The Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Issues

February 1, 2019 – January 22, 2024 R45484

The Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Issues
January 22, 2024
The Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) is one of the most-tracked single accounts funded by Congress
each year. Managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), it is the primary
William L. Painter
source of funding for the federal government’s domestic general disaster relief programs. These
Specialist in Homeland
programs, authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Security and
Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), outline the federal role in supporting state, local, tribal,
Appropriations
and territorial governments as they respond to and recover from a variety of incidents. They take

effect in the event that nonfederal levels of government find their own capacity to deal with an
incident is overwhelmed.

The appropriation which feeds the DRF predates current disaster relief programs and FEMA itself. It dates back to a half-
million dollar deficiency appropriation to the President in 1948 that allowed him to use these resources to provide temporary
emergency assistance to communities in the wake of unspecified potential natural disasters. Although the appropriation was
provided with one particular Upper Midwest flooding incident in mind, the legislative language allowed the funding to be
used more broadly if the President wished to do so. This policy of providing general disaster relief was a shift from previous
policy, which largely left emergency management, disaster relief, and disaster recovery to other levels of government and
private relief organizations. Prior to the development of the general relief program, the federal government involved itself in
disaster response and recovery on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. By the early 21st century, emergency management has its
own federal agency.
The evolving federal role in disaster relief is partially illuminated by the robust funding stream provided for it through the
DRF. Over the last four fiscal years, the DRF received more than $175 billion in appropriations for the DRF. Even with that
historically high level of appropriations, at the end of FY2023—after five weeks of emergency measures limiting most
obligations from the DRF to immediate needs—the DRF only had an unobligated balance of $2.55 billion available for the
costs associated with major disasters. However, what is a fixture of federal policy today was not a given a century ago.
Examining the history of the DRF and the programs it supports may help Congress consider future approaches to disaster
relief.
This report introduces the DRF and provides a brief history of federal disaster relief programs. It goes on to discuss the
appropriations that fund the DRF, and provides a funding history from FY1964 to the present day, discussing factors that
contributed to those changing appropriations levels. It concludes with discussion of how the budget request for the DRF has
been developed and structured, given the unpredictability of the annual budgetary impact of disasters, and raises some
potential issues for congressional consideration.

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The Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Issues

Introduction
The Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) is one of the most-tracked single accounts funded by Congress
each year. Managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), it is the primary
source of funding for the federal government’s domestic general disaster relief programs. These
programs, authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,
as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), outline the federal role in supporting state, local, tribal, and
territorial governments as they respond to and recover from a variety of incidents. They take
effect in the event that nonfederal levels of government find their capacities to deal with an
incident overwhelmed.
Although the concept of general disaster relief provided by the federal government predates both
FEMA and the Stafford Act, federal involvement in relief after natural and man-made disasters
was very rare before the Civil War and was at times considered unconstitutional. Domestic
disaster relief efforts became more common after the Civil War, but were not seen as a necessary
obligation of the federal government. Standing federal domestic disaster relief programs and a
pool of resources to fund them only emerged after the Second World War. Prior to the
development of these programs, domestic disaster relief and recovery was a matter for private
nongovernmental organizations and state and local governments.
Once established, the federal role in domestic disaster response and recovery grew, proving
politically popular and resilient despite periodic concerns about management, execution, and
budgetary impacts. The DRF is the primary source of funding for most general disaster relief
programs, so it is an indicator of the scope of those programs and the volume of taxpayer-funded
aid they provide. Understanding the trends in the growth of the federal government’s role in
general disaster relief and recovery, and the associated costs of that role, may be useful as
Congress considers changes in both emergency management and budgetary policies.
This report introduces the DRF and provides a brief history of federal disaster relief programs. It
goes on to discuss the appropriations that fund the DRF, and provides a funding history from
FY1964 to the present day, discussing factors that contributed to those changing appropriations
levels. It concludes with discussion of how the budget request for the DRF has been developed
and structured, given the unpredictability of the annual budgetary impact of disasters, and raises
some potential issues for congressional consideration.
What is the Disaster Relief Fund and how is it used?
The DRF is the primary source of funding for the federal government’s general disaster relief
program—response and recovery activities pursuant to a range of domestic emergencies and
disasters defined in law—as opposed to specific relief and recovery initiatives that may be
enacted for individual incidents.1
What determines whether an incident qualifies as an emergency or disaster?
Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as
amended; hereinafter “the Stafford Act”), the President can declare that an emergency exists or a

1 Occasional transfers from the DRF have been used to pay for specific Stafford Act programs (the Disaster Assistance
Direct Loan Program) or Inspector General oversight activities, and CRS has identified two instances where
appropriations provided to the DRF were made for specific incidents (the 9/11 attack on New York City) or programs
(Other Needs Assistance for COVID-19 pandemic-related funeral expenses).
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major disaster is occurring.2 These declarations make state, tribal, territorial, and local
governments3 eligible for a variety of assistance programs, many of which are funded from the
DRF.4 Such declarations usually are made at the request of a state, tribal, or territorial
government.
Does all federally funded disaster relief come from the DRF?
While the DRF funds Stafford Act disaster relief and recovery programs, several other federal
departments and agencies have significant roles in disaster preparedness, relief, recovery, and
mitigation. These include the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Small
Business Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the
Department of Health and Human Services. While FEMA may fund some of their activities out of
the DRF through mission assignments,5 their broader disaster-related programs are funded
through separate appropriations.6
What federal government activities are funded under the DRF?
The role of the federal government has evolved over the years, as described in the sections below,
but emergency response and disaster relief has historically been a federalized “bottom-up”
operation, starting from the local or tribal governments affected, backed up by the state or
territorial government,7 and then turning to the federal government if capacity becomes
overwhelmed. The broadening of the federal role has been a factor in which activities are funded
under the DRF.
Currently, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinates federal disaster
response and recovery efforts. As such, it manages the DRF, which funds activities in five
categories:
1. Activity pursuant to a major disaster declaration—In recent years, this
activity has represented more than 95% of DRF obligations. FEMA’s primary
“Direct Disaster Programs” are the Individual Assistance (IA),8 Public Assistance

2 Or has occurred—declarations are specific by time and place.
3 As well as certain private nonprofit organizations as stipulated in the Stafford Act.
4 For more information, see CRS Report R43784, FEMA’s Disaster Declaration Process: A Primer, by Bruce R.
Lindsay.
5 Mission assignments are directives from FEMA to other federal agencies to perform specific work in response to a
Stafford Act emergency or disaster declaration. The federal agency can seek reimbursement from FEMA for the costs
incurred. For information on how FEMA manages these activities, see https://www.fema.gov/federal-agencies/mission-
assignments.
6 For information on the breadth of federal disaster relief, see CRS Report R41981, Congressional Primer on
Responding to and Recovering from Major Disasters and Emergencies, by Bruce R. Lindsay and Elizabeth M.
Webster; and U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Disaster Assistance: Federal Departments and Agencies
Obligated at Least $277.6 Billion during Fiscal Years 2005 through 2014, GAO-16-797, September 22, 2016,
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-797.
7 Tribal governments currently may seek help directly from FEMA if their capacity to respond to an incident is
overwhelmed, as a result of changes to the Stafford Act made by Section 1110 of the Sandy Recovery Improvement
Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-2, Division B).
8 For more information, see CRS Report R46014, FEMA Individual Assistance Programs: An Overview, by Elizabeth
M. Webster
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(PA),9 and the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) programs.10 Federal
assistance provided by other federal agencies at FEMA’s direction through
“mission assignments” is often paid for from the DRF.11
2. Predeclaration surge activities—These are activities undertaken prior to an
emergency or major disaster declaration to prepare for response and recovery,
such as deploying response teams or prepositioning equipment.
3. Activity pursuant to an emergency declaration—This is federal assistance to
supplement state and local efforts in providing emergency services in any part of
the United States.
4. Fire Management Assistance Grants (FMAGs) for large wildfires—This is
assistance for the mitigation, management, and control of any fires on public or
private lands that could, if unchecked, worsen and result in a major disaster
declaration.12
5. Disaster Readiness and Support (DRS) activities—These are ongoing, non-
incident-specific activities that allow FEMA to provide timely disaster response,
operate its programs responsively and effectively, and provide oversight of its
emergency and disaster programs.

DRF Activities and Statutory Budget Controls
Implementation of budget controls in 2011 led to changes in the way DRF appropriations were structured to
support Stafford Act activities. Since FY2012, the first fiscal year of statutory limits on discretionary spending
under the Budget Control Act (BCA), a distinction has been made between budget authority for the activities
pursuant to a specific major disaster declaration—the first of the activities listed above—and budget authority for
other activities. The former now carries a special “disaster relief” designation, defining it as being provided
pursuant to a major disaster declaration under the Stafford Act, and includes language triggering an adjustment in
discretionary spending limits to accommodate it. Budget authority for the other four activities, covering other
Stafford Act functions not linked to response and recovery from a specific major disaster, is derived from the
undesignated portion, referred to as the “base.” This remaining budget authority is counted against discretionary
spending limits.
There is no direct limit in the plain language of the appropriation that would restrict “base” funds from being used
for major disasters. However, under concepts of appropriations law intended to prevent the executive branch
from improperly augmenting funding for specific activities beyond Congress’s intention, the designation of part of
the DRF as for the costs of major disasters can be interpreted as a limitation that prevents the rest of the DRF
from being used for that purpose. During the response to Hurricane Harvey in 2017, funds were reprogrammed
from the base to cover the costs of major disaster response, then replenished afterwards.
Although the statutory discretionary budget limits laid out in the BCA and the disaster relief adjustment
mechanisms expired after FY2021, a similar adjustment continued to be employed. See “Annual Appropriations”
below for more details.

9 For more information, see CRS Report R46749, FEMA’s Public Assistance Program: A Primer and Considerations
for Congress, by Erica A. Lee
10 For more information, see CRS Insight IN11187, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Hazard
Mitigation Assistance, by Diane P. Horn
11 Department of Homeland Security, Disaster Relief Fund, Fiscal Year 2019 Congressional Budget Justification,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC, February 2018, p. FEMA-DRF-23, https://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/Federal%20Emergency%20Management%20Agency.pdf.
12 For more information, see CRS Report R43738, Fire Management Assistance Grants: Frequently Asked Questions,
by Bruce R. Lindsay and Katie Hoover.
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Under what statute is the Disaster Relief Fund authorized?
The DRF is not separately authorized as a distinct entity, but the activities it funds are authorized
under the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).
Where are appropriations for the Disaster Relief Fund provided?
Since FY1980—FEMA’s first annual appropriation—the DRF has been funded through its own
appropriation within FEMA’s budget, first under the heading “Disaster Relief,” and then “Disaster
Relief Fund” starting in FY2012. FEMA’s annual appropriations were first provided through the
VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, but have been included in the
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations act since FY2004. Since the first “Disaster
Relief” appropriation for FY1948, most of the DRF’s appropriations have been provided through
supplemental appropriations. See “Appropriations for General Disaster Relief” for details.
Are specific Disaster Relief Fund appropriations for specific disasters or
programs?
DRF appropriations have historically been provided for general disaster relief, rather than
specific presidentially declared disasters or emergencies.
The most recent iterations of the appropriations bill text indicate the funds are provided for the
“necessary expenses in carrying out the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act,” thus covering all past and future disaster and emergency declarations.13 Previous
versions of the appropriations language (going back to 1950) also reference the legislation
authorizing general disaster relief rather than targeting specific disasters. On a number of
occasions, specific disasters have been mentioned in the appropriation, but funding was not
specifically directed to one disaster over others.
While many disaster supplemental appropriations bills are associated with a specific incident or
incidents—such as P.L. 113-2, “the Sandy Supplemental”—the language in that act does not limit
the use of the DRF appropriation to that specific incident.14
CRS has identified two exceptions to this practice:
• P.L. 107-117 and P.L. 107-206 provided a total of $8.04 billion in resources to the
Disaster Relief Fund, specifically for expenses “to respond to the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks on the United States.”15
• P.L. 116-260, Division M (the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2021), included a $2 billion supplemental appropriation for
the DRF and specifically provided for COVID-19 disaster-related funeral
expenses.
In addition, transfers are made from the DRF from time to time to fund the disaster relief
oversight efforts of the DHS Office of Inspector General as well as the Community Disaster Loan
program through the Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program.

