U.S.-South Korea Relations
Mark E. Manyin, Coordinator
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Mary Beth Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
November 28, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41481
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S.-South Korea Relations
Summary
Since late 2008, relations between the United States and South Korea (known officially as the
Republic of Korea, or ROK) have been arguably at their best state in decades. By the middle of
2010, in the view of many in the Obama Administration, South Korea had emerged as the United
States’ closest ally in East Asia.
Of all the issues on the bilateral agenda, Congress has had the most direct role to play in the
Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), the United States’ second-largest FTA after the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Approval by both countries’ legislatures is
necessary for the agreement to go into effect. The agreement was signed in 2007, but both the
Bush and Obama Administrations delayed its submission to Congress, in part due to opposition to
the deal. In early December 2010, the United States and South Korea announced they had agreed
on modifications to the original agreement. South Korea accepted a range of U.S. demands
designed to help the U.S. auto industry and received some concessions in return. In the United
States, the supplementary deal appears to have changed the minds of many groups and Members
of Congress who previously had opposed the FTA. On October 12, 2011, both chambers of
Congress voted to approve legislation (H.R. 3080/P.L. 112-41) to implement the KORUS FTA. In
November, after a contentious battle, the Korean National Assembly passed the agreement, which
is expected to enter into effect in early 2012.
The day after Congress passed the KORUS FTA, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak
addressed a joint session of Congress. Lee was in Washington for a State Visit to the White
House, the fifth since Barack Obama’s inauguration. Various aspects of his trip symbolized the
close relationship between the two leaders, as well as the close policy coordination the two
governments have forged, particularly over how to handle North Korea. The Obama and Lee
Administrations have adopted a medium-to-longer-term policy of “strategic patience” that
involves four main elements: refusing to return to the Six-Party Talks without an assurance from
North Korea that it would take “irreversible steps” to denuclearize; gradually attempting to alter
China’s strategic assessment of North Korea; using Pyongyang’s provocations as opportunities to
tighten sanctions against North Korean entities; and insisting that significant multilateral and U.S.
talks with North Korea must be preceded by improvements in North-South Korean relations. Lee,
in turn, has linked progress in many areas of North-South relations to progress in denuclearizing
North Korea.
The United States maintains about 28,500 troops in the ROK. Since 2009, the two sides have
accelerated steps to transform the U.S.-ROK alliance’s primary purpose from one of defending
against a North Korean attack to a regional and even global partnership. Washington and Seoul
have announced a “Strategic Alliance 2015” plan to relocate U.S. troops on the Peninsula and
boost ROK defense capabilities. Some Members of Congress have criticized the relocation plans.
Much of the current closeness between Seoul and Washington is due to President Lee. It is
unclear how sustainable many of his policies will be, particularly into 2012, when South Koreans
will elect a new president and a new legislature. Bilateral coordination will be particularly tested
if South Korea’s left-of-center groups, which gained significant momentum in 2011 and which
bitterly oppose much of Lee’s agenda, retake the presidency and/or the National Assembly.
This report will be updated periodically.
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Contents
Developments in 2011 ..................................................................................................................... 1
State Visit and Joint Address by President Lee Myung-bak...................................................... 1
Congress and the Korean National Assembly Pass the KORUS FTA....................................... 1
Senate Confirms New U.S. Ambassador ................................................................................... 3
North Korea Policy Coordination.............................................................................................. 3
South Korea’s New “Proactive Deterrence” Military Posture................................................... 4
Military Alliance Issues—Realignment, Agent Orange Dumping?, Rape Case........................ 4
Congressional Concern about U.S. Troop Deployments..................................................... 5
President Lee’s Influence Wanes; Progressive Forces Gain Momentum .................................. 6
South Korea’s Pyeongchang Chosen to Host 2018 Winter Olympics ....................................... 7
Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 7
Historical Background............................................................................................................. 10
North Korea in U.S.-ROK relations............................................................................................... 11
Policy Coordination................................................................................................................. 11
Coordination over the Cheonan Sinking........................................................................... 11
New Revelations of North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Capabilities............................. 12
North Korea’s Artillery Attack Against South Korea........................................................ 12
Inter-Korean Relations................................................................................................................... 13
South Korea’s Regional Relations ................................................................................................. 15
Growing South Korea-Japan Cooperation............................................................................... 15
South Korea-China Relations .................................................................................................. 17
Security Relations and the U.S.-ROK Alliance ............................................................................. 17
Budgetary and Operational Challenges ................................................................................... 18
U.S. Alliance and ROK Defense Reform Plans....................................................................... 18
The Relocation of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).................................................................. 19
Tour Normalization ........................................................................................................... 20
Cost Sharing ...................................................................................................................... 20
Opcon Transfer.................................................................................................................. 21
The “Strategic Flexibility” of USFK................................................................................. 21
South Korean Defense Industry and Purchases of U.S. Weapons..................................... 22
South Korea’s Deployment to Afghanistan....................................................................... 23
Economic Relations ....................................................................................................................... 23
The KORUS FTA .................................................................................................................... 24
South Korea’s Economic Performance.................................................................................... 25
Other Issues ................................................................................................................................... 26
Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation................................................................................................. 26
South Korean Nonproliferation Policy.................................................................................... 27
South Korean Politics .................................................................................................................... 27
A Powerful Executive Branch ................................................................................................. 28
Political Parties........................................................................................................................ 28
Selected CRS Reports on the Koreas............................................................................................. 29
South Korea............................................................................................................................. 29
North Korea............................................................................................................................. 30
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Figures
Figure 1. Map of the Korean Peninsula ........................................................................................... 9
Figure 2. USFK Bases After Realignment Plan is Implemented ................................................... 20
Figure 3. Party Strength in South Korea’s National Assembly...................................................... 29
Tables
Table 1. Annual U.S.-South Korea Merchandise Trade, Selected Years...................................... 24
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 31
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Developments in 2011
State Visit and Joint Address by President Lee Myung-bak
On October 13, 2011, President Barack Obama hosted South Korean President Lee Myung-bak
for a formal State Visit, the fifth since Obama’s inauguration. On October 12, Lee made an
address to a joint session of Congress. His visit included a number of items that symbolized the
extraordinary closeness the two presidents and their administrations have forged over the past
three years. In addition to their formal dinner, for instance, Obama and Lee had a private dinner at
a local Korean restaurant and made a joint visit to a General Motors plant in Michigan. Lee was
also given a security briefing by the U.S. service chiefs at the Pentagon inside the “Tank,” a
conference room where the Joint Chiefs meet, the first time the United States has ever extended
such treatment to a foreign leader.
President Lee’s visit appears to have been an “action-forcing event” that triggered action on the
South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), as the White House and congressional
leaders became determined to schedule a vote on the agreement before or during Lee’s trip. (See
the following section for more details.) Since late 2008, bilateral relations have been arguably at
their best state ever.
Congress and the Korean National Assembly Pass the KORUS FTA
On October 12, 2011, first the House (278-151) and then the Senate (83-15) approved legislation
(H.R. 3080/P.L. 112-41) to implement the KORUS FTA.1 The Obama Administration and
congressional leaders decided to consider the implementing legislation for the KORUS FTA
together with implementing legislation for U.S. FTAs with Colombia and Peru, which also were
passed. All three FTAs were initiated and signed under the Bush Administration. On November
22, the South Korean National Assembly passed the KORUS agreement, though only after a
contentious battle (see more below). The agreement is expected to enter into force in early 2012.
The United States and South Korea signed the KORUS FTA in 2007. It is the second-largest FTA
by market size in which the United States participates (after the North American Free Trade
Agreement, NAFTA). It is also South Korea’s second-largest FTA (after the Korea-European
Union FTA, which went into effect on July 1, 2011).
For years, the Obama Administration (as well as the Bush Administration) did not submit the
KORUS FTA implementing legislation to Congress. Some of the major obstacles were objections
to the agreement’s automobile provisions, which the Obama Administration pressed the Korean
government to modify. In early December 2010, the United States and South Korea announced
they had agreed on changes to the original agreement. South Korea accepted a range of U.S.
demands designed to help the U.S. auto industry and received some concessions in return. In the
1 On October 3, 2011, President Obama submitted draft legislation (H.R. 3080/S. 1642) to implement the proposed
U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) to both houses of Congress. Two days later, the House Ways
and Means Committee approved H.R. 3080 by a vote of 31-5. The Senate Finance Committee held its markup for the
KORUS FTA on October 11 and reported it to the full Senate on the same day.
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United States, the supplementary deal appears to have changed the minds of many groups and
Members of Congress who previously had opposed the FTA.
Despite this development, the Obama Administration did not formally submit the KORUS FTA to
Congress until October 3, 2011. The delay was attributable not to opposition to the KORUS FTA
per se, but rather to questions about whether and how to link the FTA to other trade and economic
measures. Throughout the winter and early spring of 2011, many Republican leaders pushed the
Administration to submit the KORUS FTA together with the Colombia and Panama FTAs. In the
spring of 2011, the Obama Administration announced that it had completed the technical
procedures necessary to submit implementing legislation for the KORUS FTA—along with FTAs
with Colombia and Panama—for congressional consideration. In May, however, the
Administration announced it would not submit the three FTAs to Congress unless an agreement
was reached on Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs, which provide aid for trade-
affected workers, firms, farmers, and communities. Between then and President Obama’s October
3 announcement, negotiations centered on whether, how, and when Congress would consider
TAA. The White House and congressional leaders, after a number of discussions, agreed to
procedures under which the TAA renewal and the three FTAs would be considered in tandem but
in separate legislation.
In South Korea, the debate over the KORUS FTA was contentious and divisive, despite the fact
that President Lee’s party, the conservative Grand National Party (GNP), controls the National
Assembly. Korea’s largest opposition party, the left-of-center Democratic Party (DP), opposed the
agreement. For weeks, it cooperated with other like-minded parties to physically block the
Assembly’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Unification from considering the FTA.
They were given a boost by political developments (discussed below) that appeared to signal
growing popular sympathy for left-of-center causes. Additionally, many GNP leaders were
reluctant to ram the agreement through the Assembly, for fear of repercussions in parliamentary
elections scheduled for April 2012.
