U.S.-South Korea Relations
Mark E. Manyin, Coordinator
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Acting Section Research Manager
Mary Beth Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
May 15, 2012Mary Beth Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Ian E. Rinehart
Analyst in Asian Affairs
William H. Cooper
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
February 5, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41481
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S.-South Korea Relations
Summary
Overview
Since late 2008, relations between the United States and South Korea (known officially as the
Republic of Korea, or ROK) have been arguably at their best state in decades. By the middle of
2010, in the view of many in the Obama Administration, South Korea had emerged as the United
States’ closest ally in East Asia. Much of the current closeness between Seoul and Washington is
due to President Lee. It remains to be seen whether this unprecedented closeness will extend
beyond 2012. A month after U.S. elections in November, South Korea will elect a new president.
By law, President Lee, whose popularity and clout have eroded over the past year, cannot serve
another term.
The KORUS FTA
Of all the issues on the bilateral agenda in recent years, Congress has had the most direct role to
play in the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), the United States’ second-largest
FTA after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Approval by both countries’
legislatures was necessary for the agreement to go into effect. The agreement was signed in 2007,
but both the Bush and Obama Administrations delayed its submission to Congress, in part due to
opposition to the deal. In early December 2010, the United States and South Korea announced
they had agreed on modifications to the original agreement. South Korea accepted a range of U.S.
demands designed to help the U.S. auto industry and received some concessions in return. In the
United States, the supplementary deal changed the minds of many groups and Members of
Congress who previously had opposed the FTA. On October 12, 2011, both chambers of
Congress voted to approve legislation (H.R. 3080/P.L. 112-41) to implement the KORUS FTA. In
November, after a contentious battle, the Korean National Assembly passed the agreement, which
went into force in March 2012.
In 2011, two-way trade between the two countries totaled over $95 billion, making South Korea
the United States’ seventh-largest trading partner. For some western states and U.S. sectors, the
South Korean market is even more important. In 2011, the United States was South Korea’s thirdlargest trading partner, second-largest export market, and the third-largest source of imports. It
was among South Korea’s largest suppliers of foreign direct investment (FDI).
Strategic Cooperation and the U.S.-ROK Alliance
The day after Congress passed the KORUS FTA, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak
addressed a joint session of Congress. Lee was in Washington for a state visit to the White House,
the fifth since Barack Obama’s inauguration. Various aspects of his trip symbolized the close
relationship between the two leaders, as well as the close policy coordination the two
governments have forged, particularly over how to handle North Korea. The Obama and Lee
Administrations have adopted a medium-to-longer-term policy of “strategic patience” that
involves four main elements: refusing to return to the Six-Party Talks without an assurance from
North Korea that it would take “irreversible steps” to denuclearize; gradually attempting to alter
China’s strategic assessment of North Korea; using Pyongyang’s provocations as opportunities to
tighten sanctions against North Korean entities; and insisting that significant multilateral and U.S.
talks with North Korea must be preceded by improvements in North-South Korean relations. Lee,
in turn, has linked progress in many areas of North-South relations to progress in denuclearizing
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North Korea. North Korea’s April 2012 long-range rocket launch has further cemented bilateral
collaboration between Washington and Seoul.
The United States maintains about 28,500 troops in the ROK. Since 2009, the two sides have
accelerated steps to transform the U.S.-ROK alliance’s primary purpose from one of defending
against a North Korean attack to a regional and even global partnership. Washington and Seoul
have announced a “Strategic Alliance 2015” plan to relocate U.S. troops on the Peninsula and
boost ROK defense capabilities. Some Members of Congress have criticized the relocation plans,
and Congress has cut funds for a related initiative to “normalization” the tours of U.S. troops in
South Korea by lengthening their stays and allowing family members to accompany them.
This report will be updated periodically.
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Contents
Developments in 2012 ..................................................................................................................... 1
North Korea’s April 2012 Missile Launch ................................................................................ 1
South Korea’s New “Proactive Deterrence” Military Posture ............................................ 2
KORUS FTA Enters into Force ................................................................................................. 3
U.S. Beef Exports ...................................................................................................................... 4
South Korea-Iran Relations ....................................................................................................... 4
Conservatives’ Surprise Victory in April 2012 Parliamentary Elections................................... 5
Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 7
Historical Background............................................................................................................. 10
North Korea in U.S.-ROK relations............................................................................................... 10
Policy Coordination................................................................................................................. 10
The Obama-Lee Joint “Strategic Patience” Approach ...................................................... 11
Coordination over the 2010 Cheonan Sinking .................................................................. 11
New Revelations of North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Capabilities............................. 12
North Korea’s 2010 Artillery Attack Against South Korea ............................................... 12
2011–early 2012: Thaws in Relations with North Korea .................................................. 13
Inter-Korean Relations................................................................................................................... 14
South Korea’s Regional Relations ................................................................................................. 16
Growing South Korea-Japan Cooperation............................................................................... 16
South Korea-China Relations .................................................................................................. 17
Security Relations and the U.S.-ROK Alliance ............................................................................. 18
South Korean Missile Range Negotiations.............................................................................. 19
Budgetary and Operational Challenges ................................................................................... 20
Congressional Concern about U.S. Troop Deployments................................................... 20
U.S. Alliance and ROK Defense Reform Plans....................................................................... 21
The Relocation of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).................................................................. 21
Tour Normalization ........................................................................................................... 22
Cost Sharing ...................................................................................................................... 22
Opcon Transfer.................................................................................................................. 23
The “Strategic Flexibility” of USFK................................................................................. 23
South Korean Defense Industry and Purchases of U.S. Weapons..................................... 24
South Korea’s Deployment to Afghanistan ....................................................................... 25
Economic Relations ....................................................................................................................... 25
The KORUS FTA .................................................................................................................... 26
South Korea’s Economic Performance.................................................................................... 27
Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Cooperation ..................................................................... 28
Bilateral Nuclear Energy Cooperation..................................................................................... 28
South Korean Nonproliferation Policy .................................................................................... 29
South Korean Politics .................................................................................................................... 31
A Powerful Executive Branch ................................................................................................. 31
Political Parties........................................................................................................................ 32
Selected CRS Reports on the Koreas............................................................................................. 32
South Korea............................................................................................................................. 32
North Korea............................................................................................................................. 33
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Figures
Figure 1. Party Strength in South Korea’s National Assembly........................................................ 6
Figure 2. Map of the Korean Peninsula ........................................................................................... 8
Figure 3. USFK Bases After Realignment Plan Is Implemented................................................... 22
Tables
Table 1. Annual U.S.-South Korea Merchandise Trade, Selected Years........................................ 25
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 33
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Developments in 2012
Overall, through the end of April 2012, U.S.-South Korea relations continue to be exceptionally
strong, as evidenced by close coordination over North Korea policy, by the entry into force of a
bilateral trade agreement in March, and by the relationship forged by Presidents Barack Obama
and Lee Myung-bak. It remains to be seen whether this combination of shared interests, priorities,
and personal chemistry will extend beyond 2012. A month after U.S. elections in November,
South Korea will elect a new president. (By law, President Lee cannot serve another term.)
North Korea’s April 2012 Missile Launch
In late 2011 and early 2012, U.S.-North Korean diplomacy appeared on the verge of reviving
after years of relative dormancy. Working closely with the Obama Administration, South Korea’s
Lee government had also offered North Korea signs of greater flexibility, but for the most part
Pyongyang rejected these overtures. Had U.S.-North Korean engagement advanced further, it is
possible that U.S.-South Korean cooperation would have been tested.
However, North Korea’s April 13, 2012, North Korea launch of a long-range rocket appears to
have halted for the near future U.S. moves toward renewed engagement with North Korea and
has further cemented already close U.S.-South Korean collaboration. The launch defied two
United Nations Security Council resolutions that ban North Korea from any launch using ballistic
missile technology.1 As acknowledged by North Korea’s official news media, the rocket failed to
reach orbit, exploding over the Yellow Sea about 90 seconds after take-off. The launch, which
North Korea said was designed to send an “earth observation satellite” into orbit, was timed to
coincide with the DPRK’s massive celebrations of the 100th anniversary of the birth of the
country’s founder, the late Kim Il-sung. Kim ruled North Korea from 1945 until his death in 1994
and founded a dynasty that continues today under his grandson, Kim Jong-un. The younger Kim
became North Korea’s supreme leader in December 2011 following the death of his father (Kim
Il-sung’s son), Kim Jong-il.
In response to the launch, the Obama Administration suspended its portion of the February 29,
2012, U.S.-DPRK agreements, in which the United States promised to provide food assistance
and North Korea agreed to allow international nuclear inspectors back to its nuclear facilities at
the Yongbyon site as well as to abide by a moratorium on nuclear activities and nuclear and
missile tests. Following the U.S. withdrawal, North Korea then backed out of its side of the “Leap
Day agreement.” The Obama Administration also suspended another portion of its outreach to
Pyongyang, the planned resumption of U.S.-DPRK missions to search for the remains of missing
Korean War-era U.S. soldiers that may be located within North Korea’s borders. The United
States, South Korea, and Japan began an intense round of consultations with each other, as well as
with China and Russia.
With South Korea’s strong backing, the Obama Administration took the matter of the launch to
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The Council—on which China and Russia serve,
with the power to veto UNSC actions—authorized an April 16, 2012, UNSC Presidential
1
Among other items, UNSC Resolution 1874—adopted in 2009—bans “any launch using ballistic missile technology.
UNSC Resolution 1718, adopted in 2006, “demands” that North Korea “not conduct any further nuclear test or launch
of a ballistic missile.”
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Statement that “strongly condemns” the launch, which it regards as “a serious violation” of
Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874. In its statement, which the United States
characterized as a “stronger response” than the UNSC’s reaction to North Korea’s 2009 rocket
launch, the Council also directed the U.N.’s North Korea Sanctions Committee to tighten existing
sanctions against North Korea by designating new North Korean enterprises that will be subject
to an asset freeze and by identifying additional nuclear and ballistic missile technology that will
be banned for transfer to and from North Korea.2 Obama Administration officials’ statements
appear to indicate they will focus on implementing existing sanctions, rather than pushing for
new sanctions at the UNSC or imposing new unilateral U.S. sanctions.3 The existing U.N. and
U.S. sanctions regimes are already quite extensive. It is not clear China would support new U.N.
sanctions against Pyongyang, and the Obama Administration is simultaneously attempting to
secure Beijing’s cooperation with U.S. policy objectives on Syria and Iran.4
It remains to be seen whether the launch will lead the U.S. and South Korea to reinvigorate their
efforts to pressure North Korea. Many observers feel that the Obama Administration generally
has treated North Korea as a lower priority than other foreign policy matters such as Iran’s
nuclear program. A key variable is likely to be whether U.S. and South Korean officials believe
China is more willing to countenance tougher measures against Pyongyang. North Korea has
responded to the joint U.S.-ROK stance by, among other steps, launching unusually specific
threats against South Korea, including conservative South Korean media outlets. There is also
widespread speculation that North Korea will conduct another test, its third, of a nuclear device.
The latest round of North Korean actions has led some in South Korea and the United States to
call for South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons or for the United States to redeploy
tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. During the Cold War, U.S. forces in South Korea
maintained nuclear weapons, but they were withdrawn in 1991. On May 10, 2012, the House
Armed Services Committee voted 32-26 in favor of an amendment to H.R. 4310, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, that encourages and would require the
Department of Defense (DoD) to report on the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the
Western Pacific region. In response, a DoD official reportedly stated that U.S. policy remains in
support of a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.5
South Korea’s New “Proactive Deterrence” Military Posture
A greater willingness among South Korean leaders to countenance the use of force against North
Korea have made some analysts and planners more concerned about the possibility that a smallscale North Korean provocation could escalate. Following two North Korean conventional attacks
in 2010—sinking a South Korean naval vessel and shelling the South Korean island of
Yeonpyeong—South Korean President Lee stated that “war can be prevented and peace assured
only when such provocations are met with a strong response. Fear of war is never helpful in
2
United States Mission to the United Nations, “Fact Sheet: UN Security Council Presidential Statement on North
Korea Launch,” press release, April 16, 2012, http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/187937.htm.
3
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jay Carney and Deputy National
Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes Aboard Air Force One,” April 13, 2012.
4
For more on sanctions against North Korea, see CRS Report R40684, North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test:
Implications of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, coordinated by Mary Beth Nikitin and Mark E. Manyin, and
CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack.
5
Chi-dong Lee, “No Plan to Deploy Tactical Nukes in S. Korea: Pentagon,” Yonhap News, May 14, 2012.
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preventing war ... the Armed Forces must respond relentlessly when they come under attack.”6
This posture became known as “proactive deterrence.” U.S. defense officials insist that the
exceedingly close day-to-day coordination in the alliance ensures that U.S.-ROK communication
would be strong in the event of a new contingency. In July 2011, General Walter Sharp, thenU.S. commander of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in South Korea, confirmed to press
outlets that the alliance had developed coordinated plans for countermeasures against any North
Korean aggression.7
KORUS FTA Enters into Force8
On March 15, 2012, the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (KORUS FTA) went into effect,
closing a six-year long process and bringing the two countries into a new era of economic
interdependence. The United States and South Korea first began negotiating the agreement in
2006, and signed it in 2007. It is the second-largest FTA by market size in which the United States
participates (after the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA). It is also South Korea’s
second-largest FTA (after the Korea-European Union FTA, which went into effect on July 1,
2011). Congress passed legislation (H.R. 3080/P.L. 112-41) to implement the agreement on
October 12, 2011, the day before South Korean President Lee Myung-bak addressed a joint
session of Congress and was hosted for a state dinner by President Obama.9 President Lee’s visit
appears to have been an “action-forcing event” that triggered action on agreement, as the White
House and congressional leaders became determined to schedule a vote before or during Lee’s
trip.
The South Korean National ratified the agreement on November 22, in a special session marked
by controversy. Reportedly acting on intelligence that the opposition parties were planning to
physically block the National Assembly from voting on the KORUS FTA, President Lee’s ruling
party called a rare snap vote on the agreement and several implementing bills. The National
Assembly passed the KORUS FTA by a vote of 151-7, with 12 abstentions. (At the time, the
Assembly had 299 members.) No members of the opposition parties participated in the voting.
This controversy spilled over into 2012, as South Korean opposition party members attempted to
delay the agreement’s entry into force, arguing that the agreement’s ratification process was
flawed and that several of the agreement’s provisions should be modified. As discussed below, the
opposition attempted to make the KORUS FTA an issue in the April 11 National Assembly
elections, a move that some analysts argue backfired and contributed to the ruling party’s
surprising victory.
6
The Blue House, Speech by President Lee Myung-bak, “The Building of an Advanced Nation Will Be Possible Only
When We Sacrifice Ourselves for Others Rather Than Simply Pursuing Our Own Interest,” December 27, 2010.
7
“U.S., Seoul Secure Plans for Potential Counterattack,” Wall Street Journal. July 7, 2011.
8
For more on the provisions of and debate surrounding the KORUS FTA, see CRS Report RL34330, The U.S.-South
Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications, coordinated by William H. Cooper.
9
The House vote was 278-151 in favor of the legislation. The Senate vote was 83-15.
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U.S. Beef Exports10
A longstanding bilateral trade controversy resurfaced in late April, when U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) inspectors discovered the fourth U.S. case of Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE), also known as “mad cow” disease, in a cow that was sampled for the
disease at a rendering facility in central California. USDA says that the cow “at no time presented
a risk to the food supply, or to human health,” because it was not intended for slaughter for
human consumption.11 Since 2003, when the first case of BSE infection was discovered in the
United States, South Korea first prohibited, and subsequently limited imports of U.S. beef.
Shortly after President Lee took office in 2008, he reached an agreement with the Bush
Administration to allow beef from cattle processed by removing BSE risk materials to be
imported into South Kore—part of a strategy intended to pave the way for U.S. approval of the
KORUS FTA. This triggered massive anti-government protests in Korea that threatened to
paralyze his government. In response, the U.S. and South Korean governments confirmed a
“voluntary private sector” arrangement allowing Korean firms to import U.S. beef produced from
cattle under 30 months of age. Since mid 2008 under this arrangement, South Korean imports of
U.S. beef noticeably increased, and reached $686 million in 2011 (compared to $815 million in
2003 prior to discovery of the first BSE-infected cow). In response to the most recent BSE case,
the South Korean government said that it would dramatically increase its quarantine inspections
of U.S. beef shipments (from 3% to 50%). Its decision not to halt imports has come under strong
criticism at home. The National Assembly’s Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries
Committee, for instance, adopted a resolution in late April calling on the government to halt all
imports of U.S. beef.
South Korea-Iran Relations12
Over the past decade, growing concerns over Iran’s nuclear program have led to increased U.S.
scrutiny of South Korea’s longstanding trade with and investments in Iran. South Korea is the
fifth-biggest customer for Iranian oil.13 Over the past decade, a number of South Korean
conglomerates (called chaebol) have received significant contracts to build or service large
infrastructure projects in Iran, including in Iran’s energy sector. Additionally, Iran has been a
significant regional hub for thousands of smaller South Korean manufacturers, which ship
intermediate goods to Iran that are then assembled into larger units and/or re-exported to other
Middle Eastern countries.
In late 2011, Congress passed and President Obama signed P.L. 112-81, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, which places strict limitations on the U.S. operations of
foreign banks that conduct transactions with Iran’s Central Bank. Foreign banks can be granted an
exemption from sanctions if the President certifies that the parent country of the bank has
significantly reduced its purchases of oil from Iran. Shortly after the law went into effect, the
10
For more, see CRS Report RL34528, U.S.-South Korea Beef Dispute: Issues and Status, by Remy Jurenas and Mark
E. Manyin.
11
USDA Press Release, “Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in
the United States,” May 2, 2012.
12
For more information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
13
Iran data from Economist Intelligence Unit, Iran Country Report, April 2012.
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Obama Administration and Lee governments began negotiating whether South Korea would be
granted an exemption.
In March 2012, the Administration did not include South Korea in the first group, of 11 countries,
that were granted exemptions for significantly reducing purchases of Iranian oil. This may have
been because in 2011 the volume of South Korean imports of Iranian oil rose by over 20%, to
their highest level in at least a decade and a half, and South Korean oil refiners reportedly signed
agreements to import even larger amounts in 2012. South Korean and U.S. officials reportedly are
continuing to discuss ways to reduce imports so that Seoul could be granted an exemption.14 The
case of Japan, which was granted an exemption, may be instructive. Despite its increased need for
oil imports with the shutdown of virtually all of its nuclear power industry, Japan crude oil
imports from Iran fell by over 10% in 2011, and are at about half the level they were in 2003.15
The last time South Korea-Iran economic ties were a major issue in U.S.-South Korea relations
occurred in 2010. In September of that year, after weeks of negotiations with the United States,
South Korea announced a package of wide-ranging sanctions against Iran and Iranian entities
that, among other steps, put nearly all financial transactions with Iran under government scrutiny
and severed future South Korean involvement in projects in Iran’s energy sector. Seoul’s actions
went beyond the requirements of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929 that
was passed in June 2010.
