143.	Executive Order 12513 of May 1, 1985, "Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving Nicaragua," 50 Federal Register 18629, May 2, 1985.
144.	Executive Order 12532 of September 9, 1985, "Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving South Africa," 50 Federal Register 36861, September 10, 1985.
145.	This number excludes those emergencies declared to extend the Export Administration Act of 1979.
146.	Executive Order 12735 of November 16, 1990, "Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation," 55 Federal Register 48587, November 20, 1990.
147.	Executive Order 13224.
148.	Executive Order 13581 of July 24, 2011, "Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations," 76 Federal Register 44757, July 27, 2011; Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015, "Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities," 80 Federal Register 18077, April 2, 2015.
149.	Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," 84 Federal Register 22689, May 17, 2019.
150.	Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, "Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits, 90 Federal Register 15041," April 7, 2025.
151.	See, for example, Executive Order 13694; Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017, "Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption," 82 Federal Register 60839, December 26, 2017; Executive Order 13848 of September 12, 2018, "Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election," 83 Federal Register 46843, September 14, 2018; Executive Order 13873; Executive Order 13920 of May 1, 2020, "Securing the United States Bulk-Power System," 85 Federal Register 26595, May 4, 2020; Executive Order 13928 of June 11, 2020, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court," 85 Federal Register 36139, June 15, 2020. Some have argued that this shift was the result of humanitarian concerns about the effects of sanctions on the populations of the targeted states. See, for example, Daniel W. Drezner, "Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice," International Studies Review 13 (2011), p. 13; Thomas Weiss, et al. eds., Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impact of Economic Sanctions (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997); Matthew Craven, "Humanitarianism and the Search for Smarter Sanctions," European Journal of International Law 13, no. 1 (2002). Beginning in the 1990s, United Nations Security Council sanctions began to target the political and economic elites of a state, rather than the whole population. Kern Alexander, Economic Sanctions: Law and Public Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. xi. However, use of such orders has expanded beyond political and economic elites. See, for example, Executive Order 13928.
152.	Executive Order 12170.
153.	Executive Order 12513.
154.	Ibid.
155.	Executive Order 12532; Executive Order 13396 of February 7, 2006, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire," 71 Federal Register 7389, February 10, 2006; Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997, "Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan," 62 Federal Register 59989, November 5, 1997; Executive Order 13692 of March 8, 2015, "Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela," 80 Federal Register 12747, March 11, 2015.
156.	Executive Order 13067.
157.	Ibid.
158.	Executive Order 13405 of June 16, 2006, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus," 71 Federal Register 35485, June 20, 2006.
159.	Ibid.
160.	Ibid.
161.	Executive Order 12532.
162.	Executive Order 12170.
163.	See, for example, Executive Order 12513.
164.	See, for example, Executive Order 12865 of September 26, 1993, "Prohibiting Certain Transactions Involving UNITA," 58 Federal Register 51005, September 29, 1993 (prohibiting transactions with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the second-largest political party in Angola); Executive Order 13129 of July 4, 1999, "Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With the Taliban," 64 Federal Register 36759, July 7, 1999 (prohibiting transactions with the Taliban); Executive Order 13224 (prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism); Executive Order 12978 (prohibiting transactions with certain narcotics traffickers); Executive Order 13928 (blocking property of certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court); Executive Order 14203 of February 6, 2025, "Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court," 90 Federal Register 9369, February 12, 2025 (same).
165.	Executive Order 12978 of October 21, 1995, "Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions With Significant Narcotics Traffickers," 60 Federal Register 54579, October 24, 1995.
166.	Ibid. Emphasis added.
167.	Executive Order 13219 of June 26, 2001, "Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans," 66 Federal Register 34777, June 26, 2001.
168.	See, for example, Aaran Money Wire Serv., Inc. v. United States, 2003 WL 22143735, at *3 (D. Minn. August 21, 2003).
169.	Executive Order 13219 of June 26, 2001, "Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans," 66 Federal Register 34777, June 29, 2001, emphasis added.
170.	See, for example, Executive Order 13224; Executive Order 13396.
171.	Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018, P.L. 115-335 (December 20, 2018), 132 Stat. 5019.
172.	Ibid.
173.	Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1986, P.L. 99-529 (October 24, 1986), 100 Stat. 3010.
174.	Ibid.
175.	See, for example, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, P.L. 102-484 (October 23, 1992), 106 Stat. 2315; Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, P.L. 104-1172 (August 5, 1996), 110 Stat. 1541; Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, P.L. 105-261 (October 17, 1998), 112 Stat. 1920; Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386 (October 28, 2000), 114 Stat. 1464; Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, P.L. 108-497 (December 23, 2004), 118 Stat. 4012; Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, P.L. 109-344 (October 13, 2006), 120 Stat. 1869; Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, P.L. 111-195 (July 1, 2010), 124 Stat 1312; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112-81 (December 31, 2011), 125 Stat 1298; Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, P.L. 112-158 (August 10, 2012), 126 Stat 1214 (makes some of the most extensive use of IEEPA); Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, P.L. 112-208 (December 14, 2012), 126 Stat 1496; Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act P.L. 113-291 (December 19, 2014), 128 Stat. 3293; Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of 2018, P.L. 115-272 (October 25, 2018), 132 Stat. 4144.
176.	Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, P.L. 113-95 (April 3, 2014), 128 Stat. 1088. Identical language can be found, for example, in: The Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, P.L. 113-278 (December 18, 2014), 128 Stat. 3011; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, P.L. 114-328 (December 23, 2016), 130 Stat. 2000. Similar language can be found, for example, in: the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, P.L. 114-122 (February 18, 2016), 130 Stat. 93; the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017), 130 Stat 886. Depending on the circumstance, Congress also includes a clause waiving the requirement to declare a national emergency. See, for example, Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of 2018, P.L. 115-272, §103, 132 Stat. 4144, 4148 ("(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions [ ... ].").
177.	CAATSA §104, codified at 22 U.S.C. §9403; Executive Order 13382 of June 28, 2005, "Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters," 70 Federal Register 38567, July 1, 2005.
178.	Executive Order 12532.
179.	H.R. 1460 (99th Cong.); See also Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, P.L. 99-440 (October 2, 1986), 100 Stat. 1086.
180.	Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer-Session with Reporters on Signing E.O. 12532, September 9, 1985, 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1048, 1050.
181.	See, for example, questions by Helen Thomas, United Press International, Ibid., 1050.
182.	Carter, International Economic Sanctions, p. 201.
183.	Ibid.
184.	Ibid., ch. 9.
185.	For example, Executive Order 13757 of December 28, 2016, "Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities," 82 Federal Register 1, January 3, 2017; See also Executive Order 13848 of September 12, 2018, "Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election," 83 Federal Register 46843, September 14, 2018.
186.	For example, Executive Order 12978 of October 21, 1995, "Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions With Significant Narcotics Traffickers," 60 Federal Register 54579, October 24, 1995.
187.	For example, Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017, "Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption," 82 Federal Register 60839, December 26, 2017.
188.	For example, Executive Order 13194 of January 18, 2001, "Prohibiting the Importation of Rough Diamonds From Sierra Leone," 66 Federal Register 7389, January 23, 2001.
189.	For example, Executive Order 13581 of July 24, 2011, "Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations," 76 Federal Register 44757, July 27, 2011.