After repeated attempts at negotiations failed to produce a breakthrough, the GNP’s leadership on
November 22 surprised nearly all observers by calling the full Assembly into a special session for
a snap vote on the KORUS FTA and several implementing bills.2 The National Assembly passed
the KORUS FTA by a vote of 151-7, with 12 abstentions. (The Assembly has 299 members.) No
members of the DP or other “progressive” parties participated in the voting, which was
interrupted when a KORUS FTA opponent set off a tear gas canister in the chamber. DP party
president Sohn Hak-kyu, who like many DP leaders supported the KORUS FTA when he was in
government, called the move “the death of democracy” in South Korea.3 Some leftist groups have
likened the deal to the 1910 Korea-Japan treaty in which Korea was agreed to be annexed by
Imperial Japan. It remains to be seen whether the Korean electorate will focus on the DP’s
obstructionism or on the GNP’s methods during the 2012 National Assembly and presidential
elections.
2 Reportedly, the GNP took this step after learning that the DP and its allies were planning to occupy the National
Assembly’s main chamber in order to block a vote on the KORUS FTA.
3 Alastair Gale, “Assault At Anti-FTA Protest,” Wall Street Journal Korea Real Time blog, November 28, 2011, 5:03
PM KST.
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Senate Confirms New U.S. Ambassador
On October 13, 2011, the Senate confirmed Sung Kim to be the next Ambassador to South Korea,
the first Korean American to hold the post. Kim, whose father was a South Korean government
official, emigrated to the United States when he was seven, and became a U.S. citizen in the early
1980s. President Obama nominated Kim in June. A “hold,” reportedly placed by Senator Jon Kyl,
delayed a Senate decision on Kim’s nomination.
North Korea Policy Coordination
For years, the Obama and Lee Administrations have essentially adopted a joint approach of
“strategic patience” toward North Korea that involves four main elements: refusing to return to
the Six-Party Talks over North Korea’s nuclear program without a North Korean assurance that it
would take “irreversible steps” to denuclearize; gradually attempting to alter China’s strategic
assessment of North Korea; using Pyongyang’s provocations as opportunities to tighten sanctions
against North Korean entities; and insisting that Six-Party Talks and/or U.S.-North Korean talks
must be preceded by North-South Korean talks on denuclearization and improvements in North-
South Korean relations. In early 2011, China backed the last of these principles, though it appears
to have tried to use this stance to pressure South Korea (as well as the United States) to relax its
conditions for holding talks with North Korea. Some have criticized the U.S. approach by saying
that it effectively gives Seoul a “veto” over U.S. initiatives toward North Korea.
Throughout the spring and early summer of 2011, there were a number of press reports that
Obama Administration officials also were encouraging the Lee government to soften South
Korea’s approach toward North Korea. If such speculation is accurate, it is not apparent from
either the joint appearances by U.S. and South Korean officials or from the two countries’ actions.
In early 2011, Lee invited North Korea to participate in inter-Korean nuclear talks and in the 2012
Nuclear Security Summit, which will be held in Seoul. During the first half of 2011, South Korea
also was involved in secret, high-level talks with North Korea that were disclosed by Pyongyang,
apparently in an effort to embarrass Lee. During the summer and early fall of 2011, the Lee
government also held talks with North Korean officials regarding North Korea’s nuclear program.
None of these initiatives necessarily represent a shift in South Korean policy, however. Indeed,
South Korean officials have repeatedly stated their belief that progress in nuclear negotiations,
including the Six-Party Talks, should be at least partially linked to North Korea’s behavior toward
South Korea—including some form of acknowledgement by Pyongyang of North Korea’s role in
various provocations in 2010 (discussed below). Moreover, the moves in 2011 were matched by
similar steps taken by the Obama Administration.
One area of active U.S.-South Korean discussion, and perhaps debate, has been over whether one
or both countries should provide food aid to North Korea, which has appealed for assistance. The
Obama Administration is actively considering the North Korean request and in May dispatched
an assessment team to North Korea to evaluate conditions there. South Korean officials indicated
that their government would prefer that neither country provide large-scale assistance to North
Korea unless Pyongyang changes its behavior.4 On June 15, 2011, the House passed by voice vote
an amendment proposed by Congressman Edward Royce to H.R. 2112, the FY2012 Agriculture
4 For more on the food aid debate, see CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin
and Mary Beth Nikitin.
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Appropriations Act, that would prohibit the Administration from using the primary U.S. food aid
program to send food assistance to North Korea. The Senate version of the bill, passed on
November 1, contained no such measure. Participants in the House-Senate conference committee
decided to strip the Royce amendment’s tougher restrictions, replacing it with language (Section
741) that food assistance may only be provided if “adequate monitoring and controls” exist.
President Obama signed H.R. 2112 (P.L. 112-55) into law on November 18, 2011.
South Korea’s New “Proactive Deterrence” Military Posture
South Korean attitudes toward North Korea have hardened since 2010. In March of that year, a
South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, sank. A multinational investigation team led by South
Korea determined that the ship was sunk by a North Korean submarine. In November, North
Korea shelled the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong Island, which lies across the inter-Korean
disputed western sea border. The barrage killed four South Koreans (two marines and two
civilians), wounded dozens, and destroyed or damaged scores of homes and other buildings
The provocations from North Korea, particularly the attack on Yeonpyeong Island, have
introduced a new element of risk in the U.S.-South Korean alliance. In response to the attacks, the
ROK military has strengthened its defense of its Northwest Islands and undertaken other
structural changes to prepare for another possible provocation. South Korean President Lee stated
that “war can be prevented and peace assured only when such provocations are met with a strong
response. Fear of war is never helpful in preventing war ... the Armed Forces must respond
relentlessly when they come under attack.”5 This posture, dubbed “proactive deterrence,” could
increase the chance of conflict escalation on the Peninsula. U.S. defense officials insist, however,
that the exceedingly close day-to-day coordination in the alliance ensures that U.S.-ROK
communication would be strong in the event of a new contingency. General Walter Sharp,
outgoing U.S. commander of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in South Korea, confirmed
to press outlets in July that the alliance had developed coordinated plans for countermeasures
against any North Korean aggression.6
Military Alliance Issues—Realignment, Agent Orange Dumping?,
Rape Case
In line with the overall strong state of U.S.-South Korea relations, a series of initiatives designed
to enhance defense cooperation has strengthened the military alliance as well. Major realignment
plans, ongoing arms sales, increasingly complex military exercises, and the transfer of operational
control (Opcon) are among the items on the military-to-military agenda. (See “Security Relations
and the U.S.-ROK Alliance” section below for more details.)
In the past, issues surrounding U.S. troop deployments have been a flashpoint for public
disapproval of the military alliance. Recently, however, analysts point out that even potential
irritants to the relationship have been dealt with skillfully by the military officials in charge. In
the spring of 2011, several U.S. veterans stated to U.S. news organizations that during the 1960s
5 The Blue House, Speech by President Lee Myung-bak, “The Building of an Advanced Nation will be Possible Only
When We Sacrifice Ourselves for Others Rather Than Simply Pursuing Our Own Interest,” December 27, 2010.
6 “U.S., Seoul Secure Plans for Potential Counterattack,” Wall Street Journal. July 7, 2011.
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and 1970s they been ordered to bury chemicals, including the defoliant “Agent Orange” dioxin,
on U.S. military bases in South Korea. United States Forces Korea (USFK) and South Korea’s
Ministry of the Environment began investigating and testing samples at the sites, some of which
are on land that has been returned to South Korea, to see if there are signs of contamination. In
the weeks after the revelations, USFK officials won praise from across the South Korean political
spectrum for their speed, transparency, and humbleness in responding. In late September 2011, a
U.S. soldier was accused of raping an 18-year old girl near his unit. The U.S. government
promised full cooperation with the investigation, several high-level U.S. officials quickly issued
apologies and expressions of regret over the incident, and USFK agreed to hand over the suspect
to Korean custody following the soldier’s reported confession. In early November, the soldier was
convicted and sentenced to 10 years in South Korean prison. Although both of these examples
have drawn criticism and sparked renewed interest in revising the U.S.-ROK status of forces
agreement (SOFA), it appears as though officials on both sides have worked together
expeditiously to quell distrust of the U.S. military among the Korean public.7
In October 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visited South Korea, in a visit at least
partially designed to reassure South Korea and Japan of the strength of the U.S. security
commitment amidst uncertainty over the size of possible cuts to the U.S. military budget. Among
other items, Panetta reiterated the Obama Administration’s commitment to maintain the current
U.S. troop level in Korea.8
Congressional Concern about U.S. Troop Deployments
In 2011, some Members of Congress have raised strong concerns with existing plans to relocate
U.S. bases in South Korea and “normalize” the tours of U.S. troops there, including longer stays
with family members accompanying them. In May 2011, Senators Carl Levin, John McCain, and
James Webb issued a statement that urged a reconsideration of the existing plans for U.S. military
presence in the Asia Pacific, including the current agreements in South Korea. A Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report requested by members of the Senate Appropriations
Committee released in May 2011 concluded that the Department of Defense had not
demonstrated a “business case” to justify the tour normalization initiative, nor considered
alternatives.9 In June 2011, the Senate Armed Services Committee passed amendments to the
2012 Defense Authorization bill (S. 1253) that, if adopted, would prevent the obligation of any
funds for tour normalization until further reviews of the plan are considered and a complete plan
is provided to Congress. Critics of the Senators’ call to overhaul existing plans say that such
changes could restrict U.S. military capabilities and readiness as well as jeopardize hard-fought
agreements designed to make U.S. presence more politically sustainable in South Korea.10
7 SOFAs establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country, addressing how the
domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction shall be applied toward U.S. personnel while in that country. For more, see
CRS Report RL34531, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized?, by R. Chuck
Mason.
8 “Full Text of Joint Communique of ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting,” Yonhap, October 28, 2011.
9 Report found at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-316.
10 Bruce Klingner, “Proposed Re-Realignment for Northeast Asia Ignores Strategic Realities,” Heritage Foundation
WebMemo #3262, May 18, 2011.