13 P.L. 115-141, Div. F.
14 See, for this specific example, 127 Stat. 28.
15 $4,356,871,000 in P.L. 107-117 (115 Stat. 2338) from a prior appropriation, as well as $1,030,000,000 transferred
from the TSA (116 Stat. 879) and $2,650,700,000 in a supplemental appropriation (116 Stat. 894) in P.L. 107-206.
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How is the DRF being spent today?
Since the enactment of P.L. 112-74, Congress has received regular reporting on spending from the
DRF. Monthly reports on such spending since March 2013 are available on FEMA’s website.16
Currently, the reports include information on DRF balances, actual and projected obligations from
the DRF for large-scale disasters broken down by disaster declaration, and obligations and
expenditures aggregated by incident. These reports also include estimates of the DRF balance
through the end of the current fiscal year.
Analysis of some of the data across these monthly DRF reports can show trends in how the DRF
has been used for disasters declared since August 1, 2017.

16 These monthly reports are available at https://www.fema.gov/about/reports-and-data/disaster-relief-fund-monthly-
reports.
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Figure 1. DRF Obligations for Major Disasters, by Program
(from Disaster Relief Fund monthly report data, as of January 10, 2024)

Source: CRS analysis of FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report data from March 2020, October 2023,
January 2024.
Notes: Pre-COVID data does not reflect deobligations made after February 29, 2020. FY2023 data does not
reflect deobligations made after September 30, 2023, or adjustments made by FEMA in fiscal year closeout.

Historical Context for Federal Disaster Relief
Funding
Disaster relief has not always been a part of the mission of the federal government. For nearly 80
years, federal domestic disaster relief was minimal, extremely narrow in scope, and largely did
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not address humanitarian needs, leaving those to private organizations and local levels of
government. Even as the country emerged from the Civil War with more of a national identity and
a sense that the federal government could act to provide relief in some circumstances, disaster aid
remained limited, responding only after the fact on a case-by-case basis. Only after World War II
did the concept emerge of a federal role in responding to disasters. This new role was more
broadly defined, led by the President and funded in advance, as opposed to case-by-case
responses to needs in the wake of the most severe events led by ad hoc congressional action. Over
the ensuing years, the general disaster relief program and its funding grew, expanding concepts of
assistance once reserved for catastrophic events to address more common natural disasters. In the
1970s, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was established, institutionalizing
the federal role in disaster response, recovery, mitigation, and preparedness—the role we
recognize today. At the heart of that role is the set of relief programs that have evolved since the
1940s, known collectively as the Stafford Act, which are funded by the Disaster Relief Fund
appropriation.
1789-1947: Case by Case, After the Fact
The Constitution provides little specific direction on the question of how the United States should
confront disasters. While allusions to the intent of the Constitution speak to promoting domestic
tranquility and the general welfare, limitations on the federal role in state affairs combined with
the balance of national priorities and federal resources constrained federal involvement in disaster
relief and recovery in the early years of the country.
The federal government did provide disaster relief on some occasions. Some observers note at
least 128 instances from 1803 to 1947 when natural disasters prompted the federal government to
provide some type of ad hoc relief on a case-by-case basis for specific incidents after they
occurred.17 Prior to the Civil War, these measures largely consisted of refunds of duties paid on
goods destroyed in customs house fires, allowances for delayed payments of bonds, and land
grants for resettlement.18
Proponents of disaster relief argued that the “general welfare” clause of the Constitution
warranted the federal role in disaster relief.19 Opponents did not find this justification convincing,
as it was nonspecific,20 and argued that certain natural disasters (such as flooding of the
Mississippi River) were foreseeable, and therefore state and local governments had an obligation
to be prepared.21 They also contended that it was improper for the government to provide relief
for specific places with money it collected for the common good;22 and that the federal
government could not afford to provide universal relief. As the U.S. economy became more

17 Moss, David A., “Courting Disaster: The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy Since 1803.” In The Financing
of Catastrophe Risk, edited by Kenneth A. Froot, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, p. 312.
18 A survey of customs duty relief and delayed payments on bonds can be found in the remarks of Rep. C. Johnson,
“New York Fire,” Congressional Globe 24, p. 136 (February 17, 1836).
19 Rep. Carleton Hunt, “Relief of Sufferers by Flood,” House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 15, part 3 (March 26,
1884), p. 2295.
20 Rep. Charles Napoleon Brumm, “Relief of Sufferers by Flood,” House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 15, part 3
(March 26, 1884), p. 2296.
21 Rep. William Whitney Rice, “Relief of Sufferers by Flood,” House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 15, part 3
(March 26, 1884), p. 2293.
22 Rep. Lewis Beach, “Relief of Sufferers by Flood,” House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 15, part 3 (March 26,
1884), p. 2295.
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robust, federal revenues grew, weakening the position of those in Congress who opposed a federal
role in disaster assistance on the basis of the lack of such resources.
Congressional willingness to provide assistance was not always sufficient to ensure its provision,
however. In 1887, President Grover Cleveland vetoed a bill that would have provided $10,000 to
pay for seeds for farmers in Texas after a drought, arguing as follows:
I can find no warrant for such an appropriation in the Constitution; and I do not believe
that the power and duty of the General Government ought to be extended to the relief of
individual suffering which is in no manner properly related to the public service or benefit.
A prevalent tendency to disregard the limited mission of this power and duty should, I
think, be steadfastly resisted, to the end that the lesson should be constantly enforced that
though the people support the Government, the Government should not support the people.
The friendliness and charity of our countrymen can always be relied upon to relieve their
fellow-citizens in misfortune. This has been repeatedly and quite lately demonstrated.
Federal aid in such cases encourages the expectation of paternal care on the part of the
Government and weakens the sturdiness of our national character, while it prevents the
indulgence among our people of that kindly sentiment and conduct which strengthens the
bonds of a common brotherhood.23
Much of the disaster relief provided in this period was nongovernmental in nature. In 1881, Clara
Barton founded the American National Red Cross (ANRC),24 which provided disaster aid from
funds it raised from private sources. One year before a catastrophic earthquake struck San
Francisco in 1906, the incorporating legislation for the ANRC was revised to task the
organization with “mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other
great national calamities, and to devise and carry on measures for preventing the same.”25 In the
days after the earthquake, President Theodore Roosevelt issued an appeal for assistance from the
public for the ANRC’s relief efforts:
In the face of so horrible and appalling a national calamity as that which has befallen San
Francisco, the outpouring of the nation’s aid should, as far as possible, be entrusted to the
American Red Cross, the national organization best fitted to undertake such relief work....
In order that this work may be well systematized and in order that the contributions, which
I am sure will flow in with lavish generosity, may be wisely administered, I appeal to the
people of the United States, to all cities, chambers of commerce, boards of trade, relief
committees and individuals to express their sympathy and render their aid by contributions
to the American Red Cross.26
While the federal government provided ad hoc response and recovery assistance to San Francisco,
the majority of the aid was provided through private means. Congress appropriated $2.5 million
in the days after the quake to the Secretary of War to provide “subsistence and quartermaster’s
supplies ... to such destitute persons as have been rendered homeless or are in needy
circumstances as a result of the earthquake and commissary stores to such injured and destitute

23 House bill 10203, 50th Congress. Richardson, James D. (compiler), Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents (1897), Volume 11, page 5142.
24 This is the formal legal name of the organization commonly referred to as the American Red Cross.
25 P.L. 58-4, 23 Stat. 600.
26 Red Cross Flyer, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, made available through the Theodore Roosevelt Digital
Library (www.theordorerooseveltcenter.org) at http://www.theodoreroosevelt.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?
libID=o529079.
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persons as may require assistance,”27 but nonfederal cash contributions to the ANRC and the local
relief organizations exceeded $9 million in the two years following the disaster.28
The ANRC served as the major institutional source of relief for disaster victims in the United
States, serving communities and individuals in cooperation with state and local governments with
relatively little direct contribution from the federal government for many years. The Red Cross
continued to play a leading role in nongovernmental disaster relief as the federal government’s
role in disaster aid evolved and expanded through the 20th century and into the 21st.
1947-1950: General Disaster Relief Funding from the Federal
Government Begins
After the Second World War, the federal government started becoming more involved in disaster
relief beyond specific incident-by-incident relief efforts. In 1947, P.L. 80-233 authorized the
federal government to provide surplus property to state and local governments for disaster relief
under the Disaster Surplus Property Program. Less than eight months later, the Administrator of
the Federal Works Agency noted in a letter to President Harry S. Truman that the program would
not provide adequate relief to communities over the longer term.29
The next year, Congress made its first appropriation for general disaster relief. The Second
Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1948,30 which was enacted on June 25, 1948, provided funding
directly to the President as follows:

27 Public Resolution No. 16, April 19, 1906, 34 Stat. 827.
28 O’Connor, Charles James, “San Francisco Relief Survey: The organization and methods of relief used after the
earthquake and fire of April 18, 1906,” The Russell Sage Foundation, 1913, p. 33.
29 U.S. President (Truman), “Letter to the Administrator, Federal Works Agency, on the Disaster Surplus Property
Program,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948 (Washington: GPO, 1964), p.
46.
30 P.L. 80-785.
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DISASTER RELIEF
Disaster Relief: To enable the President, through such agency or agencies as he may
designate, and in such manner as he shall determine, to supplement the efforts and available
resources of State and local governments or other agencies, whenever he finds that any
flood, fire, hurricane, earthquake, or other catastrophe in any part of the United States is of
sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant emergency assistance by the Federal
Government in alleviating hardship, or suffering caused thereby, and if the governor of any
State in which such catastrophe shall occur shall certify that such assistance is required,
$500,000, to remain available until June 30, 1949, and to be expended without regard to
such provisions regulating the expenditure of Government funds or the employment of
persons in the Government service as he shall specify: Provided, That no expenditures shall
be made with respect to any such catastrophe in any State until the governor of such State
shall have entered into an agreement with such agency of the Government as the President
may designate giving assurance of expenditure of a reasonable amount of the funds of the
government of such State, local governments therein, or other agencies, for the same or
similar purposes with respect to such catastrophe: Provided further, That no part of this
appropriation shall be expended for departmental personal services: Provided further, That
no part of this appropriation shall be expended for permanent construction: Provided
further, That within any affected area Federal agencies are authorized to participate in any
such emergency assistance.31
Although this legislation came with broad latitude for the President in expending these funds, this
appropriation contained several hallmarks that continue in today’s disaster relief structure:
• the President makes the determination that a disaster has occurred, and that
federal aid is required;
• the state has a role in certifying the need and committing state resources to be
eligible for federal support;
• aid is to “supplement the efforts and available resources of State and local
governments or other agencies,” rather than to fund the entire relief effort; and
• the President may direct federal agencies to participate in emergency assistance.
The conditions laid out in this appropriation were echoed in the next two appropriations, provided
in 1949, which totaled $1 million.32
1950-1966: The Disaster Relief Act of 1950—General Relief and
Specific Relief
The Disaster Relief Act of 1950 formalized the structure outlined in the initial appropriations
legislation, and indicated for the first time that
it is the intent of Congress to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the
Federal Government to States and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities
to alleviate suffering and damage resulting from major disasters, to repair essential public

31 The term “Disaster Relief Fund” as a title for the Disaster Relief appropriation seemed to have evolved informally.
The Disaster Relief appropriation was initially provided under a heading of “Funds Appropriated to the President” (this
practice would continue until the mid-1980s) and was described in its early years frequently as “the President’s disaster
relief fund.” See, for example, Rep. Angell, “Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill, 1948,” House debate,
Congressional Record, vol. 94, part 7 (June 16, 1948), p. 8467.
32 P.L. 81-3, P.L. 81-5; 63 Stat. 5.
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facilities in major disasters, and to foster the development of such State and local
organizations and plans to cope with major disasters as may be necessary.33
Section 8 of the act limited the authorized disaster relief funding to $5 million in total.34 This
restriction did not effectively constrain funding, however. The first supplemental appropriation
for general disaster relief authorized under the Disaster Relief Act for 1950 provided $25 million,
and a waiver of the Section 8 limitation.35 The first authorized annual appropriation for general
disaster relief was for $800,000, enacted August 31, 1951, less than two months later.36 Annual
appropriations were “to be available until expended,” rather than expiring as previous general
disaster relief appropriations had, and their use for administrative expenses was statutorily capped
at 2% per year.37
Under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the federal government’s role in disaster relief
expanded further.38 Federal general disaster relief programs broadened in 1962, with the inclusion
of several American territories, and provision of grants for repair of state facilities.39
However, Congress still passed specific legislation authorizing relief programs pursuant to other
major disasters. In 1964 and 1965, post-disaster legislation provided specific relief for victims of
an earthquake in Alaska,40 flooding in western states,41 and Hurricane Betsy in Florida, Louisiana,
and Mississippi.42 In a history of disaster relief legislation, one observer described the situation
thus:
In 1962, 1964, and 1965, Congress had sought to preserve P.L. 81-875 [the Disaster Relief
Act of 1950] and yet provide disaster assistance in the case of the very big disasters by
special legislation only for the states named. Although no one at the time appeared aware
that the new types of assistance would become precedents for general legislation, it was in
the nature of the system that ultimately they would be reenacted for general use.43
1966-1974: The Disaster Relief Act of 1966—General Relief
Broadens
The Disaster Relief Act of 196644 revised the general disaster assistance program by providing
more assistance to public colleges and universities, as well as authorizing assistance to repair