190.	For example, Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995, "Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process," 60 Federal Register 5079, January 25, 1995.
191.	For example, Executive Order 13400 of April 26, 2006, "Blocking Property of Persons in Connection With the Conflict in Sudan's Darfur Region," 71 Federal Register 25483, April 26, 2006.
192.	For example, Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," 59 Federal Register 59099, November 16, 1994.
193.	For example, Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, "Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism," 66 Federal Register 49079, September 25, 2001.
194.	For example, Executive Order 12923 of June 30, 1994, "Continuation of Export Control Regulations," 59 Federal Register 34551, July 5, 1994.
195.	For example, Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015, "Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities," 80 Federal Register 18077, April 2, 2015.
196.	For example, Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017, "Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption," 82 Federal Register 60839, December 26, 2017.
197.	For example, Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," 84 Federal Register 22689, May 17, 2019.
198.	For example, Executive Order 14193 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border," 90 Federal Register 9113, February 7, 2025.
199.	"The International Emergency Economic Powers Act," p. 1111; Thronson, "Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime," pp. 757-758.
200.	For example, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673 (1981) (explaining that "[blocking] orders permit the President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency. The frozen assets serve as a 'bargaining chip' to be used by the President when dealing with a hostile country").
201.	Executive Order 12170.
202.	The Algiers Accords comprise the following five documents: The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047 1, 1 (1981) [hereinafter "General Declaration"], reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3; The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 3, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9; Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 19 January 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 4, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 13; Escrow Agreement Among the United States, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bank Markazi Iran, and the Banque Centrale d'Algerie, January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 6, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 16; and Technical Arrangement Between Banque Centrale d'Algerie and the Governor and Company of the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 14, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 20 [hereinafter "Algiers Accords"].
203.	Sean D. Murphy, "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law," American Journal of International Law 94 (October 2000), p. 704 (explaining that "[a]ll of Iran's lawsuits in U.S. courts [to recover the Shah's assets] were eventually dismissed, principally on grounds of forum non conveniens").
204.	GAO Review of Economic Sanctions Imposed Against Panama, GAO/T-NSIAD-89-44, 4-5 (July 26, 1989).
205.	Ibid., 5.
206.	Executive Order 12635 of April 8, 1988, "Prohibition on the Use of Federal Funds for the Acquisition of Certain Real Property in the District of Columbia," 53 Federal Register 12134, April 8, 1988.
207.	GAO Report, supra note 159, at 5.
208.	Ibid., 7.
209.	Executive Order 12710 of April 5, 1990, "Termination of Emergency With Respect to Panama," 55 Federal Register 13099, April 6, 1990.
210.	See 1989 Cong. Q. Almanac 607 (reporting that the Department of the Treasury had concluded "that the net amount still due Panama, after 'offsets, was about $200 million").
211.	Executive Order 13692 of March 8, 2015, "Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela," 80 Federal Register 12747, March 11, 2015. For information about current sanctions against Venezuela, see CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke (2025).
212.	President Donald J. Trump Supports the Venezuelan People's Efforts to Restore Democracy in Their Country, White House Fact Sheet January 29, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-supports-venezuelan-peoples-efforts-restore-democracy-country/. For background of the situation in Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke (2022).
213.	Trump Supports the Venezuelan People's Efforts.
214.	Executive Order 13857 of January 25, 2019, "Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to Venezuela," 84 Federal Register 509, January 30, 2019; Treasury Sanctions Venezuela's State-Owned Oil Company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., U.S. Department of the Treasury (January 28, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm594.
215.	Marianna Parraga, "Venezuela's oil exports sink to 17-year low, choked by U.S. sanctions," Reuters, June 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-exports/venezuelas-oil-exports-sink-to-17-year-low-choked-by-us-sanctions-idUSKBN2392SG.
216.	Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Recognition of Venezuela's 2015 National Assembly and Interim President Guaidó, January 4, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-recognition-of-venezuelas-2015-national-assembly-and-interim-president-guaido/.
217.	Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, Venezuela's Interim Government and the 2015 National Assembly, January 3, 2023, https://www.state.gov/venezuelas-interim-government-and-the-2015-national-assembly/.
218.	U.S. Department of State, "Secretary Rubio's Call with the Rightful President of Venezuela González Urrutia and Venezuelan Democratic Opposition Leader Machado," January 22, 2025.
219.	CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
220.	CRS electronic correspondence with State Department, July 7, 2025.
221.	Ibid.
222.	Marianna Parraga, "Is Venezuela About to Lose Citgo, its Most Prized Foreign Asset," Reuters, July 7, 2025.
223.	Executive Order 12817 of October 21, 1992, "Transfer of Certain Iraqi Government Assets Held by Domestic Banks," 57 Federal Register 48433, October 23, 1992. President George H.W. Bush froze Iraqi assets under U.S. jurisdiction pursuant to IEEPA in response to Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait Executive Order 12722 of August 2, 1990, "Blocking Iraqi Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Iraq," 55 Federal Register 31803, August 3, 1990.
224.	22 U.S.C. §287c (2018). The provision authorizes the President to give effect to U.N. Security Council resolutions by "investigat[ing], regulat[ing], or prohibit[ing], in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or any person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." The provision does not explicitly mention asset confiscation.
225.	Executive Order 12817.
226.	See Ronald J. Bettauer, "Establishment of the United Nations Compensation Commission: The U.S. Government Perspective," The United Nations Compensation Commission (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 35.
227.	U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, ¶16 (April 8, 1991) (reaffirming that "Iraq ... is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, ... or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait"; U.N. Security Council Resolution 692 (May 20, 1991) (establishing the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) to administer a system to provide compensation for claims for which Iraq is liable under paragraph 16 of S.C. Res. 687); U.N. Security Council Resolution 706 (August 15, 1991) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 712 (September 19, 1991) (establishing an escrow account administered by the U.N. Secretary General to fund the costs of the UNCC and other activities); U.N. Security Council Resolution 778 (October 2, 1992) (directing all States in possession of funds due to Iraq for the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to transfer those funds to the U.N. escrow account).
228.	See "USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA."
229.	Foreign Regimes' Assets, GAO-04-1006, 11 (September 2004).
230.	Ibid., 12.
231.	Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848 (S.D.N.Y. September 13, 2021).
232.	Executive Order 14064 of February 11, 2022, "Protecting Certain Property of Da Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the People of Afghanistan," 87 Federal Register 8391, February 15, 2022.
233.	United States Government Statement of Interest, Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848, ECF 563 (S.D.N.Y. February 11, 2022) (hereinafter SOI).
234.	OFAC License No. DABRESERVES-EO-2022-886895-1, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21226931/ex-b-ofac-license.pdf.
235.	Ibid., SOI.
236.	CRS In Focus IF12052, Afghanistan Central Bank Reserves, coordinated by Martin A. Weiss (2023).
237.	In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 657 F. Supp. 3d 311, 336 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2023) (consolidated cases).
238.	Ibid., 335.
239.	John Does 1 Through 7 v. The Taliban, No. 23-263 (2d Cir. Mar. 1, 2023).
240.	50 U.S.C. §1706(a) (authorizing the President to continue to block assets after the termination of a national emergency if he "determines that the continuation of such prohibition with respect to that property is necessary on account of claims involving such country or its nationals").