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President Lee’s Influence Wanes; Progressive Forces Gain
Momentum
In April 2011, President Lee’s ruling Grand National Party (GNP) lost three of four national-level
by-elections for seats in the unicameral National Assembly. Many interpreted the results as a sign
that the opposition Democratic Party (DP) may perform well in next year’s elections for South
Korea’s National Assembly (scheduled for April 2012) and/or presidency (scheduled for
December 2012). The DP generally has been critical of President Lee’s and President Obama’s
tough policy toward North Korea. Its members tend to be more willing to question various
aspects of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, and most opposed the Korea-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement.
In reaction to the April 2011 election results, several GNP leaders resigned, and Lee replaced
several members of his Cabinet. Many have observed that Lee’s clout over the GNP has declined
markedly due to the elections and his “lame duck” status.11 A number of GNP members have
declared their candidacy for the presidency. For months, the front-runner according to virtually all
polls was an undeclared candidate, Ms. Park Geun-hye, whom Lee narrowly defeated in the GNP
primary in 2007. The GNP continues to be divided between pro-Lee and pro-Park camps. Until
the spring of 2011, the pro-Lee factions generally were ascendant.
In early July 2011, a new GNP leadership team was selected through a combination of GNP
members’ votes and a random telephone survey of South Korean citizens. Many analysts
interpreted the results as further evidence of Lee’s declining clout. The top two vote-getters—
including the new GNP chairman, Hong Chun-pyo—are seen as closely tied to Park Geun-hye.
Three of the five members chosen for the leadership council are in their 40s, making the GNP’s
current leadership team one of the youngest in memory.
Lee’s apparently diminished clout likely will make it difficult for him to undertake major new or
controversial initiatives. Most major issues in U.S.-South Korean relations are likely to be
insulated from Lee’s political fortunes, for at least two reasons: (1) the institutional dominance of
South Korea’s presidency; and (2) the GNP’s continued control over the National Assembly. The
link between South Korean politics and U.S. interests could become more direct, however, if new
sources of bilateral controversy flare up or if the “progressive” camp, led by the DP, should win a
majority in the April 2012 National Assembly elections.
In a local election seen as an important bellwether, a left-of-center activist Park Won-Soon
defeated the ruling Grand National Party’s candidate, Na Kyung-won, in the October 2011 race
for the Seoul mayoralty. The vote was significant for a number of reasons. First, because Seoul
contains around 20% of the country’s eligible voters, city-wide elections gain national import.
Before winning the presidency in 2007, Lee Myung-bak served as mayor of Seoul. Second,
Park’s victory represented the GNP’s second major defeat in six months, giving added momentum
for progressive forces and the opposition Democratic Party. Third, Park’s victory showed the
GNP’s continued problems attracting younger urban voters. According to some election polls,
around 70% of voters in their 20s, 30s, and 40s supported Park. Fourth, Park in some ways
represents a rejection of established politics. Park won despite having no previous formal
involvement in politics or government. Not only did he defeat the well-known Na, but in the
11 Lee is in year four of his five year term. By law, South Korean presidents cannot run for re-election.
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weeks before the election, he also defeated the preferred candidate of South Korea’s opposition
party, the Democratic Party (DP). The DP then backed Park against Na.
Park’s poll numbers surged when, days before the vote, popular software entrepreneur Ahn Chol-
Su endorsed his candidacy. In the fall of 2011, Ahn’s favorable ratings pulled even or ahead of
Park Geun-hye in opinion polls of possible presidential candidates. Ahn had publicly flirted with
the idea of running in the Seoul mayoral election as a progressive candidate.
South Korea’s Pyeongchang Chosen to Host 2018 Winter Olympics
In a sign of South Korea’s continued emergence as a global player, International Olympic
Committee (IOC) delegates in early July 2011 voted overwhelmingly to award the 2018
Olympics to Pyeongchang, a city of 40,000 located about 110 miles east of Seoul. Pyeongchang
had lost in the final round of two previous bids, in 2003 (for the 2010 Games, which were
awarded to Vancouver) and in 2007 (for the 2014 Games, which will be held in Sochi, Russia).
South Korea’s bids at the time were criticized for the lack of world-class facilities in
Pyeongchang. In response, the South Korean government and various companies cooperated to
spend billions of dollars in new facilities and infrastructure in and around the city. According to
one report, between 2011 and 2018 the government plans to spend roughly 20 trillion won
(approximately $19 billion), including around $3 billion for a high-speed rail connection to
Seoul.12
In its two previous Winter Games bids, South Korea’s proposals reportedly emphasized the
Olympics’ potential to help ease tensions between North and South Korea. In contrast, the 2018
bid—under the slogan of “New Horizons”—stressed Pyeongchang’s ambitions to become a new
regional winter sports center. After the result was announced, IOC President Jacques Rogge said
that among the reasons for Pyeongchang’s selection were that the bid “enjoys massive support
from the government and the public,” and that “the South Korean project will leave a tremendous
legacy as ... a new winter sports hub in Asia.”13
Overview
While the U.S.-South Korea relationship is highly complex and multifaceted, five factors
arguably drive the scope and state of U.S.-South Korea relations:
• the challenges posed by North Korea, particularly its weapons of mass
destruction programs and perceptions in Washington and Seoul of whether the
Kim regime poses a threat, through its belligerence and/or the risk of its collapse;
• the growing desire of South Korean leaders to use the country’s middle power
status to play a larger regional and, more recently, global role;
12 In-Soo Nam, “Get Ready For The Olympic Spendathon,” The Wall Street Journal, Korea Real Time blog, July 7,
2011, 5:38 PM KST.
13 International Olympic Committee Press Release, “IOC Elects PyeongChang as the Host City of 2018 Olympic
Winter Games,” July 6, 2011.
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• increasingly, China’s rising influence in Northeast Asia, which has become an
integral consideration in many aspects of U.S.-South Korea strategic and (to a
lesser extent) economic policymaking;
• South Korea’s transformation into one of the world’s leading economies—with a
very strong export-oriented industrial base—which has led to an expansion of
trade disputes and helped drive the two countries’ decision to sign a free trade
agreement; and
• South Korea’s continued democratization, which has raised the importance of
public opinion in Seoul’s foreign policy.
Additionally, while people-to-people ties generally do not directly affect matters of “high”
politics in bilateral relations, the presence of over 1.2 million Korean Americans and the hundreds
of thousands of trips taken annually between the two countries has helped cement the two
countries together.14
14 For an estimate of the number of ethnic Koreans in the United States, see U.S. Census Bureau, “The Asian
Population: 2000,” Census Brief C2KBR/01-16, February 2002, Table 4.
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Figure 1. Map of the Korean Peninsula
Source: Prepared by CRS based on ESRI Data and Maps 9.3.1; IHS World Data.
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Since late 2008, relations between the United States and South Korea have been arguably at their
best state in nearly a decade, if not ever. Coordination over North Korea policy has been
particularly close, with one high-level official in late 2009 describing the two countries as being
“not just on the same page, but on the same paragraph.”15 At a summit in June 2009, the two
parties signed a “Joint Vision” statement that foresees the transformation of the alliance’s purpose
from one of primarily defending against a North Korean attack to a regional and even global
alliance, in which Washington and Seoul cooperate on a myriad of issues, including climate
change, energy security, terrorism, economic development, and human rights promotion, as well
as peacekeeping and the stabilization of post-conflict situations. Reflecting this evolution, in a
June 2010 meeting with President Lee, President Obama referred to the alliance as “the lynchpin”
for security in the Pacific region. This statement stirred some degree of anxiety in Tokyo; Japan
has traditionally considered itself to be the most significant U.S. partner in the region.
Much of this closeness is due to the policies of President Lee, including his determination after
assuming office to improve Seoul’s relations with Washington. However, it is unclear how much
domestic support exists for some of President Lee’s policies. On North Korea, for instance, the
United States and South Korea often have different priorities, with many if not most South
Koreans generally putting more emphasis on regional stability than on deterring nuclear
proliferation, the top U.S. priority. Currently, these differences have been masked by North
Korea’s general belligerence since early 2009 and to a large extent negated by President Lee’s
consistent stance that progress on the nuclear issue is a prerequisite for improvements in many
areas of North-South relations. Also, President Lee’s enthusiastic support for expanding the role
of the U.S.-ROK alliance beyond the Korean Peninsula has come under domestic criticism.
Moreover, while large majorities of South Koreans say they value the U.S.-ROK alliance, many
South Koreans are resentful of U.S. influence and chafe when they feel their leaders offer too
many concessions to the United States. This is particularly the case among Korea’s left-of-center,
or “progressive” groups, who bitterly oppose much of President Lee’s policy agenda and his
governing style.
Thus, it is unclear how sustainable the current bilateral intimacy is likely to be, particularly
beyond 2011. South Korea’s legislative and presidential elections in 2012 could erode some of the
momentum established under Lee. Bilateral coordination will be particularly tested if South
Korea’s progressives retake the presidential office (called the Blue House) and/or the National
Assembly.
Historical Background
The United States and South Korea have been allies since the United States intervened on the
Korean Peninsula in 1950 and fought to repel a North Korean takeover of South Korea. Over
33,000 U.S. troops were killed and over 100,000 were wounded during the three-year conflict. On
October 1, 1953, a little more than two months after the parties to the conflict signed an armistice
agreement, the United States and South Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty, which provides
that if either party is attacked by a third country, the other party will act to meet the common
danger. The United States maintains about 28,500 troops in the ROK to supplement the 650,000-
strong South Korean armed forces. South Korea deployed troops to support the U.S.-led military
15 December 2009 interview.
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campaign in Vietnam. South Korea subsequently has assisted U.S. deployments in other conflicts,
most recently by deploying over 3,000 troops to play a non-combat role in Iraq and over 300 non-
combat troops to Afghanistan.
Beginning in the 1960s, rapid economic growth propelled South Korea into the ranks of the
world’s largest industrialized countries. For over a decade, South Korea has been one of the
United States’ largest trading partners. Economic growth also has helped transform the ROK into
a mid-level regional power that can influence U.S. policy in Northeast Asia, particularly the
United States’ approach toward North Korea.