Conservatives’ Surprise Victory in April 2012 Parliamentary
Elections
2012 represents the first time in 20 years that Korean presidential and legislative (the unicameral
National Assembly) elections will be held in the same year. In December, the country will elect a
new president. (By law, South Korean presidents serve for one, five-year term.) In April, voters
went to the polls for the quadrennial election of a new National Assembly, which consists of 300
seats. The outcome of these elections will have important implications for U.S.-South Korea
coordination over North Korea policy and over the implementation of the KORUS FTA.
In the April 2012 National Assembly elections, the ruling Saenuri Party, officially translated as
the National Frontier Party (NFP), shocked nearly all observers by winning an outright majority
of 152 seats. (See Figure 1.) Although this was a fall from the nearly 170 seats the party held in
the summer of 2011, it was a surprising reversal. For much of 2011, virtually all the political
winds appeared to be blowing in favor of the opposition, left-of-center parties, and many
predicted they would achieve a sweeping victory over ruling NFP, which formerly was known as
the Grand National Party.16 Thus, even though the opposition Democratic United Party (DUP)
increased its seat tally by nearly 50%, to 127, the April vote was considered a humiliating defeat,
and the party’s leadership resigned soon thereafter.
14
Data analyzed by CRS from Global Trade Atlas, accessed May 14, 2012. See also Economist Intelligence Unit, Iran
Country Report, April 2012.
15
Economist Intelligence Unit, Iran Country Report, March 2012.
16
Among the many signs of this trend: the “progressive” parties soundly defeated the ruling party in April 2011
legislative by-elections, a left-of-center activist (Park Won-Soon) won a vote for the Seoul mayoralty in October; the
approval ratings for President Lee and his party plummeted, due in part to a series of scandals; and in late 2011 and
early 2012 Korea’s major progressive parties either merged or decided to cooperate during the April National
Assembly elections.
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Figure 1. Party Strength in South Korea’s National Assembly
As of April 27, 2012
Source: Last nationwide elections held in April 2012. Next elections to be held in April 2016.
Although the National Assembly’s powers pale in comparison to those of Korea’s executive
branch, the election results have important implications for the United States. First, the DUP had
campaigned against the existing KORUS FTA, at one point promising to force the government to
withdraw South Korea from the agreement if the United States did not agree to a series of
changes.17 The DUP also has been critical of the relatively hard-line policy the Lee and Obama
governments have taken toward North Korea, and during the campaign DUP leaders called for a
more aggressive policy of engagement with Pyongyang. Although the Assembly does not make
policy, the need for Assembly approval over the budget, as well as its ability to use committee
hearings to call attention to various issues, can influence the course of South Korean debate.
Virtually all observers agree that the big winner from the April elections was Park Geun-hye, the
chairwoman of the NFP and daughter of former military dictator Park Chung-hee, who ruled
South Korea from 1961-1979. Ms. Park assumed the leadership of the ruling party in December
2011, when it was widely depicted as in a state of disarray. Under her leadership, the ruling party
rebranded the party by changing its name, purging many “old guard” politicians as candidates
(many of whom were in Lee Myung-bak’s faction), moving the party to the center by co-opting
many of the DUP’s positions on social welfare issues, and distancing itself from the unpopular
Lee.
Park’s performance solidified her position as the front-runner, at least for the moment, in the race
for the presidency in December. Two other prominent names who are often mentioned as possible
candidates include Moon Jae-in, a former chief of staff for President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008)
17
The party’s stance on the KORUS FTA appears to have hurt the DUP among voters, not only because the agreement
appears to be generally popular, but also because a number of senior DUP leaders, including its party president, had
promoted the KORUS FTA when they worked for President Lee’s predecessor, Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008). The DUP
also was damaged by scandals and by criticism for not dropping a prominent party candidate who made allegedly sexist
comments.
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who won an Assembly seat as a DUP candidate in April, and Ahn Chol-Su, a popular software
entrepreneur who has dabbled in politics in 2011. Both Park and Moon will have to survive their
respective parties’ nomination processes. Should the left-leaning Ahn decide to run for the
presidency, he will have to decide whether to run as an independent or seek to enter the ranks of
one of the existing opposition parties.
Much of the
current closeness between Seoul and Washington is due to the policies undertaken by President
Lee Myung-bak, who will leave office at the end of February 2013. His successor, Park Geunhye, is another conservative leader who is expected to maintain strong ties to the United States.
However, while the overall U.S.-South Korean relationship is expected to remain healthy under
Park, she also has hinted at policy moves—particularly with respect to North Korea and civilian
nuclear cooperation—that could strain bilateral ties. Members of Congress tend to be interested in
South Korea-related issues because of bilateral cooperation over North Korea, the U.S.-South
Korea alliance, South Korea’s growing importance in various global issues, deep bilateral
economic ties, and the interests of many Korean-Americans. The 112th Congress held over 15
hearings directly related to South and North Korea.
Strategic Cooperation and the U.S.-ROK Alliance
Dealing with North Korea is the dominant strategic element of the U.S.-South Korean
relationship. South Korea’s growing economic, diplomatic, and military power has given Seoul a
more direct and prominent role in Washington’s planning and thinking about how to deal with
Pyongyang. The Obama and Lee Administrations have essentially adopted a joint approach that
some labeled “strategic patience” and includes four main elements: refusing to return to nuclear
talks with North Korea unless Pyongyang demonstrates that it is taking “irreversible steps” to
denuclearize; gradually attempting to alter China’s strategic assessment of North Korea;
tightening sanctions against North Korean entities in response to Pyongyang’s provocations; and
insisting that significant multilateral and U.S. talks with North Korea be preceded by
improvements in North-South Korean relations.
It remains to be seen how U.S.-South Korea cooperation on North Korea will shift under
President-elect Park, who has called for a new combination of toughness and flexibility toward
Pyongyang. Perhaps most notably, Park has proposed a number of confidence-building measures
with Pyongyang in order to create a “new era” on the Korean Peninsula. Two key questions will
be the extent to which her government will link these initiatives to progress on denuclearization,
which is the United States’ top concern, and how much emphasis she will give to North Korea’s
human rights record. Likewise, an issue for the Obama Administration and Members of Congress
is to what extent they will support—or, not oppose—initiatives by Park to expand inter-Korean
relations.
The United States maintains about 28,500 troops in the ROK. Since 2009, the two sides have
accelerated steps to transform the U.S.-ROK alliance’s primary purpose from one of defending
against a North Korean attack to a regional and even global partnership. Washington and Seoul
have announced a “Strategic Alliance 2015” plan to relocate U.S. troops on the Peninsula and
boost ROK defense capabilities. Some Members of Congress have criticized the relocation plans,
and Congress has cut funds for a related initiative that would “normalize” the tours of U.S. troops
in South Korea by lengthening their stays and allowing family members to accompany them. In
the first half of 2013, the U.S. and South Korea are expected to negotiate a new Special Measures
Agreement (SMA) that includes always-contentious discussions over how much South Korea
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should pay to offset the cost of stationing U.S. forces in Korea. Currently, South Korea pays for
around 40%-45% of the total non-personnel stationing costs for the U.S. troop presence.
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
For months, bilateral talks over a new civilian nuclear cooperation agreement have stalled. The
Obama Administration would likely need to submit a new agreement for the mandatory
congressional review period in late spring 2013 for it to take effect before the current agreement
expires in March 2014. South Korea reportedly has requested that the new agreement include a
provision that would give permission in advance for U.S.-controlled spent nuclear fuel to be
reprocessed. This poses challenges for U.S. non-proliferation policy.
Bilateral Economic Ties
In October 2011, both chambers of Congress voted to approve legislation (H.R. 3080/P.L. 112-41)
to implement the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), the United States’ secondlargest FTA after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In 2011, two-way trade
between the two countries totaled over $95 billion, making South Korea the United States’
seventh-largest trading partner. In 2011, the United States was South Korea’s third-largest trading
partner, second-largest export market, and the third-largest source of imports. It was among South
Korea’s largest suppliers of foreign direct investment (FDI). To date, South Korea has not shown
a desire to join the 11-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) FTA talks, despite calls for it to do
so from many U.S. analysts.
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U.S.-South Korea Relations
Contents
Developments in Late 2012 and Early 2013 .................................................................................... 1
Park Geun-hye Wins South Korean Presidential Election ......................................................... 1
Cooperation over North Korea Policy ....................................................................................... 1
Nuclear Energy Cooperation ..................................................................................................... 3
State of the Alliance and Outlook under Park ........................................................................... 3
Revision of South Korean Ballistic Missile Guidelines ............................................................ 4
Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 5
Historical Background ............................................................................................................... 7
North Korea in U.S.-ROK relations................................................................................................. 8
North Korea Policy Coordination .............................................................................................. 8
The Obama-Lee Joint “Strategic Patience” Approach ........................................................ 8
Inter-Korean Relations ................................................................................................................... 10
South Korea’s Regional Relations ................................................................................................. 10
South Korea-Japan Relations .................................................................................................. 11
South Korea-China Relations .................................................................................................. 12
Security Relations and the U.S.-ROK Alliance ............................................................................. 13
Budgetary and Operational Challenges ................................................................................... 14
Congressional Concern about U.S. Troop Deployments ................................................... 14
U.S. Alliance and ROK Defense Reform Plans....................................................................... 15
The Relocation of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) .................................................................. 16
Tour Normalization ........................................................................................................... 17
Cost Sharing ...................................................................................................................... 17
Opcon Transfer .................................................................................................................. 17
The “Strategic Flexibility” of USFK ................................................................................. 18
South Korean Defense Industry and Purchases of U.S. Weapons ..................................... 19
South Korea’s Deployment to Afghanistan ....................................................................... 20
South Korea-Iran Relations ........................................................................................................... 20
Economic Relations ....................................................................................................................... 21
Implementation of the KORUS FTA ....................................................................................... 21
Autos ................................................................................................................................. 22
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices .............................................................................. 23
Other Issues ....................................................................................................................... 23
South Korea’s Economic Performance .................................................................................... 24
Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Cooperation ..................................................................... 25
Bilateral Nuclear Energy Cooperation..................................................................................... 25
South Korean Nonproliferation Policy .................................................................................... 27
South Korean Politics .................................................................................................................... 29
A Quick History of South Korean Presidential Changes ......................................................... 29
A Powerful Executive Branch ................................................................................................. 30
Political Parties ........................................................................................................................ 30
Selected CRS Reports on the Koreas ............................................................................................. 31
South Korea ............................................................................................................................. 31
North Korea ............................................................................................................................. 31
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U.S.-South Korea Relations
Figures
Figure 1. Map of the Korean Peninsula ........................................................................................... 6
Figure 2. USFK Bases After Realignment Plan Is Implemented ................................................... 17
Figure 3. Party Strength in South Korea’s National Assembly ...................................................... 30
Tables
Table 1. Annual U.S.-South Korea Merchandise Trade, Selected Years........................................ 22
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 32
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U.S.-South Korea Relations
Developments in Late 2012 and Early 2013
From 2009-2012, U.S.-South Korea relations were exceptionally strong, as evidenced by close
coordination over North Korea policy, by the entry into force of a bilateral trade agreement in
March, and by the relationship forged by Presidents Barack Obama and Lee Myung-bak. With
South Korea set to inaugurate a new president in February 2013, it remains to be seen whether
this combination of shared interests, priorities, and personal chemistry will continue.
Park Geun-hye Wins South Korean Presidential Election
In December 2012, South Koreans narrowly elected Park Geun-hye, the candidate of the ruling
conservative Saenuri (“New Frontier”) Party (NFP), as president. She will serve until February
2018. By law, South Korean presidents serve one five-year term.
Park defeated Moon Jae-in, the candidate of the opposition, left-of-center Minjoo (“Democratic
United”) Party (DUP), capturing 51.6% of the vote, compared with Moon’s 48%. Park not only
became the first woman to elected as South Korea’s president, she also was the first presidential
candidate to receive more than 50% of the vote since South Korea ended nearly three decades of
authoritarian rule in 1988. At nearly 76%, turnout was the highest in over a decade. The substance
of the campaign revolved around improving South Korea’s economic difficulties and social safety
net, issues that Park championed in what many analysts regard as a successful attempt to co-opt
the DUP’s agenda. The voting revealed stark demographic schisms in South Korean society, with
voters over 50 overwhelmingly choosing Park and those under 40 favoring Moon by a wide
margin.
In general, Park’s victory makes it more likely that South Korea-U.S. relations will remain
relatively strong. Moon had advocated a number of policies that would likely have placed South
Korea and the United States at odds. In particular, he had called for renegotiation of provisions of
the KORUS FTA and for South Korea to return to a policy of largely unconditional engagement
with North Korea. On most major issues Park generally appears to have a similar outlook to the
Obama Administration, although as discussed in the North Korea and civilian nuclear agreement
sections below, there are some areas in which the two sides are expected to take different
approaches. Park is the daughter of the late Park Chung-hee, who ruled South Korea from the
time he seized power in a 1961 military coup until 1979.
Cooperation over North Korea Policy
On most issues, President-elect Park generally is known as a pragmatist rather than an ideologue.
In keeping with this characteristic, her statements on North Korea policy include elements of both
conciliation and firmness, and she has written that her approach would “entail assuming a tough
line against North Korea sometimes and a flexible policy open to negotiations other times.” 1
1
Park Geun-hye, “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust between Seoul and Pyongyang,” Foreign Affairs,
September/October 2011.
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On the one hand, she has called for creating a “new era” on the Korean Peninsula by building
trust between North and South Korea. To build trust, Park and members of her transition office
have indicated a desire to:
•
resume North-South Korean dialogue and give “new momentum” to the SixParty talks over North Korea’s nuclear program;2
•
delink humanitarian assistance from overall diplomatic developments and make
such assistance more transparent than in the past;
•
ease or end the restrictions on South Korean commercial ties to North Korea that
the South Korean government imposed after the April 2010 sinking of the South
Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan;
•
restore cooperation with North Korea for South Koreans to participate in tours of
Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong city inside North Korea;
•
internationalize and expand the Kaesong Industrial Complex, an industrial park
inside North Korea where over 100 South Korean companies employ over 40,000
North Koreans;
•
uphold the promises former President Roh Moo-hyun made in an October 2007
summit with former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to provide large-scale
economic assistance and fund reconstruction projects;
•
explore the building of a transportation and energy network running through
North Korea to connect South Korea with China, Russia and the rest of Eurasia;
•
meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un “if it helps to foster South-North
relations.”3
These policies are generally consistent with the Park’s actions and words for over a decade; for
instance, in 2002 Park visited Pyongyang and met with Kim Jong-il.
On the other hand, Park also has long stated that a nuclear North Korea “can never be accepted”
and that building trust with Pyongyang will be impossible if it cannot keep the agreements made
with South Korea and the international community. Park has also said that South Korea will “no
longer tolerate” North Korean military attacks, that they will be met with an “immediate” South
Korean response, and that the need for South Korea to punish North Korean military aggression
“must be enforced more vigorously than in the past.”4 She has warned that North Korea’s
December 2012 missile launch showed “how grave our [South Korea’s] security reality is.”
It is not clear how her government will resolve the seeming contradiction between the impulses of
toughness and flexibility. A key question will be the extent to which her government will link
progress on denuclearization – the United States’ top concern – to other elements of South
Korea’s approach toward North Korea. Likewise, an issue for the Obama Administration and
Members of Congress is to what extent they will support – or, not oppose – any initiatives by
Park to expand inter-Korean relations.
2
The Six Party Talks, which were last held in late 2008, involved China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and
the United States.
3
Park Geun-hye, “Trustpolitik and the Making of a New Korea,” November 15, 2012.
4
Park Geun-hye, “A New Kind of Korea,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011.
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Nuclear Energy Cooperation
The United States and South Korea have cooperated in the peaceful use of nuclear energy for
over fifty years.5 The current U.S.-ROK bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement (or “123”
agreement) expires in 2014.6 The United States and South Korea began official talks in
Washington on renewing the agreement in October 2010.7 These talks continue, and a draft
agreement was proposed by South Korea in the second round of talks in March 2011. It is
estimated that the Obama Administration will need to send the agreement to Congress for the
required review period by late spring 2013 to avoid a lapse in the agreement.
One point of potential disagreement in the renewal process is whether South Korea will press the
United States to include a provision that would allow for the reprocessing of its spent fuel. The
current U.S.-Korea nuclear cooperation agreement, as with other standard agreements,8 requires
U.S. permission before South Korea can reprocess U.S.-origin spent fuel, including spent fuel
from South Korea’s U.S.-designed reactors.9 The issue has become a sensitive one for many
South Korean officials and politicians, who see it as a matter of national sovereignty. The United
States has been reluctant to grant such permission due to concerns over the impact on
negotiations with North Korea and on the nonproliferation regime overall. Reprocessing of spent
fuel can be used to make reactor fuel or to acquire plutonium for weapons. For many years, the
United States and South Korea have worked on joint research and development projects to
address spent fuel disposition, including joint research on pyro-processing, a type of spent fuel
reprocessing. In October 2010, the two countries began a 10-year, three-part joint research project
on pyro-processing that includes joint R&D at Idaho National Laboratory, development of
international safeguards for this technology, economic viability studies, and other advanced
nuclear research including alternatives to pyro-processing for spent fuel disposal.10 Talks were
paused during presidential elections in both countries and have not yet resumed.
State of the Alliance and Outlook Under Park
During Lee Myung-bak’s term, the U.S.-ROK alliance came to be labeled by U.S. officials as a
“linchpin” of stability and security in the Asia-Pacific. This designation reflected an overall
deepening of defense ties and joint coordination, particularly in response to provocations from
North Korea. Joint statements issued from a series of high-level meetings emphasized the
5
The original agreement was concluded in 1956, and amendments were made in 1958, 1965, 1972, and 1974. See also
CRS Report R41032, U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy Market: Major Policy
Considerations, by Mark Holt.
6
Full text at .
7
“Discussions on the New U.S.-R.O.K. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement State Department Press Release, October
26, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/10/150026.htm.
8
CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin.
9
Under the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, consent rights apply to material originating in the U.S. or material that
has been fabricated into fuel or irradiated in a reactor with U.S. technology. The majority of South Korea’s spent fuel
would need U.S. consent before it could be reprocessed.
10
“Discussions on Korea-U.S. Joint Research on Fuel Cycle,” Press Release, Ministry of Education, Science and
Technology, Republic of Korea, April 18, 2011; “S. Korea, U.S. Agree to Start Joint Study on Nuclear Fuel
Reprocessing,” Yonhap, April 17, 2011.
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commitment to modernize and expand the alliance while reaffirming the maintenance of current
U.S. troop levels on the peninsula and the U.S. security guarantee to protect South Korea. In
2012, these occasions included a June “2+2” meeting of the foreign and defense ministers from
both countries and a follow-up U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting between Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta and his counterpart.
