U.S.-South Korea Relations

November 3, 2010 – February 24, 2022 R41481

U.S.-South Korea Relations
Updated February 24, 2022
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R41481

U.S.-South Korea Relations

Summary
Overview
South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea or ROK) is one of the United States’ most
important strategic and economic partners in Asia. The 1953 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty
commits the United States to help South Korea defend itself. Approximately 28,500 U.S. troops
are based in the ROK, which is included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” The two countries’
economies are joined by the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). South Korea is
the United States’ seventh-largest trading partner and the United States is South Korea’s second-
largest trading partner. South Korean President Moon Jae-in, a left-of-center politician elected in
2017, is due to leave office in May 2022.
In recent years, Members of Congress have expressed interest in and conducted oversight over
U.S.-ROK cooperation over North Korea policy, the U.S. military presence in South Korea,
bilateral trade and investment flows, the state of political and civil rights in South Korea, and
other issues. South Korea’s rise into the ranks of the world’s top industrialized economies and
most powerful militaries has prompted many Members to explore whether and how the ROK
government, companies, and organizations can serve as partners in many U.S. Indo-Pacific
initiatives, particularly on those that involve the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China).
ROK officials generally are reluctant to raise objections about PRC behavior that does not
directly affect South Korea, though this may be changing due to rising negative attitudes towards
China among South Koreans.
Coordination of North Korea Policy
Dealing with North Korea (officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) is
the dominant bilateral strategic concern and the Biden and Moon governments have worked to
harmonize their approaches and minimize public disagreements. The Biden Administration
policy, which Moon has welcomed, appears to envision incrementally offering partial sanctions
relief in exchange for partial steps toward denuclearization. During his tenure, Moon has more
aggressively promoted engagement initiatives with the DPRK, which he says are critical to
prevent military conflict and establish a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula. U.N. and U.S.
sanctions, which have reduced DPRK exports by around 90%, severely limit Seoul’s ability to
conduct inter-Korean cooperation activities. Since early 2019, the DPRK largely has ignored U.S.
and ROK outreach, including offers of humanitarian aid.
The U.S.-ROK Alliance
For nearly two decades, the United States and South Korea have accelerated steps to reform their
alliance, including relocating U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula, boosting ROK defense
capabilities, and preparing to transfer wartime operational control (OPCON) to a binational
command led by an ROK general with a U.S. deputy. Under the existing arrangement, South
Korean soldiers would be under a binational command led by a U.S. general in the event of war.
Many of President Donald Trump’s actions and words strained the alliance, and the Biden
Administration in its first year in office sought to repair the rifts, particularly by renewing an
agreement on sharing the costs of South Korea hosting U.S. troops that had expired under the
Trump Administration. Polls in recent years indicate over 85% of South Koreans say they value
the U.S.-ROK alliance.
Bilateral Economic Relations
The KORUS FTA has been the centerpiece of U.S.-South Korea trade and investment relations
since its entry into force in 2012. Most U.S. business groups support the agreement, highlighting
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market access improvements in South Korea and a more robust mechanism for dispute resolution,
but some U.S. stakeholders have raised concerns over an increase in the bilateral U.S. trade
deficit since the agreement took effect. The two countries continue to engage on KORUS FTA
implementation issues using the agreement’s consultative mechanisms. Bilateral trade frictions
have been less pronounced under President Biden than under the Trump Administration, in line
with the Biden Administration’s interest in working with allies to address global economic
challenges and ensure greater U.S. supply chain security and reliability. However, President
Biden has maintained several unilateral U.S. import restrictions affecting major South Korean
industries, such as steel, washing machines, and solar panels, which were imposed by President
Trump using trade authorities delegated by Congress.

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his report contains two main parts: a section describing major events and trends that
occurred in 2021 and a longer background section on key elements of the U.S.-South
Korea relationship. The end of the report provides a list of South Korea-related legislation
T introduced in the 117th Congress (see the “Legislation in the 117th Congress” section). For
a map of the Korean Peninsula, see Figure 2 below. The report identifies Korean individuals by
using their last name first. For a two-page summary of U.S.-South Korea relations, see CRS In
Focus IF10165, South Korea: Background and U.S. Relations, by Mark E. Manyin et al.
Recent Developments and Upcoming Events
Possible Opportunities for Congress to Influence U.S.-ROK
Relations
Over the past decade, congressional interest in U.S. relations with South Korea (officially the
Republic of Korea or ROK) primarily has been focused on issues concerning U.S.-ROK
cooperation over North Korea policy, the U.S.-ROK alliance, and U.S.-South Korea trade and
investment flows. Additionally, South Korea’s rise into the ranks of the world’s top industrialized
economies and most powerful militaries has prompted many Members to explore whether and
how the ROK government, companies, and organizations can serve as partners in many U.S.
Indo-Pacific initiatives, particularly on those that involve the People’s Republic of China (PRC,
or China). In 2021 and 2022, as shown in the “Legislation in the 117th Congress” section below,
some Members also expressed interest in immigration from South Korea and in the state of South
Korea’s political and civil rights situation.
A number of expected or routine events and legislative vehicles in 2022 could present
opportunities for Members to seek to influence or address U.S.-South Korea relations:
 The Biden Administration has made a selection for U.S. ambassador to Seoul, a post that
has been vacant since January 2021. This development would provide the Senate with an
opportunity to review U.S. policies toward the Korean Peninsula.1
 In March or April of each year, the Armed Services Committees in both chambers
generally hold hearings with theater combatant commanders, including the Commander
of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), that provide opportunities to discuss alliance issues such
as U.S. and South Korean militaries’ state of readiness, the implementation of the
transition of wartime operational control to South Korea, and the impact the relocation of
U.S. headquarters from downtown Seoul to a site an hour south of the city has had on
alliance coordination.
 South Korea is scheduled to hold a presidential election on March 9, 2022, and the new
president is to be inaugurated on May 10. In the past, Members have attended South
Korean presidential inaugurations. Early outreach to a new South Korean President and
his or her team would offer an opportunity to collaborate on next steps on North Korea
policy and on approaches to the Indo-Pacific region. President Biden reportedly is
considering traveling to Seoul to attend the event, a trip that may also include a stop in
Japan to hold a bilateral summit there and to meet with the three other members of the

1 The White House’s pick is Philip Goldberg, the current U.S. Ambassador to Colombia and former Ambassador to the
Philippines. In 2009 and 2010, Goldberg served as the U.S. coordinator for the implementation of UN sanctions on
North Korea. The White House, “President Biden Announces 2 Diplomatic Nominees,” February 11, 2022.
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Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as “the Quad.”2 The President’s trip, if it
occurs, could provide Members with an opportunity to express their views on various
items in the U.S.-South Korea relationship.
 The launch of a new ROK presidential administration also could provide an opportunity
for Members to encourage South Korea and Japan to improve their relationship, which
has been highly strained since 2018. In the past, Congress has passed resolutions that
encourage greater trilateral cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and
Japan, underscoring the value of the two allies working together. During official travel
and other engagement with South Korea officials, some Members have emphasized this
importance to their Japanese and South Korean interlocutors. Some Members have also
engaged in trilateral legislative exchanges, which could be enhanced in order to
encourage more coordination.
 Annual authorization and appropriations bills, including the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), State Department-Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill, Military Construction-Veterans Affairs (VA) Appropriations
bill, and any hearings surrounding these measures provide opportunities for
congressional involvement in and oversight of U.S.-ROK relations, particularly
on issues related to North Korea policy coordination and the U.S.-ROK alliance.
 In February 2022, the Biden Administration released its Indo-Pacific strategy.
Key components of the approach are pursuing “unprecedented cooperation” with
U.S. allies and partners, including South Korea, and “moderniz[ing]” U.S.
alliance relations. Additionally, one of the strategy’s ten “core lines of effort” is
encouraging South Korea and Japan to increase their cooperation.3 Later in 2022,
the Administration is expected to release its national security strategy. These
documents are likely to have implications for U.S.-South Korea relations that
Members may seek to incorporate into their oversight.
 The Biden Administration has stated it plans to begin negotiations on an Indo-
Pacific Economic Framework initiative in early 2022, which may include South
Korea.4 Congress, given its constitutional authority to regulate foreign
commerce, may consider how to ensure its trade and economic priorities are
reflected in these negotiations, and the extent to which congressional approval of
the framework is required under U.S. law.
Biden and Moon’s May 2021 Summit
In May 2021, Biden and Moon Jae-in met in Washington, DC. The meeting, Biden’s second in-
person summit after one with Japan’s prime minister, was one of several early signals that the
Administration was placing a priority on the Indo-Pacific region and on reinvigorating U.S.
alliances.5 U.S.-ROK policy under the administrations of Donald Trump and Moon featured

2 Rintaro Tobita, “Biden Looks to Visit Japan in May for Quad summit,” Nikkei Asia, February 2, 2022.
3 The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, February 2022.
4 “U.S. Commerce Chief Sees Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Early Next Year,” Reuters, November 17, 2021.
5 The Administration stated in a March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance document that it will
“revitalize” the United States’ network of alliances and partnerships. The White House, Renewing America’s
Advantages. Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021. That same month, President Biden convened
the first-ever summit (held virtually) among the leaders of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, commonly referred to
as “the Quad,” which includes the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. Two weeks later, Secretary of State
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cooperation but also tensions over North Korea policy, sharing the costs of the U.S.-ROK
alliance, and trade that strained the relationship, prompting the 115th and 116th Congresses to take
legislative and oversight actions. (See the “Security Relations and the U.S.-ROK Alliance”
section below.) In 2021, Biden and Moon took steps to restore and reinvigorate the relationship.
In the weeks prior to Moon’s May 2021 visit, the two governments removed a major area of
tension by concluding a new five-year agreement to share the costs of hosting U.S. troops in
South Korea. South Korea agreed to raise its contribution by nearly 14% compared to the
previous agreement that had expired over a year earlier. (For more, see the “Cost Sharing” section
below.)
The Biden-Moon summit was widely interpreted in the United States and South Korea as
restoring the health of the alliance and expanding the aperture of the relationship to focus more
directly and more often on cooperating on global and regional issues.6 During their summit,
Biden and Moon discussed North Korea policy, terminated an agreement that had restricted ROK
ballistic missile development, and stated their shared values on many issues pertaining to China,
including the first-ever mention of Taiwan in a U.S.-ROK leaders’ joint statement. Biden and
Moon also announced:
 a Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccine partnership;
 a U.S. pledge to vaccinate 550,000 South Korean troops (increased to 1 million
after the summit) who work closely with U.S. military forces;
 investments in the United States by ROK technology companies in key sectors;
 a South Korean pledge of $220 million in aid to Northern Triangle Central
American countries to help resolve U.S. inward migration challenges; and
 expanded cooperation on critical technologies, climate change, energy, cyber-
security, nuclear energy, global health, and space.7
Moon also met with several Members of Congress, participated in the groundbreaking for a new
feature at the Korean War Memorial on the National Mall, and participated in Biden’s awarding
of the National Medal of Honor to an American Korean War veteran.

Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made their first overseas trips as cabinet secretaries to Japan
and South Korea, where they held “2+2” meetings with their Japanese and South Korean counterparts.
6 Scott A. Snyder, “The U.S.-South Korea Summit: A Relationship Restored?” Asia Unbound, Council on Foreign
Relations, May 25, 2021.
7 The White House, “U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement,” May 21, 2021; The White House and the Blue House,
“FACT SHEET: United States – Republic of Korea Partnership,” May 21, 2021. On Taiwan, the joint statement read,
“President Biden and President Moon emphasize the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”
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South Korea at a Glance
Head of State: Moon Jae-in
Life Expectancy: Total population 82.8 years (U.S.
Ruling Party: Minjoo (Democratic) Party
= 80.4 yrs.; DPRK = 71.7 yrs.) Male 79.7 years.
Largest Opposition Party: People Power Party (PPP)
Female 86.1 years.
Infant Mortality: 2.9deaths/1,000 live births
Size: Slightly larger than Indiana
(U.S. = 5.2; DPRK = 22.4)
agricultural land: 18.1% (U.S. = 44.5%; DPRK = 21.8%)

Real GDP (2010 dollars; Purchasing Power
Population: 51.7 mil ion (U.S. = 334.9 mil ion; DPRK =
Parity):8 $2.21 tril ion; world’s 14th-largest economy
25.8 mil ion)
(U.S. = $20.5 tril ion; DPRK = $40 bil ion [2015 est.])
Population Growth Rate: 0.26% (U.S. = 0.7%; DPRK =
GDP Per Capita (2010 dollars; Purchasing
0.49%)
Power Parity): $42,765 [2019 est.] (U.S. = $62,530
Portion of Population Younger than 25: 23% (U.S. =
[2019 est.]; DPRK = $1,700 [2015 est.])
31%; DPRK = 35%)
Fertility Rate: 1.09 children born per woman
(U.S. = 1.84; DPRK = 1.91)
Source: CIA, The World Factbook, accessed June 24, 2021.
North Korea Policy Coordination
North Korea is the dominant strategic concern in the U.S.-South Korea relationship. Moon has
championed U.S.-North Korea talks, which he views as critical to preventing military conflict and
to realizing his goal of establishing a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula.9 Since early 2019,
Pyongyang largely has ignored U.S. and South Korean outreach, including offers of humanitarian
assistance, and has severed all overt inter-Korean communication channels for extended periods.
South Korea’s room for maneuver with North Korea policy is constricted by U.N. and U.S.
sanctions, which not only bar most North Korean exports and many imports, but also require that
South Korea obtain a waiver from the United States for many of the cooperation activities the
Moon government favors.
The Biden Administration has stated it will pursue a “calibrated, practical approach that is open to
and will explore diplomacy with North Korea” to “make step-by-step progress toward
denuclearization” even as U.S. and international sanctions remain in place.10 The approach
appears to envision an incremental process of offering partial sanctions relief in exchange for
partial steps toward denuclearization. Administration officials say they have reached out to North
Korea, offering to meet “without preconditions,” and that “the ball is in [Pyongyang’s] court.”11

8 The purchasing power parity method of calculating GDP accounts for how much people can buy for their money in a
given country. Instead of simply measuring total output, the PPP GDP method attempts to gauge how much a person
would have to pay in the local currency for a set basket of goods. That amount is then converted to the equivalent value
in U.S. dollars, so that analysts can make cross-country standard of living comparisons.
9 The Blue House, “Address by President Moon Jae-in on the 72nd Anniversary of Liberation,” August 15, 2017; The
Blue House, “President Moon Hails US-NK Summit as ‘Historic Milestone for Peace’,” March 09, 2018; The Blue
House, “2022 New Year’s Address by President Moon Jae-in,” January 3, 2022.
10 The White House, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jen Psaki Aboard Air Force One En Route Philadelphia, PA,”
April 30, 2021; “National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan on President Biden's First Year in Office,” C-Span, Transcript
of a December 17, 2021 Conversation at the Council on Foreign Relations.
11 Jeongmin Kim, “Sung Kim: US Willing to Meet North Korea ‘Anytime, Anywhere’,” NKNews, June 21, 2021; State
Department, Department Press Briefing, June 21, 2021; State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken on ABC’s
This Week with George Stephanopoulos,” May 23, 2021.
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Incremental sanctions relief could be difficult to accomplish without congressional support, given
limitations enacted into law under the past three Congresses.12
To implement his policy, Biden has appointed the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Sung Kim, to
serve concurrently as special representative for North Korea, a position he also occupied during
the Obama Administration from 2014 - 2016. From 2011 - 2014, Ambassador Kim served as U.S.
Ambassador to South Korea. Ambassador Kim has stated that his top priority “is to collaborate
closely with my ROK counterparts” on North Korea’s denuclearization.13
Since January 2021, the United States and South Korea generally have avoided the public
surfacing of differences over North Korea policy that occurred under the Trump Administration.
(See “North Korea Policy Coordination under Obama and Trump.”) Moon has welcomed the
Biden policy, arguing that it shows an openness for U.S.-DPRK dialogue. Biden has supported
inter-Korean dialogue, and has said that 2018 U.S.-North Korea and South Korea-North Korea
agreements negotiated by Moon and former President Donald Trump could form the basis for
denuclearization and achieving “permanent peace” on the Korean Peninsula.14
As of mid-February 2022, North Korea has rejected U.S. offers to meet U.S. diplomats. DPRK
leader Kim Jong-un has characterized U.S. offers of diplomacy as “no more than a petty trick for
deceiving the international community and hiding its hostile acts,” specifically the continuation of
U.S.-ROK military exercises, the maintenance of sanctions against North Korea, and South
Korean acquisition of and advances in indigenous sophisticated military equipment.15 North
Korea also generally has ignored South Korean offers of aid, cooperation, and diplomatic
engagement. Perhaps in reaction to the ongoing stasis in U.S.-DPRK and ROK-DPRK diplomacy
as Moon approaches his May 2022 departure from office, in the late summer and early fall of
2021 Moon government officials began emphasizing their preference for pre-emptively offering a
declaration formally ending the Korean War, which Moon argues will “help us start negotiations
for denuclearisation and the peace in [sic] the Korean Peninsula.”16 Some Members of Congress
have supported pre-emptively issuing such an end-of-war declaration (see H.R. 3446 in the
Legislation section below), while others have opposed doing so in the absence of comprehensive
negotiations with North Korea.17 Among Moon’s other efforts is an attempt to promote reunions
among South Korean and North Korean family members who have been divided since the Korean
War. In 2021, by a 415-0 vote, the House passed the Korean War Divided Families Reunification
Act (H.R. 826), which would require the State Department to report to Congress on consultations
with South Korea on potential opportunities to reunite Korean Americans with family in North
Korea.
North Korea has continued to conduct cyber operations around the globe and to test short- and
medium-range missiles. In September and October 2021, for example, North Korea test-launched
three new missiles (long-range cruise missiles, short-range ballistic missiles launched from a
train, and a hypersonic glide missile) and claimed it had developed a quicker fueling system. It

12 For more, see CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E.
Rennack.
13 Sung Kim, “My Hope for US-DPRK Diplomacy,” Hankyoreh, August 24, 2021.
14 The White House, “U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement,” May 21, 2021.
15 Timothy Martin, “North Korea Sees U.S. as Ongoing Threat, Kim Jong Un Says in Speech,” Wall Street Journal,
September 30, 2021.
16 Office of the Prime Minister of Australia, “Press Conference Transcript,” December 13, 2021.
17 Chaewon Chung, “US Lawmakers Urge White House to Reject End-of-War Declaration with North Korea,” NK
News, December 8, 2021.
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also test-launched what the South Korean military described as a submarine-launched ballistic
missile.18 In January 2022, North Korea conducted seven missile tests, including two it claimed
demonstrated a new hypersonic glide vehicle that may be nuclear-capable.19 Some analysts say
that if these claims are true, these new capabilities would make North Korean missiles more
difficult to detect and more adept at evading missile defenses.20 Some analysts worry DPRK
leader Kim Jong-un will abandon his four-year-old unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and
long-range ballistic missile tests.21
South Korea’s Response to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
On February 24, 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, South Korea’s National Security
Council (NSC) reportedly “expressed strong regret” over Russia’s actions and said “the
government has no other option but to join sanctions against Russia, including export controls.”
Multiple media outlets said the NSC statement linked ROK sanctions to Russia proceeding to
launch “a full-fledged war.”22 South Korea’s response to Russia’s actions, which in the build-up
to the invasion many described as “cautious,” is likely to be tempered by Seoul’s strategic and
economic interests.23 Since the late 1980s, South Korean leaders have cultivated positive ties with
Russia (and the Soviet Union before it) as a way to promote their strategic objectives, particularly
toward North Korea.24 Russia’s veto power on the United Nations Security Council and its
longstanding diplomatic and economic ties to Pyongyang provide it with opportunities to
influence North Korea-related developments. Russo-ROK economic ties may also play a role in
the Moon government’s calculations. As South Korea’s ninth-largest trading partner, Russia is an
important source of South Korea’s energy imports and is an economic gateway to Eurasia.25
Hyundai Motors and Kia Motors together are Russia’s top-selling automotive brands, and
Hyundai Motors, Samsung Electronics, and LG Electronics have factories in Russia.26 South
Korea did not impose sanctions on Russia following its 2014 seizure of the Crimean Peninsula.

