The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Changes from March 25, 2022 to September 28, 2023

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

The International Emergency Economic Powers ~~March 25, 2022~~September 28, 2023
Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Christopher A. Casey,
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) provides the President broad The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) provides the President broad
Coordinator
authority to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a declaration of national authority to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a declaration of national
Analyst in International Analyst in International
emergency. IEEPA, like the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) from which it branched, sits at emergency. IEEPA, like the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) from which it branched, sits at
Trade and Finance Trade and Finance
the center of the modern U.S. sanctions regime. Changes in the use of IEEPA powers since the the center of the modern U.S. sanctions regime. Changes in the use of IEEPA powers since the

act’s enactment in 1977 have caused some to question whether the statute’s oversight provisions act’s enactment in 1977 have caused some to question whether the statute’s oversight provisions
Dianne E. Rennack
are robust enough given the sweeping economic powers it confers upon the President during a are robust enough given the sweeping economic powers it confers upon the President during a
Specialist in Foreign Policy Specialist in Foreign Policy
declared emergency. declared emergency.
Legislation Legislation

Over the course of the twentieth century, Congress delegated increasing amounts of emergency Over the course of the twentieth century, Congress delegated increasing amounts of emergency
power to the President by statute. TWEA was one such statute. Congress passed TWEA in 1917 power to the President by statute. TWEA was one such statute. Congress passed TWEA in 1917
Jennifer K. Elsea
Legislative Attorney to regulate international transactions with enemy powers following the U.S. entry into the First to regulate international transactions with enemy powers following the U.S. entry into the First
~~Legislative Attorney~~

World War. Congress expanded the act during the 1930s to allow the President to declare a World War. Congress expanded the act during the 1930s to allow the President to declare a
national emergency in times of peace and assume sweeping powers over both domestic and national emergency in times of peace and assume sweeping powers over both domestic and

international transactions. Between 1945 and the early 1970s, TWEA became the central means international transactions. Between 1945 and the early 1970s, TWEA became the central means
to impose sanctions as part of U.S. Cold War strategy. Presidents used TWEA to block to impose sanctions as part of U.S. Cold War strategy. Presidents used TWEA to block
international financial transactions, seize U.S.-based assets held by foreign nationals, restrict exports, modify regulations to international financial transactions, seize U.S.-based assets held by foreign nationals, restrict exports, modify regulations to
deter the hoarding of gold, limit foreign direct investment in U.S. companies, and impose tariffs on all imports into the deter the hoarding of gold, limit foreign direct investment in U.S. companies, and impose tariffs on all imports into the
United States. United States.
Following committee investigations that discovered that the United States had been in a state of emergency for more than 40 Following committee investigations that discovered that the United States had been in a state of emergency for more than 40
years, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976 and IEEPA in 1977. The pair of statutes placed new years, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976 and IEEPA in 1977. The pair of statutes placed new
limits on presidential emergency powers. Both included reporting requirements to increase transparency and track costs, and limits on presidential emergency powers. Both included reporting requirements to increase transparency and track costs, and
the NEA required the President to assess annually and extend, if appropriate, an emergency. However, some experts argue the NEA required the President to assess annually and extend, if appropriate, an emergency. However, some experts argue
that the renewal process has become that the renewal process has become pro forma. The NEA also afforded Congress the means to terminate a national . The NEA also afforded Congress the means to terminate a national
emergency by adopting a concurrent resolution in each chamber. A decision by the Supreme Court, in a landmark case, emergency by adopting a concurrent resolution in each chamber. A decision by the Supreme Court, in a landmark case,
however, found the use of concurrent resolutions to terminate an executive action unconstitutional. Congress amended the however, found the use of concurrent resolutions to terminate an executive action unconstitutional. Congress amended the
statute to require a joint resolution, significantly increasing the difficulty of terminating an emergency. statute to require a joint resolution, significantly increasing the difficulty of terminating an emergency.
Like TWEA, IEEPA has become an important means to impose economic-based sanctions since its enactment; like TWEA, Like TWEA, IEEPA has become an important means to impose economic-based sanctions since its enactment; like TWEA,
Presidents have frequently used IEEPA to restrict a variety of international transactions; and like TWEA, the subjects of the Presidents have frequently used IEEPA to restrict a variety of international transactions; and like TWEA, the subjects of the
restrictions, the frequency of use, and the duration of emergencies have expanded over time. Initially, Presidents targeted restrictions, the frequency of use, and the duration of emergencies have expanded over time. Initially, Presidents targeted
foreign states or their governments. Over the years, however, presidential administrations have increasingly used IEEPA to foreign states or their governments. Over the years, however, presidential administrations have increasingly used IEEPA to
target non-state individuals and groups, such as terrorists, persons who engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities, and target non-state individuals and groups, such as terrorists, persons who engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities, and
certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court. certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court.
As of As of ~~March 25, 2022~~September 1, 2023, Presidents had declared , Presidents had declared 6769 national emergencies invoking IEEPA, national emergencies invoking IEEPA, 3739 of which are ongoing. History of which are ongoing. History
shows that national emergencies invoking IEEPA often last nearly a decade, although some have lasted significantly shows that national emergencies invoking IEEPA often last nearly a decade, although some have lasted significantly
longer—the first state of emergency declared under the NEA and IEEPA, which was declared in response to the taking of longer—the first state of emergency declared under the NEA and IEEPA, which was declared in response to the taking of
U.S. embassy staff as hostages by Iran in 1979, is in its fifth decade. U.S. embassy staff as hostages by Iran in 1979, is in its fifth decade.
IEEPA grants sweeping powers to the President to control economic transactions. Despite these broad powers, IEEPA grants sweeping powers to the President to control economic transactions. Despite these broad powers, ~~Congress has~~
until 2023, Congress had never attempted to terminate a national emergency invoking IEEPA. Instead, Congress has directed the President on never attempted to terminate a national emergency invoking IEEPA. Instead, Congress has directed the President on
numerous occasions to use IEEPA authorities to impose sanctions. Congress may want to consider whether IEEPA numerous occasions to use IEEPA authorities to impose sanctions. Congress may want to consider whether IEEPA
appropriately balances the need for swift action in a time of crisis with Congress’s duty to oversee executive action. Congress appropriately balances the need for swift action in a time of crisis with Congress’s duty to oversee executive action. Congress
may also want to consider IEEPA’s role in implementing its influence in U.S. foreign policy and national security decision-may also want to consider IEEPA’s role in implementing its influence in U.S. foreign policy and national security decision-
making. making.
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Introduction
The issue of executive discretion has been at the center of constitutional debates in liberal The issue of executive discretion has been at the center of constitutional debates in liberal
democracies throughout the twentieth century. Specifically, the question of how to balance a democracies throughout the twentieth century. Specifically, the question of how to balance a
commitment to the rule of law with the exigencies of modern political and economic crises has commitment to the rule of law with the exigencies of modern political and economic crises has
been a consistent concern of legislators and scholars in the United States and around the world.1 been a consistent concern of legislators and scholars in the United States and around the world.1
The U.S. Constitution is silent on the question of emergency power. As such, over the past two The U.S. Constitution is silent on the question of emergency power. As such, over the past two
centuries, Congress and the President have answered that question in varied and often centuries, Congress and the President have answered that question in varied and often ad hoc
ways. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the answer was often for the President to act ways. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the answer was often for the President to act
without congressional approval in a time of crisis, knowingly risking impeachment and personal without congressional approval in a time of crisis, knowingly risking impeachment and personal
civil liability.2 Congress claimed primacy over emergency action and would decide subsequently civil liability.2 Congress claimed primacy over emergency action and would decide subsequently
either to ratify the President’s actions through legislation or indemnify the President for any civil either to ratify the President’s actions through legislation or indemnify the President for any civil
liability.3 liability.3
By the twentieth century, a new pattern had begun to emerge. Instead of retroactively judging an By the twentieth century, a new pattern had begun to emerge. Instead of retroactively judging an
executive’s extraordinary actions in a time of emergency, Congress enacted statutes authorizing executive’s extraordinary actions in a time of emergency, Congress enacted statutes authorizing
the President to declare a state of emergency and make use of extraordinary delegated powers.4 the President to declare a state of emergency and make use of extraordinary delegated powers.4
The expanding delegation of emergency powers to executives, and the increase in governing via The expanding delegation of emergency powers to executives, and the increase in governing via
emergency power by executives, was a common trajectory among twentieth-century liberal emergency power by executives, was a common trajectory among twentieth-century liberal
democracies.5 As innovation quickened the pace of social change and global crises, some democracies.5 As innovation quickened the pace of social change and global crises, some
legislatures felt compelled to delegate to their executives, who traditional political theorists legislatures felt compelled to delegate to their executives, who traditional political theorists
assumed could operate with greater “dispatch” than the more deliberate and future-oriented assumed could operate with greater “dispatch” than the more deliberate and future-oriented

1 Clinton Rossiter, 1 Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (Princeton, NJ: (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1948); Edward Corwin, Princeton University Press, 1948); Edward Corwin, Total War and the Constitution (New York: Knopf, 1963). Giorgio (New York: Knopf, 1963). Giorgio
Agamben, Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Carl Schmitt, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four
Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
2 Such an answer can be traced to, among others, John Locke, whose political theory was central to the development of 2 Such an answer can be traced to, among others, John Locke, whose political theory was central to the development of
American political institutions. John Locke, American political institutions. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas Hollis (London: A. Millar et al., , ed. Thomas Hollis (London: A. Millar et al.,
1764), pp. 340-341: “This power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, 1764), pp. 340-341: “This power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law,
and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative […].” and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative […].”
3 Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism,” 3 Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism,” Yale Law Journal 98, no. 7 (May 1989), pp. 1392- 98, no. 7 (May 1989), pp. 1392-
1398; John Fabian Witt, “A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism,” 1398; John Fabian Witt, “A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism,” Law and History Review 36, no. 36, no.
3 (August 2018); George M. Dennison, “Martial Law: The Development of a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776-3 (August 2018); George M. Dennison, “Martial Law: The Development of a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776-
1861,” 1861,” The American Journal of Legal History 18, no. 1 (January 1974); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, 18, no. 1 (January 1974); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Imperial from
the Beginning: The Constitution of the Original Executive (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), pp. 208-210; (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), pp. 208-210;
Matthew Warshauer, Matthew Warshauer, Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Martial Law (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press,
2006). As Thomas Jefferson wrote, an executive officer acting illegally for what he determines to be the good of the 2006). As Thomas Jefferson wrote, an executive officer acting illegally for what he determines to be the good of the
country “does indeed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the constitution, and his station makes it country “does indeed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the constitution, and his station makes it
his duty to incur that risk.” Qtd. in Prakash, his duty to incur that risk.” Qtd. in Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning, p. 214. , p. 214.
4 U.S. Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, 4 U.S. Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, A Brief History of
Emergency Powers in the United States, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., July 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, , committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., July 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1974), pp. 40-41. 1974), pp. 40-41.
5 For scholarship on this general trend, see, e.g., William E. Scheuerman, 5 For scholarship on this general trend, see, e.g., William E. Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social
Acceleration of Time (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart,
eds, eds, Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Peter L. Lindseth, “The Paradox of (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Peter L. Lindseth, “The Paradox of
Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s,” Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s,” Yale Law
Journal 113, no. 7 (May 2004); Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism”; Mary L. Dudziak, 113, no. 7 (May 2004); Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism”; Mary L. Dudziak,
War-Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Corwin, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Corwin, Total War
and the Constitution; Rossiter, ; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship. .
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

legislatures.6 Whether such actions subvert the rule of law or are a standard feature of healthy legislatures.6 Whether such actions subvert the rule of law or are a standard feature of healthy
modern constitutional orders has been a subject of debate.7 modern constitutional orders has been a subject of debate.7
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is one example of a twentieth- The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is one example of a twentieth-
century delegation of emergency authority.8 One of 117 emergency statutes under the umbrella of century delegation of emergency authority.8 One of 117 emergency statutes under the umbrella of
the National Emergencies Act (NEA),9 IEEPA grants the President extensive power to regulate a the National Emergencies Act (NEA),9 IEEPA grants the President extensive power to regulate a
variety of economic transactions during a state of national emergency. Congress enacted IEEPA in variety of economic transactions during a state of national emergency. Congress enacted IEEPA in
1977 to limit the emergency economic powers that it had delegated to the President under the 1977 to limit the emergency economic powers that it had delegated to the President under the
Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). Nevertheless, some scholars argue that judicial and Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). Nevertheless, some scholars argue that judicial and
legislative actions subsequent to IEEPA’s enactment have made it, like TWEA, a source of legislative actions subsequent to IEEPA’s enactment have made it, like TWEA, a source of
expansive and unchecked executive authority in the economic realm.10 Other scholarsexpansive and unchecked executive authority in the economic realm.10 Other scholars~~, however,~~
argue that IEEPA is a useful tool for Presidents to implement quickly the will of Congress either argue that IEEPA is a useful tool for Presidents to implement quickly the will of Congress either
as directed by law or as encouraged by congressional activity.11 as directed by law or as encouraged by congressional activity.11
Until Until ~~recently~~the late 2010s, there had been little congressional discussion of modifying either IEEPA or its , there had been little congressional discussion of modifying either IEEPA or its
umbrella statute, the NEA. umbrella statute, the NEA. ~~Recent presidential actions~~Presidential actions in the late 2010s and early 2020s, however, have drawn , however, have drawn renewed attention to attention to
presidential emergency powers under the NEA of which IEEPA is the most frequently used. presidential emergency powers under the NEA of which IEEPA is the most frequently used.
Origins
The First World War and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)
The First World War (1914-1919) saw an unprecedented degree of economic mobilization.12 The The First World War (1914-1919) saw an unprecedented degree of economic mobilization.12 The
executive departments of European governments began to regulate their economies with or executive departments of European governments began to regulate their economies with or
without the support of their legislatures. The United States, in contrast, was in a privileged without the support of their legislatures. The United States, in contrast, was in a privileged

6 Scheuerman, 6 Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, ch. 2; See, e.g., Carl Schmitt, “The Plight of , ch. 2; See, e.g., Carl Schmitt, “The Plight of
European Jurisprudence,” tr. G. L. Ulmen, European Jurisprudence,” tr. G. L. Ulmen, Telos 83 (Spring 1990); John Locke, 83 (Spring 1990); John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, pp. 340-, pp. 340-
341: “[…] since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so 341: “[…] since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so
too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide
for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are
executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their way; therefore there is executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their way; therefore there is
a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe.” a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe.”
7 For arguments that emergency government subverts the rule of law, see, e.g., Sanford Levinson, “Constitutional 7 For arguments that emergency government subverts the rule of law, see, e.g., Sanford Levinson, “Constitutional
Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency,” Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency,” Georgia Law Review 40, no. 3 (Spring 2006); Bruce Ackerman, 40, no. 3 (Spring 2006); Bruce Ackerman, The
Decline and Fall of the American Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). For arguments that (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). For arguments that
states of emergency can be a standard feature of healthy modern constitutional orders or that they can reflect or states of emergency can be a standard feature of healthy modern constitutional orders or that they can reflect or
anticipate the preferences of the legislature, see, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, “Small Emergencies,” anticipate the preferences of the legislature, see, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, “Small Emergencies,” Georgia Law Review
40, no. 3 (Spring 2006), p. 836; Carey and Shugart, 40, no. 3 (Spring 2006), p. 836; Carey and Shugart, Executive Decree Authority, p. 3. , p. 3.
8 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, P.L. 95-223 (October 28, 1977), 91 Stat. 1626, codified as amended 8 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, P.L. 95-223 (October 28, 1977), 91 Stat. 1626, codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. §§at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 1701 et seq. (2018) (IEEPA). (2018) (IEEPA).
9 National Emergencies Act, P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 9 National Emergencies Act, P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§§§
1601 1601 et seq. (2018) (NEA); CRS Report R46379, . (2018) (NEA); CRS Report R46379, Emergency Authorities Under the National Emergencies Act, Stafford
Act, and Public Health Service Act, coordinated by Jennifer K. Elsea. , coordinated by Jennifer K. Elsea.
10 See, e.g., Patrick Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” 10 See, e.g., Patrick Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” Michigan
Journal of Law Reform 46, no. 2 (2013), pp. 757-759; “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A 46, no. 2 (2013), pp. 757-759; “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A
Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential Emergency Power,” Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential Emergency Power,” Harvard Law Review 96, no. 5 (March 1983), p. 96, no. 5 (March 1983), p.
1120. 1120.
11 See, e.g., Scheppele, “Small Emergencies,” pp. 845-847: Statutes like IEEPA show “that emergencies have been 11 See, e.g., Scheppele, “Small Emergencies,” pp. 845-847: Statutes like IEEPA show “that emergencies have been
brought inside the constitutional order by being normalized in the ordinary legislative process.” brought inside the constitutional order by being normalized in the ordinary legislative process.”
12 See Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, eds., 12 See Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, eds., The Economics of World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005). University Press, 2005).
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position relative to its allies in Europe. Separated by an ocean from Germany and Austria- position relative to its allies in Europe. Separated by an ocean from Germany and Austria-
Hungary, the United States was never under substantial threat of invasion. Rather than relying on Hungary, the United States was never under substantial threat of invasion. Rather than relying on
the inherent powers of the presidency, or acting unconstitutionally and hoping for a subsequent the inherent powers of the presidency, or acting unconstitutionally and hoping for a subsequent
congressional ratification, President Wilson sought explicit pre-authorization for expansive new congressional ratification, President Wilson sought explicit pre-authorization for expansive new
powers to meet the global crisis.13 Between 1916 and the end of 1917, Congress passed 22 powers to meet the global crisis.13 Between 1916 and the end of 1917, Congress passed 22
statutes empowering the President to take control of private property for public use during the statutes empowering the President to take control of private property for public use during the
war.14 These statutes gave the President broad authority to control railroads, shipyards, cars, war.14 These statutes gave the President broad authority to control railroads, shipyards, cars,
telegraph and telephone systems, water systems, and many other sectors of the American telegraph and telephone systems, water systems, and many other sectors of the American
economy.15 economy.15
TWEA was one of those 22 statutes.16 It granted to the executive an extraordinary degree of TWEA was one of those 22 statutes.16 It granted to the executive an extraordinary degree of
control over international trade, investment, migration, and communications between the United control over international trade, investment, migration, and communications between the United
States and its enemies.17 TWEA defined “enemy” broadly and included “any individual, States and its enemies.17 TWEA defined “enemy” broadly and included “any individual,
partnership, or other body of individuals [including corporations], of any nationality, resident partnership, or other body of individuals [including corporations], of any nationality, resident
within the territory ... of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside of within the territory ... of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside of
the United States and doing business within such a territorythe United States and doing business within such a territory ........ ”18 The first four sections of the act ”18 The first four sections of the act
granted the President extensive powers to limit trading with, communicating with, or transporting granted the President extensive powers to limit trading with, communicating with, or transporting
enemies (or their allies) of the United States.19 These sections also empowered the President to enemies (or their allies) of the United States.19 These sections also empowered the President to
censor foreign communications and place extensive restrictions on enemy insurance or censor foreign communications and place extensive restrictions on enemy insurance or
reinsurance companies.20 reinsurance companies.20
It was Section 5(b) of TWEA, however, that would form one of the central bases of presidential It was Section 5(b) of TWEA, however, that would form one of the central bases of presidential
emergency economic power in the twentieth century. Section 5(b), as originally enacted, statesemergency economic power in the twentieth century. Section 5(b), as originally enacted, states:
That the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations That the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations
as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign
exchange, export or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers of exchange, export or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers of
credit in any form (other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly credit in any form (other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly
within the United States), and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or of the ownership within the United States), and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or of the ownership
of property between the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy, ally of of property between the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy, ally of
enemy or otherwise, or between residents of one or more foreign countries, by any person enemy or otherwise, or between residents of one or more foreign countries, by any person
within the United States; and he may require any such person engaged in any such within the United States; and he may require any such person engaged in any such
transaction to furnish, under oath, complete information relative thereto, including the transaction to furnish, under oath, complete information relative thereto, including the
production of any books of account, contracts, letters or other papers, in connection production of any books of account, contracts, letters or other papers, in connection
therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is
completed.21 completed.21

13 Rossiter, 13 Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, pp. 241-243; U.S. Congress, , pp. 241-243; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the
United States, pp. 40-41. , pp. 40-41.
14 J. Reuben Clark, 14 J. Reuben Clark, Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917: Dealing with the Control and Taking of
Private Property for the Public Use, Benefit, or Welfare (Washington, DC: GPO, 1918), pp. 1-125. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1918), pp. 1-125.
15 Clark, 15 Clark, Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917, pp. 1-125; Rossiter, , pp. 1-125; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. , p.
243; David M. Kennedy, 243; David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), ch. 2. 2004), ch. 2.
16 For an overview of TWEA’s development, see Benjamin A. Coates, “The Secret Life of Statutes: A Century of the 16 For an overview of TWEA’s development, see Benjamin A. Coates, “The Secret Life of Statutes: A Century of the
Trading with the Enemy Act,” Trading with the Enemy Act,” Modern American History 1, no. 2 (2018). 1, no. 2 (2018).
17 Trading with the Enemy Act, P.L. 65-91 (October 6, 1917) § 17 Trading with the Enemy Act, P.L. 65-91 (October 6, 1917) § 2, 40 Stat. 411, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 2, 40 Stat. 411, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ §4305 (2018) (TWEA). 4305 (2018) (TWEA).
18 TWEA § 18 TWEA § 2. 2.
19 TWEA §19 TWEA § 3. 3.
20 TWEA §20 TWEA § 4. 4.
21 TWEA §21 TWEA § 5b. 5b.
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The statute gave the President expansive control over private international economic transactions The statute gave the President expansive control over private international economic transactions
in times of war.22 While Congress terminated many of the war powers in 1921, TWEA was in times of war.22 While Congress terminated many of the war powers in 1921, TWEA was
specifically exempted because the U.S. government had yet to dispose of a large amount of alien specifically exempted because the U.S. government had yet to dispose of a large amount of alien
property in its custody.23property in its custody.23
Indeed, the disposition of property seized under emergency powers would become a central tension in the structure of emergency authority over the next century. The Expansion of TWEA
The Great Depression, a massive global economic downturn that began in 1929, presented a The Great Depression, a massive global economic downturn that began in 1929, presented a
challenge to liberal democracies in Europe and the Americas. To address the complexities challenge to liberal democracies in Europe and the Americas. To address the complexities
presented by the crisis, nearly all such democracies began delegating discretionary authority to presented by the crisis, nearly all such democracies began delegating discretionary authority to
their executives to a degree that had their executives to a degree that had ~~only~~ previously been done previously been done only in times of war.24 The U.S. in times of war.24 The U.S.
Congress responded, in part, by dramatically expanding the scope of TWEA, delegating to the Congress responded, in part, by dramatically expanding the scope of TWEA, delegating to the
President the power to declare states of emergency in peacetime and assume expansive domestic President the power to declare states of emergency in peacetime and assume expansive domestic
economic powers. economic powers.
Such a delegation was made politically possible by analogizing economic crises to war. In public Such a delegation was made politically possible by analogizing economic crises to war. In public
speeches, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asserted that the Depression was to be “attacked,” speeches, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asserted that the Depression was to be “attacked,”
“fought against,” “mobilized for,” and “combatted” by “great arm[ies] of people.”25 The “fought against,” “mobilized for,” and “combatted” by “great arm[ies] of people.”25 The
economic mobilization of the First World War had blurred the lines between the executive’s economic mobilization of the First World War had blurred the lines between the executive’s
military and economic powers. As the Depression was likened to “armed strife”26 and declared to military and economic powers. As the Depression was likened to “armed strife”26 and declared to
be “an emergency more serious than war”27 by a Justice of the Supreme Court, it became routine be “an emergency more serious than war”27 by a Justice of the Supreme Court, it became routine
to use emergency economic legislation enacted in wartime as the basis for extraordinary to use emergency economic legislation enacted in wartime as the basis for extraordinary
economic authority in peacetime.28 economic authority in peacetime.28
As the Depression entered its third year, the newly-elected President Roosevelt asked Congress As the Depression entered its third year, the newly-elected President Roosevelt asked Congress
for “broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that for “broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that
would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”29 In his first act as President, would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”29 In his first act as President,
Roosevelt proclaimed a bank holiday, suspending all transactions at all banking institutions Roosevelt proclaimed a bank holiday, suspending all transactions at all banking institutions
located in the United States and its territories for four days.30 In his proclamation, Roosevelt located in the United States and its territories for four days.30 In his proclamation, Roosevelt
claimed to have authority to declare the holiday under Section 5(b) of TWEA.31 However, claimed to have authority to declare the holiday under Section 5(b) of TWEA.31 However,
because the United States was not in a state of war and the suspended transactions were primarily because the United States was not in a state of war and the suspended transactions were primarily
domestic, the President’s authority to issue such an order was dubious.32 domestic, the President’s authority to issue such an order was dubious.32

22 TWEA §22 TWEA § 2. 2.
23 U.S. Congress, House, 23 U.S. Congress, House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, Report of the Committee on International
Relations on H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 95-459 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 4. , 95th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 95-459 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 4.
24 William E. Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” 24 William E. Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” Cardozo Law Review 21 (2000), p. 1872. 21 (2000), p. 1872.
25 See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt25 See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt'’s Inaugural Address of 1933 (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records s Inaugural Address of 1933 (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records
Administration, 1988); Rossiter, Administration, 1988); Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 256; U.S. Congress, , p. 256; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency
Powers in the United States, p. 56. , p. 56.
26 Franklin D. Roosevelt 26 Franklin D. Roosevelt'’s Inaugural Address of 1933. s Inaugural Address of 1933.
27 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306 (1932) (J. Brandeis, dissenting). 27 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306 (1932) (J. Brandeis, dissenting).
28 Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” p. 1878. 28 Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” p. 1878.
29 Franklin D. Roosevelt29 Franklin D. Roosevelt'’s Inaugural Address of 1933. s Inaugural Address of 1933.
30 Proclamation 2039 (March 6, 1933). 30 Proclamation 2039 (March 6, 1933).
31 In his proclamation, President Roosevelt did not refer to the “Trading with the Enemy Act,” but instead chose to use 31 In his proclamation, President Roosevelt did not refer to the “Trading with the Enemy Act,” but instead chose to use
the more opaque “Act of October 6, 1917.” Proclamation 2039. the more opaque “Act of October 6, 1917.” Proclamation 2039.
32 President Herbert Hoover had likewise contemplated using TWEA for such a purpose. However, Hoover’s Attorney 32 President Herbert Hoover had likewise contemplated using TWEA for such a purpose. However, Hoover’s Attorney
General, William D. Mitchell, had expressed serious doubts about the legality of such an action. In the last days of General, William D. Mitchell, had expressed serious doubts about the legality of such an action. In the last days of
~~Hoover’s presidency, Mitchell said that Hoover “should not issue [such an] executive order unless it was unanimously~~(continued...)
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Despite the tenuous legality, Congress ratified Roosevelt’s actions by passing the Emergency Despite the tenuous legality, Congress ratified Roosevelt’s actions by passing the Emergency
Banking Relief Act three days after his proclamation.33 The act amended Section 5(b) of TWEA Banking Relief Act three days after his proclamation.33 The act amended Section 5(b) of TWEA
to read: to read:
During time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the
President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise,
investigate, regulate, or prohibit....investigate, regulate, or prohibit.... 34 34
This amendment gave the President the authority to declare that a national emergency existed and This amendment gave the President the authority to declare that a national emergency existed and
assume extensive controls over the national economy previously only available in times of war. assume extensive controls over the national economy previously only available in times of war.
By 1934, Roosevelt had used these extensive new powers to regulate “[e]very transaction in By 1934, Roosevelt had used these extensive new powers to regulate “[e]very transaction in
foreign exchange, transfer of credit between any banking institution within the United States and foreign exchange, transfer of credit between any banking institution within the United States and
any banking institution outside of the United States.”35 any banking institution outside of the United States.”35
With America’s entry into the Second World War in 1941, Congress again amended TWEA to With America’s entry into the Second World War in 1941, Congress again amended TWEA to
grant the President extensive powers over the disposition of private property, adding the so-called grant the President extensive powers over the disposition of private property, adding the so-called
“vesting” power, which authorized the permanent seizure of property.36 Now in its most “vesting” power, which authorized the permanent seizure of property.36 Now in its most
expansive form, TWEA authorized the President to declare a national emergency and, in so doing, expansive form, TWEA authorized the President to declare a national emergency and, in so doing,
to regulate foreign exchange, domestic banking, possession of precious metals, and property in to regulate foreign exchange, domestic banking, possession of precious metals, and property in
which any foreign country or foreign national had an interest.37 which any foreign country or foreign national had an interest.37
The Second World War ended in 1945. Following the conflict, the allied powers constructed The Second World War ended in 1945. Following the conflict, the allied powers constructed
institutions and signed agreements designed to keep the peace and to liberalize world trade. institutions and signed agreements designed to keep the peace and to liberalize world trade.
However, the United States did not immediately resume a peacetime posture with respect to However, the United States did not immediately resume a peacetime posture with respect to
emergency powers. Instead, the onset of the Cold War rationalized the continued use of TWEA emergency powers. Instead, the onset of the Cold War rationalized the continued use of TWEA
and other emergency powers outside the context of a declared war.38 Over the next several and other emergency powers outside the context of a declared war.38 Over the next several
decades, Presidents declared four national emergencies and assumed expansive authority over decades, Presidents declared four national emergencies and assumed expansive authority over
economic transactions in the postwar period.39 economic transactions in the postwar period.39
During the Cold War, economic sanctions became an increasingly popular foreign policy and During the Cold War, economic sanctions became an increasingly popular foreign policy and
national security tool, and TWEA was a prominent source of presidential authority to use the tool. national security tool, and TWEA was a prominent source of presidential authority to use the tool.

Hoover’s presidency, Mitchell said that Hoover “should not issue [such an] executive order unless it was unanimously agreed by [the] outgoing and incoming administrations that it was necessary and assurances [were] obtained from agreed by [the] outgoing and incoming administrations that it was necessary and assurances [were] obtained from
Congressional leaders that [such an action] would be ratified promptly and that enabling legislation would be passed” Congressional leaders that [such an action] would be ratified promptly and that enabling legislation would be passed”
as there was only a “shoe string” on which to base the legality of such an order. Raymond Moley, as there was only a “shoe string” on which to base the legality of such an order. Raymond Moley, The First New Deal
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), pp. 146-147. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), pp. 146-147.
33 Emergency Banking Relief Act, P.L. 73-1 (March 9, 1933), 48 Stat. 1 (EBRA). The House, despite having no copies 33 Emergency Banking Relief Act, P.L. 73-1 (March 9, 1933), 48 Stat. 1 (EBRA). The House, despite having no copies
of the bill and relying upon a draft text read aloud by the Speaker, passed the bill after only 38 minutes of debate. The of the bill and relying upon a draft text read aloud by the Speaker, passed the bill after only 38 minutes of debate. The
Senate voted to pass the measure the same evening. U.S. Congress, Senate voted to pass the measure the same evening. U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United
States, p. 57. , p. 57.
34 TWEA as amended by EBRA. Italics show the language added by EBRA. 34 TWEA as amended by EBRA. Italics show the language added by EBRA.
35 E.O. 6560 (January 15, 1934). These actions came in the context of greater participation by the executive in 35 E.O. 6560 (January 15, 1934). These actions came in the context of greater participation by the executive in
international economic transactions generally. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 gave the President the international economic transactions generally. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 gave the President the
authority to negotiate bilateral trade agreements, marking the beginning of a period of increasing U.S. trade authority to negotiate bilateral trade agreements, marking the beginning of a period of increasing U.S. trade
liberalization through executive action. Douglas A. Irwin, liberalization through executive action. Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce (Chicago: Chicago University (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 2017), Press, 2017), chchap. 9. . 9.
36 P.L. 77-354 (December 18, 1941), 55 Stat. 838. 36 P.L. 77-354 (December 18, 1941), 55 Stat. 838.
37 Ibid. 37 Ibid.
38 Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” p. 1879; Robert S. Rankin and Winfried R. Dallmyr, 38 Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” p. 1879; Robert S. Rankin and Winfried R. Dallmyr, Freedom
and Emergency Powers in the Cold War (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964). (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964).
39 Proclamation 2914 (December 16, 1950); Proclamation 3972 (March 23, 1970); Proclamation 3972 (February 23, 39 Proclamation 2914 (December 16, 1950); Proclamation 3972 (March 23, 1970); Proclamation 3972 (February 23,
1971); Proclamation 4074 (August 15, 1971). See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10267, 1971); Proclamation 4074 (August 15, 1971). See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10267, Definition of National
Emergency under the National Emergencies Act, by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Report 98-505, , by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Report 98-505, National Emergency
Powers, by L. Elaine Halchin. , by L. Elaine Halchin.
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In 1950, President Harry S. Truman declared a national emergency, citing TWEA, to impose In 1950, President Harry S. Truman declared a national emergency, citing TWEA, to impose
economic sanctions on North Korea and China.40 Subsequent Presidents referenced that national economic sanctions on North Korea and China.40 Subsequent Presidents referenced that national
emergency as authority for imposing sanctions on Vietnam, Cuba, and Cambodia.41 Truman emergency as authority for imposing sanctions on Vietnam, Cuba, and Cambodia.41 Truman
likewise used Section 5(b) of TWEA to maintain regulations on foreign exchange, transfers of likewise used Section 5(b) of TWEA to maintain regulations on foreign exchange, transfers of
credit, and the export of coin and currency that had been in place since the early 1930s.42 credit, and the export of coin and currency that had been in place since the early 1930s.42
Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford invoked TWEA to continue export controls Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford invoked TWEA to continue export controls
established under the Export Administration Act when the act expired.43 established under the Export Administration Act when the act expired.43
TWEA was also a prominent instrument of postwar presidential monetary policy. Presidents TWEA was also a prominent instrument of postwar presidential monetary policy. Presidents
Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy used TWEA and the national emergency declared by Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy used TWEA and the national emergency declared by
President Roosevelt in 1933 to maintain and modify regulations controlling the hoarding and President Roosevelt in 1933 to maintain and modify regulations controlling the hoarding and
export of gold.44 In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson explicitly used Truman’s 1950 declaration export of gold.44 In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson explicitly used Truman’s 1950 declaration
of emergency under Section 5(b) of TWEA to limit direct foreign investment by U.S. companies of emergency under Section 5(b) of TWEA to limit direct foreign investment by U.S. companies
in an effort to strengthen the balance of payments position of the United States after the in an effort to strengthen the balance of payments position of the United States after the
devaluation of the pound sterling by the United Kingdom.45 In 1971, after President Nixon devaluation of the pound sterling by the United Kingdom.45 In 1971, after President Nixon
suspended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold, he made use of Section 5(b) of TWEA to suspended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold, he made use of Section 5(b) of TWEA to
declare a state of emergency and place a 10% declare a state of emergency and place a 10% ad valorem supplemental duty on all dutiable goods supplemental duty on all dutiable goods
entering the United States.46 entering the United States.46
The reliance by the executive on the powers granted by Section 5(b) of TWEA meant that The reliance by the executive on the powers granted by Section 5(b) of TWEA meant that
postwar sanctions regimes and significant parts of U.S. international monetary policy relied on postwar sanctions regimes and significant parts of U.S. international monetary policy relied on
continued states of emergency for their operation. continued states of emergency for their operation.
The Efforts of Congress to Limit Executive Emergency Authorities
By the mid-1970s, following U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, revelations of domestic By the mid-1970s, following U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, revelations of domestic
spying, assassinations of foreign political leaders, the Watergate break-in, and other related spying, assassinations of foreign political leaders, the Watergate break-in, and other related
abuses of power, Congress increasingly focused on checking the executive branch. The Senate abuses of power, Congress increasingly focused on checking the executive branch. The Senate
formed a bipartisan special committee chaired by Senators Frank Church and Charles Mathias to formed a bipartisan special committee chaired by Senators Frank Church and Charles Mathias to
~~reevaluate delegations of emergency authority to the President.47 The special committee issued a~~

40 Proclamation 2914 (December 16, 1950). This emergency would remain in place until 1976 and would be used to 40 Proclamation 2914 (December 16, 1950). This emergency would remain in place until 1976 and would be used to
justify a host of emergency powers. See the partial list of executive orders issued pursuant to Proclamation 2914 in U.S. justify a host of emergency powers. See the partial list of executive orders issued pursuant to Proclamation 2914 in U.S.
Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, Executive Orders in Times
of War and National Emergency, Report of the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency
Powers, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., June 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), p. 15. , committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., June 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), p. 15.
41 U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Trade and Commerce, 41 U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Trade and Commerce, United States
Embargo on Trade with South Vietnam and Cambodia, 94th Cong. 1st sess., June 4, 1975 (Washington, D.C., GPO, , 94th Cong. 1st sess., June 4, 1975 (Washington, D.C., GPO,
1975), p. 2; 31 C.F.R. 500.101-500.808 (1975). 1975), p. 2; 31 C.F.R. 500.101-500.808 (1975).
42 E.O. 10348 (April 26, 1952). 42 E.O. 10348 (April 26, 1952).
43 E.O. 11677 (August 1, 1972); E.O. 11683 (August 29, 1972); E.O. 11796 (July 30, 1974); E.O. 11798 (August 14, 43 E.O. 11677 (August 1, 1972); E.O. 11683 (August 29, 1972); E.O. 11796 (July 30, 1974); E.O. 11798 (August 14,
1974); E.O. 11810 (September 30, 1974); E.O. 11818 (November 5, 1974); E.O. 11940 (September 30, 1976). 1974); E.O. 11810 (September 30, 1974); E.O. 11818 (November 5, 1974); E.O. 11940 (September 30, 1976).
44 E.O. 10896 (November 29, 1960); E.O. 11037 (July 20, 1962). 44 E.O. 10896 (November 29, 1960); E.O. 11037 (July 20, 1962).
45 E.O. 11387 (January 1, 1968). 45 E.O. 11387 (January 1, 1968).
46 Pres. Proclamation No. 4074 (January 21, 1971). Although the proclamation did not explicitly refer to TWEA in 46 Pres. Proclamation No. 4074 (January 21, 1971). Although the proclamation did not explicitly refer to TWEA in
order to avoid the possible embarrassment of using a statute named the “Trading with the Enemy Act” to impose a order to avoid the possible embarrassment of using a statute named the “Trading with the Enemy Act” to impose a
tariff principally aimed at U.S. allies, the proclamation was carefully worded to not exclude TWEA as an authority tariff principally aimed at U.S. allies, the proclamation was carefully worded to not exclude TWEA as an authority
under which the proclamation was issued. When a legal challenge was issued, the Government argued, and the U.S. under which the proclamation was issued. When a legal challenge was issued, the Government argued, and the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals agreed, that TWEA was the source of the authority for the proclamation. United Court of Customs and Patent Appeals agreed, that TWEA was the source of the authority for the proclamation. United
States v. Yoshida Int'l, IncStates v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975). See also CRS Insight IN11129, , 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975). See also CRS Insight IN11129, The International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Tariffs: Historical Background and Key Issues, by Christopher A. , by Christopher A.
Casey. Casey.
~~47 The bipartisan special committee was called the “Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National~~
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reevaluate delegations of emergency authority to the President.47 The special committee issued a report surveying the President’s emergency powers in which it asserted that the United States had report surveying the President’s emergency powers in which it asserted that the United States had
technically “been in a state of national emergency since March 9, 1933” and that there were four technically “been in a state of national emergency since March 9, 1933” and that there were four
distinct declarations of national emergency in effect.48 The report also noted that the United States distinct declarations of national emergency in effect.48 The report also noted that the United States
had “on the books at least 470 significant emergency statutes without time limitations delegating had “on the books at least 470 significant emergency statutes without time limitations delegating
to the Executive extensive discretionary powers, ordinarily exercised by the Legislature, which to the Executive extensive discretionary powers, ordinarily exercised by the Legislature, which
affect the lives of American citizens in a host of all-encompassing ways.”49 affect the lives of American citizens in a host of all-encompassing ways.”49
In the course of the Committee’s investigations, Senator Mathias, a committee co-chair, noted, “A In the course of the Committee’s investigations, Senator Mathias, a committee co-chair, noted, “A
majority of the people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency majority of the people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency
government.” Senator Church, the other co-chair, said the central question before the committee government.” Senator Church, the other co-chair, said the central question before the committee
was “whether it [was] possible for a democratic government such as ours to exist under its present was “whether it [was] possible for a democratic government such as ours to exist under its present
Constitution and system of three separate branches equal in power under a continued state of Constitution and system of three separate branches equal in power under a continued state of
emergency.”50 emergency.”50
Among the more controversial statutes highlighted by the committee was TWEA. In 1977, during Among the more controversial statutes highlighted by the committee was TWEA. In 1977, during
the House markup of a bill revising TWEA, Representative Jonathan Bingham, Chairperson of the House markup of a bill revising TWEA, Representative Jonathan Bingham, Chairperson of
the House International Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Economic Policy, described the House International Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Economic Policy, described
TWEA as conferring “on the President what could have been dictatorial powers that he could TWEA as conferring “on the President what could have been dictatorial powers that he could
have used without any restraint by Congress.”51 According to the Department of Justice, TWEA have used without any restraint by Congress.”51 According to the Department of Justice, TWEA
granted the President four major groups of powers in a time of war or other national emergency: granted the President four major groups of powers in a time of war or other national emergency:
(a) Regulatory powers with respect to foreign exchange, banking transfers, coin, bullion, (a) Regulatory powers with respect to foreign exchange, banking transfers, coin, bullion,
currency, and securities; currency, and securities;
(b) Regulatory powers (b) Regulatory powers with respect to “any property inwith respect to “any property in which any foreign country or a which any foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest”; national thereof has any interest”;

47 The bipartisan special committee was called the “Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency,” and was charged with conducting “a study and investigation with respect to the matter of terminating the Emergency,” and was charged with conducting “a study and investigation with respect to the matter of terminating the
national emergency proclaimed by the President of the United States on December 16, 1950.” U.S. Congress, Senatenational emergency proclaimed by the President of the United States on December 16, 1950.” U.S. Congress, Senate,
Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, Trading with the
Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of International Transactions in Time of
Declared National Emergency, committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., November 1976 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), , committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., November 1976 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976),
p. iii. p. iii.
48 U.S. Congress, 48 U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v. The four national emergencies were , p. v. The four national emergencies were
those proclaimed by President Roosevelt in 1933, President Truman in 1950, and the two proclaimed by President those proclaimed by President Roosevelt in 1933, President Truman in 1950, and the two proclaimed by President
Nixon in 1970 and 1971. Nixon in 1970 and 1971.
49 U.S. Congress, 49 U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v. , p. v.
50 Qtd. in 50 Qtd. in U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents, p. iii. , p. iii.
51 U.S. Congress51 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, House, Committee on International Relations, Revision of the Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup
before the Committee on International Relations (“House Markup”), 95th Cong., 1st sess., June 1977 (Washington, DC: , 95th Cong., 1st sess., June 1977 (Washington, DC:
GPO, 1977), p. 5. House and Senate committee reports expressed the view that past Presidents had abused the authority GPO, 1977), p. 5. House and Senate committee reports expressed the view that past Presidents had abused the authority
to regulate economic transactions in a national emergency conferred by TWEA by using it in circumstances far to regulate economic transactions in a national emergency conferred by TWEA by using it in circumstances far
removed from those that originally gave rise to the declaration of national emergency. H. Rept. No. 95-459 (June 23, removed from those that originally gave rise to the declaration of national emergency. H. Rept. No. 95-459 (June 23,
1977); S. Rept. No. 95-466 (October 3, 1977). Both reports noted that President Lyndon B. Johnson, citing President 1977); S. Rept. No. 95-466 (October 3, 1977). Both reports noted that President Lyndon B. Johnson, citing President
Truman’s declaration of national emergency with respect to Korea in 1950, had imposed controls on direct investment Truman’s declaration of national emergency with respect to Korea in 1950, had imposed controls on direct investment
abroad by U.S. nationals in 1968, and that President Gerald R. Ford had used President Nixonabroad by U.S. nationals in 1968, and that President Gerald R. Ford had used President Nixon'’s declaration of national s declaration of national
emergency with respect to the balance of payments in 1971 to justify extending the controls and regulations of the emergency with respect to the balance of payments in 1971 to justify extending the controls and regulations of the
Export Administration Act when that Export Administration Act when that ~~Act~~act lapsed temporarily in 1976. H. Rept. No. 95-459, at 5; S. Rept. No. 95-466, at lapsed temporarily in 1976. H. Rept. No. 95-459, at 5; S. Rept. No. 95-466, at
2. More generally, the House report noted that the national emergency authority of TWEA had been used by President 2. More generally, the House report noted that the national emergency authority of TWEA had been used by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt to regulate the banking industry in 1933 and to impose consumer credit controls in 1941 and by Franklin D. Roosevelt to regulate the banking industry in 1933 and to impose consumer credit controls in 1941 and by
President Richard M. Nixon to impose a surcharge on imports into the United States in 1971. Thus, the House report President Richard M. Nixon to impose a surcharge on imports into the United States in 1971. Thus, the House report
concluded, TWEA “has become essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his concluded, TWEA “has become essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his
discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and international economic arena, without congressional review.” Ibid., discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and international economic arena, without congressional review.” Ibid.,
p. 7. p. 7.
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(c) The power to vest “any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof”; (c) The power to vest “any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof”;
and and
(d) The powers to hold, use, administer, liquidate, sell, or otherwise deal with “such interest (d) The powers to hold, use, administer, liquidate, sell, or otherwise deal with “such interest
or property” in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States.52 or property” in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States.52
The House report on the reform legislation called TWEA “essentially an unlimited grant of The House report on the reform legislation called TWEA “essentially an unlimited grant of
authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and
international economic arena, without congressional review.”53 The criticisms of TWEA centered international economic arena, without congressional review.”53 The criticisms of TWEA centered
on the following: on the following:
(a) It required no consultation or reports to Congress with regard to the use of powers or (a) It required no consultation or reports to Congress with regard to the use of powers or
the declaration of a national emergency. the declaration of a national emergency.
(b) It set no time limits on a state of emergency, no mechanism for congressional review, (b) It set no time limits on a state of emergency, no mechanism for congressional review,
and no way for Congress to terminate it. and no way for Congress to terminate it.
(c) It stated no limits on the scope of TWEA’s economic powers and the circumstances (c) It stated no limits on the scope of TWEA’s economic powers and the circumstances
under which such authority could be used. under which such authority could be used.
(d) The actions taken under the authority of TWEA were rarely related to the circumstances (d) The actions taken under the authority of TWEA were rarely related to the circumstances
in which the national emergency was declared.54 in which the national emergency was declared.54
In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Professor Harold G. Maier, In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Professor Harold G. Maier,
a noted legal scholar, summed up the development and the main criticisms of TWEA: a noted legal scholar, summed up the development and the main criticisms of TWEA:
Section 5(b)’s effect is no longer confined to “emergency situations” in the sense of Section 5(b)’s effect is no longer confined to “emergency situations” in the sense of
existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit, existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit,
by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has
converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President…”55 converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President…”55
The Enactment of the National Emergencies Act and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act
Congress’s reforms to emergency powers under TWEA came in two acts. First, Congress enacted Congress’s reforms to emergency powers under TWEA came in two acts. First, Congress enacted
the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976.56 The NEA provided for the termination of all the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976.56 The NEA provided for the termination of all
existing emergencies in 1978, except those making use of Section 5(b) of TWEA, and placed new existing emergencies in 1978, except those making use of Section 5(b) of TWEA, and placed new
restrictions on the manner of declaring and the duration of new states of emergency, includingrestrictions on the manner of declaring and the duration of new states of emergency, including:
• Requiring the President to transmit immediately to Congress a notification of the Requiring the President to transmit immediately to Congress a notification of the
declaration of national emergency. declaration of national emergency.
• Requiring a biannual review whereby “each House of Congress shall meet to Requiring a biannual review whereby “each House of Congress shall meet to
consider a vote on a concurrent [now joint, see below] resolution to determine consider a vote on a concurrent [now joint, see below] resolution to determine
whether that emergency shall be terminated.” whether that emergency shall be terminated.”
• Authorizing Congress to terminate the national emergency through a privileged Authorizing Congress to terminate the national emergency through a privileged
concurrent [now joint] resolution.57 concurrent [now joint] resolution.57

