The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Changes from July 14, 2020 to March 25, 2022

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The International Emergency Economic Powers ~~July 14, 2020~~March 25, 2022
Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Christopher A. Casey,
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) provides the President broad The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) provides the President broad
Coordinator
authority to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a declaration of national authority to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a declaration of national
Analyst in International Analyst in International
emergency. IEEPA, like the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) from which it branched, sits at emergency. IEEPA, like the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) from which it branched, sits at
Trade and Finance Trade and Finance
the center of the modern U.S. sanctions regime. Changes in the use of IEEPA powers since the the center of the modern U.S. sanctions regime. Changes in the use of IEEPA powers since the

act’s enactment in 1977 have caused some to question whether the statute’s oversight provisions act’s enactment in 1977 have caused some to question whether the statute’s oversight provisions
~~Ian F. Fergusson~~Dianne E. Rennack
are robust enough given the sweeping economic powers it confers upon the President during a are robust enough given the sweeping economic powers it confers upon the President during a
Specialist in Specialist in ~~International~~Foreign Policy
declared emergency. declared emergency.
~~Trade and Finance~~Legislation

Over the course of the twentieth century, Congress delegated increasing amounts of emergency Over the course of the twentieth century, Congress delegated increasing amounts of emergency
power to the President by statute. TWEA was one such statute. Congress passed TWEA in 1917 power to the President by statute. TWEA was one such statute. Congress passed TWEA in 1917
~~Dianne E. Rennack~~Jennifer K. Elsea
to regulate international transactions with enemy powers following the U.S. entry into the First to regulate international transactions with enemy powers following the U.S. entry into the First
~~Specialist in Foreign Policy~~
~~Legislation~~
Legislative Attorney World War. Congress expanded the act during the 1930s to allow the President to declare a World War. Congress expanded the act during the 1930s to allow the President to declare a

national emergency in times of peace and assume sweeping powers over both domestic and national emergency in times of peace and assume sweeping powers over both domestic and
international transactions. Between 1945 and the early 1970s, TWEA became the central means international transactions. Between 1945 and the early 1970s, TWEA became the central means
~~Jennifer K. Elsea~~
to impose sanctions as part of U.S. Cold War strategy. Presidents used TWEA to block to impose sanctions as part of U.S. Cold War strategy. Presidents used TWEA to block
~~Legislative Attorney~~
international financial transactions, seize U.S.-based assets held by foreign nationals, restrict international financial transactions, seize U.S.-based assets held by foreign nationals, restrict

exports, modify regulations to deter the hoarding of gold, limit foreign direct investment in U.S. exports, modify regulations to deter the hoarding of gold, limit foreign direct investment in U.S.
companies, and impose tariffs on all imports into the United States. companies, and impose tariffs on all imports into the United States.

Following committee investigations that discovered that the United States had been in a state of emergency for more than 40 Following committee investigations that discovered that the United States had been in a state of emergency for more than 40
years, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976 and IEEPA in 1977. The pair of statutes placed new years, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976 and IEEPA in 1977. The pair of statutes placed new
limits on presidential emergency powers. Both included reporting requirements to increase transparency and track costs, and limits on presidential emergency powers. Both included reporting requirements to increase transparency and track costs, and
the NEA required the President to the NEA required the President to ~~annually assess~~assess annually and extend, if appropriate, an emergency. However, some experts argue and extend, if appropriate, an emergency. However, some experts argue
that the renewal process has become that the renewal process has become pro forma. The NEA also afforded Congress the means to terminate a national . The NEA also afforded Congress the means to terminate a national
emergency by adopting a concurrent resolution in each chamber. A decision by the Supreme Court, in a landmark case, emergency by adopting a concurrent resolution in each chamber. A decision by the Supreme Court, in a landmark case,
however, found the use of concurrent resolutions to terminate an executive action unconstitutional. Congress amended the however, found the use of concurrent resolutions to terminate an executive action unconstitutional. Congress amended the
statute to require a joint resolution, significantly increasing the difficulty of terminating an emergency. statute to require a joint resolution, significantly increasing the difficulty of terminating an emergency.
Like TWEA, IEEPA has become an important means to impose economic-based sanctions since its enactment; like TWEA, Like TWEA, IEEPA has become an important means to impose economic-based sanctions since its enactment; like TWEA,
Presidents have frequently used IEEPA to restrict a variety of international transactions; and like TWEA, the subjects of the Presidents have frequently used IEEPA to restrict a variety of international transactions; and like TWEA, the subjects of the
restrictions, the frequency of use, and the duration of emergencies have expanded over time. Initially, Presidents targeted restrictions, the frequency of use, and the duration of emergencies have expanded over time. Initially, Presidents targeted
foreign states or their governments. Over the years, however, presidential administrations have increasingly used IEEPA to foreign states or their governments. Over the years, however, presidential administrations have increasingly used IEEPA to
target non-state individuals and groups, such as terrorists, persons who engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities, and target non-state individuals and groups, such as terrorists, persons who engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities, and
certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court. certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court.
As of As of ~~July 1, 2020~~March 25, 2022, Presidents had declared , Presidents had declared 5967 national emergencies invoking IEEPA, national emergencies invoking IEEPA, 3337 of which are of which are ~~still~~ ongoing. ongoing.
~~Typically,~~History shows that national emergencies invoking IEEPA national emergencies invoking IEEPA often last nearly a decade, although some have lasted significantly longer—the last nearly a decade, although some have lasted significantly longer—the
first state of emergency declared under the NEA and IEEPA, which was declared in response to the taking of U.S. embassy first state of emergency declared under the NEA and IEEPA, which was declared in response to the taking of U.S. embassy
staff as hostages by Iran in 1979, staff as hostages by Iran in 1979, ~~may soon enter~~is in its fifth decade. its fifth decade.
IEEPA grants sweeping powers to the President to control economic transactions. Despite these broad powers, Congress has IEEPA grants sweeping powers to the President to control economic transactions. Despite these broad powers, Congress has
never attempted to terminate a national emergency invoking IEEPA. Instead, Congress has directed the President on never attempted to terminate a national emergency invoking IEEPA. Instead, Congress has directed the President on
numerous occasions to use IEEPA authorities to impose sanctions. Congress may want to consider whether IEEPA numerous occasions to use IEEPA authorities to impose sanctions. Congress may want to consider whether IEEPA
appropriately balances the need for swift action in a time of crisis with Congress’appropriately balances the need for swift action in a time of crisis with Congress’s duty to oversee executive action. Congress duty to oversee executive action. Congress
may also want to consider IEEPA’s role in implementing its influence in U.S. foreign policy and national security decision-may also want to consider IEEPA’s role in implementing its influence in U.S. foreign policy and national security decision-
making. making.
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Introduction
The issue of executive discretion has been at the center of constitutional debates in liberal The issue of executive discretion has been at the center of constitutional debates in liberal
democracies throughout the twentieth century. Specifically, the question of how to balance a democracies throughout the twentieth century. Specifically, the question of how to balance a
commitment to the rule of law with the exigencies of modern political and economic crises has commitment to the rule of law with the exigencies of modern political and economic crises has
been a consistent concern of legislators and scholars in the United States and around the world.1 been a consistent concern of legislators and scholars in the United States and around the world.1
The The ~~United States~~U.S. Constitution is silent on the question of emergency power. As such, over the Constitution is silent on the question of emergency power. As such, over the
past two centuries, Congress and the President have answered that question in varied and often past two centuries, Congress and the President have answered that question in varied and often ad
hoc ways. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the answer was often for the President to act ways. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the answer was often for the President to act
without congressional approval in a time of crisis, knowingly risking impeachment and personal without congressional approval in a time of crisis, knowingly risking impeachment and personal
civil liability.2 Congress claimed primacy over emergency action and would decide subsequently civil liability.2 Congress claimed primacy over emergency action and would decide subsequently
~~to either~~either to ratify the President’s actions through legislation or indemnify the President for any civil ratify the President’s actions through legislation or indemnify the President for any civil
liability.3 liability.3
By the twentieth century, a new pattern had begun to emerge. Instead of retroactively judging an By the twentieth century, a new pattern had begun to emerge. Instead of retroactively judging an
executive’s extraordinary actions in a time of emergency, Congress enacted statutes authorizing executive’s extraordinary actions in a time of emergency, Congress enacted statutes authorizing
the President to declare a state of emergency and make use of extraordinary delegated powers.4 the President to declare a state of emergency and make use of extraordinary delegated powers.4
The expanding delegation of emergency powers to executives, and the increase in governing via The expanding delegation of emergency powers to executives, and the increase in governing via
emergency power by executives, was a common trajectory among twentieth-century liberal emergency power by executives, was a common trajectory among twentieth-century liberal
democracies.5 As innovation quickened the pace of social change and global crises, some democracies.5 As innovation quickened the pace of social change and global crises, some
legislatures felt compelled to delegate to their executives, who traditional political theorists legislatures felt compelled to delegate to their executives, who traditional political theorists
assumed could operate with greater “dispatch” than the more deliberate and future-oriented assumed could operate with greater “dispatch” than the more deliberate and future-oriented

1 Clinton Rossiter, 1 Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (Princeton, NJ: (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1948); Edward Corwin, Princeton University Press, 1948); Edward Corwin, Total War and the Constitution (New York: Knopf, 1963). Giorgio (New York: Knopf, 1963). Giorgio
Agamben, Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Carl Schmitt, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four
Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
2 Such an answer can be traced to, among others, John Locke, whose political theory was central to the development of 2 Such an answer can be traced to, among others, John Locke, whose political theory was central to the development of
American political institutions. John Locke, American political institutions. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas Hollis (London: A. Millar et al., , ed. Thomas Hollis (London: A. Millar et al.,
1764), pp. 340-3411764), pp. 340-341: (“This power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, “This power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law,
and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogativeand sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative~~….”).~~ […].”
3 Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism,” 3 Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism,” Yale Law Journal 98, no. 7 (May 1989), pp. 1392- 98, no. 7 (May 1989), pp. 1392-
1398; John Fabian Witt, “A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism,” 1398; John Fabian Witt, “A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism,” Law and History Review 36, no. 36, no.
3 (3 (~~Aug.~~August 2018); George M. Dennison, “Martial Law: The Development of a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776-1861,” 2018); George M. Dennison, “Martial Law: The Development of a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776-1861,”
The American Journal of Legal History 18, no. 1 ( 18, no. 1 (~~Jan.~~January 1974); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, 1974); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Imperial from the
Beginning: The Constitution of the Original Executive (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), pp. 208-210; (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), pp. 208-210;
Matthew Warshauer, Matthew Warshauer, Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Martial Law (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press,
2006). As Thomas Jefferson wrote, an executive officer acting illegally for what he determines to be the good of the 2006). As Thomas Jefferson wrote, an executive officer acting illegally for what he determines to be the good of the
country “does indeed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the constitution, and his station makes it country “does indeed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the constitution, and his station makes it
his duty to incur that risk.” Qtd. in Prakash, his duty to incur that risk.” Qtd. in Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning, p. 214. , p. 214.
4 U.S. Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, 4 U.S. Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, A Brief History of
Emergency Powers in the United States, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., July 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, , committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., July 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1974), pp. 40-41. 1974), pp. 40-41.
5 For scholarship on this general trend, see, e.g., William E. Scheuerman, 5 For scholarship on this general trend, see, e.g., William E. Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social
Acceleration of Time (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart,
eds, eds, Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Peter L. Lindseth, “The Paradox of (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Peter L. Lindseth, “The Paradox of
Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s,” Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s,” Yale Law
Journal 113, no. 7 (May 2004); Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism”; Mary L. Dudziak, 113, no. 7 (May 2004); Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism”; Mary L. Dudziak,
War-Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Corwin, Corwin, Total War and the
Constitution; Rossiter, ; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship. .
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legislatures.6 Whether such actions subvert the rule of law or are a standard feature of healthy legislatures.6 Whether such actions subvert the rule of law or are a standard feature of healthy
modern constitutional orders has been a subject of modern constitutional orders has been a subject of ~~extensive~~ debate.7 debate.7
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is one The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is one ~~such~~ example of a twentieth-example of a twentieth-
century delegation of emergency authority.8 One of 117 emergency statutes under the umbrella of century delegation of emergency authority.8 One of 117 emergency statutes under the umbrella of
the National Emergencies Act (NEA),9 IEEPA grants the President extensive power to regulate a the National Emergencies Act (NEA),9 IEEPA grants the President extensive power to regulate a
variety of economic transactions during a state of national emergency. Congress enacted IEEPA in variety of economic transactions during a state of national emergency. Congress enacted IEEPA in
1977 to 1977 to ~~rein in the expansive~~limit the emergency economic powers that it had delegated to the President emergency economic powers that it had delegated to the President
under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). Nevertheless, some scholars argue that judicial under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). Nevertheless, some scholars argue that judicial
and legislative actions subsequent to IEEPA’s enactment have made it, like TWEA, a source of and legislative actions subsequent to IEEPA’s enactment have made it, like TWEA, a source of
expansive and unchecked executive authority in the economic realm.10 expansive and unchecked executive authority in the economic realm.10 ~~Others~~Other scholars, however, argue , however, argue
that IEEPA is a useful tool for Presidents to that IEEPA is a useful tool for Presidents to ~~quickly~~ implement implement quickly the will of Congress either as the will of Congress either as
directed by law or as encouraged by congressional activity.11 directed by law or as encouraged by congressional activity.11
Until recently, there Until recently, there ~~has~~had been little congressional discussion of modifying either IEEPA or its been little congressional discussion of modifying either IEEPA or its
umbrella statute, the NEA. Recent presidential actions, however, have drawn attention to umbrella statute, the NEA. Recent presidential actions, however, have drawn attention to
presidential emergency powers under the NEA of which IEEPA is the most frequently used.presidential emergency powers under the NEA of which IEEPA is the most frequently used.
~~Should Congress consider changing IEEPA, there are two issues that Congress may wish to~~
~~address. The first pertains to how Congress has delegated its authority under IEEPA and its~~
~~umbrella statute, the NEA. The second pertains to choices made in the Export Control Reform~~
~~Act of 2018.~~
Origins
The First World War and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)
The First World War (1914-1919) saw an unprecedented degree of economic mobilization.The First World War (1914-1919) saw an unprecedented degree of economic mobilization.12 The The
executive departments of European governments began to regulate their economies with or executive departments of European governments began to regulate their economies with or
without the support of their legislatures. The United States, in contrast, was in a privileged
6 Scheuerman, 6 Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, ch. 2; See, e.g., Carl Schmitt, “The Plight of , ch. 2; See, e.g., Carl Schmitt, “The Plight of
European Jurisprudence,” tr. G. L. Ulmen, European Jurisprudence,” tr. G. L. Ulmen, Telos 83 (Spring 1990); John Locke, 83 (Spring 1990); John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, pp. 340-, pp. 340-
341341 ~~(“…~~: “[…] since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so
too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide
for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are
executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their way; therefore there is executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their way; therefore there is
a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe.”a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe.”).
7 For arguments that emergency government subverts the rule of law, see, e.g., Sanford Levinson, “Constitutional 7 For arguments that emergency government subverts the rule of law, see, e.g., Sanford Levinson, “Constitutional
Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency,” Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency,” Georgia Law Review 40, no. 3 (Spring 2006); Bruce Ackerman, 40, no. 3 (Spring 2006); Bruce Ackerman, The
Decline and Fall of the American Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). For (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). For ~~an argument~~arguments that that
states of emergency can be a standard feature of healthy modern constitutional orders or that they can reflect or states of emergency can be a standard feature of healthy modern constitutional orders or that they can reflect or
anticipate the preferences of the legislature, see, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, “Small Emergencies,” anticipate the preferences of the legislature, see, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, “Small Emergencies,” Georgia Law Review
40, no. 3 (Spring 2006), p. 836; Carey and Shugart, 40, no. 3 (Spring 2006), p. 836; Carey and Shugart, Executive Decree Authority, p. 3. , p. 3.
8 8 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, P.L. 95-223 (October 28, 1977), 91 Stat. 1626, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §P.L. 95-223 (October 28, 1977), 91 Stat. 1626, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 1701 et seq. (2018) ( (2018) (~~“IEEPA”).~~
9 IEEPA). 9 National Emergencies Act, P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § § 1601 1601 et seq. (2018) (. (2018) (~~“NEA”~~NEA); );
CRS Report R46379, CRS Report R46379, Emergency Authorities Under the National Emergencies Act, Stafford Act, and Public Health
Service Act, coordinated by Jennifer K. Elsea. , coordinated by Jennifer K. Elsea.
10 See, e.g., Patrick Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” 10 See, e.g., Patrick Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” Michigan
Journal of Law Reform 46, no. 2 (2013), pp. 757-759; “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A 46, no. 2 (2013), pp. 757-759; “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A
Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential Emergency Power,” Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential Emergency Power,” Harvard Law Review 96, no. 5 ( 96, no. 5 (~~Mar.,~~March 1983), p. 1983), p.
1120. 1120.
11 See, e.g., Scheppele, “Small Emergencies,” pp. 845-847 11 See, e.g., Scheppele, “Small Emergencies,” pp. 845-847: (Statutes like IEEPA show “that emergencies have been Statutes like IEEPA show “that emergencies have been
brought inside the constitutional order by being normalized in the ordinary legislative process.”brought inside the constitutional order by being normalized in the ordinary legislative process.” 12 See Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, eds., The Economics of World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). ).
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~~without the support of their legislatures. The United States, in contrast, was in a privileged~~
position relative to its allies in Europe. Separated by an ocean from Germany and Austria-position relative to its allies in Europe. Separated by an ocean from Germany and Austria-
Hungary, the United States was never under substantial threat of invasion. Rather than relying on Hungary, the United States was never under substantial threat of invasion. Rather than relying on
the inherent powers of the presidency, or acting unconstitutionally and hoping for a subsequent the inherent powers of the presidency, or acting unconstitutionally and hoping for a subsequent
congressional ratification, President Wilson sought explicit pre-authorization for expansive new congressional ratification, President Wilson sought explicit pre-authorization for expansive new
powers to meet the global crisis.powers to meet the global crisis.1213 Between 1916 and the end of 1917, Congress passed 22 Between 1916 and the end of 1917, Congress passed 22
statutes empowering the President to take control of private property for public use during the statutes empowering the President to take control of private property for public use during the
war.war.1314 These statutes gave the President broad authority to control railroads, shipyards, cars, These statutes gave the President broad authority to control railroads, shipyards, cars,
telegraph and telephone systems, water systems, and many other sectors of the American telegraph and telephone systems, water systems, and many other sectors of the American
economy.economy.1415
TWEA was one of those 22 statutes. TWEA was one of those 22 statutes.1516 It granted to the executive an extraordinary degree of It granted to the executive an extraordinary degree of
control over international trade, investment, migration, and communications between the United control over international trade, investment, migration, and communications between the United
States and its enemies.States and its enemies.1617 TWEA defined “enemy” broadly and included “any individual, TWEA defined “enemy” broadly and included “any individual,
partnership, or other body of individuals [including corporations], of any nationality, resident partnership, or other body of individuals [including corporations], of any nationality, resident
within the territory ... of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside of within the territory ... of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside of
the United States and doing business within such a territory ....”the United States and doing business within such a territory ....”1718 The first four sections of the act The first four sections of the act
granted the President extensive powers to limit trading with, communicating with, or transporting granted the President extensive powers to limit trading with, communicating with, or transporting
enemies (or their allies) of the United States.enemies (or their allies) of the United States.1819 These sections also empowered the President to These sections also empowered the President to
censor foreign communications and place extensive restrictions on enemy insurance or censor foreign communications and place extensive restrictions on enemy insurance or
reinsurance companies.reinsurance companies.1920
It was Section 5(b) of TWEA, however, that would form one of the central bases of presidential It was Section 5(b) of TWEA, however, that would form one of the central bases of presidential
emergency economic power in the twentieth century. Section 5(b), as originally enacted, states: emergency economic power in the twentieth century. Section 5(b), as originally enacted, states:
That the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations That the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations
as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign
exchange, export or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers of exchange, export or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers of
credit in any form (other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly credit in any form (other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly
within the United States), and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or of the ownership within the United States), and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or of the ownership
of property between the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy, ally of of property between the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy, ally of
enemy or otherwise, or between residents of one or more foreign countries, by any person enemy or otherwise, or between residents of one or more foreign countries, by any person
within the United States; and he may require any such person engaged in any such within the United States; and he may require any such person engaged in any such
transaction to furnish, under oath, complete information relative thereto, including the transaction to furnish, under oath, complete information relative thereto, including the
production of any books of account, contracts, letters or other papers, in connection production of any books of account, contracts, letters or other papers, in connection
therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is completed.21
1213 Rossiter, Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, pp. 241-243; U.S. Congress, , pp. 241-243; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the
United States, pp. 40-41. , pp. 40-41.
1314 J. Reuben Clark, J. Reuben Clark, Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917: Dealing with the Control and Taking of
Private Property for the Public Use, Benefit, or Welfare (Washington, DC: GPO, 1918), pp. 1-125. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1918), pp. 1-125.
1415 Clark, Clark, Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917, pp. 1-125; Rossiter, , pp. 1-125; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. , p.
243; David M. Kennedy, 243; David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), ch. 2. 2004), ch. 2.
1516 For an overview of TWEA’s development, see Benjamin A. Coates, “The Secret Life of Statutes: A Century of the For an overview of TWEA’s development, see Benjamin A. Coates, “The Secret Life of Statutes: A Century of the
Trading with the Enemy Act,” Trading with the Enemy Act,” Modern American History 1, no. 2 (2018). 1, no. 2 (2018).
1617 Trading with the Enemy Act, P.L. 65-91 (October 6, 1917) § 2, 40 Stat. 411, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4305 (2018) ( P.L. 65-91 (October 6, 1917) § 2, 40 Stat. 411, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4305 (2018) (~~“TWEA”).~~
~~17 Ibid.~~
~~18 Ibid. § 3.~~
~~19 Ibid. § 4~~TWEA). 18 TWEA § 2. 19 TWEA § 3. 20 TWEA § 4. 21 TWEA § 5b. .
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~~therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is~~
~~completed.20~~
The statute gave the President expansive control over private international economic transactions The statute gave the President expansive control over private international economic transactions
in times of war.in times of war.2122 While Congress terminated many of the war powers in 1921, TWEA was While Congress terminated many of the war powers in 1921, TWEA was
specifically exempted because the U.S. specifically exempted because the U.S. ~~Government~~government had yet to dispose of a large amount of alien had yet to dispose of a large amount of alien
property in its custody.property in its custody.2223
The Expansion of TWEA
The Great Depression, a massive global economic downturn that began in 1929, presented a The Great Depression, a massive global economic downturn that began in 1929, presented a
challenge to liberal democracies in Europe and the Americas. To challenge to liberal democracies in Europe and the Americas. To ~~deal with~~address the complexities the complexities
presented by the crisis, nearly all such democracies began delegating discretionary authority to presented by the crisis, nearly all such democracies began delegating discretionary authority to
their executives to a degree that had only previously been done in times of war.their executives to a degree that had only previously been done in times of war.2324 The U.S. The U.S.
Congress responded, in part, by dramatically expanding the scope of TWEA, delegating to the Congress responded, in part, by dramatically expanding the scope of TWEA, delegating to the
President the power to declare states of emergency in peacetime and assume expansive domestic President the power to declare states of emergency in peacetime and assume expansive domestic
economic powers. economic powers.
Such a delegation was made politically possible by analogizing economic crises to war. In public Such a delegation was made politically possible by analogizing economic crises to war. In public
speeches, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asserted that the Depression was to be “attacked,” speeches, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asserted that the Depression was to be “attacked,”
“fought against,” “mobilized for,” and “combatted” by “great arm[ies] of people.”“fought against,” “mobilized for,” and “combatted” by “great arm[ies] of people.”2425 The The
economic mobilization of the First World War had blurred the lines between the executive’s economic mobilization of the First World War had blurred the lines between the executive’s
military and economic powers. As the Depression was likened to “armed strife”military and economic powers. As the Depression was likened to “armed strife”2526 and declared to and declared to
be “an emergency more serious than war”be “an emergency more serious than war”2627 by a Justice of the Supreme Court, it became routine by a Justice of the Supreme Court, it became routine
to use emergency economic legislation enacted in wartime as the basis for extraordinary to use emergency economic legislation enacted in wartime as the basis for extraordinary
economic authority in peacetime.economic authority in peacetime.2728
As the Depression entered its third year, the newly-elected President Roosevelt asked Congress As the Depression entered its third year, the newly-elected President Roosevelt asked Congress
for “broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that for “broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that
would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”2829 In his first act as President, In his first act as President,
Roosevelt proclaimed a bank holiday, suspending all transactions at all banking institutions Roosevelt proclaimed a bank holiday, suspending all transactions at all banking institutions
located in the United States and its territories for four days.located in the United States and its territories for four days.2930 In his proclamation, Roosevelt In his proclamation, Roosevelt
claimed to have authority to declare the holiday under Section 5(b) of TWEA.claimed to have authority to declare the holiday under Section 5(b) of TWEA.~~30 However,~~

~~20 Ibid. § 5b.~~
~~21 Ibid. § 2.~~
2231 However, because the United States was not in a state of war and the suspended transactions were primarily domestic, the President’s authority to issue such an order was dubious.32 22 TWEA § 2. 23 U.S. Congress, House, U.S. Congress, House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, Report of the Committee on International
Relations on H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 95-459 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 4. , 95th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 95-459 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 4.
2324 William E. Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” William E. Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” Cardozo Law Review 21 (2000), p. 1872. 21 (2000), p. 1872.
2425 See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt's Inaugural Address of 1933 (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt's Inaugural Address of 1933 (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records
Administration, 1988); Rossiter, Administration, 1988); Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 256; U.S. Congress, , p. 256; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency
Powers in the United States, p. 56. , p. 56.
2526 Franklin D. Roosevelt's Inaugural Address of 1933. Franklin D. Roosevelt's Inaugural Address of 1933.
2627 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306 (1932) (J. Brandeis, dissenting). New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306 (1932) (J. Brandeis, dissenting).
2728 Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” p. 1878. Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” p. 1878.
2829 Franklin D. Roosevelt's Inaugural Address of 1933. Franklin D. Roosevelt's Inaugural Address of 1933.
~~29 Pres. Proc. No. 2039 (Mar.~~30 Proclamation 2039 (March 6, 1933). 6, 1933).
3031 In his proclamation, President Roosevelt did not refer to the “Trading with the Enemy Act,” but instead chose to use In his proclamation, President Roosevelt did not refer to the “Trading with the Enemy Act,” but instead chose to use
the more opaque “Act of October 6, 1917.” the more opaque “Act of October 6, 1917.” ~~Pres. Proc. No. 2039 (Mar. 6, 1933).~~
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~~because the United States was not in a state of war and the suspended transactions were primarily~~
~~domestic, the President’s authority to issue such an order was dubious.31~~Proclamation 2039. 32 President Herbert Hoover had likewise contemplated using TWEA for such a purpose. However, Hoover’s Attorney General, William D. Mitchell, had expressed serious doubts about the legality of such an action. In the last days of Hoover’s presidency, Mitchell said that Hoover “should not issue [such an] executive order unless it was unanimously Congressional Research Service 4 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Despite the tenuous legality, Congress ratified Roosevelt’s actions by passing the Emergency Despite the tenuous legality, Congress ratified Roosevelt’s actions by passing the Emergency
Banking Relief Act three days after his proclamation.Banking Relief Act three days after his proclamation.3233 The act amended Section 5(b) of TWEA The act amended Section 5(b) of TWEA
to read: to read:
During time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the
President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise,
investigate, regulate, or prohibit....investigate, regulate, or prohibit....3334
This amendment gave the President the authority to declare that a national emergency existed and This amendment gave the President the authority to declare that a national emergency existed and
assume extensive controls over the national economy previously only available in times of war. assume extensive controls over the national economy previously only available in times of war.
By 1934, Roosevelt had used these extensive new powers to regulate “By 1934, Roosevelt had used these extensive new powers to regulate “~~Every~~[e]very transaction in transaction in
foreign exchange, transfer of credit between any banking institution within the United States and foreign exchange, transfer of credit between any banking institution within the United States and
any banking institution outside of the United States.”any banking institution outside of the United States.”3435
With America’s entry into the Second World War in 1941, Congress again amended TWEA to With America’s entry into the Second World War in 1941, Congress again amended TWEA to
grant the President extensive powers over the disposition of private property, adding the so-called grant the President extensive powers over the disposition of private property, adding the so-called
“vesting” power, which authorized the permanent seizure of property.“vesting” power, which authorized the permanent seizure of property.36 Now in its most expansive Now in its most expansive
form, TWEA authorized the President to declare a national emergency and, in so doing, to form, TWEA authorized the President to declare a national emergency and, in so doing, to
regulate foreign exchange, domestic banking, possession of precious metals, and property in regulate foreign exchange, domestic banking, possession of precious metals, and property in
which any foreign country or foreign national had an interest.which any foreign country or foreign national had an interest.3537
The Second World War ended in 1945. Following the conflict, the allied powers constructed The Second World War ended in 1945. Following the conflict, the allied powers constructed
institutions and signed agreements designed to keep the peace and to liberalize world trade. institutions and signed agreements designed to keep the peace and to liberalize world trade.
However, the United States did not immediately resume a peacetime posture with respect to However, the United States did not immediately resume a peacetime posture with respect to
emergency powers. Instead, the onset of the Cold War rationalized the continued use of TWEA emergency powers. Instead, the onset of the Cold War rationalized the continued use of TWEA
and other emergency powers outside the context of a declared war.and other emergency powers outside the context of a declared war.3638 Over the next several Over the next several
decades, Presidents declared four national emergencies and assumed expansive authority over decades, Presidents declared four national emergencies and assumed expansive authority over
economic transactions in the postwar period.economic transactions in the postwar period.37

~~31 President Herbert Hoover had likewise contemplated using TWEA for such a purpose. However, Hoover’s Attorney~~
~~General, William D. Mitchell, had expressed serious doubts about the legality of such an action. In the last days of~~
~~Hoover’s presidency, Mitchell said that Hoover “should not issue [such an] executive order unless it was unanimously~~
39 During the Cold War, economic sanctions became an increasingly popular foreign policy and national security tool, and TWEA was a prominent source of presidential authority to use the tool. agreed by [the] outgoing and incoming administrations that it was necessary and assurances [were] obtained from agreed by [the] outgoing and incoming administrations that it was necessary and assurances [were] obtained from
Congressional leaders that [such an action] would be ratified promptly and that enabling legislation would be passed” Congressional leaders that [such an action] would be ratified promptly and that enabling legislation would be passed”
as there was only a “shoe string” on which to base the legality of such an order. Raymond Moley, as there was only a “shoe string” on which to base the legality of such an order. Raymond Moley, The First New Deal
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), pp. 146-147. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), pp. 146-147.
3233 Emergency Banking Relief Act, P.L. 73-1 ( P.L. 73-1 (~~Mar.~~March 9, 1933), 48 Stat. 1 9, 1933), 48 Stat. 1 (EBRA). The House, despite having no copies of the bill and relying upon a draft text read . The House, despite having no copies of the bill and relying upon a draft text read
aloud by the Speaker, passed the bill after only 38 minutes of debate. The Senate voted to pass the measure the same aloud by the Speaker, passed the bill after only 38 minutes of debate. The Senate voted to pass the measure the same
evening. U.S. Congress, evening. U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. 57. , p. 57.
~~33 Ibid.~~34 TWEA as amended by EBRA. Italics show the language added by Italics show the language added by ~~the Emergency Banking Relief Act.~~
34EBRA. 35 E.O. 6560 ( E.O. 6560 (~~Jan.~~January 15, 1934). These actions came in the context of greater participation by the executive in international 15, 1934). These actions came in the context of greater participation by the executive in international
economic transactions generally. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 gave the President the authority to economic transactions generally. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 gave the President the authority to
negotiate bilateral trade agreements, marking the beginning of a period of increasing U.S. trade liberalization through negotiate bilateral trade agreements, marking the beginning of a period of increasing U.S. trade liberalization through
executive action. Douglas A. Irwin, executive action. Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2017), ch. 9. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2017), ch. 9.
3536 P.L. 77-354 ( P.L. 77-354 (~~Dec.~~December 18, 1941), 55 Stat. 838. 18, 1941), 55 Stat. 838.
3637 Ibid. 38 Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” p. 1879; Robert S. Rankin and Winfried R. Dallmyr, Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” p. 1879; Robert S. Rankin and Winfried R. Dallmyr, Freedom
and Emergency Powers in the Cold War (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964). (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964).
~~37 Pres. Proc. No. 2914 (Dec. 16, 1950); Pres. Proc. 3972 (Mar. 23, 1970); Pres. Proc. 3972 (Feb. 23, 1971); Pres. Proc.~~
~~4074 (Aug.~~39 Proclamation 2914 (December 16, 1950); Proclamation 3972 (March 23, 1970); Proclamation 3972 (February 23, 1971); Proclamation 4074 (August 15, 1971). See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10267, 15, 1971). See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10267, Definition of National Emergency under the National
Emergencies Act, by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Report 98-505, , by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Report 98-505, National Emergency Powers, by L. Elaine Halchin. , by L. Elaine Halchin.
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~~During the Cold War, economic sanctions became an increasingly popular foreign policy and~~
~~national security tool, and TWEA was a prominent source of presidential authority to use the tool.~~
In 1950, President Harry S. Truman declared a national emergency, citing TWEA, to impose In 1950, President Harry S. Truman declared a national emergency, citing TWEA, to impose
economic sanctions on North Korea and China.economic sanctions on North Korea and China.3840 Subsequent Presidents referenced that national Subsequent Presidents referenced that national
emergency as authority for imposing sanctions on Vietnam, Cuba, and Cambodia.emergency as authority for imposing sanctions on Vietnam, Cuba, and Cambodia.3941 Truman Truman
likewise used Section 5(b) of TWEA to maintain regulations on foreign exchange, transfers of likewise used Section 5(b) of TWEA to maintain regulations on foreign exchange, transfers of
credit, and the export of coin and currency that had been in place since the early 1930s.credit, and the export of coin and currency that had been in place since the early 1930s.4042
Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford invoked TWEA to continue export controls Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford invoked TWEA to continue export controls
established under the Export Administration Act when the act expired.established under the Export Administration Act when the act expired.4143
TWEA was also a prominent instrument of postwar presidential monetary policy. Presidents TWEA was also a prominent instrument of postwar presidential monetary policy. Presidents
Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy used TWEA and the national emergency declared by Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy used TWEA and the national emergency declared by
President Roosevelt in 1933 to maintain and modify regulations controlling the hoarding and President Roosevelt in 1933 to maintain and modify regulations controlling the hoarding and
export of gold.export of gold.4244 In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson explicitly used Truman’s 1950 declaration In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson explicitly used Truman’s 1950 declaration
of emergency under Section 5(b) of TWEA to limit direct foreign investment by U.S. companies of emergency under Section 5(b) of TWEA to limit direct foreign investment by U.S. companies
in an effort to strengthen the balance of payments position of the United States after the in an effort to strengthen the balance of payments position of the United States after the
devaluation of the pound sterling by the United Kingdom.devaluation of the pound sterling by the United Kingdom.4345 In 1971, after President Nixon In 1971, after President Nixon
suspended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold, he made use of Section 5(b) of TWEA to suspended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold, he made use of Section 5(b) of TWEA to
declare a state of emergency and place a 10% declare a state of emergency and place a 10% ad valorem supplemental duty on all dutiable goods supplemental duty on all dutiable goods
entering the United States.entering the United States.4446
The reliance by the executive on the powers granted by Section 5(b) of TWEA meant that The reliance by the executive on the powers granted by Section 5(b) of TWEA meant that
postwar sanctions regimes and significant parts of U.S. international monetary policy relied on postwar sanctions regimes and significant parts of U.S. international monetary policy relied on
continued states of emergency for their operation. continued states of emergency for their operation.
~~Pushing Back Against Executive Discretion~~The Efforts of Congress to Limit Executive Emergency Authorities
By the mid-1970s, following U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, revelations of domestic By the mid-1970s, following U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, revelations of domestic
spying, assassinations of foreign political leaders, the Watergate break-in, and other related spying, assassinations of foreign political leaders, the Watergate break-in, and other related
abuses of power, Congress increasingly focused on checking the executive branch. The Senate abuses of power, Congress increasingly focused on checking the executive branch. The Senate
formed a bipartisan special committee chaired by Senators Frank Church and Charles Mathias to formed a bipartisan special committee chaired by Senators Frank Church and Charles Mathias to

~~38 Pres. Proc. No. 2914 (Dec.~~reevaluate delegations of emergency authority to the President.47 The special committee issued a 40 Proclamation 2914 (December 16, 1950). This emergency would remain in place until 1976 and would be used to justify 16, 1950). This emergency would remain in place until 1976 and would be used to justify
a host of emergency powers. See the partial list of executive orders issued pursuant to Proclamation 2914 in U.S. a host of emergency powers. See the partial list of executive orders issued pursuant to Proclamation 2914 in U.S.
Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, Executive Orders in Times
of War and National Emergency, Report of the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency
Powers, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., June 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), p. 15. , committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., June 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), p. 15.
3941 U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Trade and Commerce, U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Trade and Commerce, United States
Embargo on Trade with South Vietnam and Cambodia, 94th Cong. 1st sess., June 4, 1975 (Washington, D.C., GPO, , 94th Cong. 1st sess., June 4, 1975 (Washington, D.C., GPO,
1975), p. 2; 31 C.F.R. 500.101-500.808 (1975). 1975), p. 2; 31 C.F.R. 500.101-500.808 (1975).
4042 E.O. 10348 ( E.O. 10348 (~~Apr.~~April 26, 1952). 26, 1952).
4143 E.O. 11677 ( E.O. 11677 (~~Aug.~~August 1, 1972); E.O. 11683 ( 1, 1972); E.O. 11683 (~~Aug.~~August 29, 1972); E.O. 11796 ( 29, 1972); E.O. 11796 (~~Jul~~July 30, 1974); E.O. 11798 ( 30, 1974); E.O. 11798 (~~Aug.~~August 14, 1974); 14, 1974);
E.O. 11810 (E.O. 11810 (~~Sept.~~September 30, 1974); E.O. 11818 ( 30, 1974); E.O. 11818 (~~Nov.~~November 5, 1974); E.O. 11940 ( 5, 1974); E.O. 11940 (~~Sept.~~September 30, 1976). 30, 1976).
4244 E.O. 10896 ( E.O. 10896 (~~Nov.~~November 29, 1960); E.O. 11037 (July 20, 1962). 29, 1960); E.O. 11037 (July 20, 1962).
4345 E.O. 11387 ( E.O. 11387 (~~Jan.~~January 1, 1968). 1, 1968).
4446 Pres. Pres. ~~Proc.~~Proclamation No. 4074 ( No. 4074 (~~Jan.~~January 21, 1971). Although the proclamation did not explicitly refer to TWEA in order to avoid 21, 1971). Although the proclamation did not explicitly refer to TWEA in order to avoid
the possible embarrassment of using a statute named the “Trading with the Enemy Act” to impose a tariff principally the possible embarrassment of using a statute named the “Trading with the Enemy Act” to impose a tariff principally
aimed at U.S. allies, the proclamation was carefully worded to not exclude TWEA as an authority under which the aimed at U.S. allies, the proclamation was carefully worded to not exclude TWEA as an authority under which the
proclamation was issued. When a legal challenge was issued, the Government argued, and the U.S. Court of Customs proclamation was issued. When a legal challenge was issued, the Government argued, and the U.S. Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals agreed, that TWEA was the source of the authority for the proclamation. United States v. Yoshida and Patent Appeals agreed, that TWEA was the source of the authority for the proclamation. United States v. Yoshida
Int'l, IncInt'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975). See also CRS Insight IN11129, , 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975). See also CRS Insight IN11129, The International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA) and Tariffs: Historical Background and Key Issues, by Christopher A. , by Christopher A. Casey. 47 The bipartisan special committee was called the “Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National ~~Casey.~~
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~~reevaluate delegations of emergency authority to the President.45 The special committee issued a~~
report surveying the President’s emergency powers in which it asserted that the United States had report surveying the President’s emergency powers in which it asserted that the United States had
technically “been in a state of national emergency since March 9, 1933” and that there were four technically “been in a state of national emergency since March 9, 1933” and that there were four
distinct declarations of national emergency in effect.distinct declarations of national emergency in effect.4648 The report also noted that the United States The report also noted that the United States
had “on the books at least 470 significant emergency statutes without time limitations delegating had “on the books at least 470 significant emergency statutes without time limitations delegating
to the Executive extensive discretionary powers, ordinarily exercised by the Legislature, which to the Executive extensive discretionary powers, ordinarily exercised by the Legislature, which
affect the lives of American citizens in a host of all-encompassing ways.”affect the lives of American citizens in a host of all-encompassing ways.”4749
In the course of the Committee’s investigations, Senator Mathias, a committee co-chair, noted, “A In the course of the Committee’s investigations, Senator Mathias, a committee co-chair, noted, “A
majority of the people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency majority of the people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency
government.” Senator Church, the other co-chair, said the central question before the committee government.” Senator Church, the other co-chair, said the central question before the committee
was “whether it [was] possible for a democratic government such as ours to exist under its present was “whether it [was] possible for a democratic government such as ours to exist under its present
Constitution and system of three separate branches equal in power under a continued state of Constitution and system of three separate branches equal in power under a continued state of
emergency.”emergency.”4850
Among the more controversial statutes highlighted by the committee was TWEA. In 1977, during Among the more controversial statutes highlighted by the committee was TWEA. In 1977, during
the House markup of a bill revising TWEA, Representative Jonathan Bingham, Chairperson of the House markup of a bill revising TWEA, Representative Jonathan Bingham, Chairperson of
the House International Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Economic Policy, described the House International Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Economic Policy, described
TWEA as conferring “on the President what could have been dictatorial powers that he could TWEA as conferring “on the President what could have been dictatorial powers that he could
have used without any restraint by Congress.”have used without any restraint by Congress.”4951 According to the Department of Justice, TWEA According to the Department of Justice, TWEA
granted the President four major groups of powers in a time of war or other national emergency: granted the President four major groups of powers in a time of war or other national emergency:
(a) Regulatory powers with respect to foreign exchange, banking transfers, coin, bullion, (a) Regulatory powers with respect to foreign exchange, banking transfers, coin, bullion,
currency, and securities; currency, and securities;
(b) Regulatory powers with respect to “any property in which any foreign country or a (b) Regulatory powers with respect to “any property in which any foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest”; national thereof has any interest”;