33 P.L. 81-875; 64 Stat. 1109.
34 P.L. 81-875; 64 Stat. 1111.
35 P.L. 82-80; 65 Stat. 123.
36 P.L. 82-137; 65 Stat. 268.
37 This limitation would rise to three percent in an FY1956 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 84-406; 70 Stat. 12), and
be carried in appropriations legislation through FY1979.
38 For a broader discussion of this evolution, see “The Evolution of U.S. Disaster Relief Policy,” by Bruce R. Lindsay
and Francis X. McCarthy, in CRS Committee Print CP10000, The Evolving Congress: A Committee Print Prepared for
the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration.
39 P.L. 87-592.
40 P.L. 88-451.
41 P.L. 89-41.
42 P.L. 89-339.
43 Frank P. Bourgin, A History of Federal Disaster Relief Legislation, 1950-1974, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Washington, DC, September 1983, p. 103.
44 P.L. 89-769.
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local public facilities.45 The Disaster Relief Act of 196946 was enacted in response to Hurricane
Camille, although the expansion of the federal role in disaster assistance it formalized had been
included in legislation since 1965. It included broader public and individual assistance, including
temporary housing, food assistance, unemployment assistance, matching funds to help states
develop preparedness plans, and authorization for the federal government to fund up to half the
cost of repair and restoration of public facilities.47 Not all of these costs would be borne by the
funding provided to the President, and the programs were only authorized through calendar 1970,
but they represented a significant broadening of federal government involvement.
The Disaster Relief Act of 197048 consolidated the previous disaster relief legislation into a single
act, and made many of the Camille-driven programs permanent, including programs to provide
temporary housing assistance, debris removal, and permanent repair and replacement of state and
local public facilities.
1974-2017: The Era of Federally Coordinated Emergency
Management
The Disaster Relief Act of 197449 provided for a more robust preparedness program, and
introduced the concept of “emergency” declarations to accommodate assistance in cases where an
incident did not rise to the “major disaster” threshold.50
The Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments of 1988 (P.L. 100-707, hereinafter
DREAA) renamed the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 as the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (the aforementioned Stafford Act).51 It made the following
programmatic changes:
• Authorized the President to declare an emergency under the Stafford Act in “any
occasion or instance” in which federal aid is needed—allowing for assistance
without a major disaster declaration;52
• Defined a “major disaster” as “any natural catastrophe ... or, regardless of cause,
any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the
determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and
magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance.... ”53
• Established a 75% minimum level of assistance for the immediate response,
debris removal, and repair of public facilities; and
• Provided for a 50/50 cost share for hazard mitigation grants.54
The Stafford Act and the DREAA are the pieces of legislation that structure the current
relationship between the federal and state government in emergency management and disaster

45 Bourgin, p. 75.
46 P.L. 91-79.
47 Bourgin, p. 103.
48 P.L. 91-606.
49 P.L. 93-288.
50 Although it was expected to expire in December 1977, it was extended to the end of fiscal year 1980.
51 P.L. 100-707.
52 102 Stat. 4689.
53 102 Stat. 4690.
54 These grants would be amended in 1993 to a 75/25 cost share.
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relief. These laws, which appear at 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq., continue to be amended, with reform
legislation frequently following on the heels of exceptionally large disasters, or complexes of
disasters. Two major reform bills were enacted since FEMA was incorporated into DHS in 2003:
1. The Post Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA)55—Enacted as
a sixth title to the FY2007 DHS Appropriations Act, PKREMRA reauthorized
and restructured FEMA, and made amendments to the Stafford Act, including
allowing federal assistance to be provided in the absence of a specific request,
improved assistance for individuals with disabilities, and expanded availability of
public assistance to nongovernmental organizations.
2. The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act (SRIA)56—Enacted as a part of the
FY2013 supplemental appropriations act, SRIA included alternative procedures
for the Stafford Act Public Assistance program to allow disaster impacted area to
get assistance on the basis of cost estimates rather than reimbursement of costs,
among other reforms.
2017-Present: The Disaster Recovery Reform Act and Catastrophic
Disasters
The current era of disaster relief begins with a series of catastrophic disasters57 in 2017. Wildfires
in California as well as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria led to a series of large supplemental
appropriations for disasters, including two for the DRF. The following year, the Disaster
Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA)58 was enacted through an FAA reauthorization measure.
DRRA had provisions to broaden federal investments from the DRF into mitigation efforts that
protect public infrastructure, as well as making changes to the Stafford Act’s Public Assistance
and Individual Assistance programs.59
In addition to more frequent “traditional” catastrophic disasters, major disaster assistance
programs under the Stafford Act were used for the first time in the context of an infectious
disease outbreak during the COVID-19 pandemic.60 On March 13, 2020, President Donald J.
Trump made a series of emergency declarations under Section 501(b) of the Stafford Act in
response to the nationwide spread of a novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19).61 The declarations
authorized assistance to all U.S. states, territories, tribes, and the District of Columbia. At the time
he announced the declarations, he invited the recipients of those declarations to request major

55 P.L. 109-295, Title VI.
56 P.L. 113-2, Division B.
57 FEMA defines a catastrophic disaster as any incident (encompassing one or more major disaster declarations for the
same event) that costs the DRF more than $500 million.
58 P.L. 115-254, Division D.
59 For additional information on these reforms, see CRS Report R45819, The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018
(DRRA): A Summary of Selected Statutory Provisions.
60 Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, four emergency declarations were made under the Stafford Act for public health
incidents. For information on these incidents, see CRS Insight IN11229, Stafford Act Assistance for Public Health
Incidents. The difference in scale between these incidents and the COVID-19 declaration is several orders of
magnitude: for example, under one of these emergency declarations, New Jersey received a little over $2 million for
West Nile from the DRF in 2000 (according to the Emergency Management Section of the New Jersey State Police),
and $2,931 million under the COVID-19 disaster declaration from the DRF as of the end of FY2021 (according to
FEMA’s October 2021 monthly report on the DRF).
61 While the President made a single announcement, the declarations themselves apply to each individual state,
territory, or tribe.
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disaster declarations.62 FEMA notes that 50 states, five territories, the District of Columbia, and
three tribes all requested and received major disaster declarations for COVID-19 response.63 For
more information on the various applications of Stafford Act authorities pursuant to this incident,
see CRS Report R47048, FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response.
Remarks from the passage of the Stafford Act seem to indicate that such applications may not
have been what the architects of the measure envisioned. While not explicitly excluding the use
of the major disaster declaration for infectious disease, Representative Arlen Stangeland (R-MN),
the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Water Resources of the House Public Works and
Transportation Committee, noted in his comments on the final version of the bill that other
authorities existed for public health matters:
Title I reorganizes the disaster relief program to clearly define Presidential authority to
respond to major disasters and emergencies. Major disasters would include primarily
natural catastrophes or, in certain instances, nonnatural catastrophes while emergencies
would include any occasion or instance in which Federal assistance was necessary.
However, we do not intend for emergency declarations to be available in responding to
public health problems such as disease epidemics or environmental or nuclear catastrophes
for which Federal assistance is already available....
In March, 2021, the American Rescue Plan Act (P.L. 117-2; ARPA) was signed into law. Included
in Section 4005 was a $50 billion mandatory appropriation for the Disaster Relief Fund, the first
mandatory budget authority ever provided to that account.
Appropriations for General Disaster Relief
Types of Appropriations for Disaster Relief
General disaster relief activities by the federal government under the Stafford Act are funded
through the appropriations process. Three types of appropriations support these activities:
Supplemental Appropriations: Requested by the Administration on an ad hoc basis, generally to
address a need not sufficiently covered in the annual appropriations process. These move on a
short timetable and generally do not go through the complete committee process.
Annual Appropriations: Requested by the Administration in February as a part of the annual
budget process, these are expected to be passed by Congress and enacted into law prior to the
start of the fiscal year in October. Annual appropriations measures fund the core activities of the
government and are developed through the committee process.
Continuing Appropriations: Provided when annual appropriations work remains unresolved at
the beginning of the new fiscal year, these appropriations are temporary budget authority
provided at a rate for operations based on the prior fiscal year to allow the government to
continue functioning. The measure that provides them is termed a “continuing resolution,” or
“CR.” These continuing appropriations may expire (in the case of an interim CR), or extend to the
end of the fiscal year (in the case of a “long-term” CR).

62 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/letter-president-donald-j-trump-emergency-determination-stafford-
act/
63 CRS analysis of data at https://www.fema.gov/disaster/declarations. FEMA also records that 46 other tribes were
working with FEMA under emergency declarations.
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Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief
The current Disaster Relief Fund concept can trace its birth back to an appropriations bill in the
1940s—the Second Deficiency Appropriations Act, 1948.64 Deficiency appropriations bills,
which provided funding to meet unanticipated needs during the fiscal year, were a forerunner of
modern supplemental appropriations bills. The severity, frequency, and resultant costs to the
federal government from the array of disasters that strike the United States have always been
unpredictable in an annual budgetary context. To respond to this uncertainty, disaster relief
funding frequently has been provided through deficiency, and later supplemental, appropriations.
When Congress and the Administration began to express concerns about the budget deficit in the
1980s, efforts were made to restrain supplemental spending by limiting it to cases of “dire
emergency.” With the implementation of budget control in the 1990s, a special designation for
emergency spending was created. If both Congress and the Administration agreed that certain
spending was an emergency requirement, budget limits would be adjusted to accommodate that
spending. Congress used the emergency designation on a disaster relief appropriation for the first
time in an FY1992 supplemental appropriations act.65 Congress continues to use emergency
designations in supplemental appropriations legislation to provide budgetary flexibility.
At one point, Congress was statutorily required to use the emergency designation for disaster
relief appropriations. Under the terms of the aforementioned FY1992 supplemental
appropriations act, beginning in FY1993, Congress required “all amounts appropriated for
disaster assistance payments [under the Stafford Act] that are in excess of either the historical
annual average obligation of $320,000,000, or the amount submitted in the President’s initial
budget request, whichever is lower” be designated as emergency requirements under a specific
provision of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.66 This practice of
emergency designation above a particular threshold was followed until FY2000, when a clause
appeared in the appropriation noting that discretionary appropriations were being provided
notwithstanding the restrictions of this section of the U.S. Code.67
Before the implementation of special budgetary treatment specifically for disaster relief in the
FY2013 annual appropriations cycle, 86.1% of appropriations for the DRF were provided through
supplemental appropriations. See “Calculation of the Annual Appropriations Request” for a
discussion of why supplemental appropriations are central to ensuring adequate funding for the
DRF.
Annual Appropriations
The first general disaster relief funding was provided in an annual appropriations act in 1948, and
carried its own authorizing provisions. Stand-alone authorization for general disaster relief first
came in 1950.

64 P.L. 80-785.
65 P.L. 102-229, the “Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers for Relief from the Effects of
Natural Disasters, for Other Urgent Needs, and for Incremental Cost of ‘Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm’ Act of
1992.”
66 P.L. 102-229, 105 Stat. 1711. The reference remains in law as 42 U.S.C §5203, but P.L. 105-33, the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 (at 111 Stat. 699) changed the underlying law on which the requirement depended.
67 P.L. 106-74. The same clause appeared until FY2003, but has not been a part of enacted DRF appropriations since
then. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33) had altered the structure of the underlying budgetary provisions,
removing the particular emergency requirement designation upon which the statutory requirement relied.
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Once the initial separate authorization was put in place for general disaster relief, appropriations
were provided for FY1952, FY1956-FY1958, and FY1962. As noted above, with the
development, codification, and expansion of the federal role in emergency management,
appropriations for general disaster relief became more common—and larger. Annual
appropriations for general disaster relief have been provided each year since FY1964, with only
two exceptions.68
Disaster Relief Designation
The adoption of a special designation for the costs of major disasters under the Stafford Act as a
part of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25, BCA) reduced the DRF’s reliance on
supplemental appropriations, and changed its structure.
More Annual Appropriations:
Establishment in the BCA of a specific budget exception for disaster relief linked to the Stafford
Act that was distinct from the broader exception for “emergency requirements” made it easier to
provide budget authority to the DRF in the annual appropriations process.69 FY2013 was the first
year this mechanism was used over the course of the whole annual appropriations process.
Controlling for inflation, in the first six years of the disaster relief adjustment the DRF received
more annual appropriations than it had during its entire pre-BCA existence going back to 1948.
Since the implementation of the disaster relief adjustment in the annual appropriations process,
the percentage of DRF appropriations provided through annual appropriations has risen from less
than 14% to more than 41%.
The FY2023 annual appropriation for the DRF of $19.945 billion was its largest annual
appropriation ever, breaking the previous record of $18.799 billion set by the FY2022 annual
appropriation.
Changes in DRF Account Structure:
As the new mechanism required identifying resources within the DRF that were specifically for
major disasters, since the FY2013 annual appropriations request, FEMA has bifurcated the DRF
request between the costs of major disasters—the “Disaster Relief Category”—and everything
else funded by the DRF—“Base Disaster Relief,” which includes funding for emergency
designations, fire management assistance, pre-disaster declaration surge activities, and Disaster
Readiness and Support Programs. The former category is eligible for the BCA designation as
“disaster relief,” while the latter category is not, and usually scores against discretionary spending
limits.
The allowable adjustment for disaster relief expired at the end of FY2021. According to OMB, it
had covered $104 billion in major disaster costs through FY2021.70 Over the life of the BCA,
93% of covered appropriations went to the DRF.