~~52 House~~ 52 U.S. Congress, , Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2. , p. 2.
53 Ibid. 53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., p. 9. 54 Ibid., p. 9.
55 Ibid. 55 Ibid.
56 P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§56 P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601 1601 et seq. (2018). (2018).
57 Ibid. While the NEA terminated the national emergencies on September 14, 1978, it explicitly enabled the 57 Ibid. While the NEA terminated the national emergencies on September 14, 1978, it explicitly enabled the
continuation of those emergencies with respect to Section 5(b) of TWEA to give the Congress more time to consider continuation of those emergencies with respect to Section 5(b) of TWEA to give the Congress more time to consider
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Second, Congress tackled the more complicated question of TWEA. Because the authorities Second, Congress tackled the more complicated question of TWEA. Because the authorities
granted by TWEA were heavily entwined with postwar international monetary policy and the use granted by TWEA were heavily entwined with postwar international monetary policy and the use
of sanctions in U.S. foreign policy, unwinding it was a difficult undertaking.58 The exclusion of of sanctions in U.S. foreign policy, unwinding it was a difficult undertaking.58 The exclusion of
Section 5(b) reflected congressional interest in preserving existing regulations regarding foreign Section 5(b) reflected congressional interest in preserving existing regulations regarding foreign
assets, foreign funds, and exports of strategic goods.59 Similarly, establishing a means to continue assets, foreign funds, and exports of strategic goods.59 Similarly, establishing a means to continue
existing uses of TWEA reflected congressional interest in “improving future use rather than existing uses of TWEA reflected congressional interest in “improving future use rather than
remedying past abuses.”60 remedying past abuses.”60
The subcommittee charged with reforming TWEA spent more than a year preparing reports, The subcommittee charged with reforming TWEA spent more than a year preparing reports,
including the first complete legislative history of TWEA, a tome that ran nearly 700 pages.61 In including the first complete legislative history of TWEA, a tome that ran nearly 700 pages.61 In
the resulting legislation, Congress did three things. First, Congress amended TWEA so that it the resulting legislation, Congress did three things. First, Congress amended TWEA so that it
was, as originally intended, only applicable “during a time of war.”62 Second, Congress expanded was, as originally intended, only applicable “during a time of war.”62 Second, Congress expanded
the Export Administration Act to include powers that previously were authorized by reference to the Export Administration Act to include powers that previously were authorized by reference to
Section 5(b) of TWEA.63 Finally, Congress wrote the International Emergency Economic Powers Section 5(b) of TWEA.63 Finally, Congress wrote the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA) to confer “upon the President a new set of authorities for use in time of national Act (IEEPA) to confer “upon the President a new set of authorities for use in time of national
emergency which are both more limited in scope than those of section 5(b) and subject to emergency which are both more limited in scope than those of section 5(b) and subject to
procedural limitations, including those of the [NEA].”64 procedural limitations, including those of the [NEA].”64
The Report of the House Committee on International Relations summarized the nature of an The Report of the House Committee on International Relations summarized the nature of an
“emergency” in its “new approach” to international emergency economic powers: “emergency” in its “new approach” to international emergency economic powers:
[G]iven the breadth of the authorities, and their availability at the President’s discretion [G]iven the breadth of the authorities, and their availability at the President’s discretion
upon a declaration of a national emergency, their exercise should be subject to various upon a declaration of a national emergency, their exercise should be subject to various
substantive restrictions. The main one stems from a recognition that emergencies are by substantive restrictions. The main one stems from a recognition that emergencies are by
their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated withtheir nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal ongoing problems. A normal ongoing problems. A
national emergency should be declared and emergency authorities employed only with national emergency should be declared and emergency authorities employed only with
respect to a specific set of circumstancesrespect to a specific set of circumstances which constitutewhich constitute a real emergency, and fora real emergency, and for no

no other purpose. The emergency should be terminated in a timely manner when the factual how to address the issue of sanctions and international economic regulation. The International Emergency Economic how to address the issue of sanctions and international economic regulation. The International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA) grandfathered powers that “were being exercised [under TWEA] with respect to a country on July Powers Act (IEEPA) grandfathered powers that “were being exercised [under TWEA] with respect to a country on July
1, 1977,” including those with respect to Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. P.L. 95-223 (December 28, 1, 1977,” including those with respect to Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. P.L. 95-223 (December 28,
1977) §1977) § 101(b). The grandfathered powers, however, would require a declaration or renewal. See, e.g., Memorandum 101(b). The grandfathered powers, however, would require a declaration or renewal. See, e.g., Memorandum
of September 8, 1978, 45 of September 8, 1978, 45 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 40,695; Memorandum of September 12, 1979; Presidential Determination of 40,695; Memorandum of September 12, 1979; Presidential Determination of
September 8, 1980, 45 September 8, 1980, 45 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 59,549; Memorandum of September 10, 1981, 46 59,549; Memorandum of September 10, 1981, 46 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 45,321; Memorandum of 45,321; Memorandum of
September 8, 1982, 47 September 8, 1982, 47 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 39,797; Memorandum of September 7, 1983, 48 39,797; Memorandum of September 7, 1983, 48 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 40,695; Memorandum of 40,695; Memorandum of
September 11, 1984, 49 September 11, 1984, 49 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 35,927. 35,927.
58 58 ~~House~~U.S. Congress, , Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, pp. 6-7. , pp. 6-7.
59 U.S. Congress, Senate59 U.S. Congress, Senate, ~~International Emergency Economic Powers Legislation, Report of the~~ Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs , International Emergency Economic Powers Legislation, Report to Accompany H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., S.Rept. 95-466 (Washington, DC: GPO, , 95th Cong., 1st Sess., S.Rept. 95-466 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1977), p. 3. 1977), p. 3.
60 60 ~~House~~U.S. Congress, , Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, 10. , 10.
61 61 House Markup, p. 9; U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee , p. 9; U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee
on International Relations, on International Relations, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of
International Transactions in a Time of Declared Emergency, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., November 1976, committee print , 94th Cong., 2nd sess., November 1976, committee print
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1976)(Washington, DC: GPO, 1976).
62 P.L. 95-223 (December 28, 1977) (Title I) (“Section 5(b)(1) of the Trading With the Enemy Act // 50 USC app. 5. // 62 P.L. 95-223 (December 28, 1977) (Title I) (“Section 5(b)(1) of the Trading With the Enemy Act // 50 USC app. 5. //
is amended by striking out “or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President” in the text is amended by striking out “or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President” in the text
preceding subparagraph (A).”); 91 Stat. 1625, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §preceding subparagraph (A).”); 91 Stat. 1625, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4305 (2018); House, 4305 (2018); House, Trading with
the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2. , p. 2.
63 Ibid. (Title III); House, 63 Ibid. (Title III); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2 (“Title III of the bill makes a series of , p. 2 (“Title III of the bill makes a series of
conforming amendments to the Export Administration Act, which transfer to that act the authority, heretofore exercised conforming amendments to the Export Administration Act, which transfer to that act the authority, heretofore exercised
under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act to regulate exports of non-U.S.-origin goods and technology by under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act to regulate exports of non-U.S.-origin goods and technology by
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. concerns.”). foreign subsidiaries of U.S. concerns.”).
64 Ibid. (Title II); House, 64 Ibid. (Title II); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2. , p. 2.
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~~other purpose. The emergency should be terminated in a timely manner when the factual~~
state of emergency is over and not continued in effect for use in other circumstances. A state of emergency is over and not continued in effect for use in other circumstances. A
state of national emergency should not be a normal state of affairs.65 state of national emergency should not be a normal state of affairs.65
IEEPA’s Statute, its Use, and Judicial Interpretation
IEEPA’s Statute
IEEPA, as currently amended, empowers the president toIEEPA, as currently amended, empowers the president to:
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit: (A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit:
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange, (i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, (ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution,
to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country
or national thereof, or national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currencies or securities; and (iii) the importing or exporting of currencies or securities; and
(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, (B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel,
nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer,
withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any
right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which
any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to
any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(C) when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign (C) when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign
country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he
determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against
the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest,
when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the
President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the
President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered,
liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United
States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the
accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.66 accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.66
These powers may be exercised “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its These powers may be exercised “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with
respect to such threat.”67 Presidents may invoke IEEPA under the procedures set forth in the respect to such threat.”67 Presidents may invoke IEEPA under the procedures set forth in the
NEA. When declaring a national emergency, the NEA requires that the President “immediately” NEA. When declaring a national emergency, the NEA requires that the President “immediately”
transmit the proclamation declaring the emergency to Congress and publish it in the transmit the proclamation declaring the emergency to Congress and publish it in the Federal
Register.68 The President must also specify the provisions of law that he or she intends to use.69 .68 The President must also specify the provisions of law that he or she intends to use.69

In addition to the requirements of the NEA, IEEPA provides several further restrictions. Preliminarily, IEEPA requires that the President consult with Congress “in every possible 65 House, 65 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 11. , p. 11.
66 50 U.S.C. §66 50 U.S.C. § 1702. 1702.
67 50 U.S.C. §67 50 U.S.C. § 1701. 1701.
6868 50 U.S.C50 U.S.C. § § 1621. 1621.
69 50 U.S.C69 50 U.S.C. § § 1631. 1631.
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~~In addition to the requirements of the NEA, IEEPA provides several further restrictions.~~
~~Preliminarily, IEEPA requires that the President consult with Congress “in every possible~~
instance” before exercising any of the authorities granted under IEEPA.70 Once the President instance” before exercising any of the authorities granted under IEEPA.70 Once the President
declares a national emergency invoking IEEPA, he or she must immediately transmit a report to declares a national emergency invoking IEEPA, he or she must immediately transmit a report to
Congress specifying: Congress specifying:
(1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority; (1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority;
(2) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary (2) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States; national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States;
(3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those (3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those
authorities to deal with those circumstances; authorities to deal with those circumstances;
(4) why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those circumstances; (4) why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those circumstances;
and and
(5) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such (5) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such
actions are to be taken with respect to those countries.71 actions are to be taken with respect to those countries.71
The President subsequently is to report on the actions taken under the IEEPA at least once in The President subsequently is to report on the actions taken under the IEEPA at least once in
every succeeding six-month interval that the authorities are exercised.72 As per the NEA, the every succeeding six-month interval that the authorities are exercised.72 As per the NEA, the
emergency may be terminated by the President, by a privileged joint resolution of Congress, or emergency may be terminated by the President, by a privileged joint resolution of Congress, or
automatically if the President does not publish in the automatically if the President does not publish in the Federal Register and transmit to Congress a and transmit to Congress a
notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such anniversary.73 notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such anniversary.73
Amendments to IEEPA
Congress has amended IEEPA eight times Congress has amended IEEPA eight times (Table 1). Five of the eight amendments have altered . Five of the eight amendments have altered
civil and criminal penalties for violations of orders issued under the statute. Other amendments civil and criminal penalties for violations of orders issued under the statute. Other amendments
excluded certain informational materials and expanded IEEPA’s scope following the terrorist excluded certain informational materials and expanded IEEPA’s scope following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Congress also amended the NEA in response to a ruling by the attacks of September 11, 2001. Congress also amended the NEA in response to a ruling by the
Supreme Court to require a joint rather than a concurrent resolution to terminate a national Supreme Court to require a joint rather than a concurrent resolution to terminate a national
emergency. emergency.
Table 1. Amendments to IEEPA
Date
Action
December 28, 1977 December 28, 1977
IEEPA Enacted IEEPA Enacted
(P.L. 95-223; 91 Stat. 1625) (P.L. 95-223; 91 Stat. 1625)
August 16, 1985* August 16, 1985*
Fol owing the Supreme Court’s holding in Fol owing the Supreme Court’s holding in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) finding so-, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) finding so-
called legislative vetoes unconstitutional, Congress amends the NEA to change called legislative vetoes unconstitutional, Congress amends the NEA to change
“concurrent” resolution to “joint” resolution. (P.L. 99-93; 99 Stat. 407, 448). “concurrent” resolution to “joint” resolution. (P.L. 99-93; 99 Stat. 407, 448).
* While not technically an amendment to IEEPA, IEEPA is tied to the NEA’s provisions * While not technically an amendment to IEEPA, IEEPA is tied to the NEA’s provisions
relating to the declaration and termination of national emergencies. relating to the declaration and termination of national emergencies.

~~70 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a).~~
~~71 50 U.S.C. § 1703(b).~~
~~72 50 U.S.C. § 1703(c).~~
~~73 50 U.S.C. §~~ August 23, 1988 IEEPA amended to exclude informational materials (Berman Amendment, see elaboration below). (Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988; P.L. 100-418; 102 Stat. 1107, 1371) 70 50 U.S.C. §1703(a). 71 50 U.S.C. §1703(b). 72 50 U.S.C. §1703(c). 73 50 U.S.C. §1622. 1622.
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Date
Action
~~August 23, 1988~~
~~IEEPA amended to exclude informational materials (Berman Amendment, see~~
~~elaboration below).~~
~~(Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988; P.L. 100-418; 102 Stat. 1107, 1371)~~
October 6, 1992 October 6, 1992
Section 206 of IEEPA amended to increase civil and criminal penalties under the act. Section 206 of IEEPA amended to increase civil and criminal penalties under the act.
(Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993; P.L. 102-(Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993; P.L. 102-
393; 106 Stat. 1729) 393; 106 Stat. 1729)
October 6, 1992 October 6, 1992
Section 206 of IEEPA amended to decrease civil and criminal penalties under the act. Section 206 of IEEPA amended to decrease civil and criminal penalties under the act.
(Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1993; P.L. 102-396; 106 Stat. 1876) (Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1993; P.L. 102-396; 106 Stat. 1876)
April 30, 1994 April 30, 1994
IEEPA amended to update the definition of informational materials. IEEPA amended to update the definition of informational materials.
(Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; P.L. 103-236; 108 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; P.L. 103-236; 108
Stat. 382) Stat. 382)
September 23, 1996 September 23, 1996
IEEPA amended to penalize attempted violations of licenses, orders, regulations or IEEPA amended to penalize attempted violations of licenses, orders, regulations or
prohibitions issued under the authority of IEEPA. prohibitions issued under the authority of IEEPA.
(National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; P.L. 104-201; 110 Stat. 2725) (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; P.L. 104-201; 110 Stat. 2725)
October 26, 2001 October 26, 2001
USA PATRIOT Act Amendments, see elaboration below. USA PATRIOT Act Amendments, see elaboration below.
(Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001; P.L. 107-56; 115 Stat. Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001; P.L. 107-56; 115 Stat.
272) 272)
March 9, 2006 March 9, 2006
Section 206 of IEEPA amended to increase civil and criminal penalties under the act. Section 206 of IEEPA amended to increase civil and criminal penalties under the act.
(USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005; P.L. 109-177; 120 Stat. (USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005; P.L. 109-177; 120 Stat.
192) 192)
October 16, 2007 October 16, 2007
The International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act amended Section 206 The International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act amended Section 206
of IEEPA to increase civil and criminal penalties and added conspiracy to violate of IEEPA to increase civil and criminal penalties and added conspiracy to violate
licenses, orders, regulations or prohibitions issued under the authority of IEEPA. Civil licenses, orders, regulations or prohibitions issued under the authority of IEEPA. Civil
penalties are capped at $250,000 or twice the amount of the transaction found to have penalties are capped at $250,000 or twice the amount of the transaction found to have
violated the law. Criminal penalties now include a fine of up to $1,000,000 and violated the law. Criminal penalties now include a fine of up to $1,000,000 and
imprisonment of up to 20 years. imprisonment of up to 20 years.
(International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act; P.L. 110-96; 121 Stat. (International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act; P.L. 110-96; 121 Stat.
1011) 1011)
Source: Congressional Research ServiceCongressional Research Service (CRS), based on United States Code, annotated. , based on United States Code, annotated.
The Informational Materials Amendments to IEEPA
As originally enacted, IEEPA protected the rights of U.S. persons to participate in the exchange of As originally enacted, IEEPA protected the rights of U.S. persons to participate in the exchange of
“any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a “any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a
transfer of anything of value” with a foreign person otherwise subject to sanctions. Amendments transfer of anything of value” with a foreign person otherwise subject to sanctions. Amendments
in 1988 and 1994 updated this list of protected rights to include the exchange of published in 1988 and 1994 updated this list of protected rights to include the exchange of published
information in a variety of formats.74 As amended, the act currently protects the exchange of information in a variety of formats.74 As amended, the act currently protects the exchange of
“information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, “information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters,
phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs,

artworks, and news wire feeds,” provided such exchange is not otherwise controlled for national security or foreign policy reasons related to weapons proliferation or international terrorism.75 74 P.L. 100-418 (August 23, 1988); P.L. 103-236 (April 30, 1994). The amendments were introduced by Rep. Howard 74 P.L. 100-418 (August 23, 1988); P.L. 103-236 (April 30, 1994). The amendments were introduced by Rep. Howard
Berman (D-CA) and are occasionally referred to as the “Berman Amendments.” For more background, see, “Sleeping Berman (D-CA) and are occasionally referred to as the “Berman Amendments.” For more background, see, “Sleeping
with the Enemy? OFAC Rules and First Amendment Freedoms,” with the Enemy? OFAC Rules and First Amendment Freedoms,” Perspectives on History (May 2004). (May 2004).
75 Codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(3). Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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~~artworks, and news wire feeds,” provided such exchange is not otherwise controlled for national~~
~~security or foreign policy reasons related to weapons proliferation or international terrorism.75~~
~~USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA76~~USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA
Unlike the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), IEEPA did not allow the President to vest assets Unlike the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), IEEPA did not allow the President to vest assets
as originally enacted.as originally enacted.7776 In 2001, at the request of the George W. Bush Administration, Congress In 2001, at the request of the George W. Bush Administration, Congress
amended IEEPA as part of the USA PATRIOT amended IEEPA as part of the USA PATRIOT ~~Act78~~Act77 to return to the President the authority to vest to return to the President the authority to vest
frozen assets, but only under certain circumstances: frozen assets, but only under certain circumstances:
~~... the~~[T]he President may ... when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been President may ... when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been
attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization,jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or or foreign foreign
country that [the President] determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such country that [the President] determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such
hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any
property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President,
in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such
terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held,
used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the
benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and
all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.7978
Speaking about the efforts of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify and disrupt Speaking about the efforts of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify and disrupt
the flow of terrorist finances, Attorney General John Ashcroft told Congressthe flow of terrorist finances, Attorney General John Ashcroft told Congress:
At present the President’s powers are limited to freezing assets and blocking transactions At present the President’s powers are limited to freezing assets and blocking transactions
with terrorist organizations. We need the capacity for more than a freeze. We must be able with terrorist organizations. We need the capacity for more than a freeze. We must be able
to seize. Doing business with terrorist organization must be a losing proposition. Terrorist to seize. Doing business with terrorist organization must be a losing proposition. Terrorist
financiers must pay a price for their support of terrorism, which kills innocent Americans. financiers must pay a price for their support of terrorism, which kills innocent Americans.
Consistent with the President’s [issuance of E.O. Consistent with the President’s [issuance of E.O. ~~1322480~~1322479] and his statements [of ] and his statements [of
September 24, 2001], our proposal gives law enforcement the ability to seize the terrorists’ September 24, 2001], our proposal gives law enforcement the ability to seize the terrorists’
assets. Further, criminal liability is imposed on those who knowingly engage in financial assets. Further, criminal liability is imposed on those who knowingly engage in financial
transactions, money-laundering involving the proceeds of terrorist acts.transactions, money-laundering involving the proceeds of terrorist acts.8180
The House Judiciary Committee report explaining the amendments described its purpose as The House Judiciary Committee report explaining the amendments described its purpose as
follows: follows:
Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1702) 1702)
grants to the President the power to exercise certain authorities relating to commerce with grants to the President the power to exercise certain authorities relating to commerce with
foreign nations upon his determination that there exists an unusual and extraordinary threat foreign nations upon his determination that there exists an unusual and extraordinary threat
to the United States. Under this authority, the President may, among other things, freeze to the United States. Under this authority, the President may, among other things, freeze

~~75 Codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3).~~
~~76 This section was authored by Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division (ALD), CRS.~~
77certain foreign assets within the jurisdiction of the United States. A separate law, the Trading With the Enemy Act, authorizes the President to take title to enemy assets when Congress has declared war. Section 159 of this bill amends section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to provide the President with authority similar to what he currently has under the Trading With the Enemy Act in circumstances where there has been an armed attack 76 P.L. 95-223. House, P.L. 95-223. House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 15 (“This grant of authorities does not , p. 15 (“This grant of authorities does not
include the following authorities … : (1) the power to vest … property.”); Senate, include the following authorities … : (1) the power to vest … property.”); Senate, International Emergency Economic
Powers Legislation, p. 5 (“Authority to vest property, seize records and regulate purely domestic economic transactions , p. 5 (“Authority to vest property, seize records and regulate purely domestic economic transactions
would not be granted.”). would not be granted.”).
7877 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
7978 P.L. 107-56 § P.L. 107-56 § 106, 115 Stat. 272, 277, codified at 50 U.S.C. §106, 115 Stat. 272, 277, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C) (2018). 1702(a)(1)(C) (2018).
8079 E.O. 13224, 66 E.O. 13224, 66 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 49,079 (September 24, 2001). 49,079 (September 24, 2001).
8180 Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st , 107th Cong., 1st
sess., serial no. 39 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 7 (testimony of Attorney General Ashcroft). sess., serial no. 39 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 7 (testimony of Attorney General Ashcroft).
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

~~certain foreign assets within the jurisdiction of the United States. A separate law, the~~
~~Trading With the Enemy Act, authorizes the President to take title to enemy assets when~~
~~Congress has declared war.~~
~~Section 159 of this bill amends section 203 of the International Emergency Economic~~
~~Powers Act to provide the President with authority similar to what he currently has under~~
~~the Trading With the Enemy Act in circumstances where there has been an armed attack~~
on the United States, or where Congress has enacted a law authorizing the President to use on the United States, or where Congress has enacted a law authorizing the President to use
armed force against a foreign country, foreign organization, or foreign national. The armed force against a foreign country, foreign organization, or foreign national. The
proceeds of any foreign assets to which the President takes title under this authority must proceeds of any foreign assets to which the President takes title under this authority must
be placed in a segregated account can only be used in accordance with a statute authorizing be placed in a segregated account can only be used in accordance with a statute authorizing
the expenditure of such proceeds. the expenditure of such proceeds.
Section 159 also makes a number of clarifying and technical changes to section 203 of the Section 159 also makes a number of clarifying and technical changes to section 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, most of whichInternational Emergency Economic Powers Act, most of which will not change the way will not change the way
that provision currently is implemented.that provision currently is implemented.8281
The government has apparently never employed the vesting power to seize Al Qaeda assets The government has apparently never employed the vesting power to seize Al Qaeda assets
within the United States. Instead, the government has sought to confiscate them through forfeiture within the United States. Instead, the government has sought to confiscate them through forfeiture
procedures.procedures.8382
The first, and to date, apparently only, use of this power under IEEPA occurred on March 20, The first, and to date, apparently only, use of this power under IEEPA occurred on March 20,
20032003~~,84~~.83 On that date, in Executive Order 13290, President George W. Bush ordered the blocked On that date, in Executive Order 13290, President George W. Bush ordered the blocked
“property of the Government of Iraq and its agencies, instrumentalities, or controlled entities” to “property of the Government of Iraq and its agencies, instrumentalities, or controlled entities” to
be vested “in the Department of the Treasurybe vested “in the Department of the Treasury. ... [to] be used to assist the Iraqi people and to assist ... [to] be used to assist the Iraqi people and to assist
in the reconstruction of Iraq.”in the reconstruction of Iraq.”8584 However, the President’s order excluded from confiscation Iraq’s However, the President’s order excluded from confiscation Iraq’s
diplomatic and consular property, as well as assets that had, prior to March 20, 2003, been diplomatic and consular property, as well as assets that had, prior to March 20, 2003, been
ordered attached in satisfaction of judgments against Iraq rendered pursuant to the terrorist suit ordered attached in satisfaction of judgments against Iraq rendered pursuant to the terrorist suit
provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and §Section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance
~~Act86~~Act85 (which reportedly totaled about $300 million) (which reportedly totaled about $300 million)8786. .
A subsequent executive order blocked the property of former Iraqi officials and their families, A subsequent executive order blocked the property of former Iraqi officials and their families,
vesting title of such blocked funds in the Department of the Treasury for transfer to the vesting title of such blocked funds in the Department of the Treasury for transfer to the
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) to be “used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) to be “used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people,
for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament
of Iraq, for the cost of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefitting of the Iraqi of Iraq, for the cost of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefitting of the Iraqi
people.”people.”8887 The DFI was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1483, which required The DFI was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1483, which required
member states to freeze all assets of the former Iraqi government and of Saddam Hussein, senior member states to freeze all assets of the former Iraqi government and of Saddam Hussein, senior
officials of his regime and their family members, and transfer such assets to the DFI, which was officials of his regime and their family members, and transfer such assets to the DFI, which was
then administered by the United States. Most of the vested assets were used by the Coalition then administered by the United States. Most of the vested assets were used by the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) for reconstruction projects and ministry operations.Provisional Authority (CPA) for reconstruction projects and ministry operations.89

8288 The USA PATRIOT Act made three other amendments to Section 203 of IEEPA.89 After the power to investigate, it added the power to block assets during the pendency of an investigation.90 81 U.S. Congress, House, U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany H.R. 2975, 107th Cong., 1st sess., , 107th Cong., 1st sess.,
H.Rept. 107-236 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 62. H.Rept. 107-236 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 62.
8382 See United States v. All Funds on Deposit with R.J. O'Brien & Assocs., 783 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 2015) (insurance See United States v. All Funds on Deposit with R.J. O'Brien & Assocs., 783 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 2015) (insurance
companies’ attempt to intercede in civil forfeiture action involving Al Qaeda assets). companies’ attempt to intercede in civil forfeiture action involving Al Qaeda assets).
8483 E.O. 13290, 68 E.O. 13290, 68 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 14,307 (March 24, 2003). 14,307 (March 24, 2003).
8584 Ibid. Ibid.
8685 P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002). P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).
8786 See Tom Schoenberg, “Fights Loom for Iraqi Riches,” See Tom Schoenberg, “Fights Loom for Iraqi Riches,” Legal Times (March 31, 2003). Judgment creditors were paid (March 31, 2003). Judgment creditors were paid
about $140 million from the vested assets to cover the unsatisfied portions of judgments and interest. about $140 million from the vested assets to cover the unsatisfied portions of judgments and interest.
8887 E.O. 13315, 68 E.O. 13315, 68 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 52,315 (September 3, 2003). 52,315 (September 3, 2003).
8988 GAO-04-579T Recovering Iraq’s Assets (March 18, 2004). As of March 2004, according to GAO, the CPA had GAO-04-579T Recovering Iraq’s Assets (March 18, 2004). As of March 2004, according to GAO, the CPA had
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~~The USA PATRIOT Act made three other amendments to Section 203 of IEEPA.90 After the~~
~~power to investigate, it added the power to block assets during the pendency of an investigation.91~~
spent $1.67 billion of the $1.9 billion for “emergency needs, including salaries for civil servants and pensions, and for ministry operations.” Ibid. at 7. The CPA was also authorized to use the more than $900 million in assets seized by the U.S. military in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction activities. Ibid. 89 P.L. 107-56 §106, 115 Stat. 277 (2001). 90 P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(B) (2018). Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 61 link to page 20 link to page 27 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use It clarified that the type of interest in property subject to IEEPA is an “interest by any person, or It clarified that the type of interest in property subject to IEEPA is an “interest by any person, or
with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”9291 It also added It also added
subsection (c), which providessubsection (c), which provides:
In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was
based on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of thebased on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Classified Information
Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in
camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review.camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review.9392
As described in the House Judiciary Committee report, these provisions were meant to clarify and As described in the House Judiciary Committee report, these provisions were meant to clarify and
codify existing practices.codify existing practices.9493
IEEPA Trends
Like TWEA prior to its amendment in 1977, the President and Congress together have often Like TWEA prior to its amendment in 1977, the President and Congress together have often
turned to IEEPA to impose economic sanctions in furtherance of U.S. foreign policyturned to IEEPA to impose economic sanctions in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy ~~and~~, national national
securitysecurity, and economic objectives. While initially enacted to circumscribe presidential emergency authority, objectives. While initially enacted to circumscribe presidential emergency authority,95
94 presidential emergency use of IEEPA has expanded in scale, scope, and frequency since the presidential emergency use of IEEPA has expanded in scale, scope, and frequency since the
statute’s enactment. The House report on IEEPA stated, “emergencies are by their nature rare and statute’s enactment. The House report on IEEPA stated, “emergencies are by their nature rare and
brief, and are not to be equated with normal, ongoing problems.”brief, and are not to be equated with normal, ongoing problems.”9695 National emergencies National emergencies
invoking IEEPA, however, have increased in frequency and length since its enactment. invoking IEEPA, however, have increased in frequency and length since its enactment.
Between 1977 and Between 1977 and ~~March 25, 2022~~September 1, 2023, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in , Presidents have invoked IEEPA in 6769 new declarations of new declarations of
national emergency under the NEA.national emergency under the NEA.9796 On average, these emergencies last nearly nine years. Most On average, these emergencies last nearly nine years. Most
emergencies have been geographically specific, targeting a specific country or government. emergencies have been geographically specific, targeting a specific country or government.
However, since 1990, Presidents have declared non-geographically-specific emergencies in However, since 1990, Presidents have declared non-geographically-specific emergencies in
response to issues like weapons proliferation, global terrorism, and malicious cyber-enabled response to issues like weapons proliferation, global terrorism, and malicious cyber-enabled
activities.activities.9897 The erosion of geographic limitations has been accompanied by an expansion in the The erosion of geographic limitations has been accompanied by an expansion in the
nature of the targets of sanctions issued under IEEPA authority. Originally, IEEPA was used to nature of the targets of sanctions issued under IEEPA authority. Originally, IEEPA was used to
target foreign governments; however, Presidents have increasingly targeted groups and target foreign governments; however, Presidents have increasingly targeted groups and

~~spent $1.67 billion of the $1.9 billion for “emergency needs, including salaries for civil servants and pensions, and for~~
~~ministry operations.” Ibid. at 7. The CPA was also authorized to use the more than $900 million in assets seized by the~~
~~U.S. military in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction activities. Ibid.~~
~~90 P.L. 107-56 §106, 115 Stat. 277 (2001).~~
~~91 P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (2018).~~
~~92 P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (2018).~~
~~93 P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2018).~~
94individuals.98 Usually Presidents use IEEPA as an emergency power; however, Congress has directed the President to use IEEPA or expressed its approval of presidential emergency use in several statutes.99 Between 1976, when the NEA was enacted, and 2019, Congress had never affirmatively voted to terminate a national emergency. However, in the late-2010s, some Members of Congress began to express concern with the NEA. Between 2019 and September 1, 2023, Members of Congress have introduced 15 joint resolutions to terminate a national 91 P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(a) (2018). 92 P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(c) (2018). 93 House, House, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany H.R. 2975, 62. , 62.
9594 House, House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, pp. 2-9. , pp. 2-9.
9695 Ibid, p. 11. Ibid, p. 11.
9796 This tally does not include IEEPA invocations made in connection with executive orders expanding the scope of an This tally does not include IEEPA invocations made in connection with executive orders expanding the scope of an
initial declaration of national emergency. Seeinitial declaration of national emergency. See Table A-1.
9897 E.g., E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled E.g., E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Activities (April 1, 2015); E.O. 13818, Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Activities (April 1, 2015); E.O. 13818, Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or
Corruption (December 20, 2017); E.O. 13848, Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a Corruption (December 20, 2017); E.O. 13848, Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a
United States Election (September 12, 2018); E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology United States Election (September 12, 2018); E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology
and Services Supply Chain (May 15, 2019); E.O. 13920, Securing the United States Bulk-Power System (May 1, and Services Supply Chain (May 15, 2019); E.O. 13920, Securing the United States Bulk-Power System (May 1,
2020); E.O. 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court (June 11, 2020); E.O. 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court (June 11,
2020). 2020).
98 See “Presidential Emergency Use.” 99 See “Congressional Nonemergency Use and Retroactive Approval.” Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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~~individuals.99 While Presidents usually make use of IEEPA as an emergency power, Congress has~~
~~also directed the use of IEEPA or expressed its approval of presidential emergency use in several~~
~~statutes.100~~
~~Presidential Emergency Use101~~emergency, five of those resolutions involved IEEPA (Table A-2). Despite this new interest in terminating national emergencies, no emergency declared under the NEA has been terminated without Presidential assent. Presidential Emergency Use100
IEEPA is the most frequently cited emergency authority when the President IEEPA is the most frequently cited emergency authority when the President ~~invokes NEA~~
~~authorities to declare a national emergency~~declares a national emergency under the NEA. Rather than referencing the same set of emergencies, . Rather than referencing the same set of emergencies,
as had been the case with TWEA, IEEPA has required the President to declare a national as had been the case with TWEA, IEEPA has required the President to declare a national
emergency for each independent use. As a result, the number of national emergencies declared emergency for each independent use. As a result, the number of national emergencies declared
under the terms of the NEA has proliferated over the past four decades. Presidents declared only under the terms of the NEA has proliferated over the past four decades. Presidents declared only
four national emergencies under the auspices of TWEA in the four decades prior to IEEPA’s four national emergencies under the auspices of TWEA in the four decades prior to IEEPA’s
enactment. In contrast, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in enactment. In contrast, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in 6770 of the of the 7579 declarations of national declarations of national
emergency issued under the National Emergencies Act.emergency issued under the National Emergencies Act.~~102~~101 As of As of ~~March 25, 2022~~September 1, 2023, there were , there were 40
42 ongoing national emergencies; all but three involved IEEPA.ongoing national emergencies; all but three involved IEEPA.~~103~~

~~99 See “Presidential Emergency Use.”~~
~~100 See “Congressional Nonemergency Use and Retroactive Approval.”~~
~~101~~102 100 The numbers here define emergencies by executive orders declaring an emergency. This choice causes some The numbers here define emergencies by executive orders declaring an emergency. This choice causes some
anomalies in the data. For example, the national emergency with regard to controlling the whereabouts of highly anomalies in the data. For example, the national emergency with regard to controlling the whereabouts of highly
enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons in Russia lapsed when the notice extending the emergency was not enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons in Russia lapsed when the notice extending the emergency was not
published in the published in the Federal Register by the emergency’s anniversary date on June 21, 2012. As such, President Barack by the emergency’s anniversary date on June 21, 2012. As such, President Barack
Obama issued an executive order declaring a new national emergency to reinstate the restrictions. For consistency, such Obama issued an executive order declaring a new national emergency to reinstate the restrictions. For consistency, such
anomalies have been treated as two distinct national emergencies. Such treatment decreases the average duration of anomalies have been treated as two distinct national emergencies. Such treatment decreases the average duration of
emergencies. See, e.g., E.O. 13159, Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the emergencies. See, e.g., E.O. 13159, Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the
Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons (June 21, 2000); E.O. 13617, Blocking Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons (June 21, 2000); E.O. 13617, Blocking
Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium
Extracted From Nuclear Weapons (June 25, 2012). Extracted From Nuclear Weapons (June 25, 2012).
~~102~~101 The eight declarations of emergency under the NEA that did not involve IEEPA as of March 25, 2022 were all made The eight declarations of emergency under the NEA that did not involve IEEPA as of March 25, 2022 were all made
by presidential proclamation. See Proclamation 6491, To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March 3, 1931, Within a by presidential proclamation. See Proclamation 6491, To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March 3, 1931, Within a
Limited Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki (October Limited Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki (October
14, 1992); Proclamation 6867, Declaration of a National Emergency and Invocation of Emergency Authority Relating 14, 1992); Proclamation 6867, Declaration of a National Emergency and Invocation of Emergency Authority Relating
to the Regulation of the Anchorage and Movement of Vessels around Cuba (March 1, 1996); Proclamation 6907, to the Regulation of the Anchorage and Movement of Vessels around Cuba (March 1, 1996); Proclamation 6907,
Declaration of a State of Emergency and Release of Feed Grain From the Disaster Reserve (July 1, 1996); Declaration of a State of Emergency and Release of Feed Grain From the Disaster Reserve (July 1, 1996);
Proclamation 7463, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks (September 14, 2001); Proclamation 7463, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks (September 14, 2001);
Proclamation 7924, To Suspend Subchapter IV of Chapter 31 of Title 40, United States Code, Within a Limited Proclamation 7924, To Suspend Subchapter IV of Chapter 31 of Title 40, United States Code, Within a Limited
Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricane Katrina (September 8, 2005); Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricane Katrina (September 8, 2005);
Proclamation 8443, Declaration of a National Emergency With Respect to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic Proclamation 8443, Declaration of a National Emergency With Respect to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic
(October 23, 2009); Proclamation 9844, Declaration of a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the (October 23, 2009); Proclamation 9844, Declaration of a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the
United States (February 15, 2019); Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease United States (February 15, 2019); Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) Outbreak (March 13, 2020). (COVID-19) Outbreak (March 13, 2020).
~~103~~102 The three ongoing emergencies not involving IEEPA as of The three ongoing emergencies not involving IEEPA as of ~~March 25, 2022~~July 17, 2023 were declared in: Proclamation 6867, were declared in: Proclamation 6867,
Proclamation 7463, Proclamation Proclamation 7463, Proclamation ~~9994. The first two of these national emergencies~~10371. All were declared in response to were declared in response to
foreign threats. Notably, while IEEPA was not invoked in the first declaration of national emergency following the foreign threats. Notably, while IEEPA was not invoked in the first declaration of national emergency following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush declared a second state of emergency invoking terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush declared a second state of emergency invoking
IEEPA. E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transaction with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, IEEPA. E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transaction with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit,
or Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001). or Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001).
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Figure 1. Declarations and Executive Orders Citing IEEPA

Source: CRSCRS,. 2020s current 2020s current ~~to March 25, 2022.~~
~~Notes~~as of September 1, 2023. Note: Executive orders include declarations of national emergency that cite IEEPA that were made by Executive orders include declarations of national emergency that cite IEEPA that were made by
executive order and any subsequent modifications or amendments to an emergency or such an order. executive order and any subsequent modifications or amendments to an emergency or such an order.
Each year since 1990, Presidents have issued roughly 4.5 executive orders citing IEEPA and Each year since 1990, Presidents have issued roughly 4.5 executive orders citing IEEPA and
declared 1.5 new national emergencies citing IEEPA.declared 1.5 new national emergencies citing IEEPA.~~104~~103 (Figure 1)..)
On average, emergencies invoking IEEPA last more than nine years. On average, emergencies invoking IEEPA last more than nine years.~~105~~104 The longest emergency The longest emergency
was also the first. President Jimmy Carter, in response to the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, was also the first. President Jimmy Carter, in response to the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979,
declared the first national emergency under the provisions of the National Emergencies Act and declared the first national emergency under the provisions of the National Emergencies Act and
invoked IEEPA.invoked IEEPA.~~106~~105 Seven successive Presidents have renewed that emergency annually for more Seven successive Presidents have renewed that emergency annually for more
than than ~~forty~~40 years. As of years. As of ~~March 25, 2022~~September 1, 2023, that emergency is still in effect, largely to provide a legal , that emergency is still in effect, largely to provide a legal
basis for resolving matters of ownership of the Shah’s disputed assets.basis for resolving matters of ownership of the Shah’s disputed assets.~~107~~106 That initial emergency That initial emergency
aside, the length of emergencies invoking IEEPA has increased each decade. The average length aside, the length of emergencies invoking IEEPA has increased each decade. The average length
of an emergency invoking IEEPA declared in the 1980s was four years. That average extended to of an emergency invoking IEEPA declared in the 1980s was four years. That average extended to
11 years for emergencies declared in the 1990s and 11 years for emergencies declared in the 1990s and 1315 years for emergencies declared in the years for emergencies declared in the
2000s 2000s (Figure 2)..~~108~~107 As such, the number of ongoing national emergencies has grown nearly As such, the number of ongoing national emergencies has grown nearly
continuously since the enactment of IEEPA and the NEAcontinuously since the enactment of IEEPA and the NEA (Figure 3). Between January 1, 1979, Between January 1, 1979,
and and ~~March 25, 2022~~September 1, 2023, there were on average , there were on average 1415 ongoing national emergencies each year, ongoing national emergencies each year, 1314 of of
which invoked IEEPA. which invoked IEEPA.

~~104~~ 103 The practice of issuing IEEPA-related executive orders has also changed over time. During the Iran hostage-taking The practice of issuing IEEPA-related executive orders has also changed over time. During the Iran hostage-taking
in 1979, for example, President Carter issued a new and separate E.O. with each fine-tuning of the initial national in 1979, for example, President Carter issued a new and separate E.O. with each fine-tuning of the initial national
emergency declaration; overall from November 1979 to his last day in office in January 1981, President Carter issued emergency declaration; overall from November 1979 to his last day in office in January 1981, President Carter issued
12 executive orders relating to the hostage crisis and negotiations with Iran. Later presidents have opted, instead, to 12 executive orders relating to the hostage crisis and negotiations with Iran. Later presidents have opted, instead, to
issue one executive order to declare the existence of a national emergency, and then to revisit that order to adjust or issue one executive order to declare the existence of a national emergency, and then to revisit that order to adjust or
expand its reach by amending the original language. expand its reach by amending the original language.
~~105~~104 Emergencies invoking IEEPA that have been terminated lasted an average of 6.5 years. However, most emergencies Emergencies invoking IEEPA that have been terminated lasted an average of 6.5 years. However, most emergencies
citing IEEPA have not been terminated, including the first ever declared, which has been ongoing since 1979. citing IEEPA have not been terminated, including the first ever declared, which has been ongoing since 1979.
~~106~~105 E.O. 12170, Blocking Iranian Government Property (November 14, 1979). E.O. 12170, Blocking Iranian Government Property (November 14, 1979).
~~107~~106 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Iran, Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Iran, ~~86 Fed. Reg. 62,709~~87 Federal Register 68,013 (November (November ~~10, 2021).~~
~~108~~8, 2022). 107 Not enough time has passed to understand whether the trend will continue with those national emergencies declared Not enough time has passed to understand whether the trend will continue with those national emergencies declared
in the 2010s. in the 2010s.
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

In most cases, the declared emergencies citing In most cases, the declared emergencies citing
IEEPA have been geographically specific. For IEEPA have been geographically specific. For
Figure 2. Average Length of Emergencies
example, in the first use of IEEPA, President example, in the first use of IEEPA, President
Citing IEEPA
Jimmy Carter issued an executive order that Jimmy Carter issued an executive order that
both declared a national emergency with both declared a national emergency with
respect to the “situation in Iran” and “blocked respect to the “situation in Iran” and “blocked
all property and interests in property of the all property and interests in property of the
Government of IranGovernment of Iran ~~[...].”109~~.”108 Five months Five months
later, President Carter issued a second order later, President Carter issued a second order
dramatically expanding the scope of the first dramatically expanding the scope of the first
EO and effectively blocked the transfer of all EO and effectively blocked the transfer of all
goods, money, or credit destined for Iran by goods, money, or credit destined for Iran by
anyone subject to the jurisdiction of the anyone subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.United States.~~110~~109 A further order expanded the A further order expanded the
coverage to block imports to the United States coverage to block imports to the United States
from Iran.from Iran.~~111~~110 Together, these orders touched Together, these orders touched

upon virtually all economic contacts between upon virtually all economic contacts between
any place or legal person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and the territory and government of Iran.111 Many of the executive orders invoking IEEPA have followed this pattern of limiting the Source: CRS. Current as of September 1, 2023. scope to a specific territory, government, or Source: CRS. Current as of March 25, 2022.
~~any place or legal person subject to the~~
Notes: A single emergency was declared in the A single emergency was declared in the
~~jurisdiction of the United States and the~~its nationals. Executive Order 12513, for
1970s (Iran) and that has lasted 40 years. 2010s do 1970s (Iran) and that has lasted 40 years. 2010s do
~~territory and government of Iran.112~~
not have sufficient data to create an average length not have sufficient data to create an average length
~~Many of the executive orders invoking IEEPA~~example, prohibited “imports into the United
that would be meaningful for the purposes of analysis. that would be meaningful for the purposes of analysis.
~~have followed this pattern of limiting the scope to a specific territory, government, or its~~
~~nationals. Executive Order 12513, for example, prohibited “imports into the United~~ States of States of
goods and services of Nicaraguan origin” and “exports from the United States of goods to or goods and services of Nicaraguan origin” and “exports from the United States of goods to or
destined for Nicaragua.” The order likewise prohibited Nicaraguan air carriers and vessels of destined for Nicaragua.” The order likewise prohibited Nicaraguan air carriers and vessels of
Nicaraguan registry from entering U.S. ports.Nicaraguan registry from entering U.S. ports.~~113~~112 Executive Order 12532 prohibited various Executive Order 12532 prohibited various
transactions with the “Government of South Africa or to entities owned or controlled by that transactions with the “Government of South Africa or to entities owned or controlled by that
Government.”Government.”~~114~~

~~109~~113 108 E.O. 12170. E.O. 12170.
~~110~~109 E.O. 12205, Economic Sanctions Against Iran (April 7, 1980). The order exempted “food, medicine and supplies E.O. 12205, Economic Sanctions Against Iran (April 7, 1980). The order exempted “food, medicine and supplies
intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering.” intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering.”
~~111~~110 E.O. 12211, Economic Sanctions Against Iran (April 17, 1980). E.O. 12211, Economic Sanctions Against Iran (April 17, 1980).
~~112~~111 Exceptions were made for family remittances. Exceptions were made for family remittances.
~~113~~112 E.O. 12513, Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving Nicaragua (May 1, 1985). E.O. 12513, Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving Nicaragua (May 1, 1985).
~~114~~113 E.O. 12532, Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving South Africa (September 9, 1985). E.O. 12532, Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving South Africa (September 9, 1985).
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Figure 3. Cumulative Number of Ongoing National Emergencies by Year

Source: CRS. Current as of CRS. Current as of ~~March 25, 2022.~~
September 1, 2023. Notes: Orange dashed line indicates national emergencies citing IEEPA. Hashed space indicates all national emergencies. While the majority of national emergencies invoking IEEPA have been geographically specific, While the majority of national emergencies invoking IEEPA have been geographically specific,
many recent emergencies have lacked explicit geographic limitations.many recent emergencies have lacked explicit geographic limitations.~~115~~114 President George H.W. President George H.W.
Bush declared the first geographically nonspecific emergency in response to the threat posed by Bush declared the first geographically nonspecific emergency in response to the threat posed by
the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.~~116~~115 Similarly, President George W. Bush Similarly, President George W. Bush
declared a national emergency in response to the threat posed by “persons who commit, threaten declared a national emergency in response to the threat posed by “persons who commit, threaten
to commit, or support terrorism.”to commit, or support terrorism.”~~117~~116 President Barack Obama declared emergencies to respond to President Barack Obama declared emergencies to respond to
the threats of “transnational criminal organizations” and “persons engaging in malicious cyber-the threats of “transnational criminal organizations” and “persons engaging in malicious cyber-
enabled activities.”enabled activities.”~~118~~117 President Donald Trump declared an emergency to respond to “foreign President Donald Trump declared an emergency to respond to “foreign
adversaries” who were “creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and adversaries” who were “creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and
communications technologies and services.”communications technologies and services.”~~119~~118 Without explicit geographic limitations, these Without explicit geographic limitations, these
orders have included provisions that are global in scope. These geographically nonspecific orders have included provisions that are global in scope. These geographically nonspecific
emergencies invoking IEEPA have increased in frequency over the past 40 years.emergencies invoking IEEPA have increased in frequency over the past 40 years.~~120~~