241.	Claims of U.S. citizens against foreign countries have historically been paid from liquidated frozen assets or payments from the foreign country pursuant to international settlement agreements. See, generally, 22 U.S.C. §§1621-1645o (Settlement of International Claims) (outlining source of funding for claims programs.) Presidents have in the past objected to congressional efforts to put frozen foreign assets directly under the control of courts and private litigants, and exercised waivers to avoid making frozen assets subject to enforcement to satisfy judgments. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 125 (D.D.C. 2009) ("In terms of United States foreign policy and national security objectives, one of the perverse outcomes of Congress' legislative victories over the Executive Branch [recounted in Part A of the court's opinion] is that what limited resources might have served as a bargaining chip that the President could have used in dealings with Iran are now subject to depletion as a result of the TRIA."). The court when on to describe "[t]hese frozen assets, once at the disposal of the President in his management of foreign policy crises under the IEEPA and other authorities, [as being] now largely subject to the jurisdiction of the Article III courts to be divided up among what few plaintiffs first lay claim to them in satisfaction of judgments under [the terrorism exception to the FSIA]"). Ibid. For a description of executive branch objections to making frozen assets available to litigants and the exercise of presidential waivers to preclude the eventuality, see CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea (2008).
242.	Current states designated as sponsors of terrorism are Iran (1984), Cuba (2021), North Korea (2017) and Syria (1979). See U.S. Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://perma.cc/RVE8-W28E.
243.	The so-called terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) was originally codified at 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7), but an amended version is now codified at 28 U.S.C. §1605A (2018). See CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea (2008).
244.	Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, P.L. 105-277, Div. A, Title I, §117, 112 Stat. 2681-491 (1998), codified at 28 U.S.C. §1610(f)(1)(A) (2018).
245.	Presidential Determination 99-1 (October 21, 1998), reprinted in 34 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2088 (October 26, 1998).
246.	Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386, §2002, 114 Stat. 1541 (2000). Section 2002(b)(1) required the President to "vest and liquidate up to and not exceeding the amount of property of the Government of Cuba and sanctioned entities in the United States or any commonwealth, territory, or possession thereof that has been blocked pursuant to [TWEA or IEEPA]" to pay the compensatory damages portion of such judgments. Judgments against Iran were paid from appropriated funds.
247.	Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ($50 million in compensatory damages and $137.7 million in punitive damages awarded to the families of three of the four persons who were killed when Cuban aircraft shot down two Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996). The payment represented compensatory damages, judicially imposed sanctions, and interest.
248.	Martinez v. Republic of Cuba, No. 13-1999-CA 018208 (Miami-Dade Co., Fla., Cir. Ct. 2001) (awarding $7.1 million in compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages).
249.	Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002), codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1610 note.
250.	Ibid. The term "blocked asset" is defined in §201(d) of TRIA to mean (A) any asset seized or frozen by the United States under [TWEA or IEEPA]; and (B) does not include property that— (i) is subject to a license issued by the United States Government for final payment, transfer, or disposition by or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection with a transaction for which the issuance of such license has been specifically required by statute other than [IEEPA] or the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.); or (ii) in the case of property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, or that enjoys equivalent privileges and immunities under the law of the United States, is being used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in March 2023, that the United States, acting pursuant to TRIA, violated the now-defunct Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Iran-U.S., Aug. 15, 1955, U.S.T. 900, by permitting judgment creditors, to enforce terrorism judgments against Iran through the attachment of assets of Iranian agencies or instrumentalities who were not participants in the underlying lawsuit. The ICJ found the United States unreasonably ignored those companies' separate juridical status and deprived Iranian companies of the independent legal personality conferred on them by such status. Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, ¶ 159 (Mar. 30, 2023), https://icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/164/164-20230330-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf. The ICJ will decide the amount of damages the United States owes to Iran at a later phase of the case. Ibid., ¶ 231.
251.	National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. 110-181 §1083 (2008) (amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
252.	28 U.S.C. §1610(g) (2018). It is unclear whether "regulated" property and "blocked asset" are meant to be synonymous. The provision also overrides the separate juridical status ordinarily accorded to agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states. Ibid. The ICJ determined that this provision violated the Treaty of Amity for the same reason it found TRIA to be "unreasonable." Certain Iranian Assets, ¶ 159.
253.	Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, P.L. 112-158, Title V, §502, 126 Stat. 1258 (2012); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, P.L. 116-92, div. A, Title XII, §1226, 133 Stat. 1645 (2019), both codified at 22 USC §8772. The Supreme Court upheld this approach in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). For an explanation of the case, see CRS Report R44967, Congress's Power over Court Decisions: Jurisdiction Stripping and the Rule of Klein, by Joanna R. Lampe (2024). In Certain Iranian Assets, the ICJ found that Bank Markazi, as Iran's central bank, was not a "company" entitled to favorable treatment under the Treaty of Amity, and the ICJ did not have jurisdiction over the claim based on Peterson. Certain Iranian Assets ¶ 54.
254.	See Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act, div. O, title IV of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, P.L. 114-113, §404 (2015), 129 Stat. 3007, codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §20144 (2020).
255.	Ibid., for more information about the program and funding for it, see CRS In Focus IF10341, Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act: Eligibility and Funding, by Jennifer K. Elsea (2023).
256.	34 U.S.C. §20144(e) (2021).
257.	34 U.S.C. §20144(e).
258.	34 U.S.C. §20144(e)(6).
259.	United States v. Zhao, No. 2:23–CR–00178 (W.D. Wash. filed Nov. 14, 2023). Binance pleaded guilty to resolve DOJ's investigation into "violations related to the Bank Secrecy Act... failure to register as a money transmitting business, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ... " See DOJ, Binance and CEO Plead Guilty to Federal Charges in $4B Resolution, November 21, 2023, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/binance-and-ceo-plead-guilty-federal-charges-4b-resolution.
260.	S. 706, §2(a)(2).
261.	Ibid. §3(a)(3).
262.	See CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia Before 2022, coordinated by Cory Welt (2022); CRS Insight IN11869, Russia's War Against Ukraine: Overview of U.S. Assistance and Sanctions, by Cory Welt (2023); CRS In Focus IF12062, Russia's War on Ukraine: Financial and Trade Sanctions, coordinated by Rebecca M. Nelson (2023).
263.	Division F of P.L. 118-50 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §9521 note).
264.	Ibid. §§2(1)(A), 101(b).
265.	If the President determines that "Belarus has engaged in an act of war against Ukraine related to Russia's ongoing February 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine," the authorities applicable to Russia in the REPO for Ukrainians Act can apply to Belarus as well. See ibid. §2(1) (defining "Russian aggressor state").
266.	Ibid. §104(f).
267.	Ibid. §102(9).
268.	The U.S. Department of the Treasury issued instructions for U.S. financial institutions to report holdings of covered assets. Office of Foreign Assets Control, "Notice of Reporting Instructions Under the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity for Ukrainians Act," 89 Federal Register 60568, July 26, 2024.