~~45 The bipartisan, special committee was called the “Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National~~
Emergency,” and was charged with conducting “a study and investigation with respect to the matter of terminating the Emergency,” and was charged with conducting “a study and investigation with respect to the matter of terminating the
national emergency proclaimed by the President of the United States on December 16, 1950.” U.S. Congress, Senate, national emergency proclaimed by the President of the United States on December 16, 1950.” U.S. Congress, Senate,
Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, Trading with the
Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of International Transactions in Time of
Declared National Emergency, committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., , committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., ~~Nov.~~November 1976 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), p. iii. 1976 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), p. iii.
4648 U.S. Congress, U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v. The four national emergencies were , p. v. The four national emergencies were
those proclaimed by President Roosevelt in 1933, President Truman in 1950, and the two proclaimed by President those proclaimed by President Roosevelt in 1933, President Truman in 1950, and the two proclaimed by President
Nixon in 1970 and 1971. Nixon in 1970 and 1971.
4749 U.S. Congress, U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v. , p. v.
4850 Qtd. in Qtd. in Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents, p. iii. , p. iii.
4951 U.S. Congress U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, House, Committee on International Relations, Revision of the Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup
before the Committee on International Relations (“House Markup”), 95th Cong., 1st sess., June 1977 (Washington, DC: , 95th Cong., 1st sess., June 1977 (Washington, DC:
GPO, 1977), p. 5. House and Senate committee reports expressed the view that past Presidents had abused the authority GPO, 1977), p. 5. House and Senate committee reports expressed the view that past Presidents had abused the authority
to regulate economic transactions in a national emergency conferred by TWEA by using it in circumstances far to regulate economic transactions in a national emergency conferred by TWEA by using it in circumstances far
removed from those that originally gave rise to the declaration of national emergency. H. Rept. No. 95-459 (June 23, removed from those that originally gave rise to the declaration of national emergency. H. Rept. No. 95-459 (June 23,
1977); S. Rept. No. 95-466 (1977); S. Rept. No. 95-466 (~~Oct.~~October 3, 1977). Both reports noted that President Lyndon B. Johnson, citing President 3, 1977). Both reports noted that President Lyndon B. Johnson, citing President
TrumanTruman'’s declaration of national emergency with respect to Korea in 1950, had imposed controls on direct investment s declaration of national emergency with respect to Korea in 1950, had imposed controls on direct investment
abroad by U.S. nationals in 1968, and that President Gerald R. Ford had used President Nixon's declaration of national abroad by U.S. nationals in 1968, and that President Gerald R. Ford had used President Nixon's declaration of national
emergency with respect to the balance of payments in 1971 to justify extending the controls and regulations of the emergency with respect to the balance of payments in 1971 to justify extending the controls and regulations of the
Export Administration Act when that Act lapsed temporarily in 1976. H. Rept. No. 95-459, at 5; S. Rept. No. 95-466, at Export Administration Act when that Act lapsed temporarily in 1976. H. Rept. No. 95-459, at 5; S. Rept. No. 95-466, at
2. More generally, the House report noted that the national emergency authority of TWEA had been used by President 2. More generally, the House report noted that the national emergency authority of TWEA had been used by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt to regulate the banking industry in 1933 and to impose consumer credit controls in 1941 and by Franklin D. Roosevelt to regulate the banking industry in 1933 and to impose consumer credit controls in 1941 and by
President Richard M. Nixon to impose a surcharge on imports into the United States in 1971. Thus, the House report President Richard M. Nixon to impose a surcharge on imports into the United States in 1971. Thus, the House report
concluded, TWEA “has become essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his concluded, TWEA “has become essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his
discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and international economic arena, without congressional review.” Ibid., discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and international economic arena, without congressional review.” Ibid.,
p. 7. p. 7.
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(c) The power to vest “any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof”; (c) The power to vest “any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof”;
and and
(d) The powers to hold, use, administer, liquidate, sell, or otherwise deal with “such interest (d) The powers to hold, use, administer, liquidate, sell, or otherwise deal with “such interest
or property” in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States.or property” in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States.5052
The House report on the reform legislation called TWEA “essentially an unlimited grant of The House report on the reform legislation called TWEA “essentially an unlimited grant of
authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and
international economic arena, without congressional review.”international economic arena, without congressional review.”5153 The criticisms of TWEA centered The criticisms of TWEA centered
on the following: on the following:
(a) It required no consultation or reports to Congress with regard to the use of powers or (a) It required no consultation or reports to Congress with regard to the use of powers or
the declaration of a national emergency. the declaration of a national emergency.
(b) It set no time limits on a state of emergency, no mechanism for congressional review, (b) It set no time limits on a state of emergency, no mechanism for congressional review,
and no way for Congress to terminate it. and no way for Congress to terminate it.
(c) It stated no limits on the scope of TWEA’s economic powers and the circumstances (c) It stated no limits on the scope of TWEA’s economic powers and the circumstances
under which such authority could be used. under which such authority could be used.
(d) The actions taken under the authority of TWEA were rarely related to the circumstances (d) The actions taken under the authority of TWEA were rarely related to the circumstances
in which the national emergency was declared.in which the national emergency was declared.5254
In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Professor Harold G. Maier, In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Professor Harold G. Maier,
a noted legal scholar, summed up the development and the main criticisms of TWEA: a noted legal scholar, summed up the development and the main criticisms of TWEA:
Section 5(b)’s effect is no longer confined to “emergency situations” in the sense of Section 5(b)’s effect is no longer confined to “emergency situations” in the sense of
existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit, existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit,
by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has
converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President…”converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President…”53
55 The Enactment of the National Emergencies Act and the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act
Congress’s reforms to emergency powers under TWEA came in two acts. First, Congress enacted Congress’s reforms to emergency powers under TWEA came in two acts. First, Congress enacted
the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976.the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976.5456 The NEA provided for the termination of all The NEA provided for the termination of all
existing emergencies in 1978, except those making use of Section 5(b) of TWEA, and placed new existing emergencies in 1978, except those making use of Section 5(b) of TWEA, and placed new
restrictions on the manner of declaring and the duration of new states of emergency, including: restrictions on the manner of declaring and the duration of new states of emergency, including:
 Requiring the President to  Requiring the President to ~~immediately transmit~~transmit immediately to Congress a notification of the to Congress a notification of the
declaration of national emergency. declaration of national emergency.
 Requiring a biannual review whereby “each House of Congress shall meet to  Requiring a biannual review whereby “each House of Congress shall meet to
consider a vote on a concurrent [now joint, see below] resolution to determine consider a vote on a concurrent [now joint, see below] resolution to determine
whether that emergency shall be terminated.” whether that emergency shall be terminated.”
 Authorizing Congress to terminate the national emergency through a privileged  Authorizing Congress to terminate the national emergency through a privileged
concurrent [now joint] resolution. concurrent [now joint] resolution.5557

5052 House, House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2. , p. 2.
5153 Ibid. Ibid.
5254 Ibid., p. 9. Ibid., p. 9.
~~53 Ibid., p. 9.~~
5455 Ibid. 56 P.L. 94-412 ( P.L. 94-412 (~~Sept.~~September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601 1601 et seq. (2018). (2018).
5557 Ibid. While the NEA terminated the national emergencies on September 14, 1978, it explicitly enabled the Ibid. While the NEA terminated the national emergencies on September 14, 1978, it explicitly enabled the
continuation of those emergencies with respect to Section 5(b) of TWEA to give the Congress more time to consider continuation of those emergencies with respect to Section 5(b) of TWEA to give the Congress more time to consider
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Second, Congress tackled the Second, Congress tackled the ~~thornier~~more complicated question of TWEA. Because the authorities granted by question of TWEA. Because the authorities granted by
TWEA were heavily entwined with postwar international monetary policy and the use of TWEA were heavily entwined with postwar international monetary policy and the use of
sanctions in U.S. foreign policy, unwinding it was a difficult undertaking.sanctions in U.S. foreign policy, unwinding it was a difficult undertaking.5658 The exclusion of The exclusion of
Section 5(b) reflected congressional interest in preserving existing regulations regarding foreign Section 5(b) reflected congressional interest in preserving existing regulations regarding foreign
assets, foreign funds, and exports of strategic goods.assets, foreign funds, and exports of strategic goods.5759 Similarly, establishing a means to continue Similarly, establishing a means to continue
existing uses of TWEA reflected congressional interest in “improving future use rather than existing uses of TWEA reflected congressional interest in “improving future use rather than
remedying past abuses.”remedying past abuses.”5860
The subcommittee charged with reforming TWEA spent more than a year preparing reports, The subcommittee charged with reforming TWEA spent more than a year preparing reports,
including the first complete legislative history of TWEA, a tome that ran nearly 700 pages.including the first complete legislative history of TWEA, a tome that ran nearly 700 pages.5961 In In
the resulting legislation, Congress did three things. First, Congress amended TWEA so that it the resulting legislation, Congress did three things. First, Congress amended TWEA so that it
was, as originally intended, only applicable “during a time of war.”was, as originally intended, only applicable “during a time of war.”6062 Second, Congress expanded Second, Congress expanded
the Export Administration Act to include powers that previously were authorized by reference to the Export Administration Act to include powers that previously were authorized by reference to
Section 5(b) of TWEA.Section 5(b) of TWEA.6163 Finally, Congress wrote the International Emergency Economic Powers Finally, Congress wrote the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA) to confer “upon the President a new set of authorities for use in time of national Act (IEEPA) to confer “upon the President a new set of authorities for use in time of national
emergency which are both more limited in scope than those of section 5(b) and subject to emergency which are both more limited in scope than those of section 5(b) and subject to
procedural limitations, including those of the [NEA].”procedural limitations, including those of the [NEA].”6264
The Report of the House Committee on International Relations The Report of the House Committee on International Relations ~~summed up~~summarized the nature of an the nature of an
“emergency” in “emergency” in ~~their~~its “new approach” to international emergency economic powers: “new approach” to international emergency economic powers:
[G]iven the breadth of the authorities, and their availability at the President’s discretion [G]iven the breadth of the authorities, and their availability at the President’s discretion
upon a declaration of a national emergency, their exercise should be subject to various upon a declaration of a national emergency, their exercise should be subject to various
substantive restrictions. The main one stems from a recognition that emergencies are by substantive restrictions. The main one stems from a recognition that emergencies are by
their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal ongoing problems. A their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal ongoing problems. A
national emergency should be declared and emergency authorities employed only with national emergency should be declared and emergency authorities employed only with
respect to a specific set of circumstances which constitute a real emergency, and for no respect to a specific set of circumstances which constitute a real emergency, and for no
~~other purpose. The emergency should be terminated in a timely manner when the factual~~

how to address the issue of sanctions and international economic regulation. The International Emergency Economic how to address the issue of sanctions and international economic regulation. The International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA) grandfathered powers that “were being exercised [under TWEA] with respect to a country on July Powers Act (IEEPA) grandfathered powers that “were being exercised [under TWEA] with respect to a country on July
1, 1977,” including those with respect to Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. P.L. 95-223 (1, 1977,” including those with respect to Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. P.L. 95-223 (~~Dec.~~December 28, 1977) § 28, 1977) §
101(b). The grandfathered powers, however, would require a declaration or renewal. See, e.g., Memorandum 101(b). The grandfathered powers, however, would require a declaration or renewal. See, e.g., Memorandum of September~~of Sept.~~ 8, 8,
1978, 45 Fed. Reg. 40,695; Memorandum of 1978, 45 Fed. Reg. 40,695; Memorandum of ~~Sept.~~September 12, 1979; Presidential Determination of 12, 1979; Presidential Determination of ~~Sept.~~September 8, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 8, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg.
59,549; Memorandum of 59,549; Memorandum of ~~Sept.~~September 10, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,321; Memorandum of 10, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,321; Memorandum of ~~Sept.~~September 8, 1982, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,797; 8, 1982, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,797;
Memorandum of Memorandum of ~~Sept.~~September 7, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,695; Memorandum of 7, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,695; Memorandum of ~~Sept.~~September 11, 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 35,927. 11, 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 35,927.
5658 House, House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, pp. 6-7. , pp. 6-7.
5759 U.S. Congress, Senate, U.S. Congress, Senate, International Emergency Economic Powers Legislation, Report of the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs to Accompany H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., S.Rept. 95-466 (Washington, DC: GPO, , 95th Cong., 1st Sess., S.Rept. 95-466 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1977), p. 3. 1977), p. 3.
5860 House, House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, 10. , 10.
5961 House Markup, p. 9; U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee , p. 9; U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee
on International Relations, on International Relations, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of
International Transactions in a Time of Declared Emergency, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., , 94th Cong., 2nd sess., ~~Nov.~~November 1976, committee print 1976, committee print
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1976)(Washington, DC: GPO, 1976).
6062 P.L. 95-223 ( P.L. 95-223 (~~Dec.~~December 28, 1977) (Title I) (“Section 5(b)(1) of the Trading With the Enemy Act // 50 USC app. 5. // is 28, 1977) (Title I) (“Section 5(b)(1) of the Trading With the Enemy Act // 50 USC app. 5. // is
amended by striking out “or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President” in the text amended by striking out “or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President” in the text
preceding subparagraph (A).”); 91 Stat. 1625, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4305 (2018); House, preceding subparagraph (A).”); 91 Stat. 1625, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4305 (2018); House, Trading with
the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2. , p. 2.
6163 Ibid. (Title III); House, Ibid. (Title III); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2 (“Title III of the bill makes a series of , p. 2 (“Title III of the bill makes a series of
conforming amendments to the Export Administration Act, which transfer to that act the authority, heretofore exercised conforming amendments to the Export Administration Act, which transfer to that act the authority, heretofore exercised
under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Actunder section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act. to regulate exports of non-U.S.-origin goods and technology by to regulate exports of non-U.S.-origin goods and technology by
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. concerns.”). foreign subsidiaries of U.S. concerns.”).
6264 Ibid. (Title II); House, Ibid. (Title II); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2. , p. 2.
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other purpose. The emergency should be terminated in a timely manner when the factual state of emergency is over and not continued in effect for usestate of emergency is over and not continued in effect for use in other circumstances. A in other circumstances. A
state of national emergency should not be a normal state of affairs.state of national emergency should not be a normal state of affairs.6365
IEEPA’s Statute, its Use, and Judicial Interpretation
IEEPA’s Statute
IEEPA, as currently amended, empowers the president to: IEEPA, as currently amended, empowers the president to:
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit: (A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit:
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange, (i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, (ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution,
to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country
or national thereof, or national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currencies or securities; and (iii) the importing or exporting of currencies or securities; and
(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, (B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel,
nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer,
withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any
right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which
any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to
any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(C) when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign (C) when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign
country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he
determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against
the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest,
when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the
President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the
President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered,
liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United
States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the
accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.6466
These powers may be exercised “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its These powers may be exercised “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with
respect to such threat.”respect to such threat.”6567 Presidents may invoke IEEPA under the procedures set forth in the Presidents may invoke IEEPA under the procedures set forth in the
NEA. When declaring a national emergency, the NEA requires that the President “immediately” NEA. When declaring a national emergency, the NEA requires that the President “immediately”
transmit the proclamation declaring the emergency to Congress and publish it in the transmit the proclamation declaring the emergency to Congress and publish it in the Federal
Register..6668 The President must also specify the provisions of law that he or she intends to use. The President must also specify the provisions of law that he or she intends to use.67
~~In addition to the requirements of the NEA, IEEPA provides several further restrictions.~~
~~Preliminarily, IEEPA requires that the President consult with Congress “in every possible~~
69
6365 House, House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 11. , p. 11.
6466 50 U.S.C. § 1702. 50 U.S.C. § 1702.
~~65 Ibid.~~67 50 U.S.C. § 1701. § 1701.
~~66 Ibid~~68 50 U.S.C. § 1621. § 1621.
~~67 Ibid~~69 50 U.S.C. § 1631. § 1631.
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In addition to the requirements of the NEA, IEEPA provides several further restrictions. Preliminarily, IEEPA requires that the President consult with Congress “in every possible instance” before exercising any of the authorities granted under IEEPA.instance” before exercising any of the authorities granted under IEEPA.6870 Once the President Once the President
declares a national emergency invoking IEEPA, he or she must immediately transmit a report to declares a national emergency invoking IEEPA, he or she must immediately transmit a report to
Congress specifying: Congress specifying:
(1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority; (1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority;
(2) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary (2) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States; national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States;
(3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those (3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those
authorities to deal with those circumstances; authorities to deal with those circumstances;
(4) why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those circumstances; (4) why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those circumstances;
and and
(5) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such (5) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such
actions are to be taken with respect to those countries.actions are to be taken with respect to those countries.6971
The President subsequently is to report on the actions taken under the IEEPA at least once in The President subsequently is to report on the actions taken under the IEEPA at least once in
every succeeding six-month interval that the authorities are exercised.every succeeding six-month interval that the authorities are exercised.7072 As per the NEA, the As per the NEA, the
emergency may be terminated by the President, by a privileged joint resolution of Congress, or emergency may be terminated by the President, by a privileged joint resolution of Congress, or
automatically if the President does not publish in the Federal Register and transmit to Congress a automatically if the President does not publish in the Federal Register and transmit to Congress a
notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such anniversary.notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such anniversary.7173
Amendments to IEEPA
Congress has amended IEEPA eight times Congress has amended IEEPA eight times (Table 1). Five of the eight amendments have altered . Five of the eight amendments have altered
civil and criminal penalties for violations of orders issued under the statute. Other amendments civil and criminal penalties for violations of orders issued under the statute. Other amendments
excluded certain informational materials and expanded IEEPA’s scope following the terrorist excluded certain informational materials and expanded IEEPA’s scope following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Congress also amended the NEA in response to a ruling by the attacks of September 11, 2001. Congress also amended the NEA in response to a ruling by the
Supreme Court to require a joint rather than a concurrent resolution to terminate a national Supreme Court to require a joint rather than a concurrent resolution to terminate a national
emergency. emergency.
Table 1. Amendments to IEEPA
Date
Action
December 28, 1977 December 28, 1977
IEEPA Enacted IEEPA Enacted
(P.L. 95-223; 91 Stat. 1625) (P.L. 95-223; 91 Stat. 1625)
August 16, 1985* August 16, 1985*
Fol owing the Supreme Court’s holding in Fol owing the Supreme Court’s holding in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) finding so-, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) finding so-
called legislative vetoes unconstitutional, Congress amends the NEA to change called legislative vetoes unconstitutional, Congress amends the NEA to change
“concurrent” resolution to “joint” resolution. (P.L. 99-93; 99 Stat. 407, 448). “concurrent” resolution to “joint” resolution. (P.L. 99-93; 99 Stat. 407, 448).
* While not technically an amendment to IEEPA, IEEPA is tied to the NEA’s provisions * While not technically an amendment to IEEPA, IEEPA is tied to the NEA’s provisions
relating to the declaration and termination of national emergencies. relating to the declaration and termination of national emergencies.
~~August 23, 1988~~
~~IEEPA amended to exclude informational materials (Berman Amendment, see~~
~~elaboration below).~~
~~(Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988; P.L. 100-418; 102 Stat. 1107, 1371)~~

~~68 Ibid. § 1703(a).~~
~~69 Ibid. § 1703(b).~~
~~70 Ibid. § 1703(c).~~
~~71 Ibid~~ 70 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a). 71 50 U.S.C. § 1703(b). 72 50 U.S.C. § 1703(c). 73 50 U.S.C. § 1622. . § 1622.
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Date
Action
August 23, 1988 IEEPA amended to exclude informational materials (Berman Amendment, see elaboration below). (Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988; P.L. 100-418; 102 Stat. 1107, 1371) October 6, 1992 October 6, 1992
Section 206 of IEEPA amended to increase civil and criminal penalties under the act. Section 206 of IEEPA amended to increase civil and criminal penalties under the act.
(Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993; P.L. 102-(Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993; P.L. 102-
393; 106 Stat. 1729) 393; 106 Stat. 1729)
October 6, 1992 October 6, 1992
Section 206 of IEEPA amended to decrease civil and criminal penalties under the act. Section 206 of IEEPA amended to decrease civil and criminal penalties under the act.
(Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1993; P.L. 102-396; 106 Stat. 1876) (Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1993; P.L. 102-396; 106 Stat. 1876)
April 30, 1994 April 30, 1994
IEEPA amended to update the definition of informational materials. IEEPA amended to update the definition of informational materials.
(Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; P.L. 103-236; 108 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; P.L. 103-236; 108
Stat. 382) Stat. 382)
September 23, 1996 September 23, 1996
IEEPA amended to penalize attempted violations of licenses, orders, regulations or IEEPA amended to penalize attempted violations of licenses, orders, regulations or
prohibitions issued under the authority of IEEPA. prohibitions issued under the authority of IEEPA.
(National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; P.L. 104-201; 110 Stat. 2725) (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; P.L. 104-201; 110 Stat. 2725)
October 26, 2001 October 26, 2001
USA PATRIOT Act Amendments, see elaboration below. USA PATRIOT Act Amendments, see elaboration below.
(Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001; P.L. 107-56; 115 Stat. Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001; P.L. 107-56; 115 Stat.
272) 272)
March 9, 2006 March 9, 2006
Section 206 of IEEPA amended to increase civil and criminal penalties under the act. Section 206 of IEEPA amended to increase civil and criminal penalties under the act.
(USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005; P.L. 109-177; 120 Stat. (USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005; P.L. 109-177; 120 Stat.
192) 192)
October 16, 2007 October 16, 2007
The International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act amended Section 206 The International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act amended Section 206
of IEEPA to increase civil and criminal penalties and added conspiracy to violate of IEEPA to increase civil and criminal penalties and added conspiracy to violate
licenses, orders, regulations or prohibitions issued under the authority of IEEPA. Civil licenses, orders, regulations or prohibitions issued under the authority of IEEPA. Civil
penalties are capped at $250,000 or twice the amount of the transaction found to have penalties are capped at $250,000 or twice the amount of the transaction found to have
violated the law. Criminal penalties now include a fine of up to $1,000,000 and violated the law. Criminal penalties now include a fine of up to $1,000,000 and
imprisonment of up to 20 years. imprisonment of up to 20 years.
(International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act; P.L. 110-96; 121 Stat. (International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act; P.L. 110-96; 121 Stat.
1011) 1011)
Source: Congressional Research Service, based on United States Code, annotated. Congressional Research Service, based on United States Code, annotated.
The Informational Materials Amendments to IEEPA
As originally enacted, IEEPA protected the rights of U.S. persons to participate in the exchange of As originally enacted, IEEPA protected the rights of U.S. persons to participate in the exchange of
“any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a “any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a
transfer of anything of value” with a foreign person otherwise subject to sanctions. Amendments transfer of anything of value” with a foreign person otherwise subject to sanctions. Amendments
in 1988 and 1994 updated this list of protected rights to include the exchange of published in 1988 and 1994 updated this list of protected rights to include the exchange of published
information in a variety of formats.information in a variety of formats.7274 As amended, the act currently protects the exchange of As amended, the act currently protects the exchange of
“information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, “information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters,
phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs,
~~artworks, and news wire feeds,” provided such exchange is not otherwise controlled for national~~
~~security or foreign policy reasons related to weapons proliferation or international terrorism.73~~

7274 P.L. 100-418 ( P.L. 100-418 (~~Aug.~~August 23, 1988); P.L. 103-236 ( 23, 1988); P.L. 103-236 (~~Apr.~~April 30, 1994). The amendments were introduced by Rep. Howard 30, 1994). The amendments were introduced by Rep. Howard
Berman (D-CA) and are occasionally referred to as the “Berman Amendments.” For more background, see, “Sleeping Berman (D-CA) and are occasionally referred to as the “Berman Amendments.” For more background, see, “Sleeping
with the Enemy? OFAC Rules and First Amendment Freedoms,” with the Enemy? OFAC Rules and First Amendment Freedoms,” Perspectives on History (May 2004). (May 2004).
~~73 Codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3).~~
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artworks, and news wire feeds,” provided such exchange is not otherwise controlled for national security or foreign policy reasons related to weapons proliferation or international terrorism.75 USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA76~~USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA74~~
Unlike the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), IEEPA did not allow the President to vest assets Unlike the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), IEEPA did not allow the President to vest assets
as originally enacted.as originally enacted.7577 In 2001, at the request of the George W. Bush Administration, Congress In 2001, at the request of the George W. Bush Administration, Congress
amended IEEPA as part of the USA PATRIOT amended IEEPA as part of the USA PATRIOT ~~Act76~~Act78 to return to the President the authority to vest to return to the President the authority to vest
frozen assets, but only under certain circumstances: frozen assets, but only under certain circumstances:
... the President may ... when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been ... the President may ... when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been
attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign
country that [the President] determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such country that [the President] determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such
hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any
property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President,
in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such
terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held,
used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the
benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and
all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.7779
Speaking about the efforts of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify and disrupt Speaking about the efforts of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify and disrupt
the flow of terrorist finances, Attorney General John Ashcroft told Congress: the flow of terrorist finances, Attorney General John Ashcroft told Congress:
At present the President’s powers are limited to freezing assets and blocking transactions At present the President’s powers are limited to freezing assets and blocking transactions
with terrorist organizations. We need the capacity for more than a freeze. We must be able with terrorist organizations. We need the capacity for more than a freeze. We must be able
to seize. Doing business with terrorist organization must be a losing proposition. Terrorist to seize. Doing business with terrorist organization must be a losing proposition. Terrorist
financiers must pay a price for their support of terrorism, which kills innocent Americans. financiers must pay a price for their support of terrorism, which kills innocent Americans.
Consistent with the President’s [issuance of E.O. Consistent with the President’s [issuance of E.O. ~~1322478~~1322480] and his statements [of ] and his statements [of
September 24, 2001], our proposal gives law enforcement the ability to seize the terrorists’ September 24, 2001], our proposal gives law enforcement the ability to seize the terrorists’
assets. Further, criminal liability is imposed on those who knowingly engage in financial assets. Further, criminal liability is imposed on those who knowingly engage in financial
transactions, money-laundering involving the proceeds of terrorist acts.transactions, money-laundering involving the proceeds of terrorist acts.7981
The House Judiciary Committee report explaining the amendments described its purpose as The House Judiciary Committee report explaining the amendments described its purpose as
follows: follows:
Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1702) Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1702)
grants to the President the power to exercise certain authorities relating to commerce with grants to the President the power to exercise certain authorities relating to commerce with
foreign nations upon his determination that there exists an unusual and extraordinary threat foreign nations upon his determination that there exists an unusual and extraordinary threat
to the United States. Under this authority, the President may, among other things, freeze to the United States. Under this authority, the President may, among other things, freeze
~~certain foreign assets within the jurisdiction of the United States. A separate law, the~~
~~Trading With the Enemy Act, authorizes the President to take title to enemy assets when~~
~~Congress has declared war.~~

74 75 Codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3). 76 This section was authored by Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division (ALD), CRS. This section was authored by Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division (ALD), CRS.
7577 P.L. 95-223. House, P.L. 95-223. House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 15 (“This grant of authorities does not , p. 15 (“This grant of authorities does not
include the following authorities … : (1) the power to vest … property.”); Senate, include the following authorities … : (1) the power to vest … property.”); Senate, International Emergency Economic
Powers Legislation, p. 5 (“Authority to vest property, seize records and regulate purely domestic economic transactions , p. 5 (“Authority to vest property, seize records and regulate purely domestic economic transactions
would not be granted.”). would not be granted.”).
7678 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
7779 P.L. 107-56 § 106, 115 Stat. 272, 277, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C) (2018). P.L. 107-56 § 106, 115 Stat. 272, 277, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C) (2018).
7880 E.O. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 ( E.O. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (~~Sept.~~September 24, 2001). 24, 2001).
7981 Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st , 107th Cong., 1st
sess., serial no. 39 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 7 (testimony of Attorney General Ashcroft). sess., serial no. 39 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 7 (testimony of Attorney General Ashcroft).
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

certain foreign assets within the jurisdiction of the United States. A separate law, the Trading With the Enemy Act, authorizes the President to take title to enemy assets when Congress has declared war. Section 159 of this bill amends section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Section 159 of this bill amends section 203 of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act to provide the President with authority similar to what he currently has under Powers Act to provide the President with authority similar to what he currently has under
the Trading With the Enemy Act in circumstances where there has been an armed attack the Trading With the Enemy Act in circumstances where there has been an armed attack
on the United States, or where Congress has enacted a law authorizing the President to use on the United States, or where Congress has enacted a law authorizing the President to use
armed force against a foreign country, foreign organization, or foreign national. The armed force against a foreign country, foreign organization, or foreign national. The
proceeds of any foreign assets to which the President takes title under this authority must proceeds of any foreign assets to which the President takes title under this authority must
be placed in a segregated account can only be used in accordance with a statute authorizing be placed in a segregated account can only be used in accordance with a statute authorizing
the expenditure of such proceeds. the expenditure of such proceeds.
Section 159 also makes a number of clarifying and technical changes to section 203 of the Section 159 also makes a number of clarifying and technical changes to section 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, most of which will not change the way International Emergency Economic Powers Act, most of which will not change the way
that provision currently is implemented.that provision currently is implemented.8082
The government has apparently never employed the vesting power to seize Al Qaeda assets The government has apparently never employed the vesting power to seize Al Qaeda assets
within the United States. Instead, the government has sought to confiscate them through forfeiture within the United States. Instead, the government has sought to confiscate them through forfeiture
procedures.procedures.8183
The first, and to date, apparently only, use of this power under IEEPA occurred on March 20, The first, and to date, apparently only, use of this power under IEEPA occurred on March 20,
20032003.,84 On that date, in Executive Order 13290, President George W. Bush ordered the blocked On that date, in Executive Order 13290, President George W. Bush ordered the blocked
“property of the Government of Iraq and its agencies, instrumentalities, or controlled entities” to “property of the Government of Iraq and its agencies, instrumentalities, or controlled entities” to
be vested “in the Department of the Treasury.... [to] be used to assist the Iraqi people and to assist be vested “in the Department of the Treasury.... [to] be used to assist the Iraqi people and to assist
in the reconstruction of Iraq.”in the reconstruction of Iraq.”8285 However, the President’s order excluded from confiscation Iraq’s However, the President’s order excluded from confiscation Iraq’s
diplomatic and consular property, as well as assets that had, prior to March 20, 2003, been diplomatic and consular property, as well as assets that had, prior to March 20, 2003, been
ordered attached in satisfaction of judgments against Iraq rendered pursuant to the terrorist suit ordered attached in satisfaction of judgments against Iraq rendered pursuant to the terrorist suit
provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and § 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and § 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance
~~Act83~~Act86 (which reportedly totaled about $300 million) (which reportedly totaled about $300 million)8487. .
A subsequent executive order blocked the property of former Iraqi officials and their families, A subsequent executive order blocked the property of former Iraqi officials and their families,
vesting title of such blocked funds in the Department of the Treasury for transfer to the vesting title of such blocked funds in the Department of the Treasury for transfer to the
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) to be “used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) to be “used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people,
for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament
of Iraq, for the cost of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefitting of the Iraqi of Iraq, for the cost of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefitting of the Iraqi
people.”people.”8588 The DFI was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1483, which required The DFI was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1483, which required
member states to freeze all assets of the former Iraqi government and of Saddam Hussein, senior member states to freeze all assets of the former Iraqi government and of Saddam Hussein, senior
officials of his regime and their family members, and transfer such assets to the DFI, which was officials of his regime and their family members, and transfer such assets to the DFI, which was
then administered by the United States. Most of the vested assets were used by the Coalition then administered by the United States. Most of the vested assets were used by the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) for reconstruction projects and ministry operations.Provisional Authority (CPA) for reconstruction projects and ministry operations.8689

8082 U.S. Congress, House, U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany H.R. 2975, 107th Cong., 1st sess., , 107th Cong., 1st sess.,
H.Rept. 107-236 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 62. H.Rept. 107-236 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 62.
8183 See United States v. All Funds on Deposit with R.J. O'Brien & Assocs., 783 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 2015) (insurance See United States v. All Funds on Deposit with R.J. O'Brien & Assocs., 783 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 2015) (insurance
companies’ attempt to intercede in civil forfeiture action involving Al Qaeda assets). companies’ attempt to intercede in civil forfeiture action involving Al Qaeda assets).
8284 E.O. 13290, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,307 ( E.O. 13290, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,307 (~~Mar.~~March 24, 2003). 24, 2003).
8385 Ibid. 86 P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002). P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).
8487 See Tom Schoenberg, “Fights Loom for Iraqi Riches,” See Tom Schoenberg, “Fights Loom for Iraqi Riches,” Legal Times (March 31, 2003). Judgment creditors were paid (March 31, 2003). Judgment creditors were paid
about $140 million from the vested assets to cover the unsatisfied portions of judgments and interest. about $140 million from the vested assets to cover the unsatisfied portions of judgments and interest.
8588 E.O. 13315, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,315 (September 3, 2003). E.O. 13315, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,315 (September 3, 2003).
8689 GAO-04-579T Recovering Iraq’s Assets (March 18, 2004). As of March 2004, according to GAO, the CPA had GAO-04-579T Recovering Iraq’s Assets (March 18, 2004). As of March 2004, according to GAO, the CPA had
~~spent $1.67 billion of the $1.9 billion for “emergency needs, including salaries for civil servants and pensions, and for~~
~~ministry operations.” Ibid. at 7. The CPA was also authorized to use the more than $900 million in assets seized by the~~
~~U.S. military in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction activities. Ibid.~~
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The USA PATRIOT Act made three other amendments to Section 203 of IEEPA. The USA PATRIOT Act made three other amendments to Section 203 of IEEPA.8790 After the After the
power to investigate, it added the power to block assets during the pendency of an investigation.power to investigate, it added the power to block assets during the pendency of an investigation.8891
It clarified that the type of interest in property subject to IEEPA is an “interest by any person, or It clarified that the type of interest in property subject to IEEPA is an “interest by any person, or
with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”8992 It also added It also added
subsection (c), which provides: subsection (c), which provides:
In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was
based on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information based on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information
Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in
camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review.camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review.9093
As described in the House Judiciary Committee report, these provisions were meant to clarify and As described in the House Judiciary Committee report, these provisions were meant to clarify and
codify existing practices.codify existing practices.91

~~87 P.L. 107-56 §106, 115 Stat. 277 (2001).~~
~~88 Ibid., codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (2018).~~
~~89 Ibid., codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (2018).~~
~~90 Ibid., 115 Stat. at 278, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2018).~~
~~91 House, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany H.R. 2975, 62.~~
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~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Figure 1. Timeline of NEA and IEEPA Use~~

Source: CRS.
Notes: Emergencies not citing IEEPA invoke one of the other 116 emergency powers under the umbrella of the
~~NEA. For a list of these emergency powers, see CRS Report R46379,~~ ~~Emergency Authorities Under the National~~
~~Emergencies Act, Stafford Act, and Public Health Service Act, coordinated by Jennifer K. Elsea.~~
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94
IEEPA Trends
Like TWEA prior to its amendment in 1977, the President and Congress together have often Like TWEA prior to its amendment in 1977, the President and Congress together have often
turned to IEEPA to impose economic sanctions in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy and national turned to IEEPA to impose economic sanctions in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy and national
security objectives. While initially enacted to security objectives. While initially enacted to ~~rein in~~circumscribe presidential emergency authority, presidential emergency authority,9295
presidential emergency use of IEEPA has expanded in scale, scope, and frequency since the presidential emergency use of IEEPA has expanded in scale, scope, and frequency since the
statute’s enactment. The House report on IEEPA stated, “emergencies are by their nature rare and statute’s enactment. The House report on IEEPA stated, “emergencies are by their nature rare and
brief, and are not to be equated with normal, ongoing problems.”brief, and are not to be equated with normal, ongoing problems.”9396 National emergencies National emergencies
invoking IEEPA, however, have increased in frequency and length since its enactment. invoking IEEPA, however, have increased in frequency and length since its enactment.
~~Since 1977~~Between 1977 and March 25, 2022, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in , Presidents have invoked IEEPA in 5967 new declarations of national emergency declarations of national emergency. under the NEA.97 On On
average, these emergencies last average, these emergencies last ~~more than~~nearly nine years. Most emergencies have been nine years. Most emergencies have been
geographically specific, targeting a specific country or government. However, since 1990, geographically specific, targeting a specific country or government. However, since 1990,
Presidents have declared non-geographically-specific emergencies in response to issues like Presidents have declared non-geographically-specific emergencies in response to issues like
weapons proliferation, global terrorism, and malicious cyber-enabled activities.weapons proliferation, global terrorism, and malicious cyber-enabled activities.98 The erosion of The erosion of
geographic limitations has been accompanied by an expansion in the nature of the targets of geographic limitations has been accompanied by an expansion in the nature of the targets of
sanctions issued under IEEPA authority. Originally, IEEPA was used to target foreign sanctions issued under IEEPA authority. Originally, IEEPA was used to target foreign
governments; however, Presidents have increasingly targeted groups and governments; however, Presidents have increasingly targeted groups and ~~individuals.94 While~~
spent $1.67 billion of the $1.9 billion for “emergency needs, including salaries for civil servants and pensions, and for ministry operations.” Ibid. at 7. The CPA was also authorized to use the more than $900 million in assets seized by the U.S. military in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction activities. Ibid. 90 P.L. 107-56 §106, 115 Stat. 277 (2001). 91 P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (2018). 92 P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (2018). 93 P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2018). 94 House, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany H.R. 2975, 62. 95 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, pp. 2-9. 96 Ibid, p. 11. 97 This tally does not include IEEPA invocations made in connection with executive orders expanding the scope of an initial declaration of national emergency. See Table A-1. 98 E.g., E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (April 1, 2015); E.O. 13818, Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption (December 20, 2017); E.O. 13848, Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election (September 12, 2018); E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (May 15, 2019); E.O. 13920, Securing the United States Bulk-Power System (May 1, 2020); E.O. 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court (June 11, 2020). Congressional Research Service 15 link to page 20 link to page 26 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use individuals.99 While Presidents usually make use of IEEPA as an emergency power, Congress has also directed the use Presidents usually make use of IEEPA as an emergency power, Congress has also directed the use
of IEEPA or expressed its approval of presidential emergency use in several statutes.of IEEPA or expressed its approval of presidential emergency use in several statutes.95100
Presidential Emergency ~~Use96~~Use101
IEEPA is the most frequently cited emergency authority when the President invokes NEA IEEPA is the most frequently cited emergency authority when the President invokes NEA
authorities to declare a national emergency. authorities to declare a national emergency. ~~(Figure 1)~~. Rather than referencing the same set of Rather than referencing the same set of
emergencies, as had been the case with TWEA, IEEPA has required the President to declare a emergencies, as had been the case with TWEA, IEEPA has required the President to declare a
national emergency for each independent use. As a result, the number of national emergencies national emergency for each independent use. As a result, the number of national emergencies
declared under the terms of the NEA has proliferated over the past four decades. Presidents declared under the terms of the NEA has proliferated over the past four decades. Presidents
declared only four national emergencies under the auspices of TWEA in the four decades prior to declared only four national emergencies under the auspices of TWEA in the four decades prior to
IEEPA’s enactment. In contrast, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in IEEPA’s enactment. In contrast, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in 5967 of the of the 6775 declarations of national emergency issued under the National Emergencies Act.102 As of March 25, 2022, there were 40 ongoing national emergencies; all but three involved IEEPA.103 99 ~~declarations of~~

~~92 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, pp. 2-9.~~
~~93 Ibid, p. 11.~~
94 See See “Presidential Emergency Use.”
95100 See See “Congressional Nonemergency Use and Retroactive Approval.”
96101 The numbers here define emergencies by executive orders declaring an emergency. This choice causes some The numbers here define emergencies by executive orders declaring an emergency. This choice causes some
anomalies in the data. For example, the national emergency with regard to controlling the whereabouts of highly anomalies in the data. For example, the national emergency with regard to controlling the whereabouts of highly
enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons in Russia lapsed when the notice extending the emergency was not enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons in Russia lapsed when the notice extending the emergency was not
published in the Federal Register by the emergency’s anniversary date on June 21, 2012. As such, President Barack published in the Federal Register by the emergency’s anniversary date on June 21, 2012. As such, President Barack
Obama issued an executive order declaring a new national emergency to reinstate the restrictions. For consistency, such Obama issued an executive order declaring a new national emergency to reinstate the restrictions. For consistency, such
anomalies have been treated as two distinct national emergencies. Such treatment decreases the average duration of anomalies have been treated as two distinct national emergencies. Such treatment decreases the average duration of
emergencies. See, e.g., E.O. 13159, Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the emergencies. See, e.g., E.O. 13159, Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the
Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons (June 21, 2000); E.O. 13617, Blocking Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons (June 21, 2000); E.O. 13617, Blocking
Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium
Extracted From Nuclear Weapons (June 25, 2012). Extracted From Nuclear Weapons (June 25, 2012).
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~~national emergency issued under the National Emergencies Act.97 As of July 1, 2020, there were~~
~~37 ongoing national emergencies; all but four involved IEEPA.98~~
~~Figure 2. Declarations and Executive Orders Citing IEEPA~~

Source: CRS, 2020s current to July 1, 2020.
Notes: Executive orders include declarations of national emergency that cite IEEPA that were made by
~~executive order and any subsequent modifications or amendments to an emergency or such an order.~~
~~Each year since 1990, Presidents have issued roughly 4.5 executive orders citing IEEPA and~~
~~declared 1.5 new national emergencies citing IEEPA.99 (Figure 2).~~
~~On average, emergencies invoking IEEPA last more than nine years.100 The longest emergency~~
~~was also the first. President Jimmy Carter, in response to the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979,~~
~~declared the first national emergency under the provisions of the National Emergencies Act and~~
~~invoked IEEPA.101 Six successive Presidents have renewed that emergency annually for nearly~~