68 In FY1984 and FY1991, no appropriation was requested or made for disaster relief, as unobligated balances were
deemed sufficient to fund anticipated disasters. See Federal Emergency Management Agency, Justification of
Estimates, Fiscal Year 1984, Part 2, Washington, DC, January 1983, p. DR-3, and Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Justification of Estimates, Fiscal Year 1992, Washington, DC, February 1991, p. DR-3.
69 See “Changes in the Budget Process” later in this report; and CRS In Focus IF10720, Calculation and Use of the
Disaster Relief Allowable Adjustment, by William L. Painter.
70 Office of Management and Budget, OMB Sequestration Update Report to the President and Congress for Fiscal
Year 2021, Washington, DC, August 20, 2020, p. 15, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/
Sequestration_Update_August_2020.pdf; and Office of Management and Budget, OMB Final Sequestration Report to
(continued...)
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In its FY2022 budget request, the Biden Administration proposed extending special budgetary
treatment for disaster relief. Subsequently, the FY2022 budget resolution included an adjustment
for disaster relief that continued effectively to exempt such funding from spending limits within
the congressional budget process.71 When Congress reestablished statutory limits on discretionary
spending for FY2024 and FY2025, it also restored the disaster relief adjustment.72
Continuing Appropriations
Even though the DRF is a “no-year” fund, and its appropriations are available until expended, it
does get temporary replenishment from continuing resolutions (CRs) at times, until its annual
appropriations are finalized.73
In FY1982, for the first time, interim general disaster relief funding was provided in a CR through
an “anomaly,” a provision providing funds at an operating rate different from that base rate of
operations provided in the resolution.74
These “anomaly” provisions may also provide flexibility that can help avoid some of the
complications that can arise under the constraints of operating under continuing appropriations.
For example, CRs generally provide funding at a constant rate of operations, with certain
restrictions. This can complicate disaster response and recovery, when calls for funding vary in
scale and timing from year to year. The DRF could, in some circumstances, risk being depleted
by response and recovery needs while operating under a CR. This risk can be addressed in one of
two ways: responsively, when FEMA requests special flexibility from the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB)—which apportions CR funding to agencies; or proactively, when a special
provision is included in the CR that directs such flexibility be provided to ensure adequate
resources are available. Such language can be found in CRs since FY2018, which all provide that
the funds provided “may be apportioned up to the rate for operations necessary to carry out
response and recovery activities” under the Stafford Act.75
Lapses in Annual Appropriations and the DRF
Most annual appropriations expire at the end of the fiscal year. On several occasions in recent history, neither
annual nor continuing appropriations were enacted prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, leading to a “funding
gap” or “lapse” in appropriations. When this occurs, partial shutdown of government functions and emergency
furlough of employees ensues for functions that are not funded through fee revenues or multiyear appropriations,
and do not immediately protect life and property.
The Disaster Relief Fund appropriation can fund disaster relief operations, as its appropriations do not expire at
the end of the fiscal year—DHS contingency plans for lapses in annual appropriations specifically note that
“Disaster Relief Fund activities wil continue operations”—but lapses in annual appropriations have an impact on
agency efficiency. Some disaster-related functions have been subject to emergency furlough in the past.76 Such
furloughs may indirectly affect the ability of a component to carry out its mission. For example, in the event of a
shutdown and furlough, while staff directly engaged in activities to prevent loss of life or property are not subject

the President and Congress for Fiscal Year 2021, Washington, DC, January 19, 2021, p. 8,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/sequestration_final_January_2021_speaker.pdf.
71 S.Con.Res. 14, §4004(b)(6).
72 P.L. 118-5, §101(b)(3). For further discussion, see “Changes in the Budget Process” later in this report.
73 For more information on continuing resolutions, see CRS Report R46595, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of
Components and Practices.
74 P.L. 97-92; 95 Stat. 1187.
75 See, for example, P.L. 115-56, Division D, §129; P.L. 115-245, Division C, §124; and P.L. 116-59, §133.
76 For details, see CRS Report R43252, FY2014 Appropriations Lapse and the Department of Homeland Security:
Impact and Legislation, by William L. Painter.
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to furlough, other staff are not available to review grant requests or approve the release of appropriated funds for
nonemergency disaster recovery grants from the DRF.
DRF Funding History
The following figures show appropriations for the DRF from FY1964 through FY2023.
Each fiscal year shows a gross total of annual appropriations and discretionary appropriations
(represented by a two-part bar) and a net total (represented by a black mark on each bar), which
takes into account rescissions and transfers from the DRF. An inset graphic provides the scale to
include funding levels for several outlier years,77 while showing the detail of appropriations for
the more typical years. The first figure shows data in nominal dollars, and the second shows
constant FY2023 dollars.
The figures show an increase in appropriations for the DRF starting in the 1990s, largely due to
increases in supplemental appropriations. Annual appropriations rose significantly in the early
2000s and again starting in FY2013. FY2021 saw the DRF receive its largest gross appropriations
in its history, in nominal dollars, due to the $50 billion in mandatory supplemental funding
provided in the American Rescue Plan Act. However, when inflation is taken into account,
FY2005 remains the single highest year for appropriations for the DRF, when a series of
hurricanes, including Katrina, Rita, and Wilma hit the southeastern United States.78
A table showing the underlying data for each figure appears in the Appendix.

77 FY2005, FY2006, and FY2017.
78 The following year, a significant amount of what had been provided was rescinded and re-appropriated to other
agencies to provide disaster assistance and repair storm and flood damage.
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Figure 2. Nominal Dollar Disaster Relief Appropriations, FY1964-FY2023

Source: CRS analysis of appropriations laws.
Notes: Totals for FY2005, FY2006, FY2018, FY2020, FY2021, and FY2023, referenced by the arrows, are beyond the scale of the main graph and are shown on the
inset. FY2013 numbers do not reflect the impact of sequestration. Supplemental data include contingent appropriations and all appropriations under the heading of
“Disaster Relief” or “Disaster Relief Fund” including the language “for an additional amount.” Reductions reflected in the Net Total data include transfers and rescissions
specifically enumerated in appropriations acts. For information on trends in the declarations that helped drive the demand for these appropriations, see CRS Report
R42702, Stafford Act Declarations 1953-2016: Trends, Analyses, and Implications for Congress, by Bruce R. Lindsay.
CRS-19

Figure 3. FY2021 Dollar Disaster Relief Appropriations, FY1964-FY2023

Source: CRS analysis of appropriations laws.
Notes: Totals for FY2005, FY2006, FY2018, FY2020, FY2021, and FY2023, referenced by the arrows, are beyond the scale of the main graph and are shown on the
inset. FY2013 numbers do not reflect the impact of sequestration. Supplemental data include contingent appropriations and all appropriations under the heading of
“Disaster Relief” or “Disaster Relief Fund” including the language “for an additional amount.” Reductions reflected in the Net Total data include transfers and rescissions
specifically enumerated in appropriations acts. For information on trends in the declarations that helped drive the demand for these appropriations, see CRS Report
R42702, Stafford Act Declarations 1953-2016: Trends, Analyses, and Implications for Congress, by Bruce R. Lindsay.
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Factors in Changing Appropriations Levels
For years, FEMA’s budget justifications have noted, in one form or another, that “[t]he primary
cost driver associated with Major Disasters is disaster activity.”79 While year-to-year disaster
relief appropriations are largely driven by disaster activity and ongoing recovery needs, when
analyzing historical data over an extended time frame, other factors such as programmatic
changes in general disaster relief and certain changes in the budget process may also warrant
consideration.
COVID-19 and the DRF
In the interest of discussing the traditional applications of the DRF, the fol owing analysis for the most part leaves
aside the single largest draw on its resources—the COVID-19 pandemic. The decision to use Stafford Act
resources in the pandemic response was unprecedented: by the end of the first quarter of FY2024, more than
$120 bil ion had been obligated for COVID-19 pandemic response and recovery from the DRF—even when
adjusted for inflation, this was more than had been appropriated for the DRF from its inception through FY2004.
The Trump Administration also chose to use a large amount of DRF resources to fund a new unemployment
assistance initiative, which led to more than $40 bil ion in additional obligations from the DRF in less than two
months—approximately five times what had already been provided as assistance to states.
Given the unique applications of DRF funding for COVID-19 response and recovery, the analyses in this section
focus on the changing appropriations levels for the DRF in its role as a resource for more traditional “kinetic”
disasters, such as earthquakes, flooding, and storms, rather than pandemics.
More information on this topic can be found in CRS Report R47048, FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic
Response.
Incident Frequency and Severity
The two largest factors affecting year-to-year disaster relief appropriations are disaster activity,
which varies in frequency and severity, and the ongoing recovery costs from previous disasters.
Federal involvement in disaster response and recovery occurs when lower levels of government
find their capabilities are overwhelmed and turn to the federal government for help. Reduced (or
increased) numbers of calls for relief mean reduced (or increased) need for disaster relief
appropriations.
The incidents that lead to expenditures from the DRF vary in scale. Equally powerful storms may
strike a community with a glancing blow or a direct hit. An earthquake may strike a rural area, or
a major city with complex infrastructure. Stricken communities, states, territories, and tribes have
varying levels of preparedness for particular types of disaster, and different amounts of public
infrastructure to repair and replace.
Some observers have noted that as the U.S. population grows and develops property in disaster-
prone areas, and as patterns of severe weather shift, the costs of disasters are likely to continue to
rise.80 According to the National Centers for Environmental Information of the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, from 1980 through 2023, the United States has averaged more
than eight weather-related disaster events that each cost $1 billion or more each year.81 The

79 Department of Homeland Security, Disaster Relief Fund, Fiscal Year 2019 Congressional Budget Justification,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC, February 2018, p. FEMA-DRF-30. FEMA budget
justifications from FY2009 going forward are available at https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget.
80 For information on forecasts for hurricane-specific disaster costs, see Congressional Budget Office, Potential
Increases in Hurricane Damage in the United States: Implications for the Federal Budget, Washington, DC, June
2016, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51518.
81 These cost figures are based on CPI-adjusted data.
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frequency of these events is increasing. From 1980 through 2007, more than seven billion-dollar
events occurred in only one year (1998). Since 2007, these events have become more frequent:
only one year since 2007 has seen fewer than seven such events. Ten or more such events have
occurred each year since 2011. The average over the last five years (2019-2023) is more than 20
billion-dollar events. The United States was struck by 28 such events in 2023, exceeding the
previous annual record set in 2020 of 22 events.82
The contrast in funding for the DRF between the period of high-frequency, high-impact events
from FY2012 to the present day and the relatively calm period of the 1980s is illustrated in
Figure 3. Without the driver of large disasters, DRF appropriations remained modest. During the
period from FY1981 to FY1991, unusually low levels of disaster activity led to no supplemental
appropriations for 7 of those 11 fiscal years, and no annual appropriations in either FY1984 or
FY1991—the only two fiscal years for which this has occurred since FY1964. By contrast, over
the last seven years, the DRF has required sustained high levels of appropriations. Total nominal
dollar appropriations for the DRF for each year never went below $12 billion. Even adjusting for
inflation, all seven fiscal years were among the 11 highest years of funding for the DRF, and four
were within the top five. The top four years of outlays from the DRF all occurred over the four-
year period of FY2020 through FY2023.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between billion-dollar events and catastrophic incidents—those
that cost the DRF more than $500 million each. Note that not all of the billion-dollar loss events
resulted in more than $500 million in expenditures from the DRF. The most expensive of the
catastrophic events—pandemic COVID-19—is not included in NOAA’s billion-dollar event
accounting, as it is not weather-related. The right axis shows annual obligations from the DRF, to
illuminate the effect of these events on DRF obligations. Given its unprecedented nature and high
cost, white dots with green borders show DRF obligations for non-COVID events.