North Korea in U.S.-ROK relations
Policy Coordination
Dealing with North Korea is the dominant strategic element of the U.S.-South Korean
relationship. Since breakdown of the Six-Party Talks in late 2008 and North Korea’s second
nuclear test in May 2009, coordination over North Korea policy has been remarkably close. South
Korea’s growing economic, diplomatic, and military power has given Seoul a much more direct
and prominent role in Washington’s planning and thinking about how to deal with Pyongyang.
One indicator of South Korea’s centrality to diplomacy over North Korea is that no successful
round of the Six-Party nuclear talks has taken place when inter-Korean relations have been poor.
For much of the 2000s, policy coordination between the United States and South Korea was
difficult, sometimes extremely so, because the countries’ policies toward Pyongyang were often
out-of-synch, and at times and in many ways contradictory. Presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998-
2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) pursued a “sunshine policy” of largely unconditional
engagement with North Korea that clashed with the harder policy line pursued by the Bush
Administration until late 2006. President Roh, who was elected in part because of his embrace of
massive anti-American protests that ensued after a U.S. military vehicle killed two Korean
schoolgirls in 2002, also alarmed U.S. policymakers by speaking of a desire that South Korea
should play a “balancing” role among China, the United States, and Japan in Northeast Asia.
Despite this, under Roh’s tenure, South Korea deployed over 3,000 non-combat troops to Iraq—
the third-largest contingent in the international coalition—and the two sides initiated and signed
the KORUS FTA. Although relations between the two capitals improved dramatically after
President Lee Myung-bak’s 2008 inauguration, his tougher stance toward North Korea was not
always aligned with the late Bush Administration’s push for a nuclear deal with North Korea.
Coordination over the Cheonan Sinking
The two Administrations’ closeness has been both confirmed and cemented by their coordinated
reaction to the March 2010 sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan. Forty-six South
Korean sailors died in the incident. A multinational investigation team led by South Korea
determined that the ship was sunk by a North Korean submarine.16 In the wake of the sinking,
16 The cause of the Cheonan’s sinking has become highly controversial in South Korea. While most conservatives
believe that North Korea was responsible for explosion, many who lean to the left have criticized the investigation team
as biased or argue that its methodology was flawed. Alternative theories for the sinking have been swirling on the
(continued...)
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U.S.-South Korean cooperation was underscored by a series of military exercises in the waters
surrounding the peninsula, as well as symbolic gestures such as the joint visit of Secretary of
State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). During the visit,
a new set of unilateral U.S. sanctions targeting North Korea were announced.17
New Revelations of North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Capabilities18
In November 2010, the relative quietude in North Korea’s relations with South Korea and the
United States that had predominated in the months after the Cheonan sinking was shattered by
two events. First, North Korea showed Dr. Siegfried Hecker, the former head of the U.S. Los
Alamos National Laboratory, a new “ultra-modern” uranium enrichment facility with 2,000
centrifuges that the North Koreans said is producing low enriched uranium destined for fuel for a
new light-water nuclear reactor that is under construction. The revelation confirmed long-
standing fears that North Korea has been developing an alternative, uranium-based nuclear
program to complement or replace its existing plutonium-based facilities. Although Dr. Hecker
has said that the centrifuge plant and the new reactor appear to be designed primarily for civilian
nuclear power, the uranium facilities could also be used to produce fissile material suitable for
nuclear weapons.19
North Korea’s Artillery Attack Against South Korea
Second, on November 23, only days after the uranium revelations, North Korean artillery units
fired over 150 shells onto and around Yeonpyeong Island, across the North-South disputed
western sea boundary.20 North Korea claimed that the South Korean military had fired first,
during routine U.S.-ROK exercises in the area. According to one report, about half the North
Korean shells hit the island. The barrage killed four South Koreans (two marines and two
civilians), wounded dozens, and destroyed or damaged scores of homes and other buildings.21 It
was North Korea’s first direct artillery attack on ROK territory since the 1950-1953 Korean War.
(...continued)
Korean blogosphere. Additionally, polls indicate many if not most Koreans believe the Lee government attempted to
exploit the incident during local elections held across the nation in early June. Though Lee’s conservative Grand
National Party suffered notable losses, polls indicate that local issues, rather than North Korea policy, were more
significant factors determining voting behavior.
17 For more information, see CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by
Dianne E. Rennack.
18 For more on North Korea’s suspected nuclear capabilities and the diplomacy surrounding them, see CRS Report
RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary Beth Nikitin, and CRS Report R41259, North
Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
19 Siegfried S. Hecker, “A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex,” Center for International
Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, November 20, 2010.
20 This “Northern Limit Line” (NLL) was drawn in 1953 by the United Nations Command in South Korea because the
Korean War armistice signed earlier that year did not establish a maritime boundary between the two Koreas. North
Korea first protested the NLL’s legitimacy in 1953, and since that time has periodically issued rhetorical challenges
against the line. North Korea ships, including some naval vessels, also have occasionally crossed the line, sparking
inter-Korean naval clashes in 1999, 2002, and 2009.
21 Stratfor.com, “Satellite Imagery: Tactical Details of the Korean Artillery Exchange,” November 30, 2010.
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South Korea responded by shooting 80 shells at North Korea. An official North Korean media
outlet later said that the South Korean civilian deaths were “regrettable.”22
The attacks prompted a number of responses:
• South Korea and the United States held large-scale naval exercises in the Yellow
Sea area with the USS George Washington aircraft carrier strike group. In the
months immediately after the Cheonan sinking, the U.S. and South Korea had
refrained from staging exercises in the Yellow Sea area, after China had warned
of its sensitivity to military activities there.
• In a nationally televised speech, Lee announced that South Korea would no
longer hold back on retaliating for North Korean provocations. President Lee and
the South Korean military have come under strong domestic criticism for what
was widely perceived as faulty military preparation and a delayed counterattack,
prompting the defense minister to resign. His successor stated that if attacked in
the future, South Korea would consider using its air force to strike back in North
Korean territory.23
• China, after consulting widely among the other negotiating parties, proposed a
meeting of participants in the Six-Party Talks to stabilize the situation. South
Korea, the United States, and Japan rejected such a move, saying that it would
only reward North Korea’s attack and was premature without signs that North
Korea would change its behavior.
• Instead, the three countries stepped up trilateral cooperation and called on China
to do more to pressure North Korea. Secretary of State Clinton met in
Washington, DC, with the South Korean and Japanese foreign ministers, where
the three condemned North Korea’s attack, affirmed their solidarity in dealing
with North Korea, and discussed cooperation on a range of regional and global
issues. Relatedly, for the first time, South Korea sent military observers to a U.S.
and Japanese joint military exercise.24
Inter-Korean Relations
Relations between the two Koreas have deteriorated markedly since Lee’s February 2008
inauguration. After 10 years of Seoul’s “sunshine” policy of largely unconditioned reconciliation
with North Korea, the Lee government entered office insisting on more reciprocity from and
22 “DPRK KPA Supreme Command’s Communique on Artillery Gunfire Along Inter-Korean Border,” Pyongyang
Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Korean, November 23, 2010, translated by Open Source Center
KPP20101123106004; “DPRK Commentary Says 23 Nov Clash Due to US, Civilian Casualties ‘Very Regrettable’,”
Korean Central News Agency, November 27, 2010.
23 “'Full Text’ of ROK President Lee’s 29 November ‘Address to the Nation,’” Yonhap, November 29, 2010. Lee said
that for decades, South Korea had “tolerated provocations by the North time and again.… South Korea nonetheless
endured these continual provocations because we entertained a slight hope that the North would change course
someday…. At long last, we came to a realization that … that prolonged endurance and tolerance will spawn nothing
but more serious provocations. If the North commits any additional provocations against the South, we will make sure
that it pays a dear price without fail.”
24 See, for instance, State Department Press Release, “Trilateral Statement Japan, Republic of Korea, and the United
States,” December 6, 2010.
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conditionality toward Pyongyang. Most importantly, the Lee government announced that it would
review the initiation of new large-scale inter-Korean projects agreed to before Lee took office,
and that implementation would be linked to progress in denuclearizing North Korea. In another
reversal of his predecessors’ policies, Lee’s government has been openly critical of human rights
conditions in North Korea. His administration also offered to continue humanitarian assistance—
provided North Korea first requests such aid—and indicated that existing inter-Korean projects
would be continued.
MB interview (WSJ Korea Real Time blog, October 31, 2011, 5:18 PM KST In Conversation
With Lee Myung-bak):
Q: As you go into your final year in office, do you feel any pressure to show progress in
improving inter-Korean relations?
A: I’m approaching inter-Korean issues with a principle. We’re presenting them with ways
of genuine rapprochement and cooperation between the two Koreas. I don’t intend to
approach North Korea issues out of any political motives. We’re consistently saying that
we’re open to talks with North Korea. We’re open to economic cooperation with North
Korea as long as the North gives up its nuclear ambitions. We are not alone in this effort.
Members of the six-party talks are also making efforts in that regard. I wish North Korea
would make strategic decisions to bring peace on the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea reacted to Lee’s overall approach by unleashing a wave of invective against Lee and
adopting a more hostile stance toward official inter-Korean activities. Inter-Korean relations have
steadily worsened since then, to the point that by September 2010, nearly all of the inter-Korean
meetings, hotlines, tours, exchanges, and other programs that had been established during the
“sunshine” period have been suspended or severely curtailed.25 Whether it is a coincidence or a
cause, since Lee’s inauguration North Korea has behaved more provocatively, with each
provocation leading South Korea to take a harder line, which in turn has led North Korea to
respond.26
The most dramatic playing out of this dynamic occurred in the spring of 2010. In response to the
sinking of the Cheonan, South Korea curtailed nearly all forms of North-South interaction,
including all business transactions except for those associated with the inter-Korean industrial
park in the North Korean city of Kaesong. Despite periodic restrictions, the Kaesong Complex
continues to operate and has expanded slightly under Lee.27
25 Some figures quantify the downturn in relations from 2007 to 2008: official bilateral dialogues were down from 55 in
2007 to 6 in 2008; South Korea’s governmental humanitarian assistance declined from 3.5 million won ($215 million)
to 0.4 million won ($25 million); and government-run reunions of family members fell from over 3,600 to zero. After
years of double-digit growth, inter-Korean trade registered a mere 1.2% increase from 2007 to 2008. Figures are from
Ministry of Unification, “Inter-Korean Relations in 2008,” February 2009. North-South Korean trade was just over
$1.8 billion in 2008.