~~97 The seven~~102 The eight declarations of emergency under the NEA that did not involve IEEPA as of March declarations of emergency under the NEA that did not involve IEEPA as of March ~~1, 2019~~25, 2022 were all made were all made
by presidential proclamation. See by presidential proclamation. See ~~Proc.~~Proclamation 6491, To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March 3, 1931, Within a Limited 6491, To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March 3, 1931, Within a Limited
Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki (October 14, 1992); Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki (October 14, 1992);
~~Proc.~~Proclamation 6867, Declaration of a National Emergency and Invocation of Emergency Authority Relating to the Regulation of 6867, Declaration of a National Emergency and Invocation of Emergency Authority Relating to the Regulation of
the Anchorage and Movement of Vessels around Cuba (March 1, 1996); the Anchorage and Movement of Vessels around Cuba (March 1, 1996); ~~Proc.~~Proclamation 6907, Declaration of a State of 6907, Declaration of a State of
Emergency and Release of Feed Grain From the Disaster Reserve (July 1, 1996); Emergency and Release of Feed Grain From the Disaster Reserve (July 1, 1996); ~~Proc.~~Proclamation 7463, Declaration of National 7463, Declaration of National
Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks (September 14, 2001); Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks (September 14, 2001); ~~Proc.~~Proclamation 7924, To Suspend Subchapter IV of 7924, To Suspend Subchapter IV of
Chapter 31 of Title 40, United States Code, Within a Limited Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Chapter 31 of Title 40, United States Code, Within a Limited Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency
Caused by Hurricane Katrina (September 8, 2005); Caused by Hurricane Katrina (September 8, 2005); ~~Proc.~~Proclamation 8443, Declaration of a National Emergency With Respect to 8443, Declaration of a National Emergency With Respect to
the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic (October 23, 2009); the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic (October 23, 2009); ~~Proc.~~Proclamation 9844, Declaration of a National Emergency Concerning 9844, Declaration of a National Emergency Concerning
the Southern Border of the United States (February 15, 2019)the Southern Border of the United States (February 15, 2019); Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak (March 13, 2020). 103.
98 The three ongoing emergencies not involving IEEPA as of The three ongoing emergencies not involving IEEPA as of ~~August 1, 2019~~March 25, 2022 were declared in: were declared in: ~~Proc. 6867, Proc.~~Proclamation 6867, Proclamation 7463, Proclamation 9994 ~~7463,~~
~~Proc. 9844~~. The first two of these national emergencies were declared in response to foreign threats. Notably, while . The first two of these national emergencies were declared in response to foreign threats. Notably, while
IEEPA was not invoked in the first declaration of national emergency following the terrorist attacks of September 11, IEEPA was not invoked in the first declaration of national emergency following the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, President George W. Bush declared a second state of emergency invoking IEEPA. E.O. 13224, Blocking 2001, President George W. Bush declared a second state of emergency invoking IEEPA. E.O. 13224, Blocking
Property and Prohibiting Transaction with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism Property and Prohibiting Transaction with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism
~~(September 23, 2001).~~
~~99 The practice of issuing IEEPA-related executive orders has also changed over time. During the Iran hostage-taking in~~
~~1979, for example, President Carter issued a new and separate EO with each fine-tuning of the initial national~~
~~emergency declaration; overall from November 1979 to his last day in office in January 1981, President Carter issued~~
~~12 executive orders relating to the hostage crisis and negotiations with Iran. Later presidents have opted, instead, to~~
~~issue one executive order to declare the existence of a national emergency, and then to revisit that order to adjust or~~
~~expand its reach by amending the original language.~~
~~100 Emergencies invoking IEEPA that have been terminated lasted an average of 6.5 years. However, most emergencies~~
~~citing IEEPA have not been terminated, including the first ever declared, which has been ongoing since 1979. Since the~~
~~last time this report was updated, there have been a number of new emergencies citing IEEPA which has lowered the~~
~~mean length for all emergencies citing IEEPA from roughly a decade to 8.9 years; the median is currently 6 years.~~
~~101 E.O. 12170, Blocking Iranian Government Property (November 14, 1979).~~
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~~forty years. As of July 1, 2020~~(September 23, 2001). Congressional Research Service 16 link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page 23 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Figure 1. Declarations and Executive Orders Citing IEEPA Source: CRS, 2020s current to March 25, 2022. Notes: Executive orders include declarations of national emergency that cite IEEPA that were made by executive order and any subsequent modifications or amendments to an emergency or such an order. Each year since 1990, Presidents have issued roughly 4.5 executive orders citing IEEPA and declared 1.5 new national emergencies citing IEEPA.104 (Figure 1). On average, emergencies invoking IEEPA last more than nine years.105 The longest emergency was also the first. President Jimmy Carter, in response to the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, declared the first national emergency under the provisions of the National Emergencies Act and invoked IEEPA.106 Seven successive Presidents have renewed that emergency annually for more than forty years. As of March 25, 2022, that emergency is still in effect, largely to provide a legal basis for , that emergency is still in effect, largely to provide a legal basis for
resolving matters of ownership of the Shah’s disputed assets.resolving matters of ownership of the Shah’s disputed assets.~~102~~107 That initial emergency aside, the That initial emergency aside, the
length of emergencies invoking IEEPA has increased each decade. The average length of an length of emergencies invoking IEEPA has increased each decade. The average length of an
emergency invoking IEEPA declared in the 1980s was four years. That average extended to emergency invoking IEEPA declared in the 1980s was four years. That average extended to 10
11 years for emergencies declared in the 1990s and years for emergencies declared in the 1990s and 1213 years for emergencies declared in the 2000s years for emergencies declared in the 2000s
(Figure 32)..~~103~~108 As such, the number of ongoing national emergencies has grown nearly As such, the number of ongoing national emergencies has grown nearly
continuously since the enactment of IEEPA and the NEAcontinuously since the enactment of IEEPA and the NEA (Figure 43). Between January 1, 1979, Between January 1, 1979,
and and ~~July 1, 2020~~March 25, 2022, there were on average 14 ongoing national emergencies each year, 13 of which , there were on average 14 ongoing national emergencies each year, 13 of which
~~invoked IEEPA.~~
~~In most cases, the declared emergencies citing~~
~~IEEPA have been geographically specific~~
~~Figure 3~~invoked IEEPA. 104 The practice of issuing IEEPA-related executive orders has also changed over time. During the Iran hostage-taking in 1979, for example, President Carter issued a new and separate E.O. with each fine-tuning of the initial national emergency declaration; overall from November 1979 to his last day in office in January 1981, President Carter issued 12 executive orders relating to the hostage crisis and negotiations with Iran. Later presidents have opted, instead, to issue one executive order to declare the existence of a national emergency, and then to revisit that order to adjust or expand its reach by amending the original language. 105 Emergencies invoking IEEPA that have been terminated lasted an average of 6.5 years. However, most emergencies citing IEEPA have not been terminated, including the first ever declared, which has been ongoing since 1979. 106 E.O. 12170, Blocking Iranian Government Property (November 14, 1979). 107 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Iran, 86 Fed. Reg. 62,709 (November 10, 2021). 108 Not enough time has passed to understand whether the trend will continue with those national emergencies declared in the 2010s. Congressional Research Service 17 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use In most cases, the declared emergencies citing IEEPA have been geographically specific. For Figure 2. Average Length of Emergencies ~~. Average Length of Emergencies~~
~~(Figure 5). For~~ example, in the first use of example, in the first use of
IEEPA, President Citing IEEPA
~~IEEPA, President~~ Jimmy Carter issued an Jimmy Carter issued an
executive order that both declared a national executive order that both declared a national
emergency with respect to the “situation in emergency with respect to the “situation in
Iran” and “blocked all property and interests Iran” and “blocked all property and interests
in property of the Government of Iran [...].”in property of the Government of Iran [...].”~~104~~
109 Five months later, President Carter issued a Five months later, President Carter issued a
second order dramatically expanding the second order dramatically expanding the
scope of the first EO and effectively blocked scope of the first EO and effectively blocked
the transfer of all goods, money, or credit the transfer of all goods, money, or credit
destined for Iran by anyone subject to the destined for Iran by anyone subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.jurisdiction of the United States.~~105~~110 A further A further
order expanded the coverage to block imports order expanded the coverage to block imports
to the United States from Iran.to the United States from Iran.~~106~~111 Together, Together,

these orders touched these orders touched upon virtually all upon virtually all
economic contacts between Source: CRS. Current as of CRS. Current as of ~~July 1, 2020.~~
~~economic contacts between~~ March 25, 2022. any place or legal any place or legal
person subject to the Notes: A single emergency was declared in the A single emergency was declared in the
~~person subject to the jurisdiction of~~jurisdiction of the United States and the the
1970s (Iran) and that has lasted 40 years. 2010s do 1970s (Iran) and that has lasted 40 years. 2010s do
~~United States and the territory and~~
territory and government of Iran.112 not have sufficient data to create an average length not have sufficient data to create an average length.
~~government of Iran.107~~
Many of the executive orders invoking IEEPA Many of the executive orders invoking IEEPA that would be meaningful for the purposes of analysis. have followed this pattern of limiting the scope to have followed this pattern of limiting the scope to
a specific territory, government, or its nationals. Executive Order 12513, for example, prohibited a specific territory, government, or its nationals. Executive Order 12513, for example, prohibited
“imports into the United States of goods and services of Nicaraguan origin” and “exports from “imports into the United States of goods and services of Nicaraguan origin” and “exports from
the United States of goods to or destined for Nicaragua.” The order likewise prohibited the United States of goods to or destined for Nicaragua.” The order likewise prohibited
Nicaraguan air carriers and vessels of Nicaraguan registry from entering U.S. ports.Nicaraguan air carriers and vessels of Nicaraguan registry from entering U.S. ports.~~108~~113 Executive Executive
Order 12532 prohibited various transactions with the “Government of South Africa or to entities Order 12532 prohibited various transactions with the “Government of South Africa or to entities
owned or controlled by that Government.”owned or controlled by that Government.”~~109~~114

~~102 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Iran, 83 Fed. Reg. 56,251 (November 8, 2018).~~
~~103 Not enough time has passed to understand whether the trend will continue with those national emergencies declared~~
~~in the 2010s.~~
~~104~~109 E.O. 12170. E.O. 12170.
~~105~~110 E.O. 12205, Economic Sanctions Against Iran ( E.O. 12205, Economic Sanctions Against Iran (~~Apr.~~April 7, 1980). The order exempted “food, medicine and supplies 7, 1980). The order exempted “food, medicine and supplies
intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering.” intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering.”
~~106~~111 E.O. 12211, Economic Sanctions Against Iran (April 17, 1980). E.O. 12211, Economic Sanctions Against Iran (April 17, 1980).
~~107~~112 Exceptions were made for family remittances. Exceptions were made for family remittances.
~~108~~113 E.O. 12513, Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving Nicaragua (May 1, 1985). E.O. 12513, Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving Nicaragua (May 1, 1985).
~~109~~114 E.O. 12532, Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving South Africa (September 9, 1985). E.O. 12532, Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving South Africa (September 9, 1985).
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

Figure 43. Cumulative Number of Ongoing National Emergencies by Year

Source: CRS. Current as of CRS. Current as of ~~July 1, 2020~~March 25, 2022. .
While the majority While the majority ~~(40)~~ of national emergencies invoking IEEPA have been geographically of national emergencies invoking IEEPA have been geographically
specific, specific, 13many recent emergencies have lacked explicit geographic limitations. have lacked explicit geographic limitations.~~110~~115 President George H.W. Bush declared President George H.W. Bush declared
the first geographically nonspecific emergency in response to the threat posed by the proliferation the first geographically nonspecific emergency in response to the threat posed by the proliferation
of chemical and biological weapons.of chemical and biological weapons.~~111~~116 Similarly, President George W. Bush declared a national Similarly, President George W. Bush declared a national
emergency in response to the threat posed by “persons who commit, threaten to commit, or emergency in response to the threat posed by “persons who commit, threaten to commit, or
support terrorism.”support terrorism.”~~112~~117 President Barack Obama declared emergencies to respond to the threats of President Barack Obama declared emergencies to respond to the threats of
“transnational criminal organizations” and “persons engaging in malicious cyber-enabled “transnational criminal organizations” and “persons engaging in malicious cyber-enabled
activities.”activities.”118 President Donald Trump declared an emergency to respond to “foreign adversaries” President Donald Trump declared an emergency to respond to “foreign adversaries”
who were “creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and communications who were “creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and communications
technologies and services.”technologies and services.”~~113~~119 Without explicit geographic limitations, these orders have included Without explicit geographic limitations, these orders have included
provisions that are global in scope. These geographically nonspecific emergencies invoking provisions that are global in scope. These geographically nonspecific emergencies invoking
IEEPA have increased in frequency over the past 40 yearsIEEPA have increased in frequency over the past 40 years~~—seven of the 13 have been declared~~
~~since 2015.114~~.120

~~110~~115 This number excludes those emergencies declared to extend the Export Administration Act of 1979. This number excludes those emergencies declared to extend the Export Administration Act of 1979.
~~111~~116 E.O. 12735, Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation (November 16, 1990). E.O. 12735, Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation (November 16, 1990).
~~112~~117 E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or
Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001). Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001).
~~113~~118 E.O. 13581, Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations (July 24, 2011); E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (April 1, 2015). 119 E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (May 14, 2019). E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (May 14, 2019).
~~114~~120 See, E.g., E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities
(April 1, 2015); E.O. 13818, Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption (April 1, 2015); E.O. 13818, Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption
(December 20, 2017); E.O. 13848, Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States (December 20, 2017); E.O. 13848, Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States
Election (September 12, 2018); E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Election (September 12, 2018); E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services
Supply Chain (May 15, 2019); E.O. 13920, Securing the United States Bulk-Power System (May 1, 2020); E.O. 13928, Supply Chain (May 15, 2019); E.O. 13920, Securing the United States Bulk-Power System (May 1, 2020); E.O. 13928,
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court (June 11, 2020). Some have Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court (June 11, 2020). Some have
argued that this shift was the result of humanitarian concerns about the effects of sanctions on the populations of the argued that this shift was the result of humanitarian concerns about the effects of sanctions on the populations of the
targeted states. Beginning in the 1990s, United Nations Security Council sanctions began to target the political and targeted states. Beginning in the 1990s, United Nations Security Council sanctions began to target the political and
economic elites of a state, rather than the whole population. Kern Alexander, economic elites of a state, rather than the whole population. Kern Alexander, Economic Sanctions: Law and Public
Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. xi. However, use of such orders has expanded beyond political and (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. xi. However, use of such orders has expanded beyond political and
economic elites. See, e.g., E.O. 13928. economic elites. See, e.g., E.O. 13928.
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link to page 61 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

~~Figure 5. Geographically Defined Emergencies Citing IEEPA~~

Source: CRS. Current as of July 1, 2020.
In addition to the erosion of geographicIn addition to the erosion of geographic limitations, the stated motivations for
Examples of Actions Taken in Non-
~~limitations, the stated motivations for~~declaring national emergencies have expanded
Geographic Emergencies Citing IEEPA
~~declaring national emergencies have expanded~~in scope as well. Initially, stated rationales for
 
Chemical and biological weapons proliferation Chemical and biological weapons proliferation
~~in scope as well. Initially, stated rationales for~~declarations of national emergency citing
 
Measures to restrict the participation by United Measures to restrict the participation by United
~~declarations of national emergency citing~~IEEPA were short and often referenced either
States persons in weapons proliferation activities States persons in weapons proliferation activities
~~IEEPA were short and often referenced either~~a specific geography or the specific actions of
 
Measures to prevent proliferation of weapons of Measures to prevent proliferation of weapons of
a a ~~specific geography or the specific actions of~~
~~mass destruction~~
~~a government. Presidents found that~~government. Presidents found that mass destruction circumstances like “the situation in Iran,”121 or
 
Prohibiting transactions with terrorists who Prohibiting transactions with terrorists who
~~circumstances like “the situation in Iran,”115 or~~the “policies and actions of the Government of
threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process
~~the “policies and actions of the Government of~~
Nicaragua,”122 constituted “unusual and  
Blocking property and prohibiting transactions Blocking property and prohibiting transactions
~~Nicaragua,”116 constituted “unusual and~~extraordinary threat[s] to the national security
with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or
~~extraordinary threat[s] to the national security~~
support terrorism support terrorism
and foreign policy of the United States” and and foreign policy of the United States” and
 
~~Blocking property of transnational criminal~~
~~would therefore declare a national~~
would therefore declare a national Blocking property of transnational criminal organizations organizations
emergency. emergency.~~117~~123
 
Blocking the property of certain persons engaging Blocking the property of certain persons engaging
~~in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities~~
The stated rationales have, however, expanded The stated rationales have, however, expanded

~~Blocking the property of persons involved in~~in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities over time in both the length and subject  Blocking the property of persons involved in matter. Presidents have increasingly declared serious human rights abuse or corruption national emergencies, in part, to respond to  Imposing certain sanctions in the event of foreign human and civil rights abuses,124 slavery,125 interference in a United States election denial of religious freedom,126
~~over time in both the length and subject~~
~~serious human rights abuse or corruption~~
~~matter. Presidents have increasingly declared~~

~~Imposing certain sanctions in the event of foreign~~
~~national emergencies, in part, to respond to~~
~~interference in a United States election~~

~~115 E.O. 12170.~~
~~116 E.O. 12513.~~
~~117 Ibid.~~
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~~human and civil rights abuses,118 slavery,119 denial of religious freedom,120~~ political repression, political repression,~~121~~
127 public corruption,public corruption,~~122~~128 and the undermining of democratic processes. and the undermining of democratic processes.~~123~~129 While the first reference to While the first reference to
human rights violations as a rationale for a declaration of national emergency came in 1985,human rights violations as a rationale for a declaration of national emergency came in 1985,~~124~~
130 most of such references have come in the past twenty years.most of such references have come in the past twenty years. (Table A-2)..
Presidents have also expanded the nature of the targets of IEEPA sanctions. Originally, the targets Presidents have also expanded the nature of the targets of IEEPA sanctions. Originally, the targets
of sanctions issued under IEEPA were foreign governments. The first use of IEEPA targeted of sanctions issued under IEEPA were foreign governments. The first use of IEEPA targeted
“Iranian Government Property.”“Iranian Government Property.”~~125~~131 Use of IEEPA quickly expanded to target geographically Use of IEEPA quickly expanded to target geographically
defined regions.defined regions.~~126~~132 Nevertheless, Presidents have also increasingly targeted groups, such as Nevertheless, Presidents have also increasingly targeted groups, such as
political parties, corporations, or terrorist organizations, and individuals, such as supporters of political parties, corporations, or terrorist organizations, and individuals, such as supporters of
terrorism, suspected narcotics traffickers, or associates of the International Criminal Court.terrorism, suspected narcotics traffickers, or associates of the International Criminal Court.~~127~~
~~The first instances of orders directed at groups or persons were limited to foreign groups or~~
~~persons. For example, in Executive Order 12978, President Bill Clinton targeted specific “foreign~~
~~persons” and “persons determined [...] to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of”~~
~~such foreign persons.128 An excerpt is included below:~~
~~Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in~~
~~regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and~~
~~notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the~~
~~effective date, I hereby order blocked all property and interests in property that are or~~
~~hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession~~
~~or control of United States persons, of:~~
~~(a)~~
~~the foreign persons listed in the Annex to this order;~~
~~(b)~~
foreign persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
~~with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State:~~
~~(i)~~
~~to play a significant role in international narcotics trafficking centered in~~
~~Colombia; or~~

~~118~~133 121 E.O. 12170. 122 E.O. 12513. 123 Ibid. 124 E.O. 12532; E.O. 13396, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Cote d'Ivoire E.O. 12532; E.O. 13396, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Cote d'Ivoire
(February 7, 2006); E.O. 13067, Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan (February 7, 2006); E.O. 13067, Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan
(November 3, 1997); E.O. 13692, Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the (November 3, 1997); E.O. 13692, Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the
Situation in Venezuela (March 8, 2015). Situation in Venezuela (March 8, 2015).
~~119~~125 E.O. 13067. E.O. 13067.
~~120~~126 E.O. 13067. E.O. 13067.
~~121~~127 E.O. 13405, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus E.O. 13405, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus
((~~Jun.~~June 16, 2006). 16, 2006).
~~122~~128 Ibid. Ibid.
~~123~~129 Ibid. Ibid.
~~124~~130 E.O. 12532. E.O. 12532.
~~125~~131 E.O. 12170. E.O. 12170.
~~126~~132 See, e.g., E.O. 12513. See, e.g., E.O. 12513.
~~127~~133 See, e.g., E.O. 12865 (prohibiting transactions with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola See, e.g., E.O. 12865 (prohibiting transactions with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
~~(UNITA), the second largest political party in Angola); E.O. 13129 (prohibiting transactions with the Taliban); E.O.~~
~~13224 (prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism); E.O. 12978~~
~~(prohibiting transactions with certain narcotics traffickers); E.O. 13928 (blocking property of certain persons associated~~
~~with the International Criminal Court). See also CRS Insight IN11428,~~ ~~International Criminal Court: U.S. Sanctions in~~
~~Response to Investigation of War Crimes in Afghanistan, by Matthew C. Weed and Dianne E. Rennack.~~
~~128 E.O. 12978, Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions With Significant Narcotics Traffickers (October 21,~~
~~1995).~~
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Congressional Research Service 20 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use The first instances of orders directed at groups or persons were limited to foreign groups or persons. For example, in Executive Order 12978, President Bill Clinton targeted specific “foreign persons” and “persons determined [...] to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of” such foreign persons.134 An excerpt is included below: Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, I hereby order blocked all property and interests in property that are or hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons, of: (a) the foreign persons listed in the Annex to this order; (b) foreign persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State: (i) to play a significant role in international narcotics trafficking centered in Colombia; or
(ii) (ii)
materially to assist in, or provide financial or technological support for materially to assist in, or provide financial or technological support for
or goods or services in support of, the narcotics trafficking activities of persons or goods or services in support of, the narcotics trafficking activities of persons
designated in or pursuant to this order; and designated in or pursuant to this order; and
(c) (c)
persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to be owned or controlled by, or to act Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to be owned or controlled by, or to act
for or on behalf of, persons designated in or pursuant to this order.for or on behalf of, persons designated in or pursuant to this order.~~129~~135
However, in 2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13219 to target “persons However, in 2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13219 to target “persons
who threaten international stabilization efforts in the Western Balkans.” While the order was who threaten international stabilization efforts in the Western Balkans.” While the order was
similar to that of Executive Order 12978, it removed the qualifier “foreign.” As such, persons in similar to that of Executive Order 12978, it removed the qualifier “foreign.” As such, persons in
the United States, including U.S. citizens, could be targets of the order.the United States, including U.S. citizens, could be targets of the order.~~130~~136 The following is an The following is an
excerpt of the order: excerpt of the order:
Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)(1), (3), and (4) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)(1), (3), and (4) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C.
1702(b)(1), (3), and (4)), the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 1702(b)(1), (3), and (4)), the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000 (title IX, P.L. 106-387), and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may 2000 (title IX, P.L. 106-387), and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may
hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or
any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, all property and interests in any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, all property and interests in
property of: property of:
(i) (i)
the persons listed in the Annex to this order; and listed in the Annex to this order; and
(ii) (ii)
persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, because they are found: Secretary of State, because they are found:
(UNITA), the second largest political party in Angola); E.O. 13129 (prohibiting transactions with the Taliban); E.O. 13224 (prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism); E.O. 12978 (prohibiting transactions with certain narcotics traffickers); E.O. 13928 (blocking property of certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court). See also CRS Insight IN11428, International Criminal Court: U.S. Sanctions in Response to Investigation of War Crimes in Afghanistan, by Matthew C. Weed and Dianne E. Rennack. 134 E.O. 12978, Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions With Significant Narcotics Traffickers (October 21, 1995). 135 Ibid. Emphasis added. 136 See, e.g., Aaran Money Wire Serv., Inc. v. United States, , 2003 WL 22143735, at *3 (D. Minn. August 21, 2003). Congressional Research Service 21 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use (A) to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of violence...137 ~~(A)~~
~~to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of~~
~~violence...131~~
Several subsequent invocations of IEEPA have similarly not been limited to foreign targets. Several subsequent invocations of IEEPA have similarly not been limited to foreign targets.~~132~~138
In sum, presidential emergency use of IEEPA was directed at foreign states initially, with targets In sum, presidential emergency use of IEEPA was directed at foreign states initially, with targets
that were delimited by geography or nationality. Since the 1990s, however, Presidents have that were delimited by geography or nationality. Since the 1990s, however, Presidents have
expanded the scope of their declarations to include groups and individual persons, regardless of expanded the scope of their declarations to include groups and individual persons, regardless of
nationality or geographic location, who are engaged in specific activities. nationality or geographic location, who are engaged in specific activities.
Congressional Nonemergency Use and Retroactive Approval
While IEEPA is often categorized as an emergency statute, Congress has used IEEPA outside of While IEEPA is often categorized as an emergency statute, Congress has used IEEPA outside of
the context of national emergencies. When Congress legislates sanctions, it often authorizes or the context of national emergencies. When Congress legislates sanctions, it often authorizes or
directs the President to use IEEPA authorities to impose those sanctions. directs the President to use IEEPA authorities to impose those sanctions.
In the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018, for example, Congress directed In the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018, for example, Congress directed
the President to exercise “all powers granted to the President [by IEEPA] to the extent necessary the President to exercise “all powers granted to the President [by IEEPA] to the extent necessary

~~129 Ibid. Emphasis added.~~
~~130 See, e.g., the facts of Aaran Money Wire Serv., Inc. v. United States, No. 02CV789JMR/FLN, 2003 WL 22143735,~~
~~at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2003).~~
~~131 E.O. 13219, Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans~~
~~(June 26, 2001). Emphasis added.~~
~~132 See, e.g., E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to~~
~~Commit, or Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001); E.O. 13396, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing~~
~~to the Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire (February 7, 2006).~~
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~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~to block and prohibit [certain transactions].”133~~to block and prohibit [certain transactions].”139 Penalties for violations by a person of a measure Penalties for violations by a person of a measure
imposed by the President under the Act would be, likewise, determined by reference to IEEPA.imposed by the President under the Act would be, likewise, determined by reference to IEEPA.~~134~~140
This trend has been long-term. Congress first directed the President to make use of IEEPA This trend has been long-term. Congress first directed the President to make use of IEEPA
authorities in 1986 as part of an effort to assist Haiti in the recovery of assets illegally diverted by authorities in 1986 as part of an effort to assist Haiti in the recovery of assets illegally diverted by
its former government. That statute provided: its former government. That statute provided:
The President shall exercise the authorities granted by section 203 of the International The President shall exercise the authorities granted by section 203 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act [50 USC 1702] to assist the Government of Haiti in its Emergency Economic Powers Act [50 USC 1702] to assist the Government of Haiti in its
efforts to recover, through legal proceedings, assets which the Government of Haiti alleges efforts to recover, through legal proceedings, assets which the Government of Haiti alleges
were stolen by former president-for-life Jean Claude Duvalier and other individuals were stolen by former president-for-life Jean Claude Duvalier and other individuals
associated with the Duvalier regime. This subsection shall be deemed to satisfy the associated with the Duvalier regime. This subsection shall be deemed to satisfy the
requirements of section 202 of that Act. [50 USC 1701]requirements of section 202 of that Act. [50 USC 1701]~~135~~141
In directing the President to use IEEPA, Congress waived the requirement that he declare a In directing the President to use IEEPA, Congress waived the requirement that he declare a
national emergency (and none was declared).national emergency (and none was declared).~~136~~142
Subsequent legislation has followed this general pattern, with slight variations in language and Subsequent legislation has followed this general pattern, with slight variations in language and
specificity.specificity.~~137~~143 The following is an example of current legislative language that has appeared in The following is an example of current legislative language that has appeared in
several recent statutes: several recent statutes:
~~(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b)~~
~~with respect to—~~
~~...~~
~~(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—~~
~~(1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:~~
~~(A) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President~~
~~by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)~~
~~to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and~~
~~interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to~~
~~subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States,~~
~~come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of~~
~~a United States person.~~
~~...~~

~~133 P.L. 115-335 (Dec. 20, 2018), 132 Stat. 5019.~~
~~134 Ibid.~~
~~135 P.L. 99-529 (October 24, 1986), 100 Stat. 3010.~~
~~136 Ibid.~~
~~137~~ 137 E.O. 13219, Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans (June 26, 2001). Emphasis added. 138 See, e.g., E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001); E.O. 13396, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire (February 7, 2006). 139 P.L. 115-335 (December 20, 2018), 132 Stat. 5019. 140 Ibid. 141 P.L. 99-529 (October 24, 1986), 100 Stat. 3010. 142 Ibid. 143 See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, P.L. 102-484 (October 23, 1992), 106 Stat. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, P.L. 102-484 (October 23, 1992), 106 Stat.
2315; Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, P.L. 104-1172 (August 5, 1996), 110 Stat. 1541; Strom Thurmond 2315; Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, P.L. 104-1172 (August 5, 1996), 110 Stat. 1541; Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, P.L. 105-261 (October 17, 1998) 112 Stat. 1920; Victims of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, P.L. 105-261 (October 17, 1998) 112 Stat. 1920; Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386 (October 28, 2000), 114 Stat. 1464; Comprehensive Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386 (October 28, 2000), 114 Stat. 1464; Comprehensive
Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, P.L. 108-497 (December 23, 2004), 118 Stat. 4012; Darfur Peace and Accountability Act Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, P.L. 108-497 (December 23, 2004), 118 Stat. 4012; Darfur Peace and Accountability Act
of 2006, P.L. 109-344 (October 13, 2006), 120 Stat. 1869; Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and of 2006, P.L. 109-344 (October 13, 2006), 120 Stat. 1869; Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010, P.L. 111-195 (July 1, 2010) 124 Stat 1312; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Divestment Act of 2010, P.L. 111-195 (July 1, 2010) 124 Stat 1312; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
~~Year 2012, P.L. 112-81, December 31, 2011, 125 Stat 1298; Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of~~
~~2012, P.L. 112-158 (August 10, 2012) 126 Stat 1214 (makes some of the most extensive use of IEEPA); Russia and~~
~~Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, P.L. 112-208~~
~~(December 14, 2012) 126 Stat 1496; Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act~~
~~P.L. 113-291 (December 19, 2014), 128 Stat. 3293; Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of~~
~~2018, P.L. 115-272 (October 25, 2018) 132 Stat. 4144.~~
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~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~
Congressional Research Service 22 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to— ... (b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.— (1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following: (A) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. ...
(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or (2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or
causes a violation of paragraph (1)(A) or any regulation, license, or order issued to causes a violation of paragraph (1)(A) or any regulation, license, or order issued to
carry out paragraph (1)(A) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) carry out paragraph (1)(A) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b)
and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in
subsection (a) of that section.subsection (a) of that section.~~138~~144
Congress has also expressed, retroactively, its approval of unilateral presidential invocations of Congress has also expressed, retroactively, its approval of unilateral presidential invocations of
IEEPA in the context of a national emergency. In the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities IEEPA in the context of a national emergency. In the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities
Act of 2017, for example, Congress declared, “It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Act of 2017, for example, Congress declared, “It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Secretary of State should continue to implement Executive Order No. 13382.”Treasury and the Secretary of State should continue to implement Executive Order No. 13382.”~~139~~145
Presidents, however, have also used IEEPA to preempt or modify parallel congressional activity. Presidents, however, have also used IEEPA to preempt or modify parallel congressional activity.
On September 9, 1985, President Reagan, finding “that the policies and actions of the On September 9, 1985, President Reagan, finding “that the policies and actions of the
Government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy Government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy
and economy of the United States,” declared a national emergency and limited transactions with and economy of the United States,” declared a national emergency and limited transactions with
South Africa.South Africa.~~140~~146 The President declared the emergency despite the fact that legislation limiting Year 2012, P.L. 112-81, December 31, 2011, 125 Stat 1298; Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, P.L. 112-158 (August 10, 2012) 126 Stat 1214 (makes some of the most extensive use of IEEPA); Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, P.L. 112-208 (December 14, 2012) 126 Stat 1496; Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act P.L. 113-291 (December 19, 2014), 128 Stat. 3293; Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of 2018, P.L. 115-272 (October 25, 2018) 132 Stat. 4144. 144 ~~The President declared the emergency despite the fact that legislation limiting~~
~~transactions with South Africa was quickly making its way through Congress.141 In remarks about~~
~~the declaration, President Reagan stated that he had been opposed to the bill contemplated by~~
~~Congress because unspecified provisions “would have harmed the very people [the U.S. was]~~
~~trying to help.”142 Nevertheless, members of the press at the time143 (and at least one scholar~~
~~since)144 noted that the limitations imposed by the executive order and the provisions in~~
~~legislation then winding its way through Congress were “substantially similar.”145~~
~~Current Uses of IEEPA~~
~~In general, IEEPA has served as an integral part of the postwar international sanctions regime.146~~
~~The President, either through a declaration of emergency or via statutory direction, has used~~
~~IEEPA to limit economic transactions in support of administrative and congressional national~~

~~138~~ Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, P.L. 113-95 Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, P.L. 113-95
(April 3, 2014) 128 Stat. 1088. Identical language can be found, for example, in: The Venezuela Defense of Human (April 3, 2014) 128 Stat. 1088. Identical language can be found, for example, in: The Venezuela Defense of Human
Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, P.L. 113-278 (December 18, 2014) 128 Stat. 3011; National Defense Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, P.L. 113-278 (December 18, 2014) 128 Stat. 3011; National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, P.L. 114-328 (December 23, 2016) 130 Stat. 2000. Similar language can be Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, P.L. 114-328 (December 23, 2016) 130 Stat. 2000. Similar language can be
found, for example, in: the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, P.L. 114-122 (February 18, found, for example, in: the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, P.L. 114-122 (February 18,
2016) 130 Stat. 93; the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017) 130 2016) 130 Stat. 93; the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017) 130
Stat 886. Depending on the circumstance, Congress also includes a clause waiving the requirement to declare a national Stat 886. Depending on the circumstance, Congress also includes a clause waiving the requirement to declare a national
emergency. See, e.g., P.L. 115-44; P.L. 115-272 (“(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the emergency. See, e.g., P.L. 115-44; P.L. 115-272 (“(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the
President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements
of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all
transactions [...].”). transactions [...].”).
~~139~~145 Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, title I of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, title I of the Countering America’s Adversaries through
Sanctions Act, P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017) § 104 (22 U.S.C. 9403); E.O. 13382 of June 28, 2005, “Blocking Property Sanctions Act, P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017) § 104 (22 U.S.C. 9403); E.O. 13382 of June 28, 2005, “Blocking Property
of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters,” 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 (July 1, 2005). of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters,” 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 (July 1, 2005).
~~140 E.O. 12532.~~
~~141 99 H.R. 1460; See also P.L. 99-440 (October 2, 1986).~~
~~142 Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer-Session with Reporters on Signing~~
~~E.O. 12532, September 9, 1985, 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1048, 1050.~~
~~143 See, e.g., questions by Helen Thomas, United Press International, Ibid, 1050.~~
~~144 Carter, International Economic Sanctions, p. 201.~~
~~145 Ibid.~~
~~146 Ibid., ch. 9.~~
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146 E.O. 12532. Congressional Research Service 23 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use transactions with South Africa was quickly making its way through Congress.147 In remarks about the declaration, President Reagan stated that he had been opposed to the bill contemplated by Congress because unspecified provisions “would have harmed the very people [the U.S. was] trying to help.”148 Nevertheless, members of the press at the time149 (and at least one scholar since)150 noted that the limitations imposed by the executive order and the provisions in legislation then winding its way through Congress were “substantially similar.”151 Current Uses of IEEPA In general, IEEPA has served as an integral part of the postwar international sanctions regime.152 The President, either through a declaration of emergency or via statutory direction, has used IEEPA to limit economic transactions in support of administrative and congressional national security and foreign policy goals. Much of the action taken pursuant to IEEPA has involved security and foreign policy goals. Much of the action taken pursuant to IEEPA has involved
blocking transactions and freezing assets. blocking transactions and freezing assets.
Once the President declares that a national emergency exists, he may use the authority in Section Once the President declares that a national emergency exists, he may use the authority in Section
203 of IEEPA (Grants of Authorities; 50 U.S.C. § 1702) to investigate, regulate, or prohibit 203 of IEEPA (Grants of Authorities; 50 U.S.C. § 1702) to investigate, regulate, or prohibit
foreign exchange transactions, transfers of credit, transfers of securities, payments, and may take foreign exchange transactions, transfers of credit, transfers of securities, payments, and may take
specified actions relating to property in which a foreign country or person has interest—freezing specified actions relating to property in which a foreign country or person has interest—freezing
assets, blocking property and interests in property, prohibiting U.S. persons from entering into assets, blocking property and interests in property, prohibiting U.S. persons from entering into
transactions related to frozen assets and blocked property, and in some instances denying entry transactions related to frozen assets and blocked property, and in some instances denying entry
into the United States. into the United States.
Pursuant to Section 203, Presidents have Pursuant to Section 203, Presidents have
 prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as  prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as
engaging in malicious cyber-enabled activities, including “interfering with or engaging in malicious cyber-enabled activities, including “interfering with or
undermining election processes or institutions” [Executive Order 13694 of April undermining election processes or institutions” [Executive Order 13694 of April
1, 2015, as amended; 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note. See also Executive Order 13848 of 1, 2015, as amended; 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note. See also Executive Order 13848 of
September 12, 2018; 83 F.R. 46843.]; September 12, 2018; 83 F.R. 46843.];
 prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as illicit  prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as illicit
narcotics traffickers including foreign drug kingpins; narcotics traffickers including foreign drug kingpins;
 prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as  prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as
engaging in human rights abuses or significant corruption; engaging in human rights abuses or significant corruption;
 prohibited transactions related to illicit trade in rough diamonds;  prohibited transactions related to illicit trade in rough diamonds;
 prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as  prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as
Transnational Criminal Organizations; Transnational Criminal Organizations;
 prohibited transactions with “those who disrupt the Middle East peace process;”  prohibited transactions with “those who disrupt the Middle East peace process;”
 prohibited transactions related to overflights with certain nations;  prohibited transactions related to overflights with certain nations;
 instituted and maintained maritime restrictions;  instituted and maintained maritime restrictions;
147 99 H.R. 1460; See also P.L. 99-440 (October 2, 1986). 148 Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer-Session with Reporters on Signing E.O. 12532, September 9, 1985, 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1048, 1050. 149 See, e.g., questions by Helen Thomas, United Press International, Ibid, 1050. 150 Carter, International Economic Sanctions, p. 201. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid., ch. 9. Congressional Research Service 24 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use  prohibited transactions related to weapons of mass destruction, in coordination  prohibited transactions related to weapons of mass destruction, in coordination
with export controls authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and the Export with export controls authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and the Export
Administration Act of 1979,Administration Act of 1979,~~147~~153 and in furtherance of efforts to deter the weapons and in furtherance of efforts to deter the weapons
programs of specific countries (i.e., Iran, North Korea); programs of specific countries (i.e., Iran, North Korea);
 prohibited transactions with those designated as “persons who commit, threaten  prohibited transactions with those designated as “persons who commit, threaten
to commit, or support terrorism;” to commit, or support terrorism;”
 maintained the dual-use export control system at times when its then-underlying  maintained the dual-use export control system at times when its then-underlying
authority, the Export Administration Act authority had lapsed; authority, the Export Administration Act authority had lapsed;
 blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as  blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as
engaged in cyber activities that compromise critical infrastructures including engaged in cyber activities that compromise critical infrastructures including
election processes or the private sector’s trade secrets; election processes or the private sector’s trade secrets;
 blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as  blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as
responsible for serious human rights abuse or engaged in corruption; responsible for serious human rights abuse or engaged in corruption;
 blocked certain property of, and prohibited transactions with, foreign nationals of  blocked certain property of, and prohibited transactions with, foreign nationals of
specific countries and those designated as engaged in activities that constitute an specific countries and those designated as engaged in activities that constitute an
extraordinary threat; extraordinary threat;

~~147 Legislation to replace the Export Administration Act was passed as part of the John S. McCain National Defense~~
~~Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, P.L. 115-232 (Aug. 13, 2018), as the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Title~~
~~XVII(B).~~
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~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

 prohibited transactions with those who pose “an undue risk of sabotage to or  prohibited transactions with those who pose “an undue risk of sabotage to or
subversion of the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, subversion of the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution,
installation, operation, or maintenance of information and communications installation, operation, or maintenance of information and communications
technology or services in the United States.” technology or services in the United States.”
No President has used IEEPA to place tariffs on imported products from a specific country or on No President has used IEEPA to place tariffs on imported products from a specific country or on
products imported to the United States in general. However, IEEPA’s similarity to TWEA, products imported to the United States in general. However, IEEPA’s similarity to TWEA,
coupled with its relatively frequent use to ban imports and exports, suggests that such an action coupled with its relatively frequent use to ban imports and exports, suggests that such an action
could happen.could happen.~~148~~154 In addition, no President has used IEEPA to enact a policy that was primarily In addition, no President has used IEEPA to enact a policy that was primarily
domestic in effect. Some scholars argue, however, that the interconnectedness of the global domestic in effect. Some scholars argue, however, that the interconnectedness of the global
economy means it would probably be permissible to use IEEPA to take an action that was economy means it would probably be permissible to use IEEPA to take an action that was
primarily domestic in effect.primarily domestic in effect.~~149~~155
IEEPA vs Section 232 for Imposing Tariffs in Response to a
National Security Threat
While a President could likely use IEEPA to impose additional tariffs on imported goods as President Nixon did While a President could likely use IEEPA to impose additional tariffs on imported goods as President Nixon did
under TWEA, no President has done so. Instead, Presidents have turned to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion under TWEA, no President has done so. Instead, Presidents have turned to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 in cases of purported emergency.Act of 1962 in cases of purported emergency.~~150~~156 Section 232 provides that if the Secretary of Commerce “finds Section 232 provides that if the Secretary of Commerce “finds
that an article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to that an article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to
threaten to impair the national security,” then the President may take action to adjust the imports such that they threaten to impair the national security,” then the President may take action to adjust the imports such that they
153 Legislation to replace the Export Administration Act was passed as part of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, P.L. 115-232 (August 13, 2018), as the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Title XVII(B). 154 President Nixon, in effect, used TWEA to place a 10% ad valorem tariff on all imports to the U.S. Pres. Proclamation No. 4074 (January 21, 1971; United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975); See also Jason Luong, “Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” Texas Law Review 78 (2000), p. 1190. 155 “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” p. 1111; Patrick A. Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 46, no. 2 (2013), pp. 757-758. 156 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, P.L. 87-794, § 232(b)–(c), 76 Stat. 877 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)–(c)). Congressional Research Service 25 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use wil no longer impair national security.157~~wil no longer impair national security.151~~ While the use of Section 232 requires findings by the Secretary of While the use of Section 232 requires findings by the Secretary of
Commerce, the restrictions and reporting requirements of the NEA do not apply. For that reason, Section 232 Commerce, the restrictions and reporting requirements of the NEA do not apply. For that reason, Section 232
may be an attractive source of presidential authority for imposing additional tariffs for national security purposes. may be an attractive source of presidential authority for imposing additional tariffs for national security purposes.
Using this authority, President Donald J. Trump applied additional duties on steel and aluminum in March 2018.Using this authority, President Donald J. Trump applied additional duties on steel and aluminum in March 2018.~~152~~158
However, IEEPA is not subject to the same procedural restraints as Section 232. As no investigation is required, However, IEEPA is not subject to the same procedural restraints as Section 232. As no investigation is required,
IEEPA authorities can be invoked at any time in response to a national emergency based on an “unusual and IEEPA authorities can be invoked at any time in response to a national emergency based on an “unusual and
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States.” As such, IEEPA extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States.” As such, IEEPA
may be a source of authority for the President to may be a source of authority for the President to ~~quickly~~ impose a tariffimpose a tariff quickly. On May 30, 2019, President Trump . On May 30, 2019, President Trump
announced his intention to use IEEPA to impose announced his intention to use IEEPA to impose on and gradually increase a five percent tariff on all goods and gradually increase a five percent tariff on all goods
imported from Mexico until “the il egal migration crisis is alleviated through effective actions taken by Mexico.”imported from Mexico until “the il egal migration crisis is alleviated through effective actions taken by Mexico.”~~153~~
159 The tariffs were scheduled to be implemented on June 10, 2019, with five percent increases to take effect at the The tariffs were scheduled to be implemented on June 10, 2019, with five percent increases to take effect at the
beginning of each subsequent month. On June 7, 2019, President Trump announced that that “The Tariffs beginning of each subsequent month. On June 7, 2019, President Trump announced that that “The Tariffs
scheduled to be implemented by the U.S. [on June 10], against Mexico, are hereby indefinitely suspended.”scheduled to be implemented by the U.S. [on June 10], against Mexico, are hereby indefinitely suspended.”~~154~~

