The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

March 20, 2019 – January 30, 2024 R45618

The International Emergency Economic Powers January 30, 2024
Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Christopher A. Casey,
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) provides the President broad
Coordinator
authority to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a declaration of national
Analyst in International
emergency. IEEPA, like the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) from which it branched, sits at
Trade and Finance
the center of the modern U.S. sanctions regime. Changes in the use of IEEPA powers since the

act’s enactment in 1977 have caused some to question whether the statute’s oversight provisions
Dianne E. Rennack
are robust enough given the sweeping economic powers it confers upon the President during a
Specialist in Foreign Policy
declared emergency.
Legislation

Over the course of the twentieth century, Congress delegated increasing amounts of emergency
power to the President by statute. TWEA was one such statute. Congress passed TWEA in 1917
Jennifer K. Elsea
Legislative Attorney
to regulate international transactions with enemy powers following the U.S. entry into the First

World War. Congress expanded the act during the 1930s to allow the President to declare a
national emergency in times of peace and assume sweeping powers over both domestic and

international transactions. Between 1945 and the early 1970s, TWEA became the central means
to impose sanctions as part of U.S. Cold War strategy. Presidents used TWEA to block
international financial transactions, seize U.S.-based assets held by foreign nationals, restrict exports, modify regulations to
deter the hoarding of gold, limit foreign direct investment in U.S. companies, and impose tariffs on all imports into the
United States.
Following committee investigations that discovered that the United States had been in a state of emergency for more than 40
years, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976 and IEEPA in 1977. The pair of statutes placed new
limits on presidential emergency powers. Both included reporting requirements to increase transparency and track costs, and
the NEA required the President to assess annually and extend, if appropriate, an emergency. However, some experts argue
that the renewal process has become pro forma. The NEA also afforded Congress the means to terminate a national
emergency by adopting a concurrent resolution in each chamber. A decision by the Supreme Court, in a landmark case,
however, found the use of concurrent resolutions to terminate an executive action unconstitutional. Congress amended the
statute to require a joint resolution, significantly increasing the difficulty of terminating an emergency.
Like TWEA, IEEPA has become an important means to impose economic-based sanctions since its enactment; like TWEA,
Presidents have frequently used IEEPA to restrict a variety of international transactions; and like TWEA, the subjects of the
restrictions, the frequency of use, and the duration of emergencies have expanded over time. Initially, Presidents targeted
foreign states or their governments. Over the years, however, presidential administrations have increasingly used IEEPA to
target non-state individuals and groups, such as terrorists, persons who engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities, and
certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court.
As of January 15, 2024, Presidents had declared 69 national emergencies invoking IEEPA, 39 of which are ongoing. History
shows that national emergencies invoking IEEPA often last nearly a decade, although some have lasted significantly
longer—the first state of emergency declared under the NEA and IEEPA, which was declared in response to the taking of
U.S. embassy staff as hostages by Iran in 1979, is in its fifth decade.
IEEPA grants sweeping powers to the President to control economic transactions. Despite these broad powers, until 2023,
Congress had never attempted to terminate a national emergency invoking IEEPA. Instead, Congress has directed the
President on numerous occasions to use IEEPA authorities to impose sanctions. Congress may want to consider whether
IEEPA appropriately balances the need for swift action in a time of crisis with Congress’s duty to oversee executive action.
Congress may also want to consider IEEPA’s role in implementing its influence in U.S. foreign policy and national security
decision-making.
Congressional Research Service

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Introduction
The issue of executive discretion has been at the center of constitutional debates in liberal
democracies throughout the twentieth century. Specifically, the question of how to balance a
commitment to the rule of law with the exigencies of modern political and economic crises has
been a consistent concern of legislators and scholars in the United States and around the world.1
The U.S. Constitution is silent on the question of emergency power. As such, over the past two
centuries, Congress and the President have answered that question in varied and often ad hoc
ways. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the answer was often for the President to act
without congressional approval in a time of crisis, knowingly risking impeachment and personal
civil liability.2 Congress claimed primacy over emergency action and would decide subsequently
either to ratify the President’s actions through legislation or indemnify the President for any civil
liability.3
By the twentieth century, a new pattern had begun to emerge. Instead of retroactively judging an
executive’s extraordinary actions in a time of emergency, Congress enacted statutes authorizing
the President to declare a state of emergency and make use of extraordinary delegated powers.4
The expanding delegation of emergency powers to executives, and the increase in governing via
emergency power by executives, was a common trajectory among twentieth-century liberal
democracies.5 As innovation quickened the pace of social change and global crises, some
legislatures felt compelled to delegate to their executives, who traditional political theorists
assumed could operate with greater “dispatch” than the more deliberate and future-oriented

1 Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1948); Edward Corwin, Total War and the Constitution (New York: Knopf, 1963). Giorgio
Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four
Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
2 Such an answer can be traced to, among others, John Locke, whose political theory was central to the development of
American political institutions. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas Hollis (London: A. Millar et al.,
1764), pp. 340-341: “This power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law,
and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative […].”
3 Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism,” Yale Law Journal 98, no. 7 (May 1989), pp. 1392-
1398; John Fabian Witt, “A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism,” Law and History Review 36, no.
3 (August 2018); George M. Dennison, “Martial Law: The Development of a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776-
1861,” The American Journal of Legal History 18, no. 1 (January 1974); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Imperial from
the Beginning: The Constitution of the Original Executive (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), pp. 208-210;
Matthew Warshauer, Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Martial Law (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press,
2006). As Thomas Jefferson wrote, an executive officer acting illegally for what he determines to be the good of the
country “does indeed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the constitution, and his station makes it
his duty to incur that risk.” Qtd. in Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning, p. 214.
4 U.S. Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, A Brief History of
Emergency Powers in the United States, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., July 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1974), pp. 40-41.
5 For scholarship on this general trend, see, e.g., William E. Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social
Acceleration of Time (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart,
eds, Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Peter L. Lindseth, “The Paradox of
Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s,” Yale Law
Journal 113, no. 7 (May 2004); Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism”; Mary L. Dudziak,
War-Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Corwin, Total War
and the Constitution; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship.
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

legislatures.6 Whether such actions subvert the rule of law or are a standard feature of healthy
modern constitutional orders has been a subject of debate.7
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is one example of a twentieth-
century delegation of emergency authority.8 One of 117 emergency statutes under the umbrella of
the National Emergencies Act (NEA),9 IEEPA grants the President extensive power to regulate a
variety of economic transactions during a state of national emergency. Congress enacted IEEPA in
1977 to limit the emergency economic powers that it had delegated to the President under the
Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). Nevertheless, some scholars argue that judicial and
legislative actions subsequent to IEEPA’s enactment have made it, like TWEA, a source of
expansive and unchecked executive authority in the economic realm.10 Other scholars argue that
IEEPA is a useful tool for Presidents to implement quickly the will of Congress either as directed
by law or as encouraged by congressional activity.11
Until the late 2010s, there had been little congressional discussion of modifying either IEEPA or
its umbrella statute, the NEA. Presidential actions in the late 2010s and early 2020s, however,
have drawn renewed attention to presidential emergency powers under the NEA of which IEEPA
is the most frequently used.
Origins
The First World War and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)
The First World War (1914-1919) saw an unprecedented degree of economic mobilization.12 The
executive departments of European governments began to regulate their economies with or
without the support of their legislatures. The United States, in contrast, was in a privileged

6 Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, ch. 2; See, e.g., Carl Schmitt, “The Plight of
European Jurisprudence,” tr. G. L. Ulmen, Telos 83 (Spring 1990); John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, pp. 340-
341: “[…] since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so
too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide
for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are
executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their way; therefore there is
a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe.”
7 For arguments that emergency government subverts the rule of law, see, e.g., Sanford Levinson, “Constitutional
Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency,” Georgia Law Review 40, no. 3 (Spring 2006); Bruce Ackerman, The
Decline and Fall of the American Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). For arguments that
states of emergency can be a standard feature of healthy modern constitutional orders or that they can reflect or
anticipate the preferences of the legislature, see, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, “Small Emergencies,” Georgia Law Review
40, no. 3 (Spring 2006), p. 836; Carey and Shugart, Executive Decree Authority, p. 3.
8 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, P.L. 95-223 (October 28, 1977), 91 Stat. 1626, codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq. (2018) (IEEPA).
9 National Emergencies Act, P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§1601 et seq. (2018) (NEA); CRS Report R46379, Emergency Authorities Under the National Emergencies Act,
Stafford Act, and Public Health Service Act, coordinated by Jennifer K. Elsea.
10 See, e.g., Patrick A. Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” Michigan
Journal of Law Reform 46, no. 2 (2013), pp. 757-759; “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A
Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential Emergency Power,” Harvard Law Review 96, no. 5 (March 1983), p.
1120.
11 See, e.g., Scheppele, “Small Emergencies,” pp. 845-847: Statutes like IEEPA show “that emergencies have been
brought inside the constitutional order by being normalized in the ordinary legislative process.”
12 See Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, eds., The Economics of World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005).
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position relative to its allies in Europe. Separated by an ocean from Germany and Austria-
Hungary, the United States was never under substantial threat of invasion. Rather than relying on
the inherent powers of the presidency, or acting unconstitutionally and hoping for a subsequent
congressional ratification, President Wilson sought explicit pre-authorization for expansive new
powers to meet the global crisis.13 Between 1916 and the end of 1917, Congress passed 22
statutes empowering the President to take control of private property for public use during the
war.14 These statutes gave the President broad authority to control railroads, shipyards, cars,
telegraph and telephone systems, water systems, and many other sectors of the American
economy.15
TWEA was one of those 22 statutes.16 It granted to the executive an extraordinary degree of
control over international trade, investment, migration, and communications between the United
States and its enemies.17 TWEA defined “enemy” broadly and included “any individual,
partnership, or other body of individuals [including corporations], of any nationality, resident
within the territory ... of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside of
the United States and doing business within such a territory....”18 The first four sections of the act
granted the President extensive powers to limit trading with, communicating with, or transporting
enemies (or their allies) of the United States.19 These sections also empowered the President to
censor foreign communications and place extensive restrictions on enemy insurance or
reinsurance companies.20
It was Section 5(b) of TWEA, however, that would form one of the central bases of presidential
emergency economic power in the twentieth century. Section 5(b), as originally enacted, states
That the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations
as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign
exchange, export or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers of
credit in any form (other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly
within the United States), and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or of the ownership
of property between the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy, ally of
enemy or otherwise, or between residents of one or more foreign countries, by any person
within the United States; and he may require any such person engaged in any such
transaction to furnish, under oath, complete information relative thereto, including the
production of any books of account, contracts, letters or other papers, in connection
therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is
completed.21

13 Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, pp. 241-243; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the
United States, pp. 40-41.
14 J. Reuben Clark, Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917: Dealing with the Control and Taking of
Private Property for the Public Use, Benefit, or Welfare (Washington, DC: GPO, 1918), pp. 1-125.
15 Clark, Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917, pp. 1-125; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p.
243; David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), ch. 2.
16 For an overview of TWEA’s development, see Benjamin A. Coates, “The Secret Life of Statutes: A Century of the
Trading with the Enemy Act,” Modern American History 1, no. 2 (2018).
17 Trading with the Enemy Act, P.L. 65-91 (October 6, 1917) §2, 40 Stat. 411, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §4305
(2018) (TWEA).
18 TWEA §2.
19 TWEA §3.
20 TWEA §4.
21 TWEA §5b.
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The statute gave the President expansive control over private international economic transactions
in times of war.22 While Congress terminated many of the war powers in 1921, TWEA was
specifically exempted because the U.S. government had yet to dispose of a large amount of alien
property in its custody.23 Indeed, the disposition of property seized under emergency powers
would become a central tension in the structure of emergency authority over the next century.
The Expansion of TWEA
The Great Depression, a massive global economic downturn that began in 1929, presented a
challenge to liberal democracies in Europe and the Americas. To address the complexities
presented by the crisis, nearly all such democracies began delegating discretionary authority to
their executives to a degree that had previously been done only in times of war.24 The U.S.
Congress responded, in part, by dramatically expanding the scope of TWEA, delegating to the
President the power to declare states of emergency in peacetime and assume expansive domestic
economic powers.
Such a delegation was made politically possible by analogizing economic crises to war. In public
speeches, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asserted that the Depression was to be “attacked,”
“fought against,” “mobilized for,” and “combatted” by “great arm[ies] of people.”25 The
economic mobilization of the First World War had blurred the lines between the executive’s
military and economic powers. As the Depression was likened to “armed strife”26 and declared to
be “an emergency more serious than war”27 by a Justice of the Supreme Court, it became routine
to use emergency economic legislation enacted in wartime as the basis for extraordinary
economic authority in peacetime.28
As the Depression entered its third year, the newly-elected President Roosevelt asked Congress
for “broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that
would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”29 In his first act as President,
Roosevelt proclaimed a bank holiday, suspending all transactions at all banking institutions
located in the United States and its territories for four days.30 In his proclamation, Roosevelt
claimed to have authority to declare the holiday under Section 5(b) of TWEA.31 However,
because the United States was not in a state of war and the suspended transactions were primarily
domestic, the President’s authority to issue such an order was dubious.32

22 TWEA §2.
23 U.S. Congress, House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, Report of the Committee on International
Relations on H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 95-459 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 4.
24 William E. Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” Cardozo Law Review 21 (2000), p. 1872.
25 See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Inaugural Address of 1933 (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records
Administration, 1988); Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 256; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency
Powers in the United States, p. 56.
26 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Inaugural Address of 1933.
27 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306 (1932) (J. Brandeis, dissenting).
28 Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” p. 1878.
29 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Inaugural Address of 1933.
30 Proclamation 2039 (March 6, 1933).
31 In his proclamation, President Roosevelt did not refer to the “Trading with the Enemy Act,” but instead chose to use
the more opaque “Act of October 6, 1917.” Proclamation 2039.
32 President Herbert Hoover had likewise contemplated using TWEA for such a purpose. However, Hoover’s Attorney
General, William D. Mitchell, had expressed serious doubts about the legality of such an action. In the last days of
(continued...)
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Despite the tenuous legality, Congress ratified Roosevelt’s actions by passing the Emergency
Banking Relief Act three days after his proclamation.33 The act amended Section 5(b) of TWEA
to read
During time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the
President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise,
investigate, regulate, or prohibit....34
This amendment gave the President the authority to declare that a national emergency existed and
assume extensive controls over the national economy previously only available in times of war.
By 1934, Roosevelt had used these extensive new powers to regulate “[e]very transaction in
foreign exchange, transfer of credit between any banking institution within the United States and
any banking institution outside of the United States.”35
With America’s entry into the Second World War in 1941, Congress again amended TWEA to
grant the President extensive powers over the disposition of private property, adding the so-called
“vesting” power, which authorized the permanent seizure of property.36 Now in its most
expansive form, TWEA authorized the President to declare a national emergency and, in so doing,
to regulate foreign exchange, domestic banking, possession of precious metals, and property in
which any foreign country or foreign national had an interest.37
The Second World War ended in 1945. Following the conflict, the allied powers constructed
institutions and signed agreements designed to keep the peace and to liberalize world trade.
However, the United States did not immediately resume a peacetime posture with respect to
emergency powers. Instead, the onset of the Cold War rationalized the continued use of TWEA
and other emergency powers outside the context of a declared war.38 Over the next several
decades, Presidents declared four national emergencies and assumed expansive authority over
economic transactions in the postwar period.39
During the Cold War, economic sanctions became an increasingly popular foreign policy and
national security tool, and TWEA was a prominent source of presidential authority to use the tool.

Hoover’s presidency, Mitchell said that Hoover “should not issue [such an] executive order unless it was unanimously
agreed by [the] outgoing and incoming administrations that it was necessary and assurances [were] obtained from
Congressional leaders that [such an action] would be ratified promptly and that enabling legislation would be passed”
as there was only a “shoe string” on which to base the legality of such an order. Raymond Moley, The First New Deal
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), pp. 146-147.
33 Emergency Banking Relief Act, P.L. 73-1 (March 9, 1933), 48 Stat. 1 (EBRA). The House, despite having no copies
of the bill and relying upon a draft text read aloud by the Speaker, passed the bill after only 38 minutes of debate. The
Senate voted to pass the measure the same evening. U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United
States, p. 57.
34 TWEA as amended by EBRA. Italics show the language added by EBRA.
35 E.O. 6560 (January 15, 1934). These actions came in the context of greater participation by the executive in
international economic transactions generally. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 gave the President the
authority to negotiate bilateral trade agreements, marking the beginning of a period of increasing U.S. trade
liberalization through executive action. Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 2017), chap. 9.
36 P.L. 77-354 (December 18, 1941), 55 Stat. 838.
37 Ibid.
38 Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” p. 1879; Robert S. Rankin and Winfried R. Dallmyr, Freedom
and Emergency Powers in the Cold War (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964).
39 Proclamation 2914 (December 16, 1950); Proclamation 3972 (March 23, 1970); Proclamation 3972 (February 23,
1971); Proclamation 4074 (August 15, 1971). See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10267, Definition of National
Emergency under the National Emergencies Act, by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Report 98-505, National Emergency
Powers, by L. Elaine Halchin.
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In 1950, President Harry S. Truman declared a national emergency, citing TWEA, to impose
economic sanctions on North Korea and China.40 Subsequent Presidents referenced that national
emergency as authority for imposing sanctions on Vietnam, Cuba, and Cambodia.41 Truman
likewise used Section 5(b) of TWEA to maintain regulations on foreign exchange, transfers of
credit, and the export of coin and currency that had been in place since the early 1930s.42
Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford invoked TWEA to continue export controls
established under the Export Administration Act when the act expired.43
TWEA was also a prominent instrument of postwar presidential monetary policy. Presidents
Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy used TWEA and the national emergency declared by
President Roosevelt in 1933 to maintain and modify regulations controlling the hoarding and
export of gold.44 In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson explicitly used Truman’s 1950 declaration
of emergency under Section 5(b) of TWEA to limit direct foreign investment by U.S. companies
in an effort to strengthen the balance of payments position of the United States after the
devaluation of the pound sterling by the United Kingdom.45 In 1971, after President Nixon
suspended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold, he made use of Section 5(b) of TWEA to
declare a state of emergency and place a 10% ad valorem supplemental duty on all dutiable goods
entering the United States.46
The reliance by the executive on the powers granted by Section 5(b) of TWEA meant that
postwar sanctions regimes and significant parts of U.S. international monetary policy relied on
continued states of emergency for their operation.
The Efforts of Congress to Limit Executive Emergency Authorities
By the mid-1970s, following U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, revelations of domestic
spying, assassinations of foreign political leaders, the Watergate break-in, and other related
abuses of power, Congress increasingly focused on checking the executive branch. The Senate
formed a bipartisan special committee chaired by Senators Frank Church and Charles Mathias to

40 Proclamation 2914 (December 16, 1950). This emergency would remain in place until 1976 and would be used to
justify a host of emergency powers. See the partial list of executive orders issued pursuant to Proclamation 2914 in U.S.
Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, Executive Orders in Times
of War and National Emergency, Report of the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency
Powers, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., June 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), p. 15.
41 U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Trade and Commerce, United States
Embargo on Trade with South Vietnam and Cambodia, 94th Cong. 1st sess., June 4, 1975 (Washington, D.C., GPO,
1975), p. 2; 31 C.F.R. 500.101-500.808 (1975).
42 E.O. 10348 (April 26, 1952).
43 E.O. 11677 (August 1, 1972); E.O. 11683 (August 29, 1972); E.O. 11796 (July 30, 1974); E.O. 11798 (August 14,
1974); E.O. 11810 (September 30, 1974); E.O. 11818 (November 5, 1974); E.O. 11940 (September 30, 1976).
44 E.O. 10896 (November 29, 1960); E.O. 11037 (July 20, 1962).
45 E.O. 11387 (January 1, 1968).
46 Pres. Proclamation No. 4074 (January 21, 1971). Although the proclamation did not explicitly refer to TWEA in
order to avoid the possible embarrassment of using a statute named the “Trading with the Enemy Act” to impose a
tariff principally aimed at U.S. allies, the proclamation was carefully worded to not exclude TWEA as an authority
under which the proclamation was issued. When a legal challenge was issued, the Government argued, and the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals agreed, that TWEA was the source of the authority for the proclamation. United
States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975). See also CRS Insight IN11129, The International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Tariffs: Historical Background and Key Issues, by Christopher A.
Casey.
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reevaluate delegations of emergency authority to the President.47 The special committee issued a
report surveying the President’s emergency powers in which it asserted that the United States had
technically “been in a state of national emergency since March 9, 1933” and that there were four
distinct declarations of national emergency in effect.48 The report also noted that the United States
had “on the books at least 470 significant emergency statutes without time limitations delegating
to the Executive extensive discretionary powers, ordinarily exercised by the Legislature, which
affect the lives of American citizens in a host of all-encompassing ways.”49
In the course of the Committee’s investigations, Senator Mathias, a committee co-chair, noted, “A
majority of the people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency
government.” Senator Church, the other co-chair, said the central question before the committee
was “whether it [was] possible for a democratic government such as ours to exist under its present
Constitution and system of three separate branches equal in power under a continued state of
emergency.”50
Among the more controversial statutes highlighted by the committee was TWEA. In 1977, during
the House markup of a bill revising TWEA, Representative Jonathan Bingham, Chairperson of
the House International Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Economic Policy, described
TWEA as conferring “on the President what could have been dictatorial powers that he could
have used without any restraint by Congress.”51 According to the Department of Justice, TWEA
granted the President four major groups of powers in a time of war or other national emergency:
(a) Regulatory powers with respect to foreign exchange, banking transfers, coin, bullion,
currency, and securities;
(b) Regulatory powers with respect to “any property in which any foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest”;

47 The bipartisan special committee was called the “Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National
Emergency,” and was charged with conducting “a study and investigation with respect to the matter of terminating the
national emergency proclaimed by the President of the United States on December 16, 1950.” U.S. Congress, Senate
Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, Trading with the
Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of International Transactions in Time of
Declared National Emergency, committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., November 1976 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976),
p. iii.
48 U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v. The four national emergencies were
those proclaimed by President Roosevelt in 1933, President Truman in 1950, and the two proclaimed by President
Nixon in 1970 and 1971.
49 U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v.
50 Qtd. in U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents, p. iii.
51 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Revision of the Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup
before the Committee on International Relations (“House Markup”), 95th Cong., 1st sess., June 1977 (Washington, DC:
GPO, 1977), p. 5. House and Senate committee reports expressed the view that past Presidents had abused the authority
to regulate economic transactions in a national emergency conferred by TWEA by using it in circumstances far
removed from those that originally gave rise to the declaration of national emergency. H. Rept. No. 95-459 (June 23,
1977); S. Rept. No. 95-466 (October 3, 1977). Both reports noted that President Lyndon B. Johnson, citing President
Truman’s declaration of national emergency with respect to Korea in 1950, had imposed controls on direct investment
abroad by U.S. nationals in 1968, and that President Gerald R. Ford had used President Nixon’s declaration of national
emergency with respect to the balance of payments in 1971 to justify extending the controls and regulations of the
Export Administration Act when that act lapsed temporarily in 1976. H. Rept. No. 95-459, at 5; S. Rept. No. 95-466, at
2. More generally, the House report noted that the national emergency authority of TWEA had been used by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt to regulate the banking industry in 1933 and to impose consumer credit controls in 1941 and by
President Richard M. Nixon to impose a surcharge on imports into the United States in 1971. Thus, the House report
concluded, TWEA “has become essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his
discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and international economic arena, without congressional review.” H.
Rept. No. 95-459, 7.
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(c) The power to vest “any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof”;
and
(d) The powers to hold, use, administer, liquidate, sell, or otherwise deal with “such interest
or property” in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States.52
The House report on the reform legislation called TWEA “essentially an unlimited grant of
authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and
international economic arena, without congressional review.”53 The criticisms of TWEA centered
on the following:
(a) It required no consultation or reports to Congress with regard to the use of powers or
the declaration of a national emergency.
(b) It set no time limits on a state of emergency, no mechanism for congressional review,
and no way for Congress to terminate it.
(c) It stated no limits on the scope of TWEA’s economic powers and the circumstances
under which such authority could be used.
(d) The actions taken under the authority of TWEA were rarely related to the circumstances
in which the national emergency was declared.54
In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Professor Harold G. Maier,
a noted legal scholar, summed up the development and the main criticisms of TWEA:
Section 5(b)’s effect is no longer confined to “emergency situations” in the sense of
existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit,
by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has
converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President.”55
The Enactment of the National Emergencies Act and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act
Congress’s reforms to emergency powers under TWEA came in two acts. First, Congress enacted
the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976.56 The NEA provided for the termination of all
existing emergencies in 1978, except those making use of Section 5(b) of TWEA, and placed new
restrictions on the manner of declaring and the duration of new states of emergency, including
• Requiring the President to transmit immediately to Congress a notification of the
declaration of national emergency.
• Requiring a biannual review whereby “each House of Congress shall meet to
consider a vote on a concurrent [now joint, see below] resolution to determine
whether that emergency shall be terminated.”
• Authorizing Congress to terminate the national emergency through a privileged
concurrent [now joint] resolution.57