Considered by most analysts to be a strong supporter of the alliance, Park is expected to continue
close defense coordination with the United States despite her campaign promises to engage North
Korea more than her predecessor. For both sides, however, the alliance faces a range of budgetary
issues. The new budget approved by the South Korean National Assembly in January 2013 cut
proposed defense procurement funding in order to pay for social programs that Park had pledged
to establish during her campaign. The vote drew protests from outgoing Lee Administration
security officials and could hinder some cooperative efforts with the United States. The U.S.
Congress has also voiced concern about the price tag for the troop relocation and tour
normalization plans; the FY2012 and FY2013 National Defense Authorization Acts freeze
funding for tour normalization. In addition, budget constraints could intensify upcoming
negotiations for Korean cost-sharing; the current Special Measures Agreement runs through 2013.
Revision of South Korean Ballistic Missile Guidelines
On October 7, 2012, South Korea announced that the United States had agreed to allow South
Korea to increase the maximum range of its ballistic missiles from 300 km (186 miles) to 800 km
(500 miles) and to increase the payload limit from 500 kg (1,100 lbs.) to 1,000 kg (2,200 lbs.) if
the range is reduced proportionately.11 The revised missile guidelines had reportedly been under
negotiation for two years, following two conventional military attacks in 2010 by North Korea
against South Korean military and civilian targets. The South Korean and U.S. governments
characterized the revision as an effort to improve deterrence in response to the increased military
threat of North Korea, particularly its ballistic missiles. Alliance politics also may have
encouraged Washington to acquiesce to Seoul’s demands.12
The ballistic missile range extension agreement has drawn criticism for what some observers see
as negative implications for global non-proliferation efforts. The revised guidelines do not violate
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), but critics argue that the United States has
damaged its credibility to restrain other countries’ missile development, including North Korea’s.
Other analysts have raised concerns about the impact of the agreement on the regional security
environment in Northeast Asia.13 Some analysts view North Korea’s December 2012 rocket
launch (using ballistic missile technology) partly as a response to the revised guidelines.14
11
South Korea first agreed to ballistic missile range and payload restrictions in 1979 in exchange for U.S. technical
assistance in missile development. The revised guidelines supersede bilateral agreements made in 1990 and 2001.
12
Daniel Pinkston, “The New South Korean Missile Guidelines and Future Prospects for Regional Stability,”
International Crisis Group, October 25, 2012, http://www.crisisgroupblogs.org/strongandprosperous/2012/10/25/thenew-south-korean-missile-guidelines-and-future-prospects-for-regional-stability/.
13
James Schoff, The New Missile Risk on the Korean Peninsula, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Commentary, Washington, DC, September 17, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/17/new-missile-risk-onkorean-peninsula/dugs.
14
Tad Farrell, “Understanding North Korea’s Next Satellite Launch,” NK News, December 1, 2012.
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Overview
While the U.S.-South Korea relationship is highly complex and multifaceted, five factors
arguably drive the scope and state of U.S.-South Korea relations:
•
the challenges posed by North Korea, particularly its weapons of mass
destruction programs and perceptions in Washington and Seoul of whether the
Kim regime poses a threat, through its belligerence and/or the risk of its collapse;
•
the growing desire of South Korean leaders to use the country’s middle power
status to play a larger regional and, more recently, global role;
•
increasingly, China’s rising influence in Northeast Asia, which has become an
integral consideration in many aspects of U.S.-South Korea strategic and (to a
lesser extent) economic policymaking;
•
South Korea’s transformation into one of the world’s leading economies—with a
very strong export-oriented industrial base—which has led to an expansion of
trade disputes and helped drive the two countries’ decision to sign a free trade
agreement; and
•
South Korea’s continued democratization, which has raised the importance of
public opinion in Seoul’s foreign policy.
Additionally, while people-to-people ties generally do not directly affect matters of “high”
politics in bilateral relations, the presence of over 1.2 million Korean Americans and the hundreds
of thousands of trips taken annually between the two countries has helped cement the two
countries together.18
18
For an estimate of the number of ethnic Koreans in the United States, see U.S. Census
Bureau, “The Asian Population: 2000,” Census Brief C2KBR/01-16, February 2002,
Table 4.
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Figure 2
Members of Congress tend be interested in South Korea-related issues because of bilateral
cooperation over North Korea, a desire to oversee the management of the U.S.-South Korea
alliance, South Korea’s growing importance on various global issues, deep bilateral economic
ties, and the interests of many Korean-Americans. The 112th Congress held over 15 hearings
directly related to South and North Korea.
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Figure 1. Map of the Korean Peninsula
Source: Prepared by CRS based on ESRI Data and Maps 9.3.1; IHS World Data.
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Since late 2008, relations between the United States and South Korea have been arguably at their
best state in nearly a decade, if not ever. Coordination over North Korea policy has been
particularly close, with one high-level official in late 2009 describing the two countries as being
“not just on the same page, but on the same paragraph.”1915 At a summit in June 2009, the two
parties signed a “Joint Vision” statement that foresees the transformation of the alliance’s purpose
from one of primarily defending against a North Korean attack to a regional and even global
alliance, in which Washington and Seoul cooperate on a myriad of issues, including climate
change, energy security, terrorism, economic development, and human rights promotion, as well
as peacekeeping and the stabilization of post-conflict situations. Significantly, the joint vision
expands the U.S.-ROK alliance beyond the Korean Peninsula into a regional and global
partnership. Reflecting this evolution, in a June 2010 meeting with President Lee, President
Obama referred to the alliance as “the lynchpin” for security in the Pacific region. This statement
stirred some degree of anxiety in Tokyo; Japan has traditionally considered itself to be the most
significant U.S. partner in the region.
The extraordinarily close U.S.-ROK partnership of recent years was both symbolized and further
cemented in mid-October 2011, when President Obama hosted President Lee for a formal state
visit, the fifth since Obama’s inauguration. On October 13, Lee addressed a joint session of
Congress. In addition to their formal dinner, Obama and Lee had a private dinner at a local
Korean restaurant and made a joint visit to a General Motors plant in Michigan. Lee was also
given a security briefing by the U.S. service chiefs at the Pentagon inside the “Tank,” a
conference room where the Joint Chiefs meet, the first time the United States has ever extended
such treatment to a foreign leader. President Lee’s visit appears to have been an “action-forcing
event” that triggered action on the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), as
the White House and congressional leaders became determined to schedule a vote on the
agreement before or during Lee’s trip.
Much of the U.S.-South Korean closeness is
Much of the U.S.-South Korean closeness has been due to the policies of President Lee, including his
his determination after assuming office in 2008 to improve Seoul’s relations with Washington.
However, it is unclear how much domestic support exists for some of President Lee’s policies. On
North Korea, for instance, the United States and South Korea often have different priorities, with
many if not most South Koreans generally putting more emphasis on regional stability than on
deterring nuclear proliferation, the top U.S. priority. Currently, theseThese differences have been
masked by
North Korea’s general belligerence since early 2009 and to a large extent negated by
President President
Lee’s consistent stance that progress on the nuclear issue is a prerequisite for
improvements in
many areas of North-South relations. As mentioned above, while coordination over North Korea
policy is expected to remain strong under President-elect Park, it remains to be seen whether she
will maintain the same linkage.
Moreover, while large majorities of South Koreans say they value the U.S.-ROK alliance, many
South Koreans are resentful of U.S. influence and chafe when they feel their leaders offer too
many concessions to the United States. This is particularly the case among Korea’s left-of-center,
or “progressive” groups, who bitterly oppose much of President Lee’s policy agenda and his
governing style.
Thus, it is unclear how sustainable the current bilateral intimacy is likely to be. South Korea’s
presidential election in December 2012 could erode some of the momentum established under
Lee. Bilateral coordination will be particularly tested if South Korea’s progressives retake the
presidential office (called the Blue House).
19
December 2009 interview.
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U.S.-South Korea RelationsSouth Koreans also tend to be wary of being drawn into
U.S. policies that antagonize China. These critiques are particularly articulated by Korea’s
“progressive” groups, who bitterly oppose much of President Lee’s policy agenda and his
governing style. They can be expected to have the same attitudes toward President-elect Park.
Historical Background
The United States and South Korea have been allies since the United States intervened on the
Korean Peninsula in 1950 and fought to repel a North Korean takeover of South Korea. Over
33,000 U.S. troops were killed and over 100,000 were wounded during the three-year conflict. On
October 1, 1953, a little more than two months after the parties to the conflict signed an armistice
agreement, the United States and South Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty, which provides
that if either party is attacked by a third country, the other party will act to meet the common
danger. The United States maintains about 28,500 troops in the ROK to supplement the 650,000strong South Korean armed forces. South Korea deployed troops to support the U.S.-led military
campaign in Vietnam. South Korea subsequently has assisted U.S. deployments in other conflicts,
most recently by deploying over 3,000 troops to play a non-combat role in Iraq and over 300 noncombat troops to Afghanistan.
15
December 2009 interview.
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Beginning in the 1960s, rapid economic growth propelled South Korea into the ranks of the
world’s largest industrialized countries. For over a decade, South Korea has been one of the
United States’ largest trading partners. Economic growth also has helped transform the ROK into
a mid-level regional power that can influence U.S. policy in Northeast Asia, particularly the
United States’ approach toward North Korea.
North Korea in U.S.-ROK relations
North Korea Policy Coordination
Dealing with North Korea is the dominant strategic element of the U.S.-South Korean
relationship. Since breakdown of the Six-Party Talks in late 2008 and North Korea’s second
nuclear test in May 2009, coordination over North Korea policy has been remarkably close. South
South Korea’s growing economic, diplomatic, and military power has given Seoul a
much more direct
and prominent role in Washington’s planning and thinking about how to deal
with Pyongyang.
One indicator of South Korea’s centrality to diplomacy over North Korea is that
no successful
round of the Six-Party nuclear talks has taken place when inter-Korean relations have been poor.
For much of the 2000s, policy coordination between the United States and South Korea was
difficult, sometimes extremely so, because the countries’ policies toward Pyongyang were often
out-of-synch, and at times and in many ways contradictory. Presidents Kim Dae-jung (19982003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) pursued a “sunshine policy” of largely unconditional
engagement with North Korea that clashed with the harder policy line pursued by the Bush
Administration until late 2006. President Roh, who was elected in part because of his embrace of
massive anti-American protests that ensued after a U.S. military vehicle killed two Korean
schoolgirls in 2002, also alarmed U.S. policymakers by speaking of a desire that South Korea
should play a “balancing” role among China, the United States, and Japan in Northeast Asia.
Despite this, under Roh’s tenure, South Korea deployed over 3,000 non-combat troops to Iraq—
the third-largest contingent in the international coalition—and the two sides initiated and signed
the KORUS FTA. Although relations between the two capitals improved dramatically after
President Lee Myung-bak’s 2008 inauguration, his tougher stance toward North Korea was not
always aligned with the late Bush Administration’s push for a nuclear deal with North Korea.
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The Obama-Lee Joint “Strategic Patience” Approach
However, since the middle of 2009, U.S.-South Korean collaboration over North Korea has been
extremely close
have been poor.
The Obama-Lee Joint “Strategic Patience” Approach
From 2009-2012, U.S.-South Korean collaboration over North Korea was extremely close, after
several years in which the two countries frequently had competing visions of how to handle North
Korea. In effect, the Obama Administration and the Lee government have adopted a
joint approach
toward North Korea, often called “strategic patience.” The approach has used both
engagement and pressure, with an emphasis on the latter. In essence, strategic patience has four
main main
components:
•
keeping the door open to Six-Party Talks over North Korea’s nuclear program but
refusing to re-start them without a North Korean assurance that it would take
“irreversible steps” to denuclearize;
•
insisting that Six-Party Talks and/or U.S.-North Korean talks must be preceded
by North-South Korean talks on denuclearization and improvements in NorthSouth Korean relations;
•
gradually attempting to alter China’s strategic assessment of North Korea; and
•
responding to Pyongyang’s provocations by tightening sanctions against North
Korean entities, conducting a series of military exercises, and expanding the two
countries’ cooperation with JapanU.S.ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation.
Strategic patience could be described as a passive-aggressive approach that effectively is
was a policy
of containing North Korea’s proliferation activities, rather than rolling back
its nuclear program.
Indeed, underlying the approach is an expectation that North Korea
will almost certainly not
relinquish its nuclear capabilities. One drawback is that it has
allowed Pyongyang to control the
day-to-day situation. While Washington and Seoul wait
to react to Pyongyang’s moves, the
criticism runs, North Korea has continued to develop
its uranium enrichment program, solidified
support from China, and embarked on a
propaganda offensive designed to shape the eventual
negotiating agenda to its benefit.
Coordination over the 2010 Cheonan Sinking
The two Administrations’ closeness was both confirmed and cemented by their coordinated
reaction to the March 2010 sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan. Forty-six South
Korean sailors died in the incident. A multinational investigation team led by South Korea
determined that the ship was sunk by a North Korean submarine.20 In the wake of the sinking,
U.S.-South Korean cooperation was underscored by a series of military exercises in the waters
surrounding the peninsula, as well as symbolic gestures such as the joint visit of Secretary of
State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). During the visit,
a new set of unilateral U.S. sanctions targeting North Korea were announced.21
20
The cause of the Cheonan’s sinking has become highly controversial in South Korea. While most conservatives
believe that North Korea was responsible for explosion, many who lean to the left have criticized the investigation team
as biased or argue that its methodology was flawed. Alternative theories for the sinking have been swirling on the
Korean blogosphere. Additionally, polls indicate many if not most Koreans believe the Lee government attempted to
exploit the incident during local elections held across the nation in early June. Though Lee’s conservative Grand
National Party suffered notable losses, polls indicate that local issues, rather than North Korea policy, were more
significant factors determining voting behavior.
21
For more information, see CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by
Dianne E. Rennack negotiating agenda to its benefit.
Many of President-elect Park Geun-hye’s proposed initiatives with North Korea appear
designed to rectify these perceived shortcomings.
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New Revelations of North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Capabilities22
In November 2010, the relative quietude in North Korea’s relations with South Korea and the
United States that had predominated in the months after the Cheonan sinking was shattered by
two events. First, North Korea showed Dr. Siegfried Hecker, the former head of the U.S. Los
Alamos National Laboratory, a new “ultra-modern” uranium enrichment facility with 2,000
centrifuges that the North Koreans said is producing low enriched uranium destined for fuel for a
new light-water nuclear reactor that is under construction. The revelation confirmed longstanding fears that North Korea has been developing an alternative, uranium-based nuclear
program to complement or replace its existing plutonium-based facilities. Although Dr. Hecker
has said that the centrifuge plant and the new reactor appear to be designed primarily for civilian
nuclear power, the uranium facilities could also be used to produce fissile material suitable for
nuclear weapons.23
North Korea’s 2010 Artillery Attack Against South Korea
Second, on November 23, only days after the uranium revelations, North Korean artillery units
fired over 150 shells onto and around Yeonpyeong Island, across the North-South disputed
western sea boundary.24 North Korea claimed that the South Korean military had fired first,
during routine U.S.-ROK exercises in the area. According to one report, about half the North
Korean shells hit the island. The barrage killed four South Koreans (two marines and two
civilians), wounded dozens, and destroyed or damaged scores of homes and other buildings.25 It
was North Korea’s first direct artillery attack on ROK territory since the 1950-1953 Korean War.
South Korea responded by shooting 80 shells at North Korea. An official North Korean media
outlet later said that the South Korean civilian deaths were “regrettable.”26
The attacks prompted a number of responses:
•
South Korea and the United States held large-scale naval exercises in the Yellow
Sea area with the USS George Washington aircraft carrier strike group. In the
months immediately after the Cheonan sinking, the U.S. and South Korea had
refrained from staging exercises in the Yellow Sea area, after China had warned
of its sensitivity to military activities there.
22
For more on North Korea’s suspected nuclear capabilities and the diplomacy surrounding them, see CRS Report
RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary Beth Nikitin, and CRS Report R41259, North
Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
23
Siegfried S. Hecker, “A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex,” Center for International
Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, November 20, 2010.
24
This “Northern Limit Line” (NLL) was drawn in 1953 by the United Nations Command in South Korea because the
Korean War armistice signed earlier that year did not establish a maritime boundary between the two Koreas. North
Korea first protested the NLL’s legitimacy in 1953, and since that time has periodically issued rhetorical challenges
against the line. North Korea ships, including some naval vessels, also have occasionally crossed the line, sparking
inter-Korean naval clashes in 1999, 2002, and 2009.
25
Stratfor.com, “Satellite Imagery: Tactical Details of the Korean Artillery Exchange,” November 30, 2010.
26
“DPRK KPA Supreme Command’s Communique on Artillery Gunfire Along Inter-Korean Border,” Pyongyang
Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Korean, November 23, 2010, translated by Open Source Center
KPP20101123106004; “DPRK Commentary Says 23 Nov Clash Due to US, Civilian Casualties ‘Very Regrettable’,”
Korean Central News Agency, November 27, 2010.
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12
U.S.-South Korea Relations
•
In a nationally televised speech, Lee announced that South Korea would no
longer hold back on retaliating for North Korean provocations. President Lee and
the South Korean military have come under strong domestic criticism for what
was widely perceived as faulty military preparation and a delayed counterattack,
prompting the defense minister to resign. His successor stated that if attacked in
the future, South Korea would consider using its air force to strike back in North
Korean territory.27
•
China, after consulting widely among the other negotiating parties, proposed a
meeting of participants in the Six-Party Talks to stabilize the situation. South
Korea, the United States, and Japan rejected such a move, saying that it would
only reward North Korea’s attack and was premature without signs that North
Korea would change its behavior.
•
Instead, the three countries stepped up trilateral cooperation and called on China
to do more to pressure North Korea. Secretary of State Clinton met in
Washington, DC, with the South Korean and Japanese foreign ministers, where
the three condemned North Korea’s attack, affirmed their solidarity in dealing
with North Korea, and discussed cooperation on a range of regional and global
issues. Relatedly, for the first time, South Korea sent military observers to a U.S.
and Japanese joint military exercise.28
2011–early 2012: Thaws in Relations with North Korea
In late 2011 and early 2012, the Obama and Lee governments re-activated efforts to engage with
Pyongyang. The moves appeared to be at least partially motivated by a desire to reduce North
Korea’s incentives to behave provocatively, particularly on the part of the Obama Administration.
As described below,8
U.S.-South Korea Relations
The strategic patience approach has involved elements of both engagement and pressure.
The Obama and Lee governments have tended to emphasize the latter during times of
increased tension with North Korea. These periods have occurred repeatedly since Lee’s
inauguration in February 2008. Most notably, they included a North Korean nuclear test
in May 2009; long-range rocket launches in April 2009, April 2012, and December 2012;
the March 2010 sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan; and the November
2010 North Korean artillery attack on the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong-do.16 The
latter incident was North Korea’s first direct artillery attack on ROK territory since the
1950-1953 Korean War and served to harden South Korean attitudes toward North Korea.
President Lee reportedly has stated that he wanted to order a retaliatory air strike, but the
existing rules of engagement—which he subsequently relaxed—and the existence of the
U.S.-ROK military alliance restrained him.17 Park Geun-hye has implied that South
Korea’s military response, which primarily consisted of launching about 80 shells at
North Korea and holding large-scale exercises with the United States, was insufficient.