~~148 President Nixon, in effect, used TWEA to place a 10% ad valorem tariff on all imports to the U.S. Pres. Proc. No.~~
~~4074 (Jan. 21, 1971; United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975); See also Jason Luong,~~
“Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” Texas Law Review
~~78 (2000), p. 1190.~~
~~149 “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” p. 1111; Patrick A. Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive~~
~~Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 46, no. 2 (2013), pp.~~
~~757-758.~~
~~150 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, P.L. 87-794, § 232(b)–(c), 76 Stat. 877 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)–~~
~~(c)).~~
~~151~~160 Use of Assets Frozen under IEEPA161 The ultimate disposition of assets frozen under IEEPA may serve as an important part of the leverage economic sanctions provide to influence the behavior of foreign actors. The President and Congress have each at times determined the fate of blocked assets to further foreign policy goals. Presidential Use of Foreign Assets Frozen under IEEPA Presidents have used frozen assets as a bargaining tool during foreign policy crises and to bring a resolution to such crises, at times by unfreezing the assets, returning them to the sanctioned entity, or channeling them to a follow-on government. The following are some examples of how Presidents have used blocked assets to resolve foreign policy issues. President Carter invoked authority under IEEPA to impose trade sanctions against Iran, freezing Iranian assets in the United States, in response to the hostage crisis in 1979.162 On January 19, 1981, the United States and Iran entered into a series of executive agreements brokered by Algeria under which the hostages were freed and the frozen assets were distributed to various entities.163 Of the blocked assets, the agreements directed $5.1 billion to repay outstanding U.S. 157 Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF10667, Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF10667, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C. , by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C.
Jones; CRS Report R44707, Jones; CRS Report R44707, Presidential Authority over Trade: Imposing Tariffs and Duties, by Caitlain Devereaux , by Caitlain Devereaux
Lewis. Lewis.
~~152~~158 Procl. 9704, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,619 (March 15, 2019); Procl. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,361 (March 15, 2019). CRS Procl. 9704, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,619 (March 15, 2019); Procl. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,361 (March 15, 2019). CRS
Report R45249, Report R45249, Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Rachel F. Fefer and , coordinated by Rachel F. Fefer and
Vivian C. Jones. Vivian C. Jones.
~~153~~159 Statement from the President Regarding Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019, Statement from the President Regarding Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019,
available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-
address-border-crisis/. address-border-crisis/.
~~154~~160 President Donald J. Trump, Twitter Post, June 7, 2018, 5:31 p.m., https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/ President Donald J. Trump, Twitter Post, June 7, 2018, 5:31 p.m., https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/. 1137155056044826626. The suspension preceded the release of a U.S. Mexico Joint Declaration on migration. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S.-Mexico Joint Declaration, June 7, 2019, available at https://www.state.gov/u-s-mexico-joint-declaration/. 161 This section was authored by Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division (ALD), CRS. 162 E.O. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (November 14, 1979). 163 The Algiers Accords comprise the following five documents: The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep’t St. Bull., No. 2047 1, 1 (1981) [hereinafter “General Declaration”], reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3; The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America Congressional Research Service 26 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
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~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Use of Assets Frozen under IEEPA155~~
~~The ultimate disposition of assets frozen under IEEPA may serve as an important part of the~~
~~leverage economic sanctions provide to influence the behavior of foreign actors. The President~~
~~and Congress have each at times determined the fate of blocked assets to further foreign policy~~
~~goals.~~
~~Presidential Use of Foreign Assets Frozen under IEEPA~~
~~Presidents have used frozen assets as a bargaining tool during foreign policy crises and to bring a~~
~~resolution to such crises, at times by unfreezing the assets, returning them to the sanctioned entity,~~
~~or channeling them to a follow-on government. The following are some examples of how~~
~~Presidents have used blocked assets to resolve foreign policy issues.~~
~~President Carter invoked authority under IEEPA to impose trade sanctions against Iran, freezing~~
~~Iranian assets in the United States, in response to the hostage crisis in 1979.156 On January 19,~~
~~1981, the United States and Iran entered into a series of executive agreements brokered by~~
~~Algeria under which the hostages were freed and the frozen assets were distributed to various~~
~~entities.157 Of the blocked assets, the agreements directed $5.1 billion to repay outstanding U.S.~~
bank loans to Iran, $2.8 billion returned to Iran, $1 billion transferred into a security account in bank loans to Iran, $2.8 billion returned to Iran, $1 billion transferred into a security account in
the Hague to pay other U.S. claims against Iran as arbitrated by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal the Hague to pay other U.S. claims against Iran as arbitrated by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
(IUSCT), and $2 billion remained blocked pending further agreement with Iran or decision of the (IUSCT), and $2 billion remained blocked pending further agreement with Iran or decision of the
Tribunal. The United States also froze the assets of the former Shah’s estate along with those of Tribunal. The United States also froze the assets of the former Shah’s estate along with those of
the Shah’s close relatives pending litigation in U.S. courts to ascertain Iran’s right to their return. the Shah’s close relatives pending litigation in U.S. courts to ascertain Iran’s right to their return.
Iran’s litigation was unsuccessful, and none of the contested assets were returned to Iran.Iran’s litigation was unsuccessful, and none of the contested assets were returned to Iran.~~158~~164
Presidents have also channeled frozen assets to opposition governments in cases where the United Presidents have also channeled frozen assets to opposition governments in cases where the United
States continued to recognize a previous government that had been removed by coup d’état or States continued to recognize a previous government that had been removed by coup d’état or
otherwise replaced as the legitimate government of a country. For example, after Panamanian otherwise replaced as the legitimate government of a country. For example, after Panamanian
President Eric Arturo Delvalle tried to dismiss de facto military ruler General Manuel Noriega President Eric Arturo Delvalle tried to dismiss de facto military ruler General Manuel Noriega
from his post as head of the Panamanian Defense Forces, which resulted in Delvalle’s own from his post as head of the Panamanian Defense Forces, which resulted in Delvalle’s own

~~1137155056044826626. The suspension preceded the release of a U.S. Mexico Joint Declaration on migration.~~
~~Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S.-Mexico Joint Declaration, June 7, 2019, available at~~
~~https://www.state.gov/u-s-mexico-joint-declaration/.~~
~~155 This section was authored by Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division (ALD), CRS.~~
~~156 E.O. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65729 (Nov. 14, 1979).~~
~~157 The Algiers Accords comprise the following five documents: THE DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE~~
~~DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA, Jan. 19, 1981, 81 Dep’t St. Bull., No. 2047 1, 1 (1981) [hereinafter~~
~~“General Declaration”], reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3; THE DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE~~
~~DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF~~
~~THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, Jan.~~dismissal by the Panamanian Legislative Assembly, President Reagan recognized Delvalle as the legitimate head of government and instituted economic sanctions against the Noriega regime.165 As part of these sanctions, the Department of State, in February 1988, advised U.S. banks not to disburse funds to the Noriega regime, and Delvalle obtained court orders permitting him access to those funds.166 In April 1988, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12635, which “blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Panama that are in the United States . . . or that come within the possession or control of persons located within the United States.”167 In June 1988, the Department of the Treasury issued regulations directing most payments from the U.S. government owed to Panama and all payments owed “to Panama from the operation of the Panama Canal Commission” to an escrow account established at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.168 One escrow account contained funds for the payment of operating expenses of the Delvalle government.169 After the U.S. invasion of Panama ended in early 1990, President George H.W. Bush lifted economic sanctions against the country170 and used some of the frozen funds to repay debts owed by Panama to foreign creditors, with remaining funds turned over to the successor government.171 The Obama and Trump Administrations took similar actions in response to the political situation in Venezuela. President Barack Obama initially froze Venezuelan government assets in 2015 and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep't St. 19, 1981, 81 Dep't St.
Bull., No. 2047, at 3, reprinted in 1 Bull., No. 2047, at 3, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9; Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 19 January~~Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9; UNDERTAKINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED~~
~~STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN WITH RESPECT TO THE DECLARATION OF~~
~~THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA, 19 Jan.~~ 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047,
at 4, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 13; at 4, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 13; ~~ESCROW AGREEMENT AMONG THE UNITED STATES~~Escrow Agreement Among the United States, Federal Reserve , Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, Bank Markazi Iran, and the Banque Centrale d'Algerie, Bank of New York, Bank Markazi Iran, and the Banque Centrale d'Algerie, ~~Jan.~~January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047,
at 6, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 16; and at 6, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 16; and ~~TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN BANQUE CENTRALE D'ALGERIE~~
~~AND THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, Jan.~~
Technical Arrangement Between Banque Centrale d'Algerie and the Governor and Company of the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 14, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 20 (hereinafter “Algiers Accords”). 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 14, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 20 (hereinafter “Algiers Accords”).
~~158~~164 Sean D. Murphy, Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 677, , 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 677,
704 (704 (~~Oct.~~October 2000) (explaining that “[a]ll of Iran's lawsuits in U.S. courts [to recover the Shah’s assets] were eventually 2000) (explaining that “[a]ll of Iran's lawsuits in U.S. courts [to recover the Shah’s assets] were eventually
~~dismissed, principally on grounds of forum non conveniens”).~~
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~~dismissal by the Panamanian Legislative Assembly, President Reagan recognized Delvalle as the~~
~~legitimate head of government and instituted economic sanctions against the Noriega regime.159~~
~~As part of these sanctions, the Department of State, in February 1988, advised U.S. banks not to~~
~~disburse funds to the Noriega regime, and Delvalle obtained court orders permitting him access to~~
~~those funds.160 In April 1988, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12635, which “blocked~~
~~all property and interests in property of the Government of Panama that are in the United States~~
~~. . . or that come within the possession or control of persons located within the United States.”161~~
~~In June 1988, the Department of the Treasury issued regulations directing most payments from~~
~~the U.S. government owed to Panama and all payments owed “to Panama from the operation of~~
~~the Panama Canal Commission” to an escrow account established at the Federal Reserve Bank of~~
~~New York.162 One escrow account contained funds for the payment of operating expenses of the~~
~~Delvalle government.163 After the U.S. invasion of Panama ended in early 1990, President George~~
~~H.W. Bush lifted economic sanctions against the country164 and used some of the frozen funds to~~
~~repay debts owed by Panama to foreign creditors, with remaining funds turned over to the~~
~~successor government.165~~
~~The Obama and Trump Administrations took similar actions in response to the political situation~~
~~in Venezuela. President Barack Obama initially froze Venezuelan government assets in 2015~~
dismissed, principally on grounds of forum non conveniens”). 165 GAO Review of Economic Sanctions Imposed Against Panama, GAO/T-NSIAD-89-44, 4-5 (July 26, 1989). 166 Ibid., p. 5. 167 E.O. 12635, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,134 (April 8, 1988). 168 GAO Report, supra note 159, at 5. 169 Ibid., p. 7. 170 E.O. 12,710, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (April 5, 1990). 171 See 1989 Cong. Q. Almanac 607 (reporting that the Department of the Treasury had concluded “that the net amount still due Panama, after ‘offsets, was about $200 million”). Congressional Research Service 27 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use under IEEPA and the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014.under IEEPA and the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014.~~166~~172 In In
January 2019, the Trump Administration officially recognized Venezuelan opposition leader Juan January 2019, the Trump Administration officially recognized Venezuelan opposition leader Juan
Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim ~~president167~~president173 and permitted Guaidó access to the frozen Venezuelan and permitted Guaidó access to the frozen Venezuelan
government assets that were “held at the United States Federal Reserve and other insured United assets that were “held at the United States Federal Reserve and other insured United
States financial institutions.”States financial institutions.”~~168~~174 The Trump Administration also imposed additional sanctions The Trump Administration also imposed additional sanctions
under IEEPA to freeze the assets of the main Venezuelan state-owned oil company, Petróleos de under IEEPA to freeze the assets of the main Venezuelan state-owned oil company, Petróleos de
Venezuela (Pdvsa),Venezuela (Pdvsa),~~169~~175 which significantly reduced funds available to the regime of Nicolas which significantly reduced funds available to the regime of Nicolas
Maduro.Maduro.~~170 The U.S. recognition may allow the interim government to apply for a license from~~
~~OFAC to access some of Venezuela’s frozen funds.~~176 The Biden Administration has continued the recognition of Guaidó’s interim government.177
There is also precedent for using frozen foreign assets for purposes authorized by the U.N. There is also precedent for using frozen foreign assets for purposes authorized by the U.N.
Security Council. After the first war with Iraq, President George H.W. Bush ordered the transfer Security Council. After the first war with Iraq, President George H.W. Bush ordered the transfer

~~159 GAO REVIEW OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IMPOSED AGAINST PANAMA, GAO/T-NSIAD-89-44, 4-5 (July 26, 1989).~~
~~160 Ibid. at 5.~~
~~161 E.O. 12635, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,134 (Apr. 8, 1988).~~
~~162 GAO Report, supra note 159, at 5.~~
~~163 Ibid. at 7.~~
~~164 E.O. 12,710, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (Apr. 5, 1990).~~
~~165 See 1989 Cong. Q. Almanac 607 (reporting that the Department of the Treasury had concluded “that the net amount~~
~~still due Panama, after ‘offsets, was about $200 million”).~~
~~166 E.O. 13692, 80 Fed. Reg. 12,747 (Mar.~~of frozen Iraqi assets derived from the sale of Iraqi petroleum held by U.S. banks to a holding account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to fulfill “the rights and obligations of the United States under U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 778.”178 The President cited a section of the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA),179 as well as IEEPA, as authority to take the action.180 The President ordered the transferred funds to be used to provide humanitarian relief and to finance the United Nations Compensation Commission,181 which was established to 172 E.O. 13692, 80 Fed. Reg. 12,747 (March 8, 2015). For information about current sanctions against Venezuela, see 8, 2015). For information about current sanctions against Venezuela, see
CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Clare Ribando Seelke. CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
~~167~~173 President Donald J. Trump Supports the Venezuelan People’s Efforts to Restore Democracy in Their Country, ,
White House Fact Sheet White House Fact Sheet ~~Jan.~~January 29, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump- 29, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-
supports-venezuelan-peoples-efforts-restore-democracy-country/. For background of the situation in Venezuela, see supports-venezuelan-peoples-efforts-restore-democracy-country/. For background of the situation in Venezuela, see
CRS Report R44841, CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke. , coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
~~168~~174 Trump Supports the Venezuelan People’s Efforts. .
~~169~~175 E.O. 13857, 84 Fed. Reg. 509 ( E.O. 13857, 84 Fed. Reg. 509 (~~Jan.~~January 25, 2019); 25, 2019); Treasury Sanctions Venezuela’s State-Owned Oil Company Petroleos
de Venezuela, S.A., U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (~~Jan.~~January 28, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm594. 28, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm594.
~~170~~176 Marianna Parraga, “Venezuela Marianna Parraga, “Venezuela'’s oil exports sink to 17-year low, choked by U.S. sanctions,” s oil exports sink to 17-year low, choked by U.S. sanctions,” Reuters, , ~~Jun.~~June 2, 2020, 2, 2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-exports/venezuelas-oil-exports-sink-to-17-year-low-choked-by-us-https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-exports/venezuelas-oil-exports-sink-to-17-year-low-choked-by-us-
sanctions-idUSKBN2392SG. sanctions-idUSKBN2392SG.
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~~of frozen Iraqi assets derived from the sale of Iraqi petroleum held by U.S. banks to a holding~~
~~account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to fulfill “the rights and obligations of the~~
~~United States under U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 778.”171 The President cited a section~~
~~of the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA),172 as well as IEEPA, as authority to take the~~
~~action.173 The President ordered the transferred funds to be used to provide humanitarian relief~~
~~and to finance the United Nations Compensation Commission,174 which was established to~~
~~adjudicate claims against Iraq arising from the invasion.175 Other Iraqi assets remained frozen and~~
~~accumulated interest until the United States vested them in 2003 pursuant to IEEPA.~~
177 Press Statement, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Recognition of Venezuela’s 2015 National Assembly and Interim President Guaidó (January 4, 2022), https://www.state.gov/u-s-recognition-of-venezuelas-2015-national-assembly-and-interim-president-guaido/. 178 E.O. 12817, 3 C.F.R. § 317 (1992). President George H.W. Bush froze Iraqi assets under U.S. jurisdiction pursuant to IEEPA in response to Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. E.O. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (August 2, 1990). 179 22 U.S.C. § 287c (2018). The provision authorizes the President to give effect to U.N. Security Council resolutions by “investigat[ing], regulat[ing], or prohibit[ing], in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or any person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” The provision does not explicitly mention asset confiscation. 180 E.O. 12817, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,433 (October 23, 1992). 181 See Ronald J. Bettauer, “Establishment of the United Nations Compensation Commission: The U.S. Government Perspective,” The United Nations Compensation Commission (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 35. Congressional Research Service 28 link to page 17 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use adjudicate claims against Iraq arising from the invasion.182 Other Iraqi assets remained frozen and accumulated interest until the United States vested them in 2003 pursuant to IEEPA.183 In some cases, the United States has ended sanctions and returned frozen assets to successor In some cases, the United States has ended sanctions and returned frozen assets to successor
governments. For example, as a condition of releasing sanctions, the United States released governments. For example, as a condition of releasing sanctions, the United States released
$237.6 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Central Bank of the Socialist Federal $237.6 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Central Bank of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia to the central banks of the successor states in 2003.Republic of Yugoslavia to the central banks of the successor states in 2003.~~176~~184 In 2002, the United In 2002, the United
States released $217 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Taliban to the Afghan States released $217 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Taliban to the Afghan
Interim Authority.Interim Authority.~~177~~185 As of the date of this report, the fate of the Afghan Central Bank (DaB) assets held in the United States at the time of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 remains undecided. Some victims—including survivors and family members—of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks with judgments against the Taliban have obtained a writ of attachment with respect to the assets.186 The Biden Administration subsequently blocked the funds pursuant to IEEPA187 and filed a statement of interest188 asking the court for permission to make half ($3.5 billion) of the assets available for transfer under the OFAC license189 issued on behalf of the people of Afghanistan to “to address significant humanitarian and economic concerns and to avoid further regional instability and other conditions contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States.”190 The other half of the assets would remain blocked to avail the judgment plaintiffs of the opportunity to make their case for entitlement to attach them in satisfaction of their judgments. In the statement of interest, the Administration did not take a position with respect to the plaintiffs’ right to the assets, but set forth some legal considerations that seem to militate against the judgment plaintiffs.191 Congressionally Mandated Use of Frozen Foreign Assets and Proceeds of Sanctions The executive branch has traditionally resisted congressional efforts to vest foreign assets to pay U.S. claimants without first obtaining a settlement agreement with the country in question.192 Congress has overcome such resistance in the case of foreign governments that have been 182
~~Congressionally Mandated Use of Frozen Foreign Assets and Proceeds of~~
~~Sanctions~~
~~The executive branch has traditionally resisted congressional efforts to vest foreign assets to pay~~
~~U.S. claimants without first obtaining a settlement agreement with the country in question.178~~
~~Congress has overcome such resistance in the case of foreign governments that have been~~
~~designated as “State Supporters of Terrorism.”179 U.S. nationals who are victims of state-~~
~~supported terrorism involving designated states have been able to sue those countries for damages~~
~~under an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) since 1996.180~~

~~171 E.O. 12817, 3 C.F.R. § 317 (1992). President George H.W. Bush froze Iraqi assets under U.S. jurisdiction pursuant~~
~~to IEEPA in response to Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. E.O. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (Aug. 2, 1990).~~
~~172 22 U.S.C. § 287c (2018). The provision authorizes the President to give effect to U.N. Security Council resolutions~~
~~by “investigat[ing], regulat[ing], or prohibit[ing], in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal,~~
~~telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or any~~
~~person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving any property subject~~
~~to the jurisdiction of the United States.” The provision does not explicitly mention asset confiscation.~~
~~173 E.O. 12817, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,433 (Oct. 23, 1992).~~
~~174 See Ronald J. Bettauer, “Establishment of the United Nations Compensation Commission: The U.S. Government~~
~~Perspective,” The United Nations Compensation Commission (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 35.~~
~~175~~ S.C. Res. 687, para. 16 (April 8, 1991) (reaffirming that “Iraq ... is liable under international law for any direct loss, S.C. Res. 687, para. 16 (April 8, 1991) (reaffirming that “Iraq ... is liable under international law for any direct loss,
damage, ... or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and damage, ... or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait”; S.C. Res. 692 (May 20, 1991) (establishing the United Nations Compensation Commission occupation of Kuwait”; S.C. Res. 692 (May 20, 1991) (establishing the United Nations Compensation Commission
(UNCC) to administer a system to provide compensation for claims for which Iraq is liable under paragraph 16 of S.C. (UNCC) to administer a system to provide compensation for claims for which Iraq is liable under paragraph 16 of S.C.
Res. 687); S.C. Res. 706 and 712 (1991) (establishing an escrow account administered by the U.N. Secretary General to Res. 687); S.C. Res. 706 and 712 (1991) (establishing an escrow account administered by the U.N. Secretary General to
fund the costs of the UNCC and other activities); S.C. Res. 778 (1992) (directing all States in possession of funds due fund the costs of the UNCC and other activities); S.C. Res. 778 (1992) (directing all States in possession of funds due
to Iraq for the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to transfer those funds to the U.N. escrow account). to Iraq for the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to transfer those funds to the U.N. escrow account).
~~176 FOREIGN REGIMES’ ASSETS, GAO-04-1006, 11 (Sept. 2004).~~
~~177 Ibid. at 12.~~
~~178 See, generally, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1645o (Settlement of International Claims).~~
~~179 Current states designated as sponsors of terrorism are Iran, Sudan, North Korea and Syria. See U.S. Department of~~
~~State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.~~
~~180 The so-called terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) was originally codified at 28~~
~~U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), but an amended version is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2018). See CRS Report RL31258,~~
Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
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183 See “USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA.” 184 Foreign Regimes’ Assets, GAO-04-1006, 11 (September 2004). 185 Ibid. at 12. 186 Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 13, 2021). 187 E.O. 14064, 87 Fed. Reg. 8391 (Feb. 15, 2022). 188 United States Government Statement of Interest, Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848, ECF 563 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2022) (hereinafter SOI). 189 OFAC License No. DABRESERVES-EO-2022-886895-1, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21226931/ex-b-ofac-license.pdf. 190 Ibid. SOI. 191 CRS In Focus IF12052, Afghanistan Central Bank Reserves, coordinated by Martin A. Weiss. 192 See, generally, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1645o (Settlement of International Claims). Congressional Research Service 29 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use designated as “State Supporters of Terrorism.”193 U.S. nationals who are victims of state-supported terrorism involving designated states have been able to sue those countries for damages under an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) since 1996.194 To facilitate the payment of judgments under the exception, Congress passed Section 117 of the To facilitate the payment of judgments under the exception, Congress passed Section 117 of the
Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999,Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999,~~181~~195 which further amended the FSIA which further amended the FSIA
by allowing attachment and execution against state property with respect to which financial by allowing attachment and execution against state property with respect to which financial
transactions are prohibited or regulated under Section 5(b) TWEA, Section 620(a) of the Foreign transactions are prohibited or regulated under Section 5(b) TWEA, Section 620(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act (authorizing the trade embargo against Cuba), or Sections 202 and 203 of IEEPA, Assistance Act (authorizing the trade embargo against Cuba), or Sections 202 and 203 of IEEPA,
or any orders, licenses or other authority issued under these statutes. Because of the Clinton or any orders, licenses or other authority issued under these statutes. Because of the Clinton
Administration’s continuing objections, however, Section 117 also gave the President authority to Administration’s continuing objections, however, Section 117 also gave the President authority to
“waive the requirements of this section in the interest of national security,” an authority President “waive the requirements of this section in the interest of national security,” an authority President
Clinton promptly exercised in signing the statute into law.Clinton promptly exercised in signing the statute into law.~~182~~196
The Section 117 waiver authority protecting blocked foreign government assets from attachment The Section 117 waiver authority protecting blocked foreign government assets from attachment
to satisfy terrorism judgments has continued in effect ever since, prompting Congress to take to satisfy terrorism judgments has continued in effect ever since, prompting Congress to take
other actions to make frozen assets available to judgment holders. Congress enacted § 2002 of the other actions to make frozen assets available to judgment holders. Congress enacted § 2002 of the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA)Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA)~~183~~197 to mandate the payment to mandate the payment
from frozen Cuban assets of compensatory damages awarded against Cuba under the FSIA from frozen Cuban assets of compensatory damages awarded against Cuba under the FSIA
terrorism exception on or prior to July 20, 2000. terrorism exception on or prior to July 20, 2000.
The Department of the Treasury subsequently vested $96.7 million in funds generated from long- The Department of the Treasury subsequently vested $96.7 million in funds generated from long-
distance telephone services between the United States and Cuba in order to compensate claimants distance telephone services between the United States and Cuba in order to compensate claimants
in in Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, the lawsuit based on the 1996 downing of two unarmed U.S. , the lawsuit based on the 1996 downing of two unarmed U.S.
civilian airplanes by the Cuban air force.civilian airplanes by the Cuban air force.~~184~~198 Another payment of more than $7 million was made Another payment of more than $7 million was made
using vested Cuban assets to a Florida woman who had won a lawsuit against Cuba based on her using vested Cuban assets to a Florida woman who had won a lawsuit against Cuba based on her
marriage to a Cuban spy.marriage to a Cuban spy.~~185~~199
As unpaid judgments against designated state sponsors of terrorism continued to mount, Congress As unpaid judgments against designated state sponsors of terrorism continued to mount, Congress
enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA).enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA).~~186~~200 Section 201 of TRIA overrode long-standing Section 201 of TRIA overrode long-standing
objections by the executive branch to make the frozen assets of terrorist states available to satisfy objections by the executive branch to make the frozen assets of terrorist states available to satisfy
~~judgments for compensatory damages against such states (and organizations and persons) as~~
~~follows:~~
~~Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in subsection (b), in~~
~~every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim~~
~~based upon an act of terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune under section~~
~~1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, the blocked assets of that terrorist party~~
~~(including the blocked assets of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall~~
~~be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment~~

~~181~~ 193 Current states designated as sponsors of terrorism are Iran (1984), Cuba (2021), North Korea (2017) and Syria (1979). See U.S. Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm. 194 The so-called terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) was originally codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), but an amended version is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2018). See CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea. 195 P.L. 105-277, Div. A, Title I, § 117, 112 Stat. 2681-491 (1998), P.L. 105-277, Div. A, Title I, § 117, 112 Stat. 2681-491 (1998), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(1)(A) (2018). 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(1)(A) (2018).
~~182~~196 Presidential Determination 99-1 (October 21, 1998), reprinted in 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2088 (October Presidential Determination 99-1 (October 21, 1998), reprinted in 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2088 (October
26, 1998). 26, 1998).
~~183~~197 P.L. 106-386, § 2002, 114 Stat. 1541 (2000). Section 2002(b)(1) required the President to “vest and liquidate up to P.L. 106-386, § 2002, 114 Stat. 1541 (2000). Section 2002(b)(1) required the President to “vest and liquidate up to
and not exceeding the amount of property of the Government of Cuba and sanctioned entities in the United States or and not exceeding the amount of property of the Government of Cuba and sanctioned entities in the United States or
any commonwealth, territory, or possession thereof that has been blocked pursuant to [TWEA or IEEPA]” to pay the any commonwealth, territory, or possession thereof that has been blocked pursuant to [TWEA or IEEPA]” to pay the
compensatory damages portion of such judgments. Judgments against Iran were paid from appropriated funds. compensatory damages portion of such judgments. Judgments against Iran were paid from appropriated funds.
~~184~~198 Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ($50 million in compensatory damages and Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ($50 million in compensatory damages and
$137.7 million in punitive damages awarded to the families of three of the four persons who were killed when Cuban $137.7 million in punitive damages awarded to the families of three of the four persons who were killed when Cuban
aircraft shot down two Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996). The payment represented compensatory damages, aircraft shot down two Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996). The payment represented compensatory damages,
judicially imposed sanctions, and interest. judicially imposed sanctions, and interest.
~~185~~199 Martinez v. Republic of Cuba, No. 13-1999-CA 018208 (Miami-Dade Co., Fla., Cir. Ct. 2001) (awarding $7.1 Martinez v. Republic of Cuba, No. 13-1999-CA 018208 (Miami-Dade Co., Fla., Cir. Ct. 2001) (awarding $7.1
million in compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages). million in compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages).
~~186~~200 P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002) P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002), codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1610 note. .
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~~to the extent of any compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has been~~
~~adjudged liable.187~~judgments for compensatory damages against such states (and organizations and persons) as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in subsection (b), in every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune under section 1605A or 1605(a)(7) (as such section was in effect on January 27, 2008) of title 28, United States Code, the blocked assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable.201
Subsection (b) of Section 201 provided waiver authority “in the national security interest,” but Subsection (b) of Section 201 provided waiver authority “in the national security interest,” but
only with respect to frozen foreign government “property subject to the Vienna Convention on only with respect to frozen foreign government “property subject to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.” When Congress Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.” When Congress
amended the FSIA in amended the FSIA in ~~2008188~~2008202 to revamp the terrorism exception, it provided that judgments to revamp the terrorism exception, it provided that judgments
entered under the new exception could be satisfied out of the property of a foreign state entered under the new exception could be satisfied out of the property of a foreign state
notwithstanding the fact that the property in question is regulated by the United States notwithstanding the fact that the property in question is regulated by the United States
government pursuant to TWEA or IEEPA.government pursuant to TWEA or IEEPA.~~189~~203 Congress has also crafted legislation on occasion Congress has also crafted legislation on occasion
that makes specific assets available to satisfy specific judgments.that makes specific assets available to satisfy specific judgments.~~190~~204
Congress has also directed that the proceeds from certain sanctions violations be paid into a fund Congress has also directed that the proceeds from certain sanctions violations be paid into a fund
for providing compensation to the former hostages of Iran and terrorist state judgment for providing compensation to the former hostages of Iran and terrorist state judgment
creditors.creditors.~~191~~205 To fund the program, Congress designated that certain real property and bank To fund the program, Congress designated that certain real property and bank
accounts owned by Iran and forfeited to the United States could go into the United States Victims accounts owned by Iran and forfeited to the United States could go into the United States Victims
of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund, along with the sum of $1,025,000,000, representing the of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund, along with the sum of $1,025,000,000, representing the
amount paid to the United States pursuant to the June 27, 2014, plea agreement and settlement amount paid to the United States pursuant to the June 27, 2014, plea agreement and settlement
between the United States and BNP Paribas for sanctions violations.between the United States and BNP Paribas for sanctions violations.~~192~~206 The fund is replenished The fund is replenished
through criminal penalties and forfeitures for violations of IEEPA or TWEA-based regulations, or through criminal penalties and forfeitures for violations of IEEPA or TWEA-based regulations, or
any related civil or criminal conspiracy, scheme, or other federal offense related to doing business any related civil or criminal conspiracy, scheme, or other federal offense related to doing business
~~or acting on behalf of a state sponsor of terrorism.193 Half of all civil penalties and forfeitures~~
~~relating to the same offenses are also deposited into the fund.194~~

~~187~~ 201 Ibid. The term “blocked asset” is defined in § 201(d) of TRIA to mean The term “blocked asset” is defined in § 201(d) of TRIA to mean
(A) any asset seized or frozen by the United States under [TWEA or IEEPA]; and (A) any asset seized or frozen by the United States under [TWEA or IEEPA]; and
(B) does not include property that— (B) does not include property that—
(i) is subject to a license issued by the United States Government for final payment, transfer, or (i) is subject to a license issued by the United States Government for final payment, transfer, or
disposition by or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection with a disposition by or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection with a
transaction for which the issuance of such license has been specifically required by statute other transaction for which the issuance of such license has been specifically required by statute other
than [IEEPA] or the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 than [IEEPA] or the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.); or .); or
(ii) in the case of property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna (ii) in the case of property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, or that enjoys equivalent privileges and immunities under the Convention on Consular Relations, or that enjoys equivalent privileges and immunities under the
law of the United States, is being used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes. law of the United States, is being used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes.
~~188~~202 P.L. 110-181 § 1083 (2008) (amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). P.L. 110-181 § 1083 (2008) (amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
~~189~~203 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2018). It is unclear whether “regulated” property and “blocked asset” are meant to be 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2018). It is unclear whether “regulated” property and “blocked asset” are meant to be
synonymous. synonymous.
~~190~~204 P.L. 112-158, Title V, §502, 126 Stat. 1258 (2012); P.L. 116-92, div. A, Title XII, §1226, 133 Stat. 1645 (2019), P.L. 112-158, Title V, §502, 126 Stat. 1258 (2012); P.L. 116-92, div. A, Title XII, §1226, 133 Stat. 1645 (2019),
both codified at 22 USC § 8772. The Supreme Court upheld this approach in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. both codified at 22 USC § 8772. The Supreme Court upheld this approach in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct.
1310 (2016). For an explanation of the case, see CRS Report R44967, 1310 (2016). For an explanation of the case, see CRS Report R44967, Congress’s Power over Courts: Jurisdiction
Stripping and the Rule of Klein, coordinated by Kevin M. Lewis. , coordinated by Kevin M. Lewis.
191 See205 See the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act, P.L. 114-113, div. O, title IV (2015), the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act, P.L. 114-113, div. O, title IV (2015),
129 Stat. 3007, codified 129 Stat. 3007, codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. § 20144 (at 34 U.S.C. § 20144 (~~2018~~2020). ).
~~192~~206 Ibid Ibid., for more information about the program and funding for it, see CRS In Focus IF10341, , for more information about the program and funding for it, see CRS In Focus IF10341, Justice for United
States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act: Eligibility and Funding, by Jennifer K. Elsea. , by Jennifer K. Elsea.
~~193 34 U.S.C. § 20144(e) (2018).~~
~~194 Ibid.~~
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
3231

link to page 39 link to page 41 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use or acting on behalf of a state sponsor of terrorism.207 Three-quarters of all civil penalties and forfeitures relating to the same offenses are also deposited into the fund.208 The Fund sunsets in 2039. Russia’s 2022 wholesale invasion of Ukraine has led the executive branch to levy new sanctions against Russia, in addition to sanctions imposed for other reasons.209 Some Members of Congress have introduced legislation seeking to seize and repurpose Russian frozen assets for the benefit of Ukraine.210 Some of the proposals, to the extent that they permit the seizure of assets of aliens with significant ties to or property in the United States, if enacted, may invite legal challenges based on the Fifth Amendment “Takings” and Due Process clauses.211~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

Judicial Interpretation of ~~IEEPA195~~IEEPA212
A number of lawsuits seeking to overturn actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have made their way A number of lawsuits seeking to overturn actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have made their way
through the judicial system, including challenges to the breadth of through the judicial system, including challenges to the breadth of presidential authority and congressionally delegated congressionally delegated
authorityauthority, and challenges asserting ~~and assertions of~~ violations of constitutional rights. violations of constitutional rights. ~~As demonstrated below, most~~Most of of
these challenges have failedthese challenges have failed~~. The~~, and the few challenges that succeeded did not seriously undermine the few challenges that succeeded did not seriously undermine the
overarching statutory scheme for sanctions. overarching statutory scheme for sanctions.
Dames & Moore v. Regan
The breadth of presidential power under IEEPA is illustrated by the Supreme Court’s 1981 The breadth of presidential power under IEEPA is illustrated by the Supreme Court’s 1981
opinion in opinion in Dames & Moore v. Regan..~~196~~213 In In Dames & Moore, petitioners had challenged President , petitioners had challenged President
Carter’s executive order establishing regulations to further compliance with the terms of the Carter’s executive order establishing regulations to further compliance with the terms of the
Algiers Accords, which the President had entered into to end the hostage crisis with Iran.Algiers Accords, which the President had entered into to end the hostage crisis with Iran.~~197~~214 Under Under
these agreements, the United States was obligated (1) to terminate all legal proceedings in U.S. these agreements, the United States was obligated (1) to terminate all legal proceedings in U.S.
courts involving claims of U.S. nationals against Iran, (2) to nullify all attachments and courts involving claims of U.S. nationals against Iran, (2) to nullify all attachments and
judgments, and (3) to resolve outstanding claims exclusively through binding arbitration in the judgments, and (3) to resolve outstanding claims exclusively through binding arbitration in the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT). The President, through executive orders, revoked all licenses Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT). The President, through executive orders, revoked all licenses
that permitted the exercise of “any right, power, or privilege” with regard to Iranian funds, that permitted the exercise of “any right, power, or privilege” with regard to Iranian funds,
nullified all non-Iranian interests in assets acquired after a previous blocking order, and required nullified all non-Iranian interests in assets acquired after a previous blocking order, and required
banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be held banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be held
or transferred as directed by the Secretary of the Treasury.or transferred as directed by the Secretary of the Treasury.~~198~~
~~Dames and Moore had sued Iran for breach of contract to recover compensation for work~~
~~performed.199 The district court had entered summary judgment in favor of Dames and Moore and~~
~~issued an order attaching certain Iranian assets for satisfaction of any judgment that might~~
~~result,200 but stayed the case pending appeal.201 The executive orders and regulations~~
~~implementing the Algiers Accords resulted in the nullification of this prejudgment attachment and~~
~~the dismissal of the case against Iran, directing that it be filed at the IUSCT.~~
~~In response, Dames and Moore sued the government. The plaintiffs claimed that the President and~~
~~the Secretary of the Treasury exceeded their statutory and constitutional powers to the extent they~~
~~adversely affected Dames and Moore’s judgment against Iran, the execution of that judgment, the~~
~~prejudgment attachments, and the plaintiff’s ability to continue to litigate against the Iranian~~
~~banks.202~~
~~The government defended its actions, relying largely on IEEPA, which provided explicit support~~
~~for most of the measures taken—nullification of the prejudgment attachment and transfer of the~~

~~195~~215 207 34 U.S.C. § 20144(e) (2021). 208 Ibid. 209 See CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt; CRS Insight IN11869, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Overview of U.S. and International Sanctions and Other Responses, by Cory Welt; CRS In Focus IF12062, New Financial and Trade Sanctions Against Russia, coordinated by Rebecca M. Nelson. 210 See, e.g., H.R. 7083; H.R. 7086; H.R. 3838; H.R. 7015; H.R. 6930; H.R. 6869; S. 3723; S. 3838. 211 See sections below “Fifth Amendment “Takings” Clause” and “Fifth Amendment “Due Process” Clause”. 212 This section was authored by Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division (ALD), CRS. This section was authored by Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division (ALD), CRS.
~~196~~213 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
~~197~~214 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Relating to the Commitments Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Relating to the Commitments
Made by Iran and the United States and Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Made by Iran and the United States and Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981) (collectively “Algiers Accords”). of Iran, 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981) (collectively “Algiers Accords”).
~~198~~215 E.O. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 ( E.O. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (~~Nov.~~November 14, 1979); E.O. 12279, 46 Fed. Reg. 7,919 ( 14, 1979); E.O. 12279, 46 Fed. Reg. 7,919 (~~Jan.~~January 19, 1981). On February 24, 1981 President Reagan ratified the Executive orders that President Carter had signed on January 19, 1981. E.O. 13294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981) ~~19, 1981).~~
~~199 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 644.~~
~~200 Ibid~~.
~~201 Ibid. at 666.~~
~~202 Ibid.~~ ~~at 666-67~~. .
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
3332 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Dames & Moore had sued Iran for breach of contract to recover compensation for work performed.216 The district court had entered summary judgment in favor of Dames & Moore and issued an order attaching certain Iranian assets for satisfaction of any judgment that might result,217 but stayed the case pending appeal.218 The executive orders and regulations implementing the Algiers Accords resulted in the nullification of this prejudgment attachment and the dismissal of the case against Iran, directing that it be filed at the IUSCT. In response, Dames & Moore sued the government. The plaintiff claimed that the President and the Secretary of the Treasury exceeded their statutory and constitutional powers to the extent they adversely affected Dames & Moore’s judgment against Iran, the execution of that judgment, the prejudgment attachments, and the plaintiff’s ability to continue litigation against the Iranian banks.219 The government defended its actions, relying largely on IEEPA, which provided explicit support for most of the measures taken—nullification of the prejudgment attachment and transfer of the