18 Chaewon Chung, Jeongmin Kim, and Won-Gi Jung, “North Korea Launches Apparent SLBM toward East Sea,
Seoul Says,” NK News, October 18, 2021.
19 Chaewon Chung, “North Korea Test-Fires Second Missile of 2022,” NKNews, January 11, 2022.
20 Bruce Klingner, “Why North Korea Unleashed a Flurry of Missile Tests,” The Heritage Foundation Commentary,
October 6, 2021.
21 Benjamin Zimmer, “What a Path toward a Deal with Pyongyang Looks Like,” NKNews, September 8, 2021.
22 Kim Deok-hyun, “NSC Voices Strong Regret over Russia's Ukraine Attack,” Yonhap News Agency, February 24,
2022.
23 Lee Je-hun, “Why S. Korea Is Being Cautious When It Comes to Sanctioning Russia,” Hankyoreh, February 24,
2022.
24 Tobias Harris and Haneul Lee, “How Japan and South Korea Can Contribute to an International Response to a
Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” Center for American Progress, February 17, 2022.
25 Korea Customs Service, “Trade Statistics by Country,” accessed February 23, 2022 at
https://unipass.customs.go.kr/ets/index_eng.do; Anthony Rinna, “The Ukraine Crisis Tests South Korea’s Commitment
to Liberal Internationalism,” East Asia Forum, February 18, 2022.
26 Anna J. Park, “Heightened Tension in Ukraine to Hit Carmakers, Secondary Batteries,” Korea Times, February 23,
2022; Lee Je-hun, “Why S. Korea Is Being Cautious When It Comes to Sanctioning Russia,” Hankyoreh, February 24,
2022.
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Economic Ties: Bilateral Supply Chain Partnership Announced as
U.S. Import Restrictions Remain
The Biden Administration has stated its interest in working more with South Korea, and other
U.S. allies, to address global economic challenges, including as part of its supply chain security
initiatives. At the May 2021 U.S.-ROK bilateral summit, the two countries announced plans to
pursue greater cooperation on supply chain issues related to key industries, including electric
vehicle batteries, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence.27 South Korean companies also
announced promises of $25 billion in future U.S. investment in these industries.
To date, however, the Biden Administration’s economic policy has focused largely on domestic
issues and pandemic recovery. In addition, the Administration has maintained (and in one case
extended) Trump-era import restrictions on certain South Korean imports, a result of action under
trade authorities (Section 201 and Section 232) delegated by Congress in U.S. trade laws.
Congress may consider whether these import restrictions reflect congressional intent under the
delegated trade authorities and if such authorities would benefit from reform. A WTO panel ruled
in early 2022, in response to a South Korean dispute initiated in 2018, that some aspects of the
U.S. Section 201 import restrictions on washing machines violate WTO commitments. It is
unclear how the Biden and Moon Administrations may seek to resolve the dispute. (See “U.S.
Section 201 and 232 Import Restrictions Affecting South Korea.”)
In late 2021, during a visit to South Korea, United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai
noted the Administration’s plans for an economic framework agreement in the Indo-Pacific
region that could potentially include South Korea.28 It is unclear what form the agreement may
take, how it may relate to existing South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA)
commitments, and whether it would require congressional approval.29 Some U.S. stakeholders,
including several Members of Congress, have urged the Administration to focus on establishing
regional rules on digital trade issues, including during a hearing on the issue in January.30 The
KORUS FTA’s digital trade commitments have not been modified since they were originally
negotiated in the mid-2000’s and are less extensive than more recent digital trade disciplines
negotiated by the United States, such as in the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).31
South Korea’s March 2022 Presidential Election
The outcome of South Korea’s March 9 presidential election could shape the extent to which
Washington, DC and Seoul align on North Korea, China, and on a range of other issues that
concern many Members of Congress.32 Moon, elected in 2017, is ineligible to run again because

27 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and H.E. Moon Jae-in, President of the Republic of Korea,” May 12,
2021.
28 USTR, “Readout of Ambassador Katherine Tai’s Meeting with Korean Minister of Employment and Labor An
Kyung-Duk,” November 19, 2021.
29 CRS Insight IN11814, Biden Administration Signals Plans for an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, coordinated by
Brock R. Williams.
30 Letter from Representatives Ami Bera, M.D., Steven Chabot, and Gerald Connolly, et al. to Honorable Katherine
Tai, U.S. Trade Representative, November 19, 2021; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation, Strategic Importance of Digital Economic
Engagement in the Indo-Pacific, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., January 19, 2022.
31 For details on USMCA commitments, see CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA), by M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson.
32 For more on the likely importance of the 2022 election for South Korea’s foreign policy future, see Victor Cha,
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the ROK constitution limits presidents to one five-year term. Moon belongs to the left-of-center
Minjoo (Democratic) Party, which holds a commanding majority in South Korea’s unicameral
National Assembly over the right-of-center People Power Party (PPP) and other opposition
groups. (See Figure 1.) Moon’s popularity fell markedly in 2021, however, to below 30% in
some polls, due to complaints about soaring housing prices as well as about rising income
inequality.33 (For more, see “Increasing Housing Costs and Widening Inequality” below.)
Although South Korea’s two main parties support the ROK-U.S. alliance, they have notably
different views on how to approach North Korea, China, and Japan. In general, compared to their
conservative counterparts, Minjoo politicians often advocate for South Korea achieving greater
strategic autonomy, for more conciliatory approaches to North Korea, and express greater distrust
of Japan. Compared to their progressive counterparts, PPP politicians tend to emphasize the
importance of maintaining a strong U.S.-ROK alliance, are more skeptical of the value of
engaging North Korea, express less reluctance to enter into formal cooperative arrangements with
Japan, and during their time as opposition party in recent years have become more willing to
criticize China’s behavior.
Figure 1. Party Strength in South Korea’s National Assembly

Source: National Assembly website, December 31, 2021.
Thus far, the front-runners in the South Korean presidential campaign have been by the Minjoo
Party’s Lee Jae-myung and the opposition, right-of-center People Power Party’s Yoon Seok-
youl. Lee is the governor of Gyeonggi Province, which surrounds Seoul and Incheon. He has
proposed a universal basic income policy that eventually would provide every South Korean with
annual payments of 6 million won (around $5,000), to be paid in monthly allocations.34 (South
Korea’s per capita GDP is around $29,000, about half the U.S. level.) On foreign policy issues,
Lee has said he would continue to expand Moon’s emphasis on engaging North Korea by
establishing a Korean Peninsular “peace economy,” securing sanctions relief for North Korea, and
obtaining permanent exemptions from sanctions for inter-Korean projects. He also has said
sanctions should be “immediately reinstated” if North Korea does not uphold its denuclearization
commitments. Stating that South Korea should assert its “spirit of independence,” when dealing
with PRC-U.S. tensions, Lee has said, “There is no reason to choose either side to narrow the
scope of our movement on our own.”35
A political newcomer, Yoon had a nearly three-decade career as a prosecutor before announcing
his bid for the Presidency. In 2016, he helped lead the investigation into a corruption scandal that
led to then-President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment and removal from office. Yoon has criticized
the Moon government for being insufficiently committed to North Korea’s denuclearization, and
has proposed making economic aid to North Korea and inter-Korean economic cooperation

“Why South Korea's Presidential Election Matters to the U.S.,” Foreign Policy, January 26, 2022.
33 “Moon's Approval Rating at All-Time Low of 29%,” Hankyoreh, May 3, 2021.
34 Song Jung-a and Edward White, “South Korea’s ‘Bernie Sanders’ Touts Universal Basic Income ahead of Polls,”
Financial Times, October 11, 2021.
35 Jeongmin Kim, “FULL TEXT: Presidential Candidate Lee Jae-myung’s North Korea Policy Statement,” NK PRO,
August 23, 2021.
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conditional upon North Korea’s progress in denuclearizing. However, he has argued that
humanitarian aid to ordinary North Koreans be provided unconditionally—which also is the
Moon government’s preferred approach—and has pledged to set up a permanent North-South-
U.S. liaison office in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas.36 Yoon also has
said he would improve South Korea’s relations with Japan and has supported South Korea’s
participation in the working groups of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“the Quad”), a
cooperative forum that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.37 Among Yoon’s
domestic economic pledges is to build hundreds of thousands of subsidized housing units to help
reign in soaring real estate prices.
If the presidential race between Lee and Yoon is close, the performance of third-party candidates
could prove decisive. In the country’s seven presidential elections since the end of military rule in
1987, only the 2012 race produced a winner who captured a majority of the vote. The alternative
party candidate with the most support in polls, generally in the 10%-15% range as of mid-
January, is Ahn Cheol-Soo, the head of the small People’s Party (not to be confused with the
People Power Party). Ahn’s poll numbers have increased since mid-December, when they
generally were in the single digits, raising speculation that he and Yoon may form a unified
opposition ticket.38 Ahn also ran in the 2012 election, ultimately withdrawing to back Moon’s
failed bid, and the 2017 election, when he finished third, receiving 21% of the vote.
South Korea’s COVID-19 Response
Despite being one of the countries first hit by COVID-19 in early 2020, South Korea has
prevented infections and deaths to a much greater degree than most higher-income countries,
without resorting to lockdowns. As of February 17, 2022, the country reported around 1.7 million
cumulative cases and around 7,200 deaths. South Korea’s population is over 51 million, or about
1/6th the population of the United States. Over 90% of the country’s cases and two-thirds of its
COVID-19 deaths occurred during the nearly eight-month period between June 2021 and mid-
February 2022, the period the more contagious Delta and Omicron variants are presumed to have
spread to and within South Korea.39
The spread of the COVID-19 Delta variant, combined with a slow start to South Korea’s
vaccination campaign, led the Moon government in the late spring of 2021 to accelerate its
attempts to acquire vaccines, including in the weeks before the May 2021 Biden-Moon summit.
In part as a result of these efforts, by late January 2022, over 85% of the population had been
fully vaccinated, and over 50% had received booster shots.40 Under the May 2021 U.S.-ROK
vaccine partnership, South Korean biopharmaceutical companies plan to mass-produce and

36 Jeongmin Kim, “Yoon Seok-youl, Wild Card on North Korea, Wins Conservative Presidential Primary,” NKNews,
November 5, 2021.
37 Yosuke Onchi, “South Korean Presidential Hopeful Looks to Improve Ties with Japan,” Nikkei Asia, September 23,
2021; “Yoon Pledges to Normalize Military Drills with U.S., Enhance Deterrence against North,” Yonhap News
Agency, January 24, 2022; Yoon Seok-youl, “South Korea Needs to Step Up,” Foreign Affairs, February 8, 2022.
38 Nam Hyun-woo, “Opposition Candidates Face Growing Pressure to Form Coalition,” Korea Times, January 10,
2022.
39 Derived from Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) data, as reported by Yonhap News Agency.
About half of South Korea’s cumulative cases, and about one-fifth of its cumulative COVID deaths, occurred between
January 1 and February 11, 2022.
40 “S. Korea Hits Grim COVID-19 Milestone of Over 13,000 Daily Cases, New All-Time High Expected as Omicron
Fears Worsen,” Yonhap News Agency, January 26, 2022.
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export U.S.-developed vaccines. U.S. vaccine developers are to invest in ROK-based production
facilities.41
The government’s relative success in responding to COVID-19 stems in part from lessons learned
after a 2015 deadly outbreak of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) exposed flaws in the
country’s public health system. In response, South Korea passed legislation granting the
government greater powers to monitor and track individual patients and to allow private
companies to produce health tests rapidly. These changes have helped South Korea manage the
COVID-19 pandemic with aggressive testing, contact tracing, public communication, widespread
mask-wearing, and episodic restrictions on social gatherings that generally have been calibrated
to the severity of the outbreak in a particular geographic location. At times, South Korea has
prohibited large gatherings, including anti-government rallies, prompting international criticism.42
South Korea Expands its Regional Diplomacy: CPTPP and
Australia
For years, as great power rivalry has intensified in the Indo-Pacific region, South Korea has been
relatively inactive in major Indo-Pacific diplomatic and strategic partnerships and agreements
compared to the United States and many other U.S. regional allies, especially Japan and Australia,
despite U.S. efforts to encourage Seoul to increase its involvement. With the exception of the 15-
country Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which took effect for South
Korea in February 2022, South Korea generally has eschewed the region’s major new institutions
and multi-country arrangements, such as the Quad. President Moon’s 2017 New Southern Policy
of deepening relations with Southeast Asia and India largely has focused on economic matters,
and for years efforts to develop linkages between the New Southern Policy and the United States’
Indo-Pacific policy remained nascent.43
In late 2021, Moon took steps that could signal a deeper South Korean effort to play a greater role
in regional power dynamics beyond the Korean Peninsula. In December, senior government
officials announced that, in accordance with South Korean legal requirements for entering into
economic agreements, they would begin discussing with domestic stakeholders the implications
of joining the 11-nation Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The
Moon government plans to seek to apply formally for membership by the time Moon leaves
office in May 2022.44 The CPTPP is the successor arrangement to the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), from which President Trump withdrew the United States in 2017. In the fall of 2021,
China and Taiwan formally applied to join CPTPP, moves that may have contributed to South
Korea’s announcement.45 (For more, see the “Bilateral Economic Relations” section.)
In another regional move in December 2021, Moon became the first foreign leader to visit
Australia since the COVID-19 pandemic struck. In Canberra, he and Prime Minister Scott

41 The Blue House, “Remarks by President Moon Jae-in at ROK-U.S. Vaccine Partnership Establishment Event,” May
22, 2021.
42 Human Rights Watch, “South Korea: Events of 2020,” in World Report 2020, 2021, p. 606; Mason Richey, “Dark
Side of the Moon in South Korea's COVID-19 Response,” East Asia Forum, July 17, 2020
43 Miyeon Oh, Beyond the Peninsula: Prospects for US-ROK Regional Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, The Atlantic
Council, September 2021.
44 Jaewon Kim, “South Korea Takes Step to Join CPTPP, following China and Taiwan,” Nikkei Asia, December 13,
2021; “Finance Minister: Gov't Seeking to Submit Application to Join CPTPP within Moon's Term,” KBS, December
16, 2021.
45 CRS Insight IN11760, China and Taiwan Both Seek to Join the CPTPP, by Brock R. Williams and Michael D.
Sutherland.
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Morrison announced a new Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, agreeing to closer cooperation
between the two countries’ defense industries as well as expanded cooperation on supply chain
resilience in key minerals, pandemic response, infrastructure and digital technology assistance
programs in Southeast Asia, space, and digital trade. As part of the summit, the Australian
Defence Department signed a nearly $1 billion agreement with the South Korean conglomerate
Hanhwa to build self-propelled artillery equipment and other material for the Australian Army, to
be manufactured in Australia. Although Moon emphasized the economic aspects of the
partnership more than the strategic elements, and the two leaders did not cite the PRC as a factor
in their partnership, their joint statement mentioned many of the same PRC-related themes as the
May 2021 Biden-Moon summit, with the notable exception of Taiwan. They also announced
expanded cooperation on a number of the same issues—including supply chains, COVID-19
coordination, infrastructure cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, and climate change—on which the
United States has been seeking to deepen cooperation with its Indo-Pacific allies and partners.46

46 Office of the Prime Minister of Australia, “Australia-ROK Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” December 13,
2021; Office of the Prime Minister of Australia, “Press Conference Canberra, ACT,” December 13, 2021; Jeffrey
Robertson, “Australia’s ‘China’ Blinders on South Korea,” The Interpreter, The Lowy Institute, December 16, 2021.
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Figure 2. Map of the Korean Peninsula

Source: Map produced by CRS using data from ESRI, and the State Department’s Office of the Geographer.
Notes: The “Cheonan Sinking” refers to the March 2010 sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan,
kil ing over 40 ROK sailors. A multinational investigation led by South Korea determined that the vessel was
sunk by a North Korean submarine. Yeonpyeong Island was attacked in November 2010 by North Korean
artil ery, which kil ed four South Koreans (two marines and two civilians) and wounded dozens.
* This map reflects geographic place name policies set forth by the United States Board on Geographic Names
pursuant to P.L. 80-242. In applying these policies to the case of the sea separating the Korean Peninsula and the
Japanese Archipelago, the board has determined that the “Sea of Japan” is the appropriate standard name for use
in U.S. government publications. The Republic of Korea refers to this body of water as the “East Sea.” It refers
to the “Yellow Sea” as the “West Sea.”

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Background on U.S.-South Korea Relations
Overview
Although the U.S.-South Korea relationship is complex and multifaceted, five factors arguably
drive the scope and state of relations between the two allies, as well as congressional interest in
U.S.-South Korea relations:
 the challenges posed by North Korea, particularly its weapons of mass
destruction programs, cyber-attacks, as well as occasionally different perceptions
about the level and nature of the threats posed by the Kim Jong-un regime,
through its actions and/or the risk of its collapse;
 the PRC’s rising influence and assertiveness, which has made China an
increasingly integral consideration in many aspects of U.S.-South Korea strategic
and economic policymaking;
 South Korea’s status as one of the world’s leading economies and its firms’
integral role in the supply chain of several key industries, which have made the
South Korean government and South Korean conglomerates key players in
discussions over issues such as the shape of the region’s economic institutions,
supply chain resiliency, and digital trade;
 South Korea’s continued democratization since military rule ended in 1988,
which has increased the influence public opinion often has on Seoul’s foreign
policy; and
 the growing desire of South Korean leaders to use the country’s middle-power
status to achieve greater autonomy, including within the U.S.-ROK alliance, and
to play a larger regional global role.
Additionally, while people-to-people ties generally do not directly affect matters of “high”
politics in bilateral relations, the presence of over 2 million Korean Americans and the hundreds
of thousands of trips taken annually between the two nations before the COVID-19 pandemic has
helped cement the two countries together culturally and economically. Over the past decade, the
global successes of South Korean cultural content producers—including pop music groups BTS
and Blackpink, video productions such as the Academy-award winner Parasite and the Netflix hit
Squid Game, and world-class video game companies and competitors—has boosted the appeal of
South Korea generally, arguably expanding the South Korean government’s potential influence
regionally and globally.47 Six South Korean presidents have addressed joint meetings of Congress
since the ROK’s founding in 1948. The last was President Park Geun-hye, in May 2013.48

47 Sue Mi Terry, “The Korean Invasion. Can Cultural Exports Give South Korea a Geopolitical Boost?” Foreign
Affairs, October 14, 2021.
48 The other addresses to joint meetings of Congress by South Korean presidents have been as follows: Rhee Syngman,
July 28, 1954; Roh Tae Woo, October 18, 1989; Kim Young Sam, July 26, 1995; Kim Dae Jung, June 10, 1998; and
Lee Myung-bak, October 13, 2011. Neither South Korean who was president during South Korea’s period of military
rule, Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) nor Chun Doo Hwan (1979-1988), received the honor of addressing a joint meeting
of Congress. Neither did Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008). South Korea-U.S. tensions spiked during Roh’s presidency.
Current president Moon Jae-in (elected in 2017) has not addressed a joint meeting.
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According to multiple polls conducted in recent years, over 85% of South Koreans say they value
the U.S.-ROK alliance and over 70% have positive opinions of the United States.49 Since at least
2014, South Koreans have consistently indicated that the United States is their favorite nation,
according to one opinion poll.50 However, many South Koreans chafe when they feel their leaders
offer too many concessions to the United States. In addition, many South Korean officials tend to
be wary of being drawn into U.S. policies that they perceive as possibly antagonizing China, and
to be suspicious of Japan’s efforts—generally backed by the United States—to increase its
influence in East Asia, including in the military sphere. These concerns are particularly
articulated by South Korea’s progressive groups such as President Moon’s Minjoo Party.
Historical Background
The United States and South Korea have been allies since the United States intervened on the
Korean Peninsula in 1950 and fought with ROK troops and allied nations to repel a North Korean
takeover of South Korea. Over 36,000 U.S. troops died and over 100,000 were wounded in-
theater during the three-year conflict.51 On October 1, 1953, a little more than two months after
the parties to the conflict signed an armistice agreement, the United States and South Korea
signed a Mutual Defense Treaty, which provides that if either party is attacked by a third country,
the other party will act to meet the common danger. On January 26, 1954, the Senate ratified the
treaty by a vote of 81-6.52
Beginning in the 1960s, rapid economic growth propelled South Korea into the ranks of the
world’s largest industrialized countries. For over two decades, South Korea has been one of the
United States’ largest trading partners. Economic growth, coupled with South Korea’s
transformation in the late 1980s from a dictatorship to a democracy, also has helped transform the
ROK into a mid-level regional power that can influence U.S. policy in Northeast Asia,
particularly the United States’ approach toward North Korea.

49 A 2021 South Korean government survey reported that over 90% of South Korean respondents stated their belief
that maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance is “necessary.” Lee, et. al., KINU Unification Survey 2021. US-China Conflict
& South Korean Public Opinion, Korea Institute for National Unification, 2021. According to a 2020 Chicago Council
on Global Affairs survey, 90% of South Korean respondents say they support the U.S.-ROK alliance, a figure little
changed from the 92% recorded the organization’s 2019 survey. Karl Friedhoff, Troop Withdrawal Likely to
Undermine South Korean Public Support for Alliance with United States, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, August
3, 2020. According to regular Pew Research Center surveys through 2019, nearly 80% of South Koreans regularly
register a “favorable” opinion of the United States, compared to less than 50% in 2003. In the Center’s 2020 survey, the
United States’ favorability fell to 54% before rebounding to 77% in 2021. Pew Research Center, America’s Image
Abroad Rebounds with Transition from Trump to Biden, June 10, 2021.
50 Asan Institute for Policy Studies. “South Koreans and Their Neighbors 2019,” April 26, 2019, at
http://en.asaninst.org/contents/south-koreans-and-their-neighbors-2019/ .
51 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Casualty Analysis System, accessed October 2021 at
https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_korea_sum.xhtml.
52 Government Publishing Office, Congressional Record Bound Edition – Senate, 83rd Congress, 2nd session, January
26, 1954. By a separate voice vote, the full Senate also approved an interpretive “understanding” reported by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that the treaty only obligated the United States to aid the ROK for an attack “against
territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the
Republic of Korea.” The understanding reflected Senators’ concerns, which were raised during a “searching”
Committee discussion, that the ROK might seize territory through an unprovoked attack or another means that the
United States regarded as unlawful. At the time, South Korean president Rhee Syngman, who opposed the 1953
armistice that had halted major conflict, had threatened to attack North Korea, possibly triggering a renewed war. U.S.
Senate, Executive Report, Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea, Committee on Foreign Relations, Exec. Rept. No.1, 83rd
Congress, 2nd session, January 21, 1954.
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Between 2009 and the end of 2016, relations between the United States and South Korea (known
officially as the Republic of Korea, or ROK) arguably were at their most robust since the
formation of the U.S.-ROK alliance in 1953. Cemented by strong relationships with two
successive conservative governments in Seoul, U.S.-South Korea cooperation on North Korea
policy was particularly close, with the two countries essentially forging and continuously
adapting a joint approach in the face of a changing threat from Pyongyang.
Under the administrations of Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in, who was elected in May 2017, the
relationship became more strained. Although the two governments cooperated across a range of
issues and their publicly stated policies toward North Korea overlapped, subtle and not-so-subtle
differences in approach to North Korea, China, and trade made collaboration more difficult. The
election of Moon, a progressive politician who assumed the presidency after a decade of
conservative rule, on its own likely would have made U.S.-South Korea relations more
challenging because of his stated desire to engage with North Korea at a time the U.S. alarm over
the North Korean threat was rising. These bilateral differences were exacerbated by the Trump
Administration’s actions and President Trump’s words, particularly his open talk of attacking
North Korea in 2017, his Administration’s frequently mixed signals on its approach toward
Pyongyang, and reports that he wanted to withdraw from the KORUS FTA and pull troops out of
South Korea.53 In efforts to forestall the latter, the 115th and 116th Congresses inserted provisions
into the National Defense Authorization Acts (P.L. 115-232; P.L. 116-92) that conditioned the
President’s authority to reduce the number of U.S. troops in South Korea. (For more details, see
the “Security Relations and the U.S.-ROK Alliance” section.)
North Korea in U.S.-ROK Relations
Overview
South Korea’s growing economic, diplomatic, and military power over the past generation has
given Seoul a more direct and prominent role in Washington’s planning and thinking about how
to deal with Pyongyang. Additionally, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has linked progress on
denuclearization talks and in inter-Korean relations to the cessation of U.S. joint military
exercises with South Korea and shipments of advanced military equipment to South Korea.54 As
South Korea has become a more powerful and assertive actor, its leaders often have pushed for a
greater say in policy. Differences in approach can complicate U.S. interests. Although leaders in
both countries have sought North Korea’s denuclearization, the two sides at times place a
different emphasis on the extent to which the pursuit of improvements in inter-Korean relations
should be linked to progress in the denuclearization goal.
Another complicating factor in policy collaboration has been North Korea’s apparent progress in
being able to militarily strike the United States. On the one hand, this means the United States’
security is becoming more intertwined with South Korea’s and the U.S.-ROK alliance’s ability to
influence North Korea’s behavior. On the other hand, a greater sense of threat could lead to future
scenarios where U.S. policymakers feel they need to act in a unilateral fashion against a feared
North Korean attack.55 Yet another complication is that North Korea’s ability to target U.S.