In contrast, the Obama and Lee governments have tended to reach out to North Korea during
more quiescent periods. North Korea responded—as it often does—more readily to Washington’s
overtures than to Seoul’s. Had U.S.-North Korean engagement advanced further, it is possible that
U.S.-South Korean cooperation would have been tested.
One indication of this was the debate the
two countries waged in 2011 and 2012 over whether to provide
large-scale food aid to North
Korea, which early in the year appealed for international aid. 29 The
Obama Administration actively considered the North Korean request and in May dispatched an
assessment team to North Korea to evaluate conditions there. South Korean officials in the first
half of 2011 indicated that 2011 appealed for international aid. 18 South Korean officials indicated that
their government would prefer that neither country provide large-scale
assistance to North Korea unless Pyongyang changes its behavior. On June 15, 2011, the House
passed by voice vote an amendment proposed by Congressman Edward Royce to H.R. 2112, the
FY2012 Agriculture Appropriations Act, that would prohibit the Administration from using the
primary U.S. food aid program to send food assistance to North Korea. The Senate version of the
27
“'Full Text’ of ROK President Lee’s 29 November ‘Address to the Nation,’” Yonhap, November 29, 2010. Lee said
that for decades, South Korea had “tolerated provocations by the North time and again.… South Korea nonetheless
endured these continual provocations because we entertained a slight hope that the North would change course
someday…. At long last, we came to a realization that … that prolonged endurance and tolerance will spawn nothing
but more serious provocations. If the North commits any additional provocations against the South, we will make sure
that it pays a dear price without fail.”
28
See, for instance, State Department Press Release, “Trilateral Statement Japan, Republic of Korea, and the United
States,” December 6, 2010.
29
For more on the food aid debate, see CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin
and Mary Beth Nikitin.
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13
U.S.-South Korea Relations
bill, passed on November 1, contained no such measure. Participants in the House-Senate
conference committee decided to strip the Royce amendment’s tougher restrictions, replacing it
with language (Section 741) that food assistance may only be provided if “adequate monitoring
and controls” exist. President Obama signed H.R. 2112 (P.L. 112-55) into law on November 18,
2011.
In the latter half of 2011, the Lee government began to show an increased willingness to soften its
stance toward North Korea somewhat, by offering some concrete signs of flexibility in areas that
generally did not compromise the core of its harder-line policy toward Pyongyang. Seoul took
steps such as relaxing some of its previous restrictions on its citizens’ ability to travel to North
Korea, reviving plans to build emergency facilities at the Kaesong inter-Korean industrial
complex inside North Korea, and offering to help Pyongyang recover from devastating flooding
over the summer. North Korea rejected the aid and generally did not respond to the small
measures taken by the Lee government.
In contrast, Pyongyang responded more eagerly when the U.S. reinvigorated its bilateral
diplomacy with North Korea in 2011. The result was a February 29, 2012, agreement, in which
the United States promised to provide 240,000 metric tonnes (MT) of food assistance and North
Korea agreed to allow international nuclear inspectors back to its Yongbyon nuclear facilities as
well as to abide by a moratorium on nuclear activities and nuclear and missile tests. At the time,
some analysts believed that this so-called “Leap Day Deal” could open the door to the eventual
resumption of “Six Party Talks” diplomacy over North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction
programs. However, on March 16, such hopes were dashed when the North Korean Committee
for Space Technology announced that a polar-orbiting earth observation satellite would be
launched between April 12 and 16. U.S. officials say that during negotiations with North Korea in
2011, they had warned their North Korean counterparts that a satellite launch would “abrogate”
the agreement.30 North Korea’s lead negotiator, Kim Kye-gwan, has written that during the talks
he “made very clear that the moratorium on long range missile launch did not include our
peaceful satellite launch.”31 After North Korea went ahead with the launch on April 13, the
Obama Administration suspended its portion of the Leap Day agreement. North Korea soon
followed suit.
Inter-Korean Relations
Relations between the two Koreas have deteriorated markedly since Lee’s February 2008
inauguration. After 10 years of Seoul’s “sunshine” policy of largely unconditioned reconciliation
with North Korea, the Lee government entered office insisting on more reciprocity from and
conditionality toward Pyongyang. Most importantly, the Lee government announced that it would
review the initiation of new large-scale inter-Korean projects agreed to before Lee took office,
and that implementation would be linked to progress in denuclearizing North Korea. In another
reversal of his predecessors’ policies, Lee’s government has been openly critical of human rights
conditions in North Korea. His administration also offered to continue humanitarian assistance—
30
State Department Spokesperson Victoria Nuland Press Statement, “North Korean Announcement of Missile
Launch,” March 16, 2012; “Daily Press Briefing,” Washington, DC, March 16, 2012.
31
March 20, 2012, letter from Kim Kye-Gwan to U.S. Ambassador Glyn Davies, Special Representative for North
Korea Policy, as reprinted in the April 9, 2012, edition of The Nelson Report.
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U.S.-South Korea Relations
provided North Korea first requests such aid—and indicated that existing inter-Korean projects
would be
unless Pyongyang changes its behavior.
Despite this reluctance, the Obama Administration pushed ahead in discussions with North Korea.
The result was a February 2012 agreement, in which the United States promised to provide
240,000 metric tonnes (MT) of food assistance and North Korea agreed to allow international
nuclear inspectors back to its Yongbyon nuclear facilities as well as to abide by a moratorium on
nuclear activities and nuclear and missile tests. However, the United States halted implementation
of the agreement after North Korea launched a long-range rocket in April.
16
On Yeonpyeong-do, over 150 shells fired by North Korea killed four South Koreans (two Marines and two civilians),
wounded dozens, and destroyed or damaged scores of homes and other buildings. All 46 South Korean sailors on the
Cheonan died. A multinational investigation team into the sinking led by South Korea determined that the ship was
sunk by a North Korean submarine. The cause of the Cheonan’s sinking has become highly controversial in South
Korea. While most conservatives believe that North Korea was responsible for explosion, many who lean to the left
have criticized the investigation team as biased or argue that its methodology was flawed.
17
“Lee Recalls Getting Tough with N.Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, February 5, 2013.
18
For more on the food aid debate, see CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin
and Mary Beth Nikitin. During the U.S.-South Korea discussions over food aid, Congress debated an amendment
proposed by Congressman Edward Royce to H.R. 2112, the FY2012 Agriculture Appropriations Act, which would
have prohibited the Administration from using the primary U.S. food aid program to send food assistance to North
Korea. The Senate version of the bill, passed on November 1, contained no such measure. Participants in the HouseSenate conference committee decided to strip the Royce amendment’s tougher restrictions, replacing it with language
(Section 741) that food assistance may only be provided if “adequate monitoring and controls” exist. President Obama
signed H.R. 2112 (P.L. 112-55) into law on November 18, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
9
U.S.-South Korea Relations
Inter-Korean Relations
Relations between the two Koreas deteriorated markedly after Lee’s February 2008 inauguration.
After 10 years of Seoul’s “sunshine” policy of largely unconditioned engagement with North
Korea, the Lee government entered office insisting on more reciprocity from and conditionality
toward Pyongyang. Most importantly, the Lee government announced that it would review the
initiation of new large-scale inter-Korean projects agreed to before Lee took office, and that
implementation would be linked to progress in denuclearizing North Korea. In another reversal of
his predecessors’ policies, Lee’s government has been openly critical of human rights conditions
in North Korea. His administration also offered to continue humanitarian assistance—provided
North Korea first requests such aid—and indicated that existing inter-Korean projects would be
continued.
North Korea reacted to Lee’s overall approach by unleashing a wave of invective against Lee and
adopting a more hostile stance toward official inter-Korean activities. Inter-Korean relations have
steadily worsened since then, to the point that by September 2010, nearly all of the inter-Korean
meetings, hotlines, tours, exchanges, and other programs that had been established during the
“sunshine” period have been suspended or severely curtailed.32 Whether it is a coincidence or a
cause, since Lee’s inauguration North Korea has behaved more provocatively, with each
provocation leading South Korea to take a harder line, which in turn has led North Korea to
respond.33
The most dramatic playing out of this dynamic occurred in the spring of 2010. In response to the
sinking of the Cheonan, South Korea curtailed nearly all forms of North-South interaction,
including all business transactions except for those associated with the inter-Korean industrial
park in the North Korean city of Kaesong. Despite periodic restrictions, the Kaesong Complex
continues to operate and has expanded slightly under Lee.34
In August 2010 Lee publicly floated the idea of creating a “reunification tax” that would help
prepare South Korea for a future reuniting of the two Koreas. Previously, a loose consensus had
prevailed in South Korea against openly discussing and planning for reunification in the short or
medium term, because of fears of provoking Pyongyang and of the fiscal costs of absorbing the
impoverished North. While few South Koreans advocate for actively trying to topple the Kim
regime, the reunification tax proposal indicates how the Cheonan sinking has led many in the Lee
government to view North Korea as more much more of an immediate danger than previously
thought.
Polls of South Korean attitudes show widespread and increasing anger toward and concern about
North Korea. Opinion toward North Korea hardened after the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, with
fewer Koreans expressing support for a return to the largely unconditional engagement with
North Korea that occurred during the “sunshine policy” era. However, polls also show continued
ambivalence toward Lee’s approach and a desire among many, if not most, South Koreans for
their government to show more flexibility toward Pyongyang.
In July 2009, South Korea began circulating to other governments and key private sector groups a
proposal for a $40 billion multilateral aid fund and development strategy that would help North
Korea if Pyongyang denuclearized. According to the details provided by various media outlets,
the proposal appears to be a continuation of Lee’s “3,000 Policy” pledge during the 2007
32
Some figures quantify the downturn in relations from 2007 to 2008: official bilateral dialogues were down from 55 in
2007 to 6 in 2008; South Korea’s governmental humanitarian assistance declined from 3.5 million won ($215 million)
to 0.4 million won ($25 million); and government-run reunions of family members fell from over 3,600 to zero. After
years of double-digit growth, inter-Korean trade registered a mere 1.2% increase from 2007 to 2008. Figures are from
Ministry of Unification, “Inter-Korean Relations in 2008,” February 2009. North-South Korean trade was just over
$1.8 billion in 2008.
33
Four actions by North Korea have had a particularly dramatic impact on South Korea’s policy toward the North: the
refusal to allow an independent South Korean investigation into the July 2008 fatal shooting of a South Korean tourist
by a North Korean soldier at the Mt. Kumgang resort in North Korea, a nuclear test in May 2009, periodically placing
greater restrictions on the inter-Korean industrial complex at Kaesong, and the sinking of the Cheonan.
34
For more, see CRS Report RL34093, The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex, by Mark E. Manyin and
Dick K. Nanto.
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U.S.-South Korea Relations
presidential campaign to help raise North Korea’s per capita income to $3,000 over the next 10
years.35 The proposal also appears to complement the “comprehensive” package the Obama
Administration has indicated could be forthcoming if North Korea took positive steps on the
nuclear front.
South Korea’s Regional Relations
Looking at their surrounding neighborhood, South Koreans sometimes refer to themselves as a
“shrimp among whales.” South Korea’s relations with China and Japan, especially the latter, are
fraught with ambivalence, combining interdependence and rivalry. Despite these difficulties,
trilateral cooperation among the three capitals has increased over the past decade, particularly in
the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. Since 2008, leaders of the three countries have
met annually in standalone summits, established a trilateral secretariat in Seoul, signed an
investment agreement, and in May 2012 agreed to launch trilateral “C-J-K” FTA negotiations by
the end of the year.36
Growing South Korea-Japan Cooperation
A cooperative relationship between South Korea and Japan, both U.S. treaty allies, and among the
three countries is in U.S. interests because it arguably enhances regional stability, helps
coordination over North Korea policy, and boosts each country’s ability to deal with the strategic
challenges posed by China’s rise. However, despite increased cooperation, closeness, and
interdependence between the South Korean and Japanese governments, people, and businesses
over the past decade, mistrust on historical and territorial issues continues to linger. South Korea
and Japan have competing claims to the small Dokdo/Takeshima islands37 in the Sea of Japan
(called the East Sea by Koreans), and most South Koreans complain that Japan has not adequately
acknowledged its history of aggression against Korea. For more than three generations beginning
in the late 19th century, Japan intervened directly in Korean affairs, culminating in the annexation
of the Korean peninsula in 1910. Over the next 35 years, Imperial Japan all but attempted to wipe
out Korean culture.38 Among the victims were President-elect Park has spoken of a
desire to reverse this dynamic, for instance by relaxing or lifting the restrictions the Lee
government imposed in May 2010 on nearly all forms of North-South interaction after the sinking
of the Cheonan.
Polls of South Korean attitudes show widespread and increasing anger toward and concern about
North Korea. Opinion toward North Korea hardened after the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, with
fewer Koreans expressing support for a return to the largely unconditional engagement with
North Korea that occurred during the “sunshine policy” era. Moreover, the attack renewed longdormant public discussions of whether South Korea should begin making public preparations for
a future reuniting of the two Koreas. Previously, a loose consensus had prevailed in South Korea
against openly discussing and planning for reunification in the short or medium term, because of
fears of provoking Pyongyang and of the fiscal costs of absorbing the impoverished North.
However, notwithstanding the hardening of attitudes toward North Korea, polls also show
continued ambivalence toward Lee’s approach and a desire among many, if not most, South
Koreans for their government to show more flexibility toward Pyongyang.
South Korea’s Regional Relations
Looking at their surrounding neighborhood, South Koreans sometimes refer to their country as a
“shrimp among whales.” South Korea’s relations with China and Japan, especially the latter, are
fraught with ambivalence, combining interdependence and rivalry. Despite these difficulties,
trilateral cooperation among the three capitals has increased over the past decade, particularly in
the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. Since 2008, leaders of the three countries have
met annually in standalone summits, established a trilateral secretariat in Seoul, signed an
investment agreement, and in 2012 launched trilateral “C-J-K” FTA negotiations.19
19
From 1999 to 2007, trilateral summits were only held on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’
“Plus Three” summit (which included the 10 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, and South Korea).
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U.S.-South Korea Relations
In late 2012, President-elect Park decried the rise in South Korea-Japan and China-Japan
tensions, which she warned if left unchecked could lead to unintended military clashes. To
forestall this, she has proposed a “Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative” that would
involve Japan adopting a “correct understanding of history,” “forward-looking” leadership from
regional and U.S. leaders that focuses on global and regional issues rather than bilateral spats, and
“building a more enduring peace” on the Korean Peninsula.20
South Korea-Japan Relations
U.S. policymakers have long voiced encouragement for enhanced South Korea-Japan relations. A
cooperative relationship between the two countries, both U.S. treaty allies, and among the three is
in U.S. interests because it arguably enhances regional stability, helps coordination over North
Korea policy, and boosts each country’s ability to deal with the strategic challenges posed by
China’s rise. However, despite increased cooperation, closeness, and interdependence between
the South Korean and Japanese governments, people, and businesses over the past decade,
mistrust on historical and territorial issues continues to linger. South Korea and Japan have
competing claims to the small Dokdo/Takeshima islands in the Sea of Japan (called the East Sea
by Koreans), and most South Koreans complain that Japan has not adequately acknowledged its
history of aggression against Korea.21 For more than three generations beginning in the late 19th
century, Japan intervened directly in Korean affairs, culminating in the annexation of the Korean
peninsula in 1910. Over the next 35 years, Imperial Japan all but attempted to wipe out Korean
culture.22 Among the victims were tens of thousands of South Korean “comfort women” who
during the 1930s and 1940s were recruited, many if not most by coercive measures, into
providing sexual services for Japanese soldiers.
President Lee came into office seeking to improve official South Korea-Japan relations, which
had deteriorated markedly during President Roh’s term. Under Lee, and throughout and a succession
of Japanese
leaders, Cabinet and head-of-state meetings, including reciprocal visits, have become
became more routine.
Cemented for the first time in years by a common strategic outlook on North Korea,
trilateral South Korea-U.S.-Japan coordination over North Korea policy has been particularly
35
Christian Oliver, “Seoul Plans $40bn Aid Fund for N Korea,” Financial Times, July 20, 2009. North Korea’s 2009
per capita income was $1,900, according to the CIA World Factbook.
36
From 1999 to 2007, trilateral summits were only held on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’
“Plus Three” summit (which included the 10 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, and South Korea).
37
Since the end of World War II, South Korea has administered Dokdo/Takeshima.
38 trilateral
South Korea-U.S.-Japan coordination over North Korea policy was particularly close. People-topeople ties blossomed, with tens of thousands of Japanese and Koreans traveling to the other
country every day. The South Korean and Japanese militaries also stepped up their cooperation,
including holding trilateral exercises with the United States. For the first three years of his term,
Lee gave less public emphasis to flare-ups over history and the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial
dispute.
However, South Koreans’ interest in forming significant new institutional arrangements with
Japan is dampened by three factors. First, continued suspicions of Japan among the South Korean
population place political limitations on how far and how fast Korean leaders can improve
relations. Second, continued disagreements over Dokdo/Takeshima’s sovereignty continue to
weigh down the relationship. Third, unlike Japan, South Korea generally does not view China as
20
Park Geun-hye, “A Plan for Peace in North Asia,” Wall Street Journal Opinion Asia, November 12, 2012.
Since the end of World War II, South Korea has administered Dokdo/Takeshima, which the U.S. government
officially calls the “Liancourt Rocks.”
22
Many Koreans believe that the United States was complicit in this history, by reportedly informally agreeing in a
1905 meeting between U.S. Secretary of War William Taft and Japanese Prime Minister Taro Katsura that the United
States would recognize Japan’s sphere of influence over Korea in return for Japan doing the same for the United States
in the Philippines.
21
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U.S.-South Korea Relations
close since the beginning of 2009. People-to-people ties have blossomed, with tens of thousands
of Japanese and Koreans traveling to the other country every day. South Koreans, including some
victims of Japan’s colonial period, donated significant funds to Japan after the March 11
earthquake and tsunami off the coast of northeastern Japan. The South Korean and Japanese
militaries also have stepped up their cooperation. Lee has given less public emphasis to flare-ups
over history and the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute. He also welcomed the most recent
Japanese apology for its history of aggression, from Prime Minister Naoto Kan in August 2010,
that recognized the 100th anniversary of Japan’s annexation. Many observers said that the
apology, along with Kan’s move to return thousands of antiquities taken from Korea during the
occupation, were major reasons South Korean protests marking the anniversary were much
smaller and less virulent than had been expected.
However, South Koreans’ interest in forming significant new institutional arrangements with
Japan is dampened by three factors. First, continued suspicions of Japan among the South Korean
population place political limitations on how far and how fast Korean leaders can improve
relations. Second, continued disagreements over Dokdo/Takeshima’s sovereignty continue to
weigh down the relationship. These disputes flared most recently in 2011. A key to this issue will
be whether such disputes are contained or spill over into other areas of the relationship. Third,
unlike Japan, South Korea generally does not view China as an existential challenge and
territorial threat. South Korea also needs Chinese cooperation on North Korea. Accordingly,
Korean leaders tend to be much more wary of taking steps that will alarm China. A factor that
could change this calculation is if China is seen as enabling North Korean aggression. Indeed,
North Korean acts of provocation are often followed by breakthroughs in ROK-Japan relations, as
well as in ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation.