26 Four actions by North Korea have had a particularly dramatic impact on South Korea’s policy toward the North: the
refusal to allow an independent South Korean investigation into the July 2008 fatal shooting of a South Korean tourist
by a North Korean soldier at the Mt. Kumgang resort in North Korea, a nuclear test in May 2009, periodically placing
greater restrictions on the inter-Korean industrial complex at Kaesong, and the sinking of the Cheonan.
27 For more, see CRS Report RL34093, The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex, by Mark E. Manyin and
Dick K. Nanto.
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In August 2010 Lee publicly floated the idea of creating a “reunification tax” that would help
prepare South Korea for a future reuniting of the two Koreas. Previously, a loose consensus had
prevailed in South Korea against openly discussing and planning for reunification in the short or
medium term, because of fears of provoking Pyongyang and of the fiscal costs of absorbing the
impoverished North. While few South Koreans advocate for actively trying to topple the Kim
regime, the reunification tax proposal indicates how the Cheonan sinking has led many in the Lee
government to view North Korea as more much more of an immediate danger than previously
thought.
Polls of South Korean attitudes show widespread and increasing anger toward and concern about
North Korea. Opinion toward North Korea hardened after the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, with
fewer Koreans expressing support for a return to the largely unconditional engagement with
North Korea that occurred during the “sunshine policy” era. However, polls also show continued
ambivalence toward Lee’s approach and a desire among many, if not most, South Koreans for
their government to show more flexibility toward Pyongyang.
In July 2009, South Korea began circulating to other governments and key private sector groups a
proposal for a $40 billion multilateral aid fund and development strategy that would help North
Korea if Pyongyang denuclearized. According to the details provided by various media outlets,
the proposal appears to be a continuation of Lee’s “3,000 Policy” pledge during the 2007
presidential campaign to help raise North Korea’s per capita income to $3,000 over the next 10
years.28 The proposal also appears to complement the “comprehensive” package the Obama
Administration has indicated could be forthcoming if North Korea took positive steps on the
nuclear front.
South Korea’s Regional Relations
Looking at their surrounding neighborhood, South Koreans sometimes refer to themselves as a
“shrimp among whales.” South Korea’s relations with China and Japan, especially the latter, are
fraught with ambivalence, combining interdependence and rivalry. Despite these difficulties,
trilateral cooperation among the three capitals has increased over the past decade, particularly in
the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. Since 2008, leaders of the three countries have
met annually in standalone summits and in 2010 agreed to undertake an official study of a
trilateral FTA and to establish a secretariat in Seoul.29
Growing South Korea-Japan Cooperation
A cooperative relationship between South Korea and Japan, both U.S. treaty allies, and among the
three countries is in U.S. interests because it arguably enhances regional stability, helps
coordination over North Korea policy, and boosts each country’s ability to deal with the strategic
challenges posed by China’s rise. However, despite increased cooperation, closeness, and
interdependence between the South Korean and Japanese governments, people, and businesses
28 Christian Oliver, “Seoul Plans $40bn Aid Fund for N Korea,” Financial Times, July 20, 2009. North Korea’s 2009
per capita income was $1,900, according to the CIA World Factbook.
29 From 1999-2007, trilateral summits were only held on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’
“Plus Three” summit (which included the 10 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, and South Korea).
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over the past decade, mistrust on historical and territorial issues continues to linger. South Korea
and Japan have competing claims to the small Dokdo/Takeshima islands30 in the Sea of Japan
(called the East Sea by Koreans), and most South Koreans complain that Japan has not adequately
acknowledged its history of aggression against Korea. For more than three generations beginning
in the late 19th century, Japan intervened directly in Korean affairs, culminating in the annexation
of the Korean peninsula in 1910. Over the next 35 years, Imperial Japan all but attempted to wipe
out Korean culture.31
President Lee came into office seeking to improve official South Korea-Japan relations, which
had deteriorated markedly during President Roh’s term. Under Lee, and throughout a succession
of Japanese leaders, Cabinet and head-of-state meetings, including reciprocal visits, have become
more routine. Cemented for the first time in years by a common strategic outlook on North Korea,
trilateral South Korea-U.S.-Japan coordination over North Korea policy has been particularly
close since the beginning of 2009 and has become even tighter since the sinking of the Cheonan.
People-to-people ties have blossomed, with tens of thousands of Japanese and Koreans traveling
to the other country every day. Tens of thousands of South Koreans, including some victims of
Japan’s colonial period, donated funds to Japan after the March 11 earthquake and tsunami off the
coast of northeastern Japan. The South Korean and Japanese militaries also have stepped up their
cooperation. Lee has given less public emphasis to flare-ups over history and the
Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute. He also welcomed the most recent Japanese apology for its
history of aggression, from Prime Minister Naoto Kan in August 2010, that recognized the 100th
anniversary of Japan’s annexation. Many observers said that the apology, along with Kan’s move
to return thousands of antiquities taken from Korea during the occupation, were major reasons
South Korean protests marking the anniversary were much smaller and less virulent than had
been expected.
However, South Koreans’ interest in forming significant new institutional arrangements with
Japan is dampened by three factors. First, continued suspicions of Japan among the South Korean
population place political limitations on how far and how fast Korean leaders can improve
relations. Second, continued disagreements over Dokdo/Takeshima’s sovereignty continue to
weigh down the relationship. A key to this issue will be whether such disputes are contained or
spill over into other areas of the relationship. Third, unlike Japan, South Korea generally does not
view China as an existential challenge and territorial threat. South Korea also needs Chinese
cooperation on North Korea. Accordingly, Korean leaders tend to be much more wary of taking
steps that will alarm China. A factor that could change this calculation is if China is seen as
enabling North Korean aggression, as most South Korean leaders believe was the case after the
Yeonpyeong Island shelling.
Two indicators to watch over the coming months in South Korea-Japan relations are (1) whether
the two countries can restart and complete free trade agreement negotiations that have been
stalled since 2004, and (2) whether they can complete negotiations over an information sharing
and an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), both of which would facilitate
greater cooperation and coordination between the two countries’ militaries. In March 2011, a
30 Since the end of World War II, South Korea has administered Dokdo/Takeshima.
31 Many Koreans believe that the United States was complicit in this history, by reportedly informally agreeing in a
1905 meeting between U.S. Secretary of War William Taft and Japanese Prime Minister Taro Katsura that the United
States would recognize Japan’s sphere of influence over Korea in return for Japan doing the same for the United States
in the Philippines.
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Japanese Ministry of Education panel announced that middle school history textbooks must state
that Dokdo/Takeshima is Japanese territory. South Koreans protested. Although the response
appears to have been more muted than in the past, the ACSA and military information sharing
talks have not been held since then. Another flare-up of the sovereignty dispute is expected to
come in August, when Japan’s Defense Ministry issues its annual white paper.
South Korea-China Relations
China’s rise influences virtually all aspects of South Korean foreign and economic policy. North
Korea’s growing economic and diplomatic dependence on China since the early 2000s has meant
that South Korea must increasingly factor Beijing’s actions and intentions into its North Korea
policy. China’s influence over North Korea has tended to manifest itself in two ways in Seoul. On
the one hand, most South Korean officials worry that North Korea, particularly its northern
provinces, is drifting into China’s orbit. Kim Jong-il has made an unprecedented three trips to
China in the 2010-2011 time period, and the two countries have greatly expanded economic
cooperation between provinces straddling their border. For those on the political left in South
Korea, this has been an argument against Lee’s harder line stance toward inter-Korean relations,
which they say has eroded much of South Korea’s influence over North Korea. On the other hand,
China’s continued support for North Korea, particularly its month-long delay in expressing public
regret over the Cheonan’s sinking and its perceived backing of Pyongyang after the Yeonpyeong
Island shelling, has angered many South Koreans, particularly conservatives. Many South Korean
conservatives also express concern that their Chinese counterparts have been unwilling to discuss
plans for dealing with various contingencies involving instability in North Korea. Furthermore,
South Koreans’ concerns about China’s rise have been heightened by China’s increased
assertiveness around East Asia in recent years, particularly its vocal opposition in 2010 to U.S.-
South Korean naval exercises in the Yellow Sea.
Since China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization, it has emerged as South Korea’s
most important economic partner. Over 20% of South Korea’s total trade is with China, and for
years China has been the number one location for South Korean firms’ foreign direct
investment.32 Yet, even as China is an important source of South Korean economic growth, it also
looms large as an economic competitor. Indeed, fears of increased competition with Chinese
enterprises has been an important motivator for South Korea’s push to negotiate a series of free
trade agreements around the globe.
Security Relations and the U.S.-ROK Alliance
The United States and South Korea are allies under the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the
agreement, U.S. military personnel have maintained a continuous presence on the peninsula since
the conclusion of the Korean War and are committed to help South Korea defend itself,
particularly against any aggression from the North. South Korea is included under the U.S.
“nuclear umbrella,” also known as “extended deterrence” that applies to other non-nuclear U.S.
allies as well.
32 Much of South Korea’s exports to China are intermediate goods that ultimately are used in products exported to the
United States and Europe.
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The U.S.-ROK alliance has enjoyed a significant boost in recent years after a period of strain
under the George W. Bush and Roh Moo-hyun Administrations. Even before the Cheonan
sinking, South Korea’s willingness to send troops to Afghanistan and increasing defense
expenditures reinforced the sense that the alliance is flourishing. Emblematic of the close ties, the
South Korean and U.S. foreign and defense ministers held their first ever “2+2” meeting in July
2010, which featured a visit to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) by Secretary of State Clinton and
Secretary of Defense Gates. The historic meeting both commemorated the 60th anniversary of the
Korean War and demonstrated the enduring strength of the alliance. The massive joint military
exercises held immediately after the meeting, featuring a U.S. aircraft carrier and F-22 aircraft,
signaled to North Korea and others that the American commitment to Korea remains strong.