52 U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 9.
55 Ibid.
56 P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq. (2018).
57 Ibid. While the NEA terminated the national emergencies on September 14, 1978, it explicitly enabled the
continuation of those emergencies with respect to Section 5(b) of TWEA to give the Congress more time to consider
(continued...)
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Second, Congress tackled the more complicated question of TWEA. Because the authorities
granted by TWEA were heavily entwined with postwar international monetary policy and the use
of sanctions in U.S. foreign policy, unwinding it was a difficult undertaking.58 The exclusion of
Section 5(b) reflected congressional interest in preserving existing regulations regarding foreign
assets, foreign funds, and exports of strategic goods.59 Similarly, establishing a means to continue
existing uses of TWEA reflected congressional interest in “improving future use rather than
remedying past abuses.”60
The subcommittee charged with reforming TWEA spent more than a year preparing reports,
including the first complete legislative history of TWEA, a tome that ran nearly 700 pages.61 In
the resulting legislation, Congress did three things. First, Congress amended TWEA so that it
was, as originally intended, only applicable “during a time of war.”62 Second, Congress expanded
the Export Administration Act to include powers that previously were authorized by reference to
Section 5(b) of TWEA.63 Finally, Congress wrote the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA) to confer “upon the President a new set of authorities for use in time of national
emergency which are both more limited in scope than those of section 5(b) and subject to
procedural limitations, including those of the [NEA].”64
The Report of the House Committee on International Relations summarized the nature of an
“emergency” in its “new approach” to international emergency economic powers:
[G]iven the breadth of the authorities, and their availability at the President’s discretion
upon a declaration of a national emergency, their exercise should be subject to various
substantive restrictions. The main one stems from a recognition that emergencies are by
their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal ongoing problems. A
national emergency should be declared and emergency authorities employed only with
respect to a specific set of circumstances which constitute a real emergency, and for no
other purpose. The emergency should be terminated in a timely manner when the factual

how to address the issue of sanctions and international economic regulation. The International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA) grandfathered powers that “were being exercised [under TWEA] with respect to a country on July
1, 1977,” including those with respect to Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. P.L. 95-223 (December 28,
1977) §101(b). The grandfathered powers, however, would require a declaration or renewal. See, e.g., Memorandum of
September 8, 1978, 45 Federal Register 40,695; Memorandum of September 12, 1979; Presidential Determination of
September 8, 1980, 45 Federal Register 59,549; Memorandum of September 10, 1981, 46 Federal Register 45,321;
Memorandum of September 8, 1982, 47 Federal Register 39,797; Memorandum of September 7, 1983, 48 Federal
Register 40,695; Memorandum of September 11, 1984, 49 Federal Register 35,927.
58 U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, pp. 6-7.
59 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, International Emergency Economic
Powers Legislation, Report to Accompany H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., S.Rept. 95-466 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1977), p. 3.
60 U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, 10.
61 House Markup, p. 9; U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee
on International Relations, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of
International Transactions in a Time of Declared Emergency, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., November 1976, committee print
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1976).
62 P.L. 95-223 (December 28, 1977) (Title I) (“Section 5(b)(1) of the Trading With the Enemy Act // 50 USC app. 5. //
is amended by striking out “or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President” in the text
preceding subparagraph (A).”); 91 Stat. 1625, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §4305 (2018); House, Trading with the
Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2.
63 Ibid. (Title III); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2 (“Title III of the bill makes a series of
conforming amendments to the Export Administration Act, which transfer to that act the authority, heretofore exercised
under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act to regulate exports of non-U.S.-origin goods and technology by
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. concerns.”).
64 Ibid. (Title II); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2.
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state of emergency is over and not continued in effect for use in other circumstances. A
state of national emergency should not be a normal state of affairs.65
IEEPA’s Statute, its Use, and Judicial Interpretation
IEEPA’s Statute
IEEPA, as currently amended, empowers the president to
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit:
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution,
to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country
or national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currencies or securities; and
(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel,
nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer,
withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any
right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which
any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to
any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(C) when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign
country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he
determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against
the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest,
when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the
President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the
President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered,
liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United
States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the
accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.66
These powers may be exercised “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with
respect to such threat.”67 Presidents may invoke IEEPA under the procedures set forth in the
NEA. When declaring a national emergency, the NEA requires that the President “immediately”
transmit the proclamation declaring the emergency to Congress and publish it in the Federal
Register.68 The President must also specify the provisions of law that he or she intends to use.69
In addition to the requirements of the NEA, IEEPA provides several further restrictions.
Preliminarily, IEEPA requires that the President consult with Congress “in every possible

65 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 11.
66 50 U.S.C. §1702.
67 50 U.S.C. §1701.
68 50 U.S.C. §1621.
69 50 U.S.C. §1631.
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instance” before exercising any of the authorities granted under IEEPA.70 Once the President
declares a national emergency invoking IEEPA, he or she must immediately transmit a report to
Congress specifying
(1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority;
(2) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States;
(3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those
authorities to deal with those circumstances;
(4) why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those circumstances;
and
(5) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such
actions are to be taken with respect to those countries.71
The President subsequently is to report on the actions taken under the IEEPA at least once in
every succeeding six-month interval that the authorities are exercised.72 As per the NEA, the
emergency may be terminated by the President, by a privileged joint resolution of Congress, or
automatically if the President does not publish in the Federal Register and transmit to Congress a
notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such anniversary.73
Amendments to IEEPA
Congress has amended IEEPA eight times (Table 1). Five of the eight amendments have altered
civil and criminal penalties for violations of orders issued under the statute. Other amendments
excluded certain informational materials and expanded IEEPA’s scope following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Congress also amended the NEA in response to a ruling by the
Supreme Court to require a joint rather than a concurrent resolution to terminate a national
emergency.
Table 1. Amendments to IEEPA
Date
Action
December 28, 1977
IEEPA Enacted
(P.L. 95-223; 91 Stat. 1625)
August 16, 1985*
Fol owing the Supreme Court’s holding in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) finding so-
called legislative vetoes unconstitutional, Congress amends the NEA to change
“concurrent” resolution to “joint” resolution. (P.L. 99-93; 99 Stat. 407, 448).
* While not technically an amendment to IEEPA, IEEPA is tied to the NEA’s provisions
relating to the declaration and termination of national emergencies.
August 23, 1988
IEEPA amended to exclude informational materials (Berman Amendment, see
elaboration below).
(Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988; P.L. 100-418; 102 Stat. 1107, 1371)

70 50 U.S.C. §1703(a).
71 50 U.S.C. §1703(b).
72 50 U.S.C. §1703(c).
73 50 U.S.C. §1622.
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Date
Action
October 6, 1992
Section 206 of IEEPA amended to increase civil and criminal penalties under the act.
(Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993; P.L. 102-
393; 106 Stat. 1729)
October 6, 1992
Section 206 of IEEPA amended to decrease civil and criminal penalties under the act.
(Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1993; P.L. 102-396; 106 Stat. 1876)
April 30, 1994
IEEPA amended to update the definition of informational materials.
(Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; P.L. 103-236; 108
Stat. 382)
September 23, 1996
IEEPA amended to penalize attempted violations of licenses, orders, regulations or
prohibitions issued under the authority of IEEPA.
(National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; P.L. 104-201; 110 Stat. 2725)
October 26, 2001
USA PATRIOT Act Amendments, see elaboration below.
(Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001; P.L. 107-56; 115 Stat.
272)
March 9, 2006
Section 206 of IEEPA amended to increase civil and criminal penalties under the act.
(USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005; P.L. 109-177; 120 Stat.
192)
October 16, 2007
The International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act amended Section 206
of IEEPA to increase civil and criminal penalties and added conspiracy to violate
licenses, orders, regulations or prohibitions issued under the authority of IEEPA. Civil
penalties are capped at $250,000 or twice the amount of the transaction found to have
violated the law. Criminal penalties now include a fine of up to $1,000,000 and
imprisonment of up to 20 years.
(International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act; P.L. 110-96; 121 Stat.
1011)
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on United States Code, annotated.
The Informational Materials Amendments to IEEPA
As originally enacted, IEEPA protected the rights of U.S. persons to participate in the exchange of
“any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a
transfer of anything of value” with a foreign person otherwise subject to sanctions. Amendments
in 1988 and 1994 updated this list of protected rights to include the exchange of published
information in a variety of formats.74 As amended, the act currently protects the exchange of
“information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters,
phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs,
artworks, and news wire feeds,” provided such exchange is not otherwise controlled for national
security or foreign policy reasons related to weapons proliferation or international terrorism.75

74 P.L. 100-418 (August 23, 1988); P.L. 103-236 (April 30, 1994). The amendments were introduced by Rep. Howard
Berman (D-CA) and are occasionally referred to as the “Berman Amendments.” For more background, see, “Sleeping
with the Enemy? OFAC Rules and First Amendment Freedoms,” Perspectives on History (May 2004).
75 Codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(3).
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USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA
Unlike the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), IEEPA did not allow the President to vest assets
as originally enacted.76 In 2001, at the request of the George W. Bush Administration, Congress
amended IEEPA as part of the USA PATRIOT Act77 to return to the President the authority to vest
frozen assets, but only under certain circumstances:
[T]he President may ... when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been
attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign
country that [the President] determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such
hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any
property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President,
in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such
terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held,
used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the
benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and
all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.78
Speaking about the efforts of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify and disrupt
the flow of terrorist finances, Attorney General John Ashcroft told Congress
At present the President’s powers are limited to freezing assets and blocking transactions
with terrorist organizations. We need the capacity for more than a freeze. We must be able
to seize. Doing business with terrorist organization must be a losing proposition. Terrorist
financiers must pay a price for their support of terrorism, which kills innocent Americans.
Consistent with the President’s [issuance of E.O. 1322479] and his statements [of
September 24, 2001], our proposal gives law enforcement the ability to seize the terrorists’
assets. Further, criminal liability is imposed on those who knowingly engage in financial
transactions, money-laundering involving the proceeds of terrorist acts.80
The House Judiciary Committee report explaining the amendments described its purpose as
follows:
Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. §1702)
grants to the President the power to exercise certain authorities relating to commerce with
foreign nations upon his determination that there exists an unusual and extraordinary threat
to the United States. Under this authority, the President may, among other things, freeze
certain foreign assets within the jurisdiction of the United States. A separate law, the
Trading With the Enemy Act, authorizes the President to take title to enemy assets when
Congress has declared war.
Section 159 of this bill amends section 203 of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act to provide the President with authority similar to what he currently has under
the Trading With the Enemy Act in circumstances where there has been an armed attack

76 P.L. 95-223. House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 15 (“This grant of authorities does not
include the following authorities … : (1) the power to vest … property.”); Senate, International Emergency Economic
Powers Legislation, p. 5 (“Authority to vest property, seize records and regulate purely domestic economic transactions
would not be granted.”).
77 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
78 P.L. 107-56 §106, 115 Stat. 272, 277, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(C) (2018).
79 E.O. 13224, 66 Federal Register 49,079 (September 24, 2001).
80 Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st
sess., serial no. 39 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 7 (testimony of Attorney General Ashcroft).
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on the United States, or where Congress has enacted a law authorizing the President to use
armed force against a foreign country, foreign organization, or foreign national. The
proceeds of any foreign assets to which the President takes title under this authority must
be placed in a segregated account can only be used in accordance with a statute authorizing
the expenditure of such proceeds.
Section 159 also makes a number of clarifying and technical changes to section 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, most of which will not change the way
that provision currently is implemented.81
The government has apparently never employed the vesting power to seize Al Qaeda assets
within the United States. Instead, the government has sought to confiscate them through forfeiture
procedures.82
The first, and to date, apparently only, use of this power under IEEPA occurred on March 20,
2003.83 On that date, in Executive Order 13290, President George W. Bush ordered the blocked
“property of the Government of Iraq and its agencies, instrumentalities, or controlled entities” to
be vested “in the Department of the Treasury ... [to] be used to assist the Iraqi people and to assist
in the reconstruction of Iraq.”84 However, the President’s order excluded from confiscation Iraq’s
diplomatic and consular property, as well as assets that had, prior to March 20, 2003, been
ordered attached in satisfaction of judgments against Iraq rendered pursuant to the terrorist suit
provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Section 201 of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act85 (which reportedly totaled about $300 million).86
A subsequent executive order blocked the property of former Iraqi officials and their families,
vesting title of such blocked funds in the Department of the Treasury for transfer to the
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) to be “used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people,
for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament
of Iraq, for the cost of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefitting of the Iraqi
people.”87 The DFI was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1483, which required
member states to freeze all assets of the former Iraqi government and of Saddam Hussein, senior
officials of his regime and their family members, and transfer such assets to the DFI, which was
then administered by the United States. Most of the vested assets were used by the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) for reconstruction projects and ministry operations.88
The USA PATRIOT Act made three other amendments to Section 203 of IEEPA.89 After the
power to investigate, it added the power to block assets during the pendency of an investigation.90

81 U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany H.R. 2975, 107th Cong., 1st sess.,
H.Rept. 107-236 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 62.
82 See United States v. All Funds on Deposit with R.J. O'Brien & Assocs., 783 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 2015) (insurance
companies’ attempt to intercede in civil forfeiture action involving Al Qaeda assets).
83 E.O. 13290, 68 Federal Register 14,307 (March 24, 2003).
84 Ibid.
85 P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).
86 See Tom Schoenberg, “Fights Loom for Iraqi Riches,” Legal Times (March 31, 2003). Judgment creditors were paid
about $140 million from the vested assets to cover the unsatisfied portions of judgments and interest.
87 E.O. 13315, 68 Federal Register 52,315 (September 3, 2003).
88 GAO-04-579T Recovering Iraq’s Assets (March 18, 2004). As of March 2004, according to GAO, the CPA had
spent $1.67 billion of the $1.9 billion for “emergency needs, including salaries for civil servants and pensions, and for
ministry operations.” Ibid., 7. The CPA was also authorized to use the more than $900 million in assets seized by the
U.S. military in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction activities. Ibid.
89 P.L. 107-56 §106, 115 Stat. 277 (2001).
90 P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(B) (2018).
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It clarified that the type of interest in property subject to IEEPA is an “interest by any person, or
with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”91 It also added
subsection (c), which provides
In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was
based on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information
Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in
camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review.92
As described in the House Judiciary Committee report, these provisions were meant to clarify and
codify existing practices.93
IEEPA Trends
Like TWEA prior to its amendment in 1977, the President and Congress together have often
turned to IEEPA to impose economic sanctions in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy, national
security, and economic objectives. While initially enacted to circumscribe presidential emergency
authority,94 presidential emergency use of IEEPA has expanded in scale, scope, and frequency
since the statute’s enactment. The House report on IEEPA stated, “emergencies are by their nature
rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal, ongoing problems.”95 National emergencies
invoking IEEPA, however, have increased in frequency and length since its enactment.
Between 1977 and January 15, 2024, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in 69 new declarations of
national emergency under the NEA.96 On average, these emergencies last nearly nine years. Most
emergencies have been geographically specific, targeting a specific country or government.
However, since 1990, Presidents have declared non-geographically-specific emergencies in
response to issues like weapons proliferation, global terrorism, and malicious cyber-enabled
activities.97 The erosion of geographic limitations has been accompanied by an expansion in the
nature of the targets of sanctions issued under IEEPA authority. Originally, IEEPA was used to
target foreign governments; however, Presidents have increasingly targeted groups and
individuals.98 Usually Presidents use IEEPA as an emergency power; however, Congress has
directed the President to use IEEPA or expressed its approval of presidential emergency use in
several statutes.99 Between 1976, when the NEA was enacted, and 2019, Congress had never
affirmatively voted to terminate a national emergency. However, in the late-2010s, some
Members of Congress began to express concern with the NEA. Between 2019 and January 15,
2024, Members of Congress have introduced 15 joint resolutions to terminate a national

91 P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(a) (2018).
92 P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(c) (2018).
93 House, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany H.R. 2975, p. 62.
94 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, pp. 2-9.
95 Ibid., 11.
96 This tally does not include IEEPA invocations made in connection with executive orders expanding the scope of an
initial declaration of national emergency. See Table A-1.
97 E.g., E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Activities (April 1, 2015); E.O. 13818, Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or
Corruption (December 20, 2017); E.O. 13848, Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a
United States Election (September 12, 2018); E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology
and Services Supply Chain (May 15, 2019); E.O. 13920, Securing the United States Bulk-Power System (May 1,
2020); E.O. 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court (June 11,
2020).
98 See “Presidential Emergency Use.”
99 See “Congressional Nonemergency Use and Retroactive Approval.”
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emergency, five of those resolutions involved IEEPA (Table A-2). Despite this new interest in
terminating national emergencies, no emergency declared under the NEA has been terminated
without Presidential assent.
Presidential Emergency Use100
IEEPA is the most frequently cited emergency authority when the President declares a national
emergency under the NEA. Rather than referencing the same set of emergencies, as had been the
case with TWEA, IEEPA has required the President to declare a national emergency for each
independent use. As a result, the number of national emergencies declared under the terms of the
NEA has proliferated over the past four decades. Presidents declared only four national
emergencies under the auspices of TWEA in the four decades prior to IEEPA’s enactment. In
contrast, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in 70 of the 79 declarations of national emergency
issued under the National Emergencies Act.101 As of January 15, 2024, there were 42 ongoing
national emergencies; all but three involved IEEPA.102

100 The numbers here define emergencies by executive orders declaring an emergency. This choice causes some
anomalies in the data. For example, the national emergency with regard to controlling the whereabouts of highly
enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons in Russia lapsed when the notice extending the emergency was not
published in the Federal Register by the emergency’s anniversary date on June 21, 2012. As such, President Barack
Obama issued an executive order declaring a new national emergency to reinstate the restrictions. For consistency, such
anomalies have been treated as two distinct national emergencies. Such treatment decreases the average duration of
emergencies. See, e.g., E.O. 13159, Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the
Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons (June 21, 2000); E.O. 13617, Blocking
Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium
Extracted From Nuclear Weapons (June 25, 2012).
101 The eight declarations of emergency under the NEA that did not involve IEEPA as of March 25, 2022 were all made
by presidential proclamation. See Proclamation 6491, To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March 3, 1931, Within a
Limited Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki (October
14, 1992); Proclamation 6867, Declaration of a National Emergency and Invocation of Emergency Authority Relating
to the Regulation of the Anchorage and Movement of Vessels around Cuba (March 1, 1996); Proclamation 6907,
Declaration of a State of Emergency and Release of Feed Grain From the Disaster Reserve (July 1, 1996);
Proclamation 7463, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks (September 14, 2001);
Proclamation 7924, To Suspend Subchapter IV of Chapter 31 of Title 40, United States Code, Within a Limited
Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricane Katrina (September 8, 2005);
Proclamation 8443, Declaration of a National Emergency With Respect to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic
(October 23, 2009); Proclamation 9844, Declaration of a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the
United States (February 15, 2019); Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) Outbreak (March 13, 2020).
102 The three ongoing emergencies not involving IEEPA as of January 15, 2024 were declared in: Proclamation 6867,
Proclamation 7463, Proclamation 10371. All were declared in response to foreign threats. Notably, while IEEPA was
not invoked in the first declaration of national emergency following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
President George W. Bush declared a second state of emergency invoking IEEPA. E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and
Prohibiting Transaction with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001).
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Figure 1. Declarations and Executive Orders Citing IEEPA

Source: CRS. 2020s current as of January 15, 2024.
Note: Executive orders include declarations of national emergency that cite IEEPA that were made by executive
order and any subsequent modifications or amendments to an emergency or such an order.
Each year since 1990, Presidents have issued roughly 4.5 executive orders citing IEEPA and
declared 1.5 new national emergencies citing IEEPA.103 (Figure 1.)
On average, emergencies invoking IEEPA last more than nine years.104 The longest emergency
was also the first. President Jimmy Carter, in response to the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979,
declared the first national emergency under the provisions of the National Emergencies Act and
invoked IEEPA.105 Seven successive Presidents have renewed that emergency annually for more
than 40 years. As of January 15, 2024, that emergency is still in effect, largely to provide a legal
basis for resolving matters of ownership of the Shah’s disputed assets.106 That initial emergency
aside, the length of emergencies invoking IEEPA has increased each decade. The average length
of an emergency invoking IEEPA declared in the 1980s was four years. That average extended to
11 years for emergencies declared in the 1990s and 15 years for emergencies declared in the
2000s (Figure 2).107 As such, the number of ongoing national emergencies has grown nearly
continuously since the enactment of IEEPA and the NEA (Figure 3). Between January 1, 1979,
and January 15, 2024, there were on average 15 ongoing national emergencies each year, 14 of
which invoked IEEPA.

103 The practice of issuing IEEPA-related executive orders has also changed over time. During the Iran hostage-taking
in 1979, for example, President Carter issued a new and separate E.O. with each fine-tuning of the initial national
emergency declaration; overall from November 1979 to his last day in office in January 1981, President Carter issued
12 executive orders relating to the hostage crisis and negotiations with Iran. Later presidents have opted, instead, to
issue one executive order to declare the existence of a national emergency, and then to revisit that order to adjust or
expand its reach by amending the original language.
104 Emergencies invoking IEEPA that have been terminated lasted an average of 6.5 years. However, most emergencies
citing IEEPA have not been terminated, including the first ever declared, which has been ongoing since 1979.
105 E.O. 12170, Blocking Iranian Government Property (November 14, 1979).
106 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Iran, 87 Federal Register 68,013 (November 8, 2022).
107 Not enough time has passed to understand whether the trend will continue with those national emergencies declared
in the 2010s.
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In most cases, the declared emergencies citing
IEEPA have been geographically specific. For
Figure 2. Average Length of Emergencies
example, in the first use of IEEPA, President
Citing IEEPA
Jimmy Carter issued an executive order that
both declared a national emergency with
respect to the “situation in Iran” and “blocked
all property and interests in property of the
Government of Iran.”108 Five months later,
President Carter issued a second order
dramatically expanding the scope of the first
EO and effectively blocked the transfer of all
goods, money, or credit destined for Iran by
anyone subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.109 A further order expanded the
coverage to block imports to the United States
from Iran.110 Together, these orders touched
upon virtually all economic contacts between
any place or legal person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and the
territory and government of Iran.111
Many of the executive orders invoking IEEPA

have followed this pattern of limiting the
Source: CRS. Current as of January 15, 2024.
scope to a specific territory, government, or
Notes: A single emergency was declared in the
its nationals. Executive Order 12513, for
1970s (Iran) and that has lasted 40 years. 2010s do
not have sufficient data to create an average length
example, prohibited “imports into the United
that would be meaningful for the purposes of analysis.
States of goods and services of Nicaraguan
origin” and “exports from the United States of goods to or destined for Nicaragua.” The order
likewise prohibited Nicaraguan air carriers and vessels of Nicaraguan registry from entering U.S.
ports.112 Executive Order 12532 prohibited various transactions with the “Government of South
Africa or to entities owned or controlled by that Government.”113

108 E.O. 12170.
109 E.O. 12205, Economic Sanctions Against Iran (April 7, 1980). The order exempted “food, medicine and supplies
intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering.”
110 E.O. 12211, Economic Sanctions Against Iran (April 17, 1980).
111 Exceptions were made for family remittances.
112 E.O. 12513, Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving Nicaragua (May 1, 1985).
113 E.O. 12532, Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving South Africa (September 9, 1985).
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Figure 3. Cumulative Number of Ongoing National Emergencies by Year

Source: CRS. Current as of January 15, 2024.
Notes: Orange dashed line indicates national emergencies citing IEEPA. Hashed space indicates all national
emergencies.
While the majority of national emergencies invoking IEEPA have been geographically specific,
many recent emergencies have lacked explicit geographic limitations.114 President George H.W.
Bush declared the first geographically nonspecific emergency in response to the threat posed by
the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.115 Similarly, President George W. Bush
declared a national emergency in response to the threat posed by “persons who commit, threaten
to commit, or support terrorism.”116 President Barack Obama declared emergencies to respond to
the threats of “transnational criminal organizations” and “persons engaging in malicious cyber-
enabled activities.”117 President Donald Trump declared an emergency to respond to “foreign
adversaries” who were “creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and
communications technologies and services.”118 Without explicit geographic limitations, these
orders have included provisions that are global in scope. These geographically nonspecific
emergencies invoking IEEPA have increased in frequency over the past 40 years.119

114 This number excludes those emergencies declared to extend the Export Administration Act of 1979.
115 E.O. 12735, Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation (November 16, 1990).
116 E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or
Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001).
117 E.O. 13581, Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations (July 24, 2011); E.O. 13694, Blocking the
Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (April 1, 2015).
118 E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (May 14, 2019).
119 See, E.g., E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Activities (April 1, 2015); E.O. 13818, Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or
Corruption (December 20, 2017); E.O. 13848, Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a
United States Election (September 12, 2018); E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology
and Services Supply Chain (May 15, 2019); E.O. 13920, Securing the United States Bulk-Power System (May 1,
2020); E.O. 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court (June 11,
2020). Some have argued that this shift was the result of humanitarian concerns about the effects of sanctions on the
populations of the targeted states. Beginning in the 1990s, United Nations Security Council sanctions began to target
the political and economic elites of a state, rather than the whole population. Kern Alexander, Economic Sanctions:
Law and Public Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. xi. However, use of such orders has expanded beyond
political and economic elites. See, e.g., E.O. 13928.
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Figure 4. National Emergency Act Declarations

Source: Federal Register; CRS.