Two indicators to watch over the coming months in South Korea-Japan relations are (1) whether
the two countries can restart and complete free trade agreement negotiations that have been
stalled since 2004, and (2) whether they can complete negotiations over an information sharing
and an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), both of which would facilitate
greater cooperation and coordination between the two countries’ militaries. In 2011, negotiations
over these two agreements stalled, primarily due to the heating up of the Dokdo/Takeshima
dispute and the Lee government’s push for the Japanese government to provide compensation to
the surviving “comfort women.”39 However, North Korea’s April 2012 rocket launch appears to
have restarted the ACSA and information sharing discussions, and has given rise to reports that
the two countries and the United States are discussing whether to hold their first-ever trilateral
military exercise.
South Korea-China Relations
China’s rise influences virtually all aspects of South Korean foreign and economic policy. North
Korea’s growing economic and diplomatic dependence on China since the early 2000s has meant
that South Korea must increasingly factor Beijing’s actions and intentions into its North Korea
policy. China’s influence over North Korea has tended to manifest itself in two ways in Seoul. On
the one hand, most South Korean officials worry that North Korea, particularly its northern
39
The latter move came after a ruling by South Korea’s Supreme Court that the
government had not done enough to obtain official compensation for the “comfort
women.”
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U.S.-South Korea Relations
provinces, is drifting into China’s orbit. Kim Jong-il made an unprecedented three trips to China
in the 2010-2011 time period, China gave significant diplomatic and perhaps economic backing
to Kim Jong-un following his father’s death in December 2011, and the two countries have
greatly expanded economic cooperation between provinces straddling their border. For those on
the political left in South Korea, this has been an argument against Lee’s harder line stance
toward inter-Korean relations, which they say has eroded much of South Korea’s influence over
North Korea. On the other hand, China’s continued support for North Korea, particularly its
month-long delay in expressing public regret over the Cheonan’s sinking and its perceived
backing of Pyongyang after the Yeonpyeong Island shelling, has angered many South Koreans,
particularly conservatives. Many South Korean conservatives also express concern that their
Chinese counterparts have been unwilling to discuss plans for dealing with various contingencies
involving instability in North Korea. China’s treatment of North Korean border-crossers, many of
whom are forcibly repatriated to North Korea, has also become a bilateral irritant.
Furthermore, South Koreans’ concerns about China’s rise have been heightened by China’s
increased assertiveness around East Asia in recent years, particularly its vocal opposition in 2010
to U.S.-South Korean naval exercises in the Yellow Sea. In 2011 and 2012, a bilateral dispute
over usage rights in overlapping waters surrounding the Ieodo Island (which the Chinese call
Suyan Rock) has been reignited by clashes between Chinese fishermen and the South Korean
Coast Guard.40 In one case in 2011, a Chinese fisherman stabbed a South Korean Coast Guard
official to death. Thus far, the two governments have prevented these incidents from escalating;
however, they appear to have fostered significant ill feelings among many South Koreans toward
China.
Since China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization, it has emerged as South Korea’s
most important economic partner. Over 20% of South Korea’s total trade is with China, and for
years China has been the number one location for South Korean firms’ foreign direct
investment.41 In 2012, the two countries agreed to start bilateral FTA negotiations.Yet, even as
China is an important source of South Korean economic growth, it also looms large as an
economic competitor. Indeed, fears of increased competition with Chinese enterprises has been an
important motivator for South Korea’s push to negotiate a series of free trade agreements with
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U.S.-South Korea Relations
an existential challenge and territorial threat. South Korea also needs Chinese cooperation on
North Korea. Accordingly, Korean leaders tend to be much more wary of taking steps that will
alarm China. A factor that could change this calculation is if China is seen as enabling North
Korean aggression. Indeed, North Korean acts of provocation are often followed by
breakthroughs in ROK-Japan relations, as well as in ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation.
All three of these factors contributed to the dramatic downturn in South Korea-Japan relations in
2012. In May and again in June, the two sides were on the verge of signing a completed
intelligence-sharing agreement long sought by the United States as a way to ease trilateral
cooperation and dialogue. However, a firestorm of criticism against the pact in South Korea led
the Lee government to cancel the signing minutes before it was to take place. Negotiations over a
related deal on exchanging military supplies also broke down. Later that summer, President Lee
made the first-ever visit by a South Korean president to Dokdo/Takeshima. Lee said his visit was
in large measure a response to what he claimed was Japan’s failure to adequately acknowledge
and address the suffering of the World War II comfort women. Lee further upset many Japanese
when news reports revealed negative comments he made about the Japanese Emperor in a townhall setting. In response, Japanese leaders halted many forms of official dialogue for a time. Both
President-elect Park and new Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, who came to power in
December 2012 in part due to the furor over Lee’s actions, appear to have placed a priority on
maintaining more stable bilateral relations. However, given the array of domestic forces opposed
to raising South Korea-Japan relations to a new level, it is unclear whether the two governments
will have the interest or capacity to do more than maintain ad hoc cooperation, such as in
response to aggressive North Korean actions.
South Korea-China Relations
Park Geun-hye appears to be placing a priority on improving South Korea’s relations with China,
which are generally thought to have been cool during Lee Myung-bak’s tenure. China’s rise
influences virtually all aspects of South Korean foreign and economic policy. North Korea’s
growing economic and diplomatic dependence on China since the early 2000s has meant that
South Korea must increasingly factor Beijing’s actions and intentions into its North Korea policy.
China’s influence over North Korea has tended to manifest itself in two ways in Seoul. On the
one hand, most South Korean officials worry that North Korea, particularly its northern
provinces, is drifting into China’s orbit. For those on the political left in South Korea, this was an
argument against Lee’s harder line stance toward inter-Korean relations, which they say has
eroded much of South Korea’s influence over North Korea. On the other hand, China’s continued
support for North Korea, particularly its perceived backing of Pyongyang after the Yeonpyeong
Island shelling, has angered many South Koreans, particularly conservatives. Many South Korean
conservatives also express concern that their Chinese counterparts have been unwilling to discuss
plans for dealing with various contingencies involving instability in North Korea, a sentiment that
could be tested by Park Geun-hye’s call for establishing a trilateral strategic dialogue among
Korea, the United States, and China.23 China’s treatment of North Korean refugees, many of
whom are forcibly repatriated to North Korea, has also become a bilateral irritant.
Furthermore, South Korean concerns about China’s rise have been heightened by China’s
increased assertiveness around East Asia in recent years, particularly its vocal opposition in 2010
23
Park Geun-hye, “Trustpolitik and the Making of a New Korea,” November 15, 2012.
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to U.S.-South Korean naval exercises in the Yellow Sea. In 2011 and 2012, a bilateral dispute
over usage rights in overlapping waters surrounding Ieodo Island (which the Chinese call Suyan
Rock and the United States officially labels the Socotra Rock) has been reignited by clashes
between Chinese fishermen and the South Korean Coast Guard.24 In one case in 2011, a Chinese
fisherman stabbed a South Korean Coast Guard official to death. Thus far, the two governments
have prevented these incidents from escalating; however, they appear to have fostered significant
ill feelings among many South Koreans toward China.
Since China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization, it has emerged as South Korea’s
most important economic partner. Over 20% of South Korea’s total trade is with China, twice the
level for South Korea-U.S. and South Korea-Japan trade.25 For years, China has been the number
one location for South Korean firms’ foreign direct investment. In 2012, the two countries agreed
to start bilateral FTA negotiations. Yet, even as China is an important source of South Korean
economic growth, it also looms large as an economic competitor. Indeed, fears of increased
competition with Chinese enterprises have been an important motivator for South Korea’s push to
negotiate a series of FTAs with other major trading partners around the globe.
Security Relations and the U.S.-ROK Alliance
The United States and South Korea are allies under the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the
agreement, U.S. military personnel have maintained a continuous presence on the peninsula since
the conclusion of the Korean War and are committed to help South Korea defend itself,
particularly against any aggression from the North. The United States maintains about 28,500
troops in the ROK. South Korea is included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” also known as
“extended deterrence” that applies to other non-nuclear U.S. allies as well. In an October 2011
visit to South Korea, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta reassuredOctober 2011,
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visited South Korea, in a visit at least partially designed to
reassure South Korea and Japan of the strength of the U.S. security commitment amidst
40
South Korea and China both claim that the submerged land feature is part of its own exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
South Korea has built a research observation station on Ieodo.
41
Much of South Korea’s exports to China are intermediate goods that ultimately are used in products exported to the
United States and Europe.
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strength of the U.S. security commitment amidst uncertainty over the size of possible cuts to the
U.S. military budget. Among other items, Panetta
reiterated the Obama Administration’s
commitment to maintain the current U.S. troop level in
Korea.4226
Since 2009, the two sides have accelerated steps to transform the U.S.-ROK alliance, broadening
it from its primary purpose of defending against a North Korean attack to a regional and even
global partnership. At the same time, provocations from North Korea have propelled more
integrated bilateral planning for responding to possible contingencies. Increasingly advanced joint
military exercises have reinforced the enhanced defense coordinationpartnership. According to U.S. officials,
defense coordination at the working level as well as at the ministerial level has been consistent
and productive. In June 2012, the two sides plan to holdheld their second so-called “2+2” meeting
between between
the U.S. Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense and their South Korean
counterparts. The counterparts. Among
other policy areas, the joint statement emphasized new initiatives on cybersecurity and missile
defense, and the United States reiterated its commitment to maintain current troop levels. The
first ever “2+2” meeting in July 2010, which featured a visit to the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) by
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates, commemorated the 60th anniversary of the Korean War. The massive joint military
exercises held immediately after the meeting, featuring a U.S. aircraft carrier and F-22 aircraft,
signaled to North Korea and others
24
South Korea and China both claim that the submerged land feature is part of its own exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
South Korea has built a research observation station on Ieodo.
25
Much of South Korea’s exports to China are intermediate goods that ultimately are used in products exported to the
United States and Europe.
26
“Full Text of Joint Communique of ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting,” Yonhap, October 28, 2011.
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anniversary of the Korean War. The massive joint military exercises held immediately after the
meeting, featuring a U.S. aircraft carrier and F-22 aircraft, signaled to North Korea and others
that the American commitment to Korea remains strong.
In the past, issues surrounding U.S. troop deployments have been a flashpoint for public
disapproval of the military alliance. Recently, however, analysts point out that even potential
irritants to the relationship have been dealt with skillfully by the military officials in charge: in. In
2011, United States Forces Korea (USFK) and South Korean environmental officials worked
expeditiously to quelladdress public concern about buried chemicals on U.S. military bases from the
post-Korean War era, and, also. Also in 2011, the USFK handed over a U.S. soldier accused of raping a
South Korean woman to the Korean authorities, in addition to issuing high-level apologies and
pledging full cooperation. Although both of these examples have drawn criticism and sparked
renewed interest in revising the U.S.-ROK status of forces agreement (SOFA), it appears as
though officials on both sides have worked together expeditiouslybeen able to quell distrust of the U.S.
military among the Korean public.43
South Korean Missile Range Negotiations
The issue of extending South Korea’s missile range has taken on added importance in the wake of
North Korea’s failed missile launch. A 2001 agreement with the United States limits South
Korean ballistic missile range to 300 kilometers and their payload to 500 kilograms. The Lee
government has reportedly been trying to persuade the United States to extend the range and
warhead size of South Korean ballistic missiles. In April 2012, South Korea announced that it had
developed an indigenous long-range cruise missile that can strike targets anywhere in North
Korea. The cruise missile does not violate the terms of the ballistic missile agreement.
Proponents of extending the South’s ballistic missile range argue that the South lags far behind
North Korea’s missile capabilities, while critics say that allowing the extension could spark a
regional arms race, as well as go against international standards that discourage the proliferation
42
“Full Text of Joint Communique of ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting,” Yonhap, October 28, 2011.
SOFAs establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country, addressing how
the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction shall be applied toward U.S. personnel while in that country. For more, see
CRS Report RL34531, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized?, by R. Chuck
Mason.
43
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of ballistic missiles. Some observers suggest that a compromise might be struck in terms of South
Korea’s maximum range, as well as agreements to develop joint efforts on missile defense.
Korean public.27
Budgetary and Operational Challenges
Despite these indicators of strength, the alliance faces a host of significant challenges in the
months and years ahead. Delays and increasing price tags have slowed the implementation of
agreements to reduce and relocate the U.S. troop presence in South Korea. (See “U.S. Alliance
and ROK Defense Reform Plans” below.) Differences over burden sharing remain, but analysts
note that these issues tend to be prevalent in all alliance relationships. Although the political
atmospherics of the alliance have been outstanding, defense analysts note that the Lee
Administration has slowed significantly the defense budget increases planned under the earlier
Roh Administration.
Congressional Concern about U.S. Troop Deployments
In 2011, some Members of Congress raised strong concerns with existing plans to relocate U.S.
bases in South Korea and “normalize” the tours of U.S. troops there, including longer stays with
family members accompanying them. In May 2011, Senators Carl Levin, John McCain, and
James Webb issued a statement that urged a reconsideration of the existing plans for U.S. military
presence in the Asia Pacific, including the current agreements in South Korea. A Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report requested by members of the Senate Appropriations
Committee released in May 2011 concluded that the Department of Defense had not
demonstrated a “business case” to justify the tour normalization initiative, nor considered
alternatives.4428 In June 2011, the Senate Armed Services Committee passed amendments to the
2012 Defense Authorization bill (S. 1253) that prevents the obligation of any funds for tour
normalization until further reviews of the plan are considered and a complete plan is provided to
Congress. In May 2012, the House Armed Services Committee reported H.R. 4310, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which includedThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (H.R. 4310/P.L. 112-239)
includes a provision (Section 2107) that
would continue to prohibit funds for tour normalization. Critics of the Senators’ call to overhaul
existing plans say that such changes could restrict U.S. military capabilities and readiness as well
as jeopardize hard-fought agreements designed to make U.S. presence more politically
sustainable in South Korea.45
27
SOFAs establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country, addressing how
the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction shall be applied toward U.S. personnel while in that country. For more, see
CRS Report RL34531, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized?, by R. Chuck
Mason.
28
Report found at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-316.
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Critics of the Senators’ call to overhaul existing plans say that such changes could restrict U.S.
military capabilities and readiness as well as jeopardize hard-fought agreements designed to make
the U.S. military presence more politically sustainable in South Korea.29
Testimony by Administration and military officials in 2012 appeared to reflect congressional
concern on the cost of tour normalization. During his confirmation hearing, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs Mark Lippert emphasized that tour normalization,
while desirable, should be carefully considered with the costs of implementation in mind. In late
March 2012, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, General James D.
Thurman, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, said that tour normalization is not affordable at this
time and that he was content to keep accompanied tours at their current level.
44
Report found at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-316.
Bruce Klingner, “Proposed Re-Realignment for Northeast Asia Ignores Strategic Realities,” Heritage Foundation
WebMemo #3262, May 18, 2011.
45
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U.S. Alliance and ROK Defense Reform Plans
Current security developments are taking place in the context of several concurrent defense
schemes. The June 2009 Obama-Lee summit produced the broadly conceived “Joint Vision for
the Alliance,” which promised to enhance and globalize future defense cooperation. After the
decision to delay the Opcon transfertransfer of wartime operational control (Opcon), the operational “Strategic
Alliance 2015” roadmap
(announced in September 2010) outlines the new transition, including
ROK capabilities and U.S.
troop relocation and tour normalization. The U.S. military is also
undergoing a broad
transformation of its forces in the region; the 8th Army is moving toward
becoming a warfighting
war fighting headquarters that can deploy to other areas of the world while still
serving as a deterrent to any
possible aggression from North Korea.4630
Meanwhile, South Korea’s Defense Reform 2020 bill passed by the National Assembly in 2006
lays out a 15-year, 621 trillion won (about $550 million) investment that aims to reduce the
number of ROK troops while developing a high-tech force and strengthening the Joint ChiefChiefs of
Staff system. In addition, a plan known as “Defense Reformation Plan 307,” intends to enhance
collaboration among the ROK military branches. Driven by the North Korean provocations in
2010, the new “proactive deterrence” approach calls for a more flexible posture to respond to
future attacks, as opposed to the
“total war” scenario that has driven much of Seoul’s defense
planning in the past. However,
political wrangling in the National Assembly blocked the passage
of a set of defense reform bills
in April 2012, leaving the future of reform unclear. The bills,
which focused on overhauling the
military command system, hadhave been pending in the
parliamentary body for over 11 months.a year. In addition, the budget passed by the National Assembly in
January 2013 cut proposed funding for military procurement but still raised the overall defense
budget by 3.8% over 2012 levels.
The “proactive deterrence” posture—in other words, a greater willingness among South Korean
leaders to countenance the use of force against North Korea—have made some analysts and
planners more concerned about the possibility that a small-scale North Korean provocation could
escalate. After the Yeonpyeong-do attack, President Lee has said that he asked China to tell North
Korea that Seoul would respond to a future attack by mobilizing its military and by retaliating
against North Korea’s supporting bases, not just the source of the attack. Lee also relaxed the
29
Bruce Klingner, “Proposed Re-Realignment for Northeast Asia Ignores Strategic Realities,” Heritage Foundation
WebMemo #3262, May 18, 2011.
30
“U.S. Army in South Korea Begins Transformation of Forces,” Stars and Stripes. August 25, 2010.
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rules of engagement to allow frontline commanders greater freedom to respond to a North Korean
attack without first asking permission from the military chain of command.31 U.S. defense
officials insist that the exceedingly close day-to-day coordination in the alliance ensures that
U.S.-ROK communication would be strong in the event of a new contingency. In July 2011,
General Walter Sharp, then-U.S. commander of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in South
Korea, confirmed to press outlets that the alliance had developed coordinated plans for
countermeasures against North Korean aggression.32
The Relocation of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)
In 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld authorized a realignment program to reduce and
relocate U.S. forces in South Korea. Under the Rumsfeld program, the Pentagon withdrew a
3,600-person combat brigade from the Second Division and sent it to Iraq. The Rumsfeld plan
called for the U.S. troop level in South Korea to fall from 37,000 to 25,000 by September 2008.
However, in 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates halted the withdrawals at the level of 28,500.
The U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) base relocation plan has two elements. The first envisages the transfer
transfer of a large percentage of the 9,000 U.S. military personnel at the U.S. Yongsan base in
Seoul to
U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys, which is located near the city of Pyeongtaek
some 40
miles south of Seoul. The second element involves the withdrawalrelocation of about 10,000 troops
of the
Second Infantry Division from the demilitarized zone and their relocation to areas south of the
Han River
(which runs through Seoul). The end result will be that USFK’s sites will decline from
the 104 it
maintained in 2002, to 48. The bulk of U.S. forces will be clustered in the two primary
“hubs” of
Osan Air Base/USAG Humphreys and USAG Daegu that contain five “enduring sites”
(Osan Air
Base, USAG Humphreys, US AG Daegu, Chinhae Naval Base, and Kunsan Air Base).