82 NOAA, National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI), U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters
(2018), https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/. Note that NOAA data here is presented as calendar years (January-
December) rather than fiscal years (October-September).
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Figure 4. Number of $1 Billion Loss Events and Catastrophic Incidents,
FY2014-FY2023, with DRF Obligations, Controlling for COVID-19 Obligations

Source: CRS analysis of NOAA bil ion-dol ar events research and DRF monthly reports.
Notes: All events tallied by fiscal year. Amounts are not indexed for inflation. DRF obligations data does not
reflect the year-end closeout adjustments performed in the month after the fiscal year is complete; however,
these amounts are not large enough to be reflected in the Figure. Total obligations do not reflect set-asides or
obligations associated with the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities program. Deobligations of
funding, rescissions, and transfers are not reflected.
Figure 4 nevertheless shows the increasing trend in the number of billion-dollar loss events over
the last 10 years, and an increasing number of half-billion DRF cost events. It also shows, as
expected due to the significance of recovery costs from large events, that relief most often comes
in the form of reimbursements after the fact. However, the level of obligations from the DRF has
more to do with the relative severity of the event, as opposed to the number of events, as the
severity of the COVID-19 response shows.
Further analysis of the 10 most recent fiscal years reinforces the association between catastrophic
incidents and the level of appropriations for and obligations from the DRF. Figure 5 shows the
level of appropriations for the DRF for each of the last 10 fiscal years, followed by two columns
showing total DRF obligations and DRF obligations for catastrophic disasters.
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Figure 5. DRF Appropriations and Obligations, FY2014-FY2023
(Reflecting the comparative size of obligations for catastrophic events)

Source: CRS analysis of fiscal year-ending Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Reports from FEMA, FY2014-FY2023,
Appendices A and B.
Notes: Data does not reflect the year-end closeout adjustments performed in the month after the fiscal year is
complete. However, these amounts are not large enough to be reflected in the figure. Total obligations do not
reflect set-asides or obligations associated with the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities program.
Deobligations of funding, rescissions, and transfers also are not reflected. FEMA credits $16 bil ion in
supplemental appropriations for the DRF in the same measure as the FY2024 Continuing Resolution as FY2024
funding, so those funds are not reflected in this figure.
The DRF continues to pay the costs of recovery from catastrophic incidents for years after they
occur. For example, in FY2023, FEMA obligated $7.9 billion in DRF funding for ongoing
recovery from non-pandemic catastrophic disasters that occurred in FY2020 or earlier, including
almost $5.6 billion for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, and the 2017 California wildfires, $146
million for Hurricane Sandy (2012), and $267 million for costs from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita,
and Wilma (2005).
Programmatic Changes in Disaster Relief
Over the long term, alterations to the scope of federal disaster relief programs affect the type and
level of federal spending when disasters occur. Initially, the first appropriation for disaster relief
and the Disaster Relief Act of 1950 authorized funding to repair local public facilities at the
President’s discretion. As the brief history above relates, the federal program for general disaster
relief has evolved into a much broader program, of which local public facilities is only one facet.
This evolution has occurred gradually. Some of this evolution was the result of incorporating
assistance offered in response to specific disasters in the 1960s and 1970s into the general relief
programs under the Stafford Act. Additional changes were brought about by the broadening of the
federal role in smaller-scale incidents, as well as proactive declarations prior to potential disasters
to reduce their impact. In addition, disaster relief programs funded through the DRF now include
disaster mitigation programs that are not limited to mitigating the type of disaster that triggered
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them, but are also intended to reduce the impact (and by extension, the cost) of disasters over the
long term.
The impacts of programmatic expansions are reflected in Figure 3, with the trend of increased
general disaster relief appropriations on a small scale associated with expansions under the
Disaster Relief Act of 1969 and the Disaster Relief Act of 1970, and on a larger scale with the
expansion of programs under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments of
1988. While the decrease in disaster activities in the 1980s reduced the annual demand for
disaster relief appropriations, once the number of declared disasters rose again, and emergencies
and mitigation also drew on DRF resources, demand for those resources grew rapidly.
Programmatic broadening in general disaster relief has continued in the 21st century. It remains to
be seen if the novel use of the Stafford Act to support COVID-19 response will become a
precedent for future use of the Stafford Act and DRF resources.83
Changes in the Budget Process
Changes in congressional budget processes have at times been discussed as a means of limiting
the budgetary impact of disaster relief spending. However, the budget controls that have been
approved and implemented generally have been provided with provisions to ensure disaster relief
budget authority remains available if needed.
Prior to 1985, Congress provided appropriations to fund the federal government without specific
statutory limitations on overall spending. The 1985 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act put limits on deficit spending in place. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 placed
express limits on discretionary spending for the first time.
The 1990 act also provided an exception to those limits, allowing Congress, together with the
President, to declare certain spending to be an emergency requirement, and therefore not subject
to those limits. This was used to provide additional appropriations for disaster relief. Although the
original set of discretionary limits expired, the emergency spending designation has continued as
part of the appropriations process.
In 2011, the Budget Control Act (P.L. 112-25, BCA) not only reestablished statutory spending
limits, but also provided a special designation for the costs of major disasters, in addition to the
emergency designation.84
The impact of these changes in the budget process on disaster relief appropriations appears to be
limited to the structure of the total appropriations, rather than the amount. The Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) noted that in the 1970s, “about 5%” of supplemental funding was for
disasters.85 In a report reviewing supplemental appropriations enacted during the 1980s, CBO
indicated that number fell to less than 1%.86 This can be attributed to the drop in disaster activity
discussed above. In a similar report on the 1990s, CBO observed an increase in the use of
supplemental appropriations to provide disaster relief, noting the following:

83 For a more detailed discussion of changes to authorized programs, see “1966-1974: The Disaster Relief Act of
1966—General Relief Broadens” and “1974-2017: The Era of Federally Coordinated Emergency Management.”
84 See the “Disaster Relief Designation” subheading under “Annual Appropriations,” above, for further discussion.
85 Congressional Budget Office, Supplemental Appropriations in the 1970s, Staff Working Paper, Washington, DC,
July 1981, p. xiv, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/15398.
86 Congressional Budget Office, Supplemental Appropriations in the 1980s, Washington, DC, February 1, 1990, pp. 29,
32, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/17127.
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[I]n the 1990s, Presidents Bush and Clinton tended to request—and the Congress tended
to provide in regular appropriations—less than what would eventually be spent in those
disaster-related accounts. (Some observers say the underfunding was an effort to keep total
appropriations under the [budget enforcement] caps.) When a disaster or emergency arose,
the Congress enacted supplemental appropriations during the fiscal year, usually at the
request of the President. That supplemental funding was designated emergency spending
and was therefore not counted under the discretionary spending caps.87
Figure 2 and Figure 3 do not show a distinct impact of budget controls on the overall level of
disaster spending. However, they do show an increase in the amount of funding provided in
annual appropriations versus supplemental appropriations starting in FY2012. The addition of the
disaster relief designation under the BCA enabled higher funding levels for disasters in the annual
appropriations bills, as disaster relief-designated appropriations did not compete with other
appropriations for limited discretionary resources, either within the allocations provided to the
subcommittee funding FEMA, or within the overall discretionary spending limit. In the early
years of the disaster relief designation, this increased annual funding also reduced the frequency
and urgency of supplemental appropriations for the DRF.
However, Congress has provided emergency-designated relief for catastrophic disasters in
supplemental appropriations, whether statutory budget controls were in place or not.
Figure 6 shows a 20-year gross funding history for the DRF from FY2004 through FY2023,
showing, for each fiscal year, the breakdown between annual and supplemental appropriations,
then the breakdown of funding provided within budget limitations (discretionary spending) and
beyond budget limitations (disaster relief and emergency designated spending). It shows the pre-
BCA usage of the emergency designation to cover supplemental appropriations for the DRF, and
the usage of the disaster relief designation to cover increased DRF annual appropriations,
beginning in FY2013—the only time that the disaster relief designation was used in a
supplemental appropriations measure. The absence of the gross discretionary bar from FY2021
through FY2023 shows the reliance of the DRF “base” on carryover balances from the CARES
Act in that period. It also shows the first mandatory supplemental spending for the DRF—$50
billion through the American Rescue Plan Act (P.L. 117-2) in FY2021—which is subject to
different controls than discretionary appropriations.

87 Congressional Budget Office, Supplemental Appropriations in the 1990s, Washington, DC, March 2001, p. 13,
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/12999.
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Figure 6. DRF Annual and Supplemental Appropriations Within and Beyond
Discretionary Spending Limits, FY2004-FY2023

Source: CRS analysis of DRF appropriations database.
Notes: Does not show the impact of transfers or rescissions. FY2013 data does not include the impact of
sequestration.

Budgeting Practices for Disaster Relief
Management of Disaster Relief Funds
The responsibility for managing DRF appropriations has shifted among agencies as the general
disaster relief function has grown. In March 1951, President Truman initially delegated the
authority for directing federal agencies in a disaster to the Housing and Home Finance
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Administrator at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD);88 then in January
1953 the responsibility was shifted to the Federal Civil Defense Administration in the Department
of Defense (DOD).89 In 1961, the authority was moved within the department to the Office of
Civil Defense Mobilization, which had its name changed in 1961 to the Office of Emergency
Planning, and changed again in 1968 to the Office of Emergency Preparedness.90 It remained with
that office until its abolishment in 1973, when disaster relief powers were transferred from DOD
back to HUD, where those powers were exercised by the Federal Disaster Assistance
Administration (FDAA).91
Although management responsibilities were vested in various parts of the federal bureaucracy,
appropriations for general disaster relief were provided directly to the Executive Office of the
President from FY1948 through FY1973. For FY1974, funds were still described as “Funds
Appropriated to the President,” but they were provided within HUD’s appropriations.92
1978: The Creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
In 1978, responding to support from state governors for a more cohesive emergency management
structure at the federal level, President Jimmy Carter issued Reorganization Plan #3, which
created the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). At the time, disaster relief
functions were vested in three agencies: the FDAA (at HUD, managing general federal disaster
relief), the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA—part of the General Services Administration);
and the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA—part of the Department of Defense). This
was the first time that emergency management functions at the national level were expressly
centralized into a single federal agency. FEMA had a three-part role:
• Mobilizing federal resources,
• Coordinating federal efforts with state and local governments, and
• Managing the efforts of the public and private sectors in disaster responses.
FY1980 was the first year appropriations for “Disaster Relief” were provided to FEMA.
Calculation of the Annual Appropriations Request
A review of selected FEMA budget justifications shows how the executive branch has discussed
its decision concerning how much to request for disaster relief.
“Past Experience” and Various Averages
In the early 1980s (1983-1985), FEMA provided justifications for the Disaster Relief
appropriation that included management and coordination, individual assistance, and public
assistance activities. These activities were also supported under the Emergency Management
Planning and Assistance appropriation and the Salaries and Expenses appropriation for FEMA.
These justifications noted that actual disaster relief requirements were based on unpredictable
external factors. The FY1984 justification noted, “The budget requests mentioned are based on

88 Harry S. Truman, Executive Order 10221, “Providing for the Administration of Disaster Relief,” March 2, 1951.
89 Harry S. Truman, Executive Order 10427, “Administration of Disaster Relief,” January 16, 1953.
90 CRS Report 78-102, Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Assistance: Federal Organization and Programs, by
Clark F. Norton, April 18, 1978, p. CRS-37 (out of print; available to congressional clients from the author).
91 Norton, p. CRS-38.
92 After FY1986, the “Funds Appropriated to the President” heading fell out of use.
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average projection of disaster occurrence. Any significant change from the projected totals,
through either more or larger size incidents, could generate an increased request.”93
However, despite that uncertainty, a request for a specific budget number leads to questions about
the basis for that particular number. In the FY1986 process, FEMA explicitly noted it was
projecting its anticipated need “on the basis of past experience with disasters.”94 Between
September 1984, when FEMA submitted its budget request to the Office of Management and
Budget for review, and February 1985, when the budget justification was provided to Congress,
additional “experience” was apparently accumulated that reduced the projected demand for
disaster relief from $350 million to $275 million.95
By the FY1989 appropriations cycle, the language justifying the request had evolved into “an
assessment of historical averages,” and included specific data on the average annual disaster relief
obligations for a seven-year period,96 as well as the disaster relief obligations for the most
recently concluded fiscal year. The budget justification then included a request, noting the request
and the projected obligation data that justified it included $30 million in savings through
unspecified “legislative and administrative reforms.”97
As has been noted before, by the late 1980s and into the 1990s, concerns about deficit spending
led to the discussion of budget controls, and ultimately their implementation.
The FY1992 request highlighted the difficulty in simply using averages of past obligations.
According to the justification, the average annual obligation from 1981 to 1989 of $270 million
was exceeded by the FY1990 obligation of over $2 billion for costs related to Hurricane Hugo98
and the Loma Prieta earthquake.99
The FY1994 request included a great deal of information on prior-year activities, discussing these
elements in the context of average levels of obligations, and noting the impact of larger disasters
in prior years, but did little to specifically justify the request level of $292 million.100
Five-Year Averages (With Exceptions)
For FY1995, the budget discussion evolved, as FEMA justified the request on the basis of the
first five years of activities under the Stafford Act, and the series of major disasters that had
struck.101 The use of the five-year average continued through the 1990s and early 2000s, with