53 Bob Woodward, Rage (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2020), pp. 36, 69; John Bolton, The Room Where It
Happened. A White House Memoir (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2020), Chapter 4, Chapter 11.
54 Timothy Martin, “North Korea Sees U.S. as Ongoing Threat, Kim Jong Un Says in Speech,” Wall Street Journal,
September 30, 2021.
55 For more about how this discussion transpired in 2017 and early 2018, when the Trump Administration contemplated
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overseas bases and perhaps the U.S. homeland, including with a nuclear weapon, could cause
some in South Korea to doubt U.S. commitment to South Korea’s defense, a perception that could
provide an incentive for South Koreans to adopt more independent North Korea policies from the
United States.
North Korea Policy Coordination under Obama and Trump
From 2009 to 2016, the Obama Administration and its South Korean counterparts, the Lee
Myung-bak (2008-2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017) governments, maintained tight
coordination over North Korea policy, following a joint approach—often called “strategic
patience”—that involved elements of both engagement and pressure.56 Washington and Seoul
tended to reach out to North Korea during relatively quiescent periods. In contrast, they tended to
emphasize pressure tactics during times of increased tension with North Korea. In 2016, in
response to Pyongyang’s nuclear tests and missile launches, Washington and Seoul placed
significant emphasis on the harder elements of their approach, expanding multilateral and
unilateral sanctions and engaging in muscular displays of military cooperation.
The Trump Administration initially expanded upon these pressure tactics, for instance by securing
a dramatic expansion of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) international sanctions in 2017
before pivoting to top-down diplomacy in 2018 and 2019.57 Under the Trump and Moon
administrations, however, bilateral cooperation over North Korea often appeared to occur in a
fits-and-starts manner. Although there was considerable overlap in the countries’ approaches to
North Korea, there also were important differences that occasionally surfaced publicly. These
often had to do either with Moon’s desire to offer more and earlier concessions to Pyongyang
than Washington preferred, or to one side or the other adopting a position without significant
prior consultation.
The current period of U.S.-DPRK diplomacy under the Biden Administration in many ways
began in January 2016, when North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test. Over the following
two years, Pyongyang conducted two additional nuclear tests and scores of missile tests,
demonstrating major strides in its ability to strike the continental United States with a nuclear-
armed ballistic missile. The Obama and Trump Administrations, supported by the Park

launching a preventive attack against North Korea, see CRS Report R44994, The North Korean Nuclear Challenge:
Military Options and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kathleen J. McInnis. Multiple times during the crisis, Moon
made statements saying, “Our top priority is to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula. No military action on the
Korean Peninsula shall be taken without prior consent of the Republic of Korea.” The Blue House, “Address by
President Moon Jae-in at the National Assembly,” November 1, 2017.
56 Strategic patience consisted of four main components:

keeping the door open to Six-Party Talks over North Korea’s nuclear program but refusing to restart them
without a North Korean assurance that it would take “irreversible steps” to denuclearize;

insisting that Six-Party Talks and/or U.S.-North Korean talks must be preceded by North-South Korean talks
on denuclearization and improvements in North-South Korean relations;

gradually attempting to alter China’s strategic assessment of North Korea; and

responding to Pyongyang’s provocations by tightening sanctions against North Korean entities and
conducting a series of U.S.-ROK military exercises.
57 Congress passed multiple measures expanding U.S. sanctions against North Korea, including the North Korea
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-122), the Korean Interdiction and Modernization of
Sanctions Act (title III of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (P.L. 115-44), and the Otto
Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-92, division F, title LXXI, Sections
7101-7155, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020). For more, see CRS Report R41438, North Korea:
Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack.
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government and the caretaker administration that governed during the months after Park was
removed from office in 2016, responded by expanding multilateral and unilateral sanctions
against North Korea.
After taking office in May 2017, Moon supported the “maximum pressure” campaign that the
Trump Administration declared earlier that year, but he also retained his longstanding preference
for engaging Pyongyang. During 2017, Trump Administration officials, including the President,
repeatedly raised the possibility of launching a preventive military strike against North Korea,
which could have triggered DPRK retaliation against South Korea. The combination of the fear of
war, an ideological preference for engagement, and a belief that South Korea should shape the
future of the Korean Peninsula drove Moon to improve inter-Korean relations and push for U.S.-
DPRK talks. Moon argues that expanded relations between Seoul and Pyongyang could create a
path to peace on the Peninsula, greater stability and economic prosperity for South Korea, North
Korean denuclearization, and–over the long run–eventual reunification.58
Figure 3. Timeline of North Korean Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Tests, U.N. Security
Council Sanctions and Kim Jong-un’s Major Summits, 2016-2022

In 2018, DPRK leader Kim Jong-un declared “victory” in developing nuclear warhead and ICBM
capability, said he would suspend nuclear testing, and signaled his willingness to engage in talks
with the United States and South Korea.59 Kim and Moon met three times during the year, both
before and after a Trump-Kim summit with Trump in Singapore in June, a meeting Moon helped
broker. During his diplomatic outreach, Kim pledged to: “work toward complete denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula;” not conduct nuclear or long-range missile tests while dialogue with the
United States continues; and allow the “permanent dismantlement” of North Korea’s Yongbyon
nuclear site.60 He and Moon also negotiated a military confidence-building arrangement that

58 See, for instance, The Blue House, “Address by President Moon Jae-in on the 72nd Anniversary of Liberation,”
August 15, 2017; The Blue House, “Opening Remarks by President Moon Jae-in at Meeting with His Senior
Secretaries,” April 15, 2019; and The Blue House, “2022 New Year’s Address by President Moon Jae-in,” January 3,
2022.
59 Korea Central News Agency, “3rd Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK Held in Presence of Kim Jong Un,” April 21,
2018.
60 “South Korean TV Carries Full Text of South Korean Special Envoy's Briefing on Result of North Visit,” Open
Source Enterprise, March 6, 2018, KPW2018030647866849 Seoul YTN in Korean; The White House, “Remarks by
Republic of Korea National Security Advisor Chung Eui-Yong,” March 8, 2018. The White House, “Joint Statement of
President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit,” June 12, 2018; and The Blue House, “Pyeongyang Joint Declaration of
September 2018,” September 19, 2018.
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called for reduced military activity around the border and removes guard posts along the
demilitarized zone (DMZ).61
Kim and Trump met again in Hanoi in February 2019, with Moon’s support. The Hanoi summit
collapsed, however, due to differences over the scope and sequencing of concessions, specifically
North Korean denuclearization measures in exchange for sanctions relief. Despite a third Trump-
Kim meeting in Panmunjom for one hour in June 2019—Moon was present for part of the
meeting—subsequent U.S.-DPRK and inter-Korean diplomacy stalled.62 When the COVID-19
pandemic began in early 2020, North Korea responded by sealing itself off from the outside
world. North Korean diplomats are not known to have had substantive contact with their U.S. or
ROK counterparts since. Moreover, since May 2019, North Korea has conducted multiple short-
range ballistic missile tests in violation of U.N. prohibitions.
Under Moon, Seoul generally has favored offering more and earlier concessions to Pyongyang
than Washington. International and U.S. sanctions, however, prevent Moon from doing more
without U.S. approval, contributing to periodic tensions that surfaced under the Trump
Administration. For instance, in the fall of 2018, following the signing of an inter-Korean military
agreement and weeks of South Korean efforts to initiate inter-Korean economic projects, the
Treasury Department’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence reportedly called
executives in charge of compliance at seven South Korean banks expressing “concern” about
premature financial cooperation between the two Koreas, and to issue reminders about U.N. and
U.S. sanctions.63 Partially to prevent these types of incidents, in November 2018, the United
States and ROK created a working group that helped improve coordination despite significant
disagreements in approach.64 The Biden and Moon administrations disbanded the working group,
which the Biden Administration said was unnecessary because of “close and constant
coordination.”65
Security Relations and the U.S.-ROK Alliance
The United States and South Korea are allies under the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, under which
each country “recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties… would

61 “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain,” September 19,
2018, available at http://www.ncnk.org.
62 For more details and analysis of the Trump-Kim diplomacy, see CRS Report R45033, Nuclear Negotiations with
North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
63 Joyce Lee, “U.S. Treasury Calls Reveal 'Deep Concern' Over South Korea Banks' North Korea Plans,” Reuters,
October 22, 2018.
64 Another example of these latent bilateral tensions surfacing occurred in mid-January 2020. President Moon in his
annual New Year’s press conference said “Inter-Korean relations is our problem, so we have to have a willingness to
make progress a little more independently,” and he and members of his Cabinet began mentioning the possibility of
seeking exemptions from U.N. sanctions and of allowing South Korean citizens to conduct “independent” tours in
North Korea, which are not prohibited per se by U.N. sanctions. “Moon Says it's Early to be Pessimistic about Dialogue
with N. Korea,” Korea Now, January 14, 2020. Days later, then-U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Harry Harris
reportedly said that South Korean proposals to allow independent tourism to North Korea should be discussed in the
U.S.-South Korean working group on North Korea “to avoid a misunderstanding later that could trigger” U.S. or U.N.
sanctions and to coordinate possible DMZ crossings with the U.N. Command. The following day, an official with the
Blue House (South Korea’s presidential office) reportedly said that although Seoul “always” closely consults with
Washington, “it's very inappropriate for the ambassador to make such a mention for media over remarks by the
president of the hosting nation.” Chad O'Carroll, “U.S. Should be Consulted on Potential South Korean Tourism to the
North: Harris, NKNews, January 16, 2020; Josh Smith, “U.S. Ambassador Becomes Moustachioed Face of South
Korean Discontent,” Reuters, January 17, 2020.
65 State Department, “Ned Price, Department Spokesperson Department Press Briefing,” June 22, 2021.
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be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common
danger.”66 Under Article IV of the agreement, U.S. military personnel have maintained a
continuous presence on the Korean Peninsula and are committed to helping South Korea defend
itself, particularly against any aggression from the North. South Korea is included under the U.S.
“nuclear umbrella,” also known as “extended deterrence.”67 About 28,500 U.S. troops are
stationed in the ROK. The origins of the military partnership stem from the 1950-1953 Korean
War, during which over 36,000 Americans died in-theater.68 South Korea sent more troops to join
the Vietnam War than any other country other than the United States, and since has joined other
U.S.-led conflicts in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq. South Korea has dispatched 57,000
troops to 30 countries at the request of the United States or the United Nations.69 A late 2019
poll—in the midst of a contentious standoff in burden-sharing negotiations—indicated that 92%
of South Koreans supported the alliance with the United States.70
Together the allies maintain formidable capabilities. The ROK armed forces today total 599,000
active duty troops.71 In 2020, South Korea had the 10th-largest defense spending in the world,
constituting about 2.8% of its GDP.72 Under a program known as Defense Reform 2.0, South
Korea is investing heavily in new military equipment. Plans include a 30,000–35,000-ton LPX-II
light aircraft carrier that are to host F-35B combat aircraft and helicopters.73 In addition to these
investments in technology, the ROK military is integrating civilian expertise as ground troop
numbers decline.74 USFK operates about 90 combat planes, 40 attack helicopters, 50 tanks and
some 60 Patriot missile launchers, according to South Korea’s 2020 Defense White Paper.75
Since assuming office in 2017, Moon has accelerated South Korea’s drive to increase its
indigenous military capabilities. In August 2020, the Ministry of National Defense (MND)
announced plans to increase defense spending by 35% by 2025, which would put South Korea’s
defense budget on a trajectory to surpass Japan’s over the coming decade.76 Although the Mid-

66 U.S. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Volume 6, Part 3, United
States, 1954, Article III.
67 The May 2021 joint statement between Biden and Moon says, “President Biden affirms the U.S. commitment to
provide extended deterrence using its full range of capabilities.” White House, “U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement,”
May 21, 2021.
68 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Casualty Analysis System, accessed October 2021 at
https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_korea_sum.xhtml.
69 Yang Jung Chul, “A New Look at the Korea-U.S. Alliance,” CSIS Commentary, April 27, 2021.
70 Karl Friedhoff, “While Positive toward US Alliance, South Koreans Want to Counter Trump's Demands for
Support,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, December 16, 2019.
71 Military reforms in South Korea aim to reduce the size of the active duty force to 522,000 in 2022. Even with this
reduction, decreasing birth rates in South Korea are expected to lead to a deficit in military conscripts, which account
for close to half of the country’s total military force. South Korea has reserve force of 3.1 million. International
Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Six: Asia,” in The Military Balance 2021, 2021, p. 277; Chung Min Lee,
“South Korea’s Military Needs Bold Reforms to Overcome a Shrinking Population,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, June 29, 2021.
72 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Fact Sheet, Trends in Military Expenditure, April 2021.
73 Chapter Six, “Asia,” The Military Balance Volume 121, 2021 - Issue 1, February 24, 2021, accessed at
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868795.
74 Chung Min Lee, “South Korea Needs Bold Reforms to Overcome Shrinking Population,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, June 29, 2021.
75 South Korea Ministry of National Defense, 2020 Defense White Paper, provided to CRS in 2021.
76 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance: Chapter Six, Asia, p. 226-27; Hiroyuki Akita, “Time
for Japan to Concede South Korea Has Better Defense Strategy,” Nikkei Asia, June 24, 2021.
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Term Defense plan outlined more modest increases, South Korea nevertheless appears poised to
significantly expand its defense spending.77 The increases aim to boost acquisitions, facilitate the
transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON; see “OPCON Transfer”), and respond to South
Korea’s demographic challenges, which constrain its conscription forces. The moves also reflect
a response to North Korea’s military advancements and a longstanding desire by progressive
South Korean leaders, including Moon, to expand South Korea’s influence over military matters
on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea’s increasing economic and military capabilities, combined
with North Korea’s increased ability to threaten the United States with nuclear attack, leads some
long-standing critics of the U.S.-ROK alliance to argue that the United States should consider
withdrawing some or all of its troops from the Peninsula and/or terminate its defense
commitments to South Korea.78
Congress has a variety of routine means to influence the executive branch’s handling of the U.S.-
ROK alliance. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees generally hold annual
hearings, usually in the first quarter of the year, on U.S. military activities in the Indo-Pacific that
include the USFK Commander. These hearings provide opportunities for Members to raise
questions about alliance issues such as alliance coordination beyond the Korean Peninsula, the
impact of the interruption of major bilateral military exercises since 2018, and the effectiveness
of bilateral extended deterrence discussions. Additionally, the annual National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) usually includes multiple provisions related to South Korea and North
Korea. From 2018-2020, for instance, some Members who sought to restrain President Trump’s
ability to make significant shifts in force structure in the region inserted into the NDAA
provisions prohibiting the use of funds to reduce USFK forces below certain levels unless specific
conditions were met.79
Alliance Coordination: Beyond the Peninsula?
In 2021, U.S. and South Korean military leaders spoke of “promoting defense and security
cooperation” in the Indo-Pacific, echoing language expressed in the May 2021 Biden-Moon
statement. It remains to be seen, however, whether expanded regional diplomatic and economic
cooperation will be matched in the military sphere. When questioned about what form regional
military cooperation might take, the two defense ministries have tended to mention diplomatic,
rather than military, initiatives.80 Although the Biden-Moon joint statement mentioned the Taiwan

77 South Korea Proposes USD271 Billion Defence Plan,” Janes.com, September 3, 2021. Accessed at
https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/south-korea-proposes-usd271-billion-defence-plan
78 Doug Bandow, “Even With Seoul Paying More, America Can’t Afford to Defend South Korea,” Foreign Policy,
April 21, 2021.
79 Section 1264 of the FY2019 NDAA (P.L. 115-232) prohibited the use of funds to reduce USFK forces below 22,000
unless the Secretary of Defense first certifies to Congress that such a reduction is in the national security interest of the
United States and will not significantly undermine the security of United States allies in the region.
Section 1254 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) and Section 1258 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) prohibited
the use of funds to reduce U.S. forces deployed to South Korea below 28,500 until 90 days after the Secretary of
Defense certifies to Congress (1) that such a reduction is in the U.S. national interest and will not significantly
undermine the security the U.S. allies in the region and (2) that U.S. allies have been “appropriately consulted” on the
proposed reduction.
Section 1252 of the FY22 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) states that the sense of Congress is that the Secretary of Defense should
“recommit to and strengthen United States defense alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region so as to further
the comparative advantage of the United States in strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China, including
by ... reinforcing the United States alliance with the Republic of Korea and maintaining the presence of approximately
28,500 members of the United States Armed Forces deployed to the country.... ”
80 The joint communique issued at the conclusion of the December 2021 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting
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Strait and the South China Sea as areas of concern, it did not directly mention China. This is in
contrast to how Japan has framed its stance toward China in joint statements with the United
States.81 While firmly reiterating the importance of the alliance, South Korean leaders have been
reluctant to join U.S.-led security initiatives in the region, particularly as U.S.-China relations
have worsened.82 Coordinating arms sales to U.S. allies and partners may be one area of
cooperation, as perhaps indicated by the South Korean conglomerate Hanhwa’s December 2021
agreement to provide nearly $1 billion in self-propelled artillery equipment and other material to
Australia.
A bilateral understanding between Washington and Seoul gives U.S. forces the “strategic
flexibility” to respond to contingencies outside the peninsula, on the condition that U.S. officials
consult with ROK authorities. During his confirmation hearing, new USFK Commander Paul
LaCamera advocated for utilizing USFK capabilities in a range of Indo-Pacific contingencies.83 If
U.S. troops stationed in South Korea more regularly rotated to areas such as the South China Sea,
there could be significant repercussions—for command structure and mission definition, among
others—for the Combined Forces Command (CFC, a binational command), which has in the past
been almost solely focused on the DPRK.
If the USFK expands its activities beyond those aimed at deterring and defeating the DPRK, the
alliance partners may need to adjust significantly the way that they train and engage with each
other. Some strategists point to potential deficiencies in command and control integration, as well
as changes to the balance of power on the Peninsula if ROK and U.S. forces engage elsewhere in
the region.84 However, analysts remain cautious about predicting any major shifts in combined
force posture in the near future. For one, the ROK military remains primarily focused on North
Korea’s growing capabilities. Further, Seoul may be wary of signing on to expanded cooperation
with the United States because of a perception that U.S. strategy and priorities can shift after
presidential elections.85 Some U.S. analysts disagree with using the U.S.-ROK alliance to try to

(SCM) Joint Communique says, “the Minister and the Secretary pledged to continue promoting defense and security
cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and the world where mutual interests align, in order to better respond to regional
and global security challenges.” The rest of this article in the document primarily discusses cooperation in the
diplomatic arena, such as seeking cooperation between the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy and South Korea’s New
Southern Policy, which is fundamentally an economic and diplomatic initiative. (See “South Korea’s New Southern
Policy” below.) Department of Defense, “53rd Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique,” December 2, 2021.
Following the SCM, when a reporter asked ROK Defense Minister Suh Wook “how does the Republic of Korea see
itself stepping into the larger regional role that these talks envision,” he replied, “…we have shared the view today
through our meeting that we'll continue looking for a—continue looking for areas of mutual cooperation….However, in
terms of actual specific means, specific measures in terms of these—this cooperation, these were not discussed in
today's meeting.” Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and South Korean Defense
Minister Suh Wook Hold a Press Conference Following the 53rd U.S.-Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meeting
in Seoul,” December 2, 2021.
81 Bruce Klingner, “US-South Korea Summit Papers Over Policy Differences,” The Daily Signal, May 27, 2021.
82 Tobias Harris, Abigail Bard, and Hanuel Lee, “The China Difference in the U.S.-South Korea Alliance,” Center for
American Progress Report, December 14, 2021.
83 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Advance Policy Questions for General Paul LaCamera, USA
Nominee to be Commander, United Nations Command, Commander, Republic of Korea-United States Combined
Forces Command, and Commander, United States Forces Korea, 116th Congress, 2021, 8, https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/GEN%20LaCamera%20APQs%2014%20May%202021%20(FINAL).pdf.
84 Sukjoon Yoon, “Remaking the South Korea-US Alliance,” The Diplomat, July 28, 2021.
85 Chung Min Lee, “Is South Korea Going Global? New Possibilities Together with the Biden Administration,” Korea
Strategic Review, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 13, 2021.
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deter the PRC, arguing that the alliance should retain its primary focus of maintaining peace on
the Korean Peninsula by deterring North Korea.86
Military Exercises
The U.S. and ROK militaries for years have conducted large-scale drills to test alliance
interoperability, but the drills have been interrupted over the past few years for a range of reasons.
At a summit with North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore in June 2018, President Trump
called for a cancellation of large-scale military exercises, declaring them “very expensive” and
“provocative.”87 With the resumption of smaller, less public exercises in 2019, U.S. military
officials asserted that the alliance maintained readiness, but some analysts warned that any
reduction in joint exercises could damage alliance cohesion.88 The two governments’ concerns
about the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as their desire to facilitate diplomacy with the DPRK, led
them to postpone exercises planned for February 2020. The two sides conducted scaled-back
computer simulation exercises in August 2021, which North Korea criticized as preparation for
war. Prior to the exercises, over 70 ROK lawmakers called on Moon to postpone the exercises in
light of the summer 2021 decision by North Korea to re-open some communication channels with
the South.89
South Korea’s Nuclear Armament Debate
Since 2013, North Korea’s nuclear weapon tests and multiple missile launches have rekindled a
debate in South Korea about developing its own nuclear weapons capability, notwithstanding
Seoul’s reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent.90 President George H.W. Bush announced the
removal of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons abroad in 1991, some of which were based in South
Korea. Some analysts have argued that North Korea’s advancing nuclear weapons and missile
capabilities, including a possible second strike capability, may undermine the United States’
commitment to South Korea’s defense. To reassure South Korea, the United States reaffirmed the
U.S. security guarantee, including extended deterrence under the United States’ so-called “nuclear
umbrella.” An October 2016 joint “2+2” statement issued by U.S. and South Korean Foreign and
Defense Ministers restated the U.S. position that “any use of nuclear weapons [by North Korea]
will be met with an effective and overwhelming response.” At the 2+2 meeting, the two sides
agreed to establish a new, Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG).91 In
2018, the Trump and Moon administrations agreed to regularize the dialogue.