~~115~~119 114 This number excludes those emergencies declared to extend the Export Administration Act of 1979. This number excludes those emergencies declared to extend the Export Administration Act of 1979.
~~116~~115 E.O. 12735, Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation (November 16, 1990). E.O. 12735, Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation (November 16, 1990).
~~117~~116 E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or
Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001). Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001).
~~118~~117 E.O. 13581, Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations (July 24, 2011); E.O. 13694, Blocking the E.O. 13581, Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations (July 24, 2011); E.O. 13694, Blocking the
Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (April 1, 2015). Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (April 1, 2015).
~~119~~118 E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (May 14, 2019). E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (May 14, 2019).
~~120~~119 See, E.g., E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled See, E.g., E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Activities (April 1, 2015); E.O. 13818, Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Activities (April 1, 2015); E.O. 13818, Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or
Corruption (December 20, 2017); E.O. 13848, Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a Corruption (December 20, 2017); E.O. 13848, Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a
United States Election (September 12, 2018); E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology United States Election (September 12, 2018); E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology
and Services Supply Chain (May 15, 2019); E.O. 13920, Securing the United States Bulk-Power System (May 1, and Services Supply Chain (May 15, 2019); E.O. 13920, Securing the United States Bulk-Power System (May 1,
2020); E.O. 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court (June 11, 2020); E.O. 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court (June 11,
2020). Some have argued that this shift was the result of humanitarian concerns about the effects of sanctions on the 2020). Some have argued that this shift was the result of humanitarian concerns about the effects of sanctions on the
populations of the targeted states. Beginning in the 1990s, United Nations Security Council sanctions began to target populations of the targeted states. Beginning in the 1990s, United Nations Security Council sanctions began to target
the political and economic elites of a state, rather than the whole population. Kern Alexander, the political and economic elites of a state, rather than the whole population. Kern Alexander, Economic Sanctions:
Law and Public Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. xi. However, use of such orders has expanded beyond (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. xi. However, use of such orders has expanded beyond
political and economic elites. See, e.g., E.O. 13928. political and economic elites. See, e.g., E.O. 13928.
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Figure 4. National Emergency Act Declarations Source: Federal Register; CRS. Congressional Research Service 20 link to page 70 ~~link to page 61~~ The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

In addition to the erosion of geographic In addition to the erosion of geographic
limitations, the stated motivations for limitations, the stated motivations for
Examples of Actions Taken in Non-
declaring national emergencies have expanded declaring national emergencies have expanded
Geographic Emergencies Citing IEEPA
in scope as well. Initially, stated rationales for in scope as well. Initially, stated rationales for
•
Chemical and biological weapons proliferation Chemical and biological weapons proliferation
declarations of national emergency citing declarations of national emergency citing
•
Measures to restrict the participation by United Measures to restrict the participation by United
IEEPA were short and often referenced either IEEPA were short and often referenced either
States persons in weapons proliferation activities States persons in weapons proliferation activities
a specific geography or the specific actions of a specific geography or the specific actions of
•
Measures to prevent proliferation of weapons of Measures to prevent proliferation of weapons of
a government. Presidents found that a government. Presidents found that
mass destruction mass destruction
circumstances like “the situation in Iran,” circumstances like “the situation in Iran,”~~121~~120 or or
•
Prohibiting transactions with terrorists who Prohibiting transactions with terrorists who
the “policies and actions of the Government of the “policies and actions of the Government of
threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process
Nicaragua,” Nicaragua,”~~122~~121 constituted “unusual and constituted “unusual and
•
Blocking property and prohibiting transactions Blocking property and prohibiting transactions
extraordinary threat[s] to the national security extraordinary threat[s] to the national security
with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or
support terrorism support terrorism
and foreign policy of the United States” and and foreign policy of the United States” and

• would therefore declare a national would therefore declare a national

Blocking property of transnational criminal Blocking property of transnational criminal
organizations organizations
emergency. emergency.~~123~~122
•
Blocking the property of certain persons engaging Blocking the property of certain persons engaging
The stated rationales have, however, expanded The stated rationales have, however, expanded
in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities
over time in both the length and subject over time in both the length and subject
•
Blocking the property of persons involved in Blocking the property of persons involved in
matter. Presidents have increasingly declared matter. Presidents have increasingly declared
serious human rights abuse or corruption serious human rights abuse or corruption
national emergencies, in part, to respond to national emergencies, in part, to respond to
•
Imposing certain sanctions in the event of foreign Imposing certain sanctions in the event of foreign
human and civil rights abuses, human and civil rights abuses,~~124~~123 slavery, slavery,~~125~~124
interference in a United States election interference in a United States election
denial of religious freedom, denial of religious freedom,~~126~~125 political • Limiting investments by U.S. persons in certain ~~political~~
repression,repression,~~127~~126 public corruption, public corruption,~~128~~127 and the national security technologies in countries of concern ~~and the~~ undermining of democratic processes.undermining of democratic processes.~~129~~ 128 While the While the
first reference to human rights violations as a rationale for a declaration of national emergency first reference to human rights violations as a rationale for a declaration of national emergency
came in 1985,came in 1985,~~130~~129 most of such references have come in the past twenty years. most of such references have come in the past twenty years. (Table A-23). .
Presidents have also expanded the nature of the targets of IEEPA sanctions. Originally, the targets Presidents have also expanded the nature of the targets of IEEPA sanctions. Originally, the targets
of sanctions issued under IEEPA were foreign governments. The first use of IEEPA targeted of sanctions issued under IEEPA were foreign governments. The first use of IEEPA targeted
“Iranian Government Property.”“Iranian Government Property.”~~131~~130 Use of IEEPA quickly expanded to target geographically Use of IEEPA quickly expanded to target geographically
defined regions.defined regions.~~132 Nevertheless,~~131 Presidents have also increasingly targeted groups, such as Presidents have also increasingly targeted groups, such as
~~political parties, corporations, or terrorist organizations, and individuals, such as supporters of~~
~~terrorism, suspected narcotics traffickers, or associates of the International Criminal Court.133~~

~~121~~political parties, 120 E.O. 12170. E.O. 12170.
~~122~~121 E.O. 12513. E.O. 12513.
~~123~~122 Ibid. Ibid.
~~124~~123 E.O. 12532; E.O. 13396, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Cote d'Ivoire E.O. 12532; E.O. 13396, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Cote d'Ivoire
(February 7, 2006); E.O. 13067, Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan (February 7, 2006); E.O. 13067, Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan
(November 3, 1997); E.O. 13692, Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the (November 3, 1997); E.O. 13692, Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the
Situation in Venezuela (March 8, 2015). Situation in Venezuela (March 8, 2015).
~~125~~124 E.O. 13067. E.O. 13067.
~~126~~125 E.O. 13067. E.O. 13067.
~~127~~126 E.O. 13405, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus E.O. 13405, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus
(June 16, 2006). (June 16, 2006).
~~128~~127 Ibid. Ibid.
~~129~~128 Ibid. Ibid.
~~130~~129 E.O. 12532. E.O. 12532.
~~131~~130 E.O. 12170. E.O. 12170.
~~132~~131 See, e.g., E.O. 12513. See, e.g., E.O. 12513.
~~133 See, e.g., E.O. 12865 (prohibiting transactions with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola~~
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corporations, or terrorist organizations, and individuals, such as supporters of terrorism, suspected narcotics traffickers, or associates of the International Criminal Court.132 The first instances of orders directed at groups or persons were limited to The first instances of orders directed at groups or persons were limited to foreign groups or groups or
persons. For example, in Executive Order 12978, President Bill Clinton targeted specific “foreign persons. For example, in Executive Order 12978, President Bill Clinton targeted specific “foreign
persons” and “persons determined persons” and “persons determined ~~[...]~~. . . to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of” to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of”
such foreign persons.such foreign persons.~~134~~133 An excerpt is included below: An excerpt is included below:
Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in
regulations, orders, directives, or licenses thatregulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant tomay be issued pursuant to this order, and this order, and
notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date, I hereby order blocked all property and interests in property that are or effective date, I hereby order blocked all property and interests in property that are or
hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession
or control of United States persons, of: or control of United States persons, of:
(a) (a)
the the foreign persons listed in the Annex to this order; listed in the Annex to this order;
(b) (b)
foreign persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State: with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State:
(i) (i)
to play a significant role in international narcotics trafficking centered in to play a significant role in international narcotics trafficking centered in
Colombia; or Colombia; or
(ii) (ii)
materially to assist in, or provide financial or technological support for materially to assist in, or provide financial or technological support for
or goods or services in support of, the narcotics trafficking activities of persons or goods or services in support of, the narcotics trafficking activities of persons
designated in or pursuant to this order; and designated in or pursuant to this order; and
(c) (c)
persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to be owned or controlled by, or to act Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to be owned or controlled by, or to act
for or on behalf of, persons designated in or pursuant to this order.for or on behalf of, persons designated in or pursuant to this order.~~135~~134
However, in 2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13219 to target “persons However, in 2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13219 to target “persons
who threaten international stabilization efforts in the Western Balkans.” While the order was who threaten international stabilization efforts in the Western Balkans.” While the order was
similar to that of Executive Order 12978, it removed the qualifier “foreign.” As such, persons in similar to that of Executive Order 12978, it removed the qualifier “foreign.” As such, persons in
the United States, including U.S. citizens, could be targets of the order.the United States, including U.S. citizens, could be targets of the order.~~136~~135 The following is an The following is an
excerpt of the order: excerpt of the order:
Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)(1), (3), and (4) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)(1), (3), and (4) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C.
1702(b)(1), (3), and (4)), the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 1702(b)(1), (3), and (4)), the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000 (title IX, P.L. 106-387), and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may 2000 (title IX, P.L. 106-387), and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may
hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or
any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, all property and interests in any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, all property and interests in
property of: property of:
(i) (i)
the persons listed in the Annex to this order; and listed in the Annex to this order; and
~~(ii)~~
persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
~~Secretary of State, because they are found:~~

132 See, e.g., E.O. 12865 (prohibiting transactions with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the second largest political party in Angola); E.O. 13129 (prohibiting transactions with the Taliban); E.O. (UNITA), the second largest political party in Angola); E.O. 13129 (prohibiting transactions with the Taliban); E.O.
13224 (prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism); E.O. 12978 13224 (prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism); E.O. 12978
(prohibiting transactions with certain narcotics traffickers); E.O. 13928 (blocking property of certain persons associated (prohibiting transactions with certain narcotics traffickers); E.O. 13928 (blocking property of certain persons associated
with the International Criminal Court). See also CRS Insight IN11428, with the International Criminal Court). See also CRS Insight IN11428, International Criminal Court: U.S. Sanctions in
Response to Investigation of War Crimes in Afghanistan, by Matthew C. Weed and Dianne E. Rennack. , by Matthew C. Weed and Dianne E. Rennack.
~~134~~133 E.O. 12978, Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions With Significant Narcotics Traffickers (October 21, E.O. 12978, Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions With Significant Narcotics Traffickers (October 21,
1995). 1995).
~~135~~134 Ibid. Emphasis added. Ibid. Emphasis added.
~~136~~135 See, e.g., Aaran Money Wire Serv., Inc. v. United States, , 2003 WL 22143735, at *3 (D. Minn. August 21, 2003). See, e.g., Aaran Money Wire Serv., Inc. v. United States, , 2003 WL 22143735, at *3 (D. Minn. August 21, 2003).
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( (ii) persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, because they are found: (A) A)
to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of
violence violence ... 136~~...137~~
Several subsequent invocations of IEEPA have similarly not been limited to foreign targets. Several subsequent invocations of IEEPA have similarly not been limited to foreign targets.~~138~~137
In sum, presidential emergency use of IEEPA was directed at foreign states initially, with targets In sum, presidential emergency use of IEEPA was directed at foreign states initially, with targets
that were delimited by geography or nationality. Since the 1990s, however, Presidents have that were delimited by geography or nationality. Since the 1990s, however, Presidents have
expanded the scope of their declarations to include groups and individual persons, regardless of expanded the scope of their declarations to include groups and individual persons, regardless of
nationality or geographic location, who are engaged in specific activities. nationality or geographic location, who are engaged in specific activities.
Congressional Nonemergency Use and Retroactive Approval
While IEEPA is often categorized as an emergency statute, Congress has used IEEPA outside of While IEEPA is often categorized as an emergency statute, Congress has used IEEPA outside of
the context of national emergencies. When Congress legislates sanctions, it often authorizes or the context of national emergencies. When Congress legislates sanctions, it often authorizes or
directs the President to use IEEPA authorities to impose those sanctions. directs the President to use IEEPA authorities to impose those sanctions.
In the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018, for example, Congress directed In the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018, for example, Congress directed
the President to exercise “all powers granted to the President [by IEEPA] to the extent necessary the President to exercise “all powers granted to the President [by IEEPA] to the extent necessary
to block and prohibit [certain transactions].”to block and prohibit [certain transactions].”~~139~~138 Penalties for violations by a person of a measure Penalties for violations by a person of a measure
imposed by the President under the imposed by the President under the ~~Act~~act would be, likewise, determined by reference to IEEPA. would be, likewise, determined by reference to IEEPA.~~140~~139
This trend has been long-term. Congress first directed the President to make use of IEEPA This trend has been long-term. Congress first directed the President to make use of IEEPA
authorities in 1986 as part of an effort to assist Haiti in the recovery of assets illegally diverted by authorities in 1986 as part of an effort to assist Haiti in the recovery of assets illegally diverted by
its former government. That statute providedits former government. That statute provided:
The President shall exercise the authorities granted by section 203 of the International The President shall exercise the authorities granted by section 203 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act [50 USC 1702] to assist the Government of Haiti in its Emergency Economic Powers Act [50 USC 1702] to assist the Government of Haiti in its
efforts to recover, through legal proceedings, assets which the Government of Haiti alleges efforts to recover, through legal proceedings, assets which the Government of Haiti alleges
were stolen by former president-for-life Jean Claude Duvalier and other individuals were stolen by former president-for-life Jean Claude Duvalier and other individuals
associated with the Duvalier regime. This subsection shall be deemed to satisfy the associated with the Duvalier regime. This subsection shall be deemed to satisfy the
requirements of section 202 of that Act. [50 USC 1701]requirements of section 202 of that Act. [50 USC 1701]~~141~~140
In directing the President to use IEEPA, Congress waived the requirement that he declare a In directing the President to use IEEPA, Congress waived the requirement that he declare a
national emergency (and none was declared).national emergency (and none was declared).~~142~~141
Subsequent legislation has followed this general pattern, with slight variations in language and Subsequent legislation has followed this general pattern, with slight variations in language and
specificity.specificity.~~143~~142 The following is an example of current legislative language that has appeared in The following is an example of current legislative language that has appeared in
several recent statutes: several recent statutes:

~~137~~ 136 E.O. 13219, Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans E.O. 13219, Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans
(June 26, 2001). Emphasis added. (June 26, 2001). Emphasis added.
~~138~~137 See, e.g., E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to See, e.g., E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to
Commit, or Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001); E.O. 13396, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing Commit, or Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001); E.O. 13396, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing
to the Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire (February 7, 2006). to the Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire (February 7, 2006).
~~139~~138 P.L. 115-335 (December 20, 2018), 132 Stat. 5019. P.L. 115-335 (December 20, 2018), 132 Stat. 5019.
~~140~~139 Ibid. Ibid.
~~141~~140 P.L. 99-529 (October 24, 1986), 100 Stat. 3010. P.L. 99-529 (October 24, 1986), 100 Stat. 3010.
~~142~~141 Ibid. Ibid.
~~143~~142 See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, P.L. 102-484 (October 23, 1992), 106 Stat. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, P.L. 102-484 (October 23, 1992), 106 Stat.
2315; Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, P.L. 104-1172 (August 5, 1996), 110 Stat. 1541; Strom Thurmond 2315; Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, P.L. 104-1172 (August 5, 1996), 110 Stat. 1541; Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, P.L. 105-261 (October 17, 1998) 112 Stat. 1920; Victims of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, P.L. 105-261 (October 17, 1998) 112 Stat. 1920; Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386 (October 28, 2000), 114 Stat. 1464; Comprehensive Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386 (October 28, 2000), 114 Stat. 1464; Comprehensive
~~Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, P.L. 108-497 (December 23, 2004), 118 Stat. 4012; Darfur Peace and Accountability Act~~
~~of 2006, P.L. 109-344 (October 13, 2006), 120 Stat. 1869; Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and~~
~~Divestment Act of 2010, P.L. 111-195 (July 1, 2010) 124 Stat 1312; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal~~(continued...)
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(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b)
with respect to— with respect to—
... ...
(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.— (b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following: (1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:
(A) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President (A) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President
by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)
to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and
interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to
subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States,
come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of
a United States person. a United States person.
... ...
(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or (2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or
causes a violation of paragraph (1)(A) or any regulation, license, or order issued to causes a violation of paragraph (1)(A) or any regulation, license, or order issued to
carry out paragraph (1)(A) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) carry out paragraph (1)(A) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b)
and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in
subsection (a) of that section.subsection (a) of that section.~~144~~143
Congress has also expressed, retroactively, its approval of unilateral presidential invocations of Congress has also expressed, retroactively, its approval of unilateral presidential invocations of
IEEPA in the context of a national emergency. In the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities IEEPA in the context of a national emergency. In the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities
Act of 2017, for example, Congress declared, “It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Act of 2017, for example, Congress declared, “It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Secretary of State should continue to implement Executive Order No. 13382.”Treasury and the Secretary of State should continue to implement Executive Order No. 13382.”~~145~~144
Presidents, however, have also used IEEPA to preempt or modify parallel congressional activity. Presidents, however, have also used IEEPA to preempt or modify parallel congressional activity.
On September 9, 1985, President Reagan, finding “that the policies and actions of the On September 9, 1985, President Reagan, finding “that the policies and actions of the
Government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy Government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy
and economy of the United States,” declared a national emergency and limited transactions with and economy of the United States,” declared a national emergency and limited transactions with
~~South Africa.146 The President declared the emergency despite the fact that legislation limiting~~

Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, P.L. 108-497 (December 23, 2004), 118 Stat. 4012; Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, P.L. 109-344 (October 13, 2006), 120 Stat. 1869; Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, P.L. 111-195 (July 1, 2010) 124 Stat 1312; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112-81, December 31, 2011, 125 Stat 1298; Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of Year 2012, P.L. 112-81, December 31, 2011, 125 Stat 1298; Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012, P.L. 112-158 (August 10, 2012) 126 Stat 1214 (makes some of the most extensive use of IEEPA); Russia and 2012, P.L. 112-158 (August 10, 2012) 126 Stat 1214 (makes some of the most extensive use of IEEPA); Russia and
Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, P.L. 112-208 Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, P.L. 112-208
(December 14, 2012) 126 Stat 1496; Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (December 14, 2012) 126 Stat 1496; Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act
P.L. 113-291 (December 19, 2014), 128 Stat. 3293; Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of P.L. 113-291 (December 19, 2014), 128 Stat. 3293; Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of
2018, P.L. 115-272 (October 25, 2018) 132 Stat. 4144. 2018, P.L. 115-272 (October 25, 2018) 132 Stat. 4144.
~~144~~143 Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, P.L. 113-95 Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, P.L. 113-95
(April 3, 2014) 128 Stat. 1088. Identical language can be found, for example, in: The Venezuela Defense of Human (April 3, 2014) 128 Stat. 1088. Identical language can be found, for example, in: The Venezuela Defense of Human
Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, P.L. 113-278 (December 18, 2014) 128 Stat. 3011; National Defense Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, P.L. 113-278 (December 18, 2014) 128 Stat. 3011; National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, P.L. 114-328 (December 23, 2016) 130 Stat. 2000. Similar language can be Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, P.L. 114-328 (December 23, 2016) 130 Stat. 2000. Similar language can be
found, for example, in: the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, P.L. 114-122 (February 18, found, for example, in: the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, P.L. 114-122 (February 18,
2016) 130 Stat. 93; the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017) 130 2016) 130 Stat. 93; the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017) 130
Stat 886. Depending on the circumstance, Congress also includes a clause waiving the requirement to declare a national Stat 886. Depending on the circumstance, Congress also includes a clause waiving the requirement to declare a national
emergency. See, e.g., P.L. 115-44; P.L. 115-272 (“(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the emergency. See, e.g., P.L. 115-44; P.L. 115-272 (“(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the
President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements
of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all
transactions [transactions [ ...... ].”). ].”).
~~145~~144 Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, title I of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, title I of the Countering America’s Adversaries through
Sanctions Act, P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017) §Sanctions Act, P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017) § 104 (22 U.S.C. 9403); E.O. 13382 of June 28, 2005, “Blocking Property 104 (22 U.S.C. 9403); E.O. 13382 of June 28, 2005, “Blocking Property
of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters,” 70 of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters,” 70 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 38,567 (July 1, 2005) 38,567 (July 1, 2005).
~~146 E.O. 12532~~. .
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South Africa.145 The President declared the emergency despite the fact that legislation limiting transactions with South Africa was quickly making its way through Congress.transactions with South Africa was quickly making its way through Congress.~~147~~146 In remarks about In remarks about
the declaration, President Reagan stated that he had been opposed to the bill contemplated by the declaration, President Reagan stated that he had been opposed to the bill contemplated by
Congress because unspecified provisions “would have harmed the very people [the U.S. was] Congress because unspecified provisions “would have harmed the very people [the U.S. was]
trying to help.”trying to help.”~~148~~147 Nevertheless, members of the press at the Nevertheless, members of the press at the ~~time149~~time148 (and at least one scholar (and at least one scholar
since)since)~~150~~149 noted that the limitations imposed by the executive order and the provisions in noted that the limitations imposed by the executive order and the provisions in
legislation then winding its way through Congress were “substantially similar.”legislation then winding its way through Congress were “substantially similar.”~~151~~150
Current Uses of IEEPA
In general, IEEPA has served as an integral part of the postwar international sanctions regime.In general, IEEPA has served as an integral part of the postwar international sanctions regime.~~152~~151
The President, either through a declaration of emergency or via statutory direction, has used The President, either through a declaration of emergency or via statutory direction, has used
IEEPA to limit economic transactions in support of administrative and congressional national IEEPA to limit economic transactions in support of administrative and congressional national
security and foreign policy goals. Much of the action taken pursuant to IEEPA has involved security and foreign policy goals. Much of the action taken pursuant to IEEPA has involved
blocking transactions and freezing assets. blocking transactions and freezing assets.
Once the President declares that a national emergency exists, he may use the authority in Section Once the President declares that a national emergency exists, he may use the authority in Section
203 of IEEPA (Grants of Authorities; 50 U.S.C. §203 of IEEPA (Grants of Authorities; 50 U.S.C. § 1702) to investigate, regulate, or prohibit 1702) to investigate, regulate, or prohibit
foreign exchange transactions, transfers of credit, transfers of securities, payments, and may take foreign exchange transactions, transfers of credit, transfers of securities, payments, and may take
specified actions relating to property in which a foreign country or person has interest—freezing specified actions relating to property in which a foreign country or person has interest—freezing
assets, blocking property and interests in property, prohibiting U.S. persons from entering into assets, blocking property and interests in property, prohibiting U.S. persons from entering into
transactions related to frozen assets and blocked property, and in some instances denying entry transactions related to frozen assets and blocked property, and in some instances denying entry
into the United States. into the United States.
Pursuant to Section 203, Presidents have Pursuant to Section 203, Presidents have
• prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as
engaging in malicious cyber-enabled activities, including “interfering with or engaging in malicious cyber-enabled activities, including “interfering with or
undermining election processes or institutions” [Executive Order 13694 of April undermining election processes or institutions” [Executive Order 13694 of April
1, 2015, as amended; 50 U.S.C. §1, 2015, as amended; 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note. See also Executive Order 13848 of 1701 note. See also Executive Order 13848 of
September 12, 2018; 83 F.R. 46843.]; September 12, 2018; 83 F.R. 46843.];
• prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as illicit prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as illicit
narcotics traffickers including foreign drug kingpins; narcotics traffickers including foreign drug kingpins;
• prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as
engaging in human rights abuses or significant corruption; engaging in human rights abuses or significant corruption;
• prohibited transactions related to illicit trade in rough diamonds; prohibited transactions related to illicit trade in rough diamonds;
• prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as
Transnational Criminal Organizations; Transnational Criminal Organizations;
• prohibited transactions with “those who disrupt the Middle East peace process;” prohibited transactions with “those who disrupt the Middle East peace process;”
• prohibited transactions related to overflights with certain nations; prohibited transactions related to overflights with certain nations;
~~ instituted and maintained maritime restrictions;~~

~~147~~ 145 E.O. 12532. 146 99 H.R. 1460; See also P.L. 99-440 (October 2, 1986). 99 H.R. 1460; See also P.L. 99-440 (October 2, 1986).
~~148~~147 Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer-Session with Reporters on Signing Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer-Session with Reporters on Signing
E.O. 12532, September 9, 1985, 21 E.O. 12532, September 9, 1985, 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1048, 1050. . 1048, 1050.
~~149~~148 See, e.g., questions by Helen Thomas, United Press International, See, e.g., questions by Helen Thomas, United Press International, Ibid,, 1050.1050.
~~150~~149 Carter, Carter, International Economic Sanctions, p. 201. , p. 201.
~~151~~150 Ibid. Ibid.
~~152~~151 Ibid., ch. 9. Ibid., ch. 9.
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• instituted and maintained maritime restrictions; • prohibited transactions related to weapons of mass destruction, in coordination prohibited transactions related to weapons of mass destruction, in coordination
with export controls authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and the Export with export controls authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and the Export
Administration Act of 1979,Administration Act of 1979,~~153~~152 and in furtherance of efforts to deter the weapons and in furtherance of efforts to deter the weapons
programs of specific countries (i.e., Iran, North Korea); programs of specific countries (i.e., Iran, North Korea);
• prohibited transactions with those designated as “persons who commit, threaten prohibited transactions with those designated as “persons who commit, threaten
to commit, or support terrorism;” to commit, or support terrorism;”
• maintained the dual-use export control system at times when its then-underlying maintained the dual-use export control system at times when its then-underlying
authority, the Export Administration Act authority had lapsed; authority, the Export Administration Act authority had lapsed;
• blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as
engaged in cyber activities that compromise critical infrastructures including engaged in cyber activities that compromise critical infrastructures including
election processes or the private sector’s trade secrets; election processes or the private sector’s trade secrets;
• blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as
responsible for serious human rights abuse or engaged in corruption; responsible for serious human rights abuse or engaged in corruption;
• blocked certain property of, and prohibited transactions with, foreign nationals of blocked certain property of, and prohibited transactions with, foreign nationals of
specific countries and those designated as engaged in activities that constitute an specific countries and those designated as engaged in activities that constitute an
extraordinary threat; extraordinary threat;
• prohibited transactions with those who pose “an undue risk of sabotage to or prohibited transactions with those who pose “an undue risk of sabotage to or
subversion of the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, subversion of the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution,
installation, operation, or maintenance of information and communications installation, operation, or maintenance of information and communications
technology or services in the United States.” technology or services in the United States.”
No President has used IEEPA to place tariffs on imported products from a specific country or on No President has used IEEPA to place tariffs on imported products from a specific country or on
products imported to the United States in general. However, IEEPA’s similarity to TWEA, products imported to the United States in general. However, IEEPA’s similarity to TWEA,
coupled with its relatively frequent use to ban imports and exports, suggests that such an action coupled with its relatively frequent use to ban imports and exports, suggests that such an action
could happen.could happen.~~154~~153 In addition, no President has used IEEPA to enact a policy that was primarily In addition, no President has used IEEPA to enact a policy that was primarily
domestic in effect. Some scholars argue, however, that the interconnectedness of the global domestic in effect. Some scholars argue, however, that the interconnectedness of the global
economy means it would probably be permissible to use IEEPA to take an action that was economy means it would probably be permissible to use IEEPA to take an action that was
primarily domestic in effect.primarily domestic in effect.~~155~~154
IEEPA vs Section 232 for Imposing Tariffs in Response to a
National Security Threat
While a President could likely use IEEPA to impose additional tariffs on imported goods as President Nixon did While a President could likely use IEEPA to impose additional tariffs on imported goods as President Nixon did
under TWEA, no President has done so. Instead, Presidents have turned to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion under TWEA, no President has done so. Instead, Presidents have turned to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 in cases of purported emergency.Act of 1962 in cases of purported emergency.~~156~~155 Section 232 provides that if the Secretary of Commerce “finds Section 232 provides that if the Secretary of Commerce “finds
that an article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to that an article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to
threaten to impair the national security,” then the President may take action to adjust the imports such that they threaten to impair the national security,” then the President may take action to adjust the imports such that they

~~153~~ 152 Legislation to replace the Export Administration Act was passed as part of the John S. McCain National Defense Legislation to replace the Export Administration Act was passed as part of the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, P.L. 115-232 (August 13, 2018), as the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, P.L. 115-232 (August 13, 2018), as the Export Control Reform Act of 2018,
Title XVII(B). Title XVII(B).
~~154~~153 President Nixon, in effect, used TWEA to place a 10% ad valorem tariff on all imports to the U.S. Pres. President Nixon, in effect, used TWEA to place a 10% ad valorem tariff on all imports to the U.S. Pres.
Proclamation No. 4074 (January 21, 1971; United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975); See Proclamation No. 4074 (January 21, 1971; United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975); See
also Jason Luong, “Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” also Jason Luong, “Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,”
Texas Law Review 78 (2000), p. 1190. 78 (2000), p. 1190.
~~155~~154 “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” p. 1111; Patrick A. Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” p. 1111; Patrick A. Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive
Reform of AmericaReform of America'’s Emergency Law Regime,” s Emergency Law Regime,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 46, no. 2 (2013), pp. 46, no. 2 (2013), pp.
757-758. 757-758.
~~156~~155 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, P.L. 87-794, § Trade Expansion Act of 1962, P.L. 87-794, § 232(b)–(c), 76 Stat. 877 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §232(b)–(c), 76 Stat. 877 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)–1862(b)–
(c)). (c)).
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wil no longer impair national security. wil no longer impair national security.~~157~~156 While the use of Section 232 requires findings by the Secretary of While the use of Section 232 requires findings by the Secretary of
Commerce, the restrictions and reporting requirements of the NEA do not apply. For that reason, Section 232 Commerce, the restrictions and reporting requirements of the NEA do not apply. For that reason, Section 232
may be an attractive source of presidential authority for imposing additional tariffs for national security purposes. may be an attractive source of presidential authority for imposing additional tariffs for national security purposes.
Using this authority, President Donald J. Trump applied additional duties on steel and aluminum in March 2018.Using this authority, President Donald J. Trump applied additional duties on steel and aluminum in March 2018.~~158~~157
However, IEEPA is not subject to the same procedural restraints as Section 232. As no investigation is required, However, IEEPA is not subject to the same procedural restraints as Section 232. As no investigation is required,
IEEPA authorities can be invoked at any time in response to a national emergency based on an “unusual and IEEPA authorities can be invoked at any time in response to a national emergency based on an “unusual and
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States.” As such, IEEPA extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States.” As such, IEEPA
may be a source of authority for the President to impose a tariff quickly. On May 30, 2019, President Trump may be a source of authority for the President to impose a tariff quickly. On May 30, 2019, President Trump
announced his intention to use IEEPA to impose and gradually increase a five percent tariff on all goods imported announced his intention to use IEEPA to impose and gradually increase a five percent tariff on all goods imported
from Mexico until “the il egal migration crisis is alleviated through effective actions taken by Mexico.”from Mexico until “the il egal migration crisis is alleviated through effective actions taken by Mexico.”~~159~~158 The tariffs The tariffs
were scheduled to be implemented on June 10, 2019, with five percent increases to take effect at the beginning of were scheduled to be implemented on June 10, 2019, with five percent increases to take effect at the beginning of
each subsequent month. On June 7, 2019, President Trump announced that that “The Tariffs scheduled to be each subsequent month. On June 7, 2019, President Trump announced that that “The Tariffs scheduled to be
implemented by the U.S. [on June 10], against Mexico, are hereby indefinitely suspended.”implemented by the U.S. [on June 10], against Mexico, are hereby indefinitely suspended.”~~160~~159
Use of Assets Frozen under ~~IEEPA161~~IEEPA
The ultimate disposition of assets frozen under IEEPA may serve as an important part of the The ultimate disposition of assets frozen under IEEPA may serve as an important part of the
leverage economic sanctions provide to influence the behavior of foreign actors. The President leverage economic sanctions provide to influence the behavior of foreign actors. The President
and Congress have each at times determined the fate of blocked assets to further foreign policy and Congress have each at times determined the fate of blocked assets to further foreign policy
goals. goals.
Presidential Use of Foreign Assets Frozen under IEEPA
Presidents have used frozen assets as a bargaining tool during foreign policy crises and to bring a Presidents have used frozen assets as a bargaining tool during foreign policy crises and to bring a
resolution to such crises, at times by unfreezing the assets, returning them to the sanctioned entity, resolution to such crises, at times by unfreezing the assets, returning them to the sanctioned entity,
or channeling them to a follow-on government. The following are some examples of how or channeling them to a follow-on government. The following are some examples of how
Presidents have used blocked assets to resolve foreign policy issues. Presidents have used blocked assets to resolve foreign policy issues.
President Carter invoked authority under IEEPA to impose trade sanctions against Iran, freezing President Carter invoked authority under IEEPA to impose trade sanctions against Iran, freezing
Iranian assets in the United States, in response to the hostage crisis in 1979.Iranian assets in the United States, in response to the hostage crisis in 1979.~~162~~160 On January 19, On January 19,
1981, the United States and Iran entered into a series of executive agreements brokered by 1981, the United States and Iran entered into a series of executive agreements brokered by
Algeria under which the hostages were freed and the frozen assets were distributed to various Algeria under which the hostages were freed and the frozen assets were distributed to various
entities.entities.~~163~~161 Of the blocked assets, the agreements directed $5.1 billion to repay outstanding U.S. Of the blocked assets, the agreements directed $5.1 billion to repay outstanding U.S.

~~157~~ 156 Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF10667, Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF10667, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C. , by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C.
Jones; CRS Report R44707, Jones; CRS Report R44707, Presidential Authority over Trade: Imposing Tariffs and Duties, by Caitlain Devereaux , by Caitlain Devereaux
Lewis. Lewis.
~~158~~157 Procl. 9704, 83 Procl. 9704, 83 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 11,619 (March 15, 2019); Procl. 9705, 83 11,619 (March 15, 2019); Procl. 9705, 83 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 13,361 (March 15, 2019). CRS 13,361 (March 15, 2019). CRS
Report R45249, Report R45249, Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Rachel F. Fefer and , coordinated by Rachel F. Fefer and
Vivian C. Jones. Vivian C. Jones.
~~159~~158 Statement from the President Regarding Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019, Statement from the President Regarding Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019,
available atavailable at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures- https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-
address-border-crisis/. address-border-crisis/.
~~160~~159 President Donald J. Trump, Twitter Post, June 7, 2018, 5:31 p.m., https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/. President Donald J. Trump, Twitter Post, June 7, 2018, 5:31 p.m., https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/.
1137155056044826626. The suspension preceded the release of a U.S. Mexico Joint Declaration on migration. 1137155056044826626. The suspension preceded the release of a U.S. Mexico Joint Declaration on migration.
Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S.-Mexico Joint Declaration, June 7, 2019, available at Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S.-Mexico Joint Declaration, June 7, 2019, available at
https://www.state.gov/u-s-mexico-joint-declaration/. https://www.state.gov/u-s-mexico-joint-declaration/.
~~161 This section was authored by Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division (ALD), CRS.~~
~~162~~160 E.O. 12170, 44 E.O. 12170, 44 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 65,729 (November 14, 1979). 65,729 (November 14, 1979).
~~163~~161 The Algiers Accords comprise the following five documents: The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic The Algiers Accords comprise the following five documents: The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep’t St. Bull., No. 2047 1, 1 (1981) [hereinafter “General and Popular Republic of Algeria, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep’t St. Bull., No. 2047 1, 1 (1981) [hereinafter “General
Declaration”], reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3; The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Declaration”], reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3; The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 3, reprinted in 1 (continued...) Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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bank loans to Iran, $2.8 billion returned to Iran, $1 billion transferred into a security account in bank loans to Iran, $2.8 billion returned to Iran, $1 billion transferred into a security account in
the Hague to pay other U.S. claims against Iran as arbitrated by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal the Hague to pay other U.S. claims against Iran as arbitrated by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
(IUSCT), and $2 billion remained blocked pending further agreement with Iran or decision of the (IUSCT), and $2 billion remained blocked pending further agreement with Iran or decision of the
Tribunal. The United States also froze the assets of the former Shah’s estate along with those of Tribunal. The United States also froze the assets of the former Shah’s estate along with those of
the Shah’s close relatives pending litigation in U.S. courts to ascertain Iran’s right to their return. the Shah’s close relatives pending litigation in U.S. courts to ascertain Iran’s right to their return.
Iran’s litigation was unsuccessful, and none of the contested assets were returned to Iran.Iran’s litigation was unsuccessful, and none of the contested assets were returned to Iran.~~164~~162
Presidents have also channeled frozen assets to opposition governments in cases where the United Presidents have also channeled frozen assets to opposition governments in cases where the United
States continued to recognize a previous government that had been removed by coup d’état or States continued to recognize a previous government that had been removed by coup d’état or
otherwise replaced as the legitimate government of a country. For example, after Panamanian otherwise replaced as the legitimate government of a country. For example, after Panamanian
President Eric Arturo Delvalle tried to dismiss de facto military ruler General Manuel Noriega President Eric Arturo Delvalle tried to dismiss de facto military ruler General Manuel Noriega
from his post as head of the Panamanian Defense Forces, which resulted in Delvalle’s own from his post as head of the Panamanian Defense Forces, which resulted in Delvalle’s own
dismissal by the Panamanian Legislative Assembly, President Reagan recognized Delvalle as the dismissal by the Panamanian Legislative Assembly, President Reagan recognized Delvalle as the
legitimate head of government and instituted economic sanctions against the Noriega regime.legitimate head of government and instituted economic sanctions against the Noriega regime.~~165~~163
As part of these sanctions, the Department of State, in February 1988, advised U.S. banks not to As part of these sanctions, the Department of State, in February 1988, advised U.S. banks not to
disburse funds to the Noriega regime, and Delvalle obtained court orders permitting him access to disburse funds to the Noriega regime, and Delvalle obtained court orders permitting him access to
those funds.those funds.~~166~~164 In April 1988, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12635, which “blocked In April 1988, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12635, which “blocked
all property and interests in property of the Government of Panama that are in the United Statesall property and interests in property of the Government of Panama that are in the United States
~~. . .~~ ... or that come within the possession or control of persons located within the United States.”or that come within the possession or control of persons located within the United States.”~~167~~
165 In June 1988, the Department of the Treasury issued regulations directing most payments from In June 1988, the Department of the Treasury issued regulations directing most payments from
the U.S. government owed to Panama and all payments owed “to Panama from the operation of the U.S. government owed to Panama and all payments owed “to Panama from the operation of
the Panama Canal Commission” to an escrow account established at the Federal Reserve Bank of the Panama Canal Commission” to an escrow account established at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York.New York.~~168~~166 One escrow account contained funds for the payment of operating expenses of the One escrow account contained funds for the payment of operating expenses of the
Delvalle government.Delvalle government.~~169~~167 After the U.S. invasion of Panama ended in early 1990, President George After the U.S. invasion of Panama ended in early 1990, President George
H.W. Bush lifted economic sanctions against the H.W. Bush lifted economic sanctions against the ~~country170~~country168 and used some of the frozen funds to and used some of the frozen funds to
repay debts owed by Panama to foreign creditors, with remaining funds turned over to the repay debts owed by Panama to foreign creditors, with remaining funds turned over to the
successor government.successor government.~~171~~169
The Obama and Trump Administrations took similar actions in response to the political situation The Obama and Trump Administrations took similar actions in response to the political situation
in Venezuela. President Barack Obama initially froze Venezuelan government assets in 2015 in Venezuela. President Barack Obama initially froze Venezuelan government assets in 2015

~~and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 3, reprinted in 1~~
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9; Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9; Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria, 19 January 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 4, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 13; Escrow Algeria, 19 January 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 4, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 13; Escrow
Agreement Among the United States, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bank Markazi Iran, and the Banque Agreement Among the United States, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bank Markazi Iran, and the Banque
Centrale d'Algerie, January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 6, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 16; and Centrale d'Algerie, January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 6, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 16; and
Technical Arrangement Between Banque Centrale d'Algerie and the Governor and Company of the Bank of England Technical Arrangement Between Banque Centrale d'Algerie and the Governor and Company of the Bank of England
and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 14, reprinted in 1 Iran-and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 14, reprinted in 1 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 20 (hereinafter “Algiers Accords”). U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 20 (hereinafter “Algiers Accords”).
~~164~~162 Sean D. Murphy, Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 677, , 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 677,
704 (October 2000) (explaining that “[a]ll of Iran704 (October 2000) (explaining that “[a]ll of Iran'’s lawsuits in U.S. courts [to recover the Shah’s assets] were s lawsuits in U.S. courts [to recover the Shah’s assets] were
eventually dismissed, principally on grounds of forum non conveniens”). eventually dismissed, principally on grounds of forum non conveniens”).
~~165~~163 GAO Review of Economic Sanctions Imposed Against Panama, GAO/T-NSIAD-89-44, 4-5 (July 26, 1989). GAO Review of Economic Sanctions Imposed Against Panama, GAO/T-NSIAD-89-44, 4-5 (July 26, 1989).
~~166~~164 Ibid Ibid., p.p. 5. 5.
~~167~~165 E.O. 12635, 53 E.O. 12635, 53 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 12,134 (April 8, 1988). 12,134 (April 8, 1988).
~~168~~166 GAO Report, GAO Report, supra note 159, at 5. note 159, at 5.
~~169~~167 Ibid., Ibid., p. 7. p. 7.
~~170~~168 E.O. 12,710, 55 E.O. 12,710, 55 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 13,099 (April 5, 1990). 13,099 (April 5, 1990).
~~171~~169 See 1989 Cong. Q. Almanac 607 (reporting that the Department of the Treasury had concluded “that the net amount See 1989 Cong. Q. Almanac 607 (reporting that the Department of the Treasury had concluded “that the net amount
still due Panama, after ‘offsets, was about $200 million”). still due Panama, after ‘offsets, was about $200 million”).
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under IEEPA and the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014. under IEEPA and the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014.~~172~~170 In In
January 2019, the Trump Administration officially recognized Venezuelan opposition leader Juan January 2019, the Trump Administration officially recognized Venezuelan opposition leader Juan
Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim ~~president173~~president171 and permitted Guaidó access to the frozen Venezuelan and permitted Guaidó access to the frozen Venezuelan
government assets that were “held at the United States Federal Reserve and other insured United assets that were “held at the United States Federal Reserve and other insured United
States financial institutions.”States financial institutions.”~~174~~172 The Trump Administration also imposed additional sanctions The Trump Administration also imposed additional sanctions
under IEEPA to freeze the assets of the main Venezuelan state-owned oil company, Petróleos de under IEEPA to freeze the assets of the main Venezuelan state-owned oil company, Petróleos de
Venezuela (Pdvsa),Venezuela (Pdvsa),~~175~~173 which significantly reduced funds available to the regime of Nicolas which significantly reduced funds available to the regime of Nicolas
Maduro.Maduro.~~176~~174 The Biden Administration The Biden Administration ~~has continued the recognition of Guaidó’s interim~~
~~government.177~~
~~There~~continued to recognize Guaidó’s interim government175 until its dissolution in December 2022, and now recognizes the 2015 National Assembly as the “last remaining democratic institution in Venezuela.”176 The disposition of Venezuelan assets frozen abroad is uncertain, after negotiations between the Maduro government and the opposition to establish a U.N.-administered fund for humanitarian programs supported by these assets has proceeded very slowly since its announcement in November 2022.177 The United States reportedly assured the U.N. that assets in the fund would be shielded from creditors.178 In September 2023, Francisco Palmieri, Chief of Mission of the Venezuelan Affairs Unit at the U.S. Embassy to Columbia, repeated past U.S. offers to provide sanctions relief, which could include unfreezing some assets in the United States, if the Maduro administration allows for the release of political prisoners, allows all opposition candidates to run, and allows international observers to monitor the 2024 elections.179There is also precedent for using frozen foreign assets for purposes authorized by the U.N. is also precedent for using frozen foreign assets for purposes authorized by the U.N.
Security Council. After the first war with Iraq, President George H.W. Bush ordered the transfer Security Council. After the first war with Iraq, President George H.W. Bush ordered the transfer
of frozen Iraqi assets derived from the sale of Iraqi petroleum held by U.S. banks to a holding of frozen Iraqi assets derived from the sale of Iraqi petroleum held by U.S. banks to a holding
account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to fulfill “the rights and obligations of the account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to fulfill “the rights and obligations of the
United States under U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 778.”United States under U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 778.”~~178 The President cited a section~~
~~of the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA),179 as well as IEEPA, as authority to take the~~
~~action.180 The President ordered the transferred funds to be used to provide humanitarian relief~~
~~and to finance the United Nations Compensation Commission,181 which was established to~~