93 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Justification of Estimates, Fiscal Year 1984 (submitted to Congress),
January 1983, p. DR-7.
94 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Justification of Estimates, Fiscal Year 1986 (submitted to Office of
Management and Budget), September 1984, p. DR-2; and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Justification of
Estimates, Fiscal Year 1986 (submitted to Congress), February 1985, p. DR-2.
95 Ibid.
96 The data for this average went back to 1981, when cost-sharing measures were first applied to the public assistance
program. Adoption of those measures would have affected the baseline level of spending from the DRF.
97 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Justification of Estimates, Fiscal Year 1989 (submitted to Congress),
Washington, DC, February 1988, p. DR-2.
98 Hurricane Hugo occurred late in FY1989 (making landfall on September 22), so most of its disaster relief costs were
reflected in FY1990.
99 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Justification of Estimates, Fiscal Year 1992 (submitted to Congress),
Washington, DC, February 1991, p. DR-2.
100 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Justification of Estimates, Fiscal Year 1994 (submitted to Congress),
Washington, DC, March 1993, p. DR-3.
101 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Justification of Estimates, Fiscal Year 1995 (submitted to Congress),
(continued...)
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disaster support costs—the costs of maintaining disaster response capabilities that are not
attributable to a specific disaster—included as well. Certain very large disasters were not included
in the average. For example, for FY1999, FEMA explicitly excluded the costs of the 1994
Northridge earthquake, plus disaster support costs.102 For FY2003, not only were the ongoing
recovery costs from Northridge excluded from the average, but so were the impacts of the 9/11
terrorist attacks.
By FY2009, the justification had again evolved: “Coupled with funding from recoveries of prior
year obligations and unobligated funds carried forward, the appropriation request will fund the
five-year average obligation level for direct disaster activity (excluding extraordinary events, such
as the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, the 2004 hurricanes in Florida and other states, and
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005 and 2006 and excluding disaster readiness and
support functions).”103 In FY2011, the Administration simplified the request language by referring
to disasters that cost less than $500 million as “non-catastrophic disaster activity.” That year, in
addition to the request for the DRF based on the five-year average of “non-catastrophic” disaster
relief obligations, the Administration made a concurrent request for $3.6 billion for the costs of
prior catastrophic storms and wildfires.
The Budget Control Act Era: Ten-Year Averages, Reserves, and Flexibility
The 2010s saw continued debate on deficit spending, coupled with a continuing desire to fund
disaster relief programs. When Congress passed the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25;
BCA), it created statutory caps on spending as well as a special mechanism to exempt some of the
costs of major disasters from those caps. (See “Changes in the Budget Process” for details.)
A $500 million reserve fund was included in the Administration’s budget request for FY2012.
This was intended to help ensure resources were available on short notice in hurricane season.104
This rose to $1 billion in FY2015. For FY2019, the reserve request increased to $2 billion “due to
the uncertainty around the availability of additional supplemental funding to continue addressing
the 2017 hurricanes.”105
In FY2013, FEMA shifted from using a 5-year average to using a 10-year average of non-
catastrophic obligations, plus the estimated requirements for past major disasters, plus the
reserve, as the basis for their overall DRF request.106

Washington, DC, February 1994, pp. DR-2, DR-3. It also made special note that the budget justification had been
developed prior to the January 17, 1994 earthquake in Northridge, California, and that a supplemental appropriation
request of $4.7 billion had already been sent to Congress.
102 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Justification of Estimates, Fiscal Year 1999 (submitted to Congress),
Washington, DC, February 1998, pp. DR-8, DR-13, DR-23.
103 Department of Homeland Security, Disaster Relief Fund, Fiscal Year 2009 Congressional Budget Justification,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC, 2008, pp. FEMA (DRF) 1. FEMA budget justifications
from FY2009 going forward are available at https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget.
104 Department of Homeland Security, Disaster Relief Fund, Fiscal Year 2012 Congressional Budget Justification,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC, 2011, pp. DRF-5, DRF-6. FEMA budget justifications
from FY2009 going forward are available at https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget.
105 Department of Homeland Security, Disaster Relief Fund, Fiscal Year 2019 Congressional Budget Justification,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC, February 2018, p. FEMA-DRF-3. FEMA budget
justifications from FY2009 going forward are available at https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget.
106 Department of Homeland Security, Disaster Relief Fund, Fiscal Year 2013 Congressional Budget Justification,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC, 2012, pp. DRF-5, DRF-6, FEMA budget justifications
from FY2009 going forward are available at https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget.
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In FY2020, FEMA began to request funding for a statutorily established set-aside for the Building
Resilient Infrastructure and Communities program mitigation program outlined in P.L. 115-254,
§1234.107 The set-aside amount is equal to 6% of the estimated aggregate amount of eight types of
assistance required for each major disaster. The law, as it requires there to be no reduction in
those grants as a result of the set-aside, implies the need for additional funding in the DRF
appropriation.108
The Post-BCA Era: Current Practices
As noted in the “Disaster Relief Designation” subsection above, the statutory discretionary
spending limits of the BCA and the disaster relief allowable adjustment expired at the end of
FY2021. Since then, the Administration has requested, and Congress has continued to provide a
similar adjustment within the budget process, both in FY2022 without statutory limits, and under
the budget agreement that set discretionary budget limitations for FY2024 and FY2025.
The methodology for calculating the DRF request has remained consistent since FY2013:
• To calculate the anticipated need for the DRF base, the annual budget request
relies on the 10-year historical average of the costs of emergency declarations,
Fire Management Assistance Grants, and pre-disaster surge activities, plus spend
plan information for Disaster Readiness and Support Activities. Within those
amounts, FEMA projects pay costs based on a five-year historical average.109
• For the costs of major disasters, the annual budget request relies on the 10-year
historical average of the costs of major disasters costing less than $500 million
each, plus the planned spending for past catastrophic disasters. Within those
amounts, FEMA projects pay costs based on a five-year historical average.
• In addition, the DRF request for major disasters has continued to a $2 billion
reserve for initial operations in response to significant events, and funding the
set-aside for the BRIC program.110
• These amounts are offset by projected unobligated budget authority carried over
from the prior fiscal year and deobligations of previously awarded disaster relief
budget authority that is no longer eligible for use due to changes in project
parameters.
Known Limitations to this Calculation
Given the structure of the budget process, the federal role in disaster response and recovery, and
the realities of major disasters as events of limited predictability and highly variable expense,
developing an annual budget request that is authoritatively reflective of future requirements is a
virtual impossibility. FEMA notes several limitations of the current methodology in its annual
statement of its DRF funding requirements:

107 For more information, see CRS Insight IN11515, FEMA Pre-Disaster Mitigation: The Building Resilient
Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) Program, and other work by Diane P. Horn available on the CRS website.
108 42 U.S.C. §5133(i)(3).
109 Department of Homeland Security, Disaster Relief Fund, Fiscal Year 2022 Congressional Budget Justification,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC, 2021, pp. FEMA-DRF-25 and 28. FEMA budget
justifications from FY2009 going forward are available at https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget.
110 FEMA, “Disaster Relief Fund: Fiscal Year 2024 Funding Requirements,” Fiscal Year 2023 Report to Congress,
March 13, 2023, p. 6.
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• Leaving out new catastrophic disasters, beyond the reserve for new significant
event response, as FEMA points out, means the Administration will need to seek
supplemental appropriations in the event of almost any catastrophic event. Not
only are the costs of new catastrophic disasters not reflected in the budget request
for the coming fiscal year, that request does not include the cost of catastrophic
disasters that occur in the fiscal year during which the request is being
considered. These omissions are the largest driver in shortfalls in the major
disasters subaccount of the DRF.
• The practical inability of the request to reflect disaster activity in the fiscal year
when it is under consideration—activity that will affect the size of carryover
balances and recoveries that may be relied on in the request—means the request
is almost certain to mismatch with the actual need. One aspect of this is that the
delay of obligations from one project into the next fiscal year may help mitigate a
shortfall in one year, only to exacerbate one in the next.
• For existing catastrophic disasters, the request for a given fiscal year is based on
cost estimates. It is then matched up with projections based on spend plans,
which are more reflective of projected needs, as they just reflect the obligation
plans for the current year. Even these spending plans shift, which can result in
monthly fluctuations of projected end-of-year balances and potential shortfalls,
resulting in uncertainty about the required level of supplemental appropriations.
Predicting future events, especially ones as out-of-the-ordinary as disasters, presents a real
challenge. This is compounded by the rising potential costs of the catastrophic events that drive
most of the spending from the DRF. Without an agreed-upon model to project those costs in the
budgeting process, even if these events become more rare, the DRF by necessity will continue to
rely on supplemental appropriations to meet disaster funding requirements.
When the DRF Runs Low
At times, the balance in the DRF has dropped to a point that raises concern about its ability to
address current and/or impending incidents. When this occurs, FEMA implements “Immediate
Needs Funding” (INF) restrictions, which allow FEMA to prioritize, to an extent, obligation of
funds from the DRF, limiting them to “life-safety and life sustaining efforts.”
This restriction is made through FEMA guidance documents, rather than regulations. INF
restrictions were put into place seven out of the nine years from FY2003 through FY2011. After
management changes (see “If the DRF Runs Out of Money” below), INF restrictions were not
implemented again until FY2017, when a series of major hurricanes, including Hurricane Maria,
and wildfires were poised to draw heavily on DRF resources.
The most recent implementation of INF restrictions was on August 29, 2023. FEMA initiated
immediate needs funding as the unobligated balance in the DRF dropped to $3.4 billion in the
middle of responses to multiple major disasters.111 FEMA lifted the restriction on October 2,
2023, after enactment of a continuing resolution112 that provided up to $19.95 billion in
temporary budget authority for the DRF through November 17, 2023, and a $16 billion
supplemental appropriation ($15.50 billion for the costs of major disasters, and $500 million for
the DRF base).

111 FEMA, “FEMA Advisory: FEMA Announces Implementation of Immediate Needs Funding,” Office of External
Affairs email, August 29, 2003.
112 P.L. 118-15.
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Under the most recent INF restriction, FEMA indicated that it would pause new Public Assistance
(PA) and Hazard Mitigation obligations that were not essential for lifesaving and life-sustaining
activities. It further indicated that under the restriction, it would continue to provide:
• Individual Assistance payments directly to survivors for critical needs and
housing;
• Public Assistance for states, tribes and territories essential for lifesaving and life-
sustaining activities;
• State management costs;
• Mission assignments of federal partners for critical response activities;
• Fire Management Assistance grants; and
• Essential ongoing disaster operations, including salaries of FEMA field staff
(Stafford Act employees).
If the DRF Runs Out of Money…
The DRF came close to depletion in FY2011. FEMA had implemented immediate needs funding restrictions late
that August. Four days before the end of the fiscal year, the Director of OMB noted in a letter to the Senate
Majority Leader that “the DRF wil likely finish the fiscal year exhausted with a de minimis cash flow balance of less
than a day’s operating expenses.” A continuing resolution (P.L. 111-242) was enacted the day before the end of
the fiscal year, which replenished the DRF with temporary budget authority.
Today’s DRF is managed differently than it was in 2011. After the 2011 close call, FEMA changed the internal
processes of obligation from the DRF, to maintain unobligated balances longer over the course of regular
operations. Also, the DRF is no longer managed as a single fund. As noted earlier in the report, the DRF is now
divided into a base subaccount and a major disasters subaccount. As they have distinct purposes, the resources
from one subaccount cannot be used for the other without fol owing formal reprogramming procedures.
Since FY2013, “depletion of the DRF” is usually shorthand for the unobligated balance in the major disasters DRF
subaccount falling to zero.
Although unobligated resources for the BRIC program are not included in FEMA’s calculation of the balance of the
major disasters DRF subaccount, since May 2021, FEMA has indicated in its monthly reporting that those
resources could be redirected to help cover the immediate response and recovery needs pursuant to major
disasters once the major disasters subaccount is otherwise depleted.113 (This remedy has yet to be effected.)
If the major disasters DRF subaccount (including BRIC funding) were exhausted, decisions on whether certain
activities could continue would be based on the same exceptions that allow other unfunded activities to continue
in a lapse in annual appropriations. There are existing statutory exceptions for:
1. activities where authorization exists in law to incur obligations without prior appropriations;
2. activities where such authorization is implied;
3. activities necessary for the discharge of the President’s duties under the Constitution;
4. activities necessary for the protection of life and property; and
5. activities required for an orderly shutdown of operations.
The fourth item is obviously the most significant exception in regards to disaster response and recovery. The
exception is generally considered to be for direct federal activity—not for grants, not for financial assistance, and
not for salaries of federal employees working on disaster activity that had been funded through the DRF. If the
DRF is exhausted, it is likely that a significant number of personnel would be furloughed, as without funding, a
number of activities cease, including:
•
Planning (such as strategic, business, or budgetary activities);
•
Research and development activities;
•
Most policy functions, administrative, as well as programmatic, unless those functions are justified by an
exception;