86 Michael D. Swaine, Jessica L. Lee, and Rachel Esplin Odell, Toward an Inclusive & Balanced Regional Order. A
New U.S. Strategy in East Asia, The Quincy Institute, Quincy Paper No. 5, January 2021, p. 46.
87 “Trump says to stop 'expensive', 'provocative' South Korea war games,” Reuters, June 12, 2018.
88 Bruce Bennett, “Preserving the ROK-U.S. Alliance by Sustaining Military Exercises,” The RAND Blog Commentary,
November 30, 2021 and Abraham Denmark and Lindsey Ford, “America’s Military Exercises in Korea Aren’t a
Game,” Foreign Policy, June 21, 2018.
89 “US, South Korean militaries to train together this month despite warnings from Pyongyang,” Stars and Stripes,
August 9, 2021.
90 Anna Fifield, “As North Korea Flexes Its Muscles, Some in South Want Nukes, Too,” Washington Post, March 20,
2016. The Gerald Ford Administration discovered President Park Chung Hee’s clandestine nuclear weapons program in
the 1970s, and the United States successfully pressured South Korea to shut it down. For more on this episode, see
Donald Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, Basic Books, pp. 69-73.
91 State Department, “Joint Statement of the 2016 United States-Republic of Korea Foreign and Defense Ministers’
Meeting,” October 19, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/263340.htm.
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Debates about nuclearization have become more prominent in political circles in Seoul in recent
years.92 Following North Korea’s September 2016 nuclear test, a group of National Assembly
members from the then-ruling Saenuri Party called on the ROK government to consider
developing nuclear weapons.93 A presidential advisory group, the National Unification Advisory
Council, in an October 2016 report recommended that South Korea consider a return of U.S.
tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, an idea that retains currency among some conservative
South Korean thinkers.94 Some ROK presidential primary candidates in 2021 reportedly argued
for a nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States, or an independent nuclear weapons
program.95 In a 2021 Asan Institute poll, 69.3% of respondents indicated they favor “the
development of nuclear weapons in South Korea,” the highest level of support since the Asan
Institute began asking this question in 2010. At the same time, the poll showed over 61% favored
reintroducing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and almost 96% of respondents favored continued
maintenance of the U.S.-ROK alliance.96
Analysts point to the potentially negative consequences for South Korea if it were to develop its
own nuclear weapons, including significant costs; reduced international standing in the campaign
to denuclearize North Korea; the possible imposition of economic sanctions that would be
triggered by leaving the global nonproliferation regime; and potentially encouraging Japan to
develop nuclear weapons capability. For the United States, South Korea developing nuclear
weapons could mean diminished U.S. influence in Asia, the unraveling of the U.S. alliance
system, and the possibility of creating a destabilizing nuclear arms race in Asia.97 Other analysts,
however, argue that South Korea would be justified in possessing its own nuclear arsenal given
the DPRK’s increasing capabilities. They also contend a South Korean nuclear arsenal could
mitigate domestic concerns about Washington’s willingness to uphold its alliance commitments in
the event of war with the North.98
ROK’s Missile Defense Program
South Korea began earnestly pursuing an indigenous ballistic missile defense (BMD) following
North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, and BMD has become an increasingly important
component of the country’s defense capabilities since then. Missile defense is among the
capabilities prioritized in Moon’s “Defense Reform 2.0” modernization plan.99 The United States

92 Choi Kang, “South Korea Must Secure Korean Version of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction), Chosun Ilbo, April
24, 2021; Aidan Foster-Carter. “South Korea-North Korea Relations: A Toxic Nuclear Tocsin,” Comparative
Connections CSIS Pacific Forum, September 2016.
93 “Calls Grow for South Korea to Consider Deploying Nuclear Weapons,” DW, September 9, 2013.
94 Kang Seung-woo, “Park Asked to Consider US Nukes: Presidential Panel Supports Presence of Tactical Weapons,”
Korea Times, October 13, 2016; The Troubled ROK-U.S. Alliance, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies Issue Brief,
January 21, 2022.
95 Morten Soendergaard Larsen, “Talk of a Nuclear Deterrent in South Korea,” Foreign Policy, September 9, 2021;
William Kim, “Nuclear Weapons in South Korea? Not So Fringe Anymore.” The National Interest, August 21, 2021.
96 J. James Kim, Kang Chungku, Ham Geon Hee, “Asan Report: Fundamentals of South Korean Public Opinion on
Foreign Policy and National Security,” The Asan Insitute for Policy Studies, September 2021.
97 See, for example, Robert Manning, “Trump’s ‘Sopranos’ Worldview Would Undo Asian Alliances,” New Atlanticist
blog post, March 29, 2016; and Troy Stangarone, “Going Nuclear Wouldn’t Be Easy for South Korea,” The National
Interest, February 29, 2016.
98 Jennifer Lind and Darryl G. Press, “Should South Korea build its own nuclear bomb?” Washington Post, October 7,
2021.
99 Jeff Jeong, “South Korea Moves to Kick its Missile Defense Shield up a Notch,” Defense News, August 14, 2019;
South Korean Ministry of National Defense, “[Ministry of National Defense] 2022-2026 mid-term defense plan,”
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has long urged South Korea to integrate its missile defense system into the wider U.S. BMD
architecture in the region, arguing it would strengthen South Korean and regional BMD
capabilities overall. Seoul has consistently declined to do so in favor of operating its own system.
Analysts attribute South Korea’s insistence on separate systems to its desire to preserve strategic
autonomy, skepticism of deepening cooperation with its historical rival Japan, wariness of
angering China, and desire to boost its domestic defense industry.100 In July 2016, after years of
consideration and controversy, South Korea agreed to a U.S. request to deploy a Terminal High-
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in South Korea to help defend against
North Korea’s improving missiles. Seoul’s decision triggered a harsh diplomatic and economic
response from China. The Sino-ROK dispute was ameliorated in late 2017 in part due to the
Moon government’s public pledge not to integrate into a U.S. regional BMD system. (See “South
Korea-China Relations” below.)
South Korea’s BMD system, the Korea Air and Missile Defense (or KAMD) system, has been
upgraded with both domestic and foreign components since the program launched in 2006.
Initially featuring secondhand Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-2 batteries from Germany and
Israeli Super Green Pine radars, KAMD now incorporates PAC-3 systems that double the range
of the PAC-2s.101 The ROK Navy is building BMD-capable Aegis destroyers set to enter service
beginning in 2024 (the United States stations BMD-capable Aegis ships in South Korea; the ROK
Navy’s current Aegis destroyers are not BMD-capable).102 KAMD also features indigenously
developed medium-range surface-to-air missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles.103
The Relocation of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)
The United States continues to execute its planned realignment of all U.S. forces from bases near
the demilitarized zone (DMZ) border with North Korea to bases farther south. The realignment
plan reflects the shift toward a supporting role for USFK and a desire to resolve the issues arising
from the location of the large U.S. Yongsan base in downtown Seoul. In line with the 2002 Land
Partnership Plan and the 2004 Yongsan Relocation Plan, several U.S. units from Yongsan and
associated troops and facilities have relocated, most to Camp Humphreys, located near the city of
Pyeongtaek some 40 miles south of Seoul. Camp Humphreys is the largest U.S. overseas base.
The original cost estimate was over $10 billion; South Korea was to contribute $4 billion of this.
Estimates in 2010 placed the overall costs at over $13 billion. In congressional testimony in April
2016, a U.S. official stated that South Korea is funding 91% of the total $10.7 billion cost of
USFK relocations.104

September 15, 2021.
100 CRS Report R41481, U.S.-South Korea Relations, coordinated by Mark E. Manyin; Kevin Fashola, “Five Types of
International Cooperation on Missile Defense,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 9, 2020; and
Joshua H. Pollack, “Ballistic Missile Defense in South Korea: Separate Systems Against a Common Threat,” in Missile
Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century – Collected Papers, Center for International &
Security Studies at Maryland, Fall 2016.
101 Gabriel Domingguez, “Deliveries of PAC-3 Air-Defence Systems to RoKAF Completed,” Janes, December 14,
2020.
102 Xavier Vavasseur, “South Korea’s HHI Lays Keel of New KDX III Batch II Destroyer for ROK Navy,” Naval
News, October 21, 2021.
103 Arms Control Association, “U.S. and Allied Ballistic Missile Defenses in the Asia-Pacific Region,” January 2019.
104 Written testimony of General Vincent K. Brooks. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on
the Nomination of General Brooks, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., April 19, 2016.
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As of July 2021, according to press reports, USFK has returned 68 of the 80 bases designated for
returns to South Korea.105 In July, the two governments agreed to accelerate the process, with a
pledge to officially return about one-quarter of the large Yongsan Garrison by early 2022.106
Although the USFK headquarters have moved to Camp Humphreys, the Combined Forces
Command (CFC, a binational command), remains at Yongsan. Outstanding issues include
environmental contamination cleanup, which could result in further delays in the return of
additional land.
Figure 4. USFK Bases After Realignment Plan Is Implemented

Source: Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—China and Northeast Asia, date posted April 15, 2010.
Cost Sharing
Since 1991, South Korea has provided financial support through a series of Special Measures
Agreements (SMAs) to offset the cost of stationing U.S. forces in Korea. These negotiations on
cost-sharing arrangements generally occur every five years. While these talks are often
contentious, they became particularly divisive during the Trump Administration because of the
United States’ requests for steep increases in South Korean contributions. Press reports indicated
that the Trump Administration asked South Korea to increase its contribution by roughly 400%.107
After signing a one-year stop-gap measure in February 2019 that raised South Korea’s previous
annual contribution by approximately 8%, the pact expired in December 2019, leading to the
furlough of about 4,500 Koreans who worked on U.S. bases.108 Weeks after coming into office,
the Biden Administration concluded a new five-year agreement in March 2021, removing an
irritant to the relationship. Under the agreement, South Korea will pay about $1 billion annually,
representing an increase of about 13.9% over previous SMAs.109

105 “US to return a quarter of Yongsan Garrison to S. Korea by early next year,” Hankyoreh News, July 30, 2021.
106 “US speeds up return of Yongsan Garrison site,” Korea Times, July 29, 2021.
107 “Trump hikes price tag for US forces in Korea almost 400% as Seoul questions alliance,” CNN News, November 15,
2019.
108 “Thousands go on unpaid leave as US, South Korea fail to agree on military costs,” Reuters News, March 31, 2020.
109 “South Korea to Pay U.S. More Under New Troop Cost-Sharing Agreement,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2021.
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In the past, South Korea generally paid for 40-50% (over $800 million annually) of the total non-
personnel costs of maintaining the U.S. troop presence in South Korea.110 ROK payments—a
combination of in-kind and cash contributions—fall into three categories: labor (salaries for the
Koreans who work on U.S. bases); logistics; and construction (by ROK firms for U.S. facilities).
South Korean officials also point to Seoul’s contributions to the alliance beyond the SMA
agreement as evidence of their investment in the relationship and mutual defense.
Military expenditures account for 2.8% of South Korea’s GDP, one of the largest percentages
among all U.S. allies.111 The ROK government is paying $9.7 billion, or about 90% of the total
cost of constructing Camp Humphreys, and is a top buyer of U.S. defense systems.
OPCON Transfer
An agreement made in 2007 to transfer wartime operational control to the South Korean military
remains unimplemented. Under the existing arrangement, in the event of war, South Korean and
U.S. soldiers would be under U.S. command, led by the commander of the binational Combined
Forces Command (CFC), a U.S. four-star general who concurrently serves as USFK
commander.112 If wartime OPCON is transferred, a South Korean commander would become
CFC head, answering to both U.S. and ROK civilian authorities; neither side will relinquish
command authority over their own troops.113 The plan to transfer OPCON, which has generated
controversy among foreign policy thinkers in South Korea, recognizes the ROK’s advances in
economic and military strength since the Korean War, and is viewed by many Koreans as
important for ROK sovereignty.114
Like past ROK progressive leaders, President Moon has prioritized OPCON and moved to
accelerate the process. The two sides have established conditions and benchmarks to demonstrate
that the ROK can assume wartime OPCON, including improved ROK capabilities to lead
combined forces and counter the DPRK nuclear and missile threat, and a security environment on
the Peninsula conducive to a transfer.115 Significant progress has been made on some of these
areas, but it appears unlikely that the process will be completed by the conclusion of Moon’s
term.
The 2007 agreement to transition OPCON has been delayed twice, both times under conservative
South Korean presidents. In 2010, the OPCON transfer was postponed to 2015 after a series of
provocations from North Korea and amid concerns about whether South Korean forces were

110 Written testimony of General Vincent K. Brooks. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on
the Nomination of General Brooks, 114th Cong., 2nd session, April 19, 2016.
111 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Fact Sheet, “Trends in World Military Expenditure,” April 2021.
112 In peacetime, the ROK military is responsible for South Korea’s national security. In December 2021, presidential
candidate Lee Jae-myung reportedly said of the current arrangement, “It is very unusual and hard to witness any case in
the world where an independent country leaves the power of military operations to another country. That is a core part
of sovereignty, and it is already beyond common sense that the power was given to others in the first place.” Ko Jun-
tae, “Lee Jae-myung against Beijing Olympics Boycott, Opposes THAAD Missiles,” The Korea Herald,
December 30, 2021.
113 Jina Kim, “Military Considerations for OPCON Transfer on the Korean Peninsula,” Council on Foreign Relations
Asia Unbound blog, March 20, 2020.
114 For an example of objections to OPCON’s transfer, see The Troubled ROK-U.S. Alliance, The Asan Institute for
Policy Studies Issue Brief, January 21, 2022.
115 See then-USFK Commander General Curtis Scaparrotti’s testimony at U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed
Services, Hearing on the Risk of Losing Military Technology Superiority and its Implications for U.S. Policy, Strategy,
and Posture in the Asia-Pacific, 114th Cong., 1st sess., April 15, 2015.
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adequately prepared to assume responsibility. As the new deadline of 2015 grew closer, concerns
again emerged about the timing. Reportedly, South Korean officials worried that their military
was not fully prepared to cope with North Korean threats and that Pyongyang might interpret the
OPCON transfer as a weakening of the alliance’s deterrence.116 Some South Korean military
experts expressed concern that turning over control would lead to the United States reducing its
overall commitment to South Korean security.117 In October 2014, the United States and South
Korea announced in a joint statement that the allies would take a “conditions-based approach” to
the OPCON transfer and determine the appropriate timing based on South Korean military
capabilities and the security environment on the Korean Peninsula.118
South Korean Defense Industry and Purchases of U.S. Weapon Systems
Under Moon, South Korea has increased its defense budget significantly. In December 2021,
South Korea’s National Assembly approved a FY2022 defense budget of $46.32 billion. This
represented a 3.4% increase from the FY2021 budget, although it was 1% less than the Moon
Administration’s request.119 This follows a 7.6% increase in FY2017 and an 8.2% increase in
FY2018, the highest among OECD member countries.
South Korea is a major recipient of U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS). From FY2017 to FY2020,
South Korean FMS contracts with the United States totaled $5.95 billion, making it the tenth-
largest recipient during those years.120 Although European and Israeli defense companies also
compete for contracts, from 2008 to 2016, approximately 75% of South Korea’s total foreign
defense purchases were FMS and commercial sales from U.S. companies.121 Among the U.S.
systems that South Korea is acquiring or has recently acquired are Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint
Strike Fighters, Boeing’s P-8 Poseidon aircraft, and Northrup Grumman’s RQ-4 “Global Hawk”
unmanned aerial vehicles.
South Korea has a mature defense industry, advanced in the past decade through industrial
collaboration, defense offsets, and targeted efforts to acquire sophisticated technologies and
expertise.122 Korea’s Defense Reform 2.0 emphasizes increased self-reliance through the
development of indigenous capabilities by increasing the percentage of funds allocated to defense
research and development (R&D) and maturing the country’s defense sector, including by
increasing exports.123 South Korea was the world’s ninth-largest arms exporter from 2016 to

116 Song Sang-ho, “Allies Rack Brains over OPCON Transfer,” Korea Herald, May 6, 2014.
117 Lee Chi-dong and Roh Hyo-dong, “OPCON Transfer May Usher in Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Korea: Ex-
General,” Yonhap News Agency, November 18, 2013.
118 “Joint Communique of the 46th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting,” U.S. Department of Defense,
Washington, DC, October 23, 2014.
119 Jon Grevatt and Andrew MacDonald, “South Korea Finalises USD46.32 Billion Defence Budget for 2022,” Janes,
December 3, 2021.
120 U.S. Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Historical Sales Book, Fiscal Years 1950-2020.”
121 CRS Correspondence with South Korean official, March 15, 2017.
122 Janes, “Korea, South – Defence Production and R&D,” April 22, 2021.
123 The reform program prioritizes “intensive investments” in R&D for eight “core defense strategic technologies”:
“autonomous/artificial intelligence-based surveillance and reconnaissance, hyper-connected/intelligent command and
control, ultra-high-speed/high-power precision strike, futuristic propulsion and stealth-based platform, combined
manned and unmanned combat, advanced technology-based personal combat system, active cyber response and future
protection, [and] futuristic advanced new technology.” Lee Young-bin, “The 2022-2026 Mid-term Defense Plan for
Successful Accomplishment of Defense Reform 2.0 and Building a Digitalized Strong Military,” Korea Institute for
Defense Analyses ROK Angle, Issue 240, September 24, 2021, p. 3. See also Frank Smith, “South Korea Muscles in on
Global Arms Trade,” Al Jazeera, April 20, 2021.
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2020.124 South Korean firms compete internationally in the armored vehicle, shipbuilding, and
aerospace industries.125 For example, Lockheed Martin and Korea Aerospace Industries jointly
developed the T-50 Golden Eagle, a trainer and light fighter aircraft that has been successful on
the international market and will likely compete for the U.S. Air Force’s next trainer aircraft
contract. Defense News’s “Top 100” defense companies ranking for 2021 featured four South
Korean defense companies.126 South Korea aims to further improve the competitiveness of its
defense industry, which continues to face challenges like program delays, insufficient
transparency, and gaps in certain industrial capabilities.127
Southeast Asia is a major market for South Korean defense equipment. Recent South Korean
arms sales in the region include FA-50 light aircraft sold to the Philippines, three diesel electric
attack submarines sold to Indonesia, a frigate sold to Thailand, and six missile surface corvettes
sold to Malaysia.128
The 110th Congress passed legislation that upgraded South Korea’s status as an arms purchaser
from a “Major Non-NATO Ally” to the “NATO Plus Three” category (P.L. 110-429), which has
subsequently become “NATO Plus Five.” This upgrade increases the threshold for the
requirement that the U.S. executive branch notify Congress of pending arms sales to South Korea,
from $14 million to $25 million. Congress has 15 days to consider the sale and take legislative
steps to block the sale compared to 30 days for Major Non-NATO Allies.
ROK’s Aspirations for Nuclear-Powered Submarines
For years, South Korean officials—including President Moon and 2022 presidential candidate
Lee Jae-myung—have voiced an interest in acquiring or developing nuclear-powered
submarines.129 The United States has objected to this, citing proliferation concerns. This ambition
was raised again after the surprise September 2021 announcement that the United States would
help Australia develop a nuclear-powered submarine capability in cooperation with the United
Kingdom through the new partnership known as AUKUS (Australia-UK-United States). The U.S.
willingness to share this sensitive technology led some commentators to argue that South Korea,
as another key ally in the region, should also acquire nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs)
given the DPRK’s growing capabilities.130 To achieve this, South Korea would need to either
develop nuclear naval propulsion technology indigenously or seek agreement with foreign
suppliers. Such cooperation with the United States would require a new nuclear cooperation