A new
joint warrior training center, north of Seoul, will be opened. 4733
The relocations to Pyeongtaek originally were scheduled for completion in 2008, but have been
postponed several times because of the slow construction of new facilities at Pyongtaek and
South Korean protests of financial difficulties in paying the ROK share of the relocation costs.
46
47
“U.S. Army in South Korea Begins Transformation of Forces,” Stars and Stripes. August 25, 2010.
“US-South Korea: a New Security Relationship,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, January 18, 2010.
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The original cost estimate was over $10 billion; South Korea was to contribute $4 billion of this.
Estimates in 2010 placed the costs over $13 billion. In congressional testimony in September
2010, U.S. officials demurred from providing a final figure on the cost of the move, but
confirmed that the South Koreans were paying more than the original $4 billion.48 U.S.-ROK
discussions in 2009 reportedly indicated that the relocations to Pyeongtaek will not take place
until 2015 or 2016. Some individuals involved and familiar 34 The first
battalion-sized element relocated from a base in Uijeongbu, north of Seoul, to USAG Humphreys
in late December 2012.35 Some individuals involved with the move speculate that it will
not be
completed until 2020.
Figure 3
31
“Lee Recalls Getting Tough with N.Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, February 5, 2013.
“U.S., Seoul Secure Plans for Potential Counterattack,” Wall Street Journal. July 7, 2011.
33
“US-South Korea: a New Security Relationship,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, January 18, 2010.
34
“Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula,” CQ
Congressional Transcripts. September 16, 2010.
35
“US Communication Battalion to Relocate to Camp Humphreys,” Korea Times, December 27, 2012.
32
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Figure 2. USFK Bases After Realignment Plan Is Implemented
Source: Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - China Andand Northeast Asia, date posted April 15, 2010.
Tour Normalization
Another complicating factor in the development of the Yongsan Relocation Plan is the
announcement by the Pentagon in 2008 that U.S. military families, for the first time, would be
allowed to join U.S. military personnel in South Korea. Prior to this change, most U.S. troops in
South Korea served one-year unaccompanied assignments. The goal is to phase out one-year
unaccompanied tours in South Korea, replacing them with 36-month accompanied or 24-month
unaccompanied tours. Eventually, the “normalization” of tours is estimated to increase the size of
the U.S. military community at Osan/Humphries near Pyongtaek to over 50,000. Members of
Congress have raised concerns about the cost of the normalization initiative and requested a
review of the plan. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 carries over the freeze on
funding for tour normalization from the FY2012 bill.
Cost Sharing
Under a Special Measures Agreement (SMA) reached in 2009, South Korea’s direct financial
contribution for U.S. troops in South Korea in 2011 will be 812.5 billion won (about $743
million). This is about 42% of the total cost of maintaining U.S. forces in South Korea. In recent
U.S.-R.O.K. military negotiations, Pentagon officials called for South Korea to increase its share
48
“Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula,” CQ
Congressional Transcripts. September 16, 2010.
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to at least 50%. Under the 2009 agreement, South Korea’s share of the cost is to increase until
2013 in accord with the rate of inflation but no more than 4% annually offset the cost of
stationing U.S. forces in Korea by providing the United States with 836 billion won ($765
million) during 2012. In combination with that sum, other compensation outside the SMA provide
for about 40%-45% of the total non-personnel stationing costs for U.S. troop presence.36 During
U.S.-R.O.K. military negotiations in recent years, Pentagon officials called for South Korea to
increase its share to at least 50%. The current SMA runs through 2013.
Opcon Transfer
The United States has agreed with Seoul to turn over the wartime command of Korean troops
later this decade. Under the current arrangement, which is a legacy of U.S. involvement in the
36
Figures provided by officials in Special Measures Agreement program at U.S. Forces Korea through e-mail
correspondence with CRS.
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1950-1953 Korean War, South Korea’s soldiers would be under the command of U.S. forces if
there were a war on the peninsula. In 2007, Secretary Rumsfeld accepted a proposal by thenSouth Korean President Roh Moo-hyun to set up separate South Korean and U.S. military
commands by April 2012. A U.S.-R.O.K. operational control (Opcon) agreement will dismantle
the U.S.-R.O.K. Combined Forces Command (CFC), which has been headed by the U.S.
commander in
Korea. Separate U.S. and R.O.K. military commands will be established. In accord
with the plan ,
a new U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) will be established. Under the Opcon
agreement, a
Military Cooperation Center will be responsible for planning military operations,
joint military
exercises, logistics support, and intelligence exchanges, and assisting in the
operation of the
communication, command, control, and computer systems.
At their June 2010 summit, Presidents Obama and Lee announced their decision to delay the
transfer of Opcon by three years, until 2015. Although the decision was couched as sending a
strong signal to North Korea following the sinking of the Cheonan, the agreement followed
months of debate in Seoul and Washington about the timing of the transfer. Many South Korean
and U.S. experts questioned whether the South Korean military possesses the capabilities—such
as a joint command and control system, sufficient transport planes, and amphibious sea lift
vessels—to operate effectively as its own command by the original transfer date of 2012. U.S.
officials stress, however, that the transfer was militarily on track before the political decision to
postpone. Opposition to the transfer in some quarters in Seoul may reflect a traditional fear of
abandonment by the U.S. military.
With the decision made, U.S. commanders are arguing that the three-year delay will allow the
alliance to synchronize more thoroughly all the moving parts of the arrangement, including the
relocation of U.S. troops.4937 The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan envisages measures such as
upgrading South Korean defense capabilities (such as ground operations command), improving
and recalibrating USFK and South Korean command and control systems, and better aligning
military exercises to meet the new asymmetrical challenges posed by North Korea. In a Joint
Communique issued after the U.S.-ROK Military Committee Meeting in October 2012, military
officials affirmed that the transition would be completed by December 2015 and that the elements
of the Strategic Alliance agreement are on track.
The “Strategic Flexibility” of USFK
In 2007 and 2008, U.S. commanders in South Korea stated that the future U.S. role in the defense
of South Korea would be mainly an air force and naval role. The ROK armed forces today total
681,000 troops, with nearly 550,000 of them in the Army and around 65,000 each in the Air Force
and Navy. Since 2004, the U.S. Air Force has increased its strength in South Korea through the
regular rotation into South Korea of advanced strike aircraft. These rotations are not a permanent
presence, but the aircraft often remain in South Korea for weeks and sometimes months for
training.
49
“Sharp: Korea Plan Synchronizes Capabilities,” PACOM Headlines, American Forces Press Service. September 21,
2010.
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Since the early 2000s, U.S. military officials have expressed a desire to deploy some U.S. forces
in South Korea to areas of international conflicts under a doctrine of “strategic flexibility.” The
South Korean government of Roh Moo-hyun resisted this idea, largely for fear it might entangle
South Korea in a possible conflict between the United States and China. In the mid-2000s, the
37
“Sharp: Korea Plan Synchronizes Capabilities,” PACOM Headlines, American Forces Press Service. September 21,
2010.
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two governments reached an agreement in which South Korea recognized the United States’
intention to be able to deploy its forces off the Peninsula, while the United States in turn
recognized that the troops’ return to South Korea would be subject to discussion. Among other
elements, the compromise seems to imply that in an off-Peninsula contingency, U.S. forces might
deploy but not operate from South Korea.
South Korean Defense Industry and Purchases of U.S. Weapons
South Korea is a major purchaser of U.S. weapons, buying $966.9taking delivery of $540 million worth of U.S.
arms in
FY2010 calendar year 2011. The country is regularly among the top customers for Foreign
Military Sales (FMS).50
38 Although South Korea generally buys the majority of its weapons from
the United States,
European and Israeli defense companies also compete for contracts; Korea is
an attractive market because of
its rising defense expenditures. Recently, Boeing won the first two phases of South Korea’s
fighter modernization program and Seoul has also indicated interest in Lockheed Martin’s F-35
Joint Strike Fighter.51 Boeing and Lockheed Martin are
bidding with the F-15SE and F-35A, respectively, for a $7.7 billion contract to provide South
Korea’s next fighter aircraft. The Park Administration is expected to make a final decision in the
first half of 2013 on the fighter competition, which also includes the Eurofighter Typhoon.39
South Korea’s defense ministry has said that it will prioritize its defense
systems against North
Korea’s missile and nuclear threats, including Aegis combat destroyers,
missile interceptors, and
early warning radars.5240 In response to recent attacks, Seoul has deployed
precision-guided
missiles near the DMZ53DMZ41 and is currently developing a next generation multiple
launch rocket system to be placed near the Northern Limit Line.54
system to be placed near the Northern Limit Line, the line that South Korea says is the two
Koreas’ maritime boundary off the west coast of the Peninsula.42
The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency in December 2012 proposed the sale of four
Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to South Korea at a total cost of $1.2 billion.
Given concerns that the sale could violate the MTCR and non-proliferation norms, observers have
called on the Obama Administration to ensure that the Global Hawks are used strictly for
reconnaissance and are not armed.43 Currently, the South Korean military only operates
reconnaissance UAVs, but the Ministry of National Defense is budgeting $447 million to
indigenously develop a combat UAV by 2021.44 The revised ballistic missile guidelines also
increased the maximum allowable payload for South Korean UAVs to from 500 kg to 2,500 kg
(5,500 lbs.), but the ranges are not limited by any international agreements.
Korea’s Defense Reform 2020 legislation emphasizes the development of indigenous capabilities
by increasing the percentage of funds allocated to defense research and development (R&D).5545
South Korea competes internationally in the armored vehicle, shipbuilding, and aerospace
38
Joint United States Military Affairs Group—Korea Mission Brief. August 18, 2010.
Eun-joo Lee, “Choice of Fighter Jets Pushed to 2013,” JoongAng Daily, December 18, 2012.
40
“South Korea Pulls Back from Original Defense Spending Plan Amid Economic Woes,” Yonhap News. September
27, 2009.
41
“Seoul Deploys Precision-Guided Missiles Targeting Pyongyang,” Korea Herald. June 28, 2011.
42
“Next-Generation MLRS Named ‘Cheonmu,” KBS. June 28, 2011.
43
“Drones for South Korea,” New York Times, Editorial. December 29, 2012.
44
Song Sang-ho, “U.S. Agrees to Extend Seoul’s Ballistic Missile Range: Reports,” Korea Herald, September 23,
2012.
45
“South Korea Defense Budget,” Jane’s Defence Budgets. December 14, 2009.
39
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industries. Of particular note is the T-50 Golden Eagle, a trainer and light fighter aircraft
developed in conjunction with Lockheed Martin.5646
The 110th Congress passed legislation that upgraded South Korea’s status as an arms purchaser
from a Major Non-NATO Ally to the NATO Plus Three category (P.L. 110-429), which changed
the classification to NATO Plus Four. This upgrade establishes a higher dollar threshold for the
requirement that the U.S. executive branch notify Congress of pending arms sales to South Korea,
from $14 million to $25 million. Congress has 15 days to consider the sale, and may take
legislative steps to block the sale compared to 50 days for Major Non-NATO Allies.
50
Joint United States Military Affairs Group—Korea Mission Brief. August 18, 2010.
“South Korea to Buy More U.S. Weapons to Counter North,” Reuters. September 21, 2010.
52
“South Korea Pulls Back from Original Defense Spending Plan Amid Economic Woes,” Yonhap News. September
27, 2009.
53
“Seoul Deploys Precision-guided Missiles Targeting Pyongyang,” Korea Herald. June 28, 2011.
54
“Next-Generation MLRS Named ‘Cheonmu,” KBS. June 28, 2011.
55
“South Korea Defense Budget,” Jane’s Defence Budgets. December 14, 2009.
56
“Korea’s T-50 Spreads Its Wings,” Defense Industry Insider. September 13, 2010.
51
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South Korea’s Deployment to Afghanistan
After withdrawing its initial deployment of military personnel to Afghanistan in 2007, South
Korea sent a second deployment, consisting of troops and civilian workers who are staffing a
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Parwan Province, located north of Kabul.57 In February
2010, the National Assembly approved and funded the deployment of over 300 Army personnel
to protect 100 Korean civilian reconstruction workers for a two-year mission. Forty police
officers were also dispatched. The first soldiers arrived in June 2010 and are scheduled to stay
until the end of 2012. Increasing numbers of attacks on Korean facilities, coupled with the Obama
Administration decision to begin troop withdrawal in summer 2011, have raised questions about
an early return of some ROK personnel. According to some South Korean press reports, the ROK
government is considering an earlier withdrawal.
Economic Relations
South Korea and the United States are major economic partners. In 2011, two-way trade between
the two countries totaled over $95 billion (see Table 1), making South Korea the United States’
seventh-largest trading partner. For some western states and U.S. sectors, the South Korean
market is even more important. South Korea is far more dependent economically on the United
States than the United States is on South Korea. In 2011, the United States was South Korea’s
third-largest trading partner, second-largest export market, and the third-largest source of imports.
It was among South Korea’s largest suppliers of foreign direct investment (FDI).
As both economies have become more integrated with the world economy, economic
interdependence has become more complex and attenuated, particularly as the United States’
economic importance to South Korea has declined relative to other major powers. In 2003, China
for the first time displaced the United States from its perennial place as South Korea’s number
one trading partner. In the mid-2000s, Japan overtook the United States, and since that time South
Korean annual trade with the 27-member European Union has caught up with ROK-U.S. trade.
Table 1. Annual U.S.-South Korea Merchandise Trade, Selected Years
(Billions of Nominal U.S. Dollars)
Year
U.S. Exports
U.S. Imports
Trade Balance
Total Trade
1990
14.4
18.5
-4.1
32.9
1995
25.4
24.2
1.2
49.6
2000
26.3
39.8
-13.5
66.1
2005
26.2
43.2
-17.0
69.4
2008
33.1
46.7
-13.6
79.8
2009
27
38.7
-11.7
65.7
2010
36.8
47.9
-11.1
84.7
57
In 2007, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun withdrew South Korea’s initial deployment of 200 non-combat
military personnel from Afghanistan after the Taliban kidnapped South Korean missionaries. The South Korean
government reportedly paid a sizeable ransom to the Taliban to secure the release of kidnapped South Korean Christian
missionaries, reported by one Taliban official to be $20 million.
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Year
2011
U.S. Exports
41.3
U.S. Imports
56.0
Trade Balance
-14.7
Total Trade
97.3
Major U.S. Export
Items, 2011
Industrial machinery; semiconductor circuits; specialized instruments; civilian aircraft;
transistors; corn & wheat; chemicals.
Major U.S. Import
Items, 2011
Motor vehicles & parts; Cell phones; semiconductor circuits & printed circuit boards; motor
oil & jet fuel; iron & steel.
Source: 1990 and 1995 data from Global Trade Information Services. 2000-2011 data from U.S. International Trade
Commission. The 2000-2011 U.S. export data are for U.S. domestic exports and the data for U.S. imports are for
imports on a consumption basis.
The KORUS FTA58
The Bush and Roh Administrations initiated the KORUS FTA negotiations in 2006 and signed an
agreement in June 2007. The text of the free trade agreement covers a wide range of trade and
investment issues and, therefore, is expected to have wide economic implications for both the
United States and South Korea. A congressionally mandated study by the United States
International Trade Commission (USITC) concluded that investment and trade between the
United States and South Korea would increase modestly as a result of the KORUS FTA. This
result is in line with other similar studies. In general and in the short-to-medium term, the
KORUS FTA’s largest commercial effects are expected to be microeconomic in nature. The U.S.
services and agriculture industries, for instance, are expected to reap significant benefits if the
agreement is implemented. In contrast, U.S. textile, wearing apparel, and electronic equipment
manufacturers would be expected to experience declines in employment from increased South
Korean imports, though some U.S. electronics companies may see competitive benefits, as it
could be less expensive for them to source components from South Korea.
While a broad swath of the U.S. business community supported the agreement, the original
KORUS FTA was opposed by some groups, including some auto and steel manufacturers and
labor unions. Following December 3, 2010, modifications to the FTA by the Obama and Lee
administrations, several automotive interests—including Ford and the United Auto Workers—
announced that the new auto provisions had convinced them to support the agreement. In South
Korea, while public opinion polls generally showed broad support for the KORUS FTA, the
largest opposition party as well as many farmers and trade unionists vocally and actively opposed
the agreement.
Many observers have argued that, in addition to its economic implications, the KORUS FTA will
have diplomatic and security implications. Indeed, in many respects, the KORUS FTA’s fate may
go beyond strengthening U.S.-Korea ties and have profound implications for U.S. trade policy
and East Asia policy. For instance, some have suggested that a KORUS FTA will help to solidify
the U.S. presence in East Asia to counterbalance the increasing influence of China. Additionally,
many East Asian leaders have seen the move as a sign that the United States is intensifying its
involvement in East Asia, where most countries are pursuing a variety of free trade agreements.
South Korea has perhaps been the most aggressive in this FTA push. Since 2002, it has completed
seven other agreements (including one with the European Union, which went into effect in July
58
For more information, please see CRS Report RL34330, The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS
FTA): Provisions and Implications, coordinated by William H. Cooper.
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2011) and has begun negotiating several others. The KORUS FTA’s entry into force likely has
given added momentum to the Obama Administration’s push to negotiate a Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) FTA with eight other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.59 and take legislative
steps to block the sale compared to 50 days for Major Non-NATO Allies.
South Korea’s Deployment to Afghanistan
After withdrawing its initial deployment of military personnel to Afghanistan in 2007, South
Korea sent a second deployment, consisting of troops and civilian workers who are staffing a
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Parwan Province, located north of Kabul.47 In February
2010, the National Assembly approved and funded the deployment of over 300 Army personnel
to protect 100 Korean civilian reconstruction workers for a two-year mission. Forty police
officers were also dispatched. The full ROK Army contingent was in Afghanistan from June 2010
until the end of 2012. A smaller force of 70 soldiers will remain in 2013 to protect the civilians in
the PRT.
South Korea-Iran Relations48
In December 2012, the Obama Administration granted South Korea a 180-day extension of its
exemption from U.S. sanctions on Iran as a result of South Korea’s curtailing of oil imports from
Iran. P.L. 112-81, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, places strict
limitations on the U.S. operations of foreign banks that conduct transactions with Iran’s Central
Bank. Foreign banks can be granted an exemption from sanctions if the President certifies that the
parent country of the bank has significantly reduced its purchases of oil from Iran. South Korea is
one of the largest importers of Iranian oil. Following extensive negotiations between the Obama
and Lee governments in early 2012, South Korean imports of Iranian oil fell sharply. For the first
eleven months of 2012, crude oil imports of from Iran fell by around 40% compared with the
same period in 2011.