113 FEMA, Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report, May 11, 2021, p. 4, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/fema_may-2021-disaster-relief-fund-report.pdf.
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•
Auditing;
•
Most regulatory, legislative, public affairs, and intergovernmental affairs unless those functions are
justified by an exception; and
•
Training and development not deemed an excepted activity.
Emergency Contingency Funding and Reserve Funds
At times, the Administration and Congress have examined methods of speeding up or broadening
the availability of funds to address emergencies and disasters by changing how they were
appropriated. Examples of this include the use of contingent appropriations and the proposal to
establish a reserve fund for disaster relief.
Contingent Appropriations
In some of its first exercises of the emergency designation, Congress chose to provide a portion
of the appropriation for the DRF as emergency-designated budget authority contingent on the
Administration specifically requesting the additional funds and designating them as an emergency
requirement. An example of this structure can be found in P.L. 103-75, a supplemental
appropriations bill for FY1993:
For an additional amount for ‘‘Disaster relief”, $1,735,000,000, and in addition,
$265,000,000, which shall be available only to the extent an official budget request for a
specific dollar amount, that includes designation of the entire amount of the request as an
emergency requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the President to Congress, to remain available
until September 30, 1997, for the Midwest floods and other disasters: Provided, That the
entire amount is designated by Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section
251(b)(2)(D)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as
amended, and title I, chapter II, of P.L. 102-229.114
The FY2002 annual disaster relief appropriation was the last annual appropriation that included
this type of contingent appropriation.
Reserve Funds
While appropriations requests for the DRF for many years included a special appropriated reserve
within the DRF for unanticipated catastrophic disasters, the concept of a budgetary reserve fund
outside the DRF has also been proposed in the past, which would enable appropriations for
broader non-Stafford disaster relief initiatives.
In FY2002, alongside a request for the DRF that included disaster support costs and funding for
prior-year disasters, the Administration proposed the creation a of $5.6 billion National
Emergency Reserve allowance to support the costs of “significant new disasters.” The DRF, the
Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program, and wildfire programs at the
Department of Agriculture and Department of the Interior would have been the primary recipients
of this funding.115 The annual reserve would have been established in the budget resolution, and
based on the average annual spending on “extraordinarily large events.” It would have been
allocated to the appropriations subcommittees to fund presidential requests for emergency

114 107 Stat. 750.
115 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Justification of Estimates, Fiscal Year 2002 (submitted to Congress),
Washington, DC, 2001, pp. DR-6, DR-7.
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requirements if two criteria were met: “the events were sudden, urgent, unforeseen, and not
permanent; and adequate funding for a normal year has been provided for the applicable program
by the Appropriations Committees.” Unused reserve amounts could be rolled over into the next
year.116 The proposal was not adopted.
Rescissions and Transfers from the DRF
Rescissions are cancellations of previously appropriated budget authority. They are made at times
to redirect unobligated balances to other purposes through further appropriation, or to offset a
portion of the cost of the legislation that carried them. From the establishment of the DRF in
FY1948 through FY2003, rescissions were made three times from the DRF.117 From FY2004
through the present day, rescissions have been made 11 times.
Five of the 11 occurred before the enactment of the BCA:
• In FY2004, $225 million of an earlier $500 million supplemental appropriation to
the DRF was rescinded as an offset for federal funding for certain wildfire costs
in California.118
• In FY2006, over $23.4 billion of $60 billion in gross appropriations for the DRF
was rescinded and reappropriated to other disaster recovery programs across the
government.119
• In FY2008 and FY2009, three rescissions of DRF funding for the Hazard
Mitigation Program for the state of Mississippi were made to pay for a grant for
the state to purchase and deploy an interoperable communications system.120
With the restructuring of the DRF appropriation under the BCA, FEMA faced a new challenge.
Periodically, obligated funds that were no longer needed or eligible to be used for their original
purpose would be “deobligated” and returned to the DRF for use. It was unclear whether those
deobligated funds should be assigned to the base, or to the costs of major disasters. Deobligated
funds that had been appropriated without a designation were ultimately considered to be a part of
the base, as they were appropriated without a specified intent.
These were not insignificant amounts—in FY2013, FEMA recovered almost $910 million.121
Because the base is spent at a much slower rate than the disaster relief-designated portion of the
DRF, a sizeable unobligated balance accrued. Both the Obama Administration and Trump
Administration proposed rescinding portions of the unobligated recovered funds, including a
request from the Trump Administration to rescind $250 million in FY2020. From FY2014
through FY2017, almost $2.5 billion was rescinded from the DRF, which offset a portion of the
cost of the annual DHS appropriations bills.122

116 Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives, Budget Enforcement Act Preview Report, FY2002,
Executive Office of the President, Washington, DC, 2001, p. 243.
117 P.L. 97-12; P.L. 100-6; and P.L. 104-134.
118 P.L. 108-199, Division H, §102.
119 P.L. 109-148, Division B.
120 P.L. 101-161, §573; P.L. 110-329, Div. B, §10501; P.L. 111-32, §603.
121 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report, October 7, 2021, p. 4,
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_disaster-relief-fund-report_102021.pdf.
122 This accumulation of base funds in this fashion was a temporary issue, as pre-FY2011 budget authority was used up,
and most obligations are now made from disaster relief-designated funding. FEMA’s last monthly report for FY2021
indicated they had recovered more than $8.1 billion over the course of the fiscal year (reflecting the elevated level of
(continued...)
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The appropriations committees took a different approach in FY2019, when the Administration
requested a $300 million rescission from the DRF in its budget proposal. Congress included
language in the FY2019 DHS appropriations act to use $300 million in unobligated balances to
fund part of the existing DRF appropriation.123 This had the same net effect as rescinding the
funds, in that the net appropriation was smaller, but also made a statement that the DRF balances
were being used for Stafford Act purposes.
Additional rescissions were taken in FY2020 ($300 million)124 and FY2022 ($147.6 million). In
all of these cases, the rescissions were taken from the DRF base, rather than funds used to pay for
costs pursuant to major disasters.
At times transfers have been made from the DRF appropriation to fund specific disaster-related
costs. The first of these was a $5 million transfer to cover the costs of assistance to certain
workers adversely affected by a drought in 1988. Recent transfers from the DRF include:
• Office of Inspector General—First transfer from the DRF in annual
appropriations for FY2000. Starting with the FY2002 DRF appropriation,
transfers were made to support OIG oversight of disaster relief activities, first to
the FEMA OIG, then the DHS OIG. Such transfers are now frequently part of
supplemental appropriations for the DRF.
• Community Disaster Loans—Authorized in 1974, Community Disaster Loans
(CDLs) provide support for communities suffering revenue losses as the result of
a disaster.125 Loans are funded through the Disaster Assistance Direct Loan
Program (DADLP). Although the program is part of the Stafford Act, as specific
separate appropriations were provided for it in FY1992, the DADLP is not
eligible for funding through the general DRF appropriation absent specific
transfer language. DADLP received its first transfer from the DRF for CDLs in a
supplemental appropriation for the DRF in FY1992.126
• Hermit’s Peak / Calf Canyon Fire Settlement—The FY2023 Continuing
Appropriations Act included a $2.5 billion transfer of unobligated balances from
the DRF base to settle claims of victims injured by the Hermit’s Peak/Calf
Canyon Fire.127 This transfer was specifically made from the unobligated
resources provided in the CARES Act, specifically the remains of $15 billion that
was directed to the DRF base.128
• USAID Compact Aid Agreement—Unlike the other transfers, which are made
on the basis of language in appropriations measures, a small transfer from the
DRF base is projected each year to cover the costs of disaster relief pursuant to
the Compacts of Free Association, under which USAID manages disaster relief

funding flowing from the DRF in recent years), but more than $7.5 billion of that went to the major disasters
designation, and less than $600 million to the base. Current balances in the base are due to a large appropriation
provided at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, when it was unclear how much of the response would be
handled through major disaster declarations.
123 P.L. 116-6, Division A.
124 P.L. 116-93, Division D, §540.
125 P.L. 93-288, §414.
126 P.L. 102-139.
127 P.L. 117-180, Section 136.
128 P.L. 116-136.
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and reconstruction assistance for the Federated States of Micronesia, the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau.129
These transfers are distinct from the BRIC funding “set-aside,” which earmarks budget authority
within the major disasters subaccount of the DRF for program use. Should other funding in the
major disasters subaccount become fully obligated, unobligated balances originally designated for
the BRIC program can be made available for immediate response needs.
Issues for Congress
The federal government has defined a role for itself in emergency management and disaster
recovery as a backstop for state, local, territorial, and tribal governments, providing limited relief
for individuals and support for mitigation efforts. FEMA’s DRF appropriation funds a great deal
of the federal effort. As the DRF appropriation is simply an amount of budget authority provided
to support disaster activities defined through separately crafted laws and policies, many of the
issues related to the DRF are less about the appropriation than they are about the defined federal
role.
Should the purpose of the DRF be rescoped?
Despite the magnitude of funding provided through the DRF and the breadth of Stafford Act
relief, other appropriations support additional disaster-related activities in other departments and
agencies. As noted earlier, HUD, USDA, DOT, DOD, and SBA all fund various disaster relief and
recovery programs. With the COVID-19 pandemic, relief and recovery funds have come from a
wide variety of accounts through a range of programs.
At various times in the past, efforts have been made to fund activities through the DRF that are
not part of the current portfolio of Stafford Act programs. The Stafford Act already encompasses a
wide range of emergency management, disaster relief, and disaster response activities. Making
non-Stafford programs eligible for DRF funding is something Congress could choose to do, but it
may not provide any obvious policy or budgetary advantage. Existing non-Stafford programs
have their own funding streams, management, and oversight. Providing their resources through a
new appropriation could complicate their funding stream and congressional oversight. While
making the programs eligible for funding from the DRF could make additional budget authority
available, it would be more transparent and direct for Congress to simply fund the program
through its existing appropriation.
There is no special budgetary treatment for appropriations for the DRF—only for appropriations
which are designated for the costs of major disasters or designated as emergency requirements,
following the terms outlined in budget resolutions. Shifting discretionary spending out of one
appropriations subcommittee’s jurisdiction into another provides no overall budgetary benefit—
the total amount of spending remains the same. Subcommittee allocations are set and reset every
year (sometimes multiple times each year) at the discretion of the House and Senate
appropriations committees, so such a move could well result in no net impact on available
resources.