124 Pieter D. Wezeman et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2020,” Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, March 2021, p. 7.
125 Simon Mundy, “South Korea Aims to Become Defence Powerhouse,” Financial Times, November 6, 2013.
126 Hanwha was ranked 28th, Korea Aerospace Industries was ranked 57th, LIG Nex1 was ranked 68th, and Hyundai
Rotem Company was ranked 93rd. The “Defense 100” rankings are by defense revenues from the previous year.
Defense News, “Top 100 for 2021,” https://people.defensenews.com/top-100/.
127 Janes, “Korea, South – Defence Production and R&D,” April 22, 2021.
128 Siemon T. Wezeman, “Arms Flows to South East Asia,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
December 2019, pp. 11, 14.
129 In December 2021, Lee reportedly said, “I will push forward with building a nuclear-propelled submarine that is
capable of long-term underwater ambush, surveillance and reconnaissance to prepare for North Korea’s nuclear
weapons threat….Australia was acknowledged as an exception by the U.S. and is building a nuclear-powered
submarine. I think we can create [similar] conditions through a thorough consultation between the U.S. and ROK.”
Jeongmin Kim, “Lee Jae-myung Pledges to Push for Nuclear Submarine against North Korean Threats,” NKNews,
December 24, 2021.
130 Jihoon Yu and Erik French, “The US Should Support South Korea’s Nuclear Submarine Aspirations,” The
Diplomat, September 20, 2021.
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agreement, which would be subject to congressional review.131 In 2021, South Korea announced
plans to build a type of small modular nuclear reactor, which could potentially be used to power a
submarine.132
Bilateral Economic Relations
South Korea and the United States are major economic partners. Congressional interest in the
bilateral trade and economic relationship stems from Congress’ constitutional authority to
regulate foreign commerce, as well as its interest in how U.S. and South Korean trade and
investment policies may affect U.S. constituents including consumers, workers, farmers, and
business owners. In order to support bilateral economic relations, in 2011 Congress passed
legislation to implement the KORUS FTA (P.L. 112-41), which has governed bilateral trade and
investment activities since 2012. As Congress conducts its oversight of the Administration, key
concerns may include enforcement and continued implementation of KORUS FTA commitments,
effects of continued U.S. unilateral import restrictions on U.S. constituents and bilateral economic
relations, and priorities for potential new trade negotiations under the Administration’s Indo-
Pacific Economic Framework initiative.
In 2020, two-way goods and services trade between the two countries totaled $155.7 billion,
making South Korea the United States’ seventh-largest trading partner, accounting for 3% of total
U.S. trade.133 For some western states and U.S. sectors, the South Korean market is even more
important. South Korea is far more dependent economically on the United States than the United
States is on South Korea. In terms of goods trade, in 2020, the United States was South Korea’s
second-largest trading partner (after China), export market, and source of imports.134 As of 2019
(latest available), the United States was South Korea’s second-largest supplier of inward foreign
direct investment (FDI) and largest destination of outward FDI.135
The United States ran a goods trade deficit with South Korea in 2020 of $25.3 billion, the
difference of $51.4 billion in exports and $76.8 billion in imports, and a services trade surplus of
$8.1 billion, the difference of $17.8 billion in exports and $9.7 billion in imports (Table 1).136 The
bilateral investment relationship has expanded in recent years due to considerable growth in
South Korean FDI in the United States, which reached $63.7 billion in 2020, more than triple its
level in 2011, before the KORUS FTA took effect. U.S. investment in South Korea, by contrast,
has declined somewhat to $33.9 billion in 2020 from a peak of $40.2 billion in 2017. In 2019
(latest available), foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in South
Korea had 115,400 employees, while U.S. affiliates of South Korean MNEs had 94,500
employees.

131 See CRS In Focus IF11999, AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin
132 “South Korea Has Long Wanted Nuclear Subs. A New Reactor Could Open a Door,” New York Times, December
13, 2021.
133 U.S. trade and investment data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), International Trade and Investment
Country Facts: South Korea, accessed November 29, 2021.
134 Korea Trade Statistics Promotion Institute via Trade Data Monitor, accessed November 29, 2021.
135 OECD, “FDI Statistics by Partner Country and by Industry,” International Direct Investment database, updated May
19, 2021, accessed November 29, 2021.
136 U.S. trade and investment data, including activities of multinational enterprises, from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), International Trade and Investment Country Facts: South Korea, accessed November 29, 2021.
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Table 1. Annual U.S.-South Korea Trade,
2011-2020
(billions of U.S. dollars)
U.S. Exports
U.S. Imports
Trade Balance
Year
Goods Services
Total
Goods
Services Total Goods Services
Total
2011
45.2
17.9
63.1
57.6
9.9
67.5
-12.4
8.0
-4.3
2012*
44.2
20.0
64.1
59.6
10.2
69.8
-15.4
9.8
-5.6
2013
43.5
22.3
65.8
63.0
10.1
73.0
-19.4
12.2
-7.2
2014
46.4
21.4
67.8
70.7
9.8
80.5
-24.3
11.6
-12.7
2015
44.5
21.8
66.2
72.4
10.1
82.5
-28.0
11.7
-16.3
2016
42.9
22.5
65.4
70.4
9.3
79.6
-27.5
13.2
-14.3
2017
49.2
24.4
73.6
71.8
8.3
80.2
-22.6
16.1
-6.5
2018
57.4
23.4
80.7
75.1
10.3
85.3
-17.7
13.1
-4.6
2019
57.4
23.5
80.9
78.3
11.0
89.2
-20.8
12.5
-8.3
2020
51.4
17.8
69.2
76.8
9.7
86.4
-25.3
8.1
-17.2
Major
Goods: Semiconductors and semiconductor
Services: South Korean educational,
U.S.
manufacturing equipment; oil and gas; chemicals; motor
personal, and business travel to the
Exports vehicles and parts; beef and pork; medical equipment;
United States; charges for the use of
pharmaceuticals; aircraft and parts; corn, soybeans, and
intellectual property; financial and other
wheat.
business services; transport services.
Major
Goods: Motor vehicles and parts; semiconductors and
Services: Transport services; financial
U.S.
other electronic components; batteries; refined
and other business services.
Imports petroleum products; major household appliances; cell
phones; tires.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), International Transactions Tables,
accessed November 29, 2021.
Notes: Trade data reported on a balance of payments basis.
(*) The KORUS FTA went into effect on March 15, 2012.
The United States’ economic importance to South Korea has declined relative to China, which
displaced the United States as South Korea’s top trading partner in 2003. By 2020, China’s share
of South Korea’s trade was roughly double the U.S. share (25% vs. 13%, respectively).137 China
also hosts manufacturing facilities for many South Korean multinational firms and the two
countries trade heavily in intermediate goods, highlighting supply chain linkages. In 2018 (latest
available), China was the destination for 42% of South Korea’s intermediate goods exports,
compared to 8% exported to the United States, the second-largest destination.138 South Korean
firms also rely on Chinese origin inputs in their supply chains. The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates that Chinese origin value-added content in
South Korean exports doubled from 2005 to 2018, to 5.3%, the largest share of any country—the
comparable share originating in the United States was 3.6% in 2018.139 Intensifying U.S.-China

137 Korea Trade Statistics Promotion Institute via Trade Data Monitor, accessed November 29, 2021.
138 OECD, Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database, accessed November 29, 2021.
139 Ibid.
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strategic and economic competition and U.S. trade restrictions affecting China (e.g., unilateral
tariffs, export controls), therefore, may have important implications for South Korea’s economy.
South Korea’s export-driven economy and competition with domestic U.S. producers in certain
products has led to trade friction with the United States of varying intensity over the years. For
example, imports of certain South Korean products, mostly steel or stainless steel items, as well
as polyester, chemicals, and washing machines, have been the subject of U.S. antidumping and
countervailing duty (AD/CVD) investigations.140 As of November 2021, antidumping duties were
being collected on 33 South Korean imports (a 50% increase from 2017), and countervailing
duties were being assessed on seven South Korean products, making South Korea subject to the
third largest set of such trade remedies among U.S. trade partners, behind China and India.141 The
Biden Administration has maintained and, in one case, extended additional Trump-era trade
restrictions, including tariffs and quotas, that affected South Korean products (see “U.S. Section
201 and 232 Import Restrictions Affecting South Korea”).
Ten Years of the KORUS FTA (2012-2022)
For nearly ten years, the KORUS FTA has been the centerpiece of U.S.-South Korean trade and
economic relations.142 The agreement, which entered into force in March 2012, has reduced and
eliminated tariff and non-tariff barriers between the two parties on manufactured goods,
agricultural products, and services. The agreement also provides rules and disciplines on
investment, intellectual property rights (IPR) and other issues; commits both countries to
maintain certain worker and environmental standards; and provides enforceable mechanisms for
resolving disputes. The second largest U.S. FTA by trade flows after the U.S.-Mexico-Canada
Agreement (USMCA), the KORUS FTA arguably has some of the most extensive commitments
of any U.S. FTA in effect.
Upon implementation, roughly 80% of tariff lines were duty free in U.S.-South Korean trade,
whereas prior to the KORUS FTA, 38% of U.S. tariff lines and 13% of South Korean tariff lines
were duty free. Remaining tariffs in bilateral trade have been largely phased out (roughly 99% of
all tariff lines) through annual implementation of scheduled tariff cuts. The 10th round of these
annual tariff cuts took effect in January 2021. The agreement’s services trade commitments,
which are on a “negative list” basis (i.e., they apply to all sectors except those specifically
exempted), have also expanded U.S. firms’ access to South Korea’s services sector. For example,
in 2017 the third stage of South Korea's market opening to legal services became effective,
allowing U.S. firms to enter into joint ventures in South Korea.
The KORUS FTA has been modified twice since it was originally negotiated. The agreement was
initiated in 2006 and signed in 2007 under the George W. Bush and Roh Moo-hyun
administrations. Implementing legislation, however, was not submitted to and passed by Congress
until 2011. This followed negotiations and an exchange of letters by the Obama and Lee Myung-
bak administrations that modified the agreement’s commitments on auto and agricultural trade.143

140 For more on antidumping and countervailing duties, see CRS In Focus IF10018, Trade Remedies: Antidumping and
Countervailing Duties, by Vivian C. Jones and Christopher A. Casey.
141 USITC, “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders in Place,” November 26, 2021, at http://www.usitc.gov/
trade_remedy/documents/orders.xls.
142 For more on the KORUS FTA, see CRS Report RL34330, The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS
FTA): Provisions and Implementation, coordinated by Brock R. Williams, and CRS In Focus IF10733, U.S.-South
Korea (KORUS) FTA and Bilateral Trade Relations, coordinated by Brock R. Williams.
143 USTR, “Legal Texts Reflecting December 3, 2010 Agreement,” updated January 1, 2019, at https://go.usa.gov/
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In 2012, the 2007 agreement as modified by the 2011 exchange of letters took effect for both
parties.
In 2018, the Trump and Moon Jae-in administrations negotiated additional modifications to the
agreement, relating to, among other things, adjusting South Korean regulations affecting U.S.
auto exports, delaying reduction of the 25% U.S. light truck tariff to 2041, and adding clarifying
language to the investment provisions.144 The amendments, which consisted primarily of South
Korean regulatory changes and U.S. tariff modifications, took effect in 2019 without action by
Congress. The KORUS FTA implementing legislation (P.L. 112-41) provides presidential
proclamation authority to modify the U.S. FTA tariff schedule.
A number of U.S. export sectors may have benefitted from KORUS market openings. For
example, U.S. beef exports have increased from $686 million in 2011 to $1.7 billion in 2020, as
the South Korean beef tariff has fallen from 40% to 16% and will continue declining to zero by
2026.145 U.S. motor vehicle and parts exports have nearly tripled from $1.2 billion in 2011 to $3.1
billion in 2020, such that the United States now exports more cars to South Korea than to Japan, a
country with more than twice South Korea’s population and a larger GDP/capita—though South
Korea still represents a relatively small share (2.4%) of total U.S. auto exports.146 South Korea’s
auto tariff was reduced from 8% to 4% upon KORUS’s entry into force and eliminated in 2016.
U.S. exports of services also increased significantly from $17.9 billion in 2011 to $23.4 billion in
2019, but declines in travel led to a decline in services exports in 2019 to $17.8 billion.
Attributing changes in trade and investment flows to the KORUS FTA, however, is difficult. Price
changes due to tariff reductions are only one of a number of factors affecting trade. Fluctuations
in other factors affecting demand in both countries such as consumer tastes, the business cycle
and relative growth rates, and exchange rates may play a greater role in determining such
outcomes.
Views on the KORUS FTA and its outcomes over its nearly ten-year existence are mixed.
Proponents argue the FTA has expanded trade (including U.S. exports), investment, competition,
and consumer choice in both countries, increased U.S. IPR protection in South Korea, and
improved transparency in South Korea's regulatory process.147 Some observers also believe the
agreement has deepened the overall bilateral relationship and spurred South Korea’s shift to more
aggressive pursuit of regional trade liberalization initiatives.148
Others have argued that the agreement's impact is disappointing, pointing largely to an increase in
the U.S. trade deficit with South Korea since the agreement took effect—the bilateral deficit on
goods and services was $4.3 billion in 2011 and $17.2 billion in 2020.149 During this time, the
deficit has fluctuated, growing significantly early on and then declining more recently until it

xePxX.
144 USTR, “USTR Publishes Agreed Outcomes from U.S.-Korea FTA Amendment and Modifications Negotiations,”
September 3, 2018, at https://go.usa.gov/xePx5.
145 Yong Ban and Neil Mikulski, Livestock and Products Semi-Annual, South Korea, USDA Foreign Agricultural
Service, KS2021-0008, March 18, 2021.
146 Data from The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) country fact sheets: South Korea and Japan.
147 For example, see Nicholas Montella, “Six Wins as the KORUS FTA Turns Six,” U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
March 15, 2018.
148 Wendy Cutler and Seok-young Choi, “The Strategic Benefits of KORUS,” CSIS, commentary, May 5, 2020, at
https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategic-benefits-korus.
149 For example, see Robert E. Scott, “U.S.-Korea Trade Deal Resulted in Growing Trade Deficits and More than
95,000 Lost U.S. Jobs,” Economic Policy Institute, May 5, 2016.
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roughly doubled in 2020 during the pandemic (Table 1). Much of the growth in the trade deficit
stems from auto trade: U.S. goods imports from South Korea increased by $19.2 billion from
2011 to 2020, with auto and parts imports accounting for $9.0 billion of the increase. However,
U.S. auto imports peaked in 2015, before the 2.5% U.S. car tariff was reduced under KORUS,
leading many economists to disagree with the view that the FTA contributed to the increase in the
deficit.150 For example, using 2015 data, the USITC estimated that the U.S. bilateral deficit would
have been even larger had the KORUS FTA not been in effect.151 Economists generally find that
macroeconomic factors, such as aggregate demand and supply, are the main drivers of bilateral
trade balances, rather than trade agreements.152
Some business groups have raised concerns regarding South Korea’s implementation of certain
FTA commitments. The 2018 modifications, however, include several commitments that seek to
address such issues. For example, South Korea agreed to new principles for conducting origin
verifications on U.S. exports, a perennial concern of U.S. business groups, and amended a pricing
policy on pharmaceuticals to align with KORUS commitments. In addition, the KORUS FTA
includes several consultative mechanisms that allow for enhanced bilateral engagement on
implementation issues. For example, Ambassador Tai in November 2021 highlighted progress in
addressing U.S. concerns over South Korea’s implementation of commitments on cross-border
data flows for financial services.153
Many U.S. stakeholder groups viewed the Trump Administration’s modifications to the KORUS
FTA positively. For example, the U.S. auto industry praised the additional efforts to reduce non-
tariff barriers in South Korea, such as the negotiated increase, from 25,000 to 50,000 per
manufacturer, of annual U.S. auto exports allowed to enter South Korea based solely on U.S.
safety certifications.154 Proponents of trade liberalization, however, viewed some of the
modifications negatively, such as the lengthy extension of U.S. light truck tariffs.155 The USITC
estimated that the modification in the truck tariffs is unlikely to have much effect on the U.S.
market.156
Most trade policy observers disputed the Trump Administration’s characterization of the
amendments as a “basic redoing” of the agreement, arguing that they were relatively minor
adjustments and unlikely to change the KORUS FTA’s overall balance of concessions.157 The
amendments did not include specific commitments on currency, which some groups had sought.
They also did not make any changes to the agreement’s digital trade commitments, which were

150 Kadee Russ, Deborah Swenson, and Kelly Stangl, “The Economics of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,”
EconoFact, November 6, 2017, https://econofact.org/the-economics-of-the-korea-u-s-free-trade-agreement.
151 USITC, Economic Impact of Trade Agreements Implemented Under Trade Authorities Procedures, June 2016, p.
139.
152 For example, see Johannes Eugster et al., “Bilateral and Aggregate Trade Balances: Finding the Right Focus,”
VoxEU, September 10, 2019, https://voxeu.org/article/bilateral-and-aggregate-trade-balances-finding-right-focus.
153 USTR, “Remarks of Ambassador Tai at the Start of the KORUS Joint Committee,” November 19, 2021.
154 Keith Laing, “Carmakers Laud U.S.-South Korea Trade Deal,” The Detroit News, September 25, 2018.
155 Tori Smith, Analyzing the Renegotiated U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, The Heritage Foundation, April 18,
2018.
156 The USITC estimated that without the changes South Korean producers would have likely sold 12,000-30,000
additional pickup trucks in the U.S. market annually, representing a small fraction of the roughly 3 million pickup
trucks sold annually in the U.S. market. USITC, Economic Impact of Trade Agreements Implemented under Trade
Authorities Procedures, 2021 Report, Publication Number: 5199, June 2021, pp. 119-122.
157 See, for example, Simon Lester, Inu Manak, and Kyoungwa Kim, Trump's First Trade Deal: The Slightly Revised
Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Cato Institute, Free Trade Bulletin No. 73, June 13, 2019 and Jeffrey J. Schott and
Euijin Jung, KORUS Amendments: Minor Adjustments Fixed What Trump Called “Horrible Deal”, Peterson Institute
for International Economics, Policy Brief 18-22, November 2018.
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negotiated in the mid-2000s and, therefore, do not reflect more recent provisions the United
States has sought on digital trade issues, such as those included in the USMCA.
South Korea’s FTA Strategy, RCEP, and CPTPP
South Korea is a major trading nation with trade accounting for a large share of its GDP (37.6% from 2018-2020,
compared to 12.8% in the United States),158 and has made the negotiation of comprehensive and high standard
FTAs covering goods, services, investment, and rules a key focus of its trade policy. South Korea has entered into
several trade agreements over the past two decades. As of July 2021, South Korea had 17 FTAs in effect, covering
57 countries, including more recently with the United Kingdom and five countries in Central America; it has
concluded but not yet ratified negotiations on four additional agreements; and negotiations were ongoing on eight
new or updated agreements, including with Mercosur, the South America trading bloc that includes Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. South Korea’s trade agreements include several of its major trading partners, such
as the United States, China, and the European Union.159
South Korea is also a member of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade agreement,
which it signed in November 2020.160 RCEP, which entered into force for South Korea in February 2022, is of
particular interest to policymakers given its broad membership of 15 East, Southeast Asian, and Australasian
countries, including South Korea, China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the ten members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). South Korea is not currently participating in the other major Asia-Pacific
regional trade initiative, the 11-member Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP). However, in December 2021, Moon’s government publicly announced its intention to take the domestic
procedural steps necessary to formally apply for CPTPP membership, preferably before Moon leaves office in May
2022.161 CPTPP is the agreement that replaced the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), fol owing the Trump
Administration’s withdrawal of the United States signature from the proposed TPP in 2017.
Some stakeholders in the United States, including several Members of Congress, have urged the Biden
Administration to reconsider potential U.S. participation in CPTPP, but U.S. officials have stated the
Administration does not intend to pursue CPTPP membership at present.162 Participation in CPTPP by both South
Korea and the United States could serve as a potential vehicle to update elements of the KORUS FTA, such as on
digital trade. Proponents of U.S. participation in CPTPP note with concern that China, which is a member of RCEP
and has formally applied to join CPTPP, has taken a more active approach to regional trade agreement
negotiations than the United States.163 In contrast to RCEP, CPTPP includes several U.S.-priority commitments,
such as labor and environmental protections, nearly comprehensive tariff elimination, and enforceable disciplines
on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and digital trade.
U.S. Section 201 and 232 Import Restrictions Affecting South Korea
The Trump Administration imposed unilateral tariff increases and other import restrictions on
several significant U.S. imports from South Korea, which remain in place to date under the Biden
Administration.164 In March 2018, President Trump announced tariffs of 25% and 10% on certain