Over the past decade, growing concerns over Iran’s nuclear program have led to increased U.S.
scrutiny of South Korea’s longstanding trade with and investments in Iran. South Korea is one of
the most important customers for Iranian oil.49 Over the past decade, a number of South Korean
conglomerates (called chaebol) have received significant contracts to build or service large
infrastructure projects in Iran, including in Iran’s energy sector. Additionally, Iran has been a
significant regional hub for thousands of smaller South Korean manufacturers, which ship
46
“Korea’s T-50 Spreads Its Wings,” Defense Industry Insider. September 13, 2010.
In 2007, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun withdrew South Korea’s initial deployment of 200 non-combat
military personnel from Afghanistan after the Taliban kidnapped South Korean missionaries. The South Korean
government reportedly paid a sizeable ransom to the Taliban to secure the release of kidnapped South Korean Christian
missionaries, reported by one Taliban official to be $20 million.
48
For more information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
49
Iran data from Economist Intelligence Unit, Iran Country Report, April 2012.
47
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intermediate goods to Iran that are then assembled into larger units and/or re-exported to other
Middle Eastern countries.
In late 2011, Congress passed and President Obama signed P.L. 112-81, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, which places strict limitations on the U.S. operations of
foreign banks that conduct transactions with Iran’s Central Bank. Foreign banks can be granted an
exemption from sanctions if the President certifies that the parent country of the bank has
significantly reduced its purchases of oil from Iran.
Economic Relations
South Korea and the United States are major economic partners. In 2011, two-way trade between
the two countries totaled over $95 billion (see Table 1), making South Korea the United States’
seventh-largest trading partner. For some western states and U.S. sectors, the South Korean
market is even more important. South Korea is far more dependent economically on the United
States than the United States is on South Korea. In 2011, the United States was South Korea’s
third-largest trading partner, second-largest export market, and the third-largest source of imports.
It was among South Korea’s largest suppliers of foreign direct investment (FDI).
As both economies have become more integrated with the world economy, economic
interdependence has become more complex and attenuated, particularly as the United States’
economic importance to South Korea has declined relative to other major powers. In 2003, China
for the first time displaced the United States from its perennial place as South Korea’s number
one trading partner. In the mid-2000s, Japan overtook the United States, and since that time South
Korean annual trade with the 27-member European Union has caught up with ROK-U.S. trade.
In October 2011, the House and Senate passed H.R. 3080, the United States-Korea Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, which was subsequently signed by President Obama.50 The law
authorized the President to implement the KORUS FTA by an exchange of notes with South
Korea, after he determined that South Korea had taken the necessary measures to implement its
obligations under the agreement. On March 6, 2012, the President issued a proclamation ordering
federal agencies to implement the KORUS FTA, and the agreement entered into force on March
15, 2012. The George W. Bush and Roh Administrations initiated the KORUS FTA negotiations
in 2006 and signed an agreement in June 2007.
Implementation of the KORUS FTA
Upon the date of implementation of the KORUS FTA, 82% of U.S. tariff lines and 80% of South
Korean tariff lines were tariff free in U.S.-South Korean trade, whereas prior to the KORUS FTA,
38% of U.S. tariff lines and 13% of South Korean tariff lines were duty free. By the tenth year of
the agreement, the figures will rise to an estimated 99% and 98%, respectively, with tariff
elimination occurring in stages and the most sensitive products having the longest phase-out
periods. Non-tariff barriers in goods trade and barriers in services trade and foreign investment
are to be reduced or eliminated under the KORUS FTA.
50
The House vote was 278-151. In the Senate, the vote was 83-15.
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At the time of this writing, the KORUS FTA had been in force for less than one year; therefore it
is too early to ascertain its impact on U.S.-South Korean bilateral trade. Nevertheless, Table 1
below presents U.S.-South Korea merchandise trade data for selected years, including the first 11
months of 2012 (the latest data available) and comparative data for the corresponding period in
2011. The data indicate that total trade grew by 1.6% in 2012 from 2011, continuing a trend that
began in 2010 as the United States, South Korea, and other major economies recovered from the
global downturn. U.S. exports to South Korea declined by 1.5% during that period, while U.S.
imports increased by about 4.0%.
Table 1. Annual U.S.-South Korea Merchandise Trade,
Selected Years
(billions of U.S. dollars)
Year
U.S. Exports
U.S. Imports
Trade balance
Total trade
2005
26.2
43.2
-17.0
69.4
2006
30.8
44.7
-13.9
75.5
2007
33.0
45.4
-12.4
78.4
2008
33.1
46.7
-13.6
79.8
2009
27.0
38.7
-11.7
65.7
2010
38.0
48.9
-10.9
86.9
2011
43.5
56.6
-13.1
100.1
2011 (Jan.-Nov.)
39.5
52.2
-12.7
91.7
2012 (Jan.-Nov.)
38.9
54.3
-15.4
93.2
Major U.S. Export
Items
Semiconductor circuits & manufacturing equipment; specialized
instruments; civilian aircraft & parts; chemicals; coal products; corn &
wheat.
Major U.S. Import
Items
Motor vehicles; Cell phones; motor vehicle parts; semiconductor
circuits & printed circuit boards; iron & steel; tires; motor oil & jet fuel.
Sources: Global Trade Information Services.
As part of the implementation process, 19 binational committees and working groups were
formed to implement the various chapters of the agreement. About one half of those bodies have
met at least once since the March 15, 2012, entry-into-force date. The committees on
pharmaceuticals and medical devices and the committee on small and medium-sized enterprises
have met twice.
Autos
A major issue in the negotiations leading up to the KORUS FTA concerned the access to the
South Korean market for exports of U.S.-made cars. Under the agreement, the U.S. tariff of 2.5%
on South Korean cars will be eliminated in the fifth year of the agreement. The South Korean
tariff of 8% was reduced to 4% when the agreement entered into force and will be eliminated
completely in the fifth year of the agreement. South Korea also agreed to allow U.S.-based car
manufacturers to sell in South Korea up to 25, 000 cars per year per manufacturer as long as they
met U.S. safety and environmental standards. This concession addressed U.S. manufacturers’
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concern that having to meet South Korean standards added costs to the production of cars for the
South Korean market, placing them at a price disadvantage vis-a-vis domestic producers.
In 2012, sales of U.S.-made cars in South Korea have increased sharply. For example, in 2012,
sales of cars made by Ford increased 22.5%, sales of cars made by Chrysler increased 24.3%, and
sales of cars made by Cadillac increased 32.4%, compared to sales in 2011.51 It is not clear to
what degree the increases in sales can be attributed to the KORUS FTA or to other factors. The
American Chamber of Commerce in Korea has claimed that lower tariffs and consumption taxes
on U.S. cars and the concession on safety and environmental standards have allowed
manufacturers to reduce prices on their cars in the South Korean market, making them more
competitive.52
Two auto-related issues have emerged as the two sides implement the KORUS FTA. In one case,
the South Korean government has proposed introducing new safety regulations for replacement
parts even if the cars in which they would be used have qualified under the 25,000 equivalency
concession. Assistant USTR (AUSTR) Wendy Cutler indicated that the issue is the subject of
discussion between the two sides. In the second case, the South Korean government has proposed
to introduce a program to reward South Korean buyers of low-emission vehicles with a tax credit
and to penalize buyers of high-emission vehicles with a tax penalty (the so-called “bonus-malus”
system). U.S. and European car manufacturers claim that this tax program would make it more
difficult for them to sell their cars in South Korea and would undermine the benefits that were
negotiated under the KORUS FTA and the Korea-EU FTA, which went into effect in 2011.
According the AUSTR Wendy Cutler, South Korea agreed to a two-year grace period and to
consult further on the issue.53
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices
Under the KORUS FTA, South Korea agreed to form an independent review board (IRB) that
would allow appeals from pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers on South Korean
government policies pertaining to reimbursement under the government health insurance
program. South Korea has established an IRB. However, the government was going to allow up
to 60 days for the review. The government had indicated that the window would apply to all
decisions, including reimbursement prices for individual medicines. U.S. manufacturers said that
60 days would be too long and could inhibit their ability to market their products. South Korea
agreed to make the decision period 20 days on individual pricing decisions and 60 days for
decisions on overall reimbursement policies. The issue remains the subject of additional
discussions.54
Other Issues
Both South Korea and the United States have made it a priority to ensure that small- and mediumsized companies are able to take advantage of the KORUS FTA. They have formed a binational
committee to explore efforts to do so.
51
Data provided by the Korean Automobile Importers and Distributors Association (KAIDA).
American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, Early Successes Under the KORUS FTA, January 14, 2013.
53
This information was provided by Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Wendy Cutler during a recent meeting.
54
Ibid.
52
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U.S. officials will be monitoring South Korea’s implementation of a provision under the KORUS
FTA that allows for the transfer of financial and other data freely from one country to the other.
This provision is to go into effect two years after the agreement entered into force (i.e., March 15,
2014).55
In 2011 and 2012, members of South Korea’s largest opposition party, the Democratic United
Party (DUP) called for renegotiating parts of the KORUS FTA. The most prominent issue was the
agreement’s investor-state dispute provisions.56 However, the push to renegotiate this and other
parts of the KORUS FTA appears to have faded significantly following Park’s defeat of the
DUP’s presidential candidate in December, combined with the DUP’s disappointing showing in
parliamentary elections earlier in the year.
Some analysts have called on South Korea to join the 11-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
free trade agreement negotiations, in which the United States is participating. The TPP talks are a
key element of the Obama Administration’s strategy of “rebalancing” to Asia by pushing for more
internationally-based rules and norms in the region. To date, South Korea has not indicated a
desire to join the talks, preferring to concentrate on implementing the recently enacted FTAs with
the United States and European Union, and on negotiating a bilateral FTA with China and a
trilateral FTA among China, South Korea, and Japan. Joining the TPP would likely cause
consternation in China, where many view the negotiation as part of a U.S. attempt to contain
China’s rise. China to date is not a member of the TPP talks.
South Korea’s Economic Performance
South Korea has recorded relatively strong economic growth since the global financial crisis
began in late 2008. After GDP real growth declined to 0.2% in 2009, the South Korean economy
roared back and grew by 6.2% in 2010. Initially, the crisis hit the South Korean economy hard
because of its heavy reliance on international trade and its banks’ heavy borrowing from abroad.
The Lee government took strong countermeasures to blunt the crisis’ impact, engaging in a series
of fiscal stimulus actions worth about 6% of the country’s 2008 GDP, by some measures the
largest such package in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
group of industrialized countries. The Bank of Korea (BOK) also acted aggressively, lowering
interest rates from over 5% to a record low 2% and engaging in a range of other operations,
estimated by the OECD to be worth over 2.5% of GDP, designed to infuse liquidity in the Korean
economy. The BOK negotiated currency swap agreements with the United States, Japan, and
China.6057 The South Korean won, after depreciating to around 1,500 won/dollar—a fall of nearly
one-third from early 2008 to early 2009—has gradually strengthened against the dollar, to the
1,000-1,100 won/dollar range. The won’s depreciation in 2008 and 2009 helped to stimulate
South Korea’s
economic recovery by making its exports cheaper relative to many other
currencies, particularly
the Japanese yen.
the Japanese yen.
55
Ibid.
Similar to other U.S. FTAs, the KORUS FTA establishes procedures for the settlement of investor-state disputes
involving investments covered under the agreement where the investor from one partner-country alleges that the
government of the other partner-country is violating his rights under the FTA. The FTA stipulates that the two parties
should try to first resolve the dispute through consultations and negotiations. But, if that does not work, the agreement
provides for arbitration procedures and the establishment of tribunals.
57
The October 2008 swap agreement with the U.S. Federal Reserve gave Bank of Korea access to up to USD 30 billion
in US dollar funds in exchange for won.
56
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Since the second half of 2010, South Korean real GDP growth has slowed, in part due to the
a
slowdown in its foreign trade and the won’s appreciation. South Korea’s economy is highly
dependent upon capital inflows and exports,
the latter of which are equal to around half of the
country’s annual GDP. Thus, South Korean
officials have expressed concern that their country
could be hit hard by a recurrence of a major
European debt crisis, the possibility of a “double-dipdoubledip” recession in the United States, and a
slowing of growth in China. GDP growth in 2011 was 3.6%
3.6% and is estimated to have fallen close to 2% for 2012.
Although South Korea’s economic performance may look favorable to many around the world,
Lee’s handling of economic issues has come under criticism from many inside South Korea.
Complaints have risen in recent years that only Korea’s rich individuals and large conglomerates
(called chaebol) have benefitted from the country’s growth since the 2008-2009 slowdown. The
2012 presidential election is likely to bewas largely fought over the issues of governance (in the wake of a
number of corruption scandals), social welfare, and rising income inequality. Leading figures in
both parties, as well as President Lee, have proposed ways to expand South Korea’s social safety
net. Inflation, particularly due to rising oil prices, has also emerged as a concern, though it has
slowed in 2012. Growth is expected to be in the 3% for 2012.
59
For more, see CRS Report R40502, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, by Ian F. Fergusson and Bruce
Vaughn.
60
The October 2008 swap agreement with the U.S. Federal Reserve gave Bank of Korea access to up to USD 30 billion
in US dollar funds in exchange for won.
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Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Cooperation
Bilateral Nuclear Energy Cooperation61Cooperation58
The United States and South Korea have cooperated in the peaceful use of nuclear energy for
over 50 years.6259 This cooperation includes commercial projects as well as R&D work on safety,
safeguards, advanced nuclear reactors, and fuel cycle technologies. As with other countries, the
legal framework that underpins this cooperation is a bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation
agreement (or “123” agreement).63 The U.S.-South Korean 123 agreement expires in 2014. The
two countries began official talks in Washington on renewing the agreement in October 2010.64
These talks continue, and a draft agreement was proposed by South Korea in the second round of
talks in March 2011. Additional talks were held in December 2011 and February 2012.
Details of the current 123 agreement negotiations have not been made public. One point of
potential disagreement in the renewal process is whether South Korea will press the United States
to include a provision that would give permission for U.S.-obligated spent nuclear fuel (the
majority of nuclear fuel in Korea) to be reprocessed to make new fuel. The South Korean
government is reportedly also seeking confirmation in the renewal agreement of its right to
pursue enrichment technology. The United States has pursued a policy of limiting the spread of
enrichment and reprocessing technology for nonproliferation reasons. The current debate centers
on whether to treat this issue as a global standard or on a case-by-case basis, with a decision made
based on the particular country’s capabilities, nonproliferation record, and relationship with the
United States.65
The current U.S.-Korea nuclear cooperation agreement, as with other standard agreements,66
requires U.S. permission before South Korea can reprocess U.S.-origin spent fuel, including spent
fuel from South Korea’s U.S.-designed reactors.67 This is because reprocessing can create new
fuel or plutonium for weapons use. The issue has become a sensitive one for many South Korean
officials and politicians, who see it as a matter of national sovereignty. The United States has been
reluctant to grant such permission due to concerns over the proliferation potential of this
61
Written by Mary Beth Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation.
The original agreement was concluded in 1956, and amendments were made in 1958, 1965, 1972 and 1974. See also
CRS Report R41032, U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy Market: Major Policy
Considerations, by Mark Holt.
63
See also CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary
Beth Nikitin. Full text of the agreement is available at http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/
Korea_South_123.pdf.
64
“Discussions on the New U.S.-R.O.K. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement,” State Department Press Release,
October 26, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/10/150026.htm.
65
For more information see, CRS Report R41910, Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Issues for
Congress, by Paul K. Kerr, Mark Holt, and Mary Beth Nikitin.
66
CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth
Nikitin.
62
67
Under the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, consent rights apply to material
originating in the U.S. or material that has been fabricated into fuel or irradiated in a
reactor with U.S. technology. The majority of South Korea’s spent fuel would need U.S.
consent before it could be reprocessed.
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technology, the potential impact on negotiations with North Korea, and the possible contradiction
with global nonproliferation policy to prevent enrichment and reprocessing plants in new states.
For decades, the United States and South Korea have worked on joint research and development
projects to address spent fuel disposition. In the 1990s, the two countries worked intensely on
research and development on a different fuel recycling technology (the “DUPIC” process), but
this technology ultimately was not commercialized. In the past ten years, joint research has
centered on pyro-processing, a type of spent fuel reprocessing. The Korean Atomic Energy
Research Institute (KAERI) is conducting a laboratory-scale research program on reprocessing
spent fuel with an advanced pyro-processing technique.68 U.S.-South Korean bilateral research on
pyro-processing began in 2002 under the Department of Energy’s International Nuclear Energy
Research Initiative (I-NERI). New R&D work on pyro-processing was halted by the United
States in 2008, due to the proliferation sensitivity of the technology.
In an attempt to find a way forward, in March 2010 the United States and South Korea began a
six-month joint study on the economics, technical feasibility, and nonproliferation implications of
pyro-processing.69 This initial study resulted in the announcement in October 2010 of a 10-year,
three-part joint research project that is separate from the 123 renewal negotiations.70 It will
include bilateral work on pyro-processing at the Idaho National Laboratory, development of
international safeguards for this technology, economic viability studies, and other advanced
nuclear research, including alternatives to pyro-processing for spent fuel disposal.71 The South
Korean government has also included the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in the
research and development of pyro-processing to provide transparency and assurance of peaceful
purposesNegotiators are now working
out a renewal to the U.S.-South Korea bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, under section 123
of the Atomic Energy Act, often referred to as a “123 agreement.”60 The current bilateral 123
agreement expires in March 2014. The agreement would likely need to be submitted for the
mandatory congressional review period in late spring 2013 for it to take effect before the current
agreement expires.
A sticking point in the talks is how to treat fuel cycle issues. South Korea reportedly requested
that the new agreement include a provision that would give permission in advance for U.S.obligated spent nuclear fuel to be reprocessed to make new fuel using a type of reprocessing
called pyroprocessing.61 The United States and South Korea are jointly researching
58
Written by Mary Beth Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation.
The original agreement for civilian nuclear cooperation was concluded in 1956, and amendments were made in 1958,
1965, 1972, and 1974. See also CRS Report R41032, U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy
Market: Major Policy Considerations, by Mark Holt.
60
See also CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary
Beth Nikitin. Full text of the agreement is available at http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/
Korea_South_123.pdf.
61
Daniel Horner, “South Korea, U.S. at Odds over Nuclear Pact,” Arms Control Today, September 2012,
http://armscontrol.org/act/2012_09/Sout-Korea-US-at-Odds-Over-Nuclear-Pact. Under the 1978 Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act, consent rights apply to material originating in the U.S. or material that has been fabricated into
fuel or irradiated in a reactor with U.S. technology. The majority of South Korea’s spent fuel would need U.S. consent
before it could be reprocessed.
59
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pyroprocessing, but the technology is at the research and development stage.62 The Obama
Administration would prefer to approve such activities on a case by case basis (referred to as
“programmatic consent”), as is provided for under the current agreement. The South Korean
government is reportedly also seeking confirmation in the renewal agreement of its right to build
enrichment plants.
It is not yet clear what the policies of President-elect Park Geun-hye will be toward the
negotiations, although early indications are that her administration will pursue similar fuel cycle
policies and may continue to seek advance consent in the “123” agreement negotiations. If no
agreement is reached and the current 123 agreement lapses, certain commercial contracts may be
suspended.