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

property to Iran—but could not be read to authorize actions affecting the suspension of claims in property to Iran—but could not be read to authorize actions affecting the suspension of claims in
U.S. courts. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority: U.S. courts. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority:
Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA…directly authorizes the Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA…directly authorizes the
President’s suspension of claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor President’s suspension of claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor
of Congress’ legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the President is acting of Congress’ legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the President is acting
alone or at least with the acceptance of Congress. As we have noted, Congress cannot alone or at least with the acceptance of Congress. As we have noted, Congress cannot
anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President may find it anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President may find it
necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might act. Such failure of Congress necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might act. Such failure of Congress
specifically to delegate authority does not, “especially . . . in the areas of foreignspecifically to delegate authority does not, “especially . . . in the areas of foreign policy policy
and national security,” imply “congressional disapproval” of action taken by the Executive. and national security,” imply “congressional disapproval” of action taken by the Executive.
On the contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the On the contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the
President’s authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President’s authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the
President broad discretion may be considered to “invite” “measures on independent President broad discretion may be considered to “invite” “measures on independent
presidential responsibility.” At least this is so where there is no contrary indication of presidential responsibility.” At least this is so where there is no contrary indication of
legislative intent and when, as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescence in legislative intent and when, as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescence in
conduct of the sort engaged in by the President.conduct of the sort engaged in by the President.~~203~~220
The Court remarked that Congress’s implicit approval of the long-standing presidential practice The Court remarked that Congress’s implicit approval of the long-standing presidential practice
of settling international claims by executive agreement was critical to its holding that the of settling international claims by executive agreement was critical to its holding that the
challenged actions were not in conflict with acts of Congress.challenged actions were not in conflict with acts of Congress.~~204~~221 For support, the Court cited For support, the Court cited to
Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer~~205 stating~~ ,222 which stated that “a that “a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and
never before questioned … may be treated as a gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the President never before questioned … may be treated as a gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the President
by § 1 of Art. II.”by § 1 of Art. II.”~~206~~223 Consequently, it may be argued that Congress’s exclusion of 216 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 644. 217 Ibid. 218 Ibid. at 666. 219 Ibid. at 666-67. 220 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted). 221 ~~Consequently, it may be argued that Congress’s exclusion of certain express~~
~~powers in IEEPA do not necessarily preclude the President from exercising them, at least where a~~
~~court finds sufficient precedent exists.~~
~~Lower courts have examined IEEPA under a number of other constitutional doctrines.~~
~~Separation of Powers—Non-Delegation Doctrine~~
~~Courts have reviewed whether Congress violated the non-delegation principle of separation of~~
~~powers by delegating too much power to the President to legislate, in particular by creating new~~
~~crimes.207 These challenges have generally failed.208 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second~~

~~203 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).~~
~~204~~ Ibid. at 680 (citing the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 13, codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. Ibid. at 680 (citing the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 13, codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ §
1621 1621 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV)). . (1976 ed. and Supp. IV)).
~~205~~222 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952). 610-11 (1952).
~~206~~223 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Congressional Research Service 33 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use certain express powers in IEEPA do not necessarily preclude the President from exercising them, at least where a court finds sufficient precedent exists. Lower courts have examined IEEPA under a number of other constitutional doctrines. Separation of Powers—Non-Delegation Doctrine Courts have reviewed whether Congress violated the non-delegation principle of separation of powers by delegating too much power to the President to legislate, in particular by creating new crimes.224 These challenges have generally failed.225 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
~~207 United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2006) (appeal of whether IEEPA constitutes an appropriate~~
~~delegation of congressional authority to the executive).~~
~~208 United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 576 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding IEEPA’s delegation of authority to the~~
~~President); United States v. Mirza, 454 F. App’x 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2011) (same); Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 216-17 (same);~~
~~United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1092–94 (4th Cir.1993) (same); see also United States v.~~
~~Nazemzadeh, No. 11 CR 5726 L, 2014 WL 310460, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014); United States v. Vaghari, No.~~
~~CRIM.A. 08-693-01-02, 2009 WL 2245097, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2009); Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control,~~
~~No. 05–C–580, 2007 WL 1051767, at *20–21 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2007), aff'd, 559 F.3d 595 (7th Cir.2009); United~~
~~States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 566–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Esfahani, No. 05–CR–0255, 2006~~
~~WL 163025, at *1–4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2006); United States v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F. Supp. 2d 821, 829–30 (N.D.~~
~~Ohio 2005); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 807 (N.D.Ill. 2002), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th~~
~~Cir. 2002).~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

Circuit explained while evaluating IEEPA, delegations of congressional authority are Circuit explained while evaluating IEEPA, delegations of congressional authority are
constitutional so long as Congress provides through a legislative act an “intelligible principle” constitutional so long as Congress provides through a legislative act an “intelligible principle”
governing the exercise of the delegated authority.governing the exercise of the delegated authority.~~209~~226 Even if the standards are higher for Even if the standards are higher for
delegations of authority to define criminal offenses, the court held, IEEPA provides sufficient delegations of authority to define criminal offenses, the court held, IEEPA provides sufficient
guidance.guidance.~~210~~227 The court stated: The court stated:
The IEEPA “meaningfully constrains the [President's] discretion,” by requiring that “[t]he The IEEPA “meaningfully constrains the [President's] discretion,” by requiring that “[t]he
authorities granted to the President ... may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and authorities granted to the President ... may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and
extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared.” And extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared.” And
the authorities delegated are defined and limited.the authorities delegated are defined and limited.~~211~~228
The Second Circuit found it significant that “IEEPA relates to foreign affairs—an area in which The Second Circuit found it significant that “IEEPA relates to foreign affairs—an area in which
the President has greater discretion,”the President has greater discretion,”~~212~~229 bolstering its view that IEEPA does not violate the non- bolstering its view that IEEPA does not violate the non-
delegation doctrine. delegation doctrine.
Separation of Powers—Legislative Veto
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Section 207(b) of IEEPA The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Section 207(b) of IEEPA
is an unconstitutional legislative veto. That provision states: is an unconstitutional legislative veto. That provision states:
The authorities described in subsection (a)(1) may not continue to be exercised under this The authorities described in subsection (a)(1) may not continue to be exercised under this
section if the national emergency is terminated by the Congress by concurrent resolution section if the national emergency is terminated by the Congress by concurrent resolution
pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act [50 U.S.C. § 1622] and if the pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act [50 U.S.C. § 1622] and if the
~~Congress specifies in such concurrent resolution that such authorities may not continue to~~
~~be exercised under this section.213~~
~~In U.S. v. Romero-Fernandez, two defendants convicted of violating the terms of an executive~~
~~order issued under IEEPA argued on appeal that IEEPA was unconstitutional, in part, because of~~
~~the above provision. The Eleventh Circuit accepted that the provision was an unconstitutional~~
~~legislative veto (as conceded by the government) based on INS v. Chadha,214 in which the~~
~~Supreme Court held that Congress cannot void the exercise of power by the executive branch~~
~~through concurrent resolution, but can act only through bicameral passage followed by~~
~~presentment of the law to the President.215 The Eleventh Circuit nevertheless upheld the~~
~~defendants’ convictions for violations of IEEPA regulations,216 holding that the legislative veto~~
~~provision was severable from the rest of the statute.217~~

~~209 Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 215 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)).~~
~~210~~ 224 United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2006) (appeal of whether IEEPA constitutes an appropriate delegation of congressional authority to the executive). 225 United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 576 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding IEEPA’s delegation of authority to the President); United States v. Mirza, 454 F. App’x 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2011) (same); Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 216-17 (same); United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1092–94 (4th Cir.1993) (same); see also United States v. Nazemzadeh, No. 11 CR 5726 L, 2014 WL 310460, at *8 (S.D. Cal. January 28, 2014); United States v. Vaghari, No. CRIM.A. 08-693-01-02, 2009 WL 2245097, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2009); Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, No. 05–C–580, 2007 WL 1051767, at *20–21 (E.D. Wis. March 31, 2007), aff'd, 559 F.3d 595 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 566–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Esfahani, No. 05–CR–0255, 2006 WL 163025, at *1–4 (N.D. Ill. January 17, 2006); United States v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F. Supp. 2d 821, 829–30 (N.D. Ohio 2005); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 807 (N.D.Ill. 2002), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002). 226 Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 215 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)). 227 Ibid. at 216 (“Even if a heightened standard should apply to delegations concerning criminal offenses, the IEEPA's Ibid. at 216 (“Even if a heightened standard should apply to delegations concerning criminal offenses, the IEEPA's
delegation is subject to constraints similar to those found sufficient in [Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 111 delegation is subject to constraints similar to those found sufficient in [Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 111
(1991)]”); see also (1991)]”); see also Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d at 576 (“We too conclude that IEEPA “meaningfully constrains” the , 645 F.3d at 576 (“We too conclude that IEEPA “meaningfully constrains” the
President's discretion.”); President's discretion.”); Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d at 1092–94 (holding “constraining factors” in IEEPA sufficient to ., 987 F.2d at 1092–94 (holding “constraining factors” in IEEPA sufficient to
conclude the President's powers are “explicitly defined and circumscribed”). conclude the President's powers are “explicitly defined and circumscribed”).
~~211~~ 228 Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 216-17 (internal citations omitted). , 461 F.3d at 216-17 (internal citations omitted).
~~212~~229 Ibid. at 217 (citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675). Congressional Research Service 34 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Congress specifies in such concurrent resolution that such authorities may not continue to be exercised under this section.230 In U.S. v. Romero-Fernandez, two defendants convicted of violating the terms of an executive order issued under IEEPA argued on appeal that IEEPA was unconstitutional, in part, because of the above provision. The Eleventh Circuit accepted that the provision was an unconstitutional legislative veto (as conceded by the government) based on INS v. Chadha,231 in which the Supreme Court held that Congress cannot void the exercise of power by the executive branch through concurrent resolution, but can act only through bicameral passage followed by presentment of the law to the President.232 The Eleventh Circuit nevertheless upheld the defendants’ convictions for violations of IEEPA regulations,233 holding that the legislative veto provision was severable from the rest of the statute.234 ~~Ibid. at 217 (citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675).~~
~~213 50 U.S.C. § 1706(b) (2018).~~
~~214 United States v. Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d 195, 196 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).~~
~~215 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954–55.~~
~~216 Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d at 197 (“Because [defendants] were charged and convicted under 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b),~~
~~and this section is not affected by the unconstitutionality of § 1706(b), the constitutionality of the legislative veto is~~
~~irrelevant to their convictions.”).~~
~~217 Ibid., 196 (finding that the balance of IEEPA is capable of functioning independently and noting Congress’s~~
~~inclusion of a severability clause).~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

Fifth Amendment “Takings” Clause
Courts have also addressed whether certain actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have effected an Courts have also addressed whether certain actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have effected an
uncompensated taking of property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth uncompensated taking of property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause prohibits “private property [from being] taken for public use, Amendment’s Takings Clause prohibits “private property [from being] taken for public use,
without just compensation.”without just compensation.”~~218~~235 The Fifth Amendment’s prohibitions apply as well to regulatory The Fifth Amendment’s prohibitions apply as well to regulatory
takings, in which the government does not physically take property but instead imposes takings, in which the government does not physically take property but instead imposes
restrictions on the right of enjoyment that decreases the value of the property or right therein.restrictions on the right of enjoyment that decreases the value of the property or right therein.~~219~~236
The Supreme Court has held that the nullification of prejudgment attachments pursuant to The Supreme Court has held that the nullification of prejudgment attachments pursuant to
regulations issued under IEEPA was not an uncompensated taking, suggesting that the reason for regulations issued under IEEPA was not an uncompensated taking, suggesting that the reason for
this position was the contingent nature of the licenses that had authorized the attachments.this position was the contingent nature of the licenses that had authorized the attachments.~~220~~237 The The
Court also suggested that the broader purpose of the statute supported the view that there was no Court also suggested that the broader purpose of the statute supported the view that there was no
uncompensated taking: uncompensated taking:
This Court has previously recognized that the congressional purpose in authorizing This Court has previously recognized that the congressional purpose in authorizing
blocking orders is “to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President....” Such blocking orders is “to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President....” Such
orders permit the President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in orders permit the President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in
~~negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency. The frozen assets serve as a~~
~~“bargaining chip” to be used by the President when dealing with a hostile country.~~
~~Accordingly, it is difficult to accept petitioner’s argument because the practical effect of it~~
~~is to allow individual claimants throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate~~
~~this “bargaining chip” through attachments, garnishments, or similar encumbrances on~~
~~property. Neither the purpose the statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language~~
~~supports such a result.221~~
~~Similarly, a lower court held that the extinguishment of contractual rights due to sanctions~~
~~enacted pursuant to IEEPA does not amount to a regulatory taking requiring compensation under~~
~~the Fifth Amendment.222 Even though the plaintiff suffered “obvious economic loss” due to the~~
~~sanctions regulations, that factor alone was not enough to sustain plaintiff's claim of a~~

~~218 U.S. Const. Amdt. V.~~
~~219~~ 230 50 U.S.C. § 1706(b) (2018). 231 United States v. Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d 195, 196 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). 232 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954–55. 233 Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d at 197 (“Because [defendants] were charged and convicted under 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b), and this section is not affected by the unconstitutionality of § 1706(b), the constitutionality of the legislative veto is irrelevant to their convictions.”). Although the original NEA authorized termination through a concurrent resolution, which does not require the President’s signature, Congress amended the provision in 1985 to require a joint resolution as a response to Chadha. Notwithstanding this amendment, Section 207 of IEEPA continues to refer to termination by concurrent resolution. 234 Ibid., at 196 (finding that the balance of IEEPA is capable of functioning independently and noting Congress’s inclusion of a severability clause). 235 U.S. CONST. Amdt. V. For more information, see Congressional Research Service, Takings Clause: Overview, CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt5-5-1-1/ALDE_00000920/. 236 See Paradissiotis v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 16, 20 (2001) (describing a regulatory taking as “not involv[ing] Paradissiotis v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 16, 20 (2001) (describing a regulatory taking as “not involv[ing]
physical invasion or seizure of property [but rather] concern[ing] action that affects an owner’s use of property, … physical invasion or seizure of property [but rather] concern[ing] action that affects an owner’s use of property, …
based on the ‘general rule ... that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be based on the ‘general rule ... that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking’”) (citing recognized as a taking’”) (citing Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)),, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)), aff’d, 304 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. , 304 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir.
2002). 2002).
~~220~~237 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 673 n. 6. (noting that “an American claimant may not use an attachment that is subject , 453 U.S. at 673 n. 6. (noting that “an American claimant may not use an attachment that is subject
to a revocable license and that has been obtained after the entry of a freeze order to limit in any way the actions the to a revocable license and that has been obtained after the entry of a freeze order to limit in any way the actions the
President may take” pursuant to IEEPA). may take” pursuant to IEEPA).
~~221 Ibid. at 673–674; see also Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat. Airlines Corp., 657 F.2d 3, 4 (2d Cir. 1981) (“The President's~~
~~action in nullifying the attachments did not constitute a taking of property for which compensation must be paid.”).~~
~~222 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (landlord leasing office space to a~~
~~foreign government “did so against the backdrop of the government’s foreign policy power” and did not have~~
~~reasonable investment-backed expectation that its contract would be fulfilled); Rockefeller Ctr. Properties v. United~~
~~States, 32 Fed. Cl. 586, 592 (1995) (“[T]hose who trade with foreign governments must… take the President’s power~~
~~into account in structuring their transactions.”); Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]hose~~
~~who enter into employment contracts overseas do so in light of one salient fact of economic life: that their ability to~~
~~perform and compel performance is contingent upon the continuation of friendly relations between nations” (citing~~
Chang v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 555, 559-60 (1987)); Paradissiotis, 49 Fed. Cl. at 21 (holding there was no taking
~~because “plaintiff'’s [stock options] were ‘in every sense subordinate to the President’s power under the IEEPA.’”).~~
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~~compensable taking.223~~Congressional Research Service 35 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency. The frozen assets serve as a “bargaining chip” to be used by the President when dealing with a hostile country. Accordingly, it is difficult to accept petitioner’s argument because the practical effect of it is to allow individual claimants throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate this “bargaining chip” through attachments, garnishments, or similar encumbrances on property. Neither the purpose the statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language supports such a result.238 Similarly, a lower court held that the extinguishment of contractual rights due to sanctions enacted pursuant to IEEPA does not amount to a regulatory taking requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment.239 Even though the plaintiff suffered “obvious economic loss” due to the sanctions regulations, that factor alone was not enough to sustain plaintiff's claim of a compensable taking.240 The court quoted long-standing Supreme Court precedent to support its The court quoted long-standing Supreme Court precedent to support its
finding: finding:
A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring upon individuals great A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring upon individuals great
losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless. They may destroy the worth losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless. They may destroy the worth
of contracts. But whoever supposed that, because of this, a tariff could not be changed, or of contracts. But whoever supposed that, because of this, a tariff could not be changed, or
a non-intercourse act, or an embargo be enacted, or a war be declared? .... [W]as it ever a non-intercourse act, or an embargo be enacted, or a war be declared? .... [W]as it ever
imagined this was taking private property without compensation or without due process of imagined this was taking private property without compensation or without due process of
law?law?~~224~~241
Accordingly, it seems unlikely that entities whose business interests are harmed by the imposition Accordingly, it seems unlikely that entities whose business interests are harmed by the imposition
of sanctions pursuant to IEEPA will be entitled to compensation from the government for their of sanctions pursuant to IEEPA will be entitled to compensation from the government for their
losses. losses.
Persons whose assets have been directly blocked by the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office Persons whose assets have been directly blocked by the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) pursuant to IEEPA have likewise found little success of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) pursuant to IEEPA have likewise found little success
challenging the loss of the use of their assets as uncompensated takings.challenging the loss of the use of their assets as uncompensated takings.~~225~~242 Many courts have Many courts have
recognized that a temporary blocking of assets does not constitute a taking because it is a recognized that a temporary blocking of assets does not constitute a taking because it is a
temporary action that does not vest title in the United States.temporary action that does not vest title in the United States.~~226~~243 This conclusion is apparently so This conclusion is apparently so
even if the blocking of assets necessitates the closing altogether of a business enterprise.even if the blocking of assets necessitates the closing altogether of a business enterprise.~~227 In~~
~~some circumstances, however, a court may analyze at least the initial blocking of assets under a~~
~~Fourth Amendment standard for seizure.228 One court found a blocking to be unreasonable under~~
~~a Fourth Amendment standard where there was no reason that OFAC could not have first~~
~~obtained a judicial warrant.229~~
~~Fifth Amendment “Due Process” Clause~~
~~Some persons whose assets have been blocked have asserted that their right to due process has~~
~~been violated. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be~~
~~deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.230 Where one company protested~~
~~that the blocking of its assets without a pre-deprivation hearing violated its right to due process, a~~
~~district court found that a temporary deprivation of property does not necessarily give rise to a~~
~~right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.231 A second district court stated that the exigencies~~

~~223 Paradissiotis, 49 Fed. Cl. at 21.~~
~~224 Ibid. (citing Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1870), quoted in Chang, 859 F.2d at 897).~~
~~225~~244 In 238 Ibid. at 673–674; see also Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat. Airlines Corp., 657 F.2d 3, 4 (2d Cir. 1981) (“The President’s action in nullifying the attachments did not constitute a taking of property for which compensation must be paid.”). 239 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (landlord leasing office space to a foreign government “did so against the backdrop of the government’s foreign policy power” and did not have reasonable investment-backed expectation that its contract would be fulfilled); Rockefeller Ctr. Properties v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 586, 592 (1995) (“[T]hose who trade with foreign governments must… take the President’s power into account in structuring their transactions.”); Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]hose who enter into employment contracts overseas do so in light of one salient fact of economic life: that their ability to perform and compel performance is contingent upon the continuation of friendly relations between nations” (citing Chang v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 555, 559-60 (1987)); Paradissiotis, 49 Fed. Cl. at 21 (holding there was no taking because “plaintiff'’s [stock options] were ‘in every sense subordinate to the President’s power under the IEEPA.’”). 240 Paradissiotis, 49 Fed. Cl. at 21. 241 Ibid. (citing Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1870), quoted in Chang, 859 F.2d at 897). 242 Glob. Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 802 (N.D. Ill.) (“Takings claims have often been raised— Glob. Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 802 (N.D. Ill.) (“Takings claims have often been raised—
and consistently rejected—in the IEEPA context.”), and consistently rejected—in the IEEPA context.”), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002). , 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
~~226~~243 Ibid. Ibid. (citing (citing Tran Qui Than v. Regan, 658 F.2d 1296, 1304 (9th Cir.1981); , 658 F.2d 1296, 1304 (9th Cir.1981); Miranda v. Secretary of Treasury, 766 , 766
F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1985)); F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1985)); Holy Land Found. . for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 78–79 (D.D.C. 2002) , 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 78–79 (D.D.C. 2002)
(“[T]he case law is clear that a blocking of this nature does not constitute a seizure.” (citations omitted)), (“[T]he case law is clear that a blocking of this nature does not constitute a seizure.” (citations omitted)), aff'd, 333 F.3d , 333 F.3d
156 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
~~227~~244 IPT Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 92 CIV. 5542 (JFK), 1994 WL 613371, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that IPT Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 92 CIV. 5542 (JFK), 1994 WL 613371, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that
the blocking of assets is not a taking as title to the property has not vested in the Government, the company IPT did not the blocking of assets is not a taking as title to the property has not vested in the Government, the company IPT did not
become a government-owned enterprise, and any proceeds from a sale of the business or its assets will still vest in its become a government-owned enterprise, and any proceeds from a sale of the business or its assets will still vest in its
~~owners, who may claim such assets when the blocking order is lifted).~~
~~228 KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 872 (N.D. Ohio 2009); Al–~~
~~Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 585 F. Supp.2d 1233, 1263 (D. Or. 2008).~~
~~229 KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 883.~~
~~230 U.S. Const. Amdt V.~~
~~231 IPT Co., 1994 WL 613371, at *6 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 498~~
~~(1993); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976)).~~
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Congressional Research Service 36 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use some circumstances, however, a court may analyze at least the initial blocking of assets under a Fourth Amendment standard for seizure.245 One court found a blocking to be unreasonable under a Fourth Amendment standard where there was no reason that OFAC could not have first obtained a judicial warrant.246 Fifth Amendment “Due Process” Clause Some persons whose assets have been blocked have asserted that their right to due process has been violated. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.247 Where one company protested that the blocking of its assets without a pre-deprivation hearing violated its right to due process, a district court found that a temporary deprivation of property does not necessarily give rise to a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.248 A second district court stated that the exigencies of national security and foreign policy considerations that are implicated in IEEPA cases have of national security and foreign policy considerations that are implicated in IEEPA cases have
meant that OFAC historically has not provided pre-deprivation notice in sanctions programs.meant that OFAC historically has not provided pre-deprivation notice in sanctions programs.~~232~~249 A A
third district court stated that OFAC’s failure to provide a charitable foundation with notice or a third district court stated that OFAC’s failure to provide a charitable foundation with notice or a
hearing prior to its designation as a terrorist organization and blocking of its assets did not violate hearing prior to its designation as a terrorist organization and blocking of its assets did not violate
its right to procedural due process, because the OFAC designation and blocking order serve the its right to procedural due process, because the OFAC designation and blocking order serve the
important governmental interest of combating terrorism by curtailing the flow of terrorist important governmental interest of combating terrorism by curtailing the flow of terrorist
financing.financing.~~233~~250 That same court also held that prompt action by the government was necessary to That same court also held that prompt action by the government was necessary to
protect against the transfer of assets subject to the blocking order.protect against the transfer of assets subject to the blocking order.~~234~~251
In In Al Haramain Islamic Foundation v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Court of Appeals , the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit considered whether OFAC’s use of classified information without any for the Ninth Circuit considered whether OFAC’s use of classified information without any
disclosure of its content in its decision to freeze the assets of a charitable organization, and its disclosure of its content in its decision to freeze the assets of a charitable organization, and its
failure to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, violated the failure to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, violated the
organization’s right to procedural due process.organization’s right to procedural due process.~~235~~252 The court applied the balancing test set forth by The court applied the balancing test set forth by
the Supreme Court in its landmark administrative law case the Supreme Court in its landmark administrative law case Mathews v. Eldridge~~236~~253 to resolve to resolve
these questions.these questions.~~237~~254 Under the Under the Eldridge test, to determine if an individual has received test, to determine if an individual has received
constitutional due process, courts must weigh: constitutional due process, courts must weigh:
(1) [the person (1) [the person'’s or entitys or entity'’s] private property interest, s] private property interest,
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, as (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, as
well as the value of additional safeguards, and well as the value of additional safeguards, and
owners, who may claim such assets when the blocking order is lifted). 245 KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 872 (N.D. Ohio 2009); Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 585 F. Supp.2d 1233, 1263 (D. Or. 2008). 246 KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 883. 247 U.S. Constitution, Amdt. V. 248 IPT Co., 1994 WL 613371, at *6 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 498 (1993); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976)). 249 Glob. Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 803-04 (emphasizing “the Executive's need for speed in these matters, and the need to prevent the flight of assets and destruction of records”), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002). 250 Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (D.D.C. 2002). 251 Ibid. 252 686 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 2012). 253 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 254 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 979. Congressional Research Service 37 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use (3) the Government's interest in maintaining its procedures, including the burdens of (3) the Government's interest in maintaining its procedures, including the burdens of
additional procedural requirements.”additional procedural requirements.”~~238~~255
While weighing the interests and risks at issue in While weighing the interests and risks at issue in Al Haramain, the Ninth Circuit found the , the Ninth Circuit found the
organization’s property interest to be significant: organization’s property interest to be significant:
By design, a designation by OFAC completely shutters all domestic operations of an entity. By design, a designation by OFAC completely shutters all domestic operations of an entity.
All assets are frozen. No person or organization may conduct any business whatsoever with All assets are frozen. No person or organization may conduct any business whatsoever with
the entity, other than a very narrow category of actions such as legal defense. Civil penalties the entity, other than a very narrow category of actions such as legal defense. Civil penalties
attach even for unwitting violations. Criminal penalties, including up to 20 yearsattach even for unwitting violations. Criminal penalties, including up to 20 years'’
imprisonment, attach for willful violations. For domestic organizations such as AHIF–imprisonment, attach for willful violations. For domestic organizations such as AHIF–
Oregon, a designation means that it conducts no business at all. The designation is Oregon, a designation means that it conducts no business at all. The designation is
indefinite. Although an entity can seek administrative reconsideration and limited judicial indefinite. Although an entity can seek administrative reconsideration and limited judicial
relief, those remedies take considerable time, as evidenced by OFACrelief, those remedies take considerable time, as evidenced by OFAC'’s long administrative s long administrative
delay in this case and the ordinary delays inherent in our judicial system. In sum, delay in this case and the ordinary delays inherent in our judicial system. In sum,
designation is not a mere inconvenience or burden on certain property interests; designation designation is not a mere inconvenience or burden on certain property interests; designation
indefinitely renders a domestic organization financially defunct.indefinitely renders a domestic organization financially defunct.~~239~~256
Nevertheless, the court found “the government’s interest in national security [could not] be Nevertheless, the court found “the government’s interest in national security [could not] be
understated.”understated.”~~240~~257 In evaluating the government’s interest in maintaining its procedures, the Ninth In evaluating the government’s interest in maintaining its procedures, the Ninth

~~232 Glob. Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 803–04 (emphasizing “the Executive's need for speed in these matters, and~~
~~the need to prevent the flight of assets and destruction of records”), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).~~
~~233 Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (D.D.C. 2002).~~
~~234 Ibid.~~
~~235 686 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 2012).~~
~~236 424 U.S. 319 (1976).~~
~~237 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 979.~~
~~238 Ibid. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35).~~
~~239 Ibid. at 979–80 (internal citations omitted).~~
~~240 Ibid. at 980.~~
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Circuit explained that the Constitution requires that the government “take reasonable measures to Circuit explained that the Constitution requires that the government “take reasonable measures to
ensure basic fairness to the private party and that the government follow procedures reasonably ensure basic fairness to the private party and that the government follow procedures reasonably
designed to protect against erroneous deprivation of the private party’s interests.”designed to protect against erroneous deprivation of the private party’s interests.”~~241~~258 While the While the
Ninth Circuit had previously held that the use of undisclosed information in a case involving the Ninth Circuit had previously held that the use of undisclosed information in a case involving the
exclusion of certain longtime resident aliens should be considered presumptively exclusion of certain longtime resident aliens should be considered presumptively
unconstitutional,unconstitutional,~~242~~259 the court found that the presumption had been overcome in this case. the court found that the presumption had been overcome in this case.~~243~~260 The The
Ninth Circuit noted that all federal courts that have considered the argument that OFAC may not Ninth Circuit noted that all federal courts that have considered the argument that OFAC may not
use undisclosed classified information in making its determinations have rejected it.use undisclosed classified information in making its determinations have rejected it.~~244~~261 Although Although
the court found that OFAC’s failure to provide even an unclassified summary of the information the court found that OFAC’s failure to provide even an unclassified summary of the information
at issue was a violation of the organization’s due process rights,at issue was a violation of the organization’s due process rights,~~245~~262 the court deemed the error the court deemed the error
harmless because it would not likely have affected the outcome of the case.harmless because it would not likely have affected the outcome of the case.~~246~~263
In the same case, the Ninth Circuit also considered the organization’s argument that it had been In the same case, the Ninth Circuit also considered the organization’s argument that it had been
denied adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.denied adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.~~247~~264 Specifically, the organization asserted Specifically, the organization asserted
that OFAC had refused to disclose its reasons for investigating and designating the organization, that OFAC had refused to disclose its reasons for investigating and designating the organization,
255 Ibid. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35). 256 Ibid. at 979–80 (internal citations omitted). 257 Ibid. at 980. 258 Ibid. 259 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 981 (stating the use of classified information “should be presumptively unconstitutional” (citing Am.–Arab Anti–Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir.1995)). 260 Ibid. at 982 “[T]the use of classified information in the fight against terrorism, during a presidentially declared “national emergency,” qualifies as sufficiently “extraordinary” to overcome the presumption.”). 261 Ibid. at 981 (citing Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F. Supp. 2d 637, 660 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Al–Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 72 (D.D.C. 2008)). 262 Ibid. at 984 (“OFAC’s failure to pursue potential mitigation measures violated AHIF–Oregon’s due process rights.”). 263 Ibid. at 990. 264 Ibid. at 984. Congressional Research Service 38 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use leaving it unable to respond adequately to OFAC’s unknown suspicions.265~~leaving it unable to respond adequately to OFAC’s unknown suspicions.248~~ Because OFAC had Because OFAC had
provided the organization with only one document to support its designation over the four-year provided the organization with only one document to support its designation over the four-year
period between the freezing of its assets and period between the freezing of its assets and ~~the~~its redesignation redesignation ~~of the organization~~ as a specially as a specially
designated global terrorist (SDGT), the court agreed that designated global terrorist (SDGT), the court agreed that ~~the organization had been deprived of~~
~~due process rights.249~~OFAC had deprived the organization’s procedural due process rights.266 However, the court found that this error too was harmless. However, the court found that this error too was harmless.~~250~~267
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that a foreign individual could not The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that a foreign individual could not
challenge his designation as a specially designated national under IEEPA on due process grounds challenge his designation as a specially designated national under IEEPA on due process grounds
because he had not established a sufficient connection with the United States to warrant because he had not established a sufficient connection with the United States to warrant
constitutional protections.constitutional protections.~~251~~268 The court acknowledged that the D.C. Circuit has not articulated a The court acknowledged that the D.C. Circuit has not articulated a
specific test for determining whether a foreign national residing outside the United States specific test for determining whether a foreign national residing outside the United States
maintains the requisite “substantial connections” to avail himself of due process rights.maintains the requisite “substantial connections” to avail himself of due process rights.~~252 The~~

~~241 Ibid.~~
~~242 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 981 (stating the use of classified information “should be presumptively unconstitutional”~~
~~(citing Am.–Arab Anti–Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir.1995)).~~
~~243 Ibid. at 982 “[T]the use of classified information in the fight against terrorism, during a presidentially declared~~
~~“national emergency,” qualifies as sufficiently “extraordinary” to overcome the presumption.”).~~
~~244 Ibid. at 981 (citing Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.~~
~~2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.~~
~~Ohio 2010); Al–Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C. 2008)).~~
~~245 Ibid. at 984 (“OFAC's failure to pursue potential mitigation measures violated AHIF–Oregon's due process rights.”).~~
~~246 Ibid. at 990.~~
~~247 Ibid. at 984.~~
~~248 Ibid. at 984-85.~~
~~249~~269 The court held that, irrespective of the proper test, the individual had failed to meet the requisite constitutional standard because he “ha[d] not established any connection to the United States, let alone a substantial one.”270 The court did, however, hold that the foreign national retained the right to procedural review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).271 First Amendment Challenges Some courts have considered whether asset blocking or penalties imposed pursuant to regulations promulgated under IEEPA have violated the subjects’ First Amendment rights to free association, free speech, or religion. Challenges on these grounds have typically failed.272 Courts have held that there is no First Amendment right to support terrorists.273 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 265 Ibid. at 984-85. 266 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 987 (holding that, at a minimum, OFAC must provide a timely statement of reasons for , 686 F.3d at 987 (holding that, at a minimum, OFAC must provide a timely statement of reasons for
the investigation). the investigation).
~~250~~267 Ibid. at 990 (“Even if [the organization] had enjoyed better access to classified information and constitutionally Ibid. at 990 (“Even if [the organization] had enjoyed better access to classified information and constitutionally
adequate notice, we are confident that it would not have changed OFACadequate notice, we are confident that it would not have changed OFAC'’s ultimate designation determination.”). s ultimate designation determination.”).
~~251~~268 Rakhimov v. Gacki, No. CV 19-2554 (JEB), 2020 WL 1911561, at *5 (D.D.C. Rakhimov v. Gacki, No. CV 19-2554 (JEB), 2020 WL 1911561, at *5 (D.D.C. ~~Apr.~~April 20, 2020) (citing People's 20, 2020) (citing People's
Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); see also Fulmen Co. v. Office of Fulmen Co. v. Office of
Foreign Assets Control, No. CV 18-2949 (RJL), 2020 WL 1536341, at *5 (D.D.C. Foreign Assets Control, No. CV 18-2949 (RJL), 2020 WL 1536341, at *5 (D.D.C. ~~Mar.~~March 31, 2020) (“Because Fulmen’s 31, 2020) (“Because Fulmen’s
own pleadings demonstrate no property or presence in the United States, it cannot establish the ‘substantial own pleadings demonstrate no property or presence in the United States, it cannot establish the ‘substantial
connections’ necessary to potentially entitle it to constitutional protections as a non-resident alien.”). connections’ necessary to potentially entitle it to constitutional protections as a non-resident alien.”).
~~252~~269 Rakhimov, 2020 WL 1911561 at *5 (citing Nat, 2020 WL 1911561 at *5 (citing Nat'’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Depl Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep'’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, t of State, 251 F.3d 192,
201–03 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 32 Cty. Sovereignty Comm. v. U.S. Dep201–03 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 32 Cty. Sovereignty Comm. v. U.S. Dep'’t of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). t of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
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~~court held that, irrespective of the proper test, the individual had failed to meet the requisite~~
~~constitutional standard because he “ha[d] not established any connection to the United States, let~~
~~alone a substantial one.”253 The court did, however, hold that the foreign national retained the~~
~~right to procedural review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).254~~
~~First Amendment Challenges~~
~~Some courts have considered whether asset blocking or penalties imposed pursuant to regulations~~
~~promulgated under IEEPA have violated the subjects’ First Amendment rights to free association,~~
~~free speech, or religion. Challenges on these grounds have typically failed.255 Courts have held~~
~~that there is no First Amendment right to support terrorists.256 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the~~
270 Ibid. 271 See ibid. at *6 (observing that the court must follow “the APA’s [5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)] ‘highly deferential standard,’ meaning that [it] may set aside Treasury’s action ‘only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’”) (quoting Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). 272 KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (“Courts have uniformly held that OFAC's blocking and designation authorities do not reach a substantial amount of protected speech, and that its restrictions are narrowly tailored.”). Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52-55 (D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting claims that OFAC blocking action violated plaintiff's First Amendment freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of religion, and noting that “nothing in the IEEPA or the executive order prohibits [the plaintiff] from expressing its views”); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 570 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“The First Amendment's guarantee of associational freedom is no license to supply terrorist organizations with resources or material support in any form, including services as a combatant.”). 273 Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that “where an organization is found to have supported terrorism, government actions to suspend that support are not unconstitutional” under the First Amendment); Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 166 (holding “as other courts have,” with respect to a First Amendment right to association claim, that “there is no First Amendment right nor any other constitutional right to support terrorists” (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000)). Congressional Research Service 39 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use District of Columbia Circuit distinguished advocacy from financial support and held that the District of Columbia Circuit distinguished advocacy from financial support and held that the
blocking of assets affected only the ability to provide financial support, but did not implicate the blocking of assets affected only the ability to provide financial support, but did not implicate the
organization’s freedom of association.organization’s freedom of association.~~257~~274 Similarly, a district court interpreted relevant case law to Similarly, a district court interpreted relevant case law to
hold that government actions prohibiting charitable contributions are subject to intermediate hold that government actions prohibiting charitable contributions are subject to intermediate
scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, a higher standard that scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, a higher standard that typically applies to regulations implicating ~~applies to~~ political contributions.political contributions.~~258~~275
With respect to a free speech challenge brought by a charitable organization whose assets were With respect to a free speech challenge brought by a charitable organization whose assets were
temporarily blocked during the pendency of an investigation, a district court explained that “when temporarily blocked during the pendency of an investigation, a district court explained that “when
‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important government interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental important government interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”~~259~~276 Accordingly, the district court applied the Accordingly, the district court applied the
following test to determine whether the designations and blocking actions were lawful. Citing the following test to determine whether the designations and blocking actions were lawful. Citing the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. O’Brien, the court stated that a government , the court stated that a government
regulation is sufficiently justified if: regulation is sufficiently justified if:
(1) it is within the constitutional power of the government; (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government;

~~253 Ibid.~~
~~254 See ibid. at *6 (observing that the court must follow “the APA’s [5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)] ‘highly deferential~~
~~standard,’ meaning that [it] may set aside Treasury’s action ‘only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or~~
~~otherwise not in accordance with law.’) (quoting Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).~~
~~255 KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (“Courts have uniformly held that OFAC's blocking and designation authorities~~
~~do not reach a substantial amount of protected speech, and that its restrictions are narrowly tailored.”). Islamic Am.~~
~~Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52–55 (D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting claims that OFAC~~
~~blocking action violated plaintiff's First Amendment freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of~~
~~religion, and noting that “nothing in the IEEPA or the executive order prohibits [the plaintiff] from expressing its~~
~~views”); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 570 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“The First Amendment's guarantee of~~
~~associational freedom is no license to supply terrorist organizations with resources or material support in any form,~~
~~including services as a combatant.”).~~
~~256 Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that “where an organization is~~
~~found to have supported terrorism, government actions to suspend that support are not unconstitutional” under the First~~
~~Amendment); Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 166 (holding “as other courts have,” with respect to a First Amendment right to~~
~~association claim, that “there is no First Amendment right nor any other constitutional right to support terrorists” (citing~~
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000)).
~~257 Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at 736 (“The blocking was not based on, nor does it prohibit, associational~~
~~activity other than financial support.”).~~
~~258 Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting cases that concluded that intermediate scrutiny applies~~
~~to a designation as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) and blocking order affecting funds purportedly~~
~~intended for charitable purposes).~~
~~259 Glob. Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968)),~~ ~~aff'd on~~
~~other grounds, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~(2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;~~
~~(3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and~~
~~(4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is~~
~~essential to the furtherance of that interest.260~~
~~The court found the government’s actions to fall within the bounds of this test:~~
~~First, the President clearly had the power to issue the Executive Order. Second, the~~
~~Executive Order promotes an important and substantial government interest—that of~~
~~preventing terrorist attacks. Third, the government's action is unrelated to the suppression~~
~~of free expression; it prohibits the provision of financial and other support to terrorists.~~
~~Fourth, the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are no greater than~~
~~necessary.261~~
~~However, with respect to an organization that was not itself designated as an SDGT but wished to~~
~~conduct coordinated advocacy with another organization that was so designated, one appellate~~
~~court found that an OFAC regulation barring such coordinated advocacy based on its content was~~
~~subject to strict scrutiny.262 Accordingly, the court rejected the government’s reliance on the~~
~~Supreme Court’s decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project263 to find that the regulation~~
~~impermissibly implicated the organization’s right to free speech.264 Accordingly, there may be~~
~~some circumstances where the First Amendment protects speech coordinated with (but not on~~
~~behalf of) an organization designated as an SDGT.~~
~~Use of IEEPA to Continue Enforcing the Export Administration Act (EAA)~~
~~Until the recent enactment of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018,265 export of dual use goods~~
~~and services was regulated pursuant to the authority of the Export Administration Act (EAA),266~~
~~which was subject to periodic expiry and reauthorization. President Reagan was the first President~~
~~to use IEEPA as a vehicle for continuing the enforcement of the EAA’s export controls.267~~
~~After Congress did not extend the expired EAA, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12444~~
~~in 1983, finding that “unrestricted access of foreign parties to United States commercial goods,~~
~~technology, and technical data and the existence of certain boycott practices of foreign nations~~
~~constitute, in light of the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, an unusual and~~
~~extraordinary threat to the national security.”268 Although the EAA had been reauthorized for~~
~~short periods since its initial expiration in 1983, every subsequent President utilized the~~