158 WTO, Trade Profiles, 2021, at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/trade_profiles_list_e.htm. The WTO
trade profiles calculate trade to GDP using the average of a country’s exports and imports.
159 WTO, Trade Policy Review of South Korea: Report by South Korea, September 28, 2021, p. 11.
160 CRS In Focus IF11891, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), coordinated by Cathleen D.
Cimino-Isaacs.
161 “Finance Minister: Gov't Seeking to Submit Application to Join CPTPP within Moon's Term,” KBS, December 16,
2021.
162 Senator Tom Carper and Senator John Cornyn, “The U.S. Needs to Learn from its TPP Mistake and Get Its Seat
Back at the Table,” Washington Post, June 13, 2021, opinion.
163 CRS Insight IN11760, China and Taiwan Both Seek to Join the CPTPP, by Brock R. Williams and Michael D.
Sutherland.
164 For more information, see CRS Report R45529, Trump Administration Tariff Actions: Frequently Asked Questions,
coordinated by Brock R. Williams.
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U.S. steel and aluminum imports, respectively.165 The tariffs were imposed under Section 232 of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, on the premise that such imports threatened to impair U.S.
national security, and drew criticism from South Korea, given its close security relationship with
the United States. In 2017, prior to the implementation of the new trade restrictions, South Korea
was the third-largest supplier of relevant U.S. steel imports ($2.8 billion), but was not a major
supplier of aluminum ($112 million).
South Korea, which was negotiating modifications to the KORUS FTA at the time the tariffs were
announced, decided to negotiate a quota arrangement with the Trump Administration, in lieu of
the tariffs on steel. The resulting quota arrangement reached between the two sides limits South
Korean steel exports to the United States to 70% of their average annual quantity during 2015-
2017.166 More recently, the Biden Administration has negotiated quota arrangements with the
European Union and Japan in exchange for lifting the Section 232 steel tariffs on these trade
partners.167 The EU and Japan arrangements are less restrictive in some respects, than the quota
arrangement with South Korea. For example, these arrangements are in the form of tariff-rate
quotas, whereby imports above the quota allotments are allowed but face a higher tariff. The
quota arrangement with South Korea, by contrast, does not allow for imports above the quota
level. During a visit to Washington, DC in January 2022, South Korea’s trade minister suggested
the Moon administration was seeking a renegotiation of its steel-quota arrangement.168
South Korea did not negotiate a quota deal on aluminum and remains subject to the 10%
aluminum tariffs. In 2020, steel and aluminum imports from South Korea were worth $1.5 billion
and $214 million, respectively.
South Korean exports of washing machines and solar panels are also subject to additional
temporary U.S. tariffs.169 President Trump imposed these safeguard tariffs in 2018, based on
recommendations from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), under Section 201 of the
Trade Act of 1974, to address serious or threatened serious injury from such imports to domestic
industries.170 In 2017, prior to the tariffs, South Korea was the third-largest source of U.S.
washing machine imports ($303 million) and the second-largest source of U.S. solar panel
imports ($1.1 billion). In 2020, washing machine and solar panel imports from South Korea were
worth $198 million and $1.0 billion, respectively.
South Korea notified the WTO of its right to retaliate in response to these safeguard measures.171
In line with WTO commitments on safeguard actions, this retaliation was to begin in 2021, but it

165 For more information, see CRS Report R45249, Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress,
coordinated by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C. Jones, and CRS In Focus IF10667, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, by Rachel F. Fefer.
166 Hyunjoo Jin and Joyce Lee, “U.S., South Korea Revise Trade Deal, Korean Steel Faces Quota,” Reuters, March 25,
2018.
167 USTR, “Tai, Raimondo Statements on 232 Tariff Agreement with Japan,” February 7, 2022.
168 Inside U.S. Trade, “Trade Minister: South Korea Wants More IPEF Details, Section 232 Talks,” January 28, 2022.
169 These import restrictions are in the form of tariff rate quotas (TRQs), whereby a limited volume of imports are
subject to a lower in-quota tariff and imports above that threshold are subject to a higher above-quota tariff. Both
above- and in-quota tariff rates decline annually. For further information, see Customs and Border Protections quota
bulletins: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/quota/bulletins/qb-21-507-2021-solar-cellmodules; and https://www.cbp.gov/
trade/quota/bulletins/qb-21-505-washers-and-covered-parts.
170 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10786, Safeguards: Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, by Vivian C.
Jones.
171 WTO, “Republic of Korea, Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards ... ,” April 6,
2018, at https://www.globaltradealert.org/state-act/30786/republic-of-korea-second-immediate-notification-of-
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appears that South Korea has not applied any retaliatory measures to date. South Korea also
initiated WTO dispute settlement procedures as a complainant with regard to both of the U.S.
Section 201 tariff measures. In early 2022, a WTO panel ruled that some aspects of the U.S.
Section 201 import restrictions on washing machines violate WTO commitments.172 Resolving
the dispute through the WTO dispute-settlement process may be challenging given vacancies on
the WTO’s appellate body, which have resulted in the appellate body ceasing to function.173
In May 2019, President Trump also declared auto and auto parts imports a national security
threat, following another Section 232 investigation by the Commerce Department. This provided
the President with authority to impose unilateral tariffs on automobile imports, including imports
from South Korea.174 President Trump never imposed additional auto tariffs, but the prospect of
the tariffs added tension and uncertainty in the bilateral relationship. South Korean officials
expressed frustration at the threatened tariffs, particularly given the recent negotiation of the
KORUS FTA modifications and what they viewed as significant South Korean concessions on
auto issues, such as the extension of the U.S. light truck tariff.175
Biden Administration officials have stated that unilateral tariffs are a legitimate and at times
necessary U.S. trade policy tool176 and the Administration appears to have no intent currently to
remove the existing import restrictions affecting South Korea.177 The Section 201 tariffs are time
limited up to a total duration of eight years. President Trump extended the washing machine
tariffs through February 2023 and President Biden recently extended the solar tariffs, with some
modification, through February 2026.178 The Section 232 import restrictions are not time limited
and will remain in place unless the President takes action to remove them. While some domestic
U.S. producers of competing products support the tariff actions on steel, aluminum, solar panels,
and washing machines, downstream U.S. industries and retailers argue the tariffs raise costs in the
United States, which are ultimately passed to consumers and have argued that removing the tariffs
could also be a potential tool to lower costs for U.S. consumers.179

suspension-of-concessions-towards-the-united-states.
172 WTO, “WTO Dispute Panel Issues Report Regarding U.S. Safeguard on Large Residential Washers,” February 8,
2022 at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/546r_e.htm.
173 For more information, see CRS Report R45417, World Trade Organization: Overview and Future Direction,
coordinated by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.
174 Trump White House, “Adjusting Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts into the United States,” May 17,
2019, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/adjusting-imports-automobiles-automobile-parts-
united-states/.
175 Song Jung-a and Edward White, “South Korea Urges Trump to Drop Threatened Car Tariffs,” Financial Times,
May 12, 2019.
176 U.S. Congress, Senate Finance Committee, Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Katherine C. Tai to be United
States Trade Representative, with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary: Questions for the Record
(“Nomination Hearing”), 117th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 25, 2021.
177 Commerce Secretary Gina M. Raimondo and USTR Katherine Tai, “What New Steel and Aluminum Deals Mean
for American Families,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, November 28, 2021.
178 President Trump, “Proclamation on the Continuation of Facilitating Positive Adjustment to Competition from
Imports of Large Residential Washers,” January 14, 2021; President Biden, “Proclamation to Continue Facilitating
Positive Adjustment from Competition from Imports of Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells,” February 4,
2022.
179 Wall Street Journal, “U.S. Manufacturers Blame Tariffs for Swelling Inflation,” May 30, 2021.
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Currency Issues
South Korean exchange rate policies periodically have been a source of consternation in bilateral
relations. Some observers argue that South Korea has at times artificially depressed the value of
the South Korean won in order to gain a trade advantage by making its exports cheaper in other
countries’ markets.180 Given its dependence on international trade, South Korea’s economy can be
significantly affected by fluctuations in currency valuations. The U.S. Department of the Treasury
(Treasury) monitors the foreign exchange policies of major U.S. trading partners and reports to
Congress on its findings semi-annually.181
Pursuant to the Trade Facilitation and Enforcement Act of 2015, this semi-annual report considers
three criteria to determine whether foreign countries’ policies warrant more intensive engagement
by Treasury. These criteria include (1) a significant (at least $20 billion) bilateral trade surplus
with the United States; (2) a material (in excess of 2% of GDP) current account surplus; and (3)
persistent (occurring in six of 12 prior months) net purchases of foreign currency totaling at least
2% of GDP. Having had large bilateral and current account surpluses with the United States for
several years, South Korea has met two of the three criteria during every reporting period except
one since April 2016, and has remained on Treasury’s Monitoring List of countries meriting close
attention.182
In its April 2021 report to Congress, Treasury noted that in 2020, South Korea also engaged in
foreign exchange transactions in an effort to limit appreciation of the won—a potential violation
of the third monitoring criteria.183 However, the scale of these transactions, which Treasury
estimated ranged from $5 billion to $21.1 billion, remained under the 2% of GDP threshold
required to trigger greater engagement by Treasury. The report urged South Korea to limit its
currency interventions “to only exceptional circumstances of disorderly market conditions.”184
Some economists, however, argue that Treasury’s analysis of South Korea’s foreign exchange
transactions in 2020 was too narrow and found, using a broader definition of such transactions,
that South Korea did manipulate its currency for a trade advantage.185 Since 2018, South Korea
has publicly reported on its foreign exchange transactions. The United States had long urged
greater transparency in such transactions, and the Trump Administration stated that it reached an
agreement with South Korea to this effect on the sidelines of the negotiations to modify the
KORUS FTA.186

180 For example, see Mark Sobel, U.S. Foreign Exchange Policy—Currency Provisions and Trade Deals, CSIS, April
3, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-foreign-exchange-policy-currency-provisions-and-trade-deals.
181 For more information, see CRS Report R43242, Debates over Exchange Rates: Overview and Issues for Congress,
by Rebecca M. Nelson.
182 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the
United States, April 2021, p. 58. Three countries satisfied all three criteria in the April 2021 report: Vietnam, Taiwan,
and Switzerland. Other countries on the Monitoring List included China, Japan, Germany, Ireland, Italy, India,
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Mexico.
183 Ibid., p. 22.
184 Ibid.
185 Joseph E. Gagnon, “Yellen Treasury Looks the Other Way on Currency Manipulation,” Peterson Institute for
International Economics, April 23, 2021.
186 Trump Administration White House, “President Donald J. Trump is Fulfilling His Promise on the United States-
Korea FTA and on National Security,” September 24, 2018, fact sheet, at https://go.usa.gov/xe8Vq.
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South Korea’s Domestic Economy
In 2020, South Korea’s economy contracted by 0.9%, one of the mildest contractions among
advanced economies during the global pandemic-induced recession.187 The economy benefitted
from the government’s ability to control the domestic spread of COVID-19 with minimal
business lockdowns, supportive fiscal and monetary policy, and a sharp rebound in global
demand for major South Korean exports. Despite the Moon Administration’s relative success in
moderating the economic fallout from the pandemic, the Administration has faced criticism over
its broader economic reform agenda and South Korea continues to face a number of long-term
economic challenges, including growing concerns over income and wealth inequality.188
The country experienced a dramatic shift in its economic trajectory over the past several decades.
South Korea’s economy expanded rapidly in the decades following the Korean War (1960s-
1980s), during which it transformed from a largely agrarian to a modern industrialized economy.
Although the country suffered a setback during the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, it
pursued significant economic reforms, which helped it weather the global financial crisis in the
late 2000s and avoid the deep recessions experienced in most advanced economies.189 In 1990,
South Korean gross domestic product (GDP)/capita was roughly one-third of the level in the
United States, and by 2010, South Korea had closed this gap by half.190 However, during the last
decade South Korea experienced a significant growth slowdown. Ten-year average annual GDP
growth in South Korea fell from 7.2% during the 1990s to 4.7% in the 2000s to 2.6% in the 2010s
(Figure 5).
Demographic Challenges191
Economists point to a number of reforms that could potentially accelerate the country’s economic
outlook. Two of the most fundamental challenges the country faces are its shrinking and rapidly
ageing population. South Korea’s population declined in 2020, for the first time on record.192 At
0.84 children per woman in 2020, the nation has the world’s lowest birthrate, which has trended
further below the replacement rate of 2.1 since the early 1980s.193 Despite efforts to encourage
childbirth by successive governments, the rate has steadily declined, falling in each year of the
Moon administration and by 20% from 2017 (1.05) to 2020 (0.84).194 Women in South Korea face
a number of challenges in juggling a career and childcare, and receive significant pay disparities
relative to men, with compensation 32.5% below men on average—the largest gap in the
OECD.195 A shrinking population poses economic challenges, ranging from labor market

187 Bank of Korea, “Monthly Statistical Bulletin,” October 29, 2021, p. 16.
188 Song Jung-a and Edward White, “South Korea Shatters National Debt Taboo to Tackle Inequality,” Financial
Times, September 6, 2021.
189 For a brief overview of South Korea’s economic transition, see Marcus Noland, “South Korea: The Backwater that
Boomed,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 93, no. 1 (January-February 2014).
190 GDP data from IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2021.
191 Former CRS research associate Tracy Jenkins helped prepare this section.
192 Rick Gladstone, “As Birthrate Falls, South Korea’s Population Declines, Posing Threat to Economy,” New York
Times, January 4, 2021.
193 Statistics Korea, “Vital Statistics of Korea,” updated September 28, 2021, at https://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?
orgId=101&tblId=DT_1B8000F&language=en.
194 Ibid.
195 OECD, Inclusive Growth Review of Korea, 2021, p. 26.
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distortions, to a shortage of males eligible for military conscription, to general stagnant or
slowing economic growth.196
Figure 5. South Korea’s Annual GDP Growth

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2021.
Compounding these difficulties, South Korea has become the fastest ageing population among
higher-income economies. Unless this demographic trend is reversed or moderated, a shrinking
working age population will have to support a growing number of retirees, placing increasing
strain on the country’s finances. In 2019, the OECD estimated that South Korea’s dependency
ratio (the number of people older than 65 per 100 people of working age) will grow from roughly
20% today to nearly 90% by 2060 and will outpace Japan (with a ratio estimated at 80% in
2060).197 Poverty among the elderly population is already a major concern and the highest among
OECD countries at 43% in 2018.198
In light of its demographic challenges, a key potential method for boosting economic growth in
South Korea is to increase the country’s productivity per worker. As of 2017, South Korea’s
GDP/hour worked was near the bottom of OECD countries, on par with Greece and roughly half
that of the United States, suggesting considerable potential for improvement.199 Some observers
argue that greater investment in emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, could be

196 Aram Hur, “South Korea’s Demographic Crisis Is Challenging Its National Story - Demographics and the Future of
South Korea,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed July 31, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/
2021/06/29/south-korea-s-demographic-crisis-is-challenging-its-national-story-pub-84820.
197 OECD, Fiscal Challenges and Inclusive Growth in Ageing Societies, OECD Economic Policy Paper No. 27,
September 2019, p. 10, https://doi.org/10.1787/c553d8d2-en.
198 OECD, “Poverty Rate Indicator,” 2021 at https://data.oecd.org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm.
199 OECD, Compendium of Productivity Indicators 2019, 2019, p. 49 at https://doi.org/10.1787/1e1087a0-en.
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critical to improving South Korean labor productivity and easing the fiscal burdens, such as on
healthcare, of its ageing population.200
Bifurcated Industrial Structure and Labor Market
While the country is home to some of the world’s most innovative companies, a vast divide exists
between these firms and those that employ the majority of the workforce. On one side of this split
are the country’s largest, export-oriented and globally competitive firms (often family-run
conglomerates called chaebol), which are typically in the manufacturing sector. On the other side
of this divide are South Korea’s small firms, which are concentrated in the services sector and
tend to be domestically oriented, and less productive. According to one study, value added per
worker in the services sector, which employs three-quarters of the workforce, is roughly half that
in the manufacturing sector.201 The IMF has called for reforms, including easing barriers to entry
and simplifying the regulatory processes, to encourage a more dynamic business environment that
better equips young small firms to expand, and to boost productivity among services firms.202
A related challenge is the duality of the South Korean labor market. Strong labor protections and
benefits packages for regular workers give firms an incentive to hire non-regular or temporary
workers, who are easily fired and have fewer benefits. Non-regular workers, who account for
roughly one-third of the salaried workforce, receive lower compensation (roughly two-thirds the
level of regular workers), despite reportedly similar skill levels, and once in such positions, the
probability of transitioning to regular employment is low, with fewer opportunities to upgrade
skills.203 The elderly, young, and women are heavily over-represented among non-regular
workers. The pandemic recession exacerbated South Korea’s labor market disparities, with non-
regular workers facing the greatest share of layoffs.204 As the country recovers from the
pandemic, there are growing concerns that employment increases have been concentrated in non-
regular employment, including for college-educated workers.205 In addition to addressing
concerns over fairness, many economists argue that greater flexibility in the labor market could
help boost productivity by, for example, encouraging lifelong acquisition of new skills.206
Increasing Housing Costs and Widening Inequality
Other economic concerns include rapidly rising housing costs and related growth in household
debt levels, especially during the pandemic. Average home prices in the Seoul metropolitan area,
where the majority of the population lives, have doubled over the past five years, despite a variety
of measures by the Moon government to deter price growth. These prices are now equal to 18
times the median household income.207 Home prices surged 13% this year to August 2021, the

200 For example, see Kyle Ferrier, Can Emerging Technologies Cushion South Korea's Demographic Downturn,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Demographics and the Future of South Korea, June 29, 2021.
201 Jong-Wha Lee, “The Republic of Korea’s Economic Growth and Catch-Up: Implications for the People’s Republic
of China,” Asia Development Bank Institute, ADBI Working Paper Series No. 571, April 2016, p. 20.
202 IMF, 2021 Article IV Consultation, Republic of Korea, March 2021, p. 27.
203 OECD, Towards Better Social and Employment Security in Korea, 2018, at https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264288256-
en.
204 IMF, 2021 Article IV Consultation, Republic of Korea, March 2021, p. 8.
205 Choi Jae-hee, “Irregular Workers with College Degrees Hit Record High: Data,” Korea Herald, November 1, 2021.
206 See for example, Choong Yong Ahn, “Beware the Law of Unintended Consequences: Why South Korea's Income-
Led Growth Policy Isn't Working,” Global Asia, vol. 14, no. 3 (September 2019).
207 Cynthia Kim, “Seoul Warns of Debt Hangover as Apartment Price Growth Hits 15-yr High,” Reuters, September
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fastest rate of growth in 15 years.208 At 201% of disposable income, household debt levels in
South Korea are among the highest in the OECD and roughly twice that of the United States.209
The Bank of Korea cited concerns over the growth in household debt and property prices in its
August 2021 determination to raise South Korea’s base interest rate to 0.75%.210
These various challenges have led to societal tensions over wealth and income inequality and
privileges of the elite class. The Moon administration came to power in the aftermath of the South
Korean public’s outrage at former-President Park’s corruption scandal, which included special
treatment for politically connected families. The activities and employment patterns of the
chaebol contribute to narratives about unfairness and inequality in the economic system, as a
small share of South Koreans (roughly 12%) enjoy the high wages and benefits associated with
employment at these large firms.211 At the same time, a history of direct and indirect state support
helped the chaebol to achieve their dominant position in the country’s economy (e.g., Hyundai
and its subsidiary Kia account for 80% of domestic auto sales).212 Corruption and illicit activity
among chaebol leaders, who often face relatively lenient sentences if convicted, is another
concern—Samsung’s head, for example, was convicted of bribery related to the impeachment of
former President Park Geun-hye.213 Some critics of chaebol privileges argue that reforms to
address their concentration of economic and political power may be fundamental to improving
South Korea’s economic outlook.214
Addressing inequality and delivering more inclusive economic growth has been the central
economic focus of President Moon’s tenure, in addition to pandemic recovery. The Moon
administration has implemented a number of key reforms, particularly in the labor market,
including multiple yearly increases to the minimum wage (totaling roughly 30%), a statutory limit
to weekly working hours, and a boost in government hiring. As in the United States, there is
intense debate in South Korea over the appropriate reforms to improve economic outcomes for
low-income households, and many in South Korea have been critical of the Moon
administration’s policies. Critics point to lackluster economic growth and widening income
inequality metrics in arguing that President Moon has failed to address the core challenges in the
economy, and instead urge greater focus on spurring productivity through innovation and greater
flexibility in the labor market.215
The Korean New Deal
More recently, in mid-2020, the Moon administration announced a Korean New Deal agenda that
includes greater government investment in digital technology and green growth industries with
planned associated investment by the private sector. Some observers saw this new economic
framework as an attempt to address the criticisms of the government’s income-driven growth