269.	REPO for Ukrainians Act §104(b).
270.	Ibid. §104(f).
271.	Ibid. §104(g).
272.	Ibid. §104(l).
273.	P.L. 117-328, §1708, 136. Stat. 5200 (2022).
274.	Ibid. §1708(c)(2) (defining "covered forfeited property" to mean property forfeited under 18 U.S.C. §§ 981–987 or 1963 "by a person subject to sanctions and designated by the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of State, or which property was involved in an act in violation of sanctions enacted pursuant to Executive Order 14024, and as expanded by Executive Order 14066 of March 8, 2022, and relied on for additional steps taken in Executive Order 14039 of August 20, 2021, and Executive Order 14068 of March 11, 2022").
275.	Ibid. §1708(d).
276.	For example, Elisabeth Braw, "Freeze—Don't Seize—Russian Assets," Foreign Policy, January 13, 2023; Christopher Caldwell, "Everyone Wants to Seize Russia's Money. It's a Terrible Idea," New York Times, April 9, 2024; Timothy Ash, "The Economic Case for Seizing Russia's Frozen Assets to Support Ukraine," Project Syndicate, June 12, 2024.
277.	Laurence H. Tribe, et al., The Legal, Practical, and Moral Case for Transferring Russian Sovereign Assets to Ukraine, Renew Democracy Initiative, September 17, 2023, pp. 154-157, https://rdi.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2023.09.17-MPP-Report.pdf.
278.	For example, Elisabeth Braw, "Freeze—Don't Seize—Russian Assets," Foreign Policy, January 13, 2023; Christopher Caldwell, "Everyone Wants to Seize Russia's Money. It's a Terrible Idea," New York Times, April 9, 2024; Timothy Ash, "The Economic Case for Seizing Russia's Frozen Assets to Support Ukraine," Project Syndicate, June 12, 2024.
279.	For example, Scott R. Anderson and Chimène Keitner, The Legal Challenges Presented by Seizing Frozen Russian Assets, Lawfare, May 26, 2022, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/legal-challenges-presented-seizing-frozen-russian-assets.
280.	Ibid.
281.	For example, Treaty of Peace with Japan, September 8, 1951, 46 U.N.T.S. 1832; Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, Feb. 10, 1947, 41 U.N.T.S. 643; Treaty of Peace with Hungary, February 10, 1947, 41 U.N.T.S. 644; Treaty of Peace with Romania, February 10, 1947, 42 U.N.T.S. 645; Treaty of Peace with Italy, February 10, 1947, 49 U.N.T.S. 747.
282.	See U.N. Secretary-General, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, art. 36 cmt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (December 12, 2001) (ARSIWA) ("It is … well established that an international court or tribunal which has jurisdiction with respect to a claim of State responsibility has, as an aspect of that jurisdiction, the power to award compensation for damage suffered.") (citation omitted).
283.	U.N. Security Council Resolution 778 (October 2, 1992) (creating UN Compensation Commission to allocate reparations due to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait).
284.	REPO for Ukrainians Act §2(6) (defining "Russian sovereign asset" to include Russian Central Bank and other funds, as well as "any other funds or other property that are owned by the Government of the Russian Federation, including by any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of that government"). The authority to confiscate such assets excludes property protected by certain diplomatic treaties. Ibid. §104(j).
285.	Ibid. §102(7).
286.	Ibid. §101(a)(7) ("The Russian Federation bears international legal responsibility for its aggression against Ukraine and, under international law, must cease its internationally wrongful acts. Because of this breach of the prohibition on aggression under international law, the United States is legally entitled to take counter measures that are proportionate and aimed at inducing the Russian Federation to comply with its international obligations.").
287.	ARSIWA at cmt.
288.	Ibid. at comment. 1.
289.	See, e.g., Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 897 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2018); Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶¶51-52 (Sept. 25).
290.	ARSIWA arts. 22, 49, 50.
291.	Ibid. art. 48(2).
292.	Ibid. art. 49.
293.	Ibid. art. 54.
294.	Ibid. art. 54, cmt 6. The comment states that "the current state of international law on countermeasures taken in the general or collective interest is uncertain. State practice is sparse and involves a limited number of States. At present, there appears to be no clearly recognized entitlement of States ... to take countermeasures in the collective interest.... [C]hapter II includes a saving clause which reserves the position and leaves the resolution of the matter to the further development of international law."
295.	Ibid. art. 48(2)(a)-(b).
296.	453 U.S. 654 (1981).
297.	Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Relating to the Commitments Made by Iran and the United States and Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981) (collectively "Algiers Accords").
298.	Executive Order 12294 of February 24, 1981, "Suspension of Litigation Against Iran," 46 Federal Register 14111, February 26, 1981.
299.	Algiers Accords.
300.	Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979, "Blocking Iranian Government Property," 44 Federal Register 65729, November 15, 1979; Executive Order 12279 of January 19, 1981, "Direction to Transfer Iranian Government Assets Held by Domestic Banks," 46 Federal Register 7917, January 23, 1981.
301.	Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 644.
302.	Ibid.
303.	Ibid., 666.
304.	Ibid., 666-67.
305.	Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).
306.	Ibid., 680 (citing the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 13, codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§1621 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV)).
307.	Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952).
308.	Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
309.	United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2006) (appeal of whether IEEPA constitutes an appropriate delegation of congressional authority to the executive).
310.	United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 576 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding IEEPA's delegation of authority to the President); United States v. Mirza, 454 F. App'x 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2011) (same); Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 216-17 (same); United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1092–94 (4th Cir.1993) (same); see also United States v. Nazemzadeh, No. 11 CR 5726 L, 2014 WL 310460, at *8 (S.D. Cal. January 28, 2014); United States v. Vaghari, No. CRIM.A. 08-693-01-02, 2009 WL 2245097, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2009); Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, No. 05–C–580, 2007 WL 1051767, at *20–21 (E.D. Wis. March 31, 2007), aff'd, 559 F.3d 595 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 566–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Esfahani, No. 05–CR–0255, 2006 WL 163025, at *1–4 (N.D. Ill. January 17, 2006); United States v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F. Supp. 2d 821, 829–30 (N.D. Ohio 2005); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
311.	Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 215 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)).
312.	Ibid., 216 ("Even if a heightened standard should apply to delegations concerning criminal offenses, the IEEPA's delegation is subject to constraints similar to those found sufficient in [Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 111 (1991)]"); see also Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d at 576 ("We too conclude that IEEPA "meaningfully constrains" the President's discretion."); Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d at 1092–94 (holding "constraining factors" in IEEPA sufficient to conclude the President's powers are "explicitly defined and circumscribed").
313.	Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 216-17 (internal citations omitted). See also United States v. Shih, 73 F.4th 1077, 1092 (9th Cir. 2023) (upholding the use of IEEPA to maintain the Export Administration Regulations despite lapse of the Export Administration Act did not violate the non-delegation doctrine because IEEPA "specifies the steps the President must take before invoking an emergency, including consultation with Congress, and establishes reporting requirements") The court further held that IEEPA "limits the President's authority to prohibit certain types of transactions, and prohibits the punishment of unwitting violators."). Ibid. The court explained that, "[b]ecause these statutory restrictions strike 'a careful balance between affording the President a degree of authority to address the exigencies of national emergencies and restraining his ability to perpetuate emergency situations indefinitely by creating more opportunities for congressional input,'" it agreed with every Circuit to have considered the issue, and determined "that IEEPA is constitutional." Ibid. (citing United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 577 (3d Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 215–17 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1092–94 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Mirza, 454 F. App'x 249, 255–56 (5th Cir. 2011)).