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In addition to the erosion of geographic
limitations, the stated motivations for
Examples of Actions Taken in Non-
declaring national emergencies have expanded
Geographic Emergencies Citing IEEPA
in scope as well. Initially, stated rationales for
•
Chemical and biological weapons proliferation
declarations of national emergency citing
•
Measures to restrict the participation by United
IEEPA were short and often referenced either
States persons in weapons proliferation activities
a specific geography or the specific actions of
•
Measures to prevent proliferation of weapons of
a government. Presidents found that
mass destruction
circumstances like “the situation in Iran,”120 or
•
Prohibiting transactions with terrorists who
the “policies and actions of the Government of
threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process
Nicaragua,”121 constituted “unusual and
•
Blocking property and prohibiting transactions
extraordinary threat[s] to the national security
with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or
support terrorism
and foreign policy of the United States” and
•
would therefore declare a national

Blocking property of transnational criminal
organizations
emergency.122
•
Blocking the property of certain persons engaging
The stated rationales have, however, expanded
in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities
over time in both the length and subject
•
Blocking the property of persons involved in
matter. Presidents have increasingly declared
serious human rights abuse or corruption
national emergencies, in part, to respond to
•
Imposing certain sanctions in the event of foreign
human and civil rights abuses,123 slavery,124
interference in a United States election
denial of religious freedom,125 political
•
Limiting investments by U.S. persons in certain
repression,126 public corruption,127 and the
national security technologies in countries of
concern
undermining of democratic processes.128
While the first reference to human rights
violations as a rationale for a declaration of national emergency came in 1985,129 most of such
references have come in the past twenty years. (Table A-3).
Presidents have also expanded the nature of the targets of IEEPA sanctions. Originally, the targets
of sanctions issued under IEEPA were foreign governments. The first use of IEEPA targeted
“Iranian Government Property.”130 Use of IEEPA quickly expanded to target geographically
defined regions.131 Presidents have also increasingly targeted groups, such as political parties,

120 E.O. 12170.
121 E.O. 12513.
122 Ibid.
123 E.O. 12532; E.O. 13396, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Cote d'Ivoire
(February 7, 2006); E.O. 13067, Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan
(November 3, 1997); E.O. 13692, Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the
Situation in Venezuela (March 8, 2015).
124 E.O. 13067.
125 E.O. 13067.
126 E.O. 13405, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus
(June 16, 2006).
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 E.O. 12532.
130 E.O. 12170.
131 See, e.g., E.O. 12513.
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corporations, or terrorist organizations, and individuals, such as supporters of terrorism, suspected
narcotics traffickers, or associates of the International Criminal Court.132
The first instances of orders directed at groups or persons were limited to foreign groups or
persons. For example, in Executive Order 12978, President Bill Clinton targeted specific “foreign
persons” and “persons determined ... to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of”
such foreign persons.133 An excerpt is included below:
Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in
regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and
notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date, I hereby order blocked all property and interests in property that are or
hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession
or control of United States persons, of:
(a)
the foreign persons listed in the Annex to this order;
(b)
foreign persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State:
(i)
to play a significant role in international narcotics trafficking centered in
Colombia; or
(ii)
materially to assist in, or provide financial or technological support for
or goods or services in support of, the narcotics trafficking activities of persons
designated in or pursuant to this order; and
(c)
persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to be owned or controlled by, or to act
for or on behalf of, persons designated in or pursuant to this order.134
However, in 2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13219 to target “persons
who threaten international stabilization efforts in the Western Balkans.” While the order was
similar to that of Executive Order 12978, it removed the qualifier “foreign.” As such, persons in
the United States, including U.S. citizens, could be targets of the order.135 The following is an
excerpt of the order:
Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)(1), (3), and (4) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C.
1702(b)(1), (3), and (4)), the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000 (title IX, P.L. 106-387), and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may
hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or
any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, all property and interests in
property of:
(i)
the persons listed in the Annex to this order; and

132 See, e.g., E.O. 12865 (prohibiting transactions with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA), the second largest political party in Angola); E.O. 13129 (prohibiting transactions with the Taliban); E.O.
13224 (prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism); E.O. 12978
(prohibiting transactions with certain narcotics traffickers); E.O. 13928 (blocking property of certain persons associated
with the International Criminal Court). See also CRS Insight IN11428, International Criminal Court: U.S. Sanctions in
Response to Investigation of War Crimes in Afghanistan, by Matthew C. Weed and Dianne E. Rennack.
133 E.O. 12978, Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions With Significant Narcotics Traffickers (October 21,
1995).
134 Ibid. Emphasis added.
135 See, e.g., Aaran Money Wire Serv., Inc. v. United States, 2003 WL 22143735, at *3 (D. Minn. August 21, 2003).
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(ii)
persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, because they are found:
(A)
to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of
violence ... 136
Several subsequent invocations of IEEPA have similarly not been limited to foreign targets.137
In sum, presidential emergency use of IEEPA was directed at foreign states initially, with targets
that were delimited by geography or nationality. Since the 1990s, however, Presidents have
expanded the scope of their declarations to include groups and individual persons, regardless of
nationality or geographic location, who are engaged in specific activities.
Congressional Nonemergency Use and Retroactive Approval
While IEEPA is often categorized as an emergency statute, Congress has used IEEPA outside of
the context of national emergencies. When Congress legislates sanctions, it often authorizes or
directs the President to use IEEPA authorities to impose those sanctions.
In the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018, for example, Congress directed
the President to exercise “all powers granted to the President [by IEEPA] to the extent necessary
to block and prohibit [certain transactions].”138 Penalties for violations by a person of a measure
imposed by the President under the act would be, likewise, determined by reference to IEEPA.139
This trend has been long-term. Congress first directed the President to make use of IEEPA
authorities in 1986 as part of an effort to assist Haiti in the recovery of assets illegally diverted by
its former government. That statute provided
The President shall exercise the authorities granted by section 203 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act [50 USC 1702] to assist the Government of Haiti in its
efforts to recover, through legal proceedings, assets which the Government of Haiti alleges
were stolen by former president-for-life Jean Claude Duvalier and other individuals
associated with the Duvalier regime. This subsection shall be deemed to satisfy the
requirements of section 202 of that Act. [50 USC 1701]140
In directing the President to use IEEPA, Congress waived the requirement that he declare a
national emergency (and none was declared).141
Subsequent legislation has followed this general pattern, with slight variations in language and
specificity.142 The following is an example of current legislative language that has appeared in
several recent statutes:

136 E.O. 13219, Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans
(June 26, 2001). Emphasis added.
137 See, e.g., E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to
Commit, or Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001); E.O. 13396, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing
to the Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire (February 7, 2006).
138 P.L. 115-335 (December 20, 2018), 132 Stat. 5019.
139 Ibid.
140 P.L. 99-529 (October 24, 1986), 100 Stat. 3010.
141 Ibid.
142 See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, P.L. 102-484 (October 23, 1992), 106 Stat.
2315; Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, P.L. 104-1172 (August 5, 1996), 110 Stat. 1541; Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, P.L. 105-261 (October 17, 1998) 112 Stat. 1920; Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386 (October 28, 2000), 114 Stat. 1464; Comprehensive
(continued...)
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(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b)
with respect to—
...
(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:
(A) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President
by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)
to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and
interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to
subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States,
come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of
a United States person.
...
(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or
causes a violation of paragraph (1)(A) or any regulation, license, or order issued to
carry out paragraph (1)(A) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b)
and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in
subsection (a) of that section.143
Congress has also expressed, retroactively, its approval of unilateral presidential invocations of
IEEPA in the context of a national emergency. In the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities
Act of 2017, for example, Congress declared, “It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Secretary of State should continue to implement Executive Order No. 13382.”144
Presidents, however, have also used IEEPA to preempt or modify parallel congressional activity.
On September 9, 1985, President Reagan, finding “that the policies and actions of the
Government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy

Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, P.L. 108-497 (December 23, 2004), 118 Stat. 4012; Darfur Peace and Accountability Act
of 2006, P.L. 109-344 (October 13, 2006), 120 Stat. 1869; Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010, P.L. 111-195 (July 1, 2010) 124 Stat 1312; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012, P.L. 112-81, December 31, 2011, 125 Stat 1298; Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012, P.L. 112-158 (August 10, 2012) 126 Stat 1214 (makes some of the most extensive use of IEEPA); Russia and
Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, P.L. 112-208
(December 14, 2012) 126 Stat 1496; Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act
P.L. 113-291 (December 19, 2014), 128 Stat. 3293; Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of
2018, P.L. 115-272 (October 25, 2018) 132 Stat. 4144.
143 Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, P.L. 113-95
(April 3, 2014) 128 Stat. 1088. Identical language can be found, for example, in: The Venezuela Defense of Human
Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, P.L. 113-278 (December 18, 2014) 128 Stat. 3011; National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, P.L. 114-328 (December 23, 2016) 130 Stat. 2000. Similar language can be
found, for example, in: the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, P.L. 114-122 (February 18,
2016) 130 Stat. 93; the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017) 130
Stat 886. Depending on the circumstance, Congress also includes a clause waiving the requirement to declare a national
emergency. See, e.g., P.L. 115-44; P.L. 115-272 (“(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the
President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements
of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all
transactions [ ... ].”).
144 Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, title I of the Countering America’s Adversaries through
Sanctions Act, P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017) §104 (22 U.S.C. §9403); E.O. 13382 of June 28, 2005, “Blocking
Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters,” 70 Federal Register 38,567 (July 1,
2005).
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and economy of the United States,” declared a national emergency and limited transactions with
South Africa.145 The President declared the emergency despite the fact that legislation limiting
transactions with South Africa was quickly making its way through Congress.146 In remarks about
the declaration, President Reagan stated that he had been opposed to the bill contemplated by
Congress because unspecified provisions “would have harmed the very people [the U.S. was]
trying to help.”147 Nevertheless, members of the press at the time148 (and at least one scholar
since)149 noted that the limitations imposed by the executive order and the provisions in
legislation then winding its way through Congress were “substantially similar.”150
Current Uses of IEEPA
In general, IEEPA has served as an integral part of the postwar international sanctions regime.151
The President, either through a declaration of emergency or via statutory direction, has used
IEEPA to limit economic transactions in support of administrative and congressional national
security and foreign policy goals. Much of the action taken pursuant to IEEPA has involved
blocking transactions and freezing assets.
Once the President declares that a national emergency exists, he may use the authority in Section
203 of IEEPA (Grants of Authorities; 50 U.S.C. §1702) to investigate, regulate, or prohibit
foreign exchange transactions, transfers of credit, transfers of securities, payments, and may take
specified actions relating to property in which a foreign country or person has interest—freezing
assets, blocking property and interests in property, prohibiting U.S. persons from entering into
transactions related to frozen assets and blocked property, and in some instances denying entry
into the United States.
Pursuant to Section 203, Presidents have
• prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as
engaging in malicious cyber-enabled activities, including “interfering with or
undermining election processes or institutions” [Executive Order 13694 of April
1, 2015, as amended; 50 U.S.C. §1701 note. See also Executive Order 13848 of
September 12, 2018; 83 F.R. 46843.];
• prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as illicit
narcotics traffickers including foreign drug kingpins;
• prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as
engaging in human rights abuses or significant corruption;
• prohibited transactions related to illicit trade in rough diamonds;
• prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as
Transnational Criminal Organizations;
• prohibited transactions with “those who disrupt the Middle East peace process;”

145 E.O. 12532.
146 99 H.R. 1460; See also P.L. 99-440 (October 2, 1986).
147 Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer-Session with Reporters on Signing
E.O. 12532, September 9, 1985, 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1048, 1050.
148 See, e.g., questions by Helen Thomas, United Press International, Ibid., 1050.
149 Carter, International Economic Sanctions, p. 201.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid., ch. 9.
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• prohibited transactions related to overflights with certain nations;
• instituted and maintained maritime restrictions;
• prohibited transactions related to weapons of mass destruction, in coordination
with export controls authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and the Export
Administration Act of 1979,152 and in furtherance of efforts to deter the weapons
programs of specific countries (i.e., Iran, North Korea);
• prohibited transactions with those designated as “persons who commit, threaten
to commit, or support terrorism;”
• maintained the dual-use export control system at times when its then-underlying
authority, the Export Administration Act authority had lapsed;
• blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as
engaged in cyber activities that compromise critical infrastructures including
election processes or the private sector’s trade secrets;
• blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as
responsible for serious human rights abuse or engaged in corruption;
• blocked certain property of, and prohibited transactions with, foreign nationals of
specific countries and those designated as engaged in activities that constitute an
extraordinary threat;
• prohibited transactions with those who pose “an undue risk of sabotage to or
subversion of the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution,
installation, operation, or maintenance of information and communications
technology or services in the United States.”
No President has used IEEPA to place tariffs on imported products from a specific country or on
products imported to the United States in general. However, IEEPA’s similarity to TWEA,
coupled with its relatively frequent use to ban imports and exports, suggests that such an action
could happen.153 In addition, no President has used IEEPA to enact a policy that was primarily
domestic in effect. Some scholars argue, however, that the interconnectedness of the global
economy means it would probably be permissible to use IEEPA to take an action that was
primarily domestic in effect.154
IEEPA vs Section 232 for Imposing Tariffs in Response to a
National Security Threat
While a President could likely use IEEPA to impose additional tariffs on imported goods as President Nixon did
under TWEA, no President has done so. Instead, Presidents have turned to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 in cases of purported emergency.155 Section 232 provides that if the Secretary of Commerce “finds
that an article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to

152 Legislation to replace the Export Administration Act was passed as part of the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, P.L. 115-232 (August 13, 2018), as the Export Control Reform Act of 2018,
Title XVII(B).
153 President Nixon, in effect, used TWEA to place a 10% ad valorem tariff on all imports to the U.S. Pres.
Proclamation No. 4074 (January 21, 1971; United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975); See
also Jason Luong, “Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,”
Texas Law Review 78 (2000), p. 1190.
154 “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” p. 1111; Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of
America’s Emergency Law Regime,” pp. 757-758.
155 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, P.L. 87-794, §232(b)–(c), 76 Stat. 877 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §1862(b)–
(c)).
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threaten to impair the national security,” then the President may take action to adjust the imports such that they
wil no longer impair national security.156 While the use of Section 232 requires findings by the Secretary of
Commerce, the restrictions and reporting requirements of the NEA do not apply. For that reason, Section 232
may be an attractive source of presidential authority for imposing additional tariffs for national security purposes.
Using this authority, President Donald J. Trump applied additional duties on steel and aluminum in March 2018.157
However, IEEPA is not subject to the same procedural restraints as Section 232. As no investigation is required,
IEEPA authorities can be invoked at any time in response to a national emergency based on an “unusual and
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States.” As such, IEEPA
may be a source of authority for the President to impose a tariff quickly. On May 30, 2019, President Trump
announced his intention to use IEEPA to impose and gradually increase a five percent tariff on all goods imported
from Mexico until “the il egal migration crisis is alleviated through effective actions taken by Mexico.”158 The tariffs
were scheduled to be implemented on June 10, 2019, with five percent increases to take effect at the beginning of
each subsequent month. On June 7, 2019, President Trump announced that that “The Tariffs scheduled to be
implemented by the U.S. [on June 10], against Mexico, are hereby indefinitely suspended.”159
Use of Assets Frozen under IEEPA
The ultimate disposition of assets frozen under IEEPA may serve as an important part of the
leverage economic sanctions provide to influence the behavior of foreign actors. The President
and Congress have each at times determined the fate of blocked assets to further foreign policy
goals.
Presidential Use of Foreign Assets Frozen under IEEPA
Presidents have used frozen assets as a bargaining tool during foreign policy crises and to bring a
resolution to such crises, at times by unfreezing the assets, returning them to the sanctioned entity,
or channeling them to a follow-on government. The following are some examples of how
Presidents have used blocked assets to resolve foreign policy issues.
President Carter invoked authority under IEEPA to impose trade sanctions against Iran, freezing
Iranian assets in the United States, in response to the hostage crisis in 1979.160 On January 19,
1981, the United States and Iran entered into a series of executive agreements brokered by
Algeria under which the hostages were freed and the frozen assets were distributed to various
entities.161 Of the blocked assets, the agreements directed $5.1 billion to repay outstanding U.S.

156 Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF10667, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C.
Jones; CRS Report R44707, Presidential Authority over Trade: Imposing Tariffs and Duties, by Caitlain Devereaux
Lewis.
157 Procl. 9704, 83 Federal Register 11,619 (March 15, 2019); Procl. 9705, 83 Federal Register 13,361 (March 15,
2019). CRS Report R45249, Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Rachel F.
Fefer and Vivian C. Jones.
158 Statement from the President Regarding Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019,
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-
address-border-crisis/.
159 President Donald J. Trump, Twitter Post, June 7, 2018, 5:31 p.m., https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/.
1137155056044826626. The suspension preceded the release of a U.S. Mexico Joint Declaration on migration.
Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S.-Mexico Joint Declaration, June 7, 2019, available at
https://www.state.gov/u-s-mexico-joint-declaration/.
160 E.O. 12170, 44 Federal Register 65,729 (November 14, 1979).
161 The Algiers Accords comprise the following five documents: The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep’t St. Bull., No. 2047 1, 1 (1981) [hereinafter “General
Declaration”], reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3; The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America
(continued...)
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bank loans to Iran, $2.8 billion returned to Iran, $1 billion transferred into a security account in
the Hague to pay other U.S. claims against Iran as arbitrated by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
(IUSCT), and $2 billion remained blocked pending further agreement with Iran or decision of the
Tribunal. The United States also froze the assets of the former Shah’s estate along with those of
the Shah’s close relatives pending litigation in U.S. courts to ascertain Iran’s right to their return.
Iran’s litigation was unsuccessful, and none of the contested assets were returned to Iran.162
Presidents have also channeled frozen assets to opposition governments in cases where the United
States continued to recognize a previous government that had been removed by coup d’état or
otherwise replaced as the legitimate government of a country. For example, after Panamanian
President Eric Arturo Delvalle tried to dismiss de facto military ruler General Manuel Noriega
from his post as head of the Panamanian Defense Forces, which resulted in Delvalle’s own
dismissal by the Panamanian Legislative Assembly, President Reagan recognized Delvalle as the
legitimate head of government and instituted economic sanctions against the Noriega regime.163
As part of these sanctions, the Department of State, in February 1988, advised U.S. banks not to
disburse funds to the Noriega regime, and Delvalle obtained court orders permitting him access to
those funds.164 In April 1988, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12635, which “blocked
all property and interests in property of the Government of Panama that are in the United States ...
or that come within the possession or control of persons located within the United States.”165 In
June 1988, the Department of the Treasury issued regulations directing most payments from the
U.S. government owed to Panama and all payments owed “to Panama from the operation of the
Panama Canal Commission” to an escrow account established at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York.166 One escrow account contained funds for the payment of operating expenses of the
Delvalle government.167 After the U.S. invasion of Panama ended in early 1990, President George
H.W. Bush lifted economic sanctions against the country168 and used some of the frozen funds to
repay debts owed by Panama to foreign creditors, with remaining funds turned over to the
successor government.169
The Obama and Trump Administrations took similar actions in response to the political situation
in Venezuela. President Barack Obama initially froze Venezuelan government assets in 2015

and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 3, reprinted in 1
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9; Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria, 19 January 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 4, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 13; Escrow
Agreement Among the United States, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bank Markazi Iran, and the Banque
Centrale d'Algerie, January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 6, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 16; and
Technical Arrangement Between Banque Centrale d'Algerie and the Governor and Company of the Bank of England
and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 14, reprinted in 1 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 20 (hereinafter “Algiers Accords”).
162 Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 677,
704 (October 2000) (explaining that “[a]ll of Iran’s lawsuits in U.S. courts [to recover the Shah’s assets] were
eventually dismissed, principally on grounds of forum non conveniens”).
163 GAO Review of Economic Sanctions Imposed Against Panama, GAO/T-NSIAD-89-44, 4-5 (July 26, 1989).
164 Ibid., 5.
165 E.O. 12635, 53 Federal Register 12,134 (April 8, 1988).
166 GAO Report, supra note 159, at 5.
167 Ibid., 7.
168 E.O. 12,710, 55 Federal Register 13,099 (April 5, 1990).
169 See 1989 Cong. Q. Almanac 607 (reporting that the Department of the Treasury had concluded “that the net amount
still due Panama, after ‘offsets, was about $200 million”).
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under IEEPA and the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014.170 In
January 2019, the Trump Administration officially recognized Venezuelan opposition leader Juan
Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president171 and permitted Guaidó access to the frozen Venezuelan
government assets that were “held at the United States Federal Reserve and other insured United
States financial institutions.”172 The Trump Administration also imposed additional sanctions
under IEEPA to freeze the assets of the main Venezuelan state-owned oil company, Petróleos de
Venezuela (Pdvsa),173 which significantly reduced funds available to the regime of Nicolas
Maduro.174 The Biden Administration continued to recognize Guaidó’s interim government175
until its dissolution in December 2022, and now recognizes the 2015 National Assembly as the
“last remaining democratic institution in Venezuela.”176 The disposition of Venezuelan assets
frozen abroad is uncertain, after negotiations between the Maduro government and the opposition
to establish a U.N.-administered fund for humanitarian programs supported by these assets has
proceeded very slowly since its announcement in November 2022.177 The United States
reportedly assured the U.N. that assets in the fund would be shielded from creditors.178 In
September 2023, Francisco Palmieri, Chief of Mission of the Venezuelan Affairs Unit at the U.S.
Embassy to Columbia, repeated past U.S. offers to provide sanctions relief, which could include
unfreezing some assets in the United States, if the Maduro administration allows for the release of
political prisoners, allows all opposition candidates to run, and allows international observers to
monitor the 2024 elections.179
There is also precedent for using frozen foreign assets for purposes authorized by the U.N.
Security Council. After the first war with Iraq, President George H.W. Bush ordered the transfer
of frozen Iraqi assets derived from the sale of Iraqi petroleum held by U.S. banks to a holding
account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to fulfill “the rights and obligations of the

170 E.O. 13692, 80 Federal Register 12,747 (March 8, 2015). For information about current sanctions against
Venezuela, see CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
171 President Donald J. Trump Supports the Venezuelan People’s Efforts to Restore Democracy in Their Country,
White House Fact Sheet January 29, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-
supports-venezuelan-peoples-efforts-restore-democracy-country/. For background of the situation in Venezuela, see
CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
172 Trump Supports the Venezuelan People’s Efforts.
173 E.O. 13857, 84 Federal Register 509 (January 25, 2019); Treasury Sanctions Venezuela’s State-Owned Oil
Company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., U.S. Department of the Treasury (January 28, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/
news/press-releases/sm594.
174 Marianna Parraga, “Venezuela’s oil exports sink to 17-year low, choked by U.S. sanctions,” Reuters, June 2, 2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-exports/venezuelas-oil-exports-sink-to-17-year-low-choked-by-us-
sanctions-idUSKBN2392SG.
175 Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Recognition of Venezuela’s 2015 National Assembly and Interim
President Guaidó, January 4, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-recognition-of-venezuelas-2015-national-assembly-and-
interim-president-guaido/.
176 Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, Venezuela’s Interim Government and the 2015 National Assembly,
January 3, 2023, https://www.state.gov/venezuelas-interim-government-and-the-2015-national-assembly/.
177 Geoff Ramsey and Ignacia Ulloa Peters, “Getting Venezuela’s historic humanitarian accord up and running,”
Atlantic Council Issue Brief, August 11, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/
getting-venezuelas-historic-humanitarian-accord-up-and-running/. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10230,
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
178 Matt Spetalnick, Vivian Sequera and Mayela Armas, “US tells UN it will shield Venezuela humanitarian fund from
creditors.” Reuters, May, 18, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-tells-un-it-will-shield-venezuela-
humanitarian-fund-creditors-sources-2023-05-18/.
179 Luz Mely Reyes, “Venezuela 2024: Looking beyond María Corina Machado,” El País, September 6, 2023,
https://english.elpais.com/opinion/2023-09-26/venezuela-2024-looking-beyond-maria-corina-machado.html.
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United States under U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 778.”180 The President cited a section
of the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA),181 as well as IEEPA, as authority to take the
action.182 The President ordered the transferred funds to be used to provide humanitarian relief
and to finance the United Nations Compensation Commission,183 which was established to
adjudicate claims against Iraq arising from the invasion.184 Other Iraqi assets remained frozen and
accumulated interest until the United States vested them in 2003 pursuant to IEEPA.185
In some cases, the United States has ended sanctions and returned frozen assets to successor
governments. For example, as a condition of releasing sanctions, the United States released
$237.6 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Central Bank of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia to the central banks of the successor states in 2003.186 In 2002, the United
States released $217 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Taliban to the Afghan
Interim Authority.187
As of the date of this report, the fate of the Afghan Central Bank (DaB) assets held in the United
States at the time of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 remains undecided. Some
victims—including survivors and family members—of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
with judgments against the Taliban have obtained a writ of attachment with respect to the
assets.188 The Biden Administration subsequently blocked the funds pursuant to IEEPA189 and
filed a statement of interest190 asking the district court for permission to make half ($3.5 billion)
of the assets available for transfer under the OFAC license191 issued on behalf of the people of
Afghanistan to “to address significant humanitarian and economic concerns and to avoid further
regional instability and other conditions contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United
States.”192 The other half of the assets would remain blocked to avail the judgment plaintiffs of

180 E.O. 12817, 3 C.F.R. §317 (1992). President George H.W. Bush froze Iraqi assets under U.S. jurisdiction pursuant
to IEEPA in response to Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. E.O. 12,722, 55 Federal Register 31,803 (August 2,
1990).
181 22 U.S.C. §287c (2018). The provision authorizes the President to give effect to U.N. Security Council resolutions
by “investigat[ing], regulat[ing], or prohibit[ing], in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or any
person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving any property subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States.” The provision does not explicitly mention asset confiscation.
182 E.O. 12817, 57 Federal Register 48,433 (October 23, 1992).
183 See Ronald J. Bettauer, “Establishment of the United Nations Compensation Commission: The U.S. Government
Perspective,” The United Nations Compensation Commission (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 35.
184 S.C. Res. 687, para. 16 (April 8, 1991) (reaffirming that “Iraq ... is liable under international law for any direct loss,
damage, ... or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait”; S.C. Res. 692 (May 20, 1991) (establishing the United Nations Compensation Commission
(UNCC) to administer a system to provide compensation for claims for which Iraq is liable under paragraph 16 of S.C.
Res. 687); S.C. Res. 706 and 712 (1991) (establishing an escrow account administered by the U.N. Secretary General to
fund the costs of the UNCC and other activities); S.C. Res. 778 (1992) (directing all States in possession of funds due
to Iraq for the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to transfer those funds to the U.N. escrow account).
185 See “USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA.”
186 Foreign Regimes’ Assets, GAO-04-1006, 11 (September 2004).
187 Ibid., 12.
188 Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848 (S.D.N.Y. September 13, 2021).
189 E.O. 14064, 87 Federal Register 8391 (February 15, 2022).
190 United States Government Statement of Interest, Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848, ECF 563 (S.D.N.Y.
February 11, 2022) (hereinafter SOI).
191 OFAC License No. DABRESERVES-EO-2022-886895-1, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21226931/ex-b-
ofac-license.pdf.
192 Ibid., SOI.
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the opportunity to make their case for entitlement to attach them in satisfaction of their
judgments. In the statement of interest, the Administration did not take a position with respect to
the plaintiffs’ right to the assets, but set forth some legal considerations that seem to militate
against the judgment plaintiffs.193 In February, 2023, the district court denied the plaintiffs’
motion for post-judgment attachment of the DaB assets, holding that, “[p]ursuant to the FSIA,
TRIA, and the U.S. Constitution, the Taliban—not the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan or
the Afghan people—must pay for the Taliban’s liability in the 9/11 Attacks.”194 The court found
that recognizing the DaB as an “agency or instrumentality” of the Taliban would require the court
to recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, and that such authority to recognize
governments is entrusted solely to the President.195 Plaintiffs have appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.196
Congressionally Mandated Use of Frozen Foreign Assets and Proceeds
of Sanctions
The executive branch has traditionally resisted congressional efforts to vest foreign assets to pay
U.S. claimants without first obtaining a settlement agreement with the country in question.197
Congress has overcome such resistance in the case of foreign governments that have been
designated as “State Supporters of Terrorism.”198 U.S. nationals who are victims of state-
supported terrorism involving designated states have been able to sue those countries for damages
under an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) since 1996.199
To facilitate the payment of judgments under the exception, Congress passed Section 117 of the
Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999,200 which further amended the FSIA
by allowing attachment and execution against state property with respect to which financial
transactions are prohibited or regulated under Section 5(b) TWEA, Section 620(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act (authorizing the trade embargo against Cuba), or Sections 202 and 203 of IEEPA,
or any orders, licenses or other authority issued under these statutes. Because of the Clinton
Administration’s continuing objections, however, Section 117 also gave the President authority to
“waive the requirements of this section in the interest of national security,” an authority President
Clinton promptly exercised in signing the statute into law.201
The Section 117 waiver authority protecting blocked foreign government assets from attachment
to satisfy terrorism judgments has continued in effect ever since, prompting Congress to take
other actions to make frozen assets available to judgment holders. Congress enacted Section 2002