Budgetary and Operational Challenges
Despite these indicators of strength, the alliance faces a host of significant challenges in the
months and years ahead. Delays and increasing price tags have slowed the implementation of
agreements to reduce and relocate the U.S. troop presence in South Korea. Differences over
burden sharing remain, but analysts note that these issues tend to be prevalent in all alliance
relationships. Although the political atmospherics of the alliance have been outstanding, defense
analysts note that the Lee Administration has slowed significantly the defense budget increases
planned under the earlier Roh Administration.
U.S. Alliance and ROK Defense Reform Plans
Current security developments are taking place in the context of several concurrent defense
schemes. The June 2009 Obama-Lee summit produced the broadly conceived “Joint Vision for
the Alliance,” which promised to enhance and globalize future defense cooperation. After the
decision to delay the Opcon transfer, the operational “Strategic Alliance 2015” roadmap (adopted
in October 2010) outlines the new transition, including ROK capabilities and U.S. troop
relocation and tour normalization. The U.S. military is also undergoing a broad transformation of
its forces in the region; the 8th Army is moving toward becoming a warfighting headquarters that
can deploy to other areas of the world while still serving as a deterrent to any possible aggression
from North Korea.33
Current security developments are taking place in the context of several concurrent defense
schemes. The June 2009 Obama-Lee summit produced the broadly conceived “Joint Vision for
the Alliance,” which promised to enhance and globalize future defense cooperation. After the
decision to delay the Opcon transfer, the operational “Strategic Alliance 2015” roadmap
(announced in September 2010) outlines the new transition, including ROK capabilities and U.S.
troop relocation and tour normalization. The U.S. military is also undergoing a broad
transformation of its forces in the region; the 8th Army is moving toward becoming a warfighting
headquarters that can deploy to other areas of the world while still serving as a deterrent to any
possible aggression from North Korea.34
Meanwhile, South Korea’s Defense Reform 2020 bill passed by the National Assembly in 2006
remains officially in effect. The plan lays out a 15-year, 621 trillion won (about $550 million)
34 “U.S. Army in South Korea Begins Transformation of Forces,” Stars and Stripes. August 25, 2010.
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investment that aims to reduce the number of ROK troops while developing a high-tech force and
strengthening the Joint Chief of Staff system. In addition, an evolving plan known as “Defense
Reformation Plan 307,” intends to enhance collaboration among the ROK military branches.
Driven by the North Korean provocations in 2010, the new approach calls for a more flexible
posture to respond to future attacks, as opposed to the “total war” scenario that has driven much
of Seoul’s defense planning in the past.
Defense Reform 2020 calls for defense budget increases of 9.9% each year, but the Lee
Administration reduced the increase to 3.6% for FY2010, citing economic pressures.35 Following
the Cheonan sinking and amid calls for improved capabilities to counter the North, however, the
Defense Ministry requested a budget increase for funds toward the acquisition of surveillance
aircraft to monitor the North’s unconventional threat and to improve weapons systems on ROK
islands in the Yellow Sea.36 The 2011 defense budget was approved at a 6.2% increase over the
2010 budget.37
The Relocation of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)
In 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld authorized a realignment program to reduce and
relocate U.S. forces in South Korea. Under the Rumsfeld program, the Pentagon withdrew a
3,600-person combat brigade from the Second Division and sent it to Iraq. The Rumsfeld plan
called for the U.S. troop level in South Korea to fall from 37,000 to 25,000 by September 2008.
However, in 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates halted the withdrawals at the level of 28,500.
The U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) relocation plan has two elements. The first envisages the transfer
of a large percentage of the 9,000 U.S. military personnel at the U.S. Yongsan base in Seoul to
U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys, which is located near the city of Pyeongtaek some 40
miles south of Seoul. The second element involves the withdrawal of about 10,000 troops of the
Second Infantry Division from the demilitarized zone and their relocation to areas south of the
Han River (which runs through Seoul). The end result will be that USFK’s sites will decline from
the 104 it maintained in 2002, to 48. The bulk of U.S. forces will be clustered in the two primary
“hubs” of Osan Air Base/USAG Humphreys and USAG Daegu that contain five “enduring sites”
(Osan Air Base, USAG Humphreys, US AG Daegu, Chinhae Naval Base, and Kunsan Air Base).
A new joint warrior training center, north of Seoul, will be opened. 38
The relocations to Pyeongtaek originally were scheduled for completion in 2008, but have been
postponed several times because of the slow construction of new facilities at Pyongtaek and
South Korean protests of financial difficulties in paying the ROK share of the relocation costs.
The original cost estimate was over $10 billion; South Korea was to contribute $4 billion of this.
Estimates in 2010 placed the costs over $13 billion. In congressional testimony in September
2010, U.S. officials demurred from providing a final figure on the cost of the move, but
confirmed that the South Koreans were paying more than the original $4 billion.39 U.S.-ROK
35 “South Korea Approves FY10 Defence Budget,” Jane’s Defence Industry. January 4, 2010.
36 “Defense Ministry Seeks 31.2 Trillion Won Budget for 2011,” Yonhap English News, September 28, 2010, and
“Parliamentary Committee Approves Defense Budget Increase,” Yonhap English News, November 30, 2010.
37 “Analysis of ROK Defense Budget for 2011,” ROK Angle Issue 48, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, April 19,
2011.
38 “US-South Korea: a New Security Relationship,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, January 18, 2010.
39 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula,” CQ
(continued...)
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discussions in 2009 reportedly indicated that the relocations to Pyeongtaek will not take place
until 2015 or 2016. Some individuals involved and familiar with the move speculate that it will
not be completed until 2020.
Figure 2. USFK Bases After Realignment Plan is Implemented
Source: Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - China And Northeast Asia, date posted April 15, 2010.
Tour Normalization
Another complicating factor in the development of the Yongsan Relocation Plan is the
announcement by the Pentagon in 2008 that U.S. military families, for the first time, would be
allowed to join U.S. military personnel in South Korea. Prior to this change, most U.S. troops in
South Korea served one-year unaccompanied assignments. The goal is to phase out one-year
unaccompanied tours in South Korea, replacing them with 36-month accompanied or 24-month
unaccompanied tours. Eventually, the “normalization” of tours is estimated to increase the size of
the U.S. military community at Osan/Humphries near Pyongtaek to over 50,000. Members of
Congress have raised concerns about the cost of the normalization initiative and requested a
review of the plan.
Cost Sharing
Under a Special Measures Agreement reached in 2009, South Korea’s direct financial
contribution for U.S. troops in South Korea in 2011 will be 812.5 billion won (about $743
million). This is about 42% of the total cost of maintaining U.S. forces in South Korea. In recent
U.S.-R.O.K. military negotiations, Pentagon officials called for South Korea to increase its share
(...continued)
Congressional Transcripts. September 16, 2010.
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to at least 50%. Under the 2009 agreement, South Korea’s share of the cost is to increase until
2013 in accord with the rate of inflation but no more than 4% annually.
Opcon Transfer
The United States has agreed with Seoul to turn over the wartime command of Korean troops
later this decade. Under the current arrangement, which is a legacy of U.S. involvement in the
1950-1953 Korean War, South Korea’s soldiers would be under the command of U.S. forces if
there were a war on the peninsula. In 2007, Secretary Rumsfeld accepted a proposal by then-
South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun to set up separate South Korean and U.S. military
commands by April 2012. A U.S.-R.O.K. operational control (Opcon) agreement will dismantle
the U.S.-R.O.K. Combined Forces Command (CFC), which has been headed by the U.S.
commander in Korea. Separate U.S. and R.O.K. military commands will be established. In accord
with the plan a new U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) will be established. Under the Opcon
agreement, a Military Cooperation Center will be responsible for planning military operations,
joint military exercises, logistics support, and intelligence exchanges, and assisting in the
operation of the communication, command, control, and computer systems.
At their June 2010 summit, Presidents Obama and Lee announced their decision to delay the
transfer of Opcon by three years, until 2015. Although the decision was couched as sending a
strong signal to North Korea following the sinking of the Cheonan, the agreement followed
months of debate in Seoul and Washington about the timing of the transfer. Many South Korean
and U.S. experts questioned whether the South Korean military possesses the capabilities—such
as a joint command and control system, sufficient transport planes, and amphibious sea lift
vessels—to operate effectively as its own command by the original transfer date of 2012. U.S.
officials stress, however, that the transfer was militarily on track before the political decision to
postpone. Opposition to the transfer in some quarters in Seoul may reflect a traditional fear of
abandonment by the U.S. military.
With the decision made, U.S. commanders are arguing that the three-year delay will allow the
alliance to synchronize more thoroughly all the moving parts of the arrangement, including the
relocation of U.S. troops.40 The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan envisages measures such as
upgrading South Korean defense capabilities (such as ground operations command), improving
and recalibrating USFK and South Korean command and control systems, and better aligning
military exercises to meet the new asymmetrical challenges posed by North Korea.
The “Strategic Flexibility” of USFK
In 2007 and 2008, U.S. commanders in South Korea stated that the future U.S. role in the defense
of South Korea would be mainly an air force and naval role. The ROK armed forces today total
681,000 troops, with nearly 550,000 of them in the Army and around 65,000 each in the Air Force
and Navy. Since 2004, the U.S. Air Force has increased its strength in South Korea through the
regular rotation into South Korea of advanced strike aircraft. These rotations are not a permanent
presence, but the aircraft often remain in South Korea for weeks and sometimes months for
training.
40 “Sharp: Korea Plan Synchronizes Capabilities,” PACOM Headlines, American Forces Press Service. September 21,
2010.