23, 2021.
208 Ibid.
209 OECD Data, Household Debt, 2021, at https://data.oecd.org/hha/household-debt.htm.
210 Bank of Korea, “Monetary Policy Decision,” press release, August 26, 2021.
211 Eleanor Albert, “South Korea’s Chaebol Challenge,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 4, 2018.
212 Sangin Park, “Chaebol Reforms are Crucial for South Korea’s Future,” East Asia Forum, March 24, 2021.
213 Bryan Harris and Kang Buseong, “South Koreans Push for Promised Chaebol Reforms,” Financial Times,
November 27, 2018.
214 Sangin Park, “Chaebol Reforms are Crucial for South Korea’s Future,” East Asia Forum, March 24, 2021.
215 Choong Yong Ahn, “Beware the Law of Unintended Consequences: Why South Korea's Income-Led Growth Policy
Isn't Working,” Global Asia, vol. 14, no. 3 (September 2019).
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policies.216 In 2021, President Moon broadened this agenda with more funding toward the social
safety net and efforts to stimulate economic activity outside of Seoul.217 South Korea’s social
welfare spending, at 12.2% of GDP in 2019, is among the lowest of advanced economies, with
only Turkey (12%), Chile (11.4%), and Mexico (7.5%) spending less as share of economic output
among OECD members.218 Given the short time remaining in the Moon administration, the
success of these Korean New Deal initiatives may depend largely on cooperation and
continuation by the private sector and the policies of South Korea’s next administration.
Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation Cooperation
The United States and South Korea have cooperated in the peaceful use of nuclear energy since
the 1950s.219 This cooperation includes commercial power reactor projects as well as research and
development work on safety, safeguards, advanced nuclear reactors, and fuel cycle technologies.
In their May 2021 Joint Summit statement, the two Presidents reaffirmed “that close coordination
on all matters related to global nonproliferation and safe, secure, and safeguarded uses of nuclear
technology remain key characteristics of the alliance, and the United States recognizes the ROK’s
global role in promoting nonproliferation efforts.”220 They pledged to “develop cooperation in
overseas nuclear markets, including joint participation in nuclear power plant projects.” The
High-Level Bilateral Commission (HLBC) on nuclear energy provides a forum for strategic
dialogue and technical exchanges, especially regarding spent fuel management, the promotion of
nuclear exports and export control cooperation, assured fuel supply, and nuclear security. 221
Nuclear power constitutes approximately one-third of South Korea’s electricity.222 The South
Korean government is planning a phase out for nuclear energy by 2040, partly reflecting concern
by the public about safety issues related to nuclear energy as a whole. At the same time, South
Korea is a new exporter of nuclear power plants, with Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO)
completing construction of the first of four AP1400 reactors in the United Arab Emirates in 2018.
Some argue that closer U.S.-ROK cooperation in nuclear reactor exports could revitalize the
nuclear industries in both countries.223 Others see the two countries as possible competitors for
future contracts such as in Saudi Arabia. Advances in small modular reactor (SMR) designs in
both countries are a growing area of cooperation between U.S. and South Korean companies.224
South Korea is a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and has IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol, on its nuclear facilities. South Korea

216 Kim Jaewon, “South Korea’s Moon Stakes Legacy on $138bn K-New Deal,” Nikkei Asia, October 14, 2020.
217 South Korea’s Office of the President, “Remarks by President Moon Jae-in at Presentation for Korean New Deal 2.0
Plans,” July 14, 2021.
218 OECD, Social Expenditure Database, updated November 2020, at https://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm.
219 The original agreement for civilian nuclear cooperation was concluded in 1956, and amendments were made in
1958, 1965, 1972, and 1974. See also CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by
Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin and CRS Report R41032, U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World
Nuclear Energy Market: Major Policy Considerations, by Mark Holt.
220 White House, “U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement,” May 21, 2021.
221 “Statement on Launch of the U.S.-Republic of Korea High Level Bilateral Commission,” http://www.nss2016.org/
news/2016/3/4/statement-on-launch-of-the-us-republic-of-korea-high-level-bilateral-commission.
222 “Nuclear Power in South Korea,” World Nuclear Association, updated November 2020, https://world-nuclear.org/
information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/south-korea.aspx.
223 Stephen Green, “Advancing US-ROK cooperation on nuclear energy,” The Atlantic Council, March 2021.
224 Jung Min-Lee, “South Korea and United States to Cooperate in Nuclear Power Industry,” Business Korea, May 24,
2021, http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=67785.
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is also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), which controls sensitive nuclear
technology trade. Further strengthening its nonproliferation commitments, at the May 2021
summit, South Korea agreed to “adopt a common policy with the United States to require
recipient countries have an IAEA safeguard agreement Additional Protocol in place as a condition
of supply of nuclear power plants.”225
In 2015, the United States and South Korea renewed their bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation or
“123” agreement following lengthy negotiations and a required congressional review period.226
The renewed agreement expanded South Korea's options for managing its fuel supply and spent
fuel stocks. It provides “express reciprocal consent rights over any retransfers or subsequent
reprocessing or enrichment of material subject to the agreement.”227 It also gives South Korea
advance permission to ship U.S.-obligated spent fuel overseas for reprocessing into mixed-oxide
fuel if it chooses to do so. The agreement allows for enrichment up to 20% of fissile uranium-235
in South Korea, after consultation through the bilateral commission and further written agreement
by the United States, and also includes U.S. fuel supply assurances.228
The United States and South Korea continue joint research and development projects to address
the disposition of spent fuel stocks. The Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is
pursuing a type of reprocessing called “pyroprocessing.” The U.S. and South Korea conduct joint
R&D on this technology at Idaho National Laboratory. The South Korean government sought
broad U.S. approval for pyroprocessing but did not receive it in the 123 agreement
negotiations.229 The United States has a long-term nonproliferation policy of discouraging the
spread of fuel cycle (enrichment and reprocessing) technology to new states because they can be
used to create material for fuel or for nuclear weapons. To help overcome this conflict, the United
States and South Korea began a 10-year Joint Fuel Cycle Study on the economics, technical
feasibility, and nonproliferation implications of spent fuel disposition, including
pyroprocessing.230 The Joint Study was expected to be completed in 2021, but the results have not
been officially announced. Critics of pyroprocessing contend that any separation of plutonium

225 White House, “Fact Sheet: United States-Republic of Korea Partnership,” May 21, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/fact-sheet-united-states-republic-of-korea-
partnership/.
226 “123” refers to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (as amended). The two governments initialed the text of the
renewed agreement in April 2015. The agreement did not require an affirmative vote of approval from Congress and
entered into force on November 25, 2015, after a mandatory congressional review period. Its duration is 20 years, after
which it automatically will renew for an additional five-year period unless either or both parties choose to withdraw.
Text found at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-114hdoc43/pdf/CDOC-114hdoc43.pdf.
227 The Atomic Energy Act (as amended) mandates that U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements require U.S. consent for
any “alteration in form or content” (to include enrichment or reprocessing) of U.S.-origin material or any material
processed in a plant containing transferred U.S. nuclear technology.
228 South Korea does not have an enrichment capability, but was seeking language in the new agreement that would
open the door to that possibility. Enrichment at low levels can be used for nuclear fuel and would be subject to IAEA
safeguards. South Korea sought prior consent for enrichment but did not receive it in the renewed agreement. Instead,
the agreement provides for the two sides to consider the issue through the High Level Bilateral Commission. The
current South Korean government plans to phase out nuclear power and has announced no plans for domestic
enrichment.
229 Fred McGoldrick, The New Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Between South Korea and the United States
From Dependence to Parity, Special Studies Series 6: Korea Economic Institute of America, September 2015.
230 For details, see CRS Report R41032, U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy Market:
Major Policy Considerations, by Mark Holt.
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from spent fuel could allow a country to make weapons-useable material with further chemical
processing.231
South Korea’s Regional Relations
South Korea-China Relations
As seen in the “Legislation in the 117th Congress” section, many Members see South Korea as a
partner in dealing with a variety of regional China-related challenges. China’s rise as an
economic and military power influences virtually all aspects of South Korean foreign and
economic policy. Since China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization, China has
emerged as South Korea’s most important economic partner. Over 25% of South Korea’s total
trade is with China, more than the combined level of South Korea’s trade with the United States
and Japan, its second and third-largest trade partners. For years, China has been the number one
location for South Korean firms’ foreign direct investment, and the two countries signed a
bilateral FTA in 2015. Yet, even as China is an important source of South Korean economic
growth, it also looms large as an economic competitor. Fears of increased competition with
Chinese enterprises have been an important motivator for South Korea’s push to negotiate a series
of FTAs with other major trading partners around the globe.
Beijing has punished ROK companies when it disagrees with Seoul’s policy decisions. Perhaps
the most notable example occurred following Seoul’s 2016 decision to deploy a U.S. THAAD
missile defense battery. China responded by enacting measures that have cost ROK companies
billions of dollars. Tensions were reduced after South Korea announced in October 2017 that it
had no intention of deploying additional THAAD batteries, was not seeking to join the United
States’ missile defense network, and would not enter into a trilateral military alliance with the
United States and Japan.232 Many South Korean officials and analysts criticize the United States
for not doing more to support Seoul in its ensuing struggle with Beijing over the issue.
Additionally, North Korea’s dependence on China has grown: since 2017, China has accounted
for over 90% of North Korea’s trade with the world and shielded North Korea from additional
sanctions at the UNSC. Therefore, South Korea must increasingly factor Beijing’s actions and
intentions into its North Korea policy. Chinese support or opposition could be decisive in shaping
the outcome of South Korea’s approaches to North Korea, both in the short term (such as
handling sudden crises) and the long term (such as contemplating how to bring about

231 Frank N. von Hippel and Jungmin Kang, “Why joint US-South Korean research on plutonium separation raises
nuclear proliferation danger,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 13, 2022.
https://thebulletin.org/2022/01/why-joint-us-south-korean-research-on-plutonium-separation-raises-nuclear-
proliferation-danger/
232 Then-Foreign Minister stated these policies, which became known as “The Three No’s,” in testimony to the
National Assembly on October 30, 2017. The following day, South Korea and the PRC simultaneously issued
statements on restoring better bilateral relations in which “the Chinese side expressed its position and concern
regarding the establishment of MD, additional deployment of THAAD, and military cooperation among Korea, the
United States, and Japan. The Korean side reiterated its positions that it had publicly stated.” The second sentence
reportedly referred to Foreign Minister Kang’s testimony. Although the South Korean government officially denied a
connection between the two announcements, reporting by various sources indicated they were part of a compromise
that put diplomatic relations back on track. Jung Min-kyung, “Seoul Not Considering Joining US Missile Defense
System: FM Kang,” The Korea Herald, October 30, 2017; Unofficial Translations of October 31, 2017 South Korea-
China statement provided to CRS by South Korean Embassy; Daniel Snyder, “South Korea Maneuvers Between China
and The U.S.,” Toyo Keizai, December 12, 2017.
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reunification). During a December 2021 visit to Australia, President Moon summarized the
context for his approach to China:
First of all, in terms of our alliance with the US, it's the basis of our diplomacy as well as
security affairs, and in terms of the economic relationship, of course, the relationship with
China is important. However, Korea has another factor to take into account, and that has
to do with the peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. And it's also denuclearisation
of DPRK. We need the constructive efforts of China to enable denuclearisation of DPRK.
Therefore, Korea is focused on the steadfast alliance with the US and also with China. We
want a harmonised relationship and we want to maintain such a relationship, and we will
be putting in the efforts to make this happen.233
Partially due to these factors, South Korean officials generally are reluctant to raise objections in
public about PRC behavior that does not directly affect South Korea, particularly on issues such
as human rights, the South China Sea, or Taiwan. However, many South Korean and U.S.
analysts have noticed a rise in negative attitudes towards China among South Koreans since the
2016 THAAD incident, as well as increased tensions between the two countries over PRC
fishermen’s alleged incursions into and over-fishing of South Korean waters. Many South
Koreans also have publicly expressed displeasure that in recent years the PRC has attempted to
appropriate Korean cultural and culinary products, such as kimchi, as well as a perceived PRC
campaign to lay claim to ancient kingdoms on the Korean Peninsula that Koreans regard as part
of their national history.234 According to a 2020 Pew Research Center poll, the PRC has replaced
Japan as the country South Koreans regard most unfavorably. Pew found that negative views
toward the PRC have been particularly notable among South Koreans in their 20s and 30s; among
the 14 countries surveyed, South Korea was the only country in which younger people held more
unfavorable views toward China than previous generations.235 These shifts in public opinion may
partly explain Moon’s willingness to allow more PRC-relevant phrases to appear in the Biden-
Moon May 2021 joint statement than is typical of U.S.-ROK statements.
Moon’s government has taken an ambiguous stance on whether to cooperate with the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“the Quad”), a cooperative forum that includes Australia, India,
Japan, and the United States. Seoul’s participation in Quad activities may be more likely after the
Biden Administration dropped the previous U.S. framing of the group as anti-China and led the
creation of new Quad initiatives on COVID-19 vaccine distribution, climate change, and critical
technologies. South Korea has comparable bilateral projects with the United States and several
other countries, creating the potential for expanded explicit or unofficial cooperation with the
Quad programs.
Many observers and policymakers have recommended the U.S. reorient its defense strategy,
posture, and presence in the Indo-Pacific to more directly address potential military challenges by
China. To this end, section 1251 of the FY2021 NDAA authorized the establishment of a Pacific
Deterrence Initiative to establish, oversee, and fund a long-term strategy to deter Chinese military
aggression in the Indo-Pacific and “to carry out prioritized activities to enhance the United States
deterrence and defense posture in the Indo-Pacific region, assure allies and partners, and increase
capability and readiness in the Indo-Pacific region.” As Members of Congress continue to
advance the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (for which the FY2022 NDAA authorized additional
funding) and seek to shape U.S. military responses to China in the Indo-Pacific, they may

233 Office of the Prime Minister of Australia, “Press Conference Transcript,” December 13, 2021.
234 “China Should Know Why Koreans are Upset over Hanbok at Olympics Show,” Hankyoreh, February 7, 2022.
235 Choe Sang-Hun, “South Koreans Now Dislike China More than They Dislike Japan,” New York Times, August 20,
2021; Laura Silver, Kat Devlin and Christine Huang, “Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many
Countries,” Pew Research Center, October 6, 2020.
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consider how such initiatives may affect U.S. military priorities and presence on the Korean
Peninsula and U.S.-ROK relations more generally.
South Korea-Japan Relations
South Korea’s ties with Japan are perennially fraught and U.S. policymakers have long
encouraged enhanced South Korea-Japan relations. For over a decade, some Members of
Congress have expressed support for deeper U.S.-ROK-Japan cooperation and concern when
relations between Seoul and Tokyo have taken a downturn.236 A cooperative relationship between
the two countries, both U.S. treaty allies, and among the three benefits U.S. interests because it
arguably enhances regional stability, helps coordination over North Korea policy, and boosts each
country’s ability to deal with the strategic challenges posed by China’s rise. However, bilateral
mistrust between Seoul and Tokyo has deepened over the past half-decade. Domestic political
dynamics in both countries often exact a political cost to those who advocate steps that would
help assuage the concerns of the other side and reward those who take a confrontational stance.
As a result, South Korea–Japan relations often suffer from strategic neglect in both capitals.237
Among the causes of bilateral friction are the two countries’ competing claims to the small
Dokdo/Takeshima islands in the Sea of Japan (called the East Sea by Koreans). Another major
source of tension is South Korean complaints that Japan has not adequately acknowledged its
history of aggression against Korea.238 For more than three generations beginning in the late 19th
century, Japan intervened directly in Korean affairs, culminating in the annexation of the Korean
peninsula in 1910. Over the next 35 years, Imperial Japan all but attempted to subjugate Korean
culture.239 Among the victims were tens of thousands240 of South Korean “comfort women” who
during the 1930s and 1940s were brought into, many if not most by coercive measures, a system
of facilities that provided sexual services for Japanese soldiers throughout the Imperial Japanese
Empire. When South Koreans perceive that Japanese officials are downplaying or denying this
history, it becomes difficult for South Korean leaders to support initiatives to institutionalize
improvements in bilateral ties.

236 For example, in February 2019, when South Korea-Japan relations were entering a particularly
tense phase, a bipartisan, bicameral group of lawmakers, including the chairs and ranking
members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, co-
sponsored a resolution (H.Res. 127 and S.Res. 67, 116th Congress) affirming the importance of
Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral cooperation.

237 Park Cheol-hee, “Strategic Neglect on Both Sides: Korea-Japan Relations in 2018,” November 13, 2018 discussion
at the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies,
Washington, DC.
238 Since the early 1950s, South Korea has administered Dokdo/Takeshima, which the U.S. government officially calls
the “Liancourt Rocks.”
239 For instance, Japanese authorities banned the use of the Korean language in schools and required all Koreans to
adopt Japanese names. Many Koreans believe that the United States was complicit in this history, in part by reportedly
informally agreeing in a 1905 meeting between U.S. Secretary of War William Taft and Japanese Prime Minister Taro
Katsura that the United States would recognize Japan’s sphere of influence over Korea in return for Japan doing the
same for the United States in the Philippines.
240 According to some Japanese sources, the number of South Korean comfort women was much lower.
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“Comfort Women”-Related Legislation in U.S. Congress
In the past, the U.S. House of Representatives has taken an interest in the comfort women issue. In the 109th
Congress, H.Res. 759 was passed by the House International Relations Committee on September 13, 2006, but
was not voted on by the ful House. In the 110th Congress, H.Res. 121, with 167 co-sponsors, was passed in the
House on July 30, 2007, by voice vote. This resolution expressed the sense of the House that Japan should
“formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner” for its
abuses of the comfort women. The text of the resolution calls the system “unprecedented in its cruelty” and “one
of the largest cases of human trafficking in the 20th century,” asserts that some Japanese textbooks attempt to
downplay this and other war crimes, and states that some Japanese officials have tried to dilute the 1993 Kono
Statement, a document issued by then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono that apologized to the victims and
admitted responsibility by the Japanese military. In the 113th Congress, the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act
(P.L. 113-76, H.R. 3547) indirectly referred to H.Res. 121. P.L. 113-76’s conference committee issued a Joint
Explanatory Statement that called on Federal Agencies to implement directives contained in the July 2013 H.Rept.
113-185, which in turn “urge[d] the Secretary of State to encourage the Government of Japan to address the
issues raised” in H.Res. 121.
Relations have been particularly tense in recent years, following four events in the 2018-19
period: Moon’s steps to effectively terminate a 2015 ROK-Japan agreement on comfort women;
South Korean Supreme Court rulings that Japanese firms should compensate South Koreans for
forced labor during Japan’s occupation; Japan’s June 2019 imposition of procedural hurdles on
exports to South Korea of key technology materials; and South Korea’s August 2019 decision to
abandon a ROK-Japan military intelligence-sharing pact. This final move threatened to further
erode U.S.-ROK-Japan security cooperation until, under heavy U.S. pressure, Seoul in November
2019 agreed to delay its withdrawal from the agreement. Many analysts criticized the Trump
Administration for not intervening earlier to prevent ROK-Japan relations from deteriorating. The
Biden Administration has emphasized the importance of trilateral cooperation and has convened a
number of high-level trilateral meetings, generally focused on dealing with North Korea, though
U.S. government readouts mention other topics of discussion such as climate change and securing
supply chains.241 Lingering tensions between the two sides, however, have prevented them from
holding a bilateral summit since 2019. The Administration’s February 2022 Indo-Pacific strategy
states that one of its ten “core lines of effort” is “expand[ing] U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation,” to
include not only North Korea-related matters, but also regional development and infrastructure,
critical technology and supply-chain issues, and women’s leadership and empowerment.
“Increasingly,” the strategy says, “we will seek to coordinate our regional strategies in a trilateral
context.”242
South Korea-Burma (Myanmar) Relations243
Following the Burmese military’s February 2021 seizure of political power, the South Korean
government called for the restoration of democracy and the South Korean National Assembly
passed a resolution condemning the junta’s actions. President Moon and other senior officials
issued particularly vocal condemnations of the junta’s violent suppression of protestors. They
cited parallels to a seminal moment in modern South Korean history, a May 1980 incident in the
South Korean city of Gwangju, where the South Korean military government cracked down
against a pro-democracy uprising, killing at least hundreds and perhaps thousands of protestors.244

241 For instance, see State Department, “Secretary Blinken’s Trilateral Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi
and Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Chung,” September 22, 2021.
242 The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, February 2022, p. 17.
243 Former CRS research associate Tracy Jenkins drafted this section.
244 “Moon Calls for Release of Myanmar's Aung San Suu Kyi, Condemns Crackdown on Protests,” Yonhap News
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South Korea suspended new defense exchanges and cooperation with Burma, including the
export of military supplies. It also extended the visa status of all Burma nationals residing in
South Korea until peace is restored in Burma, and is reassessing development corporation
projects, though has agreed to continue projects that would directly affect livelihood and
humanitarian aid assistance in Burma.245 In their May 2021 joint statement, Biden and Moon
condemned the actions of the Burmese military, known as the Tatmadaw. In November, the two
countries joined with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom to
condemn the Tatmadaw for its “ongoing human rights violations and abuses.”246
Prior to the 2021 coup, South Korean investment into Burma had increased significantly over the
previous decade. South Korea also significantly increased its Official Development Assistance
(ODA) to Burma since the middle of the past decade. After providing an estimated $44 million in
total ODA to Burma from 2010-2014, South Korea increased its aid disbursements to
approximately $260 million in the 2015-19 period.247 In comparison, South Korea provided over
$1.7 billion and $1.9 billion to all of ASEAN countries excluding Brunei, over the 2010-14 and
2015-2019 periods, respectively.
Prior to the February 2021 coup, South Korea was one of Burma’s top-ten trade and investment
partners, largely importing agricultural goods, apparel goods, rubber, and aluminum scraps, and
exporting heavy construction material, commercial and transport cars, medical goods, and
cosmetic goods.248 Between 1988 and 2017, Burma reportedly attracted $71 billion in foreign
direct investment, with South Korea accounting for 5% of the total.249 Between 2018 and 2021,
South Korea’s largest investment sectors in Burma by number of corporations were
manufacturing; wholesale retail; financial and insurance; and professional, scientific, technical
services.250 By value, the bulk of the investments was largely in the mining and financial sectors,
followed by manufacturing.
South Korea’s New Southern Policy: Relations with South and
Southeast Asia
In 2017, President Moon launched a whole-of-government initiative to elevate South Korea’s
relations with ASEAN’s ten member-states251 and India “to the same level Korea maintains with