193 CRS In Focus IF12052, Afghanistan Central Bank Reserves, coordinated by Martin A. Weiss.
194 In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 657 F. Supp. 3d 311, 336 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2023) (consolidated cases).
195 Ibid., 335.
196 John Does 1 Through 7 v. The Taliban, No. 23-263 (2d Cir. Mar. 1, 2023).
197 See, generally, 22 U.S.C. §§1621-1645o (Settlement of International Claims).
198 Current states designated as sponsors of terrorism are Iran (1984), Cuba (2021), North Korea (2017) and Syria
(1979). See U.S. Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.
199 The so-called terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) was originally codified at 28
U.S.C. §1605(a)(7), but an amended version is now codified at 28 U.S.C. §1605A (2018). See CRS Report RL31258,
Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
200 P.L. 105-277, Div. A, Title I, §117, 112 Stat. 2681-491 (1998), codified at 28 U.S.C. §1610(f)(1)(A) (2018).
201 Presidential Determination 99-1 (October 21, 1998), reprinted in 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2088 (October
26, 1998).
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of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA)202 to mandate the
payment from frozen Cuban assets of compensatory damages awarded against Cuba under the
FSIA terrorism exception on or prior to July 20, 2000.
The Department of the Treasury subsequently vested $96.7 million in funds generated from long-
distance telephone services between the United States and Cuba in order to compensate claimants
in Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, the lawsuit based on the 1996 downing of two unarmed U.S.
civilian airplanes by the Cuban air force.203 Another payment of more than $7 million was made
using vested Cuban assets to a Florida woman who had won a lawsuit against Cuba based on her
marriage to a Cuban spy.204
As unpaid judgments against designated state sponsors of terrorism continued to mount, Congress
enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA).205 Section 201 of TRIA overrode long-standing
objections by the executive branch to make the frozen assets of terrorist states available to satisfy
judgments for compensatory damages against such states (and organizations and persons) as
follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in subsection (b), in
every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim
based upon an act of terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune under section
1605A or 1605(a)(7) (as such section was in effect on January 27, 2008) of title 28, United
States Code, the blocked assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any
agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or attachment
in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any compensatory
damages for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable.206

202 P.L. 106-386, §2002, 114 Stat. 1541 (2000). Section 2002(b)(1) required the President to “vest and liquidate up to
and not exceeding the amount of property of the Government of Cuba and sanctioned entities in the United States or
any commonwealth, territory, or possession thereof that has been blocked pursuant to [TWEA or IEEPA]” to pay the
compensatory damages portion of such judgments. Judgments against Iran were paid from appropriated funds.
203 Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ($50 million in compensatory damages and
$137.7 million in punitive damages awarded to the families of three of the four persons who were killed when Cuban
aircraft shot down two Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996). The payment represented compensatory damages,
judicially imposed sanctions, and interest.
204 Martinez v. Republic of Cuba, No. 13-1999-CA 018208 (Miami-Dade Co., Fla., Cir. Ct. 2001) (awarding $7.1
million in compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages).
205 P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002), codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1610 note.
206 Ibid. The term “blocked asset” is defined in §201(d) of TRIA to mean
(A) any asset seized or frozen by the United States under [TWEA or IEEPA]; and
(B) does not include property that—
(i) is subject to a license issued by the United States Government for final payment, transfer, or
disposition by or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection with a
transaction for which the issuance of such license has been specifically required by statute other
than [IEEPA] or the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.); or
(ii) in the case of property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, or that enjoys equivalent privileges and immunities under the
law of the United States, is being used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in March 2023, that the United States, acting pursuant to TRIA, violated
the now-defunct Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Iran-U.S., Aug. 15, 1955, U.S.T. 900, by
permitting judgment creditors, to enforce terrorism judgments against Iran through the attachment of assets of Iranian
agencies or instrumentalities who were not participants in the underlying lawsuit. The ICJ found the United States
unreasonably ignored those companies’ separate juridical status and deprived Iranian companies of the independent
legal personality conferred on them by such status. Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, ¶ 159 (Mar. 30,
2023), https://icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/164/164-20230330-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf. The ICJ will decide the
amount of damages the United States owes to Iran at a later phase of the case. Ibid., ¶ 231.
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Subsection (b) of Section 201 provided waiver authority “in the national security interest,” but
only with respect to frozen foreign government “property subject to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.” When Congress
amended the FSIA in 2008207 to revamp the terrorism exception, it provided that judgments
entered under the new exception could be satisfied out of the property of a foreign state
notwithstanding the fact that the property in question is regulated by the United States
government pursuant to TWEA or IEEPA.208 Congress has also crafted legislation on occasion
that makes specific assets available to satisfy specific judgments.209
Congress has also directed that the proceeds from certain sanctions violations be paid into a fund
for providing compensation to the former hostages of Iran and terrorist state judgment
creditors.210 To fund the program, Congress designated that certain real property and bank
accounts owned by Iran and forfeited to the United States could go into the United States Victims
of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund, along with the sum of $1,025,000,000, representing the
amount paid to the United States pursuant to the June 27, 2014, plea agreement and settlement
between the United States and BNP Paribas for sanctions violations.211 The fund is replenished
through criminal penalties and forfeitures for violations of IEEPA or TWEA-based regulations, or
any related civil or criminal conspiracy, scheme, or other federal offense related to doing business
or acting on behalf of a state sponsor of terrorism.212 Three-quarters of all civil penalties and
forfeitures relating to the same offenses are also deposited into the fund.213 The Fund sunsets in
2039.
Russia’s 2022 large-scale invasion of Ukraine has led the executive branch to levy new sanctions
against Russia, in addition to sanctions imposed for other reasons.214 Some Members of Congress
have introduced legislation seeking to seize and repurpose Russian frozen assets for the benefit of
Ukraine,215 or impose a tax on any earnings.216 Some of the proposals, to the extent that they
permit the seizure of assets of aliens with significant ties to or property in the United States, if
enacted, may invite legal challenges based on the Fifth Amendment Takings and Due Process

207 P.L. 110-181 §1083 (2008) (amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
208 28 U.S.C. §1610(g) (2018). It is unclear whether “regulated” property and “blocked asset” are meant to be
synonymous. The provision also overrides the separate juridical status ordinarily accorded to agencies and
instrumentalities of foreign states. Ibid. The ICJ determined that this provision violated the Treaty of Amity for the
same reason it found TRIA to be “unreasonable.” Certain Iranian Assets, ¶ 159.
209 P.L. 112-158, Title V, §502, 126 Stat. 1258 (2012); P.L. 116-92, div. A, Title XII, §1226, 133 Stat. 1645 (2019),
both codified at 22 USC §8772. The Supreme Court upheld this approach in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310
(2016). For an explanation of the case, see CRS Report R44967, Congress’s Power over Court Decisions: Jurisdiction
Stripping and the Rule of Klein, by Joanna R. Lampe. In Certain Iranian Assets, the ICJ found that Bank Markazi, as
Iran’s central bank, was not a “company” entitled to favorable treatment under the Treaty of Amity, and the ICJ did not
have jurisdiction over the claim based on Peterson. Certain Iranian Assets ¶ 54.
210 See the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act, div. O, title IV (2015), 129 Stat. 3007,
codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §20144 (2020).
211 Ibid., for more information about the program and funding for it, see CRS In Focus IF10341, Justice for United
States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act: Eligibility and Funding, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
212 34 U.S.C. §20144(e) (2021).
213 Ibid.
214 See CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt; CRS Insight IN11869, Russia’s War
Against Ukraine: Overview of U.S. Assistance and Sanctions, by Cory Welt; CRS In Focus IF12062, Russia’s War on
Ukraine: Financial and Trade Sanctions, coordinated by Rebecca M. Nelson.
215 From the 117th Cong., see, e.g., H.R. 3838; H.R. 6869; H.R. 6930; H.R. 7015; H.R. 7083; H.R. 7086; S. 3723; S.
3838. From the 118th Cong., see e.g., H.R. 892; H.R. 4175; H.R. 5370; H.R. 5925; H.R. 6491;S. 536; S. 1254; S. 2003;
S. 3359.
216 H.R. 6416.
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Clauses.217 Separately, Congress in the Consolidated Appropriates Act, 2023, authorized the
Attorney General to “transfer to the Secretary of State the proceeds of any covered forfeited
property for use by the Secretary of State to provide assistance to Ukraine to remediate the harms
of Russian aggression towards Ukraine.”218 The provision appears to authorize forfeiture of
property involved in certain sanctions violations as well as blocked property owned or controlled
by a person designated under the specified executive orders pertaining to Russia, which is
forfeitable under the identified statutes. There is a proposal to expand that authority to cover
additional parties and offenses.219
Judicial Interpretation of IEEPA
A number of lawsuits seeking to overturn actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have made their way
through the judicial system, including challenges to the breadth of presidential authority and
congressionally delegated authority, and challenges asserting violations of constitutional rights.
Most of these challenges have failed, and the few challenges that succeeded did not seriously
undermine the overarching statutory scheme for sanctions.
Dames & Moore v. Regan
The breadth of presidential power under IEEPA is illustrated by the Supreme Court’s 1981
opinion in Dames & Moore v. Regan.220 In Dames & Moore, petitioners had challenged President
Carter’s executive order establishing regulations to further compliance with the terms of the
Algiers Accords, which the President had entered into to end the hostage crisis with Iran.221 Under
these agreements, the United States was obligated (1) to terminate all legal proceedings in U.S.
courts involving claims of U.S. nationals against Iran, (2) to nullify all attachments and
judgments, and (3) to resolve outstanding claims exclusively through binding arbitration in the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT). The President, through executive orders, revoked all licenses
that permitted the exercise of “any right, power, or privilege” with regard to Iranian funds,
nullified all non-Iranian interests in assets acquired after a previous blocking order, and required
banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be held
or transferred as directed by the Secretary of the Treasury.222
Dames & Moore had sued Iran for breach of contract to recover compensation for work
performed.223 The district court had entered summary judgment in favor of Dames & Moore and
issued an order attaching certain Iranian assets for satisfaction of any judgment that might

217 See sections below “Fifth Amendment Takings Clause” and “Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause”.
218 P.L. 117-328, § 1708, 136. Stat. 5200 (2022).
219 See S. 1905 (proposal to expand §1708 authority to cover forfeitures by additional persons in relation to offenses
such as export control violations).
220 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
221 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Relating to the Commitments
Made by Iran and the United States and Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981) (collectively “Algiers Accords”).
222 E.O. 12170, 44 Federal Register 65,729 (November 14, 1979); E.O. 12279, 46 Federal Register 7,919 (January 19,
1981). On February 24, 1981 President Reagan ratified the Executive orders that President Carter had signed on
January 19, 1981. E.O. 13294, 46 Federal Register 14,111 (1981).
223 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 644.
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result,224 but stayed the case pending appeal.225 The executive orders and regulations
implementing the Algiers Accords resulted in the nullification of this prejudgment attachment and
the dismissal of the case against Iran, directing that it be filed at the IUSCT.
In response, Dames & Moore sued the government. The plaintiff claimed that the President and
the Secretary of the Treasury exceeded their statutory and constitutional powers to the extent they
adversely affected Dames & Moore’s judgment against Iran, the execution of that judgment, the
prejudgment attachments, and the plaintiff’s ability to continue litigation against the Iranian
banks.226
The government defended its actions, relying largely on IEEPA, which provided explicit support
for most of the measures taken—nullification of the prejudgment attachment and transfer of the
property to Iran—but could not be read to authorize actions affecting the suspension of claims in
U.S. courts. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority:
Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA … directly authorizes the
President’s suspension of claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor
of Congress’ legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the President is acting
alone or at least with the acceptance of Congress. As we have noted, Congress cannot
anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President may find it
necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might act. Such failure of Congress
specifically to delegate authority does not, “especially ... in the areas of foreign policy and
national security,” imply “congressional disapproval” of action taken by the Executive. On
the contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the President’s
authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad
discretion may be considered to “invite” “measures on independent presidential
responsibility.” At least this is so where there is no contrary indication of legislative intent
and when, as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort
engaged in by the President.227
The Court remarked that Congress’s implicit approval of the long-standing presidential practice
of settling international claims by executive agreement was critical to its holding that the
challenged actions were not in conflict with acts of Congress.228 For support, the Court cited
Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,229 which stated
that “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress
and never before questioned … may be treated as a gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the
President by §1 of Art. II.”230 Consequently, it may be argued that Congress’s exclusion of certain
express powers in IEEPA do not necessarily preclude the President from exercising them, at least
where a court finds sufficient precedent exists.
Lower courts have examined IEEPA under a number of other constitutional doctrines.

224 Ibid.
225 Ibid., 666.
226 Ibid., 666-67.
227 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).
228 Ibid., 680 (citing the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 13, codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§§1621 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV)).
229 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952).
230 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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Separation of Powers—Non-Delegation Doctrine
Courts have reviewed whether Congress violated the non-delegation principle of separation of
powers by delegating too much power to the President to legislate, in particular by creating new
crimes.231 These challenges have generally failed.232 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit explained while evaluating IEEPA, delegations of congressional authority are
constitutional so long as Congress provides through a legislative act an “intelligible principle”
governing the exercise of the delegated authority.233 Even if the standards are higher for
delegations of authority to define criminal offenses, the court held, IEEPA provides sufficient
guidance.234 The court stated
The IEEPA “meaningfully constrains the [President’s] discretion,” by requiring that “[t]he
authorities granted to the President ... may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and
extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared.” And
the authorities delegated are defined and limited.235
The Second Circuit found it significant that “IEEPA relates to foreign affairs—an area in which
the President has greater discretion,”236 bolstering its view that IEEPA does not violate the non-
delegation doctrine.
Conversely, plaintiffs have had little success challenging IEEPA sanctions where Congress has
imposed limitations on the President’s authority. The Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to the
then-existing Iraq travel ban based on the claim that the ban imposed an indirect restriction on the

231 United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2006) (appeal of whether IEEPA constitutes an appropriate
delegation of congressional authority to the executive).
232 United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 576 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding IEEPA’s delegation of authority to the
President); United States v. Mirza, 454 F. App’x 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2011) (same); Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 216-17 (same);
United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1092–94 (4th Cir.1993) (same); see also United States v.
Nazemzadeh, No. 11 CR 5726 L, 2014 WL 310460, at *8 (S.D. Cal. January 28, 2014); United States v. Vaghari, No.
CRIM.A. 08-693-01-02, 2009 WL 2245097, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2009); Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control,
No. 05–C–580, 2007 WL 1051767, at *20–21 (E.D. Wis. March 31, 2007), aff'd, 559 F.3d 595 (7th Cir.2009); United
States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 566–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Esfahani, No. 05–CR–0255, 2006
WL 163025, at *1–4 (N.D. Ill. January 17, 2006); United States v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F. Supp. 2d 821, 829–30
(N.D. Ohio 2005); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748
(7th Cir. 2002).
233 Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 215 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)).
234 Ibid., 216 (“Even if a heightened standard should apply to delegations concerning criminal offenses, the IEEPA’s
delegation is subject to constraints similar to those found sufficient in [Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 111
(1991)]”); see also Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d at 576 (“We too conclude that IEEPA “meaningfully constrains” the
President’s discretion.”); Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d at 1092–94 (holding “constraining factors” in IEEPA sufficient to
conclude the President’s powers are “explicitly defined and circumscribed”).
235 Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 216-17 (internal citations omitted). See also United States v. Shih, 73 F.4th 1077, 1092 (9th Cir.
2023) (upholding the use of IEEPA to maintain the Export Administration Regulations despite lapse of the Export
Administration Act did not violate the non-delegation doctrine because IEEPA “specifies the steps the President must
take before invoking an emergency, including consultation with Congress, and establishes reporting requirements”)
The court further held that IEEPA “limits the President’s authority to prohibit certain types of transactions, and
prohibits the punishment of unwitting violators.”). Ibid. The court explained that, “[b]ecause these statutory restrictions
strike ‘a careful balance between affording the President a degree of authority to address the exigencies of national
emergencies and restraining his ability to perpetuate emergency situations indefinitely by creating more opportunities
for congressional input,’” it agreed with every Circuit to have considered the issue, and determined “that IEEPA is
constitutional.” Ibid. (citing United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 577 (3d Cir. 2011); see also United States v.
Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 215–17 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1092–94 (4th Cir.
1993); United States v. Mirza, 454 F. App’x 249, 255–56 (5th Cir. 2011)).
236 Dhafir, 461 F.3d. at 217 (citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675).
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provision of medical supplies in violation of IEEPA.237 In a case where plaintiffs sought
injunctive relief from the imposition of sanctions by arguing that the President’s authority did not
extend to imposing sanctions involving medical supplies and humanitarian aid for Iran, the
district court dismissed the claim in part because the statutory restrictions on such sanctions do
not create a private right of action.238
Separation of Powers—Legislative Veto
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Section 207(b) of IEEPA
is an unconstitutional legislative veto. That provision states
The authorities described in subsection (a)(1) may not continue to be exercised under this
section if the national emergency is terminated by the Congress by concurrent resolution
pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act [50 U.S.C. §1622] and if the
Congress specifies in such concurrent resolution that such authorities may not continue to
be exercised under this section.239
In U.S. v. Romero-Fernandez, two defendants convicted of violating the terms of an executive
order issued under IEEPA argued on appeal that IEEPA was unconstitutional, in part, because of
the above provision. The Eleventh Circuit accepted that the provision was an unconstitutional
legislative veto (as conceded by the government) based on INS v. Chadha,240 in which the
Supreme Court held that Congress cannot void the exercise of power by the executive branch
through concurrent resolution, but can act only through bicameral passage followed by
presentment of the law to the President.241 The Eleventh Circuit nevertheless upheld the
defendants’ convictions for violations of IEEPA regulations,242 holding that the legislative veto
provision was severable from the rest of the statute.243
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
Courts have also addressed whether certain actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have effected an
uncompensated taking of property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause prohibits “private property [from being] taken for public use,

237 Sacks v. Off. of Foreign Assets Control, 466 F.3d 764, 775 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that IEEPA does not burden the
President’s powers with respect to humanitarian aid when he acts under the UNPA). IEEPA does not provide authority
to regulate “donations ... of articles, such as food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve human
suffering, except to the extent that the President determines that such donations” would risk certain harms. 50 U.S.C.
§1702(b)(2).
238 Iran Thalassemia Soc’y v. Off. of Foreign Assets Control, No. 3:22-CV-1195-HZ, 2022 WL 9888593, at *5 (D. Or.
Oct. 14, 2022) (declining to enjoin “maximum pressure” sanctions against Iran for violating the Trade Sanction Reform
and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA, P.L. 106-387, §1, found at 22 U.S.C. §7202) and the Iran financial sector
sanctions provision, found at 22 U.S.C. §8513a(d)(2)), appeal dismissed, No. 22-35850, 2022 WL 18461465 (9th Cir.
Dec. 1, 2022).
239 50 U.S.C. §1706(b) (2018).
240 United States v. Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d 195, 196 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
241 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954–55.
242 Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d at 197 (“Because [defendants] were charged and convicted under 50 U.S.C. §1705(b),
and this section is not affected by the unconstitutionality of §1706(b), the constitutionality of the legislative veto is
irrelevant to their convictions.”). Although the original NEA authorized termination through a concurrent resolution,
which does not require the President’s signature, Congress amended the provision in 1985 to require a joint resolution
as a response to Chadha. Notwithstanding this amendment, Section 207 of IEEPA continues to refer to termination by
concurrent resolution.
243 Ibid., 196 (finding that the balance of IEEPA is capable of functioning independently and noting Congress’s
inclusion of a severability clause).
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without just compensation.”244 The Fifth Amendment’s prohibitions apply as well to regulatory
takings, in which the government does not physically take property but instead imposes
restrictions on the right of enjoyment that decreases the value of the property or right therein.245
The Supreme Court has held that the nullification of prejudgment attachments pursuant to
regulations issued under IEEPA was not an uncompensated taking, suggesting that the reason for
this position was the contingent nature of the licenses that had authorized the attachments.246 The
Court also suggested that the broader purpose of the statute supported the view that there was no
uncompensated taking:
This Court has previously recognized that the congressional purpose in authorizing
blocking orders is “to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President....” Such
orders permit the President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in
negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency. The frozen assets serve as a
“bargaining chip” to be used by the President when dealing with a hostile country.
Accordingly, it is difficult to accept petitioner’s argument because the practical effect of it
is to allow individual claimants throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate
this “bargaining chip” through attachments, garnishments, or similar encumbrances on
property. Neither the purpose the statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language
supports such a result.247
Similarly, a lower court held that the extinguishment of contractual rights due to sanctions
enacted pursuant to IEEPA does not amount to a regulatory taking requiring compensation under
the Fifth Amendment.248 Even though the plaintiff suffered “obvious economic loss” due to the
sanctions regulations, that factor alone was not enough to sustain plaintiff’s claim of a
compensable taking.249 The court quoted long-standing Supreme Court precedent to support its
finding:
A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring upon individuals great
losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless. They may destroy the worth
of contracts. But whoever supposed that, because of this, a tariff could not be changed, or
a non-intercourse act, or an embargo be enacted, or a war be declared? ... [W]as it ever

244 U.S. CONST. Amdt. V. For more information, see Congressional Research Service, Takings Clause: Overview,
CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt5-9-1/ALDE_00013280/.
245 See Paradissiotis v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 16, 20 (2001) (describing a regulatory taking as “not involv[ing]
physical invasion or seizure of property [but rather] concern[ing] action that affects an owner’s use of property, …
based on the ‘general rule ... that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking’”) (citing Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)), aff’d, 304 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
246 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 673 n. 6. (noting that “an American claimant may not use an attachment that is subject
to a revocable license and that has been obtained after the entry of a freeze order to limit in any way the actions the
President may take” pursuant to IEEPA).
247 Ibid., 673–674; see also Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat. Airlines Corp., 657 F.2d 3, 4 (2d Cir. 1981) (“The President’s
action in nullifying the attachments did not constitute a taking of property for which compensation must be paid.”).
248 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (landlord leasing office space to a
foreign government “did so against the backdrop of the government’s foreign policy power” and did not have
reasonable investment-backed expectation that its contract would be fulfilled); Rockefeller Ctr. Properties v. United
States, 32 Fed. Cl. 586, 592 (1995) (“[T]hose who trade with foreign governments must … take the President’s power
into account in structuring their transactions.”); Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]hose
who enter into employment contracts overseas do so in light of one salient fact of economic life: that their ability to
perform and compel performance is contingent upon the continuation of friendly relations between nations” (citing
Chang v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 555, 559-60 (1987)); Paradissiotis, 49 Fed. Cl. at 21 (holding there was no taking
because “plaintiff’’s [stock options] were ‘in every sense subordinate to the President’s power under the IEEPA.’”).
249 Paradissiotis, 49 Fed. Cl. at 21.
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imagined this was taking private property without compensation or without due process of
law?250
Accordingly, it seems unlikely that entities whose business interests are harmed by the imposition
of sanctions pursuant to IEEPA will be entitled to compensation from the government for their
losses.
Persons whose assets have been directly blocked by the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) pursuant to IEEPA have likewise found little success
challenging the loss of the use of their assets as uncompensated takings.251 Many courts have
recognized that a temporary blocking of assets does not constitute a taking because it is a
temporary action that does not vest title in the United States.252 This conclusion is apparently so
even if the blocking of assets necessitates the closing altogether of a business enterprise.253 In
some circumstances, however, a court may analyze at least the initial blocking of assets under a
Fourth Amendment standard for seizure.254 One court found a blocking to be unreasonable under
a Fourth Amendment standard where there was no reason that OFAC could not have first
obtained a judicial warrant.255
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
Some persons whose assets have been blocked have asserted that their right to due process has
been violated. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.256 Where one company protested
that the blocking of its assets without a pre-deprivation hearing violated its right to due process, a
district court found that a temporary deprivation of property does not necessarily give rise to a
right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.257 A second district court stated that the exigencies
of national security and foreign policy considerations that are implicated in IEEPA cases have
meant that OFAC historically has not provided pre-deprivation notice in sanctions programs.258 A
third district court stated that OFAC’s failure to provide a charitable foundation with notice or a
hearing prior to its designation as a terrorist organization and blocking of its assets did not violate
its right to procedural due process, because the OFAC designation and blocking order serve the
important governmental interest of combating terrorism by curtailing the flow of terrorist

250 Ibid. (citing Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1870), quoted in Chang, 859 F.2d at 897).
251 Glob. Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 802 (N.D. Ill.) (“Takings claims have often been raised—
and consistently rejected—in the IEEPA context.”), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
252 Ibid. (citing Tran Qui Than v. Regan, 658 F.2d 1296, 1304 (9th Cir.1981); Miranda v. Secretary of Treasury, 766
F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1985)); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 78–79 (D.D.C. 2002)
(“[T]he case law is clear that a blocking of this nature does not constitute a seizure.” (citations omitted)), aff'd, 333 F.3d
156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
253 IPT Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 92 CIV. 5542 (JFK), 1994 WL 613371, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that
the blocking of assets is not a taking as title to the property has not vested in the Government, the company IPT did not
become a government-owned enterprise, and any proceeds from a sale of the business or its assets will still vest in its
owners, who may claim such assets when the blocking order is lifted).
254 KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 872 (N.D. Ohio 2009); Al
Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 585 F. Supp.2d 1233, 1263 (D. Or. 2008).
255 KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 883.
256 U.S. Constitution, Amdt. V.
257 IPT Co., 1994 WL 613371, at *6 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 498
(1993); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976)).
258 Glob. Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 803-04 (emphasizing “the Executive’s need for speed in these matters, and
the need to prevent the flight of assets and destruction of records”), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
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financing.259 That same court also held that prompt action by the government was necessary to
protect against the transfer of assets subject to the blocking order.260
In Al Haramain Islamic Foundation v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether OFAC’s use of classified information without
any disclosure of its content in its decision to freeze the assets of a charitable organization, and its
failure to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, violated the
organization’s right to procedural due process.261 The court applied the balancing test set forth by
the Supreme Court in its landmark case Mathews v. Eldridge262 to resolve these questions.263
Under the Eldridge test, to determine if an individual has received constitutional due process,
courts must weigh
(1) [the person’s or entity’s] private property interest,
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, as
well as the value of additional safeguards, and
(3) the Government’s interest in maintaining its procedures, including the burdens of
additional procedural requirements.”264
While weighing the interests and risks at issue in Al Haramain, the Ninth Circuit found the
organization’s property interest to be significant:
By design, a designation by OFAC completely shutters all domestic operations of an entity.
All assets are frozen. No person or organization may conduct any business whatsoever with
the entity, other than a very narrow category of actions such as legal defense. Civil penalties
attach even for unwitting violations. Criminal penalties, including up to 20 years’
imprisonment, attach for willful violations. For domestic organizations such as AHIF–
Oregon, a designation means that it conducts no business at all. The designation is
indefinite. Although an entity can seek administrative reconsideration and limited judicial
relief, those remedies take considerable time, as evidenced by OFAC’s long administrative
delay in this case and the ordinary delays inherent in our judicial system. In sum,
designation is not a mere inconvenience or burden on certain property interests; designation
indefinitely renders a domestic organization financially defunct.265
Nevertheless, the court found “the government’s interest in national security [could not] be
understated.”266 In evaluating the government’s interest in maintaining its procedures, the Ninth
Circuit explained that the Constitution requires that the government “take reasonable measures to
ensure basic fairness to the private party and that the government follow procedures reasonably
designed to protect against erroneous deprivation of the private party’s interests.”267 While the
Ninth Circuit had previously held that the use of undisclosed information in a case involving the
exclusion of certain longtime resident aliens should be considered presumptively