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Since the early 2000s, U.S. military officials have expressed a desire to deploy some U.S. forces
in South Korea to areas of international conflicts under a doctrine of “strategic flexibility.” The
South Korean government of Roh Moo-hyun resisted this idea, largely for fear it might entangle
South Korea in a possible conflict between the United States and China. In the mid-2000s, the
two governments reached an agreement in which South Korea recognized the United States’
intention to be able to deploy its forces off the Peninsula, while the United States in turn
recognized that the troops’ return to South Korea would be subject to discussion. Among other
elements, the compromise seems to imply that in an off-Peninsula contingency, U.S. forces might
deploy but not operate from South Korea.
South Korean Defense Industry and Purchases of U.S. Weapons
South Korea is a major purchaser of U.S. weapons, buying $966.9 million worth of U.S. arms in
FY2010. The country is regularly among the top customers for Foreign Military Sales (FMS).41
Although South Korea generally buys the majority of its weapons from the United States,
European defense companies also compete for contracts; Korea is an attractive market because of
its rising defense expenditures. Recently, Boeing won the first two phases of South Korea’s
fighter modernization program and Seoul has also indicated interest in Lockheed Martin’s F-35
Joint Strike Fighter.42 South Korea’s defense ministry has said that it will prioritize its defense
systems against North Korea’s missile and nuclear threats, including Aegis combat destroyers,
missile interceptors, and early warning radars.43 In response to recent attacks, Seoul has deployed
precision-guided missiles near the DMZ44 and is currently developing a next generation multiple
launch rocket system to be placed near the Northern Limit Line.45
Korea’s Defense Reform 2020 legislation emphasizes the development of indigenous capabilities
by increasing the percentage of funds allocated to defense research and development (R&D).46
South Korea competes internationally in the armored vehicle, shipbuilding, and aerospace
industries. Of particular note is the T-50 Golden Eagle, a trainer and light fighter aircraft
developed in conjunction with Lockheed Martin.47
The 110th Congress passed legislation that upgraded South Korea’s status as an arms purchaser
from a Major Non-NATO Ally to the NATO Plus Three category (P.L. 110-429), which changed
the classification to NATO Plus Four. This upgrade establishes a higher dollar threshold for the
requirement that the U.S. executive branch notify Congress of pending arms sales to South Korea,
from $14 million to $25 million. Congress has 15 days to consider the sale, and may take
legislative steps to block the sale compared to 50 days for Major Non-NATO Allies.
41 Joint United States Military Affairs Group – Korea Mission Brief. August 18, 2010.
42 “South Korea to Buy More U.S. Weapons to Counter North,” Reuters. September 21, 2010.
43 “South Korea Pulls Back from Original Defense Spending Plan Amid Economic Woes,” Yonhap News. September
27, 2009.
44 “Seoul Deploys Precision-guided Missiles Targeting Pyongyang,” Korea Herald. June 28, 2011.
45 “Next-Generation MLRS Named ‘Cheonmu,” KBS. June 28, 2011.
46 “South Korea Defense Budget,” Jane’s Defence Budgets. December 14, 2009.
47 “Korea’s T-50 Spreads Its Wings,” Defense Industry Insider. September 13, 2010.
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South Korea’s Deployment to Afghanistan
After withdrawing its initial deployment of military personnel to Afghanistan in 2007, South
Korea sent a second deployment, consisting of troops and civilian workers who are staffing a
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Parwan Province, located north of Kabul.48 In February
2010, the National Assembly approved and funded the deployment of over 300 Army personnel
to protect 100 Korean civilian reconstruction workers for a two-year mission. Forty police
officers were also dispatched. The first soldiers arrived in June 2010 and are scheduled to stay
until the end of 2012. Increasing numbers of attacks on Korean facilities, coupled with the Obama
Administration decision to begin troop withdrawal in summer 2011, have raised questions about
an early return of some ROK personnel. According to some South Korean press reports, the ROK
government is considering an earlier withdrawal.
Economic Relations
South Korea and the United States are major economic partners. In 2010, two-way trade between
the two countries totaled over $86 billion (see Table 1), making South Korea the United States’
seventh-largest trading partner. For some western states and U.S. sectors, the South Korean
market is even more important. South Korea is far more dependent economically on the United
States than the United States is on South Korea. In 2010, the United States was South Korea’s
third-largest trading partner, second-largest export market, and the third-largest source of imports.
It was among South Korea’s largest suppliers of foreign direct investment (FDI).
As both economies have become more integrated with the world economy, economic
interdependence has become more complex and attenuated, particularly as the United States’
economic importance to South Korea has declined relative to other major powers. In 2003, China
for the first time displaced the United States from its perennial place as South Korea’s number
one trading partner. In the mid-2000s, Japan and then the 27-member European Union also
overtook the United States.
48 In 2007, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun withdrew South Korea’s initial deployment of 200 non-combat
military personnel from Afghanistan after the Taliban kidnapped South Korean missionaries. The South Korean
government reportedly paid a sizeable ransom to the Taliban to secure the release of kidnapped South Korean Christian
missionaries, reported by one Taliban official to be $20 million.
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Table 1. Annual U.S.-South Korea Merchandise Trade,
Selected Years
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)
Year
U.S. Exports
U.S. Imports Trade Balance
Total Trade
1990 14.4
18.5
-4.1
32.9
1995 25.4
24.2
1.2
49.6
2000 26.3
39.8
-13.5
66.1
2005 26.2
43.2
-17.0
69.4
2008 33.1
46.7
-13.6
79.8
2009 27.0
38.7
-11.7
65.7
2010
38.0 48.9 -10.9 86.9
Jan-Aug 2010
24.6
30.7
-6.1
55.3
Jan-Aug 2011
27.6
37.1
-9.5
64.7
Major U.S.
Industrial machinery; specialized instruments; chemicals; civilian aircraft;
Export Items
transistors; semiconductor circuits; corn & wheat; semiconductor
circuits; iron & steel scrap.
Major U.S.
Motor vehicles & parts; Cel phones; semiconductor circuits & printed
Import Items
circuit boards; machinery; iron & steel.
Sources: 1990 and 1995 data from Global Trade Information Services. 2000-2011 data from U.S. International Trade
Commission. The 2000-2011 U.S. export data are for U.S. domestic exports and the data for U.S. imports are for
imports on a consumption basis.
The KORUS FTA49
The Bush and Roh Administrations initiated the KORUS FTA negotiations in 2006 and signed an
agreement in June 2007. The text of the free trade agreement covers a wide range of trade and
investment issues and, therefore, is expected to have wide economic implications for both the
United States and South Korea. A congressionally mandated study by the United States
International Trade Commission (USITC) concluded that investment and trade between the
United States and South Korea would increase modestly as a result of the KORUS FTA. This
result is in line with other similar studies. In general and in the short-to-medium term, the
KORUS FTA’s largest commercial effects are expected to be microeconomic in nature. The U.S.
services and agriculture industries, for instance, are expected to reap significant benefits if the
agreement is implemented. In contrast, U.S. textile, wearing apparel, and electronic equipment
manufacturers would be expected to experience declines in employment from increased South
Korean imports, though some U.S. electronics companies may see competitive benefits, as it
could be less expensive for them to source components from South Korea.
While a broad swath of the U.S. business community supports the agreement, the original
KORUS FTA was opposed by some groups, including some auto and steel manufacturers and
labor unions. Following December 3, 2010, modifications to the FTA by the Obama and Lee
49 For more information, please see CRS Report RL34330, The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement
(KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications, coordinated by William H. Cooper.
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administrations, several automotive interests—including Ford and the United Auto Workers—
announced that the new auto provisions had convinced them to support the agreement. In South
Korea, while public opinion polls generally show broad support for the KORUS FTA, the largest
opposition party as well as many farmers and trade unionists vocally and actively opposed the
agreement.
Many observers have argued that, in addition to its economic implications, the KORUS FTA will
have diplomatic and security implications. Indeed, in many respects, the KORUS FTA’s fate may
go beyond strengthening U.S.-Korea ties and have profound implications for U.S. trade policy
and East Asia policy. For instance, some have suggested that a KORUS FTA will help to solidify
the U.S. presence in East Asia to counterbalance the increasing influence of China. Some counter
this by positing that the KORUS FTA need not be seen as a necessary, let alone sufficient,
condition for enhancing the U.S.-ROK alliance. However, many South Koreans would likely
have seen a failure to complete or a defeat of the agreement in part as a U.S. psychological
rejection of South Korea. Additionally, many East Asian leaders would have seen such a move as
a sign that the United States is disengaging from East Asia, where most countries are pursuing a
variety of free trade agreements. South Korea has perhaps been the most aggressive in this FTA
push. Since 2002, it has completed seven other agreements (including one with the European
Union, which went into effect in July 2011) and has begun negotiating several others.
South Korea’s Economic Performance
South Korea has recorded strong economic growth since the global financial crisis began in late
2008. After GDP real growth declined to 0.2% in 2009, the South Korean economy has roared
back and grew by 6.2% in 2010. Initially, the crisis hit the South Korean economy hard because
of its heavy reliance on international trade and its banks’ heavy borrowing from abroad. The Lee
government took strong countermeasures to blunt the crisis’ impact, engaging in a series of fiscal
stimulus actions worth about 6% of the country’s 2008 GDP, by some measures the largest such
package in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) group of
industrialized countries.
The Bank of Korea (BOK) also acted aggressively, lowering interest rates from over 5% to a
record low 2% and engaging in a range of other operations, estimated by the OECD to be worth
over 2.5% of GDP, designed to infuse liquidity in the Korean economy. The BOK negotiated
currency swap agreements with the United States, Japan, and China.50 The South Korean won,
after depreciating to around 1,500 won/dollar—a fall of nearly one-third from early 2008 to early
2009—has gradually strengthened against the dollar, to the 1,000-1,100 won/dollar range. The
won’s depreciation helped to stimulate South Korea’s economic recovery by making its exports
cheaper relative to many other currencies, particularly the Japanese yen.
Since the second half of 2010, South Korean real GDP growth has slowed to the 4%-5% level, in
part due to the won’s appreciation. South Korea’s economy is highly dependent upon capital
inflows and exports, the latter of which are equal to around half of the country’s annual GDP.
Thus, South Korean officials have expressed concern that their country could be hit hard by the
European debt crisis, the possibility of a “double-dip” recession in the United States, and a
slowing of growth in China.