~~172~~180 The 170 E.O. 13692, 80 E.O. 13692, 80 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 12,747 (March 8, 2015). For information about current sanctions against Venezuela, see 12,747 (March 8, 2015). For information about current sanctions against Venezuela, see
CRS In Focus IF10715, CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Clare Ribando Seelke. , by Clare Ribando Seelke.
~~173~~171 President Donald J. Trump Supports the Venezuelan People’s Efforts to Restore Democracy in Their Country, ,
White House Fact Sheet January 29, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-White House Fact Sheet January 29, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-
supports-venezuelan-peoples-efforts-restore-democracy-country/. For background of the situation in Venezuela, see supports-venezuelan-peoples-efforts-restore-democracy-country/. For background of the situation in Venezuela, see
CRS Report R44841, CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke. , coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
~~174~~172 Trump Supports the Venezuelan People’s Efforts. .
~~175~~173 E.O. 13857, 84 E.O. 13857, 84 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 509 (January 25, 2019); 509 (January 25, 2019); Treasury Sanctions Venezuela’s State-Owned Oil Company
Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., U.S. , U.S. ~~Dep’t~~Department of the Treasury (January 28, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press- of the Treasury (January 28, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-
releases/sm594. releases/sm594.
~~176~~174 Marianna Parraga, “Venezuela’s oil exports sink to 17-year low, choked by U.S. sanctions,” Marianna Parraga, “Venezuela’s oil exports sink to 17-year low, choked by U.S. sanctions,” Reuters, June 2, 2020, , June 2, 2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-exports/venezuelas-oil-exports-sink-to-17-year-low-choked-by-us-https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-exports/venezuelas-oil-exports-sink-to-17-year-low-choked-by-us-
sanctions-idUSKBN2392SG. sanctions-idUSKBN2392SG.
~~177~~175 Press Statement, U.S. Press Statement, U.S. ~~Dep’t~~Department of State, U.S. Recognition of Venezuela’s 2015 National Assembly and Interim of State, U.S. Recognition of Venezuela’s 2015 National Assembly and Interim
President GuaidóPresident Guaidó, (January 4, 2022January 4, 2022), https://www.state.gov/u-s-recognition-of-venezuelas-2015-national-assembly-and-, https://www.state.gov/u-s-recognition-of-venezuelas-2015-national-assembly-and-
interim-president-guaido/. interim-president-guaido/.
~~178 E.O. 12817, 3 C.F.R. § 317 (1992). President George H.W. Bush froze Iraqi assets under U.S. jurisdiction pursuant~~
~~to IEEPA in response to Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. E.O. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (August 2, 1990).~~
~~179 22 U.S.C. § 287c (2018). The provision authorizes the President to give effect to U.N. Security Council resolutions~~
~~by “investigat[ing], regulat[ing], or prohibit[ing], in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal,~~
~~telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or any~~
~~person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving any property subject~~
~~to the jurisdiction of the United States.” The provision does not explicitly mention asset confiscation.~~
~~180 E.O. 12817, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,433 (October 23, 1992).~~
~~181 See Ronald J. Bettauer, “Establishment of the United Nations Compensation Commission: The U.S. Government~~
~~Perspective,” The United Nations Compensation Commission (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 35.~~
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~~adjudicate claims against Iraq arising from the invasion.182~~176 Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, Venezuela’s Interim Government and the 2015 National Assembly, January 3, 2023, https://www.state.gov/venezuelas-interim-government-and-the-2015-national-assembly/. 177 Geoff Ramsey and Ignacia Ulloa Peters, “Getting Venezuela’s historic humanitarian accord up and running,” Atlantic Council Issue Brief, August 11, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/getting-venezuelas-historic-humanitarian-accord-up-and-running/. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke. 178 Matt Spetalnick, Vivian Sequera and Mayela Armas, “US tells UN it will shield Venezuela humanitarian fund from creditors.” Reuters, May, 18, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-tells-un-it-will-shield-venezuela-humanitarian-fund-creditors-sources-2023-05-18/. 179 Luz Mely Reyes, “Venezuela 2024: Looking beyond María Corina Machado,” El País, September 6, 2023, https://english.elpais.com/opinion/2023-09-26/venezuela-2024-looking-beyond-maria-corina-machado.html. 180 E.O. 12817, 3 C.F.R. §317 (1992). President George H.W. Bush froze Iraqi assets under U.S. jurisdiction pursuant (continued...) Congressional Research Service 29 link to page 17 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use President cited a section of the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA),181 as well as IEEPA, as authority to take the action.182 The President ordered the transferred funds to be used to provide humanitarian relief and to finance the United Nations Compensation Commission,183 which was established to adjudicate claims against Iraq arising from the invasion.184 Other Iraqi assets remained frozen and Other Iraqi assets remained frozen and
accumulated interest until the United States vested them in 2003 pursuant to IEEPA.accumulated interest until the United States vested them in 2003 pursuant to IEEPA.~~183~~185
In some cases, the United States has ended sanctions and returned frozen assets to successor In some cases, the United States has ended sanctions and returned frozen assets to successor
governments. For example, as a condition of releasing sanctions, the United States released governments. For example, as a condition of releasing sanctions, the United States released
$237.6 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Central Bank of the Socialist Federal $237.6 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Central Bank of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia to the central banks of the successor states in 2003.Republic of Yugoslavia to the central banks of the successor states in 2003.~~184~~186 In 2002, the United In 2002, the United
States released $217 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Taliban to the Afghan States released $217 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Taliban to the Afghan
Interim Authority.Interim Authority.~~185~~187
As of the date of this report, the fate of the Afghan Central Bank (DaB) assets held in the United As of the date of this report, the fate of the Afghan Central Bank (DaB) assets held in the United
States at the time of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 remains undecided. Some States at the time of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 remains undecided. Some
victims—including survivors and family members—of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks victims—including survivors and family members—of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
with judgments against the Taliban have obtained a writ of attachment with respect to the with judgments against the Taliban have obtained a writ of attachment with respect to the
assets.assets.~~186~~188 The Biden Administration subsequently blocked the funds pursuant to The Biden Administration subsequently blocked the funds pursuant to ~~IEEPA187~~IEEPA189 and and
filed a statement of filed a statement of ~~interest188~~interest190 asking the asking the district court for permission to make half ($3.5 billion) of the court for permission to make half ($3.5 billion) of the
assets available for transfer under the OFAC assets available for transfer under the OFAC ~~license189~~license191 issued on behalf of the people of issued on behalf of the people of
Afghanistan to “to address significant humanitarian and economic concerns and to avoid further Afghanistan to “to address significant humanitarian and economic concerns and to avoid further
regional instability and other conditions contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United regional instability and other conditions contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United
States.”States.”~~190~~192 The other half of the assets would remain blocked to avail the judgment plaintiffs of The other half of the assets would remain blocked to avail the judgment plaintiffs of
the opportunity to make their case for entitlement to attach them in satisfaction of their the opportunity to make their case for entitlement to attach them in satisfaction of their
~~judgments. In the statement of interest, the Administration did not take a position with respect to~~
~~the plaintiffs’ right to the assets, but set forth some legal considerations that seem to militate~~
~~against the judgment plaintiffs.191~~
~~Congressionally Mandated Use of Frozen Foreign Assets and Proceeds of~~
~~Sanctions~~
~~The executive branch has traditionally resisted congressional efforts to vest foreign assets to pay~~
~~U.S. claimants without first obtaining a settlement agreement with the country in question.192~~
~~Congress has overcome such resistance in the case of foreign governments that have been~~

~~182~~ to IEEPA in response to Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. E.O. 12,722, 55 Federal Register 31,803 (August 2, 1990). 181 22 U.S.C. §287c (2018). The provision authorizes the President to give effect to U.N. Security Council resolutions by “investigat[ing], regulat[ing], or prohibit[ing], in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or any person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” The provision does not explicitly mention asset confiscation. 182 E.O. 12817, 57 Federal Register 48,433 (October 23, 1992). 183 See Ronald J. Bettauer, “Establishment of the United Nations Compensation Commission: The U.S. Government Perspective,” The United Nations Compensation Commission (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 35. 184 S.C. Res. 687, para. 16 (April 8, 1991) (reaffirming that “Iraq ... is liable under international law for any direct loss, S.C. Res. 687, para. 16 (April 8, 1991) (reaffirming that “Iraq ... is liable under international law for any direct loss,
damage, ... or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraqdamage, ... or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq'’s unlawful invasion and s unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait”; S.C. Res. 692 (May 20, 1991) (establishing the United Nations Compensation Commission occupation of Kuwait”; S.C. Res. 692 (May 20, 1991) (establishing the United Nations Compensation Commission
(UNCC) to administer a system to provide compensation for claims for which Iraq is liable under paragraph 16 of S.C. (UNCC) to administer a system to provide compensation for claims for which Iraq is liable under paragraph 16 of S.C.
Res. 687); S.C. Res. 706 and 712 (1991) (establishing an escrow account administered by the U.N. Secretary General to Res. 687); S.C. Res. 706 and 712 (1991) (establishing an escrow account administered by the U.N. Secretary General to
fund the costs of the UNCC and other activities); S.C. Res. 778 (1992) (directing all States in possession of funds due fund the costs of the UNCC and other activities); S.C. Res. 778 (1992) (directing all States in possession of funds due
to Iraq for the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to transfer those funds to the U.N. escrow account). to Iraq for the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to transfer those funds to the U.N. escrow account).
~~183~~185 See See “USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA.”
~~184~~186 Foreign Regimes’ Assets, GAO-04-1006, 11 (September 2004). Foreign Regimes’ Assets, GAO-04-1006, 11 (September 2004).
~~185~~187 Ibid. at 12. Ibid. at 12.
~~186~~188 Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848 (S.D.N.Y. Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848 (S.D.N.Y. ~~Sep.~~September 13, 2021). 13, 2021).
~~187~~189 E.O. 14064, 87 E.O. 14064, 87 ~~Fed. Reg. 8391 (Feb.~~Federal Register 8391 (February 15, 2022). 15, 2022).
~~188~~190 United States Government Statement of Interest, Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848, ECF 563 (S.D.N.Y. United States Government Statement of Interest, Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848, ECF 563 (S.D.N.Y. ~~Feb.~~
February 11, 2022) (hereinafter SOI). 11, 2022) (hereinafter SOI).
~~189~~191 OFAC License No. DABRESERVES-EO-2022-886895-1, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21226931/ex-b- OFAC License No. DABRESERVES-EO-2022-886895-1, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21226931/ex-b-
ofac-license.pdf. ofac-license.pdf.
~~190~~192 Ibid. SOI. Congressional Research Service 30 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use judgments. In the statement of interest, the Administration did not take a position with respect to the plaintiffs’ right to the assets, but set forth some legal considerations that seem to militate against the judgment plaintiffs.193 In February, 2023, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for post-judgment attachment of the DaB assets, holding that, “[p]ursuant to the FSIA, TRIA, and the U.S. Constitution, the Taliban—not the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan or the Afghan people—must pay for the Taliban’s liability in the 9/11 Attacks.”194 The court found that recognizing the DaB as an “agency or instrumentality” of the Taliban would require the court to recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, and that such authority to recognize governments is entrusted solely to the President.195 Plaintiffs have appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.196 Congressionally Mandated Use of Frozen Foreign Assets and Proceeds of Sanctions The executive branch has traditionally resisted congressional efforts to vest foreign assets to pay U.S. claimants without first obtaining a settlement agreement with the country in question.197 Congress has overcome such resistance in the case of foreign governments that have been designated as “State Supporters of Terrorism.”198 ~~Ibid. SOI.~~
~~191 CRS In Focus IF12052, Afghanistan Central Bank Reserves, coordinated by Martin A. Weiss.~~
~~192 See, generally, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1645o (Settlement of International Claims).~~
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~~designated as “State Supporters of Terrorism.”193~~ U.S. nationals who are victims of state- U.S. nationals who are victims of state-
supported terrorism involving designated states have been able to sue those countries for damages supported terrorism involving designated states have been able to sue those countries for damages
under an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) since 1996.under an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) since 1996.~~194~~199
To facilitate the payment of judgments under the exception, Congress passed Section 117 of the To facilitate the payment of judgments under the exception, Congress passed Section 117 of the
Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999,Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999,~~195~~200 which further amended the FSIA which further amended the FSIA
by allowing attachment and execution against state property with respect to which financial by allowing attachment and execution against state property with respect to which financial
transactions are prohibited or regulated under Section 5(b) TWEA, Section 620(a) of the Foreign transactions are prohibited or regulated under Section 5(b) TWEA, Section 620(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act (authorizing the trade embargo against Cuba), or Sections 202 and 203 of IEEPA, Assistance Act (authorizing the trade embargo against Cuba), or Sections 202 and 203 of IEEPA,
or any orders, licenses or other authority issued under these statutes. Because of the Clinton or any orders, licenses or other authority issued under these statutes. Because of the Clinton
Administration’s continuing objections, however, Section 117 also gave the President authority to Administration’s continuing objections, however, Section 117 also gave the President authority to
“waive the requirements of this section in the interest of national security,” an authority President “waive the requirements of this section in the interest of national security,” an authority President
Clinton promptly exercised in signing the statute into law.Clinton promptly exercised in signing the statute into law.~~196~~201
The Section 117 waiver authority protecting blocked foreign government assets from attachment The Section 117 waiver authority protecting blocked foreign government assets from attachment
to satisfy terrorism judgments has continued in effect ever since, prompting Congress to take to satisfy terrorism judgments has continued in effect ever since, prompting Congress to take
other actions to make frozen assets available to judgment holders. Congress enacted other actions to make frozen assets available to judgment holders. Congress enacted §Section 2002 of the 2002 of the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA)Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA)~~197~~202 to mandate the 193 CRS In Focus IF12052, Afghanistan Central Bank Reserves, coordinated by Martin A. Weiss. 194 In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, No. 01-CV-10132, 2023 WL 2138691, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2023). 195 Ibid. p. *12. 196 John Does 1 Through 7 v. The Taliban, No. 23-263 (2d Cir. Mar. 1, 2023). 197 See, generally, 22 U.S.C. §§1621-1645o (Settlement of International Claims). 198 ~~to mandate the payment~~
~~from frozen Cuban assets of compensatory damages awarded against Cuba under the FSIA~~
~~terrorism exception on or prior to July 20, 2000.~~
~~The Department of the Treasury subsequently vested $96.7 million in funds generated from long-~~
~~distance telephone services between the United States and Cuba in order to compensate claimants~~
~~in Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, the lawsuit based on the 1996 downing of two unarmed U.S.~~
~~civilian airplanes by the Cuban air force.198 Another payment of more than $7 million was made~~
~~using vested Cuban assets to a Florida woman who had won a lawsuit against Cuba based on her~~
~~marriage to a Cuban spy.199~~
~~As unpaid judgments against designated state sponsors of terrorism continued to mount, Congress~~
~~enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA).200 Section 201 of TRIA overrode long-standing~~
~~objections by the executive branch to make the frozen assets of terrorist states available to satisfy~~

~~193~~ Current states designated as sponsors of terrorism are Iran (1984), Cuba (2021), North Korea (2017) and Syria Current states designated as sponsors of terrorism are Iran (1984), Cuba (2021), North Korea (2017) and Syria
(1979). (1979). See U.S. Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.U.S. Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.
~~194~~199 The so-called terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) was originally codified at 28 The so-called terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) was originally codified at 28
U.S.C. §U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), but an amended version is now codified at 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7), but an amended version is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2018). 1605A (2018). See CRS Report RL31258, CRS Report RL31258,
Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea. , by Jennifer K. Elsea.
~~195~~200 P.L. 105-277, Div. A, Title I, § P.L. 105-277, Div. A, Title I, § 117, 112 Stat. 2681-491 (1998), 117, 112 Stat. 2681-491 (1998), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(1)(A) (2018). 1610(f)(1)(A) (2018).
~~196~~201 Presidential Determination 99-1 (October 21, 1998), reprinted in 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2088 (October Presidential Determination 99-1 (October 21, 1998), reprinted in 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2088 (October
26, 1998). 26, 1998).
~~197~~202 P.L. 106-386, § P.L. 106-386, § 2002, 114 Stat. 1541 (2000). Section 2002(b)(1) required the President to “vest and liquidate up to 2002, 114 Stat. 1541 (2000). Section 2002(b)(1) required the President to “vest and liquidate up to
and not exceeding the amount of property of the Government of Cuba and sanctioned entities in the United States or and not exceeding the amount of property of the Government of Cuba and sanctioned entities in the United States or
(continued...) Congressional Research Service 31 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use payment from frozen Cuban assets of compensatory damages awarded against Cuba under the FSIA terrorism exception on or prior to July 20, 2000. The Department of the Treasury subsequently vested $96.7 million in funds generated from long-distance telephone services between the United States and Cuba in order to compensate claimants in Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, the lawsuit based on the 1996 downing of two unarmed U.S. civilian airplanes by the Cuban air force.203 Another payment of more than $7 million was made using vested Cuban assets to a Florida woman who had won a lawsuit against Cuba based on her marriage to a Cuban spy.204 As unpaid judgments against designated state sponsors of terrorism continued to mount, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA).205 Section 201 of TRIA overrode long-standing objections by the executive branch to make the frozen assets of terrorist states available to satisfy judgments for compensatory damages against such states (and organizations and persons) as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in subsection (b), in every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune under section 1605A or 1605(a)(7) (as such section was in effect on January 27, 2008) of title 28, United States Code, the blocked assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable.206 Subsection (b) of Section 201 provided waiver authority “in the national security interest,” but only with respect to frozen foreign government “property subject to the Vienna Convention on any commonwealth, territory, or possession thereof that has been blocked pursuant to [TWEA or IEEPA]” to pay the any commonwealth, territory, or possession thereof that has been blocked pursuant to [TWEA or IEEPA]” to pay the
compensatory damages portion of such judgments. Judgments against Iran were paid from appropriated funds. compensatory damages portion of such judgments. Judgments against Iran were paid from appropriated funds.
~~198~~203 Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ($50 million in compensatory damages and Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ($50 million in compensatory damages and
$137.7 million in punitive damages awarded to the families of three of the four persons who were killed when Cuban $137.7 million in punitive damages awarded to the families of three of the four persons who were killed when Cuban
aircraft shot down two Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996). The payment represented compensatory damages, aircraft shot down two Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996). The payment represented compensatory damages,
judicially imposed sanctions, and interest. judicially imposed sanctions, and interest.
~~199~~204 Martinez v. Republic of Cuba, No. 13-1999-CA 018208 (Miami-Dade Co., Fla., Cir. Ct. 2001) (awarding $7.1 Martinez v. Republic of Cuba, No. 13-1999-CA 018208 (Miami-Dade Co., Fla., Cir. Ct. 2001) (awarding $7.1
million in compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages). million in compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages).
~~200~~205 P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002), codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1610 note. P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002), codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1610 note.
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~~judgments for compensatory damages against such states (and organizations and persons) as~~
~~follows:~~
~~Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in subsection (b), in~~
~~every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim~~
~~based upon an act of terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune under section~~
~~1605A or 1605(a)(7) (as such section was in effect on January 27, 2008) of title 28, United~~
~~States Code, the blocked assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any~~
~~agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or attachment~~
~~in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any compensatory~~
~~damages for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable.201~~
~~Subsection (b) of Section 201 provided waiver authority “in the national security interest,” but~~
~~only with respect to frozen foreign government “property subject to the Vienna Convention on~~
~~Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.” When Congress~~
~~amended the FSIA in 2008202~~206 Ibid. The term “blocked asset” is defined in §201(d) of TRIA to mean (A) any asset seized or frozen by the United States under [TWEA or IEEPA]; and (B) does not include property that— (i) is subject to a license issued by the United States Government for final payment, transfer, or disposition by or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection with a transaction for which the issuance of such license has been specifically required by statute other than [IEEPA] or the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.); or (ii) in the case of property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, or that enjoys equivalent privileges and immunities under the law of the United States, is being used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in March 2023, that the United States, acting pursuant to TRIA, violated the now-defunct Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Iran-U.S., Aug. 15, 1955, U.S.T. 900, by permitting judgment creditors, to enforce terrorism judgments against Iran through the attachment of assets of Iranian agencies or instrumentalities who were not participants in the underlying lawsuit. The ICJ found the United States unreasonably ignored those companies’ separate juridical status and deprived Iranian companies of the independent legal personality conferred on them by such status. Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, ¶ 159 (Mar. 30, 2023), https://icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/164/164-20230330-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf. The ICJ will decide the amount of damages the United States owes to Iran at a later phase of the case. Ibid. ¶ 231. Congressional Research Service 32 link to page 41 link to page 43 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.” When Congress amended the FSIA in 2008207 to revamp the terrorism exception, it provided that judgments to revamp the terrorism exception, it provided that judgments
entered under the new exception could be satisfied out of the property of a foreign state entered under the new exception could be satisfied out of the property of a foreign state
notwithstanding the fact that the property in question is regulated by the United States notwithstanding the fact that the property in question is regulated by the United States
government pursuant to TWEA or IEEPA.government pursuant to TWEA or IEEPA.~~203~~208 Congress has also crafted legislation on occasion Congress has also crafted legislation on occasion
that makes specific assets available to satisfy specific judgments.that makes specific assets available to satisfy specific judgments.~~204~~209
Congress has also directed that the proceeds from certain sanctions violations be paid into a fund Congress has also directed that the proceeds from certain sanctions violations be paid into a fund
for providing compensation to the former hostages of Iran and terrorist state judgment for providing compensation to the former hostages of Iran and terrorist state judgment
creditors.creditors.~~205~~210 To fund the program, Congress designated that certain real property and bank To fund the program, Congress designated that certain real property and bank
accounts owned by Iran and forfeited to the United States could go into the United States Victims accounts owned by Iran and forfeited to the United States could go into the United States Victims
of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund, along with the sum of $1,025,000,000, representing the of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund, along with the sum of $1,025,000,000, representing the
amount paid to the United States pursuant to the June 27, 2014, plea agreement and settlement amount paid to the United States pursuant to the June 27, 2014, plea agreement and settlement
between the United States and BNP Paribas for sanctions violations.between the United States and BNP Paribas for sanctions violations.~~206~~211 The fund is replenished The fund is replenished
through criminal penalties and forfeitures for violations of IEEPA or TWEA-based regulations, or through criminal penalties and forfeitures for violations of IEEPA or TWEA-based regulations, or
any related civil or criminal conspiracy, scheme, or other federal offense related to doing business any related civil or criminal conspiracy, scheme, or other federal offense related to doing business

~~201 Ibid. The term “blocked asset” is defined in § 201(d) of TRIA to mean~~
~~(A) any asset seized or frozen by the United States under [TWEA or IEEPA]; and~~
~~(B) does not include property that—~~
~~(i) is subject to a license issued by the United States Government for final payment, transfer, or~~
~~disposition by or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection with a~~
~~transaction for which the issuance of such license has been specifically required by statute other~~
~~than [IEEPA] or the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.); or~~
~~(ii) in the case of property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna~~
~~Convention on Consular Relations, or that enjoys equivalent privileges and immunities under the~~
~~law of the United States, is being used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes.~~
~~202 P.L. 110-181 § 1083 (2008) (amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).~~
~~203 28 U.S.C. §~~ or acting on behalf of a state sponsor of terrorism.212 Three-quarters of all civil penalties and forfeitures relating to the same offenses are also deposited into the fund.213 The Fund sunsets in 2039. Russia’s 2022 large-scale invasion of Ukraine has led the executive branch to levy new sanctions against Russia, in addition to sanctions imposed for other reasons.214 Some Members of Congress have introduced legislation seeking to seize and repurpose Russian frozen assets for the benefit of Ukraine.215 Some of the proposals, to the extent that they permit the seizure of assets of aliens with significant ties to or property in the United States, if enacted, may invite legal challenges based on the Fifth Amendment Takings and Due Process Clauses.216 207 P.L. 110-181 §1083 (2008) (amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). 208 28 U.S.C. §1610(g) (2018). It is unclear whether “regulated” property and “blocked asset” are meant to be 1610(g) (2018). It is unclear whether “regulated” property and “blocked asset” are meant to be
synonymous. synonymous.
~~204~~The provision also overrides the separate juridical status ordinarily accorded to agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states. Ibid. The ICJ determined that this provision violated the Treaty of Amity for the same reason it found TRIA to be “unreasonable.” Op. cit. Certain Iranian Assets, ¶ 159. 209 P.L. 112-158, Title V, §502, 126 Stat. 1258 (2012); P.L. 116-92, div. A, Title XII, §1226, 133 Stat. 1645 (2019), P.L. 112-158, Title V, §502, 126 Stat. 1258 (2012); P.L. 116-92, div. A, Title XII, §1226, 133 Stat. 1645 (2019),
both codified at 22 USC §both codified at 22 USC § 8772. The Supreme Court upheld this approach in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 8772. The Supreme Court upheld this approach in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct.
1310 (2016). For an explanation of the case, see CRS Report R44967, 1310 (2016). For an explanation of the case, see CRS Report R44967, Congress’s Power over Courts: Jurisdiction
Stripping and the Rule of Klein, coordinated by Kevin M. Lewis. , coordinated by Kevin M. Lewis.
In Certain Iranian Assets, the ICJ found that Bank Markazi, as Iran’s central bank, was not a “company” entitled to favorable treatment under the Treaty of Amity, and the ICJ did not have jurisdiction over the claim based on Peterson. Op. cit. ¶ 54. 210 ~~205~~ See the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act, See the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act, ~~P.L. 114-113,~~ div. O, title IV (2015), div. O, title IV (2015),
129 Stat. 3007, codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §129 Stat. 3007, codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. § 20144 (2020). 20144 (2020).
~~206~~211 Ibid Ibid., for more information about the program and funding for it, see CRS In Focus IF10341, , for more information about the program and funding for it, see CRS In Focus IF10341, Justice for United
States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act: Eligibility and Funding, by Jennifer K. Elsea. , by Jennifer K. Elsea.
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~~or acting on behalf of a state sponsor of terrorism.207 Three-quarters of all civil penalties and~~
~~forfeitures relating to the same offenses are also deposited into the fund.208 The Fund sunsets in~~
~~2039.~~
~~Russia’s 2022 wholesale invasion of Ukraine has led the executive branch to levy new sanctions~~
~~against Russia, in addition to sanctions imposed for other reasons.209 Some Members of Congress~~
~~have introduced legislation seeking to seize and repurpose Russian frozen assets for the benefit of~~
~~Ukraine.210 Some of the proposals, to the extent that they permit the seizure of assets of aliens~~
~~with significant ties to or property in the United States, if enacted, may invite legal challenges~~
~~based on the Fifth Amendment “Takings” and Due Process clauses.211~~
~~Judicial Interpretation of IEEPA212~~212 34 U.S.C. §20144(e) (2021). 213 Ibid. 214 See CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt; CRS Insight IN11869, Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Overview of U.S. Sanctions and Other Responses, by Cory Welt; CRS In Focus IF12062, Russia’s War on Ukraine: Financial and Trade Sanctions, coordinated by Rebecca M. Nelson. 215 From the 117th Cong., see, e.g., H.R. 3838; H.R. 6869; H.R. 6930; H.R. 7015; H.R. 7083; H.R. 7086; S. 3723; S. 3838. From the 118th Cong., see e.g., H.R. 892; H.R. 4175; H.R. 5370; S. 536; S. 1254; S. 2003. 216 See sections below “Fifth Amendment Takings Clause” and “Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause”. Congressional Research Service 33 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Judicial Interpretation of IEEPA
A number of lawsuits seeking to overturn actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have made their way A number of lawsuits seeking to overturn actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have made their way
through the judicial system, including challenges to the breadth of presidential authority and through the judicial system, including challenges to the breadth of presidential authority and
congressionally delegated authority, and challenges asserting violations of constitutional rights. congressionally delegated authority, and challenges asserting violations of constitutional rights.
Most of these challenges have failed, and the few challenges that succeeded did not seriously Most of these challenges have failed, and the few challenges that succeeded did not seriously
undermine the overarching statutory scheme for sanctions. undermine the overarching statutory scheme for sanctions.
Dames & Moore v. Regan
The breadth of presidential power under IEEPA is illustrated by the Supreme Court’s 1981 The breadth of presidential power under IEEPA is illustrated by the Supreme Court’s 1981
opinion in opinion in Dames & Moore v. Regan..~~213~~217 In In Dames & Moore, petitioners had challenged President , petitioners had challenged President
Carter’s executive order establishing regulations to further compliance with the terms of the Carter’s executive order establishing regulations to further compliance with the terms of the
Algiers Accords, which the President had entered into to end the hostage crisis with Iran.Algiers Accords, which the President had entered into to end the hostage crisis with Iran.~~214~~218 Under Under
these agreements, the United States was obligated (1) to terminate all legal proceedings in U.S. these agreements, the United States was obligated (1) to terminate all legal proceedings in U.S.
courts involving claims of U.S. nationals against Iran, (2) to nullify all attachments and courts involving claims of U.S. nationals against Iran, (2) to nullify all attachments and
judgments, and (3) to resolve outstanding claims exclusively through binding arbitration in the judgments, and (3) to resolve outstanding claims exclusively through binding arbitration in the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT). The President, through executive orders, revoked all licenses Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT). The President, through executive orders, revoked all licenses
that permitted the exercise of “any right, power, or privilege” with regard to Iranian funds, that permitted the exercise of “any right, power, or privilege” with regard to Iranian funds,
nullified all non-Iranian interests in assets acquired after a previous blocking order, and required nullified all non-Iranian interests in assets acquired after a previous blocking order, and required
banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be held banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be held
or transferred as directed by the Secretary of the Treasury.or transferred as directed by the Secretary of the Treasury.~~215~~

~~207 34 U.S.C. § 20144(e) (2021).~~
~~208 Ibid~~.
~~209 See CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt; CRS Insight IN11869,~~ ~~Russia’s~~
~~Invasion of Ukraine: Overview of U.S. and International Sanctions and Other Responses, by Cory Welt; CRS In Focus~~
~~IF12062, New Financial and Trade Sanctions Against Russia, coordinated by Rebecca M. Nelson.~~
~~210 See, e.g., H.R. 7083; H.R. 7086; H.R. 3838; H.R. 7015; H.R. 6930; H.R. 6869; S. 3723; S. 3838.~~
~~211 See sections below “Fifth Amendment “Takings” Clause” and “Fifth Amendment “Due Process” Clause”.~~
~~212 This section was authored by Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division (ALD), CRS.~~
~~213 453 U.S. 654 (1981).~~
~~214~~219 Dames & Moore had sued Iran for breach of contract to recover compensation for work performed.220 The district court had entered summary judgment in favor of Dames & Moore and issued an order attaching certain Iranian assets for satisfaction of any judgment that might result,221 but stayed the case pending appeal.222 The executive orders and regulations implementing the Algiers Accords resulted in the nullification of this prejudgment attachment and the dismissal of the case against Iran, directing that it be filed at the IUSCT. In response, Dames & Moore sued the government. The plaintiff claimed that the President and the Secretary of the Treasury exceeded their statutory and constitutional powers to the extent they adversely affected Dames & Moore’s judgment against Iran, the execution of that judgment, the prejudgment attachments, and the plaintiff’s ability to continue litigation against the Iranian banks.223 The government defended its actions, relying largely on IEEPA, which provided explicit support for most of the measures taken—nullification of the prejudgment attachment and transfer of the 217 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 218 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Relating to the Commitments Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Relating to the Commitments
Made by Iran and the United States and Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Made by Iran and the United States and Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981) (collectively “Algiers Accords”). of Iran, 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981) (collectively “Algiers Accords”).
~~215~~219 E.O. 12170, 44 E.O. 12170, 44 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 65,729 (November 14, 1979); E.O. 12279, 46 65,729 (November 14, 1979); E.O. 12279, 46 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 7,919 (January 19, 1981). On 7,919 (January 19, 1981). On
February 24, 1981 President Reagan ratified the Executive orders that President Carter had signed on January 19, 1981. February 24, 1981 President Reagan ratified the Executive orders that President Carter had signed on January 19, 1981.
E.O. 13294, 46 E.O. 13294, 46 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 14,111 (1981). 220 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 644. 221 Ibid. 222 Ibid. at 666. 223 Ibid. at 666-67. Congressional Research Service 34 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use ~~14,111 (1981).~~
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~~Dames & Moore had sued Iran for breach of contract to recover compensation for work~~
~~performed.216 The district court had entered summary judgment in favor of Dames & Moore and~~
~~issued an order attaching certain Iranian assets for satisfaction of any judgment that might~~
~~result,217 but stayed the case pending appeal.218 The executive orders and regulations~~
~~implementing the Algiers Accords resulted in the nullification of this prejudgment attachment and~~
~~the dismissal of the case against Iran, directing that it be filed at the IUSCT.~~
~~In response, Dames & Moore sued the government. The plaintiff claimed that the President and~~
~~the Secretary of the Treasury exceeded their statutory and constitutional powers to the extent they~~
~~adversely affected Dames & Moore’s judgment against Iran, the execution of that judgment, the~~
~~prejudgment attachments, and the plaintiff’s ability to continue litigation against the Iranian~~
~~banks.219~~
~~The government defended its actions, relying largely on IEEPA, which provided explicit support~~
~~for most of the measures taken—nullification of the prejudgment attachment and transfer of the~~
property to Iran—but could not be read to authorize actions affecting the suspension of claims in property to Iran—but could not be read to authorize actions affecting the suspension of claims in
U.S. courts. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority: U.S. courts. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority:
Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA…directly authorizes the Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA…directly authorizes the
President’s suspension of claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor President’s suspension of claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor
of Congress’ legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the President is acting of Congress’ legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the President is acting
alone or at least with the acceptance of Congress. As we have noted, Congress cannot alone or at least with the acceptance of Congress. As we have noted, Congress cannot
anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President may find it anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President may find it
necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might act. Such failure of Congress necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might act. Such failure of Congress
specifically to delegate authority does not, “especially .specifically to delegate authority does not, “especially . . .. in the areas of foreign. in the areas of foreign policy policy
and national security,” imply “congressional disapproval” of action taken by the Executive. and national security,” imply “congressional disapproval” of action taken by the Executive.
~~On the contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the~~
~~President’s authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the~~
~~President broad discretion may be considered to “invite” “measures on independent~~
~~presidential responsibility.” At least this is so where there is no contrary indication of~~
~~legislative intent and when, as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescence in~~
On the contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the President’s authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion may be considered to “invite” “measures on independent presidential responsibility.” At least this is so where there is no contrary indication of legislative intent and when, as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President.conduct of the sort engaged in by the President.~~220~~224
The Court remarked that Congress’s implicit approval of the long-standing presidential practice The Court remarked that Congress’s implicit approval of the long-standing presidential practice
of settling international claims by executive agreement was critical to its holding that the of settling international claims by executive agreement was critical to its holding that the
challenged actions were not in conflict with acts of Congress.challenged actions were not in conflict with acts of Congress.~~221~~225 For support, the Court cited For support, the Court cited
Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,~~222~~226 which stated which stated
that “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress that “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress
and never before questioned … may be treated as a gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the and never before questioned … may be treated as a gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the
President by §President by § 1 of Art. II.”1 of Art. II.”~~223~~227 Consequently, it may be argued that Congress’s exclusion of certain ~~Consequently, it may be argued that Congress’s exclusion of~~

~~216 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 644.~~
~~217 Ibid~~.
~~218 Ibid. at 666.~~
~~219 Ibid. at 666-67.~~
~~220 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).~~
~~221 Ibid. at 680 (citing the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 13, codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.~~
~~§§ 1621 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV)).~~
~~222 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952).~~
~~223 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).~~
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~~certain~~ express powers in IEEPA do not necessarily preclude the President from exercising them, express powers in IEEPA do not necessarily preclude the President from exercising them,
at least where a court finds sufficient precedent exists. at least where a court finds sufficient precedent exists.
Lower courts have examined IEEPA under a number of other constitutional doctrines. Lower courts have examined IEEPA under a number of other constitutional doctrines.
Separation of Powers—Non-Delegation Doctrine
Courts have reviewed whether Congress violated the non-delegation principle of separation of Courts have reviewed whether Congress violated the non-delegation principle of separation of
powers by delegating too much power to the President to legislate, in particular by creating new powers by delegating too much power to the President to legislate, in particular by creating new
crimes.crimes.~~224~~228 These challenges have generally failed. These challenges have generally failed.~~225~~229 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit explained while evaluating IEEPA, delegations of congressional authority are Circuit explained while evaluating IEEPA, delegations of congressional authority are
constitutional so long as Congress provides through a legislative act an “intelligible principle” constitutional so long as Congress provides through a legislative act an “intelligible principle”
~~governing the exercise of the delegated authority.226 Even if the standards are higher for~~
~~delegations of authority to define criminal offenses, the court held, IEEPA provides sufficient~~
~~guidance.227 The court stated:~~
~~The IEEPA “meaningfully constrains the [President's] discretion,” by requiring that “[t]he~~
~~authorities granted to the President ... may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and~~
~~extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared.” And~~
~~the authorities delegated are defined and limited.228~~
~~The Second Circuit found it significant that “IEEPA relates to foreign affairs—an area in which~~
~~the President has greater discretion,”229 bolstering its view that IEEPA does not violate the non-~~
~~delegation doctrine.~~
~~Separation of Powers—Legislative Veto~~
~~The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Section 207(b) of IEEPA~~
~~is an unconstitutional legislative veto. That provision states:~~
~~The authorities described in subsection (a)(1) may not continue to be exercised under this~~
~~section if the national emergency is terminated by the Congress by concurrent resolution~~
~~pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act [50 U.S.C. § 1622] and if the~~

~~224~~ 224 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted). 225 Ibid. at 680 (citing the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 13, codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§1621 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV)). 226 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952). 227 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 228 United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2006) (appeal of whether IEEPA constitutes an appropriate United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2006) (appeal of whether IEEPA constitutes an appropriate
delegation of congressional authority to the executive). delegation of congressional authority to the executive).
~~225~~229 United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 576 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding IEEPA’s delegation of authority to the United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 576 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding IEEPA’s delegation of authority to the
President); United States v. Mirza, 454 F. App’x 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2011) (same); President); United States v. Mirza, 454 F. App’x 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2011) (same); Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 216-17 (same); , 461 F.3d at 216-17 (same);
United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1092–94 (4th Cir.1993) (same); see alsoUnited States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1092–94 (4th Cir.1993) (same); see also United States v. United States v.
Nazemzadeh, No. 11 CR 5726 L, 2014 WL 310460, at *8 (S.D. Cal. January 28, 2014); United States v. Vaghari, No. Nazemzadeh, No. 11 CR 5726 L, 2014 WL 310460, at *8 (S.D. Cal. January 28, 2014); United States v. Vaghari, No.
CRIM.A. 08-693-01-02, 2009 WL 2245097, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2009); Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, CRIM.A. 08-693-01-02, 2009 WL 2245097, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2009); Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control,
No. 05–C–580, 2007 WL 1051767, at *20–21 (E.D. Wis. March 31, 2007), No. 05–C–580, 2007 WL 1051767, at *20–21 (E.D. Wis. March 31, 2007), aff'd, 559 F.3d 595 (7th Cir.2009); United , 559 F.3d 595 (7th Cir.2009); United
States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 566–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Esfahani, No. 05–CR–0255, 2006 States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 566–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Esfahani, No. 05–CR–0255, 2006
WL 163025, at *1–4 (N.D. Ill. January 17, 2006); United States v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F. Supp. 2d 821, 829–30 WL 163025, at *1–4 (N.D. Ill. January 17, 2006); United States v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F. Supp. 2d 821, 829–30
(N.D. Ohio 2005); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 807 (N.D.(N.D. Ohio 2005); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2002), Ill. 2002), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 , 315 F.3d 748
(7th Cir. 2002). (7th Cir. 2002).
~~226 Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 215 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)).~~
~~227 Ibid. at 216 (“Even if a heightened standard should apply to delegations concerning criminal offenses, the IEEPA'~~Congressional Research Service 35 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use governing the exercise of the delegated authority.230 Even if the standards are higher for delegations of authority to define criminal offenses, the court held, IEEPA provides sufficient guidance.231 The court stated: The IEEPA “meaningfully constrains the [President’s] discretion,” by requiring that “[t]he authorities granted to the President ... may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared.” And the authorities delegated are defined and limited.232 The Second Circuit found it significant that “IEEPA relates to foreign affairs—an area in which the President has greater discretion,”233 bolstering its view that IEEPA does not violate the non-delegation doctrine. Conversely, plaintiffs have had little success challenging IEEPA sanctions where Congress has imposed limitations on the President’s authority. The Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to the then-existing Iraq travel ban based on the claim that the ban imposed an indirect restriction on the provision of medical supplies in violation of IEEPA.234 In a case where plaintiffs sought injunctive relief from the imposition of sanctions by arguing that the President’s authority did not extend to imposing sanctions involving medical supplies and humanitarian aid for Iran, the district court dismissed the claim in part because the statutory restrictions on such sanctions do not create a private right of action.235 Separation of Powers—Legislative Veto The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Section 207(b) of IEEPA is an unconstitutional legislative veto. That provision states: 230 Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 215 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)). 231 Ibid. at 216 (“Even if a heightened standard should apply to delegations concerning criminal offenses, the IEEPA’s s
delegation is subject to constraints similar to those found sufficient in [Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 111 delegation is subject to constraints similar to those found sufficient in [Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 111
(1991)]”); see also (1991)]”); see also Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d at 576 (“We too conclude that IEEPA “meaningfully constrains” the , 645 F.3d at 576 (“We too conclude that IEEPA “meaningfully constrains” the
PresidentPresident'’s discretion.”); s discretion.”); Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d at 1092–94 (holding “constraining factors” in IEEPA sufficient to ., 987 F.2d at 1092–94 (holding “constraining factors” in IEEPA sufficient to
conclude the Presidentconclude the President'’s powers are “explicitly defined and circumscribed”). s powers are “explicitly defined and circumscribed”).
~~228~~232 Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 216-17 (internal citations omitted)., 461 F.3d at 216-17 (internal citations omitted).
~~229 Ibid. at 217 (citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675).~~
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~~Congress specifies in such concurrent resolution that such authorities may not continue to~~
~~be exercised under this section.230~~ See also United States v. Shih, 73 F.4th 1077, 1092 (9th Cir. 2023) (upholding the use of IEEPA to maintain the Export Administration Regulations despite lapse of the Export Administration Act did not violate the non-delegation doctrine because IEEPA “specifies the steps the President must take before invoking an emergency, including consultation with Congress, and establishes reporting requirements”) The court further held that IEEPA “limits the President’s authority to prohibit certain types of transactions, and prohibits the punishment of unwitting violators.”). Ibid. The court explained that, “[b]ecause these statutory restrictions strike ‘a careful balance between affording the President a degree of authority to address the exigencies of national emergencies and restraining his ability to perpetuate emergency situations indefinitely by creating more opportunities for congressional input,’” it agreed with every Circuit to have considered the issue, and determined “that IEEPA is constitutional.” Ibid. (citing United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 577 (3d Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 215–17 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1092–94 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Mirza, 454 F. App’x 249, 255–56 (5th Cir. 2011)). 233 Dhafir, 461 F.3d. at 217 (citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675). 234 Sacks v. Off. of Foreign Assets Control, 466 F.3d 764, 775 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that IEEPA does not burden the President's powers with respect to humanitarian aid when he acts under the UNPA). IEEPA does not provide authority to regulate “donations . . .of articles, such as food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve human suffering, except to the extent that the President determines that such donations” would risk certain harms. 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(2). 235 Iran Thalassemia Soc’y v. Off. of Foreign Assets Control, No. 3:22-CV-1195-HZ, 2022 WL 9888593, at *5 (D. Or. Oct. 14, 2022) (declining to enjoin “maximum pressure” sanctions against Iran for violating the Trade Sanction Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA, P.L. 106-387, §1, found at 22 U.S.C. § 7202) and the Iran financial sector sanctions provision, found at 22 U.S.C. § 8513a(d)(2)), appeal dismissed, No. 22-35850, 2022 WL 18461465 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 2022). Congressional Research Service 36 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use The authorities described in subsection (a)(1) may not continue to be exercised under this section if the national emergency is terminated by the Congress by concurrent resolution pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act [50 U.S.C. §1622] and if the Congress specifies in such concurrent resolution that such authorities may not continue to be exercised under this section.236
In In U.S. v. Romero-Fernandez, two defendants convicted of violating the terms of an executive , two defendants convicted of violating the terms of an executive
order issued under IEEPA argued on appeal that IEEPA was unconstitutional, in part, because of order issued under IEEPA argued on appeal that IEEPA was unconstitutional, in part, because of
the above provision. The Eleventh Circuit accepted that the provision was an unconstitutional the above provision. The Eleventh Circuit accepted that the provision was an unconstitutional
legislative veto (as conceded by the government) based on legislative veto (as conceded by the government) based on INS v. Chadha,,~~231~~237 in which the in which the
Supreme Court held that Congress cannot void the exercise of power by the executive branch Supreme Court held that Congress cannot void the exercise of power by the executive branch
through concurrent resolution, but can act only through bicameral passage followed by through concurrent resolution, but can act only through bicameral passage followed by
presentment of the law to the President.presentment of the law to the President.~~232~~238 The Eleventh Circuit nevertheless upheld the The Eleventh Circuit nevertheless upheld the
defendants’ convictions for violations of IEEPA regulations,defendants’ convictions for violations of IEEPA regulations,~~233~~239 holding that the legislative veto holding that the legislative veto
provision was severable from the rest of the statute.provision was severable from the rest of the statute.~~234~~240
Fifth Amendment ~~“Takings”~~Takings Clause
Courts have also addressed whether certain actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have effected an Courts have also addressed whether certain actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have effected an
uncompensated taking of property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth uncompensated taking of property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause prohibits “private property [from being] taken for public use, Amendment’s Takings Clause prohibits “private property [from being] taken for public use,
without just compensation.”without just compensation.”~~235~~241 The Fifth Amendment’s prohibitions apply as well to regulatory The Fifth Amendment’s prohibitions apply as well to regulatory
takings, in which the government does not physically take property but instead imposes takings, in which the government does not physically take property but instead imposes
restrictions on the right of enjoyment that decreases the value of the property or right therein.restrictions on the right of enjoyment that decreases the value of the property or right therein.~~236~~242
The Supreme Court has held that the nullification of prejudgment attachments pursuant to The Supreme Court has held that the nullification of prejudgment attachments pursuant to
regulations issued under IEEPA was not an uncompensated taking, suggesting that the reason for regulations issued under IEEPA was not an uncompensated taking, suggesting that the reason for
this position was the contingent nature of the licenses that had authorized the attachments.this position was the contingent nature of the licenses that had authorized the attachments.~~237~~243 The The
Court also suggested that the broader purpose of the statute supported the view that there was no Court also suggested that the broader purpose of the statute supported the view that there was no
uncompensated taking: uncompensated taking:
~~This Court has previously recognized that the congressional purpose in authorizing~~
~~blocking orders is “to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President....” Such~~
~~orders permit the President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in~~

~~230~~ 236 50 U.S.C. § 50 U.S.C. § 1706(b) (2018). 1706(b) (2018).
~~231~~237 United States v. Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d 195, 196 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d 195, 196 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). , 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
~~232~~238 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954–55. , 462 U.S. at 954–55.
~~233~~239 Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d at 197 (“Because [defendants] were charged and convicted under 50 U.S.C. §, 983 F.2d at 197 (“Because [defendants] were charged and convicted under 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b), 1705(b),
and this section is not affected by the unconstitutionality of §and this section is not affected by the unconstitutionality of § 1706(b), the constitutionality of the legislative veto is 1706(b), the constitutionality of the legislative veto is
irrelevant to their convictions.”). Although the original NEA authorized termination through a concurrent resolution, irrelevant to their convictions.”). Although the original NEA authorized termination through a concurrent resolution,
which does not require the President’s signature, Congress amended the provision in 1985 to require a joint resolution which does not require the President’s signature, Congress amended the provision in 1985 to require a joint resolution
as a response to as a response to Chadha. Notwithstanding this amendment, Section 207 of IEEPA continues to refer to termination by . Notwithstanding this amendment, Section 207 of IEEPA continues to refer to termination by
concurrent resolution. concurrent resolution.
~~234~~240 Ibid., at Ibid., at 196 (finding that the balance of IEEPA is capable of functioning independently and noting Congress’s 196 (finding that the balance of IEEPA is capable of functioning independently and noting Congress’s
inclusion of a severability clause). inclusion of a severability clause).
~~235~~241 U.S. CONST. Amdt. V. For more information, see Congressional Research Service, U.S. CONST. Amdt. V. For more information, see Congressional Research Service, Takings Clause: Overview, ,
CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt5-5-1-1/ALDE_00000920/. CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt5-5-1-1/ALDE_00000920/.
~~236~~242 See Paradissiotis v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 16, 20 (2001) (describing a regulatory taking as “not involv[ing] Paradissiotis v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 16, 20 (2001) (describing a regulatory taking as “not involv[ing]
physical invasion or seizure of property [but rather] concern[ing] action that affects an owner’s use of property, … physical invasion or seizure of property [but rather] concern[ing] action that affects an owner’s use of property, …
based on the ‘general rule ... that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be based on the ‘general rule ... that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking’”) (citing recognized as a taking’”) (citing Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)),, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)), aff’d, 304 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. , 304 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir.
2002). 2002).
~~237~~243 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 673 n. 6. (noting that “an American claimant may not use an attachment that is subject , 453 U.S. at 673 n. 6. (noting that “an American claimant may not use an attachment that is subject
to a revocable license and that has been obtained after the entry of a freeze order to limit in any way the actions the to a revocable license and that has been obtained after the entry of a freeze order to limit in any way the actions the
President may take” pursuant to IEEPA). may take” pursuant to IEEPA).
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This Court has previously recognized that the congressional purpose in authorizing blocking orders is “to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President.... ” Such orders permit the President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency. The frozen assets serve as a negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency. The frozen assets serve as a
“bargaining chip” to be used by the President when dealing with a hostile country. “bargaining chip” to be used by the President when dealing with a hostile country.
Accordingly, it is difficult to accept petitioner’s argument because the practical effect of it Accordingly, it is difficult to accept petitioner’s argument because the practical effect of it
is to allow individual claimants throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate is to allow individual claimants throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate
this “bargaining chip” through attachments, garnishments, or similar encumbrances on this “bargaining chip” through attachments, garnishments, or similar encumbrances on
property. Neither the purpose the statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language property. Neither the purpose the statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language
supports such a result.supports such a result.~~238~~244
Similarly, a lower court held that the extinguishment of contractual rights due to sanctions Similarly, a lower court held that the extinguishment of contractual rights due to sanctions
enacted pursuant to IEEPA does not amount to a regulatory taking requiring compensation under enacted pursuant to IEEPA does not amount to a regulatory taking requiring compensation under
the Fifth Amendment.the Fifth Amendment.~~239~~245 Even though the plaintiff suffered “obvious economic loss” due to the Even though the plaintiff suffered “obvious economic loss” due to the
sanctions regulations, that factor alone was not enough to sustain plaintiffsanctions regulations, that factor alone was not enough to sustain plaintiff'’s claim of a s claim of a
compensable taking.compensable taking.~~240~~246 The court quoted long-standing Supreme Court precedent to support its The court quoted long-standing Supreme Court precedent to support its
finding: finding:
A A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or anew tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a ~~war~~ war may inevitably bring upon individuals great may inevitably bring upon individuals great
losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless. They may destroy the worth losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless. They may destroy the worth
of contracts. But whoever supposed that, because of this, a tariff could not be changed, or of contracts. But whoever supposed that, because of this, a tariff could not be changed, or
a non-intercourse act, or an embargo be enacted, or a war be declared?a non-intercourse act, or an embargo be enacted, or a war be declared? ........ [W]as it ever [W]as it ever
imagined this was taking private property without compensation or without due process of imagined this was taking private property without compensation or without due process of
law?law?~~241~~247
Accordingly, it seems unlikely that entities whose business interests are harmed by the imposition Accordingly, it seems unlikely that entities whose business interests are harmed by the imposition
of sanctions pursuant to IEEPA will be entitled to compensation from the government for their of sanctions pursuant to IEEPA will be entitled to compensation from the government for their
losses. losses.
Persons whose assets have been directly blocked by the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office Persons whose assets have been directly blocked by the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) pursuant to IEEPA have likewise found little success of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) pursuant to IEEPA have likewise found little success
challenging the loss of the use of their assets as uncompensated takings.challenging the loss of the use of their assets as uncompensated takings.~~242~~248 Many courts have Many courts have
recognized that a temporary blocking of assets does not constitute a taking because it is a recognized that a temporary blocking of assets does not constitute a taking because it is a
temporary action that does not vest title in the United States.temporary action that does not vest title in the United States.~~243~~249 This conclusion is apparently so This conclusion is apparently so
~~even if the blocking of assets necessitates the closing altogether of a business enterprise.244 In~~