129 For more context, see CRS Report R46573, The Freely Associated States and Issues for Congress; and USAID/
FEMA, “Operational Blueprint for Disaster Relief and Reconstruction in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and
the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI),” January 31, 2017, https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/1861/Operational_Blueprint_FEMA-USAID-OFDA_FINAL_31JAN17.pdf.
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The concept of a broader funding stream providing discretionary resources for DRF, SBA, and
USDA disaster relief programs has also been considered before. Such an idea, floated by a
previous Administration but rejected by Congress, might have made more resources available in
the immediate aftermath of a disaster, but it is not clear that such reorganization would make the
programs more effective or subject to more thorough oversight. The move could actually limit the
ability of Congress to provide specific oversight or direction through appropriations to the
separate programs.
Congress could also break up the DRF into appropriations for the individual Stafford Act
programs or groups of programs, similar to what was provided for COVID-19 pandemic-related
funeral expenses in Division N of P.L. 116-260. This might allow for additional specific
congressional oversight and direction, but it could reduce the flexibility that exists within the
DRF to shift its resources to meet unanticipated disaster needs by segmenting the available
resources, and possibly inadvertently limiting the amount of resources available for the
highlighted programs in the future.
In response to the COVID-19 epidemic, the Administration and Congress used the major disaster
provisions of the Stafford Act to respond to a public health crisis for the first time. As the country
emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress may choose to reexamine a number of issues,
including the following:
• Are the Stafford Act and DRF the best vehicles for providing assistance in
responding to a public health crisis?
• How should Congress approach funding future public health needs?
• What was the interplay between natural disaster authorities and public health
authorities in this situation, and how can that be made more efficient and
effective?
How much is enough to have on hand?
Appropriations are frequently provided on the basis of what can be spent on a project in a given
fiscal year. This thinking informs part of the funding request, as it includes a basis of spending on
open disasters, where recovery is ongoing. A 10-year average informs the portion of the DRF
budget request that pays for response and recovery from disasters that cost less than $500 million.
Previous and current Administrations have sought additional reserve funds over and above those
projected needs to pay for potential significant “no notice” events—this reserve request now
stands at $2 billion. Even with this reserve, in FY2023, there was concern that the available
funding in the major disasters DRF category could be depleted prior to the end of the fiscal year
due to catastrophic events and higher-than-expected costs of previous incidents. Although FEMA
indicates that funding set aside within the major disaster portion of the DRF is available for
responding to events if its other funds are depleted, this is not the stated congressional intent for
those funds, and FEMA has never accessed those resources.
On the other hand, as noted above, from FY2014 to FY2017, almost $2.5 billion in funding was
rescinded from unobligated balances in the DRF, and in FY2019, unobligated balances were used
to offset appropriations for the DRF. FEMA’s budget explicitly states that in the event of
catastrophic disaster activity, it will need to come to Congress for supplemental appropriations for
the DRF, as it has in the past.
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What accommodations should be made in the federal budget for
disaster relief?
While disaster relief is a relatively small part of the discretionary budget, and an even smaller part
of the overall federal budget, disaster relief spending is anticipated to continue growing in the
coming years. In modern history, Congress has been generally willing to provide resources for
major disasters on an as-needed basis. However, discussions of deficit and debt continue in
Congress, and with the expiration of the Budget Control Act’s discretionary spending limits and
the statutory adjustment for disaster relief at the end of FY2021, new agreements will need to be
reached. The central question for disaster relief budgeting is this: Does disaster relief represent
enough of a priority for the federal government to maintain the status quo notwithstanding
potential increasing costs?
When budget controls were put in place starting in the 1980s, up through 2022, exceptions were
provided to help ensure relief and recovery efforts would continue to be funded. With the
expiration of the Budget Control Act statutory caps on discretionary spending, one limitation on
disaster relief spending—albeit one with a limited practical effect, as noted above—has gone
away. The allowable adjustment for disaster relief expired as well, although a similar mechanism
to adjust the limits set by budget resolutions and subcommittee allocations was included in the
FY2022 budget resolution. The adjustment has effectively allowed most of the annual DRF
appropriation to be provided without competing against other homeland security priorities for the
discretionary funding provided under the Homeland Security appropriations subcommittee’s
allocation.130 Congress may consider whether they want that process to continue.
Congress may also debate whether to try to limit disaster relief spending. The most direct means
of doing this would not be to change the DRF appropriation, but by changing the underlying laws
that authorize the programs it funds. Implementing relief limits or deductibles for states or
smaller jurisdictions, larger nonfederal cost shares, or changes in the declaration process may
prove unpopular, and having to vote for them once in more durable authorizing legislation may be
more practical than doing so annually in appropriations legislation.

130 This is also true for other appropriations associated with funding relief and recovery efforts after major disasters, but
over the 10-year life of the statutory adjustment, 93% of designated appropriations went to the DRF. For more details,
see CRS In Focus IF10720, Calculation and Use of the Disaster Relief Allowable Adjustment, by William L. Painter.
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Appendix. General Disaster Relief Appropriations,
FY1964-FY2023
Table A-1. Nominal Dollar Disaster Relief Appropriations, FY1964-FY2023
Thousands of dollars of budget authority
Supplemental
(includes
Fiscal
Annual
contingency
Fiscal Year
Net Fiscal Year
Year
Appropriations
appropriations)
Total
Total
1964
20,000
50,000
70,000
70,000
1965
20,000
35,000
55,000
55,000
1966
55,000
65,000
120,000
120,000
1967
15,000
9,550
24,550
24,550
1968
20,000
—
20,000
20,000
1969
10,000
35,000
45,000
45,000
1970
170,000
75,000
245,000
245,000
1971
65,000
25,000
90,000
90,000
1972
85,000
—
85,000
85,000
1973
92,500
500,000
592,500
592,500
1974
400,000
32,600
432,600
432,600
1975
200,000
—
200,000
200,000
1976
187,500
—
187,500
187,500
1977
100,000
200,000
300,000
300,000
1978
150,000
300,000
450,000
450,000
1979
200,000
194,000
394,000
394,000
1980
193,600
870,000
1,063,600
1,063,600
1981
375,570
—
375,570
367,570
1982
301,694
—
301,694
301,694
1983
130,000
—
130,000
130,000
1984
—
—
—
—
1985
100,000
—
100,000
100,000
1986
120,000
250,000
370,000
350,000
1987
120,000
57,475
177,475
170,000
1988
120,000
—
120,000
115,000
1989
100,000
1,108,000
1,208,000
1,208,000
1990
98,450
1,150,000
1,248,450
1,248,450
1991
—
—
—
—
1992
185,000
4,136,000
4,321,000
4,269,209
1993
292,095
2,000,000
2,292,095
2,292,000
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Supplemental
(includes
Fiscal
Annual
contingency
Fiscal Year
Net Fiscal Year
Year
Appropriations
appropriations)
Total
Total
1994
292,000
4,709,000
5,001,000
5,001,000
1995
320,000
6,550,000
6,870,000
6,870,000
1996
222,000
—
222,000
(882,000)
1997
1,320,000
3,300,000
4,620,000
4,600,000
1998
320,000
1,600,000
1,920,000
1,920,000
1999
307,745
1,806,000
2,113,745
2,113,745
2000
300,000
2,480,425
2,780,425
2,777,525
2001
300,000
1,300,000
1,600,000
1,547,100
2002
664,000
9,537,571
10,201,571
10,127,094
2003
800,000
1,425,300
2,225,300
2,200,823
2004
1,800,000
2,500,000
4,300,000
4,023,000
2005
2,042,380
66,500,000
68,542,380
68,427,380
2006
1,770,000
6,000,000
7,770,000
(16,390,800)a
2007
1,500,000
4,110,000
5,610,000
5,742,500
2008
1,400,000
11,757,000
13,157,000
12,934,850
2009
1,400,000
—
1,400,000
1,178,400
2010
1,600,000
5,100,000
6,700,000
6,573,400
2011
2,650,000
—
2,650,000
2,650,000
2012
700,000
6,400,000
7,100,000
7,076,000
2013
7,007,926
11,487,735
18,495,661
18,468,661
2014
6,220,908
—
6,220,908
5,896,386
2015
7,033,464
—
7,033,464
6,729,464
2016
7,374,693
—
7,374,693
6,328,814
2017
7,328,515
7,400,000
14,728,515
13,996,140
2018
7,900,720
42,170,000
50,070,720
45,010,720
2019
12,558,000
—
12,558,000
12,005,000
2020
17,863,259
45,000,000
62,863,259
62,560,259
2021
17,142,000
52,000,000
69,142,000
63,226,000
2022
18,799,000
200,000
18,999,000
18,800,907
2023
19,945,000
21,200,000
41,145,000
41,129,500
Total
152,808,019
325,625,656
478,433,675
437,568,541
Source: CRS analysis of appropriations acts.
Notes: FY2013 numbers do not reflect the impact of sequestration. Supplemental column includes contingent
appropriations and all appropriations under the heading of “Disaster Relief” or “Disaster Relief Fund” including
the language “for an additional amount.” Reductions reflected in the Net Total column include transfers and
rescissions specifically enumerated in appropriations acts or explanatory statements.
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a. This negative total is the result of a $23.4 bil ion rescission from the DRF, which offset the cost of other
disaster assistance and damage repairs conducted by other agencies.
Table A-2. FY2023 Dollar Disaster Relief Appropriations, FY1964-FY2023
Thousands of dollars of budget authority
Supplemental
Appropriations
Fiscal
Annual
(includes contingency
Fiscal Year
Net Fiscal Year
Year
Appropriations
appropriations)
Total
Total
1964
179,250
448,125
627,375
627,375
1965
176,795
309,390
486,185
486,185
1966
473,220
559,260
1,032,480
1,032,480
1967
126,199
80,347
206,546
206,546
1968
162,442
-
162,442
162,442
1969
76,367
267,284
343,651
343,651
1970
1,229,832
542,573
1,772,405
1,772,405
1971
439,900
169,192
609,093
609,093
1972
539,867
-
539,867
539,867
1973
562,055
3,038,136
3,600,191
3,600,191
1974
2,242,572
182,770
2,425,341
2,425,341
1975
1,021,853
-
1,021,853
1,021,853
1976
894,263
-
894,263
894,263
1977
444,421
888,843
1,333,264
1,333,264
1978
627,520
1,255,041
1,882,561
1,882,561
1979
769,589
746,501
1,516,089
1,516,089
1980
673,841
3,028,107
3,701,948
3,701,948
1981
1,177,054
-
1,177,054
1,151,981
1982
878,138
-
878,138
878,138
1983
360,658
-
360,658
360,658
1984
-
-
-
-
1985
255,362
-
255,362
255,362
1986
300,081
625,170
925,251
875,237
1987
291,771
139,746
431,517
413,342
1988
282,047
-
282,047
270,295
1989
226,064
2,504,790
2,730,854
2,730,854
1990
216,308
2,526,711
2,743,019
2,743,019
1991
-
-
-
-
1992
373,940
8,360,096
8,734,037
8,629,352
1993
573,437
3,926,377
4,499,814
4,499,628
1994
563,311
9,084,358
9,647,669
9,647,669
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Supplemental
Appropriations
Fiscal
Annual
(includes contingency
Fiscal Year
Net Fiscal Year
Year
Appropriations
appropriations)
Total
Total
1995
599,495
12,270,910
12,870,405
12,870,405
1996
407,326
-
407,326
(1,618,296)
1997
2,372,360
5,930,901
8,303,261
8,267,317
1998
570,352
2,851,761
3,422,113
3,422,113
1999
541,997
3,180,709
3,722,706
3,722,706
2000
515,141
4,259,229
4,774,370
4,769,390
2001
501,788
2,174,417
2,676,205
2,587,723
2002
1,093,617
15,708,511
16,802,128
16,679,463
2003
1,280,357
2,281,116
3,561,473
3,522,299
2004
2,806,330
3,897,681
6,704,011
6,272,148
2005
3,078,598
100,239,313
103,317,911
103,144,565
2006
2,577,414
8,736,997
11,314,410
(23,867,727)
2007
2,125,027
5,822,575
7,947,603
8,135,313
2008
1,916,665
16,095,878
18,012,543
17,708,409
2009
1,919,516
-
1,919,516
1,615,684
2010
2,155,041
6,869,192
9,024,233
8,853,715
2011
3,486,686
-
3,486,686
3,486,686
2012
903,420
8,259,840
9,163,260
9,132,286
2013
8,917,797
14,618,488
23,536,285
23,501,927
2014
7,791,832
-
7,791,832
7,385,361
2015
8,762,805
-
8,762,805
8,384,059
2016
9,130,640
-
9,130,640
7,835,732
2017
8,922,813
9,009,849
17,932,662
17,040,960
2018
9,404,786
50,197,936
59,602,722
53,579,446
2019
14,687,227
-
14,687,227
14,040,465
2020
20,503,666
51,651,547
72,155,214
71,807,426
2021
19,134,635
58,044,629
77,179,264
70,575,571
2022
19,820,267
210,865
20,031,133
19,822,278
2023
19,945,000
21,200,000
41,145,000
41,129,500
Total
192,010,756
442,195,160
634,205,916
578,418,015
Source: CRS analysis of appropriations acts.
Notes: Deflator used was drawn from the FY2024 Budget of the United States Government, “Historical Tables:
Table 1.3—Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (—) in Current Dol ars, Constant (FY2012)
Dol ars, and as Percentages of GDP: 1940—2028.” FY2013 numbers do not reflect the impact of sequestration.
Supplemental column includes contingent appropriations and all appropriations under the heading of “Disaster
Relief” or “Disaster Relief Fund” including the language “for an additional amount.” Reductions reflected in the
Net Total column include transfers and rescissions specifically enumerated in appropriations acts or explanatory
statements.
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a. This negative total is the result of a $23.4 bil ion rescission from the DRF, which offset the cost of other
disaster assistance and damage repairs conducted by other agencies.

Author Information

William L. Painter

Specialist in Homeland Security and Appropriations

Disclaimer
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Congressional Research Service
R45484 · VERSION 30 · UPDATED
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