259 Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (D.D.C. 2002).
260 Ibid.
261 686 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 2012).
262 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
263 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 979.
264 Ibid. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35).
265 Ibid., 979–80 (internal citations omitted).
266 Ibid., 980.
267 Ibid.
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unconstitutional,268 the court found that the presumption had been overcome in this case.269 The
Ninth Circuit noted that all federal courts that have considered the argument that OFAC may not
use undisclosed classified information in making its determinations have rejected it.270 Although
the court found that OFAC’s failure to provide even an unclassified summary of the information
at issue was a violation of the organization’s due process rights,271 the court deemed the error
harmless because it would not likely have affected the outcome of the case.272
In the same case, the Ninth Circuit also considered the organization’s argument that it had been
denied adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.273 Specifically, the organization asserted
that OFAC had refused to disclose its reasons for investigating and designating the organization,
leaving it unable to respond adequately to OFAC’s unknown suspicions.274 Because OFAC had
provided the organization with only one document to support its designation over the four-year
period between the freezing of its assets and its redesignation as a specially designated global
terrorist (SDGT), the court agreed that OFAC had deprived the organization’s procedural due
process rights.275 However, the court found that this error too was harmless.276
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that a foreign individual could not
challenge his designation as a specially designated national under IEEPA on due process grounds
because he had not established a sufficient connection with the United States to warrant
constitutional protections.277 The court acknowledged that the D.C. Circuit has not articulated a
specific test for determining whether a foreign national residing outside the United States
maintains the requisite “substantial connections” to avail himself of due process rights.278 The
court held that, irrespective of the proper test, the individual had failed to meet the requisite
constitutional standard because he “ha[d] not established any connection to the United States, let

268 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 981 (stating the use of classified information “should be presumptively unconstitutional”
(citing Am.–Arab Anti–Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir. 1995)).
269 Ibid., 982 “[T]the use of classified information in the fight against terrorism, during a presidentially declared
“national emergency,” qualifies as sufficiently “extraordinary” to overcome the presumption.”).
270 Ibid., 981 (citing Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.
2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F. Supp. 2d 637, 660 (N.D.
Ohio 2010); Al–Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 72 (D.D.C. 2008)). See also Olenga v. Gacki, 507 F. Supp. 3d
260, 278 (D.D.C. 2020) (“[G]iven the overriding governmental interest at stake in protecting classified information and
the wide berth afforded the executive branch in matters relating to foreign affairs and national security, the Court
concludes that OFAC has provided Olenga with sufficient notice of the reasons for his designation to comply with the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).
271 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 984 (“OFAC’s failure to pursue potential mitigation measures violated AHIF–Oregon’s
due process rights.”).
272 Ibid., 990.
273 Ibid., 984.
274 Ibid., 984-85.
275 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 987 (holding that, at a minimum, OFAC must provide a timely statement of reasons for
the investigation).
276 Ibid. at 990 (“Even if [the organization] had enjoyed better access to classified information and constitutionally
adequate notice, we are confident that it would not have changed OFAC’s ultimate designation determination.”).
277 Rakhimov v. Gacki, No. CV 19-2554 (JEB), 2020 WL 1911561, at *5 (D.D.C. April 20, 2020) (citing People’s
Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); see also Fulmen Co. v. Office of
Foreign Assets Control, 547 F. Supp. 3d 13, 22 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Because Fulmen’s own pleadings demonstrate no
property or presence in the United States, it cannot establish the ‘substantial connections’ necessary to potentially
entitle it to constitutional protections as a non-resident alien.”).
278 Rakhimov, 2020 WL 1911561 at *5 (citing Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192,
201–03 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 32 Cty. Sovereignty Comm. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
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alone a substantial one.”279 The court did, however, hold that the foreign national retained the
right to procedural review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).280
First Amendment Challenges
Some courts have considered whether asset blocking or penalties imposed pursuant to regulations
promulgated under IEEPA have violated the subjects’ First Amendment rights to free association,
free speech, or religion. Challenges on these grounds have typically failed.281 Courts have held
that there is no First Amendment right to support terrorists.282 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit distinguished advocacy from financial support and held that the
blocking of assets affected only the ability to provide financial support, but did not implicate the
organization’s freedom of association.283 Similarly, a district court interpreted relevant case law to
hold that government actions prohibiting charitable contributions are subject to intermediate
scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, a higher standard that typically applies to regulations
implicating political contributions.284
With respect to a free speech challenge brought by a charitable organization whose assets were
temporarily blocked during the pendency of an investigation, a district court explained that “when
‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important government interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”285 Accordingly, the district court applied the
following test to determine whether the designations and blocking actions were lawful. Citing the
Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. O’Brien, the court stated that a government
regulation is sufficiently justified if
(1) it is within the constitutional power of the government;
(2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
(3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and

279 Ibid.
280 See ibid., *6 (observing that the court must follow “the APA’s [5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A)] ‘highly deferential standard,’
meaning that [it] may set aside Treasury’s action ‘only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law’”) (quoting Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
281 KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (“Courts have uniformly held that OFAC’s blocking and designation authorities
do not reach a substantial amount of protected speech, and that its restrictions are narrowly tailored.”). Islamic Am.
Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52-55 (D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting claims that OFAC
blocking action violated plaintiff’s First Amendment freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of
religion, and noting that “nothing in the IEEPA or the executive order prohibits [the plaintiff] from expressing its
views”); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 570 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of
associational freedom is no license to supply terrorist organizations with resources or material support in any form,
including services as a combatant.”).
282 Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that “where an organization is
found to have supported terrorism, government actions to suspend that support are not unconstitutional” under the First
Amendment); Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 166 (holding “as other courts have,” with respect to a First Amendment right to
association claim, that “there is no First Amendment right nor any other constitutional right to support terrorists” (citing
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000)).
283 Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at 736 (“The blocking was not based on, nor does it prohibit, associational
activity other than financial support.”).
284 Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting cases that concluded that intermediate scrutiny applies
to a designation as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) and blocking order affecting funds purportedly
intended for charitable purposes).
285 Glob. Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)), aff'd on
other grounds, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
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(4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.286
The court found the government’s actions fell within the bounds of this test:
First, the President clearly had the power to issue the Executive Order. Second, the
Executive Order promotes an important and substantial government interest—that of
preventing terrorist attacks. Third, the government’s action is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; it prohibits the provision of financial and other support to terrorists.
Fourth, the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are no greater than
necessary.287
With respect to an organization that was not itself designated as an SDGT but wished to conduct
coordinated advocacy with another organization that was so designated, one appellate court found
that an OFAC regulation barring such coordinated advocacy based on its content was subject to
strict scrutiny.288 The court rejected the government’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project289 to find that the regulation impermissibly implicated the
organization’s right to free speech.290 Accordingly, there may be some circumstances where the
First Amendment protects speech coordinated with (but not on behalf of) an organization
designated as an SDGT.
First Amendment—Informational Materials and Communications Exception
under IEEPA
Although caselaw is sparse, it appears that criminal defendants have had little success asserting a
defense that their conduct amounted to conduct under the provision of informational materials or
protected communications exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected a
claim that OFAC’s regulation, which exempts informational materials that were “not fully created
and in existence at the date of the transactions” from the scope of the statutory exception for
informational materials, was ultra vires.291 The Third Circuit upheld the defendant’s conviction
for violating Iran sanctions regulations by marketing a dynamic chemical engineering software
program to various Iranian entities.292 A district court validated an indictment for IEEPA
violations against a defendant who spoke at a conference in the Democratic People’s Republic of
North Korea (DPRK) involving cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies.293 The court held
that the jury could decide if the speech was part of a long-term conspiracy to persuade and assist
the DPRK in using cryptocurrency services in an effort to avoid U.S. sanctions and launder
money.294 Another court upheld regulations that provided that software does not qualify as

286 Ibid. (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77).
287 Ibid.
288 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 997 (holding strict scrutiny applies and that, “[a]ccordingly, the prohibition survives only
if it is narrowly tailored to advance the concededly compelling government interest of preventing terrorism”).
289 561 U.S. 1, 38 (2010) (upholding the prohibition on material support of terrorist organizations, 18 U.S.C. §2339B,
against First Amendment challenge).
290 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 1001 (holding that under the prevailing fact circumstances, OFAC’s content-based
prohibitions on speech violate the First Amendment).
291 United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 583 (3d Cir. 2011).
292 Ibid., 567.
293 United States v. Griffith, 515 F. Supp. 3d 106, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
294 Ibid., 117.
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excepted “information and informational materials” if it is subject to export controls.295 Likewise,
source code was held not entitled to protection insofar as it was used to conduct cryptocurrency
transactions.296
Civil litigants have had some success challenging IEEPA regulations that effectively shut down
communications platforms altogether. On May 15, 2019, President Donald J. Trump, finding “that
the unrestricted acquisition or use in the United States of information and communications
technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by,
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries” constituted an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the
United States, declared a national emergency under the authority of the NEA and invoked
authorities granted by IEEPA.297
A little more than a year later, on August 6, 2020, President Trump issued two executive orders
under that same national emergency to address “the spread in the United States of mobile
applications developed and owned by companies in [China].”298 The executive orders applied to
the video sharing platform TikTok299 and the communications platform WeChat, among others,300
and prohibited certain transactions, as identified by the Secretary of Commerce, with ByteDance
Ltd., TikTok’s owner, and Tencent Holdings Ltd., WeChat’s owner.301
After the Trump Administration issued regulations barring transactions involving the TikTok and
WeChat communications applications (apps) in the United States, users of TikTok and WeChat
challenged the executive orders and the Commerce Department memorandums implementing
them on constitutional and statutory grounds. Specifically, in two separate cases, litigants argued
that orders and memorandums violated their First Amendment right to free speech and violated
the IEEPA restriction on regulating transactions of informational materials.302 TikTok also
brought a separate suit to enjoin the restrictions.303
In the first case, Marland v. Trump, plaintiffs, users of the video-sharing application TikTok,
challenged the Commerce Department’s memorandum that identified six prohibited transactions
under E.O. 13942.304 The Commerce TikTok Identification specified that it bans only business-to-
business transactions and does not apply to exchanges of business or personal information among

295 United States v. Alavi, No. CR 07-429-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 1989773, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2008) (denying
motion to dismiss superseding indictment).
296 Van Loon v. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 1:23-CV-312-RP, 2023 WL 5313091, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2023).
297 E.O. 13873 (May 15, 2019), Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,
84 Federal Register 22,689 (May 17, 2019).
298 E.O. 13942 (August 6, 2020), Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok, and Taking Additional Steps To Address the
National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 85
Federal Register 48,637 (August 11, 2020); E.O. 13943 (August 6, 2020), Addressing the Threat Posed by WeChat,
and Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications
Technology and Services Supply Chain, 85 Federal Register 48,641 (August 11, 2020).
299 E.O. 13942.
300 E.O. 13943.
301 E.O. 13942; E.O. 13943.
302 Marland v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 624 (E.D. Pa. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 5346749, at *1 (3d Cir. July
14, 2021); U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL
4692706 (9th Cir. August 9, 2021).
303 TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, 507 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D.D.C. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 3082803, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
July 14, 2021).
304 Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 632.
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TikTok users.305 An earlier Commerce Department memorandum noted that the effect of the
prohibitions, most of which were scheduled to apply on November 12, 2020, would be to
“significantly reduce the functionality and usability of the app in the United States,” and that
“these prohibitions may ultimately make the application less effective and may be challenging for
U.S.-based TikTok users.”306
The plaintiffs contended that the Commerce Identification violated the First and Fifth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the APA.307 The district court declined to address
the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenges and certain other claims, and considered instead their
claim that the Commerce TikTok Identification was an ultra vires exercise of agency authority
under the APA because it violates IEEPA’s “informational material” exception as well as the
exception for “personal communication[s] ... not involv[ing] a transfer of anything of value.”308
The court employed a textual interpretation of IEEPA’s informational material bar to find that the
short-format videos exchanged via TikTok clearly fell into IEEPA’s nonexhaustive exemplary list
of informational materials protected from regulation or prohibition because they are “analogous
to the ‘films,’ ‘artworks,’ ‘photographs,’ and ‘news wire feeds’ expressly protected under
§1702(b)(3).”309
The court next determined that the Commerce TikTok Identification, even though it did not
directly ban TikTok users from communicating via TikTok, amounted, at minimum, to an indirect
regulation of such communications by making them impossible to carry out.310 The government
sought to characterize the burden on TikTok users as merely incidental to the Commerce
Identification’s intended objective of prohibiting TikTok’s commercial transactions, and that any
incidental burden cannot violated IEEPA.311 The court, pointing to legislative history of the
Berman Amendments, rejected the government’s contention that the object of the regulation must
itself involve transactions of informational material to be in violation of IEEPA’s informational
material exception.312 The court observed, “[t]he Government’s suggested reading ignores
Congress’s deliberate insertion of the word ‘indirectly’ into IEEPA.”313 While the court accepted
the notion that some burdens on transactions involving informational materials might be so
tangential as to survive review, it declared that this case “does not present a line-drawing
problem” between indirect regulation and tangential effects.314
In the next case, TikTok and its Beijing-based parent company ByteDance sued to enjoin the
Commerce TikTok Identification prohibitions and were initially granted a nationwide preliminary
injunction on the first of the prohibitions, which involved availability of the video-sharing app in
app stores.315 The district court determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits

305 Identification of Prohibited Transactions to Implement Executive Order 13942 and Address the Threat Posed by
TikTok and the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services
Supply Chain, 85 Federal Register 60,061 (September 24, 2020) (the “Commerce TikTok Identification”).
306 Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 632 (quoting September 17 Commerce Department memorandum).
307 Ibid., 634.
308 Ibid. (citing 5 U.S.C. §702; 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1) and (3)).
309 Ibid., 636.
310 Ibid., 637 (“[T]he effect of the Identification will be to undermine the app’s functionality such that U.S. users will
be prevented from exchanging data on the app.”).
311 Ibid.
312 Ibid., 638.
313 Ibid.
314 Ibid., 639.
315 TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, 490 F. Supp. 3d 73 (D.D.C. 2020).
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of their claim that the prohibition contravened the informational material exception.316 The court
explained that the content users share through TikTok falls into the category of informational
materials because it “appears to be (or to be analogous to) ‘publications, films, ... photographs, ...
artworks, ... and news wire feeds.’”317 Like the court in Marland, the district court in TikTok Inc.
rejected the government’s contention that the prohibition involved only business-to-business
transactions based on the finding that the “purpose and effect” of the prohibition on U.S. users
was “to limit, and ultimately reduce to zero, the number of U.S. users who can comment on the
platform and have their personal data on TikTok.”318 The court also found it implausible that
information exchanged on TikTok would fall within a carve-out to the informational materials
exception under the Espionage Act for “shar[ing] U.S. defense secrets ... with foreign
adversaries.”319
The IEEPA exception also covers “personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of
anything of value.”320 The government in TikTok argued that, even if personal communications
shared over TikTok have no economic value to the creators and recipients, such communications
nevertheless have an economic value to the platform as a whole.321 The district court rejected this
argument, stating “such an expansive reading of the phrase ‘anything of value’ would write the
personal-communications limitation out of the statute.”322 The court reasoned that, “[a]ll
communication service providers—from televisions stations and publishers to cellular phone
carriers—get some value from a user’s ‘presence on’ their platform.”323
The third case stems from the Commerce Secretary’s issuance of “Identification of Prohibited
Transactions to Implement Executive Order 13943 and Address the Threat Posed by WeChat and
the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and
Services Supply Chain,” identifying the prohibited transactions (Commerce WeChat
Identification). 324 The Commerce WeChat Identification further clarified that these prohibitions
“only apply to the parties to business-to-business transactions” and did not apply to “[t]he
exchange between or among WeChat mobile application users of personal or business
information using the WeChat mobile application, to include the transferring and receiving of
funds,” among other things.325 The U.S. users of the messaging, social-media, and mobile-
payment app WeChat, sued to challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order 13943 on First
Amendment and Fifth Amendment grounds, as well its compliance with the IEEPA exception
precluding regulation of personal communications.326 The government did not contest that the
prohibitions would result in shutting down WeChat for users as a platform for the exchange of
information.327

316 Ibid., 80.
317 Ibid., 82 (quoting 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(3)).
318 Ibid., 81.
319 Ibid., 83.
320 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1).
321 TikTok, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 83.
322 Ibid.
323 Ibid.
324 U.S. Commerce Department, https://www.commerce.gov/files/identification-prohibited-transactions-implement-
executive-order-13943-and-address-threat.
325 Ibid.
326 U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
327 Ibid., 926 (referring to plaintiffs’ description of WeChat as “a public square for the Chinese-American and Chinese-
speaking community in the U.S”).
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Addressing the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge, the district court agreed that the plaintiffs
established a strong showing that the WeChat ban unlawfully foreclosed “an entire medium of
public expression” or amounted to an unlawful prior restraint of their communications. 328 The
court concluded that Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking WeChat users in the United States
do not have any other viable means of communicating electronically, “not only because China
bans other apps, but also because Chinese speakers with limited English proficiency have no
options other than WeChat.”329 The court suggested, without deciding, that the WeChat ban could
receive heightened First Amendment strict scrutiny if decided on the merits.330 With regard to
intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their First
Amendment challenge. An intermediate form of scrutiny is normally reserved for restrictions on
the “time, place, or manner,” and a time, place, or manner restriction survives such scrutiny if it
“(1) is narrowly tailored, (2) serves a significant governmental interest unrelated to the content of
the speech, and (3) leaves open adequate channels for communication.”331 The court agreed that
the government’s national security interest in preventing WeChat (and China) collection of data
from U.S. users is significant, but that the “effective ban” did not advance that interest in a
narrowly tailored way given the “obvious alternatives to a complete ban, such as barring WeChat
from government devices” or enhancing data security.332 The court concluded that “[o]n this
limited record, the prohibited transactions burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
serve the government’s significant interest in national security, especially given the lack of
substitute channels for communication.”333
The court further determined that the immediate shutdown of WeChat would cause irreparable
harm to the plaintiffs by eliminating their platform for communication.334 In assessing the balance
of equities and the public interest (elements that merge where the government is a party),335 the
court found that the balance of equities tipped in plaintiffs’ favor and the public interest favored
protecting the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.336 The court framed the government’s contention
that an injunction would “frustrate and displace the President’s determination of how best to
address threats to national security”337 as important, but deemed the evidence of the threat posed
specifically by WeChat to be only modest, noting that the wholesale shutdown of WeChat burdens
more speech than necessary to serve the government’s national security and foreign policy
interests.338 Accordingly, the court entered a preliminary nationwide injunction of the Commerce
WeChat Identification.339

328 Ibid., 927.
329 Ibid. (discounting government’s “argument that other substitute social-media apps permit communication”).
330 Ibid., 926-27. In order to justify a prior restraint, the government must demonstrate that the restraint is “narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” Twitter, Inc. v. Sessions, 263 F. Supp. 3d 803, 810 (N.D. Cal.
2017) (citing Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539. 571 (1979); Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement,
505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
331 U.S. WeChat Users Alliance, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 927 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Pac. Coast Horseshoeing Sch.,
Inc. v. Kirchmeyer, 961 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020)).
332 U.S. WeChat Users Alliance, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 927.
333 Ibid., 928 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
334 Ibid., 929.
335 Ibid. (citing California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018)).
336 Ibid. (citing Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2019)).
337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
339 Ibid., 930.
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All three courts adjudicating these disputes issued preliminary injunctions, and the government
appealed each decision.340 The Biden Administration initially sought to pause the litigation while
it reviewed U.S.-China policy and the effective social media platform bans.341 President Biden
subsequently issued an executive order rescinding the relevant executive orders and the
Commerce Department’s implementing memorandums,342 making the litigation moot.343 The
original underlying executive order related to the information and communications technology
and services supply chain, 344 however, remains intact with elaborations set forth in Executive
Order 14034. Consequently, should the Biden Administration decide to institute new restrictions
on the platforms, the First Amendment issue and the interpretation of IEEPA’s exception for
informational materials and personal communications may arise again in litigation.
Use of IEEPA to Continue Enforcing the Export Administration Act (EAA)
Until the enactment of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018,345 export of dual use goods and
services was regulated pursuant to the authority of the Export Administration Act (EAA),346
which was subject to periodic expiry and reauthorization. President Reagan was the first President
to use IEEPA as a vehicle for continuing the enforcement of the EAA’s export controls.347
After Congress did not extend the expired EAA, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12444
in 1983, finding that “unrestricted access of foreign parties to United States commercial goods,
technology, and technical data and the existence of certain boycott practices of foreign nations
constitute, in light of the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security.”348 Although the EAA had been reauthorized for
short periods since its initial expiration in 1983, every subsequent President utilized the
authorities granted under IEEPA to maintain the existing system of export controls during periods
of lapse.
In the latest iteration, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13222 in 2001, finding
the existence of a national emergency with respect to the expiration of the EAA and directing—
pursuant to the authorities allocated under IEEPA—that “the provisions for administration of the
[EAA] shall be carried out under this order so as to continue in full force and effect … the export

340 Marland v. Trump, No. 20-3322 (3d Cir. filed November11, 2020); TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, No. 20-5381 (D.C. Cir.
filed December 29, 2020); U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, No. 20-16908 (9th Cir. filed October 2, 2020).
341 Jeanne Whalen, Biden asks for pause in Trump’s effort to ban WeChat, WASH. POST, February 11, 2021,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/02/11/wechat-trump-biden-pause/.
342 E.O. 14034 of June 9, 2021, “Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries,” 86 Federal
Register 31,423 (June11, 2021).
343 Marland v. Trump, No. 20-3322, 2021 WL 5346749, at *1 (3d Cir. July 14, 2021) (dismissing appeal pursuant to
agreement between parties); TikTok Inc. v. Biden, No. 20-5381, 2021 WL 3082803, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2021)
(dismissing appeal at government’s request); WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, No. 20-16908, 2021 WL 4692706, at
*1 (9th Cir. August 9, 2021) (same).
344 E.O. 13873 of May 15, 2019, “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply
Chain,” 84 Federal Register 22,689 (May 17, 2019).
345In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), P.L. 115-232 to repeal the Export
Administration Act of 1979 and provide new statutory authority for the continuation of EAR. However, three sections
were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise of IEEPA. See “
The Export Control Reform Act of 2018” section below.
346 P.L. 96-72, §2, 93 Stat. 503 (1979), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§4601-4623 (2018).
347 E.O. 12444, 48 Federal Register 48,215 (October 18, 1983).
348 Ibid.
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control system heretofore maintained.”349 Presidents Obama and Trump annually extended the
2001 executive order.350
Courts have generally treated this arrangement as authorized by Congress,351 although certain
provisions of the EAA in effect under IEEPA have led to challenges. The determining factor
appears to be whether IEEPA itself provides the President the authority to carry out the
challenged action. In one case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a conviction
for an attempt to violate the regulations even though the EAA had expired and did not expressly
criminalize such attempts.352 The circuit court rejected the defendants’ argument that the President
had exceeded his delegated authority under the EEA by “enlarging” the crimes punishable under
the regulations.353
Nevertheless, a district court held that the conspiracy provisions of the EAA regulations were
rendered inoperative by the lapse of the EAA and “could not be repromulgated by executive order
under the general powers that IEEPA vests in the President.”354 The district court found that, even
if Congress intended to preserve the operation of the EAA through IEEPA, that intent was limited
by the scope of the statutes’ substantive coverage at the time of IEEPA’s enactment, when no
conspiracy provision existed in either statute.355
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the application of the EAA as a statute
permitting the government to withhold information under exemption 3 of the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA),356 which exempts from disclosure information exempted from disclosure
by statute, even though the EAA had expired.357 Referring to legislative history it interpreted as
congressional approval of the use of IEEPA to continue the EAA provisions during periods of
lapse, the court stated
Although the legislative history does not refer to the EAA’s confidentiality provision, it
does evince Congress’s intent to authorize the President to preserve the operation of the
export regulations promulgated under the EAA. Moreover, it is significant for purposes of
determining legislative intent that Congress acted with the knowledge that the EAA’s
export regulations had long provided for confidentiality and that the President’s ongoing
practice of extending the EAA by executive order had always included these confidentiality
protections.358
The D.C. Circuit distinguished this holding in a later case involving appellate jurisdiction over a
decision by the Department of Commerce to apply sanctions for a company’s violation of the
EAA regulations.359 Pursuant to the regulations and under the direction of the Commerce

349 E.O. 13222, 66 Federal Register 44,025 (August 17, 2001).
350 See, e.g., Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 82 Federal Register 39,005 (August
15, 2017).
351 Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Courts uniformly have read [the executive
order preserving the EAA regulations under IEEPA] to mean that the statute remained in full effect during the periods
of lapse.”). In this case, Sudan challenged its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism pursuant to a provision of the
EAA because the statute had expired.
352 United States v. Mechanic, 809 F.2d 1111, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1987).
353 Ibid., 1113-14 (emphasizing the foreign affairs connection served by the EAA).
354 United States v. Quinn, 401 F. Supp. 2d 80, 93 (D.D.C. 2005).
355 Ibid., 95.
356 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3) (2018).
357 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 317 F.3d 275, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
358 Ibid.
359 Micei Int’l v. Dep't of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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Department, the company sought judicial review directly in the D.C. Circuit.360 The D.C. Circuit,
however, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction:
This court would have jurisdiction pursuant to the President’s order only if the President
has the authority to confer jurisdiction—an authority that, if it exists, must derive from
either the Executive’s inherent power under the Constitution or a permissible delegation of
power from Congress. The former is unavailing, as the Constitution vests the power to
confer jurisdiction in Congress alone. Whether the executive order can provide the basis of
our jurisdiction, then, turns on whether the President can confer jurisdiction on this court
under the auspices of IEEPA…. We conclude that the President lacks that power. Nothing
in the text of IEEPA delegates to the President the authority to grant jurisdiction to any
federal court.361
Consequently, the appeal of the agency decision was determined to belong in the district court
according to the default rule under the APA.362
Issues and Options for Congress
Congress may address a number of issues with respect to IEEPA; three are addressed here. The
first pertains to how Congress has delegated its authority under IEEPA and its umbrella statute,
the NEA. The second pertains to the termination of national emergencies invoking IEEPA. The
third pertains to choices made in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018.
Delegation of Authority under IEEPA
Although the stated aim of the drafters of the NEA and IEEPA was to restrain the use of
emergency powers, the use of such powers has expanded by several measures. Presidents declare
national emergencies and renew them for years or even decades. The limitation of IEEPA to
transactions involving some foreign interest was intended to limit IEEPA’s domestic application.
However, globalization has eroded that limit, as few transactions today do not involve some
foreign interest. Many of the other criticisms of TWEA that IEEPA was supposed to address—
consultation, time limits, congressional review, scope of power, and logical relationship to the
emergency declared—are criticisms that scholars levy against IEEPA today.363 TWEA came under
criticism because the first national emergency declared pursuant to its authority had been ongoing
for 41 years.364 In November 2023, the first emergency declared pursuant to authority under
IEEPA, the emergency with Iran declared in November 1979, entered its forty-fourth year.
In general, four criticisms are levied by scholars with respect to the structure of the NEA and
IEEPA that may be of interest to Congress. First, the NEA and IEEPA do not define the phrases
“national emergency” and “unusual and extraordinary threat” and Presidents have interpreted
these terms broadly. Second, the scope of presidential authority under IEEPA has become less
constrained in a highly globalized era. Third, owing to rulings by the Supreme Court and
amendments to the NEA, Congress must have a two-thirds majority rather than a simple majority
to terminate a national emergency without Presidential consent. Fourth, the structure of the U.S.