Agency, March 6, 2021; “Moon Recalls 1980 Gwangju Uprising, Hopes for Breakthrough in Myanmar,” Yonhap News
Agency, May 18, 2021.
245 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Korean Government’s Measures on Situation in Myanmar,” March 12, 2021; Kim Sea
Young, “300 Days Since Myanmar Coup: How South Korea Can Deliver Aid That Counts,” The Peninsula blog, Korea
Economic Institute of America, November 17, 2021.
246 State Department, “Joint Statement on Increasing Violence in Myanmar,” November 26, 2021.
247 ODA numbers cited in constant 2019 dollars. Dataset: Aid (ODA) Disbursements to Countries and Regions
[DAC2a]”, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, data extracted July 22, 2021, available at
https://stats.oecd.org/#. For more, see Hyo-Sook Kim, “The Political Drivers of South Korea’s Official Development
Assistance to Myanmar,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 40, no. 3 (2018): 475–502.
248 KOTRA, “국가·지역정보” (Country/region information), KOTRA “해외시장뉴스” (Overseas Market News),
accessed July 21, 2021, https://news.kotra.or.kr/user/nationInfo/kotranews/14/nationMain.do?natnSn=57.
249 Blackpeak, “Investing in Myanmar: Southeast Asia’s Last Frontier| Blackpeak Group,” Blackpeak (blog), July 26,
2017, https://www.blackpeakgroup.com/2017/07/investing-in-myanmar-southeast-asias-last-frontier/.
250 KOTRA, “국가·지역정보” (Country/region information), KOTRA “해외시장뉴스” (Overseas Market News),
accessed July 21, 2021, https://news.kotra.or.kr/user/nationInfo/kotranews/14/nationMain.do?natnSn=57.
251 ASEAN’s members are Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines,
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the four major powers (the United States, China, Japan and Russia),” primarily by expanding
economic ties, people-to-people exchanges, and cooperation in non-traditional security areas such
as supply chain resiliency and global health.252 The effort, named the “New Southern Policy”
(NSP), fits with Moon’s overall goal of increasing South Korea’s strategic autonomy and
overlaps with parts of the United States’ approach to the Indo-Pacific over the past several years.
The NSP represents an attempt to diversify South Korea economically away from China, take
advantage of Southeast Asia’s and India’s growing economic importance, and expand South
Korea’s strategic flexibility, particularly amidst rising rivalry between the United States and
China. A further goal was to solidify the recipients’ support for Moon’s goals toward North
Korea.253
Within two years after unveiling the New Southern Policy, Moon visited India and became the
first South Korean president to visit all ten ASEAN members. Under the New Southern NSP, his
government expanded the government’s bureaucratic resources devoted to Southeast Asia,
announced a plan to more than double overseas development assistance to ASEAN countries by
2023, and concluded or began negotiating upgrades to multiple trade agreements with India and
Southeast Asian countries. The New Southern Policy emphasized the role South Korea could play
in helping Southeast Asian countries and India deal with non-traditional security issues such as
maritime security, terrorism, cyber security, natural disasters and climate change. In 2020,
Moon’s government launched the “New Southern Policy Plus,” which expanded public health
assistance, particularly COVID-19-related items.254
Moon’s New Southern Policy overlaps in a number of areas with the Indo-Pacific policies
pursued by both the Trump and Biden Administrations, including infrastructure development,
energy, pandemic response, and cybersecurity. Since at least 2019, the Washington, DC and Seoul
have attempted to create linkages between their two approaches, signing multiple MOUs, holding
a number of meetings to discuss coordination, and launching some small-scale joint projects in
Southeast Asia, such as an anti-corruption program in Indonesia.255 One 2021 study of U.S.-South
Korean coordination in Southeast Asia described most coordination as “nascent” and concluded
that rather than pursuing joint efforts with the United States and U.S.-led multi-country

Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
252 Presidential Committee on New Southern Policy, “What is the NSP?” http://www.nsp.go.kr/eng/policy/policy2.do,
accessed October 27, 2021; Sohn JiAe, “President Moon Unveils New Southern Policy for ASEAN,” Korea.net,
November 10, 2017.
253 Andrew Yeo, “South Korea’s New Southern Policy and the United States Indo-Pacific Strategy: Implications for the
U.S.-ROK Alliance,” July 22, 2021, Mansfield Foundation; Kathryn Botto, South Korea Beyond Northeast Asia: How
Seoul Is Deepening Ties With India and ASEAN, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2021.
254 Presidential Committee on New Southern Policy, “New Southern Policy Plus,” http://www.nsp.go.kr/eng/policy/
policy4_1.do, accessed October 27, 2021.
255 For a comprehensive list of joint projects, see Miyeon Oh, Beyond the Peninsula: Prospects for US-ROK Regional
Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, The Atlantic Council, September 2021.
During the Trump Administration, the United States and South Korea issued joint fact sheets on cooperation in 2019
and again in 2020, identifying energy, infrastructure and development, the digital economy, natural disaster response,
and marine environmental protection, and other issues on which cooperation could be fruitful. In September 2019, U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs signed a
memorandum of understanding in September 2019 to strengthen development cooperation in sectors such as women’s
empowerment, youth, health, and education. USAID, “Memorandum of Understanding for Development Cooperation
between the United States Agency for International Development and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Korea,” September 30, 2019. MOUs also have been signed between the Treasury Department and South Korea’s
Ministry of Economy and Finance on joint infrastructure development efforts, and between the U.S. CDC and the
Korea CDC on jointly preventing and fighting regional disease outbreaks.
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initiatives, South Korea “seems to prefer to focus on complementary, but independent, efforts in
Southeast Asia.”256 The most high profile and ambitious joint project, the KORUS Global Vaccine
Partnership launched by Biden and Moon in May 2021, appears to be an exception to this general
rule.
South Korea’s Political Structure
For most of the first four decades after the country was founded in 1948, South Korea was ruled
by authoritarian governments. Following widespread anti-government protests throughout the
1980s, the country’s military rulers in 1987 agreed to allow a new constitution to be written and
elections to be held. These moves opened the door to a fundamental transformation of the South
Korean polity into what by most measures is a thriving, robust democracy. Over the past 30 years,
South Korea has conducted seven presidential elections, managed multiple changes in power
from ruling to opposition party, held elections at all levels of government, and experienced a
flowering of civil society organizations. Peaceful protests against government policies, protected
by constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression, are a regular feature of daily life. South
Korea’s unicameral National Assembly has impeached two presidents, one of whom, Park Geun-
hye, was subsequently removed from office in March 2017 for corruption by a unanimous
Constitutional Court ruling that followed massive candlelight protests against her. In December
2021, Moon pardoned Park, who had defeated him in the 2012 presidential election.
A Powerful Executive Branch
Nominally, power in South Korea is shared by the president and the 300-member unicameral
National Assembly. Of these, 253 members represent single-member constituencies. The
remaining 47 are selected based on proportional voting. National Assembly members are elected
to four-year terms. The president and the central bureaucracy continue to be the dominant forces
in South Korean policymaking, as formal and informal limitations prevent the National Assembly
from initiating major pieces of legislation. Constitutional reforms to reduce the President’s
powers have been proposed by a succession of governments, most recently by President Moon.
Neither the previous National Assembly, in office from 2016-2020, nor the current one have
advanced these proposals.257
Political Parties
Presently, there are two major political parties in South Korea. U.S. ties historically have been
stronger with South Korea’s conservative parties.
 The Minjoo (Democratic) Party is South Korea’s largest party and its main
progressive party. Minjoo has controlled the National Assembly since April 2016
elections and currently controls the largest majority in the chamber since the
1987 Constitution was adopted. Minjoo’s predecessors controlled the Blue House
from 1998 to 2008, and the National Assembly from 2004 to 2008.

256 Miyeon Oh, Beyond the Peninsula: Prospects for US-ROK Regional Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, The Atlantic
Council, September 2021.
257 Moon’s proposals – many of which appeared in previous reform plans – included decentralizing the power of the
presidency, changing the single five-year presidency to a four-year term with opportunity for a second term (a
provision that would have applied to Moon’s successor), granting more autonomy to local governments, and delegating
more authority to the prime minister.
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 The People Power Party (PPP) is a conservative grouping and is South Korea’s
second-largest party. The PPP and its predecessor parties have controlled the
National Assembly for all but nine of the 33 years since the 1987 Constitution
went into effect. Since 2016, however, the main conservative political grouping
has been in the legislative minority, a reflection of the disarray conservatives
faced following the Park Geun-hye impeachment.
Challenges to Political and Civil Rights in South Korea
Even amidst South Korea’s democratic transformation and consolidation, questions have
persisted about the depth of South Korea’s democracy. 258 South Korea’s commitment to
democracy can appear conditional, with one standard for political allies of whoever occupies the
presidential office in the Blue House and another for opponents. In general, South Korean
conservative (as right-of-center groups are generally referred to South Korea) presidents use the
executive branch’s dominant position to target and investigate progressive (left of center) political
opponents, with the roles reversed during times of progressive rule. Often this dynamic of
selective suppression centers around North Korea policy, with conservative governments
attempting to silence critics of generally harder line policies toward Pyongyang, and progressive
governments using its powers to do the same to critics of their pro-engagement policies.259
Constitutional, legal, and political checks generally have proven insufficient to stop governments
of all political stripes from selectively attempting to limit freedom of expression to contain
political opposition.260
President Moon, for instance, has been criticized by domestic opponents, as well as non-Korean
academics and human rights organizations, for using his powers to selectively dampen freedom of
speech and expression, particularly against activities and speech that run counter to his
government’s pro-engagement policy toward North Korea.261 Critics have been particularly vocal
about the government’s support for a new law, passed in December 2020, criminalizing the
sending of material, such as leaflets, into North Korea that are critical of the North Korean regime
without permission from the Seoul government.262
Moon was elected in 2017 in part because he seemed to be a departure from the abuses that
resulted in the impeachment—and later removal from office—of Park Geun-hye (in power 2013-
2017). Park’s immediate predecessor, fellow conservative Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013), also was

258 See, for instance, Andrew Yeo, “Has South Korean Democracy Hit a Glass Ceiling? Institutional-cultural Factors
and Limits to Democratic Progress,” Asian Politics & Policy, November 2020, Volume 12, Issue 4, pp. 539-558.
259 Jung Pak, “North Korea’s long shadow on South Korea’s democracy,” Brookings Institution, January 22, 2021.
260 Stephan Haggard and Jong-Sung You, “Freedom of Expression in South Korea,” Journal of Contemporary Asia,
2015, Vol. 45, No. 1, p. 167.
261 See, for instance, Jung Pak, “North Korea’s long shadow on South Korea’s democracy,” Brookings Institution,
January 22, 2021.
262 In the 117th Congress, the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission held a hearing on South Korea that was largely
prompted by the so-called leaflet law. U.S. Congress, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, Civil and Political
Rights in the Republic of Korea: Implications for Human Rights on the Peninsula, 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 15, 2021.
The same month, four United Nations Special Rapporteurs on human rights submitted a letter to President Moon
expressing their concern that the law “may negatively impact the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression and
the legitimate activities of some civil society organisations and human right defenders in the ROK.” The April 19, 2021
letter, available at https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26313,
was sent by the United Nations’ Special Rapporteurs on: the situation of human rights in North Korea; the promotion
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the rights to freedom of peace assembly and of
association; and the situation of right defenders.
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accused of using Cold War-era laws to quash critics and hints of pro-North Korea sentiment.
South Korea’s rating in the World Press Freedom index maintained by the NGO Reporters
Without Borders fell more than 30 places during Park’s term. It since has rebounded under
Moon.263 Park and Lee were criticized in particular for abusing the National Security Law,
promulgated in 1948, which grants authorities the power to detain, arrest, and imprison persons
believed to have committed acts intended to endanger the “security of the state,” including the
dissemination of anything that the government classifies as North Korean “propaganda.”264
Since the restoration of democracy in the 1980s, every past president and/or presidential family
has been engulfed in major corruption scandals involving them and/or their families. Three of the
six were jailed for corruption after leaving office. A fourth, President Moon’s mentor, Roh Moo-
hyun (in office 2003-2008), committed suicide amid an expanding investigation into charges that
he, his family, and close associates had illegally profited from his time in office. In 2018, a year
after Park Geun-hye’s removal from office and criminal conviction, former president Lee was
arrested and convicted for corruption during his time in office.
Legislation in the 117th Congress
S. 1605/P.L. 117-81, The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022. Section
1252 states that the sense of Congress is that the Secretary of Defense should “recommit to
and strengthen United States defense alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region so
as to further the comparative advantage of the United States in strategic competition with the
People’s Republic of China, including by ... reinforcing the United States alliance with the
Republic of Korea and maintaining the presence 10 of approximately 28,500 members of the
United States Armed Forces deployed to the country.... ” Section 1201 authorizes the
Secretary of Defense to provide administrative support to foreign personnel assigned to the
United Nations Command in South Korea. Section 2511 authorizes the Secretary of Defense
to accept up to $505 million in in-kind contributions from South Korea, in the form of
construction projects at U.S. bases in South Korea, including a Black Hat Intelligence Fusion
Center at Camp Humphries. S. 1605 was passed by the House on 12/7/2021 (363 – 70, Roll
no. 405); it was passed by the Senate on 12/15/2021 (88 – 11, Record Vote Number 499); it
was signed by the President 12/27/2021.
H.R.826 (Meng)/S. 2688 (Hirono), The Korean War Divided Families Reunification Act. The
bill would require the Department of State to annually report to Congress on its consultations
with South Korea and with Korean American representatives on potential opportunities to
reunite Korean Americans with family in North Korea. H.R. 826 was introduced on 2/4/2021
and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which reported the bill on
4/21/2021; the bill was passed by the House on 7/19/2021 (415 – 0, Roll no. 209) and
referred to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations S. 2688 was introduced on 8/10/2021 and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
H.R. 4521 (Johnson), The America COMPETES Act of 2022. As published by the House
Rules Committee on January 25, 2022,265 among the measures potentially affecting U.S.-

263 “Distinct Improvement after a Bad Decade,” Reporters without Borders, https://rsf.org/en/south-korea, accessed
April 2, 2021.
264 “South Korea: Abolish or Fix National Security Law,” Human Rights Watch, September 17, 2010; Jeyup S Kwaak,
“U.N. Expert Criticizes South Korea on Human Rights,” Korea Real Time, The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2013;
“South Korea: Cold War Relic Law Criminalizes Criticism,” Human Rights Watch, May 28, 2015.
265 See Rules Committee Print 117-31, https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-
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South Korea relations are: Section 30125 expresses the sense of Congress that the U.S. and its
allies should lead cooperate to combat digital authoritarianism; Section 30202, which states
that it is U.S. policy “to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with and
among United States allies in the Indo-Pacific,” including South Korea; and section 30303,
which states that it is U.S. policy to coordinate with South Korea and other U.S. allies to
promote democracy and human rights in Hong Kong. H.R. 4521 was introduced July 19,
2021 and was passed by the House, with numerous amendments, on February 4, 2022 (222 -
210 (Roll no. 31).
H.R. 1504 (Levin), The Enhancing North Korea Humanitarian Assistance Act.The bill would
require the Treasury Department to modify North Korea sanctions regulations to facilitate
humanitarian aid projects that currently are exempted from sanctions. The bill would also
expand the coverage of the humanitarian aid exemption. The bill would require the State
Department to brief Congress on plans to expand exceptions to the current restrictions on
U.S. citizens’ travel to North Korea. H.R. 1504 was introduced on 3/02/2021 and referred to
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the House Committee on Financial Services.
H.R. 1743 (Green)/ S. 677 (Lee), The Allied Burden Sharing Report Act of 2021. The bill
would require the Defense Department to report on (1) the defense spending and military
activities of South Korea and other countries with cooperative defense agreements with the
United States, (2) whether these countries place limits on the use of funds contributed to the
common defense, and (3) any U.S. actions to minimize such limitations. H.R. 1743 was
introduced on 3/10/2021 and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. S.677 was
introduced on 3/10/2021 and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
H.R. 3373 (Bera)/S. 1774 (Schatz), The Honoring OCEANIA Act. The bill states that it is U.S.
policy to work with South Korea and other countries “to advance shared alliance goals of the
Oceania region concerning health, environmental protection, disaster resilience and
preparedness, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (commonly referred to as “IUU
fishing”), maritime security, and economic development.” The bill would require the State
Department to submit materials to Congress on U.S. cooperation with South Korea and other
allies on promoting various goals in Oceania. H.R. 3373 was introduced on 5/20/2021 and
referred to the following House committees and subcommittees: Foreign Affairs; Natural
Resources; Armed Services; Financial Services; Homeland Security; the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship; the Transportation and Infrastructure
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation; and the Veterans' Affairs
Subcommittee on Health. S. 1774 was introduced on 5/20/2021 and referred to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations.
H.R. 3382 (Connolly)/S. 1861 (Blunt), The Partner with Korea Act. The bill would create an
E-4 nonimmigrant visa category for up to 15,000 South Korean nationals each fiscal year
who are coming to the United States solely to perform specialty occupation services, subject
to various requirements. H.R. 3382 was introduced on 5/20/2021 and referred to the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship. S. 1861 was introduced on
5/26/2021 and referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 3446 (Sherman), The Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act. The bill states that it is the
sense of Congress that the State Department should (a) “pursue serious, urgent diplomatic
engagement with North Korea and South Korea” to reach “a binding peace agreement
constituting a formal and final end to the state of war” on the Korean Peninsula and (b)

117HR4521RH-RCP117-31.pdf. The House-passed version, incorporating amendments, has not been published as of
the date of this report.
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attempt to enter negotiations to exchange diplomatic liaison offices with North Korea. The
bill would require the State Department to report to Congress on its roadmap for achieving a
permanent peace on the Peninsula. The bill states that it is the sense of Congress that the State
Department should review restrictions barring United States nationals traveling to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and report to Congress on the results of the
review. H.R. 3446 was introduced on 5/20/2021 and referred to the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 3524 (Meeks), The Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement (EAGLE)
Act. The bill aims to “revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and
engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.” It contains a number of “sense of
Congress” and “statements of U.S. policy” provisions supporting U.S.-ROK relations,
promoting U.S.-ROK cooperation in “advancing a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific
region,” and promoting U.S.-ROK cooperation on human rights generally and human rights
in Hong Kong specifically. H.R. 3524 was introduced on 5/25/2021 and referred to the
Committees on Foreign Affairs, Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and
Intelligence; the bill was ordered to be reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
on 7/15/2021.
H.R. 4276 (Malinowski), The Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act of 2021.The bill
includes a statement that it is U.S. policy to coordinate with allies, including South Korea, to
promote democracy and human rights in Hong Kong. H.R. 4276 was introduced on June 30,
2021 and referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs.
H.Res. 294 (Bass), Encouraging reunions of divided Korean-American families. The bill calls
on the United States and North Korea to begin the process of reuniting Korean Americans
with their immediate relatives in North Korea. H.Res. 494 was introduced on 04/08/2021 and
referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; the bill passed the House under
suspension of the rules on 7/20/2021.
H.Res. 416 (Meeks)/ S.Res. 213 (Menendez), Recognizing the importance of the United
States-Republic of Korea relationship to safeguarding peace, security, and prosperity on
the Korean Peninsula, in the Indo-Pacific region, and beyond, and welcoming the visit of
President Moon Jae-in to the United States. H.Res 416 was introduced in the House on
5/19/2021 and referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs. S.Res. 213 was introduced
on 5/13/2021 and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
S. 1201 (Menendez), The United States Climate Leadership in International Mitigation,
Adaptation, and Technology Enhancement Act of 2021. The bill would require the State
Department to develop “a China-focused agenda” in a number of areas at the Group of 7, in
coordination with South Korea and Australia. S. 1201 was introduced on 4/19/2021 and
referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, where it was ordered to be reported favorably
on 12/15/2021.
S. 1657 (Rubio), The South China Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2021. The bill
would authorize the President to sanction Chinese persons and entities that “significantly
threaten the peace, security, or stability” of, among other areas, those parts of the East China
Sea administered by Republic of Korea, and annually report to Congress on countries that
recognize the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) sovereignty over these areas. The bill
would state that it is the sense of Congress that the Government Publishing Office not publish
any materials portraying various territories and airspace, including those administered by
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South Korea, are part of the People’s Republic of China’s territory or airspace. S. 1657 was
introduced on 5/17/2021 and reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on
10/28/2021.
S. 1260 (Schumer), The United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021. The bill
states that the sense of Congress is that the United States and South Korea, among other
countries, are “critical allies” in advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The bill states
that it is U.S. policy to defend South Korea and to deepen diplomatic, economic, security
cooperation, and human rights cooperation between and among U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific
region. The bill would encourage the executive branch to cooperate with South Korea and
other allies in multiple areas, including the development of secure supply chains for mobile
telecommunications technologies, the prevention of stolen intellectual property from entering
the United States, South Korea, and other U.S. allies. S. 1260 was introduced on April 20,
2021 and passed by the Senate on 6/8/2021 (68-32, Record Vote Number: 226).
S.Res. 122 (Risch), Reaffirming the importance of United States alliances and partnerships.
The resolution reaffirms support for “equitable and mutually beneficial burden-sharing
arrangements,” “acknowledges” the 2021 special measures agreements (SMA) reached with
South Korea and Japan, and “urges” consultations with these two countries to consider
additional allied contributions beyond the traditional SMA categories. S.Res. 122 was
introduced on 3/18/2021 and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which
reported the resolution 3/24/2021.

Author Information

Mark E. Manyin, Coordinator
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Specialist in Nonproliferation

Caitlin Campbell
Brock R. Williams
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

Emma Chanlett-Avery

Specialist in Asian Affairs

Acknowledgments
Former CRS Research Associate Tracy Jenkins contributed to this report.
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This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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