314.	Dhafir, 461 F.3d. at 217 (citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675).
315.	V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, No. 25-00066, Slip Op. 25-66 at 28 (Ct. Int'l Trade May 28, 2025); cf. CRS Report R45153, Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends, by Valerie C. Brannon (2023) (discussing use of constitutional-avoidance canon to interpret statutes).
316.	V.O.S. Selections, Slip Op. 25-66 at 30.
317.	See CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11332, Court Decisions Regarding Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), by Christopher T. Zirpoli (2025).
318.	Sacks v. Off. of Foreign Assets Control, 466 F.3d 764, 775 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that IEEPA does not burden the President's powers with respect to humanitarian aid when he acts under the UNPA). IEEPA does not provide authority to regulate "donations ... of articles, such as food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve human suffering, except to the extent that the President determines that such donations" would risk certain harms. 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(2).
319.	Iran Thalassemia Soc'y v. Off. of Foreign Assets Control, No. 3:22-CV-1195-HZ, 2022 WL 9888593, at *5 (D. Or. Oct. 14, 2022) (declining to enjoin "maximum pressure" sanctions against Iran for violating the Trade Sanction Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA, P.L. 106-387, §1, found at 22 U.S.C. §7202) and the Iran financial sector sanctions provision, found at 22 U.S.C. §8513a(d)(2)), appeal dismissed, No. 22-35850, 2022 WL 18461465 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 2022).
320.	50 U.S.C. §1706(b) (2018).
321.	United States v. Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d 195, 196 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
322.	Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954–55.
323.	Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d at 197 ("Because [defendants] were charged and convicted under 50 U.S.C. §1705(b), and this section is not affected by the unconstitutionality of §1706(b), the constitutionality of the legislative veto is irrelevant to their convictions."). Although the original NEA authorized termination through a concurrent resolution, which does not require the President's signature, Congress amended the provision in 1985 to require a joint resolution as a response to Chadha. Notwithstanding this amendment, Section 207 of IEEPA continues to refer to termination by concurrent resolution.
324.	Ibid., 196 (finding that the balance of IEEPA is capable of functioning independently and noting Congress's inclusion of a severability clause).
325.	U.S. Constitution, Amdt. V. For more information, see Congressional Research Service, "Takings Clause: Overview," Constitution Annotated, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt5-9-1/ALDE_00013280/.
326.	See Paradissiotis v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 16, 20 (2001) (describing a regulatory taking as "not involv[ing] physical invasion or seizure of property [but rather] concern[ing] action that affects an owner's use of property, … based on the 'general rule ... that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking'") (citing Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)), aff'd, 304 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
327.	Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 673 n. 6. (noting that "an American claimant may not use an attachment that is subject to a revocable license and that has been obtained after the entry of a freeze order to limit in any way the actions the President may take" pursuant to IEEPA).
328.	Ibid., 673–674; see also Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat. Airlines Corp., 657 F.2d 3, 4 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The President's action in nullifying the attachments did not constitute a taking of property for which compensation must be paid.").
329.	767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (landlord leasing office space to a foreign government "did so against the backdrop of the government's foreign policy power" and did not have reasonable investment-backed expectation that its contract would be fulfilled); Rockefeller Ctr. Properties v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 586, 592 (1995) ("[T]hose who trade with foreign governments must … take the President's power into account in structuring their transactions."); Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[T]hose who enter into employment contracts overseas do so in light of one salient fact of economic life: that their ability to perform and compel performance is contingent upon the continuation of friendly relations between nations" (citing Chang v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 555, 559-60 (1987)); Paradissiotis, 49 Fed. Cl. at 21 (holding there was no taking because "plaintiff's [stock options] were 'in every sense subordinate to the President's power under the IEEPA.'").
330.	Paradissiotis, 49 Fed. Cl. at 21.
331.	Ibid. (quoting Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1870), quoted in Chang, 859 F.2d at 897).
332.	Glob. Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 802 (N.D. Ill.) ("Takings claims have often been raised—and consistently rejected—in the IEEPA context."), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
333.	Ibid. (citing Tran Qui Than v. Regan, 658 F.2d 1296, 1304 (9th Cir.1981); Miranda v. Secretary of Treasury, 766 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1985)); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 78–79 (D.D.C. 2002) ("[T]he case law is clear that a blocking of this nature does not constitute a seizure." (citations omitted)), aff'd, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
334.	IPT Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, No. 92 CIV. 5542 (JFK), 1994 WL 613371, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the blocking of assets is not a taking as title to the property has not vested in the Government, the company IPT did not become a government-owned enterprise, and any proceeds from a sale of the business or its assets will still vest in its owners, who may claim such assets when the blocking order is lifted).
335.	KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 872 (N.D. Ohio 2009); Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 585 F. Supp.2d 1233, 1263 (D. Or. 2008).
336.	KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 883.
337.	U.S. Constitution, Amdt. V.
338.	IPT Co., 1994 WL 613371, at *6 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 498 (1993); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976)).
339.	Glob. Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 803-04 (emphasizing "the Executive's need for speed in these matters, and the need to prevent the flight of assets and destruction of records"), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
340.	Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (D.D.C. 2002).
341.	Ibid.
342.	686 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 2012).
343.	424 U.S. 319 (1976).
344.	Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 979.
345.	Ibid. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35).
346.	Ibid., 979–80 (internal citations omitted).
347.	Ibid., 980.
348.	Ibid.
349.	Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 981 (stating the use of classified information "should be presumptively unconstitutional" (citing Am.–Arab Anti–Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir. 1995)).
350.	Ibid., 982 "[T]the use of classified information in the fight against terrorism, during a presidentially declared "national emergency," qualifies as sufficiently "extraordinary" to overcome the presumption.").
351.	Ibid., 981 (citing Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F. Supp. 2d 637, 660 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Al–Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 72 (D.D.C. 2008)). See also Olenga v. Gacki, 507 F. Supp. 3d 260, 278 (D.D.C. 2020) ("[G]iven the overriding governmental interest at stake in protecting classified information and the wide berth afforded the executive branch in matters relating to foreign affairs and national security, the Court concludes that OFAC has provided Olenga with sufficient notice of the reasons for his designation to comply with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.").
352.	Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 984 ("OFAC's failure to pursue potential mitigation measures violated AHIF–Oregon's due process rights.").
353.	Ibid., 990.
354.	Ibid., 984.
355.	Ibid., 984-85.
356.	Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 987 (holding that, at a minimum, OFAC must provide a timely statement of reasons for the investigation).
357.	Ibid. at 990 ("Even if [the organization] had enjoyed better access to classified information and constitutionally adequate notice, we are confident that it would not have changed OFAC's ultimate designation determination.").
358.	Rakhimov v. Gacki, No. CV 19-2554 (JEB), 2020 WL 1911561, at *5 (D.D.C. April 20, 2020) (citing People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); see also Fulmen Co. v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, 547 F. Supp. 3d 13, 22 (D.D.C. 2020) ("Because Fulmen's own pleadings demonstrate no property or presence in the United States, it cannot establish the 'substantial connections' necessary to potentially entitle it to constitutional protections as a non-resident alien.").