~~260 Ibid. (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77).~~
~~261 Ibid.~~
~~262 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 997 (holding strict scrutiny applies and that, “[a]ccordingly, the prohibition survives only~~
~~if it is narrowly tailored to advance the concededly compelling government interest of preventing terrorism”).~~
~~263 561 U.S. 1, 38 (2010) (upholding the prohibition on material support of terrorist organizations, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B,~~
~~against First Amendment challenge).~~
~~264 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 1001 (holding that under the prevailing fact circumstances, OFAC's content-based~~
~~prohibitions on speech violate the First Amendment).~~
~~265 P.L. 115-232, Title XVIII(B). In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act to repeal the Export~~
~~Administration Act of 1979 and provide new statutory authority for the continuation of EAR. However, three sections~~
~~were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise of IEEPA. See~~ ~~“The Export~~
~~Control Reform Act of 2018”~~ ~~below.~~
~~266 P.L. 96-72, § 2, 93 Stat. 503 (1979), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4623 (2018).~~
~~267 E.O. 12444, 48 Fed. Reg. 48,215 (Oct. 18, 1983).~~
~~268 Ibid.~~
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~~authorities granted under IEEPA to maintain the existing system of export controls during periods~~
~~of lapse. Figure 1.~~
~~In the latest iteration, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13222 in 2001, finding~~
~~the existence of a national emergency with respect to the expiration of the EAA and directing—~~
~~pursuant to the authorities allocated under IEEPA—that “the provisions for administration of the~~
~~[EAA] shall be carried out under this order so as to continue in full force and effect…the export~~
~~control system heretofore maintained.”269 Presidents Obama and Trump annually extended the~~
~~2001 executive order.270~~
~~Courts have generally treated this arrangement as authorized by Congress,271 although certain~~
~~provisions of the EAA in effect under IEEPA have led to challenges. The determining factor~~
~~appears to be whether IEEPA itself provides the President the authority to carry out the~~
~~challenged action. In one case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a conviction~~
~~for an attempt to violate the regulations even though the EAA had expired and did not expressly~~
~~criminalize such attempts.272 The circuit court rejected the defendants’ argument that the President~~
~~had exceeded his delegated authority under the EEA by “enlarging” the crimes punishable under~~
~~the regulations.273~~
~~Nevertheless, a district court held that the conspiracy provisions of the EAA regulations were~~
~~rendered inoperative by the lapse of the EAA and “could not be repromulgated by executive order~~
~~under the general powers that IEEPA vests in the President.”274 The district court found that, even~~
~~if Congress intended to preserve the operation of the EAA through IEEPA, that intent was limited~~
~~by the scope of the statutes’ substantive coverage at the time of IEEPA’s enactment, when no~~
~~conspiracy provision existed in either statute.275~~
~~The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the application of the EAA as a statute~~
~~permitting the government to withhold information under exemption 3 of the Freedom of~~
~~Information Act (FOIA),276 which exempts from disclosure information exempted from disclosure~~
~~by statute, even though the EAA had expired.277 Referring to legislative history it interpreted as~~
~~congressional approval of the use of IEEPA to continue the EAA provisions during periods of~~
~~lapse, the court stated:~~
~~Although the legislative history does not refer to the EAA’s confidentiality provision, it~~
~~does evince Congress's intent to authorize the President to preserve the operation of the~~
~~export regulations promulgated under the EAA. Moreover, it is significant for purposes of~~
~~determining legislative intent that Congress acted with the knowledge that the EAA’s~~
~~export regulations had long provided for confidentiality and that the President's ongoing~~

~~269 E.O. 13222, 66 Fed. Reg. 44,025 (Aug. 17, 2001).~~
~~270 See, e.g., Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,005 (Aug. 15, 2017).~~
~~271 Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Courts uniformly have read [the executive~~
~~order preserving the EAA regulations under IEEPA] to mean that the statute remained in full effect during the periods~~
~~of lapse.”). In this case, Sudan challenged its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism pursuant to a provision of the~~
~~EAA because the statute had expired.~~
~~272 United States v. Mechanic, 809 F.2d 1111, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1987).~~
~~273 Ibid. at 1113-14 (emphasizing the foreign affairs connection served by the EAA).~~
~~274 United States v. Quinn, 401 F. Supp. 2d 80, 93 (D.D.C. 2005).~~
~~275 Ibid. at 95.~~
~~276 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2018).~~
~~277 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 317 F.3d 275, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2003).~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
42

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~practice of extending the EAA by executive order had always included these confidentiality~~
~~protections.278~~
~~The D.C. Circuit distinguished this holding in a later case involving appellate jurisdiction over a~~
~~decision by the Department of Commerce to apply sanctions for a company’s violation of the~~
~~EAA regulations.279 Pursuant to the regulations and under the direction of the Commerce~~
~~Department, the company sought judicial review directly in the D.C. Circuit.280 The D.C. Circuit,~~
~~however, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction:~~
~~This court would have jurisdiction pursuant to the President's order only if the President~~
~~has the authority to confer jurisdiction—an authority that, if it exists, must derive from~~
~~either the Executive's inherent power under the Constitution or a permissible delegation of~~
~~power from Congress. The former is unavailing, as the Constitution vests the power to~~
~~confer jurisdiction in Congress alone. Whether the executive order can provide the basis of~~
~~our jurisdiction, then, turns on whether the President can confer jurisdiction on this court~~
~~under the auspices of IEEPA….. We conclude that the President lacks that power. Nothing~~
~~in the text of IEEPA delegates to the President the authority to grant jurisdiction to any~~
~~federal court.281~~
~~Consequently, the appeal of the agency decision was determined to belong in the district court~~
~~according to the default rule under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).282~~ (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.277 The court found the government’s actions fell within the bounds of this test: First, the President clearly had the power to issue the Executive Order. Second, the Executive Order promotes an important and substantial government interest—that of preventing terrorist attacks. Third, the government’s action is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; it prohibits the provision of financial and other support to terrorists. Fourth, the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are no greater than necessary.278 With respect to an organization that was not itself designated as an SDGT but wished to conduct coordinated advocacy with another organization that was so designated, one appellate court found that an OFAC regulation barring such coordinated advocacy based on its content was subject to strict scrutiny.279 The court rejected the government’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project280 to find that the regulation impermissibly implicated the organization’s right to free speech.281 Accordingly, there may be some circumstances where the 274 Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at 736 (“The blocking was not based on, nor does it prohibit, associational activity other than financial support.”). 275 Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting cases that concluded that intermediate scrutiny applies to a designation as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) and blocking order affecting funds purportedly intended for charitable purposes). 276 Glob. Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)), aff'd on other grounds, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002). 277 Ibid. (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77). 278 Ibid. 279 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 997 (holding strict scrutiny applies and that, “[a]ccordingly, the prohibition survives only if it is narrowly tailored to advance the concededly compelling government interest of preventing terrorism”). 280 561 U.S. 1, 38 (2010) (upholding the prohibition on material support of terrorist organizations, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, against First Amendment challenge). 281 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 1001 (holding that under the prevailing fact circumstances, OFAC's content-based Congressional Research Service 40 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use First Amendment protects speech coordinated with (but not on behalf of) an organization designated as an SDGT. First Amendment—Informational Materials and Communications Exception under IEEPA Litigants have had some success challenging IEEPA regulations that effectively shut down communications platforms altogether. On May 15, 2019, President Donald J. Trump, finding “that the unrestricted acquisition or use in the United States of information and communications technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries” constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, declared a national emergency under the authority of the NEA and invoked authorities granted by IEEPA.282 A little more than a year later, on August 6, 2020, President Trump issued two executive orders under that same national emergency to address “the spread in the United States of mobile applications developed and owned by companies in [China].”283 The executive orders applied to the video sharing platform TikTok284 and the communications platform WeChat, among others,285 and prohibited certain transactions, as identified by the Secretary of Commerce, with ByteDance Ltd., TikTok’s owner, and Tencent Holdings Ltd., WeChat’s owner.286 After the Trump Administration issued regulations barring transactions involving the TikTok and WeChat communications applications (apps) in the United States, users of TikTok and WeChat challenged the executive orders and the Commerce Department memorandums implementing them on constitutional and statutory grounds. Specifically, in two separate cases, litigants argued that orders and memorandums violated their First Amendment right to free speech and violated the IEEPA restriction on regulating transactions of informational materials.287 TikTok also brought a separate suit to enjoin the restrictions.288 In the first case, Marland v. Trump, plaintiffs, users of the video-sharing application TikTok, challenged the Commerce Department’s memorandum that identified six prohibited transactions under E.O. 13942.289 The Commerce TikTok Identification specified that it bans only business-to- prohibitions on speech violate the First Amendment). 282 E.O. 13873 (May 15, 2019), Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689 (May 17, 2019). 283 E.O. 13942 (August 6, 2020), Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok, and Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (August 11, 2020); E.O. 13943 (August 6, 2020), Addressing the Threat Posed by WeChat, and Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,641 (August 11, 2020). 284 E.O. 13942. 285 E.O. 13943. 286 E.O. 13942; E.O. 13943. 287 Marland v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 624 (E.D. Pa. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 5346749, at *1 (3d Cir. July 14, 2021); U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 4692706 (9th Cir. August 9, 2021). 288 TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, 507 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D.D.C. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 3082803, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2021). 289 Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 632. Congressional Research Service 41 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use business transactions and does not apply to exchanges of business or personal information among TikTok users.290 An earlier Commerce Department memorandum noted that the effect of the prohibitions, most of which were scheduled to apply on November 12, 2020, would be to “significantly reduce the functionality and usability of the app in the United States,” and that “these prohibitions may ultimately make the application less effective and may be challenging for U.S.-based TikTok users.”291 The plaintiffs contended that the Commerce Identification violated the First and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the APA.292 The district court declined to address the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenges and certain other claims, and considered instead their claim that the Commerce TikTok Identification was an ultra vires exercise of agency authority under the APA because it violates IEEPA’s “informational material” exception as well as the exception for “personal communication[s] . . . not involv[ing] a transfer of anything of value.”293 The court employed a textual interpretation of IEEPA’s informational material bar to find that the short-format videos exchanged via TikTok clearly fell into IEEPA’s non-exhaustive exemplary list of informational materials protected from regulation or prohibition because they are “analogous to the ‘films,’ ‘artworks,’ ‘photographs,’ and ‘news wire feeds’ expressly protected under § 1702(b)(3).”294 The court next determined that the Commerce TikTok Identification, even though it did not directly ban TikTok users from communicating via TikTok, amounted, at minimum, to an indirect regulation of such communications by making them impossible to carry out.295 The government sought to characterize the burden on TikTok users as merely incidental to the Commerce Identification’s intended objective of prohibiting TikTok’s commercial transactions, and that any incidental burden cannot violated IEEPA.296 The court, pointing to legislative history of the Berman Amendments, rejected the government’s contention that the object of the regulation must itself involve transactions of informational material to be in violation of IEEPA’s informational material exception.297 The court observed, “[t]he Government’s suggested reading ignores Congress’s deliberate insertion of the word ‘indirectly’ into IEEPA.”298 While the court accepted the notion that some burdens on transactions involving informational materials might be so tangential as to survive review, it declared that this case “does not present a line-drawing problem” between indirect regulation and tangential effects.299 In the next case, TikTok and its Beijing-based parent company ByteDance sued to enjoin the Commerce TikTok Identification prohibitions and were initially granted a nationwide preliminary injunction on the first of the prohibitions, which involved availability of the video-sharing app in 290 Identification of Prohibited Transactions to Implement Executive Order 13942 and Address the Threat Posed by TikTok and the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 85 Fed. Reg. 60,061 (September 24, 2020) (the “Commerce TikTok Identification”). 291 Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 632 (quoting September 17 Commerce Department memorandum). 292 Ibid. at 634. 293 Ibid. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702; 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1) and (3)). 294 Ibid. at 636. 295 Ibid. at 637 (“[T]he effect of the Identification will be to undermine the app’s functionality such that U.S. users will be prevented from exchanging data on the app.”). 296 Ibid. 297 Ibid. at 638. 298 Ibid. 299 Ibid. at 639. Congressional Research Service 42 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use app stores.300 The district court determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the prohibition contravened the informational material exception.301 The court explained that the content users share through TikTok falls into the category of informational materials because it “appears to be (or to be analogous to) ‘publications, films, . . . photographs, . . . artworks, . . . and news wire feeds.’”302 Like the court in Marland, the district court in TikTok Inc. rejected the government’s contention that the prohibition involved only business-to-business transactions based on the finding that the “purpose and effect” of the prohibition on U.S. users was “to limit, and ultimately reduce to zero, the number of U.S. users who can comment on the platform and have their personal data on TikTok.”303 The court also found it implausible that information exchanged on TikTok would fall within a carve-out to the informational materials exception under the Espionage Act for “shar[ing] U.S. defense secrets . . . with foreign adversaries”.304 The IEEPA exception also covers “personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of value.”305 The government in TikTok argued that, even if personal communications shared over TikTok have no economic value to the creators and recipients, such communications nevertheless have an economic value to the platform as a whole.306 The district court rejected this argument, stating “such an expansive reading of the phrase ‘anything of value’ would write the personal-communications limitation out of the statute.”307 The court reasoned that, “[a]ll communication service providers—from televisions stations and publishers to cellular phone carriers—get some value from a user’s ‘presence on’ their platform.”308 The third case stems from the Commerce Secretary’s issuance of “Identification of Prohibited Transactions to Implement Executive Order 13943 and Address the Threat Posed by WeChat and the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,” identifying the prohibited transactions (Commerce WeChat Identification). 309 The Commerce WeChat Identification further clarified that these prohibitions “only apply to the parties to business-to-business transactions” and did not apply to “[t]he exchange between or among WeChat mobile application users of personal or business information using the WeChat mobile application, to include the transferring and receiving of funds,” among other things.310 The U.S. users of the messaging, social-media, and mobile-payment app WeChat, sued to challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order 13943 on First Amendment and Fifth Amendment grounds, as well its compliance with the IEEPA exception precluding regulation of personal communications.311 The government did not contest that the 300 TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, 490 F. Supp. 3d 73 (D.D.C. 2020). 301 Ibid. at 80. 302 Ibid. at 82 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3)). 303 Ibid. at 81. 304 Ibid. at 83. 305 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1). 306 TikTok, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 83. 307 Ibid. 308 Ibid. 309 U.S. Commerce Dep’t, https://www.commerce.gov/files/identification-prohibited-transactions-implement-executive-order-13943-and-address-threat. 310 Ibid. 311 U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020). Congressional Research Service 43 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use prohibitions would result in shutting down WeChat for users as a platform for the exchange of information.312 Addressing the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge, the district court agreed that the plaintiffs established a strong showing that the WeChat ban unlawfully foreclosed “an entire medium of public expression” or amounted to an unlawful prior restraint of their communications. 313 The court concluded that Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking WeChat users in the United States do not have any other viable means of communicating electronically, “not only because China bans other apps, but also because Chinese speakers with limited English proficiency have no options other than WeChat.”314 The court suggested, without deciding, that the WeChat ban could receive heightened First Amendment strict scrutiny if decided on the merits.315 With regard to intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their First Amendment challenge. An intermediate form of scrutiny is normally reserved for restrictions on the “time, place, or manner,” and a time, place, or manner restriction survives such scrutiny if it “(1) is narrowly tailored, (2) serves a significant governmental interest unrelated to the content of the speech, and (3) leaves open adequate channels for communication.”316 The court agreed that the government’s national security interest in preventing WeChat (and China) collection of data from U.S. users is significant, but that the “effective ban” did not advance that interest in a narrowly tailored way given the “obvious alternatives to a complete ban, such as barring WeChat from government devices” or enhancing data security.317 The court concluded that “[o]n this limited record, the prohibited transactions burden substantially more speech than is necessary to serve the government’s significant interest in national security, especially given the lack of substitute channels for communication.”318 The court further determined that the immediate shutdown of WeChat would cause irreparable harm to the plaintiffs by eliminating their platform for communication.319 In assessing the balance of equities and the public interest (elements that merge where the government is a party),320 the court found that the balance of equities tipped in plaintiffs’ favor and the public interest favored protecting the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.321 The court framed the government’s contention that an injunction would “frustrate and displace the President’s determination of how best to address threats to national security”322 as important, but deemed the evidence of the threat posed specifically by WeChat to be only modest, noting that the wholesale shutdown of WeChat burdens more speech than necessary to serve the government’s national security and foreign policy 312 Ibid. at 926 (referring to plaintiffs’ description of WeChat as “a public square for the Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking community in the U.S”). 313 Ibid. at 927 314 Ibid. at (discounting government’s “argument that other substitute social-media apps permit communication”). 315 Ibid. at 926-27In order to justify a prior restraint, the government must demonstrate that the restraint is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” Twitter, Inc. v. Sessions, 263 F. Supp. 3d 803, 810 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539. 571 (1979); Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 316 U.S. WeChat Users Alliance, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 927 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Pac. Coast Horseshoeing Sch., Inc. v. Kirchmeyer, 961 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020)). 317 Ibid. 318 Ibid. at 928 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). 319 Ibid. at 929. 320 Ibid. (citing California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018)). 321 Ibid. (citing Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2019)). 322 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 44 link to page 55 link to page 55 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use interests.323 Accordingly, the court entered a preliminary nationwide injunction of the Commerce WeChat Identification.324 All three courts adjudicating these disputes issued preliminary injunctions, and the government appealed each decision.325 The Biden Administration initially sought to pause the litigation while it reviewed U.S.-China policy and the effective social media platform bans.326 President Biden subsequently issued an executive order rescinding the relevant executive orders and the Commerce Department’s implementing memorandums,327 making the litigation moot.328 The original underlying executive order related to the information and communications technology and services supply chain, 329 however, remains intact with elaborations set forth in Executive Order 14034. Consequently, should the Biden Administration decide to institute new restrictions on the platforms, the First Amendment issue and the interpretation of IEEPA’s exception for informational materials and personal communications may arise again in litigation. Use of IEEPA to Continue Enforcing the Export Administration Act (EAA) Until the recent enactment of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018,330 export of dual use goods and services was regulated pursuant to the authority of the Export Administration Act (EAA),331 which was subject to periodic expiry and reauthorization. President Reagan was the first President to use IEEPA as a vehicle for continuing the enforcement of the EAA’s export controls.332 After Congress did not extend the expired EAA, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12444 in 1983, finding that “unrestricted access of foreign parties to United States commercial goods, technology, and technical data and the existence of certain boycott practices of foreign nations constitute, in light of the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security.”333 Although the EAA had been reauthorized for short periods since its initial expiration in 1983, every subsequent President utilized the authorities granted under IEEPA to maintain the existing system of export controls during periods of lapse. 323 Ibid. 324 Ibid. at 930. 325 Marland v. Trump, No. 20-3322 (3d Cir. filed November11, 2020); TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, No. 20-5381 (D.C. Cir. filed December 29, 2020); U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, No. 20-16908 (9th Cir. filed October 2, 2020). 326 Jeanne Whalen, Biden asks for pause in Trump’s effort to ban WeChat, WASH. POST, February 11, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/02/11/wechat-trump-biden-pause/. 327 E.O. 14034 of June 9, 2021, “Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries,” 86 Fed. Reg. 31,423 (June11, 2021). 328 Marland v. Trump, No. 20-3322, 2021 WL 5346749, at *1 (3d Cir. July 14, 2021) (dismissing appeal pursuant to agreement between parties); TikTok Inc. v. Biden, No. 20-5381, 2021 WL 3082803, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2021) (dismissing appeal at government’s request); WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, No. 20-16908, 2021 WL 4692706, at *1 (9th Cir. August 9, 2021) (same). 329 E.O. 13873 of May 15, 2019, “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,” 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689 (May 17, 2019). 330 P.L. 115-232, Title XVIII(B). In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act to repeal the Export Administration Act of 1979 and provide new statutory authority for the continuation of EAR. However, three sections were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise of IEEPA. See “The Export Control Reform Act of 2018” section below. 331 P.L. 96-72, § 2, 93 Stat. 503 (1979), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4623 (2018). 332 E.O. 12444, 48 Fed. Reg. 48,215 (October 18, 1983). 333 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 45 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use In the latest iteration, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13222 in 2001, finding the existence of a national emergency with respect to the expiration of the EAA and directing—pursuant to the authorities allocated under IEEPA—that “the provisions for administration of the [EAA] shall be carried out under this order so as to continue in full force and effect … the export control system heretofore maintained.”334 Presidents Obama and Trump annually extended the 2001 executive order.335 Courts have generally treated this arrangement as authorized by Congress,336 although certain provisions of the EAA in effect under IEEPA have led to challenges. The determining factor appears to be whether IEEPA itself provides the President the authority to carry out the challenged action. In one case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a conviction for an attempt to violate the regulations even though the EAA had expired and did not expressly criminalize such attempts.337 The circuit court rejected the defendants’ argument that the President had exceeded his delegated authority under the EEA by “enlarging” the crimes punishable under the regulations.338 Nevertheless, a district court held that the conspiracy provisions of the EAA regulations were rendered inoperative by the lapse of the EAA and “could not be repromulgated by executive order under the general powers that IEEPA vests in the President.”339 The district court found that, even if Congress intended to preserve the operation of the EAA through IEEPA, that intent was limited by the scope of the statutes’ substantive coverage at the time of IEEPA’s enactment, when no conspiracy provision existed in either statute.340 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the application of the EAA as a statute permitting the government to withhold information under exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),341 which exempts from disclosure information exempted from disclosure by statute, even though the EAA had expired.342 Referring to legislative history it interpreted as congressional approval of the use of IEEPA to continue the EAA provisions during periods of lapse, the court stated: Although the legislative history does not refer to the EAA’s confidentiality provision, it does evince Congress's intent to authorize the President to preserve the operation of the export regulations promulgated under the EAA. Moreover, it is significant for purposes of determining legislative intent that Congress acted with the knowledge that the EAA’s export regulations had long provided for confidentiality and that the President's ongoing 334 E.O. 13222, 66 Fed. Reg. 44,025 (August 17, 2001). 335 See, e.g., Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,005 (August 15, 2017). 336 Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Courts uniformly have read [the executive order preserving the EAA regulations under IEEPA] to mean that the statute remained in full effect during the periods of lapse.”). In this case, Sudan challenged its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism pursuant to a provision of the EAA because the statute had expired. 337 United States v. Mechanic, 809 F.2d 1111, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1987). 338 Ibid. at 1113-14 (emphasizing the foreign affairs connection served by the EAA). 339 United States v. Quinn, 401 F. Supp. 2d 80, 93 (D.D.C. 2005). 340 Ibid. at 95. 341 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2018). 342 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 317 F.3d 275, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Congressional Research Service 46 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use practice of extending the EAA by executive order had always included these confidentiality protections.343 The D.C. Circuit distinguished this holding in a later case involving appellate jurisdiction over a decision by the Department of Commerce to apply sanctions for a company’s violation of the EAA regulations.344 Pursuant to the regulations and under the direction of the Commerce Department, the company sought judicial review directly in the D.C. Circuit.345 The D.C. Circuit, however, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction: This court would have jurisdiction pursuant to the President's order only if the President has the authority to confer jurisdiction—an authority that, if it exists, must derive from either the Executive's inherent power under the Constitution or a permissible delegation of power from Congress. The former is unavailing, as the Constitution vests the power to confer jurisdiction in Congress alone. Whether the executive order can provide the basis of our jurisdiction, then, turns on whether the President can confer jurisdiction on this court under the auspices of IEEPA…. We conclude that the President lacks that power. Nothing in the text of IEEPA delegates to the President the authority to grant jurisdiction to any federal court.346 Consequently, the appeal of the agency decision was determined to belong in the district court according to the default rule under the APA.347
Issues and Options for Congress
Congress may wish to address a number of issues with respect to IEEPA; two are addressed here. Congress may wish to address a number of issues with respect to IEEPA; two are addressed here.
The first pertains to how Congress has delegated its authority under IEEPA and its umbrella The first pertains to how Congress has delegated its authority under IEEPA and its umbrella
statute, the NEA. The second pertains to choices made in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. statute, the NEA. The second pertains to choices made in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018.
Delegation of Authority under IEEPA
Although the stated aim of the drafters of the NEA and IEEPA was to restrain the use of Although the stated aim of the drafters of the NEA and IEEPA was to restrain the use of
emergency powers, the use of such powers has expanded by several measures. Presidents declare emergency powers, the use of such powers has expanded by several measures. Presidents declare
national emergencies and renew them for years or even decades. The limitation of IEEPA to national emergencies and renew them for years or even decades. The limitation of IEEPA to
transactions involving some foreign interest was intended to limit IEEPA’s domestic application. transactions involving some foreign interest was intended to limit IEEPA’s domestic application.
However, globalization has eroded that limit, as few transactions today do not involve some However, globalization has eroded that limit, as few transactions today do not involve some
foreign interest. Many of the other criticisms of TWEA that IEEPA was supposed to address—foreign interest. Many of the other criticisms of TWEA that IEEPA was supposed to address—
consultation, time limits, congressional review, scope of power, and logical relationship to the consultation, time limits, congressional review, scope of power, and logical relationship to the
emergency declared—are criticisms that scholars levy against IEEPA today.emergency declared—are criticisms that scholars levy against IEEPA today.~~283~~348 TWEA came under TWEA came under
criticism because the first national emergency declared pursuant to its authority had been ongoing criticism because the first national emergency declared pursuant to its authority had been ongoing
for 41 years.for 41 years.~~284~~349 In November In November ~~2020~~2022, the first emergency declared pursuant to authority under , the first emergency declared pursuant to authority under
IEEPA, the emergency with Iran declared in 1979, will enter is forty-IEEPA, the emergency with Iran declared in 1979, will enter is forty-~~first~~third year. year.

~~278~~343 Ibid. Ibid.
~~279~~344 Micei Int Micei Int'’l v. Dep't of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2010). l v. Dep't of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
~~280~~345 Ibid. at 1151. Ibid. at 1151.
~~281~~346 Ibid. at 1153 (internal citations omitted). Ibid. at 1153 (internal citations omitted).
~~282~~347 Ibid Ibid. at 1152 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2009)). at 1152 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2009)).
~~283~~348 See, e.g., Jason Luong, “Forcing Constraint”; Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism.” See, e.g., Jason Luong, “Forcing Constraint”; Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism.”
~~284~~349 See, e.g., “After 41 Years The Depression Finally Ending,” See, e.g., “After 41 Years The Depression Finally Ending,” New York Times, , ~~Oct.~~October 13, 1974; “Senate Votes to 13, 1974; “Senate Votes to
Conclude 4 National Emergencies,” Conclude 4 National Emergencies,” New York Times, , ~~Oct.~~October 8, 1974; U.S. Congress, 8, 1974; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency
Powers in the United States, p. v. , p. v.
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In general, three common criticisms are levied by scholars with respect to the structure of the In general, three common criticisms are levied by scholars with respect to the structure of the
NEA and IEEPA that may be of interest to Congress. First, the NEA and IEEPA do not define the NEA and IEEPA that may be of interest to Congress. First, the NEA and IEEPA do not define the
phrases “national emergency” and “unusual and extraordinary threat” and Presidents have phrases “national emergency” and “unusual and extraordinary threat” and Presidents have
interpreted these terms broadly. Second, the scope of presidential authority under IEEPA has interpreted these terms broadly. Second, the scope of presidential authority under IEEPA has
become less constrained in a highly globalized era. Third, owing to rulings by the Supreme Court become less constrained in a highly globalized era. Third, owing to rulings by the Supreme Court
and amendments to the NEA, Congress would likely have to have a two-thirds majority rather and amendments to the NEA, Congress would likely have to have a two-thirds majority rather
than a simple majority to terminate a national emergency. Despite these criticisms, Congress has than a simple majority to terminate a national emergency. Despite these criticisms, Congress has
not acted to terminate or otherwise express displeasure with an emergency declaration invoking not acted to terminate or otherwise express displeasure with an emergency declaration invoking
IEEPA. This absence of any explicit statement of disapproval, coupled with explicit statements of IEEPA. This absence of any explicit statement of disapproval, coupled with explicit statements of
approval in some instances, may indicate congressional approval of presidential use of IEEPA approval in some instances, may indicate congressional approval of presidential use of IEEPA
thus far. Arguably, then, IEEPA could be seen as an effective tool for carrying out the will of thus far. Arguably, then, IEEPA could be seen as an effective tool for carrying out the will of
Congress. Congress.
Definition of “National Emergency” and “Unusual and Extraordinary Threat”
Neither the NEA nor IEEPA define what constitutes a “national emergency.” IEEPA conditions its Neither the NEA nor IEEPA define what constitutes a “national emergency.” IEEPA conditions its
invocation in a declaration on its necessity for dealing with an “unusual and extraordinary threat invocation in a declaration on its necessity for dealing with an “unusual and extraordinary threat
… to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”… to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”~~285~~350 In the markup of In the markup of
IEEPA in the House, Fred Bergsten, then-Assistant Secretary for International Affairs in the IEEPA in the House, Fred Bergsten, then-Assistant Secretary for International Affairs in the
Department of the Treasury, praised the requirement that a national emergency for the purposes of Department of the Treasury, praised the requirement that a national emergency for the purposes of
IEEPA be “based on an unusual and extraordinary threat” because such language “emphasizes IEEPA be “based on an unusual and extraordinary threat” because such language “emphasizes
that such powers should be available only in true emergencies.”that such powers should be available only in true emergencies.”~~286~~351 Because “unusual” and Because “unusual” and
“extraordinary” are also undefined, the usual and ordinary invocation of the statute seems to “extraordinary” are also undefined, the usual and ordinary invocation of the statute seems to
conflict with those statutory conditions. conflict with those statutory conditions.
If Congress wanted to refine the meaning of “national emergency” or “unusual and extraordinary If Congress wanted to refine the meaning of “national emergency” or “unusual and extraordinary
threat,” it could do so through statute. Additionally, Congress could consider requiring some sort threat,” it could do so through statute. Additionally, Congress could consider requiring some sort
of factual finding by a court prior to, or shortly after, the exercise of any authority, such as under of factual finding by a court prior to, or shortly after, the exercise of any authority, such as under
the First Militia Act of the First Militia Act of ~~1792287~~1792352 or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.~~288 However~~353 Alternatively, ,
Congress may consider that the ambiguity in the existing statute provides the executive with the Congress may consider that the ambiguity in the existing statute provides the executive with the
flexibility necessary to address national emergencies with the requisite dispatch. flexibility necessary to address national emergencies with the requisite dispatch.
Scope of the Authority
While IEEPA nominally applies only to foreign transactions, the breadth of the phrase, “any While IEEPA nominally applies only to foreign transactions, the breadth of the phrase, “any
interest of any foreign country or a national thereof” leaves a great deal of room for executive interest of any foreign country or a national thereof” leaves a great deal of room for executive
discretion. The interconnectedness of the modern global economy has left few major transactions discretion. The interconnectedness of the modern global economy has left few major transactions
in which a foreign interest is not involved.in which a foreign interest is not involved.~~289~~354 As a result, at least one scholar has concluded, “the As a result, at least one scholar has concluded, “the

~~285~~350 50 U.S.C. § 1701. 50 U.S.C. § 1701.
~~286~~351 House Markup, p. 12. , p. 12.
~~287~~352 Using the judiciary to determine whether an emergency authority can be exercised by the executive has been Using the judiciary to determine whether an emergency authority can be exercised by the executive has been
common. The First Militia Act of 1792, for example, required that either an associate justice of the Supreme Court of a common. The First Militia Act of 1792, for example, required that either an associate justice of the Supreme Court of a
district judge confirm that an insurrection “too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial district judge confirm that an insurrection “too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings” existed. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264. Using a court to determine whether an emergency proceedings” existed. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264. Using a court to determine whether an emergency
existed and whether an action was necessary was also the method favored by the German-American jurist, advisor to existed and whether an action was necessary was also the method favored by the German-American jurist, advisor to
President Abraham Lincoln, and founder of American political science, Francis Lieber, who argued that the acts of President Abraham Lincoln, and founder of American political science, Francis Lieber, who argued that the acts of
officials in states of emergency should be adjudged in court “to be necessary in the judgment of a moderate and officials in states of emergency should be adjudged in court “to be necessary in the judgment of a moderate and
reasonable man.” Qtd. in Witt, “A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism,” p. 588. reasonable man.” Qtd. in Witt, “A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism,” p. 588.
~~288~~353 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803-1805. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803-1805.
~~289~~354 “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” Harvard Law Review, p. 1111 n49. , p. 1111 n49.
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exemption of purely domestic transactions from the President’s transaction controls seems to be a exemption of purely domestic transactions from the President’s transaction controls seems to be a
limitation without substance.”limitation without substance.”~~290~~355
Presidents have used IEEPA since the 1980s to control exports by maintaining the dual-use export Presidents have used IEEPA since the 1980s to control exports by maintaining the dual-use export
control system, enshrined in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) in times when its control system, enshrined in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) in times when its
underlying authorization, the Export Administration Act (EAA), periodically expired. During underlying authorization, the Export Administration Act (EAA), periodically expired. During
those times when Congress did not reauthorize the EAA, Presidents have declared emergencies to those times when Congress did not reauthorize the EAA, Presidents have declared emergencies to
maintain the dual-use export control system.maintain the dual-use export control system.~~291~~356 The current emergency has been ongoing since The current emergency has been ongoing since
2001.2001.~~292~~357
While Presidents have used IEEPA to implement trade restrictions against adversaries, it has not While Presidents have used IEEPA to implement trade restrictions against adversaries, it has not
been used as a general way to impose tariffs. However, as noted above, President Nixon used been used as a general way to impose tariffs. However, as noted above, President Nixon used
TWEA to impose a 10% ad valorem tariff on goods entering the United States to avoid a balance TWEA to impose a 10% ad valorem tariff on goods entering the United States to avoid a balance
of payments crisis after he ended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold. Although the use of of payments crisis after he ended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold. Although the use of
TWEA in this instance was criticized at the time,TWEA in this instance was criticized at the time,~~293~~358 the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals upheld President Nixon’s Appeals upheld President Nixon’s ~~actions294~~actions359 and Congress maintained the language that President and Congress maintained the language that President
Nixon relied upon in nearly identical form in the subsequent reforms resulting in the enactment of Nixon relied upon in nearly identical form in the subsequent reforms resulting in the enactment of
IEEPA.IEEPA.~~295~~
~~The scope of powers over individual targets is also extensive. Under IEEPA, the President has the~~
~~power to prohibit all financial transactions with individuals designated by executive order. Such~~
~~power allows the President to block all the assets of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident.296~~
~~Such uses of IEEPA may reflect the will of Congress or they may represent a grant of authority~~
~~that may have gone beyond what Congress originally intended.~~360 In both the 116th and 117th Congress, bills were introduced that would limit the President’s authority to use IEEPA to impose tariffs.361

~~290~~355 Ibid.; See also Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime,” pp. 757-758. Ibid.; See also Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime,” pp. 757-758.
~~291~~356 In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act to provide new statutory authority for the continuation of In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act to provide new statutory authority for the continuation of
EAR. However, three sections were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise EAR. However, three sections were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise
of IEEPA. See of IEEPA. See “The Export Control Reform Act of 2018” below. below.
~~292~~357 Ibid. Ibid.
~~293~~358 See, e.g., the testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy See, e.g., the testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy
and Trade. U.S. Congress, House, and Trade. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of
the Committee on International Relations and Markup of the Trading with the Enemy Reform Legislation, 95th Cong., , 95th Cong.,
1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), pp. 8-9. 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), pp. 8-9.
~~294~~359 United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (“Congress, in enacting s 5(b) of the TWEA, United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (“Congress, in enacting s 5(b) of the TWEA,
authorized the President, during an emergency, to […] ‘regulate importation,’ by imposing an import duty surcharge or authorized the President, during an emergency, to […] ‘regulate importation,’ by imposing an import duty surcharge or
by other means appropriately and reasonably related […] to the particular nature of the emergency declared.”). by other means appropriately and reasonably related […] to the particular nature of the emergency declared.”).
~~295~~360 TWEA, codified as amended in 1971 at §5(b), provided that during a period of national emergency, the President TWEA, codified as amended in 1971 at §5(b), provided that during a period of national emergency, the President
may “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, may “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding,
use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has
any interest.” IEEPA, as passed in 1977 at §203(a)(1)(B), provided that during a period of national emergency, the any interest.” IEEPA, as passed in 1977 at §203(a)(1)(B), provided that during a period of national emergency, the
President may “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, President may “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding,
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any
right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest.” national thereof has any interest.”
While he did not ultimately end up doing so, President Trump announced his intention to use IEEPA to impose and While he did not ultimately end up doing so, President Trump announced his intention to use IEEPA to impose and
gradually increase a five percent tariff on all goods imported from Mexico. Statement from the President Regarding gradually increase a five percent tariff on all goods imported from Mexico. Statement from the President Regarding
Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-address-border-crisis/. See also CRS Insight IN11129, statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-address-border-crisis/. See also CRS Insight IN11129,
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Tariffs: Historical Background and Key Issues, by , by
Christopher A. Casey. Christopher A. Casey.
~~296 Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime,” p. 759.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
45361 E.g., Protecting Our Democracy Act, S. 2921 (Klobuchar), 117th Cong., 1st sess., September 30, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act of 2021, H.R. 2618 (Davidson), 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 16, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act, S. 691 (Lee), 117th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 2019; Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 2019. Congressional Research Service 49 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use The scope of powers over individual targets is also extensive. Under IEEPA, the President has the power to prohibit all financial transactions with individuals designated by executive order. Such power allows the President to block all the assets of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident.362 Such uses of IEEPA may reflect the will of Congress or they may represent a grant of authority that may have gone beyond what Congress originally intended.