360 Ibid., 1151.
361 Ibid., 1153 (internal citations omitted).
362 Ibid., 1152 (citing 5 U.S.C. §704 (2009)).
363 See, e.g., Jason Luong, “Forcing Constraint”; Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism.”
364 See, e.g., “After 41 Years The Depression Finally Ending,” New York Times, October 13, 1974; “Senate Votes to
Conclude 4 National Emergencies,” New York Times, October 8, 1974; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency
Powers in the United States, p. v.
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sanctions regime and its reliance on IEEPA has created emergencies that do not end. Despite these
criticisms, Congress has never terminated an emergency declaration invoking IEEPA.365 This
absence of any explicit statement of disapproval, coupled with explicit statements of approval in
some instances, may indicate congressional approval of presidential use of IEEPA thus far.
Arguably, then, IEEPA could be seen as an effective tool for carrying out the will of Congress.
Definition of “National Emergency” and “Unusual and Extraordinary Threat”
Neither the NEA nor IEEPA define what constitutes a “national emergency.” IEEPA conditions its
invocation in a declaration on its necessity for dealing with an “unusual and extraordinary threat
… to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”366 In the markup of
IEEPA in the House, Fred Bergsten, then-Assistant Secretary for International Affairs in the
Department of the Treasury, praised the requirement that a national emergency for the purposes of
IEEPA be “based on an unusual and extraordinary threat” because such language “emphasizes
that such powers should be available only in true emergencies.”367 Because “unusual” and
“extraordinary” are also undefined, the usual and ordinary invocation of the statute seems to
conflict with those statutory conditions.
If Congress wanted to refine the meaning of “national emergency” or “unusual and extraordinary
threat,” it could do so through statute. Additionally, Congress could consider requiring some sort
of factual finding by a court prior to, or shortly after, the exercise of any authority, such as under
the First Militia Act of 1792368 or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.369 Alternatively,
Congress may consider that the ambiguity in the existing statute provides the executive with the
flexibility necessary to address national emergencies with the requisite dispatch.
Scope of the Authority
While IEEPA nominally applies only to foreign transactions, the breadth of the phrase, “any
interest of any foreign country or a national thereof” leaves a great deal of room for executive
discretion. The interconnectedness of the modern global economy has left few major transactions
in which a foreign interest is not involved.370 As a result, at least one scholar has concluded, “the
exemption of purely domestic transactions from the President’s transaction controls seems to be a
limitation without substance.”371
Presidents have used IEEPA since the 1980s to control exports by maintaining the dual-use export
control system, enshrined in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) in times when its

365 Congress has only successfully terminated via joint resolution one national emergency declared under the NEA.
That national emergency, which related to the Novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID 19) pandemic, did not invoke
IEEPA. See Table A-2.
366 50 U.S.C. §1701.
367 House Markup, p. 12.
368 Using the judiciary to determine whether an emergency authority can be exercised by the executive has been
common. The First Militia Act of 1792, for example, required that either an associate justice of the Supreme Court of a
district judge confirm that an insurrection “too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings” existed. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264. Using a court to determine whether an emergency
existed and whether an action was necessary was also the method favored by the German-American jurist, advisor to
President Abraham Lincoln, and founder of American political science, Francis Lieber, who argued that the acts of
officials in states of emergency should be adjudged in court “to be necessary in the judgment of a moderate and
reasonable man.” Qtd. in Witt, “A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism,” p. 588.
369 50 U.S.C. §§1803-1805.
370 “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” Harvard Law Review, p. 1111 n. 49.
371 Ibid.; See also Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” pp. 757-758.
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underlying authorization, the Export Administration Act (EAA), periodically expired. During
those times when Congress did not reauthorize the EAA, Presidents have declared emergencies to
maintain the dual-use export control system.372 The current emergency has been ongoing since
2001.373
While Presidents have used IEEPA to implement trade restrictions against adversaries, it has not
been used as a general way to impose tariffs. However, as noted above, President Nixon used
TWEA to impose a 10% ad valorem tariff on goods entering the United States to avoid a balance
of payments crisis after he ended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold. Although the use of
TWEA in this instance was criticized at the time,374 the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals upheld President Nixon’s actions375 and Congress maintained the language that President
Nixon relied upon in nearly identical form in the subsequent reforms resulting in the enactment of
IEEPA.376 In the 116th, 117th, and 118th Congresses, bills were introduced that would limit the
President’s authority to use IEEPA to impose tariffs.377
The scope of powers over individual targets is also extensive. Under IEEPA, the President has the
power to prohibit all financial transactions with individuals designated by executive order. Such
power allows the President to block all the assets of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident.378

372 In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Title XVII, Subtitle B of P.L. 115-232, 132 Stat.
2208, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§4801 et seq. to provide new statutory authority for the continuation of EAR. However,
three sections were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise of IEEPA. See
“The Export Control Reform Act of 2018” below.
373 Ibid.
374 See, e.g., the testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy
and Trade. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of
the Committee on International Relations and Markup of the Trading with the Enemy Reform Legislation, 95th Cong.,
1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), pp. 8-9.
375 United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (“Congress, in enacting s 5(b) of the TWEA,
authorized the President, during an emergency, to […] ‘regulate importation,’ by imposing an import duty surcharge or
by other means appropriately and reasonably related […] to the particular nature of the emergency declared.”).
376 TWEA, codified as amended in 1971 at §5(b), provided that during a period of national emergency, the President
may “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding,
use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has
any interest.” IEEPA, as passed in 1977 at §203(a)(1)(B), provided that during a period of national emergency, the
President may “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding,
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any
right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest.”
While he did not ultimately end up doing so, President Trump announced his intention to use IEEPA to impose and
gradually increase a five percent tariff on all goods imported from Mexico. Statement from the President Regarding
Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-address-border-crisis/. See also CRS Insight IN11129,
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Tariffs: Historical Background and Key Issues, by
Christopher A. Casey.
377 E.g., Global Trade Accountability Act, S. 1060 (Lee), 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 29, 2023; Protecting Our
Democracy Act, S. 2921 (Klobuchar), 117th Cong., 1st sess., September 30, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act of
2021, H.R. 2618 (Davidson), 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 16, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act, S. 691 (Lee),
117th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Cong., 1st sess.,
January 23, 2019; Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March
27, 2019.
378 Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” p. 759.
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Such uses of IEEPA may reflect the will of Congress or they may represent a grant of authority
that may have gone beyond what Congress originally intended.
Amending the NEA to Require Joint Resolutions of Approval
The heart of the curtailment of presidential power by the NEA and IEEPA was the provision that
Congress could terminate a state of emergency declared pursuant to the NEA with a concurrent
resolution. When the “legislative veto” was struck down by the Supreme Court (see above), it left
Congress with a steeper climb—presumably requiring passage of a veto-proof joint resolution—
to terminate a national emergency declared under the NEA.379 To date, no national emergency
declared under the NEA has been terminated without Presidential consent.
Since 2019, Members of Congress have introduced several bills that would amend the NEA to
place new limits on the exercise of emergency authorities. The most common strategy has been to
require a joint resolution of approval. In the 116th, 117th, and 118th Congresses, bills were
introduced to require a joint resolution of approval for an emergency to extend beyond a certain
number of days.380 The National Security Powers Act of 2021, for example, would have required
that Congress pass a joint resolution approving of a national emergency within 30 days.381
The NEA, IEEPA, and “Never Ending Emergencies”
Some Members of Congress, scholars, and civil society organizations have criticized the NEA for
producing “never ending emergencies.”382 The average length of an emergency declared under the
NEA is more than nine years, with one emergency well into its fifth decade. However, excluding
emergencies declared to impose sanctions drops that average to three years. Of the nine
emergencies declared under the NEA that do not cite IEEPA, six were terminated or expired after
fewer than three years. The remaining emergencies relate to Cuba, the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, and restrictions on Russian-affiliated vessels put in place after Russia’s further
invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
It is the emergencies citing IEEPA that frequently last decades. The reason for this may be
structural. Should the President terminate an emergency, the authority to continue freezing assets
would, in many cases, also terminate.383 Congress could provide non-emergency authority to
maintain blocks on transactions and freezes on assets made during a national emergency,
otherwise Presidents will likely consider the continuation of national emergencies to be necessary
to prevent assets frozen under IEEPA from becoming accessible.

379 Congress amended NEA in 1985 to require a joint resolution, which is subject to the President’s veto, to terminate
an emergency. P.L. 99-93 (August 16, 1985), 99 Stat. 405.
380 E.g., ARTICLE ONE Act, S. 1912 (Lee), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 8, 2023; Protecting Our Democracy Act, S.
2921 (Klobuchar), 117th Cong., 1st sess., September 30, 2021; National Emergencies Reform Act , H.R. 9041 (Amash),
116th Cong., 2nd sess., December 22, 2020.
381 National Security Powers Act of 2021, S. 2391 (Murphy), 117th Cong., 1st sess., July 20, 2021. For additional
examples during the 116th Congress, see Global Trade Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Cong.,
1st sess., January 23, 2019; Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong., 1st
sess., March 27, 2019.
382 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, “Never Ending Emergencies – An
Examination of the National Emergencies Act,” 118th Cong., 1st sess., hearing, May 24, 2023; Catherine Padhi,
“Emergencies Without End: A Primer on Federal States of Emergency,” Lawfare, December 8, 2017.
383 See “Implications of Terminating National Emergencies Invoking IEEPA”
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The Status Quo
In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations in 1977, Professor Harold G.
Maier summed up the main criticisms of TWEA:
Section 5(b)’s effect is no longer confined to “emergency situations” in the sense of
existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit,
by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has
converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President.”384
Like TWEA before it, IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanction regime. Like TWEA
before it, Congress has often approved explicitly of the President’s use of IEEPA. In several
circumstances, Congress has directed the President to impose a variety of sanctions under IEEPA
and waived the requirement of an emergency declaration. Even when Congress has not given
explicit approval, until 2023, no Member of Congress had ever introduced a resolution to
terminate a national emergency citing IEEPA.385 The NEA requires that both houses of Congress
meet every six months to consider a vote on a joint resolution on terminating an emergency.386
Neither house has ever met to do so with respect to an emergency citing IEEPA. In response to
concerns over the scale and scope of the emergency economic powers granted by IEEPA,
supporters of the status quo would argue that Congress has implicitly and explicitly expressed
approval of the statute and its use. Indeed, several bills proposing a limit on the length of national
emergencies declared under the NEA explicitly exclude IEEPA.387
Implications of Terminating National Emergencies Invoking IEEPA
Beginning in the late 2010s, some Members of Congress and civil society organizations began to
express concern with the NEA and IEEPA. Whereas one resolution to terminate a national
emergency declared under the NEA was introduced between 1976 and 2018,388 15 were
introduced between 2019 and January 15, 2024 (Table A-2).389 In 2019, both houses of Congress

384 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 9.
385 Since the enactment of the NEA, two resolutions to terminate a national emergency have been introduced. The first
was to terminate the national emergency declared in response to Hurricane Katrina, but the declaration of emergency in
that case did not invoke IEEPA. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Congress, 1st session, September 8, 2005. The second was
to terminate the national emergency declared February 15, 2019 with respect to the Southern Border of the United
States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019; S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess.,
February 28, 2019. However, neither of the declarations of national emergency at issue invoked IEEPA.
386 50 U.S.C. §1622(b).
387 E.g., Reforming Emergency Powers to Uphold the Balances and Limitations Inherent in the Constitution Act or the
REPUBLIC Act, S. 463 (Paul), 117th Cong., 1st sess., February 25, 2021; Assuring that Robust, Thorough, and
Informed Congressional Leadership is Exercised Over National Emergencies Act or the ARTICLE One Act, S. 764
(Lee), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 12, 2019, as reported to the Senate November 19, 2019.
388 In 2005, Rep. George Miller (CA) introduced a resolution to terminate the declaration of a national emergency as a
result of Hurricane Katrina. It was not considered. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 8, 2005.
While this resolution cited to the NEA, the declaration of national emergency that it sought to terminate (Proclamation
7924, 70 Federal Register 54227) did not.
389 Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 15, 2019, H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong.,
1st sess., February 22, 2019; A joint resolution relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February
15, 2019, S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019; A joint resolution relating to a national
emergency declared by the President on February 15, 2019, S.J.Res. 54 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., September 10,
2019; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 15, 2019, H.J.Res. 75 (Castro), 116th
Cong., 1st sess., September 19, 2019; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 15, 2019,
H.J.Res. 85 (Castro), 116th Cong., 2nd sess., February 14, 2020; Relating to a national emergency declared by the
President on March 13, 2020, H.J.Res. 46 (Gosar), 117th Cong., 2nd sess., May 20, 2021; Relating to a national
(continued...)
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passed, for the first time, a resolution to terminate a national emergency.390 President Donald J.
Trump vetoed that resolution and the House did not override the veto.391 In 2023, after several
attempts, Congress voted to terminate the national emergency concerning the Novel Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) outbreak.392 President Joe Biden signed the resolution, terminating the
national emergency.393 In 2023, several Members of Congress introduced five bills seeking to
terminate, for the first time, national emergencies invoking IEEPA; all five failed to pass the
House.394
IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanction regime. Were Congress to terminate a
national emergency invoking IEEPA, sanctions put into place under the authority of that
emergency, including the blocking of assets, would terminate395 unless such sanctions could be
kept in place under a different authority, such as the United Nations Participation Act.396

emergency declared by the President on March 13, 2020, H.J.Res. 52 (Gosar), 117th Cong., 2nd sess., June 16, 2021; A
joint resolution relating to a national emergency declared by the President on March 13, 2020, S.J.Res. 38 (Marshall),
117th Cong., 2nd sess., February 14, 2022; A joint resolution relating to a national emergency declared by the President
on March 13, 2020, S.J.Res. 63 (Marshall), 117th Cong., 2nd sess., September 22, 2022; Relating to a national
emergency declared by the President on March 13, 2020, H.J.Res. 7 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., January 9, 2023;
Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on October 27, 2006, H.J.Res. 68 (Boebert), 118th Cong., 1st
sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 25, 2011, H.J.Res. 70
(Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 22,
2003, H.J.Res. 71 (Crane), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 14, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the
President on May 16, 2012, H.J.Res. 74 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2023; Relating to a national emergency
declared by the President on May 11, 2004, H.J.Res. 79 (Gaetz), 118th Cong., 1st sess., July 6, 2023.
390 In 2019, Rep. Castro and Sen. Udall introduced resolutions to terminate the declaration of a national emergency
with respect to the Southern Border of the United States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019;
S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019.
391 Ibid.
392 Act of April 10, 2023, P.L. 118-3, 137 Stat. 6.
393 Ibid.
394 Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on October 27, 2006, H.J.Res. 68 (Boebert), 118th Cong.,
1st sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 25, 2011, H.J.Res. 70
(Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 22,
2003, H.J.Res. 71 (Crane), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 14, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the
President on May 16, 2012, H.J.Res. 74 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2023; Relating to a national emergency
declared by the President on May 11, 2004, H.J.Res. 79 (Gaetz), 118th Cong., 1st sess., July 6, 2023.
395 50 U.S.C. §1622(a) provides that:
[A]ny powers or authorities exercised by reason of [the terminated] emergency shall cease to be
exercised after [the date of termination], except that such termination shall not affect-
(A) any action taken or proceeding pending not finally concluded or determined on such date;
(B) any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior to such date; or
(C) any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were incurred prior to such date.
396 United Nations Participation Act, P.L. 79-264, §5, 59 Stat. 620 (1945), codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §287c. The
extent to which the UNPA would permit the blocking of property by placing individuals or entities on the Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List is uncertain. The UNPA gives the President the authority to implement
U.N. sanctions and authorizes him to enforce such measures by issuing “such orders, rules, and regulations as may be
prescribed by him,” thereby allowing him to “investigate, regulate, or prohibit, in whole or in part, economic relations
or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any
national thereof or any person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or
involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Ibid. IEEPA authority includes the authority for
the President to “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void,
prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or
exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any
property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(B).
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IEEPA also contains a savings provision in the event a national emergency invoking IEEPA is
terminated, permitting the President to continue to block property if “the continuation of such
prohibition with respect to that property is necessary on account of claims involving such country
or its nationals,” unless Congress provides otherwise in a resolution terminating the emergency.397
The legislative history suggests that Congress may have considered the continued blocking of
assets that could be used for presidential settlements of claims by American citizens against
foreign countries.398 In at least one case, however, the President invoked the savings provision to
continue to block property pending claims among successor states.399
The full scope of the savings provision with regard to the extent of prohibitions that may be
maintained following termination is unclear. “Property in which a foreign country or national
thereof has any interest” has been interpreted broadly by the courts, defining “interest” to mean
“an interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.”400 In other words, the sanctioned entity
need not own the property at issue in order to have an interest in it.401 The reference in the savings
provision to “that property [deemed] necessary [for purpose of resolving] claims involving such
country or its nationals”402 arguably refers only to blocked property owned by the sanctioned
entity liable for claims. Under this interpretation, the full range of prohibitions under the relevant
sanctions regulations could no longer be enforced in the event the underlying national emergency
is terminated, even if outstanding claims exist.
The Export Control Reform Act of 2018
In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA).403 The legislation repealed the
expired Export Administration Act of 1979,404 the regulations of which had been continued by
reference to IEEPA since 2001.405 ECRA became the new statutory authority for Export
Administration Regulations. Nevertheless, several export controls addressed in the Export
Administration Act of 1979 were not updated in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018;406
instead, Congress chose to require the President to continue to use IEEPA to continue to
implement the three sections of the Export Administration Act of 1979 that were not repealed.407

397 50 U.S.C. §1706(a)(1).
398 S. Rep. No. 95-466, at 6 (1977) (noting that “blocked assets may continue to be blocked by the President despite
termination of a state of emergency, the National Emergencies Act notwithstanding, unless Congress specifies
otherwise” and that “[n]othing in this act is intended by the committee to interfere with the authority of the President to
continue blocking assets which are presently blocked, or to impede the settlement of claims of U.S. citizens against
foreign countries”).
399 E.O. 13304, Termination of Emergencies With Respect to Yugoslavia and Modification of Executive Order 13219
of June 26, 2001, 68 Federal Register 32315 (May 29, 2003).
400 See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 67 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd, 333 F.3d
156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
401 See Glob. Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that covered “interest” need not
be a legal interest “in the way that a trustee is legal owner of the corpus even if someone else enjoys the beneficial
interest”).
402 50 U.S.C. §1706(a)(1) (emphasis added).
403 Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), P.L. 115-232.
404 Ibid. §1766(a).
405 E.O. 13222.
406 ECRA §1766(a). Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of 1979, codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§4611, 4612, 4613, were not repealed.
407 ECRA §1766(b) (“The President shall implement [Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of
1979] by exercising the authorities of the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).”).
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Going forward, Congress may revisit these provisions, which all relate to deterring the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
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Appendix A. NEA and IEEPA Use
Table A-1. National Emergencies Declared Pursuant to the NEA as of January 15,
2024
*Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA but that did not invoke IEEPA.

Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National
Date of
Date of
Originating
Revoking
Emergency Pursuant to NEA
Declaration
Revocation
E.O./Procl.
E.O./Procl.
1
Blocking Iranian Government Property
11/14/1979
Ongoing
12170

2
Sanctions Against Iran
4/17/1980
4/17/1981
12211
Expired
3
Continuation of Export Control
Regulations
10/14/1983
12/20/1983
12444
12451
4
Continuation of Export Control
Regulations
3/30/1984
7/12/1985
12470
12525
5
Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other
Transactions Involving Nicaragua
5/1/1985
3/13/1990
12513
12707
6
Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other
Transactions Involving South Africa
9/9/1985
7/10/1991
12532
12769
7
Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions
Involving Libya
1/7/1986
9/20/2004
12543
13357
8
Prohibiting Certain Transactions With
Respect to Panama
4/8/1988
4/5/1990
12635
12710
9
Blocking Iraqi Government Property and
Prohibiting Transactions with Iraq
8/2/1990
7/29/2004
12722
13350
10
Continuation of Export Control
Regulations
9/30/1990
9/30/1993
12730
12867
Chemical and Biological Weapons
11
Proliferation
11/16/1990
11/11/1994
12735
12938
Prohibiting Certain Transactions with
12
Respect to Haiti
10/4/1991
10/14/1994
12775
12932
Blocking “Yugoslav Government" Property
13
and Property of the Governments of Serbia
and Montenegro
5/30/1992
5/28/2003
12808
13304
To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March
3, 1931, Within a Limited Geographic Area
14
in Response to the National Emergency
Caused by Hurricane Andrewa
10/14/1992
3/6/1993
6491
6534
Prohibiting Certain Transactions Involving
15
UNITA
9/26/1993
5/6/2003
12865
24857
Measures To Restrict The Participation By
16
United States Persons In Weapons
Proliferation Activities
9/30/1993
9/29/1994
12868
12930
Continuation of Export Control
17
Regulations
6/30/1994
8/19/1994
12923
12924
Continuation of Export Control
18
Regulations
8/19/1994
4/4/2001
12924
13206
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Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National
Date of
Date of
Originating
Revoking
Emergency Pursuant to NEA
Declaration
Revocation
E.O./Procl.
E.O./Procl.
Measures To Restrict The Participation By
19
United States Persons In Weapons
Proliferation Activities
9/29/1994
11/14/1994
12930
12938
20
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction
11/14/1994
Ongoing
12938

Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists
21
Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East
Peace Process
1/23/1995
09/09/2019
12947
12947
Prohibiting Certain Transactions With
22
Respect to the Development of Iranian
Petroleum Resources
3/15/1995
Ongoing
12957

Blocking Assets and Prohibiting
23
Transactions With Significant Narcotics
Traffickers
10/21/1995
Ongoing
12978

24
Regulation of the Anchorage and
Movement of Vessels with Respect to Cuba 3/1/1996
Ongoing
6867

Declaration of a State of Emergency and
25
Release of Feed Grain from the Disaster
Reserve
7/1/1996
07/01/1997
6907
Expired
26
Prohibiting New Investment in Burma
5/20/1997
10/7/2016
13047
13742
27
Blocking Sudanese Government Property
and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan
11/3/1997
Ongoing
13067

Blocking Property of the Governments of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia,
28
and the Republic of Montenegro, and
Prohibiting New Investment in the Republic
of Serbia in Response to the Situation in
Kosovo
6/9/1998
5/28/2003
13088
13304
29
Blocking Property and Prohibiting
Transactions With the Taliban
7/4/1999
7/2/2002
13129
13268
Blocking Property of the Government of
the Russian Federation Relating to the
30
Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium
Extracted From Nuclear Weapons
6/21/2000
6/21/2012
13159
Expired
31
Prohibiting the Importation of Rough
Diamonds From Sierra Leone
1/18/2001
1/15/2004
13194
13324
Blocking Property of Persons Who
32
Threaten International Stabilization Efforts
in the Western Balkans
6/26/2001
Ongoing
13219

Continuation of Export Control
33
Regulations
8/17/2001
Ongoing
13222

34
Declaration of National Emergency by
Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks
9/14/2001
Ongoing
7463

35
Blocking Property and Prohibiting
Transactions With Persons Who Commit,
9/23/2001
Ongoing
13224

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Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National
Date of
Date of
Originating
Revoking
Emergency Pursuant to NEA
Declaration
Revocation
E.O./Procl.
E.O./Procl.
Threaten To Commit, or Support
Terrorism
Blocking Property of Persons Undermining
36
Democratic Processes or Institutions in
Zimbabwe
3/6/2003
Ongoing
13288

Protecting the Development Fund for Iraq
37
and Certain Other Property in Which Iraq
Has an Interest
5/22/2003
Ongoing
13303

Blocking Property of Certain Persons and
38
Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to
Syria
5/11/2004
Ongoing
13338

Blocking Property of Certain Persons and
39
Prohibiting the Importation of Certain
Goods From Liberia
7/22/2004
11/12/2015
13348
13710
To Suspend Subchapter IV of Chapter 31 of
Title 40, United States Code, Within a
40
Limited Geographic Area in Response to
the National Emergency Caused by
Hurricane Katrinab
9/8/2005
11/3/2005
7924
7959
Blocking Property of Certain Persons
41
Contributing to the Conflict in Cote
d'Ivoire
2/7/2006
9/14/2016
13396
13739
Blocking Property of Certain Persons
42
Undermining Democratic Processes or
Institutions in Belarus
6/16/2006
Ongoing
13405

Blocking Property of Certain Persons
43
Contributing to the Conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
10/27/2006
Ongoing
13413

Blocking Property of Persons Undermining
44
the Sovereignty of Lebanon or Its
Democratic Processes and Institutions
8/1/2007
Ongoing
13441

Continuing Certain Restrictions With
45
Respect to North Korea and North
Korean Nationals
6/26/2008
Ongoing
13466

Declaration of a National Emergency With
46
Respect to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza
Pandemic
10/23/2009
10/22/2010
8443
Expired
47
Blocking Property of Certain Persons
Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia
4/12/2010
Ongoing
13536

48
Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain
Transactions Related to Libya
2/25/2011
Ongoing
13566