~~238~~ 244 Ibid. at 673–674; Ibid. at 673–674; see also Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat. Airlines Corp., 657 F.2d 3, 4 (2d Cir. 1981) (“The President’s Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat. Airlines Corp., 657 F.2d 3, 4 (2d Cir. 1981) (“The President’s
action in nullifying the attachments did not constitute a taking of property for which compensation must be paid.”). action in nullifying the attachments did not constitute a taking of property for which compensation must be paid.”).
~~239~~245 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (landlord leasing office space to a 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (landlord leasing office space to a
foreign government “did so against the backdrop of the government’s foreign policy power” and did not have foreign government “did so against the backdrop of the government’s foreign policy power” and did not have
reasonable investment-backed expectation that its contract would be fulfilled); Rockefeller Ctr. Properties v. United reasonable investment-backed expectation that its contract would be fulfilled); Rockefeller Ctr. Properties v. United
States, 32 Fed. Cl. 586, 592 (1995) (“[T]hose who trade with foreign governments must… take the President’s power States, 32 Fed. Cl. 586, 592 (1995) (“[T]hose who trade with foreign governments must… take the President’s power
into account in structuring their transactions.”); Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (into account in structuring their transactions.”); Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]hose [T]hose
who enter into employment contracts overseas do so in light of one salient fact of economic life: that their ability to who enter into employment contracts overseas do so in light of one salient fact of economic life: that their ability to
perform and compel performance is contingent upon the continuation of friendly relations between nations” (citing perform and compel performance is contingent upon the continuation of friendly relations between nations” (citing
Chang v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 555, 559-60 (1987)); , 13 Cl. Ct. 555, 559-60 (1987)); Paradissiotis, 49 Fed. Cl. at 21 (holding there was no taking , 49 Fed. Cl. at 21 (holding there was no taking
because “plaintiffbecause “plaintiff'’’s [stock options] were ‘in every sense subordinate to the President’s power under the IEEPA.’”). ’s [stock options] were ‘in every sense subordinate to the President’s power under the IEEPA.’”).
~~240~~246 Paradissiotis, 49 Fed. Cl. at 21. , 49 Fed. Cl. at 21.
~~241~~247 Ibid. (citing Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1870), quoted in Ibid. (citing Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1870), quoted in Chang, 859 F.2d at 897). , 859 F.2d at 897).
~~242~~248 Glob. Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 802 (N.D. Ill.) (“Takings claims have often been raised— Glob. Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 802 (N.D. Ill.) (“Takings claims have often been raised—
and consistently rejected—in the IEEPA context.”), and consistently rejected—in the IEEPA context.”), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002). , 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
~~243~~249 Ibid. Ibid. (citing (citing Tran Qui Than v. Regan, 658 F.2d 1296, 1304 (9th Cir.1981); , 658 F.2d 1296, 1304 (9th Cir.1981); Miranda v. Secretary of Treasury, 766 , 766
F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1985)); F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1985)); Holy Land Found. . for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 78–79 (D.D.C. 2002) , 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 78–79 (D.D.C. 2002)
(“[T]he case law is clear that a blocking of this nature does not constitute a seizure.” (citations omitted)), (“[T]he case law is clear that a blocking of this nature does not constitute a seizure.” (citations omitted)), aff'd, 333 F.3d , 333 F.3d
156 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
~~244 IPT Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 92 CIV. 5542 (JFK), 1994 WL 613371, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that~~
~~the blocking of assets is not a taking as title to the property has not vested in the Government, the company IPT did not~~
~~become a government-owned enterprise, and any proceeds from a sale of the business or its assets will still vest in its~~
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even if the blocking of assets necessitates the closing altogether of a business enterprise.250 In some circumstances, however, a court may analyze at least the initial blocking of assets under a some circumstances, however, a court may analyze at least the initial blocking of assets under a
Fourth Amendment standard for seizure.Fourth Amendment standard for seizure.~~245~~251 One court found a blocking to be unreasonable under One court found a blocking to be unreasonable under
a Fourth Amendment standard where there was no reason that OFAC could not have first a Fourth Amendment standard where there was no reason that OFAC could not have first
obtained a judicial warrant.obtained a judicial warrant.~~246~~252
Fifth Amendment “Due Process” Clause
Some persons whose assets have been blocked have asserted that their right to due process has Some persons whose assets have been blocked have asserted that their right to due process has
been violated. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be been violated. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.~~247~~253 Where one company protested Where one company protested
that the blocking of its assets without a pre-deprivation hearing violated its right to due process, a that the blocking of its assets without a pre-deprivation hearing violated its right to due process, a
district court found that a temporary deprivation of property does not necessarily give rise to a district court found that a temporary deprivation of property does not necessarily give rise to a
right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.~~248~~254 A second district court stated that the exigencies A second district court stated that the exigencies
of national security and foreign policy considerations that are implicated in IEEPA cases have of national security and foreign policy considerations that are implicated in IEEPA cases have
meant that OFAC historically has not provided pre-deprivation notice in sanctions programs.meant that OFAC historically has not provided pre-deprivation notice in sanctions programs.~~249~~255 A A
third district court stated that OFAC’s failure to provide a charitable foundation with notice or a third district court stated that OFAC’s failure to provide a charitable foundation with notice or a
hearing prior to its designation as a terrorist organization and blocking of its assets did not violate hearing prior to its designation as a terrorist organization and blocking of its assets did not violate
its right to procedural due process, because the OFAC designation and blocking order serve the its right to procedural due process, because the OFAC designation and blocking order serve the
important governmental interest of combating terrorism by curtailing the flow of terrorist important governmental interest of combating terrorism by curtailing the flow of terrorist
financing.financing.~~250~~256 That same court also held that prompt action by the government was necessary to That same court also held that prompt action by the government was necessary to
protect against the transfer of assets subject to the blocking order.protect against the transfer of assets subject to the blocking order.~~251~~257
In In Al Haramain Islamic Foundation v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Court of , the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether OFAC’s use of classified information without Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether OFAC’s use of classified information without
any disclosure of its content in its decision to freeze the assets of a charitable organization, and its any disclosure of its content in its decision to freeze the assets of a charitable organization, and its
failure to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, violated the failure to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, violated the
organization’s right to procedural due process.organization’s right to procedural due process.~~252~~258 The court applied the balancing test set forth by The court applied the balancing test set forth by
the Supreme Court in its landmarkthe Supreme Court in its landmark ~~administrative law~~ case case Mathews v. Eldridge~~253~~259 to resolve to resolve
these questions.these questions.~~254~~ 260 Under the Under the Eldridge test, to determine if an individual has received test, to determine if an individual has received
constitutional due process, courts must weighconstitutional due process, courts must weigh:
(1) [the person’s or entity’s] private property interest, (1) [the person’s or entity’s] private property interest,
~~(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, as~~
~~well as the value of additional safeguards, and~~

250 IPT Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 92 CIV. 5542 (JFK), 1994 WL 613371, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the blocking of assets is not a taking as title to the property has not vested in the Government, the company IPT did not become a government-owned enterprise, and any proceeds from a sale of the business or its assets will still vest in its owners, who may claim such assets when the blocking order is lifted). owners, who may claim such assets when the blocking order is lifted).
~~245~~251 KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 872 (N.D. Ohio 2009); Al KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 872 (N.D. Ohio 2009); Al
Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 585 F. Supp.2d 1233, 1263 (D. Or. 2008). Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 585 F. Supp.2d 1233, 1263 (D. Or. 2008).
~~246~~252 KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 883. , 647 F. Supp. 2d at 883.
~~247~~253 U.S. Constitution, Amdt. V. U.S. Constitution, Amdt. V.
~~248~~254 IPT Co., 1994 WL 613371, at *6 (citing , 1994 WL 613371, at *6 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 498 , 114 S. Ct. 492, 498
(1993); (1993); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976)). , 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976)).
~~249~~255 Glob. Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 803-04 (emphasizing “the Executive, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 803-04 (emphasizing “the Executive'’s need for speed in these matters, and s need for speed in these matters, and
the need to prevent the flight of assets and destruction of records”), the need to prevent the flight of assets and destruction of records”), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002). , 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
~~250~~256 Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (D.D.C. 2002). , 219 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (D.D.C. 2002).
~~251~~257 Ibid. Ibid.
~~252~~258 686 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 2012). 686 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 2012).
~~253~~259 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
~~254~~260 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 979. , 686 F.3d at 979.
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( (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, as well as the value of additional safeguards, and (3) the Government’~~3) the Government'~~s interest in maintaining its procedures, including the burdens of s interest in maintaining its procedures, including the burdens of
additional procedural requirements.”additional procedural requirements.”~~255~~261
While weighing the interests and risks at issue in While weighing the interests and risks at issue in Al Haramain, the Ninth Circuit found the , the Ninth Circuit found the
organization’s property interest to be significant: organization’s property interest to be significant:
By design, a designation by OFAC completely shutters all domestic operations of an entity. By design, a designation by OFAC completely shutters all domestic operations of an entity.
All assets are frozen. No person or organization may conduct any business whatsoever with All assets are frozen. No person or organization may conduct any business whatsoever with
the entity, other than a very narrow category of actions such as legal defense. Civil penalties the entity, other than a very narrow category of actions such as legal defense. Civil penalties
attach even for unwitting violations. Criminal penalties, including up to 20 years’ attach even for unwitting violations. Criminal penalties, including up to 20 years’
imprisonment, attach for willful violations. For domestic organizations such as AHIF–imprisonment, attach for willful violations. For domestic organizations such as AHIF–
Oregon, a designation means that it conducts no business at all. The designation is Oregon, a designation means that it conducts no business at all. The designation is
indefinite. Although an entity can seek administrative reconsideration and limited judicial indefinite. Although an entity can seek administrative reconsideration and limited judicial
relief, those remedies take considerable time, as evidenced by OFAC’s long administrative relief, those remedies take considerable time, as evidenced by OFAC’s long administrative
delay in this case and the ordinary delays inherent in our judicial system. In sum, delay in this case and the ordinary delays inherent in our judicial system. In sum,
designation is not a mere inconvenience or burden on certain property interests; designation designation is not a mere inconvenience or burden on certain property interests; designation
indefinitely renders a domestic organization financially defunct.indefinitely renders a domestic organization financially defunct.~~256~~262
Nevertheless, the court found “the government’s interest in national security [could not] be Nevertheless, the court found “the government’s interest in national security [could not] be
understated.”understated.”~~257~~263 In evaluating the government’s interest in maintaining its procedures, the Ninth In evaluating the government’s interest in maintaining its procedures, the Ninth
Circuit explained that the Constitution requires that the government “take reasonable measures to Circuit explained that the Constitution requires that the government “take reasonable measures to
ensure basic fairness to the private party and that the government follow procedures reasonably ensure basic fairness to the private party and that the government follow procedures reasonably
designed to protect against erroneous deprivation of the private party’s interests.”designed to protect against erroneous deprivation of the private party’s interests.”~~258~~264 While the While the
Ninth Circuit had previously held that the use of undisclosed information in a case involving the Ninth Circuit had previously held that the use of undisclosed information in a case involving the
exclusion of certain longtime resident aliens should be considered presumptively exclusion of certain longtime resident aliens should be considered presumptively
unconstitutional,unconstitutional,~~259~~265 the court found that the presumption had been overcome in this case. the court found that the presumption had been overcome in this case.~~260~~266 The The
Ninth Circuit noted that all federal courts that have considered the argument that OFAC may not Ninth Circuit noted that all federal courts that have considered the argument that OFAC may not
use undisclosed classified information in making its determinations have rejected it.use undisclosed classified information in making its determinations have rejected it.~~261~~267 Although Although
the court found that OFAC’s failure to provide even an unclassified summary of the information the court found that OFAC’s failure to provide even an unclassified summary of the information
at issue was a violation of the organization’s due process rights,at issue was a violation of the organization’s due process rights,~~262~~268 the court deemed the error the court deemed the error
harmless because it would not likely have affected the outcome of the case.harmless because it would not likely have affected the outcome of the case.~~263~~
~~In the same case, the Ninth Circuit also considered the organization’s argument that it had been~~
~~denied adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.264 Specifically, the organization asserted~~
~~that OFAC had refused to disclose its reasons for investigating and designating the organization,~~

~~255~~269 261 Ibid. Ibid. (citing (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35). , 424 U.S. at 334-35).
~~256~~262 Ibid. at 979–80 (internal citations omitted). Ibid. at 979–80 (internal citations omitted).
~~257~~263 Ibid. at 980. Ibid. at 980.
~~258~~264 Ibid. Ibid.
~~259~~265 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 981 (stating the use of classified information “should be presumptively unconstitutional” , 686 F.3d at 981 (stating the use of classified information “should be presumptively unconstitutional”
(citing (citing Am.–Arab Anti–Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir.1995)). , 70 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir.1995)).
~~260~~266 Ibid Ibid. at 982 “[T]the use of classified information in the fight against terrorism, during a presidentially declared at 982 “[T]the use of classified information in the fight against terrorism, during a presidentially declared
“national emergency,” qualifies as sufficiently “extraordinary” to overcome the presumption.”). “national emergency,” qualifies as sufficiently “extraordinary” to overcome the presumption.”).
~~261~~267 Ibid Ibid. at 981 (citing at 981 (citing Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; , 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. , 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.
2002); 2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner ( (KindHearts II), 710 F. Supp. 2d 637, 660 (N.D. ), 710 F. Supp. 2d 637, 660 (N.D.
Ohio 2010); Ohio 2010); Al–Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 72 (D.D.C. 2008)). , 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 72 (D.D.C. 2008)).
~~262 Ibid.~~See also Olenga v. Gacki, 507 F. Supp. 3d 260, 278 (D.D.C. 2020) (“[G]iven the overriding governmental interest at stake in protecting classified information and the wide berth afforded the executive branch in matters relating to foreign affairs and national security, the Court concludes that OFAC has provided Olenga with sufficient notice of the reasons for his designation to comply with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). 268 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 984 (“OFAC’s failure to pursue potential mitigation measures violated AHIF–Oregon’s due process at 984 (“OFAC’s failure to pursue potential mitigation measures violated AHIF–Oregon’s due process
rights.”). rights.”).
~~263~~269 Ibid Ibid. at 990. at 990.
~~264 Ibid. at 984.~~
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In the same case, the Ninth Circuit also considered the organization’s argument that it had been denied adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.270 Specifically, the organization asserted that OFAC had refused to disclose its reasons for investigating and designating the organization, leaving it unable to respond adequately to OFAC’s unknown suspicions.leaving it unable to respond adequately to OFAC’s unknown suspicions.~~265~~271 Because OFAC had Because OFAC had
provided the organization with only one document to support its designation over the four-year provided the organization with only one document to support its designation over the four-year
period between the freezing of its assets and its redesignation as a specially designated global period between the freezing of its assets and its redesignation as a specially designated global
terrorist (SDGT), the court agreed that OFAC had deprived the organization’s procedural due terrorist (SDGT), the court agreed that OFAC had deprived the organization’s procedural due
process rights.process rights.~~266~~272 However, the court found that this error too was harmless. However, the court found that this error too was harmless.~~267~~273
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that a foreign individual could not The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that a foreign individual could not
challenge his designation as a specially designated national under IEEPA on due process grounds challenge his designation as a specially designated national under IEEPA on due process grounds
because he had not established a sufficient connection with the United States to warrant because he had not established a sufficient connection with the United States to warrant
constitutional protections.constitutional protections.~~268~~274 The court acknowledged that the D.C. Circuit has not articulated a The court acknowledged that the D.C. Circuit has not articulated a
specific test for determining whether a foreign national residing outside the United States specific test for determining whether a foreign national residing outside the United States
maintains the requisite “substantial connections” to avail himself of due process rights.maintains the requisite “substantial connections” to avail himself of due process rights.~~269~~275 The The
court held that, irrespective of the proper test, the individual had failed to meet the requisite court held that, irrespective of the proper test, the individual had failed to meet the requisite
constitutional standard because he “ha[d] not established constitutional standard because he “ha[d] not established any connection to the United States, let connection to the United States, let
alone a substantial one.”alone a substantial one.”~~270~~276 The court did, however, hold that the foreign national retained the The court did, however, hold that the foreign national retained the
right to procedural review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).right to procedural review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).~~271~~277
First Amendment Challenges
Some courts have considered whether asset blocking or penalties imposed pursuant to regulations Some courts have considered whether asset blocking or penalties imposed pursuant to regulations
promulgated under IEEPA have violated the subjects’ First Amendment rights to free association, promulgated under IEEPA have violated the subjects’ First Amendment rights to free association,
free speech, or religion. Challenges on these grounds have typically failed.free speech, or religion. Challenges on these grounds have typically failed.~~272 Courts have held~~
~~that there is no First Amendment right to support terrorists.273 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the~~

~~265~~278 Courts have held 270 Ibid. at 984. 271 Ibid. at 984-85. Ibid. at 984-85.
~~266~~272 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 987 (holding that, at a minimum, OFAC must provide a timely statement of reasons for , 686 F.3d at 987 (holding that, at a minimum, OFAC must provide a timely statement of reasons for
the investigation). the investigation).
~~267~~273 Ibid. at 990 (“Even if [the organization] had enjoyed better access to classified information and constitutionally Ibid. at 990 (“Even if [the organization] had enjoyed better access to classified information and constitutionally
adequate notice, we are confident that it would not have changed OFAC’s ultimate designation determination.”). adequate notice, we are confident that it would not have changed OFAC’s ultimate designation determination.”).
~~268~~274 Rakhimov v. Gacki, No. CV 19-2554 (JEB), 2020 WL 1911561, at *5 (D.D.C. April 20, 2020) (citing People Rakhimov v. Gacki, No. CV 19-2554 (JEB), 2020 WL 1911561, at *5 (D.D.C. April 20, 2020) (citing People'’s s
Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); see also Fulmen Co. v. Office of Fulmen Co. v. Office of
Foreign Assets Control, Foreign Assets Control, ~~No. CV 18-2949 (RJL), 2020 WL 1536341, at *5 (D.D.C. March 31,~~ 547 F.Supp.3d 13, 22 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Because 2020) (“Because
Fulmen’s own pleadings demonstrate no property or presence in the United States, it cannot establish the ‘substantial Fulmen’s own pleadings demonstrate no property or presence in the United States, it cannot establish the ‘substantial
connections’ necessary to potentially entitle it to constitutional protections as a non-resident alien.”). connections’ necessary to potentially entitle it to constitutional protections as a non-resident alien.”).
~~269~~ 275 Rakhimov, 2020 WL 1911561 at *5 (citing Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, , 2020 WL 1911561 at *5 (citing Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192,
201–03 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 32 Cty. Sovereignty Comm. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 201–03 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 32 Cty. Sovereignty Comm. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
~~270~~276 Ibid. Ibid.
~~271~~277 See ibid. See ibid. at *6 (observing that the court must follow “the APA’s [5 U.S.C. §at *6 (observing that the court must follow “the APA’s [5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)] ‘highly deferential 706(2)(A)] ‘highly deferential
standard,’ meaning that [it] may set aside Treasury’s action ‘only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or standard,’ meaning that [it] may set aside Treasury’s action ‘only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law’”) (quoting Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). otherwise not in accordance with law’”) (quoting Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
~~272~~278 KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (“Courts have uniformly held that OFAC, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (“Courts have uniformly held that OFAC'’s blocking and designation authorities s blocking and designation authorities
do not reach a substantial amount of protected speech, and that its restrictions are narrowly tailored.”). Islamic Am. do not reach a substantial amount of protected speech, and that its restrictions are narrowly tailored.”). Islamic Am.
Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52-55 (D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting claims that OFAC Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52-55 (D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting claims that OFAC
blocking action violated plaintiffblocking action violated plaintiff'’s First Amendment freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of s First Amendment freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of
religion, and noting that “nothing in the IEEPA or the executive order prohibits [the plaintiff] from expressing its religion, and noting that “nothing in the IEEPA or the executive order prohibits [the plaintiff] from expressing its
views”); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 570 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“The First Amendmentviews”); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 570 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“The First Amendment'’s guarantee of s guarantee of
associational freedom is no license to supply terrorist organizations with resources or material support in any form, associational freedom is no license to supply terrorist organizations with resources or material support in any form,
including services as a combatant.”). including services as a combatant.”).
~~273 Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that “where an organization is~~
~~found to have supported terrorism, government actions to suspend that support are not unconstitutional” under the First~~
~~Amendment); Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 166 (holding “as other courts have,” with respect to a First Amendment right to~~
~~association claim, that “there is no First Amendment right nor any other constitutional right to support terrorists” (citing~~
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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Congressional Research Service 41 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use that there is no First Amendment right to support terrorists.279 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit distinguished advocacy from financial support and held that the District of Columbia Circuit distinguished advocacy from financial support and held that the
blocking of assets affected only the ability to provide financial support, but did not implicate the blocking of assets affected only the ability to provide financial support, but did not implicate the
organization’s freedom of association.organization’s freedom of association.~~274~~280 Similarly, a district court interpreted relevant case law to Similarly, a district court interpreted relevant case law to
hold that government actions prohibiting charitable contributions are subject to intermediate hold that government actions prohibiting charitable contributions are subject to intermediate
scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, a higher standard that typically applies to regulations scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, a higher standard that typically applies to regulations
implicating political contributions.implicating political contributions.~~275~~281
With respect to a free speech challenge brought by a charitable organization whose assets were With respect to a free speech challenge brought by a charitable organization whose assets were
temporarily blocked during the pendency of an investigation, a district court explained that “when temporarily blocked during the pendency of an investigation, a district court explained that “when
‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important government interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental important government interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”~~276~~282 Accordingly, the district court applied the Accordingly, the district court applied the
following test to determine whether the designations and blocking actions were lawful. Citing the following test to determine whether the designations and blocking actions were lawful. Citing the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. O’Brien, the court stated that a government , the court stated that a government
regulation is sufficiently justified if:regulation is sufficiently justified if:
(1) (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government; it is within the constitutional power of the government;
(2) (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
(3) (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
(4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.essential to the furtherance of that interest.~~277~~283
The court found the government’s actions fell within the bounds of this test: The court found the government’s actions fell within the bounds of this test:
First, the President clearly had the power to issue the Executive Order. Second, the First, the President clearly had the power to issue the Executive Order. Second, the
Executive Order promotes an important and substantial government interest—that of Executive Order promotes an important and substantial government interest—that of
preventing terrorist attacks. Third, the government’s action is unrelated to the suppression preventing terrorist attacks. Third, the government’s action is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; it prohibits the provision of financial and other support to terrorists. of free expression; it prohibits the provision of financial and other support to terrorists.
Fourth, the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are no greater than Fourth, the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are no greater than
necessary.necessary.~~278~~284
With respect to an organization that was not itself designated as an SDGT but wished to conduct With respect to an organization that was not itself designated as an SDGT but wished to conduct
coordinated advocacy with another organization that was so designated, one appellate court found coordinated advocacy with another organization that was so designated, one appellate court found
that an OFAC regulation barring such coordinated advocacy based on its content was subject to that an OFAC regulation barring such coordinated advocacy based on its content was subject to
strict scrutiny.strict scrutiny.~~279~~285 The court rejected the government’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in The court rejected the government’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project280 to find that the regulation impermissibly implicated the
~~organization’s right to free speech.281 Accordingly, there may be some circumstances where the~~

~~274~~ 279 Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that “where an organization is found to have supported terrorism, government actions to suspend that support are not unconstitutional” under the First Amendment); Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 166 (holding “as other courts have,” with respect to a First Amendment right to association claim, that “there is no First Amendment right nor any other constitutional right to support terrorists” (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000)). 280 Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at 736 (“The blocking was not based on, nor does it prohibit, associational 477 F.3d at 736 (“The blocking was not based on, nor does it prohibit, associational
activity other than financial support.”). activity other than financial support.”).
~~275~~281 Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting cases that concluded that intermediate scrutiny applies Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting cases that concluded that intermediate scrutiny applies
to a designation as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) and blocking order affecting funds purportedly to a designation as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) and blocking order affecting funds purportedly
intended for charitable purposes). intended for charitable purposes).
~~276~~282 Glob. Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (citing ., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)), , 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)), aff'd on
other grounds, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002). s, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
~~277~~283 Ibid. Ibid. (citing (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77). , 391 U.S. at 376-77).
~~278~~284 Ibid. Ibid.
~~279~~285 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 997 (holding strict scrutiny applies and that, “[a]ccordingly, the prohibition survives only , 686 F.3d at 997 (holding strict scrutiny applies and that, “[a]ccordingly, the prohibition survives only
if it is narrowly tailored to advance the concededly compelling government interest of preventing terrorism”). if it is narrowly tailored to advance the concededly compelling government interest of preventing terrorism”).
~~280 561 U.S. 1, 38 (2010) (upholding the prohibition on material support of terrorist organizations, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B,~~
~~against First Amendment challenge).~~
~~281 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 1001 (holding that under the prevailing fact circumstances, OFAC's content-based~~
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~~First Amendment protects speech coordinated with (but not on behalf of) an organization~~
~~designated as an SDGT.~~
~~First Amendment—Informational Materials and Communications Exception~~
~~under IEEPA~~
~~Litigants~~Congressional Research Service 42 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project286 to find that the regulation impermissibly implicated the organization’s right to free speech.287 Accordingly, there may be some circumstances where the First Amendment protects speech coordinated with (but not on behalf of) an organization designated as an SDGT. First Amendment—Informational Materials and Communications Exception under IEEPA Although caselaw is sparse, it appears that criminal defendants have had little success asserting a defense that their conduct amounted to conduct under the provision of informational materials or protected communications exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected a claim that OFAC’s regulation, which exempts informational materials that were “not fully created and in existence at the date of the transactions” from the scope of the statutory exception for informational materials, was ultra vires.288 The Third Circuit upheld the defendant’s conviction for violating Iran sanctions regulations by marketing a dynamic chemical engineering software program to various Iranian entities.289 A district court validated an indictment for IEEPA violations against a defendant who spoke at a conference in the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK) involving cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies.290 The court held that the jury could decide if the speech was part of a long-term conspiracy to persuade and assist the DPRK in using cryptocurrency services in an effort to avoid U.S. sanctions and launder money.291 Another court upheld regulations that provided that software does not qualify as excepted “information and informational materials” if it is subject to export controls.292 Likewise, source code was held not entitled to protection insofar as it was used to conduct cryptocurrency transactions.293 Civil litigants have had some success challenging IEEPA regulations that effectively shut down have had some success challenging IEEPA regulations that effectively shut down
communications platforms altogether. On May 15, 2019, President Donald J. Trump, finding “that communications platforms altogether. On May 15, 2019, President Donald J. Trump, finding “that
the unrestricted acquisition or use in the United States of information and communications the unrestricted acquisition or use in the United States of information and communications
technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by,
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries” constituted an controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries” constituted an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the
United States, declared a national emergency under the authority of the NEA and invoked United States, declared a national emergency under the authority of the NEA and invoked
authorities granted by IEEPA.authorities granted by IEEPA.~~282~~294
A little more than a year later, on August 6, 2020, President Trump issued two executive orders A little more than a year later, on August 6, 2020, President Trump issued two executive orders
under that same national emergency to address “the spread in the United States of mobile under that same national emergency to address “the spread in the United States of mobile
286 561 U.S. 1, 38 (2010) (upholding the prohibition on material support of terrorist organizations, 18 U.S.C. §2339B, against First Amendment challenge). 287 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 1001 (holding that under the prevailing fact circumstances, OFAC’s content-based prohibitions on speech violate the First Amendment). 288 United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 583 (3d Cir. 2011). 289 Ibid. at 567. 290 United States v. Griffith, 515 F. Supp. 3d 106, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). 291 Ibid. at 117. 292 United States v. Alavi, No. CR 07-429-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 1989773, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss superseding indictment). 293 Van Loon v. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 1:23-CV-312-RP, 2023 WL 5313091, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2023). 294 E.O. 13873 (May 15, 2019), Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 84 Federal Register 22,689 (May 17, 2019). Congressional Research Service 43 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use applications developed and owned by companies in [China].”295~~applications developed and owned by companies in [China].”283~~ The executive orders applied to The executive orders applied to
the video sharing platform the video sharing platform ~~TikTok284~~TikTok296 and the communications platform WeChat, among others, and the communications platform WeChat, among others,~~285~~297
and prohibited certain transactions, as identified by the Secretary of Commerce, with ByteDance and prohibited certain transactions, as identified by the Secretary of Commerce, with ByteDance
Ltd., TikTok’s owner, and Tencent Holdings Ltd., WeChat’s owner.Ltd., TikTok’s owner, and Tencent Holdings Ltd., WeChat’s owner.~~286~~298
After the Trump Administration issued regulations barring transactions involving the TikTok and After the Trump Administration issued regulations barring transactions involving the TikTok and
WeChat communications applications (apps) in the United States, users of TikTok and WeChat WeChat communications applications (apps) in the United States, users of TikTok and WeChat
challenged the executive orders and the Commerce Department memorandums implementing challenged the executive orders and the Commerce Department memorandums implementing
them on constitutional and statutory grounds. Specifically, in two separate cases, litigants argued them on constitutional and statutory grounds. Specifically, in two separate cases, litigants argued
that orders and memorandums violated their First Amendment right to free speech and violated that orders and memorandums violated their First Amendment right to free speech and violated
the IEEPA restriction on regulating transactions of informational materials.the IEEPA restriction on regulating transactions of informational materials.~~287~~299 TikTok also TikTok also
brought a separate suit to enjoin the restrictions.brought a separate suit to enjoin the restrictions.~~288~~300
In the first case, In the first case, Marland v. Trump, plaintiffs, users of the video-sharing application TikTok, , plaintiffs, users of the video-sharing application TikTok,
challenged the Commerce Department’s memorandum that identified six prohibited transactions challenged the Commerce Department’s memorandum that identified six prohibited transactions
under E.O. 13942.under E.O. 13942.~~289~~301 The Commerce TikTok Identification specified that it bans only business-to- The Commerce TikTok Identification specified that it bans only business-to-

~~prohibitions on speech violate the First Amendment).~~
~~282 E.O. 13873 (May 15, 2019), Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,~~
~~84 Fed. Reg. 22,689 (May 17, 2019).~~
~~283~~business transactions and does not apply to exchanges of business or personal information among TikTok users.302 An earlier Commerce Department memorandum noted that the effect of the prohibitions, most of which were scheduled to apply on November 12, 2020, would be to “significantly reduce the functionality and usability of the app in the United States,” and that “these prohibitions may ultimately make the application less effective and may be challenging for U.S.-based TikTok users.”303 The plaintiffs contended that the Commerce Identification violated the First and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the APA.304 The district court declined to address the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenges and certain other claims, and considered instead their claim that the Commerce TikTok Identification was an ultra vires exercise of agency authority under the APA because it violates IEEPA’s “informational material” exception as well as the exception for “personal communication[s] ... not involv[ing] a transfer of anything of value.”305 The court employed a textual interpretation of IEEPA’s informational material bar to find that the short-format videos exchanged via TikTok clearly fell into IEEPA’s nonexhaustive exemplary list of informational materials protected from regulation or prohibition because they are “analogous 295 E.O. 13942 (August 6, 2020), E.O. 13942 (August 6, 2020), Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok, and Taking Additional Steps To Address the
National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 85 , 85
~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 48,637 (August 11, 2020); E.O. 13943 (August 6, 2020), 48,637 (August 11, 2020); E.O. 13943 (August 6, 2020), Addressing the Threat Posed by WeChat, and
Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications
Technology and Services Supply Chain, 85 , 85 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 48,641 (August 11, 2020). 48,641 (August 11, 2020).
~~284~~296 E.O. 13942. E.O. 13942.
~~285~~297 E.O. 13943. E.O. 13943.
~~286~~298 E.O. 13942; E.O. 13943. E.O. 13942; E.O. 13943.
~~287~~299 Marland v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 624 (E.D. Pa. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 5346749, at *1 (3d Cir. July Marland v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 624 (E.D. Pa. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 5346749, at *1 (3d Cir. July
14, 2021); U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 14, 2021); U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL
4692706 (9th Cir. August 9, 2021). 4692706 (9th Cir. August 9, 2021).
~~288~~300 TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, 507 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D.D.C. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 3082803, at *1 (D.C. Cir. TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, 507 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D.D.C. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 3082803, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
July 14, 2021). July 14, 2021).
~~289~~301 Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 632. 302 Identification of Prohibited Transactions to Implement Executive Order 13942 and Address the Threat Posed by TikTok and the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 85 Federal Register 60,061 (September 24, 2020) (the “Commerce TikTok Identification”). 303 Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 632 (quoting September 17 Commerce Department memorandum). 304 Ibid. at 634. 305 Ibid. (citing 5 U.S.C. §702; 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1) and (3)). Congressional Research Service 44 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 632.
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~~business transactions and does not apply to exchanges of business or personal information among~~
~~TikTok users.290 An earlier Commerce Department memorandum noted that the effect of the~~
~~prohibitions, most of which were scheduled to apply on November 12, 2020, would be to~~
~~“significantly reduce the functionality and usability of the app in the United States,” and that~~
~~“these prohibitions may ultimately make the application less effective and may be challenging for~~
~~U.S.-based TikTok users.”291~~
~~The plaintiffs contended that the Commerce Identification violated the First and Fifth~~
~~Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the APA.292 The district court declined to address~~
~~the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenges and certain other claims, and considered instead their~~
~~claim that the Commerce TikTok Identification was an ultra vires exercise of agency authority~~
~~under the APA because it violates IEEPA’s “informational material” exception as well as the~~
~~exception for “personal communication[s] . . . not involv[ing] a transfer of anything of value.”293~~
~~The court employed a textual interpretation of IEEPA’s informational material bar to find that the~~
~~short-format videos exchanged via TikTok clearly fell into IEEPA’s non-exhaustive exemplary~~
~~list of informational materials protected from regulation or prohibition because they are~~
~~“analogous~~ to the ‘films,’ ‘artworks,’ ‘photographs,’ and ‘news wire feeds’ expressly protected to the ‘films,’ ‘artworks,’ ‘photographs,’ and ‘news wire feeds’ expressly protected
under under §§ 1702(b)(3).”1702(b)(3).”~~294~~306
The court next determined that the Commerce TikTok Identification, even though it did not The court next determined that the Commerce TikTok Identification, even though it did not
directly ban TikTok users from communicating via TikTok, amounted, at minimum, to an indirect directly ban TikTok users from communicating via TikTok, amounted, at minimum, to an indirect
regulation of such communications by making them impossible to carry out.regulation of such communications by making them impossible to carry out.~~295~~307 The government The government
sought to characterize the burden on TikTok users as merely incidental to the Commerce sought to characterize the burden on TikTok users as merely incidental to the Commerce
Identification’s intended objective of prohibiting TikTok’s commercial transactions, and that any Identification’s intended objective of prohibiting TikTok’s commercial transactions, and that any
incidental burden cannot violated IEEPA.incidental burden cannot violated IEEPA.~~296~~308 The court, pointing to legislative history of the The court, pointing to legislative history of the
Berman Amendments, rejected the government’s contention that the object of the regulation must Berman Amendments, rejected the government’s contention that the object of the regulation must
itself involve transactions of informational material to be in violation of IEEPA’s informational itself involve transactions of informational material to be in violation of IEEPA’s informational
material exception.material exception.~~297~~309 The court observed, “[t]he Government’s suggested reading ignores The court observed, “[t]he Government’s suggested reading ignores
Congress’s deliberate insertion of the word ‘indirectly’ into IEEPA.”Congress’s deliberate insertion of the word ‘indirectly’ into IEEPA.”~~298~~310 While the court accepted While the court accepted
the notion that some burdens on transactions involving informational materials might be so the notion that some burdens on transactions involving informational materials might be so
tangential as to survive review, it declared that this case “does not present a line-drawing tangential as to survive review, it declared that this case “does not present a line-drawing
problem” between indirect regulation and tangential effects.problem” between indirect regulation and tangential effects.~~299~~311
In the next case, TikTok and its Beijing-based parent company ByteDance sued to enjoin the In the next case, TikTok and its Beijing-based parent company ByteDance sued to enjoin the
Commerce TikTok Identification prohibitions and were initially granted a nationwide preliminary Commerce TikTok Identification prohibitions and were initially granted a nationwide preliminary
injunction on the first of the prohibitions, which involved availability of the video-sharing app in injunction on the first of the prohibitions, which involved availability of the video-sharing app in

~~290 Identification of Prohibited Transactions to Implement Executive Order 13942 and Address the Threat Posed by~~
~~TikTok and the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services~~
~~Supply Chain, 85 Fed. Reg. 60,061 (September 24, 2020) (the “Commerce TikTok Identification”).~~
~~291 Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 632 (quoting September 17 Commerce Department memorandum).~~
~~292 Ibid. at 634.~~
~~293 Ibid. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702; 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1) and (3)).~~
~~294 Ibid. at 636.~~
~~295 Ibid. at 637 (“[T]he effect of the Identification will be to undermine the app’s functionality such that U.S. users will~~
~~be prevented from exchanging data on the app.”).~~
~~296 Ibid.~~
~~297 Ibid. at 638.~~
~~298 Ibid.~~
~~299 Ibid. at 639.~~
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~~app stores.300~~app stores.312 The district court determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits The district court determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits
of their claim that the prohibition contravened the informational material exception.of their claim that the prohibition contravened the informational material exception.~~301~~313 The court The court
explained that the content users share through TikTok falls into the category of informational explained that the content users share through TikTok falls into the category of informational
materials because it “appears to be (or to be analogous to) ‘publications, films, .materials because it “appears to be (or to be analogous to) ‘publications, films, . . .. photographs, .. photographs, .
~~. .~~ .. artworks, .artworks, . . .. and news wire feeds.’”. and news wire feeds.’”~~302~~314 Like the court in Like the court in Marland, the district court in , the district court in TikTok
Inc. rejected the government’s contention that the prohibition involved only business-to-business rejected the government’s contention that the prohibition involved only business-to-business
transactions based on the finding that the “purpose and effect” of the prohibition on U.S. users transactions based on the finding that the “purpose and effect” of the prohibition on U.S. users
was “to limit, and ultimately reduce to zero, the number of U.S. users who can comment on the was “to limit, and ultimately reduce to zero, the number of U.S. users who can comment on the
platform and have their personal data on TikTok.”platform and have their personal data on TikTok.”~~303~~315 The court also found it implausible that The court also found it implausible that
information exchanged on TikTok would fall within a carve-out to the informational materials information exchanged on TikTok would fall within a carve-out to the informational materials
exception under the Espionage Act for “shar[ing] U.S. defense secrets .exception under the Espionage Act for “shar[ing] U.S. defense secrets . . .. with foreign . with foreign
adversaries”.adversaries”.~~304~~316
The IEEPA exception also covers “personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of The IEEPA exception also covers “personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of
anything of value.”anything of value.”~~305~~317 The government in The government in TikTok argued that, even if personal communications argued that, even if personal communications
shared over TikTok have no economic value to the creators and recipients, such communications shared over TikTok have no economic value to the creators and recipients, such communications
306 Ibid. at 636. 307 Ibid. at 637 (“[T]he effect of the Identification will be to undermine the app’s functionality such that U.S. users will be prevented from exchanging data on the app.”). 308 Ibid. 309 Ibid. at 638. 310 Ibid. 311 Ibid. at 639. 312 TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, 490 F. Supp. 3d 73 (D.D.C. 2020). 313 Ibid. at 80. 314 Ibid. at 82 (quoting 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(3)). 315 Ibid. at 81. 316 Ibid. at 83. 317 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1). Congressional Research Service 45 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use nevertheless have an economic value to the platform as a whole.318~~nevertheless have an economic value to the platform as a whole.306~~ The district court rejected this The district court rejected this
argument, stating “such an expansive reading of the phrase ‘anything of value’ would write the argument, stating “such an expansive reading of the phrase ‘anything of value’ would write the
personal-communications limitation out of the statute.”personal-communications limitation out of the statute.”~~307~~319 The court reasoned that, “[a]ll The court reasoned that, “[a]ll
communication service providers—from televisions stations and publishers to cellular phone communication service providers—from televisions stations and publishers to cellular phone
carriers—get some value from a user’s ‘presence on’ their platform.”carriers—get some value from a user’s ‘presence on’ their platform.”~~308~~320
The third case stems from the Commerce Secretary’s issuance of “Identification of Prohibited The third case stems from the Commerce Secretary’s issuance of “Identification of Prohibited
Transactions to Implement Executive Order 13943 and Address the Threat Posed by WeChat and Transactions to Implement Executive Order 13943 and Address the Threat Posed by WeChat and
the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and
Services Supply Chain,” identifying the prohibited transactions (Commerce WeChat Services Supply Chain,” identifying the prohibited transactions (Commerce WeChat
Identification). Identification). ~~309~~321 The Commerce WeChat Identification further clarified that these prohibitions The Commerce WeChat Identification further clarified that these prohibitions
“only apply to the parties to business-to-business transactions” and did not apply to “[t]he “only apply to the parties to business-to-business transactions” and did not apply to “[t]he
exchange between or among WeChat mobile application users of personal or business exchange between or among WeChat mobile application users of personal or business
information using the WeChat mobile application, to include the transferring and receiving of information using the WeChat mobile application, to include the transferring and receiving of
funds,” among other things.funds,” among other things.~~310~~322 The U.S. users of the messaging, social-media, and mobile- The U.S. users of the messaging, social-media, and mobile-
payment app WeChat, sued to challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order 13943 on First payment app WeChat, sued to challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order 13943 on First
Amendment and Fifth Amendment grounds, as well its compliance with the IEEPA exception Amendment and Fifth Amendment grounds, as well its compliance with the IEEPA exception
precluding regulation of personal communications.precluding regulation of personal communications.~~311~~323 The government did not contest that the ~~The government did not contest that the~~

~~300 TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, 490 F. Supp. 3d 73 (D.D.C. 2020).~~
~~301 Ibid. at 80.~~
~~302 Ibid. at 82 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3)).~~
~~303 Ibid. at 81.~~
~~304 Ibid. at 83.~~
~~305 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1).~~
~~306 TikTok, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 83.~~
~~307 Ibid.~~
~~308 Ibid.~~
~~309 U.S. Commerce Dep’t, https://www.commerce.gov/files/identification-prohibited-transactions-implement-~~
~~executive-order-13943-and-address-threat.~~
~~310 Ibid.~~
~~311 U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020).~~
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prohibitions would result in shutting down WeChat for users as a platform for the exchange of prohibitions would result in shutting down WeChat for users as a platform for the exchange of
information.information.~~312~~324
Addressing the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge, the district court agreed that the plaintiffs Addressing the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge, the district court agreed that the plaintiffs
established a strong showing that the WeChat ban unlawfully foreclosed “an entire medium of established a strong showing that the WeChat ban unlawfully foreclosed “an entire medium of
public expression” or amounted to an unlawful prior restraint of their communications. public expression” or amounted to an unlawful prior restraint of their communications. ~~313~~325 The The
court concluded that Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking WeChat users in the United States court concluded that Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking WeChat users in the United States
do not have any other viable means of communicating electronically, “not only because China do not have any other viable means of communicating electronically, “not only because China
bans other apps, but also because Chinese speakers with limited English proficiency have no bans other apps, but also because Chinese speakers with limited English proficiency have no
options other than WeChat.”options other than WeChat.”~~314~~326 The court suggested, without deciding, that the WeChat ban could The court suggested, without deciding, that the WeChat ban could
receive heightened First Amendment strict scrutiny if decided on the merits.receive heightened First Amendment strict scrutiny if decided on the merits.~~315~~327 With regard to With regard to
intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their First intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their First
Amendment challenge. An intermediate form of scrutiny is normally reserved for restrictions on Amendment challenge. An intermediate form of scrutiny is normally reserved for restrictions on
the “time, place, or manner,” and a time, place, or manner restriction survives such scrutiny if it the “time, place, or manner,” and a time, place, or manner restriction survives such scrutiny if it
“(1) is narrowly tailored, (2) serves a significant governmental interest unrelated to the content of “(1) is narrowly tailored, (2) serves a significant governmental interest unrelated to the content of
318 TikTok, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 83. 319 Ibid. 320 Ibid. 321 U.S. Commerce Department, https://www.commerce.gov/files/identification-prohibited-transactions-implement-executive-order-13943-and-address-threat. 322 Ibid. 323 U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020). 324 Ibid. at 926 (referring to plaintiffs’ description of WeChat as “a public square for the Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking community in the U.S”). 325 Ibid. at 927 326 Ibid. at (discounting government’s “argument that other substitute social-media apps permit communication”). 327 Ibid. at 926-27In order to justify a prior restraint, the government must demonstrate that the restraint is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” Twitter, Inc. v. Sessions, 263 F. Supp. 3d 803, 810 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539. 571 (1979); Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). Congressional Research Service 46 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use the speech, and (3) leaves open adequate channels for communication.”328~~the speech, and (3) leaves open adequate channels for communication.”316~~ The court agreed that The court agreed that
the government’s national security interest in preventing WeChat (and China) collection of data the government’s national security interest in preventing WeChat (and China) collection of data
from U.S. users is significant, but that the “effective ban” did not advance that interest in a from U.S. users is significant, but that the “effective ban” did not advance that interest in a
narrowly tailored way given the “obvious alternatives to a complete ban, such as barring WeChat narrowly tailored way given the “obvious alternatives to a complete ban, such as barring WeChat
from government devices” or enhancing data security.from government devices” or enhancing data security.~~317~~329 The court concluded that “[o]n this The court concluded that “[o]n this
limited record, the prohibited transactions burden substantially more speech than is necessary to limited record, the prohibited transactions burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
serve the government’s significant interest in national security, especially given the lack of serve the government’s significant interest in national security, especially given the lack of
substitute channels for communication.”substitute channels for communication.”~~318~~330
The court further determined that the immediate shutdown of WeChat would cause irreparable The court further determined that the immediate shutdown of WeChat would cause irreparable
harm to the plaintiffs by eliminating their platform for communication.harm to the plaintiffs by eliminating their platform for communication.~~319~~331 In assessing the balance In assessing the balance
of equities and the public interest (elements that merge where the government is a party),of equities and the public interest (elements that merge where the government is a party),~~320~~332 the the
court found that the balance of equities tipped in plaintiffs’ favor and the public interest favored court found that the balance of equities tipped in plaintiffs’ favor and the public interest favored
protecting the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.protecting the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.~~321~~333 The court framed the government’s contention The court framed the government’s contention
that an injunction would “frustrate and displace the President’s determination of how best to that an injunction would “frustrate and displace the President’s determination of how best to
address threats to national security”address threats to national security”~~322~~334 as important, but deemed the evidence of the threat posed as important, but deemed the evidence of the threat posed
specifically by WeChat to be only modest, noting that the wholesale shutdown of WeChat burdens specifically by WeChat to be only modest, noting that the wholesale shutdown of WeChat burdens
more speech than necessary to serve the government’s national security and foreign policy more speech than necessary to serve the government’s national security and foreign policy

~~312 Ibid. at 926 (referring to plaintiffs’ description of WeChat as “a public square for the Chinese-American and~~
~~Chinese-speaking community in the U.S”).~~
~~313 Ibid. at 927~~
~~314 Ibid. at (discounting government’s “argument that other substitute social-media apps permit communication”).~~
~~315 Ibid. at 926-27In order to justify a prior restraint, the government must demonstrate that the restraint is “narrowly~~
~~tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” Twitter, Inc. v. Sessions, 263 F. Supp. 3d 803, 810 (N.D. Cal.~~
~~2017) (citing Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539. 571 (1979); Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement,~~
~~505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).~~
~~316~~interests.335 Accordingly, the court entered a preliminary nationwide injunction of the Commerce WeChat Identification.336 All three courts adjudicating these disputes issued preliminary injunctions, and the government appealed each decision.337 The Biden Administration initially sought to pause the litigation while it reviewed U.S.-China policy and the effective social media platform bans.338 President Biden subsequently issued an executive order rescinding the relevant executive orders and the Commerce Department’s implementing memorandums,339 making the litigation moot.340 The original underlying executive order related to the information and communications technology and services supply chain, 341 however, remains intact with elaborations set forth in Executive Order 14034. Consequently, should the Biden Administration decide to institute new restrictions 328 U.S. WeChat Users Alliance, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 927 (citing , 488 F. Supp. 3d at 927 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Pac. Coast Horseshoeing Sch., , 491 U.S. at 791; Pac. Coast Horseshoeing Sch.,
Inc. v. Kirchmeyer, 961 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020)). Inc. v. Kirchmeyer, 961 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020)).
~~317~~329 Ibid. Ibid.
~~318~~330 Ibid. at 928 (citing Ibid. at 928 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). , 491 U.S. at 791).
~~319~~331 Ibid. at 929. Ibid. at 929.
~~320~~332 Ibid. (citing California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018)). Ibid. (citing California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018)).
~~321~~333 Ibid. (citing Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2019)). Ibid. (citing Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2019)).
~~322 Ibid.~~
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~~interests.323 Accordingly, the court entered a preliminary nationwide injunction of the Commerce~~
~~WeChat Identification.324~~
~~All three courts adjudicating these disputes issued preliminary injunctions, and the government~~
~~appealed each decision.325 The Biden Administration initially sought to pause the litigation while~~
~~it reviewed U.S.-China policy and the effective social media platform bans.326 President Biden~~
~~subsequently issued an executive order rescinding the relevant executive orders and the~~
~~Commerce Department’s implementing memorandums,327 making the litigation moot.328 The~~
~~original underlying executive order related to the information and communications technology~~
~~and services supply chain, 329 however, remains intact with elaborations set forth in Executive~~
~~Order 14034. Consequently, should the Biden Administration decide to institute new restrictions~~
334 Ibid. 335 Ibid. 336 Ibid. at 930. 337 Marland v. Trump, No. 20-3322 (3d Cir. filed November11, 2020); TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, No. 20-5381 (D.C. Cir. filed December 29, 2020); U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, No. 20-16908 (9th Cir. filed October 2, 2020). 338 Jeanne Whalen, Biden asks for pause in Trump’s effort to ban WeChat, WASH. POST, February 11, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/02/11/wechat-trump-biden-pause/. 339 E.O. 14034 of June 9, 2021, “Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries,” 86 Federal Register 31,423 (June11, 2021). 340 Marland v. Trump, No. 20-3322, 2021 WL 5346749, at *1 (3d Cir. July 14, 2021) (dismissing appeal pursuant to agreement between parties); TikTok Inc. v. Biden, No. 20-5381, 2021 WL 3082803, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2021) (dismissing appeal at government’s request); WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, No. 20-16908, 2021 WL 4692706, at *1 (9th Cir. August 9, 2021) (same). 341 E.O. 13873 of May 15, 2019, “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,” 84 Federal Register 22,689 (May 17, 2019). Congressional Research Service 47 link to page 60 link to page 60 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use on the platforms, the First Amendment issue and the interpretation of IEEPA’s exception for on the platforms, the First Amendment issue and the interpretation of IEEPA’s exception for
informational materials and personal communications may arise again in litigation. informational materials and personal communications may arise again in litigation.
Use of IEEPA to Continue Enforcing the Export Administration Act (EAA)
Until the Until the ~~recent~~ enactment of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018,enactment of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018,~~330~~342 export of dual use goods export of dual use goods
and services was regulated pursuant to the authority of the Export Administration Act (EAA),and services was regulated pursuant to the authority of the Export Administration Act (EAA),~~331~~343
which was subject to periodic expiry and reauthorization. President Reagan was the first President which was subject to periodic expiry and reauthorization. President Reagan was the first President
to use IEEPA as a vehicle for continuing the enforcement of the EAA’s export controls.to use IEEPA as a vehicle for continuing the enforcement of the EAA’s export controls.~~332~~344
After Congress did not extend the expired EAA, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12444 After Congress did not extend the expired EAA, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12444
in 1983, finding that “unrestricted access of foreign parties to United States commercial goods, in 1983, finding that “unrestricted access of foreign parties to United States commercial goods,
technology, and technical data and the existence of certain boycott practices of foreign nations technology, and technical data and the existence of certain boycott practices of foreign nations
constitute, in light of the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, an unusual and constitute, in light of the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security.”extraordinary threat to the national security.”~~333~~345 Although the EAA had been reauthorized for Although the EAA had been reauthorized for
short periods since its initial expiration in 1983, every subsequent President utilized the short periods since its initial expiration in 1983, every subsequent President utilized the
authorities granted under IEEPA to maintain the existing system of export controls during periods authorities granted under IEEPA to maintain the existing system of export controls during periods
of lapse. of lapse.