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

Terminating National Emergencies or IEEPA Authorities
The heart of the curtailment of presidential power by the NEA and IEEPA was the provision that The heart of the curtailment of presidential power by the NEA and IEEPA was the provision that
Congress could terminate a state of emergency declared pursuant to the NEA with a concurrent Congress could terminate a state of emergency declared pursuant to the NEA with a concurrent
resolution. When the “legislative veto” was struck down by the Supreme Court (see above), it left resolution. When the “legislative veto” was struck down by the Supreme Court (see above), it left
Congress with a steeper climb—presumably requiring passage of a veto-proof joint resolution—Congress with a steeper climb—presumably requiring passage of a veto-proof joint resolution—
to terminate a national emergency declared under the NEA.to terminate a national emergency declared under the NEA.~~297~~363 Two such resolutions have ever Two such resolutions have ever
been introduced and neither been introduced and neither of the declarations of emergency declarations of emergency concerned involved IEEPA.involved IEEPA.~~298~~364 The lack of The lack of
congressional action here could be the result of the necessity of obtaining a veto-proof majority or congressional action here could be the result of the necessity of obtaining a veto-proof majority or
it could be that the use of IEEPA has so far reflected the will of Congress. it could be that the use of IEEPA has so far reflected the will of Congress.
If Congress wanted to assert more authority over the use of IEEPA, it could amend the NEA or If Congress wanted to assert more authority over the use of IEEPA, it could amend the NEA or
IEEPA to include a “sunset provision,” terminating any national emergency after a certain number IEEPA to include a “sunset provision,” terminating any national emergency after a certain number
of days. At least one scholar has recommended such an amendment. of days. At least one scholar has recommended such an amendment. ~~299~~365 Alternatively, Congress Alternatively, Congress
could amend IEEPA to provide for a review mechanism that would give Congress an active role. could amend IEEPA to provide for a review mechanism that would give Congress an active role.
In In ~~the Senate during the 116th Congress, for example, Senator Mike Lee introduced the Global~~
~~Trade Accountability Act, which required the President to report to Congress on any proposed~~
~~trade action (including the use of IEEPA), including a description of the proposal together with a~~
~~list of items to be affected, an economic impact study of the proposal including potential~~
~~retaliation. Congress, using expedited procedures, would need to approve the President’s action~~
~~through a joint resolution within a 45-day period. 300 Similarly, Senator Lee introduced the Article~~
~~One Act, a bill to provide for congressional approval of national emergency declarations, and for~~
~~other purposes, which would amend the NEA to require an act of Congress within 30 days to~~
~~allow a national emergency to continue.301 Several other bills have taken a similar approach.302~~
~~Alternatively, Congress could use any of these mechanisms to amend the current disapproval~~
~~resolution process in IEEPA or the NEA itself.~~
both the 116th and 117th Congresses, several bills were introduced that would require a joint resolution of approval for an emergency to extend beyond a certain number of days. The National Security Powers Act of 2021, for example, would require that Congress pass a joint resolution approving of a national emergency within 30 days.366 The Status Quo
In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations in 1977, Professor Harold G. In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations in 1977, Professor Harold G.
Maier summed up the main criticisms of TWEA: Maier summed up the main criticisms of TWEA:
Section 5(b)’s effect is no longer confined to “emergency situations” in the sense of Section 5(b)’s effect is no longer confined to “emergency situations” in the sense of
existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit, existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit,
by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has
converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President…”converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President…”~~303~~367

~~297~~362 Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime,” p. 759. 363 Congress amended NEA in 1985 to require a joint resolution, which is subject to the President’s veto, to terminate Congress amended NEA in 1985 to require a joint resolution, which is subject to the President’s veto, to terminate
an emergency. P.L. 99-93 (an emergency. P.L. 99-93 (~~Aug.~~August 16, 1985), 99 Stat. 405. 16, 1985), 99 Stat. 405.
~~298~~364 In 2005, Rep. George Miller (CA) introduced a resolution to terminate the declaration of a national emergency as a In 2005, Rep. George Miller (CA) introduced a resolution to terminate the declaration of a national emergency as a
result of Hurricane Katrina. It was not considered. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 8, 2005. In result of Hurricane Katrina. It was not considered. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 8, 2005. In
2019, Rep. Castro and Sen. Udall introduced resolutions to terminate the declaration of a national emergency with 2019, Rep. Castro and Sen. Udall introduced resolutions to terminate the declaration of a national emergency with
respect to the Southern Border of the United States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., respect to the Southern Border of the United States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., ~~Feb.~~February 22, 2019; S.J.Res. 22, 2019; S.J.Res.
10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019. Neither emergency had invoked IEEPA authorities. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019. Neither emergency had invoked IEEPA authorities.
~~299~~365 Luong, “Forcing Constraint,” p. 1181. Luong, “Forcing Constraint,” p. 1181.
~~300 Global Trade and Accountability Act, S. 1284 (Lee), 116th Cong., 1st Sess., May 2, 2019.~~
~~301 Article One Act, S. 764 (Lee), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 12, 2019.~~
~~302 See, e.g., Global Tarde Accountability Act~~366 National Security Powers Act of 2021, S. 2391 (Murphy), 117th Cong., 1st sess., July 20, 2021. For additional examples during the 116th Congress, see Global Trade Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 2019; , H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 2019;
Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 2019. (Kaine), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 2019.
~~303~~367 House, House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 9. , p. 9.
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Like TWEA before it, IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanction regime. Like TWEA Like TWEA before it, IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanction regime. Like TWEA
before it, Congress has often approved explicitly of the President’s use of IEEPA. In several before it, Congress has often approved explicitly of the President’s use of IEEPA. In several
circumstances, Congress has directed the President to impose a variety of sanctions under IEEPA circumstances, Congress has directed the President to impose a variety of sanctions under IEEPA
and waived the requirement of an emergency declaration. Even when Congress has not given and waived the requirement of an emergency declaration. Even when Congress has not given
explicit approval, no Member of Congress has ever introduced a resolution to terminate a national explicit approval, no Member of Congress has ever introduced a resolution to terminate a national
emergency citing IEEPA.emergency citing IEEPA.~~304~~368 The NEA requires that both houses of Congress meet every six The NEA requires that both houses of Congress meet every six
months to consider a vote on a joint resolution on terminating an emergency.months to consider a vote on a joint resolution on terminating an emergency.~~305~~369 Neither house has Neither house has
ever met to do so with respect to an emergency citing IEEPA. In response to concerns over the ever met to do so with respect to an emergency citing IEEPA. In response to concerns over the
scale and scope of the emergency economic powers granted by IEEPA, supporters of the status scale and scope of the emergency economic powers granted by IEEPA, supporters of the status
quo would argue that Congress has implicitly and explicitly expressed approval of the statute and quo would argue that Congress has implicitly and explicitly expressed approval of the statute and
its use. Indeed, its use. Indeed, ~~Senator Lee’s Article One Act, which seeks to reform the NEA by requiring a~~
~~joint resolution of approval for an emergency to continue beyond 30 days, would~~several bills proposing such a limit on the length of national emergencies declared under the NEA explicitly explicitly
~~exclude its application to IEEPA.306~~
exclude IEEPA.370 The Export Control Reform Act of 2018
In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA).In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA).~~307~~371 The legislation repealed the The legislation repealed the
expired Export Administration Act of 1979,expired Export Administration Act of 1979,~~308~~372 the regulations of which had been continued by the regulations of which had been continued by
reference to IEEPA since 2001.reference to IEEPA since 2001.~~309~~373 The ECRA became the new statutory authority for Export The ECRA became the new statutory authority for Export
Administration Regulations. Nevertheless, several export controls addressed in the Export Administration Regulations. Nevertheless, several export controls addressed in the Export
Administration Act of 1979 were not updated in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018;Administration Act of 1979 were not updated in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018;~~310~~374
instead, Congress chose to require the President to continue to use IEEPA to continue to instead, Congress chose to require the President to continue to use IEEPA to continue to
implement the three sections of the Export Administration Act of 1979 that were not repealed.implement the three sections of the Export Administration Act of 1979 that were not repealed.~~311~~375
Going forward, Congress may wish to revisit these provisions, which all relate to deterring the Going forward, Congress may wish to revisit these provisions, which all relate to deterring the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

~~304~~368 Since the enactment of the NEA, two resolutions to terminate a national emergency have been introduced. The first Since the enactment of the NEA, two resolutions to terminate a national emergency have been introduced. The first
was to terminate the national emergency declared in response to Hurricane Katrina, but the declaration of emergency in was to terminate the national emergency declared in response to Hurricane Katrina, but the declaration of emergency in
that case did not invoke IEEPA. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Congress, 1st session, September 8, 2005. The second was that case did not invoke IEEPA. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Congress, 1st session, September 8, 2005. The second was
to terminate the national emergency declared February 15, 2019 with respect to the Southern Border of the United to terminate the national emergency declared February 15, 2019 with respect to the Southern Border of the United
States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., ~~Feb.~~February 22, 2019; S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019; S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February
28, 2019. However, neither of the declarations of national emergency at issue invoked IEEPA. 28, 2019. However, neither of the declarations of national emergency at issue invoked IEEPA.
~~305~~369 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b). 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b).
~~306 Article~~370 E.g., Reforming Emergency Powers to Uphold the Balances and Limitations Inherent in the Constitution Act or the REPUBLIC Act, S. 463 (Paul), 117th Cong., 1st sess., February 25, 2021; Assuring that Robust, Thorough, and Informed Congressional Leadership is Exercised Over National Emergencies Act or the ARTICLE One Act, S. 764 (Lee), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 12, 2019, as reported to the Senate November 19, 2019. One Act, S. 764 (Lee), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 12, 2019, as reported to the Senate November 19, 2019.
~~307~~ 371 Export Control Reform Act, P.L. 115-232 P.L. 115-232, (August ~~(Aug.~~ 13, 2018), Title XVII(B). 13, 2018), Title XVII(B).
~~308~~372 Ibid. § 1766(a). Ibid. § 1766(a).
~~309~~373 E.O. 13222. E.O. 13222.
~~310 Ibid.~~374 Export Control Reform Act § 1766(a). Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of 1979, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ § 1766(a). Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of 1979, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§
4611, 4612, 4613, were not repealed. 4611, 4612, 4613, were not repealed.
~~311~~375 Ibid. § 1766(b) (“The President shall implement [Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of Ibid. § 1766(b) (“The President shall implement [Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of
1979] by exercising the authorities of the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 1979] by exercising the authorities of the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).”). U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).”).
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Appendix A. NEA and IEEPA Use
Table A-1. National Emergencies Declared Pursuant to the NEA
as of March 25, 2022 *Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA but that did not invoke IEEPA. *Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA but that did not invoke IEEPA.
Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National
Date of
Date of
Originating
Revoking
Emergency Pursuant to NEA
Declaration
Revocation
E.O./Procl.
E.O./Procl.
1 Blocking Iranian Government Property Blocking Iranian Government Property
11/14/1979 11/14/1979
Ongoing Ongoing
12170 12170

2 Sanctions Against Iran Sanctions Against Iran
4/17/1980 4/17/1980
4/17/1981 4/17/1981
12211 12211

Expired 3 Continuation of Export Control Regulations Continuation of Export Control Regulations
10/14/1983 10/14/1983
12/20/1983 12/20/1983
12444 12444
12451 12451
4 Continuation of Export Control Regulations Continuation of Export Control Regulations
3/30/1984 3/30/1984
7/12/1985 7/12/1985
12470 12470
12525 12525
5 Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other
Transactions Involving Nicaragua Transactions Involving Nicaragua
5/1/1985 5/1/1985
3/13/1990 3/13/1990
12513 12513
12707 12707
6 Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other
Transactions Involving South Africa Transactions Involving South Africa
9/9/1985 9/9/1985
7/10/1991 7/10/1991
12532 12532
12769 12769
7 Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions
Involving Libya Involving Libya
1/7/1986 1/7/1986
9/20/2004 9/20/2004
12543 12543
13357 13357
8 Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect
to Panama to Panama
4/8/1988 4/8/1988
4/5/1990 4/5/1990
12635 12635
12710 12710
9 Blocking Iraqi Government Property and Blocking Iraqi Government Property and
Prohibiting Transactions with Iraq Prohibiting Transactions with Iraq
8/2/1990 8/2/1990
7/29/2004 7/29/2004
12722 12722
13350 13350
10 Continuation of Export Control Regulations Continuation of Export Control Regulations
9/30/1990 9/30/1990
9/30/1993 9/30/1993
12730 12730
12867 12867
Chemical and Biological Weapons Chemical and Biological Weapons 11 Proliferation Proliferation
11/16/1990 11/16/1990
11/11/1994 11/11/1994
12735 12735
12938 12938
Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Prohibiting Certain Transactions with 12 Respect Respect
to Haiti to Haiti
10/4/1991 10/4/1991
10/14/1994 10/14/1994
12775 12775
12932 12932
Blocking "Yugoslav Government" Property Blocking "Yugoslav Government" Property 13 and and
Property of the Governments of Serbia and Property of the Governments of Serbia and
Montenegro Montenegro
5/30/1992 5/30/1992
5/28/2003 5/28/2003
12808 12808
13304 13304
To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March 3, To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March 3,
1931, Within a Limited Geographic Area 1931, Within a Limited Geographic Area 14 in in
Response to the National Emergency Caused Response to the National Emergency Caused
by Hurricane Andrewa by Hurricane Andrewa
10/14/1992 10/14/1992
3/6/1993 3/6/1993
6491 6491
6534 6534
Prohibiting Certain Transactions Involving Prohibiting Certain Transactions Involving
15 UNITA UNITA
9/26/1993 9/26/1993
5/6/2003 5/6/2003
12865 12865
24857 24857
Measures To Restrict The Participation By Measures To Restrict The Participation By
16 United States Persons In Weapons United States Persons In Weapons
Proliferation Activities Proliferation Activities
9/30/1993 9/30/1993
9/29/1994 9/29/1994
12868 12868
12930 12930
Continuation of Export Control Continuation of Export Control 17 Regulations Regulations
6/30/1994 6/30/1994
8/19/1994 8/19/1994
12923 12923
12924 12924
Continuation of Export Control Continuation of Export Control 18 Regulations Regulations
8/19/1994 8/19/1994
4/4/2001 4/4/2001
12924 12924
13206 13206
Congressional Research Service 52 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National Date of Date of Originating Revoking Emergency Pursuant to NEA Declaration Revocation E.O./Procl. E.O./Procl. Measures To Restrict The Participation By 19 ~~Measures To Restrict The Participation By~~
United States Persons In Weapons United States Persons In Weapons
Proliferation Activities Proliferation Activities
9/29/1994 9/29/1994
11/14/1994 11/14/1994
12930 12930
12938 12938
20 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
11/14/1994 11/14/1994
Ongoing Ongoing
12938 12938

Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists 21 Who Who
Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace
Process Process
1/23/1995 1/23/1995
~~Ongoing~~09/09/2019 12947 12947 Prohibiting Certain Transactions With 22 Respect
~~12947~~

~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National~~
~~Date of~~
~~Date of~~
~~Originating~~
~~Revoking~~
~~Emergency Pursuant to NEA~~
~~Declaration~~
~~Revocation~~
~~E.O./Procl.~~
~~E.O./Procl.~~
~~Blocking the Property of Certain Persons~~
Blocking the Property of Certain Persons 56 Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Activities Activities
4/1/2015 4/1/2015
Ongoing Ongoing
13694 13694

57 Blocking Property of Certain Persons Blocking Property of Certain Persons
Contributing to the Situation in Burundi Contributing to the Situation in Burundi
11/22/2015 11/22/2015
~~Ongoing~~11/18/2021
13712 13712

14059 Blocking the Property of Persons Involved Blocking the Property of Persons Involved 58 in in
Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption
12/20/2017 12/20/2017
Ongoing Ongoing
13818 13818

Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of
59 Foreign Interference in a United States Foreign Interference in a United States ~~Election~~ Election 9/12/2018 9/12/2018
Ongoing Ongoing
13848 13848

60 Blocking Property of Certain Persons Blocking Property of Certain Persons
Contributing to the Situation in Nicaragua Contributing to the Situation in Nicaragua
11/27/2018 11/27/2018
Ongoing Ongoing
13851 13851

Declaring a National Emergency Declaring a National Emergency 61 Concerning Concerning
the Southern Border of the United States the Southern Border of the United States
2/15/2019 2/15/2019
~~Ongoing~~1/20/2021
9844 9844

10142 Securing the Information and Securing the Information and 62 Communications Communications
Technology and Services Supply Chain Technology and Services Supply Chain
5/15/2019 5/15/2019
Ongoing Ongoing
13873 13873

Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of
63 Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation
in Mali in Mali
07/26/2019 07/26/2019
Ongoing Ongoing
13882 13882

Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of
64 Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation
in Syria in Syria
10/17/2019 10/17/2019
Ongoing Ongoing
13894 13894

Declaring a National Emergency Declaring a National Emergency 65 Concerning Concerning
the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
Outbreak Outbreak
03/13/2020 03/13/2020
Ongoing Ongoing
9994 9994

66 Securing the United States Bulk-Power System Securing the United States Bulk-Power System
05/01/2020 05/01/2020
~~Ongoing~~05/01/2021
13920 13920

Expired Blocking Property of Certain Persons Blocking Property of Certain Persons
67 Associated With the International Criminal Associated With the International Criminal
Court Court
06/11/2020 06/11/2020
~~Ongoing~~
~~13928~~

Source: CRS
~~Notes:~~ ~~Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA that did not invoke IEEPA~~04/01/2021 13928 14022 Congressional Research Service 55 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National Date of Date of Originating Revoking Emergency Pursuant to NEA Declaration Revocation E.O./Procl. E.O./Procl. 68 Hong Kong Normalization 07/14/2020 Ongoing 13936 69 Critical Minerals 09/30/2020 09/30/2021 13953 Expired 70 Investments that Finance Chinese Military Companies 11/12/2020 Ongoing 13959 71 Blocking Property With Respect to the Situation in Burma 02/10/2021 Ongoing 14014 Blocking Property With Respect to 72 Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Russian Federation 04/15/2021 Ongoing 14024 Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons 73 With Respect to the Humanitarian and Human Rights Crisis in Ethiopia 09/17/2021 Ongoing 14046 74 Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Involved in the Global Il icit Drug Trade 12/15/2021 Ongoing 14059 Protecting Certain Property of Da 75 Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the People of Afghanistan 02/11/2022 Ongoing 14064 Source: CRS, as of March 25, 2022. Notes: Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA that did not invoke IEEPA. This table tracks emergencies that have been declared and their ultimate disposition. It does not include expansions or amendments to those emergencies. For example, Executive Order 14024, which declared a national emergency with respect to specified harmful activities of the Russian Federation in April of 2021, has been the basis ofcertain actions taken under IEEPA against the Russian Federation since it invaded Ukraine in February 2022. See, e.g., E.O. 14065 of February 21, 2022, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Continued Russian Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” 87 Fed. Reg. 10293, February 23, 2022; E.O. 14066 of March 8, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports and New Investments with Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” 87 Fed. Reg. 13625, March 10, 2022; E.O. 14068 of March 11, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment with Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression,” 87 Fed. Reg. 14381, March 15, 2022. .
a. Although the President did not explicitly use that phrase “declare a national emergency,” the Davis-Bacon a. Although the President did not explicitly use that phrase “declare a national emergency,” the Davis-Bacon
act, as amended at the date of the proclamation, and as noted in the proclamation, provided for the act, as amended at the date of the proclamation, and as noted in the proclamation, provided for the
suspension of the act’s provisions “in the event of a national emergency.”suspension of the act’s provisions “in the event of a national emergency.”
b. Similar to the suspension of the Davis-Bacon act in 1992, this proclamation was somewhat anomalous. The b. Similar to the suspension of the Davis-Bacon act in 1992, this proclamation was somewhat anomalous. The
proclamation did not cite to the NEA when declaring a national emergency for the purposes of suspending proclamation did not cite to the NEA when declaring a national emergency for the purposes of suspending
the act. However, the revoking proclamation did cite the NEA. Moreover, Rep. George Mil er (CA) the act. However, the revoking proclamation did cite the NEA. Moreover, Rep. George Mil er (CA)
introduced a resolution to terminate the declaration of a national emergency pursuant to the NEA. H.J.Res. introduced a resolution to terminate the declaration of a national emergency pursuant to the NEA. H.J.Res.
69 (Mil er), 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 8, 2005.69 (Mil er), 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 8, 2005. Congressional Research Service 56 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Table A-2. IEEPA National Emergency Use by Executive Order
In chronological order, from first use (1979) to present day ( In chronological order, from first use (1979) to present day (~~January 2019~~March 25, 2022) )
Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
Administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981)
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~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
12170 12170
Iran (hostage taking) Iran (hostage taking)
Declares national Declares national
Revoked and replaced, Revoked and replaced,
(Nov. 14. 1979; 44 FR (Nov. 14. 1979; 44 FR
emergency; blocks Iran emergency; blocks Iran
E.O. 13599 (2012) E.O. 13599 (2012)
65729) 65729)
government property government property
12205 12205
Iran (hostage taking) Iran (hostage taking)
Prohibits certain Prohibits certain
Revoked in part by E.O. Revoked in part by E.O.
(Apr. 7, 1980; 45 FR (Apr. 7, 1980; 45 FR
transactions transactions
12282 (1981) 12282 (1981)
24099) 24099)
12211 12211
Iran (hostage taking) Iran (hostage taking)
Prohibits transactions Prohibits transactions
Revoked in part by E.O. Revoked in part by E.O.
(Apr. 17, 1980; 45 FR (Apr. 17, 1980; 45 FR
12282 (1981) 12282 (1981)
26685) 26685)
12276 12276
Iran (hostage taking— Iran (hostage taking—
Establishes escrow Establishes escrow
Ratified by E.O. 12294 Ratified by E.O. 12294
(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR (Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution) resolution)
accounts accounts
(1981) (1981)
7913) 7913)
12277 12277
Iran (hostage taking— Iran (hostage taking—
Transfers Iran Transfers Iran
Ratified by E.O. 12294 Ratified by E.O. 12294
(Jan, 19, 1981; 46 FR (Jan, 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution) resolution)
government funds government funds
(1981) (1981)
7915) 7915)
12278 12278
Iran (hostage taking— Iran (hostage taking—
Transfers Iran Transfers Iran
Ratified by E.O. 12294 Ratified by E.O. 12294
(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR (Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution) resolution)
government assets government assets
(1981) (1981)
7917) 7917)
overseas overseas
12279 12279
Iran (hostage taking— Iran (hostage taking—
Transfers Iran Transfers Iran
Ratified by E.O. 12294 Ratified by E.O. 12294
(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR (Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution) resolution)
government assets held in government assets held in
(1981) (1981)
7917) 7917)
U.S. banks U.S. banks
12280 12280
Iran (hostage taking— Iran (hostage taking—
Transfers Iran Transfers Iran
Ratified by E.O. 12294 Ratified by E.O. 12294
(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR (Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution) resolution)
government financial government financial
(1981) (1981)
7921) 7921)
assets held by non-banks assets held by non-banks
12281 12281
Iran (hostage taking— Iran (hostage taking—
Transfers other Iran Transfers other Iran
Ratified by E.O. 12294 Ratified by E.O. 12294
(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR (Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution) resolution)
government assets government assets
(1981) (1981)
7923) 7923)
12282 12282
Iran (hostage taking— Iran (hostage taking—
Revokes prohibitions Revokes prohibitions
Ratified by E.O. 12294 Ratified by E.O. 12294
(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR (Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution) resolution)
against transactions against transactions
(1981) (1981)
7925) 7925)
involving Iran involving Iran
12283 12283
Iran (hostage taking— Iran (hostage taking—
Non-prosecution of Non-prosecution of
Ratified by E.O. 12294 Ratified by E.O. 12294
(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR (Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution) resolution)
claims of Iran hostages claims of Iran hostages
(1981) (1981)
7927) 7927)
12284 12284
Iran (hostage taking— Iran (hostage taking—
Restricts transfer of Restricts transfer of
Ratified by E.O. 12294 Ratified by E.O. 12294
(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR (Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution) resolution)
property of the Shah property of the Shah
(1981) (1981)
7929) 7929)
12285 12285
Iran (hostage taking-- Iran (hostage taking--
Establishes Commission Establishes Commission
Revoked by E.O. 12379 Revoked by E.O. 12379
(Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR (Jan. 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution resolution
on Hostage on Hostage
(1982) (1982)
7931) 7931)
Compensation Compensation Congressional Research Service 57 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status
Administration of President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989)
12294 12294
Iran (hostage taking— Iran (hostage taking—
Suspends claims and Suspends claims and
Amended by E.O. 12379 Amended by E.O. 12379
(Feb. 24, 1981; 46 FR (Feb. 24, 1981; 46 FR
resolution) resolution)
litigation against Iran litigation against Iran
(1982) (1982)
14111) 14111)
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
12444 12444
Expiration of Export Expiration of Export
Continues Export Continues Export
Revoked by E.O. 12451 Revoked by E.O. 12451
(Oct. 14, 1983; 48 FR (Oct. 14, 1983; 48 FR
Administration Act of Administration Act of
Administration Administration
(1983) (EAA (1983) (EAA
48215) 48215)
1979 (EAA) 1979 (EAA)
Regulations (EAR) Regulations (EAR)
reauthorized) reauthorized)
12470 12470
Expiration of EAA Expiration of EAA
Continues EAR Continues EAR
Revoked by E.O. 12525 Revoked by E.O. 12525
(Mar. 30, 1984; 49 FR (Mar. 30, 1984; 49 FR
(1985) (EAA (1985) (EAA
13099) 13099)
reauthorized) reauthorized)
12513 12513
Nicaragua (civil war) Nicaragua (civil war)
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 12707 Revoked by E.O. 12707
(May 1, 1985; 50 FR (May 1, 1985; 50 FR
emergency; prohibits emergency; prohibits
(1990) (1990)
18629) 18629)
imports, exports, air imports, exports, air
traffic, use of U.S. ports traffic, use of U.S. ports
12532 12532
South Africa (apartheid, South Africa (apartheid,
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 12769 Revoked by E.O. 12769
(Sept. 9, 1985; 50 FR (Sept. 9, 1985; 50 FR
to meet requirements of to meet requirements of
emergency; prohibits emergency; prohibits
(1991) (1991)
36861) 36861)
U.N. Security Council U.N. Security Council
loans to government, loans to government,
(UNSC) Resolution) (UNSC) Resolution)
crime control exports, crime control exports,
nuclear-related exports, nuclear-related exports,
military-related imports; military-related imports;
supports Sul ivan supports Sul ivan
Principles Principles
12535 12535
South Africa (apartheid, South Africa (apartheid,
Prohibits import of Prohibits import of
Revoked by E.O. 12769 Revoked by E.O. 12769
(Oct. 1, 1985; 50 FR (Oct. 1, 1985; 50 FR
to meet requirements of to meet requirements of
krugerrands krugerrands
(1991) (1991)
40325) 40325)
UNSC Resolution) UNSC Resolution)
12543 12543
Libya (terrorism, regional Libya (terrorism, regional
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13357 Revoked by E.O. 13357
(Jan. 1, 1986; 51FR875) (Jan. 1, 1986; 51FR875)
unrest) unrest)
emergency; prohibits emergency; prohibits
(2004) (2004)
most imports and most imports and
exports, transactions exports, transactions
relating to transportation relating to transportation
to/from Libya, to/from Libya,
performance of contract performance of contract
obligations in support of obligations in support of
Libyan projects, bank Libyan projects, bank
loans, financial loans, financial
transactions related to transactions related to
travel to Libya travel to Libya
12544 12544
Libya (terrorism, regional Libya (terrorism, regional
Blocks Libyan Blocks Libyan
Revoked by E.O. 13357 Revoked by E.O. 13357
(Jan. 8, 1986; 51 FR 1235) (Jan. 8, 1986; 51 FR 1235)
unrest) unrest)
Government assets in Government assets in
(2004) (2004)
United States United States
12635 12635
Panama (finding Panama (finding
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 12710 Revoked by E.O. 12710
(Apr. 8, 1988; 53 FR (Apr. 8, 1988; 53 FR
government of Noriega government of Noriega
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
(1990) (1990)
12134) 12134)
and Palma a threat) and Palma a threat)
Panama assets in United Panama assets in United
States States
Congressional Research Service 58 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status Administration of President George H.W. Bush (1989-1993)
12722 12722
Iraq (invasion of Kuwait; Iraq (invasion of Kuwait;
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13350 Revoked by E.O. 13350
(Aug. 2, 1990; 55 FR (Aug. 2, 1990; 55 FR
to meet requirements of to meet requirements of
emergency; blocks Iraq emergency; blocks Iraq
(2004) (2004)
31803) 31803)
UNSC Resolution) UNSC Resolution)
Government assets in Government assets in
U.S.; prohibits most U.S.; prohibits most
export and import; export and import;
restricts transactions restricts transactions
related to travel; prohibits related to travel; prohibits
loansloans
~~Congressional Research Service~~
53

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
12723 12723
Kuwait (after Iraq’s Kuwait (after Iraq’s
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 12725 Revoked by E.O. 12725
(Aug. 2, 1990; 55 FR (Aug. 2, 1990; 55 FR
invasion; to meet invasion; to meet
emergency; blocks Kuwait (1990) emergency; blocks Kuwait (1990)
31805) 31805)
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
Government assets in Government assets in
Resolution) Resolution)
U.S. U.S.
12724 12724
Iraq (invasion of Kuwait; Iraq (invasion of Kuwait;
Blocks Iraq Government Blocks Iraq Government
Revoked by E.O. 13350 Revoked by E.O. 13350
(Aug. 9, 1990; 55 FR (Aug. 9, 1990; 55 FR
to meet requirements of to meet requirements of
assets in U.S.; prohibits assets in U.S.; prohibits
(2004) (2004)
33089) 33089)
UNSC Resolution) UNSC Resolution)
most export and import; most export and import;
restricts transactions restricts transactions
related to travel; prohibits related to travel; prohibits
loans loans
12725 12725
Kuwait (after Iraq’s Kuwait (after Iraq’s
Blocks Kuwait Blocks Kuwait
Revoked by E.O. 12771 Revoked by E.O. 12771
(Aug. 9, 1990; 55 FR (Aug. 9, 1990; 55 FR
invasion, to meet invasion, to meet
Government assets in Government assets in
(1991) (1991)
33091) 33091)
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
U.S.; prohibits most U.S.; prohibits most
Resolution) Resolution)
export and import; export and import;
restricts transactions restricts transactions
related to travel; prohibits related to travel; prohibits
loans loans
12730 12730
Expiration of EAA Expiration of EAA
Continues EAR Continues EAR
Revoked by E.O. 12867 Revoked by E.O. 12867
(Sept. 30, 1990; 55 FR (Sept. 30, 1990; 55 FR
(1993) (1993)
40373) 40373)
12735 12735
Chemical and biological Chemical and biological
Declares national Declares national
Revoked and replaced by Revoked and replaced by
(Nov. 16, 1990; 55 FR (Nov. 16, 1990; 55 FR
weapons proliferation weapons proliferation
emergency; prohibits emergency; prohibits
E.O. 12938 (1994) E.O. 12938 (1994)
48587) 48587)
transactions transactions
12775 12775
Haiti (military coup) Haiti (military coup)
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 12932 Revoked by E.O. 12932
(Oct. 4, 1991; 56 FR (Oct. 4, 1991; 56 FR
emergency; blocks Haiti emergency; blocks Haiti
(1994) (1994)
50641) 50641)
Government assets in Government assets in
U.S.; prohibits U.S.; prohibits
transactions transactions
12779 12779
Haiti (military coup) Haiti (military coup)
Blocks Haiti Government Blocks Haiti Government
Revoked by E.O. 12932 Revoked by E.O. 12932
(Oct. 28, 1991; 56 FR (Oct. 28, 1991; 56 FR
assets in U.S.; prohibits assets in U.S.; prohibits
(1994) (1994)
55975) 55975)
export and import, export and import,
transactions transactions
12801 12801
Libya (to meet Libya (to meet
Bars overflight, takeoff Bars overflight, takeoff
Revoked by E.O. 13357 Revoked by E.O. 13357
(Apr. 15, 1992; 57 FR (Apr. 15, 1992; 57 FR
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
and landing planes and landing planes
(2004) (2004)
14319) 14319)
Resolution) Resolution)
traveling to/from Libya traveling to/from Libya
12808 12808
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13304 Revoked by E.O. 13304
(May 30, 1992; 57 FR (May 30, 1992; 57 FR
Montenegro) (regional Montenegro) (regional
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
(2003) (2003)
23299) 23299)
conflict; to meet conflict; to meet
Yugoslav Government Yugoslav Government
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
assets in United States assets in United States

Resolution) Resolution)
Congressional Research Service 59 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 12810 12810
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Blocks Yugoslav Blocks Yugoslav
Revoked by E.O. 13304 Revoked by E.O. 13304
(June 5, 1992; 57 FR (June 5, 1992; 57 FR
Montenegro) (regional Montenegro) (regional
Government assets in Government assets in
(2003) (2003)
24347) 24347)
conflict; to meet conflict; to meet
U.S.; prohibits import and U.S.; prohibits import and
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
export, transactions export, transactions
Resolution) Resolution)
related to travel, air related to travel, air
traffic, loans, completing traffic, loans, completing
contracts, sports contracts, sports
participation, tech/cultural participation, tech/cultural
exchanges exchanges
~~Congressional Research Service~~
54

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
12817 12817
Iraq (postwar; to meet Iraq (postwar; to meet
Blocks assets Blocks assets
Revoked by E.O. 13350 Revoked by E.O. 13350
Oct. 21, 1992; 57 FR Oct. 21, 1992; 57 FR
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
(2004) (2004)
48433) 48433)
Resolution) Resolution)
12831 12831
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Prohibits transshipment Prohibits transshipment
Revoked by E.O. 13304 Revoked by E.O. 13304
(Jan. 15, 1993; 58 FR (Jan. 15, 1993; 58 FR
Montenegro) (regional Montenegro) (regional
(2003) (2003)
5253) 5253)
conflict) conflict)

Administration of President William Clinton (1993-2001)
12846 12846
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Tightens sanctions, Tightens sanctions,
Revoked by E.O. 13304 Revoked by E.O. 13304
(Apr. 25, 1993; 58 FR (Apr. 25, 1993; 58 FR
Montenegro) (regional Montenegro) (regional
especial y those relating especial y those relating
(2003) (2003)
25771) 25771)
conflict; to meet conflict; to meet
to maritime restrictions to maritime restrictions
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
Resolution) Resolution)
12853 12853
Haiti (military coup) Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of regime; Blocks assets of regime;
Revoked by E.O. 12932 Revoked by E.O. 12932
(June 30, 1993; 58 FR (June 30, 1993; 58 FR
prohibits export of prohibits export of
(1994) (1994)
35843) 35843)
petroleum, arms, and petroleum, arms, and
related materiel related materiel
12865 12865
UNITA (Angola) (to meet UNITA (Angola) (to meet
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13298 Revoked by E.O. 13298
(Sept. 26, 1993; 58 FR (Sept. 26, 1993; 58 FR
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
emergency; prohibits sales (2003) emergency; prohibits sales (2003)
51005) 51005)
Resolution) Resolution)
to UNITA and UNITA- to UNITA and UNITA-
control ed regions control ed regions
12868 12868
Weapons proliferation Weapons proliferation
Declares national Declares national
Revoked and replaced by Revoked and replaced by
(Sept. 30, 1993; 58 FR (Sept. 30, 1993; 58 FR
emergency; controls emergency; controls
E.O. 12930 (1994) E.O. 12930 (1994)
51749) 51749)
exports; prohibits exports; prohibits
transactions with those transactions with those
found not in compliance found not in compliance
with controls with controls
12872 12872
Haiti (military coup) Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of those Blocks assets of those
Revoked by E.O. 12932 Revoked by E.O. 12932
(Oct. 18, 1993; 58 FR (Oct. 18, 1993; 58 FR
impeding democratization impeding democratization
(1994) (1994)
54029) 54029)
process process
12914 12914
Haiti (military coup) Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of military Blocks assets of military
Revoked by E.O. 12932 Revoked by E.O. 12932
(May 7, 1994; 59 FR (May 7, 1994; 59 FR
and participants in 1991 and participants in 1991
(1994) (1994)
24339) 24339)
overthrow; prohibits air overthrow; prohibits air
traffic traffic
12917 12917
Haiti (military coup) Haiti (military coup)
Prohibits imports Prohibits imports
Revoked by E.O. 12932 Revoked by E.O. 12932
(May 21, 1994; 59 FR (May 21, 1994; 59 FR
(1994) (1994)
26925) 26925)
12920 12920
Haiti (military coup) Haiti (military coup)
Prohibits certain financial Prohibits certain financial
Revoked by E.O. 12932 Revoked by E.O. 12932
(June 10, 1994; 59 FR (June 10, 1994; 59 FR
transactions, exports transactions, exports
(1994) (1994)
30501) 30501)
Congressional Research Service 60 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 12922 12922
Haiti (military coup) Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of certain Blocks assets of certain
Revoked by E.O. 12932 Revoked by E.O. 12932
(June 21, 1994; 59 FR (June 21, 1994; 59 FR
individuals individuals
(1994) (1994)
32645) 32645)
12923 12923
Expiration of EAA Expiration of EAA
Continues EAR Continues EAR
Revoked and replaced by Revoked and replaced by
(June 30, 1994; 59 FR (June 30, 1994; 59 FR
E.O. 12924 (1994) E.O. 12924 (1994)
34551) 34551)
~~Congressional Research Service~~
55

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
12924 12924
Expiration of EAA Expiration of EAA
Continues EAR Continues EAR
Amended by E.O. 12981 Amended by E.O. 12981
(August 19, 1994; 59 FR (August 19, 1994; 59 FR
(1995) (1995)
34551) 34551)
12930 12930
Proliferation of weapons Proliferation of weapons
Declares national Declares national
Revoked and replaced by Revoked and replaced by
(Sept. 29, 1994; 59 FR (Sept. 29, 1994; 59 FR
of mass destruction of mass destruction
emergency; controls emergency; controls
E.O. 12938 (1994) E.O. 12938 (1994)
50475) 50475)
exports; prohibits exports; prohibits
transactions with those transactions with those
found not in compliance found not in compliance
with controls with controls
12934 12934
Bosnian Serb-control ed Bosnian Serb-control ed
Blocks assets; prohibits Blocks assets; prohibits
Revoked by E.O. 13304 Revoked by E.O. 13304
(Oct. 25, 1994; 59 FR (Oct. 25, 1994; 59 FR
areas of Bosnia and areas of Bosnia and
export, maritime access export, maritime access
(2003) (2003)
54117) 54117)
Herzegovina (to meet Herzegovina (to meet
to certain ports to certain ports
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
resolution) resolution)
12938 12938
Proliferation of weapons Proliferation of weapons
Declares national Declares national
Amended by E.O. 13099 Amended by E.O. 13099
(Nov. 19, 1994; 59 FR (Nov. 19, 1994; 59 FR
of mass destruction of mass destruction
emergency; controls emergency; controls
(1998) (1998)
59099) 59099)
exports; prohibits exports; prohibits
transactions with those transactions with those
found not in compliance found not in compliance
with controls with controls
12947 12947
Terrorists who disrupt Terrorists who disrupt
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(Jan. 23, 1995; 60 FR (Jan. 23, 1995; 60 FR
Middle East peace process emergency; blocks assets; Middle East peace process emergency; blocks assets;
5079) 5079)
prohibits transactions prohibits transactions
12957 12957
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Declares national Declares national
Revoked in part, and Revoked in part, and
(Mar. 15, 1995; 60 FR (Mar. 15, 1995; 60 FR
proliferation) proliferation)
emergency; prohibits emergency; prohibits
restated in E.O. 12959 restated in E.O. 12959
14615) 14615)
investment in oil investment in oil
(1995) (1995)
development development
12959 12959
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Prohibits investment in oil Revoked in part by E.O. Prohibits investment in oil Revoked in part by E.O.
(May 6, 1995; 60 FR (May 6, 1995; 60 FR
proliferation) proliferation)
development development
13059 (1997) 13059 (1997)
24757) 24757)
12978 12978
Significant narcotics Significant narcotics
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(Oct. 21, 1995; 60 FR (Oct. 21, 1995; 60 FR
traffickers (initially traffickers (initially
emergency; blocks assets; emergency; blocks assets;
54579) 54579)
Colombia) Colombia)
prohibits transactions prohibits transactions
12981 12981
EAA EAA
Amends the Amends the
Amended by E.O. 13020 Amended by E.O. 13020
(Dec. 5, 1995) (Dec. 5, 1995)
administration of export administration of export
(1996) (1996)
controls. controls.
13020 13020
EAA EAA
Further amends the Further amends the
Amended by E.O. 13026 Amended by E.O. 13026
(Oct. 12, 1996) (Oct. 12, 1996)
administration of export administration of export
(1996) (1996)
controls. controls.
Congressional Research Service 61 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13026 13026
EAA EAA
Further amends the Further amends the
Revoked by E.O. 13206 Revoked by E.O. 13206
(Nov. 15, 1996) (Nov. 15, 1996)
administration of export administration of export
(2001) (2001)
controls. Adds rules for controls. Adds rules for
encryption products. encryption products.
13047 13047
Burma (military Burma (military
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13742 Revoked by E.O. 13742
(May 22, 1997; 62 FR (May 22, 1997; 62 FR
government; to government; to
emergency; blocks new emergency; blocks new
(2016) (2016)
28301) 28301)
implement Sec. 570 of P.L. investment implement Sec. 570 of P.L. investment
104-208) 104-208)
~~Congressional Research Service~~
56

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
13059 13059
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Blocks imports, exports Blocks imports, exports
Amended by E.O. 13716 Amended by E.O. 13716
(Aug. 19, 1997; 62 FR (Aug. 19, 1997; 62 FR
proliferation, terrorism, proliferation, terrorism,
(2016) (2016)
44531) 44531)
regional stability) regional stability)
13067 13067
Sudan (conflict) Sudan (conflict)
Declares national Declares national
Revoked in part by E.O. Revoked in part by E.O.
(Nov. 3, 1997; 62 FR (Nov. 3, 1997; 62 FR
emergency; blocks Sudan emergency; blocks Sudan
13761 (2017) 13761 (2017)
59989) 59989)
Government assets; Government assets;
prohibits exports, prohibits exports,
imports, other imports, other
transactions transactions
13069 (Dec. 12, 1997; 62 13069 (Dec. 12, 1997; 62
UNITA (Angola) (war) UNITA (Angola) (war)
Prohibits certain Prohibits certain
Revoked by E.O. 13298 Revoked by E.O. 13298
FR 65989) FR 65989)
transaction transaction
(2003) (2003)
13088 13088
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13304 Revoked by E.O. 13304
(June 9, 1998; 63 FR (June 9, 1998; 63 FR
Montenegro) (war) Montenegro) (war)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
(2003) (2003)
32109) 32109)
Yugoslav Government Yugoslav Government
assets; prohibits assets; prohibits
transactions transactions
13094 13094
Proliferation of weapons Proliferation of weapons
Prohibits some Prohibits some
Amended by E.O. 13128 Amended by E.O. 13128
(July 28, 1998; 63 FR (July 28, 1998; 63 FR
of mass destruction of mass destruction
transactions, assistance, transactions, assistance,
(1999) (1999)
40803) 40803)
imports imports
13098 13098
UNITA (Angola) (war; to UNITA (Angola) (war; to
Blocks UNITA assets in Blocks UNITA assets in
Revoked by E.O. 13298 Revoked by E.O. 13298
(Aug. 18, 1998; 63 FR (Aug. 18, 1998; 63 FR
meet requirements of meet requirements of
U.S.; prohibits imports U.S.; prohibits imports
(2003) (2003)
44771) 44771)
UNSC resolution) UNSC resolution)
from and exports to from and exports to
UNITA-control ed or UNITA-control ed or
influences industries influences industries
13099 13099
Terrorists who disrupt Terrorists who disrupt
Adds Usama bin Laden Adds Usama bin Laden
Amends E.O. 12947 Amends E.O. 12947
(Aug. 20, 1998; 63 FR (Aug. 20, 1998; 63 FR
the Middle East peace the Middle East peace
and others to the and others to the
(1995); see above (1995); see above
45167) 45167)
process process
terrorist list terrorist list
13121 13121
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Blocks Yugoslav Blocks Yugoslav
Revoked by E.O. 13304 Revoked by E.O. 13304
(Apr. 30, 1999; 64 FR (Apr. 30, 1999; 64 FR
Montenegro) (war) Montenegro) (war)
Government assets; Government assets;
(2003) (2003)
24021) 24021)
prohibits transactions prohibits transactions
13128 13128
Proliferation of weapons Proliferation of weapons
Implements the Chemical Implements the Chemical
Renewed Annually. Renewed Annually.
(Jun. 25, 1999) (Jun. 25, 1999)
of mass destruction of mass destruction
Weapons Convention and Weapons Convention and
the Chemical Weapons the Chemical Weapons
Convention Convention
Implementation Act. Implementation Act.
13129 13129
Taliban (terrorism) Taliban (terrorism)
Declares national Declares national
National emergency National emergency
(July 4, 1999; 64 FR (July 4, 1999; 64 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
terminated by E.O. 13268 terminated by E.O. 13268
36759) 36759)
property property
(2002); see, however, (2002); see, however,
E.O. 13224 (2001) E.O. 13224 (2001)
Congressional Research Service 62 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status E.O. 13159 E.O. 13159
Russia for misuse of highly Declares national Russia for misuse of highly Declares national
Superseded by E.O. Superseded by E.O.
(June 21, 2000; 65 FR (June 21, 2000; 65 FR
enriched uranium enriched uranium
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
13617 (2012) 13617 (2012)
39279) 39279)
extractions extractions
property property
13192 13192
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Substantially expands Substantially expands
Revoked by E.O. 13304 Revoked by E.O. 13304
(Jan. 17, 2001; 66 FR (Jan. 17, 2001; 66 FR
Montenegro) (war) Montenegro) (war)
sanctions in E.O. 13088 sanctions in E.O. 13088
(2003) (2003)
7379) 7379)
(1998) to apply to (1998) to apply to
humanitarian crisis in humanitarian crisis in
Kosovo Kosovo
~~Congressional Research Service~~
57