For several decades, the United States has pursued a policy of limiting the spread of enrichment
and reprocessing technology to new states as part of its nonproliferation policies.63 This is
because enrichment and reprocessing can create new fuel or material for nuclear weapons.
Advance permission to reprocess rarely has been included in U.S. nuclear cooperation
agreements, and to date has only been granted to countries that already had the technology (such
as to India, Japan, and Western Europe). However, the issue has become a sensitive one in the
U.S.-ROK relationship. Many South Korean officials and politicians see the United States’ rules
as limiting its national sovereignty by requiring U.S. permission for civilian nuclear activities.
This creates a dilemma for U.S. policy as the Obama Administration has been a strong advocate
of limiting the spread of fuel cycle facilities to new states, and would prefer multilateral solutions
to spent fuel disposal.
Spent fuel disposal is a key policy issue for South Korean officials, and some see pyroprocessing
as a potential solution. While reactor-site spent fuel pools are filling up, the construction of new
spent fuel storage facilities is highly unpopular with the public. Some officials argue that in order
to secure public approval for an interim storage site, the government needs to provide a long-term
plan for the spent fuel. However, some experts point out that by-products of spent fuel
reprocessing would still require long-term storage and disposal options. Other proponents of
pyroprocessing see it as a way to advance energy independence for South Korea.
For decades, the United States and South Korea have worked on joint research and development
projects to address spent fuel. In the 1990s, the two countries worked intensely on research and
development on a different fuel recycling technology (the “DUPIC” process), but this technology
ultimately was not commercialized. In the past 10 years, joint research has centered on
pyroprocessing. The Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is conducting a
laboratory-scale research program on reprocessing spent fuel with an advanced pyroprocessing
technique. U.S.-South Korean bilateral research on pyroprocessing began in 2002 under the
Department of Energy’s International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (I-NERI). New R&D
work on pyroprocessing was temporarily halted by the United States in 2008, due to the
proliferation sensitivity of the technology. In an attempt to find common ground and continue
62
Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel can be used to make new reactor fuel or to separate out plutonium in the spent
fuel for weapons use. Pyroprocessing, or electro-refining, is a non-aqueous method of recycling spent fuel into new fuel
for fast reactors. It only partially separates plutonium and uranium from spent fuel. There is debate over the
proliferation implications of this technology.
63
For more, see CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and
Mary Beth Nikitin.
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bilateral research, in October 2010 the United States and South Korea began a 10-year joint study
on the economics, technical feasibility, and nonproliferation implications of pyroprocessing.
While the Korean nuclear research community argues for development of pyroprocessing
technology, the level of consensus over the pyroprocessing option among Korean government
agencies, electric utilities, and the public remains uncertain. Generally, there appears to be
support in South Korea for research and development of the technology. Some analysts are
concerned about the economic and technical viability of commercializing the technology. While
the R&D phase would be paid for by the government, the private sector would bear the costs of
commercialization. At a political level, pyroprocessing may have more popularity as a symbol of
South Korean technical advancement and the possibility of energy independence. Some argue that
South Korea should have the independent ability to provide fuel and take back waste from new
nuclear power countries in order to increase its competitive edge when seeking power plant
export contracts.
Some analysts critical of the development of pyroprocessing in South Korea point to the 1992
Joint Declaration, in which North and South Korea agreed they would not “possess nuclear
reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities” and are concerned about the impact of South
Korea’s pyroprocessing on negotiations with the North. Others emphasize that granting
permission for pyroprocessing in South Korea would contradict U.S. nonproliferation policy to
halt the spread of sensitive technologies to new states. Some observers, particularly in South
Korea, point out that the United States has given India and Japan consent to reprocess, and argue
that they should be allowed to develop this technology under safeguards.
South Korea and the United States have several options on how to treat this issue in the 123
negotiations. One option would be to renew the agreement without granting any prior consent,
and apply for programmatic consent in the future as required (i.e., the same provisions as the
current agreement). Another would be for South Korea to seek long-term advance consent for
pyroprocessing. Alternatively, South Korea could seek programmatic consent for research and
development of the technology and could then ask for further consent for commercialization if it
decided to go that route at a future date.
Since the technology has not been commercialized anywhere in the world, the United States and
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are working with the South Korean government
to develop appropriate IAEA safeguards should the technology be developed further. Whether
pyroprocessing technology can be sufficiently monitored to detect diversion to a weapons
program is a key aspect of the study.
South Korean Nonproliferation Policy
South Korea has been a consistent and vocal supporter of strengthening the global
nonproliferation regime, which is a set of treaties, voluntary export control arrangements, and
other policy coordination mechanisms that work to prevent the spread of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons and their delivery systems. South Korea is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers’
Group (NSG), which controls sensitive nuclear technology trade, and adheres to all international
nonproliferation treaties and export control regimes. South Korea also participates in the G-8
Global Partnership, and other U.S.-led initiatives—the Proliferation Security Initiative, the
68
Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel can be used to make new reactor fuel or to separate
out plutonium in the spent fuel for weapons use. Pyroprocessing, or electro-refining, is a
non-aqueous method of recycling spent fuel into new fuel for fast reactors, that only
partially separates plutonium and uranium from spent fuel. There is debate over the
proliferation implications of this technology.
69
http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/NEWKHSITE/data/html_dir/2010/03/17/
201003170029.asp.
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“Discussions on Korea-U.S. Joint Research on Fuel Cycle,” Press Release, Ministry of
Education, Science and Technology, Republic of Korea, April 18, 2011.
71
“S. Korea, U.S. Agree to Start Joint Study on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing,” Yonhap,
April 17, 2011.
International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (formerly GNEP), and the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. South Korea has contributed $1.5 million to the United
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International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (formerly GNEP), and the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.States’ nuclear smuggling prevention effort, run by the Department of Energy, as part of its G8
Global Partnership pledge.64
An Additional Protocol (AP) to South Korea’s safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into force as of February 2004. This gives the IAEA
increased monitoring authority over the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In the process of
preparing a more complete declaration of nuclear activities in the country, the Korean Atomic
Energy Research Institute (KAERI) disclosed previously undeclared experiments in its research
laboratories on uranium enrichment in 2000, and on plutonium extraction in 1982. The IAEA
Director General reported on these undeclared activities to the Board of Governors in September
2004, but the Board did not report them to the U.N. Security Council. In response, the Korean
government reconfirmed its cooperation with the IAEA and commitment to the peaceful use of
nuclear energy, and reorganized the oversight of activities at KAERI. The experiments reminded
the international community of South Korea’s plans for a plutonium-based nuclear weapons
program under President Park Chung Hee-hee in the early 1970s. Deals to acquire reprocessing and
other facilities were canceled under intense U.S. pressure, and President Park eventually
abandoned weapons plans in exchange for U.S. security assurances. The original motivations for
obtaining fuel cycle facilities as well as the undeclared experiments continue to cast a shadow
over South Korea’s long-held pursuit of the full fuel cycle. As a result, since 2004, South Korea
has aimed to improve transparency of its nuclear programs and participate fully in the global
nonproliferation regime. In addition, the 1992 Joint Declaration between North and South Korea
says that the countries “shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.”
Since North Korea has openly pursued both of these technologies, an intense debate is underway
over whether South Korea should still be bound by those commitments. Some analysts believe
that an agreement with North Korea on denuclearization could be jeopardized if South Korea
does not uphold the 1992 agreement.
Of recent significance, South Korea hosted the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, a forum initiated
by President Obama shortly after his inauguration. This was the second such summit after the
2010 Washington, DC, event. The South Korean government agreed to host the summit because:
it fit into the “Global Korea” concept of international leadership and summitry; it was a chance
for the South Korean nuclear industry to showcase its accomplishments; and the South Korean
government was able to emphasize South Korea’s role as a responsible actor in the nuclear field,
in stark contrast with North Korea. It was also an important symbol of trust between the U.S. and
South Korean Presidents. The Obama administration preferred that the host of the second summit
would maintain the focus and objectives of the original U.S. summit, and Obama administration
officials have praised South Korea’s leadership. Observers have pointed out that South Korea was
more than merely a logistical host for the summit, and displayed intense engagement and
leadership in setting the agenda, accommodating diverse opinions on the scope of the meeting,
convincing heads of state to attend, and producing summit outcome documents. While there
reportedly were initial disagreements between the United States and South Korea over some of
the summit agenda items (such as to what extent to include radiological security issues), overall,
the summit appears to have strengthened the bilateral relationship and coordination on
nonproliferation policy. In parallel with the summit, a nuclear industry summit and nongovernmental expert symposium were also held.
64
“Republic of Korea Increases Support of NNSA Work to Combat Nuclear Smuggling,” NNSA Press Release,
January 2, 2013, http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/koreacontributions010213
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South Korean Politics72Politics
A Quick History of South Korean Presidential Changes
For most of the first four decades after the country was founded in 1948, South Korea was ruled
by authoritarian governments. The most important of these was led by Park Chung-hee, a general
who seized power in a military coup in 1961 and ruled until he was murdered by his intelligence
chief in 1979. The legacy of Park, President-elect Park Geun-hye’s father, is a controversial one.
On the one hand, he orchestrated the industrialization of South Korea that transformed the
country from one of the world’s poorest. On the other hand, he ruled with an iron hand and
brutally dealt with real and perceived opponents, be they opposition politicians, labor activists, or
civil society leaders. For instance, in the early 1970s South Korean government agents twice tried
to kill then-opposition leader Kim Dae-jung, who in the second attempt was saved only by U.S.
intervention. The divisions that opened under Park continue to be felt today. Conservative South
Koreans tend to emphasize his economic achievements, while progressives focus on his human
rights abuses.
Ever since the mid-1980s, when widespread anti-government Ever since the mid-1980s, when widespread anti-government
protests forced the country’s
military rulers to enact sweeping democratic reforms, democratic
institutions and traditions have
deepened in South Korea. In 1997, long-time dissident and
opposition politician Kim Dae-jung (commonly referred to as “DJ”)Kim Dae-jung was elected to the
presidency, the first time an opposition party had prevailed in a South Korean presidential
election. In December 2002, Kim was succeeded by a member of his left-of-center party: Roh
Moo-hyun, a self-educated former human rights lawyer who emerged from relative obscurity to
defeat establishment candidates in both the primary and general elections. Roh campaigned on a
platform of reform—reform of Korean politics, economic policymaking, and U.S.-ROK relations.
Lee’s victory in the December 2007 election restored conservatives to the presidency. A striking
feature of the election was how poorly the left-of-center candidates performed, after a decade in
power, receiving only around 30% of the vote. Shortly after Lee’s inauguration, his Grand
National Party retained control of the National Assembly in national parliamentary elections.
Lee had a rocky first two years of his presidency. Until late 2009, his public approval ratings
generally were in the 20%-30% range. It took over a year for him to recover from the massive
anti-government protests that followed an April 2008 deal with the United States to lift South
Korea’s partial ban on imports of U.S. beef. The ban had been in place since 2003, when a cow in
the United States was found to be infected with mad cow disease, or BSE (bovine spongiform
encephalopathy). Toward the middle of his term, in 2010, Lee’s ratings had risen to the 40%-50%
range, a development many attributed to South Korea’s strong recovery from the 2008-2009
global financial crisis. However, by late 2011 and early 2012, the president’s approval ratings had
once again fallen, driven down by—among other factors—a series of scandals surrounding some
of his associates and family members, and by an increasing concern among more Koreans about
widening income disparities between the wealthy and the rest of society.
South Korea’s next presidential election will be in December 2012. By law, Lee cannot run again;
South Korean presidents serve one five-year term. The country’s next parliamentary elections are
scheduled for April 2016.
He was elected in part because of his embrace of massive anti-American protests that ensued after
a U.S. military vehicle killed two Korean schoolgirls in 2002. Like Kim Dae-jung, Roh pursued a
“sunshine policy” of largely unconditional engagement with North Korea that clashed with the
harder policy line pursued by the Bush Administration until late 2006. Roh also alarmed U.S.
policymakers by speaking of a desire that South Korea should play a “balancing” role among
China, the United States, and Japan in Northeast Asia. Despite this, under Roh’s tenure, South
Korea deployed over 3,000 non-combat troops to Iraq—the third-largest contingent in the
international coalition—and the two sides initiated and signed the KORUS FTA.
In the December 2007 election, former Seoul mayor Lee Myung-bak’s victory restored
conservatives to the presidency. Lee’s final two years of his presidency have seen his public
approval ratings fall to the 25%-35% level, driven down by—among other factors—a series of
scandals surrounding some of his associates and family members, and by an increasing concern
among more Koreans about widening income disparities between the wealthy and the rest of
society. Since the end of military rule in 1988, every former South Korean president has been
involved in scandal and in some cases criminal investigation within several months of leaving
office. It remains to be seen if the abuse-of-power allegations that have swirled around some of
Lee’s family members and supporters will expand to include Lee himself.
By law, South Korean presidents serve one five-year term. The country’s next presidential
election will be in December 2017. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for April 2016.
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A Powerful Executive Branch
Nominally, power in South Korea is shared by the president and the 300-member unicameral
National Assembly. Of these, 246 members represent single-member constituencies. The
remaining 54 are selected on the basis of proportional voting. National Assembly members are
elected to four-year terms. The president and the state bureaucracy continue to be the dominant
forces in South Korean policymaking, as formal and informal limitations prevent the National
Assembly from initiating major pieces of legislation.
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For more, see CRS Report R40851, South Korea: Its Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Outlook, by Mark E.
Manyin and Weston Konishi.
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Political Parties
Presently, there are two major political parties in South Korea: President Lee-elect Park’s conservative
Saenuri Party (which has been translated as “New Frontier Party,” or NFP) and the opposition,
center-left Democratic United Party (DUP).73 U.S. ties have historically been much stronger with
South Korea’s conservative parties. Because Korean politics tend to be hyper-partisan, this
phenomenon could make U.S.-South Korea relations more difficult to manage if the progressives
regain power.
From 2008 to 2012, the NFP’s predecessor party held 169 seats, well over half the National
Assembly’s total. However, the party’s numerical strength masked significant intra-party
divisions. Lee’s most significant rival is Park Geun-hye, the architect of the NFP’s April 2012
victory, and the daughter of Korea’s former military ruler Park Chung-hee. Lee only narrowly
defeated Ms. Park in a presidential primary in 2007. Initially, Lee had tried to marginalize Park’s
influence, an effort he later abandoned when the GNP absorbed some of Park’s supporters who
had formed a new party. This move, however, has failed to resolve the tensions between the two
camps. There is little cooperation between the GNP and the Democratic United Party, so keeping
the GNP unified on controversial issues has been critical to Lee’s ability to govern.
For years after the 2007 election, Korea's progressive camp was even more divided than the GNP.
The Democrats’ lack of unity, their minority status in the National Assembly, and the absence of
national elections until 2012 deprived them of most tools of power and influence within the South
Korean polity. In 2011, the progressive camp scored significant victories in local and bi-elections,
leading many observers to predict that they would take over the Assembly in the April 2012 vote,
particularly after two of the leading parties merged to form the DUP in late 2011. The DUP’s
defeat in April, however, combined with a vote-rigging scandal in another left-of-center party,
appears to have thrown the progressive camp back into65 U.S. ties have historically been much stronger with
South Korea’s conservative parties.
Figure 3. Party Strength in South Korea’s National Assembly
As of April 27, 2012
Source: Last nationwide elections held in April 2012. Next elections to be held in April 2016.
The NFP has controlled the Blue House (the residence and office of South Korea’s president) and
the National Assembly since 2008. In the last National Assembly elections, held in April 2012,
the NFP – under the leadership of Park Geun-hye – shocked nearly all observers by winning an
outright majority of 152 seats. (See Figure 3.) Although this was a fall from the nearly 170 seats
the party held in the summer of 2011, it was a surprising reversal. For much of 2011, virtually all
the political winds appeared to be blowing in favor of the opposition, left-of-center parties, and
many predicted they would achieve a sweeping victory.66 Thus, even though the opposition
65
The Saenuri Party formerly was known as the Grand National Party (GNP).
66
Among the many signs of this trend: the “progressive” parties soundly defeated the ruling party in April 2011
(continued...)
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Democratic United Party (DUP) increased its seat tally by nearly 50%, to 127, the April vote was
considered a humiliating defeat, and the party’s leadership resigned soon thereafter. Although the
NFP retained control of the Assembly, its narrow majority could make it vulnerable if it loses any
of its members.
South Korea’s progressive political parties controlled the Blue House for 10 years, from 19982008. For a four-year period, from 2004-2008, a progressive party was the largest political group
in in the National Assembly and held a majority for part of that period. After failing to retake the
Blue House or National Assembly in 2012, the DUP and other progressive parties will face
several more years of without significant tools of power and influence within the South Korean
polity. It remains to be seen if, as happened the last time the DUP suffered consecutive national
election losses, the DUP goes through a period of factionalism and disarray.
Selected CRS Reports on the Koreas
South Korea
CRS Report RL34330, The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions
and Implications, coordinated by William H. Cooper
CRS Report R41032, U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy Market:
Major Policy Considerations, by Mark Holt
CRS Report RL34093, The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex, by Mark E.
Manyin and Dick K. Nanto
CRS Report RL34528, U.S.-South Korea Beef Dispute: Issues and Status, by Remy Jurenas and
Mark E. Manyin
CRS Report R41032, U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy Market:
Major Policy Considerations, by Mark Holt
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The Saenuri Party formerly was known as the Grand National Party (GNP).
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North Korea
CRS Report R41259, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation,
by Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart
CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth
Nikitin
CRS Report RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary Beth Nikitin
CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E.
Rennack
(...continued)
legislative by-elections, a left-of-center activist (Park Won-Soon) won a vote for the Seoul mayoralty in October; the
approval ratings for President Lee and his party plummeted, due in part to a series of scandals; and in late 2011 and
early 2012 Korea’s major progressive parties either merged or decided to cooperate during the April National
Assembly elections.
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CRS Report R41843, Imports from North Korea: Existing Rules, Implications of the KORUS
FTA, and the Kaesong Industrial Complex, coordinated by Mark E. Manyin
CRS Report RL30613, North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List? , by Mark E. Manyin
CRS Report RL32493, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis, by Dick K. Nanto
and Emma Chanlett-Avery
CRS Report RS22973, Congress and U.S. Policy on North Korean Human Rights and Refugees:
Recent Legislation and Implementation, by Emma Chanlett-Avery
CRS Report R41043, China-North Korea Relations, by Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin
CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, by Steven A.
Hildreth
CRS Report R41749, Non-Governmental Organizations Activities in North Korea, by Mi Ae
Taylor and Mark E. Manyin
Author Contact Information
Mark E. Manyin, Coordinator
Specialist in Asian Affairs
mmanyin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7653
Mary Beth Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
mnikitin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7745
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Acting Section Research ManagerIan E. Rinehart
Analyst in Asian Affairs
irinehart@crs.loc.gov, 7-0345
Mary Beth Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
mnikitin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7745
William H. Cooper
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
wcooper@crs.loc.gov, 7-7749
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov, 7-7748
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