~~323 Ibid.~~
~~324 Ibid. at 930.~~
~~325 Marland v. Trump, No. 20-3322 (3d Cir. filed November11, 2020); TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, No. 20-5381 (D.C. Cir.~~
~~filed December 29, 2020); U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, No. 20-16908 (9th Cir. filed October 2, 2020).~~
~~326 Jeanne Whalen, Biden asks for pause in Trump’s effort to ban WeChat, WASH. POST, February 11, 2021,~~
~~https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/02/11/wechat-trump-biden-pause/.~~
~~327 E.O. 14034 of June 9, 2021, “Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries,” 86 Fed. Reg.~~
~~31,423 (June11, 2021).~~
~~328 Marland v. Trump, No. 20-3322, 2021 WL 5346749, at *1 (3d Cir. July 14, 2021) (dismissing appeal pursuant to~~
~~agreement between parties); TikTok Inc. v. Biden, No. 20-5381, 2021 WL 3082803, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2021)~~
~~(dismissing appeal at government’s request); WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, No. 20-16908, 2021 WL 4692706, at~~
*1 (9th Cir. August 9, 2021) (same).
~~329 E.O. 13873 of May 15, 2019, “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply~~
~~Chain,” 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689 (May 17, 2019).~~
~~330 P.L. 115-232~~ In the latest iteration, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13222 in 2001, finding the existence of a national emergency with respect to the expiration of the EAA and directing—pursuant to the authorities allocated under IEEPA—that “the provisions for administration of the [EAA] shall be carried out under this order so as to continue in full force and effect … the export control system heretofore maintained.”346 Presidents Obama and Trump annually extended the 2001 executive order.347 Courts have generally treated this arrangement as authorized by Congress,348 although certain provisions of the EAA in effect under IEEPA have led to challenges. The determining factor appears to be whether IEEPA itself provides the President the authority to carry out the challenged action. In one case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a conviction for an attempt to violate the regulations even though the EAA had expired and did not expressly criminalize such attempts.349 The circuit court rejected the defendants’ argument that the President 342, Title XVIII(B). In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act to repeal the Export , Title XVIII(B). In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act to repeal the Export
Administration Act of 1979 and provide new statutory authority for the continuation of EAR. However, three sections Administration Act of 1979 and provide new statutory authority for the continuation of EAR. However, three sections
were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise of IEEPA. See were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise of IEEPA. See ““ The Export
Control Reform Act of 2018” section below. section below.
~~331~~343 P.L. 96-72, § P.L. 96-72, § 2, 93 Stat. 503 (1979), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§2, 93 Stat. 503 (1979), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4623 (2018). 4601-4623 (2018).
~~332~~344 E.O. 12444, 48 E.O. 12444, 48 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 48,215 (October 18, 1983). 48,215 (October 18, 1983).
~~333 Ibid.~~
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~~In the latest iteration, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13222 in 2001, finding~~
~~the existence of a national emergency with respect to the expiration of the EAA and directing—~~
~~pursuant to the authorities allocated under IEEPA—that “the provisions for administration of the~~
~~[EAA] shall be carried out under this order so as to continue in full force and effect … the export~~
~~control system heretofore maintained.”334 Presidents Obama and Trump annually extended the~~
~~2001 executive order.335~~
~~Courts have generally treated this arrangement as authorized by Congress,336 although certain~~
~~provisions of the EAA in effect under IEEPA have led to challenges. The determining factor~~
~~appears to be whether IEEPA itself provides the President the authority to carry out the~~
~~challenged action. In one case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a conviction~~
~~for an attempt to violate the regulations even though the EAA had expired and did not expressly~~
~~criminalize such attempts.337 The circuit court rejected the defendants’ argument that the President~~
345 Ibid. 346 E.O. 13222, 66 Federal Register 44,025 (August 17, 2001). 347 See, e.g., Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 82 Federal Register 39,005 (August 15, 2017). 348 Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Courts uniformly have read [the executive order preserving the EAA regulations under IEEPA] to mean that the statute remained in full effect during the periods of lapse.”). In this case, Sudan challenged its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism pursuant to a provision of the EAA because the statute had expired. 349 United States v. Mechanic, 809 F.2d 1111, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1987). Congressional Research Service 48 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use had exceeded his delegated authority under the EEA by “enlarging” the crimes punishable under had exceeded his delegated authority under the EEA by “enlarging” the crimes punishable under
the regulations.the regulations.~~338~~350
Nevertheless, a district court held that the conspiracy provisions of the EAA regulations were Nevertheless, a district court held that the conspiracy provisions of the EAA regulations were
rendered inoperative by the lapse of the EAA and “could not be repromulgated by executive order rendered inoperative by the lapse of the EAA and “could not be repromulgated by executive order
under the general powers that IEEPA vests in the President.”under the general powers that IEEPA vests in the President.”~~339~~351 The district court found that, even The district court found that, even
if Congress intended to preserve the operation of the EAA through IEEPA, that intent was limited if Congress intended to preserve the operation of the EAA through IEEPA, that intent was limited
by the scope of the statutes’ substantive coverage at the time of IEEPA’s enactment, when no by the scope of the statutes’ substantive coverage at the time of IEEPA’s enactment, when no
conspiracy provision existed in either statute.conspiracy provision existed in either statute.~~340~~352
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the application of the EAA as a statute The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the application of the EAA as a statute
permitting the government to withhold information under exemption 3 of the Freedom of permitting the government to withhold information under exemption 3 of the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA),Information Act (FOIA),~~341~~353 which exempts from disclosure information exempted from disclosure which exempts from disclosure information exempted from disclosure
by statute, even though the EAA had expired.by statute, even though the EAA had expired.~~342~~354 Referring to legislative history it interpreted as Referring to legislative history it interpreted as
congressional approval of the use of IEEPA to continue the EAA provisions during periods of congressional approval of the use of IEEPA to continue the EAA provisions during periods of
lapse, the court stated: lapse, the court stated:
Although the legislative history does not refer to the EAA’s confidentiality provision, it Although the legislative history does not refer to the EAA’s confidentiality provision, it
does evince Congressdoes evince Congress'’s intent to authorize the President to preserve the operation of the s intent to authorize the President to preserve the operation of the
export regulations promulgated under the EAA. Moreover, it is significant for purposes of export regulations promulgated under the EAA. Moreover, it is significant for purposes of
determining legislative intent that Congress acted with the knowledge that the EAA’s determining legislative intent that Congress acted with the knowledge that the EAA’s
export regulations had long provided for confidentiality and that the Presidentexport regulations had long provided for confidentiality and that the President~~'s ongoing~~

~~334 E.O. 13222, 66 Fed. Reg. 44,025 (August 17, 2001).~~
~~335 See, e.g., Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,005 (August 15,~~
~~2017).~~
~~336 Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Courts uniformly have read [the executive~~
~~order preserving the EAA regulations under IEEPA] to mean that the statute remained in full effect during the periods~~
~~of lapse.”). In this case, Sudan challenged its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism pursuant to a provision of the~~
~~EAA because the statute had expired.~~
~~337 United States v. Mechanic, 809 F.2d 1111, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1987).~~
~~338 Ibid. at 1113-14 (emphasizing the foreign affairs connection served by the EAA).~~
~~339 United States v. Quinn, 401 F. Supp. 2d 80, 93 (D.D.C. 2005).~~
~~340 Ibid. at 95.~~
~~341 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2018).~~
~~342 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 317 F.3d 275, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2003).~~
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’s ongoing practice of extending the EAA by executive order had always included these confidentiality practice of extending the EAA by executive order had always included these confidentiality
protections.protections.~~343~~355
The D.C. Circuit distinguished this holding in a later case involving appellate jurisdiction over a The D.C. Circuit distinguished this holding in a later case involving appellate jurisdiction over a
decision by the Department of Commerce to apply sanctions for a company’s violation of the decision by the Department of Commerce to apply sanctions for a company’s violation of the
EAA regulations.EAA regulations.~~344~~356 Pursuant to the regulations and under the direction of the Commerce Pursuant to the regulations and under the direction of the Commerce
Department, the company sought judicial review directly in the D.C. Circuit.Department, the company sought judicial review directly in the D.C. Circuit.~~345~~357 The D.C. Circuit, The D.C. Circuit,
however, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction: however, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction:
This court would have jurisdiction pursuant to the President This court would have jurisdiction pursuant to the President'’s order only if the President s order only if the President
has the authority to confer jurisdiction—an authority that,has the authority to confer jurisdiction—an authority that, if it exists, must derive from if it exists, must derive from
either the Executiveeither the Executive'’s inherent power under the Constitution or a permissible delegation of s inherent power under the Constitution or a permissible delegation of
power from Congress. The former is unavailing, as the Constitution vests the power to power from Congress. The former is unavailing, as the Constitution vests the power to
confer jurisdiction in Congress alone. Whether the executive order can provide the basis of confer jurisdiction in Congress alone. Whether the executive order can provide the basis of
our jurisdiction, then, turns on whether the President can confer jurisdiction on this court our jurisdiction, then, turns on whether the President can confer jurisdiction on this court
under the auspices of IEEPA…. We conclude that the President lacks that power. Nothing under the auspices of IEEPA…. We conclude that the President lacks that power. Nothing
in the text of IEEPA delegates to the President the authority to grant jurisdiction to any in the text of IEEPA delegates to the President the authority to grant jurisdiction to any
federal court.federal court.~~346~~358 350 Ibid. at 1113-14 (emphasizing the foreign affairs connection served by the EAA). 351 United States v. Quinn, 401 F. Supp. 2d 80, 93 (D.D.C. 2005). 352 Ibid. at 95. 353 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3) (2018). 354 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 317 F.3d 275, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 355 Ibid. 356 Micei Int’l v. Dep't of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 357 Ibid. at 1151. 358 Ibid. at 1153 (internal citations omitted). Congressional Research Service 49 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Consequently, the appeal of the agency decision was determined to belong in the district court Consequently, the appeal of the agency decision was determined to belong in the district court
according to the default rule under the APA.according to the default rule under the APA.~~347~~359
Issues and Options for Congress
Congress may Congress may ~~wish to~~ address a number of issues with respect to IEEPA; address a number of issues with respect to IEEPA; ~~two~~three are addressed here. are addressed here.
The first pertains to how Congress has delegated its authority under IEEPA and its umbrella The first pertains to how Congress has delegated its authority under IEEPA and its umbrella
statute, statute, the NEA. The second pertains to the termination of national emergencies invoking IEEPA. The third~~the NEA. The second~~ pertains to choices made in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. pertains to choices made in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018.
Delegation of Authority under IEEPA
Although the stated aim of the drafters of the NEA and IEEPA was to restrain the use of Although the stated aim of the drafters of the NEA and IEEPA was to restrain the use of
emergency powers, the use of such powers has expanded by several measures. Presidents declare emergency powers, the use of such powers has expanded by several measures. Presidents declare
national emergencies and renew them for years or even decades. The limitation of IEEPA to national emergencies and renew them for years or even decades. The limitation of IEEPA to
transactions involving some foreign interest was intended to limit IEEPA’s domestic application. transactions involving some foreign interest was intended to limit IEEPA’s domestic application.
However, globalization has eroded that limit, as few transactions today do not involve some However, globalization has eroded that limit, as few transactions today do not involve some
foreign interest. Many of the other criticisms of TWEA that IEEPA was supposed to address—foreign interest. Many of the other criticisms of TWEA that IEEPA was supposed to address—
consultation, time limits, congressional review, scope of power, and logical relationship to the consultation, time limits, congressional review, scope of power, and logical relationship to the
emergency declared—are criticisms that scholars levy against IEEPA today.emergency declared—are criticisms that scholars levy against IEEPA today.~~348~~360 TWEA came under TWEA came under
criticism because the first national emergency declared pursuant to its authority had been ongoing criticism because the first national emergency declared pursuant to its authority had been ongoing
for 41 years.for 41 years.~~349~~361 In November 2022, the first emergency declared pursuant to authority under In November 2022, the first emergency declared pursuant to authority under
IEEPA, the emergency with Iran declared in 1979, will enter IEEPA, the emergency with Iran declared in 1979, will enter isits forty-third year. In general, four ~~forty-third year.~~

~~343 Ibid.~~
~~344 Micei Int’l v. Dep't of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2010).~~
~~345 Ibid. at 1151.~~
~~346 Ibid. at 1153 (internal citations omitted).~~
~~347 Ibid. at 1152 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2009)).~~
~~348 See, e.g., Jason Luong, “Forcing Constraint”; Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism.”~~
~~349 See, e.g., “After 41 Years The Depression Finally Ending,” New York Times, October 13, 1974; “Senate Votes to~~
~~Conclude 4 National Emergencies,” New York Times, October 8, 1974; U.S. Congress,~~ ~~A Brief History of Emergency~~
~~Powers in the United States, p. v.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~In general, three common~~ criticisms are levied by scholars with respect to the structure of the criticisms are levied by scholars with respect to the structure of the
NEA and IEEPA that may be of interest to Congress. First, the NEA and IEEPA do not define the NEA and IEEPA that may be of interest to Congress. First, the NEA and IEEPA do not define the
phrases “national emergency” and “unusual and extraordinary threat” and Presidents have phrases “national emergency” and “unusual and extraordinary threat” and Presidents have
interpreted these terms broadly. Second, the scope of presidential authority under IEEPA has interpreted these terms broadly. Second, the scope of presidential authority under IEEPA has
become less constrained in a highly globalized era. Third, owing to rulings by the Supreme Court become less constrained in a highly globalized era. Third, owing to rulings by the Supreme Court
and amendments to the NEA, Congress and amendments to the NEA, Congress ~~would likely have to~~must have a two-thirds majority rather have a two-thirds majority rather
than a simple majority to terminate a national emergencythan a simple majority to terminate a national emergency~~. Despite these criticisms, Congress has~~
~~not acted to terminate or otherwise express displeasure with~~ without Presidential consent. Fourth, the structure of the U.S. sanctions regime and its reliance on IEEPA has created emergencies that do not end. Despite these criticisms, Congress has terminated an emergency declaration invoking an emergency declaration invoking
IEEPA. This absence of any explicit statement of disapproval, coupled with explicit statements of IEEPA. This absence of any explicit statement of disapproval, coupled with explicit statements of
approval in some instances, may indicate congressional approval of presidential use of IEEPA approval in some instances, may indicate congressional approval of presidential use of IEEPA
thus far. Arguably, then, IEEPA could be seen as an effective tool for carrying out the will of thus far. Arguably, then, IEEPA could be seen as an effective tool for carrying out the will of
Congress. Congress.
Definition of “National Emergency” and “Unusual and Extraordinary Threat”
Neither the NEA nor IEEPA define what constitutes a “national emergency.” IEEPA conditions its Neither the NEA nor IEEPA define what constitutes a “national emergency.” IEEPA conditions its
invocation in a declaration on its necessity for dealing with an “unusual and extraordinary threat invocation in a declaration on its necessity for dealing with an “unusual and extraordinary threat
… to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”… to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”~~350~~362 In the markup of In the markup of
IEEPA in the House, Fred Bergsten, then-Assistant Secretary for International Affairs in the IEEPA in the House, Fred Bergsten, then-Assistant Secretary for International Affairs in the
Department of the Treasury, praised the requirement that a national emergency for the purposes of Department of the Treasury, praised the requirement that a national emergency for the purposes of
359 Ibid. at 1152 (citing 5 U.S.C. §704 (2009)). 360 See, e.g., Jason Luong, “Forcing Constraint”; Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism.” 361 See, e.g., “After 41 Years The Depression Finally Ending,” New York Times, October 13, 1974; “Senate Votes to Conclude 4 National Emergencies,” New York Times, October 8, 1974; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v. 362 50 U.S.C. §1701. Congressional Research Service 50 link to page 60 link to page 60 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use IEEPA be “based on an unusual and extraordinary threat” because such language “emphasizes IEEPA be “based on an unusual and extraordinary threat” because such language “emphasizes
that such powers should be available only in true emergencies.”that such powers should be available only in true emergencies.”~~351~~363 Because “unusual” and Because “unusual” and
“extraordinary” are also undefined, the usual and ordinary invocation of the statute seems to “extraordinary” are also undefined, the usual and ordinary invocation of the statute seems to
conflict with those statutory conditions. conflict with those statutory conditions.
If Congress wanted to refine the meaning of “national emergency” or “unusual and extraordinary If Congress wanted to refine the meaning of “national emergency” or “unusual and extraordinary
threat,” it could do so through statute. Additionally, Congress could consider requiring some sort threat,” it could do so through statute. Additionally, Congress could consider requiring some sort
of factual finding by a court prior to, or shortly after, the exercise of any authority, such as under of factual finding by a court prior to, or shortly after, the exercise of any authority, such as under
the First Militia Act of the First Militia Act of ~~1792352~~1792364 or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.~~353~~365 Alternatively, Alternatively,
Congress may consider that the ambiguity in the existing statute provides the executive with the Congress may consider that the ambiguity in the existing statute provides the executive with the
flexibility necessary to address national emergencies with the requisite dispatch. flexibility necessary to address national emergencies with the requisite dispatch.
Scope of the Authority
While IEEPA nominally applies only to foreign transactions, the breadth of the phrase, “any While IEEPA nominally applies only to foreign transactions, the breadth of the phrase, “any
interest of any foreign country or a national thereof” leaves a great deal of room for executive interest of any foreign country or a national thereof” leaves a great deal of room for executive
discretion. The interconnectedness of the modern global economy has left few major transactions discretion. The interconnectedness of the modern global economy has left few major transactions
in which a foreign interest is not involved.in which a foreign interest is not involved.~~354~~366 As a result, at least one scholar has concluded, “the As a result, at least one scholar has concluded, “the

~~350 50 U.S.C. § 1701.~~
~~351 House Markup, p. 12.~~
~~352~~exemption of purely domestic transactions from the President’s transaction controls seems to be a limitation without substance.”367 Presidents have used IEEPA since the 1980s to control exports by maintaining the dual-use export control system, enshrined in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) in times when its underlying authorization, the Export Administration Act (EAA), periodically expired. During those times when Congress did not reauthorize the EAA, Presidents have declared emergencies to maintain the dual-use export control system.368 The current emergency has been ongoing since 2001.369 While Presidents have used IEEPA to implement trade restrictions against adversaries, it has not been used as a general way to impose tariffs. However, as noted above, President Nixon used TWEA to impose a 10% ad valorem tariff on goods entering the United States to avoid a balance of payments crisis after he ended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold. Although the use of 363 House Markup, p. 12. 364 Using the judiciary to determine whether an emergency authority can be exercised by the executive has been Using the judiciary to determine whether an emergency authority can be exercised by the executive has been
common. The First Militia Act of 1792, for example, required that either an associate justice of the Supreme Court of a common. The First Militia Act of 1792, for example, required that either an associate justice of the Supreme Court of a
district judge confirm that an insurrection “too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial district judge confirm that an insurrection “too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings” existed. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264. Using a court to determine whether an emergency proceedings” existed. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264. Using a court to determine whether an emergency
existed and whether an action was necessary was also the method favored by the German-American jurist, advisor to existed and whether an action was necessary was also the method favored by the German-American jurist, advisor to
President Abraham Lincoln, and founder of American political science, Francis Lieber, who argued that the acts of President Abraham Lincoln, and founder of American political science, Francis Lieber, who argued that the acts of
officials in states of emergency should be adjudged in court “to be necessary in the judgment of a moderate and officials in states of emergency should be adjudged in court “to be necessary in the judgment of a moderate and
reasonable man.” Qtd. in Witt, “A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism,” p. 588. reasonable man.” Qtd. in Witt, “A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism,” p. 588.
~~353~~365 50 U.S.C. §§ 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803-1805. 1803-1805.
~~354~~366 “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” Harvard Law Review, p. 1111 n49. 367 Ibid.; See also Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” pp. 757-758. 368 In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act to provide new statutory authority for the continuation of EAR. However, three sections were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise of IEEPA. See “ The Export Control Reform Act of 2018” below. 369 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 51 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use TWEA in this instance was criticized at the time,370 the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals upheld President Nixon’s actions371 and Congress maintained the language that President Nixon relied upon in nearly identical form in the subsequent reforms resulting in the enactment of IEEPA.372 In the 116th, 117th, and 118th Congresses, bills were introduced that would limit the President’s authority to use IEEPA to impose tariffs.373 The scope of powers over individual targets is also extensive. Under IEEPA, the President has the power to prohibit all financial transactions with individuals designated by executive order. Such power allows the President to block all the assets of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident.374 Such uses of IEEPA may reflect the will of Congress or they may represent a grant of authority that may have gone beyond what Congress originally intended. Amending the NEA to Require Joint Resolutions of Approval The heart of the curtailment of presidential power by the NEA and IEEPA was the provision that Congress could terminate a state of emergency declared pursuant to the NEA with a concurrent resolution. When the “legislative veto” was struck down by the Supreme Court (see above), it left Congress with a steeper climb—presumably requiring passage of a veto-proof joint resolution—to terminate a national emergency declared under the NEA.375 To date, no national emergency declared under the NEA has been terminated without Presidential consent. Since 2019, Members of Congress have introduced several bills that would amend the NEA to place new limits on ~~“The International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” Harvard Law Review, p. 1111 n49.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~link to page 55~~ ~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~exemption of purely domestic transactions from the President’s transaction controls seems to be a~~
~~limitation without substance.”355~~
~~Presidents have used IEEPA since the 1980s to control exports by maintaining the dual-use export~~
~~control system, enshrined in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) in times when its~~
~~underlying authorization, the Export Administration Act (EAA), periodically expired. During~~
~~those times when Congress did not reauthorize the EAA, Presidents have declared emergencies to~~
~~maintain the dual-use export control system.356 The current emergency has been ongoing since~~
~~2001.357~~
~~While Presidents have used IEEPA to implement trade restrictions against adversaries, it has not~~
~~been used as a general way to impose tariffs. However, as noted above, President Nixon used~~
~~TWEA to impose a 10% ad valorem tariff on goods entering the United States to avoid a balance~~
~~of payments crisis after he ended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold. Although the use of~~
~~TWEA in this instance was criticized at the time,358 the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent~~
~~Appeals upheld President Nixon’s actions359 and Congress maintained the language that President~~
~~Nixon relied upon in nearly identical form in the subsequent reforms resulting in the enactment of~~
~~IEEPA.360 In both the 116th and 117th Congress, bills were introduced that would limit the~~
~~President’s authority to use IEEPA to impose tariffs.361~~

~~355 Ibid.; See also Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime,” pp. 757-758.~~
~~356 In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act to provide new statutory authority for the continuation of~~
~~EAR. However, three sections were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through~~ the exercise the exercise
~~of IEEPA. See “The Export Control Reform Act of 2018” below.~~
~~357 Ibid.~~
~~358~~of emergency authorities. The most common strategy has been to 370 See, e.g., the testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy See, e.g., the testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy
and Trade. U.S. Congress, House, and Trade. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of
the Committee on International Relations and Markup of the Trading with the Enemy Reform Legislation, 95th Cong., , 95th Cong.,
1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), pp. 8-9. 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), pp. 8-9.
~~359~~371 United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (“Congress, in enacting s 5(b) of the TWEA, United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (“Congress, in enacting s 5(b) of the TWEA,
authorized the President, during an emergency, to […] ‘regulate importation,’ by imposing an import duty surcharge or authorized the President, during an emergency, to […] ‘regulate importation,’ by imposing an import duty surcharge or
by other means appropriately and reasonably related […] to the particular nature of the emergency declared.”). by other means appropriately and reasonably related […] to the particular nature of the emergency declared.”).
~~360~~372 TWEA, codified as amended in 1971 at §5(b), provided that during a period of national emergency, the President TWEA, codified as amended in 1971 at §5(b), provided that during a period of national emergency, the President
may “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, may “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding,
use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has
any interest.” IEEPA, as passed in 1977 at §203(a)(1)(B), provided that during a period of national emergency, the any interest.” IEEPA, as passed in 1977 at §203(a)(1)(B), provided that during a period of national emergency, the
President may “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, President may “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding,
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any
right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest.” national thereof has any interest.”
While he did not ultimately end up doing so, President Trump announced his intention to use IEEPA to impose and While he did not ultimately end up doing so, President Trump announced his intention to use IEEPA to impose and
gradually increase a five percent tariff on all goods imported from Mexico. Statement from the President Regarding gradually increase a five percent tariff on all goods imported from Mexico. Statement from the President Regarding
Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019, available atEmergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings- https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-address-border-crisis/. See also CRS Insight IN11129, statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-address-border-crisis/. See also CRS Insight IN11129,
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Tariffs: Historical Background and Key Issues, by , by
Christopher A. Casey. Christopher A. Casey.
~~361 E.g.,~~ 373 E.g., Global Trade Accountability Act, S. 1060 (Lee), 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 29, 2023; Protecting Our Democracy Act, S. 2921 (Klobuchar), 117th Cong., 1st sess., September 30, 2021; Global Trade Protecting Our Democracy Act, S. 2921 (Klobuchar), 117th Cong., 1st sess., September 30, 2021; Global Trade
Accountability Act of 2021, H.R. 2618 (Davidson), 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 16, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Accountability Act of 2021, H.R. 2618 (Davidson), 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 16, 2021; Global Trade Accountability
Act, S. 691 (Lee), 117th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Act, S. 691 (Lee), 117th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th
Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 2019; Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong., Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 2019; Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong.,
1st sess., March 1st sess., March 27, 2019. 374 Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” p. 759. 375 Congress amended NEA in 1985 to require a joint resolution, which is subject to the President’s veto, to terminate an emergency. P.L. 99-93 (August 16, 1985), 99 Stat. 405. Congressional Research Service 52 link to page 58 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use require a joint resolution of approval. In the 116th, 117th, and 118th Congresses, bills were introduced to require a joint resolution of approval for an emergency to extend beyond a certain number of days.376 The National Security Powers Act of 2021, for example, would have required that Congress pass a joint resolution approving of a national emergency within 30 days.377 The NEA, IEEPA, and “Never Ending Emergencies” Some Members of Congress, scholars, and civil society organizations have criticized the NEA for producing “never ending emergencies.”378 The average length of an emergency declared under the NEA is more than nine years, with one emergency well into its fifth decade. However, excluding emergencies declared to impose sanctions drops that average to three years. Of the nine emergencies declared under the NEA that do not cite IEEPA, six were terminated or expired after fewer than three years. The remaining emergencies relate to Cuba, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and restrictions on Russian-affiliated vessels put in place after Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It is the emergencies citing IEEPA that frequently last decades. The reason for this may be structural. Should the President terminate an emergency, the authority to continue freezing assets would, in many cases, also terminate.379 Congress could provide non-emergency authority to maintain blocks on transactions and freezes on assets made during a national emergency, otherwise Presidents will likely consider the continuation of national emergencies to be necessary to prevent assets frozen under IEEPA from becoming accessible. ~~27, 2019.~~
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~~The scope of powers over individual targets is also extensive. Under IEEPA, the President has the~~
~~power to prohibit all financial transactions with individuals designated by executive order. Such~~
~~power allows the President to block all the assets of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident.362~~
~~Such uses of IEEPA may reflect the will of Congress or they may represent a grant of authority~~
~~that may have gone beyond what Congress originally intended.~~
~~Terminating National Emergencies or IEEPA Authorities~~
~~The heart of the curtailment of presidential power by the NEA and IEEPA was the provision that~~
~~Congress could terminate a state of emergency declared pursuant to the NEA with a concurrent~~
~~resolution. When the “legislative veto” was struck down by the Supreme Court (see above), it left~~
~~Congress with a steeper climb—presumably requiring passage of a veto-proof joint resolution—~~
~~to terminate a national emergency declared under the NEA.363 Two such resolutions have ever~~
~~been introduced and neither of the declarations of emergency concerned involved IEEPA.364 The~~
~~lack of congressional action here could be the result of the necessity of obtaining a veto-proof~~
~~majority or it could be that the use of IEEPA has so far reflected the will of Congress.~~
~~If Congress wanted to assert more authority over the use of IEEPA, it could amend the NEA or~~
~~IEEPA to include a “sunset provision,” terminating any national emergency after a certain number~~
~~of days. At least one scholar has recommended such an amendment. 365 Alternatively, Congress~~
~~could amend IEEPA to provide for a review mechanism that would give Congress an active role.~~
~~In both the 116th and 117th Congresses, several bills were introduced that would require a joint~~
~~resolution of approval for an emergency to extend beyond a certain number of days. The National~~
~~Security Powers Act of 2021, for example, would require that Congress pass a joint resolution~~
~~approving of a national emergency within 30 days.366~~
The Status Quo
In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations in 1977, Professor Harold G. In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations in 1977, Professor Harold G.
Maier summed up the main criticisms of TWEA: Maier summed up the main criticisms of TWEA:
Section 5(b)’s effect is no longer confined to “emergency situations” in the sense of Section 5(b)’s effect is no longer confined to “emergency situations” in the sense of
existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit, existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit,
by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has
converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President…”converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President…”~~367~~

~~362 Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime,” p. 759.~~
~~363 Congress amended NEA in 1985 to require a joint resolution, which is subject to the President’s veto, to terminate~~
~~an emergency. P.L. 99-93 (August 16, 1985), 99 Stat. 405.~~
~~364 In 2005, Rep. George Miller (CA) introduced a resolution to terminate the declaration of a national emergency as a~~
~~result of Hurricane Katrina. It was not considered. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 8, 2005. In~~
~~2019, Rep. Castro and Sen. Udall introduced resolutions to terminate the declaration of a national emergency with~~
~~respect to the Southern Border of the United States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019;~~
~~S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019. Neither emergency had invoked IEEPA authorities.~~
~~365 Luong, “Forcing Constraint,” p. 1181.~~
~~366~~380 Like TWEA before it, IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanction regime. Like TWEA before it, Congress has often approved explicitly of the President’s use of IEEPA. In several circumstances, Congress has directed the President to impose a variety of sanctions under IEEPA and waived the requirement of an emergency declaration. Even when Congress has not given explicit approval, until 2023, no Member of Congress had ever introduced a resolution to terminate a national emergency citing IEEPA.381 The NEA requires that both houses of Congress 376 E.g., ARTICLE ONE Act, S. 1912 (Lee), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 8, 2023; Protecting Our Democracy Act, S. 2921 (Klobuchar), 117th Cong., 1st sess., September 30, 2021; National Emergencies Reform Act , H.R. 9041 (Amash), 116th Cong., 2nd sess., December 22, 2020. 377 National Security Powers Act of 2021, S. 2391 (Murphy), 117th Cong., 1st sess., July 20, 2021. For additional National Security Powers Act of 2021, S. 2391 (Murphy), 117th Cong., 1st sess., July 20, 2021. For additional
examples during the 116th Congress, see Global Trade Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Cong., examples during the 116th Congress, see Global Trade Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Cong.,
1st sess., January 23, 2019; Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong., 1st 1st sess., January 23, 2019; Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong., 1st
sess., March 27, 2019. sess., March 27, 2019.
~~367 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 9.~~
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~~Like TWEA before it, IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanction regime. Like TWEA~~
~~before it, Congress has often approved explicitly of the President’s use of IEEPA. In several~~
~~circumstances, Congress has directed the President to impose a variety of sanctions under IEEPA~~
~~and waived the requirement of an emergency declaration. Even when Congress has not given~~
~~explicit approval, no Member of Congress has ever introduced a resolution to terminate a national~~
~~emergency citing IEEPA.368 The NEA requires that both houses of Congress~~ 378 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, “Never Ending Emergencies – An Examination of the National Emergencies Act,” 118th Cong., 1st sess., hearing, May 24, 2023; Catherine Padhi, “Emergencies Without End: A Primer on Federal States of Emergency,” Lawfare, December 8, 2017. 379 See “Implications of Terminating National Emergencies Invoking IEEPA” 380 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 9. 381 Since the enactment of the NEA, two resolutions to terminate a national emergency have been introduced. The first (continued...) Congressional Research Service 53 link to page 66 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use meet every six meet every six
months to consider a vote on a joint resolution on terminating an emergency.months to consider a vote on a joint resolution on terminating an emergency.~~369~~ 382 Neither house has Neither house has
ever met to do so with respect to an emergency citing IEEPA. In response to concerns over the ever met to do so with respect to an emergency citing IEEPA. In response to concerns over the
scale and scope of the emergency economic powers granted by IEEPA, supporters of the status scale and scope of the emergency economic powers granted by IEEPA, supporters of the status
quo would argue that Congress has implicitly and explicitly expressed approval of the statute and quo would argue that Congress has implicitly and explicitly expressed approval of the statute and
its use. Indeed, several bills proposing its use. Indeed, several bills proposing ~~such~~ a limit on the length of national emergencies declared a limit on the length of national emergencies declared
under the NEA explicitly exclude IEEPA.under the NEA explicitly exclude IEEPA.~~370~~
~~The Export Control Reform Act of 2018~~
~~In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA).371 The legislation repealed the~~
~~expired Export Administration Act of 1979,372 the regulations of which had been continued by~~
~~reference to IEEPA since 2001.373 The ECRA became the new statutory authority for Export~~
~~Administration Regulations. Nevertheless, several export controls addressed in the Export~~
~~Administration Act of 1979 were not updated in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018;374~~
~~instead, Congress chose to require the President to continue to use IEEPA to continue to~~
~~implement the three sections of the Export Administration Act of 1979 that were not repealed.375~~
~~Going forward, Congress may wish to revisit these provisions, which all relate to deterring the~~
~~proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.~~

~~368 Since the enactment of the NEA, two resolutions to terminate a national emergency have been introduced. The first~~
383 Implications of Terminating National Emergencies Invoking IEEPA Beginning in the late 2010s, some Members of Congress and civil society organizations began to express concern with the NEA and IEEPA. Whereas one resolution to terminate a national emergency declared under the NEA was introduced between 1976 and 2018,384 15 were introduced between 2019 and September 1, 2023 (Table A-2).385 In 2019, both houses of Congress passed, for the first time, a resolution to terminate a national emergency.386 President Donald J. Trump vetoed that resolution and the House did not override the veto.387 In 2023, after several attempts, Congress voted to terminate the national emergency concerning the Novel was to terminate the national emergency declared in response to Hurricane Katrina, but the declaration of emergency in was to terminate the national emergency declared in response to Hurricane Katrina, but the declaration of emergency in
that case did not invoke IEEPA. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Congress, 1st session, September 8, 2005. The second was that case did not invoke IEEPA. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Congress, 1st session, September 8, 2005. The second was
to terminate the national emergency declared February 15, 2019 with respect to the Southern Border of the United to terminate the national emergency declared February 15, 2019 with respect to the Southern Border of the United
States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019; S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019; S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess.,
February 28, 2019. However, neither of the declarations of national emergency at issue invoked IEEPA. February 28, 2019. However, neither of the declarations of national emergency at issue invoked IEEPA.
~~369~~382 50 U.S.C. § 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b). 1622(b).
~~370~~383 E.g., Reforming Emergency Powers to Uphold the Balances and Limitations Inherent in the Constitution Act or the E.g., Reforming Emergency Powers to Uphold the Balances and Limitations Inherent in the Constitution Act or the
REPUBLIC Act, S. 463 (Paul), 117th Cong., 1st sess., February 25, 2021; Assuring that Robust, Thorough, and REPUBLIC Act, S. 463 (Paul), 117th Cong., 1st sess., February 25, 2021; Assuring that Robust, Thorough, and
Informed Congressional Leadership is Exercised Over National Emergencies Act or the ARTICLE One Act, S. 764 Informed Congressional Leadership is Exercised Over National Emergencies Act or the ARTICLE One Act, S. 764
(Lee), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 12, 2019, as reported to the Senate November 19, 2019. (Lee), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 12, 2019, as reported to the Senate November 19, 2019.
~~371 Export Control Reform Act, P.L. 115-232, (August 13, 2018), Title XVII(B).~~
~~372 Ibid. § 1766(a).~~
~~373 E.O. 13222.~~
~~374 Export Control Reform Act §~~ 384 In 2005, Rep. George Miller (CA) introduced a resolution to terminate the declaration of a national emergency as a result of Hurricane Katrina. It was not considered. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 8, 2005. While this resolution cited to the NEA, the declaration of national emergency that it sought to terminate (Proclamation 7924, 70 Federal Register 54227) did not. 385 Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 15, 2019, H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019; A joint resolution relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 15, 2019, S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019; A joint resolution relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 15, 2019, S.J.Res. 54 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., September 10, 2019; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 15, 2019, H.J.Res. 75 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., September 19, 2019; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 15, 2019, H.J.Res. 85 (Castro), 116th Cong., 2nd sess., February 14, 2020; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on March 13, 2020, H.J.Res. 46 (Gosar), 117th Cong., 2nd sess., May 20, 2021; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on March 13, 2020, H.J.Res. 52 (Gosar), 117th Cong., 2nd sess., June 16, 2021; A joint resolution relating to a national emergency declared by the President on March 13, 2020, S.J.Res. 38 (Marshall), 117th Cong., 2nd sess., February 14, 2022; A joint resolution relating to a national emergency declared by the President on March 13, 2020, S.J.Res. 63 (Marshall), 117th Cong., 2nd sess., September 22, 2022; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on March 13, 2020, H.J.Res. 7 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., January 9, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on October 27, 2006, H.J.Res. 68 (Boebert), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 25, 2011, H.J.Res. 70 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 22, 2003, H.J.Res. 71 (Crane), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 14, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 16, 2012, H.J.Res. 74 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 11, 2004, H.J.Res. 79 (Gaetz), 118th Cong., 1st sess., July 6, 2023. 386 In 2019, Rep. Castro and Sen. Udall introduced resolutions to terminate the declaration of a national emergency with respect to the Southern Border of the United States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019; S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019. 387 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 54 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) outbreak.388 President Joe Biden signed the resolution, terminating the national emergency.389 In 2023, several Members of Congress introduced five bills seeking to terminate, for the first time, national emergencies invoking IEEPA; all five failed to pass the House.390 IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanction regime. Were Congress to terminate a national emergency invoking IEEPA, sanctions put into place under the authority of that emergency, including the blocking of assets, would terminate391 unless such sanctions could be kept in place under a different authority, such as the United Nations Participation Act.392 IEEPA also contains a savings provision in the event a national emergency invoking IEEPA is terminated, permitting the President to continue to block property if “the continuation of such prohibition with respect to that property is necessary on account of claims involving such country or its nationals,” unless Congress provides otherwise in a resolution terminating the emergency.393 The legislative history suggests that Congress may have considered the continued blocking of assets that could be used for presidential settlements of claims by American citizens against foreign countries.394 In at least one case, however, the President invoked the savings provision to continue to block property pending claims among successor states.395 388 Act of April 10, 2023, P.L. 118-3, 137 Stat. 6. 389 Ibid. 390 Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on October 27, 2006, H.J.Res. 68 (Boebert), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 25, 2011, H.J.Res. 70 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 22, 2003, H.J.Res. 71 (Crane), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 14, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 16, 2012, H.J.Res. 74 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 11, 2004, H.J.Res. 79 (Gaetz), 118th Cong., 1st sess., July 6, 2023. 391 50 U.S.C. §1622(a) provides that: [A]ny powers or authorities exercised by reason of [the terminated] emergency shall cease to be exercised after [the date of termination], except that such termination shall not affect- (A) any action taken or proceeding pending not finally concluded or determined on such date; (B) any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior to such date; or (C) any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were incurred prior to such date. 392 United Nations Participation Act, P.L. 79-264, §5, 59 Stat. 620 (1945), codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §287c. The extent to which the UNPA would permit the blocking of property by placing individuals or entities on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List is uncertain. The UNPA gives the President the authority to implement U.N. sanctions and authorizes him to enforce such measures by issuing “such orders, rules, and regulations as may be prescribed by him,” thereby allowing him to “investigate, regulate, or prohibit, in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or any person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Ibid. IEEPA authority includes the authority for the President to “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(B). 393 50 U.S.C. §1706(a)(1). 394 S. Rep. No. 95-466, at 6 (1977) (noting that “blocked assets may continue to be blocked by the President despite termination of a state of emergency, the National Emergencies Act notwithstanding, unless Congress specifies otherwise” and that “[n]othing in this act is intended by the committee to interfere with the authority of the President to continue blocking assets which are presently blocked, or to impede the settlement of claims of U.S. citizens against foreign countries”). 395 E.O. 13304, Termination of Emergencies With Respect to Yugoslavia and Modification of Executive Order 13219 of June 26, 2001, 68 Federal Register 32315 (May 29, 2003). Congressional Research Service 55 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use The full scope of the savings provision with regard to the extent of prohibitions that may be maintained following termination is unclear. “Property in which a foreign country or national thereof has any interest” has been interpreted broadly by the courts, defining “interest” to mean “an interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.”396 In other words, the sanctioned entity need not own the property at issue in order to have an interest in it.397 The reference in the savings provision to “that property [deemed] necessary [for purpose of resolving] claims involving such country or its nationals”398 arguably refers only to blocked property owned by the sanctioned entity liable for claims. Under this interpretation, the full range of prohibitions under the relevant sanctions regulations could no longer be enforced in the event the underlying national emergency is terminated, even if outstanding claims exist. The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA).399 The legislation repealed the expired Export Administration Act of 1979,400 the regulations of which had been continued by reference to IEEPA since 2001.401 ECRA became the new statutory authority for Export Administration Regulations. Nevertheless, several export controls addressed in the Export Administration Act of 1979 were not updated in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018;402 instead, Congress chose to require the President to continue to use IEEPA to continue to implement the three sections of the Export Administration Act of 1979 that were not repealed.403 Going forward, Congress may revisit these provisions, which all relate to deterring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 396 See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 67 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 397 See Glob. Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that covered “interest” need not be a legal interest “in the way that a trustee is legal owner of the corpus even if someone else enjoys the beneficial interest”). 398 50 U.S.C. §1706(a)(1) (emphasis added). 399 Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), P.L. 115-232. 400 Ibid. §1766(a). 401 E.O. 13222. 402 ECRA §1766(a). Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 1766(a). Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of 1979,
codified at 50 U.S.C. codified at 50 U.S.C. §§§§ 4611, 4612, 4613, were not repealed. 4611, 4612, 4613, were not repealed.
~~375 Ibid. §~~ 403 ECRA §1766(b) (“The President shall implement [Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of 1766(b) (“The President shall implement [Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of
1979] by exercising the authorities of the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 1979] by exercising the authorities of the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).”). U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).”).
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Appendix A. NEA and IEEPA Use
Table A-1. National Emergencies Declared Pursuant to the NEA as of ~~March 25,~~
~~2022~~September 1, 2023
*Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA but that did not invoke IEEPA. *Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA but that did not invoke IEEPA.

Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National
Date of
Date of
Originating
Revoking
Emergency Pursuant to NEA
Declaration
Revocation
E.O./Procl.
E.O./Procl.
1 1
Blocking Iranian Government Property Blocking Iranian Government Property
11/14/1979 11/14/1979
Ongoing Ongoing
12170 12170

2 2
Sanctions Against Iran Sanctions Against Iran
4/17/1980 4/17/1980
4/17/1981 4/17/1981
12211 12211
Expired Expired
3 3
Continuation of Export Control Continuation of Export Control
Regulations Regulations
10/14/1983 10/14/1983
12/20/1983 12/20/1983
12444 12444
12451 12451
4 4
Continuation of Export Control Continuation of Export Control
Regulations Regulations
3/30/1984 3/30/1984
7/12/1985 7/12/1985
12470 12470
12525 12525
5 5
Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other
Transactions Involving Nicaragua Transactions Involving Nicaragua
5/1/1985 5/1/1985
3/13/1990 3/13/1990
12513 12513
12707 12707
6 6
Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other
Transactions Involving South Africa Transactions Involving South Africa
9/9/1985 9/9/1985
7/10/1991 7/10/1991
12532 12532
12769 12769
7 7
Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions
Involving Libya Involving Libya
1/7/1986 1/7/1986
9/20/2004 9/20/2004
12543 12543
13357 13357
8 8
Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Prohibiting Certain Transactions With
Respect to Panama Respect to Panama
4/8/1988 4/8/1988
4/5/1990 4/5/1990
12635 12635
12710 12710
9 9
Blocking Iraqi Government Property and Blocking Iraqi Government Property and
Prohibiting Transactions with Iraq Prohibiting Transactions with Iraq
8/2/1990 8/2/1990
7/29/2004 7/29/2004
12722 12722
13350 13350
10 10
Continuation of Export Control Continuation of Export Control
Regulations Regulations
9/30/1990 9/30/1990
9/30/1993 9/30/1993
12730 12730
12867 12867
Chemical and Biological Weapons Chemical and Biological Weapons
11 11
Proliferation Proliferation
11/16/1990 11/16/1990
11/11/1994 11/11/1994
12735 12735
12938 12938
Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Prohibiting Certain Transactions with
12 12
Respect to Haiti Respect to Haiti
10/4/1991 10/4/1991
10/14/1994 10/14/1994
12775 12775
12932 12932
Blocking Blocking "“Yugoslav Government" Property Yugoslav Government" Property
13 13
and Property of the Governments of Serbia and Property of the Governments of Serbia
and Montenegro and Montenegro
5/30/1992 5/30/1992
5/28/2003 5/28/2003
12808 12808
13304 13304
To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March
3, 1931, Within a Limited Geographic Area 3, 1931, Within a Limited Geographic Area
14 14
in Response to the National Emergency in Response to the National Emergency
Caused by Hurricane Andrewa Caused by Hurricane Andrewa
10/14/1992 10/14/1992
3/6/1993 3/6/1993
6491 6491
6534 6534
Prohibiting Certain Transactions Involving Prohibiting Certain Transactions Involving
15 15
UNITA UNITA
9/26/1993 9/26/1993
5/6/2003 5/6/2003
12865 12865
24857 24857
Measures To Restrict The Participation By Measures To Restrict The Participation By
16 16
United States Persons In Weapons United States Persons In Weapons
Proliferation Activities Proliferation Activities
9/30/1993 9/30/1993
9/29/1994 9/29/1994
12868 12868
12930 12930
Continuation of Export Control Continuation of Export Control
17 17
Regulations Regulations
6/30/1994 6/30/1994
8/19/1994 8/19/1994
12923 12923
12924 12924
Continuation of Export Control Continuation of Export Control
18 18
Regulations Regulations
8/19/1994 8/19/1994
4/4/2001 4/4/2001
12924 12924
13206 13206
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Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National
Date of
Date of
Originating
Revoking
Emergency Pursuant to NEA
Declaration
Revocation
E.O./Procl.
E.O./Procl.
68 68
Hong Kong Normalization Hong Kong Normalization
07/14/2020 07/14/2020
Ongoing Ongoing
13936 13936

69 69
Critical Minerals Critical Minerals
09/30/2020 09/30/2020
09/30/2021 09/30/2021
13953 13953
Expired Expired
70 70
Investments that Finance Chinese Military Investments that Finance Chinese Military
Companies Companies
11/12/2020 11/12/2020
Ongoing Ongoing
13959 13959

71 71
Blocking Property With Respect to the Blocking Property With Respect to the
Situation in Burma Situation in Burma
02/10/2021 02/10/2021
Ongoing Ongoing
14014 14014

Blocking Property With Respect to Blocking Property With Respect to
72 72
Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the
Russian Federation Russian Federation
04/15/2021 04/15/2021
Ongoing Ongoing
14024 14024

Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons
73 73
With Respect to the Humanitarian and With Respect to the Humanitarian and
Human Rights Crisis in Ethiopia Human Rights Crisis in Ethiopia
09/17/2021 09/17/2021
Ongoing Ongoing
14046 14046

74 74
Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons
Involved in the Global Il icit Drug Trade Involved in the Global Il icit Drug Trade
12/15/2021 12/15/2021
Ongoing Ongoing
14059 14059

Protecting Certain Property of Da Protecting Certain Property of Da
75 75
Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the
People of Afghanistan People of Afghanistan
02/11/2022 02/11/2022
Ongoing Ongoing
14064 14064

Declaration of National Emergency and Invocation of Emergency Authority Relating 76 to the Regulation of the Anchorage and Movement of Russian-Affiliated Vessels to United States Ports 04/21/2022 Ongoing 10371 Declaration of Emergency and 77 Authorization for Temporary Extensions of Time and Duty-Free Importation of Solar Cells and Modules From Southeast Asiac 06/06/2022 Ongoing 10414 Bolstering Efforts To Bring Hostages and 78 Wrongful y Detained United States Nationals Home 07/19/2022 Ongoing 14078 Addressing United States Investments in 79 Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern 08/09/2023 Ongoing 14105
Source: CRS, as of March 25, 2022. CRS, as of March 25, 2022.
Notes: Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA that did not invoke IEEPA. This table Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA that did not invoke IEEPA. This table
tracks emergencies that have been declared and their ultimate disposition. It does not include expansions or tracks emergencies that have been declared and their ultimate disposition. It does not include expansions or
amendments to those emergencies. For example, Executive Order 14024, which declared a national emergency amendments to those emergencies. For example, Executive Order 14024, which declared a national emergency
with respect to specified harmful activities of the Russian Federation in April of 2021, has been the basiswith respect to specified harmful activities of the Russian Federation in April of 2021, has been the basis of certain
~~ofcertain~~ actions taken under IEEPA against the Russian Federation since it invaded Ukraine in February 2022. actions taken under IEEPA against the Russian Federation since it invaded Ukraine in February 2022.
See, e.g., E.O. 14065 of February 21, 2022, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain See, e.g., E.O. 14065 of February 21, 2022, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain
Transactions with Respect to Continued Russian Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity Transactions with Respect to Continued Russian Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity
of Ukraine,” 87 of Ukraine,” 87 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 10293, February 23, 2022; E.O. 14066 of March 8, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports 10293, February 23, 2022; E.O. 14066 of March 8, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports
and New Investments with Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and and New Investments with Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and
Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” 87 Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” 87 ~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 13625, March 10, 2022; E.O. 14068 of March 11, 2022, “Prohibiting 13625, March 10, 2022; E.O. 14068 of March 11, 2022, “Prohibiting
Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment with Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression,” 87 Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment with Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression,” 87
~~Fed. Reg.~~Federal Register 14381, March 15, 2022. 14381, March 15, 2022.
Congressional Research Service 61 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use a. Although the President did not explicitly use that phrase “declare a national emergency,” the Davis-Bacon a. Although the President did not explicitly use that phrase “declare a national emergency,” the Davis-Bacon
act, as amended at the date of the proclamation, and as noted in the proclamation, provided for the act, as amended at the date of the proclamation, and as noted in the proclamation, provided for the
suspension of the act’s provisions “in the event of a national emergency.” suspension of the act’s provisions “in the event of a national emergency.”
b. Similar to the suspension of the Davis-Bacon act in 1992, this proclamation was somewhat anomalous. The b. Similar to the suspension of the Davis-Bacon act in 1992, this proclamation was somewhat anomalous. The
proclamation did not cite to the NEA when declaring a national emergency for the purposes of suspending proclamation did not cite to the NEA when declaring a national emergency for the purposes of suspending
the act. However, the revoking proclamation did cite the NEA. Moreover, Rep. George Mil er (CA) the act. However, the revoking proclamation did cite the NEA. Moreover, Rep. George Mil er (CA)
introduced a resolution to terminate the declaration of a national emergency pursuant to the NEA. H.J.Res. introduced a resolution to terminate the declaration of a national emergency pursuant to the NEA. H.J.Res.
69 (Mil er), 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 8, 2005. 69 (Mil er), 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 8, 2005.

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~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Table A-2. IEEPA National Emergency Use by Executive Order~~
~~In chronological order, from first use (1979) to present day (March 25, 2022)~~
~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
~~Administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981)~~
~~12170~~
~~Iran (hostage taking)~~
~~Declares national~~
~~Revoked and replaced,~~
~~(Nov. 14. 1979; 44 FR~~
~~emergency; blocks Iran~~
~~E.O. 13599 (2012)~~
~~65729)~~
~~government property~~
~~12205~~
~~Iran (hostage taking)~~
~~Prohibits certain~~
~~Revoked in part by E.O.~~
~~(Apr. 7, 1980; 45 FR~~
~~transactions~~
~~12282 (1981)~~
~~24099)~~
~~12211~~
~~Iran (hostage taking)~~
~~Prohibits transactions~~
~~Revoked in part by E.O.~~
~~(Apr. 17, 1980; 45 FR~~
~~12282 (1981)~~
~~26685)~~
~~12276~~
~~Iran (hostage taking—~~
~~Establishes escrow~~
~~Ratified by E.O. 12294~~
~~(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR~~
~~resolution)~~
~~accounts~~
~~(1981)~~
~~7913)~~
~~12277~~
~~Iran (hostage taking—~~
~~Transfers Iran~~
~~Ratified by E.O. 12294~~
~~(Jan, 19, 1981; 46 FR~~
~~resolution)~~
~~government funds~~
~~(1981)~~
~~7915)~~
~~12278~~
~~Iran (hostage taking—~~
~~Transfers Iran~~
~~Ratified by E.O. 12294~~
~~(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR~~
~~resolution)~~
~~government assets~~
~~(1981)~~
~~7917)~~
~~overseas~~
~~12279~~
~~Iran (hostage taking—~~
~~Transfers Iran~~
~~Ratified by E.O. 12294~~
~~(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR~~
~~resolution)~~
~~government assets held in~~
~~(1981)~~
~~7917)~~
~~U.S. banks~~
~~12280~~
~~Iran (hostage taking—~~
~~Transfers Iran~~
~~Ratified by E.O. 12294~~
~~(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR~~
~~resolution)~~
~~government financial~~
~~(1981)~~
~~7921)~~
~~assets held by non-banks~~
~~12281~~
~~Iran (hostage taking—~~
~~Transfers other Iran~~
~~Ratified by E.O. 12294~~
~~(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR~~
~~resolution)~~
~~government assets~~
~~(1981)~~
~~7923)~~
~~12282~~
~~Iran (hostage taking—~~
~~Revokes prohibitions~~
~~Ratified by E.O. 12294~~
~~(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR~~
~~resolution)~~
~~against transactions~~
~~(1981)~~
~~7925)~~
~~involving Iran~~
~~12283~~
~~Iran (hostage taking—~~
~~Non-prosecution of~~
~~Ratified by E.O. 12294~~
~~(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR~~
~~resolution)~~
~~claims of Iran hostages~~
~~(1981)~~
~~7927)~~
~~12284~~
~~Iran (hostage taking—~~
~~Restricts transfer of~~
~~Ratified by E.O. 12294~~
~~(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR~~
~~resolution)~~
~~property of the Shah~~
~~(1981)~~
~~7929)~~
~~12285~~
~~Iran (hostage taking--~~
~~Establishes Commission~~
~~Revoked by E.O. 12379~~
~~(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR~~
~~resolution~~
~~on Hostage~~
~~(1982)~~
~~7931)~~
~~Compensation~~
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~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
~~Administration of President George H.W. Bush (1989-1993)~~
~~12722~~
~~Iraq (invasion of Kuwait;~~
~~Declares national~~
~~Revoked by E.O. 13350~~
~~(Aug. 2, 1990; 55 FR~~
~~to meet requirements of~~
~~emergency; blocks Iraq~~
~~(2004)~~
~~31803)~~
~~UNSC Resolution)~~
~~Government assets in~~
~~U.S.; prohibits most~~
~~export and import;~~
~~restricts transactions~~
~~related to travel; prohibits~~
~~loans~~
~~12723~~
~~Kuwait (after Iraq’s~~
~~Declares national~~
~~Revoked by E.O. 12725~~
~~(Aug. 2, 1990; 55 FR~~
~~invasion; to meet~~
~~emergency; blocks Kuwait (1990)~~
~~31805)~~
~~requirements of UNSC~~
~~Government assets in~~
~~Resolution)~~
~~U.S.~~
~~12724~~
~~Iraq (invasion of Kuwait;~~
~~Blocks Iraq Government~~
~~Revoked by E.O. 13350~~
~~(Aug. 9, 1990; 55 FR~~
~~to meet requirements of~~
~~assets in U.S.; prohibits~~
~~(2004)~~
~~33089)~~
~~UNSC Resolution)~~
~~most export and import;~~
~~restricts transactions~~
~~related to travel; prohibits~~
~~loans~~
~~12725~~
~~Kuwait (after Iraq’s~~
~~Blocks Kuwait~~
~~Revoked by E.O. 12771~~
~~(Aug. 9, 1990; 55 FR~~
~~invasion, to meet~~
~~Government assets in~~
~~(1991)~~
~~33091)~~
~~requirements of UNSC~~
~~U.S.; prohibits most~~
~~Resolution)~~
~~export and import;~~
~~restricts transactions~~
~~related to travel; prohibits~~
~~loans~~
~~12730~~
~~Expiration of EAA~~
~~Continues EAR~~
~~Revoked by E.O. 12867~~
~~(Sept. 30, 1990; 55 FR~~
~~(1993)~~
~~40373)~~
~~12735~~
~~Chemical and biological~~
~~Declares national~~
~~Revoked and replaced by~~
~~(Nov. 16, 1990; 55 FR~~
~~weapons proliferation~~
~~emergency; prohibits~~
~~E.O. 12938 (1994)~~
~~48587)~~
~~transactions~~
~~12775~~
~~Haiti (military coup)~~
~~Declares national~~
~~Revoked by E.O. 12932~~
~~(Oct. 4, 1991; 56 FR~~
~~emergency; blocks Haiti~~
~~(1994)~~
~~50641)~~
~~Government assets in~~
~~U.S.; prohibits~~
~~transactions~~
~~12779~~
~~Haiti (military coup)~~
~~Blocks Haiti Government~~
~~Revoked by E.O. 12932~~
~~(Oct. 28, 1991; 56 FR~~
~~assets in U.S.; prohibits~~
~~(1994)~~
~~55975)~~
~~export and import,~~
~~transactions~~
~~12801~~
~~Libya (to meet~~
~~Bars overflight, takeoff~~
~~Revoked by E.O. 13357~~
~~(Apr. 15, 1992; 57 FR~~
~~requirements of UNSC~~
~~and landing planes~~
~~(2004)~~
~~14319)~~
~~Resolution)~~
~~traveling to/from Libya~~
~~12808~~
~~Yugoslavia (Serbia and~~
~~Declares national~~
~~Revoked by E.O. 13304~~
~~(May 30, 1992; 57 FR~~
~~Montenegro) (regional~~
~~emergency; blocks~~
~~(2003)~~
~~23299)~~
~~conflict; to meet~~
~~Yugoslav Government~~
~~requirements of UNSC~~
~~assets in United States~~

~~Resolution)~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
59 c. On June 6, 2022, President Biden declared an “an emergency to exist with respect to the threats to the availability of sufficient electricity generation capacity to meet expected customer demand.” Although the President did not cite the NEA, the statute he invoked may fall under the NEA. U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, Emergency Powers Statutes: Provisions of Federal Law Now in Effect Delegating to the Executive Extraordinary Authority in Time of National Emergency, committee print, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., September 1973 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1973), pp. xi, 32, 243; U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations, National Emergencies Act, hearing on H.R. 3884, 94th Cong., 1st sess., March 6, 18, 19, and April 9, 1975 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1975), p. 117: “…American importers have relied extensively on the practice of warehousing merchandise in Customs bonded warehouses for periods in excess of the initial statutory periods afforded by sections 491, 557, and 550 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Such extensions have been made possible by Customs regulations authorized by Proclamation 2048 which President Truman Issued under the authority of section 318 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (10 U.S.C. 1318), an emergency statute. Due to the extensive reliance on these Customs regulations in the past, a statutory replacement for the existing authority conferred on this Department by Proclamation 2948 wil be recommended.” Although the letter was written in 1974 in response to other bil s, it was included in hearings on H.R. 3884, which was the bil that ultimately became the NEA. Commerce argued in subsequent regulations that the agency "[did] not agree that Proclamation 10414 fails to conform with the requirements of the [NEA]." International Trade Administration, “Procedures Covering Suspension of Liquidation, Duties and Estimated Duties in Accord With Presidential Proclamation 10414,” 87 Federal Register 56868, September 16, 2022. Table A-2. Resolutions to Terminate National Emergencies Targeted Declaration of National Disposition of Resolution Cong. Emergency Resolution IEEPA or Other H.J.Res. 69 109 Proclamation 7924 Introduced Other of September 8, 2005, “To Suspend Subchapter IV of Chapter 31 of Title 40, United States Code, Within a Limited Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricane Katrina” Congressional Research Service 62 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Targeted Declaration of National Disposition of Resolution Cong. Emergency Resolution IEEPA or Other H.J.Res. 46 116 Proclamation 9844 Failed to pass over veto Other of February 15, 2019, “Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States.” S.J.Res. 10 116 Proclamation 9844 Introduced Other of February 15, 2019, “Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States.” S.J.Res. 54 116 Proclamation 9844 Failed to pass over veto Other of February 15, 2019, “Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States.” H.J.Res. 75 116 Proclamation 9844 Introduced Other of February 15, 2019, “Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States.” H.J.Res. 85 116 Proclamation 9844 Introduced Other of February 15, 2019, “Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States.” Congressional Research Service 63 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Targeted Declaration of National Disposition of Resolution Cong. Emergency Resolution IEEPA or Other H.J.Res 46 117 Proclamation 9994 Introduced Other of March 13, 2020, “Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak.” H.J.Res. 52 117 Proclamation 9994 Introduced Other of March 13, 2020, “Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak.” S.J.Res. 38 117 Proclamation 9994 Passed Senate Other of March 13, 2020, “Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak.” S.J.Res. 63 117 Proclamation 9994 Passed Senate Other of March 13, 2020, “Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak.” H.J.Res. 7 118 Proclamation 9994 Became Law Other of March 13, 2020, “Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak.” Congressional Research Service 64 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Targeted Declaration of National Disposition of Resolution Cong. Emergency Resolution IEEPA or Other H.J.Res. 68 118 Executive Order Failed House IEEPA 13413 of October 27, 2006, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” H.J.Res. 70 118 Executive Order Failed House IEEPA 13566 of February 25, 2011, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain Transactions Related to Libya.” H.J.Res. 71 118 Executive Order Failed House IEEPA 13303 of May 22, 2003, “Protecting the Development Fund for Iraq and Certain Other Property in Which Iraq Has an Interest.” H.J.Res. 74 118 Executive Order Failed House IEEPA 13611 of May 16, 2012, “Blocking Property of Persons Threatening the Peace, Security, or Stability of Yemen.” H.J.Res. 79 118 Executive Order Failed House IEEPA 13338 of May 11, 2004, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Syria.” Source: CRS as of September 1, 2023. Notes: Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA that did not invoke IEEPA. Congressional Research Service 65 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Table A-3. IEEPA National Emergency Use by Executive Order In chronological order, from first use (1979) to July 2023 Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status Administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) 12170 Iran (hostage taking) Declares national Emergency requires annual (November 14. 1979; 44 emergency; blocks Iran renewal; other parts FR 65729) government property revoked and replaced, E.O. 13599 (2012) 12205 Iran (hostage taking) Prohibits certain Revoked in part by E.O. (April. 7, 1980; 45 FR transactions 12282 (1981) 24099) 12211 Iran (hostage taking) Prohibits transactions Revoked in part by E.O. (April 17, 1980; 45 FR 12282 (1981) 26685) 12276 Iran (hostage taking— Establishes escrow Ratified by E.O. 12294 (January 19, 1981; 46 FR resolution) accounts (1981) 7913) 12277 Iran (hostage taking— Transfers Iran Ratified by E.O. 12294 (January 19, 1981; 46 FR resolution) government funds (1981) 7915) 12278 Iran (hostage taking— Transfers Iran Ratified by E.O. 12294 (January 19, 1981; 46 FR resolution) government assets (1981) 7917) overseas 12279 Iran (hostage taking— Transfers Iran Ratified by E.O. 12294 (January 19, 1981; 46 FR resolution) government assets held in (1981) 7917) U.S. banks 12280 Iran (hostage taking— Transfers Iran Ratified by E.O. 12294 (January 19, 1981; 46 FR resolution) government financial (1981) 7921) assets held by non-banks 12281 Iran (hostage taking— Transfers other Iran Ratified by E.O. 12294 (January 19, 1981; 46 FR resolution) government assets (1981) 7923) 12282 Iran (hostage taking— Revokes prohibitions Ratified by E.O. 12294 (January 19, 1981; 46 FR resolution) against transactions (1981) 7925) involving Iran 12283 Iran (hostage taking— Non-prosecution of Ratified by E.O. 12294 (January 19, 1981; 46 FR resolution) claims of Iran hostages (1981) 7927) 12284 Iran (hostage taking— Restricts transfer of Ratified by E.O. 12294 (January 19, 1981; 46 FR resolution) property of the Shah (1981) 7929) 12285 Iran (hostage taking-- Establishes Commission Revoked by E.O. 12379 (January 19, 1981; 46 FR resolution on Hostage (1982) 7931) Compensation Congressional Research Service 66 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status Administration of President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) 12294 Iran (hostage taking— Suspends claims and Amended by E.O. 12379 (February 24, 1981; 46 FR resolution) litigation against Iran (1982) 14111) 12444 Expiration of Export Continues Export Revoked by E.O. 12451 (October 14, 1983; 48 FR Administration Act of Administration (1983) (EAA 48215) 1979 (EAA) Regulations (EAR) reauthorized) 12470 Expiration of EAA Continues EAR Revoked by E.O. 12525 (March 30, 1984; 49 FR (1985) (EAA 13099) reauthorized) 12513 Nicaragua (civil war) Declares national Revoked by E.O. 12707 (May 1, 1985; 50 FR emergency; prohibits (1990) 18629) imports, exports, air traffic, use of U.S. ports 12532 South Africa (apartheid, Declares national Revoked by E.O. 12769 (September 9, 1985; 50 to meet requirements of emergency; prohibits (1991) FR 36861) U.N. Security Council loans to government, (UNSC) Resolution) crime control exports, nuclear-related exports, military-related imports; supports Sul ivan Principles 12535 South Africa (apartheid, Prohibits import of Revoked by E.O. 12769 (October 1, 1985; 50 FR to meet requirements of krugerrands (1991) 40325) UNSC Resolution) 12543 Libya (terrorism, regional Declares national Revoked by E.O. 13357 (January 1, 1986; 51 FR unrest) emergency; prohibits (2004) 875) most imports and exports, transactions relating to transportation to/from Libya, performance of contract obligations in support of Libyan projects, bank loans, financial transactions related to travel to Libya 12544 Libya (terrorism, regional Blocks Libyan Revoked by E.O. 13357 (January 8, 1986; 51 FR unrest) Government assets in (2004) 1235) United States 12635 Panama (finding Declares national Revoked by E.O. 12710 (April 8, 1988; 53 FR government of Noriega emergency; blocks (1990) 12134) and Palma a threat) Panama assets in United States Congressional Research Service 67 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status Administration of President George H.W. Bush (1989-1993) 12722 Iraq (invasion of Kuwait; Declares national Revoked by E.O. 13350 (August 2, 1990; 55 FR to meet requirements of emergency; blocks Iraq (2004) 31803) UNSC Resolution) Government assets in U.S.; prohibits most export and import; restricts transactions related to travel; prohibits loans 12723 Kuwait (after Iraq’s Declares national Revoked by E.O. 12725 (August 2, 1990; 55 FR invasion; to meet emergency; blocks Kuwait (1990) 31805) requirements of UNSC Government assets in Resolution) U.S. 12724 Iraq (invasion of Kuwait; Blocks Iraq Government Revoked by E.O. 13350 (August 9, 1990; 55 FR to meet requirements of assets in U.S.; prohibits (2004) 33089) UNSC Resolution) most export and import; restricts transactions related to travel; prohibits loans 12725 Kuwait (after Iraq’s Blocks Kuwait Revoked by E.O. 12771 (August 9, 1990; 55 FR invasion, to meet Government assets in (1991) 33091) requirements of UNSC U.S.; prohibits most Resolution) export and import; restricts transactions related to travel; prohibits loans 12730 Expiration of EAA Continues EAR Revoked by E.O. 12867 (September 30, 1990; 55 (1993) FR 40373) 12735 Chemical and biological Declares national Revoked and replaced by (November 16, 1990; 55 weapons proliferation emergency; prohibits E.O. 12938 (1994) FR 48587) transactions 12775 Haiti (military coup) Declares national Revoked by E.O. 12932 (October 4, 1991; 56 FR emergency; blocks Haiti (1994) 50641) Government assets in U.S.; prohibits transactions 12779 Haiti (military coup) Blocks Haiti Government Revoked by E.O. 12932 (October 28, 1991; 56 FR assets in U.S.; prohibits (1994) 55975) export and import, transactions 12801 Libya (to meet Bars overflight, takeoff Revoked by E.O. 13357 (April 15, 1992; 57 FR requirements of UNSC and landing planes (2004) 14319) Resolution) traveling to/from Libya 12808 Yugoslavia (Serbia and Declares national Revoked by E.O. 13304 (May 30, 1992; 57 FR Montenegro) (regional emergency; blocks (2003) 23299) conflict; to meet Yugoslav Government requirements of UNSC assets in United States Resolution) Congressional Research Service 68

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
12810 12810
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Blocks Yugoslav Blocks Yugoslav
Revoked by E.O. 13304 Revoked by E.O. 13304
(June 5, 1992; 57 FR (June 5, 1992; 57 FR
Montenegro) (regional Montenegro) (regional
Government assets in Government assets in
(2003) (2003)
24347) 24347)
conflict; to meet conflict; to meet
U.S.; prohibits import and U.S.; prohibits import and
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
export, transactions export, transactions
Resolution) Resolution)
related to travel, air related to travel, air
traffic, loans, completing traffic, loans, completing
contracts, sports contracts, sports
participation, tech/cultural participation, tech/cultural
exchanges exchanges
12817 12817
Iraq (postwar; to meet Iraq (postwar; to meet
Blocks assets Blocks assets
Revoked by E.O. 13350 Revoked by E.O. 13350
~~Oct.~~October 21, 1992; 57 FR 21, 1992; 57 FR
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
(2004) (2004)
48433) 48433)
Resolution) Resolution)
12831 12831
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Prohibits transshipment Prohibits transshipment
Revoked by E.O. 13304 Revoked by E.O. 13304
( (~~Jan.~~January 15, 1993; 58 FR 15, 1993; 58 FR
Montenegro) (regional Montenegro) (regional
(2003) (2003)
5253) 5253)
conflict) conflict)

Administration of President William Clinton (1993-2001)
12846 12846
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Tightens sanctions, Tightens sanctions,
Revoked by E.O. 13304 Revoked by E.O. 13304
( (~~Apr.~~April 25, 1993; 58 FR 25, 1993; 58 FR
Montenegro) (regional Montenegro) (regional
especial y those relating especial y those relating
(2003) (2003)
25771) 25771)
conflict; to meet conflict; to meet
to maritime restrictions to maritime restrictions
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
Resolution) Resolution)
12853 12853
Haiti (military coup) Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of regime; Blocks assets of regime;
Revoked by E.O. 12932 Revoked by E.O. 12932
(June 30, 1993; 58 FR (June 30, 1993; 58 FR
prohibits export of prohibits export of
(1994) (1994)
35843) 35843)
petroleum, arms, and petroleum, arms, and
related materiel related materiel
12865 12865
UNITA (Angola) (to meet UNITA (Angola) (to meet
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13298 Revoked by E.O. 13298
( (~~Sept.~~September 26, 1993; 58 26, 1993; 58 FR
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
emergency; prohibits sales (2003) emergency; prohibits sales (2003)
FR 51005) 51005)
Resolution) Resolution)
to UNITA and UNITA- to UNITA and UNITA-
control ed regions control ed regions
12868 12868
Weapons proliferation Weapons proliferation
Declares national Declares national
Revoked and replaced by Revoked and replaced by
( (~~Sept.~~September 30, 1993; 58 30, 1993; 58 FR
emergency; controls emergency; controls
E.O. 12930 (1994) E.O. 12930 (1994)
FR 51749) 51749)
exports; prohibits exports; prohibits
transactions with those transactions with those
found not in compliance found not in compliance
with controls with controls
12872 12872
Haiti (military coup) Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of those Blocks assets of those
Revoked by E.O. 12932 Revoked by E.O. 12932
( (~~Oct.~~October 18, 1993; 58 FR 18, 1993; 58 FR
impeding democratization impeding democratization
(1994) (1994)
54029) 54029)
process process
12914 12914
Haiti (military coup) Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of military Blocks assets of military
Revoked by E.O. 12932 Revoked by E.O. 12932
(May 7, 1994; 59 FR (May 7, 1994; 59 FR
and participants in 1991 and participants in 1991
(1994) (1994)
24339) 24339)
overthrow; prohibits air overthrow; prohibits air
traffic traffic
12917 12917
Haiti (military coup) Haiti (military coup)
Prohibits imports Prohibits imports
Revoked by E.O. 12932 Revoked by E.O. 12932
(May 21, 1994; 59 FR (May 21, 1994; 59 FR
(1994) (1994)
26925) 26925)
12920 12920
Haiti (military coup) Haiti (military coup)
Prohibits certain financial Prohibits certain financial
Revoked by E.O. 12932 Revoked by E.O. 12932
(June 10, 1994; 59 FR (June 10, 1994; 59 FR
transactions, exports transactions, exports
(1994) (1994)
30501) 30501)
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
6069

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
12922 12922
Haiti (military coup) Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of certain Blocks assets of certain
Revoked by E.O. 12932 Revoked by E.O. 12932
(June 21, 1994; 59 FR (June 21, 1994; 59 FR
individuals individuals
(1994) (1994)
32645) 32645)
12923 12923
Expiration of EAA Expiration of EAA
Continues EAR Continues EAR
Revoked and replaced by Revoked and replaced by
(June 30, 1994; 59 FR (June 30, 1994; 59 FR
E.O. 12924 (1994) E.O. 12924 (1994)
34551) 34551)
12924 12924
Expiration of EAA Expiration of EAA
Continues EAR Continues EAR
Amended by E.O. 12981 Amended by E.O. 12981
(August 19, 1994; 59 FR (August 19, 1994; 59 FR
(1995) (1995)
34551) 34551)
12930 12930
Proliferation of weapons Proliferation of weapons
Declares national Declares national
Revoked and replaced by Revoked and replaced by
( (~~Sept.~~September 29, 1994; 59 29, 1994; 59 FR
of mass destruction of mass destruction
emergency; controls emergency; controls
E.O. 12938 (1994) E.O. 12938 (1994)
FR 50475) 50475)
exports; prohibits exports; prohibits
transactions with those transactions with those
found not in compliance found not in compliance
with controls with controls
12934 12934
Bosnian Serb-control ed Bosnian Serb-control ed
Blocks assets; prohibits Blocks assets; prohibits
Revoked by E.O. 13304 Revoked by E.O. 13304
( (~~Oct.~~October 25, 1994; 59 FR 25, 1994; 59 FR
areas of Bosnia and areas of Bosnia and
export, maritime access export, maritime access
(2003) (2003)
54117) 54117)
Herzegovina (to meet Herzegovina (to meet
to certain ports to certain ports
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
resolution) resolution)
12938 12938
Proliferation of weapons Proliferation of weapons
Declares national Declares national
~~Amended by E.O. 13099~~
~~(Nov.~~Requires annual renewal; (November 19, 1994; 59 19, 1994; 59 FR
of mass destruction of mass destruction
emergency; controls emergency; controls
~~(1998)~~
amended by E.O. 13094 FR 59099) 59099)
exports; prohibits exports; prohibits
~~transactions with those~~
(1998); E.O. 13128 transactions with those (1999); E.O. 13382 (2005) found not in compliance found not in compliance
with controls with controls
12947 12947
Terrorists who disrupt Terrorists who disrupt
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually~~
~~(Jan.~~Revoked by E.O. 13886 (January 23, 1995; 60 FR 23, 1995; 60 FR
Middle East peace process emergency; blocks assets; Middle East peace process emergency; blocks assets;
(2019) 5079) 5079)
prohibits transactions prohibits transactions
12957 12957
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Declares national Declares national
~~Revoked in part, and~~
~~(Mar.~~Requires annual renewal; (March 15, 1995; 60 FR 15, 1995; 60 FR
proliferation) proliferation)
emergency; prohibits emergency; prohibits
~~restated in E.O. 12959~~other parts revoked and
14615) 14615)
investment in oil investment in oil
~~(1995)~~restated in E.O. 12959
development development (1995)
12959 12959
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Prohibits investment in oil Revoked in part by E.O. Prohibits investment in oil Revoked in part by E.O.
(May 6, 1995; 60 FR (May 6, 1995; 60 FR
proliferation) proliferation)
development development
13059 (1997) 13059 (1997)
24757) 24757)
12978 12978
Significant narcotics Significant narcotics
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually~~
~~(Oct.~~Requires annual renewal; (October 21, 1995; 60 FR 21, 1995; 60 FR
traffickers (initially traffickers (initially
emergency; blocks assets; emergency; blocks assets;
technical amendments in 54579) 54579)
Colombia) Colombia)
prohibits transactions prohibits transactions
E.O. 13286 (2003) 12981 12981
EAA EAA
Amends the Amends the
Amended by E.O. 13020 Amended by E.O. 13020
( (~~Dec.~~December 5, 1995) 5, 1995)
administration of export administration of export
(1996) (1996)
controls. controls.
13020 13020
EAA EAA
Further amends the Further amends the
Amended by E.O. 13026 Amended by E.O. 13026
( (~~Oct.~~October 12, 1996) 12, 1996)
administration of export administration of export
(1996) (1996)
controls. controls.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
6170

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13026 13026
EAA EAA
Further amends the Further amends the
Revoked by E.O. 13206 Revoked by E.O. 13206
( (~~Nov.~~November 15, 1996) 15, 1996)
administration of export administration of export
(2001) (2001)
controls. Adds rules for controls. Adds rules for
encryption products. encryption products.
13047 13047
Burma (military Burma (military
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13742 Revoked by E.O. 13742
(May 22, 1997; 62 FR (May 22, 1997; 62 FR
government; to government; to
emergency; blocks new emergency; blocks new
(2016) (2016)
28301) 28301)
implement Sec. 570 of P.L. investment implement Sec. 570 of P.L. investment
104-208) 104-208)
13059 13059
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Blocks imports, exports Blocks imports, exports
Amended by E.O. 13716 Amended by E.O. 13716
( (~~Aug.~~August 19, 1997; 62 FR 19, 1997; 62 FR
proliferation, terrorism, proliferation, terrorism,
(2016) (2016)
44531) 44531)
regional stability) regional stability)
13067 13067
Sudan (conflict) Sudan (conflict)
Declares national Declares national
~~Revoked in part by E.O.~~
~~(Nov. 3, 1997; 62 FR~~Requires annual renewal; (November 3, 1997; 62
emergency; blocks Sudan emergency; blocks Sudan
~~13761 (2017)~~
revoked in part by E.O. FR 59989) 59989)
Government assets; Government assets;
13761 (2017) prohibits exports, prohibits exports,
imports, other imports, other
transactions transactions
13069 ( 13069 (~~Dec. 12, 1997; 62~~
December 12, UNITA (Angola) (war) UNITA (Angola) (war)
Prohibits certain Prohibits certain
Revoked by E.O. 13298 Revoked by E.O. 13298
1997; 62 FR 65989) FR 65989)
transaction transaction
(2003) (2003)
13088 13088
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13304 Revoked by E.O. 13304
(June 9, 1998; 63 FR (June 9, 1998; 63 FR
Montenegro) (war) Montenegro) (war)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
(2003) (2003)
32109) 32109)
Yugoslav Government Yugoslav Government
assets; prohibits assets; prohibits
transactions transactions
13094 13094
Proliferation of weapons Proliferation of weapons
Prohibits some Prohibits some
Amended by E.O. 13128 Amended by E.O. 13128
(July 28, 1998; 63 FR (July 28, 1998; 63 FR
of mass destruction of mass destruction
transactions, assistance, transactions, assistance,
(1999) (1999)
40803) 40803)
imports imports
13098 13098
UNITA (Angola) (war; to UNITA (Angola) (war; to
Blocks UNITA assets in Blocks UNITA assets in
Revoked by E.O. 13298 Revoked by E.O. 13298
( (~~Aug.~~August 18, 1998; 63 FR 18, 1998; 63 FR
meet requirements of meet requirements of
U.S.; prohibits imports U.S.; prohibits imports
(2003) (2003)
44771) 44771)
UNSC resolution) UNSC resolution)
from and exports to from and exports to
UNITA-control ed or UNITA-control ed or
influences industries influences industries
13099 13099
Terrorists who disrupt Terrorists who disrupt
Adds Usama bin Laden Adds Usama bin Laden
Amends E.O. 12947 Amends E.O. 12947
( (~~Aug.~~August 20, 1998; 63 FR 20, 1998; 63 FR
the Middle East peace the Middle East peace
and others to the and others to the
(1995); see above (1995); see above
45167) 45167)
process process
terrorist list terrorist list
13121 13121
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Blocks Yugoslav Blocks Yugoslav
Revoked by E.O. 13304 Revoked by E.O. 13304
( (~~Apr.~~April 30, 1999; 64 FR 30, 1999; 64 FR
Montenegro) (war) Montenegro) (war)
Government assets; Government assets;
(2003) (2003)
24021) 24021)
prohibits transactions prohibits transactions
13128 13128
Proliferation of weapons Proliferation of weapons
Implements the Chemical Implements the Chemical
~~Renewed Annually.~~
~~(Jun.~~Related to E.O. 12938 (June 25, 1999) 25, 1999)
of mass destruction of mass destruction
Weapons Convention and Weapons Convention and (1994).
the Chemical Weapons the Chemical Weapons
Convention Convention
Implementation Act. Implementation Act.
13129 13129
Taliban (terrorism) Taliban (terrorism)
Declares national Declares national
National emergency National emergency
(July 4, 1999; 64 FR (July 4, 1999; 64 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
terminated by E.O. 13268 terminated by E.O. 13268
36759) 36759)
property property
(2002); see, however, (2002); see, however,
E.O. 13224 (2001) E.O. 13224 (2001)
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
6271

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
E.O. 13159 E.O. 13159
Russia for misuse of highly Declares national Russia for misuse of highly Declares national
Superseded by E.O. Superseded by E.O.
(June 21, 2000; 65 FR (June 21, 2000; 65 FR
enriched uranium enriched uranium
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
13617 (2012) 13617 (2012)
39279) 39279)
extractions extractions
property property
13192 13192
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Substantially expands Substantially expands
Revoked by E.O. 13304 Revoked by E.O. 13304
( (~~Jan.~~January 17, 2001; 66 FR 17, 2001; 66 FR
Montenegro) (war) Montenegro) (war)
sanctions in E.O. 13088 sanctions in E.O. 13088
(2003) (2003)
7379) 7379)
(1998) to apply to (1998) to apply to
humanitarian crisis in humanitarian crisis in
Kosovo Kosovo
13194 13194
Sierra Leone (diamond Sierra Leone (diamond
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13324 Revoked by E.O. 13324
( (~~Jan.~~January 18, 2001; 66 FR 18, 2001; 66 FR
trade) trade)
emergency; prohibits emergency; prohibits
(2004) 2004)
7389) 7389)
diamond imports diamond imports
Administration of President George W. Bush (2001-2009)
13213 13213
Sierra Leone (diamond Sierra Leone (diamond
Expands prohibitions on Expands prohibitions on
Revoked by E.O. 13324 Revoked by E.O. 13324
(May 22, 2001; 66 FR (May 22, 2001; 66 FR
trade) trade)
diamond trade diamond trade
2004) 2004)
28829) 28829)
13219 13219
Western Balkans Western Balkans
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually~~Requires annual renewal;
(June 26, 2001; 66 FR (June 26, 2001; 66 FR
(destabilization postwar) (destabilization postwar)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
~~34775)~~
~~property~~amended by E.O. 13304 34775) property (2003); expanded by E.O. 14033 (2021)
13222 13222
Expiration of EAA Expiration of EAA
~~Continues EAR~~
~~Renewed annually~~
~~(Aug.~~Declares national Requires annual renewal (August 17, 2001; 66 FR 17, 2001; 66 FR
~~44025)~~ emergency with the 44025) expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA). Continues Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and three remaining statutory provisions in the EAA relating to weapons proliferation.
13224 13224
Terrorism Terrorism
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually~~
~~(Sept.~~Requires annual renewal; (September 23, 2001; 66 23, 2001; 66 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 13886 FR 49079 49079
property; prohibits property; prohibits
(2019) transactions transactions
13268 13268
Taliban and Terrorism Taliban and Terrorism
Terminates E.O. 13129 Terminates E.O. 13129
Expanded by E.O. 13371 Expanded by E.O. 13371
(July 2, 2002; 67 FR (July 2, 2002; 67 FR
(1999); amends E.O. (1999); amends E.O.
(2005) (2005)
44751) 44751)
13224 (2001) 13224 (2001)
13288 13288
Zimbabwe (undermining Zimbabwe (undermining
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually,~~
~~(Mar.~~Requires annual renewal; (March 6, 2003; 68 FR 6, 2003; 68 FR
democratic processes) democratic processes)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
superseded in part by superseded in part by
11457) 11457)
property property
E.O. 13391 (2005) E.O. 13391 (2005)
13290 13290
Iraq (war) Iraq (war)
Authorizes the Authorizes the
Modified by E.O. 13350 Modified by E.O. 13350
~~Mar.~~March 20, 2003; 68 FR 20, 2003; 68 FR
confiscation and vesting of (2004) confiscation and vesting of (2004)
14307) 14307)
property property
13298 13298
UNITA (Angola) UNITA (Angola)
Terminates earlier Terminates earlier
Revokes earlier orders Revokes earlier orders
(May 6, 2003; 68 FR (May 6, 2003; 68 FR
emergency emergency
24857) 24857)
~~13303~~
~~Iraq (war)~~
~~Declares national~~
~~Amends earlier order~~
~~(May 22, 2003; 68 FR~~
~~emergency; Protects~~
~~31931)~~
~~certain property, revokes~~
~~earlier orders.~~
~~13304~~
~~Yugoslavia (regional war)~~
~~Terminates earlier~~
~~Revokes and modifies~~
~~(May 28, 2003; 68 FR~~
~~emergency~~
~~earlier orders~~
~~32315)~~
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63

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~Congressional Research Service 72 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13303 Iraq (war) Declares national Requires annual renewal; (May 22, 2003; 68 FR emergency; Protects amends E.O. 13290 31931) certain property, revokes (2003); expanded on by earlier orders. E.O. 13315 (2003), E.O. 13350 (2004), E.O. 13364 (2004), E.O. 13438 (2007), and E.O. 13668 (2014). 13304 Yugoslavia (regional war) Terminates earlier Revokes and modifies (May 28, 2003; 68 FR emergency earlier orders 32315)
13310 13310
Burma (military Burma (military
Blocks property Blocks property
Revoked by E.O. 13742 Revoked by E.O. 13742
(July 28, 2003; 68 FR (July 28, 2003; 68 FR
government) government)
(2016) (2016)
44853) 44853)
13312 13312
Sierra Leone and Liberia Sierra Leone and Liberia
Implements the Clean Implements the Clean
Revoked by E.O. 13324 Revoked by E.O. 13324
( (~~Jul.~~July 3, 2003 3, 2003); 68 FR
(conflict) (conflict)
Diamond Trade Act Diamond Trade Act
(2004) (2004)
45151)) 13315 13315
Iraq (former regime) Iraq (former regime)
Blocks property Blocks property
Superseded by E.O. Superseded by E.O.
( (~~Aug.~~August 28, 2003; 68 FR 28, 2003; 68 FR
13350 (2004) 13350 (2004)
52315) 52315)
13324 13324
Sierra Leone and Liberia Sierra Leone and Liberia
Terminates earlier Terminates earlier
Revokes Revokes ~~earlier order~~
~~(Jan. 15, 2004)~~EO 13194 (2001) (January 15, 2004; 69 FR
(conflict) (conflict)
emergency emergency
and EO 13213 (2001) 2823) 13338 13338
Syria (civil conflict) Syria (civil conflict)
Declares national Declares national
~~Modified by E.O. 13460~~Requires annual renewal.
(May 11, 2004; 69 FR (May 11, 2004; 69 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
~~(2008); renewed annually~~Modified by E.O. 13460
26751) 26751)
property of those who property of those who
~~export certain goods to~~
~~Syria~~ (2008). See also E.O. export certain goods to 13399 (2006), E.O. 13572 Syria (2011), E.O. 13573 (2011), E.O. 13582 (2011), E.O. 13606 (2012), and E.O. 13608 (2012)
13348 13348
Liberia (corruption, to Liberia (corruption, to
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13710 Revoked by E.O. 13710
(July 22, 2004; 69 FR (July 22, 2004; 69 FR
meet requirements of meet requirements of
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
(2015) (2015)
44885) 44885)
UNSC resolution) UNSC resolution)
property; prohibits property; prohibits
imports imports
13350 13350
Iraq (postwar) Iraq (postwar)
Ends emergency from Ends emergency from
Amended by E.O. 13364 Amended by E.O. 13364
(July 29, 2004; 69 FR (July 29, 2004; 69 FR
1990 Kuwait invasion 1990 Kuwait invasion
(2004) (2004)
46055) 46055)
13357 13357
Libya (terrorism) Libya (terrorism)
Terminates earlier Terminates earlier
Revokes earlier orders Revokes earlier orders
( (~~Sept.~~September 20, 2004; 69 20, 2004; 69 FR
emergency emergency
FR 56665) 56665)
13364 13364
Iraq (postwar) Iraq (postwar)
Amends transaction Amends transaction
Amended by E.O. 13668 Amended by E.O. 13668
( (~~Nov.~~November 29, 2004 29, 2004); 69
controls and regulations controls and regulations
(2014 (2014) FR 70177) )
on the Development fund on the Development fund
for Iraq for Iraq
Congressional Research Service 73 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13372 13372
Terrorism Terrorism
Clarifies use of sanctions Clarifies use of sanctions
Amends E.O. 12947 Amends E.O. 12947~~, E.O.~~
~~(Feb.~~ (February 16, 2005; 70 FR 16, 2005; 70 FR
~~13224~~(1995), E.O. 13224 (2001)
8499) 8499)
13382 13382
Weapons proliferation Weapons proliferation
Expands on earlier Expands on earlier
Amends E.O. 12938 Amends E.O. 12938
(June 28, 2005; 70 FR (June 28, 2005; 70 FR
orders; blocks property orders; blocks property
(1994) and 13094 (1998) (1994) and 13094 (1998),
38567) 38567)
~~see above~~
13391 13391
Zimbabwe (undermining Zimbabwe (undermining
Blocks property Blocks property
Amends and supersedes, Amends and supersedes,
( (~~Nov.~~November 22, 2005; 70 22, 2005; 70 FR
democratic processes) democratic processes)
in part, E.O. 13288 (2003) in part, E.O. 13288 (2003)
FR 71201) 71201)
13396 13396
Cote d’Ivoire (conflict) Cote d’Ivoire (conflict)
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13739 Revoked by E.O. 13739
( (~~Feb~~February. 7, 2006; 71 FR . 7, 2006; 71 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
(2016) (2016)
7389) 7389)
property property
13399 13399
Syria (civil war) Syria (civil war)
Expands E.O. 13338 Expands E.O. 13338
Amends earlier order Amends earlier order
( (~~Apr.~~April 25, 2006; 71 FR 25, 2006; 71 FR
(2004); blocks property (2004); blocks property
25059) 25059)
~~Congressional Research Service~~
64