359.	Rakhimov, 2020 WL 1911561 at *5 (citing Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 201–03 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 32 Cty. Sovereignty Comm. v. U.S. Dep't of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
360.	Ibid.
361.	See ibid., *6 (observing that the court must follow "the APA's [5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A)] 'highly deferential standard,' meaning that [it] may set aside Treasury's action 'only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law'") (quoting Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
362.	KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 889 ("Courts have uniformly held that OFAC's blocking and designation authorities do not reach a substantial amount of protected speech, and that its restrictions are narrowly tailored."); Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52-55 (D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting claims that OFAC blocking action violated plaintiff's First Amendment freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of religion, and noting that "nothing in the IEEPA or the executive order prohibits [the plaintiff] from expressing its views"); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 570 (E.D. Va. 2002) ("The First Amendment's guarantee of associational freedom is no license to supply terrorist organizations with resources or material support in any form, including services as a combatant.").
363.	Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that "where an organization is found to have supported terrorism, government actions to suspend that support are not unconstitutional" under the First Amendment); Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 166 (holding "as other courts have," with respect to a First Amendment right to association claim, that "there is no First Amendment right nor any other constitutional right to support terrorists" (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000)).
364.	Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at 736 ("The blocking was not based on, nor does it prohibit, associational activity other than financial support.").
365.	Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting cases that concluded that intermediate scrutiny applies to a designation as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) and blocking order affecting funds purportedly intended for charitable purposes).
366.	Glob. Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)), aff'd on other grounds, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
367.	Ibid. (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77).
368.	Ibid.
369.	Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 997 (holding strict scrutiny applies and that, "[a]ccordingly, the prohibition survives only if it is narrowly tailored to advance the concededly compelling government interest of preventing terrorism").
370.	561 U.S. 1, 38 (2010) (upholding the prohibition on material support of terrorist organizations, 18 U.S.C. §2339B, against First Amendment challenge).
371.	Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 1001 (holding that under the prevailing fact circumstances, OFAC's content-based prohibitions on speech violate the First Amendment).
372.	United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 583 (3d Cir. 2011).
373.	Ibid., 567.
374.	United States v. Griffith, 515 F. Supp. 3d 106, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
375.	Ibid., 117.
376.	United States v. Alavi, No. CR 07-429-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 1989773, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss superseding indictment).
377.	Van Loon v. Dep't of Treasury, No. 1:23-CV-312-RP, 2023 WL 5313091, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2023).
378.	Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," 84 Federal Register 22689, May 17, 2019.
379.	Executive Order 13942 of August 6, 2020, "Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok, and Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," 85 Federal Register 48637, August 11, 2020; Executive Order 13943 of August 6, 2020, "Addressing the Threat Posed by WeChat, and Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," 85 Federal Register 48641, August 11, 2020.
380.	Executive Order 13942.
381.	Executive Order 13943.
382.	Executive Order 13942; Executive Order 13943.
383.	Marland v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 624 (E.D. Pa. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 5346749, at *1 (3d Cir. July 14, 2021); U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 4692706 (9th Cir. August 9, 2021).
384.	TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, 507 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D.D.C. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 3082803, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2021).
385.	Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 632.
386.	Identification of Prohibited Transactions to Implement Executive Order 13942 and Address the Threat Posed by TikTok and the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 85 Federal Register 60,061 (September 24, 2020) (the "Commerce TikTok Identification").
387.	Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 632 (quoting September 17 Commerce Department memorandum).
388.	Ibid., 634.
389.	Ibid. (citing 5 U.S.C. §702; 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1) and (3)).
390.	Ibid., 636.
391.	Ibid., 637 ("[T]he effect of the Identification will be to undermine the app's functionality such that U.S. users will be prevented from exchanging data on the app.").
392.	Ibid.
393.	Ibid., 638.
394.	Ibid.
395.	Ibid., 639.
396.	TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, 490 F. Supp. 3d 73 (D.D.C. 2020).
397.	Ibid., 80.
398.	Ibid., 82 (quoting 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(3)).
399.	Ibid., 81.
400.	Ibid., 83.
401.	50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1).
402.	TikTok, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 83.
403.	Ibid.
404.	Ibid.
405.	U.S. Commerce Department, https://www.commerce.gov/files/identification-prohibited-transactions-implement-executive-order-13943-and-address-threat.
406.	Ibid.
407.	U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
408.	Ibid., 926 (referring to plaintiffs' description of WeChat as "a public square for the Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking community in the U.S").
409.	Ibid., 927.
410.	Ibid. (discounting government's "argument that other substitute social-media apps permit communication").
411.	Ibid., 926-27. In order to justify a prior restraint, the government must demonstrate that the restraint is "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest." Twitter, Inc. v. Sessions, 263 F. Supp. 3d 803, 810 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539. 571 (1979); Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
412.	U.S. WeChat Users Alliance, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 927 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Pac. Coast Horseshoeing Sch., Inc. v. Kirchmeyer, 961 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020)).
413.	U.S. WeChat Users Alliance, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 927.
414.	Ibid., 928 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
415.	Ibid., 929.
416.	Ibid. (citing California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018)).
417.	Ibid. (citing Am. Beverage Ass'n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2019)).
418.	Ibid.
419.	Ibid.
420.	Ibid., 930.
421.	Marland v. Trump, No. 20-3322 (3d Cir. filed November11, 2020); TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, No. 20-5381 (D.C. Cir. filed December 29, 2020); U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, No. 20-16908 (9th Cir. filed October 2, 2020).
422.	Jeanne Whalen, Biden asks for pause in Trump's effort to ban WeChat, Wash. Post, February 11, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/02/11/wechat-trump-biden-pause/.
423.	Executive Order 14034 of June 9, 2021, "Protecting Americans' Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries," 86 Federal Register 31,423 (June11, 2021).
424.	Marland v. Trump, No. 20-3322, 2021 WL 5346749, at *1 (3d Cir. July 14, 2021) (dismissing appeal pursuant to agreement between parties); TikTok Inc. v. Biden, No. 20-5381, 2021 WL 3082803, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2021) (dismissing appeal at government's request); WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, No. 20-16908, 2021 WL 4692706, at *1 (9th Cir. August 9, 2021) (same).
425.	Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," 84 Federal Register 22,689 (May 17, 2019).
426.	P.L. 118-50. After the deadline to divest had passed and the Supreme Court upheld PAFACAA, TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 145 S. Ct. 57 (2025) (per curiam), President Trump suspended enforcement for 75 days. Executive Order 14166, "Application of Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act to Tiktok," 90 Federal Register 8611, January 20, 2025. For more information, see CRS Report R48023, TikTok: Frequently Asked Questions and Issues for Congress, by Michael D. Sutherland, Peter J. Benson, and Clare Y. Cho (2025). In June 2025, President Trump extended the enforcement delay until September 17, 2025. Executive Order 14310, "Further Extending the TikTok Enforcement Delay," 90 Federal Register 26913, June 24, 2025.
427.	P.L. 118-50, div. H, §2.
428.	In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), P.L. 115-232, to repeal the Export Administration Act of 1979 and provide new statutory authority for the continuation of Export Administration Regulations (EAR). However, three sections were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise of IEEPA. See " The Export Control Reform Act of 2018" section below.