Blocking Property of Transnational
49
Criminal Organizations
7/24/2011
Ongoing
13581

50
Blocking Property of Persons Threatening
the Peace, Security, or Stability of Yemen
5/16/2012
Ongoing
13611

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Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National
Date of
Date of
Originating
Revoking
Emergency Pursuant to NEA
Declaration
Revocation
E.O./Procl.
E.O./Procl.
Blocking Property of the Government of
the Russian Federation Relating to the
51
Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium
Extracted From Nuclear Weapons
6/25/2012
5/26/2015
13617
13695
52
Blocking Property of Certain Persons
Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine
3/6/2014
Ongoing
13660

53
Blocking Property of Certain Persons With
Respect to South Sudan
4/3/2014
Ongoing
13664

Blocking Property of Certain Persons
54
Contributing to the Conflict in the Central
African Republic
5/12/2014
Ongoing
13667

Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of
55
Certain Persons Contributing to the
Situation in Venezuela
3/8/2015
Ongoing
13692

Blocking the Property of Certain Persons
56
Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-
Enabled Activities
4/1/2015
Ongoing
13694

57
Blocking Property of Certain Persons
Contributing to the Situation in Burundi
11/22/2015
11/18/2021
13712
14059
Blocking the Property of Persons Involved
58
in Serious Human Rights Abuse or
Corruption
12/20/2017
Ongoing
13818

Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of
59
Foreign Interference in a United States
Election
9/12/2018
Ongoing
13848

60
Blocking Property of Certain Persons
Contributing to the Situation in Nicaragua
11/27/2018
Ongoing
13851

Declaring a National Emergency
61
Concerning the Southern Border of the
United States
2/15/2019
1/20/2021
9844
10142
Securing the Information and
62
Communications Technology and Services
Supply Chain
5/15/2019
Ongoing
13873

Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of
63
Certain Persons Contributing to the
Situation in Mali
07/26/2019
Ongoing
13882

Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of
64
Certain Persons Contributing to the
Situation in Syria
10/17/2019
Ongoing
13894

Declaring a National Emergency
65
Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) Outbreak
03/13/2020
Ongoing
9994

66
Securing the United States Bulk-Power
System
05/01/2020
05/01/2021
13920
Expired
Blocking Property of Certain Persons
67
Associated With the International Criminal
Court
06/11/2020
04/01/2021
13928
14022
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Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National
Date of
Date of
Originating
Revoking
Emergency Pursuant to NEA
Declaration
Revocation
E.O./Procl.
E.O./Procl.
68
Hong Kong Normalization
07/14/2020
Ongoing
13936

69
Critical Minerals
09/30/2020
09/30/2021
13953
Expired
70
Investments that Finance Chinese Military
Companies
11/12/2020
Ongoing
13959

71
Blocking Property With Respect to the
Situation in Burma
02/10/2021
Ongoing
14014

Blocking Property With Respect to
72
Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the
Russian Federation
04/15/2021
Ongoing
14024

Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons
73
With Respect to the Humanitarian and
Human Rights Crisis in Ethiopia
09/17/2021
Ongoing
14046

74
Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons
Involved in the Global Il icit Drug Trade
12/15/2021
Ongoing
14059

Protecting Certain Property of Da
75
Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the
People of Afghanistan
02/11/2022
Ongoing
14064

Declaration of National Emergency and
Invocation of Emergency Authority Relating
76
to the Regulation of the Anchorage and
Movement of Russian-Affiliated Vessels to
United States Ports
04/21/2022
Ongoing
10371

Declaration of Emergency and
77
Authorization for Temporary Extensions of
Time and Duty-Free Importation of Solar
Cells and Modules From Southeast Asiac
06/06/2022
Ongoing
10414

Bolstering Efforts To Bring Hostages and
78
Wrongful y Detained United States
Nationals Home
07/19/2022
Ongoing
14078

Addressing United States Investments in
79
Certain National Security Technologies and
Products in Countries of Concern
08/09/2023
Ongoing
14105

Source: CRS, as of January 15, 2024.
Notes: Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA that did not invoke IEEPA. This table
tracks emergencies that have been declared and their ultimate disposition. It does not include expansions or
amendments to those emergencies. For example, Executive Order 14024, which declared a national emergency
with respect to specified harmful activities of the Russian Federation in April of 2021, has been the basis of
certain actions taken under IEEPA against the Russian Federation since it invaded Ukraine in February 2022. See,
e.g., E.O. 14065 of February 21, 2022, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain
Transactions with Respect to Continued Russian Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity
of Ukraine,” 87 Federal Register 10293, February 23, 2022; E.O. 14066 of March 8, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain
Imports and New Investments with Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the
Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” 87 Federal Register 13625, March 10, 2022; E.O. 14068 of March
11, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment with Respect to Continued Russian
Federation Aggression,” 87 Federal Register 14381, March 15, 2022.
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a. Although the President did not explicitly use that phrase “declare a national emergency,” the Davis-Bacon
act, as amended at the date of the proclamation, and as noted in the proclamation, provided for the
suspension of the act’s provisions “in the event of a national emergency.”
b. Similar to the suspension of the Davis-Bacon act in 1992, this proclamation was somewhat anomalous. The
proclamation did not cite to the NEA when declaring a national emergency for the purposes of suspending
the act. However, the revoking proclamation did cite the NEA. Moreover, Rep. George Mil er (CA)
introduced a resolution to terminate the declaration of a national emergency pursuant to the NEA. H.J.Res.
69 (Mil er), 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 8, 2005.
c. On June 6, 2022, President Biden declared an “an emergency to exist with respect to the threats to the
availability of sufficient electricity generation capacity to meet expected customer demand.” Although the
President did not cite the NEA, the statute he invoked may fall under the NEA. U.S. Congress, Senate
Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, Emergency Powers Statutes: Provisions
of Federal Law Now in Effect Delegating to the Executive Extraordinary Authority in Time of National
Emergency, committee print, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., September 1973 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1973), pp. xi,
32, 243; U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations, National Emergencies Act, hearing on H.R. 3884, 94th Cong., 1st sess., March 6, 18,
19, and April 9, 1975 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1975), p. 117: “American importers have relied extensively
on the practice of warehousing merchandise in Customs bonded warehouses for periods in excess of the
initial statutory periods afforded by sections 491, 557, and 550 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Such extensions
have been made possible by Customs regulations authorized by Proclamation 2048 which President Truman
Issued under the authority of section 318 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (10 U.S.C. §1318), an emergency statute.
Due to the extensive reliance on these Customs regulations in the past, a statutory replacement for the
existing authority conferred on this Department by Proclamation 2948 wil be recommended.” Although
the letter was written in 1974 in response to other bil s, it was included in hearings on H.R. 3884, which
was the bil that ultimately became the NEA. Commerce argued in subsequent regulations that the agency
“[did] not agree that Proclamation 10414 fails to conform with the requirements of the [NEA]."
International Trade Administration, “Procedures Covering Suspension of Liquidation, Duties and Estimated
Duties in Accord With Presidential Proclamation 10414,” 87 Federal Register 56868, September 16, 2022.
Table A-2. Resolutions to Terminate National Emergencies
Targeted
Declaration of
National
Disposition of
Resolution
Cong.
Emergency
Resolution
IEEPA or Other
H.J.Res. 69
109
Proclamation 7924
Introduced
Other
of September 8,
2005, “To Suspend
Subchapter IV of
Chapter 31 of Title
40, United States
Code, Within a
Limited
Geographic Area
in Response to the
National
Emergency Caused
by Hurricane
Katrina”
H.J.Res. 46
116
Proclamation 9844
Failed to pass over veto Other
of February 15,
2019, “Declaring a
National
Emergency
Concerning the
Southern Border
of the United
States.”
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Targeted
Declaration of
National
Disposition of
Resolution
Cong.
Emergency
Resolution
IEEPA or Other
H.J.Res. 52
117
Proclamation 9994
Introduced
Other
of March 13, 2020,
“Declaring a
National
Emergency
Concerning the
Novel Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-
19) Outbreak.”
S.J.Res. 38
117
Proclamation 9994
Passed Senate
Other

of March 13, 2020,
“Declaring a
National
Emergency
Concerning the
Novel Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-
19) Outbreak.”
S.J.Res. 63
117
Proclamation 9994
Passed Senate
Other
of March 13, 2020,
“Declaring a
National
Emergency
Concerning the
Novel Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-
19) Outbreak.”
H.J.Res. 7
118
Proclamation 9994
Became Law
Other
of March 13, 2020,
“Declaring a
National
Emergency
Concerning the
Novel Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-
19) Outbreak.”
H.J.Res. 68
118
Executive Order
Failed House
IEEPA
13413 of October
27, 2006, “Blocking
Property of
Certain Persons
Contributing to
the Conflict in the
Democratic
Republic of the
Congo.”
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Targeted
Declaration of
National
Disposition of
Resolution
Cong.
Emergency
Resolution
IEEPA or Other
H.J.Res. 70
118
Executive Order
Failed House
IEEPA
13566 of February
25, 2011, “Blocking
Property and
Prohibiting Certain
Transactions
Related to Libya.”
H.J.Res. 71
118
Executive Order
Failed House
IEEPA
13303 of May 22,
2003, “Protecting
the Development
Fund for Iraq and
Certain Other
Property in Which
Iraq Has an
Interest.”
H.J.Res. 74
118
Executive Order
Failed House
IEEPA
13611 of May 16,
2012, “Blocking
Property of
Persons
Threatening the
Peace, Security, or
Stability of
Yemen.”
H.J.Res. 79
118
Executive Order
Failed House
IEEPA
13338 of May 11,
2004, “Blocking
Property of
Certain Persons
and Prohibiting the
Export of Certain
Goods to Syria.”
Source: CRS as of January 15, 2024.
Notes: Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA that did not invoke IEEPA.

Table A-3. IEEPA National Emergency Use by Executive Order
In chronological order, from first use (1979) to January 15, 2024
Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
Administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981)
12170
Iran (hostage taking)
Declares national
Emergency requires annual
(November 14. 1979; 44
emergency; blocks Iran
renewal; other parts
FR 65729)
government property
revoked and replaced, E.O.
13599 (2012)
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
12205
Iran (hostage taking)
Prohibits certain
Revoked in part by E.O.
(April. 7, 1980; 45 FR
transactions
12282 (1981)
24099)
12211
Iran (hostage taking)
Prohibits transactions
Revoked in part by E.O.
(April 17, 1980; 45 FR
12282 (1981)
26685)
12276
Iran (hostage taking—
Establishes escrow
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
accounts
(1981)
7913)
12277
Iran (hostage taking—
Transfers Iran
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
government funds
(1981)
7915)
12278
Iran (hostage taking—
Transfers Iran
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
government assets
(1981)
7917)
overseas
12279
Iran (hostage taking—
Transfers Iran
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
government assets held in
(1981)
7917)
U.S. banks
12280
Iran (hostage taking—
Transfers Iran
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
government financial
(1981)
7921)
assets held by non-banks
12281
Iran (hostage taking—
Transfers other Iran
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
government assets
(1981)
7923)
12282
Iran (hostage taking—
Revokes prohibitions
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
against transactions
(1981)
7925)
involving Iran
12283
Iran (hostage taking—
Non-prosecution of
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
claims of Iran hostages
(1981)
7927)
12284
Iran (hostage taking—
Restricts transfer of
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
property of the Shah
(1981)
7929)
12285
Iran (hostage taking—
Establishes Commission
Revoked by E.O. 12379
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution
on Hostage
(1982)
7931)
Compensation
Administration of President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989)
12294
Iran (hostage taking—
Suspends claims and
Amended by E.O. 12379
(February 24, 1981; 46 FR resolution)
litigation against Iran
(1982)
14111)
12444
Expiration of Export
Continues Export
Revoked by E.O. 12451
(October 14, 1983; 48 FR
Administration Act of
Administration
(1983) (EAA
48215)
1979 (EAA)
Regulations (EAR)
reauthorized)
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
12470
Expiration of EAA
Continues EAR
Revoked by E.O. 12525
(March 30, 1984; 49 FR
(1985) (EAA
13099)
reauthorized)
12513
Nicaragua (civil war)
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 12707
(May 1, 1985; 50 FR
emergency; prohibits
(1990)
18629)
imports, exports, air
traffic, use of U.S. ports
12532
South Africa (apartheid,
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 12769
(September 9, 1985; 50
to meet requirements of
emergency; prohibits
(1991)
FR 36861)
U.N. Security Council
loans to government,
(UNSC) Resolution)
crime control exports,
nuclear-related exports,
military-related imports;
supports Sul ivan
Principles
12535
South Africa (apartheid,
Prohibits import of
Revoked by E.O. 12769
(October 1, 1985; 50 FR
to meet requirements of
krugerrands
(1991)
40325)
UNSC Resolution)
12543
Libya (terrorism, regional
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13357
(January 1, 1986; 51 FR
unrest)
emergency; prohibits
(2004)
875)
most imports and
exports, transactions
relating to transportation
to/from Libya,
performance of contract
obligations in support of
Libyan projects, bank
loans, financial
transactions related to
travel to Libya
12544
Libya (terrorism, regional
Blocks Libyan
Revoked by E.O. 13357
(January 8, 1986; 51 FR
unrest)
Government assets in
(2004)
1235)
United States
12635
Panama (finding
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 12710
(April 8, 1988; 53 FR
government of Noriega
emergency; blocks
(1990)
12134)
and Palma a threat)
Panama assets in United
States
Administration of President George H.W. Bush (1989-1993)
12722
Iraq (invasion of Kuwait;
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13350
(August 2, 1990; 55 FR
to meet requirements of
emergency; blocks Iraq
(2004)
31803)
UNSC Resolution)
Government assets in
U.S.; prohibits most
export and import;
restricts transactions
related to travel; prohibits
loans
12723
Kuwait (after Iraq’s
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 12725
(August 2, 1990; 55 FR
invasion; to meet
emergency; blocks Kuwait (1990)
31805)
requirements of UNSC
Government assets in
Resolution)
U.S.
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
12724
Iraq (invasion of Kuwait;
Blocks Iraq Government
Revoked by E.O. 13350
(August 9, 1990; 55 FR
to meet requirements of
assets in U.S.; prohibits
(2004)
33089)
UNSC Resolution)
most export and import;
restricts transactions
related to travel; prohibits
loans
12725
Kuwait (after Iraq’s
Blocks Kuwait
Revoked by E.O. 12771
(August 9, 1990; 55 FR
invasion, to meet
Government assets in
(1991)
33091)
requirements of UNSC
U.S.; prohibits most
Resolution)
export and import;
restricts transactions
related to travel; prohibits
loans
12730
Expiration of EAA
Continues EAR
Revoked by E.O. 12867
(September 30, 1990; 55
(1993)
FR 40373)
12735
Chemical and biological
Declares national
Revoked and replaced by
(November 16, 1990; 55
weapons proliferation
emergency; prohibits
E.O. 12938 (1994)
FR 48587)
transactions
12775
Haiti (military coup)
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 12932
(October 4, 1991; 56 FR
emergency; blocks Haiti
(1994)
50641)
Government assets in
U.S.; prohibits
transactions
12779
Haiti (military coup)
Blocks Haiti Government
Revoked by E.O. 12932
(October 28, 1991; 56 FR
assets in U.S.; prohibits
(1994)
55975)
export and import,
transactions
12801
Libya (to meet
Bars overflight, takeoff
Revoked by E.O. 13357
(April 15, 1992; 57 FR
requirements of UNSC
and landing planes
(2004)
14319)
Resolution)
traveling to/from Libya
12808
Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(May 30, 1992; 57 FR
Montenegro) (regional
emergency; blocks
(2003)
23299)
conflict; to meet
Yugoslav Government
requirements of UNSC
assets in United States

Resolution)
12810
Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Blocks Yugoslav
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(June 5, 1992; 57 FR
Montenegro) (regional
Government assets in
(2003)
24347)
conflict; to meet
U.S.; prohibits import and
requirements of UNSC
export, transactions
Resolution)
related to travel, air
traffic, loans, completing
contracts, sports
participation, tech/cultural
exchanges
12817
Iraq (postwar; to meet
Blocks assets
Revoked by E.O. 13350
October 21, 1992; 57 FR
requirements of UNSC
(2004)
48433)
Resolution)
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
12831
Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Prohibits transshipment
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(January 15, 1993; 58 FR
Montenegro) (regional
(2003)
5253)
conflict)

Administration of President William Clinton (1993-2001)
12846
Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Tightens sanctions,
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(April 25, 1993; 58 FR
Montenegro) (regional
especial y those relating
(2003)
25771)
conflict; to meet
to maritime restrictions
requirements of UNSC
Resolution)
12853
Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of regime;
Revoked by E.O. 12932
(June 30, 1993; 58 FR
prohibits export of
(1994)
35843)
petroleum, arms, and
related materiel
12865
UNITA (Angola) (to meet
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13298
(September 26, 1993; 58
requirements of UNSC
emergency; prohibits sales (2003)
FR 51005)
Resolution)
to UNITA and UNITA-
control ed regions
12868
Weapons proliferation
Declares national
Revoked and replaced by
(September 30, 1993; 58
emergency; controls
E.O. 12930 (1994)
FR 51749)
exports; prohibits
transactions with those
found not in compliance
with controls
12872
Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of those
Revoked by E.O. 12932
(October 18, 1993; 58 FR
impeding democratization
(1994)
54029)
process
12914
Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of military
Revoked by E.O. 12932
(May 7, 1994; 59 FR
and participants in 1991
(1994)
24339)
overthrow; prohibits air
traffic
12917
Haiti (military coup)
Prohibits imports
Revoked by E.O. 12932
(May 21, 1994; 59 FR
(1994)
26925)
12920
Haiti (military coup)
Prohibits certain financial
Revoked by E.O. 12932
(June 10, 1994; 59 FR
transactions, exports
(1994)
30501)
12922
Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of certain
Revoked by E.O. 12932
(June 21, 1994; 59 FR
individuals
(1994)
32645)
12923
Expiration of EAA
Continues EAR
Revoked and replaced by
(June 30, 1994; 59 FR
E.O. 12924 (1994)
34551)
12924
Expiration of EAA
Continues EAR
Revoked by E.O. 13206
(August 19, 1994; 59 FR
(2001); previously
34551)
amended by E.O. 12981
(1995)
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
12930
Proliferation of weapons
Declares national
Revoked and replaced by
(September 29, 1994; 59
of mass destruction
emergency; controls
E.O. 12938 (1994)
FR 50475)
exports; prohibits
transactions with those
found not in compliance
with controls
12934
Bosnian Serb-control ed
Blocks assets; prohibits
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(October 25, 1994; 59 FR
areas of Bosnia and
export, maritime access
(2003)
54117)
Herzegovina (to meet
to certain ports
requirements of UNSC
resolution)
12938
Proliferation of weapons
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(November 19, 1994; 59
of mass destruction
emergency; controls
amended by E.O. 13094
FR 59099)
exports; prohibits
(1998); E.O. 13128
transactions with those
(1999); E.O. 13382 (2005)
found not in compliance
with controls
12947
Terrorists who disrupt
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13886
(January 23, 1995; 60 FR
Middle East peace process emergency; blocks assets;
(2019)
5079)
prohibits transactions
12957
Iran (weapons
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(March 15, 1995; 60 FR
proliferation)
emergency; prohibits
other parts revoked and
14615)
investment in oil
restated in E.O. 12959
development
(1995)
12959
Iran (weapons
Prohibits investment in oil Revoked in part by E.O.
(May 6, 1995; 60 FR
proliferation)
development
13059 (1997)
24757)
12978
Significant narcotics
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(October 21, 1995; 60 FR
traffickers (initially
emergency; blocks assets;
technical amendments in
54579)
Colombia)
prohibits transactions
E.O. 13286 (2003)
12981
EAA
Amends the
Amended by E.O. 13020
(December 5, 1995; 60
administration of export
(1996); E.O. 13206
FR 62981; 50 U.S.C. 4603
controls.
(1996); E.O. 13117 (1999)
note)
13020
EAA
Further amends the
Amended by E.O. 13026
(October 12, 1996; 61 FR
administration of export
(1996)
54079; 50 U.S.C. 4603
controls.
note)
13026
EAA
Further amends the
Exempted from
(November 15, 1996; 61
administration of export
authorities of E.O. 13206
FR 58767; 50 U.S.C. 4603
controls. Adds rules for
(2001)
note)
encryption products.
13047
Burma (military
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13742
(May 22, 1997; 62 FR
government; to
emergency; blocks new
(2016)
28301)
implement Sec. 570 of P.L. investment
104-208)
13059
Iran (weapons
Blocks imports, exports
Expands applicability of
(August 19, 1997; 62 FR
proliferation, terrorism,
E.O. 12957 (1995), E.O.
44531)
regional stability)
12959 (1995)
Congressional Research Service
71

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13067
Sudan (conflict)
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(November 3, 1997; 62
emergency; blocks Sudan
revoked in part by E.O.
FR 59989)
Government assets;
13761 (2017)
prohibits exports,
imports, other
transactions
13069 (December 12,
UNITA (Angola) (war)
Prohibits certain
Revoked by E.O. 13298
1997; 62 FR 65989)
transaction
(2003)
13088
Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(June 9, 1998; 63 FR
Montenegro) (war)
emergency; blocks
(2003); previously
32109)
Yugoslav Government
amended by E.O. 13121
assets; prohibits
(1999) and E.O. 13192
transactions
(2001)
13094
Proliferation of weapons
Prohibits some
Amends E.O. 12938
(July 28, 1998; 63 FR
of mass destruction
transactions, assistance,
(1994)
40803)
imports
13098
UNITA (Angola) (war; to
Blocks UNITA assets in
Revoked by E.O. 13298
(August 18, 1998; 63 FR
meet requirements of
U.S.; prohibits imports
(2003)
44771)
UNSC resolution)
from and exports to
UNITA-control ed or
influences industries
13099
Terrorists who disrupt
Adds Usama bin Laden
Amends E.O. 12947
(August 20, 1998; 63 FR
the Middle East peace
and others to the
(1995); see above
45167)
process
terrorist list
13121
Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Blocks Yugoslav
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(April 30, 1999; 64 FR
Montenegro) (war)
Government assets;
(2003)
24021)
prohibits transactions
13128
Proliferation of weapons
Implements the Chemical
Related to E.O. 12938
(June 25, 1999; 64 FR
of mass destruction
Weapons Convention and (1994); see above
34704)
the Chemical Weapons
Convention
Implementation Act.
13129
Taliban (terrorism)
Declares national
National emergency
(July 4, 1999; 64 FR
emergency; blocks
terminated by E.O. 13268
36759)
property
(2002); see, however,
E.O. 13224 (2001)
E.O. 13159
Russia for misuse of highly Declares national
Superseded by E.O.
(June 21, 2000; 65 FR
enriched uranium
emergency; blocks
13617 (2012)
39279)
extractions
property
13192
Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Substantially expands
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(January 17, 2001; 66 FR
Montenegro) (war)
sanctions in E.O. 13088
(2003)
7379)
(1998) to apply to
humanitarian crisis in
Kosovo
13194
Sierra Leone (diamond
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13324
(January 18, 2001; 66 FR
trade)
emergency; prohibits
(2004); previously
7389)
diamond imports
amended by E.O. 13312
(2003)
Congressional Research Service
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
Administration of President George W. Bush (2001-2009)
13213
Sierra Leone (diamond
Expands prohibitions on
Revoked by E.O. 13324
(May 22, 2001; 66 FR
trade)
diamond trade
2004); previously
28829)
amended by E.O. 13312
(2003)
13219
Western Balkans
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(June 26, 2001; 66 FR
(destabilization postwar)
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 13304
34775)
property
(2003); see also E.O.
14033 (2021)
13222
Expiration of EAA
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(August 17, 2001; 66 FR
emergency with the
amended by E.O. 13637
44025)
expiration of the Export
(2013)
Administration Act of
1979 (EAA). Continues
Export Administration
Regulations (EAR) and
three remaining statutory
provisions in the EAA
relating to weapons
proliferation
13224
Terrorism
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(September 23, 2001; 66
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 13268
FR 49079
property; prohibits
(2002), E.O. 13284
transactions
(2003), E.O. 13372
(2005), and E.O. 13886
(2019)
13268
Taliban and Terrorism
Terminates E.O. 13129
Expanded by E.O. 13372
(July 2, 2002; 67 FR
(1999); adds “Taliban”
(2005); amended E.O.
44751)
and others to restricted
13224 (2001)
list (2001)
13288
Zimbabwe (undermining
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(March 6, 2003; 68 FR
democratic processes)
emergency; blocks
superseded in part by
11457)
property
E.O. 13391 (2005)
13290
Iraq (war)
Authorizes the
Amended by E.O. 13350
March 20, 2003; 68 FR
confiscation and vesting of (2004)
14307; 50 U.S.C. 1702
property
note)
13298
UNITA (Angola)
Terminates earlier
Revokes earlier orders
(May 6, 2003; 68 FR
emergency and related
24857)
authorities
13303
Iraq (war)
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(May 22, 2003; 68 FR
emergency; Protects
amends E.O. 13290
31931)
certain property
(2003); amended by E.O.
13364 (2004); expanded
on by E.O. 13315 (2003),
E.O. 13350 (2004), E.O.
13438 (2007), and E.O.
13668 (2014)
Congressional Research Service
73