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
13400 13400
Sudan (Darfur) Sudan (Darfur)
Expands E.O. 13067 Expands E.O. 13067
Amends earlier order Amends earlier order
( (~~Apr.~~April 26, 2006; 71 FR 26, 2006; 71 FR
(1997); blocks property (1997); blocks property
25483) 25483)
13405 13405
Belarus (undermining Belarus (undermining
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually~~Requires annual renewal
(June 16, 2006; 71 FR (June 16, 2006; 71 FR
democracy) democracy)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
35485) 35485)
property property
13412 13412
Sudan (Darfur, regional Sudan (Darfur, regional
Expands E.O. 13067 Expands E.O. 13067
Revoked by E.O. 13761 Revoked by E.O. 13761
( (~~Oct.~~October 13, 2006; 71 FR 13, 2006; 71 FR
stability) stability)
(1997; blocks property (1997; blocks property
(2017) (2017)
61369) 61369)
and transactions and transactions
13413 13413
Democratic Republic of Democratic Republic of
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually;~~
~~(Oct.~~Requires annual renewal; (October 27, 2006; 71 FR 27, 2006; 71 FR
the Congo (regional the Congo (regional
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 13671 amended by E.O. 13671
64105) 64105)
stability) stability)
property property
(2014) (2014)
13438 13438
Those who threaten Those who threaten
Expands E.O. 13303 Expands E.O. 13303
Expands other orders Expands other orders
(July 17, 2007; 72 FR (July 17, 2007; 72 FR
stabilization efforts in Iraq stabilization efforts in Iraq
(2003); blocks property (2003); blocks property
39719) 39719)
13441 13441
Those who threaten the Those who threaten the
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually~~
~~(Aug.~~Requires annual renewal (August 1, 2007; 72 FR 1, 2007; 72 FR
sovereignty of Lebanon sovereignty of Lebanon
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
43499) 43499)
(primarily Syria) (primarily Syria)
property property
13448 13448
Burma (military Burma (military
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13742 Revoked by E.O. 13742
~~Oct.~~October 18, 2007; 72 FR 18, 2007; 72 FR
government) government)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
(2016) (2016)
60223) 60223)
property and transactions property and transactions
13460 13460
Syria (civil conflict) Syria (civil conflict)
Blocks property of those Blocks property of those
Amends E.O. 13338 Amends E.O. 13338
( (~~Feb.~~February 13, 2008; 73 FR 13, 2008; 73 FR
who support certain who support certain
(2004) (2004)
8991) 8991)
activities in Syria activities in Syria
13464 13464
Burma (military Burma (military
Blocks property and Blocks property and
Revoked by E.O. 13742 Revoked by E.O. 13742
~~Apr.~~April 30, 2008; 72 FR 30, 2008; 72 FR
government) government)
transactions transactions
(2016) (2016)
24491) 24491)
Congressional Research Service 74 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13466 13466
North Korea (weapons North Korea (weapons
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually~~Requires annual renewal;
(June 26, 2008; 73 FR (June 26, 2008; 73 FR
proliferation, to meet proliferation, to meet
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
see also E.O. 13551 36787) 36787)
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
property and transactions property and transactions
~~resolution~~(2010), E.O. 13570 resolution) (2011), E.O. 13687 (2015), E.O. 13722 (2016), and E.O. 13810 (2017) )
13469 13469
Zimbabwe (undermining Zimbabwe (undermining
Blocks property Blocks property
Expands E.O. 13288 Expands E.O. 13288
(July 25, 2008; 73 FR (July 25, 2008; 73 FR
democracy) democracy)
(2003) and 13391 (2005) (2003) and 13391 (2005)
43841) 43841)
Administration of President Barack Obama (2009-2017)
13536 13536
Somalia (conflict) Somalia (conflict)
Declares national Declares national
~~Amended by E.O. 13620~~
~~(Apr.~~Requires annual renewal; (April 12, 2010; 75 FR 12, 2010; 75 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
~~(2012); renewed annually~~amended by E.O. 13620
19869) 19869)
property property
(2012) 13551 13551
North Korea (weapons North Korea (weapons
~~Declares national~~
~~Renewed annually~~
~~(Aug.~~Blocks property Expands national (August 30, 2010; 75 FR 30, 2010; 75 FR
proliferation, to meet proliferation, to meet
emergency emergency~~; Blocks~~ declared in
53837) 53837)
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
~~property~~
E.O. 13466 (2008) resolution) resolution)
13553 13553
Iran (human rights) Iran (human rights)
Blocks property including Blocks property including
Expands E.O. 12957 Expands E.O. 12957
(Sept, 28, 2010; 75 FR (Sept, 28, 2010; 75 FR
that of Iranian officials that of Iranian officials
(1995) (1995)
60567) 60567)
~~Congressional Research Service~~
65

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
13566 13566
Libya (stability) Libya (stability)
Declares national Declares national
~~Modified by E.O. 13726~~
~~(Feb.~~Requires annual renewal; (February 25, 2011; 76 FR 25, 2011; 76 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
~~(2016); renewed annually~~modified by E.O. 13726
11315) 11315)
property and transactions property and transactions
(2016) 13570 13570
North Korea (weapons North Korea (weapons
Blocks transactions Blocks transactions
Expands E.O. 13466 Expands E.O. 13466
( (~~Apr.~~April 18, 2011; 76 FR 18, 2011; 76 FR
proliferation, to meet proliferation, to meet
(2008), 13551 (2010); (2008), 13551 (2010);
22291) 22291)
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
amended by E.O. 13687 amended by E.O. 13687
resolution) resolution)
(2015) (2015)
13572 13572
Syria (human rights) Syria (human rights)
Blocks property of human Expands E.O. 13338 Blocks property of human Expands E.O. 13338
( (~~Apr.~~April 29, 2011; 76 FR 29, 2011; 76 FR
rights violators rights violators
(2004), 13399 (2006), and (2004), 13399 (2006), and
24787) 24787)
13460 (2008) 13460 (2008)
13573 13573
Syria (war) Syria (war)
Blocks property of senior Blocks property of senior
Expands E.O. 13338 Expands E.O. 13338
(May 18, 2011; 76 FR (May 18, 2011; 76 FR
government officials government officials
(2004), 13399 (2006), (2004), 13399 (2006),
29143) 29143)
13460 (2008), and 13572 13460 (2008), and 13572
(2011); amended by E.O. (2011); amended by E.O.
13582 (2011) 13582 (2011)
13574 13574
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Implements new sanctions Revoked by E.O. 13716 Implements new sanctions Revoked by E.O. 13716
(May 23, 2011; 76 FR (May 23, 2011; 76 FR
proliferation) proliferation)
in Iran Sanctions Act of in Iran Sanctions Act of
(2016) (2016)
30505) 30505)
1996 1996
13581 13581
Transnational Criminal Transnational Criminal
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually~~Requires annual renewal;
(July 24, 2011; 76 FR (July 24, 2011; 76 FR
Organizations Organizations
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks amended by E.O. 13863
44757) 44757)
property property
(2019) 13582 13582
Syria (war) Syria (war)
Blocks property of Blocks property of
Expands E.O. 13338 Expands E.O. 13338
( (~~Aug.~~August 17, 2011; 76 FR 17, 2011; 76 FR
Government of Syria and Government of Syria and
(2004), 13399 (2006), (2004), 13399 (2006),
52209) 52209)
transactions transactions
13460 (2008), 13572 13460 (2008), 13572
(2011), and E.O. 13573 (2011), and E.O. 13573
(2011) (2011)
Congressional Research Service 75 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13590 13590
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Prohibits transactions Prohibits transactions
Revoked by E.O. 13716 Revoked by E.O. 13716
( (~~Nov.~~November 20, 2011; 76 20, 2011; 76 FR
proliferation) proliferation)
related to Iran’s energy related to Iran’s energy
(2016) (2016)
FR 72609) 72609)
and petrochemical sectors and petrochemical sectors
13599 13599
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Blocks property of Blocks property of
Expands E.O. 12957 Expands E.O. 12957
( (~~Feb.~~February 5, 2012; 77 FR 5, 2012; 77 FR
proliferation) proliferation)
government and financial government and financial
(1995) (1995)
6659) 6659)
institutions institutions
13606 13606
Iran and Syria (human Iran and Syria (human
Blocks property and Blocks property and
Expands E.O. 12957 Expands E.O. 12957
( (~~Apr.~~April 22, 2012; 77 FR 22, 2012; 77 FR
rights) rights)
denies visas denies visas
(1995) and 13338 (2004) (1995) and 13338 (2004)
24571) 24571)
13608 13608
Iran and Syria (sanctions Iran and Syria (sanctions
Blocks transactions and Blocks transactions and
Expands E.O. 12938 Expands E.O. 12938
(May 1, 2012; 77 FR (May 1, 2012; 77 FR
evasion) evasion)
denies visas denies visas
(1994), 12957 (1995), (1994), 12957 (1995),
26409) 26409)
13224 (2001), and 13338 13224 (2001), and 13338
(2004) (2004)
13611 13611
Yemen (stability) Yemen (stability)
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually~~Requires annual renewal
(May 16, 2012; 77 FR (May 16, 2012; 77 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
29533) 29533)
property property
13617 13617
Russia (misuse of highly Russia (misuse of highly
Blocks property Blocks property
Revoked by E.O. 13695 Revoked by E.O. 13695
(June 25, 2012; 77 FR (June 25, 2012; 77 FR
enriched uranium enriched uranium
(2015) (2015)
38459) 38459)
extractions extractions
~~Congressional Research Service~~
66

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
13619 13619
Burma (military Burma (military
Blocks property Blocks property
Revoked by E.O. 13742 Revoked by E.O. 13742
(July 11, 2012; 77 FR (July 11, 2012; 77 FR
government) government)
(2016) (2016)
41243) 41243)
13620 13620
Somalia (conflict) Somalia (conflict)
Expands targets to include Amends E.O. 13536 Expands targets to include Amends E.O. 13536
July 20, 2012; 77 FR July 20, 2012; 77 FR
misappropriations, misappropriations,
(2010) (2010)
43483) 43483)
corruption, impeding corruption, impeding
humanitarian aid humanitarian aid
13622 13622
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Additional sanctions Additional sanctions
Revoked by E.O. 13716 Revoked by E.O. 13716
(July 30, 2012; 77 FR (July 30, 2012; 77 FR
proliferation) proliferation)
( (~~Jan.~~January 16, 2016; 81 FR 16, 2016; 81 FR
45897) 45897)
3693) 3693)
13628 13628
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Implements Iran Threat Implements Iran Threat
Amended by E.O. 13716 Amended by E.O. 13716
( (~~Oct.~~October 9, 2012; 77 FR 9, 2012; 77 FR
proliferation, human proliferation, human
Reduction Act Reduction Act
(2016) (2016)
62139) 62139)
rights, sanctions evasion) rights, sanctions evasion)
13637 13637
EAA EAA
Amends EAR Amends EAR
Renewed annually Renewed annually
( (~~Mar.~~March 8, 2013) 8, 2013)
13645 13645
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Implements Iran Freedom Implements Iran Freedom
Revoked by E.O. 13716 Revoked by E.O. 13716
(June 3, 2013; 78 FR (June 3, 2013; 78 FR
proliferation, human proliferation, human
and Counter-Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation
( (~~Jan.~~January 16, 2016; 81 FR 16, 2016; 81 FR
33945) 33945)
rights) rights)
Act of 2012 Act of 2012
3693) 3693)
13651 13651
Burma Burma
Prohibits import of jadeite Expands E.O. 13047 Prohibits import of jadeite Expands E.O. 13047
( (~~Aug.~~August 6, 2013; 78 FR 6, 2013; 78 FR
and rubies and rubies
(1997) and subsequent (1997) and subsequent
48793) 48793)
orders orders
Congressional Research Service 76 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13660 13660
Ukraine (stability) Ukraine (stability)
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually~~
~~(Mar.~~Requires annual renewal; (March 6, 2014; 79 FR 6, 2014; 79 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
~~13493)~~
~~property~~
expanded on by E.O. 13493) property 13661 (2014); E.O. 13662 (2014); with additional actions in E.O. 13685 (2014); E.O. 13849 (2018); and E.O. 14065 (2022) 13661 13661
Russia (destabilization of Russia (destabilization of
Blocks property Blocks property
Expands E.O. 13660 Expands E.O. 13660
( (~~Mar.~~March 16, 2014; 79 FR 16, 2014; 79 FR
Ukraine) Ukraine)
(2014) (2014)
15535) 15535)
13662 13662
Russia (destabilization of Russia (destabilization of
Blocks property Blocks property
Expands E.O. 13660 Expands E.O. 13660
( (~~Mar.~~March 20, 2014; 79 FR 20, 2014; 79 FR
Ukraine) Ukraine)
(2014) (2014)
16169) 16169)
13664 13664
South Sudan (conflict) South Sudan (conflict)
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually~~
~~(Apr.~~Requires annual renewal (April 3, 2014; 79 FR 3, 2014; 79 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
19283) 19283)
property property
13667 13667
Central African Republic Central African Republic
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually~~
Requires annual renewal (May 12, 2014; 79 FR (May 12, 2014; 79 FR
(conflict) (conflict)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
28387) 28387)
property property
13668 13668
Iraq (postwar) Iraq (postwar)
Ends immunities granted Ends immunities granted
~~Renewed annually~~Expands E.O. 13303
(May 27, 2014) (May 27, 2014)
to the Development Fund to the Development Fund
(2003) for Iraq for Iraq
13671 13671
Democratic Republic of Democratic Republic of
Additional sanctions Additional sanctions
Expands E.O. 13413 Expands E.O. 13413
(July 8, 2014; 79 FR (July 8, 2014; 79 FR
the Congo (regional the Congo (regional
(2006) (2006)
39949) 39949)
stability) stability)
13685 13685
Ukraine (destabilizing Ukraine (destabilizing
Blocks property and Blocks property and
Expands E.O. 13660 Expands E.O. 13660
( (~~Dec.~~December 19, 2014; 79 19, 2014; 79 FR
activities in Crimea) activities in Crimea)
transactions transactions
(2014) (2014)
FR 77357) ~~77357)~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
67

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
13687 13687
North Korea (weapons North Korea (weapons
Additional sanctions Additional sanctions
Expands E.O. 13466 Expands E.O. 13466
( (~~Jan.~~January 2, 2015; 80 FR 2, 2015; 80 FR ~~819)~~
proliferation, to meet proliferation, to meet
(2008), 13551 (2010), (2008), 13551 (2010),
819) requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
13570 (2011) 13570 (2011)
resolution) resolution)
13692 13692
Venezuela (corruption, Venezuela (corruption,
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually~~
~~(Mar.~~Requires annual renewal; (March 8, 2015; 80 FR 8, 2015; 80 FR
stability) stability)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
expanded on in E.O. 12747) 12747)
property and deny visas property and deny visas
13808 (2017), E.O. 13827 (2018), E.O. 13835 (2018), E.O. 13850 (2018), E.O. 13857 (2019), and E.O. 13884 (2019) 13694 13694
Malicious Cyber-Enabled Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually~~
~~(Apr.~~Requires annual renewal; (April 1, 2015; 80 FR 1, 2015; 80 FR
Activities Activities
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
~~18077)~~
~~property~~amended by E.O. 13757 18077) property (2016), E.O. 13984 (2021)
13695 13695
Russia’s misuse of highly Russia’s misuse of highly
Terminates emergency Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13617 Revokes E.O. 13617
(May 26, 2015; 80 FR (May 26, 2015; 80 FR
enriched uranium enriched uranium
(2012) (2012)
30331) 30331)
extractions extractions
Congressional Research Service 77 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13710 13710
Liberia (corrupt Liberia (corrupt
Terminates emergency Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13348 Revokes E.O. 13348
( (~~Nov.~~November 12, 2015; 80 12, 2015; 80 FR
government) government)
(2004) (2004)
FR 71679) 71679)
13712 13712
Burundi (stability) Burundi (stability)
Declares national Declares national
~~Renewed annually~~
~~(Nov.~~Terminated by E.O. (November 22, 2015; 80 22, 2015; 80 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
14054 (2021) FR 73633) 73633)
property property
13716 13716
Iran (nuclear weapons) Iran (nuclear weapons)
Implements U.S. Implements U.S.
Revokes and modifies Revokes and modifies
( (~~Jan.~~January 16, 2016; 81 FR 16, 2016; 81 FR
obligations under the Joint earlier orders obligations under the Joint earlier orders
3693) 3693)
Comprehensive Plan of Comprehensive Plan of
Action Action
13722 13722
North Korea (weapons North Korea (weapons
Blocks property of North Blocks property of North
Expands E.O. 13466 Expands E.O. 13466
( (~~Mar.~~March 15, 2016; 81 FR 15, 2016; 81 FR
proliferation, to meet proliferation, to meet
Korea government and Korea government and
(2008) (2008)
14943) 14943)
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
central party; prohibits central party; prohibits
resolution) resolution)
transactions transactions
13726 13726
Libya (stability) Libya (stability)
Additional sanctions Additional sanctions
Expands E.O. 13566 Expands E.O. 13566
( (~~Apr.~~April 19, 2016; 81 FR 19, 2016; 81 FR
(2011) (2011)
23559) 23559)
13739 13739
Cote d’Ivoire (conflict) Cote d’Ivoire (conflict)
Terminates emergency Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13396 Revokes E.O. 13396
(Sept, 14, 2016; 81 FR (Sept, 14, 2016; 81 FR
(2006) (2006)
63673) 63673)
13742 13742
Burma Burma
Terminates emergency Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13047 Revokes E.O. 13047
( (~~Oct.~~October 7, 2016; 81 FR 7, 2016; 81 FR
(1997), 13310 (2003), (1997), 13310 (2003),
70593) 70593)
13448 (2007), 13464 13448 (2007), 13464
(2008), 13619 (2012) (2008), 13619 (2012)
13757 13757
Malicious Cyber-Enabled Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Additional sanctions Additional sanctions
Modifies E.O. 13694 Modifies E.O. 13694
( (~~Dec.~~December 28, 2016) 28, 2016)
Activities Activities
(2015) (2015)
13761 13761
Sudan (war, human rights) Recognizes “positive Sudan (war, human rights) Recognizes “positive
Revokes in part E.O. Revokes in part E.O.
( (~~Jan.~~January 13, 2017; 82 FR 13, 2017; 82 FR
actions” by the actions” by the
13067 (1997), in whole 13067 (1997), in whole
5331) 5331)
Government of Sudan by Government of Sudan by
E.O. 13412 (2006) E.O. 13412 (2006)
removing some sanctions removing some sanctions
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~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
Administration of President Donald J. Trump (2017-2021)
13804 13804
Sudan (war, human rights) Extends deadlines in E.O. Sudan (war, human rights) Extends deadlines in E.O.
Modifies E.O. 13761 Modifies E.O. 13761
(July 11, 2017; 82 FR (July 11, 2017; 82 FR
13761 13761
(2017) (2017)
32611) 32611)
13808 13808
Venezuela (human rights, Venezuela (human rights,
Additional sanctions Additional sanctions
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
( (~~Aug.~~August 24, 2017; 82 FR 24, 2017; 82 FR
democracy, corruption) democracy, corruption)
national emergency national emergency
41155) 41155)
declared in E.O. 13692 declared in E.O. 13692
(2015) (2015)
13810 13810
North Korea (weapons North Korea (weapons
Additional sanctions Additional sanctions
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(Sept, 20, 2017; 82 FR (Sept, 20, 2017; 82 FR
proliferation, human proliferation, human
national emergency national emergency
44705) 44705)
rights) rights)
declared in E.O. 13466 declared in E.O. 13466
(2008) (2008)
13818 13818
Global Magnitsky (human Global Magnitsky (human
Declares national Declares national
~~Likely to be renewed~~
~~(Dec.~~Requires annual renewal (December 20, 2017; 82 20, 2017; 82 FR
rights, corruption) rights, corruption)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
~~annually (pending first~~
~~60839)~~
~~property~~
~~anniversary)~~FR 60839) property Congressional Research Service 78 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status
13827 13827
Venezuela (sanctions Venezuela (sanctions
Prohibits transactions, Prohibits transactions,
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
( (~~Mar.~~March 19, 2018; 83 FR 19, 2018; 83 FR
evasion) evasion)
financing, trade in digital financing, trade in digital
national emergency national emergency
12469) 12469)
currency issued by or on currency issued by or on
declared in E.O. 13692 declared in E.O. 13692
behalf of the Government behalf of the Government
(2015) (2015)
of Venezuela of Venezuela
13835 13835
Venezuela (economic Venezuela (economic
Prohibits U.S. persons Prohibits U.S. persons
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(May 21, 2018; 83 FR (May 21, 2018; 83 FR
mismanagement, public mismanagement, public
from purchasing debt from purchasing debt
national emergency national emergency
24001) 24001)
corruption, undermining corruption, undermining
owed the Government of owed the Government of
declared in E.O. 13692 declared in E.O. 13692
democratic order, democratic order,
Venezuela or trading in Venezuela or trading in
(2015) (2015)
humanitarian and public humanitarian and public
equity in which the equity in which the
health crisis) health crisis)
Government holds at Government holds at
least a 50% stake least a 50% stake
13846 13846
Iran Iran
Reimposes sanctions lifted Expands actions based on Reimposes sanctions lifted Expands actions based on
( (~~Aug.~~August 6, 2018; 83 FR 6, 2018; 83 FR
for U.S. meeting its for U.S. meeting its
national emergency national emergency
38939) 38939)
obligations under the Joint declared in E.O. 12957 obligations under the Joint declared in E.O. 12957
Comprehensive Plan of Comprehensive Plan of
(1995) (1995)
Action of July 14, 2015 Action of July 14, 2015
(JCPOA) (JCPOA)
13848 13848
Foreign interference in Foreign interference in
Declares national Declares national
~~Complements actions~~
~~(Sept.~~Requires annual renewal; (September 12, 2018; 83 12, 2018; 83 FR
U.S. elections U.S. elections
emergency relating to emergency relating to
~~taken under E.O. 13694,~~
complements actions FR 46843) 46843)

election interference. election interference.
~~as amended.~~taken under E.O. 13694,
Establishes framework to Establishes framework to
as amended assess possible assess possible
interference by foreign interference by foreign
persons or governments persons or governments
in any U.S. election. in any U.S. election.
Blocks property and Blocks property and
interests in property of interests in property of
those designated for being those designated for being
complicit in interfering in complicit in interfering in
an election. an election.
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~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
13849 13849
Implements Russia-related Limits U.S. bank loans, Implements Russia-related Limits U.S. bank loans,
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
( (~~Sept.~~September 21, 2018; 83 21, 2018; 83 FR
sanctions adopted in the sanctions adopted in the
prohibits foreign prohibits foreign
national emergencies national emergencies
FR 48195) 48195)
Countering Russian Countering Russian
exchange, blocks exchange, blocks
declared in E.O. 13660 declared in E.O. 13660
Influence in Europe and Influence in Europe and
property, prohibits property, prohibits
(2014) and related EO, (2014) and related EO,

Eurasia Act of 2017 (Title Eurasia Act of 2017 (Title
Export-Import Bank Export-Import Bank
and E.O. 13694 (2015), as and E.O. 13694 (2015), as
II, P.L. 115-44; 22 U.S.C. II, P.L. 115-44; 22 U.S.C.
§ programs, limits the programs, limits the
amended. amended.
§§ 9501 et seq.) 9501 et seq.)
issuing of specific licenses, issuing of specific licenses,
requires “no” votes in the requires “no” votes in the
international financial international financial
institutions where a loan institutions where a loan
would benefit a person would benefit a person
otherwise subject to otherwise subject to
sanctions, limits access to sanctions, limits access to
the U.S. banking system, the U.S. banking system,
prohibits procurement prohibits procurement
contracts with the USG, contracts with the USG,
denies entry into the denies entry into the
United States. United States.
~~13851~~
~~Nicaragua~~
~~Blocks property of certain~~
~~(Nov. 27, 2018; 83 FR~~
~~persons contributing to~~
~~61505)~~
~~the situation in Nicaragua.~~Congressional Research Service 79 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13851 Nicaragua Declares national Requires annual renewal; (November 27, 2018; 83 emergency; blocks amended by E.O. 14088 FR 61505) property of certain (2022) persons contributing to the situation in Nicaragua; prohibits import, export, new investment, facilitation of transaction by a foreign person
13857 13857
Venezuela Venezuela
Taking additional steps to Taking additional steps to
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
( (~~Jan.~~January 25, 2019; 84 FR 25, 2019; 84 FR ~~509)~~
address the national address the national
national emergency national emergency
509) emergency with respect emergency with respect
declared in E.O. 13692 declared in E.O. 13692
to Venezuela; redefines to Venezuela; redefines
(2015); modifies (2015); modifies ~~EOs~~E.O.s
“the government of “the government of
13692, 13808, 13827, 13692, 13808, 13827,
Venezuela” Venezuela”
13850 13850
13863 Transnational Criminal Defines “significant Expands and amends E.O. (March 15, 2019; 84 F.R. Organizations transnational criminal 13581 (2011) 10255) organization” 13871 13871
Iran Iran
Prohibits transactions Prohibits transactions
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(May 8, 2019; 84 FR (May 8, 2019; 84 FR
related to Iran’s iron, related to Iran’s iron,
national emergency national emergency
20761) 20761)
steel, aluminum, or steel, aluminum, or
declared in declared in ~~Exec. Order~~E.O.12957
copper sectors. copper sectors.
~~12957~~ (1995) (1995)
13873 13873
The Information and The Information and
Declares national Declares national
~~Likely to be renewed~~Requires annual renewal
(May 15, 2019, 84 FR (May 15, 2019, 84 FR
Communications Communications
emergency. Prohibits emergency. Prohibits
~~annually (pending first~~See also E.O. 14034
22689) 22689)
Technology and Services Technology and Services
unduly risky transactions unduly risky transactions
~~anniversary~~(2021) )
Supply Chain Supply Chain
involving information and involving information and
communications communications
technology or services technology or services
designed, developed, designed, developed,
manufactured, or manufactured, or
supplied, by foreign supplied, by foreign
adversaries. adversaries.
13876 13876
Iran Iran
Prohibits transactions Prohibits transactions
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(June 24, 2019; 84 FR (June 24, 2019; 84 FR
related to U.S.-based related to U.S.-based
national emergency national emergency
30573) 30573)
assets of the Supreme assets of the Supreme
declared in declared in ~~Exec. Order~~E.O. 12957
Leader of the Islamic Leader of the Islamic
~~12957~~ (1995) (1995)
Republic of Iran, Supreme Republic of Iran, Supreme
Leader’s Office (SLO), Leader’s Office (SLO),
and anyone appointed to and anyone appointed to
a state position in Iran. a state position in Iran.
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
~~13882~~
~~Mali~~13882 Mali (terrorism, narcotics
Declares national Declares national
~~Likely to be renewed~~Requires annual renewal (July 26, 2019; 84 FR trafficking, trafficking in emergency. 37055) persons, human rights abuses, hostage-taking, and attacks against civilians and international security forces in Mali) Congressional Research Service 80 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status
~~(July 26, 2019; 84 FR~~
~~emergency relating to~~
~~annually (pending first~~
~~37055)~~
~~terrorism, narcotics~~
~~anniversary)~~
~~trafficking, trafficking in~~
~~persons, human rights~~
~~abuses, hostage-taking,~~
~~and attacks against~~
~~civilians and international~~
~~security forces in Mali; no~~
~~designations made at time~~
~~of issuance.~~
13883 13883
Chemical and biological Chemical and biological
Requires the U.S. to Requires the U.S. to
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(August 1, 2019; 84 (August 1, 2019; 84 ~~F.R.~~FR
weapons proliferation or weapons proliferation or
oppose international oppose international
E.O. 12938 (1994); E.O. 12938 (1994);
38113) 38113)
use; currently could be use; currently could be
financial institutions’ financial institutions’
implements sanctions implements sanctions
used against Syria, North used against Syria, North
programs to the targeted programs to the targeted
requirements of Sec. 307, requirements of Sec. 307,
Korea, and Russia, based Korea, and Russia, based
state; prohibits U.S. banks state; prohibits U.S. banks
P.L. 102-182; and amends P.L. 102-182; and amends
on determinations made on determinations made
from providing loans or from providing loans or
Exec. Order 12851 (1993) Exec. Order 12851 (1993)
under sec. 307 of P.L. under sec. 307 of P.L.
credits to the targeted credits to the targeted
to include CBW-related to include CBW-related
102-182 (22 U.S.C. 5605) government. 102-182 (22 U.S.C. 5605) government.
determinations determinations
13884 13884
Venezuela Venezuela
Blocks property of the Blocks property of the
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(August 5, 2019; 84 (August 5, 2019; 84 ~~F.R.~~FR
government of Venezuela government of Venezuela
E.O. 13692 (2015) E.O. 13692 (2015)
38843) 38843)
in the United States in the United States.
13886 13886 ~~(September 9,~~
Terrorism Terrorism
Consolidates and Consolidates and
Revokes E.O. 12947 Revokes E.O. 12947
~~2019; 84 F.R. 48041)~~(September 9, 2019; 84
enhances “sanctions to enhances “sanctions to
(1995); amends E.O. (1995); amends E.O.
FR 48041) combat acts of terrorism combat acts of terrorism
13224 (2001) 13224 (2001)
and threats of terrorism and threats of terrorism
by foreign terrorists”by foreign terrorists”.
13894 13894 ~~(October 14, 2019;~~ Turkey’s incursion into Turkey’s incursion into
Declares a national Declares a national
~~Current~~
~~84 F.R. 55851)~~Requires annual renewal (October 14, 2019; 84 FR
Syria Syria
emergency relating to emergency relating to
55851) Turkey’s military invasion Turkey’s military invasion
of northeast Syria; blocks of northeast Syria; blocks
property and suspends property and suspends
entry into the United entry into the United
States of “certain persons States of “certain persons
contributing to the contributing to the
situation in Syria”situation in Syria”. 13902
~~13902 (January 10, 2020;~~
Iran Iran
Blocks property and Blocks property and
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
~~85 F.R. 2003)~~(January 10, 2020; 85 FR
prohibits transactions prohibits transactions
E.O. 12957 (1995 E.O. 12957 (1995) 2003) )
related to Iran’s related to Iran’s
construction, mining, construction, mining,
manufacturing, or textiles manufacturing, or textiles
sectors, or any other sectors, or any other
sector to be determined sector to be determined
by the Secretary of the by the Secretary of the
TreasuryTreasury. 13920
~~13920 (May 1, 2020; 85~~
United States Bulk-Power United States Bulk-Power
Declares a national Declares a national
~~Current~~
~~F.R. 26595~~Suspended by E.O. 13990 (May 1, 2020; 85 FR
System System
emergency relating to emergency relating to
(2021) 26595 bulk-power system equipment. 13928 International Criminal Declares national Revoked by E.O. 14022 (June 11, 2020; 85 FR Court (ICC) emergency related to the (2021) 36139) ~~bulk-power system~~
~~equipment.~~
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~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
~~13928 (June 11, 2020; 85~~
~~International Criminal~~
~~Declares national~~
~~Current~~
~~F.R. 36139)~~
~~Court (ICC)~~
~~emergency related to the~~
ICC’s intention to ICC’s intention to
“investigate, arrest, “investigate, arrest,
detain, or prosecute any detain, or prosecute any
United States personnel United States personnel
without the consent of without the consent of
the United States”; blocks the United States”; blocks
property and entry into property and entry into
the United States of any the United States of any
person found to be person found to be
engaged in or facilitating engaged in or facilitating
ICC investigations. ICC investigations.
Congressional Research Service 81 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13936 13936
Hong Kong (China’s Hong Kong (China’s
Declares national Declares national
~~Current; requires annual~~Requires annual renewal
(July 14, 2020; 85 (July 14, 2020; 85 ~~F.R.~~FR
“normalization”) “normalization”)
emergency related to emergency related to
~~renewal~~
43413) 43413)
China’s crackdown, China’s crackdown,
resulting in the Hong resulting in the Hong
~~Kong Special~~
Codified at 22 U.S.C. Kong Special 5701 note Administrative Region Administrative Region
(HKSAR) losing its (HKSAR) losing its
political and economic political and economic
autonomy. autonomy.
13942 13942
Information & Information &
Expands emergency Expands emergency
Revoked by E.O. 14034 Revoked by E.O. 14034
(August 6, 2020; 85 (August 6, 2020; 85 ~~F.R.~~FR
Communications Communications
stated in EO 13873 stated in EO 13873
(2021) (2021)
48637) 48637)
Technology; Services Technology; Services
(2019) to restrict (2019) to restrict
Supply Chain Supply Chain
transactions with TikTok transactions with TikTok
and ByteDance—Chinese and ByteDance—Chinese
tech entities. tech entities.
13943 13943
Information & Information &
Expands emergency Expands emergency
Revoked by E.O. 14034 Revoked by E.O. 14034
(August 6, 2020; 85 (August 6, 2020; 85 ~~F.R.~~FR
Communications Communications
stated in E.O. 13873 stated in E.O. 13873
(2021) (2021)
48641) 48641)
Technology; Services Technology; Services
(2019) to restrict (2019) to restrict
Supply Chain Supply Chain
transactions with transactions with
WeChat—Chinese tech WeChat—Chinese tech
entity. entity.
13949 13949
Iran Iran
(regional stability) Targets Iran’s Targets Iran’s
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(September 21, 2020; 85 (September 21, 2020; 85
conventional arms trade conventional arms trade
E.O. 12957 (1995) E.O. 12957 (1995)
~~F.R.~~FR 60043) 60043)
for its destabilizing impact for its destabilizing impact
in the region. in the region.
13953 13953
Threat to domestic supply Declares national Threat to domestic supply Declares national
Requires annual renewal Requires annual renewal;,
(September 30, 2020; 85 (September 30, 2020; 85
chain from reliance on chain from reliance on
emergency; requires emergency; requires
~~builds on earlier non-~~
~~F.R. 62539)~~
but as of publication of FR 62539) critical minerals from critical minerals from
whole-of-government whole-of-government
~~emergency actions based~~this report, neither
foreign adversaries foreign adversaries
assessment of U.S. critical assessment of U.S. critical
renewed nor revoked. Codified at 30 U.S.C. materials. Builds on earlier non- 1601 note emergency actions based primarily on Defense ~~primarily on Defense~~
~~materials.~~
Production Act of 1950 Production Act of 1950
(see also, however, E.O. (see also, however, E.O.
14017 (2021), which 14017 (2021), which
requires similar review requires similar review
without revoking the without revoking the
2020 order. 2020 order.
13959 13959
China China
Declares national Declares national
~~National emergency~~Requires annual renewal;
(November 12, 2020; 85 (November 12, 2020; 85
emergency; restricts emergency; restricts
~~remains current and~~
~~F.R.~~amended by E.O. 13974 FR 73185) 73185)
trade, transactions, and trade, transactions, and
~~requires annual renewal;~~(2021); the remaining
investment in securities of investment in securities of ~~the remaining authorities~~authorities are
“Communist Chinese “Communist Chinese
~~are~~ superseded in largesuperseded in large part
military companies”. military companies”.
~~part by E.O. 14032 (2021)~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
by E.O. 14032 (2021) 13971 13971
China China
Expands national Expands national
Revoked by E.O. 14034 Revoked by E.O. 14034
(January 5, 2021; 86 (January 5, 2021; 86 ~~F.R.~~FR
emergency declared in emergency declared in
(2021) (2021)
1249) 1249)
E.O. 13873 (2019) to E.O. 13873 (2019) to
prohibit transactions with prohibit transactions with
several China-origin several China-origin
software applications. software applications.
Congressional Research Service 82 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13974 13974
China China
Clarifies definitions Clarifies definitions
Revoked by E.O. 14032 Revoked by E.O. 14032
(January 13, 2021; 86 (January 13, 2021; 86 ~~F.R.~~FR
related to restrictions on related to restrictions on
(2021) (2021)
4875) 4875)
transactions with China transactions with China
military entities initiated military entities initiated
in E.O. 13959; establishes in E.O. 13959; establishes
wind-down period for wind-down period for
divestment divestment
13984 13984
Cyber-enabled activities Cyber-enabled activities
Builds on emergency Builds on emergency
Expands on and amends Expands on and amends
(January 19, 2021; 86 (January 19, 2021; 86 ~~F.R.~~FR
declared in E.O. 13694 declared in E.O. 13694
authorities stated in E.O. authorities stated in E.O.
6837) 6837)
(2015) to require (2015) to require
13694 (2015) 13694 (2015)
Secretary of Commerce Secretary of Commerce
to investigate and identify to investigate and identify
foreign users of U.S. foreign users of U.S.
infrastructure as a infrastructure as a
services (IaaS), mainly services (IaaS), mainly
software and storage software and storage
services services
Administration of President Joseph R. Biden (2021-)
14014 14014
Burma Burma
(antidemocratic or Declares national Declares national
Requires annual renewal Requires annual renewal
(February 10 2021; 86 (February 10 2021; 86
FR other destabilizing emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
~~F.R. 9429)~~9429) activities)
property of and property of and
transactionstransactions ~~with those~~
~~found to support Burma’s~~
~~defense sector or those~~
~~who engage in~~
~~antidemocratic or other~~
~~destabilizing activities~~. .
14022 14022
International Criminal International Criminal
Revokes national Revokes national
Revokes E.O. 13928 Revokes E.O. 13928
(April 1, 2021; 86 (April 1, 2021; 86 ~~F.R.~~FR
Court Court
emergency; ends travel emergency; ends travel
(2020) (2020)
17895) 17895)
and asset restrictions and asset restrictions
leveled against ICC staff. leveled against ICC staff.
14024 14024
Russia Russia
(election Declares national Declares national
Requires annual renewal Requires annual renewal
(April 15, 2021; 86 (April 15, 2021; 86 ~~F.R.~~FR interference, malicious
emergency; emergency; ~~authorizes~~blocks 20249)
~~20249)~~
~~sanctions on those~~
~~involved in election~~

~~interference, malicious~~
cyber attacks, corruption; cyber attacks, corruption;
property. or extraterritorial pursuit or extraterritorial pursuit
of Russia’s adversaries)~~of Russia’s adversaries.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
14032 14032
China China
Prohibits U.S. persons Prohibits U.S. persons
Amends national Amends national
(June 3, 2021; 86 (June 3, 2021; 86 ~~F.R.~~FR
from trading or investing from trading or investing
emergency authority emergency authority
30145) 30145)
in securities of those in securities of those
declared in E.O. 13959 declared in E.O. 13959
operating in or on behalf operating in or on behalf
(2020) (2020)
of China’s defense and of China’s defense and
related materiel sector or related materiel sector or
the surveillance the surveillance
technology sector technology sector

14033 14033
Western Balkans Western Balkans
(regional Expands national Expands national
Amends national Amends national
(June 8, 2021; 86 (June 8, 2021; 86 ~~F.R.~~FR destabilization,
emergency declared in emergency declared in
emergency authority emergency authority
31079) 31079)
antidemocratic activities, E.O. 13219 (2001); E.O. 13219 (2001);
blocks declared in E.O. 13219 human rights violations, property (2001) corruption) ~~declared in E.O. 13219~~
~~targets those who seek to (2001)~~
~~destabilize the region,~~
~~undermine democratic~~
~~processes and peace~~
~~negotiations, violate~~
~~human rights standards,~~
~~or engage in corruption.~~
14034 14034
Sensitive data— Sensitive data—
Initiates new whole-of- Initiates new whole-of-
Expands on national Expands on national
(June 9, 2021; 86 (June 9, 2021; 86 ~~F.R.~~FR
protection from foreign protection from foreign
government review of government review of
emergency declared in emergency declared in
31423) 31423)
adversaries adversaries
U.S. sensitive dates and U.S. sensitive dates and
E.O. 13873 (2020) E.O. 13873 (2020)
foreign adversaries who foreign adversaries who
interfere with sensitive interfere with sensitive
data and related data and related
technology. technology.
~~14034~~
~~Sensitive data—~~
~~Initiates new whole-of-~~
~~Expands on national~~
~~(June 9, 2021; 86 FR~~
~~protection from foreign~~
~~government review of~~
~~emergency declared in~~
~~31423)~~
~~adversaries~~
~~U.S. sensitive dates and~~
~~E.O. 13873 (2020)~~
~~foreign adversaries who~~
~~interfere with sensitive~~
~~data and related~~
~~technology.~~
~~14038~~
~~Belarus~~
~~Authorizes sanctions~~Congressional Research Service 83 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 14038 Belarus (activities related Blocks property of any
Expands on national Expands on national
(August 9, 2021; 86 FR (August 9, 2021; 86 FR
~~targeting those who~~to threatening the peace, leader or official.
emergency declared in emergency declared in
43905) 43905)
~~operate in Burma’s~~human rights violations, E.O. 13405 (2006) corruption, election fraud, sanctions evasion) 14039 Russia (gas pipelines)
~~E.O. 13405 (2006)~~
~~sectors encompassing~~
~~defense and related~~
~~materiel, security, energy,~~
~~potassium chloride~~
~~(potash), tobacco~~
~~products, construction, or~~
~~transportation; or those~~
~~found to engage in~~
~~activities related to~~
~~threatening the peace,~~
~~human rights violations,~~
~~corruption, election fraud,~~
~~and more.~~
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~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
~~14039~~
~~Russia~~
Targets any foreign Targets any foreign
Expands on national Expands on national
(August 20, 2021; 86 FR (August 20, 2021; 86 FR
person identified under person identified under
emergency declared in emergency declared in
47205) 47205)
sec. 7503(a)(1)(B) of P.L. sec. 7503(a)(1)(B) of P.L.
E.O. 14024 (2021) E.O. 14024 (2021)
116-92) for financial 116-92) for financial
activities related to activities related to
Russian gas pipeline to Russian gas pipeline to
serve western Europe serve western Europe
(Nord Stream 2). (Nord Stream 2).
EO 14046 EO 14046 ~~(September 17, Ethiopia~~ Ethiopia (threats to
Authorizes Authorizes ~~sanctions~~blocking of Requires annual renewal (September 17, 2021; 86 stability, corruption, property, investments, FR 52389) disruption of delivery of use of U.S. financial humanitarian services, instruments, transactions violence against civilians) in foreign exchange. 14054
~~Requires annual renewal~~
~~2021; 86 FR 52389)~~
~~targeting any foreign~~
~~person engaged in~~
~~activities that threaten the~~
~~stability of Ethiopia,~~
~~including corruption,~~
~~disruption of delivery of~~
~~humanitarian services,~~
~~violence against civilians.~~
~~14054 (November 18,~~
Burundi Burundi
Terminates emergency Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13712 Revokes E.O. 13712
~~2021; 86 FR 66149)~~
~~(2015)~~
~~14059 (December 15,~~(November 18, 2021; 86 (2015) FR 66149) 14059
Global Il icit Drug Trade Global Il icit Drug Trade
Authorizes blocking of Authorizes blocking of
Requires annual renewal Requires annual renewal
~~2021; 86 FR 71549)~~(December 15, 2021; 86
property, prohibits use of property, prohibits use of

FR 71549) most U.S. financial most U.S. financial
instruments, denies entry instruments, denies entry
into the United States to into the United States to
any foreign person any foreign person
engaged in il icit drug engaged in il icit drug
production and trade. production and trade.
14064 14064 ~~(February 11, 2022;~~ Afghanistan Afghanistan
Declares national Declares national
Requires annual renewal Requires annual renewal
(February 11, 2022; 87 FR ~~87 FR 8391)~~
emergency; blocks Taliban emergency; blocks Taliban

8391) (as government of (as government of
Afghanistan) access to Afghanistan) access to
U.S.-based assets of U.S.-based assets of
Afghanistan’s central bankAfghanistan’s central bank.
14065 14065 ~~(February 21, 2022;~~ Ukraine/Russia Ukraine/Russia
Blocks investment in and Blocks investment in and
Expands national Expands national
(February 21, 2022; 87 FR~~87 FR 10293)~~
trade with Donetsk and trade with Donetsk and
emergency in E.O. 13660 emergency in E.O. 13660
~~(2022~~10293) )
Luhansk regions of Luhansk regions of
(2014) (2014)
Ukraine Ukraine. (2022) 14066
~~14066 (March 8, 2022; 87~~
Ukraine/Russia Ukraine/Russia
Prohibits some imports Prohibits some imports
Expands national Expands national
~~FR 13625)~~(March 8, 2022; 87 FR
from and energy-sector from and energy-sector
emergency in E.O. 14024 emergency in E.O. 14024

13625) investments in Russia investments in Russia
. (2021) (2021)
14068 ~~14068 (March 11, 2022;~~
Ukraine/Russia Ukraine/Russia
~~Prohibiting~~Prohibits additional additional
Expands national Expands national
(March 11, 2022; 87 FR~~87 FR 14381)~~
imports, exports of luxury emergency in E.O. 14024 imports, exports of luxury emergency in E.O. 14024

14381) goods, and investment in goods, and investment in
(2021) (2021)
Russia Russia. Congressional Research Service 84 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 14071 Russia Prohibits a U.S. person Expands national (April 6, 2022; 87 F.R. from engaging in new emergency in E.O. 14024 20999) investment, export, (2021) reexport, sales and services, or facilitation of a foreign person’s transaction. 14088 Nicaragua Prohibits import, export, Amends national (October 24, 2022; 87 new investment, and emergency in E.O. 13851 F.R. 64685) facilitation of a foreign (2018) person’s transactions. 14098 Sudan (threats to the Authorizes blocking of Expands national (May 4, 2023; 88 F.R. peace, security, or property of any foreign emergency in E.O. 13067 29529) stability of Sudan, person. (1997) including obstructing democratic processes, censorship, corruption, human rights abuses, targeting women, children, U.N. activities Sources
~~Source~~: CRS, based on National Archives: Executive Orders Disposition Tables; The American Presidency CRS, based on National Archives: Executive Orders Disposition Tables; The American Presidency
Project, University of California, Santa Barbara; and Project, University of California, Santa Barbara; and Federal Register, various dates. , various dates.

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Note: Unless otherwise noted in left-hand column, the declarations of national emergency are codified as notes to 50 U.S.C. 1701.

Author Information

Christopher A. Casey, Coordinator Christopher A. Casey, Coordinator
Jennifer K. Elsea Jennifer K. Elsea
Analyst in International Trade and Finance Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Legislative Attorney Legislative Attorney

Dianne E. Rennack Dianne E. Rennack

Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation

Congressional Research Service 85 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Amber Hope Wilhelm, CRS Visual Information Specialist, who developed the graphics The authors thank Amber Hope Wilhelm, CRS Visual Information Specialist, who developed the graphics
for this report, and Ian Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, who was an original for this report, and Ian Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, who was an original
contributor to this report. contributor to this report.

Disclaimer
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