429.	P.L. 96-72, §2, 93 Stat. 503 (1979), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§4601-4623 (2018).
430.	Executive Order 12444 of October 14, 1983, "Continuation of Export Control Regulations," 48 Federal Register 48215, October 18, 1983.
431.	Ibid.
432.	Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001, "Continuation of Export Control Regulations," 66 Federal Register 44025, August 22, 2001.
433.	See, for example, Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 82 Federal Register 39005 (August 15, 2017).
434.	Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2005) ("Courts uniformly have read [the executive order preserving the EAA regulations under IEEPA] to mean that the statute remained in full effect during the periods of lapse."). In this case, Sudan challenged its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism pursuant to a provision of the EAA because the statute had expired.
435.	United States v. Mechanic, 809 F.2d 1111, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1987).
436.	Ibid., 1113-14 (emphasizing the foreign affairs connection served by the EAA).
437.	United States v. Quinn, 401 F. Supp. 2d 80, 93 (D.D.C. 2005).
438.	Ibid., 95.
439.	5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3) (2018).
440.	Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 317 F.3d 275, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
441.	Ibid.
442.	Micei Int'l v. Dep't of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
443.	Ibid., 1151.
444.	Ibid., 1153 (internal citations omitted).
445.	Ibid., 1152 (citing 5 U.S.C. §704 (2009)).
446.	For information about illicit uses of cryptocurrency, see CRS Report R47425, Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues, by Paul Tierno (2023); CRS In Focus IF12537, Terrorist Financing: Hamas and Cryptocurrency Fundraising, by Liana W. Rosen, Paul Tierno, and Rena S. Miller (2024).
447.	122 F.4th 549 (5th Cir. 2024).
448.	CRS In Focus IF12405, Introduction to Cryptocurrency, by Paul Tierno (2025).
449.	Ibid., 565.
450.	According to 31 C.F.R. § 510.323 The terms property and property interest include money, checks, drafts, bullion, bank deposits, savings accounts, debts, indebtedness, obligations, notes, guarantees, debentures, stocks, bonds, coupons, any other financial instruments, bankers acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or other rights in the nature of security, warehouse receipts, bills of lading, trust receipts, bills of sale, any other evidences of title, ownership, or indebtedness, letters of credit and any documents relating to any rights or obligations thereunder, powers of attorney, goods, wares, merchandise, chattels, stocks on hand, ships, goods on ships, real estate mortgages, deeds of trust, vendors' sales agreements, land contracts, leaseholds, ground rents, real estate and any other interest therein, options, negotiable instruments, trade acceptances, royalties, book accounts, accounts payable, judgments, patents, trademarks or copyrights, insurance policies, safe deposit boxes and their contents, annuities, pooling agreements, services of any nature whatsoever, contracts of any nature whatsoever, and any other property, real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or interest or interests therein, present, future, or contingent. Ibid., footnote 53.
451.	Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015, "Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities," 80 Federal Register 18077, April 2, 2015.
452.	See U.S. Department of the Treasury, "U.S. Treasury Sanctions Notorious Virtual Currency Mixer Tornado Cash," press release, August 8, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0916.
453.	Van Loon, 122 F.4th at 553.
454.	Ibid. at 553–54.
455.	Van Loon v. Dep't of Treasury, 688 F. Supp. 3d 454, 468 (W.D. Tex. 2023) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that the smart contracts are immutable and not subject to being owned because OFAC's definition of property encompasses "contracts of any nature whatsoever"), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Van Loon v. Dep't of the Treasury, 122 F.4th 549 (5th Cir. 2024).
456.	Van Loon, 122 F.4th at 568.
457.	Ibid.
458.	Ibid., 570.
459.	Ibid., 554.
460.	In 2019, President Trump suggested that he would use IEEPA to impose a tariff on Mexico but ultimately decided not to. Statement from the President Regarding Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20190531004403/https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-address-border-crisis/; President Donald J. Trump, Twitter Post, June 7, 2018, 5:31 p.m., https://perma.cc/Q2DZ-5EK4. The suspension preceded the release of a U.S. Mexico Joint Declaration on migration. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S.-Mexico Joint Declaration, June 7, 2019, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20190608032208/https://www.state.gov/u-s-mexico-joint-declaration/.
461.	Executive Order 14193 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border," 90 Federal Register 9113, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border," 90 Federal Register 9117, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14195 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People's Republic of China," 90 Federal Register 9121, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14245 of March 24, 2025, "Imposing Tariffs on Countries Importing Venezuelan Oil," 90 Federal Register 13829, March 27, 2025; Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, "Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits," 90 Federal Register 15041, April 7, 2025; Executive Order 14323 of July 30, 2025, "Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil," 90 Federal Register 37739, August 5, 2025. See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11281, Legal Authority for the President to Impose Tariffs Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), by Christopher T. Zirpoli (2025).
462.	Executive Order 14193.
463.	Executive Order 14194.
464.	Executive Order 14195.
465.	Executive Order 14245.
466.	Executive Order 14257.
467.	Executive Order 14323.
468.	See, for example, S. 151 (119th Cong.); H.R. 407 (119th Cong.).
469.	See CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11332, Court Decisions Regarding Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), by Christopher T. Zirpoli (2025).
470.	V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, No. 25-00066, Slip Op. 25-66 at 48-49 (Ct. Int'l Trade May 28, 2025); Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 25-01248, Memorandum Op. at 27 (D.D.C. May 29, 2025). See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11332, Court Decisions Regarding Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), by Christopher T. Zirpoli (2025).
471.	V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, Nos. 2025-1812, -1813, Order (Fed. Cir. June 10, 2025) (en banc consideration granted); Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 25-5202, Order (D.C. Cir. July 1, 2025) (scheduling oral argument for Sept. 30, 2025). See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11332, Court Decisions Regarding Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), by Christopher T. Zirpoli (2025).
472.	V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, Nos. 2025-1812, 2025-1813, 2025 LX 386998, at *47-48 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 29, 2025) ("We affirm the CIT's holding that the Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs imposed by the Challenged Executive Orders exceed the authority delegated to the President by IEEPA's text. We also affirm the CIT's grant of declaratory relief that the orders are "invalid as contrary to law. We vacate the CIT's grant of a permanent injunction universally enjoining the enforcement of the Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs and remand for the CIT to reevaluate the propriety of granting injunctive relief and the proper scope of such relief, after considering all four eBay factors and the Supreme Court's holding in CASA." Internal citations omitted)
473.	Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., No. 25-250, 2025 LX 313715, at *1 (Sep. 9, 2025).
474.	See, for example, Jason Luong, "Forcing Constraint"; Jules Lobel, "Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism."
475.	See, for example, "After 41 Years The Depression Finally Ending," New York Times, October 13, 1974; "Senate Votes to Conclude 4 National Emergencies," New York Times, October 8, 1974; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v.
476.	Congress has only successfully terminated via joint resolution one national emergency declared under the NEA. That national emergency, which related to the Novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID 19) pandemic, did not invoke IEEPA.
477.	CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10267, Definition of National Emergency under the National Emergencies Act, by Jennifer K. Elsea (2019).
478.	50 U.S.C. §1701.