50 The October 2008 swap agreement with the U.S. Federal Reserve gave Bank of Korea access to up to USD 30 billion
in US dollar funds in exchange for won.
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Complaints have risen in recent months that only Korea’s rich individuals and large
conglomerates (called chaebol) have benefitted from the country’s growth since the 2008-2009
slowdown. Many analysts predict that the 2012 elections will be fought over governance and
social welfare issues. Leading figures in both parties, as well as President Lee, have proposed
ways to expand South Korea’s social safety net. Inflation, particularly due to rising oil prices, has
also emerged as a concern. Growth is expected to slow to the 3%-4% range for 2011 and 2012,
down nearly a full percentage point from earlier expectations, due to slower-than-anticipated
exports as a result of slower growth in China, Japan, the United States, and the European Union.
Other Issues
Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation51
The United States and South Korea have cooperated in the peaceful use of nuclear energy for
over 50 years.52 The current U.S.-ROK bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement (or “123”
agreement) expires in 2014.53 The United States and South Korea began official talks in
Washington on renewing the agreement in October 2010.54 These talks continue, and a draft
agreement was proposed by South Korea in the second round of talks in March 2011.
One point of potential disagreement in the renewal process is whether South Korea will press the
United States to include a provision that would allow for the reprocessing of its spent fuel. The
current U.S.-Korea nuclear cooperation agreement, as with other standard agreements,55 requires
U.S. permission before South Korea can reprocess U.S.-origin spent fuel, including spent fuel
from South Korea’s U.S.-designed reactors.56 The issue has become a sensitive one for many
South Korean officials and politicians, who see it as a matter of national sovereignty. The United
States has been reluctant to grant such permission due to concerns over the impact on
negotiations with North Korea and on the nonproliferation regime overall. Reprocessing of spent
fuel can be used to make reactor fuel or to acquire plutonium for weapons.
For many years, the United States and South Korea have worked on joint research and
development projects to address spent fuel disposition, including joint research on pyro-
processing, a type of spent fuel reprocessing. The Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute
(KAERI) is conducting a laboratory-scale research program on reprocessing spent fuel with an
advanced pyro-processing technique.57 U.S.-South Korean bilateral research on pyro-processing
51 Written by Mary Beth Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation.
52 The original agreement was concluded in 1956, and amendments were made in 1958, 1965, 1972 and 1974. See also
CRS Report R41032, U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy Market: Major Policy
Considerations, by Mark Holt.
53 Full text at http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/Korea_South_123.pdf.
54 “Discussions on the New U.S.-R.O.K. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement State Department Press Release,
October 26, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/10/150026.htm.
55 CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth
Nikitin.
56 Under the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, consent rights apply to material originating in the U.S. or material that
has been fabricated into fuel or irradiated in a reactor with U.S. technology. The majority of South Korea’s spent fuel
would need U.S. consent before it could be reprocessed.
57 Pyro-processing technology would partially separate plutonium and uranium from spent fuel.
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began in 2002 under the Department of Energy’s International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative
(INERI). New R&D work on pyro-processing was halted by the United States in 2008, due to the
proliferation sensitivity of the technology. In an attempt to find a way forward, in March 2010 the
United States and South Korea began a six-month joint study on the economics, technical
feasibility, and nonproliferation implications of pyro-processing.58 This initial study resulted in
the announcement in October 2010 of a 10-year, three-part joint research project that is separate
from the 123 renewal negotiations.59 It will include bilateral work on pyro-processing at the Idaho
National Laboratory, development of international safeguards for this technology, economic
viability studies, and other advanced nuclear research including alternatives to pyro-processing
for spent fuel disposal.60
South Korean Nonproliferation Policy
South Korea has been a consistent and vocal supporter of strengthening the global
nonproliferation regime. It is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and adheres to all
nonproliferation treaties and export control regimes. An International Atomic Energy Agency
Additional Protocol for South Korea entered into force as of February 2004. South Korea also
participates in the G-8 Global Partnership, and U.S.-led initiatives—the Proliferation Security
Initiative, the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (formerly GNEP), and
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
South Korea will host the next Nuclear Security Summit in 2012.61 South Korea hosted a Plenary
session for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in June 2011 as part of its
contribution to improving international nuclear security coordination.
South Korean Politics62
For most of the first four decades after the country was founded in 1948, South Korea was ruled
by authoritarian governments. Ever since the mid-1980s, when widespread anti-government
protests forced the country’s military rulers to enact sweeping democratic reforms, democratic
institutions and traditions have deepened in South Korea. In 1997, long-time dissident and
opposition politician Kim Dae-jung (commonly referred to as “DJ”) was elected to the
presidency, the first time an opposition party had prevailed in a South Korean presidential
election. In December 2002, Kim was succeeded by a member of his left-of-center party: Roh
Moo-hyun, a self-educated former human rights lawyer who emerged from relative obscurity to
defeat establishment candidates in both the primary and general elections. Roh campaigned on a
platform of reform—reform of Korean politics, economic policymaking, and U.S.-ROK relations.
58 http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/NEWKHSITE/data/html_dir/2010/03/17/201003170029.asp.
59 “Discussions on Korea-U.S. Joint Research on Fuel Cycle,” Press Release, Ministry of Education, Science and
Technology, Republic of Korea, April 18, 2011.
60 “S. Korea, U.S. Agree to Start Joint Study on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing,” Yonhap, April 17, 2011.
61 See also, CRS Report R41169, Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress, by Mary
Beth Nikitin.
62 For more, see CRS Report R40851, South Korea: Its Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Outlook, by Mark E.
Manyin and Weston Konishi.
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Lee’s victory in the December 2007 election restored conservatives to the presidency. A striking
feature of the election was how poorly the left-of-center candidates performed, after a decade in
power, receiving only around 30% of the vote. Shortly after Lee’s inauguration, his Grand
National Party retained control of the National Assembly in national parliamentary elections.
Lee had a rocky first two years of his presidency. Until late 2009, his public approval ratings
generally were in the 20%-30% range. It took over a year for him to recover from the massive
anti-government protests that followed an April 2008 deal with the United States to lift South
Korea’s partial ban on imports of U.S. beef. The ban had been in place since 2003, when a cow in
the United States was found to be infected with mad cow disease, or BSE (bovine spongiform
encephalopathy). By the early to mid-spring of 2010, his ratings had risen to the 40%-50% range,
a development many attribute to South Korea’s strong recovery from the 2008-2009 global
financial crisis.
South Korea’s next National Assembly and presidential elections are scheduled for April and
December 2012, respectively. By law, Lee cannot run again; South Korean presidents serve one
five-year term.
A Powerful Executive Branch
Nominally, power in South Korea is shared by the president and the 299-member unicameral
National Assembly. Of these, 245 members represent single-member constituencies. The
remaining 54 are selected on the basis of proportional voting. National Assembly members are
elected to four-year terms. The president and the state bureaucracy continue to be the dominant
forces in South Korean policymaking, as formal and informal limitations prevent the National
Assembly from initiating major pieces of legislation.
Political Parties
Presently, there are two major political parties in South Korea: President Lee’s conservative
Grand National Party (GNP) and the opposition, center-left Democratic Party (DP). U.S. ties have
historically been much stronger with South Korea’s conservative parties. Because Korean politics
tend to be hyper-partisan, this phenomenon could make U.S.-South Korea relations more difficult
to manage if the progressives regain power.
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Figure 3. Party Strength in South Korea’s National Assembly
As of June 28, 2011
Note: Last nationwide elections held in April 2008; next elections to be held in April 2012.
The GNP’s numerical strength masks significant intra-party divisions. Lee’s most significant rival
is GNP stalwart Park Geun-hye, the popular daughter of Korea’s former military ruler Park
Chung-hee, whom Lee only narrowly defeated in the GNP’s presidential primary in 2007.
Initially, Lee had tried to marginalize Park’s influence, an effort he later abandoned when the
GNP absorbed some of Park’s supporters who had formed a new party. This move, however, has
failed to resolve the tensions between the two camps. There is little cooperation between the GNP
and the Democratic Party, so keeping the GNP unified on controversial issues is critical to Lee’s
ability to govern.
After the 2007 election, the Democratic Party were even more divided than the GNP. The
Democrats’ lack of unity, their minority status in the National Assembly, and the absence of
national elections until 2012 have deprived them of most tools of power and influence within the
South Korean polity. In a sign that the progressive camp may be regrouping, however, the DP
scored significant victories in important local elections in June 2010. DP members and their
supporters often are more critical of U.S. policies and are much more likely to support
engagement policies toward North Korea than their conservative counterparts.
Selected CRS Reports on the Koreas
South Korea
CRS Report RL34330, The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA):
Provisions and Implications, coordinated by William H. Cooper
CRS Report RL34093, The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex, by Mark E.
Manyin and Dick K. Nanto
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CRS Report RL34528, U.S.-South Korea Beef Dispute: Issues and Status, by Remy Jurenas and
Mark E. Manyin
CRS Report R41032, U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy Market:
Major Policy Considerations, by Mark Holt
North Korea
CRS Report R41259, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation,
by Emma Chanlett-Avery
CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth
Nikitin
CRS Report RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary Beth Nikitin
CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E.
Rennack
CRS Report R41843, Imports from North Korea: Existing Rules, Implications of the KORUS
FTA, and the Kaesong Industrial Complex, coordinated by Mark E. Manyin
CRS Report RL30613, North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List? , by Mark E. Manyin
CRS Report RL32493, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis, by Dick K. Nanto
and Emma Chanlett-Avery
CRS Report RS22973, Congress and U.S. Policy on North Korean Human Rights and Refugees:
Recent Legislation and Implementation, by Emma Chanlett-Avery
CRS Report R41043, China-North Korea Relations, by Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin
CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, by Steven A.
Hildreth
CRS Report R41749, Non-Governmental Organizations Activities in North Korea, by Mi Ae
Taylor and Mark E. Manyin
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Author Contact Information
Mark E. Manyin, Coordinator
Mary Beth Nikitin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Specialist in Nonproliferation
mmanyin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7653
mnikitin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7745
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov, 7-7748
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