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
13194 13194
Sierra Leone (diamond Sierra Leone (diamond
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13324 Revoked by E.O. 13324
(Jan. 18, 2001; 66 FR (Jan. 18, 2001; 66 FR
trade) trade)
emergency; prohibits emergency; prohibits
2004) 2004)
7389) 7389)
diamond imports diamond imports
Administration of President George W. Bush (2001-2009)
13213 13213
Sierra Leone (diamond Sierra Leone (diamond
Expands prohibitions on Expands prohibitions on
Revoked by E.O. 13324 Revoked by E.O. 13324
(May 22, 2001; 66 FR (May 22, 2001; 66 FR
trade) trade)
diamond trade diamond trade
2004) 2004)
28829) 28829)
13219 13219
Western Balkans Western Balkans
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(June 26, 2001; 66 FR (June 26, 2001; 66 FR
(destabilization postwar) (destabilization postwar)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
34775) 34775)
property property
13222 13222
Expiration of EAA Expiration of EAA
Continues EAR Continues EAR
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(Aug. 17, 2001; 66 FR (Aug. 17, 2001; 66 FR
44025) 44025)
13224 13224
Terrorism Terrorism
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(Sept. 23, 2001; 66 FR (Sept. 23, 2001; 66 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
49079 49079
property; prohibits property; prohibits
transactions transactions
13268 13268
Taliban and Terrorism Taliban and Terrorism
Terminates E.O. 13129 Terminates E.O. 13129
Expanded by E.O. 13371 Expanded by E.O. 13371
(July 2, 2002; 67 FR (July 2, 2002; 67 FR
(1999); amends E.O. (1999); amends E.O.
(2005) (2005)
44751) 44751)
13224 (2001) 13224 (2001)
13288 13288
Zimbabwe (undermining Zimbabwe (undermining
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually, Renewed annually,
(Mar. 6, 2003; 68 FR (Mar. 6, 2003; 68 FR
democratic processes) democratic processes)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
superseded in part by superseded in part by
11457) 11457)
property property
E.O. 13391 (2005) E.O. 13391 (2005)
13290 13290
Iraq (war) Iraq (war)
Authorizes the Authorizes the
Modified by E.O. 13350 Modified by E.O. 13350
Mar. 20, 2003; 68 FR Mar. 20, 2003; 68 FR
confiscation and vesting of (2004) confiscation and vesting of (2004)
14307) 14307)
property property
13298 13298
UNITA (Angola) UNITA (Angola)
Terminates earlier Terminates earlier
Revokes earlier orders Revokes earlier orders
(May 6, 2003; 68 FR (May 6, 2003; 68 FR
emergency emergency
24857) 24857)
13303 13303
Iraq (war) Iraq (war)
Declares national Declares national
Amends earlier order Amends earlier order
(May 22, 2003; 68 FR (May 22, 2003; 68 FR
emergency; Protects emergency; Protects
31931) 31931)
certain property, revokes certain property, revokes
earlier orders. earlier orders.
13304 13304
Yugoslavia (regional war) Yugoslavia (regional war)
Terminates earlier Terminates earlier
Revokes and modifies Revokes and modifies
(May 28, 2003; 68 FR (May 28, 2003; 68 FR
emergency emergency
earlier orders earlier orders
32315) 32315)
Congressional Research Service 63 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13310 13310
Burma (military Burma (military
Blocks property Blocks property
Revoked by E.O. 13742 Revoked by E.O. 13742
(July 28, 2003; 68 FR (July 28, 2003; 68 FR
government) government)
(2016) (2016)
44853) 44853)
13312 13312
Sierra Leone and Liberia Sierra Leone and Liberia
Implements the Clean Implements the Clean
Revoked by E.O. 13324 Revoked by E.O. 13324
(Jul. 3, 2003) (Jul. 3, 2003)
(conflict) (conflict)
Diamond Trade Act Diamond Trade Act
(2004) (2004)
13315 13315
Iraq (former regime) Iraq (former regime)
Blocks property Blocks property
Superseded by E.O. Superseded by E.O.
(Aug. 28, 2003; 68 FR (Aug. 28, 2003; 68 FR
13350 (2004) 13350 (2004)
52315) 52315)
~~Congressional Research Service~~
58

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
13324 13324
Sierra Leone and Liberia Sierra Leone and Liberia
Terminates earlier Terminates earlier
Revokes earlier order Revokes earlier order
(Jan. 15, 2004) (Jan. 15, 2004)
(conflict) (conflict)
emergency emergency
13338 13338
Syria (civil conflict) Syria (civil conflict)
Declares national Declares national
Modified by E.O. 13460 Modified by E.O. 13460
(May 11, 2004; 69 FR (May 11, 2004; 69 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
(2008); renewed annually (2008); renewed annually
26751) 26751)
property of those who property of those who
export certain goods to export certain goods to
Syria Syria
13348 13348
Liberia (corruption, to Liberia (corruption, to
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13710 Revoked by E.O. 13710
(July 22, 2004; 69 FR (July 22, 2004; 69 FR
meet requirements of meet requirements of
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
(2015) (2015)
44885) 44885)
UNSC resolution) UNSC resolution)
property; prohibits property; prohibits
imports imports
13350 13350
Iraq (postwar) Iraq (postwar)
Ends emergency from Ends emergency from
Amended by E.O. 13364 Amended by E.O. 13364
(July 29, 2004; 69 FR (July 29, 2004; 69 FR
1990 Kuwait invasion 1990 Kuwait invasion
(2004) (2004)
46055) 46055)
13357 13357
Libya (terrorism) Libya (terrorism)
Terminates earlier Terminates earlier
Revokes earlier orders Revokes earlier orders
(Sept. 20, 2004; 69 FR (Sept. 20, 2004; 69 FR
emergency emergency
56665) 56665)
13364 13364
Iraq (postwar) Iraq (postwar)
Amends transaction Amends transaction
Amended by E.O. 13668 Amended by E.O. 13668
(Nov. 29, 2004) (Nov. 29, 2004)
controls and regulations controls and regulations
(2014) (2014)
on the Development fund on the Development fund
for Iraq for Iraq
13372 13372
Terrorism Terrorism
Clarifies use of sanctions Clarifies use of sanctions
Amends E.O. 12947, E.O. Amends E.O. 12947, E.O.
(Feb. 16, 2005; 70 FR (Feb. 16, 2005; 70 FR
13224 13224
8499) 8499)
13382 13382
Weapons proliferation Weapons proliferation
Expands on earlier Expands on earlier
Amends E.O. 12938 Amends E.O. 12938
(June 28, 2005; 70 FR (June 28, 2005; 70 FR
orders; blocks property orders; blocks property
(1994) and 13094 (1998), (1994) and 13094 (1998),
38567) 38567)
see above see above
13391 13391
Zimbabwe (undermining Zimbabwe (undermining
Blocks property Blocks property
Amends and supersedes, Amends and supersedes,
(Nov. 22, 2005; 70 FR (Nov. 22, 2005; 70 FR
democratic processes) democratic processes)
in part, E.O. 13288 (2003) in part, E.O. 13288 (2003)
71201) 71201)
13396 13396
Cote d’Ivoire (conflict) Cote d’Ivoire (conflict)
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13739 Revoked by E.O. 13739
(Feb. 7, 2006; 71 FR (Feb. 7, 2006; 71 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
(2016) (2016)
7389) 7389)
property property
13399 13399
Syria (civil war) Syria (civil war)
Expands E.O. 13338 Expands E.O. 13338
Amends earlier order Amends earlier order
(Apr. 25, 2006; 71 FR (Apr. 25, 2006; 71 FR
(2004); blocks property (2004); blocks property
25059) 25059)
Congressional Research Service 64 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13400 13400
Sudan (Darfur) Sudan (Darfur)
Expands E.O. 13067 Expands E.O. 13067
Amends earlier order Amends earlier order
(Apr. 26, 2006; 71 FR (Apr. 26, 2006; 71 FR
(1997); blocks property (1997); blocks property
25483) 25483)
13405 13405
Belarus (undermining Belarus (undermining
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(June 16, 2006; 71 FR (June 16, 2006; 71 FR
democracy) democracy)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
35485) 35485)
property property
13412 13412
Sudan (Darfur, regional Sudan (Darfur, regional
Expands E.O. 13067 Expands E.O. 13067
Revoked by E.O. 13761 Revoked by E.O. 13761
(Oct. 13, 2006; 71 FR (Oct. 13, 2006; 71 FR
stability) stability)
(1997; blocks property (1997; blocks property
(2017) (2017)
61369) 61369)
and transactions and transactions
~~Congressional Research Service~~
59

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
13413 13413
Democratic Republic of Democratic Republic of
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually; Renewed annually;
(Oct. 27, 2006; 71 FR (Oct. 27, 2006; 71 FR
the Congo (regional the Congo (regional
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 13671 amended by E.O. 13671
64105) 64105)
stability) stability)
property property
(2014) (2014)
13438 13438
Those who threaten Those who threaten
Expands E.O. 13303 Expands E.O. 13303
Expands other orders Expands other orders
(July 17, 2007; 72 FR (July 17, 2007; 72 FR
stabilization efforts in Iraq stabilization efforts in Iraq
(2003); blocks property (2003); blocks property
39719) 39719)
13441 13441
Those who threaten the Those who threaten the
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(Aug. 1, 2007; 72 FR (Aug. 1, 2007; 72 FR
sovereignty of Lebanon sovereignty of Lebanon
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
43499) 43499)
(primarily Syria) (primarily Syria)
property property
13448 13448
Burma (military Burma (military
Declares national Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13742 Revoked by E.O. 13742
Oct. 18, 2007; 72 FR Oct. 18, 2007; 72 FR
government) government)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
(2016) (2016)
60223) 60223)
property and transactions property and transactions
13460 13460
Syria (civil conflict) Syria (civil conflict)
Blocks property of those Blocks property of those
Amends E.O. 13338 Amends E.O. 13338
(Feb. 13, 2008; 73 FR (Feb. 13, 2008; 73 FR
who support certain who support certain
(2004) (2004)
8991) 8991)
activities in Syria activities in Syria
13464 13464
Burma (military Burma (military
Blocks property and Blocks property and
Revoked by E.O. 13742 Revoked by E.O. 13742
Apr. 30, 2008; 72 FR Apr. 30, 2008; 72 FR
government) government)
transactions transactions
(2016) (2016)
24491) 24491)
13466 13466
North Korea (weapons North Korea (weapons
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(June 26, 2008; 73 FR (June 26, 2008; 73 FR
proliferation, to meet proliferation, to meet
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
36787) 36787)
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
property and transactions property and transactions
resolution) resolution)
13469 13469
Zimbabwe (undermining Zimbabwe (undermining
Blocks property Blocks property
Expands E.O. 13288 Expands E.O. 13288
(July 25, 2008; 73 FR (July 25, 2008; 73 FR
democracy) democracy)
(2003) and 13391 (2005) (2003) and 13391 (2005)
43841) 43841)
Administration of President Barack Obama (2009-2017)
13536 13536
Somalia (conflict) Somalia (conflict)
Declares national Declares national
Amended by E.O. 13620 Amended by E.O. 13620
(Apr. 12, 2010; 75 FR (Apr. 12, 2010; 75 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
(2012); renewed annually (2012); renewed annually
19869) 19869)
property property
13551 13551
North Korea (weapons North Korea (weapons
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(Aug. 30, 2010; 75 FR (Aug. 30, 2010; 75 FR
proliferation, to meet proliferation, to meet
emergency; Blocks emergency; Blocks
53837) 53837)
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
property property
resolution) resolution)
13553 13553
Iran (human rights) Iran (human rights)
Blocks property including Blocks property including
Expands E.O. 12957 Expands E.O. 12957
(Sept, 28, 2010; 75 FR (Sept, 28, 2010; 75 FR
that of Iranian officials that of Iranian officials
(1995) (1995)
60567) 60567)
Congressional Research Service 65 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13566 13566
Libya (stability) Libya (stability)
Declares national Declares national
Modified by E.O. 13726 Modified by E.O. 13726
(Feb. 25, 2011; 76 FR (Feb. 25, 2011; 76 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
(2016); renewed annually (2016); renewed annually
11315) 11315)
property and transactions property and transactions
13570 13570
North Korea (weapons North Korea (weapons
Blocks transactions Blocks transactions
Expands E.O. 13466 Expands E.O. 13466
(Apr. 18, 2011; 76 FR (Apr. 18, 2011; 76 FR
proliferation, to meet proliferation, to meet
(2008), 13551 (2010); (2008), 13551 (2010);
22291) 22291)
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
amended by E.O. 13687 amended by E.O. 13687
resolution) resolution)
(2015) (2015)
13572 13572
Syria (human rights) Syria (human rights)
Blocks property of human Expands E.O. 13338 Blocks property of human Expands E.O. 13338
(Apr. 29, 2011; 76 FR (Apr. 29, 2011; 76 FR
rights violators rights violators
(2004), 13399 (2006), and (2004), 13399 (2006), and
24787) 24787)
13460 (2008) 13460 (2008)
~~Congressional Research Service~~
60

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
13573 13573
Syria (war) Syria (war)
Blocks property of senior Blocks property of senior
Expands E.O. 13338 Expands E.O. 13338
(May 18, 2011; 76 FR (May 18, 2011; 76 FR
government officials government officials
(2004), 13399 (2006), (2004), 13399 (2006),
29143) 29143)
13460 (2008), and 13572 13460 (2008), and 13572
(2011); amended by E.O. (2011); amended by E.O.
13582 (2011) 13582 (2011)
13574 13574
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Implements new sanctions Revoked by E.O. 13716 Implements new sanctions Revoked by E.O. 13716
(May 23, 2011; 76 FR (May 23, 2011; 76 FR
proliferation) proliferation)
in Iran Sanctions Act of in Iran Sanctions Act of
(2016) (2016)
30505) 30505)
1996 1996
13581 13581
Transnational Criminal Transnational Criminal
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(July 24, 2011; 76 FR (July 24, 2011; 76 FR
Organizations Organizations
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
44757) 44757)
property property
13582 13582
Syria (war) Syria (war)
Blocks property of Blocks property of
Expands E.O. 13338 Expands E.O. 13338
(Aug. 17, 2011; 76 FR (Aug. 17, 2011; 76 FR
Government of Syria and Government of Syria and
(2004), 13399 (2006), (2004), 13399 (2006),
52209) 52209)
transactions transactions
13460 (2008), 13572 13460 (2008), 13572
(2011), and E.O. 13573 (2011), and E.O. 13573
(2011) (2011)
13590 13590
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Prohibits transactions Prohibits transactions
Revoked by E.O. 13716 Revoked by E.O. 13716
(Nov. 20, 2011; 76 FR (Nov. 20, 2011; 76 FR
proliferation) proliferation)
related to Iran’s energy related to Iran’s energy
(2016) (2016)
72609) 72609)
and petrochemical sectors and petrochemical sectors
13599 13599
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Blocks property of Blocks property of
Expands E.O. 12957 Expands E.O. 12957
(Feb. 5, 2012; 77 FR (Feb. 5, 2012; 77 FR
proliferation) proliferation)
government and financial government and financial
(1995) (1995)
6659) 6659)
institutions institutions
13606 13606
Iran and Syria (human Iran and Syria (human
Blocks property and Blocks property and
Expands E.O. 12957 Expands E.O. 12957
(Apr. 22, 2012; 77 FR (Apr. 22, 2012; 77 FR
rights) rights)
denies visas denies visas
(1995) and 13338 (2004) (1995) and 13338 (2004)
24571) 24571)
13608 13608
Iran and Syria (sanctions Iran and Syria (sanctions
Blocks transactions and Blocks transactions and
Expands E.O. 12938 Expands E.O. 12938
(May 1, 2012; 77 FR (May 1, 2012; 77 FR
evasion) evasion)
denies visas denies visas
(1994), 12957 (1995), (1994), 12957 (1995),
26409) 26409)
13224 (2001), and 13338 13224 (2001), and 13338
(2004) (2004)
13611 13611
Yemen (stability) Yemen (stability)
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(May 16, 2012; 77 FR (May 16, 2012; 77 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
29533) 29533)
property property
13617 13617
Russia (misuse of highly Russia (misuse of highly
Blocks property Blocks property
Revoked by E.O. 13695 Revoked by E.O. 13695
(June 25, 2012; 77 FR (June 25, 2012; 77 FR
enriched uranium enriched uranium
(2015) (2015)
38459) 38459)
extractions extractions
Congressional Research Service 66 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13619 13619
Burma (military Burma (military
Blocks property Blocks property
Revoked by E.O. 13742 Revoked by E.O. 13742
(July 11, 2012; 77 FR (July 11, 2012; 77 FR
government) government)
(2016) (2016)
41243) 41243)
13620 13620
Somalia (conflict) Somalia (conflict)
Expands targets to include Amends E.O. 13536 Expands targets to include Amends E.O. 13536
July 20, 2012; 77 FR July 20, 2012; 77 FR
misappropriations, misappropriations,
(2010) (2010)
43483) 43483)
corruption, impeding corruption, impeding
humanitarian aid humanitarian aid
13622 13622
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Additional sanctions Additional sanctions
Revoked by E.O. 13716 Revoked by E.O. 13716
(July 30, 2012; 77 FR (July 30, 2012; 77 FR
proliferation) proliferation)
(Jan. 16, 2016; 81 FR (Jan. 16, 2016; 81 FR
45897) 45897)
3693) 3693)
~~Congressional Research Service~~
61

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
13628 13628
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Implements Iran Threat Implements Iran Threat
Amended by E.O. 13716 Amended by E.O. 13716
(Oct. 9, 2012; 77 FR (Oct. 9, 2012; 77 FR
proliferation, human proliferation, human
Reduction Act Reduction Act
(2016) (2016)
62139) 62139)
rights, sanctions evasion) rights, sanctions evasion)
13637 13637
EAA EAA
Amends EAR Amends EAR
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(Mar. 8, 2013) (Mar. 8, 2013)
13645 13645
Iran (weapons Iran (weapons
Implements Iran Freedom Implements Iran Freedom
Revoked by E.O. 13716 Revoked by E.O. 13716
(June 3, 2013; 78 FR (June 3, 2013; 78 FR
proliferation, human proliferation, human
and Counter-Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation
(Jan. 16, 2016; 81 FR (Jan. 16, 2016; 81 FR
33945) 33945)
rights) rights)
Act of 2012 Act of 2012
3693) 3693)
13651 13651
Burma Burma
Prohibits import of jadeite Expands E.O. 13047 Prohibits import of jadeite Expands E.O. 13047
(Aug. 6, 2013; 78 FR (Aug. 6, 2013; 78 FR
and rubies and rubies
(1997) and subsequent (1997) and subsequent
48793) 48793)
orders orders
13660 13660
Ukraine (stability) Ukraine (stability)
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(Mar. 6, 2014; 79 FR (Mar. 6, 2014; 79 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
13493) 13493)
property property
13661 13661
Russia (destabilization of Russia (destabilization of
Blocks property Blocks property
Expands E.O. 13660 Expands E.O. 13660
(Mar. 16, 2014; 79 FR (Mar. 16, 2014; 79 FR
Ukraine) Ukraine)
(2014) (2014)
15535) 15535)
13662 13662
Russia (destabilization of Russia (destabilization of
Blocks property Blocks property
Expands E.O. 13660 Expands E.O. 13660
(Mar. 20, 2014; 79 FR (Mar. 20, 2014; 79 FR
Ukraine) Ukraine)
(2014) (2014)
16169) 16169)
13664 13664
South Sudan (conflict) South Sudan (conflict)
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(Apr. 3, 2014; 79 FR (Apr. 3, 2014; 79 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
19283) 19283)
property property
13667 13667
Central African Republic Central African Republic
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(May 12, 2014; 79 FR (May 12, 2014; 79 FR
(conflict) (conflict)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
28387) 28387)
property property
13668 13668
Iraq (postwar) Iraq (postwar)
Ends immunities granted Ends immunities granted
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(May 27, 2014) (May 27, 2014)
to the Development Fund to the Development Fund
for Iraq for Iraq
13671 13671
Democratic Republic of Democratic Republic of
Additional sanctions Additional sanctions
Expands E.O. 13413 Expands E.O. 13413
(July 8, 2014; 79 FR (July 8, 2014; 79 FR
the Congo (regional the Congo (regional
(2006) (2006)
39949) 39949)
stability) stability)
13685 13685
Ukraine (destabilizing Ukraine (destabilizing
Blocks property and Blocks property and
Expands E.O. 13660 Expands E.O. 13660
(Dec. 19, 2014; 79 FR (Dec. 19, 2014; 79 FR
activities in Crimea) activities in Crimea)
transactions transactions
(2014) (2014)
77357) 77357)
Congressional Research Service 67 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13687 13687
North Korea (weapons North Korea (weapons
Additional sanctions Additional sanctions
Expands E.O. 13466 Expands E.O. 13466
(Jan. 2, 2015; 80 FR 819) (Jan. 2, 2015; 80 FR 819)
proliferation, to meet proliferation, to meet
(2008), 13551 (2010), (2008), 13551 (2010),
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
13570 (2011) 13570 (2011)
resolution) resolution)
13692 13692
Venezuela (corruption, Venezuela (corruption,
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(Mar. 8, 2015; 80 FR (Mar. 8, 2015; 80 FR
stability) stability)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
12747) 12747)
property and deny visas property and deny visas
13694 13694
Malicious Cyber-Enabled Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(Apr. 1, 2015; 80 FR (Apr. 1, 2015; 80 FR
Activities Activities
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
18077) 18077)
property property
~~Congressional Research Service~~
62

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
13695 13695
Russia’s misuse of highly Russia’s misuse of highly
Terminates emergency Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13617 Revokes E.O. 13617
(May 26, 2015; 80 FR (May 26, 2015; 80 FR
enriched uranium enriched uranium
(2012) (2012)
30331) 30331)
extractions extractions
13710 13710
Liberia (corrupt Liberia (corrupt
Terminates emergency Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13348 Revokes E.O. 13348
(Nov. 12, 2015; 80 FR (Nov. 12, 2015; 80 FR
government) government)
(2004) (2004)
71679) 71679)
13712 13712
Burundi (stability) Burundi (stability)
Declares national Declares national
Renewed annually Renewed annually
(Nov. 22, 2015; 80 FR (Nov. 22, 2015; 80 FR
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
73633) 73633)
property property
13716 13716
Iran (nuclear weapons) Iran (nuclear weapons)
Implements U.S. Implements U.S.
Revokes and modifies Revokes and modifies
(Jan. 16, 2016; 81 FR (Jan. 16, 2016; 81 FR
obligations under the Joint earlier orders obligations under the Joint earlier orders
3693) 3693)
Comprehensive Plan of Comprehensive Plan of
Action Action
13722 13722
North Korea (weapons North Korea (weapons
Blocks property of North Blocks property of North
Expands E.O. 13466 Expands E.O. 13466
(Mar. 15, 2016; 81 FR (Mar. 15, 2016; 81 FR
proliferation, to meet proliferation, to meet
Korea government and Korea government and
(2008) (2008)
14943) 14943)
requirements of UNSC requirements of UNSC
central party; prohibits central party; prohibits
resolution) resolution)
transactions transactions
13726 13726
Libya (stability) Libya (stability)
Additional sanctions Additional sanctions
Expands E.O. 13566 Expands E.O. 13566
(Apr. 19, 2016; 81 FR (Apr. 19, 2016; 81 FR
(2011) (2011)
23559) 23559)
13739 13739
Cote d’Ivoire (conflict) Cote d’Ivoire (conflict)
Terminates emergency Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13396 Revokes E.O. 13396
(Sept, 14, 2016; 81 FR (Sept, 14, 2016; 81 FR
(2006) (2006)
63673) 63673)
13742 13742
Burma Burma
Terminates emergency Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13047 Revokes E.O. 13047
(Oct. 7, 2016; 81 FR (Oct. 7, 2016; 81 FR
(1997), 13310 (2003), (1997), 13310 (2003),
70593) 70593)
13448 (2007), 13464 13448 (2007), 13464
(2008), 13619 (2012) (2008), 13619 (2012)
13757 13757
Malicious Cyber-Enabled Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Additional sanctions Additional sanctions
Modifies E.O. 13694 Modifies E.O. 13694
(Dec. 28, 2016) (Dec. 28, 2016)
Activities Activities
(2015) (2015)
13761 13761
Sudan (war, human rights) Recognizes “positive Sudan (war, human rights) Recognizes “positive
Revokes in part E.O. Revokes in part E.O.
(Jan. 13, 2017; 82 FR (Jan. 13, 2017; 82 FR
actions” by the actions” by the
13067 (1997), in whole 13067 (1997), in whole
5331) 5331)
Government of Sudan by Government of Sudan by
E.O. 13412 (2006) E.O. 13412 (2006)
removing some sanctions removing some sanctions
Congressional Research Service 68 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status Administration of President Donald J. Trump (2017-)
13804 13804
Sudan (war, human rights) Extends deadlines in E.O. Sudan (war, human rights) Extends deadlines in E.O.
Modifies E.O. 13761 Modifies E.O. 13761
(July 11, 2017; 82 FR (July 11, 2017; 82 FR
13761 13761
(2017) (2017)
32611) 32611)
13808 13808
Venezuela (human rights, Venezuela (human rights,
Additional sanctions Additional sanctions
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(Aug. 24, 2017; 82 FR (Aug. 24, 2017; 82 FR
democracy, corruption) democracy, corruption)
national emergency national emergency
41155) 41155)
declared in E.O. 13692 declared in E.O. 13692
(2015) (2015)
13810 13810
North Korea (weapons North Korea (weapons
Additional sanctions Additional sanctions
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(Sept, 20, 2017; 82 FR (Sept, 20, 2017; 82 FR
proliferation, human proliferation, human
national emergency national emergency
44705) 44705)
rights) rights)
declared in E.O. 13466 declared in E.O. 13466
(2008) (2008)
~~Congressional Research Service~~
63

~~The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use~~

~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
13818 13818
Global Magnitsky (human Global Magnitsky (human
Declares national Declares national
Likely to be renewed Likely to be renewed
(Dec. 20, 2017; 82 FR (Dec. 20, 2017; 82 FR
rights, corruption) rights, corruption)
emergency; blocks emergency; blocks
annually (pending first annually (pending first
60839) 60839)
property property
anniversary) anniversary)
13827 13827
Venezuela (sanctions Venezuela (sanctions
Prohibits transactions, Prohibits transactions,
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(Mar. 19, 2018; 83 FR (Mar. 19, 2018; 83 FR
evasion) evasion)
financing, trade in digital financing, trade in digital
national emergency national emergency
12469) 12469)
currency issued by or on currency issued by or on
declared in E.O. 13692 declared in E.O. 13692
behalf of the Government behalf of the Government
(2015) (2015)
of Venezuela of Venezuela
13835 13835
Venezuela (economic Venezuela (economic
Prohibits U.S. persons Prohibits U.S. persons
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(May 21, 2018; 83 FR (May 21, 2018; 83 FR
mismanagement, public mismanagement, public
from purchasing debt from purchasing debt
national emergency national emergency
24001) 24001)
corruption, undermining corruption, undermining
owed the Government of owed the Government of
declared in E.O. 13692 declared in E.O. 13692
democratic order, democratic order,
Venezuela or trading in Venezuela or trading in
(2015) (2015)
humanitarian and public humanitarian and public
equity in which the equity in which the
health crisis) health crisis)
Government holds at Government holds at
least a 50% stake least a 50% stake
13846 13846
Iran Iran
Reimposes sanctions lifted Expands actions based on Reimposes sanctions lifted Expands actions based on
(Aug. 6, 2018; 83 FR (Aug. 6, 2018; 83 FR
for U.S. meeting its for U.S. meeting its
national emergency national emergency
38939) 38939)
obligations under the Joint declared in E.O. 12957 obligations under the Joint declared in E.O. 12957
Comprehensive Plan of Comprehensive Plan of
(1995) (1995)
Action of July 14, 2015 Action of July 14, 2015
(JCPOA) (JCPOA)
13848 13848
Foreign interference in Foreign interference in
Declares national Declares national
Complements actions Complements actions
(Sept. 12, 2018; 83 FR (Sept. 12, 2018; 83 FR
U.S. elections U.S. elections
emergency relating to emergency relating to
taken under E.O. 13694, taken under E.O. 13694,
46843) 46843)

election interference. election interference.
as amended. as amended.
Establishes framework to Establishes framework to
assess possible assess possible
interference by foreign interference by foreign
persons or governments persons or governments
in any U.S. election. in any U.S. election.
Blocks property and Blocks property and
interests in property of interests in property of
those designated for being those designated for being
complicit in interfering in complicit in interfering in
an election. an election.
Congressional Research Service 69 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13849 13849
Implements Russia-related Limits U.S. bank loans, Implements Russia-related Limits U.S. bank loans,
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(Sept. 21, 2018; 83 FR (Sept. 21, 2018; 83 FR
sanctions adopted in the sanctions adopted in the
prohibits foreign prohibits foreign
national emergencies national emergencies
48195) 48195)
Countering Russian Countering Russian
exchange, blocks exchange, blocks
declared in E.O. 13660 declared in E.O. 13660
Influence in Europe and Influence in Europe and
property, prohibits property, prohibits
(2014) and related EO, (2014) and related EO,

Eurasia Act of 2017 (Title Eurasia Act of 2017 (Title
Export-Import Bank Export-Import Bank
and E.O. 13694 (2015), as and E.O. 13694 (2015), as
II, P.L. 115-44; 22 U.S.C. II, P.L. 115-44; 22 U.S.C. §
programs, limits the programs, limits the
amended. amended.
§§ 9501 et seq.) 9501 et seq.)
issuing of specific licenses, issuing of specific licenses,
requires “no” votes in the requires “no” votes in the
international financial international financial
institutions where a loan institutions where a loan
would benefit a person would benefit a person
otherwise subject to otherwise subject to
sanctions, limits access to sanctions, limits access to
the U.S. banking system, the U.S. banking system,
prohibits procurement prohibits procurement
contracts with the USG, contracts with the USG,
denies entry into the denies entry into the
United States. United States.
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~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
13851 13851
Nicaragua Nicaragua
Blocks property of certain Blocks property of certain
(Nov. 27, 2018; 83 FR (Nov. 27, 2018; 83 FR
persons contributing to persons contributing to
61505) 61505)
the situation in Nicaragua. the situation in Nicaragua.
13857 13857
Venezuela Venezuela
Taking additional steps to Taking additional steps to
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(Jan. 25, 2019; 84 FR 509) (Jan. 25, 2019; 84 FR 509)
address the national address the national
national emergency national emergency
emergency with respect emergency with respect
declared in E.O. 13692 declared in E.O. 13692
to Venezuela; redefines to Venezuela; redefines
(2015); modifies EOs (2015); modifies EOs
“the government of “the government of
13692, 13808, 13827, 13692, 13808, 13827,
Venezuela” Venezuela”
13850 13850
13871 13871
Iran Iran
Prohibits transactions Prohibits transactions
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(May 8, 2019; 84 FR (May 8, 2019; 84 FR
related to Iran’s iron, related to Iran’s iron,
national emergency national emergency
20761) 20761)
steel, aluminum, or steel, aluminum, or
declared in Exec. Order declared in Exec. Order
copper sectors. copper sectors.
12957 (1995) 12957 (1995)
13873 13873
The Information and The Information and
Declares national Declares national
Likely to be renewed Likely to be renewed
(May 15, 2019, 84 FR (May 15, 2019, 84 FR
Communications Communications
emergency. Prohibits emergency. Prohibits
annually (pending first annually (pending first
22689) 22689)
Technology and Services Technology and Services
unduly risky transactions unduly risky transactions
anniversary) anniversary)
Supply Chain Supply Chain
involving information and involving information and
communications communications
technology or services technology or services
designed, developed, designed, developed,
manufactured, or manufactured, or
supplied, by foreign supplied, by foreign
adversaries. adversaries.
13876 13876
Iran Iran
Prohibits transactions Prohibits transactions
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(June 24, 2019; 84 FR (June 24, 2019; 84 FR
related to U.S.-based related to U.S.-based
national emergency national emergency
30573) 30573)
assets of the Supreme assets of the Supreme
declared in Exec. Order declared in Exec. Order
Leader of the Islamic Leader of the Islamic
12957 (1995) 12957 (1995)
Republic of Iran, Supreme Republic of Iran, Supreme
Leader’s Office (SLO), Leader’s Office (SLO),
and anyone appointed to and anyone appointed to
a state position in Iran. a state position in Iran.
Congressional Research Service 70 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13882 13882
Mali Mali
Declares national Declares national
Likely to be renewed Likely to be renewed
(July 26, 2019; 84 FR (July 26, 2019; 84 FR
emergency relating to emergency relating to
annually (pending first annually (pending first
37055) 37055)
terrorism, narcotics terrorism, narcotics
anniversary) anniversary)
trafficking, trafficking in trafficking, trafficking in
persons, human rights persons, human rights
abuses, hostage-taking, abuses, hostage-taking,
and attacks against and attacks against
civilians and international civilians and international
security forces in Mali; no security forces in Mali; no
designations made at time designations made at time
of issuance. of issuance.
13883 13883
Chemical and biological Chemical and biological
Requires the U.S. to Requires the U.S. to
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(August 1, 2019; 84 F.R. (August 1, 2019; 84 F.R.
weapons proliferation or weapons proliferation or
oppose international oppose international
E.O. 12938 (1994); E.O. 12938 (1994);
38113) 38113)
use; currently could be use; currently could be
financial institutions’ financial institutions’
implements sanctions implements sanctions
used against Syria, North used against Syria, North
programs to the targeted programs to the targeted
requirements of Sec. 307, requirements of Sec. 307,
Korea, and Russia, based Korea, and Russia, based
state; prohibits U.S. banks state; prohibits U.S. banks
P.L. 102-182; and amends P.L. 102-182; and amends
on determinations made on determinations made
from providing loans or from providing loans or
Exec. Order 12851 (1993) Exec. Order 12851 (1993)
under sec. 307 of P.L. under sec. 307 of P.L.
credits to the targeted credits to the targeted
to include CBW-related to include CBW-related
102-182 (22 U.S.C. 5605) government. 102-182 (22 U.S.C. 5605) government.
determinations determinations
13884 13884
Venezuela Venezuela
Blocks property of the Blocks property of the
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
(August 5, 2019; 84 F.R. (August 5, 2019; 84 F.R.
government of Venezuela government of Venezuela
E.O. 13692 (2015) E.O. 13692 (2015)
38843) 38843)
in the United States in the United States
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~~Country or Issue of~~
~~Executive Order~~
~~Concern~~
~~Sanction/Remedy~~
~~Current Status~~
13886 (September 9, 13886 (September 9,
Terrorism Terrorism
Consolidates and Consolidates and
Revokes E.O. 12947 Revokes E.O. 12947
2019; 84 F.R. 48041) 2019; 84 F.R. 48041)
enhances “sanctions to enhances “sanctions to
(1995); amends E.O. (1995); amends E.O.
combat acts of terrorism combat acts of terrorism
13224 (2001) 13224 (2001)
and threats of terrorism and threats of terrorism
by foreign terrorists” by foreign terrorists”
13894 (October 14, 2019; Turkey’s incursion into 13894 (October 14, 2019; Turkey’s incursion into
Declares a national Declares a national
Current Current
84 F.R. 55851) 84 F.R. 55851)
Syria Syria
emergency relating to emergency relating to
Turkey’s military invasion Turkey’s military invasion
of northeast Syria; blocks of northeast Syria; blocks
property and suspends property and suspends
entry into the United entry into the United
States of “certain persons States of “certain persons
contributing to the contributing to the
situation in Syria” situation in Syria”
13902 (January 10, 2020; 13902 (January 10, 2020;
Iran Iran
Blocks property and Blocks property and
Expands actions based on Expands actions based on
85 F.R. 2003) 85 F.R. 2003)
prohibits transactions prohibits transactions
E.O. 12957 (1995) E.O. 12957 (1995)
related to Iran’s related to Iran’s
construction, mining, construction, mining,
manufacturing, or textiles manufacturing, or textiles
sectors, or any other sectors, or any other
sector to be determined sector to be determined
by the Secretary of the by the Secretary of the
Treasury Treasury
13920 (May 1, 2020; 85 13920 (May 1, 2020; 85
United States Bulk-Power United States Bulk-Power
Declares a national Declares a national
Current Current
F.R. 26595 F.R. 26595
System System
emergency relating to emergency relating to
bulk-power system bulk-power system
equipment. equipment.
Congressional Research Service 71 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13928 (June 11, 2020; 85 13928 (June 11, 2020; 85
International Criminal International Criminal
Declares national Declares national
Current Current
F.R. 36139) F.R. 36139)
Court (ICC) Court (ICC)
emergency related to the emergency related to the
ICC’s intention to ICC’s intention to
“investigate, arrest, “investigate, arrest,
detain, or prosecute any detain, or prosecute any
United States personnel United States personnel
without the consent of without the consent of
the United States”; blocks the United States”; blocks
property and entry into property and entry into
the United States of any the United States of any
person found to be person found to be
engaged in or facilitating engaged in or facilitating
ICC investigations. ICC investigations.

Source: CRS, based on National Archives: Executive Orders Disposition Tables; The American Presidency
~~Project, University of California, Santa Barbara; and Federal Register, various dates.~~

~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Author Information~~

~~Christopher A. Casey, Coordinator~~
~~Dianne E. Rennack~~
~~Analyst in International Trade and Finance~~
~~Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation~~

~~Ian F. Fergusson~~
~~Jennifer K. Elsea~~
~~Specialist in International Trade and Finance~~
~~Legislative Attorney~~

13936 Hong Kong (China’s Declares national Current; requires annual (July 14, 2020; 85 F.R. “normalization”) emergency related to renewal 43413) China’s crackdown, resulting in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) losing its political and economic autonomy. 13942 Information & Expands emergency Revoked by E.O. 14034 (August 6, 2020; 85 F.R. Communications stated in EO 13873 (2021) 48637) Technology; Services (2019) to restrict Supply Chain transactions with TikTok and ByteDance—Chinese tech entities. 13943 Information & Expands emergency Revoked by E.O. 14034 (August 6, 2020; 85 F.R. Communications stated in E.O. 13873 (2021) 48641) Technology; Services (2019) to restrict Supply Chain transactions with WeChat—Chinese tech entity. 13949 Iran Targets Iran’s Expands actions based on (September 21, 2020; 85 conventional arms trade E.O. 12957 (1995) F.R. 60043) for its destabilizing impact in the region. 13953 Threat to domestic supply Declares national Requires annual renewal; (September 30, 2020; 85 chain from reliance on emergency; requires builds on earlier non- F.R. 62539) critical minerals from whole-of-government emergency actions based foreign adversaries assessment of U.S. critical primarily on Defense materials. Production Act of 1950 (see also, however, E.O. 14017 (2021), which requires similar review without revoking the 2020 order. 13959 China Declares national National emergency (November 12, 2020; 85 emergency; restricts remains current and F.R. 73185) trade, transactions, and requires annual renewal; investment in securities of the remaining authorities “Communist Chinese are superseded in large military companies”. part by E.O. 14032 (2021) Congressional Research Service 72 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 13971 China Expands national Revoked by E.O. 14034 (January 5, 2021; 86 F.R. emergency declared in (2021) 1249) E.O. 13873 (2019) to prohibit transactions with several China-origin software applications. 13974 China Clarifies definitions Revoked by E.O. 14032 (January 13, 2021; 86 F.R. related to restrictions on (2021) 4875) transactions with China military entities initiated in E.O. 13959; establishes wind-down period for divestment 13984 Cyber-enabled activities Builds on emergency Expands on and amends (January 19, 2021; 86 F.R. declared in E.O. 13694 authorities stated in E.O. 6837) (2015) to require 13694 (2015) Secretary of Commerce to investigate and identify foreign users of U.S. infrastructure as a services (IaaS), mainly software and storage services Administration of President Joseph R. Biden (2021-) 14014 Burma Declares national Requires annual renewal (February 10 2021; 86 emergency; blocks F.R. 9429) property of and transactions with those found to support Burma’s defense sector or those who engage in antidemocratic or other destabilizing activities. 14022 International Criminal Revokes national Revokes E.O. 13928 (April 1, 2021; 86 F.R. Court emergency; ends travel (2020) 17895) and asset restrictions leveled against ICC staff. 14024 Russia Declares national Requires annual renewal (April 15, 2021; 86 F.R. emergency; authorizes 20249) sanctions on those involved in election interference, malicious cyber attacks, corruption; or extraterritorial pursuit of Russia’s adversaries. Congressional Research Service 73 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 14032 China Prohibits U.S. persons Amends national (June 3, 2021; 86 F.R. from trading or investing emergency authority 30145) in securities of those declared in E.O. 13959 operating in or on behalf (2020) of China’s defense and related materiel sector or the surveillance technology sector 14033 Western Balkans Expands national Amends national (June 8, 2021; 86 F.R. emergency declared in emergency authority 31079) E.O. 13219 (2001); declared in E.O. 13219 targets those who seek to (2001) destabilize the region, undermine democratic processes and peace negotiations, violate human rights standards, or engage in corruption. 14034 Sensitive data— Initiates new whole-of- Expands on national (June 9, 2021; 86 F.R. protection from foreign government review of emergency declared in 31423) adversaries U.S. sensitive dates and E.O. 13873 (2020) foreign adversaries who interfere with sensitive data and related technology. 14034 Sensitive data— Initiates new whole-of- Expands on national (June 9, 2021; 86 FR protection from foreign government review of emergency declared in 31423) adversaries U.S. sensitive dates and E.O. 13873 (2020) foreign adversaries who interfere with sensitive data and related technology. 14038 Belarus Authorizes sanctions Expands on national (August 9, 2021; 86 FR targeting those who emergency declared in 43905) operate in Burma’s E.O. 13405 (2006) sectors encompassing defense and related materiel, security, energy, potassium chloride (potash), tobacco products, construction, or transportation; or those found to engage in activities related to threatening the peace, human rights violations, corruption, election fraud, and more. Congressional Research Service 74 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Country or Issue of Executive Order Concern Sanction/Remedy Current Status 14039 Russia Targets any foreign Expands on national (August 20, 2021; 86 FR person identified under emergency declared in 47205) sec. 7503(a)(1)(B) of P.L. E.O. 14024 (2021) 116-92) for financial activities related to Russian gas pipeline to serve western Europe (Nord Stream 2). EO 14046 (September 17, Ethiopia Authorizes sanctions Requires annual renewal 2021; 86 FR 52389) targeting any foreign person engaged in activities that threaten the stability of Ethiopia, including corruption, disruption of delivery of humanitarian services, violence against civilians. 14054 (November 18, Burundi Terminates emergency Revokes E.O. 13712 2021; 86 FR 66149) (2015) 14059 (December 15, Global Il icit Drug Trade Authorizes blocking of Requires annual renewal 2021; 86 FR 71549) property, prohibits use of most U.S. financial instruments, denies entry into the United States to any foreign person engaged in il icit drug production and trade. 14064 (February 11, 2022; Afghanistan Declares national Requires annual renewal 87 FR 8391) emergency; blocks Taliban (as government of Afghanistan) access to U.S.-based assets of Afghanistan’s central bank 14065 (February 21, 2022; Ukraine/Russia Blocks investment in and Expands national 87 FR 10293) trade with Donetsk and emergency in E.O. 13660 (2022) Luhansk regions of (2014) Ukraine 14066 (March 8, 2022; 87 Ukraine/Russia Prohibits some imports Expands national FR 13625) from and energy-sector emergency in E.O. 14024 investments in Russia (2021) 14068 (March 11, 2022; Ukraine/Russia Prohibiting additional Expands national 87 FR 14381) imports, exports of luxury emergency in E.O. 14024 goods, and investment in (2021) Russia Source: CRS, based on National Archives: Executive Orders Disposition Tables; The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara; and Federal Register, various dates. Congressional Research Service 75 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use Author Information Christopher A. Casey, Coordinator Jennifer K. Elsea Analyst in International Trade and Finance Legislative Attorney Dianne E. Rennack Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation Acknowledgments The authors thank Amber Hope Wilhelm, CRS Visual Information Specialist, who developed the graphics for this report, and Ian Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, who was an original contributor to this report.
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Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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