479.	House Markup, p. 12.
480.	Using the judiciary to determine whether an emergency authority can be exercised by the executive has been common. The First Militia Act of 1792, for example, required that either an associate justice of the Supreme Court of a district judge confirm that an insurrection "too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings" existed. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264. Using a court to determine whether an emergency existed and whether an action was necessary was also the method favored by the German-American jurist, advisor to President Abraham Lincoln, and founder of American political science, Francis Lieber, who argued that the acts of officials in states of emergency should be adjudged in court "to be necessary in the judgment of a moderate and reasonable man." Qtd. in Witt, "A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism," p. 588.
481.	50 U.S.C. §§1803-1805.
482.	"The International Emergency Economic Powers Act," Harvard Law Review, p. 1111 n. 49.
483.	Ibid.; See also Thronson, "Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime," pp. 757-758.
484.	In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Title XVII, Subtitle B of P.L. 115-232, 132 Stat. 2208, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§4801 et seq. to provide new statutory authority for the continuation of EAR. However, three sections were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise of IEEPA. See "The Export Control Reform Act of 2018" below.
485.	Ibid.
486.	Executive Order 14193 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border," 90 Federal Register 9113, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border," 90 Federal Register 9117, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14195 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People's Republic of China," 90 Federal Register 9121, February 7, 2025.
487.	See, for example, the testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on International Relations and Markup of the Trading with the Enemy Reform Legislation, 95th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), pp. 8-9.
488.	United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1975) ("Congress, in enacting s 5(b) of the TWEA, authorized the President, during an emergency, to […] 'regulate importation,' by imposing an import duty surcharge or by other means appropriately and reasonably related […] to the particular nature of the emergency declared.").
489.	TWEA, codified as amended in 1971 at §5(b), provided that during a period of national emergency, the President may "investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest." IEEPA, as passed in 1977 at §203(a)(1)(B), provided that during a period of national emergency, the President may "investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest." While he did not ultimately end up doing so, President Trump announced his intention to use IEEPA to impose and gradually increase a 5% tariff on all goods imported from Mexico. Statement from the President Regarding Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-address-border-crisis/. See also CRS Insight IN11129, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (NEA), and Tariffs: Historical Background and Key Issues, by Christopher A. Casey (2025).
490.	For example, Global Trade Accountability Act, S. 1060 (Lee), 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 29, 2023; Protecting Our Democracy Act, S. 2921 (Klobuchar), 117th Cong., 1st sess., September 30, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act of 2021, H.R. 2618 (Davidson), 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 16, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act, S. 691 (Lee), 117th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 2019; Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 2019.
491.	Thronson, "Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime," p. 759.
492.	Congress amended NEA in 1985 to require a joint resolution, which is subject to the President's veto, to terminate an emergency. P.L. 99-93 (August 16, 1985), 99 Stat. 405. See also Rachel Jessica Wolff, "Whose Constitutional Authority Is It Anyway? Nondelegation, the National Emergencies Act, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act," Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 21 (2023), p. 628.
493.	For example, ARTICLE ONE Act, S. 1912 (Lee), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 8, 2023; Protecting Our Democracy Act, S. 2921 (Klobuchar), 117th Cong., 1st sess., September 30, 2021; National Emergencies Reform Act , H.R. 9041 (Amash), 116th Cong., 2nd sess., December 22, 2020.
494.	National Security Powers Act of 2021, S. 2391 (Murphy), 117th Cong., 1st sess., July 20, 2021. For additional examples during the 116th Congress, see Global Trade Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 2019; Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 2019.
495.	U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, "Never Ending Emergencies – An Examination of the National Emergencies Act," 118th Cong., 1st sess., hearing, May 24, 2023; Catherine Padhi, "Emergencies Without End: A Primer on Federal States of Emergency," Lawfare, December 8, 2017.
496.	See "Implications of Terminating National Emergencies Invoking IEEPA"
497.	House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 9.
498.	Since the enactment of the NEA, two resolutions to terminate a national emergency have been introduced. The first was to terminate the national emergency declared in response to Hurricane Katrina, but the declaration of emergency in that case did not invoke IEEPA. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Congress, 1st session, September 8, 2005. The second was to terminate the national emergency declared February 15, 2019 with respect to the Southern Border of the United States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019; S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019. However, neither of the declarations of national emergency at issue invoked IEEPA.
499.	50 U.S.C. §1622(b).
500.	For example, Reforming Emergency Powers to Uphold the Balances and Limitations Inherent in the Constitution Act or the REPUBLIC Act, S. 463 (Paul), 117th Cong., 1st sess., February 25, 2021; Assuring that Robust, Thorough, and Informed Congressional Leadership is Exercised Over National Emergencies Act or the ARTICLE One Act, S. 764 (Lee), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 12, 2019, as reported to the Senate November 19, 2019.
501.	In 2019, Rep. Castro and Sen. Udall introduced resolutions to terminate the declaration of a national emergency with respect to the Southern Border of the United States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019; S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019.
502.	Ibid.
503.	Act of April 10, 2023, P.L. 118-3, 137 Stat. 6.
504.	Ibid.
505.	Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on October 27, 2006, H.J.Res. 68 (Boebert), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 25, 2011, H.J.Res. 70 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 22, 2003, H.J.Res. 71 (Crane), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 14, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 16, 2012, H.J.Res. 74 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 11, 2004, H.J.Res. 79 (Gaetz), 118th Cong., 1st sess., July 6, 2023.
506.	50 U.S.C. §1622(a) provides that: [A]ny powers or authorities exercised by reason of [the terminated] emergency shall cease to be exercised after [the date of termination], except that such termination shall not affect- (A) any action taken or proceeding pending not finally concluded or determined on such date; (B) any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior to such date; or (C) any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were incurred prior to such date.
507.	United Nations Participation Act, P.L. 79-264, §5, 59 Stat. 620 (1945), codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §287c. The extent to which the UNPA would permit the blocking of property by placing individuals or entities on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List is uncertain. The UNPA gives the President the authority to implement U.N. sanctions and authorizes him to enforce such measures by issuing "such orders, rules, and regulations as may be prescribed by him," thereby allowing him to "investigate, regulate, or prohibit, in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or any person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." Ibid. IEEPA authority includes the authority for the President to "investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(B).
508.	50 U.S.C. §1706(a)(1).
509.	S. Rep. No. 95-466, at 6 (1977) (noting that "blocked assets may continue to be blocked by the President despite termination of a state of emergency, the National Emergencies Act notwithstanding, unless Congress specifies otherwise" and that "[n]othing in this act is intended by the committee to interfere with the authority of the President to continue blocking assets which are presently blocked, or to impede the settlement of claims of U.S. citizens against foreign countries").
510.	Executive Order 13304 of May 28, 2003, "Termination of Emergencies With Respect to Yugoslavia and Modification of Executive Order 13219 of June 26, 2001," 68 Federal Register 32315, May 29, 2003.
511.	See, for example, Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 67 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
512.	See Glob. Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that covered "interest" need not be a legal interest "in the way that a trustee is legal owner of the corpus even if someone else enjoys the beneficial interest").
513.	50 U.S.C. §1706(a)(1) (emphasis added).
514.	Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), P.L. 115-232.
515.	Ibid. §1766(a).
516.	Executive Order 13222.
517.	ECRA §1766(a). Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of 1979, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§4611, 4612, 4613, were not repealed.
518.	ECRA §1766(b) ("The President shall implement [Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of 1979] by exercising the authorities of the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).").