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13304
Yugoslavia (regional war)
Terminates earlier
Revokes and modifies
(May 28, 2003; 68 FR
emergency
earlier orders
32315)
13310
Burma (military
Blocks property
Revoked by E.O. 13742
(July 28, 2003; 68 FR
government)
(2016)
44853)
13312
Sierra Leone and Liberia
Implements the Clean
Revoked by E.O. 13324
(July 3, 2003; 68 FR
(conflict)
Diamond Trade Act
(2004)
45151))
13315
Iraq (former regime)
Blocks property
Superseded by E.O.
(August 28, 2003; 68 FR
13350 (2004)
52315)
13324
Sierra Leone and Liberia
Terminates earlier
Revokes E.O. 13194
(January 15, 2004; 69 FR
(conflict)
emergency
(2001) and E.O. 13213
2823)
(2001)
13338
Syria (civil conflict)
Declares national
Requires annual renewal.
(May 11, 2004; 69 FR
emergency; blocks
Modified by E.O. 13460
26751)
property of those who
(2008). See also E.O.
export certain goods to
13399 (2006), E.O. 13572
Syria
(2011), E.O. 13573
(2011), E.O. 13582
(2011), E.O. 13606
(2012), and E.O. 13608
(2012)
13348
Liberia (corruption, to
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13710
(July 22, 2004; 69 FR
meet requirements of
emergency; blocks
(2015)
44885)
UNSC resolution)
property; prohibits
imports
13350
Iraq (postwar)
Ends emergency from
Revokes several earlier
(July 29, 2004; 69 FR
1990 Kuwait invasion
E.O.
46055)
13357
Libya (terrorism)
Terminates earlier
Revokes earlier orders
(September 20, 2004; 69
emergency
FR 56665)
13364
Iraq (postwar)
Amends transaction
Amends E.O. 13303
(November 29, 2004; 69
controls and regulations
(2003)
FR 70177)
on the Development fund
for Iraq
13372
Terrorism
Clarifies use of sanctions
Amends E.O. 12947
(February 16, 2005; 70 FR
(1995), E.O. 13224 (2001)
8499)
13382
Weapons proliferation
Expands earlier orders;
Amends E.O. 12938
(June 28, 2005; 70 FR
blocks property
(1994) and 13094 (1998)
38567)
13391
Zimbabwe (undermining
Blocks property
Amends and supersedes
(November 22, 2005; 70
democratic processes)
part of E.O. 13288 (2003)
FR 71201)
Congressional Research Service
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13396
Cote d’Ivoire (conflict)
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13739
(February. 7, 2006; 71 FR
emergency; blocks
(2016)
7389)
property
13399
Syria (civil war)
Blocks additional property Expands E.O. 13338
(April 25, 2006; 71 FR
(2004)
25059)
13400
Sudan (Darfur)
Blocks additional property Expands E.O. 13067
(April 26, 2006; 71 FR
(1997)
25483)
13405
Belarus (undermining
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(June 16, 2006; 71 FR
democracy)
emergency; blocks
35485)
property
13412
Sudan (Darfur, regional
Expands E.O. 13067
Revoked by E.O. 13761
(October 13, 2006; 71 FR
stability)
(1997); blocks property
(2017)
61369)
and transactions
13413
Democratic Republic of
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(October 27, 2006; 71 FR
the Congo (regional
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 13671
64105)
stability)
property
(2014)
13438
Those who threaten
Blocks additional property Expands E.O. 13303
(July 17, 2007; 72 FR
stabilization efforts in Iraq
(2003)
39719)
13441
Those who threaten the
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(August 1, 2007; 72 FR
sovereignty of Lebanon
emergency; blocks
43499)
(primarily Syria)
property
13448
Burma (military
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13742
October 18, 2007; 72 FR
government)
emergency; blocks
(2016)
60223)
property and transactions
13460
Syria (civil conflict)
Blocks property of those
Amends E.O. 13338
(February 13, 2008; 73 FR
who support certain
(2004)
8991)
activities in Syria
13464
Burma (military
Blocks property and
Revoked by E.O. 13742
April 30, 2008; 72 FR
government)
transactions
(2016)
24491)
13466
North Korea (weapons
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(June 26, 2008; 73 FR
proliferation, to meet
emergency; blocks
see also E.O. 13551
36787)
requirements of UNSC
property and transactions
(2010), E.O. 13570
resolution)
(2011), E.O. 13687
(2015), E.O. 13722
(2016), and E.O. 13810
(2017)
13469
Zimbabwe (undermining
Blocks property
Expands E.O. 13288
(July 25, 2008; 73 FR
democracy)
(2003) and 13391 (2005)
43841)
Congressional Research Service
75

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
Administration of President Barack Obama (2009-2017)
13536
Somalia (conflict, high seas Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(April 12, 2010; 75 FR
piracy)
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 13620
19869)
property
(2012)
13551
North Korea (weapons
Blocks property
Expands national
(August 30, 2010; 75 FR
proliferation, to meet
emergency declared in
53837)
requirements of UNSC
E.O. 13466 (2008)
resolution)
13553
Iran (human rights)
Blocks property including
Expands E.O. 12957
(Sept, 28, 2010; 75 FR
that of Iranian officials
(1995)
60567)
13566
Libya (stability)
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(February 25, 2011; 76 FR
emergency; blocks
expanded by E.O. 13726
11315)
property and transactions
(2016)
13570
North Korea (weapons
Blocks transactions
Expands E.O. 13466
(April 18, 2011; 76 FR
proliferation, to meet
(2008), 13551 (2010);
22291)
requirements of UNSC
expanded by E.O. 13687
resolution)
(2015)
13572
Syria (human rights)
Blocks property of human Expands E.O. 13338
(April 29, 2011; 76 FR
rights violators
(2004), 13399 (2006), and
24787)
13460 (2008)
13573
Syria (war)
Blocks property of senior
Expands E.O. 13338
(May 18, 2011; 76 FR
government officials
(2004), 13399 (2006),
29143)
13460 (2008), and 13572
(2011); amended by E.O.
13582 (2011)
13574
Iran (weapons
Implements new sanctions Revoked by E.O. 13716
(May 23, 2011; 76 FR
proliferation)
in Iran Sanctions Act of
(2016)
30505)
1996
13581
Transnational Criminal
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(July 24, 2011; 76 FR
Organizations
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 13863
44757)
property
(2019)
13582
Syria (war)
Blocks property of
Expands E.O. 13338
(August 17, 2011; 76 FR
Government of Syria and
(2004), 13399 (2006),
52209)
transactions, new
13460 (2008), 13572
investment, importation
(2011), and E.O. 13573
of petroleum and related
(2011)
products
13590
Iran (weapons
Prohibits transactions
Revoked by E.O. 13716
(November 20, 2011; 76
proliferation)
related to Iran’s energy
(2016)
FR 72609)
and petrochemical sectors
13599
Iran (weapons
Blocks property of
Expands E.O. 12957
(February 5, 2012; 77 FR
proliferation)
government and financial
(1995)
6659)
institutions
13606
Iran and Syria (human
Blocks property and
Expands E.O. 12957
(April 22, 2012; 77 FR
rights)
denies visas
(1995) and 13338 (2004)
24571)
Congressional Research Service
76

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13608
Iran and Syria (sanctions
Blocks transactions and
Expands E.O. 12938
(May 1, 2012; 77 FR
evasion)
denies visas
(1994), 12957 (1995),
26409)
13224 (2001), and 13338
(2004)
13611
Yemen (stability)
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(May 16, 2012; 77 FR
emergency; blocks
29533)
property
13617
Russia (misuse of highly
Blocks property
Revoked by E.O. 13695
(June 25, 2012; 77 FR
enriched uranium
(2015)
38459)
extractions
13619
Burma (military
Blocks property
Revoked by E.O. 13742
(July 11, 2012; 77 FR
government)
(2016)
41243)
13620
Somalia (conflict)
Expands targets to include Amends E.O. 13536
July 20, 2012; 77 FR
misappropriations,
(2010)
43483)
corruption, impeding
humanitarian aid
13622
Iran (weapons
Additional sanctions
Revoked by E.O. 13716
(July 30, 2012; 77 FR
proliferation)
(2016)
45897)
13628
Iran (weapons
Implements Iran Threat
Revoked by E.O. 13846
(October 9, 2012; 77 FR
proliferation, human
Reduction Act
(2018); previously
62139)
rights, sanctions evasion)
amended by E.O. 13716
(2016)
13637
EAA
Delegates export
Amends E.O. 13222
(March 8, 2013; 78 FR
authorities, coordinates
(2001)
16131)
responsibilities; amends
E.O. 13222
13645
Iran (weapons
Implements Iran Freedom
Revoked by E.O. 13716
(June 3, 2013; 78 FR
proliferation, human
and Counter-Proliferation
(2016)
33945)
rights)
Act of 2012
13651
Burma
Prohibits import of jadeite Revoked by E.O. 13742
(August 6, 2013; 78 FR
and rubies
(2016)
48793)
13660
Ukraine (stability)
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(March 6, 2014; 79 FR
emergency; blocks
expanded on by E.O.
13493)
property
13661 (2014); E.O. 13662
(2014); with additional
actions in E.O. 13685
(2014); E.O. 13849
(2018); and E.O. 14065
(2022)
13661
Russia (destabilization of
Blocks property
Expands E.O. 13660
(March 16, 2014; 79 FR
Ukraine)
(2014)
15535)
13662
Russia (destabilization of
Blocks property
Expands E.O. 13660
(March 20, 2014; 79 FR
Ukraine)
(2014)
16169)
Congressional Research Service
77

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13664
South Sudan (conflict)
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(April 3, 2014; 79 FR
emergency; blocks
19283)
property
13667
Central African Republic
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(May 12, 2014; 79 FR
(conflict)
emergency; blocks
28387)
property
13668
Iraq (postwar)
Ends immunities granted
Expands E.O. 13303
(May 27, 2014; 79 FR
to the Development Fund
(2003)
31019)
for Iraq
13671
Democratic Republic of
Additional sanctions
Expands E.O. 13413
(July 8, 2014; 79 FR
the Congo (regional
(2006)
39949)
stability)
13685
Ukraine (destabilizing
Blocks property and
Expands E.O. 13660
(December 19, 2014; 79
activities in Crimea)
transactions
(2014)
FR 77357)
13687
North Korea (weapons
Additional sanctions
Expands E.O. 13466
(January 2, 2015; 80 FR
proliferation, to meet
including on DPRK
(2008), 13551 (2010),
819)
requirements of UNSC
government officials and
13570 (2011)
resolution)
members of the Workers’
Party of Korea
13692
Venezuela (corruption,
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(March 8, 2015; 80 FR
stability)
emergency; blocks
expanded on in E.O.
12747)
property and deny visas
13808 (2017), E.O. 13827
(2018), E.O. 13835
(2018), E.O. 13850
(2018), E.O. 13857
(2019), and E.O. 13884
(2019)
13694
Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(April 1, 2015; 80 FR
Activities
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 13757
18077)
property
(2016), E.O. 13984 (2021)
13695
Russia’s misuse of highly
Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13617
(May 26, 2015; 80 FR
enriched uranium
(2012)
30331)
extractions
13710
Liberia (corrupt
Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13348
(November 12, 2015; 80
government)
(2004)
FR 71679)
13712
Burundi (stability)
Declares national
Terminated by E.O.
(November 22, 2015; 80
emergency; blocks
14054 (2021)
FR 73633)
property
13716
Iran (nuclear weapons)
Implements U.S.
Revoked by E.O. 13846
(January 16, 2016; 81 FR
obligations under the Joint (2018). Had revoked and
3693; 22 U.S.C. 8801
Comprehensive Plan of
modified earlier orders
note)
Action
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13722
North Korea (weapons
Blocks property of North
Expands E.O. 13466
(March 15, 2016; 81 FR
proliferation, to meet
Korea government and
(2008)
14943)
requirements of UNSC
central party; prohibits
resolution)
transactions
13726
Libya (stability)
Additional sanctions
Expands E.O. 13566
(April 19, 2016; 81 FR
(2011)
23559)
13739
Cote d’Ivoire (conflict)
Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13396
(Sept, 14, 2016; 81 FR
(2006)
63673)
13742
Burma
Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13047
(October 7, 2016; 81 FR
(1997), 13310 (2003),
70593)
13448 (2007), 13464
(2008), 13619 (2012),
13651 (2013)
13757
Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Additional sanctions
Modifies E.O. 13694
(December 28, 2016)
Activities
(2015)
13761
Sudan (war, human rights) Recognizes “positive
Revokes in part E.O.
(January 13, 2017; 82 FR
actions” by the
13067 (1997), in whole
5331)
Government of Sudan by
E.O. 13412 (2006);
removing some sanctions
amended by E.O. 13804
(2017)
Administration of President Donald J. Trump (2017-2021)
13804
Sudan (war, human rights) Extends deadlines in E.O.
Modifies E.O. 13761
(July 11, 2017; 82 FR
13761 (2017)
(2017)
32611)
13808
Venezuela (human rights,
Additional sanctions
Expands actions based on
(August 24, 2017; 82 FR
democracy, corruption)
national emergency
41155)
declared in E.O. 13692
(2015)
13810
North Korea (weapons
Additional sanctions
Expands actions based on
(Sept, 20, 2017; 82 FR
proliferation, human
national emergency
44705)
rights)
declared in E.O. 13466
(2008)
13818
Global Magnitsky (human
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(December 20, 2017; 82
rights, corruption)
emergency; blocks
FR 60839)
property
13827
Venezuela (sanctions
Prohibits transactions,
Expands actions based on
(March 19, 2018; 83 FR
evasion)
financing, trade in digital
national emergency
12469)
currency issued by or on
declared in E.O. 13692
behalf of the Government
(2015); amended by E.O.
of Venezuela
13857 (2019)
13835
Venezuela (economic
Prohibits U.S. persons
Expands actions based on
(May 21, 2018; 83 FR
mismanagement, public
from purchasing debt
national emergency
24001)
corruption, undermining
owed the Government of
declared in E.O. 13692
democratic order,
Venezuela or trading in
(2015); amended by E.O.
humanitarian and public
equity in which the
13857 (2019)
health crisis)
Government holds at
least a 50% stake
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13846
Iran
Reimposes sanctions lifted Revokes E.O. 13716
(August 6, 2018; 83 FR
for U.S. meeting its
(2016); expands actions
38939)
obligations under the Joint based on national
Comprehensive Plan of
emergency declared in
Action of July 14, 2015
E.O. 12957 (1995)
(JCPOA)
13848
Foreign interference in
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(September 12, 2018; 83
U.S. elections
emergency; establishes
complements actions
FR 46843)

framework to assess
taken under E.O. 13694
possible interference by
(2015), as amended
foreign persons or
governments in any U.S.
election; blocks property
and interests in property
of those designated for
being complicit in
interfering in an election
13849
Implements Russia-related Limits U.S. bank loans,
Expands actions based on
(September 21, 2018; 83
sanctions adopted in the
prohibits foreign
national emergencies
FR 48195; 22 U.S.C. 9521
Countering Russian
exchange, blocks
declared in E.O. 13660
note)
Influence in Europe and
property, prohibits
(2014) and related EO,
Eurasia Act of 2017 (Title
Export-Import Bank
and E.O. 13694 (2015), as

II, P.L. 115-44; 22 U.S.C.
programs, limits the
amended
9501 et seq.)
issuing of specific licenses,
requires “no” votes in the
international financial
institutions where a loan
would benefit a person
otherwise subject to
sanctions, limits access to
the U.S. banking system,
prohibits procurement
contracts with the USG,
denies entry into the
United States
13851
Nicaragua
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(November 27, 2018; 83
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 14088
FR 61505)
property of certain
(2022)
persons contributing to
the situation in Nicaragua;
prohibits import, export,
new investment,
facilitation of transaction
by a foreign person
13857
Venezuela
Taking additional steps to
Expands actions based on
(January 25, 2019; 84 FR
address the national
national emergency
509)
emergency with respect
declared in E.O. 13692
to Venezuela; redefines
(2015); modifies E.O.s
“the government of
13692, 13808, 13827,
Venezuela”
13850
13863
Transnational Criminal
Defines “significant
Expands and amends E.O.
(March 15, 2019; 84 F.R.
Organizations
transnational criminal
13581 (2011)
10255)
organization”
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13871
Iran
Prohibits transactions
Expands actions based on
(May 8, 2019; 84 FR
related to Iran’s iron,
national emergency
20761)
steel, aluminum, or
declared in E.O.12957
copper sectors
(1995)
13873
Information and
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(May 15, 2019, 84 FR
communications
emergency; prohibits
see also E.O. 14034
22689)
technology and services
unduly risky transactions
(2021)
supply chain
involving information and
communications
technology or services
designed, developed,
manufactured, or
supplied, by foreign
adversaries
13876
Iran
Prohibits transactions
Expands actions based on
(June 24, 2019; 84 FR
related to U.S.-based
national emergency
30573)
assets of the Supreme
declared in E.O. 12957
Leader of the Islamic
(1995)
Republic of Iran, Supreme
Leader’s Office (SLO),
and anyone appointed to
a state position in Iran
13882
Mali (terrorism, narcotics
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(July 26, 2019; 84 FR
trafficking, trafficking in
emergency; blocks
37055)
persons, human rights
property
abuses, hostage-taking,
and attacks against
civilians and international
security forces in Mali)
13883
Chemical and biological
Requires the U.S. to
Expands actions based on
(August 1, 2019; 84 FR
weapons proliferation or
oppose international
E.O. 12938 (1994);
38113; 22 U.S.C. 5605
use; currently could be
financial institutions’
implements sanctions
note)
used against Syria, North
programs to the targeted
requirements of Sec. 307,
Korea, and Russia, based
state; prohibits U.S. banks
P.L. 102-182; and amends
on determinations made
from providing loans or
Exec. Order 12851 (1993)
under Sec. 307 of P.L.
credits to the targeted
to include CBW-related
102-182 (22 U.S.C. 5605) government
determinations
13884
Venezuela
Blocks property of the
Expands actions based on
(August 5, 2019; 84 FR
government of Venezuela
E.O. 13692 (2015)
38843)
in the United States
13886
Terrorism
Consolidates and
Revokes E.O. 12947
(September 9, 2019; 84
enhances “sanctions to
(1995); amends E.O.
FR 48041)
combat acts of terrorism
13224 (2001)
and threats of terrorism
by foreign terrorists”
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13894
Turkey’s incursion into
Declares a national
Requires annual renewal
(October 14, 2019; 84 FR
Syria
emergency relating to
55851)
Turkey’s military invasion
of northeast Syria; blocks
property and suspends
entry into the United
States of “certain persons
contributing to the
situation in Syria”
13902
Iran
Blocks property and
Expands actions based on
(January 10, 2020; 85 FR
prohibits transactions
E.O. 12957 (1995)
2003)
related to Iran’s
construction, mining,
manufacturing, or textiles
sectors, or any other
sector to be determined
by the Secretary of the
Treasury
13920
U.S. Bulk-Power System
Declares a national
Suspended by E.O. 13990
(May 1, 2020; 85 FR
emergency relating to
(2021; 42 U.S.C. 4321
26595; 50 U.S.C. 1621
bulk-power system
note)
note)
equipment
13928
International Criminal
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 14022
(June 11, 2020; 85 FR
Court (ICC)
emergency related to the
(2021)
36139)
ICC’s intention to
“investigate, arrest,
detain, or prosecute any
United States personnel
without the consent of
the United States”; blocks
property and entry into
the United States of any
person found to be
engaged in or facilitating
ICC investigations
13936
Hong Kong (China’s
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(July 14, 2020; 85 FR
“normalization”)
emergency related to
43413; 22 U.S.C. 5701
China’s crackdown,
note)
resulting in the Hong
Kong Special
Administrative Region
(HKSAR) losing its
political and economic
autonomy
13942
Information &
Expands emergency
Revoked by E.O. 14034
(August 6, 2020; 85 FR
Communications
stated in EO 13873
(2021)
48637)
Technology; Services
(2019) to restrict
Supply Chain
transactions with TikTok
and ByteDance—Chinese
tech entities
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13943
Information &
Expands emergency
Revoked by E.O. 14034
(August 6, 2020; 85 FR
Communications
stated in E.O. 13873
(2021)
48641)
Technology; Services
(2019) to restrict
Supply Chain
transactions with
WeChat—Chinese tech
entity
13949
Iran (regional stability)
Targets Iran’s
Expands actions based on
(September 21, 2020; 85
conventional arms trade
E.O. 12957 (1995)
FR 60043)
for its destabilizing impact
in the region
13953
Threat to domestic supply Declares national
Requires annual renewal,
(September 30, 2020; 85
chain from reliance on
emergency; requires
but has been neither
FR 62539; U.S.C. 1601
critical minerals from
whole-of-government
renewed nor revoked
note)
foreign adversaries
assessment of U.S. critical
since its issuance. Builds
materials
on earlier non-emergency
actions based primarily on
Defense Production Act
of 1950 (see also,
however, E.O. 14017
(2021), not codified,
which requires similar
review without revoking
the 2020 order.
13959
China
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(November 12, 2020; 85
emergency; restricts
amended by E.O. 13974
FR 73185)
trade, transactions, and
(2021); the remaining
investment in securities of authorities are
“Communist Chinese
superseded in large part
military companies”
by E.O. 14032 (2021)
13971
China
Expands national
Revoked by E.O. 14034
(January 5, 2021; 86 FR
emergency declared in
(2021)
1249)
E.O. 13873 (2019) to
prohibit transactions with
several China-origin
software applications
13974
China
Clarifies definitions
Revoked by E.O. 14032
(January 13, 2021; 86 FR
related to restrictions on
(2021)
4875)
transactions with China
military entities initiated
in E.O. 13959; establishes
wind-down period for
divestment
13984
Cyber-enabled activities
Builds on emergency
Expands on and amends
(January 19, 2021; 86 FR
declared in E.O. 13694
authorities stated in E.O.
6837)
(2015) to require
13694 (2015)
Secretary of Commerce
to investigate and identify
foreign users of U.S.
infrastructure as a
services (IaaS), mainly
software and storage
services
Administration of President Joseph R. Biden (2021-)
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
14014
Burma (antidemocratic or
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(February 10 2021; 86 FR
other destabilizing
emergency; blocks
9429)
activities)
property of and
transactions
14022
International Criminal
Revokes national
Revokes E.O. 13928
(April 1, 2021; 86 FR
Court
emergency; ends travel
(2020)
17895)
and asset restrictions
leveled against ICC staff
14024
Russia (election
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(April 15, 2021; 86 FR
interference, malicious
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 14114
20249)
cyber attacks, corruption;
property
(2023)
or extraterritorial pursuit

of Russia’s adversaries)
14032
China
Prohibits U.S. persons
Amends national
(June 3, 2021; 86 FR
from trading or investing
emergency authority
30145)
in securities of those
declared in E.O. 13959
operating in or on behalf
(2020)
of China’s defense and
related materiel sector or
the surveillance
technology sector

14033
Western Balkans (regional Expands national
Amends national
(June 8, 2021; 86 FR
destabilization,
emergency declared in
emergency authority
31079)
antidemocratic activities,
E.O. 13219 (2001); blocks
declared in E.O. 13219
human rights violations,
property
(2001)
corruption)
14034
Sensitive data—
Initiates new whole-of-
Expands on national
(June 9, 2021; 86 FR
protection from foreign
government review of
emergency declared in
31423)
adversaries
U.S. sensitive dates and
E.O. 13873 (2020)
foreign adversaries who
interfere with sensitive
data and related
technology
14038
Belarus (activities related
Blocks property of any
Expands on national
(August 9, 2021; 86 FR
to threatening the peace,
leader or official
emergency declared in
43905)
human rights violations,
E.O. 13405 (2006)
corruption, election fraud,
sanctions evasion)
14039
Russia (gas pipelines)
Targets any foreign
Expands on national
(August 20, 2021; 86 FR
person identified under
emergency declared in
47205)
Sec. 7503(a)(1)(B) of P.L.
E.O. 14024 (2021)
116-92) for financial
activities related to
Russian gas pipeline to
serve western Europe
(Nord Stream 2)
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
14046
Ethiopia (threats to
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(September 17, 2021; 86
stability, corruption,
emergency; authorizes
FR 52389)
disruption of delivery of
blocking of property,
humanitarian services,
investments, use of U.S.
violence against civilians)
financial instruments,
transactions in foreign
exchange
14054
Burundi (civil strife,
Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13712
(November 18, 2021; 86
human rights, stability)
(2015)
FR 66149)
14059
Global il icit drug trade
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(December 15, 2021; 86
emergency; authorizes
FR 71549)
blocking of property,
prohibits use of most U.S.

financial instruments,
denies entry into the
United States to any
foreign person engaged in
il icit drug production and
trade
14064
Afghanistan
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(February 11, 2022; 87 FR
emergency; blocks Taliban
8391)
(as government of
Afghanistan) access to

U.S.-based assets of
Afghanistan’s central bank
14065
Ukraine/Russia
Blocks investment in and
Expands national
(February 21, 2022; 87 FR
trade with Donetsk and
emergency in E.O. 13660
10293)
Luhansk regions of
(2014)
Ukraine
(2022)
14066
Ukraine/Russia
Prohibits some imports
Expands national
(March 8, 2022; 87 FR
from and energy-sector
emergency in E.O. 14024
13625)
investments in Russia
(2021)

14068
Ukraine/Russia
Prohibits additional
Expands national
(March 11, 2022; 87 FR
imports, exports of luxury emergency in E.O. 14024
14381)
goods, and investment in
(2021); amended by E.O.
Russia; amendments add
14114 (2023)

restrictions on trade in
seafood, diamonds,
alcohol
14071
Russia
Prohibits a U.S. person
Expands national
(April 6, 2022; 87 F.R.
from engaging in new
emergency in E.O. 14024
20999)
investment, export,
(2021)
reexport, sales and
services, or facilitation of
a foreign person’s
transaction
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
14088
Nicaragua
Prohibits import, export,
Amends national
(October 24, 2022; 87
new investment, and
emergency in E.O. 13851
F.R. 64685)
facilitation of a foreign
(2018)
person’s transactions
14097
Global il icit drug trade
Authorizes the Secretary
Expands authorities to
(April 27, 2023; 88 F.R.
of Defense and Secretary
address national
26471; 10 U.S.C. 12302
of Homeland Security to
emergency in E.O. 14059
note)
order to active duty
(2021)
members of the Ready
Reserve to address
international drug
trafficking
14098
Sudan (threats to the
Authorizes blocking of
Expands national
(May 4, 2023; 88 F.R.
peace, security, or
property of any foreign
emergency in E.O. 13067
29529)
stability of Sudan,
person
(1997)
including obstructing
democratic processes,
censorship, corruption,
human rights abuses,
targeting women,
children, U.N. activities
14105
Sensitive technologies
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(August 9, 2023; 88 F.R.
emergency; requires
54867)
identifying “countries of
concern” and related
“notifiable transactions”
associated with “covered
national security
technologies and
products”
14114
Russia (harmful activities)
Targets foreign financial
Expands and amends
(December 22, 2023; 88
institutions operating in
national emergency in
F.R. 89271)
Russia’s economy
E.O. 14024 (2021)
Sources: CRS, based on National Archives: Executive Orders Disposition Tables; The American Presidency
Project, University of California, Santa Barbara; and Federal Register, various dates.
Note: Unless otherwise noted in left-hand column, the declarations of national emergency are codified as notes
to 50 U.S.C. §1701.
Some Executive Orders are codified as notes to 50 U.S.C. §4603, a provision in the Export Administration Act of
1979 (P.L. 96-72) that was repealed by the Export Control Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-232). Those authorities
continue in force to the extent they might apply to the remaining three provision of the 1979 Act, related to
weapons proliferation, or remaining designations or other executive actions taken under foreign policy or
national security provisions in the 1979 Act.
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Author Information

Christopher A. Casey, Coordinator
Jennifer K. Elsea
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Legislative Attorney

Dianne E. Rennack

Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation

Acknowledgments
The authors thank Amber Hope Wilhelm, CRS Visual Information Specialist, who developed the graphics
for this report, and our dear friend Ian Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, who was
an original contributor to this report.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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